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
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LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES AS
LOYALTY-GENERATING INSTITUTIONS

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Abstract

The current debate over models of self-selection in Congress -- whether Congressmen by-and-large find themselves on committees which most closely correspond to their constituents' interests -- has implications for theories of Congressional organization. Building on recent findings which question a categorical self-selection process, in this paper we present a theory of committee function based on loyalty to party leaders. As a rationale for leadership privilege, and to provide context for our argument, we first present a theoretical framework based on a modified model of cooperation. We then focus on certain specifics of our leadership theory; that rank-and-file members vote leadership interests in exchange for leader support in gaining choice committee assignments and aid in passing legislation. This leads to predictions about voting patterns across committees. Static tests of these relations are performed, as well as those incorporating changes in voting patterns with seniority.

1. Introduction

The committee system has long been considered the critical feature in our understanding of Congress and its organization. Particularly, the degree and purpose of the specialization embodied by committees has attracted much recent attention. The traditional view holds that a committee is an ideologically-differentiated subset of a chamber, and its position on issues within its purview is thereby not representative of those of the chamber as a whole. The standard precondition which drives this result is that new members of Congress, motivated by concerns of reelection, more-or-less self-select the committees on which they will serve, basing this self-selection on the needs and desires of their constituents. The expectation is that members from farm states will control the Agriculture Committee, those with armament firms in their districts (states) will gravitate toward Armed Services, and so on. One important implication of the self-selection model is that the party leadership's control over committee appointments, as well as the internal proceedings of committees, is necessarily limited. Specialization leads, in these models, to exchanges within a naturally balanced committee structure, with a greatly reduced role for party leadership oversight.

The specifics of the self-selection debate are usefully summarized (and extended) by two recent papers. Krehbiel (1990) in an important paper tests the categorical claim of committees as preference-outliers. With the exception of the Armed Services committee (and several borderline cases) he finds little supporting evidence. This finding is reviewed and qualified by Hall and Grofman (1990). While criticizing certain technical assumptions they agree with Krehbiel's rejection of the "broad brush" preference-outlier characterization. Their interpretation of this nihilistic result, supported by their own

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tests, is that a conditional, rather than categorical, preference-outlier theory is appropriate. Their findings build on concepts in Shepsle (1978) to suggest that committees with broad jurisdictions are not apt to evidence ideological bias because of the varied and competing interests they contain. A search for bias on these committees is more likely to be seen on the subcommittee rather than full committee level. Furthermore, bias should be more visible if the bill data are more carefully screened, pinpointing individual programs. This conditional version of self-selection, however, deviates from a pure self-selection model in several respect. Perhaps most critically it makes competition for committee appointments an important consideration. Committees with broader jurisdictional ranges will tend to attract a larger applicant pool per opening, generating competition, and therefore limiting the role of unconditional self-selection. Given the broad jurisdictions of many committees and differences in importance among them (often correlated with jurisdictional sweep), there must be an additional mechanism for the most sought-after committee appointments. Krehbiel's and Hall and Grofman's studies both leave room for forces working in tandem with, and at times superseding, the dictates of a self-selection committee appointment process.

Building on these results we introduce an alternative view of the committee system: as an institution for loyalty-generation. We maintain that the preferences of Congressional leaders disproportionately influence the fate of legislation. This influence extends into the make-up and functioning of the committee structure. We would expect that the voting behavior on the more important committees should more closely conform to that of the leadership, reflecting the influence of those leaders on the committee appointment process, or on the members of such committees after appointment, or both. We envision control exerted through the committee system as being of two

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primary types, roughly corresponding to the relative importance of committees. Members appointed to more important committees can be assumed to have passed a sort of loyalty screen; their average level of votes cast "with the leadership" should be higher, but they enjoy a certain level of freedom as well. This freedom is based on their having cleared the loyalty-hurdle of appointment, and also on the ease of monitoring their more prominent position affords. Over time, there is little reason for their voting records to more closely adhere to leadership positions. Members of less important committees, on the other hand, are under more constant pressure over time, and closer conformity to leadership voting patterns should be observed with greater seniority.

The paper will be divided into several sections. The first section will develop the theoretical background of our argument. Although the assumptions and predictions to be tested are laid out in a stark manner above, the arguments leading to them actually come out of several different strands of the economic and political science literatures. The second and third sections will elaborate and test the concepts outlined briefly in the previous paragraph. A more general discussion of the organization of Congress will be found there. The fourth section assesses the dynamics of loyalty over the span of legislators' careers. A fifth section offers some concluding remarks. A fourth section concludes.

2. Theoretical Framework

There are many possible frameworks for discussing principles of legislative organization and production.[1] The arguments for one or another of these frameworks are often thought to be dependent on which time period is under discussion. Different models, for instance, supposedly characterize a pre- and post-1973 Congress, when

committees were reorganized and the committee chairman's power compromised. Our background theory, being quite general, has a wider applicability, but is clearly appropriate in this later, post-reorganization period. For the purposes of this paper a context based on notions of cooperation shapes the ways in which problems are considered and addressed. The choice of a cooperative model in this case derives extra support from the "kind" of Congress to which it is to be applied. One assumption of simple cooperative models is an "even field" of individuals; essentially, a non-hierarchical or "even" basis for exchange. The decentralization of committees nudged Congress in this direction, although this was quickly complicated, as it will be complicated in our modeling.[2] The "even field" situation in a legislature is a potentially chaotic one, and legislators will attempt to take steps to avoid it. As a framework for conceptualizing these results, beginning with the cooperative model should be informative.

The background to cooperative theory stretches back at least to David Hume, but much recent attention has derived from the work of Robert Axelrod. Axelrod, in his pathbreaking presentation (1984), stresses the role of reciprocity in developing systematic cooperative schemes. In the reported computer tournament, a strategy of initial cooperation, and then replying in-kind (tit-for-tat) was shown to be remarkably successful in games with more than two players.[3] This cooperation between individuals is expanded to larger groups through the process of clustering. Since dealing with non-cooperators is costly, individuals choosing to behave cooperatively (keeping promises, etc.) begin to interact only with those of a similar cooperative disposition, forming a group or cluster of such cooperators. The enforcement mechanism is the cessation of mutually profitable interaction -- the exclusion of the non-cooperative member. Such exclusion can be accomplished through a member's changed "reputation" becoming

known to the entire cluster.

One might expect legislative bodies to demonstrate a great deal of such simple cooperative interaction. We hypothesize, though, that the almost "invisible hand"-type mechanism which is at work in these simple trading models is complicated by the legislative environment. Whereas in Axelrod's system a growing number of cooperators clustering together only presents additional advantages for cluster members, in a legislative environment this may not always be the case. Legislators with bills they hope to have passed are competing with each other for budget dollars. In that sense their interests are opposed, and not mutually reinforcing as in the pure cooperative "game". In economic terms, this is so because Say's Law does not apply to legislation: supply of bills, unlike supply of goods in the market, does not create its own demand. Cooperation, however, clearly plays a major role in strategies to get legislation enacted. Support from colleagues is necessary, and a network of promises, trading and offering support, should emerge. Yet this network of bargains would be exceedingly complex. Unlike the cooperative game described above, a "transaction" in a legislative setting requires agreement from many members. These intricate webs of interaction introduce elements of cost and fragility absent in the abstract cooperative theory.

