

FOR THE LOVE OF A BARKING LADY

: an exploration of mental illness

in the light of

Max Scheler's 'Invisible Person'

by

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THESIS ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to re-examine the phenomenon of mental illness, from a perspective that sets out to explore it in the hope of new discoveries rather than a reformulation of the problem/treatment, cause/effect dichotomies found in the several approaches to the subject by the human sciences, and in particular, psychopathology. The question to be addressed is, What is mental illness? rather than, Why is there mental illness? Once this phenomenon is understood in its essence, we also discover that the one who experiences this 'illness' is not a 'diseased person'. One holds no part in or of the other.

Although the phenomenon of psychic disease (or mental illness) manifests itself in the individual human being who becomes its host, its occasion and its vessel, its presence does not touch the person of this individual human being. But, the person, in a special sense, does not remain impervious to the onslaught of this most dreaded and most misunderstood phenomenon. The person, so to speak, becomes both the witness and equally and

simultaneously the one who experiences this illness. With the enlargement of the intimate, individual aspect of the person, his communal and social aspects appear to become obscure, they seem to fade in impotence. The person, while apparently 'hidden' to the other, at the same time experiences himself as one enshrouded by the sense of his own solitude, his own inability to 'speak', his own inability to share and participate in any relationship - his own inability to love.

Max Scheler, in his great and profound insights into the essential nature of the person, stood at the threshold of understanding this phenomenon when he referred to the 'missing' person and the 'invisible' person, and the 'empty' place wherein once the spiritual core of the person stood, as representing one who suffered from mental illness.¹ He did not, however, enter through the doorway. This thesis, as it unfolds, attempts to complete his unfinished pilgrimage - to search for the 'hidden' person, the 'invisible' person of the mentally ill.

Along the way, we discover that there is only one source through which this 'hidden' person regains the 'ability' to reveal himself, and for this, too, we firmly owe our debt again to Max Scheler. Again, however, he merely stood at the threshold, not venturing beyond. His dis-

coveries and understanding of love, in its truest and purest form, afford us the way whereby we may call this 'hidden' person forth in love. This renewal of the person is not borne of method and technique, but by the simple faith in the presence of that which is hidden, and by the small hope offered in and nurtured by the subtle glimpses of the intimated presence of a personal, fundamental moral attitude found within this wounded one. Both of these, the faith and the hope, are discovered in and flow from an unwavering active attitude of love for the 'hidden' person's valuable essence, a love for the person simply because he is a person and thus, the highest of value - one most worthy of love.

This does not establish the birth of any possible new treatment plan for the mentally ill, nor does it foster the schemes from which new rehabilitation programs may be brought forth. Rather, it affords us the opportunity to discover the essence of healing - not merely restoration - the rebirth of the person in the love which was meant for him and given to him eternally from the spirit and heart of God.

The calling forth of the 'hidden' person into community, into dialogue, into relationship, into love is the 'life-line' for the one who is suffering. Patience rather than

procedure, presence rather than programs, mutual participation rather than supervision become the condition for healing. The place, the environment, the facilities become secondary, just as long as there are persons present who love.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

At the beginning of this work I would like to take a moment and express my deepest gratitude to those who have enabled me to embark upon this venture and see it through to its completion - who shared in the realization of a dream and a vision that for me, has come true. I wish to thank Father J. H. Nota, Dr. John Nayer and Dr. J. Adams-Webber who have so enthusiastically and so freely shared with me their wisdom, knowledge, experience and their insights, and whose doors have always been open to me throughout the writing of this thesis. I dearly wish to thank Dr. Martha Husain, my faithful mentor and friend. I deeply wish to thank my Bud, whose love, faith and encouragement ever demanded more from me and inspired more from within me than I ever dared believe possible from myself. I gratefully thank my precious friend (and mother) Eula without whose help and devotion to me and my family, I might never have completed this endeavor. And thank you to darling Joey who taught me the meaning of it all in laughter, and tears, and lullabies.

I offer my special thanks to the hearts of so many wounded ones who shared their precious love with me, and welcomed me into their worlds, their communities and their lives -

and who gave to me their silence and their miracles,
that they, as persons, could become a part of me, and
by this thesis they could become a part of you, also.

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FOREWORD

This thesis did not begin to materialize solely as a result of an academic requirement. It is something that has been in the making for over the past seven or eight years - although it has only been in the recent past few years that I could properly attach to it a name. I have been fortunate enough to have had and shared many unique and sometimes frightening experiences with those persons who have peopled my recent past. From intimate and personal experiences in psychiatric hospitals with the inmate population (myself being among their number), to working on the wards of hospitals tailored for the drug addicts and alcoholic, from the bedsides of patients dying from many forms of terminal illnesses, to the dialogue and relationship with those who are on parole from our minimum and maximum security penal institutions, from friendly fellowship and communion with all manner of religious persons to the gentle talks with friends, I have come to the point where everything that I once thought and felt about man, man's nature and his place in this world has been challenged.

I had to come to **terms** with fear, prejudice and complacency - largely my own - and in doing so, this paper (in part) has come into being. Many of the above types of people, at one time in my life, made me cringe and sudder - at least

if I knew (by label) to whom it was that I was speaking. Rather than types, they were kinds of people, lumped together into their own categories and there they remained in both my mind and my attitude toward them. I, then, through the events and circumstances of my life, came to be one of these many labelled persons. Far from being one of the worst experiences in my life, it was the most illuminating, challenging and rewarding thus far. In a great sense I am able to identify with those words of Clifford Beers:

Had I been restored to health sooner than I was, or under different conditions, I should not have suffered and learned; nor should I have tasted the peculiar joy of a life little known and less understood by mankind at large.²

My labelling system, my categories into which I grouped people, together with my attitudes toward them were violently shattered. No longer was it I and Them, but, 'We'.

Rapidly following on the heels of this experience in my life, I entered into university with the hope of gaining an education in psychology and philosophy. It seemed, as time went on, that the world of my past experience (that one which I now call the 'real' world) and my present world (that world of books and ideas, of knowledge and learning) quite literally challenged one another, and I was caught in the middle. But as time

passed, it was of my own choosing to remain in this strange and often uncomfortable situation. I knew too much of both worlds to forsake either. Rather, I could not speak to the one after leaving the other and also the reverse. Let me further explain.

The majority of people in my world of the street (by this I mean that world of people 'outside' these walls) are often sick in mind and heart, often living in despair, not so much from something being 'wrong' with them as from their apparently 'being left', and their 'being left without hope'; that is to say, 'hope' in a very personal sense of the word. For the welfare worker (only one of the many workers that are assigned to them) they are numbers and cheques; for the social worker, they are cases; for the probation officers they are interviews; for the churches they are handouts; and for the average citizen they are an abomination to be tolerated. (This list is only an example, and of course a great deal more could be added.) These are a few of the ones who are 'noticed'. There yet remain at least one hundred in this city alone who have no number, no cheque, no interview, etc. because they have no home and no address. These are the ones who sleep under the bridges, in the vacant warehouses and factories, and in the parking garages when the weather is too cold, and this group knows no age and no sex as barriers to those

among its number.

During my employment as the managing supervisor of a local drop-in centre, I came to know these people, and know some of them very well. We would talk sometimes for hours. The more they spoke with me, the more we shared, the more I began to really listen to them. Each one of them had something to teach me about man, about life, about circumstance and about who and what we are as people, as persons. They defied every construct, they shattered every abstract that I had learned - or at least revised each one a great deal! They ceased to be people with 'problems' who sat before me. In their place there emerged persons whose lives were filled with meaning and significance; and perhaps more than that, persons, each of whom had something to give, something to offer, to share with other persons, something unique and rich and special that could be found in no one else. It was at this same time that I began to study Max Scheler, and his ideas on person and love.

That these people were also 'persons' did not occur to me in any 'earth-shattering' way. Rather, it came about quite quietly, and very subtly. Let me give you an example that will perhaps clarify my meaning.

One day a woman came to see me at the drop-in centre, searching for a place to stay. She had been told that I might be of some assistance to her. I had seen her about town, but always from a distance. She was commonly known as the 'Barking Lady'. She was in her early 50's although she looked much older than this. Her hair was matted, streaked with silver and grey in profusion amid the shocks of brown curls. She desperately needed a bath and her clothes were in rags and tatters.

She had a dreadful habit of shrieking, using abusive language, and making threatening gestures with her hands and arms. She did this both when she was alone and in the presence of others, although never was this apparently violent behavior directed at anyone 'visible'. It seemed as though she lived in two entirely different universes and when they moved together and 'overlapped' (which they often did) she would carry on in this manner, seemingly oblivious to anyone and anything around her. She was no different the day she came to visit me.

She sat her frail, weathered and badly undernourished form in front of me and asked for a cigarette. I obliged her and offered her a cup of coffee (the day was bitterly cold and I knew that she had not eaten yet). She had been sleeping under the large bridge at the end

of main street, but told me that she was going to be moving to an indoor parking garage downtown. She was bothered by the fact that she couldn't move her large box which had served as her residence all that summer, and was also bothered by the fact that her move would mean that she would be sharing her new-found accommodations with several others who were in the same situation as herself. She said that she would miss her privacy. Winter wasn't far off and if she remained under this bridge she would surely freeze to death; and at least this new haven would afford some protection.

The moment she sat before me and asked if I could find her any lodging, all that I knew about her flashed through my mind. She had been a highly respected high school teacher across the border, years ago. Her subjects were history and English literature. She had been engaged to a young man who, just before their wedding had been tragically and brutally beaten and killed. She never recovered from the shock and grief that engulfed her at the time.

Through the use and abuse of alcohol and drugs, she had permanently damaged her mind. She had been in several psychiatric hospitals, had gained some sense of sanity and had been released - each time with no assistance to gain lodging or anything else on the 'outside'.

It is freely and readily admitted that she is entitled to full disability benefits on a permanent basis, but she has never received anything. The reason for this - she has become totally incapable of living along and tending for herself - at least in the manner in which we are accustomed to looking after ourselves. Through the regular channels, she had been unable to fulfill the requirements necessary for receiving her pension.

In order to fulfill these requirements she would have needed to have had a place to stay for over three days in order to qualify for welfare. No one would take her long enough for welfare to be established. And without welfare, she could not go on to receive her pension. It was all part and parcel of the system. And now, she had come to me. There was nothing that I could do for her that had not already been tried and ended in failure. Although some of my readers may wonder at this lengthy description, it is a most necessary inclusion for my following point to be made.

How easily the habits of our minds take over, as easily as automatic reflexes in the midst of unpleasantness. By this I mean, I had to do little or no thinking for myself. It had all been done for me. I knew her whole story and her 'reputation' long before she had entered

my doors. But what was to follow violently confronted these 'automatic reflexes' of my mind, and this is one of the experiences that has haunted me since then (and as a result directed me toward the writing of this paper). As she sat before me, the conversation shifted to cover a great many other topics - different than those of her intended purpose in visiting me at the centre.

Before I had realized it, her countenance had changed - and in all probability, so had mine. We had somehow changed. Before me sat a woman, and a person now - a person that few others had had the privilege to meet. It flashed before me that here was another person, not just another human being. She was one who 'called' for my respect. I did not respond to her out of pity, rather, I wondered at her. I felt that I had somehow met her and she had likewise met me. We had come to know one another, we had come to share. We laughed as we began to hang up some wet coats that had carelessly been thrown on a chair by some new visitors to the centre. Then, quite by surprise, she became aware of their presence, turned quickly toward the door, and began to leave. At the door she turned for a moment, and with an air that seemed to be quite final, she softly said goodbye, gave me a half-smile, thanked me and left. As I returned to my office, I heard her world collide and overlap once more - she went

screaming and 'barking' out the door and into her street. I haven't seen her since, only 'heard' her from afar.

Although this incident, in its detail remains quite clear in my memory, this can easily be set aside. The part that is not so easily dismissed is that 'sense' about our meeting that I mentioned earlier. It remains clear and sharp in my mind - that for a little while we shared something, and for me it was a sense of respect for her and a sense of communion with her. As I reflect upon it, there was no 'reason', no 'cause' for this respect (for example, that she had been able to survive for so long under such adverse circumstances), just as there had been no 'reason' or 'cause' for my lack of pity for her. Under ordinary conditions, 'pity' would seem to be the most natural response in the world to such an individual - and I could have quite readily felt sorry for this woman. But in that brief moment these reactions were 'present' only by their absence, because they were 'overtaken' by my respect for her. I look to the fact of the presence of her person as the only possible 'reason' for this overtaking, thus the only possible explanation - and yet, what does this explain? The answer will hopefully be found within the pages of the following thesis.

Another example of this type of experience which has

inspired the following is in the meeting with a person who has changed so much in the past years that were it not for the physical appearance remaining relatively unchanged, the one could not pass for the other. The change is almost as drastic as that from black to white. The 'why' and 'how' and 'what' of this change defy explanation by means of inner or outer factors (by this I mean, psychological or environmental) alone. The fundamental change occurred prior to any change in these factors, thus, they were no more than changes after the fact, although they still flowed from the initial transformation. It was not a transformation taking place from the outside to within, but rather, the reverse; and in the 'usual' sense of 'conversion' there was no external object (for example, God, termed so by the religious) to stand as 'cause'. What then had happened? how had it happened? and why? and further, why does it yet remain so? Again the answers to these questions will hopefully be found within the pages of the following thesis.

These are only two examples of a great many experiences wherein a 'presence' has been found - a presence of person. Although the fields of psychology and psychiatry have explored many areas and aspects of man, up to this point I have not succeeded in discovering any writings in the area of 'person' as such. I have come to realize

that this area cannot be explored by the human sciences until it has first been established firmly in the philosophical ground from which it was borne. It is my hope that, although this thesis is set within the context of philosophical thought, study and enquiry, it will provide enough evidence for the human sciences (at least some of them) to support reasons for a new beginning, and a new approach to the study, treatment, and above all, the understanding of the suffering of man - a very old problem.

It is to Max Scheler and his many writings on 'Person', and 'Love', that I owe the foundation of this thesis, for providing the starting point from which I have taken my departure, and also for supplying me with a 'way of seeing' that enables me to share this with you, my readers.

Introduction:

THE QUESTION

The Question

In the fields of psychiatry and psychology, and in particular, the areas in each which deal with the understanding and treatment of the mentally ill, vast amounts of information have been written. At the onset it may seem that this subject has been and is being exhaustively covered. There is, however, one area which needs, even demands our attention and to date it has been largely neglected. This is the area devoted to answering the question: "What is mental illness?"³ or "What is this presence that overtakes another as secretly and silently as an unseen invader and which at an equally secret and silent moment begins to retreat and withdraw, leaving its host profoundly changed and yet, in a special sense, very much the same?"

A volume written by Clifford Beers, A Mind that Found Itself, offers us a fine example of the need to acknowledge such questions - to seek out their answers.⁴ After reading this account of a personal experience with mental illness there is one question which relentlessly haunts me. His familiarity with the events and circumstances before, during and after his suffering is indeed most evident, and one readily understands that he was one and the same person throughout the ordeal. And yet, if we

were to take Mr. Beers before, during and after his illness, as three separate individuals, they would appear as strangers one to the other. How is this possible?

We also see this same type of example surface when we reflect upon my meeting with the 'Barking Lady' (a situation which would restate itself in the same sense if we were to come face to face with her today or at any future point in time). At one moment she is 'apparently' as 'normal' as you or I am, spontaneous, interesting, interested and 'here' in the moment of our meeting 'today'; and, at any future moment she holds a capacity to change, to become so very different that she seems to hold no part in our world (ie. when her worlds 'collide'). Place these two 'separate' women side by side and, other than the physical appearance, we are left, so to speak, with two strangers. What is it that is happening here? How are we to understand it and grasp the sense of it?

Finally, although this may seem to be drawing our examples from far flung fields, how is it possible for someone to commit the most violent of crimes and yet in the moments rapidly following, seem to 'return to our world' with no apparent recollection of anything out of the ordinary happening? I have in mind here the famous case on one known as the Boston Strangler.⁵ After having been con-

fronted with the fact of his deeds, this man became enshrouded in a veil of silence until the day he died. How do we understand a 'normal' family man and a man 'capable' of committing the most horrible deeds to be embraced within the form of one individual? What is mental illness that it should hold such apparent power?

These three examples are quite different, one from the other, and yet they are in some sense the same, because in each case it is one and the same individual to whom mental illness has come and retreated, or come and remained. How is mental illness to be understood in this context?

From another perspective, other questions as yet unanswered have arisen. From the pens of two totally different women in many respects, came works that profoundly confront the human sciences of psychiatry and psychology. Anne Barry, a journalist, decided to become 'mad' in order to compile material for her excellent book, Bellevue is a State of Mind.⁶ Lara Jefferson (not her real name) who wrote within the walls of a psychiatric institution, gave us a book which expresses her most poignant and illuminating insights into her own 'madness' and that of those with whom she lived. She wrote, These are My Sisters, and though it was published, she died within the walls of an institution because she had shown herself repeatedly

unable to 'cope with the world outside'.⁷ In both of these cases, Anne and Lara shared a deep and 'feelable' understanding of and a compassion and love for those with whom they spent their hours as 'patients'. They touched upon the heart of those unique communities wherein they found themselves, offering their thoughts to us in such a fashion that we could grasp their sense and meaning both readily and easily. Again I ask, How is this possible?

What is this mental illness that it seems to enshroud so many individuals, for as many reasons, it seems, as there are individuals who are suffering; and, what is it that, by the same token, brings it to a halt without altering the memory of those painful hours endured for those who are redeemed from its grasp? And in the cases of Anne and Lara, how is it that sanity may share so readily with insanity as if the insanity, for moments unknown, had somehow been transcended? And if it has been so transcended, what is it that allows for the transcending? All such questions, when traced back to their roots lead us to one singular question, "What is mental illness?"

This, then, is the question, and embraced within the pages of the following thesis it will be my constant hope that the frail beginnings of an answer will be found.

Section I

THE PLACE WHEREIN WE STAND

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Our approach to mental illness is radically different from that usually taken by the human sciences. We will not be treating mental illness as that subject about which we have gathered an overwhelming amount of information and data; rather, we will be approaching it as it presents itself in the one who is suffering from its presence. In other words, we shall not examine it as a conceptual abstract, as a reification of a process, but rather as a 'phenomenon' which all too often presents itself in the day to-day reality of our lives. The object of our journey will be the essence of this phenomenon, and it will be our aim to explore it as deeply and as fully as possible.

Part "A"

THE NEED TO ASK 'WHAT'

A Brief Historical Overview

Historically, what we have come to know as 'mental illness' became an 'illness' through the work of Phillippe Pinel (1745-1826).² It would seem that in his day and age, this 'name' was the only one, terminologically, that 'fit' the case. As a physician, Pinel could not only work with those who were considered 'mad', and the 'lunatic' of his day, but also, by declaring their condition as one of illness, he was able to offer an attitude of dignity and

respect to those who suffered from its presence.⁹ Pinel 'fell upon' the plight of the mentally ill by means of the self-inflicted death of one of his dear friends. Pinel had known him as a man of 'Reason', not 'Unreason' (as was considered the state of those who were mad).¹⁰ As friends they had spent many happy hours together and he was now at a loss to explain what had happened.

Why had this man gone mad? Why was nothing done for him? What could have been done for him? Today our questions differ very little from these. Time has not changed this, nor has the number of mentally ill diminished to any great extent from that of Pinel's day, proportionately. With the work of Pinel, the plight of the mentally ill would become another area of medicine, thus another area of science and today it is by and large still the 'property' of the human and the medical sciences. Over the years, as I have noted, our questions would change very little from those of Pinel and those of hundreds of men and women who were to follow him. Why do people suffer in this way? What causes it and how can it be eliminated or cured?

Four Emerging Problems

The 'why' and the 'how' superceded the question 'what'. The urgency of a treatment and cure had taken precedence over the desire to come to an understanding of this 'power-

ful enemy' and 'unseen invader'. This is not 'wrong' in any sense, but it tends to create many problems which could possibly have been lessened or found not to exist at all. It is a matter of putting the cart before the horse. Let me further explain. As a result of this 'well-intended' approach, born of the urgency to eliminate the presence of mental illness, there are problem areas which incessantly rear their ugly heads today causing much friction and debate, (not to mention confusion) within the realms of psychiatry, psychology and medicine (sociology may also be included in this list¹¹). There are four problem areas which emerge. These will be briefly examined.

1) The mental illness 'itself'

When we deal with something in terms of why and how it occurs, we are treating the 'something' as a 'given' - a 'thing' already known and taken for granted. This is the fundamental assumption - that mental illness exists. But each one of us, in our own way, has an idea of just what this mental illness is. Perhaps we hold this idea consciously, perhaps we hold it unconsciously (having never really thought about it), but this idea is there. What we often fail to realize is that this 'idea' is borne of our explanation of its presence and its process. If we see its presence and its process differently, one

from another, we shall most assuredly disagree as to what mental illness is in its very nature. By this, I mean that we never hold mental illness to be an accident, as something 'rootless' and springing forth from nothing. By virtue of the fact that we ask 'why', we presuppose a 'what', but the 'what', in a special sense remains ignored, and we move on to another assumption. Since we ask why, we assume a point of origin - a starting point. We assume that man is not born mad.¹²

It will be this starting point that we move toward that will determine our explanation of mental illness. This is a very subtle process, but one which must be examined. By asking why, the 'given what' of mental illness becomes dim, in that we have left it behind us. Therefore, in order to return to it in some sense, we must 'create' a model for mental illness, and, in the end we explain this 'mental illness' through our own creation. Once the initial 'intuition' given in the 'phenomenon' of mental illness has been forgotten, that 'experience' wherein we first discovered its presence, the model of mental illness becomes for us the 'mental illness' itself.

It emerges in the following sense - In the case of Phillippe Pinel, who believed that mental illness was a disease,

we find the creation of one of the first 'medical models' for mental illness. The models explain mental illness in a style and in a vocabulary suited to medicine.¹³ We have those who follow the Freudian school, whose understanding of mental illness takes on a whole new shape and form. It now becomes the battle between the ego, the superego and the id, and man becomes the battle ground.¹⁴ We also have a blend of the medical model and the Freudian model in works like those of Lidz.¹⁵ There is Virginia Satir, who understands mental illness as originating within the dynamics of the family relationship and structure.¹⁶ Glenn sees mental illness born of the oppression of the people and an oppressive cultural ideology;¹⁷ Fromm sees mental illness as stemming from man's relationship and his relatedness to himself, to others and to his world in a very negative way;¹⁸ Frankl sees the problem as originating from man's search for meaning within himself, his life and his world;¹⁹ and Laing sees mental illness originating within the context of man's self-experience and his experience in relationship to and with others.²⁰

In each of the above 'schools' of thought we find not only an idea of mental illness in terms of theory and explanation, but each comes complete with its own vocabulary and paradigm. Many thorny issues arise, largely centering around these ideas, the following vocabularies,

the theories and the definitions emerging. These lead to subsequent debates with regard to methods and procedures and treatments of the mentally ill without ever touching the heart of the matter - mental illness itself.²¹

In a sense, we become a house divided against ourselves. We argue procedure rather than presence, theory and definition against one another, idea against idea and somehow in the midst of all of this, we find ourselves adrift from our patients or clients, from those for whom we have been called as 'healers'. There are few who could not capably argue and debate idea for idea, etc. without ever having come into direct contact with, or partaken in a dialogue with one who is wounded in mind and heart, the one for whom all of these theories are taken as representations.

All of the above finds its beginnings in one very small and yet very large place. We first asked 'why' before we asked 'what' is mental illness. Our definitions grew out of our explanations. Our explanations grew out of our course taken in backtracking from the 'here and now' experience of the presence of mental illness in the one who stands before us, to the reasons as to why we think he is in the state and condition he is in. Our vision automatically narrows when our scientific spectacles

determine the field of mental illness. We will only be able to see that which falls before our lenses and we will only be able to see this in a manner that our lenses will allow. This leads us to a second problem.

2) "Where is your 'mental illness'?"

We find ourselves in a trap both intellectually and logically again due to our assumption and presuppositions.

Due to the nature of our initial question - 'why is this one suffering?' we cannot ask as to the nature of the suffering itself. The asking presupposes the 'what' as already a thing established. We find ourselves in somewhat the same shoes as Milinda, the king (of Buddhist lore) when confronted as to the 'whatness' of himself, by

Nagasena.²² The question almost becomes a whimsical one, ie. Is mental illness (as a thing, or an object) to be found in the mind, in the body, in the intellect, in the psyche, in the ego, in the id, in the personality, in the family, in the society, in the culture? To all of these we must answer, No. If it is none of these and found in none of these, then where might it be found? Logic loyal to this line of thinking would necessarily say that there must be no such thing as mental illness for we cannot find its place. It then becomes a name - an 'ill-fitting' title which stands for no-thing, nothing at all.

This line of logic is insufficient and yet it is something that we ourselves have created and in a sense assumed to be true. Rarely do we confront this dilemma unless someone very precious to us 'goes mad' in a heart-breaking way. It is then, in that moment, that we almost unhaltingly cry out, "What has happened to you?" Mental illness does indeed have a presence and a power of which we are most assuredly aware. But, if we are loyal to the 'scientific method' we are blocked from delving more deeply into this mental illness in such a way. In the scientific method there must be an object of study, and since mental illness as it offers itself to us is not an object, in the strictest sense, we must create an object to represent it in some fashion. This object is borne of our explanation.

Let us return, however, to the pattern of logic which is followed by the 'scientific method'. We have before us a process and a consequence - the consequence being the presence of mental illness. In an odd way we again find ourselves in an area which shares kinship with the Buddhist.

I am here thinking of the 4 Noble Truths of the following:

1. that there is suffering
2. that it has a cause
3. that there is a way by which suffering may be eliminated
4. the way itself. 23

How very much we grant this with mental illness! We come

to grant that we know mental illness by its process rather than its presence. The Webster's New World Dictionary gives as one of its definitions of science:

...systematized knowledge derived from observation, study and experimentation carried on in order to determine the nature or principles of what is being studied.²⁴

In our dealing with mental illness we know that there is suffering and in a systematic fashion, by means of the scientific format and methodological techniques we observe, study and experiment, we set about to determine the causal principles and the consequences which manifest themselves in the occurrence of mental illness. The outcome can be no greater than the approach which determines the perspective taken to examine it and the elements and factors found therein. It matters little whether we take the medical, behavioral, intrapsychic or phenomenological (as understood by the human sciences) approach to mental illness, they all embrace their own particular etiology which necessarily brings forth the most effective way by which the mental illness may be remedied. In this way we find the 'cure' or the 'treatment'. If that which 'causes' mental illness to occur is altered, its effect will necessarily be altered and the mental illness will be eliminated. This is the second Noble Truth: that this suffering has a cause.

In each school holding a particular view of mental illness we find an outline for its treatment (eg. surgery, drug therapy, electro-shock, behavior modification, psychoanalysis, etc.). In this way mental illness is held to be the result of or the consequential outworking of one or more contributing and conditioning factors found within the life of the one who is suffering - in himself, and in the environment which surrounds him. These factors, individual make-up, environment, society, biophysical or chemical defects, etc., all blend together in a myriad of complex and intricate patterns which over time yield the occurrence of mental illness in some, and the maintenance of mental health in others.²⁵ And whether it takes a relatively brief period of time (as in the case of Frankl's Logotherapy,²⁶ or Ellis' Rational-emotive Therapy²⁷, for example) or a longer period of time (as in the case of psychoanalysis), the unspoken or spoken goal is to undo the damage of the past.

We also find ourselves on the horns of another dilemma in this area. Regardless of the 'type' of mental illness that we are dealing with, these types become as entities in their own right. Because these are non-invasive terms (the particular label given to the type of mental illness) it does not follow that they are absolute terms. They are incomplete terms and cannot be under-

stood apart from the genitive or dative case. They cannot be torn assunder from the one who is suffering from their particular presence. We often take these terms on their own, but in and of themselves they are incomplete and cannot stand alone. Regardless of the type of mental illness 'diagnosed' it is always 'that of someone in particular' not in general or a thing in and of itself, so to speak, in this way.²⁸ In the above we have covered the third and fourth of the Noble Truths in that by searching out and pinpointing the 'causes' for mental illness, these causes can thus be eliminated, and the process by which they will be eliminated will be the treatment or the cure. 'Freedom' from suffering will hopefully be achieved.

