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A Study in the Psychology of Religious Sentiment

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A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT

by

Wm. Linton Davis

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Science
College of Religion

Division of Graduate Instruction
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Indianapolis
1941

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A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The importance of the study.--Religion is a vital subject. This dissertation either makes a contribution to the study of the psychology of religion, or else it is a waste of time trifling with a very vital subject. There are various phases of the psychology of religion such as the origin of religion; the phenomena connected with conversion and religious revivals; with mysticism, spiritism, occultism, ecstasy, and prophetism; with the subconscious, faith-cure, Christian Science, etc.; the interconnection of mind and body; and the growth of the religious consciousness.¹ Most of these phases have received a great deal of attention, while other phases have been neglected. Some have written on what is known as the "religious instinct"; these have been largely concerned with the question as to whether the tendency to be religious springs from an innate instinct or whether that tendency is acquired. However, hardly any up-to-date writer holds the view that the dis-

¹Stanley A. Cook, "Religion," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (abbr. HERE), ed. James Hastings, Vol. X (1919), p. 668.

position to be religious springs from an innate instinct.¹ This dissertation deals with that disposition as an acquired sentiment. The writer has become convinced, as a result of investigation, that the study of "the religious sentiment" (as acquired) has been neglected and that there is need of giving it a great deal of consideration. The importance of this study may be summarized in three statements: (1) Religion is always a vital subject and, in the last generation, "has attracted increasing attention."² (2) The attention given by McDougall to religion was subsidiary to his dealing with sociology,³ and so there is need of its being made the subject of study with sociology as subsidiary. (3) There is great confusion in the religious world as to the nature, origin, and function of religion,⁴ and a study of the religious sentiment has brought to light a better understanding of these phases of religion.

¹James Bissett Pratt, The Religious Consciousness: A Psychological Study (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1930), pp. 69ff.

²Cook, "Religion," HERE, X, 662.

³Wm. McDougall, "The Instincts through which Religious Conceptions Affect Social Life," An Introduction to Social Psychology (Boston: John W. Luce & Co., 1921), chap. xiii, pp. 309-328.

⁴James H. Leuba, "The Nature of Religion," A Psychological Study of Religion: Its Origin, Function, and Future (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1912), Part I, pp. 1-54; ibid., "Definitions of Religion and Critical Comments," ibid., appendix, pp. 339-363.

The problem of this study.--The question is not so much whether the religious sentiment springs from an innate instinct or is acquired, but how it is acquired and how it is developed.¹ And there is considerable disagreement as to the composition of religion, as to whether it is largely intellectual or emotional or volitional; this seriously involves the composition of the religious sentiment. But certain of the more up-to-date scholars deal with religion as including all three of the mental processes--the intellect, the emotions, and the volitions.² This is the view which the writer holds and which he sets forth in this dissertation. Then, there is the problem of analyzing the religious sentiment. Just as McDougall analyzed the sentiments of man from the standpoint of sociology, so this dissertation is an analysis of the sentiments of a person from the standpoint of religion. That is, the same psychological principles which McDougall applied to the study of sociology have been applied to the study of religion.³ However, the problem of this dissertation is not how to prove that religion is an acquired sentiment involving the whole mind, but how best to present the facts that have come to light in this study

¹McDougall, Soc. Psy., p. 309.

²Thomas Hywell Hughes, Psychology of Religious Origins (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), pp. 98f.; Pratt, Rel. Con. (1930), pp. 2f.

³McDougall, Soc. Psy.

in such a way as will be most useful to those who are concerned with developing people into Christ-like characters.

The source of information for the study.--Because of the influence of scholars over each other, the works which have been used in the preparation of this dissertation should be considered, for the most part, in the order in which they appeared. James' Principles of Psychology¹ appeared in 1890; then he abridged it and published it in 1894 in one volume entitled simply Psychology.² He says that there are many instincts and emotions;³ but McDougall, in his Social Psychology,⁴ first published in 1908, says that there are few.⁵ McDougall based his analysis of the sentiments on Shand's article⁶ published shortly before in Mind. Then Shand wrote his Foundations of Character,⁷ which appeared in 1914, and in which he quotes McDougall's Social Psychology on the sen-

¹Wm. James, Principles of Psychology ("American Science Series: Advanced Course"; 2 vols., New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1890).

²Wm. James, Psychology ("American Science Series: Briefer Course"; New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1893).

³Ibid., pp. 373ff.

⁴Wm. McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology, (Boston: John W. Luce & Co., 1921).

⁵Ibid., pp. 20ff.

⁶Alexander F. Shand, "Character and the Emotions," Mind, N.S., Vol. V., referred to in footnote and commented on in text by McDougall, Soc. Psy., p. 126f.

⁷Alexander Shand, The Foundations of Character (London: Macmillan and Co., 1920).

timents. Finally, McDougall wrote his Outline of Psychology¹ and published it in 1922. Further, the writer has observed that various writers quote McDougall, especially his Social Psychology. Some of these are: Coe (1916), Selbie (1923), Edward (1926), Thouless (1927), Stout (1929), Pratt (1930), and Hughes (1937). There are others, of course, who quote him; these were chosen largely at random, but Coe, Stout, and Pratt were purposely selected. So far as the writer has observed in his examination of these other sources, none of their authors added much toward the improvement of the theory as presented by McDougall and Shand. They follow McDougall very closely, as the writer has done in this dissertation. Besides these works dealing with the sentiments, Leuba's A Psychological Study of Religion,² Pratt's The Religious Consciousness,³ and Hughes' Psychology and Religious Origins⁴ have largely furnished the information for arriving at a definition of religion. Other sources of information have been recognized in the appropriate places.

¹Wm. McDougall, Outline of Psychology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923).

²James H. Leuba, A Psychological Study of Religion: Its Origin, Function, and Future (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1912).

³James Bissett Pratt, The Religious Consciousness: A Psychological Study (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1930).

⁴Thomas Hywell Hughes, Psychology and Religious Origins (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937).

The title of the study.--It is called A Study in the Psychology of the Religious Sentiment. It suggests the main divisions in the dissertation: the term "study" suggests chapter i; the term "psychology" suggests chapter ii; the term "religious" suggests chapter iii; and the expression "religious sentiment" suggests chapter iv. These four chapters with the concluding chapter make up the whole. A more detailed analysis of the study has been left to the next section.

The study itself.--The first chapter, of course, is introductory to the subject. The second chapter is devoted to the definition of a person and an analysis of his mind or consciousness. This analysis is the main part of chapter ii and is the foundation on which the study of the religious sentiment rests; hence, instincts, emotions, and especially sentiments have been discussed in considerable detail in the analysis of a person's feeling, while his thinking and willing have not received as much attention. The third chapter has been devoted to the definition of the religious person and his religion. The definition of religion has been arrived at only after an examination of three classes of definitions of religion. This classification of definitions was made on the basis of whether their authors define religion as largely intellectual or emotional or volitional. Then the definition of religion is given as including all three--the intellect, the emotions, and the will. The fourth chapter is an analysis of the religious sentiment. This chapter is largely an analy-

sis of the sentiment of Love for God, the Father. Two short sections are devoted to faith and hope. Finally, in the fifth chapter the whole study is summarized in order to get a bird's eye view of what has been accomplished.

The field of the study.--From the above discussion of the subject of this study, it is readily seen that this dissertation is limited to the field of psychology. Further, since the writer is not concerned with the origin of the mental processes and their function in creating the true, the beautiful, and the good, this dissertation is limited to an analysis of the mental processes as organized into sentiments, especially the religious sentiment. It is based on the theory of sentiments as set forth by Shand and McDougall, and it is limited to the introspectionist's view and method of approach.

A great deal is said in the present day about applying the scientific spirit and method to religion. Since religion is definitely a mental phenomenon, it belongs rightly to the field of psychology. The application of the psychological method to the study of religion in this dissertation is therefore in keeping with the modern attitude as expressed by many scholars. So far as the writer has been able to determine, he knows of no other work that approaches the study of the religious sentiment in just the way he has approached it in this study. He considers the study of the religious sentiment a very timely topic and submits this dissertation to the reader, leaving it to his judgment as to whether it does justice to the subject.

CHAPTER II

PERSON

Introductory

Preliminary statement.--The introductory portion of this chapter is devoted to defining the terms "person" and "mind" and the rest of the chapter to an analysis of mind. This is necessary to the proper understanding of the nature and composition of the religious sentiment.

Definition of a person.---If an average person were asked the question, "What is a person?" he most likely would say, "a man," or "a human being." This is true, but it is not quite definite enough for the present purpose. To be more definite, a person is defined as a self-conscious, self-directing organism who directs his activity toward his own apparent good. He is a spirit. He is conscious in that he thinks, feels, and wills; but further, as a spirit he is self-conscious in that he knows that he thinks, feels, and wills--thus, he has a mind and knows his own mind. By saying that he is an organism, his body is included. And, to satisfy the theologian, his soul is included in his constitution as life, mind, or spirit, according to different views. He inherits certain mental abilities; others he acquires. He is self-directing in that he directs his own activity; this is toward

his own apparent good or self-development, as Plato¹ and others have said. However, if one wishes to ask any person about this, that person will say, "Surely, I am looking out for Number One." This attitude may seem somewhat selfish, but it is characteristic of the average man. These brief remarks should make clear what is contained in the above definition.² The rest is limited to a study of his mind.

Definition of mind.--Mind is best defined by what it does. If one ask another what his mind is, he will very likely say that it is his thinking; but if he is questioned further, he may say that it is his thinking, feeling, and willing. He is right; with his mind he thinks, feels, and wills. Mind and consciousness are practically synonymous. Mind, therefore, is defined as the whole complex process of mental activity, composed of thinking, feeling, and willing, derived from inherited abilities and contact with environment, developed through use, and used for one's own self-betterment. The way has now been prepared for an analysis of each of these three processes of the mind. The next section is an analysis of his thinking.³

¹William De Witt Hyde, "The Platonic Subordination of Lower to Higher," From Epicurus to Christ: A Study in the Principles of Personality (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1904), chap. iii, pp. 110-168.

²"Person," Webster's New International Dictionary: (abbr. Web. New Int. Dict.), 1940.

³"Mind," Web. New Int. Dict.; "Mind," A Dictionary of the Bible (abbr. HDB), ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899), III (1919), 374.

A. Analysis of His Thinking

1. Productive Thinking

Producing thought.-- Thoughts about the external world are produced, not merely by perceiving, but by conceiving the objects that make up the external world. "Perceiving is one mode of conceiving."¹ But these two activities of the mind need to be considered separately.

Perceiving.-- This activity of the mind is the simplest, most elementary kind of thinking.² It is taking knowledge of the objects of experience, whether these objects are present to the senses or absent from them but present to the mind as ideas of the actual objects. A boy's puppy at home is to the boy at school just as real in his thinking about it as if it were actually present to his senses, though not as vivid in his mind as if it were present to his senses.

Conceiving.--This activity of the mind includes perceiving as one mode of conceiving. "To know, to recognize, to be aware of, or conscious of, any object is to conceive it, even when our knowledge is a perceptual knowing. To mean an object is to conceive it."³ Perceptive thinking requires either an actual object or the idea of it to make thinking

¹McDougall, Outline of Psy., p. 254.

²Ibid., p. 253.

³Ibid., p. 254.

possible--that is, it requires that all objects and ideas be concrete. Conceptive thinking is possible, whether the ideas are concrete or abstract. A concrete idea is a mental image of a concrete object; an abstract idea is the name of a class of concrete objects, that is, the class as a whole is conceived in the same way as one object of the class is perceived. A single object can also be conceived as made of different parts, and yet it can be perceived as one object. Thoughts are produced by perceiving and conceiving objects or ideas of objects.

2. Reproductive Thinking

Reproducing thought.-- Thoughts about the external world can be reproduced through remembering and imagining the same objects perceived in the past. As they are remembered they are created or reproduced just as they were perceived or conceived the first time they were experienced. But these activities of the mind are better discussed separately.

Remembering.--This activity of the mind has already been implied in part. In order to recall objects absent from the senses, one must be able to retain in his thinking ideas formed of objects previously perceived when present to the senses. Retaining these ideas, recreating the images of the objects at the will to recall them, and then recognizing them as the same images made in the presence of the objects--these three activities of the mind consist of what is called remembering.