The complicating factors introduced above -- competition for budget dollars, and the relatively large numbers needed for any single transaction -- derive from the institutional structure of legislatures. This institutional emphasis will be implicit in the paper's later analysis. Looking at the first factor -- competition for funding -- it is easy to see that the scarcity implied is of a different sort than any found in the cooperative game. In the game, all mutually profitable trades should take place. But the parallel in legislative bargaining -- say, a bargain for legislators to support each other's bills -- is subject to a

further condition (funding) which validates or negates a concrete outcome. Priorities must inevitably be assigned these legislative efforts, with only higher priority bills succeeding and emerging as law. The second factor -- the relatively large numbers needed for a transaction -- does not run counter to the precepts of cooperative interaction, but does introduce additional costs. Both factors point to the value of introducing some hierarchical dimension to augment and organize simple cooperative interaction.

One means of introducing this dimension would be to designate and assign a role to leaders within a legislative body. Provision of additional power to these members could serve to answer the needs sketched above. Leaders able to set priorities on bills would guarantee the fruitfulness of some legislative efforts, and reduce costs by discouraging others. By having vote exchanges monitored and coordinated, leadership could simplify the network of promises legislative action requires. Enforcement of deals could be strengthened as well. If deals flow through a central "broker board", or power is assigned by members to a select group enabling it to "kill" legislation under certain conditions, enforcement of agreements is tightened. Defectors would face not a possibly uncertain reputational decay, but a more absolute inability to negotiate the leadership "bottleneck." The leadership's authority to include or exclude others from deal-making thereby seriously deters opportunistic behavior. And rank-and-file members may well be willing to grant this power in return for the enforcement and efficiency such an arrangement would produce. Therefore this power, though naturally exercised also towards the ends of those possessing it (the leaders), would be contingent on the overall benefit bestowed on the rank-and-file membership.

The benefits of concentrating power in a select group form a basis for a leadership view of legislative activity. These benefits have been discussed in terms of how

leadership activity addresses difficulties that are institution-driven, difficulties that were not present in simple cooperative interaction. The importance of beginning with a cooperative model is to see more clearly how it is altered by the legislative environment, and therefore how a hierarchically-based "solution" can benefit both leaders and rank-and-file members. Because we assume this bargain to be in effect and to characterize current legislative activity, the advantages secured by rank-and-file members will be harder to analyze quantitatively (partly because their gain in the bargain results in an absence of difficulties that would otherwise be present) than those secured by the leadership. A "leadership view" of Congressional organization, then, is an emphasis on the more visible outcome of this bargain, but is only comprehensible as advantage gained in return for other services. It is this "exchange" dimension that we feel is most often overlooked in the literature which discusses, pro and con, the leadership's influence in Congress. Lacking this rationale, arguments for leadership power can degenerate into models of tyranny, with their attendant difficulty in explaining reasons for establishing a dominant group and its ability to survive. The discussion to this point has focused on the justification for leadership power, i.e., what function that power serves for those who do not themselves wield it. We now turn to a more straightforward question: the advantages that leadership power generates for the leaders themselves.

Members who manage to become leaders have their own interests and agendas, and we expect they will use whatever additional power they acquire to act on those interests. This "other side" of the bargain, therefore, has obvious legislative consequences. The leadership, by definition, is positioned at key locations in the legislative process. Most obviously, it chairs many of the more critical committees and subcom-

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mittees. Yet leaders possess broader power than simple control of certain channels through which legislation moves; for example, action on any bill can be affected by the Rules committee, the members of which are hand-picked by the House Speaker. Almost surely involved in any successful legislative initiative, the leadership desires to increase its own effectiveness, and the longevity of legislative outcomes which it supports. And by influencing committee assignments it helps shape the ideological profile of those committees which are most powerful. This not only reinforces the like-mindedness of those committees for current legislative activities; it also allows each generation of leaders some control in choosing those leaders who will succeed them. This has implications for the study of the durability of legislation, a topic we can only touch on it this paper.

Much of the previous argument has centered on the influence of leadership positions and wishes, yet aren't legislators even more firmly constrained by reelection concerns, and hence by constituent desires? The "micro foundation" of the self-selection theory of committees places emphasis on this constraint, by suggesting that the delivery of benefits to dominant constituent interests is reasonably driven by fear of defeat at the polls. While a portion of this argument must be conceded even by critics, recent reelection rates in the U.S. House would seem, at any rate, to belie the intensity of this reelection fear. And some current thinking has focused on the elected representative as someone who deals with the bureaucratic tangle at the behest of individual voters (Fiorina, 1977). In the hypothetical compact between party leadership and the rank-and-file, the increased confidence of reelection which has characterized the last several decades should permit a greater ability on the part of rank-and-file members to accommodate themselves to the wishes of the leadership.

If reelection pressures constitute an "exterior" control on the behavior of legislators, then the focus of this paper is on controls that are interior, arising from individual incentives and the institutional setting in which those incentives must operate. The cooperative model for this group interaction stresses the functional exchange of benefits which a hierarchical organization secures. This static view, however, fails to shed light on how roles are assigned to legislators. Why would some legislators accept the less powerful, rank-and-file status, and how might these positions change over time? One dimension of this change can be understood through a theory of "loyalty filters." Akerlof (1983) analyzes examples where self-sacrificing or "overly loyal" members generate a public good for the entire group. The rationale for such loyalty is a deferred payoff or benefit: members will benefit later from the greater reputation/efficiency that this "self-sacrificing" behavior generates. Some version of this would seem appropriate within our cooperative scheme as well (Westefield, 1974; Crain, 1990). New members seek to please leaders -- pass through the loyalty filter -- in return for positioning nearer the power base at a later time. Members, in other words, must "pay their dues" if hopes for future rewards and promotion are to be realized. This dynamic dimension, incorporated in a loyalty/seniority relation, will be central to the second half of our quantitative analysis.

The legislative game is apt to be played with greater proficiency over time, as legislators gain greater security and sharpen skills. In general we anticipate a positive relation between seniority and electoral security. This in turn implies that loyalty considerations become paramount over time as reelection becomes more assured. There remains at least the possibility that voting with leadership rather than with one's constituent interests could pose a threat to reelection. Additionally, we postulate a learning

curve on how best to play the legislative game. Making necessary contacts and assimilating strategies are apt to be time consuming, learning-by-doing activities. At first it may be difficult to determine what those in power actually want. Also a lack of seniority influences the willingness of others to associate. This is true not only because junior legislators have less to offer (have less power to generate legislative results), but also because their less certain tenure makes the investment in establishing working relationships with them riskier. These various factors contribute to a gradual learning of the ropes, which should be particularly in evidence on less important committees that provide little initial influence.

In summary we suggest that the roots of leadership influence can be found in an "exchange" of services for power. One means of clarifying this exchange is to attempt to contrast legislative activity with "pure" cooperative interaction. The difficulties (or constraints) imposed by the legislative environment can be seen as problems which a more hierarchical organizational structure might successfully address. These differences generate a more complex form of cooperation. Here both additional organizational complexity (committee structure) and norms reply to problems absent in simpler cooperative situations. In exchange for this amelioration, powers are conferred which reward the recipients, permitting them disproportionate influence. We test for this influence in the following two sections, focusing on voting patterns across committees and on changes occurring in voting behavior as seniority changes.

3. The Pattern of Loyalty Across House Standing Committees

We examine several implications of the analysis using data on the U.S. House of Representatives. As noted, the loyalty-generating function of legislative committees

differs from the self-selection model in key respects, and our purpose in this section is to offer preliminary analysis of how well the data fit the alternative theory. Our alternative theory implies that institutional pressures which characterize the committee system will cause members to conform more closely to the wishes of party leaders than they would in the absence of these pressures. Like Krehbiel (1990), we compare member voting behavior as a function of committee assignments.[4] As we explain in more detail below, the loyalty generating model implies that a party member's adherence to his/her leaders' preferences will be altered by the committee system.

