

Western  Graduate&PostdoctoralStudies

Western University
Scholarship@Western

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

1-10-2011 12:00 AM

Constructing Categories, Imagining a Nation: A Critical Qualitative Analysis of Canadian Immigration Discourse

Andrea R. Flynn
The University of Western Ontario

Supervisor
Dr. Danièle Bélanger
The University of Western Ontario

Graduate Program in Sociology
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy
© Andrea R. Flynn 2011

Follow this and additional works at: <https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd>



Part of the [Sociology Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Flynn, Andrea R., "Constructing Categories, Imagining a Nation: A Critical Qualitative Analysis of Canadian Immigration Discourse" (2011). *Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository*. 77.
<https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/77>

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlsadmin@uwo.ca.

CONSTRUCTING CATEGORIES, IMAGINING A NATION: A CRITICAL
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN IMMIGRATION DISCOURSE

(Spine title: A Critical Analysis of Canadian Immigration Discourse)

(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

Andrea R. Flynn

Graduate Program in Sociology

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

© Andrea R. Flynn 2011

THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES

CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION

Joint-Supervisor

Dr. Danièle Bélanger

Joint-Supervisor

Dr. Tracey Adams

Supervisory Committee

Examiners

Dr. Alan Simmons

Dr. Jerry White

Dr. Wei Wei Da

Dr. Jeff Hopkins

The thesis by

Andrea R. Flynn

entitled:

**Constructing Categories, Imagining a Nation: A Critical Qualitative
Analysis of Canadian Immigration Discourse**

is accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Date _____

Chair of the Thesis Examination Board

ABSTRACT

Immigration and population diversity are hot topics in Canadian society. Canadian immigration discourses include widespread debates over the value of immigration to Canada, the structure of the immigration program, and the impact of immigrants with ‘non-Canadian’ traditions and practices on Canadian society. Representations deployed in these discourses operate to socially construct the Canadian nation, and symbolically define immigrants’ place in Canada’s national imagined community. The present thesis elaborates on theoretical understandings of the social construction of the Canadian national community in the contemporary era of international migration by providing a qualitative critical discourse analysis of three types of Canadian immigration discourses: (1) media discourse (focusing on news media coverage of marriage immigrants); (2) policy discourse (addressing materials produced by Citizenship and Immigration Canada); and (3) official measurement of immigrants (in the form of the *Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada* and its accompanying analytical reports). The thesis reveals that these dominant immigration discourses serve to co-construct immigrants, Canadians, and the Canadian state in the imagining of the Canadian national community. These representations reveal that contemporary immigration to Canada is a major source of tension and uncertainty. This ambivalence manifests as inconsistent representations of immigrants (in general, and different groups of immigrants, in particular), involving co-existing, contradictory discourses of inclusion, marginalization, and exclusion. These representations inconsistently gender and racialize immigrants, often in the context of immigration categories of admission. These varied representations are interpreted in the thesis in terms of the convergence of

historical patterns of discrimination, the growth in immigration from non-European source countries, contemporary national and international concerns (e.g., economic stability; terrorism), and rhetorical pride in Canada as a multicultural nation. Overall, the present study contributes to theoretical work on Canadian immigration and imagined communities by furthering understandings of the various ways in which immigration discourses operate as conceptual spaces wherein what it means to be Canadian is articulated, and the place of immigrants in the Canadian nation is defined and contested.

Keywords: Canada, immigration, imagined community, imagined futures, critical discourse analysis, qualitative, media discourse, policy discourse, Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, this thesis would not have been possible without the dedication, advice, and unwavering patience and support of Dr. Danièle Bélanger and Dr. Tracey Adams. Their insights, thoughtfulness, and encouragement appear on every page of this thesis. Dr. Bélanger – you have been steadfast in your knowledge, wisdom, kindness, and generosity. You have been a wonderful mentor, and I will forever be grateful for the time and energy that you have invested in me throughout my graduate career. Dr. Adams – thank you for helping me see the forest through the trees during this thesis process. You have always been able to provide me with the direction I needed, and I am so thankful for all of your contributions. A special thank you is due to my examination committee – Dr. Alan Simmons, Dr. Jerry White, Dr. Wei Wei Da, and Dr. Jeff Hopkins – in deepest appreciation for the time and expertise that they lent to the final stages of my PhD. I would also like to extend my thanks to the wonderful staff and faculty at the Department of Sociology, all of whom are incredibly helpful and responsive to graduate students' needs. In particular, I would like to extend a warm thank you to Denise Statham – Denise, you are a wonderful resource to students in the department, and a great source of kindness and support. Thank you to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for financial support throughout my graduate career. Finally, I am forever indebted to my amazing mom (Nora), my wonderful sister (Gillian) and my precious niece (Ava). Thank you for all the love, support, and late night phone calls that it has taken to get me through my PhD. I simply could not ask for a better family.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Certificate of Examination	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Acknowledgements	v
Table of Contents	vi
List of Tables	x
List of Figures.....	xi
List of Appendices.....	xii
List of Abbreviations.....	xiii
Chapter One: Introduction	1
1.0 Introduction.....	1
1.1 The Social Construction of Immigrants in Canada.....	9
1.2 Building Canada’s Imagined Community: A History of Immigration	13
1.3 A Brief Summary of Current Immigration in Canada	16
1.31 Economic Immigrants	18
1.32 Family-Class Immigrants	19
1.4 Canadian Immigration Discourse.....	22
1.5 Thesis Outline	24
Chapter Two: Conceptual and Methodological Framework	26
2.0 Introduction.....	26
2.1 Social Constructionism	26
2.2 Dominant Discourses: Elites, Orthodoxy, Ideology, and Power	28
2.3 Imagined Communities	33
2.4 Imagined Futures.....	35
2.5 Additional Concepts.....	38
2.51 Nation, Country, and State	38
2.52 Race, Racialization, and Racism	39
2.53 Ethnicity	42
2.54 Gender	44
2.6 Critical Discourse Analysis.....	45
Chapter Three: Canadian Immigration from Confederation to the IRPA	53
3.0 Introduction.....	53

3.1 White Settler Families: 1869 to 1910	55
3.2 White Permanent Settlers and Domestic Labourers: 1906 to 1920s.....	61
3.3 British Family Recruitment: 1920s.....	65
3.4 Non-Asian Family Reunification: 1930 to 1944.....	70
3.5 Humanitarian Pressures and ‘Family’ Controversies: Post-WWII to 1976.....	73
3.6 Further Divergence Between Economic and Family Immigrants: 1967 to 1976	82
3.7 The Growing Rationality of Canadian Immigration: 1976 to Early 1990s	84
3.8 Reconceptualizing and Dichotomizing Family and Economic Immigrants: 1993 to Present	89
3.9 Conclusion	92
Chapter Four: News Media as Discourse – Focusing on Marriage Immigrants	96
4.0 Introduction.....	96
4.1 The Canadian Marriage-Migration Context.....	97
4.2 The Marriage-Migration Link.....	101
4.3 Media Research.....	105
4.4 Methods.....	109
4.5 Results.....	112
4.51 Negative Coverage: The Social Problem of Inauthentic Marriage Immigration	113
4.52 Negative Coverage: Inauthentic Marriages, Problematic Asians.....	122
4.53 Negative Coverage: Deviants and Criminals	128
4.54 Sympathetic Coverage: Legitimate Unions.....	134
4.55 Sympathetic Coverage: Sponsorship and Domestic Abuse.....	144
4.6 Conclusion	147
Chapter Five: Immigration Policy Discourse	152
5.0 Introduction.....	152
5.1 The Contemporary State and the Quest for Legitimacy	158
5.2 Democratic Racism.....	159
5.3 Previous Research	162
5.4 Data Sources	170
5.5 Methods.....	172

5.6 Results.....	173
5.61 Discourses of National Identity	174
5.611 <i>Immigration and Nation-Building</i>	174
5.612 <i>Fairness</i>	177
5.613 <i>Economic Strength</i>	181
5.62 Discourse of Multiculturalism: Diversity and Tolerance	187
5.63 Discourses of Moral Panic.....	191
5.631 <i>Balance and Burden</i>	191
5.632 <i>Border Security: Health and Safety Threats</i>	195
5.633 <i>Illegal Migration and Human Trafficking</i>	199
5.7 Conclusion	202
Chapter Six: Statistical Measurement as Discourse	207
6.0 Introduction.....	207
6.1 Population Measurement	210
6.2 Constructing Immigrants: Problematic Dichotomies.....	214
6.3 Data Sources	218
6.31 LSIC Questionnaire	218
6.32 LSIC Reports	220
6.4 Methods.....	220
6.5 Results.....	221
6.51 Immigrant Identity: Ethnicity	221
6.52 Immigrant Identity: Mode of Entry	229
6.53 Immigrants and Economic Considerations: An Individualistic Focus.....	236
6.6 Conclusion	244
Chapter Seven: Discussion	250
7.0 Introduction.....	250
7.1 Summary and Discussion.....	250
7.2 Limitations and Future Directions	262
7.3 Conclusion	267
References	269
Appendix A: Canadian Immigration Levels.....	299
Appendix B: Immigration Program Objectives.....	302

Appendix C: Information on LSIC.....	303
Appendix D: LSIC Reports Analyzed in Chapter Six.....	307
Curriculum Vitae	308

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1	Canada's Point System in 1967	83
Table 3.2	Maximum Points and Selection Factors in Canada's Point System (Selected Years).....	85
Table 4.1:	Sympathetic, Neutral, and Negative Articles, by Newspaper	112
Table 4.2:	Examples of Sympathetic Article Headlines, by Main Theme and Newspaper	135
Table 5.1:	Discourses and Themes Emerging from Critical Discourse Analysis of CIC Reports.....	173
Table 6.1:	Examples of LSIC Language Questions.....	223
Table 6.2	Examples of LSIC Questions on English and French Language Skills	225
Table 6.3	Examples of LSIC Employment and Income Questions	238
Table 6.4	Summary of LSIC Reports	239
Table A.1:	Number of Immigrants Admitted to Canada, by Selected Regions of Origin, 1946-2000	299
Table A.2:	Percentage of Permanent Residents Admitted in 2008, by Category of Admission.....	300
Table A.3:	Percentage of Male and Female Permanent Resident Immigrants by Source Region, 2008	300
Table A.4:	Percentage of Family Class and Economic Immigrants by Source Region, 2008	301
Table C.1:	Overview of LSIC Questionnaire	303
Table D.1:	LSIC Reports Analyzed in Chapter Six.....	307

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Imagined Futures and Immigration Policy.....	35
Figure A.1: Region of Birth of Recent Immigrants to Canada, 1971 to 2006.....	299

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix A: Canadian Immigration Levels 299

Appendix B: Immigration Program Objectives 302

Appendix C: Information on LSIC 303

Appendix D: LSIC Reports Analyzed in Chapter Seven 307

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis

CIC – Citizenship and Immigration Canada

IPR – Immigration Policy Review

IRPA – Immigration and Refugee Protection Act

LSIC – Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

“Immigrants are actual people born outside the country who have been admitted to Canada, as well as symbolic representations of those who, in the eyes of the resident population, should be given or denied entry to Canada” (Li, 2003c:2).

1.0 Introduction

On April 23, 2009, clad in a white wedding dress and holding a bridal bouquet, Lainie Towell was surrounded by on-lookers and flashing cameras as she scaled the steps of Parliament Hill. Towell, an attractive artist and dancer from Ottawa, was accompanied up the steps not by her future husband, but by a full-sized red door that she had strapped to her back: “‘The door was red, my dress was white – the colours echoed the Canadian flag,’ says Ms. Towell” (Bielski, 2009, April 30). Towell was climbing Parliament Hill on her hands and knees as a symbolic portrayal of the burden she claimed to have suffered at the hands of her estranged husband, Fodé Mohamed Soumah. Soumah, an immigrant from West Africa, was granted entry to Canada in 2007 on the basis of his marriage to Towell, a Canadian citizen. According to Towell, Soumah had tricked her into marrying him just to gain entry to Canada and receive status as a permanent resident, only to abandon her within four weeks of landing on Canadian soil. Appearing alongside the jilted bride on CTV’s Canada AM the day of her Parliament Hill trek, Jason Kenney, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, noted with regret that Towell’s experience was all too common, and that her case was evidence of “one of the most frequent forms of immigration fraud.”¹ Kenney commented that “migration

¹ See http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/TopStories/20090423/marriage_protest_090423/ to watch a clip of Towell and Kenney’s appearance on CTV’s Canada AM.

integrity officers” closely screen potential immigrants, and do their best to prevent fraud. Kenney further emphasized to viewers that it is of central importance to Canadian society that incidents of immigration fraud be prevented.

In August of 2009, Naema Ahmed, a 29-year old pharmacist from Egypt, joined a government-sponsored French language class in Montréal. While attending class, Ahmed, a Muslim, insisted on wearing a niqab – a face-covering veil that exposes only the wearer’s eyes. She also requested that certain accommodations be made in the classroom out of respect for her religious beliefs:

“The teacher allowed her to give an oral presentation at the back of the classroom, facing away from other students. However, [Ahmed] complained that some male students could see her face and asked that they be moved to a different part of the classroom” (Scott, 2010, March 2).

During the next three months, the school accommodated Ahmed’s requests to wear the niqab, have female instructors, and be segregated from male students. Yet, in November of 2009, Ahmed was expelled from the school on the grounds that her niqab was interfering with language instruction and that her demands were creating a tense classroom atmosphere. In response, Ahmed lodged a human rights complaint, reigniting the “never-far-from-the-surface debate over reasonable accommodation of minorities” (Scott, 2010, March 2). The case made national headlines and sparked a major controversy over the extent to which the Canadian nation-state should bend to meet newcomers’ diverse needs:

“I think this is an illustration of when an accommodation becomes unreasonable,” civil-rights lawyer Julius Grey said...Morton Weinfeld, chair in Canadian ethnic studies at McGill University, said it will be up to the courts to rule on the issue. “My personal view as a citizen is that there are always going to be limits to the amount of reasonable accommodation we can have. This may be a reasonable limit,” he said (Scott, 2010, March 2).

As these two cases poignantly illustrate, immigration and the ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity it brings about are controversial issues in contemporary Canadian society, despite Canada's widely cited legacy as a 'nation of immigrants.' Indeed, these examples are only two of innumerable instances of public and political debate surrounding immigration in Canada. These cases also capture the essence of the various issues being addressed in this thesis. They demonstrate tensions surrounding immigration policy and common concerns pertaining to the admission of newcomers, such as who should be granted entry and, once they have been granted entry, how they should be dealt with by Canadians and the Canadian state. The examples illustrate concerns over granting admission to 'undeserving' immigrants, and trepidation surrounding how to deal with immigrants who have 'non-Canadian' traditions and practices. These examples also demonstrate that the Canadian nation has both literal and symbolic boundaries, and illustrate that both types of boundaries are often perceived as being threatened by newcomers from diverse backgrounds to the end of requiring safeguarding by the Canadian state. These cases also reveal the fact that immigrants occupy a contested place in Canadian society, and that their admission as permanent residents does not automatically render them uncontested members of the Canadian national community in the eyes of Canadian citizens or the Canadian state. Moreover, the two examples document how discourses on immigrants, such as those put forth by the media, politicians, and academics, communicate ideological messages pertaining to gender, 'race'/ethnicity, and national belonging in the context of immigration. Together, these issues echo the overarching research question at hand in the present thesis –

namely, in a global era of international migration, how is the Canadian national community imagined and discursively constructed in relation to immigration?

As Benedict Anderson (2006) notes, “nation, nationality, nationalism – all have proven notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyze” (p.3). In an effort to do just that, Anderson examined the ways in which political and economic elites in post-colonial nations brought together fragmented population groups to formulate relatively cohesive societies. Across different settings, he noted that elites sought to create a shared sense of belonging among all citizens of a nation-state. This sense of belonging, however, was necessarily ‘imagined’ in light of the impossibility of personal connections among all members of the nation. It follows that nations, for Anderson, are cultural artifacts that are upheld through elite-led nation-building processes. Importantly, according to Anderson, nation-building was historically facilitated through the development of print and mass media.

Anderson’s notion of ‘national communities’ as constructed imaginings and his views of nation-building bear directly on questions of immigration and constructions of national belonging. In a settler society such as Canada, there is an inherent link between immigration and nation-building. As Smith (1993) notes, Canada emerged as a nation-state through “the gradual accretion of the right kinds of people, who acquire their national identity by living in Canada and contributing to a Canadian way of life” (p.52). Yet, with the emergence and acceleration of processes of globalization in recent decades, the theoretical integrity of the ‘nation’ has come into question, in part due to the widespread international movement of people, involving increasing temporary migration, mobile refugee populations, and growth in transnational networks

(Appadurai, 1996, 1993; Basch et al., 1994; Glick Schiller, 1999; Glick Schiller et al., 1995, 1992; Kearney, 1995; Papastergiadis, 2000; Smith, 1995). Global and transnational processes have led some theorists to prompt the need for ‘post-national’ understandings that move beyond viewing the ‘nation’ as a territorially bounded imagined community that is governed by a sovereign state (Appadurai, 1996, 1993; Glick Schiller, 1999; Glick Schiller et al., 1995, 1992; Steger, 2009a, 2009b; see also Nieguth, 1999).

The present thesis was inspired by these theoretical tensions surrounding the configuration of imagined communities in an era of globalization and international migration. As previously noted, immigration has historically been a central component of Canadian nation-building (Simmons, 2010), yet remains a source of considerable controversy that speaks to the gap between literal and symbolic national borders. The present thesis contends that the configuration of the Canadian imagined community in contemporary contexts can be most fruitfully understood through an examination of immigration discourses. This contention also draws on Anderson’s (2006) emphasis on modes of communication, particularly print documentation and media, in historical nation-building efforts. To this end, the present thesis examines dominant discourses on Canadian immigration, focusing on media discourse, policy discourse, and ‘measurement’ discourse (i.e., official surveys), in order to assess the manner in which the Canadian imagined community is imagined and constructed in an era of globalization and widespread international migration.

Discourse can be broadly understood as an extensive, ongoing dialogue articulated in a wide variety of written, spoken, and symbolic forms. Existing research

on Canada's immigration discourse has contended that immigrants are symbolically constructed as outsiders to the Canadian imagined community (see Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Bannerji, 2000; Creese et al., 2008; Creese & Peterson, 1996; Henry & Tator, 2002; Henry et al., 2000; Jiwani, 1998; Li, 2007, 2003a, 2003c, 2001; Mahtani, 2008; Thobani, 2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1998). This work commonly argues that immigrants are socially constructed as symbolic or literal threats to the Canadian nation. More specifically, much of the literature contends that Canada's immigration discourse constructs a racialized insider/outsider dichotomy between Canadian nationals and immigrants that leads to the symbolic exclusion of immigrants and citizens of colour from Canadian society. Gender has also been considered in this context, most often addressed with a view to the marginalization of women immigrants of colour (see Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Jiwani, 1998; Thobani, 2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1998). It is my contention, however, that the immigration discourse accomplishes much more than this. To this end, the present thesis builds on the strengths of the existing literature and simultaneously helps fill the literature's gaps by departing from it in important ways. The thesis provides a more comprehensive and systematic examination of Canada's immigration discourse than previous work. This contribution involves both a theoretical and empirical expansion upon the existing literature, the latter of which focuses most directly on race and, importantly, on constructions of *immigrants*. Although the existing literature recognizes that the construction of immigrants as 'outsiders' to the Canadian nation implicitly constructs the nation's 'insiders,' the present thesis contends that the focus on the 'immigrant' side of this equation, and, in particular, the racialized immigrant, has left considerable room for a further theoretical exploration of the

‘imagined communities’ framework in reference to contemporary Canadian immigration. Moreover, the literature typically makes reference to an expansive ‘immigration discourse’ to draw broad conclusions about underlying discriminatory biases without exploring in detail the contours of different ‘strands’ of discourse. Indeed, Canada’s immigration discourse is not monolithic, but is, in fact, constituted by a number of discourses originating from diverse sources and representing particular points of view and agendas in immigration debates. It is thus insufficient to simply consider the construction of immigrants without contextualizing the potential social and political reasons underlying these constructions in different contexts. To this end, the present thesis explores three different immigration discourses with an eye to the conceptualization of Canada’s imagined community in an era of globalization and international immigration. In order to address this overarching objective, the thesis examines the following research questions:

- (1) How do specific immigration discourses (media, policy, and measurement) represent immigrants?
- (2) How are different categories of immigrants (i.e., based on immigrant mode of entry, with a focus on family-class and economic immigrants – defined in section 1.3 below) differentially characterized and represented in discourse?
- (3) How are immigrants racialized and gendered in these representations?
- (4) How might these various representations be put in service of the Canadian state?
- (5) How do these representations operate to discursively define the boundaries of Canada’s national imagined community?

The thesis applies a social constructionist perspective to Canadian immigration discourses in order to elucidate the manner in which Canada's imagined community is constructed in the contemporary era of international migration and globalization, addressing the broader social, economic, and political contexts within which this construction occurs. In doing so, the thesis expands on theoretical understandings of the manner in which gender, 'race'/ethnicity, and immigrant mode of entry are independently and interactively involved in the construction of Canada's imagined community.

Based on a multi-faceted examination of Canadian immigration discourse, the present thesis argues that the Canadian imagined community is directly constructed around a particular vision of the Canadian nation that entails the co-construction of immigrants, Canadians, and the Canadian state. These constructions embody distinct social and political tensions surrounding the presence of immigrants from non-European countries, and occur alongside a neo-liberal agenda and national self-interest involving an understanding of Canada as an economically strong, multicultural nation-state that selects 'good' immigrants and prevents 'bad' immigrants from entering the country. To this end, the construction of the Canadian national community through immigration bears various stamps, including Canada's discriminatory nation-building history, national and global trends and controversies surrounding immigration, ideological struggles to define Canadian national identity, and the state's pursuit of legitimacy.

The remainder of this chapter provides the background for the thesis. First, a theoretical framework of the various ways in which immigrants are socially constructed

is discussed, followed by a brief overview of Canada's post-Confederation immigration history and a description of the current immigration program.

It is important to briefly note here that this thesis does not specifically examine the immigration situation in Québec. Immigrant settlement (in both historical and contemporary contexts), immigration policies, ethnic relations, and national identity in Québec differ significantly from the remainder of the country. A comprehensive appreciation of Québec's imagined community would require an analysis of Québécois French-language discourses and an in-depth appreciation of the unique political and cultural history and circumstances of that province – a study in and of itself. The thesis thus focuses on English-language discourses associated with 'Canadian' immigration, and does not address the unique immigration situation of Québec in either the background chapters or the original analysis chapters of the thesis.

1.1 The Social Construction of Immigrants in Canada

According to Li (2003a), social assessments and understandings of immigrants and their place in receiving societies are, in part, determined by the ideological preferences and concerns of the assessor. In other words, the interests and subjectivities of the assessor shape the manner in which immigrants, as well as their role in and their impact on society, are viewed and interpreted; these interests and subjectivities ultimately affect the outcome of the assessment and the manner in which immigrants are represented. To this end, different social constructions of immigrants can be interpreted as different vantage points from which immigrants are evaluated. Social constructions of immigrants define who is considered an immigrant, in addition to the characteristics and

social value of those placed within the boundaries of this group. A useful framework is offered by Li (2003a), who specifically articulates three different ways in which immigrants are socially constructed: (1) a 'folk' version of immigrants; (2) immigrants as an analytical concept, and (3) immigrants as a bureaucratic definition. Each of these three constructions is addressed in the present thesis and thus requires brief explanation.

In Li's (2003a) first type of social construction, the 'folk' version, the notion of an 'immigrant' is associated with 'racial'/ethnic categorization and cultural difference. In the Canadian context of this type of construction, immigrants are understood as persons who appear 'foreign' compared to descendents of mainly 'White,' European settlers. In this social construction of immigrants, 'fact' and 'myth' are often confounded, with 'non-Whites' being defined as 'immigrants,' regardless of their national origin, and 'Whites' being defined as Canadian nationals, regardless of whether or not they were born in Canada. As articulated by Kobayashi and Peake (1997), "White, middle-class professionals from Britain or the United States are not commonly perceived as 'immigrants'" (p.7), even if they are, in fact, legally newcomers. In contrast, visible minorities, regardless of whether they were born in Canada, are constructed as immigrants based on their phenotypical features. Both Ng (1990) and Mahtani (2008) similarly point out that 'common-sense' discourse constructs immigrants as people of colour, and constructs people of colour as immigrants (see also Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002; Bannerji, 2000; Creese & Kambere, 2003; Gonick, 2000), despite the possible inaccuracies of these understandings. In the folk construction of immigrants, 'non-Whites' are commonly problematized based on the assumption that

they are linguistically and culturally ‘different’ from ‘Canadians’ (Li, 2003a; see also Creese, 2007 and Creese & Kambere, 2003).

According to Li (2003a), immigrants can also be constructed as an analytical concept. In this sense, ‘immigrant’ is a conceptual label used to construct theoretical and operational boundaries around a group of individuals for analytical purposes. Researchers, for instance, may conceptualize immigrants as persons who have moved from one country to settle in another. In research studies, immigrant status is often assessed by comparing country of birth and country of permanent residence, the assumption being that if an individual were born in a country other than the one in which they are residing, then she/he can be considered an ‘immigrant.’ According to Li (2003a), the term ‘immigrant’ in analytical contexts is often used inconsistently and imprecisely, and can at times be misleading. For instance, children living in Canada who were born to individuals themselves born outside of Canada are often referred to in research contexts as ‘second-generation immigrants,’ even if the children were born in Canada. Imprecision in analytical contexts might also arise from self-identification (or non-identification) as an immigrant, or in the context of acquired citizenship. In other words, in an analytical setting, it is not always clear when someone is, is not, or is no longer an immigrant.

Li’s (2003a) third way in which immigrants can be socially constructed pertains to the bureaucratic definition of immigrants; this form of social construction is of central importance in the present thesis. In a bureaucratic context, individuals are constructed as ‘immigrants’ based on their legislative status. Nationals from other countries who are granted legal admission to Canada as permanent residents are

bureaucratically constructed as ‘immigrants’ until they become Canadian citizens, at which point their designation as immigrants would cease from a bureaucratic standpoint, as these individuals would legally enjoy the same privileges and rights as native-born Canadians. At the same time, this bureaucratic shift from ‘immigrant’ to ‘Canadian’ precludes access to immigrant settlement services, despite the possibility that these services may still be of value to newly defined citizens.

As this typology suggests, the notion of an ‘immigrant’ is surrounded by ambiguities and imprecision, despite typically being used as if it were straightforward and unambiguous. The present thesis reveals that, in the Canadian context, these different constructions of immigrants are often intertwined in complex ways, and are illustrative of broader tensions relating to the social imagining of Canada as a nation. Moreover, the present thesis reveals that the social construction of immigrants is about much more than just immigrants. Indeed, the thesis illustrates that focusing exclusively on the social construction of immigrants ignores the broader effect of these representations in constructing other constituent parts of the Canadian nation. The thesis demonstrates that constructions of immigrants are not exclusively about immigrants but, rather, serve as a key means for defining the Canadian national community and this community’s identity. As background to the thesis’ analysis, it is necessary to briefly review the history of Canadian immigration and the contemporary context of immigrant admission and immigration debates. The remaining sections of this chapter offer this background.

1.2 Building Canada's Imagined Community: A History of Immigration

Canada's post-Confederation immigration history is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, and an overview of Canadian immigration levels is located in Appendix A. For now, however, it is relevant to briefly document the extent to which constructions of immigrants have been a longstanding feature of Canadian nation-building.

Canada was founded as a settler society whose government actively sought to build a 'White' nation through immigration by enacting policies to attract 'desirable' immigrants and to exclude or marginalize 'undesirable' immigrants (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). Indeed, as Canada was settled and built as a nation, the immigration program was structured so as to promote the long-term settlement of persons and families who were seen as ideal future citizens (that is, who *could* and *would* become 'insiders' to the Canadian national community) and to discourage or outright prohibit the settlement of migrants who were viewed as inherently incompatible with the long-term vision of the nation (Abu-Laban, 1998a; Das Gupta, 1995; Satzewich, 1998a; Simmons, 2010, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis, 1997). Public and political discourses, as represented by immigration policies, published documents, public forums, politicians' speeches, etc., reflected these ideological biases in both explicit and implicit ways.

The precise features of 'desirable' and 'undesirable' immigrants, and the manner in which these features were defined in discourse, have varied to some degree over time, depending on social norms and the economic and demographic needs of the Canadian nation at any given point in time. For the first century of Canada's post-Confederation immigration history, the distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' was explicitly structured along lines of 'race,' ethnicity, and/or national origin (Abella

& Trooper, 1982; Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Boyd & Vickers, 2000; Calliste, 1993; Das Gupta, 1995; Green & Green, 2004; Hawkins, 1972; Li, 1998; Satzewich, 1989a, 1989b; Simmons, 2010, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Thompson & Weinfeld, 1995; Whitaker, 1991). The settlement of British, Western European, and American immigrants was typically preferred, while the settlement of other immigrants was discouraged or prohibited (Li, 2003a). Although some ‘non-preferred’ immigrants were granted entry to the country throughout the nation’s early immigration history, often as needed for immediate labour purposes, they remained marginalized ‘Others’ who were excluded from the full privileges afforded to ‘White’ settlers (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). Moreover, the intersection between the ideological construction of a ‘White Canada’ and the economic needs of the growing nation interacted with gender and social class in relation to norms of appropriate work and social roles. To this end, immigrants, immigrant families, and the Canadian nation were constructed along intersecting lines of race, gender, and social class (Abu-Laban, 1998a; Das Gupta, 1995; Stasiulis, 1985; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Thobani, 2000; 1999, 1998). These points are clarified in Chapter Three.

Since the late 1960s, the composition of the immigration population to Canada has changed considerably compared to the first century of post-Confederation immigration. During the 1960s, in the midst of growing social and political commitment to principles of equality and non-discrimination, the Canadian government liberalized the immigration system, abandoning the longstanding “nationality preference system” (Simmons, 1990: 141) of immigrant selection. In the new system introduced in the 1960s, immigrants were selected according to ‘objective’ criteria pertaining to

individual skills and family relationships.² As a result of these changes, the nation witnessed a ‘new wave’ of immigrants from ‘non-traditional’ source countries, including Asia, Africa, and Latin America (see Simmons, 1990). Moreover, increased allowances for family reunification meant that a growing number of immigrants were arriving in Canada on the basis of their relationship with a Canadian permanent resident or citizen. Notably, this change in immigration patterns sparked a controversy regarding ‘family’ immigration that has persisted for the past 50 years, and has come to occupy a prominent place in Canadian public and political discourses on immigration. This debate is discussed in Section 1.4 of this chapter.

Over time, non-European source countries have come to provide an increasingly substantial portion of Canada’s annual intake of immigrants. For instance, 87.1% of all immigrants admitted to Canada between 1946 and 1955 arrived from Europe (including Britain, which alone accounted for 29.3% of immigrants over this time period); in contrast, between 1979 and 2000, only 22.5% of all immigrants to Canada arrived from Europe (with a total of only 5.1% from Britain), while 53.8% arrived from Asia. In 2008, only 20.9% of immigrants arrived from the United States, Europe, and the United Kingdom (CIC, 2009b). These changes have been associated with a transformation of the cultural landscape of Canada; as Simmons (2010) notes, “immigrants from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America have brought and continue to bring new

² The supposed deracialization of Canada’s immigration system in the 1960s has been challenged, often by critical race scholars who point out that the manner in which the immigration program was structured continued to racialize immigration, despite the overt removal of race as an organizing principle (see Satzewich, 1989a; Simmons, 1999; Stasiulis, 1985; Thobani, 2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1998). Moreover, it has been argued that the socio-economic criteria embedded in the selection system introduced in the 1960s effectively served to create a ‘class-based’ system that continues to shape the countries from which immigrants are selected (see Simmons, 2010). Chapter Three discusses these matters in more detail.

nationalities, languages, and cultures to Canada” (p.114). The growth in non-European immigration source countries has also entailed a transformation of the ‘face’ of the nation since the 1960s, with ever-increasing proportions of visible minorities constituting the Canadian population. For instance, in 1981, 4.7% of Canada’s total population was considered a visible minority (Statistics Canada, 1998). By 1991, this proportion had increased to 7.7% (Statistics Canada, 1993). Fifteen years later, this proportion had more than doubled, with the 2006 Census recording over 5 million persons, or approximately 16.2% of Canada’s population, as visible minorities (Statistics Canada, 2008).

