



1-1-1967

The Foreign Policy of Harry S. Truman

Patricia Reagan Slater

Follow this and additional works at: <http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/grtheses>

 Part of the [International Relations Commons](#), [Political History Commons](#), and the [United States History Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Slater, Patricia Reagan, "The Foreign Policy of Harry S. Truman" (1967). *Graduate Thesis Collection*. 460.
<http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/grtheses/460>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Butler University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Thesis Collection by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Butler University. For more information, please contact fgaede@butler.edu.

BUTLER UNIVERSITY
Indianapolis, Indiana

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN

Masters Thesis
Patricia Reagan Slater
April 15, 1967

LD
701
B626
500

PREFACE

A statement should be made at the outset of this paper as to why I chose to write on the subject of Truman's foreign policy. As a student with liberal inclinations, I am always interested in those public figures who shaped the liberal traditions of our country. I am also one who needs to know whether or not this liberalism was merely lip service or actually put into some tangible, working form. More specifically, the history courses offered at both the secondary and the college level as survey subjects never seem to be able to transcend the gap between World War II and the present. Because I was born in 1942, I never had any scholarly details on the forces that shaped the world in which I live today. I was also aware that Franklin Roosevelt was always exalted, and rightly so in the field of domestic policy, and Harry Truman was merely the President of the United States after Roosevelt's death. I believe that more and more historians are realizing that there is a pedestal in history for Harry Truman too. In a small way, I hope to help place Mr. Truman on that pillar reserved for "great" American Presidents. Roosevelt's vice-president not only stepped into his shoes; he walked in them. Mr. Truman was a quiet, simple, religious man. His genius lay in knowing how to use what he had well. He had a temper which he used constructively without worrying if a special interest group would be offended, as in the example of the railroad strike which plagued his administration--nationalize them and let them worry about it. President Truman acted quickly and left no doubt as to the intent of his actions. In domestic policy, Truman,

to a large extent, carried on the purposes of his predecessor's programs. This paper analyzes specifically the area of foreign policy. I have tried to select in topical form the most important programs that developed during the Truman administrations. Each one could be a thesis by itself. None are without criticism because nothing is perfect in this world; however, my discussions will concern the change in purpose and execution in foreign policy under Mr. Truman. I have tried, in addition, to relate these programs to a global discussion. Since hindsight is better than foresight, I have tried to emphasize the situations in their proper contexts.

Without knowing it, a professor of mine, Dr. Emma Lou Thornbrough, stimulated my interest in President Truman when she stated in a freshman history course that Harry S. Truman would go down in history as one of the greatest American Presidents if not the greatest because of his ingenuity in foreign policy. The exact purpose of this paper is to examine these programs.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	ii
Chapter	
I The Need for a Realistic Foreign Policy	1
II The United Nations, Expectations and Realities	4
III Potsdam: The First Russian Challenge	11
IV The Truman Doctrine: First "Offensive" Against the Russians	20
V An Economic Hypodermic for Western Europe: The Marshall Plan	24
VI The First Challenge to Containment: The Berlin Blockade . .	35
VII A Military Hypodermic for Western Europe: NATO	39
VIII The Economic Hypodermic Extended: Point Four	44
IX A Truman Policy for Israel	47
X The Decision That May Have Ended Total War	56
XI Korea: Containment's Broken Pustule	63
CONCLUSION	89
FOOTNOTES	91
BIBLIOGRAPHY	98

CHAPTER I

THE NEED FOR A REALISTIC FOREIGN POLICY

John W. Spanier in his book, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, believes that America was not prepared on a conceptual level for the international problems that arose after the war. He seems to think that our middle class philosophy was the culprit.

Since the middle class identified the power of the state with its own lack of freedom, its aim was to restrict this power. Only by placing restraints upon the authority of the state could it gain the individual liberty and, above all, the right to private enterprise which it sought. Liberal philosophy asserted these claims in terms of the individual's natural rights against the state.

Sometimes these claims could be less than an asset. To make the state strong and secure, some individual freedoms might have to be restricted; to have this freedom, the power of the state had to be denied. This philosophy of liberals concluded that undemocratic states were evil warmongers; democratic nations, on the other hand, were peaceful and moral. Therefore, there was no need to engage in power politics because evil countries would be defeated and there would be no need for this kind of bargaining. This was the type of thinking that faced President Truman at home while the rest of the world was engaged in power politics.

Previously, if we were moral and set a good example we would only have to go to war to "keep the world safe for democracy" and punish the evil-doers. The Russians too had stated that they wanted peace, democracy, and freedom so why wouldn't we believe that the Soviets at that

time were our friends? Harry Hopkins had stated:

'We really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of the new day we had all been praying for and talking about for so many years. We were absolutely certain that we had won the first great victory of the peace--and by 'we', I mean all of us, the whole civilized human race. The Russians had proved that they could be reasonable and far-seeing, and there wasn't any doubt in the minds of the President(Roosevelt) or any of us that we could live with them and get along with them peacefully for as far into the future as any of us could imagine.' ²

Hopkins' statement sums up the feelings of President Roosevelt when he was at Yalta. The result was inherited by Harry S. Truman. This era of good-will so strongly expressed by Roosevelt and Hopkins would be embodied as an institution in the United Nations. Here was an affront to wickedness on the international level. Each nation could keep an eye on his enemies by listening to speeches and set good, moral examples in the process.

America had a habit of viewing international politics in terms of abstract moral principles instead of realistic clashes of interest and power. An example of this abstract idealism would be Wilson's self-determination policy after World War I; yet, in reality, various ethnic groups were thrown together in the single nation of Czechoslovakia.

What makes President Truman a great President is that he was the first great policy maker to steer away from this abstract idealism and put a workable program into effect. Winston Churchill was asked at one time what he thought his biggest mistake in World War II was; he replied, ". . .not going to meet Truman after Roosevelt's death. . . . During the next three months tremendous decisions were made by a man I did not know." ³ Added to Churchill's remark can be the knowledge of Truman's actions beyond the three months that the former Prime Minister mentioned.

According to Tris Coffin, Roosevelt died at the victor's brief moment; Byrnes and Truman inherited the strains of leadership in the post-war world.

An authority on foreign policy, Norman Graebner, says, "Specific problems abroad eventually disappear into history, leaving a legacy of success or failure. . . But the concepts and assumptions live on. . . to guide future generations." ⁴ For example the foreign aid program established by Truman's administration could be used to the extreme of throwing money away to anyone for any purpose; or a more sophisticated touch can be placed on this type of program in the purposes of the Peace Corps.

Unlike Roosevelt, who thought that feelings of good will and maintenance of an alliance with Russia was necessary at all cost, Truman saw the Soviet Union as a threat. Credit must be given to Mr. Roosevelt, however, for modifying his views on the Soviet Union, although they were not conveyed publicly to the American people notes Graebner.

President Truman would receive bi-partisan support for his foreign policy programs unlike President Wilson. The leader of this support would be Senator Vandenberg. He found solace in Truman's attitude of continuing the preparation for the San Francisco Conference after Roosevelt's death. The new President had remarked, ". . . if the Russians did not want to join us they could go to hell. . ." (the Senator wrote in his diary), " FDR's appeasement of Russia is over." ⁵

The United States was the only great nation whose people had not been drained physically and spiritually. Truman knew that the role of leadership was on the shoulders of the United States, and his entire foreign policy was based on counteracting the threat of the Soviet Union by some means other than total war and halocaust.

CHAPTER II

THE UNITED NATIONS, EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES

The pillar of peace to which President Roosevelt had attached the greatest importance was the United Nations. The UN would be a town meeting on an international level from which all nations could seek protection and expression; nations would not know war anymore. The forerunner of Roosevelt's pillar was of course the League of Nations which had died in 1931 after Japan's invasion of Manchuria. The character of the policy which had allowed the League to sink into uselessness was symbolized by the Kellogg-Briand Pact which outlawed war but provided no means of enforcing this moral principle. The UN had slowly evolved with the Atlantic Charter in 1941 followed by Stalin's lip service in the Moscow Declaration in 1943; the Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks conferences of 1944 had added more detail, and the concrete plans were laid at Yalta in 1945. One of Truman's first official acts as President was to announce that the organizational meeting to write the United Nation's charter was scheduled for San Francisco; this conference was to proceed without interruption. "I wanted to make it clear," the President has since recalled, "that I attached the greatest importance to the establishment of international machinery for the prevention of war and the maintenance of peace. . .I knew that in a world without such machinery we would be forever doomed to the fear of destruction." ¹

The San Francisco Conference lasted from April 25 to June 26, 1945. At this organizational meeting, the charter for the world peace-keeping body was drawn. Hope prevailed that the world situation would become stable, and international peace would be maintained. The success of the United Nations from its very birth depended on the unity of the Big Three Alliance. The disintegration of the alliance placed an immediate impediment in the effectiveness of the new organization, but in spite of this difficulty, the UN was a world forum with specialized agencies making significant contributions. President Truman believed in enforcing the principles of the Charter and adhering to international cooperation among nations.

In an address at Jefferson City, Missouri on February 22, 1945, the then Vice President Truman revealed his ideas on the approaching San Francisco Conference.

. . .all Americans should take a good look at the most modern maps. By air, no place on the globe is more than sixty hours away. . .and this time is decreasing. . .Lend-Lease was cooperation among nations to put down aggressors. Now we propose to go beyond that, to keep down aggressors. The policy we hope and believe will emerge from the San Francisco Conference will embody cooperation among nations for that purpose. . .The only rational alternative to existing international anarchy lies in some reasonable form of international organization among all so-called sovereign States.²

At the opening of the Conference itself, the new President, only days after Roosevelt's death, stated in a message that his predecessor had given his life in order that the ideals of the Charter could be perpetuated, and that the very existence of the Conference was in large part due to the former President's labors and visions. The world would soon know if humanity could cease suffering and a lasting peace could be maintained.

In closing the Conference on June 26, 1945, President Truman made the following remarks:

The Constitution of my own country came from a Convention which--like this one--was made up of delegates with many different views. . . . Out of this conflict have come powerful military nations, now fully trained and equipped for war. But they have no right to dominate the world. It is rather the duty of these powerful nations to assume the responsibility for leadership toward a world of peace. . . . With this Charter the world can begin to look forward to the time when all worthy human beings may be permitted to live decently as free people. . . . We must set up an effective agency for constant and thorough interchange of thought and ideas. For there lies the road to a better and more tolerant understanding among nations and among people. 3

The President and his Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes delivered speeches in October, 1945, which revealed their feelings about the United States' new role in the post-war world, as well as the part the UN would play. On the twenty-seventh of the month, Truman gave his Navy Day Speech. He stated that even though the United States did not seek any territory for itself, it would be necessary to maintain a powerful navy and air force as well as the army reserve. America only wanted to keep the necessary bases essential to her security. Armed might had four responsibilities as far as our country was concerned: In close association with our Allies, we needed to enforce the defeat of our enemies; we must fulfill our military obligations as a Charter member of the United Nations in order to enforce a lasting peace. In cooperation with the other nations of this hemisphere, we would preserve territorial integrity and political freedom. As provided by the Constitution of the United States, the military would provide for our common defense in order to preserve world peace. . . ."For we now know that this is the only way to make our freedom secure. That is the basis of the foreign policy of the United States. The foreign policy of the United States is based firmly on fundamental principles of righteousness and justice may seem reminiscent of the Wilsonian days,

the new emphasis is on enforcement.

The President cited twelve fundamentals of American foreign policy:

1. We seek no territorial expansion or selfish advantage. . .
2. We believe in the eventual return of sovereign rights and self-government to all peoples who have been deprived of them by force.
3. We shall approve no territorial changes in any friendly part of the world unless they accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.
4. We believe that all peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own form of government by their own freely expressed choice, without interference from any foreign source. . .
5. By the combined and cooperative action of our war allies, we shall help the defeated enemy states establish peaceful democratic governments of their own free choice. And we shall try to attain a world in which nazism, fascism and military aggression cannot exist.
6. We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon by the force of any foreign power. In some cases it may be impossible to prevent forceful imposition of such a government. But the United States will not recognize any such government.
7. We believe that all nations should have the freedom of the seas and equal rights to the navigation of boundary rivers and waterways and of rivers and waterways which pass through more than one country.
8. We believe that the sovereign states of the Western Hemisphere without interference from from outside. . . must work together as good neighbors in the solution of their common problems.
9. We believe that all states which are accepted in the society of nations should have access on equal terms to the trade and the raw materials of the world.
10. We believe that full economic collaboration between all nations, great and small, is essential to the improvement of living conditions all over the world, and to the establishment of freedom from fear and freedom from want.
11. We shall continue to strive to promote freedom of expression and freedom of religion throughout the peace-loving areas of the world.
12. We are convinced that the preservation of peace between nations requires a united nations organization composed of all the peace-loving nations of the world who are willing jointly to use force if necessary to insure peace. . . 5

In these principles can be seen what President Truman later put into practice: non-recognition of Red China and recognition of Formosa; the European Recovery Program and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the recognition of Israel within a sea of Arabs; the examples that his successors applied in the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress.

Walter Lippman criticized the Navy Day Speech by remarking, "We do indeed live in a marvelous age, having succeeded not only in tapping the sources of atomic energy, but the source of moral revelation as well." ⁶

Norman Graebner mentions also that the war was not a victory of democracy alone, but a victory aided by the world's largest dictatorship, Russia. The Soviets would never accept the Atlantic Charter's principle of self-determination, and Stalin never hid this feeling. ⁷

On the last day of October, 1945, Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, addressed the New York Herald-Tribune Forum. He stated that oppression consists of censorship and blackouts thus creating suspicion and distrust. We have sympathized with Russia moving closer to her Central and Eastern European neighbors. Because she had been attacked from the west, we recognized the Soviet Union's interest in those countries and her sensitivity to the occupation and control of these former enemy nations. If taken out of context, Byrnes might seem very pro-Russian. He was referring, actually, to the reasoning behind Roosevelt's treatment of the Russians at Yalta, and presenting a picture of how the Soviets themselves must have felt after being invaded three times from the West. Norman Graebner commented that post-ponement of frontiers until the peace was a request by the exiled Eastern European governments to Roosevelt and Churchill. The American President was confident that his personal diplomacy would remove "deviations of purpose." ⁸

Walter Lippman disagreed. He said, ". . .the effect of urging postponement in the name of high principles has been to . . .nullify our own influence in favor of moderation and compromise."⁹

Byrnes went on to say that the Soviet Union will never tolerate again the policies of eastern Europe being directed deliberately against Russia and her way of life. In addition, Byrnes remarked that the United States would never engage in any hostile intrigue against the Soviet Union; being also confident that the Soviet Union would not engage in any similar intrigue against the United States or any country in this hemisphere. In an optimistic conclusion, Byrnes said,

We have put that belief into practice in our relations with our neighbors. The Soviet Union has also declared that it does not wish to force the Soviet system on its neighbors. The whole-hearted acceptance of this principle by all the United Nations will greatly strengthen the bonds of friendship among nations everywhere. . . . We have learned that our security interests in this hemisphere do not require its isolation from economic and cultural relations with the rest of the world. We have freely accepted the Charter of the United Nations. . . .¹⁰

In comparing the two speeches, remembering the time which they were delivered in order to understand the optimism, Truman seems to have emphasized the enforcement of peace by military means if necessary; Byrnes emphasized that America would no longer be an isolationist after a war. Russian foreign policy had counted on the opposite; the Soviet Union had earnestly hoped that we would again withdraw into our shell and set good, moral examples. A new school was developing in the United States to oppose the Kellogg, Lodge, and Taft isolationists; the school of Harriman, Kennan, Marshall, Vandenberg and Harry Truman.