Imagining.--This activity of the mind, too, has already been implied in its simplest form. An object present to the senses can be perceived only by forming an image of it in the mind; likewise, an object absent from the senses can be perceived in the mind only by recalling to the mind the image previously made--creating it in the same way that it was created the first time. It is through this process of making mental images that the boy is able to imagine his puppy at home. But the various images thus created can be combined to make other images, either partly new or wholly new. There are two kinds of creative thinking: fancying or purposeless thinking and constructive or purposeful thinking. This creative activity of the mind is more complex than merely perceiving simple objects, since it is a reconstruction of the simple percepts into new objects. Whether simple percepts and simple concepts are created in the presence or in the absence of the objects, the process of imagining is the same. A man may stand in front of his house and imagine how it would appear with a new coat of paint. Remembering is reproductive thinking; imagining is both productive and reproductive.

3. Intuitive Thinking and Understanding

Intuitive thinking.--This activity of the mind is immediately perceiving the reality of things directly without analyzing or reasoning.¹ Such thinking, if the person were

¹"Intuition," Web. New Int. Dict.

capable of no other kind, would be only a series of disconnected reals. A child burns his hand on the stove and perceives intuitively that the stove burns. He repeats the act several times before reasoning that hot stoves are not to be touched. A succession of disconnected intuitive truths would never give organized knowledge.

Understanding.--This activity of the mind is conceiving the truth of things through analyzing and reasoning about things. It is apprehending and comprehending truth.¹

Apprehending is the activity of the mind catching the meaning of a part of, or the whole of, a situation as a unit, either by chance or by purposely giving attention to it.² Comprehending is the activity of the mind seizing or taking in many or all of the details of any situation, or of several situations, together, as to form a whole.³ These require an analytic and synthetic mind, for, without such a mind, no one could understand anything. Situations and objects in them are analyzed into parts; then, these parts are synthesized by reorganizing and combining into new ideas of things. Analysis involves discriminating between likes and dislikes; synthesis involves association of likes into classes and dislikes into classes.⁴

¹"Understanding," Web. New Int. Dict.

²"Apprehending," Ibid.

³"Comprehending," Ibid.

⁴James, "Discrimination," and "Association," Psy., chaps. xv and xvi, pp. 244-279; McDougall, "Growth of Mental Structure," Outline of Psy., chap. xv, pp. 378-398.

When statements are formed about these, judgments are formed.
 Knowledge is composed of judgments.¹

3. Judging and Reasoning

Judging.--This activity of the mind is affirming or denying statements of thought. When certain knowledge is available, it is the affirming and denying what is true or false; when only probably knowledge is available; it is the affirming of what is believed or denying what is not believed. In case of doubting judgment is suspended.²

Reasoning.--This activity of the mind is the most complex kind of thinking. Reasoning is a process of combining judgments or propositions already known or believed to be true. It originates in the thinking, as may be inferred from what has been said above, and develops by passing from the propositions, in order, to the conclusion, which is the result of comparing the judgments used in the argument. The validity of the conclusion depends on reasoning correctly from true propositions. In forming the conclusion, either new knowledge is obtained, or old knowledge is validated. In the former, statements are postulated and reasons are found to validate these statements, which then become conclusions. In the latter, when a statement is challenged, reasons are sought to

¹ Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1914), pp. 399-402.

² McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp. 367ff.; 399f.

validate it. But there are many self-evident truths that are known intuitively and need no proof. These are the basis on which all valid arguments are formed. All correct reasoning from these gives certain knowledge, and reasoning is dependent on understanding and judgment.¹

Summary.--Through perceiving, remembering, imagining, apprehending, comprehending, and understanding all ideas are acquired. They are formed by conceiving, judging, and reasoning. All thinking is analyzing, comparing, and synthesizing. Conceptive thinking is comparing and contrasting ideas and forming concepts. Judging is comparing and contrasting concepts and forming judgments, thus producing knowledge. Reasoning is comparing and contrasting judgments and forming proofs, thus increasing knowledge. Knowledge is composed of judgments.

Transition.--The above summary completes this section and gives a comprehensive view of a person's intellect or thinking. The next section is an analysis of his emotions or feelings. It is the most important section in this chapter.

¹ James, "Reasoning," Psy., chap.xxii, pp.351-369; McDougall, "Reasoning and the System of Beliefs," Outline of Psy., chap. xvi, pp. 399-416.

A. Analysis of His Feelings

1. Sensations and Feelings Proper

Sensing.--This activity of the mind is perceiving through the special senses and in a general manner. The special senses are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and the varieties of touching; perceiving in a general manner includes what is known as "common bodily feeling" or coenesthesia--a class of general feelings such as weariness, hunger, sickness, nausea, etc.--as well as those peculiar feelings resulting from bodily changes that accompany the emotions--e.g., accompanying anger are feelings resulting from flushed face, tension of muscles, etc., and accompanying fear are feelings resulting from shivering, shuddering, etc.

Feelings proper.--In general, feelings may be loosely spoken of as including sensations, feelings proper, desires, emotions, and sentiments. But feelings proper must always be carefully distinguished from sensations, desires, emotions, and sentiments. And it is better to reserve the term feeling to refer only to those pleasant or unpleasant (agreeable or disagreeable, etc.) affects of sensations which are classed as either pleasure or pain. To illustrate: the tasting of sugar results in a sweet sensation and an agreeable feeling and the desire for more of the sweet sensation; the smelling of flowers results in a fragrant sensation and an agreeable

feeling and the desire for more of the fragrant sensation; the burning of the hand on a stove results in a burning sensation and a disagreeable feeling and the aversion to any more burning sensation; etc.¹ Feelings do not produce emotions; emotions are merely accompanied by agreeable or disagreeable feelings. Feelings must, therefore be carefully distinguished from emotions and sentiments.²

2. Instincts and Emotions

Definition of instinct.--This is an innate or in-born disposition to purposeful action to obtain a desired end; it is inherited and so not acquired by learning. It seems to be a blind impulse that attains its goal without the learning how previous to its incitement.³ McDougall has this to say:

We may therefore define "an instinct" as an innate disposition which determines the organism to perceive (to pay attention to) any object of a certain class, and to experience in its presence a certain emotional excitement and an impulse to action which finds expression in a specific mode of behavior in relation to that object.⁴

¹McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp. 191f, 347ff; James, Psy., pp. 392ff., 389f.

²James Ward, "Psychology," Ency. Brit., 11th ed. XXI-XXII, 551f.; cf. W.B. Selbie, The Psychology of Religion, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), p. 41, footnote.

³McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp.70f.,109f.,118ff.; "The Nature of Instincts and Their Place in the Constitution of the Human Mind," Soc. Psy., chap.ii, pp.20-46; James, Psy., p.391.

⁴McDougall, Outline of Psy., p.110; cf. his Soc. Psy., p.30.

While an instinct may control action as definitely as intelligence, it is below the level of intelligence; instinctive action must be distinguished also from reflexive action. Instincts are inherited by the child, begin above the level of reflex actions, and are modified both by intelligence and by habit.¹ The following table is based largely on McDougall's tables in his Outline of Psychology.²

TABLE I
INSTINCTS AND PRIMARY EMOTIONS

Name of the Instinct	Name of Object Inciting it	Name of the Accompanying Emotion	Resulting Action
Pugnacity (combat)	Enemy	Anger	Injure, flee
Escape (flight)	Danger	Fear	Flee from it
Curiosity	Strange	Wonder	Approach it
Repulsion	Distasteful	Disgust	Put it aside
Self-aggrandizement	Self	Elation	Assert self
Self-submission	Self	Meekness	Submit self
Mating instinct	Opposite sex	Lust (good)	Intercourse
Social instinct	Others (of kind)	Sociability	Join group
Parental instinct	Weak, off-spring	Tenderness	Care for it
Laughter (smiling)	Wit, fun, joke	Amusement	Laugh, smile
Appeal (to others)	Pain, need	Distress	Cry, beg
Construction	Things	Craft-feeling	Make things
Food-seeking	Food	Craving	Hunt food
Acquisition	Things, money	Want	Hoard, get
Prodigality	Things, money	Gift-feeling	Give it away
Sympathy (for others)	Distress, need	Love	Help
Suggestibility	Suggestion	Satisfaction	Do as told
Imitation	Another's action	Unity-feeling	Imitate

¹McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp. 70f., 74-81, 87-93.

²McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp. 304, 352; cf. his Soc. Psy., pp. 20ff., chap. iii, pp. 47-92, chap. iv, pp. 93-124.

Varieties of instincts.--In the first column of Table 1 the first seven instincts are well defined and are specific;¹ the next eight are not so well defined, but they are specific.² The last three are general or non-specific instincts involving the interaction of the minds of two or more persons.³ Each instinct is incited in the presence of or at the thought of one of a definite class of objects. Each instinct is accompanied by a definite emotion; and each instinct that is satisfied results in a definite set of actions; but, when it is not satisfied its accompanying emotional stress is greatly increased instead of being released. In the latter case when the condition is temporary it is called a temper, and when the condition is continued it is called a mood. Instincts vary in degree among different persons. One's temperament is determined largely by the proportionate strength, endurance, and affectability from environment, of the different instincts he inherits. Temperament is modified by the psycho-physical changes that take place during his life.⁴ From these inherited instincts come the emotions that play so large a part in the lives of people.

¹McDougall, Soc. Psy., pp. 20ff., 47ff.

²Ibid., pp. 20ff., 47-92.

³Ibid., pp. 20ff., 93-124.

⁴McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp. 351-361.

Emotion.--Below are three statements which may be termed as definitions of an emotion. The first is made by the Encyclopedia Britannica:

EMOTION, a vivid feeling or state of excitement induced by the apprehension of some object which arouses an instinctive reaction.¹

James says:

An emotion is a tendency to feel, and an instinct is a tendency to act, characteristically, when in the presence of a certain object in the environment. But the emotions also have their bodily "expression," which may involve strong muscular activity (as fear or anger, for example); and it becomes a little hard in many cases to separate the description of the "emotional" condition from that of the "instinctive" reaction which one and the same object may provoke. . . . As inner mental conditions, emotions are quite indescribable. . . . Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well.²

McDougall observes that

Each of the principal instincts conditions . . . some one kind of emotional excitement whose quality is specific or peculiar to it; and the emotional excitement of specific quality that is the affective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal instincts may be called a primary emotion. This principle . . . proves to be of very great value when we seek to analyze the complex emotions into their primary constituents.³

Emotion, in its narrow sense--that is, a primary emotion--may be defined, then, as vivid feeling, as an affective constituent of consciousness, which is indescribable and which always accompanies the same instinctive reaction to

¹"EMOTION," Encyc. Brit., 14th ed., VIII, 399.

²James, Psy., p. 373.

³McDougall, Soc. Psy., p. 49.

one of a class of objects, which is excited by apprehending the same object, and which is the cause of changes both in the body and its behaviour, sustaining the action as long as attention is focused on the object. It can be excited either by perceiving or recalling (remembering) or imagining the object apprehended.

Varieties of emotions.¹--In general, there are two classes of emotions: primary and secondary or blended emotions. The latter have not yet been discussed; the former--emotions in the narrow sense--are those defined on the previous page. Primary or elementary emotions are varieties of emotional qualities or "qualitative varieties of emotional experience."² Each arises in the same way--that is by apprehending its own appropriate object while reacting instinctively to that object. Secondary emotions are not, strictly speaking, properly called emotions themselves, but are the blendings of emotions. Each arises in its simple form when two elementary emotions are excited by the same object. For example, Figure 1 (on next page) represents a man who perceives a strange object that he does not fully apprehend at first, which arouses, on the one hand, the instinct to flee and the emotion of fear, and on the other hand, the instinct to

¹ McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp. 316f., 325f., 329-338.

²Ibid., p. 315.

approach and the emotion of wonder; the result is that the two opposing emotional forces cause him, neither to approach in wonder nor to flee in fear, but to stand still, fascinated. Fascination is the blending of two emotions: fear and wonder. No object will directly excite fascination, but the blending of excited emotions will produce it. This illustrates what is true of many of the primary emotions. See the figures given in chapter




FIGURE I

THE BLENDED EMOTION OR SENTIMENT OF FASCINATION

In this figure, I represents the intellectual factor; E', the emotional factor; V, the volitional factor; E'', the emotion aroused by the object; and S the sentiment resulting from the blending of emotions.

iv.¹ Primary emotions do not always blend; but when blendings do take place, the secondary emotions function to sustain action just as primary emotions but in a stronger degree and for a longer time. When there is marked conflict and failure to harmonize, all emotions are eliminated except one that becomes dominant; but, if they harmonize, they blend to form compound or secondary emotions. A secondary or blended emotion already acquired may have an emotion blended with it and increase its complexity. Thus, complex emotions, better called sentiments, are formed in varying degrees of complexity.