1.3 A Brief Summary of Current Immigration in Canada

Broadly speaking, migrants to Canada are granted entry as either temporary residents or permanent residents. Temporary residents are migrants who enter Canada for a defined period of time. This group includes visitors, temporary workers, and students (see <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/index.asp>). There are various streams of admission for immigrants whose entry is premised on the expectation of permanent residence (and possible citizenship). Under current immigration legislation (the 2002 *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act – IRPA*), permanent residents fall under one of three categories: (1) economic immigrants, whose admission is based on their human capital and is geared toward national economic development; (2) family-class immigrants, whose admission is associated with social goals – specifically, the reunification of families; and (3) refugees, whose admission is based on humanitarian considerations involving Canada’s international obligation to protect individuals affected by imminent danger or

undue persecution (see Statutes of Canada, 2001). Importantly, although ‘immigrant’ and ‘refugee’ are legal categories, affecting individuals’ material reality in Canada (for instance, in terms of access to settlement services), they can also be seen as discursive constructions, in that they reflect ideological biases and constitute immigrants as objects bearing institutionally defined characteristics.

In terms of these bureaucratic categories, the present thesis is most specifically interested in family-class and economic immigrants (but also more broadly considers ‘immigrants’ insofar as this concept is articulated in discourse without being further defined). In the current immigration legislation, the immigration program (associated primarily with economic and social objectives) and the refugee program (associated with humanitarian objectives) are guided by distinct regulations. Temporary labour migration streams are also regulated by discrete policies and programs (see <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/work/index.asp>). Moreover, permanent resident immigrants, refugees and temporary workers are generally treated as distinct groups in the sociological literature and in public discourse, and thus, to some extent, are seen as occupying unique sociological spaces. Although the decision to focus on economic immigrants and family-class immigrants in this thesis may reinforce the notion that bureaucratic categorizations are a meaningful way of identifying and constructing immigrants, it is not meant to reify these distinctions, nor is it intended to indicate support for bureaucratic categorization as the best way of defining immigrants. Rather, it is merely a decision based on the existing nature of Canadian immigration, and a means of providing a manageable scope for the present research.

1.31 Economic Immigrants

As described in the IRPA, economic immigrants are foreign nationals selected on the basis of their ability to become economically established in Canada. This category includes skilled workers, the self-employed, entrepreneurs, investors, and certain provincial/territorial nominees (Statutes of Canada, 2001). Skilled workers are selected through the point system, wherein they are evaluated according to a number of ‘objective’ criteria (specifically, education, language skills, experience, age, arranged employment, and adaptability), each of which is associated with a defined number of possible points. If an applicant’s total score exceeds the designated cut-off (currently, 67 points), they are eligible for entry as a permanent resident, providing that other criteria for entry to Canada (such as health and security checks) are met (see <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/apply-factors.asp>). Business class immigrants (including entrepreneurs and the self-employed) are granted entry based on their likelihood of success in a business, athletic, or cultural venture in Canada, as defined by different criteria depending on the activities in which the immigrant intends to be involved (see <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/business/index.asp>). ‘Investor’ immigrants are required to have a net worth of at least \$800,000 and are required to invest a minimum of \$400,000 in a business project in Canada.³ Eligible spouses and dependents who accompany principal applicants are also enumerated as economic immigrants. Notably, however, as the upcoming chapters illustrate, this

³ As of June 26, 2010, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) temporarily stopped accepting applications for the Immigrant Investor Program in order to revise eligibility requirements. The Government of Canada is proposing that investors be required to have a net worth of at least \$1.6 million and invest at least \$800,000 in the Canadian economy. This represents a proposed increase of 100% over the existing requirements.

bureaucratic classification does not mean that economic-class spouses and principal applicants are socially constructed in comparable terms. This disjuncture is discussed throughout the thesis.

1.32 Family-Class Immigrants

Family-class status is reserved for immigrants who join a family member already residing in Canada as a permanent resident or a citizen. These immigrants are granted entry on the basis of their relationship with a Canadian permanent resident/citizen, be it a spouse, a child, a parent, etc.⁴ (in addition to health and security criteria) (Statutes of Canada, 2001). Family-class immigration occurs in contexts of family reunification and family formation (Croes & Hooimeijer, 2010; Merali, 2009, 2008). In somewhat of a simplification of often complex processes, the first instance involves reunification of families that pre-existed the migration of one or more member of the family, and thus pertains to families that were geographically split by the migration process. This type of migration is a common arrangement wherein one family member migrates first, and is later ‘followed’ by other family members, known as ‘chain migration’ (Boyle et al., 1998; Croes & Hooimeijer, 2010; Massey et al., 1994). Conceptually, this process implies an active leader (a pioneer migrant), and a passive, dependent, follower. The second sub-category of family-class immigration involves establishing new families in various ways, such as through transnational marriages (e.g., culturally arranged marriages, mail-order brides, new partners encountered over the Internet or through

⁴ Exactly who has been eligible for entry under different categories has changed over time; this will be discussed further in Chapter Three.

travel, etc.) (Constable, 2003; Lauser, 2008, 2006; Merali, 2009, 2008; Piper & Roces, 2003).

Importantly, both family reunification and family formation are gendered processes that materially and ideologically construct the secondary immigrant (most often a woman) within relations of dependence (Boyd, 1997; Das Gupta, 1995; Merali, 2009, 2008; Thobani, 2000a, 2000b). In the Canadian context, this construction of dependence is tied into the legislative requirements associated with family-class immigration. Under existing legislation, family-class immigrants are eligible for entry into Canada only if a Canadian citizen or permanent resident signs a ‘sponsorship agreement.’ With this agreement, sponsors commit to being financially responsible for their sponsored family member for a minimum of three to ten years after the immigrant acquires permanent resident status (with the specific length of time depending on the type of family relationship between the sponsor and the sponsored immigrant). With this commitment, the sponsor agrees to pay for any sponsored immigrant’s “food, shelter, clothing, necessary goods or services, and health and dental care not already covered” (CIC, 2010a: 47). For spouses or partners sponsored into the country under the family class, the sponsor’s financial obligation is set at three years after the sponsored immigrant becomes a permanent resident; this time period was set in 2002, at which time it was lowered from the previous commitment of ten years. This change was brought about in part by political activism relating to the potential dangers that legislated dependence could entail for sponsored immigrants (for instance, in cases of domestic violence; see Côté et al., 2001; Narayan, 1995; Thobani, 1999; Vukov, 2003; Walton-Roberts, 2004a).

As previously noted, family-class immigration, including the sponsorship program, has long stood as a topic of notable debate in the Canadian immigration discourse, commonly addressed by both women's advocates and immigration critics. Immigrant advocates commonly emphasize the gendered nature of spousal sponsorship; in this regard, some argue the need to abandon sponsorship requirements altogether, pointing out that women who migrate through marriage are highly vulnerable in light of their precarious status in society and the unequal power relations entailed in the sponsorship process (Côté et al., 2001). Others maintain that the sponsorship process is needed in order to ensure financial security for incoming spouses⁵ (Walton-Roberts, 2004a). For their part, immigration critics problematize family-class immigration and the sponsorship program based on claims that immigrants entering the country through this route impose a financial burden on the Canadian system, emphasizing that the financial responsibility of sponsors is insufficiently enforced (see, for example, Francis, 2002a, 2002b, 1993). As illustrated in this thesis, the contention that family-class immigration is a national burden represents a central theme around which this group of immigrants is constructed in immigration discourses. The present thesis uncovers in detail the contours of these social constructions of family-class immigrants, interpreted in terms of the impact of these representations in symbolically positioning family-class immigrants to the Canadian national community.

⁵ See Walton-Roberts (2004a) for a discussion of the arguments presented to CIC by two advocacy groups taking these different stances leading up to the regulation changes implemented in the IRPA.

1.4 Canadian Immigration Discourse

At the heart of the present study is the contention that immigration discourse is a central site for constructing the Canadian national imagined community, including the social groups that inhabit this community, those that stand on its margins, and those that stand outside its borders. In the Canadian context, the ‘immigration question’ speaks directly to the imagining of the Canadian national community. This ‘question’ commonly revolves around the theme of balance: balance between admitting ‘too many’ or ‘too few’ immigrants into the country with respect to economic and demographic needs; balance between the economic and the social goals of the immigration program; and balance between the costs and the benefits associated with being a country of large-scale immigration (Puttagunta, 1998). Much of this debate over ‘balance’ translates into a debate over the type of immigrants (and the respective volume of these groups) being admitted into the country.

Broadly speaking, the ‘balance’ discourse is indicative of a widespread utilitarian mentality and a widely held belief “[...] that the worth of immigrants is contingent on the ability of newcomers to benefit the existing population in Canada” (Li 2003a: 164). Indeed, although immigration has long been justified on grounds of national economic benefit, public and political discourses on immigration have increasingly emphasized the value of immigrant ‘self-sufficiency,’ particularly since the 1990s, at which time Canada underwent a widespread process of neo-liberal restructuring (Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Arat-Koc, 1999). In this context, ‘ideal’ immigrants are those who will enrich the Canadian labour market with their skills and who will not ‘drain’ public resources by relying on welfare and other social programs.

As it commonly plays out in the public and political discourse on immigration, this ideology translates into a clear and unquestioned preference for economic immigrants (and skilled worker principal applicants in particular), and a widespread problematization of family-class immigration (Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Creese et al., 2008; Deshaw, 2006; Li, 2003c; Satzewich, 1993; Thobani, 2000a, 2000b, 1998). Indeed, family-class immigration represents a common target for vocal critics of the country's immigration program (see Campbell, 2000, 1989; Collacott, 2002; Francis, 2002b; Gwyn, 1995; Stoffman, 2002, 1993⁶). These critics most commonly espouse two major classes of arguments: first, that admission of family-class immigrants results in the exclusion of skilled and talented immigrants; and second, that family-class immigrants place a burden on the public purse because they are not self-sufficient and commonly rely on government assistance. In the public and political discourse surrounding immigration, family-class immigrants are thus constructed as being “less able [than economic immigrants] to integrate, more likely to go on welfare, and in general more of a burden to Canadian society” (Abu-Laban 1998b: 201). Anti-family-class immigration arguments also imply this form of immigration represents a detriment to the Canadian nation because it allows entry to those who will detract from the country's well-being at the expense of those who would be able to contribute to Canadian prosperity (Puttagunta, 1998).

⁶ All of these authors are well-known critics of Canada's immigration program whose views receive widespread media attention (as discussed by Bauder, 2008; Henry & Tator, 2002; Li, 2003c). Stoffman's book (entitled “Who gets in: What's wrong with Canada's immigration program – and how to fix it,” 2002) was runner-up for the Donner Prize for best book on Canadian public policy and the Shaughnessy Cohen Prize for best book on Canadian politics. Other of these authors (particularly Diane Francis and Martin Collacott) are regular contributors to the *National Post*, widely known for its anti-immigrant stance. A case study of Francis' reporting on Canadian immigration can be found in Henry and Tator (2002, Chapter 7).

The remainder of this thesis elaborates on portrayals of immigrants in various discourses, with a focus, whenever possible, on distinctions between economic and family-class immigrants, and on the ‘racial’/ethnic and gendered nature of representations. The thesis documents the subtleties, continuities, and contradictions of these representations within and across different discourses, and demonstrates that the social construction of immigrants serves distinct purposes and is revealing of broader social concerns that are uncovered by linking representations of immigrants to the social context within which they are articulated. The thesis links these representations to the social construction of the Canadian ‘imagined community,’ demonstrating the central role that the social construction of immigrants plays in defining ‘Canadians,’ the Canadian state, and the Canadian nation.

1.5 Thesis Outline

Chapter Two describes the theoretical and methodological background for this thesis, including an explanation of the overarching theoretical framework, definitions of key concepts, and an explanation of critical discourse analysis as a methodology. Chapter Three provides a critical examination of post-Confederation immigration history with a focus on the intersections between economic and family-class immigration streams. Chapters Four to Six constitute the thesis’ original data analysis. Each of these chapters uses a different data set (to be described in each individual chapter), and focuses on a different ‘type’ of discourse. More specifically, Chapter Four offers an analysis of print news media, focusing on the social construction of a particular sub-group of family-class immigrants in Canada (namely, “marriage” immigrants); Chapter Five considers

immigration policy discourse; Chapter Six addresses analytical discourse (represented by official measurement of immigrants, in the form of the *Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada*). A focused literature review and a description of the specific methods used for selecting and analyzing data are provided in these individual chapters. Chapter Seven brings together the findings from the three analysis chapters to offer an overarching conclusion regarding discourse and the construction of Canada's imagined community.

CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

“One of the key tenets of contemporary social theory is to question the ideological construction of social categories and to seek to uncover the material interests that such categorizations inevitably serve” (White & Jackson, 1995: 15).

“We are surrounded by and immersed in discourses. They inhabit all written and spoken material and are embedded in all systems of signification” (Burr, 1995: 141).

2.0 Introduction

Overarching the individual theoretical frameworks guiding Chapters Four, Five, and Six is a larger framework that informs this thesis as a whole. The thesis draws on a wide range of perspectives that share an inherent epistemological affinity and that are highly amenable to the methodology of critical discourse analysis. The present chapter outlines these perspectives, and defines key concepts that surface throughout the thesis. First, the overarching ideas of social constructionism, discourse, and the concepts of power and ideology are described. Next, two main theoretical frameworks used in the thesis, Imagined Communities and Imagined Futures, are discussed. From here, additional key concepts (namely, race, racism, racialization, ethnicity, and gender) are defined in terms of how they are employed in the present thesis. Having laid this conceptual groundwork, the chapter concludes by summarizing the methodological principles of critical discourse analysis that underlie the thesis’ analytical approach.

2.1 Social Constructionism

At the heart of theories of social constructionism is the understanding that categories are used to structure experience and to understand the social world (Jackson & Penrose,

1993). Proponents of social constructionism contend that knowledge and reality are produced and sustained by social processes whereby information about the world is constructed in such a way as to provide a framework of understanding. From this perspective, characteristics of individuals or groups, as well as social relationships between people and groups (including unequal relationships), are often accepted as natural or legitimate, when, in fact, they have been *socially constructed*. For instance, using Hacking's (2000) example, a 'woman refugee' can be understood as a social construction:

What is socially constructed is not, in the first instance, the individual people, the women refugees. It is the classification, *woman refugee*. [...] This way of classifying people is the product of social events, of legislation, of social workers, of immigrant groups, of activists, of lawyers, and of the activities of the women involved. This kind of person, as a specific kind of person, is socially constructed. Or simply: the *idea* of the woman refugee is constructed (p.10).

To this end, social constructionism questions essentialist views of the social world, and problematizes taken-for-granted knowledge that is traditionally viewed as 'natural,' unbiased, or objective (Burr, 1995; Jackson & Penrose, 1993). Social constructionist theories are critical of the status quo, and demand that a range of 'givens' be questioned and re-evaluated (Burr, 1995; Hacking, 2000). A social constructionist perspective involves identifying the components and processes of category construction. In this context, the objective is not to demonstrate that categories are 'false,' but, rather, to illustrate that they are not 'natural' and, as such, serve a social purpose. Insofar as existing categories are exposed as constructs, they can be deconstructed so as to "disempower them or appropriate their intrinsic power, to achieve more equitable ends" (Jackson & Penrose, 1993:2).

2.2 Dominant Discourses: Elites, Orthodoxy, Ideology, and Power

The notion of discourse as a scientific construct was popularized by 20th century philosophers and post-structuralists, and is commonly associated in the social sciences with philosopher Michel Foucault and cultural theorist Stuart Hall. Broadly speaking, a discourse is a body of representations (including written and spoken words, images, ideas, etc.) that create meaning regarding a particular topic (Lilja, 2009). As defined more specifically by Hall (1997):

Discourses are ways of referring to or constructing knowledge about a particular topic of practice: a cluster (or formation) of ideas, images and practices, which provide ways of talking about, forms of knowledge and conduct associated with, a particular topic, social activity or institutional site in society. These discursive formations, as they are known, define what is and is not appropriate in our formulation of, and our practices in relation to, a particular subject or site of social activity; what knowledge is considered useful, relevant and ‘true’ in that context; and what sorts of persons or ‘subjects’ embody its characteristics (p. 6).

Discourses are a central site of social construction, and inform social practices by providing meanings and by defining the social world (Lilja, 2009).

The present thesis focuses on *dominant* discourses pertaining to immigration (namely, discourses originating from various components of the Canadian state and from the Canadian news media). A discourse is distinguished as ‘dominant’ on the basis of its connection to elite groups and structures in society, its power to be ‘heard’ and ‘seen’ in society, and its ubiquity as a framework for interpreting social life (relative to other possible frameworks). As van Dijk (1989) explains:

It is the symbolic elite and its discourses that control the types of discourses, the topics, the types and the amount of information, the selection or censoring of arguments, and the nature of rhetorical operations. These conditions essentially determine the contents and the organization of public knowledge, the hierarchies of beliefs, and the pervasiveness of the consensus, which in turn are potent factors in the

formation and the reproduction of opinions, attitudes, and ideologies (van Dijk, 1989: 25-6).

The concept of ‘symbolic elites’ underlies the notion of dominant discourse employed in this thesis. This term refers to groups (such as state actors and journalists) who are implicated in the construction of dominant discourses through their privileged access to powerful institutions and instruments in society (such as the mass media) (see van Dijk, 2006, 1996). Although the boundaries surrounding such a definition may not be precise, symbolic elites can be broadly understood as “those who control the means of communication and who are engaged in the manufacturing of public opinion” (van Dijk, 1993b: x).

Importantly, scholars often argue that dominant discourses are characterized by considerable ideological and linguistic coherence, and share a normative framework rooted in the (conscious or unconscious) desire of elites to maintain the status quo. Often, these discourses are interpreted in terms of hegemony (see Karim, 1993; Li, 2003c; Lilja, 2009; Williams, 1977). In contrast, from the perspective employed in this thesis, dominant discourses on immigration are better understood in reference to Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of orthodoxy. In Bourdieu’s formulation, social knowledge consists of two fields, or ‘universes’: the universe of the undisputed (*doxa*), and the universe of the disputed (consisting of heterodox and orthodox discourses). *Doxa* consists of social knowledge that, at a given point in time in a given society, is taken for granted and unquestioned. *Doxa* can thus be understood as that which “goes without saying because it comes without saying” (Bourdieu, 1977: 167). Embedded in *doxa* is the implication that the existing nature of the social (and natural) world is not only legitimate, but entirely natural and incapable of human modification. Dominant groups

hold interest in protecting doxa, while dominated groups hold interest in advancing discourses that push back the boundaries of doxa. The universe of discourse offers this possibility in the form of heterodoxy. Heterodoxy consists of the radical arguments, experiences, and suggestions that protest the order of the world laid out in doxa. In other words, although doxa is upheld by dominant groups as being beyond question, it can be brought into crisis and transformed through heterodox discourses that identify alternative possibilities to the existing social order (that is, the constructed systems of classification associated with the status quo).

In the presence of heterodoxy, another field of discourse – orthodoxy – emerges. Orthodoxy represents the realm of dominant discourses, which offer manifestly legitimate ways of thinking about the social and natural world. These discourses are advanced to protect the integrity of doxa, and operate (albeit imperfectly) to protect the interests of the dominant classes and preserve the status quo. Orthodoxy thus represents the “imperfect substitute” (Bourdieu, 1977: 169) of doxa, geared toward rendering heterodox discourses illegitimate opinions rather than viable alternatives to doxa. Depending on the effectiveness of orthodoxy, heterodox discourses will be silenced to greater or lesser degrees, which in turn affects the extent to which doxa is preserved or altered.

Underlying this framework is the understanding that dominant discourses (the universe of orthodoxy) act as vehicles of ideology. Ideology, as a theoretical construct, has been understood and employed in different ways throughout the history of the sociology, and remains variably defined across different approaches (see Mannheim, 1997; Minar, 1961; van Dijk, 2000). Although the notion of ideology can be traced back

at least as far as the French Revolution (see Hunt, 2004), the concept is commonly associated with Marxism and its various theoretical offshoots (Hunt, 2004; Mannheim, 1997). In the work of George Lukacs and Antonio Gramsci, for instance, ideology is understood in relation to false consciousness. Lukacs argues that false consciousness emerges out of the practices of life in capitalist society, wherein impersonal economic exchanges constitute the basis of most social relations, such that the socially constructed nature of class inequality is obscured by the structure of capitalist production and exchange. This leads to false consciousness regarding the reality of class oppression. False consciousness benefits the bourgeoisie and is detrimental to the working class in light of the fact that it preserves the status quo. In this context, ideologies serve as explanations and justifications for the visible contradictions between the circumstances of the capitalists and the working poor in capitalist societies (see Lukacs, 1971). Also addressing class inequality in capitalist societies, Antonio Gramsci (1971) contends that ideologies are normative sets of ideas and beliefs that guide observations and interpretations of the capitalist social world. In Gramsci's understanding, by virtue of its general and intellectual subordination to the capitalist class, the working class adopts ideologies that legitimate its oppression. In this context, social change is theorized as coming about when the working class adopts a revolutionary ideology. Drawing on these various ideas but stepping outside of the link between capitalism, false consciousness, and ideology, Henry and Tator (2002) offer a useful definition that captures the manner in which ideology is understood in the present thesis. According to the authors, an ideology is:

A complex set of ideas that attempts to explain, justify, legitimate, and perpetuate the circumstances in which a collectivity finds itself. It

provides the basis for guiding behaviour, making sense of the world, imparting meaning to life, instilling a common bond among group members, and explaining situations. Ideology provides a framework for organizing, legitimizing, and maintaining relations of power and decision-making at all levels in institutions and systems (Henry & Tator, 2002: 246).

Ideologies are propagated, in part, through discourses that represent and construct the social world, including different groups of people, the relationships between them, and their respective relationships with other entities and institutions in a given society at a given point in time. In other words, ideologies operate in discourses that both reflect existing ideologies and contribute to their stability (or their modification) (see van Dijk, 2002, 1989).

As the above discussion suggests, the notions of symbolic elites, orthodoxy and ideology are all linked to the idea of social power. Power, a widely used concept in sociology, is the source of considerable debate in terms of its meaning and analytical usefulness (Grabb, 2007). This issue notwithstanding, the notion of power is commonly invoked in critical discourse analysis, and is intimately intertwined with the notion of dominant discourses, elites, and orthodoxy. Power is understood in the present thesis in social (rather than personal/individual) terms. Social power is a property of the relationship between social groups, premised upon differential access to, and control over, limited social resources (van Dijk, 1995, 1989). It can be broadly defined in the context of structured inequality, wherein dominant social groups have the capacity and resources to enact processes and strategies geared toward the legitimation of inequality and the preservation of the status quo (Grabb, 2007). In this regard, “the exercise and maintenance of social power presupposes an ideological framework [which] is mainly acquired, confirmed, or changed through communication and discourse” (van Dijk,

1989: 21). As previously discussed, dominant groups utilize orthodox discourses to support the status quo (including their positions of power) while oppressed groups deploy heterodox discourses to protest unequal social conditions. Deconstructing discourse thus affords the opportunity to identify manifestations of social power, as well as strategies that aim to resist inequality.

2.3 Imagined Communities

Benedict Anderson's treatise on nationalism, *Imagined Communities*, offers an important starting point for the present thesis, and can be tied to social constructionism, orthodox discourses, and the other associated concepts discussed thus far in this chapter. Based on an examination of the historical development of nation-states around the world, Anderson argues that nation-building efforts on behalf of economic and political elites revolve around creating a shared sense of belonging among all constituents of the nation-state. In this understanding, a nation is a geographical, cultural, and ideological entity with four defining features. First, it is "*imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson, 2006: 6). Second, it is "*sovereign* because the concept was born in an age in which the Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm" (Anderson, 2006: 7). Third, it is "*limited* because even the largest [nation], encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries" (Anderson, 2006: 7). Finally, a nation can be conceptualized as "*a community* because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (Anderson,

2006: 7). As part of nation-building strategies employed by national elites, the creation of imagined communities was an intentional process that was historically facilitated by the spread of literacy and the development of mass media and improved modes of communication. State actors and other elites, through access to various tools and discourses (such as media and school curricula), are able to create a shared sense of nationhood that legitimates particular sets of values, beliefs, and practices, and that obscures internal fragmentation and diverse (non-national) forms of identification (such as those based on ethnicity or religion).


Viewing a nation as an imagined, sovereign, limited community entails a series of assumptions and implications that are highly pertinent to immigration discourse and, thus, to the present thesis. First, insofar as a community is *imagined*, its reality lies in its social construction. In this context, a nation is a cultural artifact that brings with it an ideology of national belonging around which inclusion in the nation is premised. Yet, given that a nation is *limited*, it is necessarily characterized by exclusion. To this end, the construction of ‘us,’ as members of a shared imagined community, involves a counter-construction of ‘them,’ consisting of ‘Others’ who do not fall within the boundaries of the nation. Finally, Anderson’s articulation of the importance of modes of communication and the role of elites in the construction of imagined communities suggests the relevance of dominant discourses in symbolic nation-building strategies. Indeed, as Creese (2007) explains, “imagined communities operate through discourses [...] that tend to homogenize and erase differences internal to the nation, and separate citizens from (both internally and externally located) ‘Others’” (Creese, 2007: 354). The historical centrality of dominant discourses in nation-building highlights the relevance

of studying prevailing discourses with an eye to how they contribute to the social construction of national imagined communities in contemporary contexts.

2.4 Imagined Futures

Alan Simmons offers a particularly useful expansion on Anderson's notion of imagined communities by directly addressing immigration policy (which, notably, was not explicitly addressed by Anderson). For Simmons, each phase of a nation's history can be understood in terms of a prevailing vision of the nation's future (that is, an 'imagined future') around which nation-building efforts are constructed. Nation-building, in this context, is "a historical process guided by political leaders through their implementation of relatively coherent policy packages covering economic growth, trade, immigration, and cultural goals and strategies, as well as other related matters" (Simmons, 2010: 14) (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 Imagined Futures and Immigration Policy



Source: Reproduced from Simmons (1999: 35)

In developing policies, political leaders and policy advisors consider the various combinations of policy options, and decide upon the most appropriate strategy for achieving the desired 'imagined future.' Imagined futures are thus 'conceptual spaces' wherein nation-building is negotiated and planned (Simmons, 1999).

Depending on the historical circumstances and the nation-building goals being pursued at any given point in time, there will be varying degrees of tension involved in determining the most complementary set of policies. In an over-simplified example, political leaders may struggle to determine the best policy package for a nation in instances where the nation's imagined future requires a high level of immigration to meet labour demands, the prevailing vision of the population is monocultural in nature, and immigrants are only available from 'non-preferred' cultural sources. Alternatively, if a pluralistic vision of the nation exists under the same circumstances, developing a coherent policy package would be (in principle) less challenging.

As this description suggests, immigration policy does not emerge as an independent and isolated decision, but is integrated into state leaders' broader vision for the nation within an international system. It follows that, depending on broader goals and policy directions, immigration flows will wax and wane, and different immigrants will be considered more or less 'ideal' with respect to their 'fit' with a nation's imagined future. On a related point, it is important to note that the formulation of a policy package is based on *assumptions* about the 'fit' between various policies and, in the case of immigration, the success of newcomers with respect to their 'imagined' role in building the nation. At any given point in time, immigration policies (and the other

policies with which they are intertwined) will continue to make sense only insofar as they enable the nation's goals (as defined by political leaders) to be realized:

For example, if Canada's hopes for future exports are not realized, the logic of a policy favouring the immigration of skilled foreign labour and entrepreneurs will be called into question. The skilled workers will be without jobs and the entrepreneurs will seek greener pastures elsewhere (Simmons, 1999: 46).

Given that immigration is an arena where economic and cultural values intersect (Simmons, 1999), any imagined future will be based on the assumption that the cultural identity of the nation will not be threatened by immigration, and that newcomers will be accepted into the nation. Thus, if immigration policies are constructed around a multi-cultural national vision, the assumption is that immigrants from diverse countries and backgrounds will integrate into their receiving society, and that immigration will not stimulate social conflict (Simmons, 1999).

The present thesis draws on Simmons' useful framework, but approaches it from a slightly different angle by focusing on discourse. More specifically, insofar as Canadian immigration policies are based on a particular vision of the nation, then the discourse advanced by the state can be expected to reflect and reconstruct that vision, and to reiterate its underlying ideologies. Other dominant discourses can be expected to echo the ideological underpinnings of state discourses based on their shared status as orthodox discourses and their common role in protecting the status quo. To this end, the concrete policies associated with any given imagined future are seen here as reflecting and supporting particular ideologies; the present thesis thus explores how these ideologies manifest in dominant discourse on immigration.⁷

⁷ See Sutherland (2005) for a useful discussion of the value of taking a discourse approach when studying the ideological dimensions of nation-building and nationalism.

2.5 Additional Concepts

The present section outlines additional concepts that surface at various points in this thesis and that are embedded to greater or lesser degrees in the construction of Canada's imagined community. The section specifically defines the manner in which the terms nation, country, state, race, racialization, racism, ethnicity, and gender are understood and used in the remainder of the thesis.

2.51 Nation, Country, and State

Throughout the thesis, the terms nation, country, and state are used to refer to related concepts that are highly relevant to immigration. In this thesis, 'Canada' as a *country*, is understood as a sovereign territorial entity that is separated from the remainder of the world by its geopolitical boundaries. The Canadian *nation* is understood in the thesis as a social construction; it is the community that is imagined (here, in media, policy, and official measurement discourse) as corresponding to Canada (the country). This understanding adheres to Anderson's (2006) view of nations (see section 2.3 of the present chapter). It is, however, critical to acknowledge that using the term 'Canadian nation' is not meant to imply the existence of a monolithic, uniform nation. The use of this term is not intended to suggest that all individuals contained within the geopolitical boundaries of Canada share a sense of belonging to a unified 'Canadian nation.' For instance, First Nations communities and Québec are widely regarded as distinct nations residing within the geopolitical boundaries of Canada (the *country*). Yet, it is the contention of the present thesis that, in media, policy, and official measurement

discourse, an ambiguously defined ‘Canadian nation’ *is* imagined, in neglect of the fact that internal ‘national’ divisions exist within the country (i.e., the fact that there are multiple communities within Canada that imagine themselves as being nations). Finally, the term ‘state’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to the set of institutions that are manned by a heterogeneous group of actors who, as a collectivity, are charged with carrying out the regulatory and administrative capacities associated with overseeing the constituent population (including citizens, permanent residents, and temporary residents). Although the government (at the federal level) is the component of the state most relevant to the present thesis, the term ‘state’ is also frequently used in light of the fact that the government is not seen as an independent entity but, rather, is understood as being part of an overarching social structure (the state) that, as a whole, operates on the basis of a shared organizational and bureaucratic logic, despite internal divisions and conflicts.

2.52 Race, Racialization, and Racism

The term ‘race’ has had a long history of widespread usage in public, political, and scholarly discourses. In biological terms, ‘race’ refers to genetic or biological differences (such as skin colour) that have often served as the basis of scientific and popular efforts to categorize individuals into ‘racial’ groups. Historically, efforts to delineate biological ‘races’ coincided with attempts to attribute individual and cultural competencies to racial difference (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007; Miles & Brown, 2003; Satzewich, 1998b). Scientific evidence indicates, however, that phenotypical variation across human population groups is not indicative of inherent ‘racial’ differences; as

such, the scientific validity of race has largely been rejected in contemporary scholarly contexts. As Satzewich (1998b) explains:

Things like skin pigmentation certainly vary, and there may very well be differences in the geographical frequency distribution of certain genes. In other words, physical and genetic differences between individuals exist, but these are not race differences. Race is simply the label that has been used to describe certain kinds of human difference (p.29).

Despite the scientific rejection of the validity of biologically categorizing population groups on the basis of 'race,' the concept of race persists in public, political, and academic discourses. For instance, race is reified in the legislative definition of visible minorities in Canada; according to the Employment Equity Act of 1995, visible minorities are "persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour" (<http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/ref/dict/pop127-eng.cfm>). It is in contexts such as this that the notion of 'racialization' emerges as a useful framework.