It seems, though, that in spite of all of the above, we have, at one time or another, discovered a moment, or a series of moments, in our relationship with either patients or clients that something yet underlies these principles of mental illness which we have found. There seems to be far more to our 'treatment' than the interruption of the determining causal factors which 'produced' the mental illness. But due to the very nature of the scientific method, and attitude, we are restricted, we are barred from coming to grips with this. 'Success' is based on proper treatment not on the insights which spring forth

in the twinkling of an eye, when they emerge within our relationship with those who are mentally ill.²⁹

3) Mental illness as a diagram

We encounter a third problem when we reconsider the theories, definitions etc., used in the study of and dealing with mental illness. Once mental illness becomes a presupposed given, we no longer deal with it as such, directly and immediately; rather, we contrive diagrams to take its place, to act as representatives of the mental illness. These diagrams are based on the explanation of mental illness - not the mental illness itself. In this special sense, then, what we now understand and accept to be mental illness is a 'creature' - the product of our creation. Millon states:

Nature was not made to suit our need for a tidy and well-ordered universe. The complexity and intricacy of the natural world make it difficult not only to establish clearcut relationships among phenomena, but to find simple ways in which these phenomena can be classified or grouped. In our desire to discover the essential order of nature we are forced to select only a few of the infinite number of elements which could be chosen; in this selection we narrow our choice only to those aspects of nature which we believe best enable us to answer the questions we pose. The elements we have chosen may be labeled, transformed, and re-assembled in a variety of ways. But we must keep in mind that these labels and transformations are not 'realities'. The definitions, concepts and theories scientists create are only optional tools to guide their observation and interpretation of the natural world; ...³⁰ (That portion underlined was done so by me.)

In a special sense, then, we have left the 'natural' presence of mental illness, the way in which it is first discovered and have replaced it with our 'optional tools'. 'The guides for our observation' have too often come to take the place of the 'observations' themselves and have, in the very deepest sense obliterated our immediate touching of 'mental illness' through our own experience.

It would be helpful for a moment to reflect upon the origin of all theories, etc. In the case of Pinel, he began his diaries in dealing with the mentally ill after he began to work with them.³¹ The same holds true for Freud, for Tuke and Kelly, etc. and for all of those who have been the leading 'thinkers' as well as 'workers' in the fields of psychiatry and psychology, medicine and sociology.³² In the light of their 'successes' with their patients, they began to formulate and set down in their writings that to which they attributed such success. In a way, they laid out the structure and the method they discovered or thought worked for them in helping the one suffering from mental illness BUT in doing so, they made note of only that which was repeatable in their eyes, that which could be learned and copied by others. In the process of healing they could cast light backward into the past and discover the roots (or possible roots) of

the origin of the 'illness'. These insights they passed on, employing terms and patterns to make their insights more readily understandable for those who would follow them. They laid out plans of treatment and technique as in the cases of George Kelly and Carl Rogers, for example.³³

The accent, however, slips from relationship to technique, from dialogue to procedure, from faith to prognosis and from love to unconditional positive regard. That which was in its freshness and newness, the wonderous mystery of relationship, caring and communion seemed to fade from the central focus, and the 'how to' began to take its place. At a later point in this thesis, we shall devote a great deal of attention to this 'relationship' and the 'love' found therein.³⁴ I bring the matter up now only to serve as another illustration of how we have become lost in the intellectual maze of what is known as 'practical application', of what is 'learned' about this mental illness and the mentally ill.

Another result which creates further problems is that our attention is diverted from the relationship of healing to an examination of method and technique in an attempt to 'improve' upon them. The suffering one comes to be seen as a sum of parts, in a special sense. He is

seen in terms of self-image, personality, state of health, behavior, social interaction, etc., all parts which are further and further subdivided, further and further broken down into areas of specialization. At the end of all of the 'breaking down' we then attempt to reassemble the individual with our assessments specifically, and this is followed by an overall assessment of the resulting 'aggregate' of the one suffering. This overall assessment is a long way removed from what was once an individual suffering from mental illness, and who came as 'one' needing and wanting help. We must ask ourselves, "Have we yet come to understand him? Are we any closer to him now than when we first began? Is our knowledge of him any greater, or our knowing him any deeper?"

Polanyi claims that knowledge consists equally of both the I-It and the I-Thou - a new harmony between reason and belief.³⁵ The I-It is that knowledge which can be empirically observed, and validated - all explicit forms of reasoning (inductive and deductive, and inference) used in psychiatry, psychology and medicine (in short, science and human and medical science) to verify and substantiate a wealth of data and factual information necessary for its ever more complex study of man. The information is the object of interest. But the factual data are only a part of understanding, according to

Polanyi and they alone cannot withstand the weight of the demands that understanding places upon them.

Hence the need becomes apparent for another way of knowing which compliments the I-It. That way is the I-Thou, belief. This way wedded to the I-It reasoning becomes a synthesis which yields understanding. This I-Thou is

the knowing of a thing by attending to it in the way we attend to an entity as a whole.³⁶

By this, man is seen as a whole, as a unity first.³⁷ He is seen as a human being, the known, by another human being, the knower, and thus is awarded the same ground, the same status since he may become the knower and his knower may become the known. And a small opening unfolds for persons. Thus, the particulars of the I-It knowledge must be seen as an alternate way of understanding the whole, but not one to be taken in the place of the whole. The I-Thou knowledge embraces the whole of the other as more than the mere sum of its parts, its particulars. By means of an intricate and intimate joining of the two ways of knowing, a new vantage point is yielded - in this case man meeting man, person meeting person, with accompanying, helpful and necessary information.

4) The building blocks of mental illness

The fourth and final problem lies in the use of the many

building blocks we now have in our possession in terms of our understanding of mental illness. These 'blocks' are in the form of ego, personality, behavior, etc. Each of these blocks was and is born of the question 'why', each one serves its purpose within the framework of explanation, each one finds its way into the formulations of methodology and technique for treating mental illness and the mentally ill. Our knowledge of the 'what' of mental illness is born by the way we place and interpret the structure formed by the building blocks created originally to answer 'why'. As Millon stated, these building blocks, these definitions, theories and concepts are tools and guidelines. If we were in a position wherein we had to prove the existence of any of these building blocks, if we had to 'prove' the ego, the personality, etc. or any other so-named and created 'part' of man, we would indeed be hard pressed to do so. And yet, these terms and hundreds akin to them fill the volumes of our literature, they all link discoveries together, they are the points of our communication with one another about our common concern - those who suffer from mental illness. We devote a great deal of our time coming to understand these ideas, that which these names and titles represent. I believe that we must return again to that which is called 'mental illness' and spend time coming to know it essentially, because its presence is far closer to us than that of an

ego, a personality, etc. We cannot deeply come to know mental illness by means of building blocks, but we can come to know it as it offers itself to us in one who is suffering.

The power of mental illness lies not in its symptoms, in its manner and mode of expression; rather, its power lies within its secrets, within its mysterious dark corners, within the places that we do not know and cannot reach from the rigid format of the scientific method and perspective. It cannot be laid bare, cannot be exposed so completely for analysis before the purely 'objective and probing' mind. These secrets and mysteries cannot be spread out for empirical validation, observation or experimentation. Each individual case of mental illness embraces its own plenum of unique and idiosyncratic expression. In a special sense it cannot be generalized, nor can it be made a universal idea; but, I believe, however, that those mysterious places can be known and understood in such a way that many of the blind spots in our thinking about and in our grasping of mental illness may be filled in. The question posed in the introduction does have an answer, as so the questions which flow from it. "What is mental illness?" does have

have an answer, an answer that is not and is never too far away from us. Our approach and our attitude need only be altered.

Part "B" THE NATURE OF THE QUESTION - 'WHAT?' 3°

In order for us to come to the depth of the phenomenon of mental illness, and explore it as it is in itself, we must address it directly in that place wherein we find it (or discover it). We must come face to face with the one who is suffering from its presence. To address a phenomenon with the question, 'what?' is to seek out its nature, its essence, to grasp that which makes it as it is and not something else. To ask 'what?' also demands that we leave it as it is, in its manner, mode and means of expression, ie. we do not touch it, we do not infer, we do not approach it with inductive or deductive reasoning.³⁹ We do not stand before this phenomenon as passive observers watching it, so to speak; rather, we are here to 'explore' it, to 'discover' it, to 'question' it.

We do not attribute anything to it nor do we impose anything upon it in terms of 'frames' or 'structures' which, for Millon, would 'simplify the chaos'. Rather, we await

disclosure of the phenomenon itself, as to its own nature. We can only do this because we have not made the phenomenon into an 'object' or a 'thing'. We have not addressed ourselves to a conceptually abstracted reification of what we 'think' mental illness is. In short, there is no 'idea' or 'paradigm' standing as mediator and there is no 'sign' between the phenomenon and our own capacity to 'experience' it.⁴⁰ It is, thus, allowed to live and move according to its own nature, and it will be from this 'life' and 'movement' that we hope to discover the 'whatness' of mental illness fully and absolutely.⁴¹

Within the moment of our meeting with another human being who is suffering from mental illness, we grasp our initial glimpse of its presence. This is the place wherein we first 'hear it call to us', if we are attuned to its language and voice, and 'see' it, if we are keen to its manner of revelation; if we carefully grasp the experience deeply 'felt' within ourselves of that moment wherein we first came into meeting with another who was suffering from this mental illness. It is in this experiencing mental illness in another wherein we are given the fullness of the phenomenon itself, as it is in itself. We are here attempting to establish an 'attitude' rather than a 'method' for coming to know the phenomenon, the

phenomenon of mental illness. By 'attitude' I mean a 'way of seeing' wherein mental illness will be apprehended.⁴² In this approach, I believe that much will come to be known, the essence of which will provide us with the answer to the question which provides the thrust and force for this thesis: "What is mental illness?" And, perhaps from that which is gained in our answer, a different and more solid ground may be established for the scientific question: "Why is there mental illness?"⁴³

There are, perhaps those who are skeptical about such a venture as the one herein proposed, saying that there are as many different types of mental illness as there are those suffering from its presence. They may say that to find the heart of the phenomenon of mental illness is an impossible task. They may say that there are perhaps a few common factors which thread through most forms of mental illness, but never can there be said to be just one. But, here we are seeking an essence, not the smallest number of factors. Factors relate to questions of why, just as essences relate to questions of what. Here we are looking to 'discover', not to diagnose, or define mental illness.

This task would indeed be impossible if we were here understanding mental illness as a causally determined process

individuated by the factorial variability of internal and external conditions and historical differences found within the individuals who suffer from its presence, and also by the multiple varieties and degrees of intensity observed in its mode and manner of manifestation in these people. We are not here concerned with the symptoms or clues of its presence, rather we are committed to this very presence itself. The phenomenon of mental illness supports, grounds and holds these ~~very~~ symptoms within itself.⁴⁴

As we encounter the bramble and thorns of mental illness, that tattered and fragmented offering of words, thoughts and behavior, etc. (that would seem to fend us off, so to speak, from the suffering one) or as we encounter the deep silence which seems to enshroud them and which seems almost too dense to penetrate, we simultaneously experience something else at a much deeper level, both in the one suffering and within ourselves. The former offers us information about mental illness, the latter offers us the givenness of the phenomenon of mental illness itself.⁴⁵ We are all too often distracted from the givenness of mental illness by the noise of a thousand different voices, the ragings, the chatter, the confusion, the frustration, and the pain of that which we think to be mental illness. This is the realm of our natural exper-

encing, the experiencing of the 'I', and from another perspective, it is the realm of science, because it is with all of the above 'tatters' and 'fragments' that the sciences gain the material for their theories and their concepts which seek to place some type of design or pattern upon these 'loose ends'.

In the realm of natural experiencing, we come most closely, I believe, to that which Scheler refers to as 'psychic feelings'.⁴⁶ It is in the realm of natural feelings that we respond to the mentally ill, as we perceive and experience them, with fear and mistrust, pity and sorrow, and all that is riddled through and through with our own discomfort and our own insecurity, because in this realm all of that which accompanies any awareness of anything is always an idea of the 'I', it is always in relation to one's ego. When we meet someone who is mentally ill, we often experience discomfort, fear, sympathy, frustration - a whole gamut of feelings which, in fact, fall into the area of feeling-states. We are aware of the 'I' in each feeling. So very often this is the level which is offered in any of our meetings with those ones who are suffering, and it is usually at this level that we attempt to understand them. If we are to come to terms with mental illness as a phenomenon and explore it as it is essentially, we must rise above this 'human response', as it is often

called.⁴⁷

The scientific attitude or approach will not offer us an immediate and direct way in which we may come to apprehend this phenomenon of mental illness because it 'creates' its own object out of the given phenomenon and transfers that which is given (ie. mental illness) into a network of symbols, concepts, definitions and theories.⁴⁸ In a special sense, natural experience is closer to the phenomenon in its givenness than is the scientific approach, in that the initial experiencing, even though it is misinterpreted in terms of the ego, has not yet grown dim. The goal of any scientific method is to 'order' the world, the goal of the method of the human sciences is to 'order' man. A phenomenon is in no 'need' of ordering; rather, it is discovered or intuited as given in itself, in its fullness, immediately, and directly.⁴⁹ We can come to know it through its immanent expression, and in this present case - as it offers itself essentially in the one who is mentally ill.

Seeing:

Phenomenology offers us a way of 'seeing' this phenomenon of mental illness as it is there in itself. This approach as it was understood by Scheler, is an attitude of seeing 'spiritually' all of that which would otherwise remain

hidden, largely due to, 1) the ever-present 'I' in natural experience, in which case we would be blinded by our own ego, and 2) the scientific method the goal of which is to 'unscramble' the 'chaos' found in man and world alike.⁵⁰ For Scheler, this attitude of seeing spiritually is a densely packed affair and it will be our task in the following to attempt to 'unpack' the meaning of this phrase.

'The attitude' in phenomenology, is not merely a vantage point or a particular perspective taken. It is not simply one perspective found among a number of possible perspectives. A perspective, or vantage point presupposes a stand taken, a position of observation whereby something is viewed. The attitude of which Scheler speaks is an active attitude, one which is intentionally directed toward the essential nature of the phenomenon given in intuition.⁵¹ In that it is an act it is the 'spiritual' act performed by the person (as are all 'personal' acts).⁵² In that this attitude is the act performed by a person, it must be borne of and nurtured by (to a greater or lesser degree) the loving act which founds and grounds all acts of cognition, conation, phenomenological experiencing and intuition., etc.⁵³

As this 'loving' act relates to this subject in many

ways it must be developed more fully at this point (although a great deal of the following portion of this paper will be based upon Scheler's fullest understanding of 'love'). For Scheler, if we are to know the truth, we must love the truth above all else in our search for knowledge and understanding of things and all phenomena as they are essentially. This love, in that it is 'spiritual' transcends the 'I' in all ways.⁵⁴ In a special sense it means not acquiring knowledge on the backs of those who have gone before, but faithfully striking out on one's own, committing one's personal being to the value of truth and relentlessly striving after it. In the quest for this truth (in our case, the essence, the heart of mental illness) every idea as to what we think it is or might be must be disregarded - placed to one side.⁵⁵ In doing so we forsake the pride of our own minds and demand from ourselves an attitude of intellectual innocence.⁵⁶

This also means that we will open our hearts and minds to all of that which is before us in our intuition, in our experiencing. There may be much in coming to apprehend this truth that we do not want to know - but this must not deter us. If we stop to sift through that which is given and only take the 'good' parts, the parts that we like, or agree with, or the parts that we want and disregard all else that is offered - we shall not

discover the truth but rather a gross caricature of what at one time might have been the truth. We must humbly and gratefully accept to the fullest all of that which offers itself to us, as it offers itself to us. If we love it, work toward it and value it above all else, the above will not be difficult. If, however, we have the slightest reservation or have not the heart to see this journey to the truth to the end, then it would be better not to have embarked upon the venture at all. The above, if followed, will be the only way whereby we may 'rise above' the natural experiencing and the scientific method, which remain only a 'feeling' and a 'thought' away.⁵⁸

In our case, mental illness, or our 'idea' of it is often frightening, sometimes offensive and most assuredly tragic. If this remains a part of our 'attitude' in the following quest before us, we shall surely fail. We must maintain constant vigilance to keep our eyes, our minds and our hearts upon the destination so that we do not lose sight of the essence and all of its interconnections held within the embrace of the experiencing moment itself.⁵⁹ Gurs too, must be an attitude, then, of loving openness.

Listening:

In our loving attitude of openness and innocence toward the phenomenon of mental illness within the one suffering, we have almost transcended the realm of noise, sight and movement which so easily tend to distract us in the natural attitude, and experience. To assure our place we must now engage in the active attitude of the above and listen to the phenomenon as it calls to us. We must 'listen' for what 'it' has to say to us rather than that which we would like to hear.⁶⁰ We do not listen with our ears of hearing which are organs merely for audible sounds and noises, or for words and phrases which catch our attention. Rather, we listen with our hearts and minds, with our experiencing, our intuition all actively working in such union that together they detect that special language spoken by this phenomenon of mental illness alone. Beyond the clatter and noise, the idle chatter or violent ragings, or the dark silence or the one suffering, we hear the unmistakable voice of the phenomenon itself - the voice which will disclose to us its essential nature.

Not as passive hearers waiting, but as active listeners approaching, we listen to the one voice of mental illness, regardless of its multiplicity of variation and degrees of intensity, regardless of its vast number of manifest-

In other words, the symptoms experienced and made manifest by the one suffering from mental illness depends on mental illness essentially, rather than the other way around. This is the heart of their interrelatedness and the interconnection between the two.⁶⁴

There are those who would now claim, at this point in our approach that we have completely emptied the idea of mental illness, that we have drained it totally. They would claim that we, too, have nothing left. This would be similar, it seems, to our Buddhist friends who have 'nothing' left. But the two above statements do not necessarily follow one another, nor do they even belong together in our case. It is quite true that we have now emptied the idea of mental illness. In terms of causal relationships, environment, an individual suffering in a particular manner, ideas, concepts, paradigms, theories, and definitions, we are indeed quite empty! But I ask this: Have we not merely then demonstrated the effectiveness of our attitude and reached the intended destination of our quest?

It is through fidelity to our course that we have come this far, and it is only now that the fruits of our labor are there for the harvest. Rather than finding ourselves 'left with nothing', we reach the threshold of mental

illness, itself. Once we have 'artificially' removed the occasion (the individual human being) and the display (the symptoms or signs) of this phenomenon, abstracting these and yet, at the same time, holding these very securely as the anchor wherein we first discovered this presence essentially, we may come to respond to it, penetrating it as deeply as we possibly can to discover its secrets, its mysterious dark places which seem to so readily elude us. We have succeeded in removing the variability which has so beset the human sciences. The only other recourse left open for the human sciences at this point is to generalize the common factors found in thought, behavior, motivation, etc. and formalize universal concepts conducive for the treatment of the symptoms found. Through the phenomenological attitude we have found the essence of mental illness itself.

Responding:

In our phenomenological approach it is not only 'seeing' the phenomenon (through the phenomenological intuition or experience) and 'listening' to its voice as it speaks to us, it is also and simultaneously an act of 'responding' to the phenomenon, seeking an ever deeper penetration into its essence that is our task. Through this 'spiritual seeing' we have found the phenomenon named 'mental illness' and we have reduced it to its essential nature

such that it cannot undergo any further reduction and yet remain that which it is. In our responding to it, we now pose the question, "What are you?" In our reaching out to touch the phenomenon, we allow it also to 'touch' us, and we come to know it.

In a most profound and (apparently) mysterious way our experiencing of that which is to follow bears a haunting resemblance to that experiencing of the person who suffers from the presence of mental illness. There is a great misunderstanding held by many that the 'whole' person suffers from this mental illness. By this I mean that they believe or hold to be true that mental illness is such that it holds within its grasp and power the entirety of the one who is suffering from its presence. One who suffers from mental illness is not totally engulfed in this affliction.

We shall devote a large portion of the next section to dealing with the 'Person' and then the above statement (which must seem fairly dogmatic at the present) will become much clearer and more fully developed. Let it suffice to say for now that although the individual as a person experiences the presence of this suffering as personal, he remains untouched by the presence of the 'disease' itself, ie. he is non-diseased. He, in fact,

personally transcends the disease. He would not experience the suffering which is such a part of mental illness, if he were, himself, totally suffering from its presence. He would not be able to remember or to reflect upon this suffering clearly, nor indeed would he be able to come to know healing and renewal were he not personally 'above' and 'beyond' this disease itself. There is a great difference between the experiencing of suffering and the actual suffering itself. The wounded one, the one suffering, is suffering precisely because of his experiencing and knowing the presence of the 'disease' in himself, not from the 'disease' itself, as such.

As I said in the above, we, in a most profound way, in our experiencing of the presence of this mental illness essentially share much with the mentally ill in terms of this experiencing of its presence. The difference between our experiencing and the experiencing known by the person of the mentally ill lies not in the fact that our experiencing is 'objective' and his is 'subjective'. Subjectivity is in the 'I' realm, the realm of the ego, the psycho-socio-physical human being; and we are, here at the level of persons. The difference is that we desire to come as close to the phenomenon of mental illness as we can - we wish to know it. We are

actively responding to its presence. The one suffering, on the other hand, does not. His intention lies in the opposite direction, in that he does not want to know it. He withdraws from its presence. He, in a very special sense, flees from even the slightest echo of its voice, which essentially becomes that which forces him into a 'position' of unspeakable bondage. Simply put, we seek to understand what he seeks to escape.

Upon our initial experiencing of this mental illness (in the experiencing of its presence in another) we intuit a most peculiar and profound sense of 'emptiness'. The 'givenness' of the phenomenon offers itself not as a 'void' or a 'nothingness', but rather as a sense of absence, as a sense of 'loss'.⁶⁵ It is as though we stand all alone even while in the midst of (what 'should' be) relationship, in that we are with another. We experience a sense of abandonment, while the one who is suffering from mental illness is yet before us and with us. Scheler gives us an excellent example:

Someone tells us a somewhat strange and extravagant tale, that is 'difficult' for us to 'understand'. We are in an 'understanding' attitude. Now someone comes and whispers in our ear, "This man is insane." Immediately our attitude changes in a characteristic way. The place wherein we were given his spiritual center in our own experiencing, wherein we relived his acts with him becomes empty, and only the life-center and the body, the ego, remain given. We no longer see any meaningfully directed intentions that end in his life-expressions, and that which remains

are notions of expressions and other notions behind which we start to seek out psychic occurrences as causes. The former band of 'sense' is now replaced by a band of 'causality' or environmental irritation or attraction which elicits his present expressions.⁶⁶

This example is, to a large degree, accurate, although the transition from the 'empty place' to causes and reasons explaining this 'individual's' present behavior etc. has been far too hastily derived. This may be our recourse in the scientific attitude, but only if we are in some way familiar with the theory and language of psychiatrists and psychologists, or if we have some passing knowledge of their perspectives. If we are to continue in our present attitude, however, as phenomenologists, we cannot so easily close the issue at this point in our experiencing. It is in that which follows that 'mental illness' is to be discovered. This 'empty place' is an offering of the givenness of mental illness as it presents itself to us, and we must continue our response. We must remain faithful to the phenomenon if we are to gain the answer to our initial question.⁶⁷

Let us return again to the aforementioned 'emptiness' which greets us in our experiencing of this mental illness. There before us unfolds an 'empty place', empty due to an 'absence'. This absence, in a special sense, is distinctive in nature. Scheler profoundly puts to us

in the phenomenological intuition (experience) the phenomenon appears to us in the point of meeting for that which is meant and that which is given.⁶⁸ If we are given something and have to infer a meaning into in or upon it, or if we are given something but it is not quite adequate in itself and we must further add to it, then there is no phenomenon given at all. We do have before us a phenomenon of mental illness in that that which is given (ie. an empty place) is meant. This 'emptiness' is both meant and given in mental illness. Were it not so, mental illness 'could' not be as it is, and could not be necessarily. Were we to experience anything other than this emptiness, we would not be intuiting or experiencing the essence of the presence of mental illness. This emptiness is fulfilled in and sufficient unto itself. But again, this is not to speak of a 'void' or a 'nothingness', rather, it is an 'absence'. There is 'something missing' in our experiencing, within the experiencing itself.⁶⁹ To speak of psychic motions and bands of causality, etc. is to go beyond the moment of the experience.⁷⁰ We are as yet 'suspended' as it were, in the exact moment of our experiencing this 'emptiness'.

An example comes to mind to illustrate my meaning, perhaps a bit more clearly. A dear friend of mine recently

went through a difficult period with her husband who was undergoing psychiatric treatment at the time for his deep depression. She confided in me that for so many years they had shared so much together, so much that words were often not needed and yet she felt his closeness in everything. Now they would sit together at the supper table and she found herself saying, "Who is this man, this stranger? I don't know him at all. He looks like Sam, and his history is the same, but oh, dear God, he's not my Sam! I miss him so much. I feel as though I could just take this man and shake him and demand to know where Sam is, to look into his eyes and call out Sam's name in the hope of calling him back to me." Of course, all of this took place within the confines of her own heart; however, her experience is most clear; Sam was there, and yet he was not.

A different set of examples come from another woman whom I have known for many years. She has a brother who is now in a psychiatric institution, and has been there for some years now. She shared with me the number of times while they were growing up when she would be talking with him and it seemed that he would wander miles away - as though he wasn't even there at all. But, then he would return, so to speak, and join in the conversation once more. At the time she simply chalked it up to being

part and parcel of his nature and didn't think too much more about it. As time passed, however, his 'wanderings' became more frequent and for longer periods of time until the day that he was no longer 'there' at all. At that point he was institutionalized, and after some fifteen years he is finally starting to 'return'. Her second experience was one where her husband, an extremely bright teacher, began to have lapses, as she was first to call them. This began to take place quite a while before he went to see a doctor. By this time she said that she felt that she was sharing her life and her home with a total stranger. The man she loved wasn't 'really' there with her and she felt terribly alone - almost abandoned. It was to be discovered in the course of the tests that had been scheduled for him that he had a malignant brain tumor which by this time had overtaken two-thirds of his brain. Surgery could not save him.

In each of these three examples, the 'root cause' of the 'mental illness' differed one from the other, but the experience of its presence was the same. The sense of emptiness was profound, the loneliness for their loved ones was certain and clear. They did not know nor did they think to question 'why', or to look for 'bands of causality' or anything within the 'environment', they simply felt alone. In a special sense they 'expected'

something to be 'given' and it was not. They awaited the 'return' of their loved ones, although they had not left. They went about the affairs of their day, following their usual habits and routines, but it was as though things continued along 'in their absence'.⁷¹

It is not difficult for us to draw upon some examples from our own experiences every day wherein we have this same 'sense of absence'. We come into meeting with one who is suffering from mental illness. We begin to talk with him on the wards or as a patient in therapy, etc. and we slowly begin to apprehend a lack of something. We sometimes describe it as a 'wall' around the patient, or an 'unwillingness' to co-operate with our attempts to treat him. We cannot seem to break through or reach him. Before we fall into following the easiest course of action (ie. trying to find the 'reasons' for the 'wall' or the 'unwillingness') we will stop here and hold this moment before us, exploring it further.

That which is explained as a 'wall' or an 'unwillingness' are indeed found within the embrace of the phenomenon of mental illness, but although their essence is grasped, they have been misnamed. Behind or beneath these we sense an 'emptiness', a 'something' missing. This is a far greater clue to the heart of mental illness than

seeking to discover the 'why' of the wall or the unwillingness. The wall is judged to be that which holds the one behind it in bondage. The unwillingness is judged to be the defiant act of one who does not wish to 'get better'. Yet, how do we know that there is indeed one who is in bondage or one who is unwilling? Is it merely the attribution of a 'someone' being there on our part? Do we impose this someone? Do we really know that there is someone there and for the moment we are at a loss as to know how to get through to him?

If we come to terms with these questions, we find that we know that there is more to the one who is suffering, above and beyond that which is found in the psycho-socio-physical human being who has a history and a physical presence in time and space.⁷² It cannot be validated empirically, nor can it be isolated in any type of experimentation, and yet, as certain as we are that there is life on this earth, we are equally certain that there is 'one' behind the wall, or 'one' who is (or rather, is judged to be) unwilling.

Regardless of the terms we use or the manner in which we choose to express this phenomenon that we come to experience within the twinkling of an eye, regardless how we attempt to grapple with the phenomenon or absence or

emptiness which is in itself mental illness, it is all based on this (perhaps unconscious) knowing that although we do not experience his presence, there is yet 'someone there' in the midst of all of this - someone who we have yet to meet. This is the common faith upon which therapy is based.⁷³ Without this faith, therapy would be folly and any healing or the hope thereof would be no more than wishful thinking on our part. But therapy is not folly, nor is our hope ill-founded! We are beginning to hit upon certain principles which are themselves the ground for all therapy and treatment of those who are mentally ill, but before we address these, we must first complete our discussion of the phenomenon in respect to this emptiness.