The general proposition examined by Krehbiel is that members of House standing committees will be more extreme in their policy positions than the typical House member. Members self-select on to standing committees, and hence into specialized policy areas that enable them to serve their individual constituencies, and ultimately increase their chance of reelection. He tests this proposition by comparing the mean ADA rating for members of each House standing committee to the mean ADA rating for all House members. The preference outlier implication is that committee voting means will differ from the overall House mean.

Our initial empirical design generally follows this approach laid out by Krehbiel; however, to pursue the implications of the loyalty generating framework two differences are introduced. First, voting behavior is measured and analyzed from the perspective of party leaders; thus we only include members of the Democrat party in our analysis.[5] Second, we construct a Loyalty Index that reflects the degree to which party members vote in concert with the party leaders. Whereas in the self-selection theory members are chiefly driven by desires to satisfy "outside" constituents, the loyalty-generating theory implies that members pursue the favor of their party leaders.

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The process is one in which the leadership rewards member loyalty with better committee assignments. Members who cannot or do not conform as closely to the leaders' desires as their cohorts will fare correspondingly worse in obtaining influential committee spots.

The construction of the Loyalty Index used in the analysis is relatively easy to describe. First we select our sample of floor votes; it includes all House floor votes in the 99th Congress that had a margin of one percent or less.[6] This is a meaningful voting sample because it is on close votes that the leadership "needs" each member's vote. If the outcome of a floor vote is relatively assured -- win or lose -- party leaders are more likely to release members to vote their constituencies, should the leadership's position be at odds with a member's constituent-interests. On close votes party leaders demand adherence to the party line and such votes thus test a member's ability to support the leadership in crucial times. Leaders are less likely to let their members off the hook when the outcome is in doubt, and it is on these votes that the compatibility of the leadership's positions and a member's constituents is most likely to be revealed. Closeness of the vote is not a criterion used by the ADA in selecting its sample of floor votes, and thus may not pick up the tension between a member's desire to support the leadership's position versus supporting the preferences of outside interest groups. Using the one percent closeness criterion we obtain a sample of 26 floor votes. A brief description of the votes included in the Loyalty Index is provided in the Appendix.

Second, a "favorable" vote on each of the 26 votes that comprise the Loyalty Index is determined by which way a majority of the Democrats on the Steering and Policy Committee voted. Members of the Steering and Policy Committee are the core group that determine committee assignments for House Democrats. The membership of

the Steering and Policy Committee consists of the Democratic leadership (Speaker, Majority Leader, Majority Whip, Caucus Chairman, Caucus Secretary), the Congressional Campaign Committee Chairman, and the Chairmen of the Ways and Means, Rules, Budget, and Appropriations Committees. Additionally, there are eight members who are appointed by the Speaker and 12 elected regional representatives who are limited to two 2-year terms.[7] When committee positions are vacant, party members seeking the assignment must first be nominated by their regional representative and be approved by a majority vote of the Steering and Policy Committee. When multiple nominees are put forward, a sequential voting procedure is used. Following each vote, the nominee receiving the lowest votes is dropped from the subsequent round, until a single name remains. The Steering and Policy Committee members compose the group that Democrat party members need to please to obtain their preferred committee assignments. The Steering and Policy Committee reports its recommendations for Committee assignments to the full Democratic Caucus for action. After Caucus approval the proposed membership lists are incorporated into a resolution and submitted to the House for *pro forma* ratification.[8] The Rules Committee is an important exception to this procedure, its members being appointed by the Speaker. The Steering and Policy Committee is also constrained in its actions by certain limitations on committee service established in Caucus rules.[9]

Within these guidelines many considerations influence the assignment process. The Democratic Study Group lists six: personal preferences, policy attitudes, geographical balance, reelection prospects, state delegation support, and support of the leadership and committee chairman. (No. 99-55, Nov. 7 1986, pp. 5-6). Most theoretical attention has focused on the first and last: member preferences and leadership influence. In our

model of exchange of power for coordination and enforcement, member preferences and leadership influence each play a role, the difference from the self-selection model being that the first factor does not completely dominate the second. Members grant power to leaders to coordinate the passage of legislation, and one dimension of this coordinating effort is to be able to reward or punish those who facilitate or retard shared goals or perceived fair allocations of legislation and rents. Such enforcement power inevitably allows leaders a greater chance to act on and realize their own agendas as well, rewarding them for the services they offer the rank-and-file. Thus leaders do not dictate committee assignments, rather they facilitate member desires while retaining a real threat to frustrate those desires should certain "uncooperative" behaviors become manifest. The atmosphere of competition and leadership oversight is readily apparent to entering members, as Congressman and scholar David Price points out.[10] Again, though the focus of our discussion is on leadership influence, the exchange model which accounts for this influence emphasizes real gains both for leaders and the membership as a whole.

Third, because the voting data are generated by a binomial process -- a vote "yea" or "nay" -- we construct the Loyalty Index to reflect the frequency with which the "i-th" party member casts a vote favorable to the leadership's position. A House Democrat voting the leadership's position on r out on the 26 opportunities has a frequency r/26. The Loyalty Index is estimated by the weighted logit technique developed in Zellner and Lee (1965). Because this frequency is bounded by zero and unity, and we adjust for the cases where r = 0 and r = 100 using the procedure suggested in Gart and Zweifel (1967), and recently employed by Kalt and Zupan (1984 and 1990). In sum, the transformed Loyalty Index reflects an unbounded log-odds ratio, estimated with the equa-

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tions shown in 1a, 1b, and 1c:

(1a) if r = 0, Loyalty Index = ((log ((r + .5) / ((n - r) + .5))) - .5);

(1b) if r = 100, Loyalty Index = ((log ((r + .5) / ((n - r) + .5))) + .5); and

(1c) otherwise, Loyalty Index = log ((r + .5) / ((n - r) + .5)).

Based on the estimator properties reported in Gart and Zweifel (1967), we employ the variance estimator:

(2) Var = ((n+1)/n) * (((1/(r+.5))+(1/(n-r+.5)))).

Using this Loyalty Index, we initially compare and test for significant differences in the mean voting behavior of members on each House standing committee compared to the overall party mean. In addition we test for differences in the variance in voting by members within each committee versus the variance in voting by all party members. We begin by displaying in Table 1 the mean of the Loyalty Index for Democrats on each of the 22 House standing committees, arrayed from lowest (least loyal) to highest (most loyal). Interestingly, we find that the Armed Services committee exhibits the lowest mean loyalty of all standing committees. This was the sole committee that Krehbiel finds supportive of the preference outlier implication. In all, eight standing committees are less loyal than the mean loyalty rating of all House Democrats. In the third column we present the difference in the committee mean and the mean loyalty rating for all

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House Democrats. The last column contains the t-test statistic that the committee mean is equal to the mean of all Democrats. We return below to a model that explains the differences in mean loyalty across committees.

Next, we array in Table 2 the variance in each committee's Loyalty Index, ranked in terms of the smallest variation to the largest. The purpose here is to display the homogeneity of loyalty within each standing committee and examine the differences across committees. The filtering analysis suggests that committees will differ with respect to how carefully members have been screened by the leadership, prior to appointment. More influential committees are expected to exhibit more homogeneity than less influential committees. The third column contains the F-test statistic that the committee variance is equal to the variance in loyalty for all House Democrats.

