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Leon Ma. Guerrero

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# The Kaiser and the Philippines

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LEON MA. GUERRERO

SOMETIME in 1958 my eye was caught by a reference in the London newspapers to the secret records of the German Foreign Office which the Allies had seized upon the fall of Berlin. I had always been intrigued by the seemingly provocative conduct of the commander of the German naval squadron in Manila Bay after Dewey's destruction of Montojo's fleet, and it occurred to me that a clue to Vice-Admiral von Diederichs' actions might be found in these secret archives which were now unexpectedly open to historical research.

I could not leave London myself for this purpose, which was of course unofficial, and so I had recourse to my friend and colleague, the German Ambassador in London, His Excellency Hans von Herwarth, who very kindly transmitted my request to the custodian of the political archives of his Foreign Office.

In due time I received photostat copies of the 13 pertinent German documents, some of them with marginal notes in the hand-writing of Kaiser Wilhelm himself. Three of these had previously appeared in *Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette*, 1871-1914. To my knowledge, the other ten have never been published, most of them having been sent or received in code and marked "secret."

As such they may be a not unimportant contribution to the history of the Philippines, particularly its diplomatic history, since they illuminate the efforts of the Filipinos to enlist German support for the cause of independence and also sug-

gest a number of curious turns that our history might have taken.

What would we be now if the Philippines had become a monarchy under a German king, or if the Philippines had been partitioned among the world's sea-powers, or if the First Republic had been neutralised under their joint guarantee and protection? These are the courses of action that the Kaiser pondered in 1898 and which are the subject of this article.

## I

Shortly after Dewey's victory in Manila Bay several foreign warships gathered around the stricken capital. There were Her Majesty's ships *Immortalite* and *Linnet*, the French cruiser *Bruix*, the Japanese cruiser *Itsukushima*, and the German cruisers *Irene* and *Cormoran*. Soon there were as many as 15 at anchor in the bay, like anxious friends and relations waiting for their share of the inheritance.<sup>1</sup>

None of these gave Dewey so much trouble as Vice-Admiral von Diederichs, the German commander, who quickly assembled a squadron considered superior to the American, adding to his two cruisers the *Kaiserin Augusta*, the *Kaiser*, and the *Prinzess Wilhelma* as well as the transport *Darmstadt* with relief crews of 1,400 men and a coaling steamer.

When Dewey called on the German admiral as his senior and ventured to ask the reason for such a large squadron, Diederichs clicked his heels and curtly replied:

"I am here, sir, by order of the Kaiser."<sup>2</sup>

What His Imperial and Royal Majesty had ordered would puzzle Dewey until the fall of Manila. Certainly the German ships were behaving in the most unorthodox fashion in a blockaded port. The *Irene*, the first arrival, had coolly ignored the American admiral. The next, the *Cormoran*, had arrived with lights masked in the dead of night and had had to be brought

<sup>1</sup> Commander Nathan Sargent, U.S.N. (ed.), *Admiral Dewey and the Manila Campaign* (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Foundation, 1947), pp. 52, 60.

<sup>2</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 68.

up with a shot across her bows. German seamen casually took soundings off Malabon and the mouth of the Pasig, occupied the lighthouse there for a few days, drilled at Mariveles, and seized the quarantine station and a large Spanish officers' quarters.

Diederichs himself officially visited the Spanish Governor General and Augustín returned the call aboard the *Kaiserin Augusta* at night, staying for two hours. A Prince von Lowenstein, suspected of being a German intelligence agent, who had spent some time in the islands, was being taken to the German flagship by one of Aguinaldo's staff when heavy seas forced them to take refuge aboard an English warship.<sup>3</sup>

Matters came to a head when Aguinaldo's men captured Subic but were then prevented by the *Irene* from attacking the Spanish garrison on Isla Grande. Dewey acted quickly and dispatched the *Raleigh* and the *Concord* to the spot; as they steamed into the bay, the *Irene* quietly steamed out.<sup>4</sup> But the American commander was not disposed to let the Germans off so easily as all that. When the *Cormoran* was sighted one day coming up the bay, Dewey decided that this time she would not pass by without stopping, to avoid the routine daily boarding visit. Calling his Flag Lieutenant, he ordered:

"Mr. Brumby, I wish you to go on board the *McCulloch* and stop that vessel; mind you, sir, stop her!"