We hear words, at times with no apparent end, coming from the one suffering. They may be idle chatter or violent ravings, but looking deeply beyond them they are empty - without roots or continuity. We see behavior that ranges from gentle and slow (or perhaps none at all) to manic, aggressive and perhaps threatening, but which has no continuing, no flowing, no follow through (in a manner of speaking) that runs from initiation to completion. We find thought patterns disjointed to a greater or lesser degree, without unity and again without apparent initiation or completion. All at this level

offers us nothing but loose ends.⁷⁴ But our sense of emptiness looms as background behind this manifest disjointedness. In a peculiar sense it would almost seem that were we not the witnesses of such a discrepancy in thought, word and deed, by the same individual, these could well be bits and snips taken from many individuals and brought together into one. They would seem to possess the unity and gatheredness of a myriad of leaves in the autumn wind, blown aloft without knowing where they would fall. We are left with 'ego' and 'intellect', 'personality' and 'upbringing', 'physiological factors' and 'environmental stimuli', etc. if we lose sight of this emptiness we are actively experiencing in the phenomenon of mental illness.

To this point, then, in summary, we have come to experience or intuit, in the phenomenological sense that mental illness is, in essence, an emptiness, an absence of someone, someone who 'should' be there, and yet is not. We experience this presence of absence or emptiness long before we gain knowledge of its presence in another. In a special sense, even before mental illness had this name or title, it was. It is, then, essentially rather than 'historically' a suffering of man. And in a most profound way, this holds true for mental illness, as such, whether its symptomatic cause is physiological (eg. a brain tumor), psychological

in terms of personality disorders, etc., or even spiritual (as in the case of the work done by Viktor Frankl in logotherapy and its explanation). The degree and intensity may vary, its manifestations are diverse, its duration may extend from days into years, but our experiencing of the emptiness, the absence, the loss are one and the same. But how we 'know' this absence, this emptiness, and how we come to understand our faithfulness to the 'someone' behind it is truly miraculous as will be discovered next.

Section II

THE PERSON

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THE PERSON

Part "A" PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH THE TERM 'PERSON'

There is a profound mystery and a great wonder found within each one of us as members of the human race - as human beings. This is not because we stand as the assumed highest upon the evolutionary scale, but rather because we are each one a person, or hold the 'seeds of potential personhood' within us.⁷⁵ We do not have persons, as we think of having personalities, egos, minds, intellects, etc., rather we are persons.⁷⁶ The word 'person' is a term that is almost taken for granted - a word the meaning of which we assume we know and yet, I doubt very much that this is the case in many instances. In the field of the human sciences, and in particular, psychology and psychiatry, the term 'person' is used frequently in a way that would almost imply that something more is meant, however, this 'something' remains elusive and evasive, or, it appears in a way which sounds very 'other-worldly', i.e. it sounds beautiful but there is no solid ground upon which it is based.⁷⁷ We 'sense' or 'intuit' this presence of something, but if we were to attempt to pin it down, or to demonstrate its presence, it would seem to defy any grasping of it. We cannot explicitly lay it bare and say 'there it is' or 'here it is'; and yet, it is there and we somehow know it.

'Person' is a term embracing a meaning most truly its own and this meaning raises it far above the psychosocio-physical realm wherein we find it so often used by the authors in psychiatry and psychology, sociology and medicine. For example, Theodore Lidz, in his remarkable volume, The Person, gives a comprehensive study of man's development from birth to death.⁷⁸ Within its pages, we are given many insights into the physical, psychological and social progress and maturation of the individual from frail beginning through to the end of life. Although the text follows a rigid format and the chosen vocabulary is filled with many terms familiar to the human sciences and medicine, we discover something wonderful and 'mysterious' which underlies the 'scientific' manner of its presentation. I have in mind the following text as an example:

This is the time of fulfillment, when years of effort reach fruition. This is autumn when the fruits are harvested and colours are brilliant though mellow. Not all reap the harvest, and for some the regrets and disillusionment mount, often mixed with a bitter resentment that life has slipped through their fingers. Still, even for the fortunate, the balance of life is upset by awareness of the passing of time and the limits of life's span. There is a recrudescence of a type of existential anxiety; an awareness of the insignificance of the individual life in an infinity of time and space. Now, in middle life, a stock taking and a re-evaluation occur.... For some, middle age brings neither fruition nor disappointment so much as angry bewilderment as they find that their neglect of meaningful relationships in the frenetic striving for success now makes life seem like 'a tale told by an idiot - full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.'⁷⁹

This passage 'transcends' the realm of the 'purely' psycho-socio-physical progress and maturation of the individual human being. It awards a worth and a value - almost a sanctity to life and the human being as a 'person', the quality of which cannot be generalized nor made universal as the bulk of the information which he shares with us consists. Bear this example in mind as we more fully explore the term 'person', and my meaning will unfold more clearly as we progress through this thesis.

R. D. Laing notes the difficulty in dealing with the term 'person':

It is tempting and facile to regard 'persons' as only separate objects in space, who can be studied as any other natural objects can be studied... one will never find persons by studying persons as though they were objects. A person is the one or you, he or she, whereby an object is experienced.

Coffman also states:

Much role analysis seems to assume that once one has selected a category of person and the context or sphere of life in which one wants to consider him, there will then be some main role that will fully dominate his activity. Perhaps there are times when an individual does march up and down like a wooden soldier, tightly rolled up in a particular role. It is true that here and there we can pounce on a moment when an individual sits fully astride a single role, head erect, eyes front, but the next moment the picture is shattered into many pieces and the individual divides into different persons holding ties of different spheres of life by his hands, by his teeth, and by his grimaces. When seen up close, the individual bringing together in various ways all the connections that he has in life, becomes a blur."

Shortly following the above, Coffman speaks of a 'dance of identification' that is witnessed when viewing someone who is not placed within a specific context for examination as to the 'person'.⁹² The human sciences encounter one of their greatest difficulties when confronted by this term 'person'. Science, through its methodological format finds itself well capable of dealing with 'individuals' or individual human beings in its research and its investigations and experimentations, but to deal with persons in such a manner is a 'frightening' thought.

Person - not an Individual

The habit of many authors is one in which they use the term 'individual' and the term 'person' as though they were synonymous one with the other. They use them as though they were of the same value and the same rate of exchange. But this is to take far too much liberty - a liberty which invariably brings forth problems in a great number of ways. Persons and individuals are not the same, and can never be thought of as the same for several reasons - a number of which will be discussed in the following. 'Person' is a word foreign to psychiatry, psychology, sociology and medicine, in the strict scientific sense because there is no where within the framework of the scientific format in which to place it fully and wherein it finds room to 'move and live' completely. 'Individual', on the other hand, is the term

perfectly at home here. It is the term which aptly finds its place in science as a tool for the conveyance of accurate, scientific thought in the universal and general sense.⁸³

'Person' is, in the deepest sense, a philosophical term and to be more exact, a phenomenological term. 'Individual' in the deepest sense, and in an unrestricted sense, simply means 'one'. This 'one' is conducive to science. 'Person' is in no way restricted to such a sense, because, as we shall see later, it may not necessarily come to mean simply and merely one human being. Further, in a special sense, both terms, (person and individual) denote a way in which we 'look' at a human being. As such they embrace inherent assumptions which must be clarified in order to fully grasp the need for the following lengthy discussion of the term 'person', and its place in coming to grips with the nature of mental illness as it is handled and as it 'could' be (and perhaps 'should' be) handled by the human sciences.

When we use the term individual it is found in the context of that which is, in a sense, conceptually static. 'Individual' can mean 'one' whether one alone or one of a group. Thus, this term need not apply to human beings at all. We could be talking about pencils, leaves,

buildings, votes, cats or cars. All could be seen as individuals in terms of representing their specific group or category of classification. For example, in an experiment, a group of individuals is taken to represent a specific and greater population. The way in which the statistical analysis of any data takes place, and the presentation of the results of any experiment are couched in individual terms, in terms of units, etc. in the greatest number of cases. In this sense, each individual is 'replaceable', as long as each new replacement meets the criteria of the group into which it is placed. For example, if an experiment is to be undertaken to determine the extent of change (if any at all) in the attitudes of college students during their time as undergraduates with regard to intensity and direction, or any number of specific subjects, the only qualifications needed for the participant are 1) that one be a college student and 2) that he or she be in the first year of studies. In this sense, then if one individual dropped out, another one could easily replace him or her. 'Individual', then is a term which is general, universal and numerical. 'Person' is not a general term, nor is it in any way to be considered as a universal, and it cannot be seen, in any way, in terms of one person among or apart from the many (persons). And one person, (it matters not the case) can never replace another.⁸⁴

'Individual' in the scientific sense, stands for one something - one 'object', in general, meaning that the term itself remains the same although that which is or becomes its content may embrace a multiplicity of variability. But this is also static as well. Once this unit of 'one' has been 'filled' with a content, (and here it makes little difference whether that which fills the content is one thing over and above another thing) it becomes static, remaining reified - a thing caught in time, in a sense. This is because, by and large, science looks at its objects in terms of constants and variables, and as such it classifies them accordingly. All scientific experiments or research studies explicitly set out the controls used in their particular endeavor, the dependent and the independent variables. The individuals are, in a way, secondary to these variables, and this could never happen with persons - one would lose the persons completely. Science is concerned with underlying generalities - common factors which thread their way through all of the participants. 'Individual', as a term, then, embraces no special meaning at all, other than the one given to it by us. It is, in a sense, a term wherein we fill in the meaning and it becomes an individual or a group of individual 'whatever(s)'.

Finally, an individual has 'parts' in a sense and may be seen as the sum of these parts. For example, an individ-

nal is understood to have a personality, an ego, a mind, a body, etc. and each of these parts may be abstracted from the whole, examined, tested, and probed for all manner of data, and at the termination of the investigation they may be 'replaced' back into the individual. Or, the individual may be seen as part of a group, 'lifted' out of such, and his status and position, his role and function, etc. may be examined as abstracted things, and at the conclusion of this enterprise he may be replaced back into the group again. This can never be done or accomplished with the term 'person' or with a 'person'. It would be an exercise in futility at best because the person eludes such handling and treatment. In a sense, to attempt to compare these two terms (individual and person) at their deepest level, would be to compare a stone and a rose. In the final analysis, the stone is taken to be a 'dead and set' thing, while the rose lives and moves and offers the delight and wonder, the mystery of its being, in its being alive. There is a way in which we may come to understand and see the 'individual person' in one aspect of his being.⁸⁵ But there is no way that we may see an 'individual' as a 'person'.

There can be no scientific 'grasping' of the person, and although Laing speaks of a 'science of persons', such a 'science' will necessarily not be of the nature of science

as we are to understand the term here. There can be no scientific study of, manipulation of, research or investigation by means of experimentation of 'persons'. Coffman may be said to have grasped a classification of individual human beings but not a 'classification of persons'.³⁶ 'Persons' transcend all of this.

Person - not an Ego, or a Self

We are, in a special sense, meeting Lidz's person 'whose years of effort have reached fruition', and Laing's person who reveals himself in experience before labels are imposed upon him or 'thought' given to him.³⁷ This 'person', however, is not to be confused with either 'ego' or 'self'. Ego and self are concepts denoting the subject-object approach to man once again (although it is of a different type than that of 'individual').³⁸ Self and ego are experienced 'things' in that it is the person who objectifies them and looks at them as 'experienced' things.³⁹ There are several in the human sciences who seem to confuse the issues involved here. For example, Allport, in his Becoming, writes:

In distinguishing various functions of the proprium - bodily sense, self-identity, ego-enhancement, ego-extension, rational activity, self-image, appropriate striving, and knowing - I hope I have not implied that any concrete instance of becoming may be explained by one and only one function. The fact is that at every stage of becoming a fusion of these is involved.

Take, for example, the acquiring of self-insight or self-objectification, one of the most important characteristics of maturity in the personality.

Here obviously is a condition where the knowing aspect of the proprium is engaged. It catches a glimpse of the rational processes, including those devoted to ego-defensiveness. At the same time the rational processes are evaluated in terms of the sense of importance (propriate striving). The self-image and the ideals resident in the extended ego play their part.....

In other instances self-assertion, acts of love, or carrying through a propriate purpose are in the ascendancy. But in all cases the functions are interlocked. The locus of the act is the person.⁹⁰

He then says that:

Person and personality are far broader conceptions than proprium....personality includes besides propriate functions a wide variety of adjustive activities, characteristic of the person and rendering the human organism the unique unit that it is.

The proprium is not a thing; it is not separable from the person as a whole...The person is thus an individual organism capable of propriate activities, including, of course, the function of knowing.⁹¹

In the above Allport struggles with the ideas of 'things' and 'non-things' but one cannot say that something is not a 'thing' while yet speaking of it in 'thing-terms'. By this I mean that person is born of a special kind of experience; in this sense, then, person cannot be a concept. The person, for Allport, seems to be that which is a theory, a product of the intellect. He attempts to explain the person and personality in terms of a proprium and this again is another theoretical structure of categories which somehow work together in terms of 'acts', the 'sense' of which he fails to clarify. I am not here attempting to criticize Allport, merely to point out his

use of terms such as 'person', 'proprium', 'act', 'function', 'ego' and 'organism', etc. He attempts to use terms together that are not 'found' or 'given' together. By this I mean that we 'experience' persons in their performance of acts - in our sharing with them in such acts as persons.⁹²

'Acts' in this sense are as special and unique as the 'persons' who perform them. The 'ego' and 'functions' and 'proprium' etc., however, are theorizations, structures born of the intellect to serve the purpose of explaining man as a psycho-socio-physical human being and his environment in terms of his responding to it, etc. A lengthy discussion of this matter will be found in the following. For the moment, however, I only wish to underscore the use of the term 'person' by so many in the human sciences as that which is held to be of the same stance as 'ego' etc. in the 'object-sense'.

Self-identity, ego-enhancement, self-image, etc. are terms denoting separation and distinction. In order to gain an 'idea' of my self-identity, I must divorce (objectify) myself from myself and examine that which I have extracted (my self, my ego). I do so by holding it as an object before me. 'Person' cannot be so divided - however, a person may undertake the task of making such a division.⁹³ Again, to acquire self-insight, or to 'objectify the self, this necessarily implies the distancing of 'self' from me

in order for my acquisition of insight or to achieve such objectification. Both acquisition and objectification are indeed 'personal acts' and are performed by a person but this person has nothing to do with the self or the ego as Allport seems to have suggested.⁹⁴ A person cannot perform an act and at the same time be the 'object' of that act. Such an idea is inconceivable. However, Allport, is correct to note the interconnection of person and acts, although his term 'locus', meaning 'place' is not accurate in the way I have put forth person and act in this thesis according to Scheler.⁹⁵

The ideas of both self and ego are extremely important to the gaining of a greater understanding of man and his environment as it is filled with people and things, studying how man responds to and comes with it as a human being (a psycho-socio-physical individual). This offers much in the way of advancing our knowledge of man and his enviroing world. Thus, the world within and the world outside of man, as a psycho-socio-physical human being are the 'objects' of psychiatry and psychology. They are the 'things' tested, measured, researched and investigated in the human sciences as sciences.⁹⁶ This realm, however, all too often remains the highly theoretical and abstract, filled with definitions and paradigms. This is but another way by Rollo May in his discussion for the need of a new

'methodology'. He devotes the beginning portion of his book, Existence, to the problems incurred by many therapists who work directly with the 'mentally ill'. These therapists may come to know a great deal about the one with whom they are working, but in the midst of this there must be a knowing the one who is suffering. Without coming to know the other as a person, the 'whys' and 'hows' are only just so much information.⁹⁷ The whys and hows of the occurrence of mental illness are the result of an examination of the internal and external factors of the 'individual'. They are examinations of the ego, the self and the outer world of the individual. They are the factors which combine together in unique variation to form the individual in his individuality, but they are not and can never be understood as representing the 'person'.

As I have pointed out in the above, we have egos, we have selves in that we may experience and come to know them; we also have environments, we have outer worlds through which we travel in the daily matters of our lives; but we are persons. Person transcends the psycho-socio-physical realm.⁹⁸ What we are transcends what we have.

The ego (the self), the lived body, the environment, the outer world are all concepts and models dealt with in psychiatry and psychology in that they (and all of that

which is embraced and can be said to be embraced by these terms) are found in the realm of 'causality'. This is the realm wherein all of the 'whys' and 'hows' with regard to understanding mental illness as a process, (a happening) are to be found.⁹⁹ Simply put, all of that which is considered in the realm of psychiatry and psychology, in terms of what the patient or client feels, thinks, has experienced, etc. is the 'stuff' with which the human sciences must deal - it is their 'object'. All of that which the suffering one is conscious of both in inner perception and outer perception, inner and outer understanding, inner and outer experiences on all levels is the matter given to the human sciences because all of this may be made an 'object' of study both for the professional and his patient or client.¹⁰⁰ In a special sense, it becomes the heart of that which draws therapist and client into relationship. It becomes the 'project' for the therapist and the patient or client.¹⁰¹ The patient (client) and the therapist are brought together and held together by this 'project' and depending upon the extent to which this relationship is embraced by both, the 'missing someone' referred to in the previous section may come forth. The basis for this is grounded in and based upon the 'presence of persons' in the therapeutic relationship, a presence which must necessarily be 'found' within the therapeutic relationship if this relationship

is to bring forth the 'healing' of the one suffering from mental illness.¹⁰²

Part "B" INTRODUCTION TO SCHELER'S 'PERSON'

Max Scheler, in his deeply revealing insights into the essential nature of the person, opened up the door for us in coming to terms with the mentally ill (and mental illness) or the wounded ones (as I prefer to call them). Although he, himself, did not enter through this doorway, but only stood at the threshold, I believe that he has provided us with an attitude - a way of seeing that will shed light upon mental illness and these wounded ones. He spoke of the mentally ill as 'invisible' persons, as 'missing' persons, 'empty places wherein the spiritual centre of the person once stood'.¹⁰³ This was his way of seeing them, of understanding them, but he did not go further. The following is the way that I believe he would have sought for us to understand them. This portion, I hope will complete this unfinished task, this pilgrimage - to search for Scheler's 'invisible' person, discover him, and begin to apprehend the way in which he experiences healing.

Scheler, in his understanding of the person, renews within us the wonder and mystery that truly belongs to man as

a person. In a special sense, Scheler 'recalls' the glory found in man as a person, he 'redeems' man from the stark and bleak examination table upon which he has become an object, an abstract idea, an aggregate of parts which is only 'labelled' man. Scheler welcomes into view all of that which does not 'fit' into any form or definition created to explain him (man). He re-introduces terms and words that have all but been forgotten for the most of us when we think of a person; words such as 'love' and 'value', 'feeling' and 'morality', 'sharing' and 'devotion', 'sacrifice' and 'commitment', 'responsibility' and 'repentance', 'fidelity' and 'faith'. It seems that Scheler has brought to the fore almost every word with respect to man as a person that we cannot control - either in our minds or in our worlds. With Scheler's person we cannot capture him but we can discover him; we cannot define him but we can understand him; we can never know him in the way we know theories and propositions, things and objects, but we can love him.

In coming to understand the phenomenon of mental illness we find that the above words (love, value, feeling, morality, sharing, devotion, sacrifice, commitment, responsibility, repentance, fidelity and faith) draw us to the heart of the matter - penetrating to the very core the sense and meaning of the emptiness or absence discussed

in the previous section. These are the very words which are shunned by psychiatrists and psychologists, in general, because they fall outside the scientific format. These words, however, permeate many of the works of modern authors who are deeply involved with coming to understand the 'mentally ill'.

These 'words' convey a sense and meaning which most assuredly find place in the healing of the mentally ill. They are, however, ill-suited for science, as I stated in the above. Alice von Hildebrand puts it this way:

When we speak of psychology, we have in mind the science aiming at the unprejudiced analysis of given facts. Its contribution to human knowledge lies in its objective presentation of empirical facts. In no way does it pretend to be able to give an over all interpretation of these facts.¹⁰⁴

The Problem of the 'New Human Scientist'

There are aspects of the character of mental illness which are 'unscientific', in that they transcend the realm of science and its accompanying attitude. There are a growing number of 'scientists' who cannot remain satisfied with the rigid and strict framework demanded in and by science. They have found more, discovered more with regard to 'man' and 'person' which, too, demands its expression. These professionals have accepted this 'calling' to share their insights in their writings with us. They have expressed these insights in such terms as are available to them and within the

context most familiar to them and herein lies the horns of a thorny dilemma. Although their writings and ideas are insightful and most necessary, they find themselves between realms. On the one hand, their works are not quite philosophical in that their explicit philosophies (those found within their writings) about man have emerged after the fact, as generalizations of that which has frequently emerged or shown itself over time consistently within their relationships with their clients or patients. This becomes problematic because these 'philosophies' are creations of the intellect - theorizations and paradigms which serve to explain their original insights and experiences, which in turn are 'validated' or 'shored up' by the use of several examples drawn from their private practices and cases. Their 'philosophies' serve to explain the recurrence of certain 'human' and 'personal' phenomenon of which they have become aware.

This seems the case with Frankl's Logotherapy, Roger's client-centered therapy, and Laing's 'science of persons'.¹⁰⁵ Also, we find attempts of this in another form in May's ideas in, Man's Search for Himself, Kelly's Constructive Alternativism and Allport's Becoming.¹⁰⁶ These men have made profound discoveries, however, they have all 'explained' their meaning in terms of a different phil-

osophy, as a result. Philosophy has thus become a 'tool' for explanation rather than the ground for authority from which these insights emerge as 'necessarily' so - that these insights are not merely the product of private opinion. Their findings have been shared in the only way open to them, given the context within which they have come forth. As I said earlier, their authority is thus based upon the frequencies and the consistencies of their findings rather than on philosophical necessity. Their philosophies are the product of induction, deduction and inference and can be understood in no other context. Their authority, other than this, is non-existent. They are, thus, not philosophical in the true sense and meaning of philosophy.

On the other hand, these works are not purely nor are they rigidly scientific. They have gone further than the scientific format allows in that they have begun to 'interpret' the 'meaning of their facts'. In this sense they have overstepped their bounds and entered into regions which are no longer the object of science, nor are they under the 'jurisdiction' of science. Thus, these men are 'more' than scientists and not yet 'philosophers'; rather they have removed their philosophical insights and intuitions, their profound discoveries and

'experiences' into the realm of science. They have come to do 'justice' to neither in the fullest sense of the term.

My reason for introducing the dilemma of these 'human scientists' is to underscore the fact that, in their comingling of empirical facts and philosophical intuition, their works are, in far too many cases, criticized as being too shallow and superficial (beautiful stories lacking substance - a problem that I alluded to in the beginning portion of this section) and that which is found within them is given too little 'solid' attention in the field of science and in the field of philosophy.

These professionals are and have been discovering aspects of man that emerge in therapy. These discoveries have offered great assistance in 'making therapy work'. This 'making therapy work' is, however, not the result of refined skills and techniques, nor is it the result of the formulations of new methodologies, rather, these men have 'hit upon' many essential principles by which their therapies must necessarily work. It is not the skill of the therapist, nor is it the method used which brings about 'success'; rather this 'success' (if we may presume to call it that!) is due to the 'heart of

the therapist' - a fundamental attitude, the personal presence of which is born out in the therapist within the dialogue of the 'therapist-patient' (therapist-client) relationship. These men have come to discover the communion which emerges in therapy between 'persons'. They have been given the precious gift of love for their patients or clients, and in so accepting it they have come to wonder and marvel at its power to heal. The following will explore this communion of persons as found in the most special kind of therapy, which is the ground for the healing of the wounded one, the redeeming of the lost person. Before we can apprehend the depth and meaning of this, however, we must come to understand and explore Scheler's 'Person'.

Part "C" MEETING SCHELER'S 'PERSON'

The Person and the Psycho-Socio-Physical Human Being

When Scheler uses the title or the name, 'person', he has a very definite understanding of the term. (This is also true for his employment of the term 'act' as well, as it is always used in the context of the person as its correlate term) So many authors mentioned in the above have used the terms 'person' and 'act', but for them it would seem that these terms have no special meaning of their own; rather, they almost seem to

hold as synonymous the words 'self' and 'behavior'.

For example, Laing, in his book, Self and Others, states:

One can feel physically empty when not putting oneself into what one is doing, or when what one is putting oneself into feels intrinsically meaningless to oneself. But emptiness and futility can arise when a person has put himself into his acts even when these acts seem to have some point to him, if he is accorded no recognition by the other and if he feels he is not able to make a difference to anyone.¹⁰⁷

This is well in line with that which Scheler would say.

Laing, however, goes on to say that:

Self receives and gives. Other is needed to give and to receive. The more self receives, the more self needs to give¹⁰⁸

These two quotes obviate the point raised here. It is not the self who receives and gives; rather, it is the person! The other is not needed to give and receive; rather, it is another person who is needed. The 'self' and the 'other' here are no more than generalized theoretical constructs - objects that have no 'power' or 'life' to 'do' anything - much less 'act'. The point made here by Laing, regardless of how valid it is, no longer relates to persons; instead, the very idea of 'persons' has been drawn into the 'scientific' realm wherein 'persons' become void of all meaning essentially theirs. The psycho-socio-physical human being is the only one to be 'found' in this realm.

To develop this point further, the psycho-socio-physical human being 'behaves'; the person 'acts'. The difference between the two statements is not one of semantics but rather one of essences. A psycho-socio-physical human being is understood as one fully encased within the realm of his environing world, reacting to his inner and outer worlds (ie. his ego and his environment of people, situations and things). He 'reacts' to these worlds as he experiences them in terms of one another - he, himself, being the place and position for the coincidence of the two to interact with one another, and one upon the other. Within the confines of this realm, man lives according to his fate - he lives it out, so to speak, and his fate is influenced heavily by the fate of others and the 'fate of things' that surround him.¹⁰⁹ Within this realm both his freedom and his choices are greatly limited.¹¹⁰ This was the focal point in an ongoing debate between David Premack and B. F. Skinner, but Premack was incapable of 'lifting' man above his environment in order to 'free' him, although he 'knew' that essentially man was not the 'determined' creature that Skinner would have him to be.¹¹¹ The dilemma of the sciences will ever emerge in this fashion.

To return to our discussion, however, man is subject to

the limitations placed upon him by inherent traits, and tendencies, social environment, and social factors. The physical environment also has a large role to play, in this realm and at this level. Within this realm, man is a solitary creature; he is 'with' others in a 'found' social sense, in that from birth onward his social world is filled with primary and secondary others as socializing agents; but in the deepest sense of this realm, man is quite alone, necessarily alienated from these same others in space and time. Rather than acting, he behaves, he reacts, he responds to the given situations and conditions of the life which surround him and according to their dictates upon him. He can only 'choose' which dictate to follow or to go against.¹¹² He, himself, is the height, the breadth and the depth of his world - a world relative to life alone. All of that beyond the boundaries of his bound-to-life-experiences, as a human being is virtually unknown to him - and it cannot be known. Science can do no more for man than this - can offer him no greater rank or position, nor can it hope to discover him in any other context than the one of which it is the creator.