Derived emotions.--McDougall makes a distinction between secondary and derived emotions. Such emotions as joy, sorrow, regret, remorse, surprise, hope, despair, anxiety, and peace do not seem to belong in either the class of primary emotions or the class of blended emotions. McDougall says of this peculiar group of feelings:

None of these can be shown by an analytical introspection to be a blend of any two or more of the primary emotional qualities. Nor do they conform to the type of the primary emotion. For it is impossible to point out any one instinctive impulse with which any one of these "emotions" is constantly conjoined, as anger with the impulse of aggression, fear with the impulse of escape, curiosity with the impulse to draw near and examine. . . . The best we can do . . . is to speak of . . . a third distinct class, that of the derived emotions.²

While these facts may be true, it seems that because

¹Cf. p. 75.

²McDougall, Outline of Psy., p. 338.

of the complexity of this third class of feelings, they must be really secondary emotions so complex that no psychologist has yet analyzed them; and if they were analyzed, they might be found to be blended emotions. They are aroused by the apprehension of an object just as do the blended emotions. For the purpose of this dissertation they will be considered in the same way as the blended emotions, whether they are such or not. In general, they may be classed according to whether they are prospective (e.g., confidence, hope, anxiety, despondancy, and despair) or retrospective (e.g., regret, remorse, sorrow, chagrin, and grief).¹

Transition.-- It is seen that feelings are to be classified as pleasant or unpleasant (pleasure and pain); that these accompany the emotions, both primary and secondary; that emotions blend so as to build up a complex system of emotional reactions, which are called sentiments in the next topic.

3. Sentiments, Attitudes, and Ideals

Sentiment.--Emotions are blended only when thinking and willing control the conflicting emotional experiences. The intellectual factor in a sentiment is determined by apprehending the object of experience and reasoning about it; the volitional factor is determined by attending to the object and choosing the proper course of action; and the emotional

¹Ibid., pp. 338-343.

factor is determined by the results of thinking and willing. But when once a sentiment is formed, it sustains the action, initiated by the will under control of the intellect. When several emotional dispositions (or emotions) are combined in one system, this is called a sentiment.¹ The Encyclopedia

Brittanica observes that a sentiment is:

a constellation or system of emotional dispositions related to one person or object. Love, friendship, and reverence, e.g., are sentiments.

A Dictionary of Psychology states that sentiment is:

an emotional disposition which has reference to an object, person, or abstract idea,³ and lacks the characteristic of a true emotion.

The characteristic that it lacks has already been noted to be the inherited tendency of an emotion; in contrast to this, a sentiment is dependent upon the blending of emotions. It cannot be excited innately by the object, but it is excited emotionally by the object. McDougall agrees with the two definitions above, when he says:

We have seen that a sentiment is an organized system of emotional dispositions centred about the idea of some object. The organization of the sentiments in the developing mind is determined by the course of experience; that is to say, the sentiment is a growth in the structure of the mind that is not

¹ McDougall, "Nature of the Sentiments," Soc. Psy., chap. v, pp. 125; Shand, Found. of Char., pp. 20-27.

² "Sentiment," Encyc. Brit., XX, 331.

³ "Sentiment," A Dictionary of Psychology, ed. Howard C. Warren (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934), p. 248.

natively given in the inherited constitution.¹

A sentiment, then, may be defined as an organized unit of conscious activity, composed of emotional dispositions (consisting of intellectual, emotional, and volitional factors), derived from the blending of these emotional dispositions by the mind, developed by blending in more emotional dispositions, strengthened through repetition, and functioning as the sustainer of activity toward the goal or object around which the system is organized. Two synonyms are attitude and ideal. They need to be defined before considering sentiments further.

Attitude.--Attitude and sentiment are often used interchangeably. But attitude is really the broader of the two terms. One may assume almost any physical attitude; it is clear that the term sentiment would not apply to all such attitudes. An attitude is "a readiness to respond in a definite way to social stimuli of a general or specific character."² In a general sense, attitude may be used to comprise all of one's sentiments, as one's general attitude toward life; or it may include only those sentiments that cluster about some object, as one's attitude toward God; and frequently, it is nothing more than a synonym for sentiment. But because the

¹ McDougall, Soc. Psy., p. 164.

² "Attitude," Dict. of Psy., p. 24.

organization in the mind as a unit of consciousness is the same for any one of the three--sentiment, attitude, or ideal --these three terms have been considered the same and have, at times, been used as synonyms.

Ideal.--While an ideal is the same as a sentiment when considered as a unit of consciousness, an ideal may also become the object of a sentiment; then, it is considered as a perfect or superior goal to be striven for, and the sentiment toward that goal is the actual condition of the mind at any time during one's development toward the ideal.¹ The term "ideal" is "more commonly used to denote that which is perfect or supreme of its kind";² or, "an emotionally colored representation of some future line of behavior or situation as desirable, though scarcely attainable."³ The only difference in these two statements is one of degree of the completeness or perfection of the ideal; they express the senses in which the term has been used in this dissertation.

Desire.--Desire is neither a sentiment, nor an ideal, nor an attitude, nor an emotion.⁴ It seems that the term "desire" has never been accurately defined; each psychologist has his own conception of its meaning. McDougall used this

¹Shand, Foundations of Character, pp. 112f.

²"Ideal," Encyc. Brit., 14th ed., XII, 65.

³"Ideal," Dict. of Psy., p. 129.

⁴Shand, Foundations of Character, pp. 460-463.

expression apparently as synonymous to the term "desire": "the thought of the desired end."¹ In this expression, "thought" is intellectual, "desire" is emotional, and "end" is purposeful or volitional. Desire is any emotional condition with thought and purpose, but not an emotion or a sentiment. Shand illustrates desire thus: "It is 'desire' when, having been separated from one we love, we feel an impulse toward reunion, and have a thought of this reunion as distinct from all that we may be accomplishing to effect it."²

Stages of growth of a sentiment.--Shand gives two stages in the development of a sentiment:

While ⁱⁿ the first freshness of a sentiment its virtues often develop in this spontaneous way yet a little later these qualities are often checked; and effort and reflection succeed the first stage of spontaneous growth. . . . Hence in all sentiments that continue to grow or even to maintain themselves, a second stage tends to occur in which we become conscious of their qualities, and reflect on them, and strive after them with effort; because we recognize that these qualities are in danger of not advancing with the growth and needs of the sentiment, or even falling away. From this cause arise the Ideals of a sentiment.³

The growth of a sentiment may be considered also as passing through three stages in its development: the unreflective spontaneous stage, the reflective stage of discovery, and the reflective stage of striving after "Ideals."⁴

¹McDougall, Soc. Psy., p. 376; cf. his Outline of Psy., pp. 207, 313.

²Shand, Foundations of Character, p. 460.

³Ibid., p. 111f.

⁴Ibid., p. 112f.

Varieties of sentiments.--In general, there are three systems of sentiments: hate, love, and respect.¹ McDougall says:

Besides the sentiments of these three main types, love, hate, and respect, which we must call complete or full-grown sentiments, we may recognize the existence of sentiments of all degrees of development from the most rudimentary upward; these may be regarded as stages in the formation of fully grown sentiments, although many of them never attain any degree of complexity or strength.²

Sentiments may be classified in another way. They are characterized by repulsion or attraction, according as the person is repulsed or attracted by the object. This has been illustrated in the blended emotion or sentiment of fascination (Fig. 1 above).³ Hate and love also illustrate this.

Transition.--It has been decided best to defer any detailed discussion of the various sentiments until chapter iv when considering the religious sentiment, when those that make up the system of love and hate will be described. It should be noted also that while the volitions have been considered in describing the intellectual processes as activities and in describing instinctive action, volitions have been left for discussion in the next section of this chapter. It was necessary to introduce the person's willing in order to accurately describe his thinking and feeling; likewise, it is also necessary to consider his thinking and feeling with his willing.

¹McDougall, Soc. Psy., pp. 164-170.

²Ibid., p. 167.

³Cr. p. 22.

C. Analysis of His Willing

1. Involuntary and Voluntary Action

Involuntary action.--There are two kinds of reacting in which there is no influence of the intellect operative; these are automatic (e.g., heart-beat) and reflexes (e.g., blinking the eye).¹ A third kind of reacting is the instincts discussed above.² A certain measure of mental control is exercised over these, and they also involve all or almost all of the organism. A fourth kind of involuntary reaction is well developed habits, which have their origin not only in instinctive action, but also in voluntary action. Habits range all the way from voluntary to involuntary action.

Voluntary action.--James³ gives great prominence to the will. However, voluntary action involves the exercise of all the three processes of mind--thinking, feeling, and willing. Often the will is operative against the emotions; this takes place when the desire is not to do the act. When there is a sentiment involving some act as an ideal, it is

¹ Arthur Holmes, Principles of Character Making ("Lippincott's Educational Series"; Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1913), p. 31.

² Cf. pp. 17ff.

³ James, "Will," Psy., chap. xxvi, pp. 415-460.

easier to initiate the act and sustain it. Such a voluntary action is called ideal action.¹ This is the type of action with which this part of the chapter is most concerned. It requires both attending to and interest in some goal desired, which has been chosen and resolved upon, in order for any kind of voluntary action to be initiated and maintained.

2. "Attention and Interest."²

Attending.--This activity of the will is merely willing or conation viewed from the point of view of its effects on thinking or cognitive processes.³ Attending is striving, attempting, stretching forward to get a better view or understanding of an object or idea. According to McDougall:

The more strongly we strive to see, to hear, to understand, or in any way to achieve better or fuller cognition, the more attentive are we. And conversely, we are less attentive the less strongly we strive to know or cognize the object [or idea] in hand, the more we are relaxed, the more nearly we sink into mere passivity.⁴

Attention is action; the man is active. "Absorption of the organism in any particular task" is "attention."⁵ "The fundamental condition of striving," or acting, is "that thinking of some object shall stir up some conative disposition," shall excite the impulse of some instinct, and thus lead to action; "that, accordingly, is the fundamental condition of

¹Homes, Principles of Character Making, p. 32.

²McDougall, Outline of Psy., chap. ix, pp. 265-283.

³Ibid., pp. 271f.

⁴Ibid., p. 272.

⁵Ibid., p. 110.

'attention' or attending."¹ Attending may be involuntary or spontaneous, or it may be voluntary and forced. The latter is a higher form of attending and is achieved only by an effort of will. James says, "Effort of attention is thus the essential phenomena of will."² Again, he says, "Consent to the idea's undivided presence, this is effort's sole achievement."³ By "idea" he means the idea that is gaining attention and commanding interest.

Interest.--This activity of the will is largely con-
ative.⁴ To interest is to awaken concern; to be interested is to be concerned about an object or idea to which one is attending. It is the readiness to think when the object is presented to the senses, as McDougall says:

To have an "interest" in any object is, then, to be ready to pay attention to it. Interest is latent attention; and attention is interest in action. The essential condition of both interest in and attention to any object is that the mind shall be so organized, either natively or through experience, that it can think of the object, and that such thinking shall evoke some impulse or desire which maintains a train of activity in relation to the object.⁵

Concentrating.--Attending to an object may be momen-
tary, or it may endure for a time. In either case concentra-
ting all the processes of the mind on the object is necessary

¹ McDougall, Outline of Psy., chap. ix, p. 272.

² James, Psy., p. 450. ³ Ibid., p. 452f.

⁴ McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp. 274-277.

⁵ Ibid., p. 277.

to attending to it. Concentrating is bringing all of the activities of the mind to focus on a certain object. Thus, when concentration has been accomplished, attention begins; as long as the mind is focused upon the object, attending to it is possible. It is the function of interest to maintain concentration and attention.¹

3. Choosing and Resolving

Choosing.--This activity of the will hardly needs defining; however, it must be distinguished from such terms as judging, resolving, etc. Choosing is selecting from several or many objects one on which attention is to be concentrated. It is the process of deliberating prior to and culminating in judging and resolving. McDougall states the conditions that make choosing necessary:

Without conflicting motives, we do not deliberate on our choice of goal; though we may deliberate on choice of means to a goal already adopted. In such cases the choice of a means is a process as nearly purely intellectual as any can be; our desire is simply to know what are the best means for the purpose in hand. The choice of a goal, on the other hand, is always a process in which desire largely determines judgment; when the decision is reached, the process of deliberation terminates in an explicit judgment, expressed in some assertion as "That is my line," "That's what I will aim at."²

Resolving.--This activity of the will is simply willing to do something, whether or not the action follows;

¹ McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp. 274, 278.