The *Cormoran* ignored the *McCulloch's* signals and a shot was fired across her bows.

The next day Diederichs sent a staff officer to deliver to Dewey His Excellency's protests.

"And does His Excellency know that it is my force and not his which is blocking this port?"

"Yes, sir."

"And is he aware that he has no rights here except such as I choose to allow him, and does he realise that he cannot communicate with that city except by my permission?"

<sup>3</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 69.

<sup>4</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 70; Walter Millis, *The Martial Spirit* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1931), p. 332.

The German shrugged his shoulders.

"One would imagine, sir, that you were conducting this blockade."

The officer denied it.

"Do you want war with us?"

"Certainly not."

"Well, it looks like it, and you are very near it, and"—Dewey's voice rose to a shout—"you can have it, sir, as soon as you like."<sup>5</sup>

But the Kaiser did not want war with the Americans then, any more than he would want it in 1917.

The Documents in the hitherto secret archives of the German Foreign Office now throw some light on what His Imperial and Royal Majesty did want. If we are to judge by them, it was the German Ambassador in London, Graf von Hatzfeldt, who first brought to the official notice of his government the changed situation in the Philippines brought about by Dewey's naval victory. On the 4th May 1898 he reported to the Reich Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfuerst, that "the English press is already beginning to occupy itself very actively with the probable fate of the Philippines."<sup>6</sup> He then went on to quote briefly from three London newspapers, *The Times*, *The Standard*, and *The Daily Chronicle*. The articles cited in his dispatch are worth quoting at some length because they show how hesitant and undefined American policy towards the Philippines was at that stage of the war and what exciting possibilities this indecision opened to the European powers.

"It is said," speculated *The Times*, "that the President (of the U.S.A.), on whom responsibility will rest in the first in-

<sup>5</sup> Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>6</sup> Documents from the Political Archives of the German Foreign Office, Doc. I. (Thirteen records, arranged chronologically and extending from 4 May 1898 to 13 August 1898, were forwarded to London. They will henceforth be referred to as GFO, followed by the document number.)

stance, is determined to hold the Philippines, after the conquest which is regarded as assured, until the end of the war, and then, if Spain is unable to redeem her dependency by payment of an indemnity, to sell the islands to any nation that may undertake to pay off this mortgage upon them.”<sup>7</sup>

It is ironic that, in the event, it was the U.S.A. that paid the indemnity and kept the Philippines, but the German Ambassador in London could not know that and in his dispatch he made it plain that he thought the islands would be sold, most probably to England. He had some reason for his belief. The *Standard* correspondent in New York reported that “the suggestion of the *New York Times* . . . is echoed in other quarters with, here and there, a variation in favour of their (the Philippines’) exchange for islands in the Atlantic, in place of their out-and-out sale.”<sup>8</sup> Another *Standard* dispatch datelined Washington was more specific. “What most interests foreign authorities here is the suggestion that Britain should take the Philippines in exchange for the Bermudas or the British possessions near this country.”<sup>9</sup>

*The Chronicle* was more assertive. “Whatever our helpless government does or does not do, they must see to it that no European interference of the kind that is hinted at is allowed. If anyone is allowed to help in the policing of Manila, it is we [the English] who have the best right to do so.”<sup>10</sup> *The Chronicle* was not too well informed. The fact was that Her Majesty’s Government was not interested in acquiring the Philippines; they had a grander objective, the development of an Anglo-American connection in the Far East, which they were ultimately to achieve, and for that it was essential that the U.S.A. should be committed definitely and irrevocably in the Philippines.

<sup>7</sup> *The Times* (London), 4 May 1898.

<sup>8</sup> *The Standard* (London), 4 May 1898.

<sup>9</sup> *The Standard*, *loc. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> *The Daily Chronicle* (London), 4 May 1898.