The scientist, however, could not create such a 'plan' of man were he not 'other than' this man of which he speaks, the 'object' of his study. Goffman expresses it

this way in a different context:

There is a vulgar tendency in social thought to divide the conduct of the individual into a profane and a sacred part, ...The profane part is attributed to the obligatory world of social roles; it is formal, stiff and dead; it is exacted by society. The sacred part has to do with 'personal' matters and 'personal' relationships - with what an individual 'really' is like underneath it all when he relaxes and breaks through to those in his presence ... Sociologists qua sociologists are allowed to have the profane part; sociologists qua persons along with other persons, retain the sacred for their friends, their wives and themselves.¹¹³

The Person in the Spiritual Realm

The person is found, discovered in his givenness, within the spiritual realm (as are also his 'acts'). This is Goffman's 'sacred' part. The spiritual realm transcends the one found to be the 'object' of and for science. Although the person is indeed found within the realm of the psycho-socio-physical world as a living human being, in a manner of speaking, in that he rises every morning, goes about his business throughout the day, and then returns home to family and friends and comfort in the evening, the person, himself, as such (and also his acts) is psycho-physically indifferent.¹¹⁴ He 'belongs' to the spiritual realm wherein he emerges as a person who performs acts- he is a 'spiritual' given - given in the experiencing of the person. At the onset, let me clarify that this does not mean that the person and his acts are somehow 'higher' than, or 'above', or 'over top' of the human being and his behavior. All too often the

'transcending' is taken to mean 'a place' or a 'position' rather than a 'way of understanding' man in a totally different context and in totally different terms other than those found in the areas of sociology, psychology, psychiatry, etc. and the sciences such as biology, physiology, neurology, etc. In the latter case, man, as such, is abstracted and viewed as an 'object' (as I discussed above), removed from his being in the world, from the heart of his dailiness. The 'spiritual' realm, in itself, offers another way of seeing man, in that it rediscovers him precisely in the heart of his dailiness, both in himself as an individual person and in relationship and relatedness to other persons as a communal person. This is the meaning of the spiritual realm.¹¹⁵

This is one of Scheler's more difficult portions in that we cannot take 'person' to be an object, and thus we cannot examine the 'name' as such in that fashion.¹¹⁶

The essential nature of the person and also of his acts lends itself only to description, a description which it is hoped will point to the phenomenon of the 'person, himself', and his 'acts'.¹¹⁷ Again, and put differently, by this it is meant that person and acts do not in any way refer to what is thought to be the ego or behavior (whether in terms of a 'Thou' or an environing world). The inner world of man (the ego, the self, etc.) and

the environing world of man (in terms of people and objects, and extending into the realm of the areas of study for the natural and hard sciences) are all objects for the person. All that is or can be an object is an object for the person, in a special sense. This is one major problem in the work of Allport, in his Becoming.¹¹⁸ All that is or can be an object for the person, necessarily is not that which can also be considered as the person or as 'part' of the person. As I have said, person and act are discovered in and discoverable only within the spiritual realm in their givenness.¹¹⁹

Person and Act

As persons and acts are found with one another, in a special sense, the person is not beneath, behind, above or in any other way apart from his acts. He is that substantial unity and foundation of being, existing for and in the performance of all possible, essentially different acts, such as thinking, preferring, remembering, loving and hating, hoping, expecting and adoring, etc.¹²⁰ Though he precedes these acts in their differentiation, essentially, he is to be found only in that they are performed, in their being performed, and in their performance. Both are in and for one another, and there must be a faithfulness in our understanding of this and in our expression of this or else both lose their sense and

meaning. They 'belong' together and cannot be understood apart from one another.¹²¹ Thus, we cannot look at 'person' and then look at 'act' - the person is only given in the performing of his acts.

The term person embraces quite comfortably within itself all that in every other attitude toward man seems to become a contradiction or opposites. There is no difference between inner or outer world, inner or outer perception, inner or outer willing, etc. because the person is as close to one as to the other.¹²² There is no differentiation between thinking, perceiving, loving, willing, preferring, or placing after, etc. in that they are all acts performed by the person.¹²³

With the term person, there is no notion of 'time' involved, in the sense of permanence and change or in the sense of objective or phenomenal time. The person in the above sense is quite 'ageless'. The person 'transcends' time and this also holds, in a special way for acts, in that acts 'pierce' into time, ie. the person acts into time and is not bound in any way by it.¹²⁴ (We will not here get into Scheler's understanding of what happens after death.) We must ever keep in mind that whatever may be said for acts is also embraced within the idea of

person. There are not found to be any such problems as the ones of sameness and differentness in terms of the person, because, although the person varies in quality through the performance of each act, in its being performed (as opposed to either before or after the performance of the act) this variation is one of quality, a pure becoming different which is found in the direction and intention of the act itself.¹²⁵ There is nothing to be considered in this sense as outside of the act. This variation, however, does not imply any sort of causality in any sense of the term. It has nothing to do with the idea that the person's becoming different is caused by the act, or the person's becoming different caused the act.... This is most assuredly not the case. This will become clearer as we begin to discuss the area of meaning and intention with regard to acts.¹²⁶ As acts are performed by the person, they are understood to be 'personal', and by essential necessity in their givenness they are found to be with direction and intention toward the fulfillment of some meaning. This is the spiritual heart of personal acts - their direction or directedness, their intentionality and their meaningfulness.¹²⁷

We have established that the givenness of the person and act are always in a 'givenness-together'. The person is

found in the act, in the performing of the act, as the act is found in its givenness of intention toward a 'world'. This act in terms of intention has nothing whatsoever to do with purpose or goals.¹²⁸ Rather, this act has to do with the intentional fulfillment of some meaning as it is discovered in the person's world.

Person and World

This world, referred to in the above, is not a world of people and things etc. as is found in the idea of an environing world. This environing world is always the correlate of the ego. This world is for the person, a world of which he is not a part, but rather the correlate, as ego is to the environing world.¹²⁹ Within the embrace of this 'personal' world we find all of that which may be understood as the 'objects' for the person in a very special sense. It is the world wherein he 'experiences' himself as a person.¹³⁰ This world is absolute as the person is absolute, and substantial as the person is considered to be substantial.¹³¹

In any understanding of the world, as with the person, we will encounter great difficulty if we attempt to understand it in terms of an object or entity in any way. It is not a thing, but rather a name or a title given to that which is found to be essentially for the person wherein all of the essential constituents of the inner

world (ego, body, lived body and all to do with the 'I am') and the outer world (space, time, the environing world, the Thou, etc.) belong. This world is special unto each person, given to each person and illuminated by each person in a very special way.¹³² This wonderfully rich world is, in a most beautiful way, the loving discovery of and the loving inspiration for the person.¹³³ The person has his foundation in absolute being and represents this absolute being and his world.¹³⁴ This matter of 'absolute being' and the person and his personal world will become easier to understand once we have discussed Scheler's understanding of values, etc.

The person acts toward his world as it is discovered by him in terms of love. His acts are intentionally directed toward that which constitutes his world according to the manifold values he 'sees' unfolding before his 'heart', as held to be worthy of his loving acts. This world, although it is filled with all of the things and people we find round and about us in the dailiness of our lives, and filled with all that we find within the realm of our inner worlds, such as thoughts and ideas, memories, etc., is not to be understood in these terms. It is, rather, to be understood as the world, the constituents of which are found to be those listed above, only as they are 'bathed in the light of our loving' and found to be worthy

of our loving.¹³⁵

The absolute being of this world may be seen in two different ways: 1) as man apprehends it in accord with the light of his frail and finite loving;¹³⁶ and 2) as apprehended by the loving act of its Creator who at once establishes, maintains, and sustains it by and with and in His loving.¹³⁷

The World in the Heart of Man

For Scheler, man in the deepest sense and most profound way, 'before he is a thinking being and before he is a willing being, is a loving being'.¹³⁸ The act of loving is the first and most wonderously personal act performed by man, and it is the foundation for all other personal acts.¹³⁹ Through performing such an act, man leaves his own situation, the security of 'himself', the security of any accompanying 'I am', and freely offers himself, in the stead of his personal spiritual core, and emerges forth toward the thing or the value, (eg. truth, knowledge, beauty, etc.) the stars of the heavens or the vast expanse of the sea, the friend, the beloved, or his God. In this loving act, and by means of its performance, in its being performed, he unites himself with that one to whom his love is intentionally directed, gently demanding, affirming and encouraging its tendency toward its proper perfection (as held in the heart of God in terms of that

which it is meant to be), aiding it, promoting it and blessing it.¹⁴⁰ All loving acts (whether or not their 'objects' are in accord with the measure of love in which they are held) are essentially this. In loving, man reaches out, blessing his world in its being and blessing the One by whom, through whom and in whom it came to be. And as we shall see, the way in which we love our world and the way in which we love that 'power' greater than ourselves which is found to be the height of the meaning of being in the world and for the world, will, in turn form the quality of our substantial, personal being.¹⁴¹

As man is a loving being, this loving to the depth and breadth and height that it expands, is the precondition for all that he may know - which in turn, is the precondition for all that he may will. Scheler says that

(We find ourselves) in an infinitely large world of things, both sensible and spiritual, all of which move our hearts and our passions constantly. All that we recognize through thinking and perceiving, all that we will, all of our choices, all of our deeds, that height to which we may attain or the depths to which we may plummet, all of this depends upon the play (Spiel) of this stirring of our hearts.¹⁴²

The mind can only know that in which the heart has first found delight, or at the very least a sense of wonder. And how can one will toward that which the mind does not know? This loving act is offered in as many different ways and towards as many different values, objects and

persons as there are found to be persons. Each personal world, for each personal act is as filled with wonder and meaning as the heart of the one who beholds it all. In a most beautiful way this loving brings its own very special illumination upon the world of daily matters, of public and private concerns and affairs; it enlarges all that is found to be worthwhile and disregards all that does not fall within the scope of its rays.¹⁴³ This is the sacred part to which Goffman referred.

The sacred part, for Goffman, the spiritual and the holy realm for Scheler, is that part wherein, as persons, we experience ourselves and others, in the sharing with, the being with, the communion and dialogue with others and our world.¹⁴⁴ This is grounded in loving. As our loving illuminates our world, as it expands to welcome more and more things and values and persons into our embrace, it expands the ground from which our knowing and subsequently our willing spring forth. The saying of Powell finds itself placed upon many beautiful posters:

The size of a person's world is the size
of his heart.

The World in the Heart of God

The world embraces an objective order of values, in that all that is found to be within this world, was and is born of the heart of God. All of that which constitutes

this world, from the smallest grain of sand to God Himself, is embraced within one realm of which God is both its Source and crown.¹⁴⁵ This includes both things and persons, and according to their own value-qualities, they are 'given' their own special and singularly unique places wherein they stand within this realm. In this sense, all that is found to be within this realm and heirarchy of values in accord with the worthiness of love in each and every thing and person therein, is seen and understood in terms of the loving 'idea' with which and in which it was created by God.¹⁴⁶

Everything, then, within this realm, is found to 'exist' in the fullest sense, in its perfection, as God 'meant' it to be. For Scheler, then, each and every time we apprehend a value within our worlds (for to each person there is a world), and to the extent that we are capable of apprehending it with the purest act of loving, then we 'see' it as it stands in the eyes of God Himself. We have grasped God's vision of it, His heart-print upon it.¹⁴⁷ One indeed might tend to say that this is far too idealistic an 'interpretation' of the world in which we live. We look about us with our natural eyes at all there is to be seen and we can, in any number of cases, find flaws, imperfections, little frailties wherein finitude has

placed its mark and taken its price. But, by the same token, how is it that we grasp these faults (whether they are major or minor), how is it that we 'know' there are these large or small imperfections? That which we see with our natural eyes is also seen with our hearts. We see that which it is now, and that which it is essentially, and thus, that which it could be 'if only ...'. Every time we even allow the words, 'it could be so much more ...', we have offered the evidence which demonstrates that while we have grasped what it is, as it is, we have also grasped what it was meant to be. This 'meant-to-be' often does not have a 'by whom' following it; but we know, in a very special way to whom this 'by whom' refers. It refers to God - or the one by whom it came into being, and as it came into being, essentially. But this happens so subtly, so secretly, that we rarely pay much heed to it. It slips by us unnoticed.

This, in no way, points to what may be called in any sense 'relativism', i.e. that we know when something is flawed because we have seen something better with which to compare it. Relativism always presupposes a type of 'figuring out' process - a cognitive act - wherein we compare one thing with another, a process which seeks out differences in terms of the common factors of things by degrees. And in a special sense, it presupposes the

essential distinction between one thing and another to be on an empirically qualitative level. The empirical realm has nothing whatsoever to do with the value of a thing in itself, or the treating and handling of each object as a thing unique unto itself, in its own right. Looking at things in the light of their value, in their sense of 'meaning', each and every thing beheld is beheld in its own right, in its own way of being. In this there is no comparison at all; it is embraced to the fullest within the givenness of the thing itself. We become entangled by the tentacles of such 'isms' as relativism when we begin to explore the second aspect of this absolute being, as man apprehends this world in the light of his frail and finite loving, and thus how he comes to be understood as representing it.

Man the Loving Being

For Scheler, the act of loving is ever that which 'awakens both knowing and willing; it is, indeed, the mother of spirit and understanding itself.¹⁴⁸ We thus come to know that toward which our loving has 'opened' our eyes; and our willing toward it finds its beginnings in this knowing. Loving, then becomes the active attitude toward our world and all that lies therein. It tempers and flavours and gives all texture to the way in which we come to know, and following, the way in which we come to will. This is the sanctity of the person, the sub-

stance of his being.

We do not love randomly, nor do we love accidentally, nor indiscriminately.¹⁴⁹ The act of love is directed with intention toward its object or toward another person to the depth and degree that there are value-qualities discovered as 'being found' therein.¹⁵⁰ We love all that we love because of the worthiness of love it reveals to us from within its essential nature. This or that particular loving act is spurred on by the force of our active loving attitude which is the ground and the condition for all acts performed by us as persons. We do not think about something or someone and then 'decide' to love; rather it is the reverse. This someone or something must necessarily be found to be within the scope of our loving before we even take 'an interest' in it.¹⁵¹ And this loving grows.¹⁵² In that these things and/or persons fall within our realm of loving, we come to know them, and our willing reaches out to embrace them. We are drawn to them in that they 'possess' values in themselves - a worthiness of love, in their 'being valuable'.

The more we come to know them, the more we love them for the ever higher values that are discovered within them.

This is the birth place wherein the miracles begin in terms of the mentally ill. Before we can fully apprehend this, however, we must explore more fully the depth of Scheler's understanding of these values and persons.

Part "D" THE ORDER OF VALUES AND THEIR BEING-FELT

Scheler has yet another way in which he understands these values and the realm wherein they are to be 'found'. In this portion, we shall discuss these values in terms of their objective order (range) within the hierarchy of values and the feeling with which they are accompanied and apprehended within the person. Scheler finds these values to be given in what may be distinguished as four different realms, in a ranking order or hierarchy from least to most valuable.¹⁵³ As I noted these values range from least to most worthy of love.

The Agreeable and the Useful¹⁵⁴

The 'least' valuable are those things found to be agreeable and disagreeable and the useful. These are given in sensible feelings that may be found ranging from pleasure to pain. Even though these are considered to be the lowest in terms of this value hierarchy, they begin to supply us with an opportunity to come to understand what Scheler means by feeling. These fall within

realm of sensible or 'physical' feeling and in that they are felt clearly demonstrates that these feelings are 'given' before we think about them or contemplate their meaning - even before they are so-named. The 'agreeable' found herein is the most dividible in terms of its lending itself to being shared. By this I mean that enjoying or suffering are very individual and that which is found to be enjoyable for one person may not necessarily be that enjoyable for another; and equally, that which is found to be quite painful for one person, is not necessarily so for another.

Also, the agreeable, the pleasant and the useful are those things which tend, by some to be greatly over-valued. In our modern world, in terms of the mass media, it seems that we are constantly being barraged by that which is 'said' to be the most agreeable, the most pleasant and the most useful. We are (or would be, if they had their way) made to believe that because these things (whatever they may be) are agreeable, pleasant or useful, we simply cannot live without them. Money, at this level often dictates who will possess these 'questionable' goods. They are beheld by many, but their possession belongs to few. In most cases, we are encouraged to over-value these things, believing that they are far

greater in value than they are.¹⁵⁵

In the foregoing portion it was discussed that from a grain of sand to God, everything and every person is valuable to a greater or lesser degree according to its own particular dispensation within this realm or hierarchy. At the level of the agreeable, etc., the values found within these things are the least, they are the most transient (eg. that which was held to be useful one hundred years ago is hardly in the same way useful today), they are the least 'shareable', and they remain 'outside' of the heart of man. This is demonstrable in cases where something is held to be extremely valuable (in terms of desire, because we cannot 'love' at this realm in any true sense); it is in fact, highly over-valued, were someone to want it above all things. Once this one gains possession of it, the degree of value previously 'felt' is never fulfilled, and rather than experiencing pleasure from this particular possession a strange sense of 'emptiness' begins to grow - one feels that a portion of the heart has been poured out. This becomes the frail beginnings of greed.

In order to attempt to fill this emptiness, one seeks to possess more and more of that which is deemed as

valuable, rather than that which is indeed valuable in its own way, and in its own place within the hierarchy of values. In an ever enlarging fashion the depth and breadth of this feeling of emptiness grows. With this comes the 'birth of the miser'. One cannot fill one's heart with only that which fills a room.

The Vital¹⁵⁶

The second realm or level, found to be resting upon the level of the agreeable, the disagreeable and the useful is the level of vital values and vital feelings. These are higher than the useful in that the useful are found at the highest level of the 'physical' values; and they are discoverable in those feeling-states of health and well-being as opposed to the feeling-states of sickness and decline. This is the realm of 'life-values'. We have all had the feeling that 'the world is wonderful and it is just good to be alive'. We do not necessarily feel this way for any particular 'reason(s)'. The feeling is just welcomed as it springs forth within us. By the same token, we have all had what could be considered to be days when all 'was not well'. We can rarely, if ever, offer even the remotest explanation for these feelings, and yet we experience their presence within us as surely as we did those of 'being alive'. The origin of these cannot be found within the same realm as those preceding these, ie. the physical realm (the agreeable,

disagreeable, the useful, and the harmful) We may feel fine, physically (in the sense of being free from any discomfort) and yet experience the feeling of decline. And we may, in the reverse, be experiencing the feeling of discomfort - even pain, and yet we still experience the feeling of 'well-being'.

There is found a peculiar lawfulness among all values and feeling of values that when one 'strives for a value' it will always elude one's grasp. By this it is meant that when one desires to acquire a value itself- as if it were a 'thing to be had' the value will never be felt. For example, there are those we have all met at one time or another, who always strive for 'good health'. Because they always strive for it, it will necessarily always be one step away. One who suffers from hypochondria may be seen in this light, in many instances. One who values youth and 'runs after this value' will ever 'feel' old, regardless of his or her age. The same may be said for those who value happiness. Those who strive after happiness as a value 'to be had' in life experience, will ever be striving, because happiness is born of the way one lives and experiences his life, not the experience of life itself. A last example could be found in those who are 'survivalists' today. They value surviving to living, in that they seek to guarantee their survival.

In this sense, they strive for the guarantee for life as the value rather than valuing life itself - in the living of it in a valuable way. One cannot experience or feel the value of living if one constantly seeks a guarantee for its preservation in such a fashion, as though it were a 'thing to be had'.¹⁵⁷

Again, this level, as with the one below it, is often short-lived in terms of the duration of the feelings experienced within its range. They are less transient than those of the physical realm; they are more extended, in that whereas the feeling of pain is quite specific, the feelings of well-being or decline are ones that seem to extend throughout the whole of the person in terms of the lived body. We feel the feeling essentially, in a manner of speaking, in that we feel, for example, the 'presence' of decline or well-being. There is a certain sense of wholeness about this feeling which extends throughout us with its presence.

The Place of Psychic Feelings ¹⁵⁸

We find that, for Scheler, there comes a dramatic shift once we transcend the vital level and enter into the spiritual realm of values and the realm of (pure) psychic feelings, etc. At the onset, there would seem to be a 'gap' difficult to bridge. This emerges when he speaks about the 'pure psychical feelings', as they stand 'outside'

the realm of values in terms of either the vital or the spiritual realms. When I say 'stand outside' I mean that in his discussions of values and feelings there seems to be a correlation between the values of the agreeable, etc. and, in some sense, the feelings that correspond to these values in terms of pleasure and pain etc. Next, in the vital realm we find the life-values and in some sense, vital feelings, such as well-being and decline. When we arrive at the spiritual values, however, we discover that there is no 'place' found for the 'psychical feelings' which seems initially to correspond with the third realm of values simply because psychical feeling is found within the third level of 'feelings'.¹⁵⁹ This would seem to be the most 'natural' way of understanding Scheler, and it is not difficult to become confused, at the onset, at Scheler's apparent 'omission' of psychic feelings from the hierarchy of values. We must realize, however, that Scheler is not giving us a formula that develops into an easily understandable pattern. There is no omission of the recognition of psychic feelings, their intentionality in terms of meaning fulfillment and their 'object' of intention.¹⁶⁰ But when we begin to understand the realm of spiritual values, etc., as Scheler understands them, we must see them in the following light.

For Scheler, the functions and acts wherein these values

are grasped are the functions of spiritual feeling and the acts of spiritual preferring, loving and hating.¹⁶¹ The (pure) psychical feelings are ego-qualities.¹⁶² As for the ego, that which corresponds to or is the correlate of the ego, is the environing world. We have already discussed the environing world in several places in this work up to this point and will not go into this matter further, however, we shall recall some of the points that seem to relate to this topic. Scheler says that all functions are psychic, or the mind - in terms of the ego, or the "I".¹⁶³ Psychic feelings, in a sense, bond the relationship between the ego (my sense of I, or myself) and my outer world, or my environing world.

Psychic feelings are those feelings which are directed with intentionality toward the 'outer world' or the 'environing world' as it is experienced by the "I" - the psycho-socio-physical human being - and this is the realm i.e. the "I", psychic feelings, and the outer world, that psychiatrists and psychologists deal with in their understanding of mental illness and the mentally ill. These feelings are always given in the sense of 'I feel sad', 'I feel sadness' or 'I am sad', for example.¹⁶⁴ These feelings are still, to a degree transient, and they have definite attachment to the "I" of man in that they are

ego-qualities. They are born of the experiences of life, in terms of myself.

As ego, environing world, psychic feelings and (in a sense) behavior are found and given together, so too are person, world, spiritual feelings and acts found and given together. The ego, etc. are given in the form of inner intuition or inner perception, as acts performed by the person. This is not, however, the only distinction between the two realms. The value of my ego is given in my sense of 'myself', my experiencing of my "I". The value of me as a person - not something that I experience in any manner like that of my ego - is the value of my personal being. This 'my' in the sense that I have used it here is indicative, not possessive. There is a great difference, thus, between ego-quality and being-quality; psychic feelings and spiritual feelings with regard to the 'self'.¹⁶⁵

It would seem to me, given that which Scheler says about egoness and these feeling-states which are the qualities of the ego, that we could easily misapprehend an ego-quality for a being-quality unless we were aware of the radical difference between the two. If one is deeply submerged within the ego, within the sense of self or the sense of "I", that which is felt to be an ego-

quality could be taken for a being-quality. In doing so this would shift the outlook with which one beheld everything within himself and the world beyond himself. As we reflect upon this we discover that there are times when we 'feel' a certain way, be it angry, depressed (or let down), melancholy, etc. and we do not want to feel this way. In a special sense we 'know' that we are 'over-reacting', we are too filled with emotion, too much within ourselves and too blinded by these feelings. It is often at these times that we attempt to sit down and 'have a good talk with ourselves' (and it would seem that it must be the maddest of men who would not admit to this exercise once in a while!) We attempt to talk ourselves out of feeling this way. There are other instances when we find that it is precisely these feelings that, at times, we try to fight, or at times we try to embrace - to make them stay with us. These feeling-states (which they are rather than feelings that remain with us for any lengthy period of time) are passing, fleeting things - 'if' we allow them to be. Let us examine and explore these feelings in terms of one feeling that is quite familiar to us all (though it is not all that often felt by most of us.) This feeling is one of self-pity.

I spoke in the above of the misunderstanding of ego-qualities and being-qualities. By means of such a mis-

understanding we tend to 'ontologize' or 'reify' the ego and remain oblivious to the fact of our being, in any way. This ego is that which becomes, in a sense, the 'object' of our endeavors. The more we tend to attempt to 'enlarge' our egos, the more we 'rob' our very being, in terms of qualities. This is the paradoxical situation of one who is in the throws of self-pity.

The one who is filled, so to speak, with self-pity, sees himself in the midst of all of life's circumstances as being the brunt of or the target of life's misfortune - as if he was the object of life's unpleasant joke. This whole situation is permeated with the accompanying sigh of 'poor me'. The one who is filled with self-pity seems to grieve and mourn over the harsh treatment (which he thinks) his ego, or self-image is receiving from all of those around him who do not tend to see him as he sees himself and they, as a result, will not treat him the way in which he thinks he should be treated. Slowly, over a period of time, this one begins to do all that he can to preserve his self-image, his ego. No price is too high and no compromise is too great for the sake of, or the preservation of this ego, this self-image. There are those who would carry on this crusade to the very death, in that death is ultimately the price they are willing to pay in order to maintain their own 'idea' of themselves.

Let me give an example to clarify my meaning. During my own hospitalization there was a dear, dear woman who was with me as a fellow inmate. There were a great number of opinions expressed as to the exact nature of her problem. Indeed, there were those who firmly believed that she had no problem at all, that she just wanted the attention and was faking the whole thing. The staff at the hospital, by and large, put a great deal of effort into trying to help her 'sort out her life', and she did everything that was recommended to her - carrying it out to the very letter. She received a wealth of support from her family and her friends who came to visit her faithfully. I, for my part, was afraid for her. I did not voice my fears - for I, too, was mad, and who would there be to listen to these feelings of foreboding that never left me? This is, in a sense, a tragedy that all too often arises in the community of the mentally ill. Often times, those who are insane, have a far clearer sense of the insanity of their fellows than the most excellent of diagnosticians. And just as often, we must live with this in silence - concentrating upon the progress of our own recovery.

For the moment, I shall call this woman Mary. Mary's only 'problem' was born of her inability to be honest with herself. And who could see Mary, in the midst of her suffer-

ing, and call her a 'liar'. Through our long relationship I had learned much about Mary, but I had also come to know Mary herself. It was after the war, in England, and Mary was young and not very beautiful. She was not very skilled and thus could not guarantee herself a good job over there, and she hated the thought of staying in London while the rebuilding of all of the ruins would be taking place. She never wanted to be hungry, never wanted to be without a place that was warm and safe, she never wanted to hear another bomb again as long as she lived. She wanted to guarantee her safety and her security - regardless of the price. Along came a young Canadian soldier, about to return home. They dated a few times, he asked her to marry him, and return to Canada with him. She, without a moment's hesitation, said "Yes".

Thirty years, a house in the country, and children later Mary, a hard worker in the church, a model citizen, an active member in the community, a talented craft person, a wonderful gardener, and a very loving mother, and a dear friend to many finds herself an inmate in a psychiatric hospital, grieving, and wondering, why? She was one of the most beautiful, loving persons that I have ever come to know, and at that time, I could not tell her that her

life was a 'lie'. Anger, hatred, resentment, grief, disgust, guilt and remorse seethed within her, beneath her 'loving' attitude, and her concern for others. It was not that she was unhappy, not that she was bored, not that she was frigid, not that she was confused and frustrated with her life, and not that she was depressed that had brought her here. Nor was it because she had an accompanying medical problem. Mary had spent thirty years devoting herself to the guaranteeing of her own safety and security. She had created a world and a Mary to fit it. This Mary was not the personal being of Mary - as a person; rather, this Mary was a caricature of Mary, the concretized ego of Mary, the reified self of Mary. It was, in a sense that will unfold further along in this section, the 'false god' of Mary. And in the deepest heart of her, she 'knew' it. Those 'round and about her 'loved' the presentation of Mary, they loved her 'false god'. They never really got to know the Mary hidden and buried so deeply within at all.

At the point of her hospitalization, Mary's 'false god' had shattered, and the world that she had created had fallen apart. She had lost possession of her god and her world because she could no longer maintain them. When these fell away there was little else left other than the habits of her dailiness - the motions of her life

and she was empty. What we are is never what we have - even to the point of the image that we have or try to have of ourselves. If the two are confused, the storehouse of what we have may be brimming over, but the storehouse of what we are will echo with its emptiness. We will eventually become missing persons, Scheler's 'invisible' persons. The end of Mary's tale is sad because she finished it herself. She worked and worked to reinstate her god, to recreate her world. When all efforts finally failed, and Mary's god died, Mary, herself could not survive, and she took her own life.

The Spiritual¹⁶⁶

The third realm of values and 'value-feelings' for Scheler is found to be within the spiritual level. These, again are unique in their origin and mode of feeling. In this realm we find the beautiful and the ugly, and all of the other aesthetic values, and the values of right and wrong. Herein we also discover the values of truth, science, culture, etc. These values relate to our being. For example, we sense a peculiar feeling of joy, a spiritual joy when we listen to the Messiah by Handel, or when we create something that we know will bring joy to many others (not in the sense that it will bring us praise, but in the strongest sense we are only aware of the joy that it will give to others), or when we have 'seen' justice done in something we have been a part of, for example, bring-

ing peace again between friends. In each and every value at the spiritual level, man has somehow 'gone beyond himself', transcended his environing world, seen greater things, beheld greater values, held higher hopes, shared in that which is shared in 'with' many other persons. It must be understood that the higher the value, the more it allows for the 'communion with others' in the feeling of that which the value embraces, and affords. All of the value feelings up to and including this value-feeling vary as the object wherein the value was first sighted vary.¹⁶⁷

Spiritual values, in any way, shape or form, never afford any place for the "I" (the ego) of man at all.¹⁶⁸ In the value realms preceding the spiritual, ie. the physical and the vital, these values are found to be relative because they are dependent upon the particular 'pattern of loving' found to be emerging within each person. Their apprehension is, in a special sense, to be understood as more a matter of taste and inclination, a matter of every day life in the personal sense. By this, I am saying that these 'lower' values are more likely to be found within value-complexes for the person. The apprehension of these values greatly enable the person to discover higher and higher values within the realms of the spiritual and the holy. In a special sense, by

their realization, I as a person am freed from my sense of self to a greater and greater extent. Scheler, in his handling and understanding of psychical feelings and any linking of them with values clearly demonstrates that the 'ego' of man, the 'I' of man has relatively little value whatsoever, and then only as it is found within the realm of life and the environing world.¹⁶⁹ This is the misunderstanding to which I earlier referred, and due to the great amount of attention fostered upon the ego and the self-image of man, it is granted a place and an importance in therapy to such an extent that the heart of therapy (that heart which is hopefully made more understandable by this thesis) is often overlooked. This is not because it is ignored, but rather because it cannot be seen. This will be discussed to a greater extent further along in this work.