In criticism, Senator Arthur Capper, a Kansas Republican, said of Churchill's Fulton speech about the Iron Curtain, (March 5, 1946) that his talk was only to arouse Americans ". . .to commit the country

to the task of preserving the far flung British Empire." 11

On the other hand, Anne O'Hare McCormick wrote in July 1946:

"When Americans demand in one breath that their government take a firm stand on principle and in the next that the bulk of our forces be withdrawn from Europe, they should not complain of unsatisfactory compromises. We cannot stand and move away at the same time." 12

CHAPTER III

POTSDAM: THE FIRST RUSSIAN CHALLENGE

Between 1945 and 1947, the United States tried to convert the wartime alliance to a peacetime one. At the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945, the Big Three tried to decide what role each would play in the post-war world. "What mattered," said Norman Graebner, "to thoughtful Americans in 1945 was not Soviet ideology, but the new balance of power."¹ What had been a de facto containment geographically of Soviet expansion in the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires before World War I had been dismembered. Now Central and Eastern Europe was in pieces. Stalin had told Averell Harriman that he would never again allow anti-Russian governments along her western border.

Churchill met Truman for the first time in Berlin. "I was impressed with his gay, precise, sparkling manner and obvious power of decision."² At Potsdam, July 17, Churchill's doctor, Lord Moran, asked the Prime Minister about Truman. Was he an able man? The answer was, "I should think he is. At any rate, he is a man of immense determination. He takes no notice of delicate ground; he first plants his feet firmly on it."³

The central problem at Potsdam would be Poland. The Russians were already at the Curzon line. New land would be needed east of the line for four million that would return from abroad. The Poles in London had said that their country would be far from communist,

but the fact remained that no one had been allowed inside Poland to see what was actually happening. Ambassador Harriman reported from Moscow in May, 1945:

I am afraid that Stalin does not and never will fully understand our interest in a free Poland as a matter of principle. The Russian Premier is a realist in all of his actions, and it is hard for him to appreciate our faith in abstract principle. It is difficult for him to understand why we should want to interfere with Soviet policy in a country like Poland which he considers so important to Russia's security unless we have some ulterior motive. ⁴

On May 12, 1945, Churchill had wired his anxieties to President Truman:

I am profoundly concerned about the European situation. I have always worked for friendship with Russia, but like you, I feel deep anxiety because of their misinterpretations of the Yalta decisions, their attitudes toward Poland, their overwhelming influence in the Balkans. . . and above all their power to maintain very large armies in the field for a long time. . . Surely it is vital now to come to an understanding with Russia, or see where we are with her, before weakening our armies. . . or retiring to our zones of occupation. . . ⁵

In June, Harry Hopkins went on a special mission to Moscow, and said that he had convinced Stalin we weren't forcing an unfriendly Polish government on him. On June 22, 1945, Ambassador Harriman reached an agreement on a new provisional government for Poland as announced by the President.

The main purpose of Potsdam was to put into actuality the agreements made at Yalta in February. It would be appropriate to summarize the agreements made at Yalta in order to understand the obstacles of agreement at Potsdam. It is important to note that it would be impossible without Russian good-will to remove them from any land they occupied at the time of the Potsdam meeting.

1. Poland's eastern border was to be approximately at the old Curzon line established after the First World War, but she was to get some new territory in the west from Germany in the final peace settlement. A provisional government representing the main democratic forces in Poland was to be installed and to hold power until free elections under Allied supervision could be held.

2. Yugoslavia, where the Communist partisans under Tito had already secured the upper hand, was to have a supervised political settlement approximating that devised for Poland.

3. Germany's occupation zones were expanded to include France as a fourth power. But how a conquered Germany was to be administered between the time of her defeat and the conclusion of a peace treaty was, after much inconclusive debate, set aside for settlement at some future date.

4. The other Axis satellites in Europe were awarded a vague promise of democracy and free elections.

5. Russia promised to enter the war against Japan three months after Hitler's defeat. For this, she was promised some substantial concessions in China, about which it was thought best to keep Chiang-Kai-shek in the dark for the time being, principally to prevent a leak to the Japanese.

6. The constituent assembly for the United Nations was set for April 25, and membership was extended to the Ukrainian and Bylorussian Soviet Socialist Republics as a partial counter-balance to the weight of the British dominions and the United States-oriented Latin-American nations.

Lord Moran observed that Potsdam's atmosphere was quite a contrast to that of Yalta. In the former's conference, "Roosevelt, without a word to the Prime Minister (Churchill), would declare that the Russian case was most reasonable. Truman, when Stalin gets tough, makes it plain that he, too, can hand out the rough stuff, and Winston chortles and looks very pleased. Tonight the Prime Minister said 'If only this had happened at Yalta.' There was a long pause. 'It is too late now,' he said." ⁶

Russia had made a gesture to consult the London Poles in exile, but when they were brought to Moscow, they were arrested for plots against the Soviet Union. At Potsdam, the Russians

admitted the unilateral solution of turning over to the Poles the administration of the German territory east of the Oder-Neisse line as the Russians occupied them moving west. The Provisional Polish Government testified that the Allied Control Council for Germany had to make arrangements for the acceptance of more than five million Germans from the new German-Polish provinces. This meant that the Soviets became the chief protector of the new Poland and extended her influence into Germany. Any change of the German-Polish boundaries would become dependent on Soviet initiative, according to Hajo Holborn.

Was Poland's admission to the United Nations as she was then governed a sell-out? Some settlement was needed at the time so that the United Nations could proceed. "At least it could be claimed that democratic elements had gained a foot in the door at Warsaw. . . it is a fact of history, of course, that they did not." ?

In his Memoirs, President Truman wrote concerning Potsdam: "As I left for home, I felt that we had achieved several important agreements. But more important were some of the conclusions I had reached in my own mind and a realization of what I had to do in shaping future foreign policy. . . Force is the only thing the Russians understand. And while I was hopeful that Russia might some day be persuaded to work in cooperation for peace. . . the Russians were planning world conquest." § This statement seems to repudiate the policy that Roosevelt had toward Russia, that of keeping the Soviets pacified at all cost. In a later memo to Secretary of State Byrnes on January 5, 1946, the President wrote,

"At the time (Potsdam) we were anxious for Russian entry into the Japanese war. . .of course we found later we didn't need Russia there and that the Russians have been a headache to us ever since."⁹

What were the exact agreements reached at Potsdam? Some of the papers still have not been released to the public for security reasons. One must rely heavily on Truman and Churchill's own words to find out what happened. In Truman Speaks, he stated that the United States would continue to maintain the military bases deemed necessary for American security and protection of world peace. Any bases not now in our possession would be acquired according to arrangements consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The first non-military agreement, which had no obstacles in discussions, was the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers which would work out the details of the peace at several meetings. The Council was considered a continuous meeting body. Members of the Council were the foreign ministers of the United States (the Secretary of State), United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and China. "It will be their duty to apply, so far as possible, the fundamental principles of justice underlying the charter adopted at San Francisco."¹⁰ On other matters, Stalin would place obstacles such as postponements unless he received concessions. In addition to the creation of the Council, German industry would be decentralized in order to do away with concentration of monopolies. The major emphasis in the German economy would be agriculture and peaceful industries. An additional agreement was the reparation claims of the Soviet Union and Poland would be met from the property located in the German zone occupied by Russia. An additional

fifteen percent of the capital equipment in the western zones not necessary for the German peacetime economy, would also be turned over to the Soviet Union and Poland "in exchange for an equal amount in value in food, coal and other raw materials. . . providing the usual exchange of goods between the eastern part and the western. . . moved freely." 11

Thus Potsdam came to a close amidst feelings of vagueness and uncertainties. The Council of Foreign Ministers would subsequently try to put more specific and explicit agreements and practices into the post-war world. The official Potsdam communiqué of August 2, 1945, stated that the Council would meet for the first time in London to draw five peace treaties.

The first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was held in London September 11, 1945. The proceedings were conducted in secret. The items that kept the meetings busiest were those that did not concern Germany's allies at all, but rather, settling with Russia. The London Conference broke down indicating that the first effort at peace-making failed. The main issue seems to have been how to interpret the meaning of free elections in order that the Russians would understand. "Our objective", Secretary of State Byrnes explained, "is to have governments both friendly to the Soviet Union and representative of all the democratic elements." 12 According to Herbert Feis, "The London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers had broken up over China's place in the European peace treaties. . . on October 2." 13

More specific problems concerned boundary lines; for example, should Italy renounce sovereignty over her colonies; should the

Italian-Yugoslavian border be ethnic; should Trieste be a free port; would the Soviets withdraw from Bulgaria, Roumania, and Hungary: All the answers were vague. Where, actually, was the Italian-Yugoslavian border; who would get Trieste; and how would colonies be disposed of? A deadlock occurred; therefore, a new meeting was scheduled for January 18, 1946 but was not held until April--this time in Paris. During this same period, Russia began challenging Greece and Turkey in the Mediterranean.

In December, 1945, between meetings, Secretary of State Byrnes went to Moscow. He went". . .without special preparation or Republican advisors, against the judgment of veteran diplomats." 14 In his defense, Byrnes wrote, "I believed that if we met in Moscow. . . we could have a chance to talk to Stalin (to) remove the barriers to the peace treaties." 15 In his search for a decision at Moscow, Byrnes was synonymous with the end of American optimism toward the wartime collaboration with the Soviets.

The chief movement for a get tough policy according to Norman Graebner was in the GOP leadership. Following the Moscow Conference the Republicans voiced their criticism of Soviet control of the newly liberated Eastern European countries.

At the first Paris conference in April, Foreign Minister Molotov went back on his vague promise to withdraw from Bulgaria. A recess was called and another meeting was held in May. In the meantime, Byrnes gave a speech indicating that the United States would never again be isolationist. In May, Senator Vandenberg told the Senate, "We can compromise within the boundaries of a principle. We can no longer compromise principles themselves." 16 One could question

the criteria of his statement because no definite course of action was offered by the opposition party.

Byrnes and Vandenberg's statements, however, must have reached Russian ears, because at the second Paris Conference, Molotov surprised everyone by giving in to French demands to Briga-Tenda if Italy could continue to have access to the power supply. In July, Byrnes demanded a settlement on Trieste and the Italian colonies. If one world was impossible, the West would negotiate a separate treaty with Italy. Trieste became international; she had not been won by the west, but neither was she Russian. In 1954, this city would be incorporated into Italy. The British got control of the former Italian colonies.

Secretary Byrnes, in his book, Speaking Frankly, reveals some of the reasons for problems at these international conferences in addition to political ideology. At the Paris Conference, 143,000 maps had to be drawn. There were three translations of every statement: English to French to Russian. "Much is lost."¹⁷ The Secretary wrote that Charles Bohlen, advisor to the American delegation remained behind after a heated session at Paris to talk to a Soviet representative. The Russian said he did not understand the Americans. Secretary Byrnes had been making speeches about principles. "Why doesn't he stop this talk. . .and get down to the business and start trading? Americans had a reputation for being good traders."¹⁸

During the summer, even Allied cooperation began to break down. France and Russia refused to treat Germany as a whole economic, if not political, unit. General Clay, administering the United States' zone, stopped reparations from our zone. At Stuttgart,

in September, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes gave his famous speech that the United States wanted Germany to have its own government as soon as possible. He hoped for a smooth conversion from occupational to provisional government. The Russians would soon react by cutting off Berlin to which we would reply with the airlift.

The final conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers was held in New York in December, 1946. The countries represented at this time were the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France. The Italian treaty stipulated that four small Alpine areas would be incorporated into France; the Austrians of South Tyrol were to stay in Italy; Trieste was a Free Territory; the colony question was referred to the United Nations.

The Roumanian, Finnish, Bulgarian, and Hungarian treaties were all similar in that reparations were to be paid to the Allies, armies were limited, and a few territorial changes were accomplished. Poland was the exception in the boundary question; she was not considered in these treaties because Potsdam had already settled the Polish question as a de facto situation where the Russians stopped the day they took Berlin.

CHAPTER IV

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE: FIRST "OFFENSIVE" AGAINST THE RUSSIANS

The first actual violence of the post-war world erupted in early 1947 in Greece. There had been a spreading awareness in the United States that a sustained and dangerous program of Moscow-directed military and political infiltration in Western Europe was under way. In Greece it took the form of guerrilla warfare; in Turkey it took the form of diplomatic pressure backed by military threat. In France and Italy, Communist parties were trying to destroy the democratic processes that were still fragile. In Germany, the Soviet aim was to delay the economic revival of that country as well as postpone the unification of the occupational zones of Berlin.

On February 21, 1947, Great Britain acknowledged her exhaustion in meeting her commitments in Greece and Turkey. After fighting Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV of France, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, she had been able to preserve the balance of power which had protected America for years. Her ability to continue had steadily declined. Twice she had needed American help and twice she had sustained the longer battle... Now all of a sudden, there was no power to protect the United States except herself. If Greece fell, the Russians would have a gate to the Middle East and also to Italy and France, which both had large Communist parties. For the first time, the United States had been called to help Britain in an area which she had dominated.

A year earlier, in Iran, the United States and Britain had delivered firm statements which strongly implied to the Soviet Union that the two Atlantic allies would use force if necessary to defend Iran. The preceding situation, however, was a joint undertaking by both the United States and Great Britain. In the case of Greece and Turkey, the action would have to be unilateral by the United States, according to Spanier.

To Turkey, the United States sent a naval task force into the Mediterranean. Both Great Britain and the United States rejected a Soviet note offering to share in defending the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardenelles with Turkey. These actions were merely swift reactions to an immediate crisis; they were not part of an overall American strategy in our foreign policy. A new reassessment of Soviet policy was made by George Kennan, an expert on Russia who had served in our embassy in Moscow for many years. Contradicting what President Roosevelt had believed to be Russian foreign policy, Kennan stated that the Soviets thought that the whole outside world was their enemy; it was imperative for them to overthrow these enemies. Soviet hostility would be constant, and it would continue until the whole capitalist world had been destroyed. Soviet antagonism would remain until their goal had been accomplished. What is disturbing in the Kremlin's foreign policy is more easily understood under this new light: their secretiveness, their lack of frankness, their war suspiciousness, and their basic unfriendliness of purpose. In Kennan's opinion, the Soviet attitude could change with their leadership.

The Russians are not obligated to any timetable; therefore they can suffer setbacks, and we should never make the mistake that they have stopped their struggle. They will simply wait for another opportunity. What could we do? Sporadic acts would not effectively counter long range Soviet policy. We too, must have a long range policy, and we must not make the mistake of resorting to whimsical, democratic outbursts. This type of policy would not lead to any purpose and would be ". . .no less variegated and resourceful in their application than those of the Soviet Union itself." ¹ If the Soviet Union's expansion could not be contained, her internal tensions would be increased and would either destroy the country from within or else force the leaders of the Soviet Union to pacify the domestic dissatisfaction. It was assumed that they would choose the second course and thus modify their foreign policy aims.

In March, 1947, President Truman went before Congress to request four hundred million dollars in aid for Greece and Turkey. He stated that the United States could flourish only in a free world, and to make that world free, we had to assist peoples in maintaining their institutions and national integrity before any totalitarian regime could impose slavery on them. Note that nothing was said about any area which was already under Communist domination such as Poland. Truman's statements were in his own words, ". . .no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct and indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." ² The President also stated that we could consider anywhere in the world as vital to American security because of the rapid means of transportation and communication.

We were the only free big power left in the world.

Walt Rostow states that "The Truman doctrine did not launch a decisive clash of arms in which victory or unconditional surrender could serve as meaningful goals. It launched the nation on a still unended duel with limited force, in which all the instruments of power and influence were interwoven: military, political, economic, and psychological. The Truman Doctrine opened a new and authentically revolutionary phase in the nation's experience." ³ Truman himself, in his Memoirs, reveals that as a measure short of war, his doctrine was as significant as the Monroe Doctrine. "America could not and should not let these free countries stand unaided. To do so would carry the clearest implications in the Middle East and in Italy, Germany, and France. The ideals and the traditions of our nation demanded that we come to the aid of Greece and Turkey, and that we put the world on notice that it would be our policy to support the cause of freedom wherever it was threatened." ⁴ This I believe proved to the Russians that America would never revert back to isolationism. What Secretary of State Byrnes said during the Council of Foreign Minister's conference period concerning the willingness of the United States not to revert to isolationism, may have seemed a moral platitude reminiscent of the twenties and thirties at the time. The Truman Doctrine, though largely psychological, revealed to the Soviet Union that the days of our moral-legalistic talk were over.