## II

Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Secretary, might have his own ideas about the Philippines, but the Germans were not to be put off. In a secret report to Kaiser Wilhelm dated the 14th May 1898,<sup>11</sup> Bernhard von Bulow, the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office, made a definitive survey of the situation.

He first placed before the Emperor "with deepest reverence" a report of the German Consul in Manila, Kruger, sent via Hong Kong, which confirmed a previous report of Prince Henry of Prussia, then in command of the German Asiatic squadron.

"In the general opinion," cabled Kruger, "Spanish government in the Philippines untenable. A bloody settlement of accounts with the natives imminent at any hour. The insurgents, however, do not, on any account, just want to change masters and, say, exchange the Spaniards for the Americans, but want to become independent. They do not think themselves capable of founding a republic but prefer a kingdom, to them a more congenial form of government. Great inclination for Germany. There are signs that the matter may possibly end with the offer of the throne to a German prince. Can the matter take its course or is it to be discouraged?"

From all other available accounts this was an extraordinary misconception on the part of Kruger, who does not seem to have had the slightest understanding of the philosophy of the Philippine Revolution. Two Filipino representatives had left Hong Kong aboard Dewey's fleet on the 25th April but Aguinaldo himself had not arrived on time. It was only on the 16th May that he had been put aboard the *McCulloch* by the American Consul in Hong Kong, arriving in Cavite three days later. Kruger, therefore, cannot have had more authoritative basis for his report than the gossip of Manila. Bulow, however, was more realistic than the gullible Consul. In the survey he submitted to the Emperor he pointed out:

<sup>11</sup> GFO Doc. II; Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme (eds.), *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914* (Berlin, 1922 ff.), XV, pp. 33-38.



“It may be quite true that the Spanish regime in its present form cannot be maintained in the Philippines. The question is whether the archipelago will be taken over by a single Power or under foreign protection. Consul Kruger’s report is added confirmation that the natives of the Philippines show scant disposition to exchange the Spanish yoke with another direct and effective foreign domination. To subject the Tagalogs against their will to such foreign rule would probably be no easy task. Should the Americans or the English try it, they may have some unpleasant surprises, such as the French experienced in Mexico and the Italians in Eritrea. The inclination of the natives of the Philippines is to establish an independent state, which somewhat recalls the events in Formosa in the spring of 1895 when the leader of the independence party on that island telegraphed Your Majesty begging for your sublime benevolence toward ‘his fellow-citizens, abandoned and unfortunate but resolved to fight.’ At that time various signs indicated that the French had suggested and encouraged the Formosans’ declaration of independence. But their ideas of emancipation could not be realised because they failed to receive outside support.”

The perceptive and astute Bulow also warned, further on, that “unless the insurgents in the Philippines gain the upper hand or at least achieve notable success, Your Majesty’s Government can hardly declare itself in their favour openly or in favour of a change of regime, since such a procedure would, on the one hand, be in grave contradiction with the principle of legitimacy, which forms the basis of our relations with Russia and Austria-Hungary, while, on the other hand, we would come into conflict not only with America but also with England. An imprudent German move could cause a general reaction against us.”

He continued: “The position of Germany, if she should assume the role of the protecting Power of the Philippines and give that archipelago a German prince for a King, would in fact be more dangerous than the position of France three years ago when she planned to enforce the independence of Formosa.”

This grave warning moved Kaiser Wilhelm to write vehemently on the margin: "*I do not even consider it!*"

But Bulow had not been too sure of the Emperor's reaction when he wrote his memorandum and he had belabored the point. "If," he argued, "without first consulting the other Powers, we were to declare today that we propose to make the Philippines a German protectorate, these other Powers would, in all probability, and no matter how their interests might conflict otherwise, unite in the urgent task of preventing an archipelago with an area of approximately 350,000 square kilometres from falling under German rule. Even assuming that all the Tagalogs were to take up arms for Germany, it would not decide the issue, as only he who commands the seas can permanently hold the Philippines. In such a case the German fleet would have to face overwhelmingly superior forces. Here again," added Bulow in an obsequious aside, "is shown how much damage was done to the true German national interests when stupidity and sloth hindered the realisation of Your Majesty's grand and magnanimous projects to strengthen the German Navy!"