The question we pursue is whether the loyalty-generating framework explains the differences in these loyalty characteristics across committees. We note that in general a smaller variance in the Loyalty Index is found (in Table 2) for the committees that have a higher mean value of the Loyalty Index (in Table 1).

The argument that committees are loyalty-inducing institutions implies that the leadership will benefit from this institutional arrangement. One test of this proposition is that loyalty will be stronger for the more powerful committees, where responsibility for prime legislative decisions is concentrated. A good proxy of relative committee importance is the degree to which the leadership feels compelled to "stack" the committee with party members (*i.e.,* the committee has a higher ratio of Democrats to Republicans). Such stacking provides a margin of safety when defections occur on votes, and would tend to be more heavily utilized where legislative stakes are greatest. Ranking committee importance by the ratio of committee Democrats to Republicans

does conform to accepted views: Rules, Ways and Means, and Appropriations hold three of the top four places. Other metrics of committee importance are suggested in the literature, but the importance of many committees changes over time, and these shifts can be difficult for outsiders to observe. Since party ratios are set by the leadership, this measure provides an approximation of the leadership's own view of committee importance, and the jurisdictions most likely to receive crucial legislation in upcoming sessions. We thus use the ratio of Democrats to Republicans on the committee as a proxy for its importance.

The proposition that more loyal members will wind up on more influential committees is tested statistically by regressing the mean of the Loyalty Index (from Table 1) as a function of committee importance. The relationship, presented in Column 1 of Table 3, is positive and significant at the one percent level. (The proposition predicts a positive sign and we thus use a one-tailed test criterion for rejecting the null hypothesis.) Members who have proven themselves more willing and able to vote in accord with the leadership's positions generally obtain assignments to more important committees. We note that these two managerial techniques -- both increasing party majorities on key committees and filling those slots with members with loyal voting records -- are independent, and therefore could on occasion be substitutes as well. Our result indicates, however, that the leadership generally exercises both options as margins for controlling the outcomes on the more important committees.

We next examine the proposition that the variation in party loyalty will be inversely related to committee importance. This implication follows for two reasons. First, members of influential committees will be screened more carefully by the leadership and thus should exhibit more similarity in their loyalty traits. Second, unimportant

committees will be manned by members facing a wider variety of constraints. Members at the "top" of the seniority ladder most likely have been "screened-out," that is, older congressmen who have already failed the leadership's loyalty test. At the bottom of the ladder, newly-elected members are untutored in the skills for advancement and burdened by an uncertain electoral future. In the middle ranks, members are signaling hard for promotion to a better assignment. Thus, the variation in loyalty on the unimportant committees should be greater than the variation on important committees. The results of regressing the variance in the Loyalty Index (shown in Table 2) against committee importance are reported in Column 2 of Table 3. The relationship is negative as expected and significant at the five percent level (again using a one-tailed test criterion).

We further explore the differences in the means and variances in party loyalty across committees by examining their relationships to the number of party members assigned to the committee. Adherence to the leadership's policy preferences is expected to increase as the number of members decreases. We have already noted the positive correlation between the importance of a committee and the loyalty of its members. The expected inverse relationship between the number of party members and loyalty can therefore be understood as a supplemental measure. That is, holding constant the committee importance/loyalty link, this relation between size and loyalty can be seen operating within differing "strata" of importance. For instance, considering the most important committees -- Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules -- we would expect the smallest of these to exhibit the most loyal voting behavior. The argument would, of course, work as easily in reverse -- holding constant the number of party members on committees, the more important among these would tend to have more loyal members. Smaller committees, *ceteris paribus*, tend to concentrate the power held

by individual members, and the leadership will naturally prefer more powerful members to be more loyal. We thus add the number of Democrats on the committee as an independent variable to the simple univariate regression models used above. The results are reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3. While the impact of size makes no difference in the model explaining the variance in the Loyalty Index, it is negative and strongly significant in the model explaining the mean of the Loyalty Index. The mean level of party loyalty is higher on committees with fewer Democrats, holding constant the importance of the committee.

4. Effects of Seniority on Loyalty

The above analysis of the effects of committee importance and size on member loyalty provide a probable overview of priorities of the leadership when making committee assignments. Generally, committee importance and loyalty are positively correlated and loyalty and committee size are negatively correlated. Considering both of these as reinforcing measures of the overall legislative power of a party member, it appears that the leadership prefers more loyal members in the more important committee posts -- hardly a startling view, yet conspicuously absent in the previous models of the committee system.

The relations illuminated in our preliminary analysis above do little to reveal the "patterns" of loyalty over party members' legislative careers. What happens to legislators who miss critical assignments to important committees? Do they, many as senior members of less important committees, tend to drift away from their leaders? Do newly elected legislators likewise "oversubscribe" to leadership vote positions to gain prestigious assignments? To assess more thoroughly the institutional functioning of loyalty,

it is useful to consider its dynamics over the span of a legislator's career.

We investigate this time dimension by bringing the concept of seniority into the analysis. Seniority in the U.S. House is an ordinal measure of the length of time party members have served continuously on a given committee. It is a committee-specific measure and with very few exceptions, length of continuous committee service -- *seniority* -- is the sole criterion for determining committee and sub-committee chairman-ships. The member with the highest seniority is the chairman, the member with the second highest seniority chairs the most important subcommittee, and so on.

For each standing committee, we regress the Democrat members' Loyalty Index values against their seniority ranking. We use a scale that assigns a seniority value of one to the lowest ranking committee member (*i.e.*, the newest member) and enter the natural logarithm of this seniority value into the regression. By this procedure, the intercept term estimated by the regression equation has a special interpretation: it is the predicted value of the Loyalty Index of a newly appointed member. (To be clear, this follows because the natural log of one is zero; thus the intercept term in the regression projects the expected value of the Loyalty Index at the origin.) The slope of the regres-sion line for each committee estimates the change in committee member loyalty with respect to seniority. The estimated slope coefficients allow us to explore the loyalty-generating capacity of different committees to determine which committees are loyalty-enhancing, loyalty-neutral, or loyalty-diminishing with respect to seniority.

House committees are ranked from lowest to highest in Table 4 according the intercept values of the Loyalty Index. These values project the Loyalty Index rating required for the newest committee member. As shown in Table 4 placement on the Veterans Affairs committee demands the lowest level of loyalty; placement on the Rules

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committee demands the highest level. Before investigating the general pattern of the entry requirements across all committees, we briefly characterize the pattern found on the seniority effects (*i.e.*, the slope coefficients).

Table 5 arrays the committees based of the estimated slope coefficients, reflecting the change in loyalty with respect to seniority. A positive value on the slope coefficient indicates that time served on the committee tends to be loyalty-enhancing, a zero (statistically insignificant) value indicates that service on the committee is loyalty-neutral, and a negative value indicates that committee service over time is loyalty-diminishing.

These two effects -- the loyalty requirement for entry and the change in loyalty with respect to length of service -- are likely to be interconnected. The results for the Rules Committee provides a useful illustration; Rules has the highest loyalty requirement for an entering appointee, but once appointed, loyalty tends to diminish over time. Veterans Affairs has a low entry requirement, but serving on this committee encourages members to alter their voting behavior to become more loyal. In context, new members of unimportant committees (such as Veterans Affairs) learn quickly that to obtain a better assignment they must subscribe more closely to the leadership's wishes.

