Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity and the Long Peace of East Asia: What Lessons Can They Offer to the World?

Timo Kivimäki, University of Bath

Introduction

Jeju, an Island of World Peace, is the location of six major Summit meetings on world affairs. Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity (JFPP) is an East Asian peace forum organised since 2001 by the Jeju Peace Institute, Jeju province, and the Foreign Ministry of South Korea on the Island of Jeju, South Korea. This forum respects East Asian traditions of peace-making and contributes to them.

This paper will first argue that since 1980 the East Asian tradition of prevention of conflict violence has been very successful. This argument will be based on statistics of conflict, and battle deaths in conflict, and success in this paper is defined as an ability to keep fatalities of conflict per population low. East Asia, since 1980, has been successful in this respect compared to other regions, and compared to its performance three decades before 1980.

Furthermore, the paper will look at what kind of fatalities of conflict East Asia has managed to reduce. Such analysis reveals that East Asian success has mainly been based on the ability to avoid conflict escalation. East Asia has not generally been very successful at avoiding conflict onset or managing conflict termination: it is the ability to avoid the spreading and deepening of conflicts that the success of East Asian peace strategy is based on. Given this discovery, the explanation of the East Asian strategy of peace must be altered from one that is narrowly based on the obsession to develop to a much broader concept. In addition to developmental obsession that has reduced the regions willingness to fight wars, East Asian strategy of peace is also based on self-restraint with regards to interference in disputes outside country's own borders. Furthermore, it is based on a willingness to change the world in cooperation with others rather than by seeing problems as challenges posed by rogue countries and groups, and by confronting militarily such actors of world politics. East Asia does not aim at progress through military victories over rogue actors, but rather through mutual self-restraint.

Once there is clarity of the East Asian recipe for peace, this paper moves to the contribution of the Jeju Peace and Prosperity Forum and similar forums to the East Asian strategy for peace. There the conclusion is Forums like the JFPP can offer support to several of the elements of the East Asian peace formula.

Finally, the paper will investigate whether the East Asian recipes for peace and prosperity could offer global prescriptions. Again, the conclusion is clear. The world could learn from East Asia and Jeju: some of the recipes that Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity supports, can be found useful also to the entire world.

Has East Asia been Successful in the Prevention of Organized Violence?

East Asia, defined as ASEAN countries, Koreas, Mongolia, Japan and China, represent about 31% of world's population. During the first post-World War decades from 1946 to 1979, it produced 75-82% of world's conflict fatalities depending on which battle deaths data version one chooses. I will call this period the East Asian belligerent era. During the decades, since 1980, it has only produced 3-7% of world's fatalities of conflict.[1] I will therefore call this time East Asian peaceful era or the long peace of East Asia. The average annual number of fatalities of conflict in East Asia during the peaceful era compared to the belligerent era, is just 5%. Thus, 95% of fatalities of conflict have disappeared! Tønnesson, Bjarnegård, Kreutz and others have specified this by pointing to the fact that peace has emerged in steps, first in Japan, then in Korea, then in ASEAN and finally also in China and Indochina. After the 1980s interstate conflicts and wars (conflicts with more than 1000 annual fatalities) have disappeared almost altogether (Bjarnegård and Kreutz 2017; Tønnesson 2009; Weissmann 2011).

But the long peace of East Asia is not just an exceptional transformation of a belligerent region into a peaceful one. East Asia today (after 1979) is also an exception if we compare it to other regions. If we look at all organised violence,[2] we can see that the world average number of fatalities per population in all the years between 1989 and 2019 has been more than 23 times higher than in East Asia.[3] In fact, if we compare East Asia to Americas, to the rest of Asia, Europe, Africa

---

[1] These calculations are based on low, high and best estimates of the PRIO battle deaths data 2.0 and 3.0 (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). The use of Uppsala and PRIO data for the overlapping years (1989-2008) produce very different results specifically in East Asia (Kivimäki 2014, 40). Consequently, this article does not combine the two data sources in the study of the period before and after 1979. Calculated from UCDP data (Pettersson and Öberg 2020) we can see that the share of East Asian fatalities of all organised violence in 1989-2019 is 3.0% (the subregion East Asia has been added to the data by the author of this paper).

[2] Organised violence here includes, in addition to conflicts, also fatal, organised violence against civilians, i.e. one-sided violence, and violence that the state does not get involved in, i.e. non-state violence.

[3] This conclusion and most of the calculations on the relationship between conditions and conflict are based on a dataset (Kivimäki 2021b) that uses UCDP Georeferenced data (Pettersson and Öberg 2020), State Fragility Index of Systemic Peace 2018 (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017), population from the World Bank's World

or any other region, there is not another region that produces as small a number of fatalities of organised violence per population. Thus, we can conclude that the East Asian formula for peace has been successful.