The Holy 170

The highest realm of values is that of the holy and the unholy, a realm wherein those values which are disclosed are given as absolute - whether in things or persons. In this realm the feelings offer themselves in terms of closeness or distance to the divine as given in our experiencing of them. Thus, spiritual feelings are absolute, completely detached from any idea of the ego, in that all states of the ego and feeling states of the ego as qualities evaporate. Scheler has a very special way of understand-

ing this and equally a special way of sharing his understanding of this with us.¹⁷¹ The feelings as spiritual feelings of this realm bring forth the substantial 'value' of our being - in our blissfulness or in our despair.

For the moment, we shall consider this realm of values itself. It is in this realm that persons are given as highest in value, in terms of that which is finite. It is in this light, in another sense that man freely devotes himself in loving servitude to God.¹⁷² The One who is of ultimate value is, for Scheler, the Person of persons and this One is God. (For the moment we must place to one side any possible prejudice that Scheler is advancing too much in terms of religion into his philosophy. We are here exploring, examining and discussing specific spiritual principles, the givenness of which is not dependent upon there existing any 'idea' of God at all. If Scheler's philosophical insights are sound and 'valid' they should be so in and of themselves. They do not rest upon an ultimate '... because God'.)

Scheler said that

Every finite spirit believes in either God or in idols...every man necessarily has an 'object of faith' and every man enters into the act of faith. Everyone has a special something which, for him is of the highest value to which he deliberately or through his naive practical behavior gives precedence over everything else... Man

appears magically bound and treats it (this something special) 'as if' it were God ... There is no choice between having and not having such a good. The only choice is in the good in his absolute realm ie. the God of the religious act as one's good, or an idol.¹⁷³

Thus, what Scheler is saying, is that each one of us lives 'by faith' in a 'power greater than ourselves'. In fact, one might say that wherever a man places his heart, this place will be found to be his reason to be.¹⁷⁴ It is that 'for whom', 'through whom', and 'by whom' he 'lives'. There was once an old adage that said: If you wish to know the kind of god worshipped and adored by a man, look at the man himself, rather than that which he calls his 'god'. In an interesting way this seems to be quite similar in many respects to the Personal Construct theory of personality offered by George Kelly.¹⁷⁵

A Glimpse at Kelly's 'Person' in the Light of Values

It is Kelly's theory that each and every person lives according to a personal set of constructs which he has established for the purposes of understanding his world, the lenses through which he perceives the reality of his world'.¹⁷⁶ The most superficial constructs are many and frail, in that they may be subject to change at any time by the person. The deeper these constructs go, however, into the heart of the person, the less easy they are to change; and those which lie at the deepest level are often not even recognized by the person as being his.

He cannot turn himself that far inward in order to become aware of their existence - and yet these constructs, known as 'core constructs' are the 'light' by which he lives and through which he comes to know, feel, will or understand anything and everything.¹⁷⁷ One could envision these constructs which lie at the core of man (at the very depth of heart) as the light which pierces through the darkness, the chaos and the vast plenum of people and things which fill the person's world.¹⁷⁸ The 'core construct', the one from which all the other constructs find the roots of their beginnings nurtured, strengthened and reaffirmed, could be understood to be that 'god' of which Scheler speaks. Kelly himself stated that his ideas were an attempt to embrace all of that which is found within man by the presence of which he lives his life, in that:

...the psychology of personal constructs is built upon an intellectual model ... (and) it is also taken to apply to that which is commonly called emotional or affective, and to that which has to do with action or conation.¹⁷⁹

The personality, it would seem, for Kelly, is born of the mind, the heart and the willing (striving) of man. This, too, is in accord with Scheler's insights with regard to man.¹⁸⁰ However, it is my belief that Kelly himself, did not fully realize that which he had 'hit upon', and thus did not fully come to grasp the sense and meaning of the construct tests themselves.

To clarify my meaning, Kelly saw man to be a scientist (most definitely not as the 'person' of Scheler's writings; although Scheler's 'person' somehow seems to be a given for Kelly, the given to which he applies the term 'scientist'), testing and retesting his 'hypotheses' which he held toward the world, removing those that were ineffective and strengthening those which seem to facilitate his ability to predict and possibly control that which was 'within the power of his actions'. Indeed, man may be a scientist in terms of those constructs within his 'view', those extending to the periphery of his personal construct system - those he can 'catch hold of'.¹⁸¹ But, my question, which begs an answer not found within Kelly's system is: What about those constructs which lie much deeper, those of which man is unaware, in most cases, are there? These, indeed and in fact, could be the idol(s) of which Scheler speaks, which are most definitely beyond the realm of science and fall under the category of faith by which and for which man lives - the power(s) greater than himself - born out through 'his naive practical behavior'.

This is evident for many who have run tests with his Repertory Grid Test. The 'figures' chosen by Kelly, (ie. self, mother, father, etc.) are all value figures, although Kelly only places value on the last three of

the list, ie. the successful person, the happy person and the ethical person.¹⁸² We find not merely a list of people who have had some connection with the person involved in the test; rather, we find persons who have become meaningful to that person in one way or another, whether positively or negatively. The constructs themselves are attempts at articulating these persons in meaningful terms. Although the list is, to be sure, contrived, and the groupings are also contrived, the person involved in the test, must attempt to 'intellectualize' or at best verbalize, some value held about these persons that was somehow 'there' prior to the test itself. In a most primitive way this test, and this theory, seem to be to be an attempt to objectify and articulate the 'heart' of the person, in some manner, rather than to 'define his personality' in terms of its constructs and systems. In a most intriguing and inspiring way it, in itself, tells us a great deal about the man, George Kelly, himself. He sees man as having a much greater depth to him than science, in many ways can ever hope to grasp; but, more importantly, he embraces man in his unique expression with much hope and optimism, much faith.

Given all of the above, any study of Kelly cannot be anything less than fascinating! Kelly, it would seem, little realizes, as many of the modern psychologists herein

mentioned, that although they as scientists are discovering, in many cases, the 'fate' of their patients, and clients, they are taking this fate and offering man the chance, by their own personal participation in his life, to become aware of and rise to fulfill his destiny.¹⁸³

The Values and their Realization

Returning to this 'realm of values' or hierarchy of values, within its embrace are found all of that which fills the person's world in terms of values of goods and persons. Within this order of values, each realm is found to be firmly grounded upon the one preceding it. The 'perfection' of the lower realm becomes the humble beginnings of the realm immediately higher in the range.¹⁸⁴ The holy is above the spiritual, the spiritual is above the vital, the vital is above the useful or the agreeable.¹⁸⁵

The values in this hierarchy are absolutely objective. As I stated in the above, it is essentially an order to be found beyond man which man can discover but not create or control or manipulate in any way, although it must be granted that he tries to re-create it for himself all too often. How man discovers these values and their ranking order is another profound insight of Scheler's.

These values are not to be grasped nor are they to be made the goal of striving in and of themselves. The

attempt to do so would result in futility.¹⁸⁶ These values as expressed in things and persons are understood as value-qualities, value-qualities of the being of particular things and persons. Thus, these things and persons are not the 'values' themselves, nor are they the mere manifestations of ideals; rather, they are valuable in the sense that they are worthy of love essentially as they more closely realize that 'intended meaning and value', that lovingly held image of their own unique and individually rich ideal expression, in the eyes, mind and heart of God.¹⁸⁷

For example, some of us have had the experience wherein we knew a person very well, and in the truest sense we loved him or her - not with a romantic love, so to speak, but rather a love for the person simply for who and what he or she was. The love with which we 'loved' them was a clear and unmarred love in the sense that it was not for personal gain nor was it for any other 'purpose' or 'design'. We beheld within him or her not only that which was given within the immediately given experience of their personal presence, but also, the direction in which they were heading - the presence of yet greater value, greater talent, greater virtue, and honour. This direction was one without limitation, in that we could not envision where this growth in depth and breadth and

height of value could ever come to an end. It was almost held to be 'open-ended'. It was as if we heard a gentle proding, a tender demanding surging from within ourselves toward them, saying, 'You are so much more than I behold at this moment; you have within you great things.' For Scheler, this is the value-image, the substantial value-image of the person which in our experiencing of their personal presence offers itself to us along with that which is found to fulfill this immanent moment of the present. Their 'future' so to speak is revealed to us as a shooting star, in terms of the substantial value which 'could' be realized by him or her.

And then, perhaps months later, we meet him or her again and have a chance to 'really' talk with them. It takes only a few seconds for us to 'know' that this one has fallen away, and somehow lost that substantial value that we had experienced before within them, in that special moment, or number of moments. Although we know that they have indeed varied, we yet behold that value-image of them that once we held in our hand.¹⁸⁸ We, in this example, came to know the 'order of the heart' in the one that we loved; and even though their heart, or their spiritual core has varied in, perhaps, a negative way, this does not alter the ideal value-image of the person, himself, as a person, nor does it alter the

value of the order of values once found to be in the heart of this one, even though now it is not the 'same'.

Values and the Heart/Mind of Man - a Possible Dilemma?

Values, for Scheler, are held to be a clearly feelable phenomenon, and for that reason, we could not miss 'knowing' them.¹⁸⁹ This area is one which has caused some controversy over the ideas of Scheler in that it is said by some that he far too severely separates the mind and the heart of man, his 'thinking' and his 'feeling'. By doing so, he may have created an unbridgeable gap by which his idea of the person, himself, would be so divided that there could be no reuniting of him again. To further explain this problem, Scheler leaned very heavily upon Pascal's saying: the heart has its reasons, which reason itself cannot know. By this it was meant that there were to be found within the person laws and essential interconnections of feeling and emotion which were every bit as valid and 'unyielding' as those of the mind or the intellect. The heart has the capacity within itself to act in a manner equally legitimate to that of thought. However, for Scheler, the reason, the intellect, could never grasp hold of nor come to understand these laws and principles of the heart, ie. to know why and how they work. He held also that the heart had its own way of seeing and knowing to which the reason was blind, and to which the reason would ever be blind. If we only

understand Scheler's thought in this context, it is true that we will end up, in the final analysis, with an unalterable dualism in man, - what could be taken to be an unresolvable struggle between the mind and the heart of man. However, we must place this problem within the proper context of Scheler's writings in order to discover whether indeed there actually is such a problem, and if it does exist, in what manner it does so.

The heart of the dilemma lies in Scheler's emphatic desire to lift the emotions and feelings of the person (in the sense that they are acts) from the realm of the human sciences wherein they have been left and come to be understood as elicited responses of the psycho-socio-physical human being, to environmental or 'ego' stimulation. As we have already discussed, the person, and his acts transcend the psycho-socio-physical human being and hold no part in it either as it is understood to be the 'creation' of science or the accidental occasion for determination or causality. It seems to me then, that this is the context wherein Scheler made the firm and lasting distinction between the reason and the heart.

Man, the psycho-socio-physical human being is that which already viewed in terms of causality. This is so in the sense that whatever apparently befalls man, there are

always reasons, there is always some manner or form of explanation for its coming to be. There are definite laws and principles inherent within any idea of causality. This also holds for any sort of determination which is found to manifest itself in man, within this realm. Man moves, so to speak, in terms of motives which can always be uncovered and explained. Reasons always begin with 'because'. When it comes to matters of the heart, there are very few cases where one can strictly and clearly articulate what would follow 'because'. Man's mind, his intellect, works largely in the area of 'knowing about', of postulating, of hypothesizing, of speculating and accounting for in very precise terms. When one says that he understands this or that, it is usually held to mean that he has grasped all of the variables which come into play to produce or to bring about this or that effect, or outcome. Reason denotes explanation, and explanation denotes causes. This is reason's domain.

In Scheler's essay on the Probleme der Religion, he is, throughout the entire work underscoring the essential difference between religious knowledge and metaphysics.¹⁹⁰ In short, metaphysics will never discover the being of a personal God, but only the process by which it may postulate the existence of 'Something' that must possess such-and-such qualities, etc.¹⁹¹ Religious knowledge,

on the other hand, 'knows' no abstract Something; rather, the religious person knows God Himself, and thus has no need to postulate that which may be freely discovered (by a finite being about the Infinite Being). The metaphysician knows about a possible, abstract Being, whom he calls God, the religious man knows God, the loving Father. The former knows 'consequentially', the latter knows essentially; the former knows through logic, etc., the latter knows through personal experience. One can never replace the other. However, in a certain sense both are necessary. In terms of Scheler's reason and feelings, I believe that simply due to the fact that Scheler describes and writes about these feelings and emotions, he demonstrates that both reason and feeling are wedded in a very special way in that neither is drained of its own unique offering, but the offerings of both are both possible and necessary for coming to understand any phenomenon essentially.^{192(a)}

The obvious difference between the two is the 'object' toward which each one is intentionally directed in the realm of acts. The object of thinking, even philosophical thinking in terms of phenomenology, is toward things. For example, one cannot talk about an experiencing an intuition, one cannot talk about an essence, one cannot talk about a phenomenon such as 'the person' without, in some way lifting this person from his 'proper' place

and pointing to or describing the features, aspects and essential qualities found to be therein. Such an 'artificial' and 'unnatural' abstraction must always be taken to be just that. That toward which the reason is directed, is never found in the 'immediately given', ie. in experiencing. Reflection 'upon' always presupposes distance in one form or another, from the one reflecting and the object of reflection.^{192(b)}

The 'emotional' act is intended toward a good or a person wherein a value is discovered or 'felt'. Emotional intentionality, the intentional feeling 'something' is never toward an 'object' as such, but rather a value as it is felt. Values (goods or persons) must always be understood in terms of their worthiness of love. In the act of loving, for example, if someone were to question you as to why you love, what would be your response?¹⁹³ It could not be explained in terms of 'because of ...' Love bursts the limitations of any explanation, always emerging as that which can never be confined to a detailed analysis of qualities, attributes, and tendencies on the part of the beloved. (This especially holds for the love of God, in that if someone were to ask why one loves God, and a number of reasons were given - this person, by such a response, would demonstrate his knowing a great deal about God perhaps - but it would also show his

not knowing God, Himself, very well.)

Of someone asked you to explain why you beheld a rainbow with joy, or why you shared in the act of adoration before God, and toward Him, what would be the response? It is in this way that reason knows not the reasons of the heart. The mind, in the most spiritually personal sense, cannot apprehend the 'experience' of an intentional feeling felt. Emotional intention is not only directed toward the object wherein the value is initially found or discovered in feeling, rather, it is also directed beyond, always to the limitless ultimate perfection of the object or the person beheld (and which initially stood as the mediator between the object and the heart, the being and the feeling.)¹⁹⁴ Reason finds no place here.¹⁹⁵ For Scheler, loving and hating are the highest and most powerful of our intentional emotional life.¹⁹⁶

Loving and Hating, and their Power

Here and throughout Scheler's understanding, hate is always held to be a rebellion of our hearts and spirits against a violation of the *ordo amoris* (the ordering of all that is worthy of love within the realm of values).¹⁹⁷ As love brightens and broadens our worlds, hate darkens and narrows them; as love enlarges the heart, hate shrinks it; as love awakens us to ever higher values and their realization and their actualization within our worlds

(the worlds within and beyond ourselves as persons), hate blinds us and darkens the order of values to such an extent that only the lower values, if they are seen, are seen only dimly, and we become equally blind to our own values, as persons. In loving, we thrive and grow, in hating, we wither and die as persons.¹⁹⁸ Hating, however, is still an emotional act wherein intention and meaning are found. It is an act directed at the being of values and all of that which is found to be valuable. At the deepest and most profoundly dark level of its performance (of its being performed) it is directed toward the destruction of the very being of values, things and persons. Hatred, just as love may be the foundation for all knowing and consequently all willing, but just as loving illuminates and clarifies, darkens and blurs all that is known and willed in the performance of these acts.

Within the loving act itself, in the act of preferring a higher value to a lower one, within this preferring of the higher value, that value which is the 'object' of our intentional act of preferring is found within the act of preferring itself, in terms of feeling, and as such becomes a quality of the essential being of our person (in that it is of the nature of the person as the unity of and for all possible essentially different acts to embrace all acts in terms of their value and

meaning within each and every act performed and all possible acts which may potentially be performed by the person).¹⁹⁹ In preferring every higher value, the person in the same sense, enlarges and deepens the value of his own substantial being. As the person apprehends ever higher values, so the value of his personal being grows.

In the act of hating, this emerges as the reverse. In its most severe sense it is aimed with meaning and intention at the very extinction of being - the personal being, the absolute being, the being of his world, the being of values, etc. Just as loving seeks to bless all that is, hating seeks to curse it; just as loving seeks to create, hating seeks to destroy.²⁰⁰ Loving is the positive act toward promotion and affirmation, hating is the positive act toward negation and destruction. (By using the term 'positive' with regard to hating, it is meant here that there is a 'content' to hating - it is not empty or void of meaning nor is it empty or void of intention.) The being, the personal being of one who hates 'diminishes in size' and there is also a diminution in quality, and this diminishing is equal to the depth of his value- negation in terms of the intention and meaning of his acts as they are intended toward the extermination of that which is, and also the value of such, necessarily. In loving, the value of the morally good person ascends

beyond all limitation; in hating, the value of the morally evil person descends toward extinction.

In our loving acts, as we reach out toward all that is within our world in terms of meaning, and value, we fill out and substantiate a blueprint for our hearts. By this it is meant that, because the foundation of all of our acts is our loving toward our world, in our preferring higher values to lower ones (or in hating in our placing lower values over and above the higher values - value distortion) this preferring (or placing after) fill out the fundamental guidelines for the way in which we will live in our communal world. It becomes our spiritual core, that core which comes to nurture all that we do, all that we think, all that we say, and, in fact, all that we are, or can ever hope to become. It is the very ground of our being for the world and our 'representation' of both the absolute being which founds us (our God or our idol) and our worlds.

The Pattern of our Personal Being

- our Spiritual Personality

Personality, for Scheler, (Personalität), is thus not our 'understanding' of the world as psycho-socio-physical human beings, but rather, the 'pattern and formation' of our very being in the spiritual core of our persons, in terms of meaning and value - our worthiness of love, and

in love.

In our acts, in the performing of them as persons, this 'pattern' of our substantial being is to be found - even beneath the most concerted efforts to hide it. We cannot deceive other persons all the time, because somewhere there will spout out a spontaneous act in place of this offering of our 'acts of calculation' with which we would hope to disguise our deepest core.²⁰¹ Scheler said that even beneath the most severe manifestation of mental illness there could be found a personal core - no matter how faint or frail its glimmerings.²⁰² It is, then, understood in this way that the person of the mentally ill is in no way 'diseased'; rather, he is invisible or missing or hiding.²⁰³

For Scheler, man, as a person, could never be fully apprehended in amoral terms. In that we are able to understand another person and he, in turn, is able to understand us in terms of this spiritual core which 'fulfills' the centre of our personal being (as a value being); in that we are mature in our being able to experience the differentiation between our own acts of thinking, willing, loving, feeling, etc., and those of another person; in that we are able to experience the power of willing by which we freely commit ourselves to

the fulfillment of something, for example, promising, and have the ability to follow through in our commitment; and in that we are responsible and accountable for our personal acts, we are moral persons. We cannot be, otherwise, as persons.²⁰⁴ The degree to which we are moral or immoral emerges solely from the way in which we have fundamentally come to love our world and all that lies therein, that the order of our loving is in some sense in accord with the objective order of loving and values which exists outside and beyond man as a finite being. And in a special sense, also, man, as a person, is as moral or immoral as his absolute being and his world, both of which he is the 'representation'.

It was stated earlier that the person varies in the performance of each and every act - not once the act has been performed, but rather, in the performing of the act itself.²⁰⁵ The person, himself is the foundation of and the unity for not only each and every one of these acts, but within the embrace of each and every one of these acts the substantial 'value' of each and every preceding act which has been performed by the person comes to bear upon the present act.²⁰⁶ This is dependent upon the value, the meaning and the significance of each and every act performed by the person himself. These acts find their ground and foundation in man-the-loving-being, in the active attitude of

his loving which directly or indirectly give birth to each and every act performed in terms of its value and worth, as man establishes the substance of his moral being. This is the founding principle behind Scheler's Fundamental Moral Tenor (Gesinnung) of the person, and the Ordo Amoris,²⁰⁷ In both of these we grasp the fundamental way in which the person essentially lives and moves and has his being for the world, we grasp the 'absolute (value) being' toward which his life is directed, and the light by which his life is directed; we grasp his world, and we also grasp his ordering of love, his very heart. We grasp this as the person's meaningful centre, his being in his worthiness of love.

We do not 'judge' a man 'good' or 'evil', in terms of 'being good' or 'being evil'. Rather, we experience him in his 'being good' or his 'being evil'. We 'find' him to be either good or evil to greater or lesser degrees within the givenness of his personal acts, in their performance. We, in all cases, find the 'person, himself' in varying degrees. There is only one instance wherein the person is not immediately given to us, in the like manner described in the above. That is in the case of the one who is mentally ill. In this instance, we 'find' no person at all. He is missing, invisible or hiding, except in very special circumstances, and attitudes.

Bliss and Despair

There is one place within the writings of Scheler wherein I believe that we discover the key to the missing person of the mentally ill. It emerges from his writings on the spiritual feelings (die geistigen Gefühle)²⁰⁸ In Scheler's discussion of bliss and despair (Seeligkeit und Verzweiflung) as those feelings of value and meaning of our very being as we apprehend it within ourselves, as we experience it at the deepest levels of our beings as 'our being given to ourselves'(as we, ourselves are), he says that just as bliss is an emotional 'Yes' lying deep within the very core of our being and our world, and enlarging to permeate and envelope our whole being, despair is to the same depth and extent an emotional 'No'. Even in the face of the most tragic circumstances or situations, bliss is 'unshakable' and peace lies deep within, beyond the touch of any storm which may beset any other level of our being. Despair, on the other hand, is equally 'untouchable', in that there is absolutely nothing that the person, himself, can do, or hopefully accomplish to 'lift' himself from this condition. This is the point wherein I begin to disagree with those ideas of Scheler with regard to despair, and I shall elaborate upon this for the next little while.

Although despair is that feeling which is born of the very

value-nature of the person himself, his being and his value being, and although it is 'untouchable' in the sense that the person can do nothing and is powerless to do anything to alter or to change this feeling, this despair is excluded, or overcome (or at least penetrated) when the person in despair is 'placed' within the hands or 'found' within the hands and heart of a person who truly loves him. Despair is a way of being in that there is absolutely nothing, no act, no attitude that we can perform, or hold that will alter this fully and deeply negative feeling. In despair, we are without hope, without faith, without value and very much alone. The sphere of our intimate individual person has grown and swollen to the extent that it has engulfed the whole of our being. We can no longer perform acts born of love wherein another might 'catch sight' of us. In despair, we live in silence as persons, our acts remaining unspoken (for we have forgotten how to speak) and believing that there would be no one to 'hear' them. This is the condition and feeling of the mentally ill. And it is due to the presence of persons who have the 'ears' of faith to hear the acts unspoken, to hear the one who hides from so many others, that these ones are 'brought to life again.

In despair we do not utter an emotional 'No'; rather, we

are 'personally' silent, or perhaps I should say personally silenced. Within the personal being of one who is mentally ill, within his personal world, looking toward his absolute - there is nothing, no value, no meaning, no love, no hate, no sound. It is only the silence that 'seems' to declare this 'No'.

For the 'given' person, silence is, in a sense an act, in that it yet embraces both meaning and intention wherein we prefer to be silent. Or, this silence is born when one can no longer answer in self-revelation or self-disclosure. He has reached that point where he is at the heart of his most intimate realm as an individual person.²⁰⁹ In this realm only God may know that which lies therein. This is the realm of absolute solitude, but it is yet a place wherein there is communion with another, namely God.²¹⁰ But in the depths of despair even this communion may not be realized. There is a tacit cry of forsakenness so characteristic of despair, yet the cry is hardly heard by the one who utters it, for he has lost the ability to hear - even that which is uttered by himself from the very roots of his being. This cry, however, reveals its own 'secret'. In that it is a cry - regardless of the depths of its silence - it is a cry to, it is an acknowledgement of a listener. In a most peculiar way, this reveals the presence of the

person, in the communal aspect - that aspect which is not openly given in the one who is mentally ill.

Within the person, there is both an individual person and a communal person, neither originating from the other, but rather, both equally and originally found within the person himself. Our communal person is that aspect of the person which may be understood as our being for and with other persons. This is not to be in any way misunderstood as a 'social' relatedness to others, but rather it is an essential relatedness found within the very being of persons themselves. Persons, as a term, embraces both the individual and the communal person and this may be easily understood in terms of those acts as they are personally performed always and essentially 'giving' relationship with another. Persons, in this sense, always 'means' relationship at the most fundamental depths of our being. As was stated in the above, even in the most intimate level of our individual being there is always 'being with' another, the Other being God.

Person and Silence

For the wounded one, the mentally ill one, as I have stated in the above, there is a personal silence. He is personally silent, or personally silenced. This may be understood in two ways. In exploring these ways we find that Scheler, himself, has offered us many clues in

the gaining of a deeper understanding into this silence.

1) It has already been discussed, according to Scheler's understanding of the person, that love is the foundation of and that which fundamentally permeates all other acts performed by the person, whether these acts are performed in the individual or the communal sense of the person. I have also shown, in the above, in my discussion of despair, that in despair - as a way of being, a fundamental quality of being - there is also silence. Only in the absence of loving (or hating) do we find silence (since loving and hating are the founding acts and the active attitude of all other acts). In 'silence', in the wounded one, we discover no fulfillment of meaning, no intention and no direction within the depths of his being. These (the fulfillment of meaning, intention and direction) are yet present in one who loves and in one who hates.

Because this silence is found at the most fundamental level of the givenness of one person to another, at the most fundamental core from which acts are performed by the person - there is no act, and can be no act that the person is capable of performing which will alter the quality or way of being - the being in despair. He cannot 'help himself', in a special sense, and he desperately needs another person to 'call him forth'. This is one tragic demonstration wherein we find that if a 'silent'

person is not welcomed into relationship by another person, one who loves him and calls him forth, there will be no hope for him. This is one way in which the wounded one is 'seen' as silenced and cannot speak.

2) Earlier, in this work I discussed Scheler's highest realm of values - those of the holy and the unholy. Here it was found that man lives by a 'power' greater, or one considered to be greater than himself. This power is also the one toward which man ultimately directs his love and his being. In a special sense this would hold for hating as well as loving in that hating also has its own meaning fulfillment, etc. regardless of how deluded or distorted this might be. It is by means of the presence of such a power or powers (although these are not usually the focal point for extensive exploration) that a person is found to be good or evil (morally), innocent or guilty (legally), etc. A missing person, an invisible person - a silent person - is not held in such regard.

We will not explore this further, rather we will consider the profound place held by this 'power' greater than the person. This power is the ultimate end of the person, that goal toward which he performs his acts. As Scheler said, this may either be God or 'an idol'. It is interesting to consider this in his further discussion of the

'dashing of idols' (Zerschmetterung der Götzen)²¹¹ He speaks of this leading one to the 'turning toward a search for God, or the idea of God'. It is here that I pose a set of questions to Scheler, "What if the person does not turn toward a search for God as the one to Whom he offers his religious act? What if this person sought out no 'higher good'? What if this person merely remains among the ruins of his idol or idols and ceases to perform any religious act or acts of faith?" Of course, Scheler, himself provides no answers to these specific questions, but if we remain faithful to his writings, he offers us 'traces' of an answer which might have been his.