CHAPTER V

AN ECONOMIC HYPODERMIC FOR WESTERN EUROPE: THE MARSHALL PLAN

Secretary of State Byrnes had made several important major policy decisions without informing President Truman. At the Moscow Conference concerning Iran, the Secretary had received promises of further talks. Byrnes agreed with the Russians to share atomic energy information without inspection safeguards. The President was furious. Calling the Secretary into the stateroom, Truman read a letter to him saying that he had been considering some of their difficulties.

The President wanted to pursue a policy of delegating authority to Cabinet members in their various fields and then back them up in the results. In doing that and in carrying out that policy he did not intend to turn over the complete authority of the President nor to forego the Presidential prerogative to make final decisions. The President must be kept informed on what is taking place. "I received no communication from you directly while you were in Moscow. The only message I had from you came as a reply to one which I had Under Secretary Acheson send to you about my interview with the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy." ¹ The President maintained that he had been completely in the dark on the whole conference until Byrnes had been requested to come to Williamsburg by Truman in order to supply information. Byrnes had released the Moscow communique before the President had seen it. Truman continued by telling Byrnes that he had read the Ethridge letter that morning concerning Rumania and Bulgaria. It confirmed previous information on the two police states.

The United States would not recognize them unless they were radically changed.

The President stated that we should protest with vigor against the Russian program in Iran. There was no justification for Soviet behavior. "It is a parallel to the program of Russia in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. It is also in line with the high-handed and arbitrary manner in which Russia acted in Poland." ² Reviewing Potsdam, the President said that we were faced with an accomplished fact in Poland and were forced by circumstances to accept the Russian occupation. It was an outrage. "When you went to Moscow you were faced with another accomplished fact in Iran. Another outrage. . ." ³ Iran was our ally in the war as well as Russia's. The former agreed to the free passage of arms, ammunition and other supplies running into the millions of tons across her territory from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. Without these supplies furnished by the United States, Russia would have been ignominiously defeated. Yet now Russia stirs up rebellion and keeps troops on the soil of her friend and ally--Iran. The President had no doubt as to Russian intentions on invading Turkey and seizing the Straits. Unless the Soviets were faced with an "iron fist" and strong language another war would erupt. Only one language do they understand--"How many divisions have you?" We should not compromise any longer. We should refuse to recognize Rumania and Bulgaria until they comply with our requirements, Truman continued. ". . . We should let our position on Iran be known in no uncertain terms and we should continue to insist on the internationalization of the Kiel Canal, the Rhine-Danube waterway and the Black Sea Straits, and we should maintain complete control of Japan and the Pacific. We should rehabilitate China and create a strong central

government there. We should do the same for Korea. I'm tired of babying the Soviets." 4

At this point, a note should be made that there was no specific long-range policy to accomplish these desires at this point. What was realized by 1946 was that realistically, one world was out of the practical realm.

The President had read his own letter to Mr. Byrnes. He not only indicated that he would not tolerate a subordinate keeping him uninformed, but also revealed the outline of military containment that would soon be put into a more specific formula. There is no greater documentary proof than this letter of the difference between Roosevelt and Truman on the treatment of the Soviet Union.

A few months later, Secretary Byrnes resigned due to reasons of health, and General Marshall became the new Secretary, a man whom Truman called, "the greatest living American."

On July 7, 1947, the 80th Congress passed a law that approved a Committee on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government which appointed in January 1948 a Task Force on Foreign Affairs charged with the responsibility of analyzing the present-day problems confronting the Government in the conduct of foreign affairs. The committee was ". . .impressed by the drastic changes in the conduct of foreign affairs over the last fifteen years. . .in character and magnitude of the problems (and) . . . in the accelerated tempo of the operation. . ." 5

The Task Force made the following recommendations: there were to be cabinet level advisory committees to obtain formulation of objectives of the State Department, which was to have four regional assistant secretaries, an Under-Secretary and Deputy Under-Secretary.

The 81st Congress passed another law establishing the following divisions: the Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Under Secretary of State, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State, Assistant Secretaries of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Counselor, and an Ambassador-at-Large. By requesting these laws to be passed, the President had shown his obvious desire to be continuously informed at all levels by means of coordinating bodies in the Executive Branch on matters of foreign affairs. In the post-World War II world, there was too much at stake for the President to miscalculate by reasons of being uninformed of his subordinates' activities.

The Truman Doctrine had just passed the Congress in the spring of 1947, but it made America's position difficult in some respects. We seemed to be broadcasting to the world that we were ~~economic imperial-~~ists; we seemed to be supporting reactionaries such as the institution of the Greek monarchy.

President Truman relied on his new Secretary of State, George Marshall, to set up a Policy Planning Staff. The chairman was George Kennan, who was considered to be an expert on Russian matters. Paul Nitze was made assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Will Clayton. The former had the idea that the world balance of payments showed how deep in trouble other countries were economically. We were absorbing most of the world's currency. The Planning Staff was officially set up after Will Clayton, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, went on a fact-finding mission to Europe while Congress debated the Truman Doctrine. Even while the Moscow Conference had been in session, more reports came into the State Department that Western Europe was disintegrating economically.

The continent had suffered an extremely cold winter, poor harvests, a short coal supply and a short dollar supply. "A convergence of reports from Europe with the conclusion about Stalin's attitude and intentions drawn from the Moscow Conference set the stage for the Marshall Plan." ⁶

Inside the State Department many strains of thought had begun weaving together. One of these strands was the position of George Kennan. He insisted that ". . .in its relations with Europe, the United States should move only in association with real European efforts to achieve their own salvation. . .Should an effort be made to embrace all of Europe in a new enterprise of reconstruction, or should the lesson of the Moscow Conference be read as indicating that the only realistic alternative for the West was to accept the split and to strengthen the area still outside Stalin's grasp?" ⁷ Kennan, the realistic diplomat, went on to indicate that the Soviets were neurotic, insecure, and distrustful. They believed in destroying rivals without compromise. Again, a difference can be noted between Truman and Roosevelt's policies. The former had believed Stalin when he made the remark during one of the wartime conferences that the economic democracy of the Soviets would someday meet with the political democracy of the Americans. The latter, on the other hand, did not like or trust the Russians since they had not kept their wartime promises.

Kennan goes on to say that there were three alternatives in dealing with the Russians: fight a total war; let Russia expand at will; or halt it now where their expansion stands. "Economic aid is not enough. It could only serve as a spark to recovery and only for those nations which had the will to remain non-Communist (with) an economic situation capable of improvement without fundamental surgery." ⁸

In other words, western Europe and Japan which were blessed with natural resources capable of supporting heavy industry and balanced with agriculture were worth trying to save.

Under-Secretary of State, Dean Acheson also illustrated that the minds of the State Department were formulating a totally new policy. Asked by the President to replace him on a speaking trip to Cleveland Mississippi's Delta Agricultural Council, Acheson spelled out the new direction in foreign policy that was beginning to form. "You who live and work in this rich agricultural region, whose daily lives are concerned with the growth and the marketing of cotton and corn and other agricultural products, must derive a certain satisfaction from the soil. . ." ⁹ War brings one back to the elementals, to where one can easily see how short the distance is from food and fuel to peace or anarchy. The war will not end until the world's people can feed and clothe themselves in order to face the future with some degree of confidence. The blizzard in Europe last year showed how close to the narrow margin of subsistence her people live. ". . .Not only do human beings and nations exist in narrow economic margins, but also human dignity, human freedom and democratic institutions. . . It is one of the principal aims of our foreign policy today to use our economic and financial resources to widen these margins." ¹⁰

Whereas Acheson prepared the American people for a foreign aid program by hinting that something should be done, Secretary of State Marshall, in June, 1947, in a speech at Harvard, declared formally that a specific course of action was going to be taken as a result of the summary of his Policy Planning Staff. The Secretary said that the disintegration of the wartime alliance and the growing Soviet

domination of Eastern Europe had led the United States to prepare a program of saving Western Europe from economic and political collapse. These nations would also take steps to aid themselves. As it had never done in the years following the First World War, American leadership now realized that our nation's security was tied up with a free, stable, and solvent Europe.

On December 19, 1947, President Truman submitted to Congress the following message on long-term aid to Western Europe. The text is taken from the New York Times, December 20, 1947.

We seek lasting peace in a world where freedom and justice are secure and where there is equal opportunity for the economic well-being of all peoples. . . . Considered in terms of our own economy, European recovery is essential. The last two decades have taught us the bitter lesson that no economy, not even one so strong as our own, can remain healthy and prosperous in a world of poverty and want. . . . Our deepest concern with European recovery, however, is that it is essential to the maintenance of the civilization in which the American way of life is rooted. . . . The economic plight in which Europe now finds itself has intensified a political struggle between those who wish to remain free men living under the rule of law and those who would use economic distress as a pretext for the establishment of a totalitarian state. ¹¹

The actual program was for recovery not relief. The following indicates the scope of the program. Seventeen billion dollars was recommended to be available from April 1, 1948 to June 30, 1952. The aid would achieve the double purpose of lifting the standard of living in Europe to a decent level, and also enlarging European capacity for production. In order that our aid would be used properly, we would retain the right to determine whether the aid should continue to any participating country. Aid would consist partly of loans and partly of grants depending upon the repayment capability of each participating country. As each participant became more stable, private financing would gradually increase. Concerning the impact on our own economy, the President stated that many commodities which

are needed in Europe are also necessary here. Sharing with Europe will require a certain amount of self-denial by Americans. West Germany could contribute to the general cooperative effort of the other industrialized Western European countries; coal production of the Ruhr should increase.

The President said, "Our support of European recovery is in full accord with our support of the United Nations. The success of the United Nations depends upon the independent strength of its members. Our intention to undertake a program of aid for European recovery does not signify any lessening of our interest in other areas of the world. . . The workshops of Europe, with their great reservoir of skilled workers, must produce the goods to support peoples of many other nations." 12

President Truman recommended that a new and separate agency be formed in order to administer the arrangements, the Economic Cooperation Administration. "We shall be dealing with a number of countries in which there are complex and widely varying economic and political situations. . . the Administrator must be subject to the direction of the Secretary of State on decisions and actions affecting our foreign policy." 13

In summary, the primary goal of the Marshall Plan was to stimulate economic recovery through substantial increases in industrial and agricultural production and reductions in the dollar gap and inflationary pressures.

On March 17, 1948, President Truman spoke before a Joint Session of the Congress. He reminded the members that rapid changes were affecting western Europe, and that it had been difficult to settle the questions arising from the war in a peaceful manner. We made promises

and kept them; the Russians made promises and did not keep them. (Czechoslovakia had just fallen.) "It is necessary that we take additional measures to supplement the work of the United Nations. First. . .that Congress speedily complete its action on the ERP (European Recovery Program) . . . (that there be) prompt enactment of universal training legislation. . .(and) temporary re-enactment of selective service legislation." 14

In a recent issue of Current History, Glen Johnson discusses the impact of post war assistance programs. He asks why we had an ERP program. Three basic reasons are discussed; Nature had been harsh during the winter of 1946-47 bringing heavy snows, floods, and drought; labor was dislocated, and many skills were rusty or non-existent; production had been stifled by destruction of plants and lack of capital to repair or rebuilt. The United States had simply agreed to provide the money required for foreign exchange. On the European side, the O.E.E.C. act was passed. (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) The provisions involved, ". . .analyzing European economic data and distributing American aid among the various member states." 15 Most American money came back via European purchase power of American goods and services.

Whereas the Truman Doctrine saved Greece and Turkey; the Marshall Plan saved Western Europe. Using 1938 as a base(100) index of industrial production for ERP the following results can be charted:

	1947	1949	1951	Per Cent Increase
United Kingdom	110	129	145	32
France	99	122	138	39
Italy	93	109	143	54
Greece	69	90	130	88
W. Germany	34	72	106	312
all participating countries	87	112	135	55

The total cost for the United States was less than expected:
12.5 billion. "War. . . is the ultimate extension of diplomacy.
A measure short of war, when it succeeds, it diplomacy at its best." 16

An Organization of European Economic Recovery report said that
"The Marshall Plan brought a vision of a new spirit of cooperation
with which Europe's problems could be tackled." 17 The Marshall
Plan had induced Europe to bind together; the program had also
illustrated the importance of our Congress to implement foreign policy.
In section 102 of the Economic Cooperation Act is stated:

. . . (We) recognize the intimate economic and other relation-
ships between the United States and the nations of Europe. . . it is
declared to be a policy of the people of the United States to en-
courage these countries through a joint report of the Committee
of European Economic Cooperation signed at Paris, September 22,
1947. . . 18

Actually, only 300,000,000 less than the sum authorized in
section 114c (4,300,000,000) was appropriated.

A long range criticism of the program was noted by Glen Johnson.
There was an ". . . erroneous assumption that the alliance between
Western Europe and the United States was the result of the American
aid program. . . but it was the congruence of national interests,
and not American aid which brought the alliance into being in the
first place. In the absence of congruent national interests, no
amount of American aid will build an effective alliance." 19

Our aid was conditional that there be economic cooperation
among the European states. The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948
called specifically for this. America's economy was built on a
home mass market; Europe was to be treated the same way. They must
create a domestic mass market free from tariffs and other barriers.
To contain in Europe was essential as the Marshall Plan unfolded.

France was a good example. The Communist Party received one-quarter of the votes cast, practically the entire working class. They felt that capitalism had deceived them. They were extremely disillusioned. To achieve a good standard of living was to them to destroy the capitalist system. In the short time of operation of the European Recovery Program, the Communist vote in France decreased considerably.

CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST CHALLENGE TO CONTAINMENT: THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

The Council of Foreign Ministers met in March and April of 1947 in Moscow, and in November and December in London to agree on Germany's final settlement. By this time, it was obvious to all concerned that a Cold War had replaced the process of international consultation.

Sumner Welles asks where did we make our mistakes after Potsdam? Why would there no longer be only the problem of handling the vanquished? Why was a former ally now our enemy? Would there be another war? Welles makes five statements as to our post-war mistakes.

1. In May, 1945, we should not have withdrawn our troops from Czechoslovakia. Churchill had requested President Truman to allow forces to remain; the request was refused on the grounds that Russia might get suspicious of our aims. If we had kept our forces there we could have gone to Potsdam with greater bargaining power. The East-West line was drawn.

2. We demobilized and faced at Potsdam a mobilized Russia.

3. We left the conference with no assurance that Germany could not be drawn into Soviet orbit.

4. We had no sufficient military advisors except Admiral Leahy; and whereas Attlee was the new Prime Minister in Britain, he had been in Churchill's war cabinet and knew what was happening.

5. Secretary of State Byrnes made a trip to Moscow without previous diplomatic experience except for taking notes at the Yalta

Conference. He allowed an agreement with Stalin that the liberated countries of eastern Europe would be represented by "all democratic elements." Obviously the Communist machines undermined the democratic elements in the "free elections" in Eastern Europe. Byrnes also did not report first-hand to President Truman.

"Despite the apparent intentions of Soviet policy in Europe, Truman and Marshall deduced that one last effort at the highest level must be tried before accepting the split of Germany and the continued occupation of Austria as the terms of reference for postwar Europe, over at least, the medium range future."¹

The delegation from the United States was prepared to treat with interest and understanding the legitimate Russian border and security interests. Our delegation was not going to be blindly sentimental over the wartime alliance; we were facing reality. Germany and Eastern Europe were in fact split from the western part.

The Moscow Conference taught the Americans one valuable lesson: never negotiate from a base of weakness with any nation. It was useless to test the intentions of the Soviet Union unless we could speak or threaten to speak in the language that they understood: military enforcement.