East Asian recipe for peace: developmentalism and military non-interference

Many scholars have suggested that at the core of the recipe for East Asian peace is the region's willingness to develop economically rather than focusing on territorial or ideological ambitions (Bjarnegård and Kreutz 2017; Tønnesson 2009). I have also shown with my own calculations that a developmentalist interpretation of the role of the state does explain part of the long peace of East Asia (Kivimäki 2014, chap. 5; Kivimäki and Kivimäki 2011): regimes that did not define the promotion prosperity as a task of the state experienced more than 300 times as many fatalities of conflict as countries with regimes focused on development as the main task of the state (Kivimäki 2014, 101). If East Asian states construct the role of the state as an instrument of economic human security of citizens, this makes conflicts less attractive. Furthermore, trade and development are common interests that East Asian states can focus on, and by focusing on things that unite rather than things that divide East Asia has managed to avoid over-emphasizing divisions and conflict (Djiwandono 1994).[4]

The East Asian focus on economic human security has also meant that the idea of responsibility to protect has not become a vehicle for the legitimation of military interventions. Instead, the East Asian developmentalist attitude pushes the focus away from confrontational regime changes and military interventions. When there are humanitarian issues that are related to poor political administration, East Asian countries are mostly inclined to help host governments of such problems create more efficient governance. The several humanitarian crises of North Korea and the South Korean constructive rather than confrontative approach to them offer excellent examples

---

Development Indicators (https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=#), UNDP's Human development data (http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/download-data), Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions data (https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi) and data on US and other great power interventions from Kivimäki, Timo. Coding of US Presidential Discourse on Protection. University of Bath Research Data Archive, 2019. doi:10.15125/BATH-00535.

[4] While Djiwandono described this approach as traditional to ASEAN in the 1990s, the consistency of this approach can be demonstrated by the fact that the China-ASEAN meeting of June 2021 was still described in the media as follows: "During the ASEAN-China meeting, both sides largely downplayed their differences, including over the South China Sea disputes. Instead, they emphasized areas of common concern and cooperation" (Heydarian 2021)

of the East Asian developmentalist approach to human security. The lack of militarized focus on political rights in other countries has not reduced the development of democracy in East Asia: on the contrary, since 1980 autocratic violence has been reduced more in East Asia than elsewhere (Kivimäki 2010a).

However, the East Asian experience of conflict does not suggest that we should emphasise developmentalism as the main explanation of the long peace of East Asia despite the fact that this has been the main conclusion by many scholars (See for example Tønnesson 2009; Bjarnegård and Kreutz 2017). A closer look at the conflict problem in East Asia reveals that East Asia has not really improved its ability to avoid conflict onset very much. Rather it has managed to avoid the escalation of conflicts. If we use PRIO-Uppsala data (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Öberg 2020) on conflict and war episodes and we sophisticate the geographic specification of conflicts by adding the East Asian subregion into the data, and if we also add a temporal distinction between years 1946-1979 and 1980-2019[5], we can cross-tabulate small conflicts (with 25-999 annual battle deaths) and wars (with 1000- battle deaths) and pre-1980 years and post-1979 years of East Asian violence. Looking at all conflicts the number has only been reduced by 15% (from 338 to 286), while the number of small conflicts has increased! It may be possible that only bigger conflicts affect economic growth, but then the experience of inter-Korean trade seems to suggest that tension already reduces trade, investment and economic growth. One does not need a major war for that. Thus, it seems unlikely that developmentalism is the main explanation to the long peace of East Asia. The main explanation to the transition from belligerent era to the long peace of East Asia must be related to something that East Asian states do once there already is some disagreement and violence.

If we look at how East Asia differs from other regions, after the beginning of the long peace of East Asia, we will see the same pattern as in the difference between belligerent and peaceful era's in East Asia. East Asia has as many wars as Europe and only slightly less than in Americas, but many more small conflicts (because it also has many more people). While elsewhere the number of small conflicts is 3-4 times that of wars, in East Asia it is 13 times. Clearly, East Asia is special in its ability to avoid conflict escalation.

---

[5] It would be more accurate to compare average annual numbers of fatalities, but since the two periods area almost equally long, and since we are mainly looking at relative developments, there is no reason to complicate the discussion by introducing annual figures.

To reveal the formula of the long peace of East Asia, we will then need to find an explanation to the decline in conflict escalation. If we look at the documents that preceded the great change in East Asia at the end of the 1970s, we can see one doctrinal change that could be related to the drastic drop in conflict fatalities and conflict escalation in East Asia. Of the six fundamental principles of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation three first emphasise the respect of military non-interference, sovereignty and territorial integrity (ASEAN Secretariat 1976). This document became the foundation of a broader East Asian cooperation in the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN Regional Forum cooperation.