Although there are various definitions of racialization, a useful definition is offered by Miles and Brown (2003), who use the term "to denote those instances where social relations between people have been structured by the signification of human biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated social collectivities" (Miles & Brown, 2003: 101). Racialization can thus be understood as processes that mark physical bodies with symbolic meaning, to the end of assigning people to different social locations and organizing social interactions accordingly (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007; Kobayashi & Johnson, 2007). In this understanding, groups that are 'marked' as a certain race are constructed as having specific non-physical qualities, such as intellectual capacity, work ethic, beliefs and values, etc. That is, physical and cultural traits become associated with social attributes, regardless of

whether these associations legitimately exist. These social attributes are constructed as being the inherent result of ‘racial’ group membership (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007). The traits that are considered salient vary across time and place and are a matter of contestation and renegotiation, yet are largely contingent on power differentials, with dominant groups in society holding the power and resources to dictate the characteristics that define other groups as subordinate (Li, 1988; see also Omi & Winant, 1994).

Racism and racialization are conceptually interrelated, albeit not coterminous. Racism can broadly be understood as an ideology, doctrine, or dogma involving a negative or prejudicial evaluation of a ‘racial’ collectivity (see Back & Solomon, 2000; Fleras & Elliot, 2003; Henry et al., 2000; Miles & Brown, 2003; Satzewich, 1998b; Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007). In this context, racism presupposes a process of racialization; groups must first be racialized before they can be evaluated on the basis of their assigned characteristics. Insofar as these evaluations are prejudicial or negative, and are rooted in the assumption of shared, inherent, group characteristics, they can be considered ‘racist.’ Importantly, racism can be explicit or implicit and can operate as both individual prejudices or as institutional forms of discrimination (of which social actors may or may not be aware). Moreover, racism can take a variety of forms, depending on the historical, social, and economic context (Miles & Brown, 2003). As such, as Satzewich (1998b) explains: “what exists is not so much racism, but rather a range of racisms [...] Part of the task of sociology, then, is to analyze the varied meanings, expressions, and significance of racism” (p.39). A critical examination of dominant discourses of immigration in Canada allows for such an analysis, given the

‘racial’ diversity commonly associated with contemporary Canadian immigration (discussed in Chapter One) and the ideological connection between ‘race’ and the ‘immigration question’ (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007).

2.53 Ethnicity

Closely linked to the issue of ‘race’ is the concept of ethnicity. In popular discourses, the terms race and ethnicity are often used interchangeably (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007). This tendency reflects widespread confusion and conflation surrounding the two concepts in a variety of contexts, including scholarly settings. As was the case for ‘race,’ the term ‘ethnicity’ is not straightforward to define, despite its widespread usage.

The word ‘ethnic’ has its origin in the Greek word ‘ethnos’ (translated as ‘nation’); in this context, it refers to group membership based on shared descent or blood ties (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007). In the term’s first English usage in the 15th century, it carried with it the meaning of ‘others’ (in reference to religion) to refer to persons who were neither Christian nor Jewish (Tonkin et al., 1989). Under these conditions, ‘ethnicity’ served as a means of drawing boundaries around a religious imagined community. In sociological contexts, one of the first theorists to offer an explicit definition of ethnicity was Max Weber, who defined ethnic groups as “those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization” (Weber, 1968: 389). This definition acknowledges the subjective element of ethnicity, wherein ethnicity is contingent on a *belief* in common descent or shared ties, regardless of whether biological ties exist.

More recently, sociological definitions have addressed ethnicity in terms of shared cultural characteristics or, in some cases, national origin. Feagin and Feagin (2003), for instance, define an ethnic group as “a group socially distinguished or set apart, by others or by itself, primarily on the basis of cultural or national-origin characteristics” (p.8). Cornell and Hartmann (2007) elaborate on this idea, offering a useful framework for the concept of ethnicity that reflects the manner in which it is understood in the present thesis. First, Cornell and Hartmann (2007) note that ethnicity can be linked to three (real or imagined) features: shared kinship or ancestry (which is broadly defined, often involving descent from a common homeland); a common historical trajectory; and symbolic means of group identification. Second, ethnicity is a matter of contrast, and is thus inherently relational. In other words, “to claim an ethnic identity (or to attempt to assign one to someone else) is to distinguish ourselves from others; it is to draw a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ on the basis of the claim we make that ‘we’ share something that ‘they’ do not” (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007: 20-21). Finally, as this latter quote suggests, ethnicity can be a matter of self-identification, involving self-conscious membership in an *ethnic group*. Alternatively, ethnicity can be identified and assigned by external parties, in which case it can be understood as an *ethnic category* that may or may not represent the manner in which individuals self-identify. In the present thesis, ethnicity is addressed in terms of how it is socially constructed in discourse; to this end, it is interpreted primarily in relation to ethnic *categorization*, based upon relational notions of cultural or national belonging.

2.54 Gender

In the present thesis, gender is understood as a social construction that operates at a number of levels, ranging from the relations between individual men and women all the way up to the structural organization of societies. In the social construction of ‘women’ and ‘men,’ the biological distinction between females and males is transformed into socially significant differences in terms of roles and societal arrangements (Agnew, 2003; Rubin, 1975). In this understanding, the meanings associated with femininity and masculinity and the differential roles that women and men occupy in society (for instance, in terms of the family and the household, the economy, the education system, the state, etc.) are not inevitable outcomes of being female or male but arise through ongoing processes of social construction (see Ferree, Lorber & Hess, 1999). Gender, then, is not fixed, but is constructed and reconstructed in given historical and social contexts (Agnew, 2003). Gender, however, is not seen here as merely a characteristic of individuals. Rather, it is a constitutive feature of social life that extends beyond socially constructed meanings pertaining to individual women and men. It is an “organizing principle of collectivities, social institutions, historical processes, and social practices” (Nakano Glenn, 1999: 5). As a constitutive feature and central organizing principle of social life, gender is linked to the allocation of power, privilege, and resources.

In the context of international immigration, gender operates at all stages of the migration process and experience (Boyd, 2006; Boyd & Grieco, 2003). In the pre-migration stage, for instance, cultural norms define the opportunity that women and men have to migrate, as well as the context within which such migration might occur (i.e., independently as a labour migrant; as part of a family as a dependent, etc.) (Boyd

& Greico, 2003). Critical scholars have argued that contemporary determination processes involved in the selection of immigrants often appears gender neutral, yet actually occur within gendered frameworks, thus embedding gender in immigrant access to receiving countries (see, for example, Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Boyd, 1997; Boyd & Grieco, 2003; Mascini & van Bochove, 2009; Ng, 1990; Palriwala & Uberoi, 2008; Sweetman, 1998; Thobani, 1999). Gender is also implicated in the post-migration stage in terms of the impact of gendered entry status on social rights and entitlements, and cultural norms in the receiving country (see Boyd, 2006; Boyd & Grieco, 2003; Boyd & Pikkov, 2005; McKay, 2003; Oxman-Martinez et al., 2001; Sweetman, 1998). Much like race and racialization, gender is often obscured in ‘neutral’ discourses that do not acknowledge pre-existing gendered norms and structures. Indeed, insofar as social practices and processes are organized in gendered ways, then gender neutrality facilitates the persistence of gender inequality. To this end, the gendered reality underlying gender neutrality is a necessary consideration of all immigration studies, as well as all studies of discourse.

2.6 Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is highly attuned to the various frameworks and concepts discussed thus far in the present chapter. CDA involves examining a discourse’s construction of particular ‘objects’ with an eye to the ideological work it performs (van Dijk, 1993c). In other words, CDA addresses “how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies, and the constructive effects discourse has on social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief, neither of which

are normally apparent to discourse participants” (Fairclough, 1993: 12). From this perspective, discourse is implicated in the social construction of reality, acting to constitute identities and structure the social world (Fairclough, 2001).

Although CDA is theoretically and analytically diverse, what is consistent across all critical approaches to discourse analysis is the contention that there is a *de facto* relationship between discourse, power, and social inequality (van Dijk, 1993c). Most forms of CDA thus focus on the manner in which discursive structures serve to reproduce dominance and inequality, regardless of the genre or context of discourse under examination (van Dijk, 2001). As Luke (2002) describes, “critical discourse analysis [...] is an explicitly normative analysis of how texts and discourses work in ideological interests with powerful political consequences” (p.96).

According to Fairclough and Wodak (1997), there are eight main tenets of CDA. These tenets are briefly described here as general principles, as well as in terms of how they relate to Canadian immigration and the present thesis.

(1) *CDA addresses social problems.* In CDA, discourse is examined in the context of a social concern, pertaining to how discourse is implicated in the (re)production of systematic inequalities. Thus, for instance, many analyses based on the principles of CDA have been conducted on racism (see, for example, Goldberg, 1992, 1990; Li, 2007, 2001; Puttagunta, 1998; van Dijk, 1997, 1994, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Wodak, 1996b; Wodak & Matouschek, 1993) as well as on gender inequality (e.g., Baden & Goetz, 1997; Ehrlich, 2007; Elliott et al., 1995; Kobayashi, 1994; Kondo, 1990; Marling, 2010; Wetherell, Stiven & Potter, 1987). With respect to Canadian immigration, inequalities along dimensions of ‘race’ and gender represent

important issues that have been addressed by numerous scholars (e.g., Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Agnew, 2007; Jiwani, 2006; Simmons, 1998; Thobani, 2000). Building on this work, the present thesis examines dominant discourses more closely to ascertain the manner in which discourse symbolically includes, marginalizes, or excludes different groups of immigrants in the construction of Canada's imagined community.

(2) *Power relations are discursive.* Dominant forms of discourse (e.g., in arenas of politics, media, and science) play central roles in sustaining unequal social relations and supporting discriminatory social structures. On the one hand, accessing these discourses is a matter of power (van Dijk, 2001). Power is enacted through discourse by placing certain individuals and groups in the position to constitute the content of talk and text; this content subsequently plays a role in influencing the knowledge and opinions of receiving audiences. In other words, groups who control the most influential discourses have the power to socially construct people, things, and relationships, to the end of positioning individuals and groups in particular social roles and establishing, sustaining, and legitimizing unequal social relationships (van Dijk, 2001). With respect to Canadian immigration, the construction of immigrants in orthodox discourses positions immigrants with respect to Canadian state and society, and provides the means by which these relationships are to be understood and rationalized. Dominant discourses also inform broader audiences about immigrants and immigration, to the end of influencing knowledge and opinions about newcomers, and providing symbolic resources for naturalizing discrimination against immigrants.

(3) *Discourse constitutes society and culture, as well as being constituted by them.* Discourse has a role in reproducing or transforming society and culture, and must

be understood as having a dialectical relationship with the society and culture in which it occurs. A discourse both informs social practice and is created, upheld, and/or transformed through practice. In other words, discourse provides meanings that underlie social practices, while social practices themselves become represented as discursive formations. Take, for instance, an example offered by Lilja (2009):

Every hijab-wearing woman constitutes a representation within a religious, sometimes nationalistic discourse, a discourse that she is upholding by wearing the hijab. She is one representation among many forming an Islamic discourse. She, acting from her identity, becomes a 'living representation' and a powerful means to strengthen a discourse (p.8).

In the context of Canadian immigration, relationships between immigrants and Canadian society, as well as the positioning of different groups of immigrants relative to one another, are constantly created and reproduced through discourses that socially construct these groups in particular ways. The manner in which immigrants are constructed in dominant discourses stands to affect public opinion, political agendas, and the treatment of immigrants within society. Discourses thus reflect existing conditions, yet also stand to configure the social life of immigrants (and non-immigrants) in symbolic and material ways. Social practices also have the ability to alter dominant discourses by constituting and strengthening counter-discourses (i.e., heterodoxy).

(4) *Discourse does ideological work.* As discussed earlier in this chapter, ideology is a means by which dominant groups exercise control over society – namely, by legitimating the status quo and thus supporting prevailing power structures and existing inequalities. In this regard, discourse serves as a conceptual space wherein ideologies are expressed, often in coded ways, to the end of naturalizing a particular

social order. As Fairclough and Wodak note, “discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations through the ways in which they represent things and position people” (cited in Wodak, 1996a: 15). With respect to immigration, the social construction of Canada’s imagined community in discourse is based on ideological underpinnings that can go unnoticed as ideological formulations in light of their seemingly ‘common sense’ nature.

(5) *Discourse is historical.* From a sociological perspective, any given discourse must be considered within its broader context, and is only meaningful if it is understood in terms of the events and discourses that have preceded it and that surround it. It follows that uncovering the discursive meaning of given texts and talk necessarily requires historical and social contextualization. As such, in order to deconstruct contemporary discourses on Canadian immigration, it is necessary to examine the long history surrounding immigration in Canada, particularly with respect to immigrants’ place in the Canadian nation and Canadian nation-building efforts; Chapter Three provides this contextualization.

(6) *The link between text and society is mediated.* There is necessarily a mediated relationship between discourse and social practice, involving intervening socio-cognitive processes through which intentions, beliefs, and ideologies are realized in discourse, and, likewise, through which interpretations of discourse produce beliefs, attitudes, knowledge, and behaviours. In terms of discourse analysis, these socio-cognitive processes are most commonly addressed in social psychological approaches; this is a major topic of study in its own right (see, for instance, Fiske & Taylor, 1984;

Giles & Peterson, 1990; Wyer & Srull, 1985). For the present thesis, it is necessary to acknowledge that there is a ‘black box’ between the content of dominant immigration discourses and the manner in which their content does or does not affect identity formation, discriminatory behaviour, and policy formation. The emphasis in this thesis is on uncovering the ideologies and constructions in particular immigration discourses, not on determining how these constructions are or are not translated into attributions or actions. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind throughout the thesis that a mediating socio-cognitive relationship, albeit undefined here, exists between discourse and social practice.

(7) *Discourse analysis is interpretive and explanatory.* There are likely to be various readings of any given discourse. In other words, in the context of CDA, “interpretations are never finished and authoritative, they are dynamic and open” (Wodak, 1996a: 20). The manner in which dominant immigration discourses are read, interpreted, and understood in the present thesis is inevitably shaped by the theoretical and methodological perspective and social location of the analyst – myself. In this regard, the reading of the immigration discourse offered here is simply one reading that could be contested by other readings. Rather than being a caveat, this point is seen as reflective of the complex nature of any social science. Moreover, a critical reading of discourse, involving systematic efforts to deconstruct a discourse and embed it within its social conditions, may help to narrow down the range of possible readings and help to link a particular discourse to ideologies and power relationships. To this end, efforts were taken throughout the thesis to be transparent, and to provide as much as possible the textual evidence contributing to the conclusions being drawn. In this way, the reader

is afforded the opportunity to configure an alternative reading of the immigration discourse.

(8) *Discourse is a form of social action.* As discussed in point number four above, CDA is rooted in the contention that analyses of discourse can reveal ideologies that operate to uphold and legitimize the existing social order. It follows that the ultimate goal of CDA is to uncover the hidden operation of power and oppression in discourse, thereby contributing to changes in consciousness and leading to social action. In this regard, CDA is a “socially committed scientific paradigm” (Young & Fitzgerald, 2006: 24) that encourages both reflective and reflexive thinking. Clearly, expecting social change to come about from any single analysis, or even multiple analyses, is a lofty goal. Nevertheless, CDA has had some notable successes in this regard. For instance, van Dijk’s (1993b) analysis of Dutch school books raised awareness of their racist undertones, ultimately leading to the production of new school materials (see Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). In terms of the present thesis, although it is not expected that this work alone will alter orthodox discourses on immigration, it nevertheless stands to contribute to a literature that contests inequality pertaining to immigration in Canada.

Overall, these eight principles are implicit in CDA, and will be evident to greater or lesser degrees throughout the present thesis. As discussed above, some of the tenets are beyond the scope of the thesis (for instance, the socio-cognitive mediation between ‘text’ and society), and thus will be not explicitly discussed in the remainder of the thesis. Nevertheless, these principles provide background for understanding the methodological usefulness of CDA in the context of this thesis and beyond.

The other frameworks and concepts outlined in the present chapter also inform the upcoming chapters. Benedict Anderson's notion of imagined communities represents the core framework for the thesis, which also draws inspiration from Alan Simmons' 'imagined futures' approach to immigration policy. The upcoming analysis chapters elaborate on the manner in which immigration is tied into the social construction of the contemporary Canadian imagined community, thereby extending both of these frameworks into the realm of discourse. First, however, it is necessary to address the history of Canadian immigration in more detail. This history lends insight into current immigration patterns and controversies. It also sheds light on the relevance of addressing the notion of imagined communities in reference to immigration, and in considering the intersection of 'race,' gender, and immigrant mode of entry in such an examination. Chapter Three provides this historical contextualization.

CHAPTER THREE: CANADIAN IMMIGRATION FROM CONFEDERATION TO THE IRPA

“The exercise of examining the past reminds us that change is constant and that the present is only the latest installment in an unfolding story” (Simmons, 2010: 48).

3.0 Introduction

There have been several comprehensive examinations of Canadian immigration history (see Hawkins, 1991, 1988; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Knowles, 2007), and nearly every textbook and scholarly publication on Canadian immigration includes an abbreviated version of this history. This work has documented the evolution of immigration policies over time in accordance with economic and nation-building goals, and has also articulated the widespread discrimination that characterized the first century of Canadian post-Confederation immigration. Indeed, the manner in which ‘race’/ethnicity, national origin, gender, and social class were implicated in early Canadian immigration have been well-documented in the existing literature (see, for example, Abella & Trooper, 1982; Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Bolaria & Li, 1988; Boyd & Vickers, 2000; Buchignani & Indra, 1985; Calliste, 1993; Das Gupta, 1995; Elliot & Fleras, 1992; Hawkins, 1991, 1988; Li, 1988; Ng, 1992; Satzewich, 1989a, 1989b; Simmons, 1998; Stasiulis, 1997; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Thobani, 1998). Although the present chapter also addresses these issues, it adds to the existing literature by looking more directly at how and why the ‘family’ entered into immigration policies and flows, in combination with, and as distinct from, ‘economic’ immigration. Family-

based⁸ and economic immigration have both always been a part of Canadian immigration; however, the relationship between these two types of immigration has evolved considerably since Canada's first *Immigration Act* in 1869. By examining these changes over time, it becomes possible to see that the conceptualization of the family, and its relation to economic immigration, has been directly implicated in racialized and gendered constructions of Canada's imagined community over time. More specifically, the chapter demonstrates that the family has been a central site for defining three types of relationships to Canada's national community. The first of these three relationships involves immigrants who most closely resemble the 'ideal future citizen,' be it based on skin colour, national origin, gender, or skill; these immigrants have historically been most readily granted entry into the country and permitted access to their family (either through migration of the family unit or allowances for family reunification). The second positioning of immigrants to the Canadian nation involves persons who are constructed as *less* than 'ideal' future citizens, yet are nevertheless granted access to the nation; this group has typically been marginalized through limited or no access to family reunification, and thus constructed as 'outsiders' *within* the nation. Finally, those most strongly contradicting the image of an 'ideal' immigrant have typically been excluded from entry, and thus most explicitly and literally constructed as 'outsiders.' Each of these three relationships has been visible throughout Canadian post-Confederation immigration history.

⁸ For the sake of ease of discussion, this term is used loosely in this chapter to capture various forms of immigration that share in common a connection to the institution of the family. In particular, it is used as an umbrella term for the immigration of entire families as the migratory unit and for family reunification.

The present chapter defines sub-periods of post-Confederation immigration that delineate the changing relationship between family-based and economic immigration. The discussion is organized according to these periods, and addresses the manner in which the relationship between family-based and economic immigration has manifested in terms of gender, 'race'/ethnicity, and social class.

3.1 White Settler Families: 1869 to 1910

Prior to Confederation, Canada was conceptualized as a British colony within the Americas. With Confederation in 1867, an official vision of 'White Canada' as its own nation became firmly established (Simmons, 2010, 1998). Accordingly, despite a variety of changes in immigration volumes and policies, immigration during the first hundred years following Confederation in 1867 was guided by an overarching goal of building a well-populated, economically successful, independent nation that replicated the desirable features of Canada's mother country (Simmons, 2010, 1998). These economic and demographic goals were articulated within exclusionary immigration principles based on gendered and class-based 'racial' preferences (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Knowles, 2007; Stasiulis, 1997). Importantly, as the upcoming discussion illustrates, these goals clearly manifested in the manner in which economic and family-based immigrants were positioned in the context of nation-building and the construction of the nation's imagined community.

In the early post-Confederation years, the National Policy of Prime Minister John A. Macdonald's administration represented the package of strategies through which the Canadian Dominion was to be solidified. Efforts were to revolve around

agricultural development, the completion of a transnational railway, tariffs to incite industrial growth, and the promotion of immigration in order to protect the nation (particularly in the West) from U.S. expansionism and to compensate for the loss of population through emigration to the U.S. (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Puttagunta, 1998; Simmons, 2010; Thompson & Weinfeld, 1995). As part of this set of national policies, Canada's first *Immigration Act* was implemented in 1869. This earliest immigration program focused on excluding immigrants who were most immediately constructed as a threat to the well-being of the emerging nation; this was expressed in medical terms, geared towards avoiding the introduction of communicable diseases into the nation (Whitaker, 1991). Efforts were also taken to safeguard the nation against the possible burden imposed by less than desirable immigrants (defined in the Act in terms of idiocy, lunacy, deafness, infirmity, etc.) through the imposition of a \$300 bond, to be collected for each individual deemed likely to become a public charge in the absence of a family to care for them (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Knowles, 2007; Whitaker, 1991). The expectation that immigrant families were responsible for 'burdensome' immigrants, currently embedded in the sponsorship agreement (discussed in Chapter One), was thus evident in the earliest immigration policies.

At this point in time, official restrictions on immigrants were not explicitly articulated in terms of ethnic or national origin of immigrants. Nevertheless, the prevailing vision of the nation's imagined future entailed an ideological preference for 'White' settler (i.e., agricultural) families (Simmons, 2010, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis, 1997; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). In this context, economic and family-based immigration were largely synonymous – the family was conceptualized as the unit of both economic

production and demographic/social reproduction. The assumption that women were dependents of male heads of households was implicit in the patriarchal structures and norms of the time (Côté et al, 2001). Consistent with these norms, women were only indirectly addressed in the 1869 *Immigration Act* as dependents of males. To this end, in the earliest years of Canadian immigration policy, ideal future citizens were bureaucratically and normatively constructed as male heads of agricultural households. Female immigrants were located within the family unit, and thus were constructed as dependents of permanent settlers rather than as future citizens in their own right. Although 'White' British and American women were recruited to come to Canada as domestic workers at the time (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998), the presence of women as workers was not articulated in the first *Immigration Act*. In this way, women's economic contributions to Canadian nation-building were obscured by the fact that they were subsumed within families.

Through 1867 into the 1890s, emigration from Canada (primarily to the U.S.) remained ahead of immigration; this heightened the demand for "large-scale British immigration to retain the 'British' character of Canada" (Whitaker, 1991: 4). Yet, despite the ideological goal of populating the nation with British agricultural families, the labour needs required for the expansion of the nation meant that a larger influx of immigrants was needed than was being provided by British settlers (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Whitaker, 1991). As a result, immigration in the early post-Confederation decades commonly involved admission of immigrants outside of the ideal 'White settler' model (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995), albeit under circumstances that clearly demonstrated the distinction between ideal future citizens and 'undesirables.' In

this regard, family-based immigration was particularly telling; when ‘non-White’ immigrants were admitted to Canada (typically for labour purposes), their spouses were largely prohibited from entry. For instance, between 1880 and 1885, large numbers of Chinese male labourers were recruited to work dangerous posts during the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (Abu-Laban, 1998a; Satzewich, 1993). Only single male migrants or married men willing to leave their families behind were recruited; the wives and children of married Chinese workers were not eligible for entry to Canada (Satzewich, 1993). Access to family-based immigration thus existed very early on as a feature that distinguished between those intended for permanent inclusion in the Canadian nation and those intended for temporary residence. Moreover, specifically excluding women of ‘undesirable’ races was not only a means of restricting the permanent settlement of immigrants who were not ‘ideal’ future citizens themselves, it also served to preclude the reproduction of ‘undesirables’ on Canadian soil (Satzewich, 1993; Stasiulis, 1997). In this way, the labour of Asian men contributed to building the Canadian nation, while their marginalization in the Canadian nation was solidified through the exclusion of their family members.

As suggested by the above discussion, immigrants of Chinese origin were singled out for particularly restrictive treatment in the early decades of post-Confederation immigration. Indeed, once railway construction was completed in 1885, the government introduced the *Chinese Immigration Act*, which implemented an immigration tax (‘head tax’) on newcomers of Chinese origin. This legislation institutionalized efforts to exclude these ‘undesirables’ from the Canadian nation (Bolaria & Li, 1988; Li, 1998; see Chapleau & Gray, 1885). Later amendments to this

Act illustrated the extent to which women immigrants were entrenched within the family unit, as well as the extent to which Chinese *families*, rather than individual migrants, were perceived as the most salient threat to the developing nation:

No duty shall be payable under “The Chinese Immigration Act,” in respect of any woman of Chinese origin who is the wife of a person who is not of Chinese origin; but, for the purposes of the said Act, such a woman shall be deemed to be of the same nationality as her husband (Canada, 1887, ch.35, section 1).

In other words, in cases where Chinese women were granted entry as wives of non-Chinese males, their national origin was erased in official documentation, subsuming them under their husband’s origin.

At the turn of the 20th century, large influxes of immigrants continued to be central to the growth of the Canadian nation and official efforts to populate the Canadian west (Green & Green, 2004; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Puttagunta, 1998). In 1896, Clifford Sifton was appointed Minister of Interior (the portfolio responsible for immigration at the time). Sifton immediately initiated an aggressive recruitment campaign with a focus on attracting farmers from Central and Eastern Europe (as well as from the U.S.). Although small numbers of non-British immigrants had arrived in the first three decades after Confederation, it was during Sifton’s post that immigration of non-British immigrants was first actively encouraged. This immigration, however, was not unrestrained, but involved clear limits geared towards encouraging agricultural settlement (Whitaker, 1991). In this way, economic and demographic nation-building goals were, to some degree, prioritized over the cultural boundaries previously constructed around the Canadian imagined community.

Importantly, however, immigrant recruitment retained racial assumptions, structured around racialized views of different groups’ abilities in ways that defined

which types of families were economically desirable. At this point in time, the immigration of farming families was central to Canadian nation-building, relating to official efforts to encourage the growth of western Canada. To this end, the Canadian government entered into an agreement with the North Atlantic Trading Company (NATC) in 1899 geared toward the recruitment of peasant families. The NATC was mandated to recruit continental European peasant families who possessed at least \$100 (Satzewich, 1993). In this context, the *family*, rather than the individual, was clearly still the unit of immigration, corresponding to the Canadian state's view of the nation's needs at that point in time. Moreover, the recruitment of continental European families for settlement in the west "was based on a Social Darwinist belief that certain types of families, conditioned by many years of oppression and arduous labour, were 'racially' suited for the labour intensive tasks essential to homesteading" (Satzewich, 1993: 320). In this way, families of particular origins were racialized as a unit; their merit to the Canadian nation was only realized in the context of family labour power. Additionally, the racialization of continental European peasant families entailed gendered and class-based implications: many of these families were granted land that was of inferior quality, undermining their ability to meet a subsistence level of existence. The males were thus forced to engage in seasonal labour (for instance, for logging companies or as section hands on railroads); women, along with children, engaged in reproductive labour on the homestead, while some women also performed domestic labour in the homes of more established farmers in the area (Satzewich, 1993). These immigrants were thus marginalized in the Canadian nation; they were included in literal terms insofar as they served nation-building needs, but were simultaneously entrenched (as

both individuals and as families) in unequal relationships with settlers who more closely approximated the model of ideal citizens.

Overall, the policy discourse of the early post-Confederation decades illustrates the central role of family-based immigration in the construction of the Canadian nation at the time. Indeed, the earliest immigration policies in Canadian history constructed the nation's imagined community around a vision of a nation composed of largely British family units consisting of a male head who was responsible for his wife and dependents. Accordingly, British male heads of households, as ideal future citizens, were granted the most generous allowances in terms of family-based immigration; their wives were allowed entry to Canada, guided by these women's status as dependents and their role in bearing the next generation of ideal citizens. Other European families were granted entry on the basis of racialized views of their farming ability, yet were still symbolically and materially marginalized with respect to the Canadian national community. Chinese men during this time were not constructed as future citizens, but were more restrictively viewed as labourers whose only purpose was to fill production needs that could not be met by the existing population. In turn, their wives and families were largely excluded from Canada. More generally, women of the most 'inferior races' were excluded from entering Canada and constructed as a veritable threat to the nation's ('White') imagined future due to their risk of reproducing 'undesirables.'

3.2 White Permanent Settlers and Domestic Labourers: 1906 to 1920s

Sifton's recruitment of non-British immigrants generated considerable controversy, illustrating the tension surrounding the intersection of economic and demographic

interests, on the one hand, and national cultural identity, on the other. Prompted by a growing backlash against his approach to immigration, Sifton was replaced by Frank Oliver in 1905. With his succession, Oliver reasserted the boundaries of the nation:

It is not merely a question of filling the country with people ...It is a question of the ultimate results of the efforts put forward for the building of a Canadian nationality...This can never be accomplished if the preponderance of the population should be of such a class and character that will deteriorate rather than elevate the condition of our people and our country at large (cited in Whitaker, 1991: 8).

The immigration program, under Oliver's direction, continued to aggressively recruit immigrants, but no longer welcomed immigrants of non-British origin.

During this time, the intersection between 'family' and 'economic' immigration surfaced in two main ways that were clearly articulated in new immigration regulations implemented in 1906 and in 1910. First, as in the previous sub-period, British agricultural families remained the ideal immigration unit from both an economic, demographic, and cultural perspective. These families would populate the nation with culturally suitable citizens, and would also reproduce the next generation of ideal citizens. What was unique in this sub-period was the heightened articulation of gendered norms of dependence, which further documented the extent to which the family was viewed as the integral unit of settlement at the time:

In any case where deportation of the head of a family is ordered, all dependent members of the family may be deported at the same time. And in any case where deportation of a dependent member of a family is ordered on account of having become a public charge, and in the opinion of the Minister such circumstance is due to willful neglect or non-support by the head or other members of the family morally bound to support such a dependent member, then all members of the family may be deported at the same time. Such deportation shall be at the cost of the persons so deported (Statutes of Canada, 1910, ch. 27, s. 42.5).

The second unique feature of this time period was the active recruitment of female domestic workers. This meant that the immigration of women for labour purposes (albeit, notably, still within a ‘family’ setting) was officially articulated for the first time in Canada’s post-Confederation history. At the time, the demand for British domestic servants typically outstripped the supply, in part because wages and work conditions for this class of worker were not substantially better than in Britain. As such, encouragement of female domestic workers from other areas of Europe at the beginning of the 20th century became part of the state’s broader recruitment efforts, otherwise primarily focused on agriculturalists:

The policy of the Department at the present time is to encourage the immigration of farmers, farm labourers, and female domestic servants from the United States, the British Isles, and certain Northern European countries, namely, France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Iceland. On the other hand, it is the policy of the Department to do all in its power to keep out of the country undesirables [i.e.,] those belonging to nationalities unlikely to assimilate and who consequently prevent the building up of a united nation of people of similar customs and ideals (Statutes of Canada, 1910, cited in Department of Manpower and Immigration Canada, 1974: 9-10).

Overall, whether women arrived in Canada as dependents within a family unit or as domestic workers, their place in the Canadian nation was constructed solely in terms of the domestic sphere, and thus in the context of the institution of the family. Consistent with social norms and ideologies at the time, the location of women within the private sphere was embedded in the *Immigration Act*, which explicitly defined women in positions of subservience and dependence within the home, either as domestic workers or as dependents within a male-headed household.

In this context, social class was also central to immigration policy and the construction of the Canadian national community, and again manifested in the realm of

the family. Women from higher social classes were expected to immigrate as dependents of the male head of their household (either as wives or children), while women from lower social classes were to immigrate as individual workers, in the form of domestic servants who would contribute to the growth and well-being of the ‘ideal settler’ families they serviced. The intersection of gender and ‘race’ was also evident here; as the above excerpt from the 1910 *Immigration Act* shows, the Canadian government sought single, European women to serve as domestic workers (Abu-Laban, 1998a), while women of colour were still excluded from entry through such immigration programs (Côté et al., 2001).

Overall, during this period, the intersection between economic immigration and family-based immigration (either for permanent settlement or domestic labour) clearly served as a site for defining the three relationships of immigrants to Canada’s imagined community (i.e., inclusion, marginalization, and exclusion). ‘Black,’ working-class, Caribbean women, for instance, were commonly singled out for exclusion (or deportation) from positions as domestic workers, despite the aforementioned high demand for workers to fill these positions. These women were assumed to be ‘immoral,’ likely to become public charges through pregnancy and single parenthood (Calliste, 1993). Stasiulis (1997) notes that “the exclusion of prospective female Caribbean domestic workers was ... informed by invidious myths of the promiscuous nature and proneness to single parenthood of Black women” (p.148). In this instance, the racialized sexualization of Black women constructed this group as self-evidently undesirable for membership in the Canadian nation, in direct opposition to ‘ideal’ British women in settler families.