We examine the patterns outlined in Tables 4 and 5 more generally with a final set of regressions; the first with the intercept terms as the dependent variable, the second with the slope coefficients as the dependent variable. The independent variables in each case are those defined and discussed previously: the number of Democrats and the ratio of Democrats to Republicans (committee importance). The results are presented in Table 6. Looking at the slope results first, the coefficient on the committee

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importance variable is negative and significant. This means that less important committees have a tendency to be more loyalty-enhancing institutions. Why might this be so?

The committee system in this paper is modeled as a filtering device, with the leadership able to utilize its appointment power to mold the loyalty profile of individual committees. The party leadership can therefore act both positively and negatively, rewarding some and withholding reward from others. Those less loyal will consist partly of members unwilling to support the leadership, but there will also be members who are unable to do so. Those legislators truly constrained by constituent pressure will tend to find the rewards of power not forthcoming. Instead of clinging to second-rate committee assignments, many of these members will succumb to attrition. Through attrition "less loyal" members are removed, which could dominate the effect of the "more loyal" being promoted to superior committees. This is one way to account for the increase in loyalty with respect to seniority on less important committees. A second explanation is that on less important committees seniority may signal a growing crisis in the course of a legislator's career. Members who have decided to persevere become increasingly desperate to ingratiate themselves with the leadership, and so gain the appointments necessary to work the legislative process. This urgency would not be expected on more important committees. Additionally members who have obtained positions highly compatible with those of the leadership may be encouraged to explore other political opportunities, in the Senate or elsewhere. This siphoning-off of more loyal members will further reduce the loyalty-seniority correlation on important committees.

These differences in changes in loyalty with respect to seniority on less versus

more important committees fit well with the intercept results, which are also presented in Table 6. If loyalty increases more steeply with seniority on less important committees, then an overall correlation between more important committees and greater loyalty would imply a higher predicted "entry level" of loyalty for more important committees. And this is what we observe. The regressions containing the number of Democrats and committee importance to explain the entry level of Loyalty produces a positive coefficient in each case. Though the number of Democrats variable is not significant, the committee importance variable is significant in Columns 3 and 4 at the five percent level. More important committees have a higher predicted loyalty requirement for the entering Democrat. This can be understood as a minimum loyalty requirement in place for these committees: only those members who demonstrate a relatively high loyalty level are considered for important committee assignments.

In combination with the slope results discussed earlier, a dual filtering process in committees is observed and this helps explain why loyalty does not increase with seniority as fast on the more important committees. The minimum loyalty hurdle for entry is higher on important committees; having cleared this hurdle such appointees have less to "prove" to the leadership than do their opposite numbers on lesser committees. Other factors should be considered as well. The significance of the number of Democrats variable in the slope equations could involve a number of contributing factors. Mancur Olson's work on coalition dynamics suggests that smaller groups have less severe monitoring problems than do larger ones (Olson, 1965). In Table 6, the number of Democrats variable is significant at the five percent level, and negatively correlated with the slope coefficient. This result is consistent with Olson's group-size theory. Smaller groups, because of cheaper monitoring costs (and greater vulnerability

to individuated pressures), produce more conformity with the party leaders' voting behavior. The explanation for the greater increase in loyalty with respect to seniority on smaller committees is likewise consistent with Olson's analysis.

Cheaper monitoring of small groups does not operate purely as a coercive mechanism; members for their part hope to "catch the eye" of the leadership and thereby gain recognition and approval. The visibility afforded by small committees is a natural advantage for their members, at least initially. Junior members on larger committees are thereby at a comparative disadvantage, and one extrapolation would have them "signaling" with loyal voting more strenuously to compensate for their general lack of visibility. This,in turn, would make the change in loyalty with seniority on these larger committees less dramatic; needing to signal early, the progression of loyalty change with seniority is less marked. As members become more senior, though, the ranks thin, and we conjecture that seniority brings heightened visibility to all members. Because the terms of competition have changed, the relative advantage enjoyed by members of small committees when they were junior has lessened. Visibility effects may therefore be concentrated only for more junior members on small committees.

Decentralization of committee power, or the increase in Congressional activities which necessitated it, could also influence the results above. As more subcommittees are created and their chairs vested with greater power, the number of opportunities open to legislators increases. Wider availability of positions increases the stakes in the legislative game -- more members feel the chance for real advancement, and the competition for positions is broader. The extension of opportunity to greater numbers would intensify competition on important committees, but it would also reach into committees which previously were considered unimportant.

5. Conclusions

This paper has attempted to analyze the committee structure as an institution which arises to solve inefficiencies in the legislative process. The difference in this approach from previous models is that a significant role is given to the leadership and their authority over the committee assignment process. We have characterized this institutional dimension of committees as one of loyalty-generation: simply put, committee assignments and aid in passing legislation are exchanged for loyalty in voting positions preferred by the leadership. Our statistical analysis reveals that loyalty increases with measures of committee importance, which is the predicted result of the power-barter model we introduce. Some committees are exceptions to this strict pattern -- like all monocausal explanations of the committee system, our model is incomplete.

Our leadership-based view of legislative organization is an attempt to develop one important dimension of a very complex problem. Other theories have undoubted contributions to make, and our own theory is far from fully tested or explored. Yet the exchange model for loyalty, coming out of comparisons with a simpler cooperative model, would appear to offer a useful departure point for future investigations. In this paper we have concentrated on the context it provides for analyzing the role of committees. Our tests provide support for the idea of committees as an institutional feature for encouraging loyalty to party leaders. The difficulties created by legislative constraints on the cooperative situation can be addressed by the coordinating and enforcing powers of leaders. Strategic positioning on committees and subcommittees is one more obstacle the rank-and-file member must negotiate to strengthen his/her ability to get legislation passed. By influencing access to these positions, as well as more direct control over legislative voting, leaders work towards a legislative order desired by

legislators with less and more power alike.

Finally, we stress the relevance of the loyalty generating view for the lively debate and active empirical literature seeking to sort out the ideological versus economic factors that determine legislator decisions (for a few examples, Kalt and Zupan 1984 and 1990, Peltzman 1984, Kau and Ruben 1979). This literature seeks to discover largely through empirical means the alternative forces that drive voting by representatives. The alternative hypotheses in these studies pit the representative's own preferences against those of his constituents. Our analysis suggests a powerful "third" force driving the behavior of representatives: the desire to please party leaders. Representatives that follow their own preferences in the standard view are shirking on their constituents. Our model suggests that shirking in this sense will not only come at the expense of constituents' preferences, but also at the expense of the leadership's legislative agenda. As we have explained, party leaders have the incentive and the institutional tools through the committee system to discourage party members from deviating. Thus, even if constituent monitoring costs allow legislator's to shirk on constituent interests, party leaders may absorb this flexibility with demands for greater loyalty.

[1]A (far from exhaustive) list of papers representing the recent literature on legislative committees include: Gilligan and Krehbiel (1990), Haeberle (1978), Leibowitz and Tollison (1980), Moe (1987), Munger (1988), Rohde (1991), Shepsle (1978), Shepsle and Weingast (1987), Smith (1988), Weingast and Marshall(1988), and Weingast and Moran (1983).

[2]See Weingast (1979) for ways in which "universalism" may be vulnerable to opportunistic behavior (in his example, he attempts to generate short-term minimum winning coalitions). p. 253ff. Our cooperative model is also "universal," not a minimum winning coalition arrangement.

[3]The level of cooperation observed in Axelrod is partly the result of pair-wise interaction as well as repeated play. But individual bargains to a large extent characterize legislative cooperation also. We argue that the level of "play" -- where the leadership has greater powers of reward and retaliation than ordinary members -- makes leadership desires the gravitational center of legislative cooperation.