² Ibid., pp. 445f.

in other words, whether a resolution is carried into action or not is not essential to making it. Resolving is more than merely choosing; one may, in passing from one selection to another (e.g., in making a purchase), discover that one of these selections is the one of interest and the one that he really desires, but for some reason (e.g., cost) he is not quite able, at first, to make the resolution about it. Finally, he does. When once a definite choice has been made, it sometimes requires a great deal of will-power to resolve to act (e.g., to purchase the article selected), and again, it may require very little. The point is that at least some willing is required to make a resolution. Much depends on whether or not it is made. Great issues are often determined by seemingly insignificant choices. A man's career is often shaped by some one resolution made with little thought of the consequences.

Judging.--All resolutions are judgments. "Judgment is not cognitive merely. It is the interplay of cognition and conation."¹ While judgment is usually considered in the discussion of the cognitive processes, as done above,² yet decision is an act of the will. The judge's decision is an act that determines the amount of the criminal's penalty.

¹ McDougall, Outline of Psy., p. 375.

² See p. 14.

In order to make a judgment both thinking and willing are necessary; also the action does not necessarily precede the thinking. (It does in reflex actions.) "In such cases of decision preceded by reasoned deliberation, we have the most intimate and subtle interplay of the cognitive and the conative processes."¹ "In most developed or complete volitions, explicit judgment does precede action."² Voluntary action is always preceded by reasoning. The one important point is this: When a man determines to act, the whole man--thinking, feeling, and willing--goes into action.

4. Will and action

Will is the whole man in action. This action is either good or bad, that is, moral or immoral. This dual aspect of it, then, involves choice--choosing the good or the evil. The man attends, thinks, desires, chooses, resolves, and then acts. His choices determine his character. McDougall defines "will" and "conscience" in this manner:

"The Will" is character in action; and "Conscience" is moral character--character developed under moral guidance, character in which the moral sentiments are duly incorporated in the system of the sentiments and, through the medium of the sentiment of self-regard, are given due weight in all moral issues; character consolidated by habitual and consistent decision and action, in accordance with the promptings of the moral sentiments and of

¹ McDougall, Outline of Psy., p. 445.

² Ibid.

an unyielding self-respect.¹

This is purposeful activity toward one's own self-betterment. "The ideal of character is the synthesis or harmonized system of moral sentiments."² Conduct that realizes this ideal is moral. Conduct of this type "is generally admitted to involve volition in the fullest sense. It is decision and action in the line of most resistance, after moral conflict and deliberation."³

Here's a hand to the boy who has courage
To do what he knows to be right.

.....
All honor to him if he conquers;
A cheer for the boy who says, "No!"⁴

¹ McDougall, Outline of Psy., p. 442.

² Ibid., p. 441.

³ Ibid., p. 442.

⁴ Phoebe Carey, "Be Steadfast," quoted by Ada Rose Demerest, Educate for Total Abstinence (Cincinnati: The Standard Pub. Co., 1934), p. 81.

D. "The Cycle of Mental Activity"¹

Persons are always active; they are never static. They are always doing something. Their mental processes should never be called states of mind, but activities of mind. All thinking, all desiring, and all experiencing is a process, and an on-going activity toward a goal. When one tries to analyze this mental activity, he finds that no matter with which process he begins--whether thinking, feeling, or willing--, he finds it as McDougall says:

Mental activity is a cyclic process, a series of cycles of activity. Each cycle begins with some cognition; the subject recognizes or thinks of some object. This object evokes in him an impulse to effect some change, if only fuller cognition, more definite recognition. The striving thus brings about further cognition, which either satisfies the impulse (when the process terminates) or fails to do so, when the subject continues to strive, varying the direction and nature of his efforts. This cyclic character is perhaps most obvious in such an activity as thinking out the moves of a game of chess. It is generally admitted that all mental activity has these three aspects, cognitive, conative, and affective; and when we apply any one of these three adjectives to any phase of mental process, we mean merely that the aspect named is the most prominent of the three at that moment. Each cycle of activity has this triple aspect; though each tends to pass through three phases in which cognition, conation, and affection are in turn most prominent; as when the naturalist, catching sight of a specimen, recognizes it, captures it, and gloats over his capture.²

It is doubtful whether a better statement of these facts could be found; nothing more need be added to them.

¹McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp. 265f.

²Ibid.

Summary

A human person is a self-conscious, self-directing organism born with certain mental abilities that are highly susceptible to great modification and are modified greatly from year to year in his development, and who devotes his activity toward his own apparent self-betterment. His consciousness or mind is composed of many processes. But for purposes of study, it can be analyzed into three main processes: thinking, feeling, and willing. Through his perceiving, remembering, imagining, understanding, judging, and reasoning he is able to acquire and organize his knowledge. His emotions blend and surcharge his thinking with such great desire for his own self-betterment that his whole attention is held on his achieving this goal. Being moved with such great desire, his every action is for his own apparent good, and his every choice of means for achieving this end are made with this in mind. His goal is his all-absorbing interest, and so he attends to it. Being goaded on by his failures to do his best and being led on by his great desire, he is continually resolving to do better and still better. When he concentrates all his mental activity, in its many cycles, on his own goal, he conquers and goes on conquering.

CHAPTER III

THE RELIGIOUS PERSON AND HIS RELIGION

Introductory

Preliminary statement.--In chapter ii, a human person and his mind were defined and his mind was analyzed. This was in preparation for a definition of religion in this chapter and for a definition of the religious sentiment in chapter iv. The introductory portion of this chapter is devoted to the definition of a religious person and to a preview of his religion; the main portion of it is an examination of religion; the definition of religion makes up the summary of the chapter.

Definition of a religious person.--A human person was defined above¹ as a self-conscious, self-directing organism, who devotes his activity toward his own apparent self-betterment. The religious person is merely one variety of persons. He is defined, briefly, as a person who invokes the aid of a superhuman being in his striving for self-betterment. And this definition is in harmony with the average man's view that a religious person is one who worships or serves God

¹Cf. pp. 8 and 38.

(or heathen gods) and prays for aid from Him (or them). Thus, further definition of the religious person is unnecessary for the present.

The religious person's religion.--His religion involves the whole of his mind; it is what he thinks, feels, and wills when he is religious. His mind, his religion, and his life all should be synonymous terms for his activity and would be if he were a perfect religious person. As it is, there is lack of harmony and much conflict between them. This conflict has two causes: a lack of the understanding of what religion really is and the failure to do as well as is known. The first one of these two causes will be treated in this chapter and the other will be touched upon in the next chapter.

Preliminary definition of religion.--It is necessary to consider both of these causes of the conflict mentioned above, before a final definition of religion can be given. But it is necessary to have some definite statement in mind to help guide the study and to give it unity. As result of considerable study, a preliminary definition can be given now. It is this: a person's religion is his whole attitude toward God and all that pertains to God. Of course, his attitude (as was seen in chapter ii) is composed of his thinking, feeling, and willing when the whole man goes into action; therefore, his religious attitude is the whole man in cooperation with God in striving for self-betterment. Leuba says: "A

favorite custom among the more philosophically inclined students of religion has been to condense the results of their labor into little formulae called definitions of religion."¹

Two ways of defining religion.--A person may define religion by observing its manifestations in other persons, or he may define it as he observes it in himself. These may be called the objective and the subjective viewpoints of religion. There are some correlaries that follow from these two points of views: (1) Objectively, the same man may define religion as largely intellectual or emotional or volitional, according as he has been trained or according as he has been influenced by his religious environment. (2) Subjectively, through introspection, the intellectual man would be more likely to define religion as largely intellectual; the emotional man, as largely emotional; and the volitional man, as largely volitional. However, even then any definition may be colored more or less by training and religious background. Several definitions have been quoted in the main part of this chapter; it is not intended that these are all defined subjectively. No attempt has been made to classify them as objective or subjective, because they are classified as to intellectual, emotional, and volitional views.

Classification of definitions.--Pratt classifies the aspects or "temperamental kinds" of religion as the traditional,

¹Leuba, Psy. Study of Rel., p. 23.

the rational, the mystical, and the practical.¹ Leuba classifies them according to intellectualistic, affectivistic, and voluntaristic views.² But each has a different purpose in mind. For the purpose at hand, Leuba's principle of classification has been chosen; because, just as mind was analyzed into intellect, emotion, and will in the previous chapter, so religious definitions have been classified according to the intellectual, emotional, and volitional points of view.

¹ Pratt, Rel. Con., p. 14.

² Leuba, "Constructive Criticism of Current Conceptions of Religion," op. cit., chap. ii, pp. 23-54; ibid., "Definitions of Religion and Critical Comments," op. cit., appendix, pp. 339-361.

A. The Intellectual Viewpoint

1. The View in Theory as Defined

The intellectual person.--This person is merely one who naturally allows his thinking to be more prominent than either his feeling or his willing. There are also different degrees of intellectuality in intellectual persons. It is, therefore, only natural that he should define his religion as being mainly intellectual, and it is even possible that he would define it as being wholly intellectual. If he goes to this extreme he is then forced to consider his feelings that accompany his religion as by-products rather than part of his religion, and he is also forced to divorce his willing from his religion and consider it to belong, not to religion, but to morality. But not all go to this extreme. A few examples of defining religion as mainly intellectual will illustrate this point of view.

Some definitions of religion.--Martineau defines religion as a "belief in an Ever-living God, that is, a Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe and holding Moral relations with mankind."¹ Cook quotes E. B. Tylor as saying that religion is "the belief in spiritual beings."² Galloway

¹James Martineau, A Study of Religion: Its Sources and Contents (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1888), Vol. I, p. 1.

²E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, quoted by Cook, "Religion," HERE, X (1919), 663; cf. Leuba's quotation of him in his Psy. S. of Rel., pp. 70ff.

tentatively defines religion as "man's faith in a power beyond himself whereby he seeks to satisfy emotional needs and gain stability of life, and which he expresses in acts of worship and service."¹ In all three of these the emphasis is thrown on the intellect by making religion "faith" and considering faith as belonging to the intellect. Galloway, in his discussion leading up to his tentative definition, states that religion includes all three faculties; belief, feeling, and will, but it is evident in his thinking that belief is the main faculty. Sterrett says that Hegel defines religion as "the knowledge possessed by the finite mind of its nature as absolute mind."² Frederich Max Müller says that religion is "a subjective faculty for the apprehension of the infinite," also, that "religion is a mental faculty which, dependent of, nay, inspite of sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the infinite and under different names and under varying disguises."³ He calls religion "faith" and makes it spring wholly from the intellect. Jevons is quoted as saying: "Religion as a form of thought is the perception of 'the invisible things of Him through the things that are made.'"⁴

¹George Galloway, The Philosophy of Religion (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914), p. 184.

²Sterrett, Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, quoted by Leuba, Psy. Study of Rel., p. 344.

³Frederich Max Muller, Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by the religions of India, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1879), p. 21.

⁴F. Byron Jevons, History of Religion, pp. 9f, quoted by Lauba, op. cit., p. 344.

One more definition will suffice to illustrate the intellectual point of view; it is by Münsterberg:

Religion is the completion of experience. It does not complete merely actual experience; that is the task of science, and faith would do more than simply fill up the gaps in science. Such gaps can be filled only by means of possible experience, while faith, not only with transcendent but also with immanent conceptions of God, goes beyond all that is given. The given universe and the given individual powers are not sufficient to enable us to experience the totality of the ideal. The individual who feels values completes the universe through revelation and his own powers through prayer.¹

Their religious differentia.--This is faith. The terms such as "faith" "belief," "thought," "perception," etc. refer to the intellect. All, except possibly Hegel, who says that religion is "knowledge" (science), relegate religion to the realm of faith and science to the realm of knowledge, thus carrying on the apparent conflict between science and religion. Since religion is the whole attitude of the religious person toward God and what pertains to God, that kind of "religion" defined above is hardly more than theology in theory and practice. If theology can be defined as knowledge about God or the science of the knowledge of God, then religion and science may be called "twin sisters."²

The import of these definitions.--It should be noted that

¹Hugo Münsterberg, The Eternal Values, p. 358, quoted by Leuba, Psy. Study of Rel., p. 345.