More generally, the circumstances surrounding prospective Black Caribbean immigrants, including domestic workers, demonstrates the tension between ideological and economic needs that defined much of Canadian immigration history, wherein a clear dialectic existed between ideological preferences for 'ideal' immigrants (historically understood in gendered, class-specific, racial terms), and economic/employer needs. Among Black prospective immigrants (as with Chinese immigrants, as previously discussed), the end result typically involved selective entry under restrictive conditions, most often when there was an urgent need for cheap labour; relegation to specific posts within a racialized split labour market; and vulnerability to mistreatment and expulsion. In this fashion, immigration to Canada and the construction of the nation's imagined community up until WWI was clearly structured in intersecting terms of 'race,' gender, and social class, with respect to both individual immigrants and immigrant families.

3.3 British Family Recruitment: 1920s

During WWI, immigration to Canada had declined considerably, due to British and European needs for workers in war-related industries and army recruits, and the expense and hazard of transportation at times of war. As a result, the majority of immigrants arriving in Canada during WWI originated in the U.S. (approximately 50,000 annually) (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Li, 2003a). Following the war, national economic and political concerns visibly shaped both immigration policy over the next decade and views of 'foreigners' within the nation. On the economic side, the return of hundreds of thousands of soldiers to a post-war depressed economy and increasing demands on

federal funds brought about by various payments to veterans led to a rapid increase in both unemployment and the cost of living (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). Growing labour unrest within the country manifested as a wave of radicalism towards the end of WWI, culminating in the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 (Green & Green, 2004; Whitaker, 1991). In the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and growing concern over ‘foreign agitators’ and ‘enemy aliens’ within the nation, this strike was constructed in political, public, and legal arenas as evidence of a Bolshevik conspiracy (Horrall, 1980).

As Horall (1980) explains:

During the early morning of 17 June 1919 eight leaders of the Winnipeg General Strike were arrested by members of the RNWMP [Royal North West Mounted Police] and charged that as officials of the One Big Union⁹ they had conspired together to replace constituted authority with a soviet form of government. Although a royal commission which investigated the causes of the strike found no evidence of any seditious conspiracy, nor any connection between the strike and the [One Big Union], seven of the eight accused were eventually convicted by the courts of trying to ‘overthrow’ the state (p.169).

Such suspicions meant that the borders of the Canadian imagined community tightened in the immediate post-WWI years (both literally and symbolically), involving marginalization and exclusion based on national origin, political anarchism, and labour radicalism. For instance, concerns over ‘foreign agitators’ within the nation prompted expulsions of persons suspected of conspiring against the Canadian government (Whitaker, 1991).

These prevailing conditions also prompted revisions to the existing *Immigration Act* in 1919. Although not explicitly expressed in the context of concerns over the soviet threat, the new provisions created additional latitude for excluding immigrants by: (1)

⁹ The One Big Union was a syndicalist trade union, formed in 1919 and dissolved in 1956, when it merged with the Canadian Labour Congress (see Bercuson, 1990).

establishing a literacy test for prospective immigrants; (2) expanding on how prospective immigrants' origins were defined by adding the term 'nationality' to the word 'race'; and (3) requiring prospective immigrants from anywhere other than the U.S. or Britain to have a valid passport and/or visa prior to leaving their country of origin for Canada (Green & Green, 2004). Kelley and Trebilcock (1998) argue that these changes were intended to allow the government to screen out immigrants that would place an added burden on an already depressed Canadian economy and potentially contribute to even more unemployment. However, the policy restructuring also served to expand the government's power to strictly regulate the composition of newcomers; this served to structure the Canadian imagined community through inclusion, marginalization, and exclusion on 'racial' and ethnic ground. Thus, couched within concern for the domestic economy persisted the belief that certain immigrants were a threat to the Canadian nation, and the assumption that these threats could be screened out on the basis of applicants' 'race' and national origin. Overall, British immigrant families remained the most 'preferred' settlers, followed by North Europeans, then Central Europeans. Southern and Eastern Europeans were much lower on the list of suitable immigrants, while Asian and 'Black' immigrants remained explicitly unwelcome (Li, 2003a). Continued restricted access to family-based immigration among marginalized groups remained in effect, thereby perpetuating the distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' within the nation through family settlement rights.

As the nation moved into the 1920s, British immigration to Canada lagged behind Canadian official targets as a result of a lack of both 'push' and 'pull' factors.

The lack of 'push' factors related to the relative prosperity of Britain at the time and the expense of the overseas journey to Canada. In Canada, desirable tracts of land near railways were no longer in abundant supply; land in more remote areas, although available, was less appealing to potential settler families. At the same time, the economy was reviving and growing in diversity. As such, although immigrant families of British origin remained the 'gold standard' from an ideological perspective, business interests resulted in a moderate level of continued immigration of 'non-preferred' groups (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). In an attempt to continue building the Canadian population along 'desired' cultural lines, the Canadian government took strides to guarantee the exclusion of the most undesirable immigrants and the inclusion of the most preferred. For instance, efforts to exclude Asian immigrants became even more rigid. In the revised *Chinese Immigration Act*, passed in 1923, the head tax system on Chinese newcomers was eliminated in favour of broad provisions that were designed to effectively exclude most prospective Chinese immigrants (see Statutes of Canada, 1923). By the mid-1920s, immigration from China had virtually halted (Li, 1988). In contrast, in order to encourage British immigrant families and thus to promote the immigration of families that best suited Canada's ideal 'imagined future,' the Canadian government entered into several agreements with the British government involving efforts to recruit families for agricultural settlement. In this context, economic and family-based immigration remained synonymous, albeit only for the most desirable (i.e., British) future citizens.

For instance, under the Farm Family Settlement Schemes, the Canadian government provided assistance (including aid with travel, agricultural training, and the

provision of land on credit) to British families willing to settle on farms in Canada (Green & Green, 2004), thereby further institutionalizing racialized preferences for certain ‘types’ of families. The original goal of the Canadian government was for 3,000 British families to arrive through this program; in 1927, an additional 1,000 families were expected to arrive under similar programs directed toward settlement in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. However, the Farm Family program was ultimately a disappointment: by the time the program was terminated in 1929, it had attracted a total of only 1,500 families (Green & Green, 2004). According to Whitaker (1991), relatively few competent British farmers had been willing to immigrate, and many of those recruited eventually abandoned farming for manual work in the cities, wound up on public assistance, or returned to Britain. By 1941, over 50% of those families had abandoned their farms, and a mere seventeen families had repaid their land credit loans (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998).

With the relative failure of efforts to recruit British farming families, the powerful transportation corporations *Canadian Pacific Railway* and *Canadian National Railway* began placing pressure on the government to open the doors to central and eastern Europeans. The companies’ interest in a more open-door immigration policy was rooted in the fact that larger numbers of immigrants meant more passenger and commercial railway traffic (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Whitaker, 1991). In 1925, the government ceded, and signed a Railway Agreement with the two companies. This agreement permitted the companies to recruit agriculturalists and farm workers from countries in continental Europe that had previously been discriminated against. Immigrants who had not settled in farm work after one year were to be deported at the

cost of the transportation companies. Approximately 185,000 immigrants from central Europe entered Canada under the Railway Agreement between 1925 and 1929 (Whitaker, 1991). Among the largest of these groups were Mennonites from Russia, Ukrainians, Poles, and Hungarians (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). Despite their entry, the ideological preference for British settler families remained intact, prompting growing anti-immigrant nativist sentiment (Whitaker, 1991). To this end, in 1928, a House of Commons committee recommended that the Railway Agreement be amended to reinstate greater governmental control over the selection of newcomers.

3.4 Non-Asian Family Reunification: 1930 to 1944

With the door on certain immigrants already beginning to close again due to persisting ideological preferences for British settler families, it was effectively shut on the majority of immigrants with the collapse of the New York stock market in 1929 and the further worsening of the Canadian economy. Indeed, the 1930s marked one of the most exclusionary periods in Canadian immigration history, and also represented a time of high levels of expulsion of ‘undesirable’ immigrants. R.B. Bennett, elected as prime minister in 1930, rapidly implemented highly restrictive immigration regulations, particularly against potential immigrants from outside Britain and the U.S. (Whitaker, 1991). In March of 1931, the Order in Council PC 695 effectively closed the doors to immigrants of all classes and occupations; however, immigration officers could permit the landing of a select few exceptions. These exceptions were clearly drawn along racialized lines, embedded within economic interests, and included: British subjects (by birth or naturalization) entering Canada directly or indirectly from “predominantly

white dominions” (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998: 216) (such as Britain, Ireland, Newfoundland, New Zealand, Australia etc.) who had the proven means to sustain themselves until employment was secured; agriculturalists with the proven means to farm in Canada; United States citizens entering Canada from the U.S. having sufficient means to provide for themselves until employment was secured; and wives and unmarried children under the age of 18 of Canadian citizens with the means to provide for them (Green & Green, 2004; Hawkins, 1991). This Order in Council specifically stated that these provisions did not apply to any individuals of ‘Asiatic race’ (Hawkins, 1991). Again, Asian immigrants who had previously been granted entry for economic purposes were thus marginalized from within the Canadian nation through non-access to family reunification.

Family reunification among certain groups was further constrained through restricted access to citizenship. At the time, British immigrants received naturalization status automatically after five years of residence. Immigrants of all other national origins had to apply for naturalization through the court system; these applications were reviewed and decided upon by the secretary of state, whose decision required no explanation and could not be reviewed or reversed. According to Kelly & Trebilcock (1998), historical records clearly indicate that applications were commonly denied for no explicit reason; however, “the pattern of rejections make it clear that such refusals often were made on racial grounds” (Kelly & Trebilcock, 1998). Given that access to family-based immigration depended on citizenship status, discriminatory access to naturalization thus represented another means by which immigration was racialized and the ideological model of ‘White settler’ families was preserved.

Overall, at a time of economic depression, the discriminatory nature of Canadian immigration policy became increasingly visible, with immigration being rooted in racialized nation-building efforts and the desire to guarantee a future nation of suitable immigrant families. Indeed, throughout the 1930s, most immigrants granted entry to Canada were of British or northern European origin, and were wives and minor children of Canadian male citizens having the means to support them (Kelly & Trebilcock, 1998). Thus, even in conditions of economic devastation, certain ‘types’ of families were allowed to reunite in Canada while others were not afforded the same right; in this way, the Canadian imagined community was being continually constructed along the lines of ‘ideal’ future citizens located within ‘preferred’ types of families. As evidenced in the above discussion, these preferences entailed the intersection of ‘cultural’ goals (i.e., for immigrants to be as ‘White’ as possible) and economic goals (with agricultural families representing the ideal economic unit of immigration).

The restrictive immigration regulations surrounding family-based immigration implemented at the onset of the Depression persisted throughout much of the 1930s, easing only slightly in 1938 with a new allowance for fiancées of male citizens able to support their intended wives. In 1944, regulations were again widened, this time to permit immigration of non-British European wives and dependent children of members of the Canadian armed forces. Reflecting gendered social norms, women residents in Canada were not permitted to sponsor family members into the country, even if they had adequate means to support these individuals. Other than these modifications, immigration policy changed very little during the 1930s and 1940s (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). As such, the construction of the Canadian imagined community

remained based around the ideal of British (and, to a lesser extent, Northern European) families consisting of a male head of household and his dependent wife and children.

3.5 Humanitarian Pressures and ‘Family’ Controversies: Post-WWII to 1976

In general, two major factors had a powerful influence over Canadian immigration policy in the post-WWII years that led to a distinct change in the intersection between economic and family-based immigration. First, government investment in infrastructure and large-scale private investments in manufacturing and natural-resource industries, low unemployment, and high post-depression/post-war consumer demand created an economic environment that favoured elevated immigration for labour and consumption purposes. Yet, the decline in agriculture as the predominant industry meant that the family (as an economic unit) was no longer at the heart of economic development; accordingly, family-based immigration and economic immigration began to formally diverge into two distinct streams. The second major factor affecting Canadian immigration policy was the changing international environment in the context of WWII atrocities and Canada’s place in this environment. Such changes involved, for instance, the creation of the United Nations in 1945, Canadian involvement in peacekeeping efforts and post-war rebuilding in Europe, and Canada’s development of a non-discriminatory international trading regime (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) in 1947 (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). The post-WWII rise in humanitarianism also brought about the official repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1947, at which time Chinese Canadians were also afforded full citizenship rights. More broadly, the devastation of atrocities during WWII stimulated growing opinion among some

politicians and interest groups that a more open immigration policy was needed. In terms of family-based immigration, migrants' rights emerged as an issue in the global humanitarian discourse, bringing about pressures to increase allowances for family reunification. To this end, it was during the post-WWII period that the notion of family sponsorship, in its current form, first surfaced. Correspondingly, reunification emerged as an increasingly important means for immigrants to enter the country during the 1950s¹⁰ (Côté et al., 2001; Green & Green, 2004; Hawkins, 1991; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Parai, 1975; Whitaker, 1991).

In 1956, an Order in Council (1956-785) specified that citizens by birth or naturalization of any country of Europe or the Americas, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, or Turkey could be sponsored by a relative in Canada who was a Canadian citizen *or* a permanent resident, and who was able to provide for them financially. Eligible relatives in this category included spouses, children and their spouses and children (under the age of 21), siblings and their spouses and children (under the age of 21), fathers (over age sixty-five), mothers (over age sixty), grandparents, and unmarried orphaned nieces and nephews. The Order in Council also stipulated that citizens from countries other than those listed above could be eligible for admission as a family member if they were a spouse, unmarried child (under the age of 21), father (over age sixty-five), or mother (over age sixty) of a Canadian *citizen* who applied to receive them and was in a financial position to be able to provide for any 'sponsored' family member (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). These differential allowances for family-based immigration meant that the immigration of Asian and African populations remained considerably more

¹⁰ It is interesting that the timing of the increased allowances for family reunification coincided with the rise in the ideology of domesticity in Western countries.

restricted than European immigration. Overall, in the two decades between 1946 and 1966, out of 2,500,000 newcomers to Canada, 900,000 arrived through family reunification (Côté et al., 2001).

In light of the large numbers of immigrants entering the country on the basis of family relationships, this form of immigration became an issue of considerable debate during the late 1950s (Côté et al., 2001; Green & Green, 2004). As Green and Green (2004) note, different understandings of ‘family’ among immigrants who had been granted new rights to family-based immigration (most notably those from southern Europe) brought about changes in the composition of newcomers to Canada.¹¹ Immigrants from southern Europe in particular commonly made use of family-based immigration rights, much more so than immigrants from ‘traditional’ source countries (Green & Green, 2004). By 1958, while British immigration had fallen substantially (specifically, to 5,000, compared to 23,000 at the same time in 1957), immigration from southern and central Europe, and from Italy in particular, was steadily increasing. The majority of immigrants arriving from southern Europe, Central America, and South America entered through family-based immigration, given existing restrictions on their independent immigration (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). On average, sponsored immigrants represented about 37% of all immigrants entering Canada during the 1950s

¹¹ It is interesting that these authors attribute the use of family-class immigration to inherent familialism among certain groups rather than structural discrimination. For a critical examination of this issue, see Satzewich’s (1993) excellent discussion on ethnic families. Based on historical evidence, Satzewich argues that ‘ethnic families’ in Canada were in part shaped by structural constraints, namely, immigration policy, the labour market, and racism. In this context, Satzewich claims that the extended familialism of certain groups was a reaction to existing conditions and constraints rather than a natural consequence of their ethnicity.

and 1960s; at its peak in 1959, 55% per cent of all immigrants entered through family reunification (Whitaker, 1991).

One of the specific points of contention that emerged in the face of the expanded allowances for family members at the time (and which remains prominent in contemporary immigration discourse) was where the line should be drawn in defining, from a policy perspective, what constitutes ‘close relatives.’ A distinction was also clearly emerging that would continue to structure the social construction of immigrants up to the present, involving the assumed intersection of ‘skill’ with different types of immigration, as discussed in Chapter One. Specifically, the large numbers of immigrants arriving through family reunification during the 1950s prompted growing concern over the influx of ‘unskilled’ immigrants (Côté et al., 2001; Green & Green, 2004; Whitaker, 1991). In this regard, the predominant concern was that broad criteria for family-based immigration would produce a ‘lower quality’ immigrant pool, and would result in the country being flooded by ethnic groups that could potentially develop undue influence in Canadian society. The following lengthy but important quote from Whitaker (1991) both captures the controversy of the time and highlights the manner in which family-based immigration continues to be viewed by many contemporary immigration critics:

A policy of sponsored immigration had certain results: it encouraged the entry of many more low or unskilled people; it led to uncontrolled growth in numbers, skewed toward the expansion of ethnic groups already established in Canada with strong kinship ties; and it helped foster, especially in major cities, strong ethnic pressure groups with political leverage, which seek to maintain and expand the system. Thus the state in effect diminished the control and selectivity which it apparently sought in other aspects of immigration policy (Whitaker, 1991: 16).

By the end of the 1950s, family reunification was being problematized in reference to three main concerns. The first of these concerns was the impact of uneven family-based immigration from different regions of the world (i.e., the changing ethnic composition of the Canadian population). Second, concern was mounting among municipalities that ‘sponsored’ relatives would become public charges. Finally, the federal government was concerned that family reunification lowered the skill level of the incoming immigrant population and undercut efforts to align immigration with the country’s labour needs (Côté et al., 2001; Green & Green, 2004; Whitaker, 1991).

As a result of these concerns, an Order in Council was enacted on March 19, 1959 that added restrictions to family reunification from regions most commonly using this form of entry (specifically, southern Europe, Central America and South America) by excluding married children and siblings (including their spouses and children) from eligibility (Hawkins, 1991; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). However, this measure was not well received, as evidenced by political and media discourse at the time. The Opposition’s immigration critic J.W. Pickersgill, for instance, viewed the Order as an unjust and cruel legislation that directly targeted Italian immigrants, as indicated in his speech to the House of Commons on April 15, 1959:

We are told by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, or by some so-called spokesman for the department, that the reason they made this unnecessary, cruel and inhuman order was to give preference for skilled workers. Of course, that is the most unadulterated camouflage; there is not the slightest intention on the part of the government of doing anything about that at all. This order was just a restriction. It was an unnecessary and inhuman restriction [...]. The reason it was done, sir, was that when the government realized that more people of Italian origin than people from the United Kingdom came in last year, they got in a panic. They were afraid of many of their political supporters, and they

felt they had to do something about it. Then they did this stupid, cruel, silly and inhuman thing (cited in Hawkins, 1972: 121-122).¹²

In this context, the Conservative government rescinded the Order in Council in question. Despite this action, Canada's immigration system at the end of the 1950s remained highly discriminatory, with the persistence of a hierarchical organization of immigrant preferences, defined largely in terms of national (and ethnic) origin. Thus, although family-based immigration widened during the post-WWII era, it was racialized through restrictions on families of specific ethnic and national origins. Foreshadowing the decades to come, family reunification in the post-WWII period remained a topic of active debate regarding its implications for the nation's future.

With the passage of the first Bill of Rights in Canada in 1960, stipulating non-discrimination on the basis of "race, national origin, colour, religion, or sex" (Justice Canada, 1960, part 1: 1), the discriminatory features of Canada's immigration program became increasingly incompatible with the broader principles of Canadian law. Accordingly, the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker announced its intention to overhaul the existing *Immigration Act*. The next major amendment to Canada's immigration system, undertaken by Diefenbaker's government in 1962, would mark a significant milestone in Canadian immigration history, involving a new vision of the nation's 'imagined future.' In this imagined future, the Canadian nation was envisioned as a growing power in the international scene. The pursuit of this vision entailed efforts to expand Canadian trade, and to remain engaged in peace-keeping, international

¹² It is interesting that Pickersgill's speech, given over 50 years ago, expresses many of the same claims as contemporary critical scholars (e.g., Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Thobani, 2000a) regarding the state's use of the 'skills' discourse to obscure discriminatory policies and attitudes against certain groups of immigrants.

development and anti-racism activities. The 1960s thus marked an important transformative period in Canadian immigration history, involving official abandonment of the ‘White Canada’ policy and the beginning of Canada’s contemporary ‘non-discriminatory’ immigration system (Simmons, 2010, 1999).

Importantly, 1962 was a landmark year for formalizing the distinction between ‘economic’ and ‘family’ immigration; from 1962 to the present day, immigrant families were officially no longer at the heart of Canadian immigration. Moreover, the official move toward ‘non-discrimination’ in 1962 was not uniform across the immigration program, but, rather, further delineated between economic and family-class immigration. More specifically, in 1962, new regulations to the *Immigration Act* were developed in which explicit ‘race’ and ethnicity-based restrictions on immigration were removed (Hawkins, 1972). These regulations firmly established ‘skill’ as the main criterion for independent (that is, economic) immigration. Under the 1962 regulations, persons from all national origins and ethnic backgrounds were eligible for entry into Canada if, “by reason of *his* education, training, skills, or other special qualifications is likely to be able to establish *himself* successfully in Canada” (*An Act Respecting Immigration*, cited in Hawkins, 1972: 125; italics added to highlight the gendered construction of independent immigrants at the time). The definition of ‘skill’ was, at this point, still highly discretionary, with immigration officers having the power to determine which skills were likely to ensure an immigrants’ ‘success.’ This discretion meant that, although discriminatory stipulations had been removed from the official regulations, the possibility for discriminatory biases in immigrant selection remained intact. Indeed, numerous authors (e.g., Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Satzewich, 1989a,

Simmons, 1999, 1998) have argued that, informal *control* over the entry of economic immigrants was constructed around racial definitions and assumptions long after the supposed deracialization of the system in 1962.

Also relevant to the present chapter is the fact that family immigration policy retained a discriminatory character, despite the purported rejection of discriminatory biases. Under the 1962 immigration regulations, all Canadian citizens or permanent residents were able to sponsor their spouse, unmarried children under twenty-one years old, parents, and grandparents (Hawkins, 1972). However, the sponsorship of children over the age of twenty-one, married children, siblings and their spouses/children, and unmarried orphaned nieces and nephews under the age of twenty-one (s.31[d]; see Hawkins, 1972) was restricted to citizens of the ‘preferred’ nations outlined in the 1956 Immigration Regulations (Parai, 1975). In this way, family-based immigration persisted as a means of racializing immigration, with family reunification policy echoing earlier patterns of excluding *families* of ‘undesirable’ groups more so than individual economic immigrants. Given the gendered nature of immigration, with family-based immigration being a more prominent means of entry for women (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Thobani, 1998), differential allowances for family sponsorship additionally amounted to *gendered*, racialized immigration flows.

The Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the Department of Labour were amalgamated into the Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1966.¹³ In the same year, the Liberal government commissioned a policy paper as part of the ongoing efforts to reassess and revamp Canada’s immigration program. This paper (the White

¹³ This amalgamation arguably reflects the extent to which immigration was first and foremost perceived as a strategy for national economic development.

Paper¹⁴ of 1966) provides a striking illustration of the official discourse on family-class immigration at the time. The paper advocated changing Canada's immigration program to be more closely aligned with the country's labour needs, and recommended restricting the family-class sponsorship program in order to ensure immigrant 'quality.' In this context, ideal immigrants were educated, skilled, and trained (which family-based immigrants were assumed *not* to be). It was recommended that the number of immigrants entering through family sponsorship be restricted to prevent the influx of large numbers of 'unskilled' foreign nationals. As Kelley and Trebilcock (1998: 359) note, "the sponsorship issue was a continuing source of concern to immigration officials because, allegedly, too many unskilled workers were being sponsored by relatives, a process which was largely beyond the department's control." The White Paper specifically recommended that family sponsorship be limited to spouses, unmarried offspring under the age of twenty-one, orphaned relatives under the age of sixteen, and parents and grandparents (who would not be eligible to work in Canada). It was further recommended that while both Canadian citizens and landed immigrants be granted these sponsorship rights, additional sponsorship privileges were to be afforded to Canadian citizens, subject to literacy and/or employment requirements (including, for instance, siblings, unmarried nieces and nephews under the age of twenty-one, and parents and grandparents, who would be allowed to work in Canada) (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). The White Paper's recommendations elicited considerable criticism from community organizations and ethnic groups, yet were welcomed by the business community. Political players stood on both sides of the debate, some problematizing

¹⁴ A White Paper is a document issued by the government that outlines policy directions or proposed actions on a specific policy topic of imminent concern.

and others praising the recommendations. In the end, new regulations were introduced in 1967 that seemed designed to provide a middle ground, supposedly rendering both economic and family-based immigration ‘fair,’ ‘objective’ and ‘reasonable’ by creating three categories of immigrants (namely, independent, family, and nominated relatives), each with defined criteria for eligibility.

3.6 Further Divergence Between Economic and Family Immigrants: 1967 to 1976

Beginning in 1967, defined criteria according to which newcomers were to be selected became an institutionalized dimension of Canadian immigration. The selection of ‘independent’ immigrants was to be governed by the ‘point system,’ which formalized and systematized the 1962 regulations by creating a grid of criteria (e.g. education, work experience, age, ‘personal suitability’) each quantified by a defined number of points (Green & Green, 2004; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Parai, 1975) (see Table 3.1 for the point system grid of 1967). Based on their qualifications and circumstances, applicants were assigned a score for each criterion and, if their total score exceeded the predefined ‘pass mark’ (set at 50 points in the original system), they were eligible for admission as an independent immigrant (Parai, 1975). To this day, the point system is cited as the step that finally limited the discretionary powers of immigration officials, thereby eliminating “all traces of racial discrimination from Canada’s immigration laws” (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998: 351).

Table 3.1 Canada's Point System in 1967

	Factors for Evaluation of Independent Applicants	Range of Points
Short-term factors	<i>Arranged employment or designated occupation</i>	0 or 10
	<i>Knowledge of English and/or French</i>	0-10
	<i>Relative in Canada</i>	0-5
	<i>Area of destination</i>	0-5
Long-term factors	<i>Education and training</i>	0-20
	<i>Personal qualities</i>	0-15
	<i>Occupational demand</i>	0-15
	<i>Occupational skill</i>	1-10
	<i>Age</i>	0-10
	Total	1-100

Source: Department of Manpower and Immigration Canada (1974)

With respect to family sponsorship, official European privilege was eliminated with the development of one set of rules that applied equally to immigrants from all regions of the world (Parai, 1975). However, to deal with concerns over the widespread sponsorship of ‘unskilled’ relatives, family-based immigration was separated into two types: ‘sponsored dependents’ and ‘nominated relatives’ (Côté et al., 2001; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). The ‘nominated’ category was created for distant relatives, who were evaluated according to a select portion of the points system – specifically, education, occupational skill, occupational demand, ‘personal suitability,’ and age. These applicants could receive a specified number of ‘bonus points’ if their family members already in Canada acknowledged a willingness to assist them in their settlement.

Immediate relatives, defined as ‘sponsored dependents,’ would continue to be processed exclusively on the basis of their relationship with a Canadian citizen or permanent resident (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). At this point in time, aside from the general statement about a sponsor’s ability to support their family members, no explicit contractual obligation was built into family-based immigration, reflecting prevailing ideologies about the nature of family relationships:

The assumption was that the term ‘sponsored dependents’ designated a ‘natural’ relationship of dependence or moral obligation that did not require definition under contractual provisions. The subtext here leads us to believe that the family model based on the patriarchal structure of a [male] spouse who support the household and meets the needs of his wife, children and aged parents was still very prevalent (Côté et al., 2001: 23).

The assumption of dependence, however, would soon become explicit, codified in immigration policy.

3.7 The Growing Rationality of Canadian Immigration: 1976 to Early 1990s

In 1976, a new *Immigration Act* was passed (although it did not come into effect until new Immigration Regulations were introduced in 1978). With this Act came increasing systematization of the immigration program, reflecting increasing rationality and bureaucratic logic. Indeed, this Act was the first in Canadian immigration history to specify objectives for the immigration program, as opposed to just the criteria for immigrant eligibility. These objectives aligned with specific groups of immigrants as follows: (1) family reunification (represented by both the family class and assisted relatives); (2) humanitarian considerations (represented by refugees); and (3) national economic development (represented by independent/economic immigrants) (Côté et al., 2001; Green & Green, 2004; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). In the 1976 *Immigration Act*,

the point system remained in effect for the selection of independent immigrants; however, it was adapted from its original (1967) form to place greater emphasis on practical training and occupational experience. Preference was also to be given to immigrants whose occupations were in high demand in Canada. (See Table 3.2 for an overview of the point system over time). The ‘independent’ stream of immigration would grow in subsequent years, with the additions of business-class immigrants (including entrepreneurs and the self-employed) in 1978, and the ‘investor’ class of business immigrants in 1986.¹⁵

Table 3.2 Maximum Points and Selection Factors in Canada’s Point System (Selected Years)

<i>Selection Factor</i>	1978	1986	1993	1996	2004	2010
Education	12	12	14	21	25	25
Proficiency in English and/or French	10	15	14	21	24	24
Specific vocational preparation	15	15	16	-	-	-
Work experience	8	8	8	9	21	21
Occupational demand	15	10	10	-	-	-
Labour market balance	-	-	-	10	-	-
Age	10	10	10	13	10	10
Pre-arranged employment in Canada	10	10	10	4	10	10
Personal suitability	10	10	10	17	-	-
Adaptability (levels control)	-	10	8	-	10	10
Relative in Canada	5	-	-	5	-	-
Destination	5	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Total Possible Points</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Pass Mark</i>	50	70	67	*	67	67

*Pass mark varies by skill group: 52 for Professionals and Skilled Administrators; 47 for Technical; 45 for Trades

Sources: CIC, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/apply-factors.asp>; Simmons (2010)

¹⁵ Persons granted entry in the business class were required to submit a business plan and were evaluated according to a variety of criteria pertaining to their likelihood of success in a business venture in Canada (in which they would be involved on a day-to-day basis and which would employ a designated number of Canadians). Investor immigrants were required to have a net worth of at least \$500,000 and had to invest a minimum of \$250,000 in a business project in Canada for at least three years (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Whitaker, 1991).

Under the 1976 Act, family members eligible for entry under the family class included spouses and fiancé(e)s, unmarried children under the age of twenty-one, and parents (of any age), as well as orphaned sisters, brothers, nieces, nephews, and grandchildren who were under the age of eighteen and unmarried. Eligible members of the ‘assisted relative’ class (previously referred to as the ‘nominated’ class), included brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and grandparents (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). This group was evaluated according to a modified form of the point system, as previously discussed.

Several changes pertaining to family-class immigration are important here, and speak to changing conceptualizations of the ‘immigrant family.’ First, for the first time in Canadian immigration history, the 1976 *Immigration Act* included a formal stipulation of a contractual sponsorship obligation, wherein sponsors had to take financial responsibility for their relatives for up to ten years after immigration (up to five years for the assisted relative class) (Côté et al., 2001; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). In previous Acts, it was merely specified that the sponsor was to ensure that their family member did not become a ‘public charge’; however, in practice, there was very little monitoring or enforcement of this matter. Although the expectation that the Canadian citizen or permanent resident (the sponsor) was responsible for supporting sponsored family members had always been inherent in immigration regulations, the formalization of this commitment officially constructed this group as dependents.

A second relevant point pertaining to family-class immigration under the 1976 Act was the allowance for parents of any age to be sponsored. This change opened up family-class immigration to heightened criticism in the face of growing pressures to

match Canadian immigration to the economic needs of the country. Described by one of the most vocal critics of family-class immigration, Daniel Stoffman, as a “monumental blunder” (Stoffman, 1993:13), the 1978 change in legislation has been widely criticized for allowing entry to an elderly population. The concern here was that this group could, in turn, sponsor additional relatives, thereby amplifying the influx of ‘unskilled’ relatives that, presumably, would not qualify to come to Canada as skilled workers. Concern over the burden on the health care system imposed by sponsored relatives was also prominent in the anti-family-class immigration discourse at the time (and, notably, remains a feature of contemporary discourse).