It might be as follows: In that man cannot avoid performing the religious act (here I assume that Scheler is referring to persons because acts are performed by persons; der religiöse Akt wird von jedem Menschen notwendig vollzogen,²¹²) regardless of the object toward whom or which this act is intended, this God or god must necessarily hold the same or almost the same power as the act of loving and thus be awarded the same ground (in that man as a person is the representation of both his absolute being - his God (god) - and his world). If, then, a person's god 'dies' - if his idol shatters, and if he fails to embrace a replacement, through discovering that which is greater than his idol, or in searching for such a 'some-

thing' greater than that which has now shattered, or if he cannot 'find' one of equal or greater value - then, it would seem to follow that he will cease to love, cease to value, cease in the performing of personal acts - ones the sense, the intention, the direction, and the meaning of which others may share - or at least apprehend.

We may say then, that if a man loses that absolute being value toward which his personal acts are intentionally directed and from which these acts gain fulfillment of meaning, and his love embraces no other god or God, Himself, the person will fall into silence - in a special sense, becoming a person silenced, one who cannot speak. This, in a peculiar and strange way, seems to bespeak the case of Mary and her desire for just one thing - the guarantee that she would ever be safe and secure regardless of the cost.²¹³

In terms of personal acts, just as loving is the first and foremost act of the person, loving toward the value of another is indeed the most sacred for it reaches the very heart of our personal being. The offering of the loving act, in the purest and truest form, that loving act which is the finite expression of the infinite love in which another person is loved, always and necessarily calls forth a loving response from the very depth of the

heart of the other person, the beloved.²¹⁴

This loving act, this active loving attitude toward another is that which awakens the heart of the 'silent' one, the invisible person, in that this love (although the silent one cannot apprehend its confirmation) offers affirmation in the value and the meaning of the being of this one, and he, in his loving brings, perhaps for the first time, a flickering of value to the world of the silent one. This is because, for the silent one, the one who is mentally ill, the person does not act, because he cannot act, as we have already discussed. Silence envelops the heart of his being - the silence, the emptiness wherein no 'person' can act is the despairing hushed 'No' of his being. True love alone, in the infancy of communion, will offer the only hand of healing that this silent one can know - for man, before he is a thinking being, before he is a willing being, is a loving being²¹⁵

Section III

THE CALLING OF LOVE

: the Therapeutic Relationship,

- an example

Because so many of us spoke in private images; we looked past words ... But it mattered that even here, in the purlieus milieu therapy and resocialization behavior patterning, love sought out our devils and the magical thieves who stole from us the night, and healed us.²¹⁶

This is the 'power' by which the mentally ill are healed - the power of love. In a sense this is the power by which, as persons, they are 'born again'. Allport stated:

In recent years, psychiatry has been discovering what religion has always maintained: that there is no cure apart from love. Healing follows the path of redemptive love, whether human or divine.²¹⁷

And this is a matter that psychologists and psychiatrists must come to terms with every day within their own relationships with their patients or clients. The importance of the presence of love can never be underestimated, and it must never be treated lightly. Love is the power by which a person, as a person, stands or falls. For the mentally ill, love has become a stranger, a foreigner in themselves and in their world. They have become empty in the deepest, most fundamental realm of their beings, so empty that they have essentially become missing, invisible persons. In the most extreme cases it may be found that they have not yet become persons at all (in that they do not even 'know' love, have never known its touch upon their hearts, have never known its name.

Love, in any or all of its aspects, has, in the past, been largely neglected as an essential part of the treatment in the 'restoration' of the one who is mentally ill. Until modern times, love has been treated as though it were only one of the many emotions of man, equal with them all; and all of the emotions held only a relative place of importance in the study of mental illness. The mentally ill were held to be emotionally immature, as having little or no control over their emotions, etc. The emotions were thought to be that which could be regulated by thought and by behavior and thus thought and behavior were the points of focus rather than the emotions themselves. They received attention only in terms of responses or reactions to environmental stimuli and biophysical changes, or chemical changes, etc. All feelings or feeling-states were subject to the same treatment and handling, and the same definitions. Love was understood as just another 'feeling'. It was overlooked, or placed to one side. It was either understood at the level of the psyche or at the lower levels of instinct and 'passion'. By demoting love to the realm of the subjective, which was the umbrella term under which all of the above fell, its value was only relative and as such was never explored 'in itself'.

The need to be perceived is not, of course, a purely visual affair. It extends to the general need to have one's presence endorsed or confirmed

by the other, the need for one's total existence to be recognized, the need, in fact, to be loved.²¹⁸

Love is, indeed, the healer, not because it seems to work or because it apparently works; rather, the case is this: Love, in that it is a pure act of loving toward the other, must necessarily bring forth healing for the wounds which are found so deeply carved into the hearts and minds of the mentally ill. Carl Rogers, in one of his essays shares a very tender moment in therapy with us:

I think of one man with whom I have spent many hours, including many hours of silence. There have been long stretches when I had no way of knowing whether the relationship had any meaning for him. He was uncommunicative, seemingly indifferent, withdrawn, hopeless, suicidal. He wanted to run away, wanted to do away with himself because, as he muttered in flat despair, 'I just don't care.' I responded, 'I know you don't care about yourself at all, but I just want you to know that I care.' And then, after a long pause, came a violent flood of deep, wracking, gasping sobs which continued for nearly half an hour. He had taken in the meaning of my feeling for him.²¹⁹

This example was used by Rogers to demonstrate the need to treat patients, regardless of the depth and degree of their symptoms, as persons - persons with whom one must have empathy, persons who must be embraced within an attitude of unconditional positive regard, and persons with whom the therapist must be 'real'. In short, what Rogers is saying essentially, is that the person must be loved. He continues:

... behind the curtains of silence, and hallucination and strange talk and hostility, and indifference, there is in each case a person, and ... if we are skillful and fortunate we can reach that person, and can live, often for brief moments only, in a direct person-to-person relationship with him.²²⁰

In that his 'skillfulness' and 'fortune' are born of an active loving attitude toward the patient, the above obtains. This is stated by Rogers in another essay wherein he gives an example of a young therapist who seemed to be warm and positive, possessing all of Rogers' preconditions in skill and technique, but 'she was not reaching the real person of the children'.²²¹ He admits that 'perhaps there are still elements missing which (he) has not captured in (his) formulations'.²²² This is true! In the above I discussed the problems of the psychologists and psychiatrists who 'fall' between the realms of science and philosophy. This statement of missing 'elements' is evidence that Rogers does not grasp fully the depth and meaning of the attitude of love which he himself holds. He states:

The attitude pictured (unconditional positive regard, empathy congruence) makes no sense except in a context of great respect for the person and his potentialities. Unless the primary element in the counsellor's value system is the worth of the individual, he is not apt to find himself experiencing a real caring, or a desire to understand, and perhaps he will not respect himself enough to be real.²²³

The person of the mentally ill must be loved, and this love or caring must be real. Many therapists are

shocked, or at least surprised when a patient, 'who apparently makes no sense at all' in many ways, quite pointedly asks the therapist, 'Why don't you like me?' One of the psychologists at the university shared with me one day that at one time he had had a patient who was quite disturbed, and yet who knew his every mood the moment he walked through the door and began to talk to him (even though he tried very hard to hide it from him). This struck him as quite amazing. But when we come to a deeper understanding of the mentally ill human beings, we shall discover that although their psycho-socio-physical being may very well be enshrouded by the presence of mental illness, their persons are never 'touched' by the 'disease'. Their hearts are, in fact, in some ways more clearly attuned to essential feelings than we would perhaps, like to think. The mentally ill 'know' when they are loved, and they know who loves them, and the extent of this love. They also know and know the degree and the extent to which they are mistrusted, feared, disliked, and tolerated. Words and gestures of protest hold no power to change this.

The meaningful value with which the suffering one is held is indeed a 'felt' experience of the person - in the moment that it is given, and therefore words of explanation are altogether unnecessary. As a matter of fact,

the more energy spent by the 'other' telling the suffering one how important he is and how valuable he is only serve to illuminate the pseudo feeling of concern by the other if his feelings of love are not pure. The feeling-states of the mentally ill may be to a greater or lesser degree confused, but their 'feelings' are very clear. The 'person' of the mentally ill, in that he does not suffer from being 'diseased' or 'ill', retains his capacity to experience the acts of another person as they are directed toward him - in that these acts are performed intentionally toward him in terms of values.

The insights of Scheler fill in many areas left wanting in the works of Rogers. For Scheler, loving the person of the wounded one is not loving him because he is suffering or because he is to be pitied. Rather, in truly loving him, he is loved as a person, for all of the positive and uniquely personal values that are inherently his and embraced within him as a person - in spite of his suffering. As this love offers itself in the act of re-living the suffering of these wounded ones, it does so only as a form of outpouring of the original loving.²²⁴ All too often, many of those who work with the mentally ill love them (though it is hardly in the purest sense of the term) because they are suffering or because they want to help them and this 'help' is more

born of their own sense of guilt than a 'love' of any true kind. ²²⁵

Scheler, however, shows true love to be the reverse, i.e. it is only because we love them as persons worthy of love and respect that we look to them with compassion and empathy. Empathy and positive regard do not stand upon their own merit - as acquired skills, etc. - nor can they be learned. ²²⁶ The skills or techniques are effective only in that they aid in the clearer expression of 'what' the therapist 'feels' or 'what' he senses that the patient feels. If therapy is held to be no more than an exercise of skills and techniques, it is doomed to failure. An active attitude of love is that which gives these 'learned' things their life, and their meaning, or they have no life and no meaning at all. The one who is wounded knows this surely and accurately - he 'feels' its truth. The silent person felt Rogers' concern and caring - not for his condition, but in himself as a person.

Love calls forth an answering love, once its presence is seen (once its presence, its meaning and its intention are felt) ²²⁷

Love is not a 'feeling' but rather, it is a spontaneous spiritual act having both direction and intention. ²²⁸

It is not based upon attraction, nor attributes of the

other. It cannot be elicited, it cannot be commanded, it cannot be conjured up through some sense of duty or ought as in the case of 'you should love this one or that one, etc.'²²⁹ When one truly loves, he loves not because of this or that quality, because of this or that trait or tendency. Rather, it is only due to the presence of love that these qualities, traits or tendencies found in the other take on the meaning that they do. When someone truly loves another it is not due to a sum of characteristics, and it cannot be understood so. In fact, it is only in such love that these characteristics come to the fore, and many more besides, in a limitless fashion, because within the beloved, there are found to be present more and more qualities worthy of love.²³⁰

If we treat an individual as an object or objectify him in any sense, his 'person' will elude us, 'he' will disappear. The person, and indeed the person of the wounded one, will only reveal himself, disclose himself, open himself up to us (even to the smallest degree initially) as a person in that he knows (he feels) he is loved, that he is most valuable to us as a person, as a person in his own right. He may not value and love himself (this is often the deepest and most painful wound) but he feels our love for him - our love has 'hit' its mark.

In the movement of love, the miracle of healing begins, born of and nurtured by this love. It is according to the law of loving that when one person loves another (whether the other is invisible or not) the heart of the one who loves is not only stirred and enlarged - but the heart of the one who is loved is also stirred and enlarged, in that such a love calls for an answering love, a responding love. This love is necessarily not the 'token' love which calls expecting (even demanding) a response in return (for example, I will love you if you love me in return).²³¹ This true love is not filled with its own self-interest nor is it extended for the purposes of self-interest. In true love the heart of the one who loves is enlarged by the act of loving, in the act of loving itself, not because of the amount of the responding love. In the case of the mentally ill there may be no responding love, even in the remotest sense for quite some time.

The value of the person is the highest value. It is above and beyond all other kinds of values of things, feelings, etc.²³² The person is most worthy of our love. In the mentally ill, where this person is missing - this does not mean that the person is 'gone' or does not 'exist'. He is missing and invisible to us in that we do not

experience the givenness of his personal presence (the spiritual core of his being), we cannot enter into immediate dialogue with him, or share with him as we would do with others in whom this personal presence (spiritual core) is taken for granted.²³³ Thus, even though the givenness of the person of one who is mentally ill is not found, this does not mean that he is not as valuable as all other persons are valuable and worthy of love. If a psychiatrist or a psychologist does not take this as a given within his own heart, then his chances in therapy are almost minimal. This value cannot be learned - it cannot even be 'proven', nor can a 'logical' argument be given to substantiate this value. Either one holds this value as 'true' and real and as such - or one does not.

If one is truly faithful to the value of the person in therapy, as most worthy of love, in the act of loving and in the active attitude of loving this person, he will catch glimpses of and twinklings of the person, as scattered, frail outlines, as faint blueprints upon that which the person 'personally' touches. He will vaguely see the person slowly but surely begin to emerge. This cannot be otherwise, if the loving is faithful and pure.²³⁴

As the loving one loves the person of the wounded one (who, at first, may be there for 'faith's eyes alone) a

movement begins which ever calls, ever demands, ever beckons, ever inspires the person of the other to grow, to become, to awaken and reach toward that value-image beheld by the one who is loving. Only in this love is there found the courage, the trust, the acceptance and the ground to grow.²³⁵ It must be understood that this 'loving' and 'being loved' is not an easy and simple giving and receiving affair. This is often far from the case. Often new life is extremely painful, confusing, frustrating and frightening for the wounded one because the wounds and scars, the hurts and fears have been coddled and covered by the shroud of silence, by the shroud of inactivity, the shroud of solitude. Through love this shroud has been rent, it has been penetrated, and the person has been 'found out'. It is the strange paradox of the miracle that he has been 'found out' and now is being 'brought out', not yet wanting to emerge and at the same time never wanting to return to the place of bitter solitude. In this loving he would run both places (both backward and ahead) at once, and yet it is this very love that holds him sure and certain in the 'knowledge' and the 'hope' that there is a place especially for him because not the therapist alone, but the world needs him. As a person, he has a value and a meaning to fulfill, and without the realization of these, the world will not be the same, for it cannot be the same. This is far too

great a topic to begin in this work, but that does not lessen its import. It must however, be saved for, perhaps, another author and another time.

There is never any fear through the love spoken about in the above, that the wounded one becomes 'what the therapist thinks he should'. This would be a very legitimate fear if the therapist did not purely love the patient or client. Thus, this wounded one will never seek to 'win' his love, a love very much unlike that about which we are discussing here. This love is always to the wounded one, a love which dares him to take the chances necessary for his becoming ever more closely that which is already held within the embrace of his own wonderfully and richly unique 'value-image' - one which holds no limitation, such as that of a mere self-image would.²³⁶

This is essentially the power behind the idea of Rogerian therapy, and only to the extent that a therapist loves deeply and purely and assuredly beyond himself toward his patient and his patient's value as a person, can the therapist possibly hope to see the person of the wounded one begin to blossom - begin to fully become a person once again (or perhaps for the first time). The active loving attitude cannot be conveyed by words or gestures. It cannot be conveyed by any means; rather,

it is that which conveys the words and gestures themselves. All of that which it conveys is bathed in this loving, as it is born of this loving toward the person of the wounded one. This is why the therapist must be real, why he must be himself as truly and as wholly as he can. One could acquire mastery over all other skills and methodologies and techniques that there are, he could be the most excellent teacher of these 'arts', his professional (or professed) attitude and philosophy may be well attuned to that of Rogers, but in that he has not love, he has nothing to offer the wounded one 'personally'. He will, in fact, do more harm than good because a show of love without the heart from which true love flows, can cause wounds far deeper, frustration far greater and pain much sharper in the wounded one than had he not been there at all.

The wounded one may appear to be enshrouded by silence. As a person, he may be deeply buried beneath a great deal of frustration and confusion. There are many things which 'cloak' him as a person, through which nothing seems to penetrate. But all of this begins to fall away as nothing when a person who really loves him and holds him in high regard and the greatest of respect offers him but two words - I care.

Epilogue

HOW DO WE LOVE A BARKING LADY?

The miserable person needs us to come to him, not out of duty or through pity, but because he is a human person. He is important, of real value, irreplaceable in the eyes of God. It is important that he live ... if not, something precious will be missing from the universe, a flower will be missing in the garden of humanity.

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Every community of persons, be it great or small, has its own wounded person, its own type of Barking Lady. This wounded one, man, woman, child, could be anyone - perhaps someday, even one of us. Each time a wounded one emerges, each time a 'barking lady' emerges, and we hear the screams or behold the worn and weathered form, we are reminded, ever so painfully, that we are yet a broken people, sharing a broken world. We share a world a little less than it could be, if this one, this wounded one, were whole, if this one were a person revealed rather than hidden. Each time we encounter a wounded one, a lost one, we also behold within the reach of our love a person - a wonderously rich treasure, an absolutely unique being, but one who is yet blind and deaf to this miraculous truth, this hidden reality.

This wounded one holds within himself a value, a meaning, a worthiness of love special unto himself and if this person remains hidden, we are the ones who suffer as well, because we are poorer in our missing of the presence

of this one. This is the sacred secret held within the hearts of those therapists (it matters not the school to which they belong) who seem to be so successful in their 'treatment' of the mentally ill. They are the ones who realize that this wounded one needs them, but much more important than this, they realize that they need this one - that we all need this one in his wholeness, if we are to be whole. When he is hiding he cannot love - he has forgotten how to love. He finds no value in himself and he finds no value in his world worthy of his love - were he ever to offer it. How deeply it strikes our hearts when we apprehend the meaning of this, when we grasp the truth that we are found in his world and he cannot love us.

We are, in our small portions, each one responsible to this one in that we are responsible for ourselves as persons, in community one with another. If we apprehend our worlds in pure love - we also apprehend these lost ones in this same love. The power of our love will give us the frail courage to call this one into communion with us, to call forth his responding love toward us and toward the world. If we do not know such love, and the faith which inspires these smallest yet most profound acts of courage, this one will remain lost - and we shall lose also.

I am truly grateful that I found myself within a community of 'hidden' persons, who needed one another so much and who came to mean so much to one another that our hidden persons could no longer remain hidden. In a place where we were stripped of all demarcations of individuation imposed upon and lived up to by us in the outside world, where madness had become the great leveller of all, we had nothing left to give one another but the frailest of our persons. We had only weakness and confusion, sadness and despair, fear and frustration and loneliness to offer one another. We had nothing else. And yet, here in we find the miracle emerging in that we found within ourselves the capacity to love - to love and care for another. We came to welcome one another's presence - the presence of persons - delicate, weak and wounded though they were.

And there were two doctors, a few nurses, and the odd maintenance person and cafeteria person who called us by name, who smiled and said, "Good morning", who actually seemed to look forward to seeing us - here within the walls of our madness. We were important to another person, and we had a little place where we were welcomed - some of us for the first time that we could recall. The miracle of healing ever emerges from such humble beginnings.

The miracle of healing is born when these wounded ones feel that they are important, that they matter, that they are valuable. Here, they are needed only because they are, for when you are 'mad' you have little else to offer besides the fact of your existence. (This one cannot hide - even if one wanted to - save in death.) And in such 'unimportant' gestures of welcome, in smiles and nods from others, and in the heart of communion, dialogue and relationship born of weakness and 'insanity', within the midst of ones' fellows, the wonder of healing begins, or at least the briefest emerging of the person has begun.

This reveals itself in an event that happened one rainy and cold winter afternoon at the hospital. A young boy about eighteen years old (whom I will call David) was brought back to the hospital - returned to our ward in a state far worse than in his previous hospitalizations. He was in a confused frenzy and there was little hope of settling him down. All at once he sighted an old lady who had been a patient here for a very long time. She did not speak - only groaned. She never laughed, never smiled. She sat in her chair with a tray in front of her to protect her from injuring herself. (It often seemed that she didn't even know who she was or where she was.)

But David went over to her - his frenzy apparently stopped in mid-flight - knelt by her chair, took her hand and said, "Oh, Lady, you're still here. I'm so very glad that you're still here. I've missed you, you know. Are you alright?" Tears came to the old lady's eyes and one could almost see a smile begin. And, then, in a split second, David returned to his 'madness' once more. This took only a few seconds, an instant of time - not much in the life of our universe - but it was time enough for a small and tender miracle. And these little miracles are born each and every time we reach out and touch another, love another, bless another (whether there is a 'response' or not).

How, then, do we love a barking lady? How do we reach out and touch her? How do we bless her? This is not a question easily answered. How do we look beyond that which is so frightening, so confused, so loud, and touch her heart? How do we call her back, how do we redeem her? The answers to these questions must be left for another time and perhaps another author - one whose heart is large enough to share this precious secret with us. For the moment I can only say that she needs us and we need her. Each of us is a little poorer, a little less whole, a little less loved and loving because she is not 'with'

us - her personal presence is not 'here' to bless us.
But she did reach out once, and maybe, just maybe, she
will again. I only hope and pray that when I come face
to face with her again, I will have within my heart enough
love to reach out to her, and smile, and say, "Hello".

Deep in our hearts there is a call to live in
communion with others, a call to love²³⁸

Vanier

Love

I love you
Not only for what you are,
But for what I am
When I am with you.

I love you
Not only for what
You have made of yourself
But for who
You are making of me.

I love you
For the part of me
That you bring out;
I love you
For putting your hand
Into my heaped-up heart
And passing over
All the foolish, weak things
That you can't help
Dimly see there,
And for drawing out
Into the light
All the beautiful belongings
That no one else had looked
Quite far enough to find.

I love you because you
Are helping me to make
Of the lumber of my life
Not a tavern
But a temple;
Out of the works
Of my every day
Not a reproach
But a song.

I love you
Because you have done
More than any creed
Could have done
To make me good,
And more than any fate
Could have done
To make me happy.

You have done it
Without a touch,
Without a word,
Without a sign.
You have done it
By being yourself.
Perhaps that is what
Being a friend means,
After all.

Author Unknown

Key to Abbreviations

- ETHIK Scheler, Max, Der Formalismus In Der Ethik Und Die Materiale Wertethik, Neuer Versuch Der Grundlegung Eines Ethischen Personalismus, Francke Verlag, Bern, 1966.
- S. aus dem N. - - - - Schriften Aus Dem Nachlass, Band I, Zur Ethik Und Erkenntnislehre, Francke, Verlag, Bern, 1957
- VOM EWIGEN - - - - Vom Ewigen Im Menschen, Francke, Verlag, Bern, 1954
- SYMPATHIE - - - - Wesen Und Formen Der Sympathie, Die Deutsche Philosophie Der Gegenwart, Francke, Verlag, Bern, 1973.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

The notes and references listed below are given consecutively as numbered in the body of the work. I have also maintained one numbering system throughout rather than beginning each section with a new set of numbers in order to enable the reader easier access to the notes etc. found within this table.

Thesis Abstract

1. Scheler, Max, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik, Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines Ethischen Personalismus, Franke Verlag, Bern, 1966. p. 478: ... dass die Krankheit schliesslich seine Person völlig unsichtbar mache ... ; p. 471: An die Stelle das vorher gegebenen Zentrums tritt eine leere Stelle.

Foreword

2. Beers, Clifford Whittingham, A Mind that Found Itself, An Autobiography, Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1917. p. 15.

General Introduction: The Question

3. By using the term, 'mental illness', I do not mean to imply that I support the medical model for mental illness, ie. that it is a 'disease'. I am here referring only to a name given to a phenomenon, the sense and meaning of which, to both laymen and professionals alike are grasped in some sense or another by this 'name'. The term, 'mental illness', then is used here in an indicative sense rather than a diagnostic sense. This term will be held as such consistently throughout the rest of this work.
4. Beers, Clifford Whittingham, The Mind that Found Itself.
5. Frank, Gerald, The Boston Strangler, New American Library, New York, 1966.

6. Barry, Anne, Bellevue is a State of Mind, Harcourt Bruce Jovanovich, Inc., New York, 1971.
7. Jefferson, Lara, These Are My Sisters: A Journal from Inside Insanity, Anchor Press, Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1974.

Section I: THE PLACE WHEREIN WE STAND

Part "A" THE NEED TO ASK 'WHAT'

8. Freeman, Lucy, & Small, Karvin, The Story of Psychoanalysis, Pocket Books, Inc., New York, 1960, p. 25. He thought of insanity as a disease like typhus and consumption, from which some of the stricken could recover. It is true that another physician by the name of Johann Weyer 'stated that mental illness was a natural disease (but) his opinions were scorned and his books were ignored. Ibid. p. 31.
9. Ibid. pp 23-41 give a brief but clear summary of Pinel and his work within the society of his time. Thomas Szasz, in a sense, becomes too anachronistic with regard to his treatment of many of the pioneers dealing with mental illness and the mentally ill. I believe that he focuses far too strongly upon the place and the procedure rather than that which transpired in the life of the suffering ones and the transformation in their lives after having net these persons who 'treated' them. Persons are not institutions, and I believe that he fails to differentiate this most important point. Szasz uses as his examples excerpts from A Treatise on Insanity (trans. from the French, Traite medico-philosophique sur l'alienation mentale, ou la manie /Paris: Richard et all. 1801/ by D. D. Davis, Facsimile of the London 1906 edition, New York: Hafner Publishing Co. 1962.) These brief snatches of history do not give one the full impact of Pinel's work. Another problem arises when we consider the success rate (although a questionable phrase) Pinel's patients had, who had previously been suffering from such desperate and depraved conditions. (Szasz, Thomas, The Age of Madness, Anchor Books, Garden City, New York, 1973, p. 18-22.
10. We are in no position to judge our 'forefathers' who effectively did so much on the unknown horizons of mental illness to help those who were suffering. Sitting in an armchair in 1984, it is not difficult

to slice portions from the past and effectively criticize those who worked and dwelt therein; however, replace them in their proper historical perspective and the results become far different. The following brief synopsis of the history of the 'management of the insane' will support this claim.

In all cases, the position of, and the attitude of the powerless were determined by the position of and attitude of the powerful toward them. In the western world the mentally ill were cast no differently. As far back as the second century AD the problem of alleviating the suffering of the poor manifests itself. These 'poor' included the widows, orphans, exiles, the plague-stricken, and the workless, lepers, prisoners, captives, the sick, travellers and the 'mad'. The proletariat of Rome had lost its purchasing power, the State was nearly bankrupt and the responsibility for the poor fell to the Church. They did what they could with what they had. Over the next 800 years, the Church, following close on the heels of all the military conquests, carried on this work as their duty and mission - part of its establishing the 'kingdom of God' on earth. The Church, by the tenth to the thirteenth century had established a tax and tithes system for the poor relief. All over Europe everyone from king to commoner alike was obliged to contribute to this fund. Hospitals, lepersaries, orphanages, maternity houses, houses for the aged and infirmed were springing up everywhere throughout Europe. Tierny states that the poor were better looked after in the thirteenth century than in any subsequent century until the present one. Idlers and wasters were the only ones excluded from this charity.

This is not hard to understand when the essence of charity and Christian love was taught to be 'do unto others as you would have them do unto you' (Matt. 7:12) and 'as you have done it to the least of these my brothers you have done it unto Me' (Matt. 25:40). This would change dramatically with the coming of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The wars of England, France, Italy and Milan shifted the economic power from the Church to the State. In many places the Church became taxed, its properties were seized, nobles and lords became more influential and powerful than the priests and as result the poor (including the mentally ill) grew at such a rapid pace, the declining Church power could not cope.

A new and greater poor class was emerging which encompassed more and more people including those 'left' helpless by the wars. Luther and Calvin brought problems of another sort creating dissention and irreparable damage within the Church and their homelands in terms of further splintering society regarding the 'poor' and their treatment. The rich class changed and altered and the poor of all nations in this part of the world became subject to the whim of the rich and the State.

The poor, including the mentally ill did not change in its nature, but the way in which they were viewed changed drastically. The ideology of Christian love and charity all but disappeared. By the 1800's the poor, the powerless, the helpless and the suffering people had been forsaken by the State, the Church and the 'Lord', and as a result, they were no more than kept off the streets, fed no better than street scavengers (if as well) and imprisoned in cells of filth, disease and pestilence, chained like animals and treated worse than animals by their keepers or guards.

With these conditions firmly entrenched within society and accepted even by the families of those who suffered (because of fear and shame) we would indeed be hard pressed to support many of Szasz's criticisms. 'Illness' would be accepted by most in the society, and would also be an accepted point of departure for radical changes to come about in the treatment of the mentally ill. Niebuhr's insight that 'the society in which each man lives is at once the basis for and the nemesis of, that fullness of life which each one seeks,' seems highly applicable in this case. (Niebuhr, Reinhold, Moral Man and Immoral Society, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1953.p. 1) The rendering of madness and lunacy as an illness and a disease was indeed a salvation for the mentally ill of Pinel's day, but as we have become more and more aware, in a sense, of understanding mental illness, we are now left with a 'medical model' which is the source of much debate and contention.

For a further understanding of the social conditions to which I have been referring I suggest that my readers consult the following books:

Durant, Will and Ariel, The Age of Voltaire, Simon &

Schuster, New York, 1965.

Foucault, Michael, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, Vintage Books, New York, 1965.