²Thomas Huxley, quoted and commented on by Leuba, op.cit., p. 24.

no one can put his conception of religion into few words, and so the above definitions do not represent all that their authors have to say. While they are fragmentary definitions, there are very good ideas--truths--expressed in all of them. But, it is also true that all of them limit religion, if not wholly, then almost wholly, to the intellect.

2. The View in Practice Deficient

Catechising and confirming.--Those churches maintaining their growth largely by catechising and confirming children have always put too much emphasis on the intellect.

To a large extent these churches continue this method of training in the present day, holding to the traditions based on creeds, theologies, etc. This method is a "survival" of the Medieval Church which almost made the intellect the sole function of the religious person in Christianity.¹ As long as churches hold to their creeds, tenets, theologies, etc., they will continue to give prominence to the intellect, even though they recognize that feeling and will have some part in the function of the religious person.

Modern Christian education.--Besides the traditional view, there are those who would make religion hardly more than the culture of the intellect. They do this by advocating the so-

¹George Park Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine ("The International Theological Library"; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899), p. 255.

called "Christian education" as the solution of the problem of making the world Christian. They would make the church largely an educational institution.¹

Appealing to the intellect.--This method of trying to develop religious people has proven a very inefficient one. It will influence the intellectual person probably more than any other type, but even then, far greater influence can be had by appealing to the whole mind--intellect, emotions, will.

1

George Albert Coe, What Is Christian Education?
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935); and others.

B. The Emotional Viewpoint

1. The View in Theory as Defined

The emotional person.--This type of person is usually more easily recognized than either the intellectual or the volitional person, since he finds it hard to conceal his emotions when they are excited by some object. There are different degrees of sentimentality in sentimental or emotional persons. It, therefore, is only natural that he would define his religion as being mainly emotional, and it is even possible that he would define it as being wholly emotional. In this case, he is forced to consider his thinking as doctrinal and his willing as moral, divorcing both from his religion and calling them theology and ethics respectively. A few examples of defining religion as mainly emotional will illustrate this point of view.

Some definitions of religion.--Leuba says that Schleiermacher is "the best-known representative of this class" who define religion from the affectivistic point of view¹ and that he vigorously attacks the intellectual conception:

Religion cannot and will not originate in the pure impulse to know. . . . What you may know or believe about the nature of things is far beneath the sphere of religion. . . . Any effort to pen-

¹Leuba, Psy. Study of Rel., p. 33.

trate into the nature or substance of things is no longer religion, but seeks to be a science of some sort.¹

Further, he says that this "sphere of religion is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition and feeling,"² --feeling excited by any object in the universe. Leuba's comment is: "Pure religion is pure feeling; that is feeling disconnected from thought and from action: 'What we feel and are conscious of in religious emotions is the operation of things upon us, not our reaction to the received impressions.'³ Finally, in a subsequent book Schleiermacher arrives at this well-known statement: "The essence of religion consists in a feeling of absolute dependence upon God."⁴

Leuba quotes Herbart as holding that "sympathy with the universal dependence of man is the essential natural principle of all religion"⁵ and Comenius as saying: "By religion we understand that inner veneration by which the mind of man attaches and binds itself to the supreme Godhead."⁶

Tiele says: "I am satisfied that a careful analysis

¹Frederich Schleiermacher, The Nature of Religion, pp. 48f., quoted by Leuba, Psy. Study of Rel., pp. 33, 346.

²Ibid., p. 33.

³Ibid., p. 34.

⁴Frederich Schleiermacher, The Doctrine of Faith, quoted by Leuba, Psy. Study of Rel., p. 34.

⁵Johann Frederich Herbart, Science of Education, p. 171, quoted by Leuba, op. cit., pp. 32f.

⁶Johann Amos Comenius, Great Didactic, Keating tr., p. 190, quoted by Leuba, op. cit., p. 351.

of religious phenomena compels us to conclude that they are all traceable to the emotions--traceable to them, I say, but not originating in them. Their origin lies deeper."¹ Again, Leuba quotes Tiele:

We mean that religion is, in truth, that pure and reverential disposition or frame of mind which we call piety Now, whenever I discover piety I maintain that its essence, and therefore the essence of religion itself, is adoration Adoration necessarily involves the elements of holy awe, humble reverence, grateful acknowledgement of every token of love, hopeful confidence, lowly self-abasement, a deep sense of one's own unworthiness and shortcomings, total self-abnigation, and unconditional consecration of one's whole life and one's whole faculties But at the same time adoration includes a desire to possess the adored object, to call it entirely one's own.²

D. G. Thompson is quoted as saying that "religion is the aggregate of those sentiments in the human mind arising in connection with the relations assumed to subsist between the order of nature (inclusive of the observer) and a postulated supernatural."³

Their "religious differentia."-Leuba says that in this class of definitions, "a particular emotion or sentiment, usually termed 'feeling,' is seized upon as the religious differentia. The affective experiences most frequently singled out for this purpose are fear, awe, reverence, adoration, piety,

¹Cornelis Petrus Tiele, Science of Religion, II, 15, quoted by Leuba, op. cit., p. 348.

²Tiele, op. cit., 198f., quoted by Leuba, Psy. Study of Rel., p. 349; cf. p. 33.

³Daniel Greenleaf Thompson, The Religious Sentiment of the Human Mind, quoted by Leuba, op. cit., p. 351.

dependence, love, and 'cosmic feeling.'"¹ Religion is marked by the aggregate of these sentiments (Thompson), while philosophy is marked by its intellectual nature and ethics is marked by its volitional nature. Religion is feeling (Tiele).

The import of these definitions.--Some of them are more accurately called descriptions, because of their length as well as their nature. What was said of the intellectual class is true also of the emotional class, namely, that no one of them expresses its author's complete thought. If Thompson's aggregate of the sentiment were interpreted to mean what was given as the meaning of sentiment in chapter ii,² he would be very near the truth, if not fully correct in his view. But in so far as has been observed, his view, or that of any of the others quoted, should ^{not} be interpreted in that way. Their idea of emotion and sentiment is that of pure feeling--that is, without any conative or cognative elements in them. However some of them recognize that religion is deeper than mere feelings (e.g., Tiele), and they say also that it results in action (e.g., Tiele). Compare the above quotations with this:

Concerning the origin of religion, Tiele writes that it "begins with conceptions awakened by emotions and experiences, and these conceptions awakened produce definite sentiments, which were already present in germ in the first emotion, but which can only be aroused to consciousness by these conceptions; and

¹

Leuba, op. cit., p. 32.

²Cf. "Instinct," pp.17f; "Emotion," pp.20f; and "Sentiment," pp. 24ff.

these sentiments manifest themselves in actions.¹

After all that has been said about not interpreting Tiele's view of sentiments to mean what was meant and described in chapter ii and what Leuba says about Tiele's view, he may be more nearly correct than has been accredited to him. While there seems to be some indication that he had somewhat similar ideas about sentiments as those set forth in this dissertation, there does not seem to be enough evidence in the above quotation even to say that he held such a theory of sentiments as that described in chapter ii.

2. The View in Practice Deficient

Modern evangelism.---Evangelism in its modern method of reclaiming people began in England and America during the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries and remains today in a modified form a prominent method of the evangelistic churches for maintaining their growth. The "pietistic" appeal of Whitefield and the Wesleys was sorely needed at the time modern evangelism began; theirs was a noble purpose and undertaking; they accomplished much. The success of their efforts was possible, not because they appealed to the emotions alone, but because they appealed to the intellect and to the will also--that is, they appealed to the whole mind, though they put the emphasis on the

¹Tiele, op. cit., p. 67, quoted by Leuba, op. cit., p. 349.

emotions.¹ Otherwise, they would have been more successful.

Revivalism and high-pressure evangelism.--The nobler methods of evangelism are not being attacked here; only certain methods used to increase church membership, which are not worthy of being called evangelism, are being condemned. The so-called revival meeting to revive the church that is evangelistic is not only illogical and ineffective, but it is absolutely a detriment to the church. An evangelistic church should never have to be revived. Such is what is called "revivalism." "High-pressure" evangelism and other low orders of evangelism are other results of the degeneration of the noble movement and undertaking of Whitefield and the Wesleys. These are the evils that are being condemned here.²

Appealing to the emotions.--This method of trying to develop religious people is like the sea with its tide, waves, and breakers. A tide of revivalism sweeps the country and then ebbs. The life of each church during this period is like a series of waves that ends in a breaker. Such work is not lasting; it cannot yield permanent results. There is no onward movement, just as there is no forward movement in the waves. Just as the tide ebbs and flows, so revivals come and go. Success lies only in appealing to the whole mind.

¹T. Harwood Pattison, "The Eighteenth Century," The History of Christian Preaching (Philadelphia: The American Baptist Publishing Society, 1903), chap. x, pp. 242-277.

²Cliff E. Barber, Sin and the New Psychology (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1930).

C. The Volitional Viewpoint

1. The View in Theory as Defined

The volitional person.--Like the other two types of persons, the intellectual and emotional, the volitional man emphasizes one of the three mental processes, the will, more than he does the other processes. There are many very strong-willed persons, and there are many weak-willed persons; there are all degrees between. It is only natural that the volitional person define his religion as largely belonging to the will, if not wholly of the will. In the case that he defines it as wholly of the will, he makes it purely practical, eliminating completely the theoretical and aesthetical aspects of it. A few examples of this kind of defining religion will illustrate this point of view.

Some definitions of religion.--F. H. Bradley says:

We have found that the essence of religion is not knowledge. And this certainly does not mean that its essence consists barely in feeling. Religion is rather the attempt to express the complete reality of goodness through every aspect of our being.¹

Sabatier says that the essence of religion "is a commerce, a conscious and willed relation into which the soul

¹Francis Horbert Bradley, Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay (2d ed., London: George Allen and Uwin, Ltd., 1920), p. 453.

in distress enters with the mysterious power on which it feels that it and its destiny depend."¹ According to Reville, "Religion rests above all upon the need of man to realize an harmonious synthesis between his destiny and the opposing influences he meets in the world."² Josiah Royce says that "religion is the consciousness of our practical relation to an invisible, spiritual order."³ According to Kant, when religion is considered subjectively, it is "the recognition of all our duties as divine commands."⁴ This should be compared with his principle of ethics, his "categorical imperative," which is merely another way of stating the Golden Rule: "Always act so that you can will the maximum or determining principle of your action to become universal law; act so that you can will that everybody shall follow the principle of our action."⁵

James says that "the word 'religion' cannot stand for any single principle of essence, but is rather a collective

¹Auguste Sabatier, Outlines of a Philosophie of Religion based on Psychology and History (New York: James Pott & Co., 1897), p. 27.

²A. Reville, La Religion des puples non-civilises, I, 120, quoted by Leuba, Psy. Study of Rel., p. 352.

³Josiah Royce, quoted by Leuba, op. cit., p. 357.

⁴Immanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, quoted by Leuba, op. cit., p. 358.

⁵Thilly, Hist. of Philos., p. 423.

name."¹ In the same lecture he says:

Religion, therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for us the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine. Since the relation may be either moral, physical, or ritual, it is evident that out of religion in the sense in which we take it, theologies, philosophies, and ecclesiastical organizations may secondly grow.²

He has in mind Stoicism and such like when he says:

Now in those states of mind which fall short of religion, the surrender is submitted to as an imposition of necessity, and the sacrifice is undergone at the very best without complaint. In the religious life, on the contrary, surrender and sacrifice are positively espoused: even unnecessary givings-up are added in order that the happiness may increase. Religion thus makes easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary; and if it be the only agency that can accomplish this result, its vital importance as a human faculty stands vindicated beyond dispute, performing a function which no other portion of our nature can so successfully fulfill.³

He starts out in his next lecture by characterizing "the religious life in the broadest and most general terms possible" as "the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto. This belief and this adjustment are the religious attitude of the soul."⁴ In his concluding lecture, he sums up "in the broadest possible way the characteristics of the religious life," adding to the above, prayer or communion with God; "a new zest" in life; "an assurance of safety and a temper

¹William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience ("Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion," 1901-1902; New York: Longman's Green, & Co., 1925), p. 26.

²Ibid., p. 31.