It is also important to note that, while the 1976 Act removed overt discrimination from Canadian immigration policy, in practice, the immigration system retained ethnic, gender, and class biases (see, for instance, Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Das Gupta, 1995; Thobani, 2007, 2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis, 1997; Simmons, 1998). As Côté et al. (2001) note, although the immigration program put forth in 1976 is widely touted as marking the official end to Canada’s discriminatory immigration policies, gendered access to education and training in many countries prohibits equal access to immigrant admission. This contention bears directly upon the distinction between family-class and economic immigration. According to Das Gupta (1995), the point system of immigration:

...perpetuates systemic barriers for women and people of colour since it emphasizes such things as education, skills, training, employability in ‘open occupations,’ and knowledge of English and/or French. Most women from the working classes and from racial minority groups would never qualify to immigrate on the basis of such criteria as they lack access to the required training (p.166).

In other words, via the inherently discriminatory nature of economic immigrant selection, the 1976 Act streamlined immigrants of particular national and ethnic origins, particularly persons from lower social classes and women, into family sponsorship (in addition to, for instance, domestic worker or temporary labour migration streams). In light of the new contractual obligations of the sponsorship program, family-class immigrants were additionally legislated into relations of dependence, and thus were constructed as subordinates both within households and within society more broadly (Abu-Laban, 1998a; Côté et al., 2001).

Moreover, biases in all immigration streams were still effectively instituted through differential access to immigration posts abroad, with disproportionately more posts in Europe and the U.S. than in other regions of the world and longer processing times in non-Western countries (Abu-Laban, 1998a). In this way, the explicitly overt discrimination of the first century of post-Confederation immigration became translated into sanctioned practices and structures that rendered discrimination opaque and implicit. Thus, more than a century after Canada's first Immigration Act, the 1976 Act continued to structure access to Canada along gender, ethnic, and class lines, with the distinction between 'independent' versus 'family class' immigrants representing a primary means of differentially positioning these immigrants (both literally and symbolically) with respect to Canada's national community.

3.8 Reconceptualizing and Dichotomizing Family and Economic Immigrants: 1993 to Present

According to Simmons (2010, 1999), a key shift in Canadian immigration policy occurred in the late 1980s. This shift entailed a reimagining of the nation's 'imagined future,' involving a new vision of Canada as a competitive, multicultural nation that holds a distinct economic and political presence in an international world. This vision of Canada as a global player demands immigrants with skills that will boost Canada's economic development and trade-competitiveness. Immigrant selection thus became centred around the 'post-industrial' requirements of a globalized, knowledge-based economy, with 'ideal' immigrants constructed as self-sufficient innovators who "are custom designed to meet the specific criteria of a neo-liberal nation intent on productivity, cost recovery, and immigrant self-settlement" (Simmons, 2010: 85).

Key changes pertaining to family-class immigration associated with this 'imagined future' occurred in the early 1990s. These changes were intertwined with economic immigration, involving a further dichotomization of family and economic immigration. The polarization of the two groups of immigrants was directly associated with an interest in admitting a more flexible, skilled labour force through revisions to the point system (Abu-Laban, 1998a; Green & Green, 2004) (see Table 3.2). For instance, the original pass mark for independent immigrants was 50 out of 100 points; it was raised to 70 points in 1993 (Abu-Laban, 1998a). Further evidence of the push toward prioritizing highly-skilled immigrants and marginalizing family-class immigration came in 1993, at which time the 'assisted relative' class was eliminated (Abu-Laban, 1998a). Moreover, with the stated intention to "capture more effectively

the concept of family” (Employment and Immigration Canada, 1992: 3), a cap on the age of children eligible for sponsorship was established in 1993, such that children over the age of 19 became ineligible for sponsorship unless they were demonstrably dependent on their parents (i.e., not capable of self-support due to disability or full-time studies). Overall, economic immigrants became increasingly conceptualized as a highly skilled and valuable group of newcomers, while the value family-class immigration increasingly came into question. The chasm between ‘economic’ versus ‘family’ immigrants thus continued to grow, again shifting the boundaries of Canada’s imagined community.

In the mid-1990s, the Chrétien Liberals initiated the Immigration Policy Review (IPR) as part of a broader agenda of neo-liberal restructuring. The IPR resulted in the repeal of the 1976 *Immigration Act*, which was replaced by the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (IRPA). The IRPA, which came into effect on June 28, 2002, was tabled as nearly 300 pages of legislation. Yet, as Dauvergne (2003) notes, despite some modifications from previous legislation, “one of the most surprising things about the new IRPA is how little it [changed]” (p.726). As with the 1976 *Immigration Act*, the three main categories of immigrant admission in the IRPA were the economic class, the family class, and the refugee class (Statutes of Canada, 2001).¹⁶ The institutionalized dependence of family-class immigrants on their sponsor, introduced in the previous Immigration Act of 1976, remained in effect in the IRPA in the form of the sponsorship agreement (see Chapter One). Spousal sponsorship, however, changed considerably,

¹⁶ It is relevant, however, that, for the first time in Canadian immigration history, objectives for immigration were elaborated upon, and separate objectives were defined for immigration and refugee protection. (The specific objectives for the immigration program are listed in Appendix B).

and entailed two of the most notable modifications introduced in the IRPA. First, prior to the IRPA, the required period of financial obligation toward a sponsored spouse was 10 years. This period of dependence was criticized by immigrant advocates and women's rights groups for the potential problems it could create for women immigrants in violent relationships (see Walton-Roberts, 2004a). To this end, the sponsorship period for spouses was reduced in the IRPA to 3 years. Second, with the IRPA, same-sex partners were, for the first time, made eligible for family-class sponsorship. These modifications suggest, at least in part, the growing advocacy power of minority rights' groups in the immigration policy process.

Despite the important move toward equality pertaining to sexual orientation in the IRPA, the non-discriminatory nature of the immigration program remained (and remains) in question in ways that pertain to both economic and family-class immigration. For instance, it has been argued (see, for example, Arat-Koc, 1992; Boyd, 1992, 1997; Das Gupta, 1995; Li, 2003c, 2001; Simmons, 2010, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis, 1997; Thobani, 2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1998) that the country's current immigration program maintains class-based racialization and gendering of Canadian immigrants through policies that privilege certain immigrants over others. As Simmons (2010) notes, "while Canada does not officially select immigrants on the basis of country of origin, Canadian policy nevertheless uses socio-economic criteria that play an important role in determining the countries from which immigrants come" (p.114). As in previous policy eras, family-based immigration persists as an important way of structuring differential access to the Canadian nation and for constructing Canada's imagined community. For instance, under current legislation, there is no minimum income

requirement for sponsors of spouses, common-law or conjugal partners and dependents; however, those sponsoring any other family members must meet a low-income cut-off to be eligible for family-class sponsorship. Specifically, “the sponsor’s income must meet the minimum necessary income requirement [...] to support all members of a sponsor’s own family and all sponsored persons and their family members, including family members listed as non-accompanying” (CIC, 2010a: 23-4). In this way, despite official discourse promulgating Canada’s acceptance of ‘non-traditional’ families and respect for a broad range of traditions and customs (see CIC, 1994a), reunification of extended families is constrained by financial requirements, to the end of indirectly promoting the reunification of nuclear families, or of families of higher socio-economic status. As such, biases remain rooted in Canadian immigration policy in ways that most strongly (albeit indirectly) discriminate against ethnic minority women from lower-class backgrounds originating in disadvantaged regions of the world (Abu-Laban, 1998b; Das Gupta, 1995; Thobani, 2007). To this end, family-based immigration remains a site for differentially prescribing access to the nation and, by extension, membership in the Canadian national community.

3.9 Conclusion

Since Canada’s first *Immigration Act* in 1869, the admission of immigrants has revolved around defining the nation’s ‘ideal’ citizens within the context of the nation’s ‘imagined future’; this has involved the intersection of economic interests and ‘cultural’ preferences in direct relation to economic and family-based immigration. Over time, the boundaries for inclusion in the Canadian nation have evolved in reference to the

demographic and economic needs of the country, alongside social norms and international pressures pertaining to human rights and humanitarian interests. Intertwined with these factors has been an overarching vision of the nation's identity, which can be clearly discerned from the structure of the immigration program at any given point in time. As demonstrated by the present chapter, the relationship between economic and family-based immigration, and the role of these types of immigration in defining membership to the nation's imagined community over time, provides useful insight into the contemporary construction of the Canadian national community.

Clearly, the role of 'economic' and 'family' immigration in Canada has shifted over time in meaningful and telling ways. In the early post-Confederation decades, family-based and economic immigration were inextricably intertwined, with the ideal migratory unit being (largely British) agricultural families. Moreover, racialized access to both immigration as a family unit and family reunification served as a central site for defining inclusion in, marginalization to, and exclusion from Canada's national community. Over time, changing national needs and social pressures resulted in an increasing polarization of 'family' and 'economic' immigration. At present, the two streams of immigration are clearly divided in policy and discursive contexts.

Despite this shift, the positioning of immigrants to the Canadian nation through access to family-based immigration remains, in large part, intact. For instance, permanent resident economic principal applicants (i.e., skilled workers, business and investor immigrants) are currently granted the most generous allowances to family, both in terms of being allowed to bring their family with them at the time of immigration, and in terms of reunification (i.e., family-class sponsorship). Access to family

reunification, however, depends on the ability of the sponsor to accept financial responsibility for sponsored newcomers. In this way, in the contemporary context, access to family reunification requires socio-economic success. In the face of discrimination and challenges experienced by racialized immigrants in the Canadian labour market, it follows that visible minority immigrants (particularly those for whom language is an added barrier to economic success) remain hindered in their access to family. For other groups of migrants, the historical use of foreign labour without access to family and permanent settlement is echoed in temporary migration programs (e.g., relating to agricultural work). For the majority of current temporary worker programs, future citizenship is not a legal option, and permanent settlement is discouraged through non-access to family reunification rights. These migrants are thus highly marginalized in the Canadian nation through their severely restricted rights. Somewhat less marginalized are live-in-caregivers, who enter as temporary workers as part of the Live-in-Caregiver Program under the stipulation that, after two years of work in home care, they are eligible to apply for permanent residence (and, if successful, will have access family sponsorship rights).¹⁷ Given that the majority of agricultural workers are male and live-in-caregivers are female, the distinctive allowances between these two programs clearly genders future membership in the Canadian nation. These brief examples demonstrate continuity with Canadian immigration history, involving gendered and racialized distinctions between family and economic immigration in ways that are directly implicated in the positioning of immigrants to Canada's national community.

¹⁷ See <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/work/caregiver/index.asp>

The remainder of this thesis builds on the background offered by the present chapter pertaining to the symbolic positioning of different groups of immigrants to the Canadian nation. The upcoming three chapters examine in more detail the subtleties of immigrants' national belonging by examining the social construction of Canada's contemporary imagined community in a variety of discourses. Chapter Four begins this examination with an analysis of media discourse surrounding one particular group of family-class immigrants – marriage immigrants.

CHAPTER FOUR: NEWS MEDIA AS DISCOURSE – FOCUSING ON MARRIAGE IMMIGRANTS

“In effect, journalists join with other agents of control as a kind of ‘deviance-defining elite,’ using the news to provide an ongoing articulation of the proper bounds of behaviour in all organized spheres of life” (Ericson et al., 1987:3).

4.0 Introduction

As discussed in Chapters One and Three, family-class immigration is a source of considerable debate in contemporary Canadian society. The value of this type of immigration to the Canadian nation is generally questioned, to the end of symbolically positioning family-class immigrants on the margins of Canada’s imagined community. The present chapter offers a focused consideration of the social construction of a particular group of family-class immigrants by examining media discourse surrounding marriage immigration.¹⁸ This analysis focuses on media coverage of immigration relating to the sponsorship of spouses or intimate partners. The chapter is based on a content analysis of articles relating to marriage immigration in Canada published in four newspapers (the *Globe and Mail*, the *National Post*, the *Toronto Sun*, and the *Toronto Star*) over a ten year period. The chapter argues that marriage immigration serves as a site for articulating anxieties pertaining to the presence of newcomers from non-traditional immigration source countries. More specifically, it argues that media discourse on marriage immigrants, which is characterized by ambiguity, conceptual vagueness, and contradictory constructions, reflects underlying tensions pertaining to

¹⁸ Although the term ‘marriage’ is used throughout the chapter for the sake of being concise, it is not meant to imply that only legal marriages are being considered. The term is meant to capture intimate partner relationships that can be considered ‘spousal’ in nature, including conjugal and common-law relationships.

ethnic and cultural diversity associated with contemporary international immigration to Canada. The media discourse also demonstrates broader ambivalence surrounding international marriages, and, more generally, upholds and reproduces dominant discourses that devalue and problematize family-class immigration. To this end, the media discourse largely marginalizes marriage immigrants with respect to Canada's imagined community.

The chapter begins by defining the recent Canadian context of the marriage immigration 'problematic,' and proceeds to discuss the importance of studying media discourse. The chapter then briefly reviews the two bodies of literature within which the present analysis is grounded. First, research on the marriage-migration connection is discussed, including a consideration of existing work on media coverage of marriage migrants. Second, research on Canadian news media coverage of immigrants is reviewed.

4.1 The Canadian Marriage-Migration Context

In Canada, 75% of all family-class immigration involves the sponsorship and migration of a spouse/partner of a Canadian citizen or permanent resident (CIC, 2010a). As much as 60% of male-initiated sponsorship applications involve efforts to sponsor wives from a foreign country (Merali, 2008). According to Merali (2008), these statistics "reflect the increasing number of immigrant men who are choosing to marry women from other countries of origin, as well as the increasing number of non-immigrant males who are

choosing to marry women from other countries and cultures” (p.281).¹⁹ In recent years, spousal sponsorship has entailed visible concern on the part of the Canadian government, pertaining to the possibility that marriage could represent a route for immigrants to enter the country under false pretenses. Indeed, the “abuse of the immigration system through marriages of convenience”²⁰ was first identified as a concern on the main page of Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s (CIC) website in 2006 as follows:

When someone gets married for the sole reason of immigrating to Canada, this is known as a marriage of convenience. Under Canada’s immigration law, marriages of convenience are not allowed. Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s officers are specially trained to recognize genuine immigration applications, and they know how to detect marriages of convenience [...] Canada’s immigration system is also set up in a way that discourages marriages of convenience. Anyone who wants to sponsor their spouse or partner to immigrate to Canada makes a serious legal commitment. As part of this commitment, sponsors must support their spouse or partner for three years, even if the relationship fails. If the couple breaks up and the sponsored person gets social assistance, the sponsor must pay back the amount of social assistance the former spouse received. Given the legal obligations, sponsorship should not be taken lightly, and everyone is responsible for ensuring that their marriage is genuine.

More recently, CIC initiated an online survey in which visitors to the website were invited to provide input on the problem of marriages of convenience. The survey, available on CIC’s website between September 27 2010 and October 27 2010, asked respondents about their experiences with marriages of convenience, and their opinions on what the government should do to protect Canadians and the Canadian nation against

¹⁹ Note that, despite Merali’s statement, the 60% of male-initiated spousal sponsorships cited above does not distinguish between family reunification and family formation; indeed, there are no valid or reliable statistics on this issue in Canada.

²⁰ An archived version of these statements can be viewed at:
<http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20061025235652/http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/index.html>

this type of immigration fraud. The survey was launched by CIC Minister Jason Kenney in advance of upcoming amendments to the IRPA regulations, and represented “part of a wider government consultation that will likely lead to a crackdown on marriages of convenience and tighter rules on immigration sponsorship.”²¹ CIC’s survey and Kenney’s articulation of concern over inauthentic marriage immigration thrust this matter into the national spotlight, with stories of the longstanding ‘problem’ of fraudulent immigrants abounding in national television reports, print media, and radio programs.²²

Importantly, little is known about marriage immigrants in Canada (VanderPlaat et al., 2009). This knowledge gap is arguably due, at least in part, to the neo-liberal orientation of current immigration policies and the associated lack of official empirical data on non-economic immigrants. In the absence of detailed information about marriage immigrants and in light of the current controversies and official concern surrounding this group, news media coverage of marriage immigrants becomes particularly important to study. Indeed, news media is likely to represent one of the most prominent sources of public ‘knowledge’ on marriage immigrants, and stands to have a salient role in shaping social views about this group in their receiving society (Hsia, 2007). Widespread research has demonstrated that the news media play a role in influencing public opinion and policy agendas by identifying and/or reiterating issues that are, or that ‘should’ be, of public and political concern (Creese & Peterson, 1996;

²¹ See <http://www.cbc.ca/consumer/story/2010/09/28/immigration-marriages-sponsorship-survey.html#ixzz14Qtgv1TI>

²² See, for example, <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/toronto/story/2010/05/03/arranged-marriages.html>. A CBC radio broadcast on marriage fraud can be heard at <http://www.cbc.ca/thecurrent/2010/07/july-19-2010.html>. A documentary on marriage fraud also recently appeared on the CBC program “The Passionate Eye”: see <http://www.cbc.ca/documentaries/passionateeyeshowcase/2010/truelove/>.

Hay, 1996; Ungerleider 1991; van Dijk, 1995). Importantly, despite the ideal of neutral and value-free media, a large body of critical literature suggests that the news media do not provide objective coverage of people and events but, rather, provide particular versions of a story, filtered through professional and personal ideologies and values, as well as social, cultural, and organizational norms and corporate interests (Hay, 1996; Henry & Tator, 2002; Jiwani, 1998; Karim, 1993; Mahtani, 2008, 2001; Ungerleider, 1991; van Dijk, 1989, 1983). As van Dijk (1983) comments, “news is not simply an (incomplete) description of the facts, but a specific kind of (re)construction of reality according to the norms and values of some society” (p.28). In other words, by reporting selected stories in certain ways, news media contribute to the social construction and reconstruction of reality. It follows that news media discourse acts to construct the social groups it addresses, and contributes to an ideological climate replete with assumptions about how the world ought to be, including who and what belongs and does not belong in that world (Henry & Tator, 2002; Jiwani, 1998; Vukov, 2003).

Marriage immigration also represents a site of theoretical interest. In a time of unprecedented ease in travel and communication across vast geographic distances, marriages between nationals of different countries are becoming increasingly common (Cottrell, 1990; Merali, 2008; Piper, 2003). These cross-border (or international) marriages and their complex interconnections with migration have stimulated heightened interest in scholarly circles in recent years. Indeed, the marriage-migration link is a multi-faceted phenomenon involving implicit and explicit articulations of gender, ‘race,’ and social class, embedded in historical and contemporary economic, political, and social relations on the local, national, and international stage. To this end,

a rapidly growing body of literature has stressed the need for closer attention to the manner in which the marriage-migration phenomenon is experienced, constructed in, and influenced by local, national, and global social and political contexts (Aguilar & Lacsamana, 2004; Constable, 2005, 2003; Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2003; Merali, 2008; Palriwala & Uberoi, 2008; Piper, 2003; Piper & Roces, 2003; Waldis & Byron, 2006).

Overall, marriage migration is a theoretical source of interest that is also currently on the Canadian government's policy radar and in the Canadian public eye. To this end, an examination of how marriage immigration is understood and presented in media discourse is both sociologically *and* socially relevant. Yet, an analysis of Canadian media coverage of marriage immigration has not previously been conducted. Existing research has addressed the complexity of the marriage-migration link and, in other national contexts, media analyses of marriage immigrants have been conducted. In the Canadian context, media analyses have focused primarily on negative, racialized portrayals of immigrants. These bodies of literature are briefly reviewed here in turn.

4.2 The Marriage-Migration Link

The connection between marriage and migration is complex, entailing a wide variety of relationships relating to both permanent and temporary migration (Kofman, 2003). In Canada, marriage and migration can intersect in the following ways: (1) the immigration of one spouse as a principal applicant (e.g., as an economic immigrant), involving the simultaneous immigration of the other spouse as an accompanying dependent who is not evaluated independently for admission; (2) the immigration of one

spouse as a principal applicant, who later sponsors the admission of their existing spouse under family-class immigration policies; (3) the independent immigration of one individual, who, as a permanent resident or Canadian citizen, subsequently marries or becomes intimately involved with a foreign national and sponsors their immigration to Canada; or (4) a Canadian-born citizen who enters into an relationship with a foreign national and sponsors their immigration to Canada.

As this description suggests, marriage migration occurs in the context of both family reunification and family formation.²³ Although family reunification is associated with its own set of concerns and is not viewed unproblematically by receiving societies (as discussed in Chapters One and Three), it is nevertheless viewed as less suspicious than family formation, as suggested by CIC's ongoing concern over marriages of convenience. A logical explanation for these diverging views of family formation and family reunification is that the latter, in principle, involves unions that preceded migration, and thus are less open to having their veracity questioned. As such, literature on marriage migration associated with family formation is most relevant to the present analysis. This background offers insight into the phenomenon of marriage immigration against which this chapter's analysis of news media coverage can subsequently be considered.

Existing literature has highlighted how uneven economic development, demographic pressures, unprecedented ease of communication across vast differences, and accelerated international migration in the context of globalization have intersected in the arena of marriage in complex ways (see, for instance, Bélanger, 2010; Constable,

²³ The difference between family reunification and family formation is explained in Chapter One of this thesis.

2005, 2003; Lauser, 2008; Lu, 2008; Palriwala & Uberoi, 2008; Piper, 2003, 1999; Piper & Roces, 2003; Wang & Chang, 2002). For example, some international marriages across Asian borders have been associated with increasing gaps between the expectations of women and men pertaining to work and marriage. These social changes surrounding gender roles are occurring in the midst of social pressures for men to find a suitable wife in order to carry on the paternal lineage. Together, these factors lead men, typically from more developed Asian countries, to seek out foreign brides, often from less developed countries; these women are perceived as being more willing to occupy a traditional 'wife and mother' role (Bélanger, 2010). Cross-border marriages and the migrations associated with these marriages are often brokered by matchmaking or so-called introduction agencies in both sending and receiving countries (Bélanger, 2010; Constable, 2005; Lu, 2008; Nakamatsu, 2003; Wang & Chang, 2002).²⁴

Other research has further demonstrated the importance of cultural pressures in shaping marriage migration on a global stage. Research on second generation South Asian immigrants, for instance, has documented the role of transnational social networks in establishing marriages between children of South Asian immigrants overseas and nationals of their parents' country of origin. This work has documented how 'arranged introductions' often lead to cross-border marriages, entailing the migration and settlement abroad of the South Asian spouse (Ballard, 1990; Brown, 2006; Walton-Roberts, 2004b). Walton-Roberts (2004b), for instance, has illustrated

²⁴ The role of marriage brokers in cross-border marriages has produced a growing dialogue surrounding women's status in these unions – namely, whether they are victims of human trafficking or agents determining their own fate through voluntary migration (see Bélanger, 2010; Constable, 2005, 2003; Lu, 2008). Again, this reflects the complexity of marriage migration in the face of the convergence of restrictive national immigration policies, structured inequality, and multi-dimensional attitudes and motivations in an era of globalization.

that marriage immigration to Canada represents a means of satisfying Sikh marital requirements (i.e., caste endogamy and village exogamy) in the midst of broader migratory pressures and desires.

A growing body of literature has documented the complex intersections between cross-border marriages and labour migration (see Piper & Roces, 2003; Piper, 2003, 1999). McKay (2003), for instance, argues that the de-skilling experienced by single female Filipino migrant workers arriving in Canada through the Live-in-Caregiver program represents a possible motivating factor for entering into an international marriage with a Canadian citizen. In contrast, Pe-Pua (2003) demonstrates that the marriage migration patterns of Filipino domestic workers in Spain and Italy less commonly involve marriage to local men in their destination countries. Rather, the majority of these women are married at the time of their migration. Some women thus utilize labour migration as a means to gain admission to a foreign country, and subsequently proceed to sponsor their family to join them through family reunification policies. Other women do not sponsor their family, but rather live as part of a transnational family, with their husband and children remaining in the country of origin (see Pe-Pua, 2003).

Overall, the intersections between marriage and migration are complex, with individual migrants' experiences and motivations in different roles not always clearly aligning with the category under which they gain admission to their receiving country. Given this context, as well as the above-described importance of media representations in reconstructing social and political realities and reiterating social norms and dominant ideologies, the ultimate question at hand in this chapter remains – how are marriage

immigrants represented in the media? Although, as noted, this issue has not been addressed in Canada, a small body of literature has documented media coverage of marriage migration in other national contexts.

4.3 Media Research

Despite the complexity of marriage migration, existing media research has demonstrated that portrayals of marriage migrants and cross-border marriages draw on overly simplistic, highly gendered stereotypes. These stereotypes fail to capture the multi-dimensional nature of immigrants' lives and obscure the complex and diverse motivations associated with both marriage and migration. The existing literature nearly exclusively focuses on Asian 'foreign brides' involved in marriage migration. This research has generally documented highly similar representations across national contexts, involving long-standing and highly familiar popular images of Asian women: "One is the sweet and innocent, sexual-romantic 'oriental doll' or 'lotus blossom'; the other is the conniving, devious, and shrewd 'dragon lady'" (Constable, 2003: 13). These representations involve dichotomous constructions of women as either passive victims of controlling men, or as cunning and manipulative women who dupe innocent men in order to get a free meal-ticket and immigration status (Constable, 2003; Hsia, 2007).

Importantly, these stereotypical representations are commonly invoked in the construction of marriage migration as a social problem. For example, in a detailed examination of Taiwanese news media, Hsia (2007) demonstrates that foreign brides are discursively linked with prostitution and broken families; these women are constructed as passive victims, materialist gold-diggers, or criminals. Taiwanese men who marry

foreign brides are broadly constructed as being socially undesirable, typified as physically or morally inferior. These marriages are portrayed as a serious threat to Taiwanese society, given their potential to lead to the deterioration of population 'quality.' To this end, Hsia (2007) argues that the Taiwanese media discourse reflects national fear that a 'low quality' generation of children will interfere with Taiwan's competitiveness on a global economic stage.

Other research similarly demonstrates how national interests and concerns underlie media representations of marriage immigrants. In the Vietnamese mass media, for instance, marriage immigrants (namely, Vietnamese women married to Taiwanese or South Korean men) are depicted, on one hand, as ignorant, uneducated, and poor victims in need of state education and protection. On the other hand, these immigrants are portrayed as selfish, materialistic opportunists who evade their duties as good wives, daughters, mothers, and citizens (Bélanger et al., 2007). For Bélanger et al. (2007), these images represent concerns over Vietnamese women's abandonment of their duties within a socialist society, and thus articulate the supposed threat that marriage migration poses to Vietnamese nationalism, patriarchy, and masculinity.

Research on media coverage in receiving countries outside of Asia has similarly revealed dichotomous representations of marriage immigrants. In the Australia media, Asian foreign brides are alternatively constructed as sensual sex slaves or as the "salvation of traditional family values" (Robinson, 1996: 60). Robinson (1996) interprets these representations as an intersection between historically-rooted Orientalist discourses of Western dominance and contemporary patterns of gender and marriage relations in Australia. More specifically, media depictions reflect reactions to the

changing nature of family and marital relations in the face of feminist advances in Australia, co-mingled with debates surrounding Australia's relations with Asia. In this context, patriarchal and Orientalist discourses intertwine in the struggle to define contemporary Australian identity (Robinson, 1996).

As previously noted, Canadian media coverage of marriage immigration has not been analyzed. Nevertheless, there exists a large body of work on Canadian media coverage of immigrants and ethnic minorities²⁵ (see Mahtani, 2008, for a review of this literature) that deserves brief consideration. This research highlights the role of media discourses in exclusionary nation-building, wherein immigrants and ethnic minorities are symbolically located on the margins of the Canadian nation. Generally speaking, immigrants and ethnic minorities are consistently portrayed in the Canadian media in negative and stereotypical ways (Henry & Tator, 2002; Mahtani, 2008). Extensive research on Canadian news media has demonstrated that immigrants and ethnic minorities are widely racialized and criminalized in media coverage (Fleras & Kunz, 2001; Greenberg, 2000; Greenberg & Hier 2001; Henry & Tator, 2002; Hier & Greenburg, 2002a, 2002b; Jiwani, 2006, 1998; Ma & Hildebrandt, 1993; Mahtani, 2008, 2001; Mahtani & Mountz, 2002). For example, in an examination of three daily British Columbia newspapers between 1995 and 2000, Mahtani and Mountz (2002) found that articles associated with immigrant criminality rose in volume and intensity of negative tone over time, accompanied by increasing anti-immigration rhetoric. Similarly, in an

²⁵ Note that much of the mainstream media discourse on immigration is characterized by the *folk construction* of immigrants discussed by Li (2003a) (see Chapter One). In this understanding, there is an epistemological conflation between immigrants and ethnic minorities, wherein the terms immigrants, visible minorities, people of colour, racial minorities, etc. are often used interchangeably, despite the inaccuracies this involves (Mahtani, 2008). This conflation means that, in the present review, some of the literature discussed addresses media coverage of ethnic minorities, and not necessarily immigrants *per se*.

analysis of the *Toronto Star* and the *Vancouver Sun* between 1970 and 1990, Ma and Hildebrandt (1993) found that, over time, an increasing proportion of news stories about ethnic Chinese in Canada (including but not restricted to immigrants) constructed this group as criminals, and the balance of stories about the Chinese community generally became more negative.

Hier and Greenberg have written cogently about media treatment of the 600 Fujian migrants, popularly and pejoratively termed the “Chinese boat people,” who arrived on Canada’s west coast in 1999 (Greenberg 2000; Greenberg & Hier 2001; Hier & Greenberg 2002a, 2002b). The authors argue that news media coverage of the incident was part of a process of ‘collective problematization’ of immigration (Greenberg & Hier 2001), touching on public concerns about the ability of the Canadian state to secure the nation’s borders and protect the Canadian population. In this regard, the arrival of undocumented migrants was constructed into a narrative crisis that was factually disproportionate to the reality of the situation, yet appealed to the population’s concern over national security. To this end, even a relatively small group of migrants became ‘legitimately’ defined as a ‘crisis’ (Hier & Greenberg, 2002a). Moreover, these migrants were racialized as foreign ‘Others’; as the authors explain, “repeated reference to the fact that [the migrants] were of ‘Chinese’ or ‘Asian’ origin [created] an instant epistemological distinction between ‘Chinese’ and ‘Canadian,’ ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident,’ ‘Us’ and Them” (p.498). In this way, insiders’ status in Canada’s imagined community was solidified through the construction of the Fujian migrants as threats to the Canadian nation.

The present chapter extends and draws together the above two bodies of work by examining Canadian news media discourse on marriage immigration. The chapter contends that this discourse reflects national anxieties about contemporary immigration relating to the increasing ethnic and cultural diversity of the Canadian nation, as well as broader concerns associated with non-economic (i.e., family-class) immigration. The media coverage is revealing of ambivalence and uncertainty surrounding the presence of residents of non-European origins and about marriages between Canadians and ‘foreigners.’ The media discourse thus reflects and contributes to social tensions surrounding marriage migrants, and contributes to this group’s symbolic marginalization in Canada’s imagined community.

4.4 Methods

An initial keyword search of newspaper publications was conducted using the electronic database LexisNexis. Broad search terms of “Canada,” “immigration,” and (“family” or “spouse”) were used in order to ensure that as many relevant articles as possible would be located. Given that marriage immigration has never been specifically examined in existing analyses of Canadian media, there was no *a priori* expectation regarding the volume of articles that might be published on this topic. However, given that Canadian immigration is a very broad topic, and that specific coverage of any individual aspect of this topic would not be likely to garner a particularly high volume of publications, a relatively long time frame of ten years was selected for the present analysis. As such, the search was conducted for articles published between December 1999 and December 2009.

The LexisNexis keyword search returned 958 newspaper results. Of this total, approximately 79% were published in three newspapers: the *Globe and Mail* (n=242), the *Toronto Star* (n=382), and the *Toronto Sun* (n=131); all other newspapers included in the results were primarily non-Canadian publications, and were thus excluded from the analysis. In order to ensure that articles of interest from these three newspapers were not missed, an additional search with slightly more narrow search terms (“Canada” and “immigration” and “spouse or marriage”) was conducted in the electronic database ProQuest for these three specific newspapers. These results were cross-referenced with the LexisNexis results to identify any non-duplicate articles. An additional search for articles published in the *National Post* between 1999 and 2009 was also conducted in ProQuest, again using the search terms “Canada,” “immigration,” and “spouse or marriage.” Notably, the *National Post* is not included in the LexisNexis database; however, it was purposively sampled in order to provide as national a perspective as possible. Based on this search, a total of 304 results from the *National Post* were reviewed for relevance.