A similar message can be found in the Chinese conversion into the ideology of the long peace of East Asia: Deng Xiaoping rejected the subversive Chinese intrusion into the internal affairs of other countries, the exportation of communist insurgency and the ideological interventionism in his definition of the position of the new China in 1978 (Deng 1978). Deng also emphasised the importance of facilitating economic development as the main function of the state (Deng 1982), but for the question of conflict escalation the Chinese ending of ideology-based interference in disputes and conflicts of other countries may have been a more important contribution to peace in East Asia. Restraint with regards to interfering into disputes outside country's borders seems like a plausible explanation for the fact that conflicts do not spread and become more deadly.

My previous research has shown that since 1946, intra-state wars that have been intervened by outsiders have contributed to two thirds of conflict fatalities in East Asia. Conflicts with external intervention tend to be 3-9 times more intensive than conflicts without such external escalation (measured as fatalities per year). Furthermore, a huge majority of fatalities (up to 98%) of conflict in those conflicts that outsiders, mainly great powers, have intervened, have occurred only after the entry of great powers (Kivimäki 2014, 117–20). Thus, it seems logical that the East Asian rejection of and self-restraint with regards to external involvement in the intrastate disputes and conflicts must be a big part of the explanation of sudden drop of conflict fatalities in the region.

This does not, however, necessarily mean that all external interference is detrimental for peace. US deterrence, for example, has often been seen as a pillar of peace in East Asia (George and Smoke 1974; Kang et al. 2017). Military involvement is always an indicator of failure of deterrence, and thus, it could be possible that great power interference in domestic disputes and conflicts is detrimental only when deterrence fails, and punishments must be implemented.

However, if we look at how allies of great powers fare in East Asia in comparison to neutral countries and enemies of alliances, we can see that deterrence cannot be part of the recipe that explains the long peace of East Asia. It is clear that the general unwillingness in East Asia to accept foreign bases, foreign drone-based surveillance and counter-terrorism, etc, means that military deterrence by foreigners has declined in the period of relative peace in East Asia. The new commitment to non-interference, and the reluctance to accept external forces in internal disputes is temporaneously associated with the decline of fatalities. Yet, an even stronger evidence can be found in the track record of deterrence in the post-Cold War history of East Asia.

If we look at the impact of the rise of US deterrence after the formal new American commitment to the region decided upon in the US ambassadorial conference in Bangkok in 1950, one cannot see an improvement in the security of the region. About half of the nations experienced more, and half less conflict annually, on average. The East Asian average (as well as the Japanese, Mongolian averages) remained the same during the Cold War and before it after the WWII. If we look at battle deaths, only Malaysia and China were better off during the Cold War US leadership than before it. Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, The Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Korea lost on average more people in Cold War conflicts than before the rise of US leadership. What is striking is that it was mainly the allies of the US whose conflict fatalities increased most once the US took leadership of East Asian affairs in 1950 (Kivimäki 2010b).

After the ending of Cold War, the US had less interest in deterring undesired developments in East Asia. Yet, except for Cambodia and the Philippines, all East Asian countries had fewer conflicts and battle deaths after the end of the Cold War than before it. The beginning of the War on Terror in 2001 increased the US interest in the region and created some systematic effect on the level of US deterrence. Yet, in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, the number of conflicts and the number of casualties increased slightly, while no effect could be detected elsewhere. The countries whose conflict intensified were the ones where the US used its deterrence most, as conflicts with radical Islamist movements were exactly the focus of US security strategy.

Thus, it seems that the key to security in East Asian is in Asian, rather than American hands, and thus regional processes like the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity, can potentially be very influential if they manage to tackle the main challenges to security in the area.

East Asian recipe for peace-making: face-saving and endless multi-track dialogue

Peace-making does not only indicate the ability to end conflicts, but it also gives a hint of the culture that leads to and escalates conflicts. Victory, for example, can be an incentive to further conflicts while the need to protect might be a justification for the defeating of perpetrators of violence or atrocity criminals. If again, conflicts end in formal processes, rather than in informal interaction and self-restraint of conflicting parties, this may constitute a culture where conflicting parties do not see benefits in informal dialogue, and as a result, there may have a different path to peace or escalation of conflicts than countries with more informal path.

Comparing East Asia after 1979 with other regions and with itself before 1980, reveals three patterns of the long peace of East Asia. First, East Asian conflicts do not seem to end in military victories, especially not into revolutionary victories (Svensson 2011; Kivimäki 2011). Partly this may be related to the rejection of foreign influence that could tilt the balance of power to the advance of one of the conflicting parties, to allow a victory. This may also reveal something about East Asian framing of conflicts: conflicts are not about perpetrators that need to be defeated, but rather they are about disagreements, misunderstandings and policies that emphasise divisive issues too much and disregard uniting common interests. The East Asian approach to peace and conflict is relational, it is not one in which the enemy as an agent is seen as the main problem.