³Ibid., pp. 51f.

⁴Ibid., p. 53.

of peace, and, in relation to others, a preponderance of loving affection."¹ In a sense, religion is a forced option, as James might say, and dependent on "the will to believe."²

Tönnies says that religion "is essentially social" and describes it as being "of a twofold nature," that is, having a twofold function: political and ethical.³ His description of the political indicates that he means ecclesiastical, and his description of the ethical reflects the "pure and undefiled religion" of James 1:27; cf. Matthew 25: 31-46. Prince Kropotkin, leader of the Anarchist movement, is said by Leuba to stress the social aspect: "For him, 'a passionate desire for working out a new, better form of society' is a religious impulse."⁴

Their religious differentia.--The volitional person relegates religion to only a faculty of the mind--the will. "Duty for duties sake" is their motto; duty is the specific differentia. It takes two phases: the theoretical in the form of ethics, theology, and pragmatic philosophy, and the practical in the form of morals, social gospel, etc. Accord-

¹James, Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 485f.

²William James, The Will to Believe and other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longman's, Green, & Co., 1902), pp. 1-31.

³F. Tönnies, "The Origin and Function of Religion," Sociological Papers, III, 237, quoted by Leuba, op. cit., p. 355.

⁴Prince Kropotkin, "The Ethical Needs of the Present Day," The Nineteenth Century, LVI (August, 1904), 207-226, quoted by Leuba, op. cit., p. 358.

ing to Upton, "It is the felt relationship in which the finite self-consciousness stands to the immanent and universal ground of all being, which constitutes religion."¹

The import of these definitions.--In the first place, so many statements from the men quoted have been left out of this section that a very incomplete idea has been given of just what some of them say, as well as the viewpoint of the voluntaristic definition of religion in general is fragmentary. An adequate idea of it is not possible in so limited a space; this is true to some extent of the other two viewpoints. From the above definitions, it is very evident that without the desire that causes a person to do more than he is asked or feels necessary, as James made so clear in his statement quoted above,² he does not have the religion described by James. James makes it clear in his statement that religion is far more than mere ethics. They recognize emotions as being connected with religion, but they do not make them part of it; or, if it is granted that some of them do, feelings are made a very little part of religion. To take religion in the general sense of the volitional person's point of view is a very narrow view to say the least.

¹Upton, *The Basis of Religious Belief* ("Hibbert Lectures," 1893), quoted by Leuba, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

²Cf. p. 56 (middle of page).

2. The View in Practice Deficient

Ecclesiasticism.--The dominating spirit of ecclesiasticism hardly needs to be mentioned here, except to say that this aspect of religion is to be greatly deplored because of its corruption as a political organization. It could never hope to succeed, in the first place, and it is not worthy of Christianity, in the second place.¹

The social gospel.--The other phase of religion from the voluntaristic viewpoint manifests itself in the social gospel. Since this movement has considerable influence on others that are not considered as belonging to it, it should be noted here. It is really hardly more than an ethical movement. It never has had such influence as "revivalism" has, and it probably never will. It is not the whole gospel and should not be allowed to deceive any one in thinking that it is.²

Appealing to the will.--This method of trying to develop religious people is like trying to drive balky horses or mules. It is only natural that when sheer force fails to move people, persuasion is resorted to. This is merely a tacit confession of failure to move the will directly. The

¹ Burke Aaron Hinesdale, Ecclesiastical Tradition: its origin and early growth, its place in the churches, and its value (Cincinnati: The Standard Pub. Co., 1879).

² Chester Carlton, The Genesis of the Social Gospel, the meaning of the ideas of Jesus in the light of their antecedents (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929).

one redeeming feature of this viewpoint is the resorting to the pragmatic test; if it works, use it. But pragmatism is only possible when there is a persuasion to make the test. After the desire is created to try out a thing, then the pragmatic test can be applied. "Duty for duties sake" has never conquered the stubborn will.

D. Definition of Religion

Introductory statement.--The three different points of view have been analyzed and each has been seen to be only an aspect of religion rather than the whole of it. Further, it has been seen that to take any one of the three views is to hold a very narrow conception of the meaning of religion. After considering briefly the three views described above a definition will be stated that will include the whole of religion, and thus it will include all the truths in the statements and definitions quoted above.

1. The three views considered briefly

Faith as religion.--First, as far as the intellect is concerned, religion is dependent upon faith, and this faith is a far higher and more satisfying faith than can inductive science at its best ever expect to reach. The faith that is contained in pure and uncorrupted theology is the attitude or sentiment of divine psychology, for faith is not wholly intellectual. It is basically intellectual, but it has an emotional and a volitional element also. The only way that students of religion in the past could define religion in terms of faith and claim it to be wholly of the intellect, is to limit faith to the intellect. Intellectual assent to any proposition is only the intellectual element of faith. A faith that believes

because it feels that the proposition is true is a faith that is religious, because pure intellectual assent to a proposition is merely rationalism. A faith that is the result of "the will to believe" is a faith that is controlled, not by the whims of a person, but by the will of a person. Such a faith is both felt and willed, for without the desire to believe, the continued willing to believe is impossible. The more faith is fused with desire and will the more it approaches the religious ideal for faith.

Sentiment as religion.--In some of the above definitions of the emotional person's religion, religion was called a sentiment. Only in the narrow sense of the term can sentiment be considered as an element of religion, for religion is more than feeling. As the term sentiment was defined above in chapter ii,¹ it requires all three elements--the intellectual, the emotional, and the volitional--to make up its elements. When the term sentiment is used in its narrow sense, it can not be made to include the whole of religion. Only by using it in its broad sense can it be made to include the whole of religion. This is the sense it has been used in chapter iv.

Practice of religion.--Practice furnishes the person the opportunity to live what he believes--to live according to his attitude toward God and all that pertains to God. "Faith apart from works is barren."² Religion involves not

¹
Cf. pp. 24ff.

²
James 2.

only desire, the more it approaches the ideal of religion. Every act ought to be prompted by love, not from the sense of duty alone. Religion involves not only the person himself, but his fellowman. The more will is charged with desire, the more it approaches the ideal of religion. Besides the social aspect of religion there are acts of service to God, ceremonies to be performed, rites to be observed, liturgies to be sung, prayers to be offered, etc. It takes all of this to express one's faith and attitude toward God. All of this is simply the striving for self-betterment and invoking the aid of God in the striving. Leuba says:

In its objective aspect, active religion consists, then, of attitudes, practices, rites, ceremonies, institutions; in its subjective aspect, it consists of desires, emotions, and ideas, instigating and accompanying these objective manifestations.¹

2. All gathered up into the whole

Religion as the whole man.--Leuba says that "religion involves the whole man."² Religion is variable; it varies with the man. In whatever way a man changes, his religion changes accordingly. It has been said that religion springs from some impulse to action; there is no "religious instinct." But "any impulse, any desire, may lead to religious activity."³ That is his religion at that time. One's general religious

¹ Leuba, Psy. Study of Rel., p. 53.

² Ibid., p. 57.

³ Ibid., p. 7.

behavior as viewed by others will vary gradually; religion is never static but active, just as the man is never static but always active. The religion of a country or of a race of people varies in time, so religion must be defined so as to meet all of these conditions. Pratt defines religion as "an attitude," meaning by the word "attitude" "that responsive side of consciousness which is found in such things as attention, interest, expectancy, feeling, tendencies to reaction, etc."¹ "Thus it is not to be confined to any one of the three traditional departments of the mind--'knowing, feeling, willing,' but . . . includes what there was of truth in the historical attempts to identify religion with feeling, belief, or will."² Pratt, thus, uses the term "attitude" exactly the same way as McDougall uses the term "sentiment."³ In the definition that has been formulated as the result of this study and is being proposed now, the term "sentiment" means "attitude" as was stated above.⁴

Definition of religion.--Religion, therefore, may be defined as the whole attitude of a person toward God and all that pertains to God--which attitude is composed of thinking, feeling, and willing-- which attitude arises in consciousness as the result of the influence of environment on native capacities for developing this sentiment or attitude, which

¹Pratt, Rel. Con., p. 2. ²Ibid., p. 3.

³Ibid., pp. 74, 214, 307. ⁴Cf. p. 25ff.

grows and functions as the determiner of the thinking, the feeling, and the willing of the religious man in his striving for self-betterment. Hughes well says:

In reality, the weakness of all the views which treat religion as if it were derived from any one of the various aspects of man's self-conscious life lies in the fact that they make an unwarranted cleavage in consciousness, and that therefore, they make man religious only in a part of his being. Man is not religious, when religion is real to him, in his reason or his will or his feeling only. He is religious in them all, in his whole manhood at its highest and best, for religion lays every faculty and power under tribute. It raises every aspect of consciousness to a level of higher and more intense life, and in the integrating power of communion with God, it renews and transforms the whole man.¹

Again, as was said above,² a man's religion, his life, and his mind should be synonymous terms for his activity in striving for self-betterment. Now, the truth of this statement should be evident. Religion involves the whole man. Man lives his religion just as he lives his life; thus, man makes his religion fit his life, or he makes his life fit his religion, according to his desire. Man not only makes his own religion, but religion makes the man; religion makes the man who makes his religion. When he is a co-worker with God they together make true religion--Christianity. A Christian is a religious man whose whole life is transformed "by the renewing of the whole mind"³ so as to have the mind of Christ.⁴

¹Thomas Hywell Hughes, Psychology and Religious Origins, pp. 98, 99.

²Cf. p. 40.

³Cf. Rom. 12:1f.

⁴Cf. I Cor. 2:16; Phil. 2:5, esp. 1-11.

Summary

A religious person is one who invokes the aid of a superhuman being in his striving for self-betterment. This involves the whole man--intellect, emotions, and will. His religion is his whole attitude toward God and all that pertains to God. This activity includes all of his activities --thinking, feeling, and willing-- as organized into this attitude or sentiment. This attitude is a system of sentiments organized around God as the object. It does not include that part of a man's thinking, feeling, and willing which is opposed to God, but that part which is toward God. Pure religion casts out all that is foreign to the nature of the religious sentiment, and thus life, religion, and mind become the same. All of the activities of the man are directed toward his own self-betterment, but he invokes the aid of, and cooperates with, God in his striving. Thus, the proper understanding of what religion is eliminates one of the causes of the conflict between religion and life; cooperation of the whole man with God leads to successful and harmonious striving for self-betterment. A study of the three viewpoints of religion has clarified the other cause of the conflict between life and religion, that is, the failure to do as well as is known. The next chapter will only touch upon this cause. It is primarily an analysis of the religious sentiment.

CHAPTER IV

THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT

Introductory

Preliminary statement.--In chapter ii, a human person was defined and his mind was analyzed. In chapter iii, the religious person and his religion were defined. This was in preparation for the analysis of the religious sentiment in this chapter. The introductory portion of this chapter has been devoted to a consideration of sentiments in general; it is based on the discussion of sentiments in chapter ii. The remainder of this chapter has been devoted to an analysis of the religious sentiment.

Sentiments.--These are "organized colonies of feelings"; each sentiment or colony of feelings is "gathered about an idea"; and these sentiments "exercise an almost irresistible and decisive effect upon character."¹ This is just another way of summarizing what was said in chapter ii.² Each colony of feelings is "organized securely and comparatively definitely about ideas, persons, and things." They "work themselves out

¹ Arthur Holmes, The Mind of St. Paul: A Psychological Study (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 55.

² Cf. pp. 24ff.

in actions, or behavior"; they are "released by the will" and are "guided by the idea." "They develop through the ordinary struggles of life" as well as through "deliberate education." One of two destinies await them: either they "maintain their lustiness by practice," or, they "die by neglect" and "go like mites into a sunbeam." There are three main classes of sentiments (i.e., fully-organized systems of sentiments): sentiments of love, hate, and respect; there are two sub-classes of sentiments: sentiments directed toward self and toward others. These are all characterized by repulsion or by attraction according as their objects are repulsive or attractive.¹

The so-called "religious instinct."--From all that has been said thus far concerning sentiments, there can be no innate instinct as the root of the religious sentiment. The religious sentiment cannot be excited innately and instinctively by an object but it is excited emotionally by the object around which it centers, which is God. McDougall says:

Many authors have written of the religious instinct or instincts, though few have made any serious attempt to make clear the meaning they attach to these phrases. Those who use these phrases usually seem to imply that this assumed religious instinct of man is one that is his peculiar endowment and has no relation to the instincts of the animals. But I do not know that this is now seriously maintained by any psychologist.²

¹Holmes, Mind of Paul, p. 55.