Results from both the LexisNexis and ProQuest databases were obtained in full-text format and examined for possible inclusion in the current analysis. Publications that contained the specified search terms but were not actually about marriage immigration, articles that were only peripherally relevant (i.e., where marriage immigration was not the substantive focus), and duplicate results were excluded from the data file. In addition, articles that were not authored by journalists (e.g., letters to the editor) were excluded from the analysis, on the basis that these types of pieces are not bound by the journalistic standards and requirements of newspapers, and are viewed in critical

analytical and theoretical terms as being distinct from the discourse produced by staff journalists.²⁶

The final sample for the present analysis consisted of 190 articles on spousal sponsorship. This included 47 articles from the *Toronto Star*, 44 from the *Toronto Sun*, 62 from the *Globe and Mail*, and 37 from the *National Post*. For all individual articles, the following information was entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet: (1) overall tone (positive/sympathetic, neutral, or negative/accusatory); (2) article focus (e.g., policy, personal/human interest story); (3) specific topic(s) covered in the article (e.g., sponsorship policy; immigrants as a burden on Canadian society; difficulties associated with spousal sponsorship); (4) whether the article specifically addressed female or male immigrants or both; and (5) whether a specific country of immigrant origin or the ethnic origin of immigrants were discussed. From here, content analysis was conducted in order to identify themes and codified context.

It should be noted that, given this chapter's focus on marriage immigrants, the tone of the newspaper articles was evaluated with respect to this group or this type of immigration. There were instances where, for example, articles discussed both economic immigration and family-class (including marriage) immigration; in some cases, the tone of individual articles was positive towards economic immigrants and their contribution to Canadian society or positive towards immigration as a general phenomenon, yet simultaneously negative towards marriage immigrants. For the present

²⁶ Letters to the editor are meaningful, in that they are part the public discourse on a given topic; they can also reflect newspapers' ideological inclinations, in the sense that the editors choose which letters to publish. Nevertheless, these types of pieces are not seen as possessing the same degree of discursive power as news stories. This distinction has been made in previous media analyses that have also excluded letters to the editor for the same reason (see Hier & Greenberg, 2002b).

analysis, articles as a whole were coded according to the dominant tone directed toward marriage immigrants. In the small number of cases where both sympathetic and negative elements were strongly present within individual articles, the articles were coded as both ‘negative’ and ‘sympathetic.’ It is noted in the text when this type of article is discussed.

4.5 Results

Overall, 56.2% of articles were categorized as having a negative tone, while 33.3% of articles were categorized as sympathetic and 10.4% were categorized as neutral. The breakdown of the number and percentage of each type of article in all newspapers is provided in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Sympathetic, Neutral, and Negative Articles, by Newspaper

Newspaper	Sympathetic	Neutral	Negative	Total
Globe and Mail	21	4	42*	67
National Post	8	6	23	37
Toronto Star	23	8	22**	53
Toronto Sun	15	3	26	44
Total	67	21	113	201

*5 articles coded as both negative and sympathetic

**6 articles coded as both negative and sympathetic

Articles that were neutral in tone dealt mostly with immigration policy. The articles primarily reported on changes relating to the spousal sponsorship program, most commonly relating to regulations surrounding residency requirements during the processing of sponsorship applications. Other articles in this category reported on the change in immigration policy in 2002 that allowed spousal sponsorship among same-sex partners. Overall, the neutral articles were typically short in length and were very

straightforward, providing little to no evidence of ideological inclinations or political leanings; as such, they offered very little content for meaningful and theoretically-relevant analysis of marriage immigration. Moreover, these articles represented a relatively small proportion of all articles (6% for both *Globe and Mail*, 16% for the *National Post*, 15% for the *Toronto Star*, and just under 7% for the *Toronto Sun*, for an overall total of 10.4% across all newspapers). For these reasons, the remainder of the chapter focuses on negative and sympathetic articles relating to marriage immigration. These articles provide insight into the manner in which marriage immigrants were socially constructed and symbolically positioned in the Canadian imagined community through media discourse.

4.51 Negative Coverage: The Social Problem of Inauthentic Marriage Immigration

The analysis revealed that marriage immigration was presented in the media as a distinct and growing social problem. In constructing marriage immigration as a social problem, the media coverage emphasized immigrants' growing use of marriages of convenience and fraudulent marriages to undeservedly gain entry to Canada. As defined in one article (Jimenez, 2006, July 29), marriages of convenience are unions entered into with both parties' knowledge that the primary purpose of the marriage is one spouse's immigration, with the migrating spouse commonly paying a fee to the resident spouse for the marriage. In fraudulent marriages, on the other hand, the Canadian counterpart is said to enter into a marriage not knowing that for the immigrant, the sole purpose of the union is to come to Canada. Several sub-themes characterized articles focusing on marriages of convenience and fraudulent marriages: first, that these types of

unions are a significant and growing problem in Canada requiring state attention; second, that culturally arranged marriages are a common route for introducing inauthentic marriage immigrants²⁷ to Canada; and third, that marriage immigrants are deviants or criminals who threaten the safety of the Canadian population, the integrity of the Canadian immigration program, and the stability of Canadian values and norms. Across these themes, marriage immigrants were commonly portrayed as evil-doers who defraud Canadian citizens and the immigration system. Canadian partners, on the other hand, were alternatively depicted as victims of marriage immigrants, or as victims of an unduly harsh immigration system that imposes a financial burden on Canadian sponsors via the sponsorship program.

Across articles from all newspapers, inauthentic marriage immigration was portrayed as a widespread and growing problem, despite the absence of valid data to support this claim. In the absence of such data, many articles attempted to quantify the inauthentic marriage migration problem, often using quotes from immigration officials or other elite voices (e.g., lawyers) to legitimize the claims being put forth:²⁸

Ms. Towell is one of a growing number of people going public with their stories of marriage fraud in the immigration system. These are Canadians who married a foreigner only to see their husband or wife leave them within weeks or even days of landing on Canadian soil (Curry, 2009, April 20).

The Canadian Marriage Fraud Victim Society has already documented 200 cases [of marriage fraud] and believes there are many, many more (Mandel, 2006, July 9).

²⁷ The term ‘inauthentic marriages’ is used in this chapter to capture both fraudulent marriages and marriages of convenience.

²⁸ These strategies (the use of questionable statistics and equivocal estimates, and reliance on authority figures) were similarly found by Hsia (2007) as means used by the Taiwanese media to ‘prove’ that marriage migration was a social problem.

When a New Democratic Party MLA organized a meeting on [marriage fraud] in Burnaby, B.C., in 2006, nearly 200 people filled a town hall. An advocacy group called the Canadian Marriage Fraud Victims' Society estimates the number of victims to be in the thousands (Curry, 2008, May 21).

Ottawa immigration lawyer Julie Taub said thousands of Canadians have fallen victim to marriage fraud and the 100 or so members of Canadians Against Immigration Fraud 'represent only the tip of the iceberg' (Spencer, 2009, April 23).

Ms. Green is just one of 1,500 Canadians who fall victim to marriage fraud each year, according to an advocacy group called Canadians Against Immigration Fraud. Falling in love with foreigners, they are jilted weeks – if not days – after the vows are exchanged. Commenting on this issue last week, Immigration Minister Jason Kenney said: "I would say it's one of the most frequent forms of immigration fraud" (Bielski, 2009b, April 30).

When he first saw the front page of the Sunday [*Toronto*] *Sun* about a woman abandoned shortly after sponsoring her Cuban groom here, Shah nervously joked to his bride, "but you wouldn't leave me, right?" She gave him a big hug. "What a stupid question," she assured him. "Of course not." But the very next day the Cuban woman had vanished as well, joining an epidemic of foreign brides and grooms who are ditching their Canadian spouses soon after using them to get to this promise land (Mandel, 2006, July 9).

The media discourse entailed constant assertion that inauthentic marriage immigration is a widespread and growing problem that is nearing epidemic proportions, without actually having data to this effect. The enumeration provided was based on questionable, impressionist estimates or vague terminology (e.g., many; widespread), yet served to lend a sense of 'realness' to the 'problem' under construction. In this way, the media established a sense of prevalence and urgency, regardless of the extent to which inauthentic marriage migration actually occurs.

Across the articles analyzed, the Canadian state's concern over disingenuous immigrants and active investigation of possible fraud was emphasized, further

contributing to the construction of inauthentic marriage migration as a notable social problem:

“The government is concerned about marriages of convenience and is currently engaged in the investigation of these cases,” said department spokesperson Danielle Norris (Keung, 2008, May 23).

After being flooded with fake wedding photos, false forms and forged signatures, the Canadian government is sounding the alarm over immigration fraud (“Feds look out for immigration fraud,” *Toronto Sun*, 2009, March 11).

The Harper government is deploying clandestine teams to fan out across foreign countries and gather raw information about elaborately staged phony weddings aimed at duping Canadian immigration officials. The teams, which comprise up to five people, are part of a wider bid by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to crack down on marriages of convenience as immigrant communities warn that thousands of foreign fraudsters are leaving lonely Canadians broke and broken-hearted (Curry, 2008, May 21).

Officials from Citizenship and Immigration Canada are looking for input from the Canadian Bar Association on possible changes to regulations regarding ‘bad faith’ marriages, in which foreigners dupe Canadians into marriage to gain a Canadian passport (Curry, 2008, July 10).

By defining inauthentic marriage immigration as an imminent problem affecting a growing number of Canadians, marriage immigrants were cast under a shadow of suspicion, while Canadians were directly represented as victims of immigration scams:

Palwinder Gill of Surrey, B.C., had an arranged marriage that quickly fell apart two years ago. The 43-year-old said his wife left him one year after he sponsored her entry into Canada from India. He is convinced she used him purely for immigration purposes. Now he advocates for change as part of a group called the Canadian Marriage Fraud Victims' Society. The group says these marriages have devastating effects, leading to depression, embarrassment and economic hardship (Curry, 2008, May 21).

Victims say such marriages of convenience stigmatize and humiliate them before their family, friends and peers. Worse still is the depression that follows the sudden marital abandonment. And there is a financial burden: Sponsors are on the hook financially for any social assistance

their spouses might receive for three years – 10 years if they've also sponsored children (Bielski, 2009b, April 30).

There are no statistics measuring the scope of the problem [of marriage fraud], but advocacy groups argue it is widespread, leaving Canadians feeling ashamed and possibly on the hook financially should a fleeing spouse go on social assistance (Curry, 2009, January 22).

Their unwitting Canadian sponsors invest not only their hearts but thousands of dollars in paperwork, long-distance phone calls and airfare. They also mortgage their future: To sponsor their immigrant spouses here, they must agree to financially support them for three years. If the newcomer draws on social assistance – even if they have run out on their spouse – their Canadian sponsor is still on the hook to pay that money back to the Canadian government (Mandel, 2006, July 9).

The media discourse thus constructed a clear dichotomy between marriage immigrants and Canadians, with overseas marriages emerging as a site for marginalizing marriage immigrants to Canada's national community. Also important to note from the above descriptions is the attribution of inauthentic marriage immigration to both women and men immigrants; this stands in contrast to previous research focusing on foreign *brides*. Indeed, the analysis revealed that inauthentic marriage migration was portrayed as a scheme commonly used by both men and women immigrants to enter Canada. The gendered contours of these portrayals are discussed further in section 4.53 of this chapter.

The 'social problem' of inauthentic marriage immigration was also articulated in reference to the necessity of the sponsorship program. In these cases, the potential financial detriment that Canadians may face if they marry a fraudulent immigrant further contributed to the image of marriage immigrants as a problematic group of newcomers in Canadian society:

[Lawyer Julie] Taub argues that those who cynically say Canadians marrying foreigners deserve their ordeals are missing the point. "When

fraudsters become permanent residents, then they too have the right to sponsor family members. They're entitled to health care, social assistance, housing and all the benefits that Canadians are entitled to" (Bielski, 2009b, April 30).

Ms. Finley is working with the B.C. government – which was asked to co-operate with Ottawa on the issue – to warn and remind Canadians they will be on the hook financially if their new husbands or wives immediately leave them and apply for social assistance (Curry, 2008, May 21).

The duped Canadian not only suffers emotional distress and embarrassment as the victim of a marriage fraud, but they are also liable for financial support if their ex then applies for social assistance. Some immigrant advocates would have the federal government waive this obligation, saying it punishes only the victim, but under existing rules such an arrangement is a necessary protection for taxpayers and should inspire greater vigilance among Canadians who enter into arranged marriages ("A Simple Remedy," *Globe and Mail*, 2008, May 22).

In this context, marriage immigrants were portrayed as a potential threat to not only individual Canadian sponsors, but to Canadian taxpayers more generally. The potential social burden associated with inauthentic marriage immigration not only depicted these immigrants as a potential drain on the Canadian system, but also served as the basis for articulating a warning to Canadians against entering an international marital union. It is also evident from these latter examples that portrayals of Canadians within inauthentic marriages were not always clear-cut. In some cases, Canadians were problematized for marrying foreigners, and were portrayed as being at least partly responsible for their own victimization. In other instances, as evidenced by the last article quoted above ("A Simple Remedy," *Globe and Mail*, 2008, May 22), marriage fraud was associated with culturally arranged marriages. Importantly, as this example illustrates, articles referring to culturally arranged marriages inconsistently and often simultaneously referred to alleged victims of marriage fraud as 'Canadians' and as 'immigrants.' These articles

thus served as a means of discouraging Canadians, in general, from entering marriages with ‘foreigners,’ yet often also located the problem of inauthentic marriage migration within certain ‘immigrant’ communities. This point will be discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter (section 4.52).

Other articles linked marriages of convenience to foreign workers and students, thereby expanding the reach of the ‘social problem’ of inauthentic marriage immigration beyond newcomers who enter the country through marriage. Similar to previously discussed articles, equivocal statistics were used in an attempt to establish the extent to which temporary migrants remain in the country through inauthentic marriages. For instance, an article in the *Globe and Mail* specifically stated that foreign workers and foreign students can use marriage and spousal sponsorship as a way of gaining permanent residence in Canada, then immediately noted that 90,668 workers and 56,536 students were granted entry to Canada two years ago (Jimenez, 2006, May 11). Putting these two statements together suggested a direct connection, implying that these large numbers of foreign workers and students are at risk of defrauding the Canadian system through inauthentic marriages. The discursive effect of this connection was to cast suspicion on a much broader population of migrants in Canada. In other words, the media coverage suggested that family-class spousal immigrants *as well as* temporary residents may abuse the system through marriage scams. By commenting that fraudulent marriage is a common strategy used by temporary migrants to remain in the country, the possibility that a migrant worker or student and a Canadian can actually fall in love and be joined in a genuine union was dismissed, and marriages between Canadians and temporary residents were inherently problematized. In this way,

Canadians were implicitly warned against marrying a ‘foreigner’ residing overseas *or* within Canada.

Indeed, unions between Canadians and foreign immigrants were directly presented in the media discourse as highly problematic:

“In any overseas marriage,” says immigration spokesman Melanie Carkner, “they [Canadian sponsors] are counselled that this [marriage fraud] could happen. It’s on their application” (Jimenez, 2006, June 1).

“It really is buyer beware when you marry overseas,” says Marina Wilson, a spokeswoman for Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Jimenez, 2006, July 29).

International marriage immigrants were characterized as a distinct threat to individual Canadians entering unions with foreign nationals, and, by extension, cross-border marriages were problematized. Moreover, concern about these types of union was rendered legitimate by citing government officials. In this regard, the above-cited words of state official Marina Wilson are particularly telling. Her statement portrayed foreign marriage migrants as a ‘purchase’ that Canadians should be wary of ‘buying.’ This statement explicitly conveyed doubt that international marriages can be based on genuine love, and emerged as an official cautionary assertion against the sponsorship of ‘foreign’ marriage partners.

In other instances, the possibility that marriage immigration could escalate and entail ongoing immigration scams was emphasized:

If marriages of convenience go undetected, the couple divorce once the spouse receives permanent residency. Some then go on to marry for a second time and sponsor someone from their homeland in a process known as ‘chain sponsorships’ (Jimenez, 2006, May 11).

Someone divorces their real spouse, then enters a marriage of convenience to get into Canada. Their “ex” husband or wife does the

same. Although officially divorced, the couple end up living together again in their new country (Blackwell, 2004, April 7).

The possible spiraling of inauthentic marriage immigration amplified the problematization of marriage immigrants; it also undermined the validity of family-class immigration as a component of Canada's immigration system by suggesting that it is inherently amenable to enabling the entry of inauthentic migrants. In this way, marriage immigrants were presented as a source of ongoing threat to the Canadian nation through their facilitation of additional disingenuous immigration. This further contributed to the marginalization of marriage immigrants with respect to Canada's imagined community, constructing them as outsiders within the nation's borders in light of their tendency to continually take advantage of the Canadian immigration system.

In portraying inauthentic marriage immigration as a social problem, the media coverage also delineated the differential value of economic versus family-class immigrant types:

“The selection criteria [for economic-class immigrants] is set so high that it's increasingly difficult for someone who doesn't have a relative here to get into Canada,” said James Bissett, a retired Immigration and Foreign Affairs official and critic of the system. “It's a serious concern, because the family class²⁹ is squeezing out the selected classes like skilled workers” (Blackwell, 2004, April 7).

Once spousal sponsorships are granted, the partner immediately qualifies for permanent resident status – avoiding skills requirements and queues that for economic-class immigrants can involve waits of as long as six years. Too often, the bureaucrats get it wrong. There are many cases where the partner, once in Canada, then dumps his or her unsuspecting spouse (“A Simple Remedy,” *Globe and Mail*, 2008, May 22).

“Marriages of convenience are increasing substantially...because it takes so long to process immigration cases,” Tony Luk, president of the

²⁹ Although this quotation is about the family class more generally, the article itself was about “sham marriages.”

Chinese Immigration Consultants' Association, told the Toronto Star yesterday. [...] Luk said it takes about four to five years for a skilled worker, for example, to get landed immigrant status, compared with six to nine months for someone married to a Canadian. "Under the new rules...you don't even need to be (legally) married as long as you are common-law," Luk said (Brennan, 2006, May 10).

Marriage immigrants were thus presented as unskilled and undeserving of entry to Canada. Moreover, they were depicted as inhibiting the admission of deserving immigrants (i.e., economic immigrants). In this way, the media coverage discursively located economic immigrants within the boundaries of the nation's imagined community by suggesting that they are necessarily preferable to family-class immigrants, while simultaneously marginalizing marriage immigrants. Marriage immigrants also served as a basis for articulating broader concerns about the current state of the immigration system by indicating that qualified economic immigrants are hampered from entering the country while marriage immigrants (and family-class immigrants more generally) readily gain entry. It is also worth noting that, in portraying economic and family-class immigrants in this fashion, the media coverage contributed to an image of the Canadian state as an ineffective guardian of the nation's borders. In this way, marriage immigrants served as a means for highlighting 'flaws' in the Canadian immigration system.

4.52 Negative Coverage: Inauthentic Marriages, Problematic Asians

Another characteristic of the media coverage of inauthentic marriages was the common conflation of these unions with culturally arranged marriages. Alongside this conflation was a tendency to largely attribute inauthentic unions to Asian communities. In this context, 'Asian' partners in Canada were inconsistently presented as 'immigrants,'

without clear indication of whether they were, in fact, immigrants or Canadian-born. As discussed in the preceding section, these types of articles commonly used ambiguous quantifiers and appeals to authority to legitimize the claim that marriage immigration is a major (Asian) problem.

The conflation of arranged marriages and inauthentic unions was, at times, blatant. For instance, an article in the *Globe and Mail* entitled “*Arranged marriages becoming more common, officials say*” (Jimenez, 2006, May 11, italics added) had as its first line: “*Marriages of convenience* are more and more common, particularly in the Chinese and South Asian communities, immigration lawyers say” (Jimenez, 2006, May 11, italics added). Other articles suggested that marriages involving immigrants and Asian communities were highly likely to be inauthentic:

Marriages of convenience are common in the South Asian community, and because of this, spousal sponsorships are scrutinized closely to ensure people are not marrying for immigration purposes (Jimenez, 2006, June 1).

Mr. Parikh, according to his court filing, counts himself a victim of marriage fraud, a new kind of immigration offence that is bringing humiliation, financial ruin and distress to a growing number of immigrants from India, China, the Philippines and other countries. [...] “I would tell Indo-Canadians, don’t marry in India,” Parikh said in an interview (Jimenez, 2006, July 29).

As this latter example also illustrates, the tendency to locate inauthentic marriage immigration in Asian communities served as a means of obscuring whether sponsors had previously immigrated to Canada or were born in the country. This contributed to a broader depiction of Asian-Canadians as immigrants, thereby conflating ethnicity and immigrant status.

Numerous articles attempted to demonstrate the growing problem of inauthentic marriage among Asian immigrants:

Chinese women wishing to come to Canada literally line up outside the Canadian Embassy in Beijing proposing to men who've been issued visas to travel here, according to immigration officers in Hong Kong. The officers said single women try to marry visa-holding men so they can be sponsored here as their wives (Godfrey, 2003, March 5).

Canadian immigration officials say migration from China will remain the most problematic issue their department will have to deal with this year. [...] Canadian diplomats said 21% of Chinese sponsorship cases are rejected because they consist of misrepresentation and marriage of conveniences (Godfrey, 2000, January 3).

To crack down on those using phony marriages to come to Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, according to news reports, is now sending investigative teams around the world, especially to high-fraud regions such as India, China and Vietnam, to gather intelligence on staged marriages (Keung, 2008, May 23).

Canadian bureaucrats who staff visa desks at places such as Chandigarh have the unenviable task of trying to determine whether a marriage is fraudulent or not. They are required to immerse themselves in local and religious customs that would seem mysterious to many Canadians, but which provide insight into a marriage's legitimacy, for example the seven steps associated with Hindu ceremonies ("A Simple Remedy," *Globe and Mail*, 2008, May 22).

Marriage immigration involving Asian migrants was thus presented as a growing problem for Canada and as a major source of concern among immigration officials.

Moreover, as the last example above illustrates, marriage immigration among Asians served as the basis for highlighting the 'foreignness' of this group. The 'mystery' of their cultural practices was presented as a challenge to Canadian immigration officials in determining the veracity of marriage immigration. These portrayals dichotomized Asians and Canadians, and defined Asians as ethnic Others with norms and customs that are not easily understood by Canadians. The media coverage thereby served as a

means of racialization, homogenizing both ‘Canadians’ and ‘Asians’ and positioning them to each other in dichotomous terms.

Elsewhere, the previously noted link between inauthentic marriages and temporary foreign residents (such as students, labour migrants, and visitors) was reiterated in specific reference to Asian migrants:

A memo from an Immigration Canada intelligence analyst in Beijing cites a Hong Kong newspaper article that told the story of a Hong Kong woman willing to pay \$30,000 for a Canadian spouse, and a Vancouver dating service that routinely got calls, usually from Chinese people in Canada on student or visitor visas, asking for marriage partners (Blackwell, 2004, April 7).

It is often the cultural norm for Chinese Canadians and Indo-Canadians to marry virtual strangers in arranged marriages overseas, making it difficult for immigration officials here to assess the validity of these unions. Foreign students and workers in Canada on temporary visas may also persuade someone to marry them as a favour to be repaid in kind, or for money, from as little as \$1,000 to as much as \$25,000, according to immigration lawyers (Jimenez, 2006, May 11).

As previously discussed, this type of coverage cast a broader shadow of doubt over marriages involving all types of migrants, suggesting that marriage immigrants, foreign students, and foreign workers all stand the risk of defrauding the Canadian system through inauthentic marriage. These examples also further demonstrate the manner in which marriage served as a basis for articulating the ‘foreignness’ of the Asian community, effectively Othering both Asian migrants and Asian-Canadians.

Other articles addressed a new, more sophisticated marriage migration scheme that was purportedly being used by South Asians to skirt Canadian immigration regulations:

Arranged marriages, where parents introduce young people to each other and couples marry after a brief courtship, are common among South Asians, but “barter” marriages seem to be becoming increasingly

common, too. In other words: I'll get your son/daughter to Canada, you help get my niece/nephew out of India. These ads have been around for some time, but never as bold or pervasive as they are now, as people find new ways of bringing relatives over after Citizenship and Immigration Canada plugged legal loopholes and cracked down on marriage fraud in recent years (Aulakh, 2009, June 29).

Once again, culturally arranged marriages were rendered comparable to inauthentic marriages designed to fraudulently gain admission to Canada. This type of coverage also cast suspicion on South Asians within Canada in light of their possible involvement in marriage scams. Family-class immigrants in general were also problematized in association with Asian marriage migration, with the implication that these inauthentic marriage immigrants will sponsor additional relatives who are undeserving of entry.

It is relevant to note that the problem of inauthentic marriage immigration was not exclusively attributed to Asian communities:

“This is a very huge problem in Canada,” Mr. Gill [a self-identified victim of marriage fraud] said. “Marriage is the easiest and fastest way to get Canadian immigration status, so people are using marriage as a route to get into Canada. [...] There are thousands of cases in each and every immigrant community” (Curry, 2008, May 21).³⁰

Vancouver immigration lawyer Andrew Wlodyka says he has seen it all during his past 17 years in practice, and over the previous seven years in various roles with the Immigration and Refugee Board. “In many communities it's epidemic,” Mr. Wlodyka said. He mentioned India, China and Vietnam as frequent sources of marriage fraud, but stressed those countries are also a major source of overall immigration to B.C. and that fraud is being committed by people of all backgrounds (Curry, 2008, May 21).

These runaway spouses come from every possible nation – from the Dominican Republic and China to India and Pakistan, even Fiji – with one common intent, to use a short-term Canadian marriage to escape poverty back home and enjoy the good life here (Mandel, 2006, July 9).

³⁰ Note in this example the previously mentioned articulation of marriage immigration as an easy route of entry relative to economic immigration, thereby privileging economic immigrants as more valuable than family-class immigrants.

“Most of [the cases] that we have involve spouses from India because we deal largely with the Indo-Canadian community but I think it's happening in all immigrant communities,” says [Canadian Marriage Fraud Victim Society] spokesman Navdeet Dhillon, an abandoned bride living in Vancouver. “We believe there are thousands of cases but people are too embarrassed to come forward.” In her case, Dhillon married her husband in India in April 2004 and sponsored him here in October of that year. He stayed just one day before telling her that he had used her to immigrate and wanted a divorce (Mandel, 2006, July 9).

Marriage fraud was thus framed as an epidemic, and as a scam used by immigrants from all regions (but especially Asian countries) to undeservedly gain entry to Canada.

Marriage immigrants were clearly portrayed as schemers seeking to escape poverty, while their Canadian counterparts were depicted as embarrassed victims who are left to pick up the pieces of their lives. The ongoing emphasis on Asian immigrants, despite acknowledgement that inauthentic marriage immigration is a larger immigrant problem, suggested that fraudulent marriage immigrants are most commonly Asian, and simultaneously suggested that marriages between Asian nationals and (Asian-) Canadians are suspicious and problematic.

Overall, ambiguity surrounding the distinction between culturally arranged marriages and inauthentic marriages, and vagueness surrounding the immigrant status of Canadian residents of Asian background are revealing of the tension surrounding immigration from Asian source countries. Locating inauthentic marriage immigration primarily within Asian communities inherently problematized the presence of immigrants (and non-immigrants) of Asian origin, and defined ‘Asian’ cultural practices (i.e., arranged marriages) as contravening Canadian norms. The identification of Asian-Canadians as ‘immigrants’ that stand to defraud the Canadian immigration system constructed this group as Others within the nation. In this way, Asians residing

in Canada, regardless of their legal or citizenship status, were racialized and marginalized with respect to Canada's imagined community. These findings offer discursive evidence of a struggle to come to terms with ethnic and cultural diversity in the Canadian context, wherein the lines around membership in the Canadian national community are blurred, and the identification of an individual as an 'immigrant' is not clearly linked to their legal status. In this context, 'non-Canadian' practices are viewed with suspicion, and the 'Canadian' status of persons from Asian ethnic communities is rendered unstable.

4.53 Negative Coverage: Deviants and Criminals

The analysis of negative articles pertaining to marriage immigrants further revealed that these immigrants were commonly represented in terms of deviance and criminality. In this way, marriage immigrants were presented as highly undesirable members of the Canadian nation. Consistent with research on foreign brides in other national contexts, this component of the discourse employed simplistic gendered stereotypes; women immigrants were constructed as sexualized deviants, while male marriage immigrants, for their part, were constructed as criminals involved in terrorism and murder.

In terms of the media coverage of women marriage immigrants, numerous articles (e.g., Clements, 2004, December 24; Fife, 2004, November 17; Fife, 2004, November 15; Freeze & Jimenez, 2004, November 27; Friscolanti, 2004, December 4; Girard, 2005, January 27; Jimenez, 2004, December 4; Jimenez, 2004, November 24; Thompson, 2005, February 26; 2004, December 4) discussed the controversial case of Alina Balaican, a female migrant from Romania attempting to remain in the country

through marriage. The articles recounted the fact that the Immigration Minister at the time, Judy Sgro, had granted Balaican – a former stripper who had been residing in Canada despite having an expired status, a permit to remain in the country while the spousal sponsorship application submitted by Balaican’s Canadian husband was being reviewed. The media coverage commonly implied that this marriage may be inauthentic, intended only for Balaican to obtain immigration status. The coverage also reiterated the fact that Balaican had previously volunteered on Sgro's election campaign; to this end, the case came to be referred to in the media as ‘Strippergate.’ As this label suggests, Balaican’s status as a former stripper became the dominant feature of her identity as an immigrant, and served to cast her in a highly gendered, deviant light:

This is where “Strippergate,” the controversy that threatens to derail the career of Immigration Minister Judy Sgro, all began: on a stage like this one, at the Diamonds Cabaret in Mississauga, Ont. The lights are dim. The sound system blares Ludacris rapping about “all these women on the prowl,” while a porn movie plays on the television. A customer lies on the stage beneath a brass pole, as two blond Slavic women...wearing nothing but leather boots stand over him and simulate lesbian sex. They spank his backside with a belt, take the bills out of his mouth, and move on to the next customer (Freeze & Jimenez, 2004, November 27).

Balaican’s case was used to paint all female foreign strippers as potential inauthentic marriage immigrants:

Critics of the exotic-dancer program – and of Immigration Minister Judy Sgro, who is accused of helping a Romanian stripper named Alina Balaican prolong her stay here – say these foreign dancers are being exploited by agents demanding kickbacks. But there is another side to their Canadian journey. According to interviews with several people in the industry, while some strippers are mistreated by corrupt agents, others use the program as a back door into the country, and then marry Canadian men in a bid for citizenship (Freeze & Jimenez, 2004, November 27).

Foreign exotic dancers were portrayed on the one hand as hapless victims of shady businessmen, and on the other hand as scheming frauds who use marriage to remain in Canada. In this way, ‘Strippergate’ served as a basis for painting both Balaican and foreign exotic dancers more broadly as would-be marriage immigrant frauds. The highly sexualized language used to describe these women cast them in an unfavourable light, and relegated them to the ‘dark side’ of Canadian society. The implication that foreign strippers who marry Canadians might simply be seeking citizenship served to cast doubt on marriages involving these immigrants, and indirectly portrayed the men in these marriages as victims of calculating women who use their sexuality to get what they want – Canadian citizenship. In this way, foreign exotic dancers were portrayed as undesirable members of the Canadian national community, at least in part due to their risk of inauthentic marriage immigration.

The connection between marriage immigration and exotic dancing was also articulated in passing in other articles. One article, for instance, stated that “the practice [of inauthentic marriage] isn’t restricted to Chinese and South Asian communities; West Indians, Americans, Filipinos, Fijians and *exotic dancers* from Eastern Europe have also been known to marry for immigration purposes” (Jimenez, 2006, May 11, italics added). By noting that inauthentic marriage immigrants are commonly exotic dancers, most readily assumed to be women, this statement sexualized women marriage immigrants and simultaneously depicted them as abusers of the Canadian immigration system. This statement also reflects the previously discussed tendency to present inauthentic marriage immigration as primarily an ‘Asian’ problem, but also as a larger ‘immigrant’ problem.

With respect to male foreign spouses, these immigrants were more commonly portrayed as organized criminals at risk of harming the Canadian nation. One example of this theme concerns the case of Saïd Namouh. After immigrating to Canada through marriage, Namouh was arrested on conspiracy charges pertaining to an alleged terrorist act on Austrian soil:

Attempts to immigrate were unsuccessful until he married a Canadian woman. A Moroccan-born man arrested in Québec in connection with a bomb plot had tried several times to immigrate to Canada but wasn't successful until he married a Canadian woman nearly 18 years older than him...RCMP Corporal Sylvain L'Heureux said police seized a computer and documents from Mr. Namouh but no bomb-making material because the plot was "nipped in the bud" (Ha & Peritz, 2007, September 15; italics indicate title sub-heading).