[4]We replicated Krehbiel's empirical tests using the 1985-86 data sample and our results were very close. (The differences are so small it would be superfluous to include them here; they simply reinforce the major conclusions in Krehbiel's paper.)

[5]The Democrats held a 59 percent majority in the 99th Congress. We choose to examine the Democrats because, as the majority party, they control most major policy outcomes. As found in Crain, Leavens and Tollison (1986), legislation sponsored by a House Democrat has a much higher chance of being reported out of committee and of passing the full chamber than legislation introduced by a Republican member.

[6] We should point out that we first attempted the empirical analysis of the loyalty-generating theory using the sample of ADA bills from 1985 and 1986 (the same sample used in Krehbiel's analysis, except only Democrats were included). The difference we introduced to these data was in the definition of a "favorable" vote. Instead of accepting the ADA's definition (as Krehbiel does in testing the outlier hypothesis), we defined a "favorable" vote as being the way a majority of the party leaders voted on each bill in the ADA sample. This procedure provided some underpinning for the role of loyalty. This is because a strong statistical relation, showing many committees as outliers, would tend to deemphasize loyalty among appointment considerations. Committee appointments that wholly conform to constituent interests would curtail the leadership's prerogative in making those appointments. The shape and function of the committee institution itself would be different. Our results, comparing voting patterns for various committees using the ADA bills, show few cases where the median ratings were different from that of the House as a whole. The pattern we found closely paralleled that found by Krehbiel, with only the Armed Services Committee being a dramatic outlier. The strong relationship that is present for Armed Services, and nearly for the Post Office and Education and Labor, does indicate that such considerations can matter. Their insufficiency as a complete explanation, however, we see as supporting attempts to look at other factors as well.

[7] "Special Report," Democratic Study Group, U.S. House of Representatives, No. 99-56 (Nov. 10, 1986) p. 1. Perhaps a "purer" test could have been devised by omitting the 12 elected regional representatives from consideration. That we obtain strong results with such a leadership index indicates to us the degree to which the leadership element dominates Steering and Policy decisions.

[8]"Special Report," Democratic Study Group, U.S. House of Representatives, No. 99-55 (Nov. 7, 1986), p.3.

[9]No member serving on an exclusive committee (Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means) may serve on another exclusive, major, or non-major committee. Neither can a member serve on two major committees. *ibid*. p.3.

[10]"Several powerful House committees — Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Rules — are virtually off-limits to first term members both because of the intense competition for seats and because the party and committee leadership wish to take the measure of a member before placing him or her in such a critical position." (Price, 1989, p. 422)

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TABLE 1: COMMITTEES RANKED BY MEAN OF LOYALTY INDEX*

COMMITTEE	MEAN	DIFFMEAN**	T-STAT
Armed Services	0.34	1.04	3.74
Agriculture	0.65	0.73	2.59
Merchant Marine	0.73	0.65	2.31
Veterans' Affairs	0.79	0.59	1.85
Small Business	0.86	0.52	1.80
Science and Technology	1.06	0.32	1.14
Government Operations	1.18	0.20	0.69
Energy and Commerce	1.41	-0.02	-0.09
Budget	1.41	-0.02	-0.09
Banking	1.44	-0.05	-0.19
Public Works	1.49	-0.10	-0.38
Interior	1.58	-0.19	-0.65
Foreign Affairs	1.66	-0.27	-0.99
Judiciary	1.66	-0.27	-0.91
Appropriations	1.73	-0.34	-1.43
Ways and Means	1.76	-0.38	-1.28
Standards of Official Conduct	1.77	-0.38	-0.68
House Administration	1.82	-0.43	-1.09
Post Office	1.90	-0.52	-1.37
Rules	1.93	-0.54	-1.18
Education and Labor	1.94	-0.55	-1.79
District of Columbia	2.20	-0.82	-1.58

* The mean of the Loyalty Index for the 256 House Democrats is 1.3836.
**DIFFMEAN = 1.3836 - Mean of Committee Democrats.

TABLE 2: COMMITTEES RANKED BY VARIANCE IN LOYALTY INDEX *

COMMITTEE	VARIANCE	F-STAT**
Foreign Affairs	0.39	4.69
Education and Labor	0.47	3.92
Judiciary	0.58	3.17
Post Office	0.71	2.58
House Administration	0.89	2.06
Interior	0.98	1.86
Rules	1.23	1.49
Energy and Commerce	1.32	1.39
Budget	1.35	1.36
Public Works	1.46	1.25
Government Operations	1.49	1.23
Appropriations	1.63	1.13
Merchant Marine	1.65	1.11
District of Columbia	1.75	1.05
Science and Technology	1.89	1.02
Ways and Means	1.98	1.07
Banking	2.04	1.11
Agriculture	2.39	1.29
Standards of Official Conduct	2.40	1.30
Armed Services	2.44	1.32
Veterans' Affairs	2.83	1.53
Small Business	3.06	1.66

*The variance in the Loyalty Index for the 256 House Democrats is 1.8449.
**F-STAT = 1.8449 / Variance of Committee Democrats, or
  Variance of Committee Democrats / 1.8449, as appropriate.

TABLE 3: OLS RESULTS FOR THE
EFFECTS OF COMMITTEE IMPORTANCE AND NUMBER OF DEMOCRATS ON MEAN AND
VARIANCE IN LOYALTY INDEX

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS (T- RATIOS)			
	(1) MEAN LOYALTY	(2) VARIANCE IN LOYALTY	(3) MEAN LOYALTY	(4) VARIANCE IN LOYALTY
COMMITTEE IMPORTANCE	1.30 (2.00)**	-1.43 (-1.39)*	1.05 (-1.81)**	-1.42 (-1.32)*
NUMBER OF COMMITTEE DEMOCRATS	----	----	-0.51 (-2.63)**	0.03 (0.08)
CONSTANT	0.87 (2.96)**	2.20 (4.72)**	2.51 (3.72)**	2.11 (1.68)*
R-SQUARE	0.16	0.09	0.39	0.09
F-STAT	3.99**	1.29	6.04**	0.91

** Indicates significance at the .01 level for a one-tailed test.
* Indicates significance at the .05 level for a one-tailed test.

TABLE 4: PREDICTED LOYALTY OF ENTERING COMMITTEE DEMOCRAT
(Committees Ranked by Intercept Coefficients)

COMMITTEE	INTERCEPT COEFFICIENT	T-STATISTIC
Veterans' Affairs	-3.74	-6.56
Standards of Official Conduct	-0.17	-0.11
Agriculture	-0.06	-0.04
Public Works	0.63	0.76
Energy and Commerce	0.88	1.32
District of Columbia	0.99	0.96
Appropriations	1.04	1.09
Budget	1.30	1.57
Merchant Marine	1.42	1.80
Science and Technology	1.60	1.27
Ways and Means	1.61	1.47
Education and Labor	1.64	4.06
House Administration	1.96	3.03
Interior	1.97	3.98
Government Operations	2.07	2.73
Judiciary	2.37	5.75
Foreign Affairs	2.45	8.38
Post Office	2.60	5.59
Small Business	3.06	1.37
Banking	3.35	3.76
Armed Services	3.54	4.25
Rules	4.25	13.20

TABLE 5: CHANGE IN MEMBER LOYALTY WITH RESPECT TO SENIORITY
(Committees Ranked By Slope Coefficients)