Secondly, conflicts in East Asia are not terminated with peace negotiations (Svensson 2011; Kivimäki 2011). There are only two conflicts, one on the conflict in East Timor, and the other in Aceh, that were ended in peace negotiations. Elsewhere negotiations either did not result in the ending of hostilities, or hostilities were ended already before formal negotiation.

Thirdly, rather than formal processes, in the peaceful East Asia, conflicts tend to end in informal dialogue and mutual decisions based on self-restraint. The two last elements of East Asia peace-making clearly suggest that instead of explicitly negotiating about differences, avoidance of conflict escalation in East Asia is based on informal, quiet dialogue, emphasis on things that unite, and self-restraint.

The percentage of victories dropped from 35.6% to 18.8% when moving from the belligerent to peaceful era. East Asia is also less focused on military victory than the rest of the world. Furthermore, conflicts do not tend to end in rebel victories in East Asia as often as they used to, or as often as elsewhere in the world. The latter unique characteristic of East Asian peace-making

is related to the new prudence and restraint against the support of anti-government conflicting parties in another country. While this used to be rather common in East Asia still in the 1960s and 1970s, it is possible to see from the Uppsala/PRIO conflict statistics that this has not happened a single time in East Asia after 1979 (Kivimäki 2011).

While the Western security paradigm is often focused on sorting out who is right and who is wrong, who is the good guy and who is the bad guy, many East Asian cultures are more hesitant to seek solutions that constitute defeat and loss of face for anyone. Instead, many East Asian cultures are more interested in finding stable solutions that save everyone's face and help everybody to feel victorious (Anwar 1994, 42; Djiwandono 1994). While the Western way to human security and interpretation of the Responsibility to Protect consensus is to identify the perpetrators of atrocity crimes and punish them,[6] East Asia emphasises self-restraint, and tries to cooperate for human security. As a result, the Western media is often puzzled by the unwillingness of East Asian and ASEAN meetings even to name the perpetrators. The ASEAN meeting of June 2021, for example, was commented in the following manner: "While calling for "self-restraint in the conduct of activities" and urging claimant states to "avoid actions that could complicate or escalate the situation," ASEAN once again demurred from directly criticizing or even naming China." (Heydarian 2021)

A more confrontational way can be found in the Wars in Korea and Vietnam during the belligerent era. There security was not offered by peace but by victory of capitalism over communism. According to instructions by the office of the US Secretary of Defense, officers should tell the soldiers that "if the Communists were successful, you would become the slave, body and soul, of as cruel a band of individuals as ever ranged the earth." (Office of Secretary of Defense 1950) Thus, security based on compromise with the enemy was not an option. Peace had to be achieved though victory. This must be one of the reasons why East Asia used to be belligerent, while currently it is peaceful.

Perhaps even more astonishing than the decline of victories, is the decline of formal peace negotiation in East Asian conflict termination. After 1979, only two of the 48 conflict terminations ended with the help of formal peace negotiation. This constitutes a decline from

---

[6] It is common in the Western literature to treat the idea of Responsibility to Protect as a principle that demands reaction to atrocity crimes, even though that concept of atrocity crime was not even mentioned in the summit outcome document that records the global consensus on R2P.

14.6% of East Asian conflict terminations to 4.2%. Even the two peace negotiations were not as formal as they normally are. The two negotiations were the East Timor process, where Professor Peter Wallensteen's team was asked to facilitate a hybrid formal/informal effort, and the Aceh Peace Talks, where President Martti Ahtisaari mediated with a group of unofficial academics and businessmen facilitating the process of pre-negotiation and creation of contacts of negotiation (Kingsbury 2006; Merikallio 2005). These negotiations never claimed exclusivity and they were based on the idea of "nothing is accepted until everything is accepted". This meant that the negotiation process as such was almost entirely informal until the signing of the final agreement.

Instead of formal peace negotiation, conflicts tend to end after informal contacts and independent decisions by each conflicting parties to end hostilities (informal dialogue and self-restraint). While informal, personalistic dialogue has been typical for East Asia, this was not typical for the termination of conflicts that great powers participated in. Most colonial wars as well as the Vietnam and Korean Wars were terminated in very formal settings.[7] The share of informal conflict termination which can only be observed as cessation of hostilities (in absence of ceasefires, peace agreements or negotiations) has increased by 18.2 percent points of all conflict terminations from the belligerent to the peaceful era. The large share of informal conflict terminations is an anomaly also in comparison with other regions. The share of informal conflict terminations has increased in most regions of the world, but East Asian share is still much higher than anywhere else.

In most cases of conflict termination, one cannot link any official activity to the process. Rather interaction between conflicting parties and stakeholders take place between academics, media personnel and officials in their private capacity. Instead of allowing these meetings any official capacity or decision-making power, most often the format of East Asian informal peace-making is that after unofficial dialogue, conflicting parties make their individual decisions that echo the consensus arrived at in informal, person-to-person dialogue based on individual ties and friendship.