The phase of Soviet consolidation in Eastern Europe ended with the blockade of Berlin, to which the response was a massive air lift during the winter of 1948 and 1949.

Russia had realized how effective the Marshall Plan was going to be. She sought to retaliate by two moves: to set up a Soviet "Marshall Plan" for the benefit of the Eastern European satellite countries in order to cut off whatever flow of trade and commerce there had been between eastern and western zones; and to risk a military incident over Berlin. The Russians had treated her sector in Berlin

as a conquered territory to be exploited; the Americans, British, and French were trying to rehabilitate commerce and peaceful industry. Little choice was left to the western sectors but to organize bi-zonal governmental machinery because the Russians were no longer cooperating. On March 20, 1948, the Russian representative walked out of the Allied Control Council meeting in order to force the western allies out of Berlin. Truman said, "If we failed to maintain our position there, Communism would gain great strength among the Germans. . . there was always the risk that Russian reaction might lead to war. We had to face the possibility that Russia might deliberately choose to make Berlin the pretext for war, but a more immediate danger was the risk that a trigger-happy Russian pilot or hot-headed Communist tank commander might create an incident that could ignite the powder keg." 2

Between April and July 1, 1948, the Russians sealed off all traffic going in and out of Berlin's Soviet sector. On June 25, at the Cabinet meeting, President Truman through Secretary of the Army, Kenneth Royall, who had constant touch with General Lucius Clay, learned that the general ". . . was forced to make emergency arrangements to have essential supplies flown into the city, since Berlin, by now, was effectively blockaded by the Russians by land and by water." 3

On June 26, President Truman as stated in his Memoirs, ". . . directed that this improvised airlift be put on a full-scale organized basis and that every plane available to our European Command be impressed into service." 4 The Soviets replied on July 14 that the traffic had not been blockaded due to technical difficulties, but that this was a major move of political propaganda. As 1949 began, the technical efficiency of the blockade had strengthened. Over

4500 tons a day were being carried into the West Berlin zones by plane. The people of Germany now looked to the West as their protector of freedom. Berlin itself would become a symbol of freedom that would last to this day even as the Wall divides the city.

The Kremlin realized that the West could hold out longer than they, especially when we demonstrated that we could supply coal during the winter months. To save face, Stalin, used one of his common devices--that of indicating a change of policy through foreign correspondents. He said that ". . .there would be no obstacle to the lifting of the traffic restrictions if restrictions (the airlift) imposed by the three Western powers and by the Russians were lifted at the same time." ⁵ The blockade ended on May 12, 1949.

President Truman remarked, "The Berlin blockade was a move to test our capacity and will to resist. This action and the previous attempts to take over Greece and Turkey were part of a Russian plan to probe for soft spots in the Western Allies' positions all around their own perimeter." ⁶

On May 19, 1949, the new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who had replaced the ailing Marshall, made a statement. This remark was part of a speech on the problems facing the Council of Foreign Ministers. Acheson said that the lifting of the blockade should not be overlooked that neither side gained anything. The situation remained the same as a year ago, that of a split Germany and Europe.

The real significance of the Berlin Airlift is that the Russians were probing for weak spots in order to come out of their contained area. The Kremlin also wanted substantial proof that we had come out of isolationism to stay. NATO would lock them in on the western front, and soon, the probing would continue on the far eastern front.

CHAPTER VII

A MILITARY HYPODERMIC FOR WESTERN EUROPE: NATO

In February, 1948, the fall of Czechoslovakia made it clear that the Marshall Plan for economic recovery would not be sufficient. A military pact was also needed in order that the economic rehabilitation could be secure. The Brussels Pact was signed as a military counterpart to the economic recovery. In June, the Senate supported President Truman's recommendation that we also participate, and the Vandenberg Resolution was passed in the Congress in order that the basis for American participation in alliance with the European powers could be laid. The U.S. opened negotiations with the nations of Europe in order to build an alliance on an Atlantic-wide scale. The only precedents for actual military participation with foreign countries was the Rio Pact of September 2, 1947. The Vandenberg Resolution specifically stated that it should be a policy of the United States ". . . to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations. . . (and) we should exclude the veto in questions involving peaceful settlement of international disputes. . . (and) agree to provide) the United Nations with armed forces on the regulation of armaments under dependable guarantees against violations. . ." ¹

Specific actions by the Russians other than the Berlin Blockade included forbidding the East German breadbasket to supply food to West Germany almost a year to the day after V-E Day. The United States then announced that it would suspend all further reparations payments to the Soviet Union, and they were not to be continued until the

Soviet Union operated its zone the same as the western sectors according to the original terms of agreement. To obtain food, West Germany had to import; thus she must increase production in order to have something to exchange on the world market. As a necessity, then, the agreement to hold Germany's industrial production down collapsed. A chance that she would re-arm was considered a lesser risk as compared to the menace of the Soviet Union. Sumner Welles believed that this was a blunder; that the Germans could have a change of heart and 1933 would happen again. His opinion was written in 1951.

Secretary of State Byrnes had announced West Germany's new position in the world as early as September 1946, at Stuttgart. "The occupying powers should only lay down the general rules under which German democracy can govern itself so that Allied troops could be limited to a number sufficient to see that these rules are obeyed. . . Security forces will probably have to remain in Germany for a long period. . . We will not shirk our duty." 2

The Soviets had been defeated in Germany on three counts: America had not withdrawn her troops or liquidated Continental bases; Russia did not have all of Germany in a subservient partnership; and the Berlin Airlift had held out longer than the Berlin Blockade. John Spanier said, "In short, it was Germany that blocked Russia's expansionist purposes in Europe." 3

The Soviets had made the Atlantic Pact a necessity. Sumner Welles asked, "Who could have imagined a few short years ago that the English-speaking peoples, pledged to impose permanent disarmament upon a defeated Germany, would now, in spite of all French remonstrances, be pressing a reluctant West Germany to create immediately fifteen to twenty divisions? This upon the pretext that German manpower is required if the Atlantic Pact is to be successful." 4

Because the French were afraid of a renewed German industry, the European Coal and Steel Community was created to integrate German industrial might to the rest of Europe. In France, of course, the re-emergence of German military strength produced timorous emotions despite NATO's existence. To help lessen French fears, the United States, after a searching Congressional and public debate, committed four divisions in Europe in 1951--"a momentous decision in terms of previous American reactions to French requests for guarantee, stretching back to Versailles," ⁵ said Walt Rostow.

Although economic aid under the Marshall Plan was a stimulus to European recovery, the intensity of the Cold War between the West and the East placed the western European countries in an insecure position. By itself, a union of the European nations was considered ineffective without the industrial and military might of the United States. In July, 1948, the feeler was made by members of the Brussels Pact, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, for a North Atlantic security pact which would include the United States military might. By April, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed; the alliance included in addition to the previously mentioned nations, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal.

Not only did these nations recognize that an attack against one was an attack against all, but they adopted necessary measures to implement the security provisions of the treaty. Said John Gunther of the treaty, "The original idea of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was to create an international military force which could, in an emergency, stop the Russians on the ground or at least delay them significantly if they attempted to march across Europe." ⁶

The treaty was created in 1949 before anyone anticipated that Russia would have the Atomic Bomb and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. NATO's forces were small, but the main effect would be psychological. After all, that is what the Cold War really was.

The following is a summary of the fourteen articles of the North Atlantic Treaty.

1. The parties would agree to settle disputes in a peaceful manner so not as to be at odds with the United Nations.
2. The parties will try to strengthen their economic well-being and free institutions. (with the aid of the Marshall Plan where possible.)
3. They will maintain mutual self-help so as to resist any armed attack.
4. The parties will meet together ". . .when in the opinion of any one of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." ⁷
5. An attack against one is taken as an attack against all; any such attack will be reported immediately to the Security Council (of the United Nations).
6. To be an armed attack on any party is to aggress on the territory of any party to the treaty in Europe or North America, the Algerian Departments of France, or the occupation of forces of any Party in Europe, or on their islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the participating countries.
7. "This Treaty does not affect. . .in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security." ⁸
8. Any international agreement made by any of the participating countries should not conflict with this Treaty.
9. A council is established to meet at any time.
10. The Parties can ask any European country to join as long as as its "instrument of accession" is deposited with the Government of the United States.
11. This Treaty will be ratified by means of the constitutional procedures of each member nation.

12. After ten years, the nations can get together and review the treaty. (which De Gaulle has already done)

13. After twenty years, any Party may cease to be a member.

14. The treaty will be deposited in the archives of the United States Government, written both in English and French.

Thus Russia was not only "contained" in Western Europe, but also outside the continent in the locations stipulated in the treaty.

NATO was a psychological success if nothing else; the fact remains that the Russians did not cross the line any farther west. She only later would poke a hole in the "container" going eastward, and build a Wall to keep the container full.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ECONOMIC HYPODERMIC IS EXTENDED: POINT FOUR

President Truman stated in his fourth point of his Inaugural Address on January 20, 1949, that a bold new program must be put into action in order that the benefits of science and industrial technology could be shared with those less fortunate. Since the United States was so advanced in industrial and scientific progress, we could afford to use our vast resources in order to help more limited areas. Our resources seemed to be ". . . constantly growing and are inexhaustible. . . The old imperialism--exploitation for a foreign profit--has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair play dealing. . ." ¹

With the Russian development of the atomic bomb and the new nationalism of former colonies, President Truman faced these new problems squarely. He was concerned with how to maintain a nuclear stand-off and thus ordered the development of fusion weapons; secondly, to put Point Four into effect into the former possessions of the world powers. As the President said:

Thus it was the Americans' intention that the great transitional processes go forward in ways which would prevent Moscow or Peking dominated governments from gaining power, which would prevent the external projection of nationalism from taking forms which disrupted the strength of the Free World alliance or threatened armed conflict, and which would yield a reasonable steady process of political and social development toward the norms of modern democracy. These required, in turn, among many other conditions, steady economic progress at a ₂ rate which exceeded substantially the rate of population increase.

In other words, an allowance would be made for those countries, who unlike the ones participating in the ERC, would have to have major

economic surgery. This would be anti-isolationism in its extreme in the American diplomatic tradition.

The International Bank would be used for long-run economic development by those who would represent "underdeveloped countries." In 1948, while the Berlin Blockade was in progress, the United Nations Assembly, meeting in Paris, began the United Nations Technical Assistance program to commence on January 20, 1949.

When actually signing the Foreign Economic Assistance Act, June 5, 1950, President Truman stated that the act authorized a continuation of the European Recovery Program for a third year. Aid would continue to the people of Korea, Southeast Asia, and non-Communist China; thirdly, there would be a program of relief and public works for the Arab refugees from Palestine; fourthly, there would be legislative authorization for a program of "technical assistance to help build up the economically underdeveloped areas. . . known as Point Four. . ." ³; finally, a continuation of support for the United Nations' program on the behalf of children would be made.

After he left the Presidency, Truman was asked about what he had envisioned in the Point Four Program. The basic over-all purpose had been to allow unfortunate peoples to help themselves. A mass give-away was not intended. In the past, colonial powers had exploited the mass of people under their control. Instruction and assistance would help each nation develop its own resources. "In this way," said the President, "I thought it would make it easier for the world to get along and work together in improving the lot of all people and to meet the needs of the growing population everywhere." ⁴

The United States previously had no frame of reference regarding the policy of transitional nations freshly freed from colonialism. When dealing with Western Europe, we had associated with societies which had

evolved their own forms of organization.

As there was a stale-mate in the use of nuclear weapons, our strategy was polarized around techniques of propaganda, economic aid, and other forms of non-military influence. On April 22, 1950, Secretary of State, Dean Acheson made a speech in Washington to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. He summed up his view of containing the Russians.

We should settle with Russia not destroy her, but the Secretary did not enumerate any conditions. To him, the security of the U.S. was the most important. ". . .It is not enough that one should have a faith. . .(in freedom) it is . . .essential that we, and those who think like us, should have the power to make safe the area in which we carry that faith into action. . .While we are helping to get people producing in Europe and other parts of the world. . .we have. . .to develop a sensible system of trade. . ." 5

We have the machinery of NATO, the Marshall Plan, and the OAS for dealing with friendly nations. We can use the UN to thrash out our differences with the Soviet Union. "We do not propose to subvert the Soviet Union. . .That real and present threat of aggression stands in the way of every attempt at understanding with the Soviet Union. . .If, as, and when that idea of aggression can be ruled out of our relations with the Soviet Union, then the greatest single obstacle to agreement will be out of the way." 6

CHAPTER IX

A TRUMAN POLICY FOR ISRAEL

Great Britain was not able to maintain her commitments in Palestine any better than her obligations in Greece and Turkey. When Britain gave up her mandate from the First World War, two nationalist conflicts were to arise in the Near East: Zionist and Arab. Complicating the problem as usual was the Soviet Union ready to exploit national emotions. For a time, Britain and the United States were indecisive because of Russian pressure in the Near East, Britain's growing weakness, and our lack of rights of ownership in the area from the very beginning. Our interest in the area was not lacking, however, because of our previous policies in Turkey, Iran, and Saudi-Arabia (we had an air base at Dhahran built in 1946), and the Arabian-American Oil Company.

In 1917, the Balfour Declaration had made a Jewish homeland in Palestine following the principles of Wilson's self-determination. President Roosevelt had played the middle of the road, indicating sympathy for some Zionist aims, but promising Ibn Saud that we would not assist Jews against Arabs or be hostile against Arabs. President Truman wrote to the Egyptian Prime Minister that the Jews were so persecuted by Nazism that he hoped that Britain would lift the immigration restrictions into her Palestinian mandate. As the President himself wrote in his Memoirs, "Britains were enforcing their laws and cracking down hard on efforts to bring unauthorized immigration into Palestine. . . the Zionists, on the other hand, were impatiently making

my immediate objective more difficult to obtain. They wanted more than just easier immigration practices. They wanted the American government to support their aim of a Jewish state in Palestine." ¹ Secretary of State Byrnes had wanted Roosevelt's letter to Ibn Saud published so that America would think that we did not endorse Zionism. Mr. Truman said that obviously the State Department was concerned about Jewish sufferings and Arab reactions, but that some sort of aid was necessary in order that European Jews could find a place to live in decency. The President went ahead and had Roosevelt's letter to Ibn Saud published for the simple reason that Americans would realize that we wanted to be friendly and unantagonistic to both sides.

On October 2, 1945, a message from Prime Minister Attlee of Great Britain proposed a joint Anglo-American inquiry into the problem as one of many other points for discussion. At the end, Truman's wish prevailed that this would be the major focus of inquiry, not just one of many.

On April 22, 1946, the Anglo-American Committee presented its long-awaited findings. The following suggestions were made; Jews and Arabs shall not try to dominate each other; Palestine shall be neither Jewish nor Arab; the form of government to be established shall protect the Moslem, Jewish, and Christian faiths in the Holy Land under international guarantee; the mandate should be continued for the time being, as Arab and Jewish relations were so strained; nationhood would only result in bloody strife. An eventual trusteeship agreement with the United Nations should be set up so that Arabs and Jews could gradually draw closer together; full immigration rights should be restored, and land laws protecting Arabs against Jews should be repealed.

In other words, a purely Jewish government was put off indefinitely which upset the Zionists; the Arabs, meanwhile, were equally apprehensive concerning the unlimited immigration suggestion in the report. Prime Minister Attlee stated after the committee reported that the British would agree to consult with the Arabs and Jews, but at that time they were engaged in important and delicate negotiations with Egypt and suggested a postponement until May 20 or later. Meanwhile, the diplomatic representatives of various Arab states called on Dean Acheson to protest the committee's report.

One easily gets the impression that Britain was disposing of her foreign problems by dumping them in our lap; in addition, she seemed to dilly-dally along while others were clamoring for action. Harry Truman was going to provide that decisive action.