²McDougall, Soc. Psy., p. 309.

The instinctive actions in the religious life are the same that enter into ordinary life. The emotions aroused by the objects that one meets in life are the same emotions that are aroused by the thought of God. But it is the object around which they are organized that determines whether they are religious or not. While the emotions are the same, yet they blend into a different kind of system when organized around God as their unifying object. This organized system of sentiments is called the religious sentiment.

Definition of the religious sentiment.--It may, therefore, be defined as the whole attitude of a man toward God as its object; an attitude arising in consciousness through the contemplation of God, who arouses instinctive action and accompanying emotions that blend to form the whole attitude; an attitude developed through increase of the knowledge of God and through struggling to become perfect like God; and an attitude that exercised an almost irresistible and decisive effect upon character by determining almost completely one's activity. It comprises "faith, hope, and love, and the greatest of these is love."¹ The greatest of these is discussed first.

¹

1 Cor. 13:13

A. The Love of God the Father

1. Preliminary Considerations

What is love?--Love has been defined as "intelligent good will";¹ it may also be expressed as "intelligently wishing one well" or "intelligent best wishes." While the first one puts the proper emphasis on the will, the last two put more emphasis on the emotional content of love. All three give due emphasis to the intellectual content. These express the idea meant by the idea of LOVE for some one. When love is directed toward God, he becomes the object of love.

Sentiment of love for God.--Love is here used to mean an organized system of sentiments directed toward God; he is the object or center around which this sentiment of love is organized. As all sentiments have intellectual, emotional, and volitional contents; so does love for God. Since love for God is such a complex sentiment, it will require first a study of the emotions that blend to form the secondary sentiments in the system; secondly a study of these secondary sentiments that blend to form love for God.

2. Emotions that Blend to Form Secondary Sentiments

Mt. Sinai.--Perhaps the best illustration of awe for God is the dramatic scene at Mt. Sinai when God uttered the

¹Source of this definition not known to writer.

Decalogue in the hearing of the people of Israel.¹ It is rich in detail and illustrates most of the instincts and emotions connected with and entering into the sentiment of awe toward God. Fear, wonder, and meakness are the primary emotions that blend in forming the sentiment of awe.

Curiosity and wonder.--God had given Moses directions; bounds had been set around the mountain. Preparation served to increase the curiosity of the people in great measure. The people were so curious that they would have entered into the holy precincts themselves, had not God warned them not to do so. They had drawn as near as they dared to the mountain in order to view the thing that was now about to take place. The instinct of curiosity and the emotion of wonder were excited. A general state of expectancy was in the air.

Fear and flight.--The mountain smoked, the thunder rumbled and shook the earth, the lightning flashed and rent the sky, and the Voice spoke. The people, before curious, now feared and drew back from the mountain, trembling and crying out, "Let not God speak with us, lest we die."² The physical manifestations of the awful presence and power of God excited the instinct to flee and the emotion of fear. Enough curiosity was left to keep them from taking to full flight; instead, they merely moved back some distance from the wonderful sights.

¹ Ex. 19 & 20.

² Ex. 20: 18ff.

Before, curiosity was the stronger emotion, and they approached the mountain; afterward, fear was the stronger emotion, and they drew back from the mountain.

Submission and meekness.--In this wonderful incident the instinct to submit to God Omnipotent and the emotion of meekness or submissive self-feeling toward God were aroused also by the awful presence and power of God manifested in the physical phenomena. While they feared yet they were held at a distance through curiosity that they might have the opportunity to behold the phenomena in wonder and admiration.

Self-assertion and elation.--The people showed that their instinct to assert themselves was aroused by the fact that they said to Moses, "Speak thou with us and we will hear, but let not God speak with us, lest we die."¹ Since it was an almost total submission, the assertive instinct struggled to appear in the complex situation. The phenomena, even if it did fill with fear, aroused a sort of elation in the thrill it gave the wondering people.

Appeal and distress.--The instinct to appeal to some power for help or protection in time of distress is evident in the statement of the people. Though distress is mixed with fear, the feeling of distress is clearly manifest; the people seem almost ready to become frantic; hence, the cause of the

¹Ex. 20:19.

exclamation in their appeal for protection.

Mount of Transfiguration.--The above illustration -- the scene at Mt. Sinai--does not seem to furnish any evidence of any tenderness (the tender emotion sometimes called "love.") But there is abundant evidence that Jesus was beheld (looked upon) with admiration¹ at the scene of his transfiguration.² Also there are other emotions manifest in this scene that were not manifest at Mt. Sinai. The transfiguration is probably the most sublime scene ever exacted on earth.

Service and tenderness.-- The disciples had learned to hold Jesus with great tenderness and sympathy. He was their Master whom they served. On the mount this tenderness and the desire to serve were aroused. Peter, filled with holy awe and reverence (these to be discussed later), said, "Lord, it is good for us to be here: if thou wilt, I will make three tabernacles; one for thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elijah."³ There Peter wanted to remain apart from the world and all of its trouble and just serve Jesus, Moses, and Elijah. But that was not to be, not even Jesus alone was to be served there on the mount; he was to be served down in the world.

Acquiring, building, and possessing.--Peter wanted to build; the instinct to construct was aroused. But the place and the time for building was not "as Jesus willed."⁴

¹ Cf. 1 John 1:1; see *Θαυμάσιω*, Thayer's Greek English Lexicon, p.284.

² Matt. 17:1-13ff.

³ Matt. 17:4

⁴ Ibid.

The cloud overshadowed them all. Imagine the disciples who felt that they possessed Jesus in an unique way, that they had a special claim on him that others did not--imagine their feeling when Jesus passed from their sight into the heavenly cloud--what a feeling of lonesomeness that must have been! But it was only for a few moments or minutes at the most. After the Voice spoke, the cloud passed and Jesus was left ALONE, restored to the disciples, now possessed in a new and a more unique way than before.

Self-assertion and elation.--Impetuous Peter asserted himself all right, but ill-advisedly. He manifested a great degree of elation; undoubtedly all the disciples shared his elation to some degree. Elation in this incident is far more evident and pronounced than the incident at Mt. Sinai. These two illustrations have furnished the emotions contained in love; the discussion of them has prepared the way for a discussion of the sentiments which they form when they blend, that is, the secondary sentiments that make up the complex sentiment of love.

3. Secondary Sentiments that Blend to Form Love

Fascination.--The blending of the emotions of fear and wonder were described above¹ as fascination. In that case the strange object was not understood and the sentiment did not unite with other emotions to form a more complex statement.

¹ Cf. p. 222 and McDougall, Soc. Psy., p. 140.

SIX OF THE BLENDED EMOTIONS*




FIGURE 2

SENTIMENT OF ADMIRATION




FIGURE 3

SENTIMENT OF GRATITUDE




FIGURE 4

SENTIMENT OF LOATHING




FIGURE 5

SENTIMENT OF ENVY




FIGURE 6

SENTIMENT OF SCORN




FIGURE 7

SENTIMENT OF REPROACH

*McDougall, Soc. Psy., pp. 132ff., 136ff., 140, 140, 139, 141.

For this reason fascination in its simple form is not one of the sentiments that enter into the religious sentiment. But it is preliminary to all religious feeling. At Mt. Sinai, fear almost overcame wonder, and so the people were dominated largely by fear rather than by fascination. At the transfiguration, fascination is lost in the sentiments of awe and reverence. (these are discussed below).

Admiration.-- The blending of the emotions of wonder and submissive self-feeling produces admiration (see Fig. 2)¹. But there is usually tenderness blended into it also. At Mt. Sinai, fear so dominated that there was little room for admiration and probably no room for tenderness. After the people had withdrawn to what to them seemed a distance of safety, they did stand in admiration of the wonderful presence and power of God manifested in the phenomena. At the transfiguration, there seems to have been a considerable amount of admiration present in the complex sentiment toward the supernatural phenomena. The disciples not only beheld Jesus with great admiration, but they beheld him with awe and reverence (these are discussed below).

The sublime.--The transfiguration is probably the most sublime incident^{that} ever happened on earth. How those disciples stood enraptured! The wonder of it carried them away from the world of appearance into the world of reality. No wonder

¹Cf. McDougall, Soc. Psy., pp. 132ff.

they wanted to remain there. Fear and submission blending with wonder produces the sentiment of the sublime (see Fig. 9).

Loathing.--The blending of the emotions of fear and disgust produce the sentiment of loathing (see Fig. 4).¹ A snake is loathed by most people; this is the result of the blending of their fear of it with their disgust for its appearance. Evil spirits are feared; the human conception of them makes them disgusting. Those possessed by demons in the time of Christ were shunned and feared. Jesus went down from the mountain to heal the demon-possessed epileptic boy.² On a³ previous occasion the Gadarene demoniac was healed.³ "A wicked man is loathsome, and cometh to shame."⁴ In contrast to this, righteous men are always admired for their goodness.

Wonder and disgust.--Wonder unites more readily with submissive self-feeling or meekness; while disgust unites more readily with assertive self-feeling or elation. There is a sort of elated feeling that comes over a person when he kills a snake. But there is a sort of meekness given way to when a person stands in admiration of a jack-rabbit running across the prairie; the person realizes he cannot run like that and is meek. The very impious or wicked man is disgusting, to be shunned, never to be imitated. The very pious or

¹Ibid., p. 140.

³Matt. 8:28-34.

²Matt. 17:14-18.

⁴Prov. 13:5. (ARV).

righteous man is admired and imitated.¹

Awe.--The blending of wonder and submissive self-feeling produces admiration. When the emotion of fear is blended with the sentiment of admiration, the sentiment of awe is produced (see Fig. 8).² The sentiment of awe can be produced in two different ways at least; all three emotions --fear, wonder, meekness--can be excited at the same time by the same object and, blending, produce awe; or, fear may




FIGURE 8

SENTIMENT OF REVERENCE

¹ Cf. McDougall, Soc. Psy., pp. 58-61.

² Ibid.

become blended with admiration after wonder and meekness have produced it. At Mt. Sinai, the people were standing in wonder; when the mountain began to smoke and the lightning to flash, their wonder blended with meekness, then with fear at the voice of God, if not before. They stood in awe before the fearful and wonderful phenomena, attributing it all to God. Fear, wonder, and meekness blended to form awe toward Christ transfigured before his disciples. The degree to which each of the emotions is aroused determines the strength of the sentiment; and, just as there are different degrees of wonder, meekness, and fear, so there are different qualities of admiration and awe.

Reverence.--As stated above,¹ there does not seem to have been any tenderness aroused in the people of Israel at Mt. Sinai; if there were, it is hardly discernible. So it can hardly be said that they revered God upon that occasion. For reverence is the blending of admiration and awe with tenderness; without tenderness there would be no reverence (see Fig. 8).² At the transfiguration, the tender emotion was present to a marked degree; it blended with awe and admiration and produced reverence for Christ. Further, reverence is often colored with gratitude, as it was on this occasion. (Gratitude is discussed below.)

Gratitude.--When tenderness and meekness are blended

¹Cf. p. 73.

²Cf. McDougall, Soc. Psy., pp. 309-15.

the sentiment of gratitude is formed (see Fig. 3 and 8),¹ but gratitude also may have elation blended into it (see Fig. 9).² When the gift comes from "the giver of every good and perfect gift,"³ gratitude toward God is or should be the result. When gratitude has elation blended into it, the sentiment leads to appreciation and thanksgiving. Only one of the ten lepers willed (self-assertion played a part) to return and give to Christ thanks for his bestowal of grace in the act of healing.⁴ Gratitude is from man toward God for grace which is possessed by man. Grace is unmerited favor from God bestowed by him on man. At the transfiguration, how grateful the disciples must have been to receive back their Master from the overshadowing cloud that passed over Him.

Joy.--This is a very complex sentiment classed by McDougall as a derived emotion,⁵ but derived emotions are considered in this dissertation as merely complex secondary sentiments.⁶ Some of the emotions that blend to form it are tenderness, elation, the satisfaction or the anticipation of the satisfaction of some want, and an emotion called aesthetic pleasure for want of a better designation.⁷

¹Cf. McDougall, Soc. Psy., pp. 136ff.

²Cf. Holmes, Mind of Paul, p. 109.

³Paraphrase of James 1:17.

⁴Luke 17:11-19.

⁵McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp. 343f.