For academic organizations the facilitation of meetings that officials can use for testing their ideas safely without committing their government or losing their face, is a matter of prestige. Academics with influence and official contacts are often considered more successful in the East

---

[7] Even in absence of a peace agreement, Korea is at de facto peace. The formality of the ceasefire negotiations was clearly a deviation from the Southeast Asian, and current East Asian informality of conflict termination.

Asian academia. At the same time, several East Asian countries consider it legitimate for politicians and officials to get their promotions on the basis of meritocratic virtues. Participation in academic events is therefore attractive to them. Furthermore, yielding to the concepts and ideas arrived at in regional expert meetings is to the meritocratic credit of the entire government. As a result, East Asian unofficial peace dialogue proceeds through the unofficial path to the "fizzling out" of conflicts. The fact that such a way of conflict termination also reflects most East Asian political cultures better than the "best practices" of conflict terminations of those conflicts in which too much authorship was with outside powers, makes the East Asian conflict terminations more sustainable: conflicting parties made their decisions on peace themselves and thus, there is no need to challenge a peace they feel ownership of.

How does the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity contribute to the East Asian peace formula?

It is not possible to measure how much the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity (JFPP) contributes to the East Asian strategy for peace, Yet, on the basis of the identification of the elements that the East Asian strategy consists of, it is possible to investigate how activity like the JFPP supports these different elements.

Already the name of the forum reveals a framing in which human security is not only threatened by war but also by poverty. Peace and prosperity go hand in hand in the East Asian and Jeju peace strategy, and this framing contributes to the East Asian strategy of peace: developmentalism is one of the core framings that make conflicts less attractive.

Secondly, the JFPP practices also sediment a framing that supports non-interference. Discussions are polite and cooperative, rather than adversarial, and regional scholars tend to focus mostly on the definition of their own country's approaches in their own country's problems. In this sense the debate does not encourage interventionism. On the contrary, the respect for sovereignty of each country seems to be an unwritten pre-agreement of argumentation in the forum. Thus, it would be possible to say that JFPP is in line with the East Asian approach to peace.

However, it is the East Asian and global approaches to peace-making and conflict termination that mainly reveal the full JFPP "complicity" in the long peace of East Asia.[8] The Jeju Forum is linked to the East Asian strategy for peace in its contribution to a specific kind of communication. As a forum the JFPP represents a service to the increased communication between formal and informal peace actors, in the public sector, private sector, academia and governments. In addition to linking various sectors of peace promoting action, the forum also contributes to communication between former and current leaders, and thus, to bring in a longer perspective to peace promotion. The Jeju dialogue also links official and unofficial national decision-makers crucial to peace, with international governmental organizations on a platform that in its unofficial nature promotes freedom of innovation and the development of confidence.

The Jeju Forum clearly demonstrates the culture of face saving and avoidance of harsh divisions. For governments touching sensitive issues and recognizing other conflicting parties may be problematic, and thus informal meetings, often in context of semi-scholarly meetings like the JFPP, are a more flexible option. Behind the JFPP are a research institute and two public entities: the province and the Foreign Ministry. This is typical of the East Asian unofficial peace path. Simultaneous individual decisions to cease hostilities by all conflicting parties are then seemingly independent and they fail to create observable official processes. Thus, it seems that conflicts simply fizzle out as Isak Svensson describes (Svensson 2011).

The East Asian and Jeju strategy of conflict termination does not aim at victory of one side. Instead, it focuses on dialogue between conflicting parties aiming at face saving solutions that leave no-one with an embarrassing defeat. Informal discussions like the ones in Jeju offer ways to help test opinions and consensuses and bring ideas into the discussion in a way that does not commit official parties into positions that they will then have to retract from in an embarrassing manner. East Asian dialogues rarely define other side's positions and interests, as for example, the solutions that impose regime change or "good governance" on others. Solutions that such dialogue reaches are then often more genuinely locally owned and, thus, more durable than solutions that one party imposes on others after a victorious battle.

---

[8] Quantitative evidence on conflict termination in this article is based on the UCDP data from 1946-2014 (Kreutz 2010).

The Jeju Peace Forum has not been optimally successful in this kind of facilitation of dialogue as it has not managed to foster exchange of ideas between conflicting parties such as the two Koreas. To be more useful for the deepening of the long peace of East Asia, it should find ways of inviting North Korean academics and officials in their personal capacity to help facilitate face-saving dialogue.