"I realized," he said, "that it would be difficult to get action from the British, but while there was much clamor in the United States that something be done, the country was neither disposed nor prepared to assume risks and obligations that might require us to use military force." ²

In order to put our military leaders on record as to their opinion in the Palestine matter, President Truman asked Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to call a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The military chiefs were mainly concerned that we would endanger our Middle Eastern oil rights, and that the Arabs if antagonized, would make common cause with the Soviet Union. The Iranian and Turkish situations of the immediate past had illustrated that the Arabs could be stirred with Russian pressure.

It became difficult to persuade the British to relax immigration restrictions. Acts of terrorism were increasing in Palestine. Attlee decided to get discussions about Palestine with his cabinet and a joint

Anglo-American committee under way for July 10, 1946. At this meeting the following plan was forthcoming:

1. . . The creation in Palestine of something resembling a federal system of two autonomous states but with a very strong central government. . . 2. Approximately 15 hundred square miles were to become a Jewish state. . . 3. The central government would retain control of the cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, as well as of the southernmost section of Palestine, the Negib. The remainder of Palestine would become an Arab state. . . 4. Of most importance, however, the plan provided that the central government would have reserved powers of such extent that the two states to be set up would have very little control over anything except wholly local matters. . . 5. The government of the provinces would consist of elected assemblies, but the speakers. . . would be appointed by the British, and no bill would become law without the assent of these appointed officials. The executive would also be appointed by the British, in the form of a council of ministers. 3

No one supported the plan. The Arabs would not want any kind of Jewish government next door to them; the Jews really would not have any substantial control over their government; and the United States was trying to help the Jews; we were not trying to enhance British control in the Palestine area.

Meanwhile, acts of terrorism were increasing in Palestine. By the fall of 1946, the problem seemed to have no solution. President Truman realized that the British Government was under a great deal of pressure throughout her empire. The nationalist movements of colonial possessions were moving at a terrific pace. The British had neither the funds nor the military personnel to administer her responsibilities; yet, she was not anxious either to give up her position as a major world power. For years, the British had spent millions of dollars and precious diplomatic time cultivating the friendship of the Arab world in order to preserve and secure her lifeline from Suez to India. The British had, however, complied with a request by President Truman on April 20, 1946, that 100,000 Jews be admitted to Palestine. In June, experts had been sent to London to work out the travel arrangements. On June 11, President Truman had set up a Cabinet Committee on

Palestine and Related Problems to discuss in London how reports might be best implemented. In light of the situation, the President specifically stated his views at that time. "I believe and urge that substantial immigration into Palestine cannot wait. . . Immigration laws should be liberalized (in the United States and elsewhere); I would be willing to recommend to the Congress a plan for economic assistance for the development of that country(Palestine)." 4

On October 4, 1946, President Truman made a statement following the Adjournment of the Palestine Conference in London. He expressed regret that the meeting had been adjourned until December 16 after the British Government had made the initial request for a meeting and had helped set up a committee of inquiry. Still, no direct action had been taken in order to implement any of the reports or suggestions of previous meetings of committees of the British and the Americans.

On October 28, 1946, the President sent a message to the King of Saudi Arabia.

It seems to be that all of us have a common responsibility for working out a solution which would permit those unfortunates who must leave Europe to find new homes. . . The Government and the people of the United States have given support to the concept of a Jewish National Home in Palestine ever since the termination of the First World War which resulted in the freeing of a large area of the Near East. . .with regard to the possibility envisaged by Your Majesty that force and violence may be used by Jews. . .against the neighboring Arab countries, I can assure you that this Government stands opposed to aggression of any kind. . .I cannot agree with Your Majesty that my statement of October 4 is in any way inconsistent. . .the hope was expressed that as a result of the proposed conversations between the British Government and the Jewish and Arab republics, a fair solution of the problem of Palestine could be found. . .Unfortunately these hopes have not been realized. 5

The above excerpts illustrate most pointedly that President Truman was not the type to handle heads of state delicately as long as there was a point to be made. The President was a very frank man who was able to lay all of his cards on the table regardless of who or what was involved. He did not worry about trying to satisfy several interest

Groups such as the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or oil companies. He tried to illustrate what was right and persuade the others to follow. To the President, the cardinal interest was to relieve the sufferings of the victims of Nazism.

On October 30, President Truman received a wire from Zionist spokesmen. Instead of a time-consuming investigation by a committee, they desired the immediate entry into Palestine of 100,000 Jews and a joint pronouncement by the British and American governments indicating their intention to support and pursue a Palestinian policy. As President Truman phrased it after receiving this request from Zionist Emergency Council in America members, the major obstacle was that Palestine was a British not a United States' possession. "In my own mind," wrote the President, "the aims and goals of the Zionists at this stage to set up a Jewish state were secondary to the more immediate problem of finding means to relieve the human misery of the displaced persons." 6

The Arabs would not compromise on the Jewish question. They attended some talks in January 1947 which the British had convened, but they would not give an inch. On February 4, 1947, the British decided to place the whole matter before the United Nations.

On May 15, 1947, the General Assembly set up a special committee, designated as UNSCOP--the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. The committee on which none of the so-called great powers was represented, agreed that the British mandate in Palestine should be brought to an end and that, under the auspices of the UN, the British should help to form an independent government that would evolve gradually. The majority of the members serving on the committee recommended that independence should take the form of two separate states, one Jewish and one Arab, tied together in an economic union. The city of Jerusalem, however, should become a UN trusteeship. This opinion generally followed the

recommendations of the preceding Anglo-American reports.

Most Jews were willing to compromise on this plan because they would have at least a part of their cherished homeland. The Arab reaction was the same as before; they would not compromise. On October 9, 1947, President Truman was told that the Arab League Council had placed troops on the Palestine border. He then instructed the State Department to support the partition plan of the United Nations.

"I was of the opinion that the proposed partition of Palestine could open the way for peaceful collaboration between the Arabs and the Jews." 7

The President was determined to bring about the redemption of the pledge of the Balfour Declaration and the rescue of the victims of the Nazi regime of Hitler. He said:

The American policy was designed to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of the promised Jewish homeland and easy access to it for the displaced Jews in Europe. The simple fact is that our policy was an American policy rather than an Arab or Jewish policy. It was American because it aimed at the peaceful solution of a world trouble spot. It was American because it was based on the desire to see promises kept and human misery relieved. 8

The United Nations partition plan was formally introduced on November 29, 1947; naturally, the Arabs resisted. The British had decided to terminate their mandate on May 15, 1948 so that they would not have to enforce the partition plan. As far as the Executive Branch of the American Government was concerned, the State and Defense Departments thought that partition would be unworkable; they chose trusteeship. The partition support in this branch of our government was strictly a White House policy. United States representative to the United Nations, Warren Austin, submitted two proposals to the Security Council: that there be an immediate end to the violence and acts of terrorism in Palestine; and that a special session of the General Assembly be called. No specific plans had been made for enforcing the partition plan of the UNSCOP committee. Another committee was

set up in the Security Council to see that the recommendations were carried out, but the Assembly did not give any directions. President Truman mentions in his Memoirs: "I point this out because the impression was spread by many of our newspapers that the General Assembly had approved a specific blueprint, whereas it had merely accepted a principle. The way in which this principle might be translated into action had yet to be found. It was my constant hope that it would be a peaceful way." 9

Meanwhile the Arabs announced that their militia was entering Palestine, and the Jews said that they were establishing their own military force. The pressure put on the White House was terrific. The Jews wanted pressure put on the British to keep them from being so delicate with the Arabs, and to furnish American soldiers to do various tasks.

The Jews had opposed the calling of the General Assembly, thinking that the United States would abandon them after stalling for time. The Assembly dragged on as the Jews had predicted. Eliahu Epstein, representative of the Jewish Agency in Washington, told the President that the Jews would set up an independent republic on May 14, 1948 at midnight.

At this point, the State Department experts still felt that the Arabs must not be antagonized or they would go over to the Soviets. The Jews were for partition; the Arabs against. The British only wanted to wash their hands of the whole mess. On the night of May 14, 1948, President Truman was also told that the Jews were prepared to defend their half of the partition. The President realized then that a fait accompli would solve the whole problem. There would be nothing left to discuss or drag on. The Jews would have their country anyway.

"I decided to move at once and give American recognition to the new nation. I instructed a member of my staff to communicate my decision to the State Department and prepare it for transmission to Ambassador Austin at the United Nations in New York,. About thirty minutes later, exactly eleven minutes after Israel had been proclaimed a state, Charlie Ross, my press secretary, handed the press the announcement of the de facto recognition by the United States of the provisional Government of Israel." 10

The Democratic Platform of 1948 had also expressed clearly what the President had decided about Israel: "We approve the claims of the State of Israel. . .to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations' resolution of November 29, 1947 and consider that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel. . . We continue to support, within the framework of the United Nations, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of the holy places in Palestine." 11

Harry Truman had projected into Israel his own personal policy; the recognition of a new country, divided as it was, went contrary to the opinions of the State and Defense Departments, and the feelings of the oil interests. He was not too outwardly concerned about the Arabs tying themselves closer to Russia because we were the strongest nation in the world; if we made the first move, it would also imply to the Arabs and the Russians that they had better tread lightly. The President's main concern all along, was that it was more important to relieve the sufferings of a race of people that had been nearly extinguished by a fanatic mad-man, than to worry about being delicate with the Arabs, the British, or anyone else.

CHAPTER X

THE DECISION THAT MAY HAVE ENDED TOTAL WAR

The argument of maintaining limited war in the Korean chapter, and the decision to utilize the Atomic bomb at the end of World War II offer a striking contrast.

The control of the atomic bomb was a United States monopoly until 1949. This control was the subject of endless debates in the United Nations. When it was revealed that the Soviet Union also possessed the total tool of destruction, Bernard Baruch suggested a plan of international control enforced by supervision. This plan was unacceptable to the Soviet Union because as Raymond Aron remarked: "The Stalinists find it somewhat irritating to have to put up with the presence of foreign diplomats on the soil of Holy Russia."¹ In addition, the Soviets would not tolerate an infringement of two cardinal principles: industrial secrecy and absolute sovereignty.

Since the explosion at Hiroshima, it seems that the Bomb has been completely useless in the Cold War. It is a paradox that the Americans' stock pile was no longer a monopoly just as it became useful. In 1950, the bomb was not a crucial factor as an implement in any future war, but it was indispensable as a balance in world forces. During World War II, there were unique weapons that were never used: poisons, bacteriological weapons, and gases. All of these horrible weapons have been kept in reserve supposedly in case the enemy was an aggressor. In Asia, guerrilla warfare is becoming so common that perhaps the atomic age will also be known as the guerrilla age. In a total war, we run the risk with atomic weapons of destroying mankind.

If the decision to use a total weapon of destruction had not been at the end of World War II, we would not have the desire to counteract another total war; nor would we have turned to weapons of propaganda and economic aid under the title of Cold War.

Former Secretary of State Stimson suggested to President Truman that a committee be created (of civilians) to advise him ". . . on the whole range of moral and political issues presented by the emergence of atomic energy as a totally new aspect of civilization." ² The committee was created and was served by such notables as Stimson, chairman; James F. Byrnes, then War Mobilizer; Ralph A. Bard, Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development; and James B. Conant, former President of Harvard and then chairman of the National Defense Research Committee. In advisory capacities were J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and Arthur H. Compton. The final report of this group is still classified and under lock and key, but Herbert Feis has pieced together the proceedings from many sources. According to Feis, ". . . there were two basic items on the agenda: 1. how this new source of energy was to be controlled internationally; and 2. how the bomb was to be used in the war against Japan." ³

The Committee's final decision ". . . resolved itself in forwarding to the President the following historic conclusion on what to do about the atomic bomb: "We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring and end to the war. We can see no acceptable alternative to direct military use." ⁴ The general feeling was that millions of American lives could be saved if the Pacific forces did not invade the Japanese islands; and after V-E Day, there was a desire to speed up the war on the Pacific front. Some examples of these specific

matters follow: On July 26 at the Potsdam Conference, a recess was called to enable Churchill and Attlee to go to London to receive the British election results. At the "Little White House" two messages awaited Mr. Truman. One concerned Churchill's defeat; the other from Chiang-Kai-shek approving the Potsdam Declaration which required the unconditional surrender of Japan. "They (the articles in the Declaration) were phrased so that the threat of utter destruction if Japan resisted was offset with a hope of a just though stern peace if she surrendered. It is tragic that the Japanese chose to reject this offer."⁵

According to James F. Byrnes' memoirs, Ambassador Sato said to his Foreign Office: "I want to preserve the lives of hundreds of thousands of people who are about to go to their death needlessly . . . Japan has no choice but to accept unconditional surrender."⁶ Mr. Byrnes goes on writing that the drop of the atomic bomb would not have been necessary had the Japanese Government listened to Sato.

By July 21, the Japanese Government had advised its Moscow representative: "We cannot consent to unconditional surrender under any circumstances. Even if the war drags on and more blood must be shed so long as the enemy demands unconditional surrender, we will fight as one man against the enemy in accordance with the Emperor's command."⁷

Byrnes also writes in his Speaking Frankly, that the Japanese Cabinet did not decide to surrender until the atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima. He also notes that when the agreement on Russian participation in the war was reached at Yalta, the military situation had been entirely different.

Herbert Feis quotes from the Forrestal diaries a memo from James F. Byrnes: ". . . The Secretary was most anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got in, with particular reference to Dairen and Port Arthur. Once the Russians were in there, he felt, it would not be easy to get them out." 8

On August 7, word was received aboard ship (returning from Potsdam) of the drop on Hiroshima. After returning, word was received of the drop on Nagasaki as recorded by James F. Byrnes. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan to be effective August 9. On the tenth, word was received from the Swiss that Japan would accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.

The following is a summary of the text from the Effects of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946.

Typical comments of survivors were: 'If the enemy has this type of bomb, everyone is going to die, and we wish the war would hurry and finish.

Admiration for the bomb was more frequently expressed than anger. Over one-fourth of the people in the target cities and surrounding area said they were impressed by its power and by the scientific skill which underlay its discovery and production.

. . . Japanese morale was already low before the bomb, for example, losses and failures at Saipan, the Phillipines, and Okinawa. As distance from the target cities increased, the effectiveness of the bombs in causing certainty of defeat declined progressively.

There had been a decision as early as 1944, in the spring, by the Supreme War Guidance Council to seek peace. The peace group had been effective in bringing about Tojo's and Koiso's fall.

. . . The peace effort culminated in an Imperial conference held on the night of 9 August and continued into the early hours of 10 August for which the stage was set by the atomic bomb and the Russian war declaration. At this meeting the Emperor. . . stated specifically that he wanted acceptance of the Potsdam terms. (These referred to the call upon Japan to surrender and be occupied, demilitarized, and democratized.) . . . It is apparent that in the atomic bomb the Japanese found the opportunity which they had been seeking to break the existing deadlock with the Government over accepting the Potsdam terms.

Related to the actual dropping of the bomb, August 6, 1945, was a desire of President Truman to control this use of atomic energy. In a letter to Senator Mc Mahon on February 2, 1946, the President asked

for legislation for the domestic development and control of atomic energy. The essential elements of legislation were: A commission of civilians was established by Congress for atomic energy control; the Government would be the exclusive owner and producer of fissionable materials; ". . . devices utilizing atomic energy must be made fully available for private development through compulsory, non-exclusive licensing of private patents." ⁹ (to assure free inquiry and enterprise there should) include coordination between the research activities of the commission and those of the proposed National Science Foundation now under consideration by the Congress. The Atomic Energy Act was signed August 1, 1946 after much debate.