⁶Cf. p. 23ff.

⁷McDougall, Soc. Psy., pp. 155f.

Peace.--This is another very complex sentiment not even mentioned by McDougall in either of his books. It seems that no psychologist has succeeded in analyzing it. It may be that it is the blending of the satisfaction of some want with a perfectly balanced blend of meekness and elation. If this be not a satisfactory analysis, no other is proposed to take its place. In order for a person to be at peace within, he must have all of his conflicts within harmonized. The person he was yesterday must be at one with the person he is today and the person he will be tomorrow.¹ Then he will have peace within; in short, he must be perfectly consistent. To be at peace with other persons is the same in consciousness as to be at peace within. The difference is that one man has control over all that is within, but he cannot have control over all that is without.

Devotion.--This complex sentiment is produced by the blending of admiration, awe, reverence, and gratitude (see Fig. 9).² Awe is the sentiment toward supernatural power, personal or impersonal, but admiration and gratitude must have as their objects, persons; while reverence must not only have a person as its object, but it must have a person that is held as sacred or holy. When all of these sentiments blend, it means that the person having the sentiments has devoted himself to the service of the one person (monotheism).

¹Cf. Rom. 7.

²Holmes, Mind of Paul, p.109.

He admires this personal god as the most sublime and tender power to which he could submit himself in service. He is grateful for the tenderness, mercy, and grace of this personal god. He rejoices because of his possession of these blessings. He stands in awe of his god, ready to fear, wonder, and submit himself at all times. He holds his god in reverence as sacred and holy. He desires to possess these characteristics of his god, in order that he may be like his god. The thought of the possibility of his acquiring them fills him with joy and causes him to strive for them, for his own benefit, for his self-betterment. In his gratitude he is appreciative and thankful for all his blessings. To a certain extent he may feel at peace within and without, but not wholly, because he does not think of his god as absolute,—that is, he does not trust him explicitly in every way. The sentiment of devotion is the sentiment of monotheism. It is marked by the desire of the person to serve, to give himself wholly to his god, to devote himself completely to what is sacred and holy.




FIGURE 12

DIAGRAM OF THE SENTIMENT OF LOVE FOR GOD, THE FATHER*

1. As a transcendent God, he arouses wonder, curiosity, and self-submission.
2. As a Person, admiration, wonder, submission, tender emotion.
3. As a Father, reverence, gratitude for his grace, possession of grace.
4. As loving and all-wise and all-powerful, peace.
5. As Savior through Christ, joy.
6. As the Christian grows in his Love for God fear becomes less and less, until perfect Love casts out fear. This furnishes an emotional scale by which he may measure his religion.
7. The figures 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively, refer to the object of the sentiment of Love, the secondary sentiments involved, the emotions of instincts, and the impulses to action given by the instinct.

*Cf. Holmes, Mind of Paul, p. 109.

Agapé or LOVE.---The word love has been reserved to refer to the sentiment called love, which is some times called agape; and the emotions called love have been designated tenderness and lust (in a good sense). The sentiment of love is the most complex sentiment of all, unless it be hate. Love is the sentiment of Christian theism. It is the sentiment toward GOD. God is conceived of as a person, as loving and all-wise, both immanent and transcendent, as Father, as Savior through Christ, and as perfect--pure, holy, sacred, absolutely good. This sentiment of love for God is produced by the blending of all the emotions --all that enter into admiration, gratitude, awe, reverence, devotion, etc.--all except fear. "Perfect love casts out fear."² Absolute confidence in God is necessary in order that fear be driven out of love.³ Only to the degree with which a person places confidence in God, only to that degree does he cast out fear. Love made perfect contains no fear,⁴ but love not full-grown, imperfect love, contains a small amount of fear. The ideal to attain is perfect love. The diagram of the sentiment of love for God, the Father (Fig. 9)⁵ gives a graphic survey of love at a glance, but only after it has been completely under-

¹Cf. p. 18, 70, 72.

²1 John 4:18.

³Heb. 12:6; 1 Tim. 1:12; Rom. 8:28.

⁴1 John 4:16-21.

⁵Holmes, Mind of Paul, p. 109.

⁶McDougall, Soc. Psy., pp. 128f.

stood can love be seen at a glance or as a whole. Figure 10 shows the emotions common to both the sentiment of love and the sentiment of hate. As there is no fear in perfect love, so there is no tender emotion in perfect hate, if there can be such a sentiment as perfect hate.¹

Love and hate.--These two opposing sentiments may be studied together, because they have so many emotions in common. Each sentiment has its own object; and McDougall says concerning the sentiments:

It is clear that the objects of these two very different sentiments may arouse many of the same emotions, and that the two sentiments comprise emotional dispositions that are identical, or, in other words, that some of the emotional dispositions, or central nuclei of the instincts, are members of sentiments of both kinds.²

The following figure (Fig. 10) is based on the one




FIGURE 10

SENTIMENTS OF LOVE AND HATE

D is for disgust, F for Fear, A for anger, W for wonder, S for submissive self-feeling or meekness, E for elation of assertive self-feeling, and T for tenderness. The width of the lines indicates the degrees of strength of the emotions excited by the objects.

¹ McDougall, Soc. Psy., pp. 128f. ² Ibid.

by McDougall in his Social Psychology.¹ The objects selected for these two sentiments are Satan (or sin) as the object of the sentiment of hate and God (or purity) as the object of love. The note below the figure explains it.

Transition.--The various emotions that blend to form the sentiments in love were noted first; then, the secondary sentiments resulting from the blending of simple sentiments were analyzed; and finally the more complex sentiments of reverence, devotion, and love were analyzed. While sentiments contain all three elements--intellect, emotion, and will--the emotions that blend to form love have been given the main emphasis thus far. It is necessary to note now the intellectual and volitional elements in the sentiments. The intellectual elements will be noted in connection with the study of the attitude of faith toward God. The volitional elements will be noted in connection with the study of hope.

¹
McDougall, Soc. Psy., p. 129.

B. The Attitude of Faith toward God

What is faith?--There are three varieties of faith according to Pratt.¹ If different persons were asked to define faith, there would possibly be three definitions given. One man would say it was credulity, another intellectual assent, and a third emotional assent. Pratt defines faith as "the mental attitude of assent to the reality of a given object."² This definition has been adopted, but with the interpretation that it includes all three varieties of faith. In other words, faith, largely intellectual, has both an emotional and a volitional element in it. Faith is not an attitude toward the whole of religion, but only a part.³

Faith in God.--Each person who loves God as his heavenly Father believes "that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek after him."⁴ They strive to be well-pleasing to him; in their striving for self-betterment, they are striving to become like him, perfect. God is the object of their faith. Through exercise of faith they develop greater, stronger faith; through neglect their faith would weaken and die. They keep it alive by struggling onward.

¹James Bissett Pratt, The Psychology of Religious Belief (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1907), pp. 32-43.

²Ibid., p. 32.

³Cf. p. 69.

⁴Cf. Heb. 11:6.

Faith and love.--In the sentiment of love, the intellectual factor is dependent on faith; without faith in God, the idea that there is a God would not be held, and there would be no object around which to organize the sentiment. But belief is "something more than the mere presence of an idea in the mind," as Hume is said by Pratt to have pointed out; "whether or not the object of consciousness shall be an object of belief will depend upon the 'manner of our conceiving'¹ it. The object of belief is not merely presented or represented, but acknowledged and accepted as a part of the ^{world} of reality."² As was stated above,³ when only probably knowledge is available, judging is asserting what is believed and denying what is not believed. When in doubt, judgment is suspended. When an idea is first appears in consciousness, it may be merely credible; then after reasoning about it, it may be given intellectual assent as a truth; but when an emotional content is added to it, it is accepted with emotional assent, that is with feeling--sometimes very strong feeling. In the latter case it becomes a sentiment, but faith is always more intellectual than emotional. The more faith a person has the more he is inclined to act accordingly.

¹ Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (Selby-Bigge's ed.), p. 96, quoted by Pratt, Psy. of Rel., Belief, pp. 32f.

² Pratt, Psy. of Rel. Belief, p. 32ff.

³Cf. p. 14.

C. The Attitude of Hope in God

What is hope?--McDougall calls it a derived emotion.¹ As was stated above,² these so-called derived emotions that McDougall differentiates from blended emotions or sentiments are considered as secondary sentiments and as being formed in the same way as secondary or blended emotions are. McDougall borrows Major Priestly's excellent illustration of hope. Explorers in the Arctics experience almost the whole gamut of derived emotions in their experience of trying to get back to where they can obtain food. From confidence they go to hope, from hope to anxiety, to despondency, and to despair; then to regret, remorse, sorrow, chagrin, and finally to grief. If faith were added to this list, it would come at the first--thus, faith confidence, hope, etc. No attempt has been made here to analyze hope.

Faith and hope.--The more uncertainty there is put in to faith, the weaker it becomes; hope is sometimes so strong that it is almost faith. But there is a certain measure of uncertainty about the thing believed. When a person seems about to triumph over this uncertainty, he has hope. Hope is faith weakened by having varying degrees of uncertainty mixed into it. People hope that there is a hereafter and that they are not mistaken in believing that God helps them in their striving for self-betterment. The stronger hope is, the stronger the will is.

¹McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp.338-343. ²Cf. p.23f.

Summary

There is no particular instinct (or instincts) that is peculiar to man, which the animals do not have, from which religion springs. Religion is not innately given even in its simplest forms; it is acquired by forming sentiments around God as their object. These sentiments are organized into one complex sentiment, which is called the religious sentiment in this dissertation, because of its object and its nature.

This religious sentiment or attitude may be first analyzed into faith, hope and love, and since the greatest of these is love, it was discussed in great detail. Very short sections were given to faith and hope because the religious sentiment is largely composed of love. Love is defined as "intelligent good will." Faith is largely intellectual; hope is almost wholly emotional; and love is composed of all three with the emotional most prominent.

Admiration, awe, and reverence are the prevailing sentiments in the religious life.¹ Fascination is the sentiment preliminary to all religious feeling; admiration and disgust (loathing) are the prevailing sentiments toward good and evil spirits respectively, marking the beginning of religious feeling; awe is the first real religious feeling; and

¹ McDougall, Soc. Psy., pp. 309-315.

reverence is the religious sentiment par excellence,¹ because it is the sentiment toward the Sacred, the Holy. Devotion is the sentiment proper to monotheism. Love is the sentiment of Christian theism, the sentiment toward GOD.

¹
Ibid., p. 136.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Purpose of this chapter.--The intention of this chapter is to summarize the whole study with the view of giving a bird's eye view of what has been done.

Person.--A man is a self-conscious, self-directing organism; he is composed of spirit, mind, and body, he (Adam) originated by creation; each man is now developing toward moral perfection through devotion to his own self-betterment.

Mind.--The mind of a man is a unit of spiritual activity; it is analyzed into interacting processes--thinking, feeling, and willing; each of these is analyzed into processes.

Sentiments.--These are colonies of emotional dispositions organized about persons, things, and ideas. There are three main classes of sentiments: sentiments of love, hate, and respect; there are two subspecies: egoism (sentiments toward self) and altruism (sentiments toward others). Each sentiment contains intellectual, emotional, and volitional factors. These sentiments arise in consciousness with the contemplation of the object and grow through education and through experience in struggling toward self-betterment. They must be cultivated or they will be crowded out like crops are taken by weeds. They make up one's character and determine

one's conduct. A man is judged by his conduct; he can be judged by his sentiments also.

Religious persons.--They are one variety of persons. A religious person is distinguished from all other persons by the fact that he invokes the aid of a superhuman being in his striving for self-betterment. This superhuman being becomes the object around which he organizes all of his sentiments. For the Christian God is the object of all of his sentiments.

Religion.--The religious person's religion does not spring from one faculty of his mind, but it involves his whole mind--his thinking, feeling, and willing. Mind, life, and religion are synonymous terms for the functions of the religious man.

The religious sentiment.--This is an organized system comprising all of the sentiments of a religious person that have God as their object. They are all unified by their organization about one object. The religious sentiment is the whole attitude of a religious person toward God and all that pertains to God. This attitude is made up of faith, hope, and love, and "the greatest of these is love," or "intelligent good will."

Finally, this dissertation has shown how sentiments are formed; that religion includes the whole man; and that the religious man's sentiments toward God form one process or activity centered around God, who is evoked for aid in his striving to become perfect like God--to the glory of God.

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