Lessons to the world

The focus on prosperity as part of the peace strategy can be seen useful also globally. Firstly, a focus that looks at human security and the responsibility to protect people merely or primarily as a political issue, or an issue of prevention of atrocity crimes, is problematic. This is because of the fact that prosperity seems to protect people better than punishment of atrocity criminals. Human security is much more severely threatened by poverty than violence. Less than 100,000 people are killed by all types of organized violence in the world annually (Calculated from the UCDP data, Pettersson and Öberg 2020), while a greater number of children die every week from poverty-related problems (calculated from Unicef 2019). Clearly, there is more work on poverty-related human security problems than problems related to violence by dictators and terrorists. Thus, there are global lessons from East Asian developmentalism and Jeju focus on prosperity.

Development focus is also globally useful in the prevention of fatalities of organised violence. The UN saves more than 30,000 lives more in its peacekeeping operations (counted together) during years when the development discourse is more prominent than average, compared to years when it is less prominent than average.[9] Here, development discourse's utility for UN success in saving lives excludes the focus on lives saved directly by actual development effort, as the focus here is only on the reduction of fatalities of direct violence. When focused on development the UN operations save a vast number of lives also by reducing the number of fatalities of poverty, disease, hunger, child mortality, mortality at birth, etc..

The world could also learn from the East Asian and Jeju hesitance towards military interventionism. If we focus on the post-Cold War period, we can see that what East Asia has experienced can be perceived globally. The only difference is that there has not been a global

---

[9] This is calculated by assuming that fatalities of organized violence would continue as they were before UN intervention and then by comparing the effect of UN intervention in years when UNSC debate emphasizes developmental issues to those years it does not. The data is from (Kivimäki 2021a).

hesitance towards external intervention as there has been in East Asia.[10] External intervention by great powers is associated with 5.4 times greater number of fatalities per population, and 5.5 times higher if the intervention is conducted by the US.[11]

If we then look at the change in the number of fatalities per population from one year to the next, we can see that that on average intervention predicts an increase of fatalities by 45 times. In this investigation US intervention seems to be less detrimental for the development of fatalities of organized violence. Yet also US intervention predicts an 18 times greater increase in conflict fatalities compared to a situation where US has not intervened.[12] Thus, it is clear that intervention into internal disputes and conflicts massively escalates conflicts, and thus, to create a long peace of the world, we should learn from East Asia.

The world could also learn from the East Asian and JFPP ideas of face-saving. In Western-dominated scholarship East Asian hesitance to focus mainly on things that divide, is often seen as unwillingness to face realities. This may be the reason why it has been so difficult for the Western scholars to understand why East Asia has not been ready to choose between China and the US in the recent escalation of tension between the two great powers. Peace in Western political discourse is a product of victory rather than compromise. All enemies of Western military operations are dictators or terrorists that one can only in very exceptional circumstances negotiate compromises with. This even though many of the most ruthless atrocity criminals that Western military operations have fought against are former allies whose rise to power some or most Western states have assisted (Al Qaeda, Vladimir Putin, Saddam Hussein, Khalifa Haftar, etc.). Due to the idea of tight association between peace and our terms of peace in the Western security discourse, conflict termination is often seen as imposition of solutions (often from

---

[10] In the analysis of the effects of intervention in intrastate violence in this paper is based on a data merger and treatment in (Kivimäki 2021b), in which data the source for fatalities of organised violence is from the UCDP Georeferenced Events data (Pettersson and Öberg 2020; Sundberg and Melander 2013).

[11] Lagging intervention and lagging fatalities and then correlating the two shows that both the number of fatalities predicts intervention, but also that intervention predicts increased numbers of fatalities per population.

[12] While the impact measured this way seems great, it is not systematic in a correlational sense. US intervention and intervention by any great power has a negligible positive correlation with the year-to-year change in conflict fatalities. Yet, because we are not looking at a sample, but all cases, it is legitimate to present averages of changes. This is all the evidence of the track record of interventions (all of the post-cold war interventions by great powers, UK, US, France and Russia, are somehow justified by references to protection), and thus it is legitimate to present how interventions have failed to prevent the loss of lives.

outside the group of conflicting parties). Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, for example, emphasises in his political memoirs about the need not just to pacify the situation and facilitate negotiation between conflicting parties. The task of peacemakers is to introduce a solution to the political problem and if necessary, to use military power to "sell" the solution (Blair 2010, chap. 8). To enable the imposition of a solution, the enemy must be defeated, and often also embarrassed. In the case of Libya in 2011, the opponent, head of state Muammar Gaddafi was already willing to concede and accept a non-political position of a titular leader of the same type as the queen in the UK, and yet, great powers felt there was a need to humiliate Gaddafi, and deny a face saving option from him (Samuel 2011).

In Syria, hundreds of thousands of fatalities of organised violence ago, there was a process of removing President Bashar al Assad from power in a process that offered face saving for Assad, and there are strong indications that this plan was accepted by the president himself. Yet, according to the author of such dignified exit, the plan was rejected by the Western permanent members of the UN Security Council, who did not want to hear about anything "dignified" in relation to the atrocity criminal of Syria (Ahtisaari 2015; Borger and Inzaurralde 2015). As a result, Syria became the deadliest conflict in the post-cold war era, while the dictator is still in power.