According to the Congressional Conference Committee, at the end of October, 1945, a special Senate committee was formed by Senator Mc Mahon, who was also chairman. This committee proposed the legislation. There was a ninety minute debate. The Senators were afraid if the committee were questioned too broadly, national security would be threatened. In the House, the Lanham amendment proposed private patents rather than having non-patentable production of fissionable materials because of the fear of socialism. In the Senate, Gilbert Steiner wanted the government to be in complete charge because of the fear of a breach in national security. The Military Affairs Committee was also concerned. The bill passed the Committee of the Whole 121-57. A separate vote was demanded in the House which resulted in 151-90. ¹⁰ There were two committee amendments. One of five Atomic Energy Commissioners was to be military personnel. Both the Lanham and military provisions called a conference to explain his patent insertion; then the House passed the Senate version of licensed patents. The act when passed on July 20, 1946, created a national commission to regulate research

and activities of any type of atomic energy.

The President alone has the power to decide whether atomic bombs shall be produced and distributed as stated by section 6(a) of the Atomic Energy Act. The Atomic Energy Commission is authorized to ". . .conduct experiments and do research. . .(and) deliver such quantities of fissionable materials to the armed forces. . ." 11 as directed by the President. It is unlawful for anyone else to manufacture and distribute fissionable materials without the permission of the Commission.

The statutory basis for our present efforts for the common defense is provided by the National Security Act of 1947. Section 202 (a) states that war is too important to be left to the generals. "A Secretary of Defense. . .shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. . .He shall establish general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment. . .exercise general direction and authority. . .(and) shall submit annual written reports to the President and the Congress. . ." 12 The Act also put the armed forces in four separate branches and created a Joint Chiefs of Staff also subject to the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense. ". . .It is the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare strategic direction of the military forces . . .(in addition) (they) shall act as the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense. . ." 13

President Truman in a public message said that we did not intend to share the technical knowledge of producing A-Bombs. He was criticized but this died down when it was understood that the manufacture of the bombs could not be a monopoly, but that the spreading of them should be prohibited until safeguards were provided. Since no country would,

it was assumed, premeditatedly initiate an all-out war, a miscalculation could be possible. President Truman, having made the decision to use the atomic bomb in a wartime situation, wanted international safeguards as well as keeping any future outbreaks limited geographically. So far this method has been successful. Norman Graebner could write after the end of the Korean War: "In Korea. . .the fighting has been stopped on honorable terms. That was possible because the aggressor, already thrown back to and behind his place of beginning, was faced with the possibility that the fighting might, to his own great peril, soon spread beyond the limits and methods which he had selected. . ." 14

CHAPTER XI

KOREA: CONTAINMENT'S BROKEN PUSTULE

During World War II, the United States had been in the Pacific for two reasons; to defeat Japan and to create a powerful and friendly China in her place; it was hoped, according to Spanier's Truman-Mac Arthur Controversy, that a democratic China would help protect the peace in the post war Far East. ¹

James F. Byrnes writes that our China efforts up to his taking office had failed. He seems to have the attitude that "China doesn't matter because Japan was more valuable. . . (She) has made heartening progress toward matching in the political, economic, and social fields its earlier swift absorption of the technical aspect of modern civilization. . . Much of this progress is due to the wise administration of General Douglas Mac Arthur." ² Herbert Feis criticizes President Truman for not allowing Chiang-Kai-shek to participate in a document as vital as the Potsdam Declaration since Japan had possession of some Chinese territory. The Truman Compromise seems to have been to allow China a place in the Council of Foreign Ministers at the London Conference ". . . as a government power since she was on the Security Council (of the UN). . . as the months passed, China's weakness, due largely to internal distress, further reduced its role." ³

Sumner Welles says that the Truman Administration failed in the summer of 1945 to carry out President Roosevelt's decision to set up a United Nations trusteeship for a unified Korea. The trusteeship should have been set up immediately after Korea's liberation. ⁴ The White House and the State Department were too

willing to sanction the Pentagon's decision to divide Korea into two military zones. The Russian propagandists were easily able to create the impression in both Korea and China that South Korea was to become an American puppet state and an opening wedge for American imperialist expansion on the Asian mainland. Both the Chinese and the Russians would consider the occupation of Korea by any alien power a threat, as each did in the years when it was occupied by Japan. In 1945, China's integrity and unification under the Nationalists was inconceivable without Russian good-will, although Ambassador Hurley had resigned believing that the Russian and Chinese Communists "were part of the same international movement." 5

It was also inconceivable that the Sakhalin and Kuriles Islands should not be returned to Russia in order that her Siberian provinces would be secure. In the opinion of Sumner Welles, the new American President lacked the vision to foresee that the division of Korea into Russian and American zones would lead to trouble. The author forgets that Truman came into the White House completely without top level information; all he knew was what he had read in the newspapers, like any other citizen. An example of the route of a message concerning Far Eastern Affairs is discussed by Herbert Feis: On November 24, 1945, to answer Wedemeyer, the Secretaries of the War and Navy signed a memo to the Secretary of State.

The document was not. . . a model of either clarity, conciseness or decision. It was very long; it showed the symptoms of that 'on-the-one-hand-on-the-other-hand' disease which was to blight so many documents on Chinese policy in the ensuing years, and it skillfully handed the fundamental issue--which the State Department had passed to Wedemeyer, which Wedemeyer had returned to Washington--back to the State Department. 6

Welles also mentions that Truman's weakness in regard to Korea was that no detailed agreements were reached before V-J Day. The Russians were allowed to accept the Japanese surrender north of the 38th parallel because the line was convenient. This step was taken on the initiative of the United States. In addition, he says that the South Koreans' record of American administration was that we were not efficient; we gave no encouragement to carry out the reforms that the people demanded; and we ignored Korea's significance to China; China should have been included in any trusteeship for Korea.

In 1948, Stalin began violating the 1945 treaty which stated that the unification of China should be supported under Chiang-Kai-shek; also, that Russia refused to let a UN observer visit North Korea. Preventive measures in Welles opinion, should have been taken at that time. The author fails to say, however, what those measures should have been. He commends Roosevelt, who wanted to make China united and so powerful that no nation could dominate her, but also states that Secretary of State Marshall was against giving Chiang all-out support.

General Joseph W. Stilwell was sent during the war to coordinate Chiang's and Washington's efforts against the Japanese. He reported that "the Chinese government is a structure based on fear and favor, in the hands of an ignorant, arbitrary, stubborn man." 7

Word must be made here of the fall of China as affecting the total global picture, since Korea would be directly affected after the Battle of Inchon.

To relieve the internal split between the Communists and the Nationalists we thought, by way of Ambassador Hurley, that there would be no harm in uniting the two elements. Why? In addition to the American tradition of compromise, ". . .The American attitude is that once war breaks out, the total effort must be directed toward the single goal of military victory. . .this reinforced the American desire to establish a coalition government in China." 8 Chiang had never had time to develop a social and economic program; China had fought for her life since 1921 against outside encroachment.

Secretary of State Marshall had been sent to China in January, 1946 to get concessions from Mao-Tse-Tung, which meant social and economic reforms within a Nationalist administration and some Communist representatives at policy and executive levels.

The main aims of the Marshall mission were: "to develop a united and democratic China; to assure the Chinese government that it would be able to extend its sovereignty over Manchuria, as confirmed at the Cairo Conference and in the Yalta Agreement. . ."⁹ We were to effect a truce in North China by keeping our Marines there, and we were to have the Chinese government call a national conference of the major political elements.

As far as keeping Marines in North China was concerned in order to disarm and evacuate the Japanese, it must be remembered that ". . .in a wide-spread emotional crisis of the American people, demobilization has become, in effect, disintegration, not only of the armed forces but apparently of all conception of world responsibility and what it demands of us. . ." ¹⁰ so stated George Marshall.

According to Robert Payne's biography of Marshall, the former General used the word compromise "as though he really believed it. . . He does not know that the word has never been used before in Chinese political discussions. . . a strong, united and democratic China. . . is an ambiguous statement. . . China could only be strong under a dictatorship. . . she could become democratic only by jettisoning her whole culture." 11 How could Marshall be both an arbitrator and special emissary from the President to Chiang-Kai-shek?

By February a cease-fire had been accomplished and a National Assembly formed to write a constitution and establish a Provisional Government with Communist representatives, but Chiang was to be in command. By April, Marshall's work had fallen apart. The Communists in Manchuria took over the Japanese military stores and began a Nationalist extermination policy. Chiang no longer listened to Marshall. In Truman's Memoirs is an ultimatum to Chiang dated August 10, 1946. The President expressed that he had followed China's situation closely since Mr. Marshall had been sent there. With deep regret the President felt that Marshall's efforts were to no avail. In the United States an increasing amount of opinion existed that China must be re-examined in the light of her spreading strife. Americans feared that the desires of the Chinese people were being thwarted by militarists and reactionaries. Unless proof could be given soon that some progress was being made concerning China's internal problems, United States' opinion would not continue in a generous attitude. By January, 1947, Truman made good his threat and recalled Marshall.

In July, 1947, the President sent General Wedemeyer to China to see if the situation had improved; it had not. On December 18, the President made a statement concerning Marshall's mission. The economic rehabilitation loan by the Export-Import Bank had been unexpended, and the coalition interim government had violated the truce. Chiang had not even desired to allow China to help herself. Herbert Feis concludes in China Tangle, ". . . We made great exertions in behalf of China. . . The call for help was made. . . while we were engaged in great battles elsewhere. . ." ¹² The Communist position was made stronger when near the end of the war, the Russian Army took Manchuria. Japanese arms were given over to the Chinese Communists. Roosevelt at Yalta had been blamed, but to take this charge seriously, one has to deny certain clear facts of wartime military strategy; namely, that American military men were unsure that the atomic bomb would be a success; that they believed an invasion of Japan would be necessary to bring about Japan's surrender; that they expected to suffer at least one million casualties, and feared even more if the Japanese reinforced the home-island garrison with troops from Manchuria and northern China.

China's fall might have been prevented, according to John Spanier, if we had committed massive military and financial aid after V-J Day. We did not have these forces to give; the American people were crying for a return of the servicemen.

To save face, American foreign policy became disentangled from Chiang-Kai-shek. The State Department released a White Paper saying in essence, that Chiang was no longer worthy of our support. We thought that we could extend recognition to the Communist

Government if it would duplicate Tito's independence from Moscow. Before this could happen, war broke out in Korea.

The security of containment in Europe popped like a pustule in Asia. Why did we get involved in Korea; and once there, why did we insist on limited war? These questions can be answered by asking other questions.

Walt Rostow asks why weren't the military during this period posing the question of limited war? Why wasn't a strong case made to the President and the public by the military for keeping at combat readiness a ready reserve of infantry with naval support? Why were the civil war in Greece and the Berlin Airlift not recognized as prototypes of the main Communist thrust? The main reason seems to be that "Washington failed to understand the potentialities in Asia for an extension of the Soviet method used in Greece."¹³ The result of United States military policy as it evolved from 1947 to 1950 was that the Korean War would find the United States prepared only for deterring a major war. The only response that the Soviets had to America and to the United Nations regarding attempts to unify Korea was to withdraw occupation forces in order that "free" elections could be held.

The American decision to withdraw troops from Korea had already been agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September, 1947. Rovere and Schleisinger said, "The position within Korea, . . . was unique among the postwar occupied areas by July, 1949 in that, formally, both the occupying powers had withdrawn their formations. . ."¹⁴ Where Korea would fit in terms of American security policy would be explained later by Dean Acheson in his famous "Perimeter Speech."

Why did the Joint Chiefs of Staff think that military occupation was no longer necessary in Korea? President Truman had asked Secretary of State Marshall in 1947 to get an opinion from the Joint Chiefs. General Eisenhower, the unofficial chairman, thought that our troops could not be maintained on the peninsula without reinforcements. The Eightieth Congress had cut military funds, and the Joint Chiefs thought that major war retaliation was the major problem. Korea, to them, was not the threat. The State Department thought that it was inevitable that Formosa would fall to the Communists. To minimize damage to our integrity, the National Security Council recommended to the President the following policy regarding Formosa. He made this public January 5, 1950. "The United States had no predatory designs on Formosa or any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. . ."15

Where did Korea lie in our security system? Dean Acheson gave the answer in a speech before the National Press Club in Washington, January 12, 1950. The perimeter of our security system in the Pacific ". . .runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukus. . .(it) runs from the Ryukus to the Philippine Islands. . .so far as the military security of the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack." 16 ". . .Initial reliance must be on the people attacked. . .and then upon the commitments of the entire world under the Charter of the United Nations. . ."17

The last statement reveals that Acheson was not inviting the attack made on South Korea, as some of his critics have remarked, but that a country must help itself first. The United Nations could always intervene to maintain peace as provided by the Charter. Being interviewed before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 7, 1950, Acheson went on to explain further the ideas in his perimeter speech.

The United States' one policy in the Far East is directed toward encouraging and assisting the efforts of the people of that area to improve their welfare and security, to stabilize their economies, to strengthen free institutions and to advance the cause of self-government free from outside domination. Korea is one place in which the United States can continue to take well-defined positive steps to help a democratic country to survive in the face of efforts of communism to engulf it.¹⁸

In June, 1950, the North Koreans attacked South Korea.

John W. Spanier says that we miscalculated. The attack upon the South Koreans altered the whole basis upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had based their earlier recommendations. Their analysis of Korea's strategic value had been in terms of global warfare. The cold war had focused attention upon the wider political and military implications of a communist occupation of South Korea and the threat that this would pose in the Far East. We could not abandon Korea for two reasons: Our allies and the Soviet Union would think that we had reverted to isolationism; we could not allow another Munich. The American people wanted a new positive policy which would punish the enemy. The American public had suffered the emotional ordeal of knowing that Russia had the bomb; spies and atomic secrets were allegedly running rampant out of the State Department, and China had fallen to the Communists.

On July 19, 1950, President Truman gave the following radio address defining the issues:

The Communists, by their attack upon South Korea, have shown contempt for basic moral principles. Dean Acheson called me at Independence, Missouri and said that with my approval he would ask for an immediate meeting of the Security Council. Aggression will be met with force. Appeasement leads only to more aggression and to war. A unified command has been established under General Douglas Mac Arthur. The prompt action of the United Nations to put down lawless aggression, and the prompt response to this action by free peoples all over the world, will stand as a landmark in mankind's long search for a rule of law among nations. The Soviet Union has said on a number of occasions that it desires peace, but its attitude toward the aggression on South Korea is in direct contradiction to its statements. The United States will continue to support the United Nations' action to restore peace.

The last phrase, to restore peace, is most important; we were not stating that we wanted a total victory, but rather, we were to keep the peace as a policeman would in his district. The district is not annihilated; the status quo is restored. At the very beginning, to restore things as they were, was the main objective in Korea.

Mr. Truman also stated that aggression could happen anywhere in the world at any time since that was the way the Communists were going to operate. Therefore he made recommendations to increase the size of our military strength, specifically, to send more men and supplies to Mac Arthur; build up our Army, Navy and

Air Force; and strengthen our collective security with other countries. The third point deserves elaboration. Mac Arthur would later differ with the President on the limited versus a global perspective. Mr. Truman never once weakened our collective security anywhere in the world.

No one knew how much aid the South Korean army would need. President Truman told General Mac Arthur to send a survey party on June 25, 1950. On the following Monday, Mac Arthur told the President that the South Korean army could not handle the aggression alone; thus, the President ordered more ground troops for the General's disposal. He also told Mac Arthur to use American air and naval forces to support the South Korean army. On June 29, the General went to Korea himself to view the situation. He cabled the President on his return to Tokyo that the South Korean army was in confusion, and that he would like to send a U.S. ". . .regimental combat team to Korea as the nucleus of a possible build-up of two divisions for an early counter-offensive."²⁰ When President Truman adhered to Mac Arthur's wish, he had committed all three branches of the armed forces to Korea. The New York Herald Tribune said on June 30, 1950, "The purpose of President Truman's decision is simply to persuade the Kremlin that the United States means what it says. It is hoped that the Kremlin is convinced that the U.S. means business and will soon call off its puppets."²¹ On the same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to allow Mac Arthur to use all troops at his disposal in Japan. The actual commitment of American forces came with two resolutions in the Security Council which the Russians had boycotted. The North Korean

attack was an invasion upon a state which the UN, by action of its General Assembly, had created. One of the aims of U.S. foreign policy was to associate its cold war policies with the humanitarian and symbolic values of the international organization.