The above article emphasized the fact that Namouh was Muslim, and that officials had linked the bomb plot to al-Qaeda. Marriage immigration to Canada thus became discursively linked to the broader threat associated with Islamist ideological opposition to the Western world, drawing on post-September 11 fears surrounding the possibility of terrorism against Canada. It is also interesting to note from the last quote above that the lack of bomb-making materials in Namouh's residence was not interpreted in the media as possible evidence of his innocence, but, rather, as evidence of the Canadian state's success in preventing him from proceeding with a terrorist plan.

It is also relevant that, in the media coverage of Namouh's case, very little was said about his Canadian sponsor, Carole Lessard, except for the comments quoted above and the fact that, after sponsoring Namouh's entry to Canada, the couple divorced. Lessard was not explicitly blamed for enabling Namouh to enter Canada, nor was their marriage specifically articulated as fraudulent or as a marriage of convenience. However, the fact that Namouh had failed in his numerous attempts to enter the country

until he married Lessard, and the fact that she was 18 years older than him, served to place doubt in the veracity of their marriage. The implication that Namouh was only interested in gaining entry to Canada and was not interested in a genuine union with Lessard was clear. To this end, portraying Namouh as a terrorist who likely scammed his way into Canada through marriage served as a warning to Canadian women against marrying and sponsoring foreign men. It also implicitly problematized marriages that defy Canadian gender norms – that is, involving an older woman and a younger man.

Other articles further articulated that inauthentic marriage immigration is a common strategy used by organized criminals and terrorists:

A growing number of would-be immigrants are resorting to marriages of convenience and even divorces of convenience – some of them set up by organized crime – to fraudulently enter Canada (Blackwell, 2004, April 7).

Numerous articles (e.g., Ivison, 2009, April 6; Jain, 2008, May 28; Keung, 2009, March 31; Spencer, 2009, April 23) discussed the concerns of the group *Canadians Against Immigration Fraud* regarding spousal sponsorships and overseas marriages, citing the group's president Sam Benet as saying “It is very much possible for a terrorist to enter Canada through (such) a marriage...” (Jain, 2008, May 28). Although the gender of an individual marriage immigrant was not always articulated in these articles, the stereotype that terrorists and organized criminals are men meant that marriage immigrants were painted in these articles as evil, threatening, (and often Muslim) men. Again, these articles implicitly located the ‘problem’ of inauthentic marriage immigration within a highly threatening context, drawing on post-September 11 discourses of fear and national security to problematize marriage immigration and international marriages.

In a case that received widespread media attention, marriages of convenience were also linked to the kidnapping and murder of a young girl:

Min Chen, a student from China who pleaded guilty this week to the second-degree murder in the killing of Cecilia Zhang, claimed he intended only to kidnap the nine-year-old girl so that he could extract a ransom of \$25,000 from her parents. Failing in his studies and knowing his student visa would run out, he was copying a friend's desperate ruse and planning to pay \$25,000 for a marriage of convenience to secure permanent residency here (Jimenez, 2006, May 11).

His student visa was about to expire and Chen was worried he would be sent back to face his disappointed parents. But what could he do? Alone in a foreign country, he turned to committing minor, non-violent crimes with some fellow students in similar circumstances. But it wasn't enough, especially if he wanted to raise \$25,000 to pay for a marriage of convenience – like his friend had done – so he could stay in Canada and finish his studies. And so the young man decided he would kidnap a little girl he had met six months earlier while visiting a friend who lived at the Zhang home (Brieger, 2006, May 10).

These latter articles used an isolated and highly sensationalized case (notably, involving an Asian male) to illustrate the ultimate danger that Canadian society faces as a result of foreign men entering or remaining in the country through marriage.

Overall, media coverage of marriage immigration discursively established a clear connection between these immigrants and a wide range of activities that are looked down upon or viewed as a threat to Canadian society. From relatively minor contraventions of social mores (i.e., exotic dancing) all the way to serious and frightening outcomes (e.g., organized crime, terrorism, and murder), marriage immigrants were identified as a notable threat, requiring heightened vigilance on the part of the Canadian population and the Canadian state. Portrayals of marriage immigrants as deviants or criminals served as a basis for problematizing international and interethnic marriages, involving doubt in the authenticity of marriages between

Canadians and ‘foreigners.’ These tensions and ambiguities suggest broader uncertainty surrounding cultural and ethnic diversity in Canada in a time of globalization and large-scale movement across national borders. The presence in Canada of nationals from non-traditional immigration source countries, in particular, served as the basis for fear and concern over the dangers that such immigrants could entail for the Canadian nation. Once again, marriage was highlighted as a particularly easy route through which criminals and deviants could gain admission to Canada, thereby problematizing marriage immigration as a valid component of the country’s immigration program. These immigrants were constructed not only as non-contributing members of society, but as outright threats to national integrity. To this end, the vilification of marriage immigrants effectively marginalized them with respect to the nation’s imagined community.

4.54 Sympathetic Coverage: Legitimate Unions

Not all articles analyzed were explicitly negative toward marriage immigrants. However, an interesting finding from the analysis was the subtly contradictory nature of much of the sympathetic coverage of marriage immigration. The use of the term ‘sympathetic’ instead of ‘positive’ is intentional here; it indicates that these articles conveyed a sympathetic tone while simultaneously problematizing marriage immigration. Indeed, the analysis revealed that articles in this category were never positive about marriage immigration *per se*. Moreover, the sympathy put forth was often contingent on the ‘legitimate’ Canadian status of one of the parties involved. In

some cases, the sympathetic tone of the articles, while distinctly present, co-occurred with underlying suggestions of marriage immigrants' own wrongdoings.

Examples of headlines for sympathetic articles are listed in Table 4.2.

Importantly, evidence suggests that newspaper readers tend to recall select, striking details of individual newspaper stories (van Dijk, 1994, 1988, 1986). Headlines provide the type of succinct, dramatic details that are most likely to be recalled; they also present the major subject of the article and set the cognitive tone of the piece (van Dijk, 1988). As such, the wording of these headlines provides insight into the discursive impact of the articles.

Table 4.2: Examples of Sympathetic Article Headlines, by Main Theme and Newspaper

Main theme	Headline	Newspaper and Reference
Bureaucracy and spousal reunification	“Red tape tearing Toronto family apart: Application to stay in works, but mom with Canadian son being deported back to China”	<i>Toronto Star</i> (Javed, 2008, December 30)
	“Christmas reunions wrapped in red tape”	<i>Toronto Star</i> (Keung, 2004, 26 December)
	“Twist in red tape at Immigration keeping husband and bride apart”	<i>Globe and Mail</i> (Jimenez, 2006, May 25)
	“Red tape swept aside, couple to reunite at last”	<i>Globe and Mail</i> (Jimenez, 2006, June 1)
	“G’bye to the Rock? Feds may force Newfoundland mayor’s wife back to Cuba”	<i>Toronto Sun</i> (Godfrey, 2004, January 3).
	“His prayers unanswered: 79-year-old minister’s application to sponsor Chinese wife ignored for two years”	<i>Toronto Sun</i> (Godfrey, 2008, November 21).
	“‘My love for her is real’: Chinese bride denied entry”	<i>Toronto Sun</i> (Godfrey, 2009, August 12)

Main theme	Headline	Newspaper and Reference
Abuse	“She was the ticket to a better life”*	<i>Toronto Star</i> (Aulakh, 2009, January 31)
	“Marriage scam: Polish women forced to be sex slaves to bogus husbands”*	<i>Toronto Sun</i> (Godfrey, 2003, September 10)
	“Used ‘n’ abused: Polish Alliance rallies to help keep sex-exploited women in Canada”*	<i>Toronto Sun</i> (Godfrey, 2003, September 20)
	“Last illegal refuge of the brokenhearted: Thousands of women in immigration void as marriages to sponsors break down”	<i>Globe and Mail</i> (Armstrong, 2003, November 20)
	“Slain woman kept marriage concealed: What may have started as an act of kindness ended in her death by strangulation”*	<i>Globe and Mail</i> (Friesen, 2005, 23 February)
	“Cataloguing coercion, abuse: Researchers find mail-order brides often are victims of poverty, family pressure, and myths of Western affluence”	<i>National Post</i> (Bell, 2000, May 19)

*Coded as both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ in Table 4.1 due to elements of both problematization and sympathy.

One of the main topics associated with sympathetic coverage of marriage immigration related to the difficulties couples face in the sponsorship process. These articles typically addressed the plight of spouses trying to join each other or to remain together in Canada, and commonly made reference to bureaucratic ‘red tape’ that these couples were facing. An example of this type of coverage involves the Wu-Chen family. Articles on the Wu-Chen case discussed a pregnant woman’s (Chen’s) struggle to remain in Canada with her husband and ten-month-old son. The Wu-Chen’s dilemma was presented in the *Toronto Star* as follows:

Instead of looking forward to the New Year, the Wu-Chen family is dreading its arrival. In two weeks, Jin Ming Wu, a factory worker, will put his pregnant wife, Jaun Yun Chen, and 10-month-old son on a plane to China – with no idea of when he will see them next [...]. Chen, 28, who is three months pregnant, is being deported by the Canada Border Services Agency. This, despite the fact that her inland spousal

sponsorship application – which allows her to stay in the country while her immigration application is being processed – is still being reviewed. And even though she may be granted a stay in a matter of a few months, she won't be allowed to remain to find out (Javed, 2008, December 30).

Articles on the Wu-Chen case were clearly sympathetic towards the plight of this family. However, the sympathy seemed largely built around the 'Canadianness' of the woman's husband and young child, and the fact that that she was pregnant with a Canadian citizen's child. Indeed, the legitimacy of the Wu-Chen's sponsorship claim revolved around the Wu-Chen *family*, and relied heavily on the presence of children as 'proof' that the marriage was genuine. The articles on the Wu-Chen case reiterated the fact that Chen's husband, Jin Ming Wu, is a Canadian *citizen*, and emphasized that both her young son and unborn child are, by extension, 'Canadian.' This emphasis is illustrated by the headline, "Red tape tearing Toronto family apart: Application to stay in works, but mom with *Canadian* son being deported back to China" (Javed, 2008, December 30, italics added). Emphasizing that Chen's son is a Canadian citizen served to promote concern that a legitimate Canadian could be taken away from his country. Chen's pregnancy was highlighted in a subsequent article detailing the success of the Wu-Chen's sponsorship claim, as indicated by the headline, "Pregnant mom won't be deported" (Javed, 2009, January 13). The Canadian status of her family was again noted in this article:

The Star wrote about the red tape that has bogged down [Chen's] immigration application last month. Despite an inland application filed by her Canadian husband more than a month ago, she was slated for deportation by Canada Border Services Agency (Javed, 2009, January 13).

Coverage of the Wu-Chen family offers an interesting counterpoint to the broader coverage of Asian marriage immigrants, wherein culturally arranged marriages were problematized and presented as inauthentic. In contrast, the Wu-Chen's marriage, which was not arranged but, rather, was based on romantic love, was presented as genuine. This contradiction demonstrates the manner in which representations of marriage immigrants were embedded within broader uncertainty surrounding 'non-Canadian' practices. The recurring emphasis on Chen's husband's Canadian citizenship stands in clear contrast to the manner in which, as previously discussed, Asians sponsors were commonly described as 'immigrants,' without actual clarification of their status as Canadians citizens (born or naturalized) or former immigrants. Indeed, there was no indication in the articles whether Chen's husband was Canadian-born or previously came to Canada as an immigrant. It is also worth noting that the circumstances of their union might otherwise be seen as suspect. Chen originally came to Canada as an international student in 2002. She subsequently filed a refugee claim, which was denied, as were numerous appeals. In 2007 (at which time she was living in Canada without status), she married Wu, who submitted a sponsorship claim for Chen to remain in Canada as his spouse. What is thus interesting about the coverage of the Wu-Chen case is the fact that, in the presence of children, their marriage was portrayed as necessarily more valid than other instances of Asian marriage immigration. In this case, the ethnicity of the Wu-Chen family and the possibility of an inauthentic marriage was downplayed in the face of 'proof' that the Wu-Chens are a legitimate family. Overall, the Wu-Chen story demonstrates the fluid nature of the boundaries of immigrants' symbolic membership in the Canadian national community constructed through media

coverage. Specifically, visible minority sponsors were inconsistently and ambiguously presented as ‘immigrants’ and/or as ‘Canadians’ in cases where their international marriages were deemed suspect – typically, in cases of arranged marriages. In contrast, in the case of the Wu-Chens, whose marriage was deemed ‘legitimate’ by the media, the ‘Canadian’ status of the husband and the children were emphasized. In this way, the media discourse revealed tensions surrounding marriages between immigrants and ‘Canadians,’ and highlighted uncertainty surrounding marriage immigrants’ status as fraudulent schemers or as legitimate partners who deserve to be in Canada. This contrast reveals the struggle associated with defining the boundaries of national belonging in an era of international immigration and cultural diversity, wherein ‘non-Canadian’ practices generate uncertainty and facilitate suspicion of immigrants from non-traditional immigration source countries.

In other articles, the social standing of the Canadian sponsor emerged as the basis for sympathy surrounding marriage immigration. Importantly, the discourse surrounding these ‘legitimate’ Canadians stood in direct contrast to the previously discussed coverage of ‘immigrant’ Canadians, whose marriages were presented as suspicious and concerning. Interestingly, most of the sympathetic articles involving ‘legitimate’ Canadians operated to gender and racialize the marriage immigrants; in these examples, the immigrants were women whose status as legitimate partners was discursively placed in question. In contrast, the Canadian men were portrayed not as victims of would-be frauds, but as victims of an inept immigration system.

One example of this type of media coverage involved the case of Cec Stein. Stein, the mayor of a town in Newfoundland, was married to a Cuban woman who was

being directed to leave the country and reapply for spousal sponsorship from Cuba. According to Stein, who had been the mayor of Stephenville, Newfoundland for 14 years, immigration officials were attempting to paint his relationship as a marriage of convenience. His wife, whom he met while vacationing in Cuba, had been staying in Canada on a visitor's visa, which had been extended several times. She was being ordered to go back to Cuba out of her own free will or face deportation. The article emphasized Stein's standing in his community (including a mention of his city's \$8 million annual budget), and portrayed his marriage as a legitimate relationship that was being unfairly questioned by immigration officials. In the media coverage of Stein's case, very little attention was devoted to Stein's wife. She was thus silenced in the debate over her sponsorship, which was presented as a matter of negotiation between her Canadian husband and the state (see Godfrey, 2004, January 3). The only real detail offered about Stein's wife pertained to their age difference – Stein was 68 years old, his Cuban wife was 31. It is interesting that this age difference, involving an older man and a younger woman, was not highlighted as suspicious in the same manner as the previously discussed case involving an older woman and a younger man (see section 4.53 of the present chapter). This finding reveals an added dimension of gender, wherein an international marriage that followed expected trends (i.e., a younger woman from a less developed country marriage a older male of higher social status) was deemed less suspect than a marriage that defied these norms (i.e., a younger Muslim man marrying an older Canadian woman).

Another case similarly revealed how sympathy toward marriage immigrants pertained largely to the status of the Canadian partner. This case involved James De

Frederico (nicknamed Jimmy D, age 71) and his wife from the Philippines, Veronica Lopez (age 55). One article in particular, entitled “Jimmy D’s fight for love: Air Canada retiree seeks status for wife” (Godfrey, 2009, June 24) revealed the manner in which the sponsor’s symbolic membership in the Canadian national community rendered his marriage to an immigrant acceptable. This article discussed the couple’s two year struggle to obtain landed immigrant status for Lopez. The majority of the article, however, was dedicated toward recounting Jimmy D’s contacts with elite society members through his former job:

An Air Canada retiree who catered to former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau and the Queen Mother is worried he’ll die before his common-law wife is accepted as an immigrant in Canada (Godfrey, 2009, June 24).

De Frederico has dozens of photos of himself with celebrities and sports figures who travelled on the airline. He proudly displays photos of himself with Muhammad Ali and George Chuvalo. He met Walter Matthau, fried chicken king Col. Harland Sanders and John Diefenbaker (Godfrey, 2009, June 24).

Once again, the female marriage migrant was rendered largely irrelevant in favour of establishing her husband’s status, which served to imply that he deserved to be able to sponsor a wife in the pursuit of love. Indeed, very little was said about Jimmy D’s wife in this coverage. Rather, Jimmy D’s proven ‘legitimacy’ as a member of the Canadian nation emerged as the primary basis for sympathy and for precluding a claim of inauthentic marriage immigration.

In other cases, the status of Canadian sponsor served more directly as the basis for racializing marriage immigrants as foreign Others. In these instances, the underlying problematization and suspicion of international marriages was present, but was obscured by an overarching sympathetic tone. A good example of this type of coverage

is the *Toronto Sun* article entitled “His prayers unanswered: 79-year-old minister’s application to sponsor Chinese wife ignored for two years” (Godfrey, 2008, November 21). Notably, the opening line of the article reiterated the Canadian status of the male sponsor and the Chinese origin of his wife (the would-be immigrant):

A Scarborough minister says he’s been trying for more than two years to sponsor his Chinese-born wife to Canada and is hoping her case will be looked at before he dies (Godfrey, 2008, November 21).

The Chinese origin of the minister’s wife was repeated numerous times throughout the article. In contrast, the minister was specified as a “British-born Canadian citizen.” It is worth noting here how this characterization of the minister differs from the manner in which Canadian residents of Asian ethnic origins were often characterized as ‘immigrants,’ as discussed earlier in this chapter, without clarification of whether they were born in Canada or abroad.

Moreover, despite maintaining an overarching sympathetic tone, suspicion of the Chinese wife, Li Hua Han, was evident throughout the article. For instance, it was noted that she initially overstayed her visa and then met and married the minister, who is 21 years her senior. In addition, the only quote from Li has her stating: “I miss my two daughters and I want to bring them to Canada” (Godfrey, 2008, November 21). The article also quotes the couple’s immigration consultant as saying: “‘How much longer is this man going to live? [...] If he dies there will be no one to sponsor his wife in Canada.’” These details take on a clear discursive purpose when considered in reference to the findings of this chapter and the wider problematization of family-class immigration (as discussed in Chapters One and Three). Specifically, while avoiding direct claims of fraud or suspicion, the cross-cultural nature of the minister’s marriage,

particularly in light of the cited age difference, served to cast Li in a suspicious light, as did her stated interest in obtaining immigration status so that her daughters will be eligible to immigrate to Canada. However, the minister's status as a British-born Canadian seemed to preclude outright accusations that their relationship was inauthentic. Nevertheless, the coverage still hinted at the challenges associated with international marriages, and provided room for problematizing immigrants who seek to gain admission to Canada through marriage.

Overall, these articles illustrate how sympathetic coverage of marriage immigrants focused on the status of the *sponsor* (the Canadian), presented as legitimate members of the Canadian national community and thus as deserving of love and respect. The treatment of migrant spouses, in contrast, subtly drew upon gendered stereotypes in ways that either conjured additional sympathy or generated suspicion. In cases of cross-cultural marriages, women marriage immigrants were indirectly presented as potential frauds through a sub-text of suspicion. In contrast, in the case of the Wu-Chen family, sympathy was derived from the fact that the marriage was *not* cross-cultural, and the fact that the would-be immigrant could be viewed as a nurturer – a pregnant wife and a mother of a young child. In this way, the boundaries of national belonging were inconsistently drawn, with the positioning of marriage immigrants in social space dependent on gendered and racialized imaginings of legitimate marital unions.

4.55 Sympathetic Coverage: Sponsorship and Domestic Abuse

Approximately 15% of the articles categorized as sympathetic dealt in some way with the victimization of women marriage immigrants. These articles recounted experiences of physical and sexual abuse, and even murder. Many of these articles were highly contradictory in tone, containing distinct elements of sympathy, yet simultaneously portraying marriage immigration as inherently problematic. Once again, this problematization commonly revolved around the ethnic/cultural ‘difference’ of marriage immigrants.

One example of this type of article involved the story of Amandeep Kaur Dhillon. Amandeep, a 22-year old woman who immigrated to Canada from India through an arranged marriage, and was allegedly murdered by her father-in-law (Aulakh, 2009, December 26; 2009, January 31; 2009, January 11; O’Toole, 2009, January 7):

Amandeep’s family has been left grieving with few answers. The slaying has also shaken the South Asian community and again raised concerns about the lack of social support for immigrant women, particularly young brides who leave their home and family behind, to live with another family they hardly know. Some endure a life of isolation and extreme hardship, with the hope that their family – which has invested heavily in dowry money – will one day join them in Canada (Aulakh, 2009, January 31).

The executive director of the Punjabi Community Health Centre in Brampton says hundreds of young Punjabi brides arrive in Canada every year. Many have arranged marriages. “They don’t know anyone, don’t have any support system and battle pressures most people can’t even imagine exist,” he said. [...] Some women are so isolated that they are not allowed to have communication even with their parents. [...] In some cases women, bruised and beaten, have been locked up in their homes, not allowed to make or receive any calls (Aulakh, 2009, January 31).

Despite clearly presenting Amandeep's story as a tragedy and documenting the hardship her death has caused her family, the media coverage effectively portrayed arranged marriages as potentially dangerous for South Asian women. In this way, Amandeep's death was directly attributed to her 'non-Canadian' culture, with Amandeep emerging as a victim of an unreasonable cultural system. Amandeep's victimization, and the broader victimization of South Asian female marriage immigrants in general, thus served as a means of problematizing arranged marriages and South Asian cultural practices. By attributing blame for Amandeep's murder to her culturally arranged marriage, the South Asian community in Canada was constructed as not truly 'Canadian,' thereby effectively marginalized with respect to the Canadian national community.

Other articles similarly retained a highly sympathetic tone while highlighting the potential for domestic abuse associated with marriage immigration. For instance, a series of articles discussed a group of Polish women who came to Canada as visitors, overstayed their visas, and subsequently paid Canadian men to marry them and sponsor their continued residence in the country:

Eva Nowak is 21, attractive, and will do just about anything to stay in Canada, even if it means marrying a man she's only known for five weeks. Her hubby, Tony, 27, was found working in Kitchener by a marriage broker who knew Nowak and three of her girlfriends were searching for husbands to sponsor them so they could remain in Canada. The women, all illegally in Canada from Poland, will pay their Canadian citizen husbands up to \$15,000 each for the marriage and sponsorship. Though they won't live together, community leaders say the women are used as sex slaves by the men (Godfrey, 2003, September 20).

Hundreds of Polish women living in the country illegally are being fleeced for up to \$15,000 each by Canadian men in a phony marriage scheme that often ends up in their being deported, says the country's largest Polish group [the Polish Alliance]. Alliance spokesman Ted

Lojko said many of the women end up being sexually assaulted by men they pay to marry so they can be sponsored here (Godfrey, 2003, September 10).

In this case, marriage immigration was presented as problematic from several different angles. First, the possibility that illegal migrants could remain in the country through paid marriages of convenience served to present spousal sponsorship as a problematic immigration program, and instilled doubt surrounding the veracity of marriages between Canadians and immigrants. Second, the Polish women, although portrayed as victims, were also presented as willing participants in their victimization and thus as sharing in the blame for their own situation. Indeed, this point was highlighted in the articles:

Federal immigration officials say there's little they can do to help Polish women who are here illegally. "Appropriate action will be taken against those who are in violation of the immigration act," spokesman Rejean Cantlon says. "We will take action when it comes to our attention" (Godfrey, 2003, September 20).

In this instance, the women's abuse of the immigration system, and not the abuse they experienced at the hands of their sponsors, was presented as the foremost issue of concern. In other words, marriage immigrants were still identified as the problem requiring attention, regardless of their circumstances or the hardships they were facing. Finally, these articles simultaneously represented the women's Canadian male partners as abusers of women, and as possible abusers of the Canadian immigration system (through their involvement in marriages of convenience). Indeed, these articles represent the most obvious instance in which Canadians were described in the media coverage in clearly negative terms. These portrayals of Canadian men served to highlight core values of Canadian society that help define the boundaries of national

belonging. In this instance, partner violence, sexual abuse, and willing participation in defrauding the immigration system render even 'Canadians' less desirable members of the Canadian nation. To this end, general sympathy toward marriage immigrants facing abuse co-occurred with the problematization of both these immigrants and their Canadian counterparts. As such, although the insider/outsider status of the involved parties was not entirely clear-cut, marriages between Canadians and immigrants were nevertheless cast in a concerning light.

4.6 Conclusion

In considering this chapter's findings, it is important to contemplate both what the media discourse accomplishes, as well as what it obscures. It is also important to locate this coverage within current controversies surrounding the Canadian immigration system. In the media coverage of marriage immigration, a very specific picture of these immigrants was painted – they are frauds, criminals, and deviants. They victimize Canadians and take advantage of the Canadian social system. They skirt Canadian immigration regulations to the end of hindering the entry of deserving and contributing immigrants (i.e., economic immigrants). Indeed, marriage immigrants were symbolically devalued, and were constructed as necessarily less valuable than economic immigrants. The possible contributions of marriage immigrants to Canadian society as wives, mothers, and workers never entered the scope of the media coverage. In this way, the broader assumptions that marriage immigrants (and family-class immigrants in general) are unskilled and do not contribute to the economic well-being of the nation was upheld. Bureaucratic classifications were reified, with marriage immigrants being

located in their roles as spouses without acknowledgement of the fact that they can be productive members of Canadian society, economically or otherwise. The media coverage thus produced a highly biased image of marriage immigrants. These representations served as the basis for articulating tangible doubt over the possibility of genuine marriages between immigrants and Canadians, and implied that marriage immigrants are not deserving members of the Canadian nation. Moreover, migratory pressures associated with globalization and international inequalities were also largely left of the picture. In this way, the broader context of international migration was ignored, and national self-interest in protecting Canadian social space took centre stage.

It is also relevant that the media discourse was overwhelmingly one-sided, often emerging out of the voices of Canadians alleging to be victims of marriage fraud. As a consequence, claims of marriage fraud were presented as a fact rather than as one partner's perspective on a failed personal relationship. This coverage also largely denied the possibility that Canadian sponsors may have failed to live up to their obligations toward sponsored partners, and that sponsors' claims of being defrauded may not be accurate. The fact that Canadian 'insiders' were constructed as victims of immigrants in cases of relationship failure demonstrates the symbolic exclusion that persons defined as immigrants tend to face. This conclusion is further supported by the finding that sponsorship breakdown was typically discussed in terms of its impact on Canadian sponsors or Canadian taxpayers, but never in terms of its potential detrimental impact on immigrants. All of these absences acted to silence marriage immigrants, including those who have successfully formed families in Canada, as well as those who may have

been unsuccessful in their pursuit of this goal but, in reality, are not immigration or marriage frauds.

In addition, the media discourse on marriage immigrants contributed to the broader problematization of family-class immigrants beyond just spouses. Insofar as marriage immigrants were constructed as frauds, deviants, and criminals, then family-class immigration, in general, was problematized. Concern over family-class immigration also emerged through the media's portrayal of inauthentic marriage migration as a stepping stone for further family-class sponsorship. Tied into this representation was the suggestion that these migrants might take advantage of Canadian social programs upon their arrival. In this regard, negative media portrayals of marriage immigrants were not isolated from other dominant discourses, but reflected and upheld broader negative views of family-class immigration (as discussed in Chapters One and Three). As such, family-class immigrants beyond just spouses were marginalized to Canada's imagined community through media discourse surrounding marriage immigration.

Overall, the media's coverage of marriage immigration reveals tensions relating to ethnic/cultural diversity and the state's ability to protect Canadian borders in the contemporary era of international immigration. By constructing international marriage migration as inherently problematic and inauthentic, the media discourse served as a cautionary tale surrounding international marriages, implicitly discouraging 'insiders' in the Canadian nation from marrying 'outsiders.' In doing so, marriage immigration served as the basis for marginalizing immigrants from non-European origins (most notably, Asia), and for questioning marriages that defy Canadian norms. By portraying

marriage immigration as an easy route for undeserved immigrants to gain access to the country, the media discourse can also be interpreted as legitimizing extensive scrutiny of spousal sponsorship and for justifying current efforts to impose further restrictions on marriage immigration (discussed at the beginning of this chapter). In examining sponsorship applications, Canadian immigration officers already hold the right to verify personal documents (such as phone records), conduct site visits, demand invasive proof of the veracity of spousal relationships, and ultimately deny the legitimacy of a union. This process holds the default assumption that international marriages are questionable and that immigrants arriving in Canada through marriage are disingenuous in their intentions. Indeed, as addressed in the analysis, the nature of the spousal sponsorship agreement is indicative of the skepticism surrounding international marriages and their associated migrations. In this context, the possibility that marriage immigration may become even more rigidly controlled by the Canadian state bears dangerous implications for migrants' rights and the rights of Canadian sponsors.

Admittedly, a direct link between the media discourse discussed in this chapter and the current policy agenda cannot be empirically established here. Nevertheless, it is significant that the predominant focus of media coverage on marriage immigration over the past decade pertained to marriage fraud and marriages of convenience, and that these concerns are presently at the heart of Canadian family-class immigration reform. At the very least, the media discourse provides a climate conducive to suspicion of marriage immigrants, international marriages, culturally arranged marriages, and family-class sponsorship, while obscuring the possibility that marriage immigrants might be 'good,' contributing, valuable members of Canadian society. In this way, these

immigrants were clearly positioned on the margins of Canada's national community, at best. Indeed, in the imagining of the Canadian national community that emerged from media discourse on marriage immigrants, this group simply did not belong. As explained in one *Toronto Sun* article on marriage immigration, "There are some true love stories out there...but they're few and far between" (Godfrey, 2003, September 20).

CHAPTER FIVE: IMMIGRATION POLICY DISCOURSE

“Liberal principles are the very language and conceptual framework through which intolerance and exclusion are enabled, reinforced, defined and defended” (Mackey, cited in Henry et al., 2000: 25).

5.0 Introduction

Chapter Four of this thesis documented controversies and tensions surrounding marriage immigrants in Canada, and revealed gendered and racialized portrayals of this group in the Canadian news media. The present chapter steps back to consider the broader immigrant population in a different discursive setting – the policy arena.

Since Canada’s first *Immigration Act* in 1869, immigration policy has represented a source of public and political contention in Canada. Politicians, experts, and diverse interest groups commonly dispute the costs and benefits of immigration to the Canadian nation, and grapple with how immigration policy should be structured so as to maximize the benefits of the immigration program. These debates arouse deep-seated passions on both sides, involving diverging views about the impact of immigration on Canada’s national economy and the implications of immigration for Canadian society. Importantly, controversies surrounding immigration are often intertwined with the question of ‘race.’ Population diversity is widely attributed to the increase in immigration from non-European source countries, such that opposition to large-scale immigration is often interpreted by both immigrant advocates and scholars as evidence of racial intolerance (see Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Li, 2007, 2003c, 2001; Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007; Thobani, 2001a, 2001b). This matter is particularly relevant in light of the inherent incompatibility between discrimination and the liberal democratic values that purportedly define the Canadian nation.

A useful illustration of the complexity of the immigration policy ‘question’ and its intersection with the ‘race question’ is provided by two recent events in Ontario, Canada. The first incident relates to the 2010 mayoral race in Toronto, Ontario. During a televised debate in August 2010, when answering a question about Tamil migrants, mayoral front-runner Rob Ford noted that, in a “perfect world,” Toronto would not become home to any more immigrants, further stating that: “We can’t even deal with the 2.5 million people in this city. I think it’s more important to take care of the people here now before we start bringing in more people” (Alcoba, 2010, August 18). Immediately after the debate, Ford was put on the defensive about his comments, and faced widespread claims of racism and intolerance. His opponents demanded that he withdraw from the race in light of his ‘racist’ statements. Yet, media reports confirmed that Ford’s position on immigration policy was not unique:

Almost half of people who say they’d vote for Rob Ford also have qualms about welcoming new Canadians to Toronto. A Nanos poll done for The Globe, CTV and CP24 found 48.8 per cent of Ford supporters either disagree or somewhat disagree with the statement “Toronto would benefit from welcoming more new Canadians to the city.” By comparison, 32 per cent of the broader Torontonionian population felt the same way (“Almost half of Ford supporters...,” *Globe and Mail*, 2010, September 21).

Media outlets jumped on Ford’s comments, keeping the connection between immigrants, racism, and immigration policy directly in the public eye for months to come (e.g., Balkissoon, 2010, August 17; Doolittle, 2010, August 18; Lilley, 2010, September 28; Wente, 2010, October 7).