COMMITTEE	SLOPE COEFFICIENT	T-STATISTIC
Rules	-1.46	-5.41
Small Business	-0.92	-1.06
Armed Services	-0.71	-2.08
Banking	-0.44	-1.24
Foreign Affairs	-0.27	-2.15
Government Operations	-0.20	-0.63
Post Office	-0.19	-0.80
Judiciary	-0.19	-1.02
Merchant Marine	-0.17	-0.53
Interior	-0.03	-0.16
Agriculture	0.01	0.02
House Administration	0.17	0.49
Budget	0.20	0.54
Science and Technology	0.22	0.43
Education and Labor	0.25	1.45
Energy and Commerce	0.35	1.35
Public Works	0.63	2.10
Ways and Means	0.65	1.46
Appropriations	0.65	1.98
District of Columbia	1.43	2.34
Veterans' Affairs	2.19	7.72
Standards of Official Conduct	2.38	2.51

TABLE 6: OLS RESULTS FOR THE
EFFECTS OF COMMITTEE IMPORTANCE AND NUMBER OF DEMOCRATS
ON CHANGE IN LOYALTY AND ENTERING LOYALTY

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS (T- RATIOS)			
	(1) CHANGE IN LOYALTY	(2) CHANGE IN LOYALTY	(3) ENTERING LOYALTY	(4) ENTERING LOYALTY
COMMITTEE IMPORTANCE	-2.26 (-1.90)**	-2.65 (-2.39)**	3.62 (1.65)*	3.81 (1.68)*
NUMBER OF COMMITTEE DEMOCRATS	----	-0.81 (-2.17)**	-----	0.38 (0.50)
CONSTANT	1.17 (2.17)**	3.77 (2.91)**	0.04 (0.04)	-1.19 (-0.45)
R-SQUARE	0.15	0.32	0.12	0.13
F-STAT	3.60**	4.49**	2.74*	1.44

** Indicates significance at the .01 level for a one-tailed test.
* Indicates significance at the .05 level for a one-tailed test.

APPENDIX: BILLS USED TO COMPUTE THE LOYALTY INDEX
(The 26 House Votes in the 99th Congress
with a Winning Margin of Less than One Percent*)

1. H.RES.97   by MICHEL (R-IL) -- Resolution to Seat Richard D. McIntyre

03/04/85 -- HOUSE Vote No. 1024: 168-167   (DEM: 168-4; REP: 0-163)

   Favorable Vote**: 'YES'

   (House agreed to a motion to refer H.Res.97, to seat Richard D. McIntyre,
   to the Committee on House Administration.)

2. S.J.R.71   by GOLDWATER, BARRY (R-AZ) -- Resolution Concerning the Procurement
             of MX Missiles (P.L.99-17, Approved 4/4/85)

03/26/85 -- HOUSE Vote No. 1037: 219-213   (DEM: 61-189; REP: 158-24)
   Favorable Vote: 'YES'

   (House passed S.J.Res.71, to approve the obligation of funds made available
   by Public Law 98-473 for the procurement of MX missiles, subject to the
   enactment of a second joint resolution.)

3. H.J.R.181   by MCDADE (R-PA) -- Resolution Concerning Procurement of Additional
             MX Missiles (P.L.99-18, Approved 4/4/85)

03/28/85 -- HOUSE Vote No. 1039: 217-210   (DEM: 61-187; REP: 156-23)
   Favorable Vote: 'YES'

   (House passed H.J.Res.181, to approve the obligation and availability of
   prior year unobligated balances made available for fiscal year 1985 for the
   procurement of additional operational MX missiles.)

4. H.R.1714 by FUQUA (D-FL) -- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
             Authorization Act of 1986 (P.L.99-170, Approved 12/9/85)

04/03/85 -- HOUSE Vote No. 1049: 206-201   (DEM: 43-190; REP: 163-11)
   Favorable Vote: 'YES'

   (House agreed to an amendment that changes the shuttle pricing policy for
   commercial and foreign users.)

5. H.R.1617 by FUQUA (D-FL) -- National Bureau of Standards Authorization Act for
             Fiscal Year 1986 (P.L.99-73, Approved 7/29/85)

04/18/85 -- HOUSE Vote No. 1056: 196-201   (DEM: 39-186; REP: 157-15)
   Favorable Vote: 'YES'

   (House rejected an amendment to the preceding amendment that sought to

reduce the total authorization level to 122.5 million dollars.)

6. H.J.R.247 by BARNES (D-MD) -- Resolution Concerning Peace and Democracy in
        Central America

04/24/85 -- HOUSE Vote No. 1068: 213-215   (DEM: 46-201; REP: 167-14)
    Favorable Vote: 'YES'

    (House rejected an amendment in the nature of a substitute to the preceding
    substitute that sought to provide 14 million dollars for humanitarian
    assistance to the Contras to be distributed by the U.S. Agency for
    International Development.)

7. H.R.2577 by WHITTEN (D-MS) -- Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1985
        (P.L.99-88, Approved 8/15/85)

06/06/85 -- HOUSE Vote No. 1145: 203-202   (DEM: 95-133; REP: 108-69)
    Favorable Vote: 'YES'

    (House agreed to an amendment to the Whitten Amendment eliminating the 98
    million dollars that would be spent on unauthorized water projects.)

8. H.R.99   by SEIBERLING (D-OH) -- American Conservation Corps Act of 1985

07/11/85 -- HOUSE Vote No. 1225: 193-191   (DEM: 175-43; REP: 18-148)
    Favorable Vote: 'YES'

    (House passed H.R.99, to provide for the conservation, rehabilitation, and
    improvement of natural and cultural resources located on public or Indian
    lands .)

9. H.R.3629 by ADDABBO (D-NY) -- Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986

10/30/85 -- HOUSE Vote No. 1377: 211-208   (DEM: 174-70; REP: 37-138)
    Favorable Vote: 'YES'

    (House agreed in the Committee of the Whole to Frank amendment that sought
    to strike 1.746 billion dollars appropriated for MX missile procurement.)

10. H.R.3629 by ADDABBO (D-NY) -- Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986

10/30/85 -- HOUSE Vote No. 1378: 210-214   (DEM: 176-70; REP: 34-144)
    Favorable Vote: 'YES'

    (House rejected Frank amendment that sought to strike 1.746 billion dollars
    appropriated for MX missile procurement.)

11. H.R.1616 by FORD, WILLIAM (D-MI) -- Labor - Management Notification and
        Consultation Act of 1985

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11/21/85 -- HOUSE Vote No. 1421: 203-208   (DEM: 183-54; REP: 20-154)
     Favorable Vote: 'YES'

     (House failed to pass H.R.1616, to require employers to notify and consult
     with employees before ordering a plant closing or permanent layoff.)

12. H.J.R.465 by WHITTEN (D-MS) -- Resolution Making Further Continuing
             Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986 (P.L.99-190, Approved
             12/19/85)

12/04/85 -- HOUSE Vote No. 1427: 212-208   (DEM: 205-37; REP: 7-171)
     Favorable Vote: 'YES'

     (House passed H.J.Res.465, making further continuing appropriations for the
     fiscal year 1986, and for other purposes.)

13. H.R.2817 by ECKART, DENNIS (D-OH) -- Superfund Amendments of 1985

12/10/85 -- HOUSE Vote No. 1446: 212-211   (DEM: 178-68; REP: 34-143)
     Favorable Vote: 'YES'

     (House agreed to the Edgar Amendment that requires companies to inventory
     and keep track of chemical emissions that are known to cause or suspected
     of causing cancer, birth defects, heritable genetic mutations, or other
     chronic health effects on humans.)