Immediately following the attack, a temporary truce was declared between the two major American political parties until the controversy between Mac Arthur and Truman developed. On July 8, 1950, the General was appointed the first UN commander, and a third Security Council resolution recommended that all UN members assist the United States. In United States' domestic politics, the Republicans demanded the defense of Formosa and non-recognition of Red China. They also created an atmosphere whereby any diplomatic relations with the mainland Chinese would be interpreted as pro-Communist; this, they accomplished by charging that the New Deal administrations had deliberately sold out Chiang-Kai-shek. These matters would be put aside for the time being; they would not be forgotten.

Korea was containment's first military challenge. We proved that we meant to enforce our policy in this area; for the first time, an American President by himself took a nation into a shooting war. George Kennan said that diplomacy in the modern world is not moralistic-legalistic. Tied with it is total war. "We now face the fact that it is very questionable whether in a new global conflict there would ever be any such thing as total military victory."²² It was ironic indeed that the containment in Europe shifted Communist pressure to Asia, an area more easily exploited politically and militarily. Most countries in this area were

emerging from the grip of Western colonialism. Soviet propaganda was easily absorbed by these peoples who were nationalistic and poor. The Communists had overrun China and were threatening the rest of Asia. The cold war threatened a universal cataclysm, yet, the decisive action of the United Nations on Korea, even though made possible only by the absence of the Russians from Security Council meetings, enabled it to survive a challenge to its existence. The United States, by resolute intervention, took a momentous step forward in its leadership of all nations dedicated to human freedom and world order.

The Truman-Mac Arthur controversy began when General Mac Arthur flew to Formosa on July 31, 1950. Washington had asked him to refuse Chiang's offer of troops. The Joint Chiefs thought Chiang might intervene on his own.

Mac Arthur issued a statement, which indicated that American forces would unite with the Generalissimo in case of an attack on his island. The message concluded with praise of Chiang as a determined man who wanted to keep the Pacific free. Secretary of State Acheson became concerned with Mac Arthur's message and cabled William Sebald, the State Department officer on the General's staff. Acheson was informed that Sebald had not been along on Mac Arthur's trip since the General felt that the State Department had an unfriendly attitude toward the Formosan leader. In response to these developments, President Truman sent Averill Harriman to brief Mac Arthur. The report to the President was that the General did not understand or recognize ". . . fully the difficulties, both within the world and within the East, of whatever moves we make

within China in our position with the Generalissimo in Formosa." ²³

On August 28, Mac Arthur had his message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars published in the newspapers before President Truman could have it withdrawn. This message brought into the open the controversy that was budding. According to the General, Formosa was the most important island in the American defense perimeter. From it ". . .we would dominate every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific." ²⁴ Formosa should not be in the hands of a hostile power. He continued by attacking the argument that to defend Formosa would alienate Asian peoples. "Those who speak thus, do not understand the Orient. They do not grant that it is in the pattern of the Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership to quickly turn on a leadership characterized by timidity or vacillation--and they underestimate the Oriental mentality." ²⁵ The General wanted to protect Formosa beyond Korea's end. At this time, the President was already thinking of replacing Mac Arthur, but such action would be difficult if a united political front in the United States was to be maintained.

Inchon, 150 miles north of the 38th parallel would prove an insurmountable obstacle in the removal of the General as commander. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had given their opinion that the landing had to be at low tide; in early winter a landing would be next to impossible. Surprise attacks were a specialty with Mac Arthur, and Inchon was no exception. On September 15, the surprise landing was made. By September 27, Seoul was liberated. Mac Arthur was a hero once more. Only the unexpected action of the Chinese would alter this opinion.

Although there is no reference in the Truman Memoirs or the Mac Arthur biography, it does seem more than coincidental that the President's trip to Wake Island on October 10 occurred just one day after the Russians were protesting about a miscalculated attack on Siberia. The emphasis of the historic meeting between the commander-in-chief and his general was to stress limited warfare. By October 23, all foreign troops had been ordered to halt forty miles south of the Yalu. Again, Mac Arthur decided to test enemy strength and launched his "home by Christmas" offensive saying that military necessity made it imperative to disregard a September order of halting foreign troops at the Yalu so as not to provoke massive retaliation due to Chinese fear for Manchuria. Mac Arthur had condemned this as appeasement and ordered his field commanders to use both Korean and non-Korean troops for their advance to the Yalu. Mac Arthur contended that Asians respected aggressive leadership.

Washington was concerned. No general should take his entire army on an offensive. At least a rear guard should stay behind.

By the end of December, the UN forces had been pushed back to the 38th parallel because the Chinese Communists had successfully launched a massive army inside Korea without detection. Now, the administration had to abandon the decision made immediately after Inchon, that of actually uniting Korea and return to the original objective of preserving the status quo at the 38th parallel.

Mac Arthur felt that the entrance of the Chinese was a new act of aggression. He felt that they could be totally defeated

by bombing the bases in Manchuria, blockading the Chinese coast, using members of the Nationalist army from Formosa along with major reinforcements of UN troops. The administration replied that the U.S. should be involved in action for the shortest period possible because the Soviet Union might enter the action. The Russians at that time had a strong commitment to China and engaging Red China would utilize too many American resources against a secondary army in a secondary theater. The White House was thinking in a global perspective. The alienation of our allies in Western Europe and Asia must be accorded heavy weight. The emphasis to be noted is that Mac Arthur did not seem to have this global perspective. Walt Rostow says, "Mac Arthur symbolized that part of American history which, since the early days of the China trade, had looked out over the Pacific to Asia as a region where the American nation could express its enterprise. . . . relatively untrammelled with ties to old Europe. . . . Marshall and the Truman Administration as a whole stood solidly, on the other hand, for the twentieth-century experience of strategic reserve to Western Europe and of leadership of the Atlantic coalition." ²⁶ Thus, on October 7, the General Assembly had passed Resolution 376 stating that the status quo decision had been changed after Inchon due to the victory mood, and General Mac Arthur's belief that the Chinese would not intervene. When China did intervene, the General thought that he had been a victim of espionage. Apparently he did not think that the Chinese would feel insecure with American troops along the Manchurian border. China had been locked in for so long that paranoia was very evident. "Mac Arthur must always

be 110 per cent right," ²⁷ says John Spanier. Since he had miscalculated, he must have been betrayed at home. He did not realize that China would rightly think that the United States would want to take Japan's place in domination of Asia. We were proving it, believed the Chinese, by stationing troops along the Manchurian border, basing troops in Formosa, aiding France financially in Indo-China, and occupying Japan which would turn the Japanese into pro-Americans, in the opinion of Spanier. In other words, the Chinese felt that they had good reason to intervene, and they might not have if Mac Arthur had not tried to play the policy-maker.

On December 3, Mac Arthur informed the Joint Chiefs that the Chinese had 26 divisions and 200,000 more troops on the way; thus, a new enemy meant a new war. The Joint Chiefs said to resist at some point if there were no serious losses; otherwise, withdraw to protect Japan. Mac Arthur replied that this would alienate the Asians, especially Japan, and would unleash more Chinese. He wanted reinforcements; the Joint Chiefs rejected this request on January 9, 1951. Their main objective was to protect Japan and let the Nationalists protect Formosa. Since the original objective of returning to the status quo had been reaffirmed, Mac Arthur let the nation know his view from November 28 to December. He gave interviews and messages to Three Star Extra newsbroadcast, the New York Times, the U.S. News and World Report, London Daily Mail, and Tokyo Press Corps. Denying that his North Korean campaign had brought in the Chinese, he demanded a total victory. Any withdrawal would be admitting defeat. He was being deprived of a victory because of Washington.

President Truman, upset at these remarks, issued a directive on December 6: all press releases concerning foreign or military policy had to be cleared by the State or Defense Departments; overseas officials should also be cautious when making public statements.

The domestic political truce ended when Taft and the right wing of the Republican Party took up Mac Arthur's cause. The Administration was indicted on three counts: American economy was weakened; Russia would start a war thinking we had over-extended ourselves and could not keep our commitments in NATO; Europe was expendable as long as we could defend our own shores. ²⁸

The British view was expressed by Prime Minister Attlee. Diplomatic recognition should be extended to China, and she should be allowed a seat in the UN. Such a policy would appeal to the Chinese masses and lack of Chinese antagonism would impede Russia's policy of getting us deeply involved in China so as to weaken our European commitments.

John Spanier remarked, "(The) Allied view that restraint of the United States was more important than restraint of Communist China received. . .support from the neutral Arab-Asian bloc led by India. . .India's desire to end the fighting by mediation before it expanded into a major war enveloping all of Asia. . ." ²⁹ was illustrated by the Arab-Asian bloc sponsoring the first peace attempt. On December 12, a resolution was introduced at the UN for a Far Eastern conference and a cease-fire. Peking felt that since she was not a member of the United Nations, this resolution was useless. On January 11, another resolution was introduced

and subsequently turned down by Peking. She would not agree to a cease-fire before negotiating. India made a private attempt but no cease-fire was still the main condition by Peking. The United States also refused a demand made by the Chinese capital, namely, that we get out of Formosa. This stand was our way of conciliating the Republicans' desire that we be firm with Red China. Meanwhile, NATO was threatened with disintegration. The Administration was caught in a squeeze between Mac Arthur and his supporters and our allies during December 1950 and January 1951. The Allies believed in a non-Russian-controlled Mao-Tse-Tito. The Administration agreed with General Mac Arthur that the acceptance of Communist China's demands would be politically disastrous; it did not share his enthusiasm for more vigorous military action. Even without American bombardment of Communist China, the Administration believed that it stood on the brink of war. Even if the Russians would not intervene, the United States realized that it would have to conserve its strength for possible future outbreaks in other areas of the world, a matter that our Allies must realize. The United States supported the two United Nations attempts to end hostilities, but at the same time it included in both proposals the terms which would not be accepted by Peking. Thus, in accepting the UN proposals, Washington played a shrewd game; we accepted the form of negotiations while denying the substance of concessions.

Mac Arthur refused to accept limiting the war to the Korean peninsula; his troops had not been driven from it. On February 3 and March 7, 1951, the General made statements both indicating a new plan to defeat the Chinese without going into China. We would

sow "a defensive field of active wastes across Northern Korea. . . to make the Yalu useless; and at the same time, with Chiang's troops they would close the gigantic trap." ³⁰ This statement was interpreted to mean that Mac Arthur desired to use atomic weapons although he later denied this interpretation. The Administration then released the President's statement to the United Nations troops in Korea that the aggressors had been pushed back to the place where they had originally attacked and that thus the objective had been reached. On March 24, Mac Arthur issued another statement saying that the UN had had many successes and the inability of Red China to supply her troops had been demonstrated in his opinion. If the UN terms were not accepted, Mac Arthur wanted to carry the war into China herself. This statement was the second major policy statement expressed after Truman's December 6 order. The General believed that he had ". . . forestalled one of the most disgraceful plots in American history; the appeasement of Chinese aggression by the surrender of Formosa and the cession of Nationalist China's seat at the UN in return for peace in Korea; he had unquestionably wrecked this secret plan." ³¹ No such plan existed. A cease-fire before negotiations was affirmed and a conference to settle the problem in a peaceful manner was desired. In issuing this statement, Mac Arthur's motive must have been a desire to take the war into China. To fight there would be victory; to risk global war was necessary. House Minority Leader, Joseph Martin, on April 5, 1951 released a letter that he had received from the General on March 19, again expressing the desire to use Formosan troops and carrying a total war to China. This letter

was the last straw as far as Harry Truman was concerned, as commander-in-chief. The General was subsequently dismissed from his post. Three major reasons were given: "First, he had failed to submit his statements for clearance in accord with the President's directives of December 6. . .The government had reminded him of these orders after the episode of March 24. . .(Secondly) Mac Arthur had challenged the President's role as the nation's spokesman on foreign policy. This could not be tolerated. . .He is primarily responsible for the formulation and execution of the country's foreign affairs, and he is the embodiment of the democratic belief that the civilian authority is and must remain in control of its military arm. . .(Thirdly) (Mac Arthur) was not in sympathy with the decision to try to limit the conflict to Korea. . ."32

During the Congressional hearings that followed, Senator Morse interrogated Secretary of State Acheson, asking him if it could be concluded that Mac Arthur was not in sympathy with the restrictions imposed in order to keep the war limited. The Secretary replied that this conclusion could be drawn; it was worrisome to consider a possible escalation of the action. The following is an exchange between Senator MacMahon and General MacArthur:

The Senator: "Now, General, do you think that we are ready to withstand the Russian attack in Western Europe today?"

The General: Senator, I have asked you several times not to involve me in anything except my own area. My concepts on global defense are not what I am here to testify on. I don't pretend to be the authority now on those things.

The Senator: And so, General, you concede. . .by that statement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having access to global intelligence, having made global plans for our defense, may have in that information made decisions contrary to your recommendations which could be sound. 33

It is not difficult to see that by this example, the Truman Administration was able to persuade the Congress and the public that the decision to seek a settlement at the 38th parallel had been the correct one. Mac Arthur's case had revealed three themes: He declined to accept the Administration's estimate on the Soviet Union's intentions; he did not accept the global consequences of his requests; and above all, the real issue involved is not whether the Joint Chiefs are perfect, but whether they, on the basis of the global intelligence available to them, are in a better position to determine the course of policy than the theater commander. Mac Arthur said they were, but at the same time implied that he also, despite his more limited responsibilities, could predict the Soviet Union's intentions and American capabilities. If the Joint Chiefs disagreed with him, it was they who were in the wrong, not he.

In the Administration's defense, Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt Vandenberg stated that Communist China's arsenal was in Russia so there was no point at all in bombing China. North Korea's supply should be more important; a blockade of the Chinese mainland would be ineffective because of the long Sino-Soviet border. The general opinion of the Joint Chiefs was that if we were drawn into a war with Red China, we would have to fight without any allies. Chiang-Kai-shek would have to defend Taiwan by himself, and his soldiers were anything but the best.

Dean Acheson added that if we had followed Mac Arthur's recommendations, we would have increased our risks and commitments simultaneously; meanwhile, the strength of our collective security would diminish. He said, "They (our Allies) would understandably

hesitate to be tied to a partner who leads them to a highly dangerous short cut across a difficult crevasse." ³⁴

Rovere and Schlesinger maintain that Mac Arthur failed to see that Russia probably would have intervened if we had attacked China. When Communist power on the Chinese mainland had been established barely a year and a half earlier, the Chinese were wholly dependent on the Soviets for arms, and there was a large Soviet presence in an area to which Mac Arthur wanted to carry the war.

The police action in Korea was considered a success from several points of view. The objective of the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists had been thwarted mainly to drive the UN forces out of the peninsula. No atomic warfare had been necessary because an escalation of the action had been prevented. Korea had thus fallen into the same category as Berlin. Another successful containment had been realized in the Cold War.

Dean Acheson made a statement that induced the first peace initiative by the Communists. Senator Alexander Smith had told the Secretary that he was confused by the idea of stopping where the aggression had started. Acheson replied, "We started out to do two things. One (was to) repel armed attack and the other . . . to restore peace and security in the area."³⁵ Acheson did not state formally that the mission of a unified Korea after Inchon had been abandoned, but instead emphasized strongly that the Administration was willing to accept a cease-fire at the 38th parallel. One June 23, 1951, Jacob Malik, the Russian delegate to the UN, indicated that the Soviet Union would support a cease-fire at the 38th parallel. One recalls the words of George Kennan:

"United States containment policy. . .has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." 36

Walt Rostow adds to the achievements of Korea; Non-Communist Asia, except Malaya and Vietnam had used this period to find political stability; the passage of time underlined the depth and urgency of the domestic economic problems of Communist China; Stalin died.