Kaiser Wilhelm exclaimed on the margin: "*Very true!*"

It is useless to speculate who might have been German King of the Philippines to play Maximilian to Aguinaldo's Juarez. The German Empire had been raised on the ruins of Napoleon III's, after a war provoked by the candidacy of another German prince to the throne of Spain herself, and both Bulow and his imperial master were too clever to risk another, and obviously less auspicious, war for the same cause, against the formidable sea-power of the Anglo-Saxons.

On the 18th May 1898 Bulow sent Kruger secret instructions by code:<sup>12</sup>

"The idea of choosing a German prince as head of state in the Philippines and eventually placing the archipelago under German protection has been definitely rejected by His Majesty the Emperor. Maintain therefore a negative attitude towards any soundings or approaches in this direction. Observe

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<sup>12</sup> GFO Doc. III.

unobtrusively and report any signs that may indicate that one or another Power, for example England or America, is attempting to establish itself permanently through negotiations with the insurgents."

Count Hatzfeldt in London and Admiral Tirpitz of the Navy High Command received similar advice.<sup>13</sup>

The Filipino leaders were not privy to these secret instructions and may have wondered at the German Consul's abrupt change of manner. But they had not yet given up hope of enlisting the Kaiser's support, as will be seen hereafter.

### III

Both apologists for and critics of American bases here may find it stimulating to consider the possibility that, if things had gone otherwise in 1898, we might have ended up with not only American but also British, German, Russian, Japanese, and French bases in the Philippines. Such was the second course of action in the Philippines which Bulow submitted to his imperial master in his secret memorandum of the 14th May 1898. Bulow based his views on what was to become an axiom of power politics: sea power is world power. "In my most humble opinion," he began, "command of the seas will decide who will directly or indirectly rule the Philippines. If England and America were to agree on a common policy, it would greatly influence the resolution of the Philippine question. The Russian, as well as the French, press is already very much concerned with this eventuality and discusses the various coalitions, divisions, etc., which could be used to prevent the Philippines from falling into the hands of the Americans with England's consent, or into England's with America's consent, as the result of a deal between them. It cannot be denied that the wishes of the Tagalogs would have less significance than the support of either one or the other great sea-power, even if it were justified to assume that the natives do not just intend to play us off against the Spaniards and the Americans as the Boers tried more or less to do against England three years ago, and that they really take annexation to Germany seriously.

<sup>13</sup> GFO Docs. IV & V.

Various newspapers have already published reports that the insurgent leaders in the Philippines are attempting to establish direct contact with Japan in order to induce the Japanese Government to support the establishment of an independent Philippine state and, together with North America, to take it under their protection. The insurgents are also supposed to have made contact with England. . . .”

Bulow’s information on the intentions of those traditional allies, France and Russia, seems to have been derived largely from the press.

“The *Moskawskija Wjedomosti* has already expressed anxiety about the consequences that a permanent alien occupation of the Philippines might have on Russian interests. *Swet* declares that Russia ought to acquire part of the Philippines for herself, and the *Paris Journal des Debats* hastens to disseminate these statements. The *Nowojo Wremja* believes that Russia could make good use of an intermediate station in the Philippines. The semi-official *Temps* has left no doubts on the French position and, as early as the 6th of this month, stated that France, being in Tongking [now Viet-Nam], an immediate neighbour of the Philippines, would, if necessary, act in accordance with her legitimate interests.”

The German Secretary of State’s analysis accurately reflected the cupidities aroused in Europe by Spain’s imminent collapse and America’s indecision. When war had broken out, only England had shown sympathy for the U.S.A.; most of the European governments, no doubt influenced by dynastic ties, cultural affinities and popular sentiment against the thrusting policies of the young North American Republic, had favored the manifestly enfeebled but gallant Spanish Regency. But now that the last remnants of what was once the world’s mightiest empire were to be cast adrift, it was obviously a free-for-all.