Cilchrist, J., The Church and Economic Activity in the Middle Ages, MacFillan, Toronto, 1969.

Kraepelin, Emil, One Hundred Years of Psychiatry, Philosophical Library, Inc., New York, 1975.

Masters, Anthony, Bedlam, Michael Joseph, London, 1977.

McKown, Robin, Pioneers in Mental Health, Dodd, Mead & Company, New York, 1961.

Neaman, Judith S., Suggestion of the Devil, The Origin of Madness, Anchor Books, Garden City, New York, 1975.

Sykes, Norman, The Crisis of the Reformation, Geoffrey Blis, London, 1955.

Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1950.

11. Texts such as the following indicate that sociology has already established a foothold in this area and have offered several insights in their own manner and method:

Clausen, John A., Sociology and the Field of Mental Health, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1956.

Coffman, Irving, Asylums, Garden City, Doubleday & Co., 1961.

Scheff, Thoams J., Being Mentally Ill, A Sociological Theory, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1966.

12. It is evident from almost every source written on the subject of mental illness that such is taken as being the outworking of the nature/nurture dichotomy, ie. individual propensity plus environmental factors, primary and secondary socialization and opportunity, and also that which is 'born' of physiological factors (such as brain tumors, chemical imbalances, etc.). This is the 'mental illness' which

is the focus of this paper. There are of course infants born with certain physiological defects, but these ones will not be specifically addressed in this work. These cases, however, are found to be embraced within the general scope of this thesis; I have in mind here, the wonderful and miraculous development by many Down's Syndrome infants who were held to be both helpless and hopeless in our not too distant past. Many of these children, through the love and devotion of family and friends have become beautiful, responsible and giving persons, sharing their talents and gifts with us in many, many ways.

To return to the specific point of this note, if man were considered to somehow 'be born mad' any labor spent over treatment and any commitment in therapy, in the hope of the healing of this wounded one, would of course be time wasted, or at least, ill-spent.

13. In each school of thought with regard to the understanding of mental illness and its explanation, we find a somewhat unique paradigm and etiology, ideology and vocabulary of key words and terms used to embrace and facilitate the mutual understanding of that which is held to be its particular idea of mental illness. Examples of this may be found in:

Siegler Marian, & Osmond, Humphrey, Models of Madness, British Journal of Psychiatry, 112 (No. 493) pp 1193-1203, 1966, in which they have constructed medical, moral, psychoanalytic, family interaction, social, conspiratorial and impaired models of schizophrenia.

14. Freud, Sigmund, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, trans. Joan Riviere, Fernabooks, New York, 1957.
15. Lidz, Theodore, The Person, His Development throughout the Life Cycle, Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1969.
16. Satir, Virginia, Conjoint Family Therapy, Science and Behavior Books, Palo Alto, California, 1964.
17. Glenn, Michael, Voices from the Asylum, Harper Calophon Books, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1974.
18. Fromm, Erich, The Sane Society, Fawcett Publications, Inc., Greenwich, Conn., 1955.

19. Frankl, Viktor, The Doctor and the Soul, An Introduction to Logotherapy, Knopf, New York, 1955.
20. Laing, R. D., The Divided Self, An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness, Penguin Books, Markham, Ontario, 1969.
21. Szasz, Thomas, Psychiatric Slavery, The Free Press, Collier MacMillan, Publishers, London, 1977.

----- The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1974.

In both of these books, again Szasz stresses his arguments against the various forms of treatment for the mentally ill wherein he sees the 'doctor' as holding a role that is far too powerful, etc. over the patient. If we examine his arguments, we see in many respects they are very valid, however, there remains the core problem that these are points made over or about the 'patient' and against the way in which the patient is perceived and treated. They are lodged against a system - a way of treating the patient. In order to make the headway necessary in any real change in the 'system' one must go beneath the system - to the ground of that which upholds the system - which makes it work, in a manner of speaking. These systems are the products born of the question posed to mental illness - ie. 'why?'. One cannot argue against an answer, if the problem lies in the question, itself.

22. Warren, Henry Clarke, Buddhism in Translations, Atheneum, New York, 1974, pp 122-146.
23. Ibid. p 122.
24. Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, ed. David B. Guralnik, William Collins, World Publishing Co., Inc., 1978.
25. This idea of a consequential outworking of the so-named variables (this list is only a small portion of the potentially vast number of possible variables seen as factors in a history leading to the occurrence of mental illness) as the assumed ground from which mental illness springs has led to other grave assumptions which have been subtly and unquestioningly accepted as a kind of given with regard to every man and woman, 'ill' or 'well'. One part-

icularly erroneous assumption (a much fuller discussion of which will be developed in the following sections wherein we deal with Scheler's ideas of the Person) is that since we are all basically physiologically the same (ie. that our biological, chemical, etc. make-up fits that of one another to the point whereby many scientific and medical generalizations apply, eg. that polio in one individual will manifest itself in a reasonably identical fashion in all individuals that one vaccine for all is now readily available) we may all follow the same rule of thumb in terms of our psychological make-up, our capacity for socialization, etc. In other words, we are different and individual one from another through our differences in (past) experience. Our individual historical, social, environmental and genetic pasts 'create' our differentness. I am different from you because my experiences have been different from yours. This assumption carries with it implicitly and necessarily that were you to have had my exact same experiences, you would be identical to me and only physically (genetically) and numerically different from me. This is borne out in the saying so often heard (even of the mentally ill), "If I had been in his or her shoes, I'd have done the same thing, etc. This in itself, leads to the problem found wherein the diagnosis (generalized according to a particular paradigm) of one form or another of mental illness in an individual, and the subsequent (and somewhat generalized) treatment of that individual called for in the diagnosis does not always bring about the predicted 'change' or 'response to treatment'. Here we have fallen into a form of relativism, and the questionable assumption manifests itself most clearly in the recidivism rate of the mentally ill, in a tragic number of cases.

26. Frankl, Viktor, The Doctor and the Soul
27. Ellis, Albert, Rational Emotive Psychotherapy, Journal of General Psychology, 59, 1958, pp. 35-49.
28. I yet recall in one of my courses, diagrams found in the text book, and also charts which classified and categorized different forms of psychopathology and their degrees and intensities in such a fashion as to make it difficult to imagine that it was actually people suffering from these 'things', and that apart from the people, these diagrams and charts were meaningless. see for examples, Millon, Theodore, Modern Psychopathology, A Biosocial Approach to Maladaptive Learning and Functioning, W. B. Saunders

Company, Toronto, 1969, pp. 216-17, 298-9, 301, 415.

29. True to the format of science there must be a paradigm, a practical applicability of such which is necessarily repeatable. We must be able to replicate and duplicate the same conditions and variability in procedure (in this case in treatment) in order to ensure that as we accomplish something, or are successful at something, so too will be the next person who follows our exact method. This is, in a sense the reason why treatments for the mentally ill are often seen as being so general and in some cases non-specific (ie. not individually tailored). The sense and depth of that which transpires in therapy and the therapeutic relationship defies the written word of detailed conversation and observation in transcripts compiled afterward. In fact, much of the wonder of therapy eludes the art of description so necessary in the assessment following, simply because it does not spring forth in the twinkling of an eye, in a brief exchange of glances or in a smile. A miracle happens, or may happen, in the flash of a moment, but the scientific format, which demands a test of significance or a series of skills or techniques which are repeatable, will never capture it to call it 'success'.
30. Millon, Theodore, (ed), Theories in Psychopathology, W. B. Saunders Company, Philadelphia, 1967, p. 1.
- This is also an excellent and well-written text which offers an overview of many of the different theories held today as written by prominent members of the various schools.
31. 'This tragedy had affected Pinel deeply. He undoubtedly felt, as a doctor, that something could have been done to prevent his friend's death. ... For the next 5 years, he studied the behavior and treatment of the insane ... Seven years after the tragic death of his friend, Pinel wrote his first major article on insanity. It discussed the destructive features of madness and how they might be treated.' The Story of Psychoanalysis, p. 25.
32. Freud worked on his ideas gained from his own inner journeys and his work with his patients for almost 15 years before his theories were published. Hall, Calvin S., A Primer in Freudian Psychology, New American Library, New York, 1954, p. 14,15.

Samuel Take actually lived among the mentally ill at the Retreat (started by his grandfather, William Take) while recovering from a long illness. He had thus been with these suffering ones long before he ever worked with them or wrote his three volumes, Description of the Retreat, an Institution near York for the Insane Persons of the Society of Friends, York, 1813; Insanity in Ancient and Modern Life; and Chapters in the History of the Insane.

George Kelly actually begins his text with the statement, "This book started out 20 years ago ..." It went through many transitions before its final publication. Kelly, George, The Psychology of Personal Constructs, W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1955, Vol. I, pp. ix,x.

33. Ibid: Vol II, pp. 1141 - 1197

Rogers, Carl, Client-Centered Therapy, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1961.

----- A Theory of therapy, personality, and interpersonal relationships as developed in the client-centered framework, Psychology: A Study of a Science, S. Koch (ed), McGraw-Hill, New York, Vol 3, 1959.

34. See in this work pages

35. Schwartz, Fred, (ed), Scientific Thought and Social Reality, Essays by Michael Polanyi, Psychological Issues, Vol VIII, #4, monograph 32, p 121.

36. Ibid: p 119

37. Although I disagree in Polanyi's use of the term 'entity' (when referring to a man as a person, he cannot be understood in terms of an entity or an 'object' - "... dasz namlich Person niemals als ein Ding oder eine Substanz gedacht werden darf .." ETHIK p 371) he has none-the-less hit upon an essential point wherein 'belief' must be in some sense at the very least acknowledged in the field of science, even if there is no room for it within the parameters of the scientific method of investigation or analysis.

Part "B" THE NATURE OF THE QUESTION - 'WHAT?'

38. Much of that which follows in this portion has been drawn from and inspired by Scheler's way of understanding Phenomenology and the phenomenological attitude. The texts used for this are:

ETHIK, pp. 67 - 99

S. aus dem N., pp. 377 - 430

VOL. ETHIKEN, pp. 61 - 99

Where I have specifically quoted from Scheler, the text has been marked and noted.

39. In other words, we are not going to examine this phenomenon in terms of knowing more about it or thinking more about it; nor are we using the thinking 'tools' of logic wherein we generalize from the particular repeated instances of the manifest occurrences of mental illness through inference, nor are we using the thinking 'tools' of deduction wherein we infer valid conclusions based upon some premise. That about which we will speak in a special sense cannot be 'proven' nor can it be refuted. We are here laying ground for a 'new way of seeing' that which is already familiar to us. (S. aus dem N., pp. 380, 381, 383, 391-394.)
40. ETHIK, pp. 69 and 70.
41. Ibid. p. 70. Die phanomenologische Erfahrung aber ist diejenige, in der die jeweilige Gesamtheit dieser Zeichen, Anweisungen, Bestimmungsarten ihrer letzte Erfüllung findet.
42. S aus dem N. p. 380. ... ist Phanomenologie weder der Name für eine neue Wissenschaft noch ein Ersatzwort für Philosophie, sondern der Name für eine Einstellung des geistigen Schauens, in der man etwas zu er-schauen oder zu er-leben bekommt, was ohne bleibt: nämlich ein Reich von "Tatsachen" eigentlicher Art. Ich sage "Einstellung"- nicht Methode.
43. ETHIK p. 67, Im Grunde steht es ja der theoretischen Philosophie nicht besser wie hier. Denn auch hier dürfen wir nicht von der "Wissenschaft" ausgehen, um das Apriori zu bestimmen, oder gar um Wesen von Erkenntnis und Wahrheit zu bestimmen. Auch hier ist die erste Frage: Was ist gegeben? Und erst die

zweite: Für welche Elemente des Gegebenen der Anschauung hat gerade die "Wissenschaft" im Unterschiede zB von der "natürlichen Weltanschauung", von der "Philosophie", ...Auch hier kann das Apriori nicht als "Voraussetzung der Wissenschaft" erschlossen werden, sondern ist in seinen phänomenalen Grundlagen aufzuweisen. (footnote)

44. Ibid. p. 71, Auch das a priori Gegebene ist ein intuitiver Gehalt

The 'signs' of mental illness, which appear 'chaotic' at times, to the natural experience, are grounded in the intuited 'content' of the phenomenological experience of mental illness, itself, in its givenness to intuition. The givenness is a priori to the variability of the signs made manifest in the one who is suffering.

45. VON SWIGEN p. 95, Dieses Sein selber fordert nicht vermoge eines Schlusses, sondern vermog einer unmittelbar anschauenden Einsicht eine Quelle in einem schlechthin und ohne jede nahere einschränkende Bestimmung Seienden. In this case we are speaking of the direct intuition of the phenomenon of mental illness (as it has been so-named).

Although we may encounter its presence initially in an individual who is suffering as its 'host' and thus we may only find ourselves availed of its evident manifestation in a rather limited sense, this does not restrict us from gaining direct intuition into its absoluteness, as it is in itself, beyond this specific 'example' of its presence. In the fact that it presents itself in this or that manner, we are also, and necessarily 'given' its presence and thus its essence. We must only come to 'see' it before us.

Also, S. aus dem N. p. 383, Scheler adds: Denn alles, was auf einer unmittelbaren Selbstanschauung beruht, d.h. "selbst" im Erleben und Anschauen da ist, das ist auch für alle mögliche Beobachtung und Induktion aus dem Beobachten a priori gegeben, als pure Washeit = Wesenheit.

46. For 'Psychic Feelings' refer to this text pages
47. VOM SWIGEN, p 90. Die Selbstbeherrschung als Mittel der Zurückhaltung und als Mittel der Vergegenständlichung der Triebimpulse bricht die

natürliche Concupiscentia und ist die moralische Bedingung einer sich von Null bis zur Vollkommenheit steigenden Adäquation in der Gegebenheitsfülle des Weltinhalts.

48. S. aus dem N. p. 405,6 Die Wissenschaft befreit uns von den Schranken der menschlichen Umwelt. Andererseits aber bleibt das wissenschaftliche Weltbild an Adäquation der Erkenntnis und der ihr entsprechenden "Fülle" des Gehaltes der Gegenstände weit zurück. Es wird vielmehr im selben Maße bloß symbolisch, wie es jene Enge, wie es jene Relativität der Gegenstände auf die spezifisch menschliche Organisation überwindet. Also S. aus dem N. pp. 411-415.
- This is also reminiscent of Millon's quote within this work, page 18.
49. ETHIK p.70, Sie allein gibt die Tatsachen "selber" und daher unmittelbar ... alle nur möglichen Symbole zu erfüllen.....Gleichzeitig ist sie allein rein "immanent" Erfahrung....
50. S. aus dem N. p. 380, ...eine Einstellung des geistigen Schauens.
51. Ibid. p. 380. ...Phänomenologie ... ist der lebendigste, intensivste und unmittelbarste Erlebnisverkehr mit der Welt selbst - d.h. mit den Sachen, um die es sich gerade handelt. Und zwar mit den Sachen, wie sie sich ganz unmittelbar im Erleben im Akte des Erlebens geben, und in ihm und nur in ihm "selber da" sind.
52. For 'personal acts' refer to this text page 77
53. VOM EWIGEN p. 90 Die Liebe, der Kern und die Seele gleichsam des ganzen Aktgefüges, führt uns in die Richtung des absoluten Seins. Sie führt also hinaus über die nur auf unser Sein relativ daseienden Gegenstände.
54. Ibid. 99 die Liebe der ganzen geistigen Person zum absoluten Wert und Sein... (and 90) Die Liebe zum absoluten Wert und Sein bricht die im Menschen befindliche Quelle der Seinsrelativität alles Umweltseins.
55. VOM EWIGEN p. 92 Der positive Forscher ist in seinem Erkenntnis willen primär besetzt von einem Herrschafts-

und einem erst aus ihm hervorgehenden Ordnungswillen gegenüber aller Natur: "Gesetze", nach denen sich Natur beherrschen lässt, sind auch darum sein höchstes Ziel. Nicht was die Welt sei, sondern wie sie als gemacht gedacht werden kann, um sie innerhalb dieser obersten Grenze als praktisch veränderlich überhaupt zu denken, interessiert ihn.

56. Ibid. 99 .. die Verdemütigung des natürlichen Ich und Selbst... (also 90) Die Verdemütigung bricht den natürlichen Stolz ...
57. The truth, in this case with regard to the phenomenon of mental illness, is never constructed; rather, it is always 'given' in the experiencing of the phenomenon.
58. This snare, the temptation to 'choose' that which we like and ignore that which we do not is always a part of the phenomenological path of seeing. It is always in some sense 'with' us and strict attention must be paid to this. In the phenomenological experiencing we apprehend the givenness of the phenomenon. In the phenomenological reduction (which will be discussed later in this portion) we 'peel' away all of that which does not essentially belong to the phenomenon itself until we reach that point at which no further reduction can be made without 'losing' the phenomenon itself. In the end, we are left with the phenomenon itself. For example, if we apprehend the 'green' of a leaf, the green is yet green if the idea of the leaf is removed; it is yet green if the extended form in which the green appears is 'removed'; it is yet green if the texture of the leaf is 'removed' - but we cannot 'touch' the green itself, otherwise, we would lose the phenomenon 'green'. If we were to believe that we had to yet hold onto the 'leaf' or the 'extended form' or the 'texture' in order to retain the 'green' we would not be apprehending the phenomenon of 'green' clearly. In this sense then, we must 'love' the green to 'see' it clearly.

Also, in the phenomenological intuition (the above phrased in a somewhat different manner) of eg. mental illness, as we perform the eidetic reduction, the essence of mental illness slowly begins to emerge. The essence of mental illness emerges as the 'pure whatness' of mental illness - the 'heart' of it, so to speak.

59. S. aus dem N. pp. 412-13 Indem der Philosoph einen resoluten Kampf gegen die Tendenz führt, Gegebenes nur als solch "Erfüllung" sich geben zu lassen, findet er das durch die Sprache gleichsam noch unberührte vorsprachlich Gegebenes; und er sieht so noch, was vom Gegebenen als bloße Erfüllung der Sprache fungiert. In this sense, then, the philosopher must keep silent and listen to the language of the phenomenon rather than attempting to 'speak for it' as to what he 'thinks' it might say.
60. Ibid. p393 ...Die Phanomenologische Philosophie ist das Gegenteil aller schnell fertigen Rede-philosophie. Man redet hier etwas weniger, schweigt mehr und sieht mehr - auch das vielleicht Nicht-mehr-Beredbare der Welt. Dasz die Welt dazu da sei, um durch eindeutige Symbole bezeichnet und mit ihrer Hilfe geordnet und beredet zu werden - ja, dasz sie "nichts" sei, bevor sie in diese Reden eingeht, das ist doch ein wenig gar zu wenig ihres Seins und ihres Sinnes!
61. Once we apprehend, through phenomenological intuition, an essence as it is, its mode of givenness may be manifold, but the essence is but one. For example, the number 3 may be given in many different ways but 3 is essentially 'beneath' its observable varieties.
62. 'Bracketing' or the 'phenomenological reduction' is that procedure whereby the experiencing of the phenomenon is refined. For example, in ETHIK p. 380, Scheler begins to 'reduce' and refine the essences of 'person' and 'act'. In the same way we are able to perform the phenomenological reduction on the given intuition or experience of mental illness and glean the nugget - that which is mental illness itself.
63. By 'bearer' I mean that specific individual who is the 'host' of this mental illness.
64. As we shall discover, mental illness is there, often long before the symptoms of its presence make themselves manifest. Mental illness is not an accident of fate, it is not the result of a crisis (as if coming out of 'nowhere'), nor is it the result of 'stress'. Its seeds may be found within us all and we are all the ones who will give them the ground to grow, either in ourselves, or in others.

65. Since something is given in this experience it cannot be said to be a 'void' or a 'nothingness'.
66. ETHIK pp. 470 & 471 Man denke, es erzählte jemand eine etwas sonderbare, extravagante Geschichte, die uns "schwerverständlich" erscheint. Wir sind in der Einstellung des "Verstehens". Nun aber flüstert uns jemand ins Ohr: "Dieser Mensch ist wahnsinnig." Sofort wird sich unsere Einstellung charakteristisch ändern. An die Stelle des vorher gegebenen geistigen Zentrums, aus dem heraus wir weine Akte nachlebten, tritt eine leere Stelle; und nur sein Leibes- und Lebenszentrum sowie seine Ichheit bleibt in der Gegebenheit der Anschauung. In seinen Lebensäußerungen sehen wir nun nicht mehr sinngerichtete Intentionen an, sondern was uns gegeben ist, sind Ausdrucksbewegungen und andere Bewegungen, hinter denen wir psychische Vorgänge als Ursachen suchen. An Stelle des "Sinnbandes" dieser Äußerungen aber tritt das Band der "Kausalität" resp. der Umweltreize, die jene Äußerungen auslösen;.....
67. In this thesis, as the subject is further developed, I have put forth the belief that it is the experience of the 'emptiness' rather than any transition to try to understand or explain the behavior etc. of the one suffering, that points to the phenomenon of mental illness. Scheler introduced, in the above quotation, the presence of someone who told him that the man was insane. Scheler, then, mentions the change in attitude taking place. I believe, however, that this 'empty place' was 'there' in the meeting with the 'madman'. It only needed articulation. This will hopefully become clearer as this thesis is developed.
68. ETHIK p. 70 In der Deckung von "Gemeintem" und Gegebenem" wird uns der Gehalt der phänomenologischen Erfahrung allein kund. In dieser Deckung, im Punkte des Zusammentreffens der Erfüllung des Gemeintem und Gegebenem erscheint das "Phänomen".
70. Scheler, in a special sense, rushes ahead too quickly when he discusses our attitude change. Our attitude seems to change by virtue of the fact that we cannot understand the depths of our 'experiencing' and due to 'discomfort' we would prefer to 'flee' from the presence of the one who is mentally ill and 'race' into rationalization and justification for our own 'natural response' than to come to terms with that which we are experiencing, ie. this phenomenon of 'emptiness'.

71. One could almost say that they seemed to 'operate on automatic pilot'.
72. This 'knowing' will be further understood as we begin the discussion of the 'communal person' in the following section. (Section II p 103 etc.)
73. For a definition of 'faith' as it is meant here, it would not be unthinkable to understand it as it is found in Hebrews 11:1 - '.... the substance (ground or confidence) of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen'. (King James Version)
74. Carl Rogers has a very interesting way of understanding this business of 'loose ends'. He states: "The simplest way of stating our present attitude is to say that we have learned how relatively unimportant is psychotic material. ...in the therapeutic relationship it simply forms a more difficult language of communication." (Rogers, Carl R. and Stevens, Barry, Person to Person, The Problem of Being Human, A New Trend in Psychology, Real People Press, Lafayette, California, 1967. p. 188

Section II: THE PERSON

Part "A" PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH THE TERM 'PERSON'

75. HELIK p. 470 Können wir auch, nachdem uns das phänomenologische Wesen von "Person" einmal aufgegangen ist, den Begriff erweitern und keine (gleichsam) des Personseins schon auf unentwickelten Stufen menschlichen Seins annehmenso ist doch der Ort gleichsam, wo uns das Wesen der Person zum erstenmal aufblitzt, nur bei einer gewissen Art von Menschen, nicht beim Menschen überhaupt...
76. Ibid. p. 389 Person ist ... sondern ein absoluter Name. ... Das mit Person Gemeinte hat den Ich gegenüber etwas von einer Totalität, die sich selbst genügt. Eine Person "handelt" a.B.; sie "geht spazieren" usw.; dies kann ein "Ich" nicht. Person, then, is a term embracing the whole being in a very special sense.
77. Any understanding of man in the fields of the human sciences necessarily presupposes or assumes an

underlying philosophical understanding of man - often without articulation. Fromm states that, "... the concept of mental health depends on our concept of the nature of man." (Fromm, Erich, The Sane Society, Fawcett Publication Inc., Greenwich, Conn., 1955, p. 67.) Every time we read the works of an author who writes with regard to mental illness and the mentally ill, these assumptions are there. They are, however, often in the form of 'apparent opinion' or they permeate the text in the form of the dialogue used.

78. Lidz, Theodore, The Person, His Development throughout the Life Cycle, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1968.
79. Ibid. p. 459,9.
80. Laing, R. D., The Politics of Experience and the Bird of Paradise, Penguin Books, Markham, Ontario, 1975, p. 20.
81. Goffman, Irving, Encounters, Two Studies in the sociology of Interaction, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., Indianapolis, 1966, p. 143.
82. Ibid.
83. By this I mean that all science deals with universals and laws which demonstrate themselves in particular cases. The universal is drawn from and based upon that which has been found within any number of specific cases. Two simple examples may be found in the ideas behind 'teacher's expectations' and 'the self fulfilling prophecy'. Also, rather than dealing with special cases as such, the sciences generalize that which evidences itself in several specific cases and instances and the generalization becomes the common thread or common pattern 'used' for all of these. This is the foundation for most theories, etc.
84. SYMPATHIE, p. 129, Je tiefer wir in einen Menschen eindringen, durch Personliebe geleitete verstehende Erkenntnis, desto unverwechselbarer, individueller, einzigartiger, unvertret- und unersetzbarer wird der Mensch für uns.
85. In the following section, much of the discussion of the person, is dealt with in terms of the 'individual person'. Also, see ETHIK p. 499-509 (Person und Individuum)

86. Laing, R. D., The Divided Self, An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness, Penguin Books, Markham, Ont., 1969, p. 21. "The science of persons is the study of human beings that begins from a relationship with the other as person and proceeds to an account of the other still as person."

Goffman, Erving, Encounters.

87. Laing, R. D., The Divided Self, p. 23, "The experience of oneself and others as persons is primary and self-validating. It exists prior to the scientific or philosophical difficulties about how such experience is possible or how it is to be explained."
88. ETHIK, p. 389, "Das erste hat denselben Sinn wie in "Ich gehe spazieren", d.h. den Sinn der Anredeform; das zweite dagegen bedeutet das psychische Ich des Erlebens, den Gegenstand innerer Wahrnehmung. Eine Person kann daher, so gut wie sie z.B. "spazieren gehen" kann, auch ihr Ich wahrnehmen, dergleichen ihren Leib, dergleichen die Außenwelt; aber absolut ausgeschlossen ist es, dass die Person Gegenstand, sei es der von ihr selbst vollzogenen, sei es der von einem anderen vollzogenen Vorstellung oder Wahrnehmung wird."
89. "Da die Person ihre Existenz hat eben erst im Erleben ihrer Erlebnisse erfassen zu wollen. ... "Erlebnisse" sehen und nicht auf das Erleben dieser Erlebnisse, bleibt die Person also völlig transzendent." ETHIK, p. 385.
90. "Da Person überhaupt nichts Psychisches bedeutet,..." Ibid. 475.
90. Allport, Gordon W., Becoming, Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1962, p. 56 & 57.
91. Ibid. p. 61
92. SYMPATHIE, p. 169 "Die Person kann nie nur gegeben sein, indem ich ihre Akte "mitvollziehe"-erkenntnislosig im "Verstehen" und "Nachleben", sittlich aber in der "Gefolgschaft".
93. ... in that the person performs acts, one of which is 'self-objectification', etc.
94. ETHIK, p. 375, "Vielmehr ist es selbst (das Ich, the ego) nur ein Gegenstand unter Gegenständen. Identität besteht nur insofern, als Identität eben ein Wesen-momental des Gegenstandes ist."

Also: Ibid. p. 50 & 51. Denn die Person ist weder selbst ein Ding, noch trägt sie das Wesen der Dinghaftigkeit in sich Als die konkrete Einheit aller nur möglichen Akte steht sie der ganzen Sphäre möglicher "Gegenstände" (seien sie Gegenstände der inneren oder der "äusseren" Wahrnehmung, d.h. seien sie psychische oder physische) gegenüber: erst recht also der gesamten dinghaften Sphäre, die ein Teil jener ist. Sie existiert nur im Vollzug ihrer Akte.

95. See the following pages of this work, pages
96. A further discussion of 'ego', 'outer world' etc. would be far too elaborate an undertaking for the present thesis. However, a fascinating account of this in his ETHIK will offer the reader a viewing of these 'objects of science', according to Scheler's understanding of them.
97. May, Rollo, Existence, Random House, Inc., New York, p. 16 - 35.
98. ETHIK, p. 388, ...die Akte..und..die Person..beides eben psychophysisch indifferent....
99. ETHIK, p. 386&7, "Versteht man daher - wie üblich - unter Psychologie eine Wissenschaft von - einer Beobachtung, Beschreibung und Erklärung zugänglichen - "Geschehnissen", und zwar Geschehnissen, wie sie in innerer Wahrnehmung vorliegen, so ist sowohl alles, was den Namen Akt verdient, sowie die Person der Psychologie schon aus diesen Grunde völlig transzendent. ... Was den "Akt" gegenüber Inhalt und Gegenstand ist, enthält unter vielem anderen auch alle nur möglichen Tatsachen der psychologischen Forschung....
100. Often, in the beginnings of therapy the topic, or subject of discussion is based upon a type of information-sharing. This also holds for the various tests undertaken by the therapist, the possible results of which are discussed in the beginning of therapy. In a sense, this approach starts the dialogue between the therapist and the patient or client.
101. The original 'topic of therapy' or the object of therapy evolves into a project in a sense, by which both therapist and patient engage in a working together, a sharing together a common task - a common goal.