14. H.J.R.192 by COELHO (D-CA) -- National Day of Remembrance of Man's Inhumanity
             to Man, Designation

12/12/85 -- HOUSE Vote No. 1459: 206-213   (DEM: 157-84; REP: 49-129)
     Favorable Vote: 'YES'

     (House rejected the Ford of Michigan Amendment that sought to clarify the
     perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide.)

15. H.RES.415 by BONIOR (D-MI) -- Procedural Resolution - H.R.4515 and S.J.Res.283

04/15/86 -- HOUSE Vote No. 2079: 212-208   (DEM: 211-33; REP: 1-175)
     Favorable Vote: 'YES'

     (House agreed to H.Res.415, waiving certain points of order against
     consideration of H.R.4515, making urgent supplemental appropriations for
     the fiscal year ending September 30, 1986, and providing for the
     consideration of a joint resolution relating to Central America pursuant to
     the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 only
     containing the text of S.J.Res.283.)

16. H.R.1116 by DORGAN (D-ND) -- Garrison Diversion Unit Reformulation Act of 1986
             (P.L.99-294, Approved 5/12/86)

04/23/86 -- HOUSE Vote No. 2095: 199-203   (DEM: 107-127; REP: 92-76)
     Favorable Vote: 'YES'

     (House rejected the Bedell amendment that sought to require growers of
     surplus crops to pay the full cost of water from the project used for
     irrigation of those surplus crops.)

17. H.R.4784 by COLLINS, CARDISS (D-IL) -- District of Columbia, Requirement to
          Transfer Certain Jurisdiction Over Property to by Used for a
          Homeless Shelter

06/05/86 -- HOUSE Vote No. 2151: 181-182   (DEM: 29-180; REP: 152-2)
     Favorable Vote: 'YES'

     (House rejected the DioGuardi amendment that sought to restrict the
     administration of the property to an organization with charitable status
     under the Internal Revenue Code provisions prohibiting political
     activities.)

18. H.R.4116 by WILLIAMS, PAT (D-MT) -- Domestic Volunteer Service Act Amendments
          of 1986 (P.L.99-551, approved 10/27/86)

06/17/86 -- HOUSE Vote No. 2173: 204-208   (DEM: 33-206; REP: 171-2)
     Favorable Vote: 'YES'

     (House rejected the Martin (R-IL) amendment that sought to limit to 2,400
     the VISTA volunteer service years for 1987, 1988, and 1989.)

19. H.R.5052 by HEFNER (D-NC) -- Military Construction Appropriations Act, 1987

06/25/86 -- HOUSE Vote No. 2202: 215-212   (DEM: 192-56; REP: 23-156)
     Favorable Vote: 'YES'

     (House agreed to the Mrazek amendment to the Edwards amendment that
     prohibits United States personnel from entering any area in Honduras or
     Costa Rica, within 20 miles of the Nicaraguan border, for the purposes of
     providing aid or training to the Contras.)

20. H.R.4428 by ASPIN (D-WI) -- National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
          1987; Military Justice Amendments of 1986; Dan Daniel Special
          Operations Forces Act, Amendment; Military Construction
          Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1987; Department of Energy
          National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy
          Authorization Act of 1987; Strategic and Critical Materials
          Stock Piling Amendments of 1986

08/13/86 -- HOUSE Vote No. 2339: 210-209   (DEM: 172-72; REP: 38-137)
     Favorable Vote: 'YES'

(House agreed to the Porter amendment that prohibits use of authorized funds for procurement of binary nerve gas weapons until October 1, 1987, and prohibits the unilateral removal by the United States of unitary chemical weapons from Europe unless they are replaced with binary chemical weapons.)

21. H.R.5484 by WRIGHT (D-TX) -- International Narcotics Control Act of 1986; Narcotics Control Trade Act; ; Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986; Career Criminal Amendments Act of 1986; Drug and Alcohol Dependent Offenders Treatment Act of 1986; National Park Police Drug Enforcement Supplemental Authority Act; Drug Enforcement Enhancement Act of 1986; Federal Employee Substance Abuse Education and Treatment Act of 1986; Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1986; U.S. Insular Areas Drug Abuse Act of 1986; National Antidrug Reorganization and Coordination Act; Money Laundering Control Act of 1986; Drug Possession Penalty Act of 1986; Juvenile Drug Trafficking Act of 1986; Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund Amendments Act of 1986; Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986; Continuing Drug Enterprises Act of 1986; Controlled Substances Import and Export Penalties Enhancement Act of 1986; State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1986; Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986; Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act; White House Conference for a Drug Free America; Federal Drug Law Enforcement Agent Protection Act of 1986; National Drug Interdiction Improvement Act of 1986; Defense Drug Interdiction Assistance Act; Customs Enforcement Act of 1986; Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Prosecution Improvements Act of 1986; Alcohol and Drug Abuse Amendments of 1986; Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1986; Ballistic Knife Prohibition Act of 1986; Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act; National Forest System Drug Control Act of 1986; Anti- Drug Abuse Act of 1986; President's Media Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Act; Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (P.L.99-570, approved 10/27/86)

09/11/86 -- HOUSE Vote No. 2375: 198-206   (DEM: 106-129; REP: 92-77)
    Favorable Vote: 'YES'

(House rejected the Bennett amendment that sought to provide for the transfer of certain deportable aliens from State and local penal facilities to Federal penal facilities.)

22. H.J.R.732 by WHITTEN (D-MS) -- Resolution Making Supplemental Appropriations and for Emergency Assistance to the Philippines

09/18/86 -- HOUSE Vote No. 2391: 203-197   (DEM: 150-83; REP: 53-114)
    Favorable Vote: 'YES'

(House passed H.J.R.732, making urgent supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1986, for emergency assistance to the Government of the Philippines.)

23. H.J.R.738 by WHITTEN (D-MS) -- Resolution Making Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987; Goldwater - Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Amendment; Omnibus Drug Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1987 (P.L.99-500, Approved 10/18/86) (P.L.99-591, Approved 10/30/86)

09/25/86 -- HOUSE Vote No. 2417: 201-200   (DEM: 186-43; REP: 15-157)
    Favorable Vote: 'YES'

    (House passed H.J.R.738, making continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1987.)

24. H.RES.559 by BEILENSON (D-CA) -- Procedural Resolution - H.R.3810

09/26/86 -- HOUSE Vote No. 2419: 196-189   (DEM: 186-40; REP: 10-149)
    Favorable Vote: 'YES'

    (House agreed to order the previous question on the rule.)

25. H.R.3810 by RODINO (D-NJ) -- Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments Act of 1986

10/09/86 -- HOUSE Vote No. 2455: 192-199   (DEM: 68-159; REP: 124-40)
    Favorable Vote: 'YES'

    (House rejected the McCollum amendment that sought to strike the legalization program provisions.)

26. H.R.3810 by RODINO (D-NJ) -- Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments Act of 1986

10/09/86 -- HOUSE Vote No. 2456: 197-198   (DEM: 52-176; REP: 145-22)
    Favorable Vote: 'YES'

    (House rejected the Fish amendment that sought to strike provisions providing for the investigation, review, and temporary limitation on deportation of displaced Salvadorans and Nicaraguans.)

    * SOURCE: Data were obtained from Legi-Slate, a subsidiary of the *Washington Post.*

    ** A "favorable vote" on each bill is determined by the way a majority of the members of the Democrat Policy and Steering Committee voted. (See the discussion in the text.)