“In these circumstances,” Bulow was bound to observe, “a happy outcome for any German undertaking in the Philippines would depend, first of all, on an agreement with one or more first-class sea-powers. In such a case, an agreement with England and America, or with England alone (if she were recep-

tive), might offer greater security than an agreement with Russia and France as the latter two, even allied with Germany, could not, as far as I know, stand up against an Anglo-American combination at sea."

Bulow ran down the list of possibilities with Teutonic thoroughness. As between France and Germany, France might be able to rely on Russia to a greater degree than Germany on one of the sea-powers, for Russia could not stand by to see France worsted in a diplomatic or even an armed conflict with an England allied with Japan.

On the other hand there were already indications in the American press "that the Americans will not cede any part of the Philippines for the time being, but will keep them for themselves, eventually to conclude a barter agreement with England, which would be particularly congenial to the American character, perhaps exchanging [the Philippines] for the British possessions in the West Indies."

We have already seen that this did not at all suit high British policy. But Berlin was not expected to know that and was apparently not hostile to a partition of the Philippines or at least to the grant of bases or coaling stations there to the various interested powers. In any case the Kaiser did not propose to be shut out of the Philippines completely and without compensation, and in his secret instructions to Count Hatzfeldt in London on the 18th May 1898 Bulow stated that "His Majesty is definitely of the opinion . . . that the Philippines cannot wholly or in part pass into the possession of an alien Power without Germany receiving adequate compensation."<sup>14</sup>

Bulow did not specify what would be deemed "adequate compensation" but eventually Baron von Richtofen, the Deputy (then Acting) Secretary of State, would indicate to Andrew D. White, the American Ambassador in Berlin, that he "personally imagined" Germany would like full possession of the Samoan and Caroline islands, with coaling stations in the Philippines, perhaps in Sulu.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> GFO Doc. IV; *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, p. 39.

<sup>15</sup> J. F. Rippey, *Latin America in World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1928), p. 170.

As it turned out the partition project was stillborn. There was no support to be had from the other European powers who were perhaps just as glad that the U.S.A. finally decided to keep the Philippines whole. The Philippines could scarcely have escaped becoming a battleground in World War I if both German and Allied bases had been established here; and if, as happened in Tsingtao and the Carolines, the Japanese had been designated by the Allies to oust and succeed the Germans, the conquest of the Philippines in World War II would have been an accomplished fact long before Pearl Harbor.

#### IV

Neither a German monarchy nor the partition of the Philippines, however, can be said to have been Berlin's immediate objective in 1898. In his secret instructions to the Imperial Ambassador in London,<sup>16</sup> the German Secretary of State made this clear.

"Should circumstances appear unfavourable to a satisfactory consideration of German claims [for adequate compensation], German diplomatic activity should be directed toward the neutralisation of the Philippines for the present, under the protection of all the sea-powers. The final solution, that is to say, partition, would have to be deferred. The neutralisation of the Philippines is a harmless way of bringing the Philippine question up for discussion once the Spanish regime becomes untenable and a change of possession unavoidable."

Earlier, in his secret memorandum to Kaiser Wilhelm,<sup>17</sup> Bulow had cleared this proposal with his imperial master. "Besides a protectorate and partition," he had suggested, "there is a third possible *modus procedendi*, namely, to secure the independence of the Philippines by neutralising them and placing them under the joint protection of a combination of sea-powers. Thus a situation would be created similar to that of Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxemborg. Its advantage may be found in that it keeps the future open, and in the secret hope of every one of the protectors that a convenient

<sup>16</sup> cf. Note 14.

<sup>17</sup> cf. Note 11.

moment to act will turn up in the course of time. The latter reason," interjected Bulow in a frank parenthesis, "is specifically applicable to Germany which, under Your Majesty's strong and wise leadership, will soon be far more powerful at sea than at present."

Bulow concluded by suggesting that Hatzfeldt in London could sound out Salisbury on whether Her Majesty's Government wanted to "share immediately" in the spoils of the Spanish empire or whether it would satisfy the British for the time being "if nobody, including England, received anything."