102. I use the term 'healing' rather than 'cure' because 'healing' is understood as having to do with renewal whereas 'curing' seems to be in line with the cessation of a process. A cure, as I understand it implies a manipulation or an elimination of the negative factors held to be the 'cause' of mental illness in the one suffering. Healing, takes place within the one who is suffering from mental illness as a redemption of the person. Healing, then, is far more than simply a 'cure' for mental illness.

Part "B" INTRODUCTION TO SCHELER'S 'PERSON'

103. ETHIK, pp. 478 and 471
104. von Hildebrand, Alice, Introduction to a Philosophy of Religion, Franciscan Herald Press, Chicago, 1970, p. 8.
- Scheler, himself, said that all psychology (and also psychiatry, etc.) guarantees its object only when they have abstracted it from and disregarded the person. What the human sciences offer is the possible matter of life of the person which allows itself to be hypothetically arranged in any one of a number of ways. ETHIK 481.
105. Frankl, Viktor E., The Doctor and the Soul, pp 26-175.
Rogers, Carl, On Becoming a Person, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1961, esp. pp. 163-196
Laing, Ronald D., The Divided Self, Penguin Books, Markham, Ont., 1965, p. 21
106. May, Rollo, A Man's Search For Himself, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 1953
Kelly, George, The Psychology of Personal Constructs, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 1955, Vol. I and II
Allport, Gordon W., Becoming, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1955

Part "C" MEETING SCHELER'S 'PERSON'

107. Laing, R. D., Self and Others, Penguin Books, Middlesex, England, 1969, pp. 83, 84
108. Ibid. p 84

109. For a further discussion of 'fate' and 'destiny' see ftnt. 183.
110. 'Choices' are held as opposed to 'preferring' found within the spiritual realm of the person. Choices are made when a number of alternative possibilities are present for the individual. To choose is a cognitive act wherein a decision is made between or among deeds and/or things. Regardless of the number of choices, however, this number is always limited. Also, see ETHIK, p. 105.
111. Premack, David, Mechanisms of Self-Control, presented at the 4th Annual Conference on Behavior Modification, Napa California, 1969.
- Skinner, B. F., Contingencies of Reinforcement in the Design of a Culture, Behavioral Sciences, 1966/11.
- In each of these one may easily see the matter of confrontation between these two men.
112. See ftnt. 10
113. Goffman, Erving, Encounters, The Bobbs-Merill Company, Inc., Indianapolis, 1961, p 152
114. ETHIK p 388 Wenn wir Akte aus der psychischen Sphäre (und erst recht die Person) ausschlieszen, so ist natürlich damit nicht gesagt, sie seien physisch. Es ist nur gesagt, dasz beides eben psychophysisch indifferent ist.
115. This is not a 'social' relatedness, rather, it is an essential relatedness found within the nature of the person in his givenness. For Scheler's understanding of the communal person see ETHIK pp 509-548.
116. ETHIK p 371 ... Person niemals als ein Ding oder ein Substanz
117. Scheler says that 'if it is indeed a genuine essence which has been discovered in its givenness, this genuine essence is there for all to 'see'. For example, see S. aus dem N. pp 392,3. Problems could arise in that the one offering the description of the phenomenon and its essence, in the hope of pointing it out to others, does so in an inadequate way - that others are not able to 'see' his insight.

118. Allport, Gordon, Becoming.
119. There is a great deal of controversy in and around the proper translation of the term 'Geist' which Scheler, himself, uses in regard to the 'person' and 'acts'. Frings et al would translate this Geist as 'mind' as they have done in their translation of Scheler's ETHIK (Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, Frings, Manfred S., Funk, Roger L. /trans/ Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1963, p 389, for example) However, in the beginning portions and the concluding portions of this work, they translate Geist as 'spirit', and 'geistlich' as spiritual, and 'geistlichkeit' as spirituality. (see ETHIK pp 124, 344, 5, and 388; as compared to the work of Frings pp 107 & 8, 342-4, and 389.) In that Geist is used with all consistency in terms of person and act; I believe that Geist must necessarily be translated as 'spirit'. This is because a person performs intellectual (mental) acts but he also, and prior to these performs loving acts. It is impossible to conceive of 'love' in Scheler's understanding of it, as having to do with the 'mind' as the definition of 'Geist' as a working definition of the term, is found to embrace on page 388 of ETHIKS. This understanding seems to thread its way through out Scheler's thought with regard to the person, and this consistency must be maintained lest the controversy over Scheler's heart/mind dilemma grow greater than it already has in some circles of criticism with regard to his work.

Noble, in his translations of Scheler, particularly as found in Problems of Religion (On The Eternal In Man, /trans/ Bernard Noble, Archon Books, 1972, pp 105-356) translates Geist as 'mind', geistlich as 'mental' and geistlichkeit as 'mentality'. To understand Scheler's God as mind or in terms of mentality is to miss something which the term 'mind' simply cannot embrace. Here again, we return to the idea of the act of love as first and foremost with both 'person' and 'God'. An example which fully conveys the dilemma of translation is found in Noble's rendering of the following passage.

".... so ist die ursprünglichste Wurzel alles "Geistes", sowohl des erkennenden als des wollenden Geistes in Gott wie im Menschen, vielmehr die Liebe. Sie allein ist das

was die Einheit von Willen und Verstand stiftet, die ohne sie dualistisch auseinanderfielen." (VON EWIGEN, p. 219)

Noble renders it this way:

"... the most original root of all 'mind' in God as in man is love. Love alone it is which founds the unity of will and intellect, which but for love would fall dualistically apart." (pp 225 & 6)

Unless, it seems, Geist is translated as spirit, love becomes no more than a kind of 'glue' that holds the intellect and the will of man together. This leads to a faulty misconception of that which Scheler so ardently holds to be the essential nature of man, ie. that man 'is first a loving being before he is a knowing or a willing being.' (S. aus dem N. p. 356)

As will be shown, in the bulk of this thesis, to the best of my ability, I believe that a translation of 'geist' as 'spirit' is the key to deeply apprehending that was so profoundly grasped by Scheler as to man, in that he is a 'person'.

'Spirit', then, as I have come to understand it in the works of Scheler, ever presupposes two things: 1) that that to which the term 'spirit' refers can never be made into an object of thought in the same sense as that of 'mind', 'intellect', 'ego', 'soul', etc. can. and 2) 'spirit' always refers to that which is beyond any and all factors found within such areas as causation, determination and limitation in terms of finitude, space and time, etc. Equally, however, this 'spirit' does not refer to or imply an additional idea of the mysterious, the ethereal or the religious, etc.

120. That is to say that the person is the substantial unity of all acts, (ETHIK, p 382, ...Person ist die konkrete, selbst wesenhafte Seinseinheit von Akten verschiedenartigen Wesens,...)
121. ETHIK p. 389, ...zum Wesen der Person gehört, dass sie nur existiert und lebt im Vollzug intentionaler Akte.
122. Die Person handelt hierbei ebenso unmittelbar auf die Auszenwelt, wie sie auf die Innenwelt handelt.. (ETHIK p 475)

123. ETHIK p. 382 & 3

124. For one way of understanding Scheler's idea of time and the person, see VOM EWIGEN pp 33 & 34. Also from ETHIK p 385, he states:

"... Die Person lebt wohl in die Zeit hinein; sie vollzieht anderswerdend ihre Akte in die Zeit hinein; nicht aber lebt sie innerhalb der phänomenalen Zeit, die im Abflusz der innerlich wahrgenommenen seelischen Prozesse unmittelbar gegeben ist; oder gar in der objektiven Zeit der Physik, in der es weder schnell noch langsam, noch Dauer ..., noch die phänomenalen Zeitdimensionen von Gegenwart, Vergangenheit und Zukunft gibt, da auch die Vergangenheits- und Zukunftspunkte der phänomenalen Zeit bei dieser Begriffsbildung "als" mögliche Gegenwartspunkte behandelt werden."

125. ETHIK p. 384, "Vielmehr steckt in jedem voll konkreten Akt die ganze Person und "variiert" in und durch jeden Akt auch die ganze Person - usw..."

and p 385, "Die Identität liegt hier allein in der qualitativen Richtung dieses puren Anderswerdens selbst."

126. ETHIK pp. 110 & 111, also Ibid pp. 525 & 526, "Da die geistige Person als konkretes Aktzentrum aller diesen Akten sich nicht wie eine unveränderliche Substanz zu ihren wechselnden Eigenschaften oder Tätigkeiten, aber auch nicht wie ein Kollektivum zu seinen Gliedern oder ein Ganzes zu seinen summierbaren Teilen verhält, sondern wie ein Konkretes zu Abstraktem; da die ganze Person in jedem ihrer Akt ist und lebt, ohne doch in einem oder ihrer Summe aufzugehen, so gibt es keinen Akt, dessen Vollzug nicht auch den Seins-gehalt der Person selbst wandelte, und deinen Aktwert, der nicht ihren Personwert steigerte oder verminderte, erhöhte oder erniedrigte, positiv oder negativ fortbestimmte."

127. Here I have translated 'Geist' into 'spirit'. ETHIK p. 388, "... den Terminus "Geist" in Anspruch, indem wir alles, was das Wesen von Akt, Intentionalität, und Sinnerfülltheit hat- wo immer es sich finden mag - also nennen. Dasz aller Geist dann auch wesensnotwendig "persönlich" ist und die Idee eines "unpersönlichen Geistes" "widersinnig" ist, folgt dann ohne weiteres aus dem früher Gesagten."

128. For Scheler's understanding of goals and purposes see ETHIK pp. 51-64.
129. Ibid. p. 392 "Nur die Person ist niemals ein "Teil", sondern stets das Korrelat einer "Welt": die Welt in der sie sich erlebt."
130. Ibid, "Nehme ich von einer beliebigen Person nur einen ihrer konkreten Akte.."
131. Ibid. p. 393, "Die Welt" ist aber durchaus keine "Idee", sondern ein absolutseiendes, überall konkretes, individuelles Sein, .."
132. Ibid. p. 392, "...jeder individuellen Person auch eine individuelle Welt."
133. This will become clearer as the meaning of Love as beheld by Scheler is more fully explored.
134. Ibid. p. 394, " ... sie selbst als im absoluten Sein gegründet, ja absolutes Sein (ebenso wie die Welt)..."
135. S. aus dem N. p. 356, "Die Fülle, die Abgestuftheit, die Differenzierung, die Kraft seiner Liebe umgränzt die Fülle, die Funktionsspezifikation, die Kraft seines möglichen Geistes und der ihm möglichen Spannweite im Kontakt mit dem Universum."
137. Ibid. "Dieses Eine aber, das an allem also teilnimmt, ohne dessen Wollen nichts Reales real sein kann und durch dan hindurch alle Dinge aneinander irgendwie (geistig) teilhaben und miteinander solidarisch sind..."
136. Ibid. p 348.
138. Ibid. p 356, "Der Mensch ist, ehe er ein ens cogitans ist oder ein ens volens, ein ens amans."
139. Ibid. pp356 & 357
140. Ibid. p 356
141. For a further elaboration on this subject see the portions dealing with Loving and Hating, and their Power, page 119, and The Pattern of our Personal Being - our Spiritual Personality, page 122, in this work.
142. S. aus dem N. p 347

143. ETHIK p 275, "Für die Person, je wertvoller sie in sich selbst ist und sich verhält, öffnet sich zu- sehends in jedem Schritte die Welt der Werte. Des Frommen Seele dankt immer leise für Raum, Licht, Luft, für die Gunst der Existenz seiner Arme, Glieder, seines Atems, und alles bevölkert sich mit Werten und Unwerten, was dem anderen "wertindifferent" ist.
144. For a further discussion of Scheler's understanding of the 'Spiritual' and the 'Holy' see pages 103 and 105 and following.
145. S. aus dem N. p 357, " Vom Uratom und Sandkorn bis zu Gott ist dieses Reich ein Reich." and, p 359, "Gott und nur Gott kann die Spitze des stufenförmigen und pyramidenförmigen Aufbaus des Reiches der Liebenswürdigen sein - Quelle und Ziel des Ganzen zugleich."
146. Ibid p 357, "...wir können auch sagen: sich mit der Liebe, mit der Gott schon die Idee der Welt resp. ihren Gehalt liebte, ehe er sie schuf, und mit der er sie jede Sekunde forterhält, eins oder geschieden und im Gegensatz fühlen und wissen können."
147. VOM EWIGEN pp 298-301
148. S. aus dem N. p 356, "Also ist Liebe immer die Weckerin zur Erkenntnis und zum Wollens - ja die Mutter des Geistes und der Vernunft selbst."
149. S. aus dem N. p 361, "Denn das, was wir "Gemüt" oder in bildhafter Weise das "Herz" des Menschen nennen, ist kein Chaos Gefühlszustände"
150. SYMPATHIE p 157, "... Liebe ursprünglich auf Wertgegenstände gerichtet, und auch auf den Menschen nur, soweit und insofern er Träger von Werten ist und sofern er einer Werterhöhung fähig ist.
151. Scheler's understanding of 'taking an interest in' may be found in S. aus dem N. p 370, and ETHIK p 125 - 172, with particular reference to page 161 in terms of the Fundamental Moral Tenor (Gesinnung).
152. SYMPATHIE p 160, "... die Liebe selber ist es die im Gegenstände nun den je höheren Wert ganz kontinuierlich, und zwar im Laufe ihrer Bewegung zum Auftauchen bringt - gleich als ob er aus dem geliebten Gegen-

- stande selbst ohne jede strebende Betätigung des Liebenden "von selbst" herausströme."
- Part "D" THE ORDER OF VALUES AND THEIR BEING-FELT
153. ETHIK pp 122-126, 331-359
 154. Das sinnliche Gefühle see ETHIK pp 335-340, and die Wertreihe des Angenehmen und Unangenehmen Ibid. pp 122 & 123.
 155. This is evidenced in any commercial on the television screen from cars to soap, from clothes to medication, from cosmetics to beer.
 156. Die Tiefenschicht des Lebensgeföhls see ETHIK pp 340 - 344, and der Inbegriff von Werten des vitalen Fühlens see Ibid. pp 123 & 124.
 157. With the vital feelings (feeling-states) there is always a notion of futurity involved. As Scheler notes in the above note, there is always a sense of 'that which is to come'.
 158. Die rein seelischen Geföhle see Ibid p 344
 159. See die geistigen Werte, Ibid pp 124 & 125
 160. Ibid. p 269 "...dazs aber sowohl die Vitalgeföhle wie die rein seelischen und geistigen Geföhle immer auch einen intentionalen Charakter aufweisen können,..."
 161. Ibid. p 124, "Die Akte und Funktionen, in denen wir sie erfassen, sind Funktionen des geistigen Fühlens und Akte des geistigen Vorziehens und Liebens und Haszens ..."
 162. Ibid. 344, "Das seelische Geföhle ... Es is von Hause aus eine Ichqualität."
 163. Ibid. p 387, "Alle Funktionen sind erstens Ichfunktionen, niemals etwas zur Personshäre Gehöriges. Funktionen sind psychisch, Akte sind unpsychisch.
 164. Ibid. p 344, "ich fühle mich traurig", "ich fühle Trauer", "ich bin traurig".
 165. Since psychic feelings are always given with an "I", there is always a sense in which the 'self' is felt as somehow 'owning them'. They are, in a sense, "my feelings"; however, with spiritual feelings there is a certain 'detachment' from the "I", the 'self' or 'ego'. Ibid. p 344, Scheler says, "In echter Seligkeit

und Verzweiflung ... erscheint alles Ichzuständliche wie ausgelöscht.

166. Die geistigen Gefühle see Ibid pp 344 & 345.
167. By this I mean that these values and those of the physical and the vital realm are not found within the absolute sphere as are those of the holy.
168. As I have said in the above, the higher values are always those in which many and in the ultimate case (ie. those of the holy) all persons may share. These are the values which, when realized, draw men together and embrace them into the heart of community, of being and belonging together in the performance of their acts, for example, the value of the 'spirit' of a nation (the cultural value, for Scheler) or the value of fine music, art, the values of justice, etc. And in the highest sense, the communion born of coming together in the worship and adoration of God, one always finds the 'welcome' for all persons - and the 'communal need or calling' for all persons. Valuing of the 'ego' or the 'I' only offers greater and greater alienation and separation - not the communion found among persons. This, too, is born out in the experience of Mary.
169. See, within this work the portion entitled, The Person and the Psycho-Socio-Physical Human Being, page 71.
170. Des Heiligen und Unheiligen, ETHIK pp 125 & 126.
171. Ibid pp 509 - 548.
172. S. aus dem N. p 356, "Er steht darin als dienstwürdigster und freiester Deiner Gottes.."
173. VOM EWIGEN pp 261, 263.
174. S. aus dem N. p 357, "Wo sein Gemüt anhangt, da ist für ihn je der "Kern" des sog. "Wesens" der Dinge. This is in that God, Himself, is the One who embraces all essences within Himself, so too all false gods or idols must necessarily be found to embrace the same in a pseudo sense. Also, in Probleme der Religion, Scheler says:" Die Wesenheiten und ihre Zusammenhänge werden nun "Worte einer natürlichen Sprache Gottes" an den Menschen und in den Dingen, durch die er ihm auf seine "Fragen" durch die Vermittlung des

- "natürlichen Lichtes" "Antwort" erteilt."(VOM EWIGEN p 298)
175. Kelly, George, The Psychology of Personal Constructs.
176. Ibid pp 8 & 9
177. The core construct is the one which governs the client's maintenance processes. Ibid p 565; The difference between core constructs and other constructs (for example those at the periphery) is that the core constructs are vital to one's personal identity. Ibid 1188.
178. Kelly sees the world for man as a chaos or an 'undifferentiated homogeneity' (Ibid p 9) This, of course, is in diametric opposition to Scheler in that he accuses Kant of 'mistrusting' the givenness of the world. ETHIK p 86, "Diese "Haltung" kann ich nur mit den Worten einer ganz ursprünglichen "Feindseligkeit" zu oder auch "Misstrauen" in alles "Gegebene" als solches, Angst und Furcht vor ihm als dem "Chaos" bezeichnen - "die Welt da draussen und die Natur da drinnen" -; das ist, auf Worte gebracht, Kants Haltung gegen die Welt, und die "Natur" ist das, was zu formen, zu organisieren, was zu "beherrschen" ist, sie ist "das Feindliche", das "Chaos" usw."
179. Kelly, George, The Psychology of Personal Constructs, p 130.
180. There is a great temptation to understand and translate Scheler's Personalität into the personality found within the realm of psychology and psychiatry. This is especially found in Heath's translation of The Nature of Sympathy (trans. Peter Heath, Archon Books, The Shoe String Press Inc., Hamden, Conn., 1970) in the chapter which he renders Love and Personality, rather Love and Person. The latter is more accurate rendering in that Scheler titles this portion, Liebe und Person (SYMPATHIE p 167). In the sense of 'person' 'personality' must be treated in the same manner - in that neither term is a conceptual abstraction or a reification or pattern created to explain anything about man in the sense that the human sciences create such abstracts.
181. Kelly, George, The Psychology of Personal Constructs, pp 12-14, & 16.
182. Ibid. See Figures 1 through 11, especially 1,2,5 & 8.
183. In Scheler's essay, Ordo Amoris, in S. aus dem N.,

we are given his understanding of the difference between fate and destiny (pp 349-355) On page 352 Scheler says, "... ist nicht etwa sein Schicksal die individuelle Bestimmung des Menschen." Man's fate is not his individual destiny. Man's fate is bound to time and the way in which he addresses himself to all of that which is embraced by his environment. Fate is 'born' of time and circumstance as they relate to the pattern of loving begun by and established by man, himself. It dictates his choices in life in such a way that, although not in each and every individual case in point and situation, his life acquires a sense and a direction that becomes almost predictable in the long run. Fate is thus seen as the way in which man's actual (rather than ideal) ordo amoris is formed. It is found in the realm of man, the psycho-socio-physical human being in a sense as he here a solitary creature.

The destiny of man holds no part in this. In that man is a free person, in that he is not only an individual person but also a communal person, he can be blind to his destiny if there is no other person who will lovingly accept the responsibility to help him 'see' and 'discover' his own destiny (special and unique and meant only for him, ETHIK pp 499-509). The person can stand above his fate and rise to his destiny, or he can surrender to his fate or fight against it alone. But whatever may be the case, it is in the realization of personal destiny that we as persons are responsible to one another in helping, and assisting each other toward the actualization of those values which are ours alone, in the heart and mind of God. Man, as a person, can never aspire to fulfill his destiny in isolation, and it is one of the tragedies of our times that the wounded must often 'enlist' the aid of another rather than discovering another to help him overcome that which is held to be insurmountable - the cloak of his own fate - and yet this is the wonderful part of the sacred calling of those who devote themselves to the wounded ones. A miracle emerges when we share in the wonder of another discovering and accepting the call of his destiny.

184. ETHIK pp 112-113.
185. Ibid. p 126
186. We cannot 'possess' values, rather we must realize them. ETHIK pp 497 & 498.

187. VOM EWIGEN p 298, "Die Dinge gewinnen ontisch den Anteil an ihrer Bestimmung und Bedeutung, die idealiter schon besitzen: Sie werden Gott als der Wurzel aller Dinge, als den Wesensbegriff aller Wesen und damit auch des ihrigen "zugeführt", zu ihm heraufgeführt, zu ihm zurückgeführt.

Ibid. p 306, "... Jeder Wert (als Qualität) ist Eigenschaft eines daseienden Subjekts - ob dieses Subjekt bekannt ist oder nicht.

Ibid. p 307, "Das eben ist ... das Wunderbare des weder auf Erkennen noch Wollen zurückführbaren Liebesaktes, dasz er seinen Gegenstand auf einer Stufe des "Seins" ergreift, auf der sein Sosein sowohl seinem existentialen Sein, als seinem Wertsein nach noch unbestimmt ist - ... dieser Faktor die universelle Liebesbejahung des Wesens und Daseins des endlichen Gegenstandes durch Gott; durch sie allein ist der Gegenstand (gleichsam gerettet aus dem unendlichen Meere des Nichtseienden und der Nichtigkeit); .."

188. ETHIK p 480, "Es ist an erster Stelle das durch Liebe zur Person selbst vermittelte "Verstehen" ihres zentralsten Springquells, das uns die Anschauung dieses ihres idealen, individuellen Wertwesens vermittelt. Diese verstehende Liebe ist der grosze Werkmeister und ... der grosze plastische Bildner, der aus dem Gemenge von empirischen Einzelteilen heraus - gegebenenfalls nur an einer Handlung, ja einer Ausdrucksgeste - die Linien ihres Wertwesens herauszuschauen und herauszuarbeiten vermag ..."

189. Ibid. p 57, "Denn wir vermögen Werte ...zu fühlen, ohne dasz sie erstrebt werden oder einem Streben immanent sind."

190. VOM EWIGEN pp 300-301 for example.

191. Ibid. p 300 for example.

- 192(a) Ibid. pp 142-149.

- 192(b) Also, reason, the mind, the intellect, the understanding, etc. (cognition) do not deal with the a priori givenness of essences but rather they are employed after the original intuition to reflect upon it and come to understand it in its givenness.

193. SYMPATHIE, p 168.
194. Ibid. p 164 "...Liebe ist die Bewegung, in der jeder konkrete individuelle Gegenstand, des Werte trägt, zu den für ihn und nach seiner idealen Bestimmung möglichen höchsten Werten gelangt; oder in der er sein ideales Wertwesen, das ihm eigentümlich ist, erreicht ..."
195. There is no response that could hope to follow a 'because' in terms of an explanation. It is meant here that this is a-reason in a special sense, not unreason.
196. ETHIK p 266 "Lieben und Hassen endlich bilden die höchste Stufe unseres intentionalen emotionalen Lebens."
197. S. aus dem N. p 370, "Der Hasz ist also immer und Überall Aufstand unseres Herzens und Gemutes gegen eine Verletzung des ordo amoris .."
198. Ibid. pp 368-372; and SYMPATHIE pp 151-179.
199. ETHIK pp 265 & 266; and p 382, "...Person ist die konkrete selbst, wesenhafte Seinseinheit von Akten verschiedenartigen Wesens die an sich ... allen wesenhaften Aktdifferenzen ... vorhergeht. Das Sein der Person "fundiert" alle wesenhaft verschiedenen Akte.
200. SYMPATHY p 157, "...Liebe ist "schöpferisch" für ein auf diese Sphären relatives "Dasein". Hasz dagegen ist darum "vernichtend" im strengsten Wortsinn, da er (für diese Sphären) faktisch die höheren Werte vernichtet ..."
201. ETHIK p 133.
202. Ibid. p 134.
203. An example of this is to be found in the Epilogue of this work.
204. Although Scheler makes the distinction (apparently) between 'the person' and the 'moral person' there is no essential difference. The person, in that he is a person, is always to a greater or a lesser degree a moral person.
205. See in this work page 79.

206. VOM EWIGEN p 34.
207. For the Fundamental Moral Tenor (Gesinnung) see ETHIK pp 125-171 and from another perspective see SYMPATHIE pp 219 & 220. For the Ordo Amoris see S. aus dem N. pp 345-376.
208. ETHIK pp 344 & 345
209. Ibid. p 556, "... Die absolut intime Person ist aller möglichen Fremderkenntnis und Fremdwertung ... ewig transzendent."
210. Ibid. pp 549, 550.
211. VOM EWIGEN p 262.
212. Ibid. p 261.
213. Refer in this work to pages 100 to 103.
214. SYMPATHIE p 166, "Denn da Liebe Gegenliebe bestimmt, sofern sie gesehen ist ..."
215. S. aus dem N. p 356.

SECTION III THE CALLING OF LOVE

216. Barry, Anne, Bellevue is a State of Mind, p 78
217. Allport, Gordon W., Persons in Psychology, Beacon Press, Boston, 1968, p 143.
218. Laing, R. D., The Divided Self, p 119.
219. Rogers, Carl, & Stevens, Barry, Person to Person, The Problem of Being Human, Real People Press, Lafayette, California, 1967, p 191.
220. Ibid.
221. Ibid. p 97
222. Ibid.
223. Ibid.
224. SYMPATHIE, p 149
225. Scheler, in his book, Ressentiment, discusses types

of 'questionable' love in the contexts of Altruism (pp 93-99) and Humanitarianism (pp 114-136). (Scheler, Max, Ressentiment, trans. William W. Holdheim, Schocken Books, New York, 1976)

Jean Vanier, in his book, Be Not Afraid, phrases the subject quite differently in his poem entitled, Two Worlds, and in the pages immediately following this (pp 1-19). (Vanier, Jean, Be Not Afraid, Griffen House, Toronto, 1975.

226. We can never 'love' these wounded ones because we 'should' or because we think that we are 'supposed to do so'. We do not love them because we impute upon them a value, but rather because they are valuable persons, worthy of our love.
227. SYMPATHIE, p 166.
228. Ibid. p 146, "...Liebe kein."Fühlen" (d.h. eine Funktion), sondern ein Akt und eine "Bewegung". (ist) ... (p 147) Liebe aber ist eine Bewegung des Gemüts und ein geistigen Akt....aber ist die Liebe ein spontaner Akt...."
229. ETHIK p 231, "...Liebe nicht Zeboten werden kann."
230. SYMPATHIE, pp 167 & 168
231. ETHIK p 524
232. Ibid. p 499, "Personwert selbst ist uns die höchste Wertstufe und als solche allen Wertarten, deren Träger Wollen, Tun, Eigenschaften der Person sind, ebenso an Rang überlegen als den Sachwerten und Zustandswerten."
233. Ibid. pp 470 & 471
234. If we love him as he is in the eyes and the heart of God.
235. Rogers, Carl, On Becoming a Person, pp 107-124.
236. A self-image is a psychological concept and therefore it is limited. A value-image is one's value and spiritual potential and therefore it is limitless.
237. Vanier, Jean, Eruption to Hope, Griffin House, Toronto, 1971, pp 32 & 33.

238. Ibid. p 33.

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