On June 25, 1966, T.R.B. reported from Washington in the New Republic. The article concerned a comparison of President Johnson's plummeting popularity with President Truman's former experience in the same field. Truman had Korea: a war which would contain an aggressor rather than to destroy him; he had a war of limited objectives against a secondary enemy to avoid an unlimited war against a primary enemy. The greatest calamity in Asia, Truman told his general at Wake Island, would be for the Koreans to turn against their defenders because of friction between governments. Chou En-Lai would enter the Korean War if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. Mac Arthur did not believe this even when a quarter of a million Chinese had arrived. American policy had thought in terms of all-out war until Korea; this policy had been the reason that Korea had been left outside the defense perimeter. At the time that Acheson had made his "Perimeter Speech" Korea was thought of as strategically unimportant until June 25, 1950. The Russians had shrewdly placed the U.S. in the dilemma of either risking a total

war for a limited objective or of taking no action at all and thus surrendering South Korea. American policy was prepared to deal only with an all-out Soviet surprise attack upon the U.S. or Western Europe. The United States was trying to support its containment policy; Mac Arthur wanted a total victory to punish the enemy. Truman and Acheson had sought to strengthen the U.S. and its allies in order to improve the terms of coexistence and survival.

As John Spanier aptly stated:

In the United States it is the President and his chosen advisors who . . . determine the over-all grand strategy which the country pursues. . . The military man executes their orders. This is his duty. . . He is, so to speak, a military civil servant, a nonpartisan career officer who implements state policy. He may not openly question that policy while he is still in command. As a soldier, he must obey his orders. . . If he cannot accept the orders he has received, he must resign. . . If he will not. . . he must be dismissed. Civilian control of the military demands no less. 37

In 1946, the National Defense Act was signed creating the National Security Council. This Council serves the President and informs him of conditions around the world that affect our security. In January, 1950, President Truman authorized a crash program to develop the H-Bomb; on the same day, he authorized the National Security Council to work on a new comprehensive study of American defense and foreign policy in the light of global problems and development. The report is known as NSC-68 (National Security Council Policy Paper Number). This great document of our history, as Dean Acheson called it, can be summarized as follows: After World War II, two major events took place: The menace of the Communist movement on a world basis, and the development of nuclear arms. The Kremlin's policy is to strengthen their movement by

ideological subversion and satellites and to oppose any competing system of power. We responded at first to this problem with NATO and the Marshall Plan. The NSC study stated that we could choose one of four courses: continue as we were then with reduced defense budgets and limited military capability; we could withdraw back into isolationism; we could go to war with Russia; we could rebuild the West's defensive potential to surpass that of the Soviets-- such a program must have the United States at its political and material center with other free nations in variable orbits around. We chose the fourth alternative. We backed up NATO with the Military Defense Assistance Program. While the fighting went on in Korea from 1950 to 1953, Cabell Phillips states, "The arms build-up in Europe not only continued but was intensified." ³⁸ Korea had always remained only part of a larger global picture, and through the Joint Chiefs and the National Security Council, the President had access at all times to global developments which Mac Arthur could never have.

CONCLUSION

On January 15, 1953, John Foster Dulles made a Statement on Liberation which criticized the containment policies of the Truman Administrations. He said that we could not continue tolerating a tie between China and Moscow by throwing them together within the same geographical area. "A purely defensive policy never wins against an aggressive policy. . .It is only by keeping alive the hope of liberation, by taking advantage, wherever opportunity arises. . .(that we can be on the offensive.)" ¹

On January 25, 1954, Dulles made a speech in New York that criticized the entire concept of Truman's foreign policies. The Secretary's main point was that the former President's program was piece-meal. The initiative had been left to the Kremlin. We needed long range policies. ". . .Measures cannot be judged adequate merely because they ward off immediate danger. . ." ² In Dulles' opinion, we could prevent aggression by threatening massive retaliation. This procedure promised ultimate victory at a reduced expenditure. "There is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty land power of the Communist world." ³

Harry Truman's foreign policy had accomplished two broad objectives: he had prevented atomic holocaust while containing the Russian bear, and he had brought America out of her self-containment by giving her to the world in peacetime as well as in wartime. The decades of the fifties and sixties would emphasize limited war because a third world war would have no victors. Foreign aid as

presented by the Marshall Plan and Point Four enabled countries to help themselves in order that their material destruction would not be accompanied by a moral and psychological destruction. Truman's policy had been his own rather than an extension of his predecessor. Whereas Roosevelt had waited for public opinion, Truman had gone ahead in what he believed to be necessary and realistic action. The policy concerning Israel's recognition pitted the President against his own State and Defense Departments, but if a decision had to be made quickly, Truman was the man to do just that. American national security was considered affected by any world development. This thought has been carried on by Truman's successors in Lebanon, Berlin, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. Any violent outbreak has been contained in the area where the action originated. We have had no World War III, and as Kennan predicted, Russia's military policy has mellowed. The People's Cultural Revolution in China may also be a turning point into a mellowing process, as that country too, is frustrated in an Asian container. World Communism has not quit in its goal to conquer the world; however, the attempts will have to be made in a manner that the Western World can cope with: propaganda and education.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

¹John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, (New York, 1960), p.4

²Ibid., p.17

³Lord Moran, Churchill, (New York, 1966), p.189

⁴Norman Graebner ed., Ideas and Diplomacy, (New York, 1964), p.vii

⁵Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960, (Princeton, New Jersey, 1962), p.22

CHAPTER II

¹Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency, (New York, 1966), p.76

²Cyril Clemens, ed., Truman Speaks, (New York, 1946), pp. 26-28

³Ibid., pp. 53,55,56

⁴Norman Graebner, Ideas and Diplomacy, pp.690-2

⁵Ibid.

⁶Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960, p.27

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., p.14

⁹Ibid., p.18

¹⁰Norman Graebner, Ideas and Diplomacy, pp. 690-2

¹¹Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960, p.31

¹²Ibid., p.33

CHAPTER III

¹Ibid., p. 15

²Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, (Boston, 1953), p.630

³Lord Moran, Churchill, p. 190

⁴Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960, p.20

⁵Ibid.

⁶Lord Moran, Churchill, p. 194

⁷Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency, pp.80-1

⁸Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. I, (Garden City, New York, 1956)
p.442

⁹Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, (New York, 1966) p.325

¹⁰Cyril Clemens, ed., Truman Speaks, pp. 61-71

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960, p.25

¹³Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, p.392

¹⁴Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960, p.26

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., p.32

¹⁷James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, (New York and London, 1947),
p.151

¹⁸Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

¹John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II,
p.28

²Ibid. p.31

³Walt W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, (New York,
1960), p.208

⁴Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. II, (Garden City, New York, 1956),
p.119

CHAPTER V

¹Ibid., pp. 551-553

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Raymond Dennett, Robert K. Turner eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, January 1 to December 31, 1949, vol. xi, p.40

⁶Walt W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, p.209

⁷Ibid., p.210

⁸Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After, America, 1945-1960, (New York, 1960), p.72

⁹Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency, pp.192-4

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Avery Craven, Walter Johnson, Roger F. Dunn, A Documentary History of the American People, (New York, 1951), pp. 882-3

¹²Ibid., pp.837-8

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Raymond Dennett, Robert K. Turner eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, January 1 to December 31, 1948, vol. V, "Message of the President to a Joint Session of the Congress," March 17, 1948

¹⁵Glen Johnson, Current History, "Aid Success in Western Europe," vol. LI, no. 299 July 1966, pp. 2,3,52

¹⁶Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency, pp. 192-4

¹⁷Glen Johnson, Current History, "Aid Success in Western Europe"

¹⁸Clinton Rossiter, Documents in American Government, (New York, 1949), p.215

¹⁹Glen Johnson, Current History, "A id Success in Western Europe"

CHAPTER VI

¹Walt W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, p.208

²Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. II, p.120

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

CHAPTER VII

¹John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs: 1948-1949, (New York, 1947), p.13

²John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, p.54

³Ibid., p.56

⁴Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, (New York, 1951), p.212

⁵Walt W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, p.220

⁶John Gunther, Inside Europe Today, (New York, 1961), p.250

⁷Avery Craven, Walter Johnson, Roger F. Dunn, A Documentary History of the American People, p.840

⁸Ibid.

CHAPTER VIII

¹Walt W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, (New York, 1960), p.256

²Ibid., p.253

³Public Papers of the President, (January 1 to December 31, 1950), #154, pp.453-4

⁴Harry S. Truman, Mr. Citizen, (New York, 1960), p.173

⁵Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960, pp.156-7

⁶Ibid., p.158

CHAPTER IX

¹Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. II, p.140

²Ibid., p.149

³Ibid., pp.151-2

⁴Public Papers of the President, (January 1 to December 31, 1946), #227, pp.444-5

⁵Public Papers of the President, #241, pp.467

⁶Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. II, p.145

⁷Ibid., pp.154-5

⁸Ibid., p.157

⁹Ibid., p.159

¹⁰Ibid., p.164

¹¹Ibid., p.167

CHAPTER X

¹Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War, (Boston, 1960), p.153

²Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency, p.55

³Ibid., Feis as quoted in Phillips, p.55

⁴Ibid., p.57

⁵James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.207

⁶Ibid., p.211

⁷Ibid.

⁸Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, p.329

⁹Public Papers of the President, #28, p.105

¹⁰Gilbert V. Steiner, The Congressional Conference Committee (1951)

¹¹Clinton Rossiter, Documents in American Government, p.245

¹²Ibid., p.236

¹³Ibid., pp. 241-2

¹⁴Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960, p.169

CHAPTER XI

¹John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, (Cambridge Massachusetts, 1959), p.69

²James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.204

³Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, p.332

⁴Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, p.221

⁵Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, p.410

⁶Ibid., p.403

⁷Richard Hofstadter, William Miller, Daniel Aaron, The American Republic, vol. II, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1960), p.646

⁸John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, p.71

⁹Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, p.420

¹⁰Ibid., p.422

¹¹Robert Payne, The Marshall Story, (New York, 1952), p.257,262

¹²Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, p.429

¹³Walt W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, p.229

¹⁴Ibid., p.234

¹⁵John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, p.55

¹⁶Richard H. Rover, Arthur Schlesinger, The MacArthur Controversy and American Foreign Policy, (New York,1965), p.100

¹⁷Raymond Dennett, Robert K. Turner eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. XII, "Remarks by the Secretary of State Before the National Press Club, Washington, (January 12, 1950), p.432

¹⁸Ibid., "Statement by the Secretary of State on Foreign Relations of the Senate, " (March 7, 1950), pp. 508-9

¹⁹Avery Craven, Walter Johnson, Roger F. Dunn, A Documentary History of the American People, pp. 868-9

²⁰John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, p.31

²¹Ibid.

²²George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950, (Chicago, 1951), p.101

²³John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, p. 73

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Walt W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, p.238

²⁷John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, p.94

²⁸Ibid., p.156

²⁹Ibid., p.177

³⁰Ibid., p.198

³¹Ibid.,

³²Ibid., pp. 205-6

³³Walt W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, p.241

³⁴John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, p.248

³⁵Ibid., p.253

³⁶George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950, p.256

³⁷John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, p.3-4

³⁸Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency, p.308

CONCLUSION

¹Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960, p.166

²Ibid., p.168

³Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

- Angle, Paul M., By These Words, Rand McNally & Company, (New York, 1954)
- Byrnes, James F., Speaking Frankly, Harper & Bros. Publishers, (New York and London, 1947)
- Campbell, John C., The United States in World Affairs: 1945-1947, pub. for the Council on Foreign Relations, Harper & Bros. Publishers, (New York, 1947)
- Clemens, Cyril, ed., Truman Speaks, International Mark Twain Society, (New York, 1946)
- Craven, Avery Johnson, Walter Dunn, Roger F., A Documentary History of the American People, Ginn & Company, (New York, 1951)
- Dennett, Raymond Turner, Robert K., eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, vols. V, XI, XII
- House Resolution #726, (to collect) Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States from George Washington 1789 to Harry S. Truman, 1949, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, House Document #540
- Payne, Robert, The Marshall Story, Prentice Hall, Inc., (New York, 1952)
- Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman #28 "Letter to Senator Mc Mahon Concerning a Bill for Domestic Development and Control of Atomic Energy, February 2, 1946
- Public Papers of the Presidents, #227 "Statement by the President (Truman) Following the Adjournment of the Palestine Conference in London, October 4, 1946
- Public Papers of the Presidents, #241 "Message to the King of Saudi-Arabia Concerning Palestine, October 28, 1946
- Public Papers of the Presidents, #265 "Statement by the President: United States Policy Toward China," December 18, 1946
- Public Papers of the Presidents, #154 "Statement by the President Upon Signing the Foreign Economic Assistance Act," June 5, 1950
- Rossiter, Clinton L., Documents in American Government, William Sloane Associates, Inc: Publishers, (New York, 1953)
- Truman, Harry S., Memoirs: Year of Decision, vol. I and Years of Trial and Hope, vol. II, Doubleday & Company, (Garden City, 1956)

U.S. Department of State Historical Office, Foreign Relations of the
United States Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945

SECONDARY WORKS

A. BOOKS

- Aron, Raymond, The Century of Total War, The Beacon Press, (Boston, 1960)
- Asbell, Bernard, When F.D.R. Died, The New American Library, (New York, 1961)
- Churchill, Winston, Triumph and Tragedy, Houghton Mifflin Company, (Boston, 1953)
- Coffin, Tris, Missouri Compromise, Little Brown and Company, (Boston, 1947)
- Dulles, Foster Rhea, America's Rise to World Power 1898-1954, Harper Torchbooks, (New York, 1955)
- Feis, Herbert, The China Tangle, Atheneum, (New York, 1966)
- Goldman, Eric F., The Crucial Decade and After, America 1945-1960, Vintage Books, (New York, 1960)
- Graebner, Norman, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960, D. Van Nostrand & Company, Ind., (Princeton, New Jersey, 1962)
- Graebner, Norman ed., Ideas and Diplomacy, Oxford University Press, (New York, 1964)
- Gunther, John, Inside Europe Today, Harper & Bros. Publishers, (New York, 1952)
- Hillman, William, Mr. President, Farrar, Straus and Young, (New York, 1952)
- Hölbörn, Hajo, The Political Collapse of Europe, Alfred Knopf, (New York, 1951)
- Hughes, H. Stuart, Contemporary Europe: A History, Prentice-Hall, Inc., (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1962)
- Kennan, George F., American Diplomacy 1900-1950, University of Chicago Press, (Chicago, 1951)
- Lord Moran, Churchill, Doubleday Inc., (Garden City, New York, 1966)
- Martin, Ralph S., President From Missouri, Jullian Messner, (New York, 1965)
- Maurois, Andre, From the New Freedom to the New Frontier, David McKay Company, (New York, 1963)
- Phillips, Cabell, The Truman Presidency, The MacMillan Company, (New York, 1966)

- Plischke, Elmer, Contemporary Government of Germany, Houghton Mifflin Company, (Boston, 1961)
- Rostow, W.W., The United States in the World Arena, Harper & Bros. Publishers, (New York, 1960)
- Rovere, Richard H. and Schlesinger, Arthur, The MacArthur Controversy and American Foreign Policy, Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, (New York, 1965)
- Spanier, John W., American Foreign Policy Since World War II, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, (New York, 1960)
- Spanier, John W., The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1959)
- Steiner, Gilbert, The Congressional Conference Committee, 1951
- Truman, Harry S., Mr. Citizen, Bernard Geis Associates, (New York, 1960)
- Welles, Sumner, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, Harper & Bros. Publishers, (New York, 1951)

B. SCHOLARLY ARTICLES

- Freidel, Frank, "The Atomic Age: Its Problems and Promises," National Geographic CXXIX, (January 1966) pages 81-89
- Johnson, Glen, "Aid Success in Western Europe," Current History LI No. 299, (July 1966)
- T.R.B., "T.R.B. from Washington," The New Republic, (June 25, 1966)

C. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

- Ferrell, Robert H., "Roosevelt and Truman Policy: Continuity or Change?", given for a seminar on Recent Foreign Policy, (April 29, 1966)