Again, the East Asian recipe of avoiding imposition of solutions and the aversion of humiliating military defeats and victories can be a global lesson, too. If we look at the strategy of UN peacekeeping and compare it with the strategies of unilateral great power interventions, we can see that the UN approach is closer to the one in East Asia: UN conflict intervention intends to do exactly what Tony Blair suggested one should not settle for. It aims at freezing the conflict in order to facilitate dialogue between conflicting parties. At the same time, most unilateral interventions have defined the "atrocity criminals" in advance and then simply aimed at defeating them.

If we then look at the development of fatalities of organized violence during and after intervention and compare it to the situation before the intervention, we can see that unilateral operations almost always fail to reduce these fatalities while UN operations that do not aim at victorious conflict termination, tend to reduce fatalities. Only one of UN's 32 latest peacekeeping operations that were not eclipsed by unilateral operations (Rwanda operation in 1993-1996) has left the conflict with more fatalities of organised violence during and after the operation

compared to the situation before the operation. Such failure, however, has been characteristic to most unilateral protective operations of the US, UK, France and Russia (Kivimäki 2021c).

Furthermore, if we look at the East Asian approach of focusing on self-restraint more than changing the behaviour of others, we have some global evidence of the virtues of the East Asian approach. In a study focused on US presidential discourse and conflict fatalities, it was possible to conclude that fatalities increased when the US president framed protection as something where one needs to prevent actions of a perpetrator of atrocity crimes, whereas the opposite effect followed when the situation was framed in a way that did not identify someone else whose action needed to be changed for the sake of protection. Whenever the focus was on exercising power to influence others, US tended to fail to protect more often than when the focus was on doing something oneself or when the approach focused on mutual self-restraint (Kivimäki 2019, chap. 8). Again, the East Asian formula of conflict termination has some useful lessons for the rest of the world.

Conclusions and discussions about the future of JFPP and the long peace of East Asia

East Asia has been very successful at avoiding conflict escalation. The Jeju Process represents and supports many framings and approaches crucial for the successful East Asian strategy to avoid conflict escalation. The JFPP has already made significant contribution in the facilitation of track two diplomacy, as well as in the facilitation of the interplay between different tracks of peace diplomacy. Regional security, according to the experiences of the past, is primarily in the hands of East Asians, and thus initiatives like the Jeju Process have potential for contributing to the security of East Asians.

The world in moving towards the escalation of tension and proxy wars in areas where the Western world is at odds with Russia and China. The approach of the West, but also Russia and China, has been to blame the opponent and frame the conflict as something that can only be ended if the other conflicting party can be defeated or reformed. This is clearly not the East Asia way of conflict de-escalation. Unsurprisingly, no progress has been made to avoid escalating tension and global war. There is a need for dialogue that strictly focuses on issues that could emphasize the common interests of great powers, and that could aim at cooperation and joint action to build on the common interests that unite great powers. For those who oppose cooperative approaches due to their disapproval of the behaviour of the opponent, we need to remind that even the reform of the other party is easier in absence of an immediate external threat to it. Stalin as the war ruler was the most

violent of Soviet leaders. He justified his human rights violations with reference to the external threat. The great reform that ended communism in the Soviet Union did not take place under maximum external pressure either. Soviet Union could find space for improvement only once such external pressure had ended and Gorbachov and Bush Sr. were negotiating major agreements of de-escalation. Thus, to avoid great power war, but also to end Chinese/Russian autocracy or American imperialism (whichever one perceives as real), we need a cooperative, East Asian approach to world politics. Thus, there could be a calling for a new, more globally oriented Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity; one that utilizes the East Asian concept of peace into dialogue initiatives that focus on and aim at global peace and prosperity.

Bibliography

Ahtisaari, Martti. 2015. "The Future of World Peace- Old Ways and New Thinking." Presented at the Kim Dae-jung Forum on World's Future., Seoul, Korea.

Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. 1994. *Indonesia in ASEAN Foreign Policy and Regionalism*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

ASEAN Secretariat. 1976. "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation." https://asean.org/treaty-amity-cooperation-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976/.

Bjarnegård, Elin, and Joakim Kreutz. 2017. *Debating the East Asian Peace: What It Is, How It Came About, Will It Last?* Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

Blair, Tony. 2010. *A Journey*. New York, NY / Newark, NJ: Random House / Audible.

Borger, Julian, and Bastien Inzaurralde. 2015. "West 'Ignored Russian Offer in 2012 to Have Syria's Assad Step Aside.'" *The Guardian*. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/15/west-ignored-russian-offer-in-2012-to-have-syrias-assad-step-aside (September 17, 2015).