Neutralisation under a joint guarantee of the sea-powers had an added attraction. It met, at least part of the way, a desperate move of Spanish diplomacy. On the 18th June 1898 Bulow informed the Kaiser of an interesting telegram sent four days previously by Consul Kruger in Manila.<sup>18</sup> The Spanish Governor-General had intimated to him that "the Tagalogs would believe the Spanish promises of reform if certain powers would guarantee their fulfillment."

Bulow thought that for this purpose only Germany, England and France as sea-powers would need to be "taken into account." It is difficult to see how the German Secretary of State proposed to reconcile the U.S.A., whose Asiatic squadron actually controlled Manila Bay, to the three-power guarantee of Spanish reforms which implied continued Spanish sovereignty. In any case he expressed his "most humble opinion [that], should the question of a guarantee really be raised by a competent representative of the Spanish side, one would next have to wait for the reactions of the London and Paris governments."

Confirmation of the Spanish maneuver came the very next day in a coded telegram from the Imperial Ambassador von Radowitz in Madrid,<sup>19</sup> although the same message made it clear that it would come to nothing. Radowitz reported that the Spanish Minister of State had offered to hand Manila over to the Powers, the Duke of Almodovar del Río protesting that

<sup>18</sup> GFO Doc. VII.

<sup>19</sup> GFO Doc. VIII.

he could see no other way to prevent the complete victory of the Revolution, which would threaten not only Spanish but European interests. The intervention of the Powers would also make it easier for Spain to negotiate peace with the U.S.A.

Alas, reported Radowitz, the proposal had met with general approval except from England, which had rejected it as constituting a breach of neutrality. The Ambassador was compelled to believe that England intended to hinder a negotiated peace and to "force Spain to accept the conditions agreed upon between England and America".

Again Bulow was more sceptical than his man in the field. "*Has such a suggestion been really made there?*" he asked in a marginal note. It seems that it had been, and Bulow tried to drum up support, if not in London, at least in Paris and St. Petersburg, but the reaction was negative.

## V

In his secret memorandum to Admiral Tirpitz on the 18th May 1898<sup>20</sup> Bulow had stated that "His Majesty the Emperor has graciously ordered Admiral Diederichs to sail to the Philippines after termination of the ceremonies attendant upon Prince Henry's reception in Peking, so that he can form for himself on the spot an opinion of the situation of the Spaniards, the attitude of the natives, and any outside influences which may make themselves felt with regard to a reorganization of conditions there."

Tirpitz took this rather badly, pointing out that "the employment of ships abroad falls, now as ever, under my department," but he acknowledged receipt of the "most high" order.

Diederichs reached Manila on the 12th June 1898. He was, as we have seen, almost obnoxiously active, and on the 20th German Naval Headquarters passed on to Bulow the following message from the Admiral:

"No native party is capable of forming and conducting a government on their own. The insurgents, under Aguinaldo's

<sup>20</sup> GFO Doc. V.



growing influence, do fight in the American interest, but their final intentions as against Dewey are unknown. Meanwhile they will have to give way to the victorious Americans owing to their lack of means and organisation and their shortage of leaders. The European merchants prefer the rule of any civilised nation other than Spain; they would like England best of all. The desire of the natives for self-determination would probably favour the increase of our influence."<sup>21</sup>

This was followed by a dispatch from Manila sent by the German Consul in Hong Kong, Rieloff,<sup>22</sup> who had apparently been sent to the Philippines either to relieve or to assist Kruger. Rieloff reported that the first American ground force, consisting of 2,700 men, had landed on the 1st July 1898 after taking Guam.

"Reciprocal distrust between the insurgents and the Americans more evident," he continued. "Last week I had two talks with Aguinaldo and his closest advisers. Fourteen provinces with over two million people are now in revolt. . . . Insurgents holding fast to plan of turning to Germany and seeking a closer association under some form acceptable to both sides, once they can dispose freely of the Philippines, that is to say, after finishing off the Spaniards and expelling the Americans or any armed intervention by another power. They have already sent a written commission to their partisan, Antonio Regidor, residing in London, with orders to proceed to Berlin to negotiate on a possible later association with Germany, offering in return commercial facilities as a start. . . . It is best for Germany to leave the insurgents to themselves in coming days. . . [and] enter later into closer or wider negotiations with the insurgents after they have achieved independence."

This was the last new element in the situation. The Filipinos were now trying their hand at diplomacy: Agoncillo in Washington and Paris, Ponce in Tokyo, and now Regidor in London and Berlin. But the wealthy barrister, an exile and a refugee since the mutiny of 1872, was not to walk under the *Linden* at all. Events had overtaken both the Kaiser and the Republic.

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<sup>21</sup> GFO Doc. IX.

<sup>22</sup> GFO Doc. X.

The U.S. Navy had given the American nation a magnificent Fourth of July present with the massacre of Cervera's fleet. On the 6th July the Senate approved the annexation of Hawaii. The best of the American volunteer regiments were being marshalled for the expedition to Porto Rico. And in the Philippines General Anderson had already landed with the first contingent of the expeditionary corps.

Even Berlin could see the enthusiasm with which the Americans were setting out in pursuit of their "manifest destiny". The Kaiser, for once, accepted the fact with good grace. "*Antonio Regidor*," he scribbled on the margin of Rieloff's dispatch, "*may appear here only when Philippines completely independent.*"<sup>23</sup> Taking no chances Graf zu Eulenburg, in attendance on the Emperor at Molde, sent a hasty message in code to the Foreign Office:<sup>24</sup> "His Majesty remarked that the partisan in London may not come to Berlin until the Philippines are completely independent. His Majesty orders the strictest secrecy in regard to the whole matter."

Richtofen, in turn, immediately instructed the Manila consulate "to unobtrusively inform the appropriate quarters there that the partisan living in London should on no account come to Berlin at this time because the situation is still obscure." On the contrary, it was now blindingly clear. He added, although it scarcely mattered in the circumstances: "I further inform you that the Japanese Government wishes the Philippines to remain Spanish, while the American representatives [in Berlin?] have recently given to understand that in the U.S. the supporters of the party favouring annexation of the Philippines are increasing continuously. Is it true," he asked, "that the leaders of the nationalist party are demanding a plebiscite and are therefore on bad terms with the Americans as the latter consider such a vote to be a serious inconvenience? In these circumstances the greatest prudence is required of us. Destroy these instructions immediately."<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> *loc. cit.*

<sup>24</sup> GFO Doc. XI.

<sup>25</sup> GFO Doc. XII.

It was the end. The All-Highest would no longer stoop to to conquer. Richtofen had already turned his eyes to easier spoil. On the 13th August 1898, the day Manila fell, he cabled Radowitz in Madrid:<sup>26</sup> "At the peace conference neither the West Indian question nor the Philippine question affects us politically. . . . The cession of one of the Ladrone islands is convenient to improve our political situation in that area. We must therefore attach much value to bringing about an agreement [on this]. Without revealing your mission but ostensibly only in the course of personal study of the conditions of peace [between Spain and the U.S.A.], please sound out the Minister of State if, and for what price, the Carolines, Kusaie, Ponape, and Yap could be ceded to us."

The Spaniards were reluctant to discuss the matter while the peace negotiations were in progress, but the Germans were persistent and secured a provisional agreement on the 10th September 1898 on the cession of the islands "for an indemnity the amount of which shall be fixed later." Pending ratification "the governments concerned pledge(d) themselves to maintain the strictest secrecy."<sup>27</sup>

Regidor stayed in London. In December the Treaty of Paris gave the Philippines to the Americans. On the night of the 4th February 1899 Private Grayson shot and killed a Filipino soldier crossing the San Juan bridge, and the next day the U.S. Senate voted for annexation by ratifying the treaty with only one vote to spare.

The foreign warships had long ago cleared Manila Bay; the Kaiser had his footholds in the Pacific; and Aguinaldo's officers, now no longer the allies of the American liberators, were to go rushing in their gala uniforms from a ball in Malolos to the front lines of Calocan. They were about to learn, what perhaps even now we only imperfectly understand, that the first law of nations is self-interest.

<sup>26</sup> GFO Doc. XIII; *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, p. 74 et seq.

<sup>27</sup> Rippey, p. 173; *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, pp. 74-75.