Deng, Xiaoping. 1978. "Realize the Four Modernizations and Never Seek Hegemony." http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/dengxiaoping/103389.htm (August 12, 2013).

———. 1982. "We Shall Concentrate On Economic Development. September 18, 1982." *Talk With Kim Il Sung, General Secretary Of The Central Committee Of The Korean Workers' Party. Available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1030.html.*

Djiwandono, J. Sudjati. 1994. "'Intra ASEAN Territorial Disputes: The Sabah Claim.'" *Indonesian Quarterly* 22(2): 49.

George, Alexander L., and Richard Smoke. 1974. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter et al. 2002. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615–37.

Harbom, Lotta, and Peter Wallensteen. 2009. "Armed Conflicts, 1946–2008." *Journal of Peace Research* 46(4): 577–87.

Heydarian, Richard Javad. 2021. "Biden's China Policy Gets ASEAN Cold Shoulder." *Asia Times*. https://asiatimes.com/2021/06/bidens-china-policy-gets-asean-cold-shoulder/ (June 21, 2021).

Kang, David C., Jake Novak, Adam Cathcart, and Kim Beng Phar. 2017. "On North Korea, Nuke Deterrence Works." *usatoday*. https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/07/06/north-korea-nuke-deterrence-works-editorials-debates/103483372/ (January 16, 2019).

Kingsbury, Damien. 2006. *Peace in Aceh: A Personal Account of the Aceh Peace Process*. Jakarta: Equinox Publishing. http://dro.deakin.edu.au/view/DU:30000430 (November 26, 2013).

Kivimäki, Timo. 2010a. "East Asian Relative Peace - Does It Exist? What Is It?" *Pacific Review* 23(4): 503–26.

———. 2010b. "The Jeju Process and the Relative Peace in East Asia." *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 22(3): 355–70.

———. 2011. "East Asian Relative Peace and the ASEAN Way." *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* 11(1): 57–85.

———. 2014. *The Long Peace of East Asia.* Farnham/London & Cambridge MA: Ashgate/Routledge.

———. 2019. *The Failure to Protect. The Path to and Consequences of Humanitarian Interventionism*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

———. 2021a. *A Dataset on the Discourse, Approach and Outcomes of UN Peacekeeping,1993-2019.* Bath: University of Bath Research Data Archive. https://doi.org/10.15125/BATH-00783.

———. 2021b. *Data on the Fragility-Grievances-Conflict Triangle.* Bath: University of Bath Research Data Archive. https://doi.org/10.15125/BATH-00951.

———. 2021c. "Transition from US-Led Foreign Military Presence to UN Peacekeeping in Afghanistan. Opportunities and Dangers." *Mahr Brief of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies* 6: 1–17.

Kivimäki, Timo, and Mika Kivimäki. 2011. "Commitment to Development and the Capitalist Peace of ASEAN." In *Paper Presented at the East Asian Peace Panel of the ISA Convention, Hawaii, April 2011*.,.

Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. "How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 243–50.

Lacina, Bethany Ann, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2005. "'Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths'." *European Journal of Population* 21(2–3): 145–65.

Marshall, Monty G., and Gabrielle Elzinga-Marshall. 2017. *Global Report 2017. Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility.* Vienna: Center for Systematic Peace.

Merikallio, Katri. 2005. *Making Peace - Ahtisaari and Aceh*. Helsinki: WSOY. http://www.wsoy.fi/kirjat/-/product/no/9789510351932 (December 3, 2013).

Office of Secretary of Defense. 1950. "The Issues as Stake in Korea." *Armed Forces Talk* 340.

Pettersson, Therese, and Magnus Öberg. 2020. "Organized Violence, 1989-2019." *Journal of Peace Research* 57(4): 589–603.

Samuel, Henry. 2011. "French Say Col Muammar Gaddafi 'Prepared to Leave.'" http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8632560/French-say-Col-Muammar-Gaddafi-prepared-to-leave.html (September 26, 2015).

Sundberg, Ralph, and Erik Melander. 2013. "Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 50(4): 523–32.

Svensson, Isak. 2011. "East Asian Peacemaking: Exploring the Patterns of Conflict Management and Conflict Settlement in East Asia." *Asian Perspective* 35(2): 163–85.

Tønnesson, Stein. 2009. "What Is It That Best Explains the East Asian Peace since 1979? A Call for a Research Agenda." *Asian Perspective* 33(1): 111–36.

Unicef. 2019. "The State of the World's Children 2019 Statistical Tables." *UNICEF DATA*. https://data.unicef.org/resources/dataset/sowc-2019-statistical-tables/ (June 7, 2021).

Weissmann, Mikael. 2011. *The East Asian Peace. Conflict Prevention and Informal Peacebuilding.* Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.