Just over a month after Ford’s comments, an unrelated occurrence in Ottawa – the launch of the Centre for Immigration Policy Reform on Parliament Hill on September 28, 2010 – highlighted many of the same issues sparked by the Ford

controversy. The organization, headed by Martin Collacott (former ambassador to Sri Lanka, Syria, Lebanon, and Cambodia), James Bissett (former director-general of the Canadian Immigration Services), and Derek Burney (former ambassador to the U.S.), emerged out of concern that Canada admits too many immigrants. In introducing the Centre, the co-founders claimed that current immigration levels entail excessive government expenditures, higher houses costs, pollution, and crowding in large urban centres.³¹ According to Burney, “the [immigration] system is broken...there’s too much abuse, too much fraud, and no rhyme or reason about what we’re doing. It’s just a numbers game” (Wente, 2010, October 7). In establishing the Centre, Burney and his co-founders further argued that honest debate over immigration in Canada is precluded by politicians’ concern about losing the ‘immigrant vote,’ alongside broader social fears of appearing racist: “Canadian society, [Burney] said, needs to stop treating immigration as an untouchable ‘third rail’ that can’t be debated without prompting allegations of bigotry” (<http://www.cireport.ca/2010/09/centre-for-immigration-policy-reform.html>). Indeed, opponents of the Centre were quick to contend that the founders’ anti-immigration sentiments were evidence of their racial intolerance:

[The founders of the Centre for Immigration Policy Reform] think our immigration policies could be better. The NDP immediately attacked them for being “un-Canadian.” One immigration lawyer called the group a bunch of grumpy old white men who’d be hard to take seriously “were it not for their ability to fan the flames of intolerance” (Wente, 2010, October 7).

These examples highlight the two interrelated issues that lie at the heart of this chapter.

The first pertains to state legitimacy in the face of controversies surrounding

³¹ See <http://www.cireport.ca/2010/09/centre-for-immigration-policy-reform.html>; see also <http://www.immigrationreform.ca/>

immigration policy, while the second concerns the questions of ‘race’ and racism relating to contemporary immigration in Canada. Indeed, as the above examples demonstrate, immigration policy is mired in controversies that are often directly linked to the questions of ‘race’ and racism, and that simultaneously bring the activities of the immigration department into question. It is in this social and political milieu that the present chapter is located. The chapter draws together two conceptual frameworks – one on state legitimacy and another on “democratic racism” (Henry et al., 2000) – to offer a critical qualitative analysis of Canadian immigration policy discourse.

Importantly, much of the existing literature on recent Canadian immigration policy comments on the underlying racist (as well as sexist) biases of immigration policy, and claims that these biases are obscured by neo-liberal discourses of skill and the rhetoric of multiculturalism (see, for instance, Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Li, 2003b, 2003c, 2001; Oxman-Martinez et al., 2001; Thobani, 2007, 2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999). This work often quotes specific policy statements as evidence of racism and/or racialization. However, it is the contention here that the existing literature does not offer a comprehensive assessment of immigration policy discourse that is sufficiently located within the specific social and political contexts within which the discourse is articulated. In other words, policy discourse is typically addressed as evidence of discriminatory policy, and thus as indicative of structural ‘racism,’ but is not itself addressed as a social phenomenon that serves a distinct purpose. Moreover, policy discourse is typically not examined through a comprehensive analysis that examines both the content of the discourse and the social purpose that it serves. The present chapter offers such an analysis, and simultaneously advances a conceptual critique of

Henry et al.'s (2000) framework of 'democratic racism.' Democratic racism is commonly used to describe the 'new' racism of contemporary liberal societies, involving the use of discourse to obscure underlying racist attitudes and practices. The ideas associated with this framework are commonly used in the immigration literature. Yet, the sociological utility of the democratic racism framework has not *itself* been critically evaluated through a comprehensive application. Also, given the above discussion surrounding the politics of immigration policy in Canada, the present chapter views a theoretical affinity between democratic racism and state legitimacy that deserves focused attention.

The chapter begins by outlining the conceptual framework for the upcoming analysis, addressing notions of legitimacy and democratic racism. The chapter then proceeds to review existing research on immigration policy discourse in Canada and beyond. Next, the chapter provides a critical analysis of Canadian immigration policy discourse, organized in terms of Henry et al.'s (2000) democratic racism framework, and interpreted in reference to the state's quest for legitimacy. Materials for this analysis consist of CIC reports published over the past 16 years (discussed in Section 5.4 of this chapter). Based on this analysis, the present chapter advances two interrelated arguments. First, it is argued that the Canadian state department responsible for immigration (Citizenship and Immigration Canada – CIC) deploys discourses associated with democratic racism (labeled 'discourses of dominance') as part of a concerted, ongoing effort to demonstrate the legitimacy of its activities. Thus, in a social and political context of controversies surrounding immigration, the state engages in self-legitimizing communications in which it attempts to appeal to a wide variety of

interest groups and stakeholders (including, for instance, Canadian citizens and permanent residents, potential migrants and newcomers to Canada, NGOs, corporate Canada, other governments around the world, various international players, etc.). The discourses of dominance commonly associated with democratic racism are a key means by which this legitimacy is sought. However, the analysis also illustrates that these discourses are not strictly discourses about 'race' that can be interpreted in terms of 'racism.' To this end, the second main argument advanced in the present chapter pertains to the sociological usefulness of democratic racism as a conceptual framework. In documenting the manner in which so-called discourses of dominance serve the state's quest for legitimacy, the chapter contends that democratic racism is a limited conceptual tool that risks reifying race and racism. The chapter demonstrates that the framework of democratic racism is not entirely without merit, but is arguably too broadly conceptualized, and is problematic for its tendency to equate racialization with 'racism.' Moreover, it is argued that the democratic racism framework is limited by its tendency to reduce discrimination to 'race,' thereby precluding a consideration of other potential dimensions of discrimination (such as gender and social class) and ignoring the manner in which various dimensions of discrimination intersect. By applying discourses associated with the democratic racism framework to an examination of immigration policy discourse, the present chapter is able to highlight the dimensions of this framework that are sociologically useful, while simultaneously illustrating the framework's limitations.

5.1 The Contemporary State and the Quest for Legitimacy

Legitimacy, which “pertains to how power may be used in ways that citizens consciously accept” (Gilley, 2006: 499), is a critical component of effective governance. A state is perceived as more legitimate to the extent that relevant people and groups view the state as having the rightful will to execute political power and direct policy activities (Gilley, 2006). In pre-modern societies, the legitimacy of authority derived from metaphysical sources such as holiness, providence, or divine rights. However, the growing rationality of modern societies brought with it a rejection of divine authority in favour of the authority of reason, the latter of which involves rational legitimacy. In this context, governance is largely legitimized through communicative processes that employ principles of reasoning and rational deliberation (that is, rational discourse) (Habermas, 1984; Weber, 1968). Under the authority of reason, state legitimacy can only be generated through normative discourses, wherein the arguments advanced and the decisions made will, in principle, receive a maximum degree of consent and a minimal degree of dissent (Steffek, 2003). In other words, state legitimacy in contemporary contexts depends on discourses that render state activities an obvious, rational choice to as many stakeholders as possible.

The notion of rational legitimacy has been most extensively elaborated upon by Jürgen Habermas in his theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984). For Habermas, legitimate governance emerges from rational exchanges of arguments and eventual arrival at agreed-upon conclusions. Logically, in a contemporary country such as Canada, it is not possible for all possible stakeholders to engage in such processes of deliberation. In this context, legitimacy depends not on an *actual* consensus, but on a

rational, normative conclusion that can be articulated as a reasonable justification, adhering to valid and established norms (see Habermas, 1984). Rational legitimacy is thus achieved by advancing arguments that are generalizable and impersonal – in other words, given a particular social context, reasonable people who are familiar with the existing social conditions could be expected to support the logic underlying the state’s perspective, even if they do not agree with the perspective *per se*. It is this element of rationality upon which state legitimacy in contemporary contexts depends. Arguably, in a contemporary liberal democracy, this legitimacy relies, at least in part, on the articulation of state goals and activities as democratic, fair, and reasonable endeavours. It is in this context that the theoretical affinity between the notions of state legitimacy and democratic racism becomes apparent.

5.2 Democratic Racism

In liberal democratic contexts, the principles of equality, justice, and non-discrimination are social norms, as well as institutionalized expectations encoded in law. Under such conditions, overt expressions of discrimination, such as racism or sexism, are seen as inappropriate in public discussions. This issue has primarily been addressed in terms of ‘race’ and ethnicity on the basis of what Henry et al. (2000) term democratic racism (see also Henry & Tator, 2002, 2000).³² Henry et al. (2000) argue that contemporary racism does not necessarily entail references to inherent biological difference or inferiority. In other words, terms such as ‘race’ or references to skin colour need not be

³² See also theoretical discussions of ‘new racisms’ by Barker (1981) and Rex (1983), and Sears’ (1988) discussion of ‘symbolic racism.’ See also Simmons’ (1998) discussion of the possible racist outcomes of ‘non-racist’ immigration policies.

mentioned for racism to be expressed. Instead, new forms of racism are elusive, articulated in subtle ways through democratic modes of representation and communication. Democratic racism can be understood as:

...an ideology in which two conflicting sets of values are made congruent to each other. Commitments to democratic principles such as justice, equality, and fairness conflict but co-exist with attitudes and behaviours that include negative feelings about minority groups, differential treatment, and discrimination against them (Henry et al., 2000: 23).

According to the authors, democratic racism can be addressed in terms of discourses of dominance, which operate upon racist myths and unexamined assumptions. In other words, discrimination is obscured through discourses of dominance that render racism invisible and/or acceptable. These discourses include: (1) the discourse of binary polarization; (2) the discourse of national identity; (3) the discourse of multiculturalism; and (4) the discourse of moral panic, among others.³³ These discourses can be understood as follows:

(1) *The discourse of binary polarization*: This discourse involves the fragmentation of social groups into racialized contingents of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (i.e., a Self and an Other), often in implicit and subtle ways. This fragmentation most commonly involves references to cultural differences that serve to dichotomize majority/minority groups in normative evaluations. As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, the process

³³ The present chapter focuses on these four discourses because they were the only discourses of dominance that emerged in the analysis of this chapter’s data, and are used to organize the results section. The remaining discourses of dominance through which democratic racism is purportedly expressed include: (1) the discourse of denial; (2) the discourse of colour blindness; (3) the discourse of equal opportunity; (4) the discourse of blaming the victim; (5) the discourse of white victimization; and (6) the discourse of liberal values. See Henry and Tator (2000) for a complete discussion of these other discourses.

of Othering is theorized as being central to definitions of national imagined communities.

(2) *The discourse of national identity*: According to Henry et al. (2000), the quest for national identity is at the heart of various dominant discourses in Canada. Messages about national identity tend to democratically erase and silence the contributions of ethno-racial minorities to the Canadian nation, often through the ‘myth’ that Canada was established by two founding nations (English and French). These silences act as “the vehicles through which inequalities and imbalances are legitimized” (Henry et al., 2000: 31).

(3) *The discourse of multiculturalism*: In this discourse, concepts of tolerance, accommodation, harmony, and diversity are emphasized. According to Henry et al. (2000), however, underlying these notions is an inherent element of racist Othering and the implication that “while one must accept the idiosyncrasies of the ‘others’ ... the dominant way is superior” (Henry et al., 2000: 30).

(4) *The discourse of moral panic*: This discourse draws on an underlying climate of uncertainty, fear, and threat associated with economic, political, and social destabilization and dislocation to convey racist beliefs and concerns (see also Henry & Tator, 2002; Husband, 1994).

For Henry et al. (2000), discourses of binary polarization, national identity, multiculturalism, and moral panic represent some of the main ways in which racism is expressed and obscured in contemporary democratic societies. In other words, discursive articulations associated with these discourses obscure the reality of racism, and themselves act as subtle or invisible expressions of racism.

The present chapter takes issue with the fact that the democratic racism framework identifies a broad range of expressions and actions as ‘racist,’ to the point of locating racism where, arguably, it may or may not exist. By depending on highly subtle, implicit, and often invisible references to race, the framework thus walks a thin line between *identifying* racism and *constructing* racism. Notably, Henry et al.’s (2000) framework was not specifically developed in reference to either state discourse or immigration. However, there is a logical connection between the framework of democratic racism, considerations of state discourse on immigration, and, drawing in the second theoretical dimension of this chapter, the state’s quest for legitimacy. The first point of relevance here is the fact that immigration stimulates questions about a nation’s cultural values and identity (Simmons, 1999). Second, in liberal democratic contexts, explicit discrimination or appearance of undemocratic principles in state discourse could undermine the perceived legitimacy of the state. Given this context, it is logical to infer that, insofar as discrimination is expressed or obscured in state discourse, it would occur in a ‘democratic’ fashion. An examination of immigration policy discourse in reference to state legitimacy thus offers a fruitful avenue for critically evaluating the democratic racism framework.

5.3 Previous Research

The existing literature on Canadian immigration policy discourse is typically not presented directly within frameworks of legitimacy and/or democratic racism, with only a few exceptions (e.g., Simmons & Keohane, 1992 on legitimacy; Li, 2007 on democratic racism). Despite the fact that legitimacy and democratic racism seem to

underlie much of the literature on discriminatory immigration policy and practices, these two issues are rarely at the centre of analysis, nor are the two frameworks addressed concurrently. Moreover, the Canadian literature draws on highly selective evidence of immigration policy discourse, focusing either on a particular policy event (e.g., Abu-Laban, 1998a; Thobani, 2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999) or relying on a small selection of policy documents as evidence of the racial subtext of discourse (see Li, 2007, 2001). Outside of the Canadian context, much of the literature on immigration and democratic racism focuses closely on discursive expressions of racism without taking a critical approach to the application of the democratic racism framework, and without an eye to the broader purpose that this discourse serves. The present section briefly reviews this literature in order to highlight its contributions and its gaps, both of which inform the upcoming analysis.

With respect to state legitimacy, Simmons and Keohane (1992) offer a useful interpretation of debates over Canadian immigration and refugee policy. Their analysis speaks directly to the state's pursuit of legitimacy through communication strategies. According to Simmons and Keohane (1992) (see also Simmons, 1994), the Canadian immigration policy landscape changed in 1989, when economic transformations associated with globalization and the subsequent responses to these changes by various institutional actors (including labour, capital, ethnic communities, human rights groups, and the provinces) brought about new concerns, agendas, and points of contention with which the Canadian state had to grapple. It was in this social context that the state introduced refugee bills (C-55 and C-84) in an effort to better control refugee flow, and engaged in consultations in developing the immigration plan for 1990-1995. Simmons

and Keohane's (1992) research approach was two-fold. First, they identified the key players who sought to influence immigration policy and determined, of these actors, whose interests were ultimately reflected in policy outcomes. Second, they considered state actors' management of communications in the policy formation process. Based on interviews with key informants and observations of consultations on policy reform, Simmons and Keohane (1992) argue that, in developing immigration and refugee policy at that time, the state operated on the basis of three general interests: (1) the perpetuation of economic security; (2) the pursuit of a rational-bureaucratic agenda; and, overarching and dependent on these previous two endeavours, (3) the quest for continued legitimacy. Simmons and Keohane (1992) also specifically demonstrate that the state engaged in a concerted effort to manage the communication process associated with policy formation so as to undercut opposition and establish the legitimacy of its own agenda. The authors comment that:

In the period studied, the state's awareness of potential threats to legitimacy led to a general nervousness and anxiety among the key state actors. Power was used to override opposition only when the support for opposing groups was weak or could be undermined. Otherwise, the state consulted and sought policy outcomes which would reinforce its legitimacy, while allowing it to also achieve economic and rational planning objectives (Simmons & Keohane, 1992: 445).

Simmons and Keohane's (1992) work is relevant here for highlighting the centrality of legitimacy to state communications surrounding immigration policy. Importantly, Simmons and Keohane (1992) mention the widespread anti-immigration sentiment in Canadian society, and the possible racist backlash against immigration and refugee policy. However, the authors did not evaluate the content of state communications in reference to racism *per se*. Rather, racism was merely acknowledged as a potential issue

that state actors keep in mind when attempting to establish and manage immigration policy.

In contrast, other literature on the politics of Canadian immigration policy largely ignores the issue of state legitimacy, focusing instead on the discriminatory nature of contemporary policy and subtle race-based expressions of anti-immigrant sentiment in public and policy discourse. For instance, Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b) and Thobani (2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999) have widely addressed the restructuring of Canada's immigration program during the 1990s (i.e., the Immigration Policy Review – IPR; see Chapter Three). The IPR was presented in public and political domains as a process that would include members of the Canadian general population as key contributors to policy change via widespread consultations across the country. The extent to which this public consultation process can be considered democratic, however, has been challenged by Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b) and Thobani (2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999), in light of the fact that the agenda for discussion was already set by a select panel of state actors. Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b) and Thobani (2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999) claim that the predetermination of the discussion topics enabled the state to present *its* agenda back onto the public as if it came from 'Canadian society' rather than state actors (Thobani, 2000a, 2000b). Although these authors did not interpret this process directly in terms of state legitimacy, their findings speak to the state's need to appear democratic, while simultaneously managing the immigration program according to its own agenda.

Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b) and Thobani (2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999) have further documented the various ways in which racist (and sexist) biases in the

immigration system were obscured and/or expressed in democratic ways during the IPR and beyond. Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b), for instance, specifically contends that discourses of skill and integration³⁴ operate in a neo-liberal context as democratic ways of obscuring discrimination in the Canadian immigration system. The author comments that discourses of inclusion, equality and justice hide the fact that the Canadian immigration system remains inherently discriminatory: “While the still unfolding liberal policy reproduces the class, gender and race biases of post 1967/Policy Era Two it nevertheless re-asserts these biases in the context of a productivist emphasis on the ‘economic worth’ and ‘self-sufficiency’ of immigrants” (Abu-Laban, 1998b: 205). Thobani (2000a, 2000b) similarly argues that racist and sexist biases are a prominent driving force behind immigration policy. For Thobani, these biases are obscured through neutral discourses that facilitate the marginalization of immigrants arriving from non-European sources (as well as men and women of colour, regardless of their immigration status). For instance, according to Thobani (2000a), the ‘legitimate’ problematization of family class immigrants (the majority of whom are women, with a large proportion from non-traditional immigration source countries) is actually a manifestation of racism and sexism. However, by framing these biases in terms of the burden associated with family-class immigrants, racism and sexism are obscured and discrimination is rendered palatable to the Canadian public. Thobani (2000b) further concludes that the prioritization of economic goals and the problematization of family-

³⁴ The term ‘integration’ is widely used in Canadian immigration discourses to refer to the optimal outcome for newcomers in Canadian society. The precise meaning and subtext of this term, however, is widely debated, with some critical immigration scholars contending that ‘integration’ is used as a ‘politically correct’ way of suggesting that the cultural specificities of some ethnic groups serve as impediments to their full participation in Canadian society. See Abu-Laban (1998b) and Li (2003b) for a discussion of this issue.

class immigration in documents associated with the IPR acted to "... define *immigrant* women as requiring increased control and management. The problems with both the 'quality' and 'costs' of immigration thus become inscribed, quite literally, on the bodies of *immigrant* women" (Thobani, 2000b: 307; italics in original).

While Abu-Laban's (1998a, 1998b) and Thobani's (2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999) work implicitly draws on the notion of 'democratic racism,' this framework has been most pointedly been addressed in the Canadian immigration context by Peter Li. Li (2007, 2003c, 2001) argues that academic, media, and policy discourses all construct immigrants in opposition to 'real Canadians' based on implied, immutable 'racial' differences (see Li, 2007, 2003c, 2001). These constructions, however, are subtle, occurring in such a way so as not to disrupt the normative conventions of liberal democracy. For instance, Li argues that concepts such as 'diversity' and 'cultural difference' represent coded references to race. He further argues that academic research facilitates these formulations by developing "pseudo-scientific constructs" (Li, 2001: 92) that allow for masked race-based evaluations without appearing undemocratic. To this end:

The stakeholders of the immigration discourse – academics, journalists, pollsters, policy-makers, and individual citizens – participate in the construction of a racial subtext that ultimately transforms the racial messages into "valid concerns" and "scientific findings," and transforms what would otherwise be unacceptably racially based opinions into acceptable voices in a legitimate public debate (Li, 2001: 92).

Legitimacy, in this context, refers to the fact that 'racial' concerns become rearticulated as acceptable social concerns; the extent to which this occurs in state discourse in direct service of state legitimacy, however, is not addressed by Li. Nevertheless, in reference to state discourse, Li (2003c) contends that the commitment to diversity and

multiculturalism running through policy statements obscures underlying racist messages that conformity to normative 'Canadian' values and standards is the desirable outcome for immigrants. For Li, the subtext of policy discourse thus discriminates against racialized immigrants and visible ethnic minorities by underscoring that their norms, values, and behaviours are 'non-Canadian,' and act as impediments to their integration into Canadian society.

Research outside the Canadian context has also addressed discursive forms of discrimination and Othering in the context of immigration. This work predominantly focuses on the specific discursive manifestations of racism in political talk and policy discourse. In this literature, however, the focus is on how racism is expressed in democratic ways, without a deeper appreciation of the legitimation purpose that this discourse serves in the arena of immigration politics. For instance, in work specifically focusing on parliamentary debates in Britain, France, and the U.S., van Dijk (2002, 1997, 1993a, 1992) has documented the widespread use of positive self-representations and negative Other-representations in debates over immigration and ethnic relations. According to van Dijk (2002, 1997, 1993a, 1992), political speakers in British, French, and American parliamentary debates commonly invoke representations of national self-glorification, involving repeated references to national values of tolerance and democracy while espousing the threats associated with immigration. The author notes that positive representations of 'insiders' are consistently intertwined with negative representations of immigrants and ethnic minorities, and discrimination is obscured through explicit disclaimers of non-racism and articulations of commitment to humanism and equality. Similar findings were reported by Every and Augoustinos

(2007), who examined constructions of racism in Australian parliamentary debates on asylum-seekers. These authors point out that invoking nationalist discourses and making references to ‘cultural’ (rather than ‘racial’) difference conveys racist sentiment without appearing ‘racist,’ thereby rendering the problematization of racialized Others more socially acceptable.

Similarly, both Capdevila and Callaghan (2008) and Van der Valk (2003) have documented the ways in which immigrants are racially discriminated against in political discourse in ‘democratic’ ways. Capdevila and Callaghan (2008) specifically examined a campaign speech given by the leader of the opposition party (Michael Howard) during the 2005 British elections, while Van der Valk (2003) focused on the UDF/RPR’s discourse in parliamentary during the 1997 election campaign in France. According to the authors, in both national contexts, discriminatory biases were articulated without references to ‘race’ or contravention of democratic norms. For instance, immigrants were racialized through references to this group’s ‘cultural difference’ and the challenges associated with their integration into host societies. Racial problematization of immigrants emerged through nativist and nationalist discourses on the immigrant ‘problem.’ Immigrants were constructed, on the one hand, as a threat to the physical safety of non-immigrants, and, on the other hand, as a threat to the moral integrity of the nation. Racialized immigrants were also framed in both French and British contexts as a potential burden to the respective nations and as an obvious source of social problems (Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008; Van der Valk, 2003). These discursive strategies acted to “produce, reproduce and stabilize racism whilst concurrently leaving it explicitly

excluded, otherwise unnamed and, apparently, invisible” (Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008: 6).

The above research suggests the centrality of both ‘race’ and democracy in the context of immigration policy, and, by extension, hints at the usefulness of Henry et al.’s (2000) framework. At the same time, however, the role of democratic racism in specific reference to Canadian state legitimacy remains largely unarticulated. In order to demonstrate the inherent affinity between these two frameworks, the upcoming analysis locates discourses of dominance associated with democratic racism (namely, binary polarization, national identity, multiculturalism, and moral panic) within an examination of the quest for state legitimacy in the arena of immigration policy.

5.4 Data Sources

This chapter is based on an analysis of twenty-four reports generated by CIC between 1994 and 2010. These consist of the core reports associated with the IPR of the 1990s, each *Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration* published between 1995 and 2009 (with 2009 being the most recent report available), and each *Report on Plans and Priorities* published between 1998 and 2010. These reports are all publically available,³⁵ and have, as their intended audience, “Parliament and the people of Canada” (CIC, 2002b: 3). These reports thus provide an overview of CIC’s official policy discourse over the past 16 years.

³⁵ The selection of documents that are publically available and the fact that these documents *are* publically available is noteworthy here in light of Steffek’s (2003) comment that, in contemporary contexts, public visibility is a prerequisite of legitimacy: “legitimacy can only be generated through a public discourse” (Steffek, 2003: 264-5).

With respect to the IPR documents, four main reports were tabled as a result of the public consultations and the review process (Thobani, 2000). Three³⁶ of these reports were analyzed in depth for the present chapter: *Into the Twenty-First Century: A Strategy for Immigration and Citizenship* (CIC, 1994b), which outlines the findings of the public consultations and describes in broad terms the expected main directions for the immigration program in the subsequent ten years; *A Broader Vision: Immigration and Citizenship Plan 1995-2000* (CIC, 1994a), which provides more specific elaborations of the general policy directions outlined in *Into the 21st Century*; and *Building on a Strong Foundation for the Twenty-First Century: New Directions for Immigration and Refugee Policy Legislation* (CIC, 1998a), which specifies the major directions slated for the immigration program moving into the new millennium. This latter document was the White Paper that became the basis for developing the 2002 *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*.

Each *Annual Report to Parliament* describes CIC activities and initiatives during the preceding calendar year; it outlines the selection of foreign nationals as permanent and temporary residents during the previous year, provides an overview of the department's agreements and joint initiatives with provinces and territories regarding immigration, and discusses the immigration plan for the upcoming calendar year.

A Report on Plans and Priorities is an annual expenditure plan that details CIC's main priorities and planned initiatives for achieving these objectives for the

³⁶ The analysis of the fourth document associated with the IPR, *Not Just Numbers* (Trempe et al., 1998), is not discussed in the present chapter's results. This report was developed by independent consultants, and as such, is considered in this chapter to be *external* to the state and thus distinct from official policy discourse.

upcoming year. These reports specify the department's strategic outcomes, program activities and planned/expected results pertaining to immigration.

5.5 Methods

The above reports were analyzed using qualitative content analysis. Documents were initially read in chronological order without being coded such that an overall sense of the document could be established (with respect to overall tone, focus, and substantive topics). A second reading, again in chronological order, was performed and major themes tentatively identified. A third reading was conducted by section (in instances where sections were repeated in reports published in different years). For example, each Annual Report to Parliament opens with a Message from the Minister of CIC at the time. These Messages were read together in isolation from other sections of the reports in order to elucidate commonalities and differences across time. The same process was repeated for all recurring topics/sections. From here, all reports were read again and were coded to the point of thematic saturation (i.e., until no new themes emerged after additional readings). Once the major themes were finalized, portions of the documents corresponding to each theme were read together in order to identify sub-themes. Once again, coded segments for individual themes across all reports were read to the point of thematic saturation. Finally, the codified content of each sub-theme was interpreted in terms of the chapter's and the thesis's theoretical framework.

5.6 Results

The analysis revealed discourses of *national identity*, *multiculturalism*, *moral panic*, and *binary polarization*. The themes identified for discourses of national identity, multiculturalism, and moral panic are listed in Table 5.1. Binary polarization was interwoven throughout the other discourses, and thus will be addressed as applicable throughout the discussion.

Table 5.1: Discourses and Themes Emerging from Critical Discourse Analysis of CIC Reports

Discourse	Theme
National Identity	Nation-Building
	Fairness
	Economic Strength
Multiculturalism	Diversity and Tolerance
Moral Panic	Burden and Balance
	Border Security: Health and Safety Threats
	Illegal Migration and Human Trafficking

Importantly, these themes were not mutually exclusive, but commonly overlapped, and were woven together in a narrative that outlined the meaning and value of immigration in the Canadian context, defined the place of immigrants in the Canadian nation, identified the Canadian population's beliefs, values, goals, and desires, and explained the role of the Canadian state in protecting and building the Canadian nation. These portrayals functioned together to document state legitimacy by demonstrating how the state was serving the Canadian nation through its immigration policies while simultaneously protecting the Canadian nation from problems and dangers associated with immigration. Through these representations, the symbolic borders of Canada's imagined community were defined in variable and shifting ways.

5.61 Discourses of National Identity

Throughout the reports, state legitimacy in reference to immigration was sought by emphasizing the important contributions of immigrants in past and present nation-building efforts. Canadian national identity was also defined in terms of fairness and economic considerations in ways that served to document the legitimacy of CIC's policy activities.

5.611 Immigration and Nation-Building

Throughout the reports, immigrants were presented as having played a central role in the historical development of the Canadian nation and as being vital to the maintenance and building of a strong and prosperous Canada in the future. The reports also articulated the nature of the Canadian population and the values on which the Canadian nation was built in ways that linked Canadian national identity directly to immigration:

Canada's history is replete with stories of people seeking a new life for themselves and their families. As a country populated to a very large extent by immigrants and their descendents, that experience is deeply rooted in our national consciousness. Canadian values have been influenced by the need to welcome and integrate people from many cultures, religions, languages and national experiences (CIC, 1998a: 1).

Our country has been built and enriched by immigrants. Throughout our history, immigrants have come to our shores seeking opportunities and a better future for themselves and their families. Our shared immigrant experience is central to how Canadians see themselves, and to how the rest of the world sees Canada (CIC, 1999a: 2).

Immigration has been fundamental to the growth of Canada and to our history of achievement. From our earliest days through to the global transformations of recent years, hardworking people and their families have come to Canada from all over the world. Collectively, they have made a significant contribution to the development of our economy, our society and our culture (CIC, 2005a: 7).

One of the many rewards of being a welcoming land has been the attraction of newcomers who have played a vital role in the development of our values, our culture, our economy, and our political institutions (CIC, 1998a: 1).

Clearly, portrayals of immigrants, Canadians, the Canadian nation, and the Canadian state were inextricably intertwined in the context of nation-building in ways that sought to document the inherent value of immigration. Immigrants were presented as having played a central role in establishing the Canadian nation, with Canadian values simultaneously presented as having been inevitably shaped by immigration. In this way, the immigration program was legitimized as an integral part of Canadian history, and the state was shown to be acting directly in the interests of the Canadian population by granting entry to immigrants.

In this theme, binary polarization emerged through repeated use of pronouns ‘our’ (to represent both Canadians *and* the Canadian state). This implied that the needs and values of the Canadian state and those of Canadians are one and the same, while simultaneously creating a binary polarization between members of the Canadian population and newcomers: immigrants (*they*) come to *our* shores to better their lives; *they* have come to *our* land and have helped build *our* economy, society, and culture. In this way, an in-group/out-group dichotomy was firmly established. Moreover, the ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction simultaneously served to present Canada as a desirable place to live, where newcomers are able to improve their lives. Canada was thus portrayed as an open land, brimming with opportunity, for which the Canadian state is partly responsible, and of which Canadians can be proud. Yet, despite the ‘us’ and ‘them’ polarization, the Canadian nation and Canadian national identity were at times presented in inclusive terms (for instance, with the mention of “*our shared* immigrant

experience”). Acknowledging that many Canadians are descendents of immigrants served to partially break down the symbolic boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that had previously been drawn. In doing so, the borders of the Canadian imagined community shifted to include not only Canadians, but also ‘good’ immigrants (as cited above, “hardworking people and their families”).

As alluded to in the above discussion, the central role of the Canadian state in historical, present, and future nation-building through immigration was emphasized throughout the reports, and operated to confirm the legitimacy of CIC’s activities in the eyes of diverse stakeholders:

Canada’s Immigration program has played a vital role in shaping and enriching our country. Canada has and will continue to benefit economically and culturally from the immigration of individuals and families who come here each year to seek a better future (CIC, 2004a: 1).

For almost a century and a half, immigration has been an engine for the economic and social development of our country. Since 1967, the employees of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) – whether they worked in this country or in our offices abroad – have played a crucial role in welcoming newcomers to join our work force and participate as community leaders (CIC, 2005a: 3).

Canada has a long history of being a choice destination for immigrants, and our immigration system is one of the best known and most successful in the world. Every year Canada welcomes thousands of new immigrants, international students and temporary workers who help develop the economic and cultural fabric of our country (CIC, 2008a: 5).

The historical legacy of immigration as a nation-building strategy discursively served as a means of demonstrating the ongoing necessity and value of immigration to Canada.

The centrality of immigration in building the Canadian nation and shaping Canadian values thus operated in the interests of state legitimacy by documenting the symbolic and material necessity of immigration to the Canadian nation. By extension, the manner

in which the state structures immigration policy was legitimized by documenting the ability of the immigration program to grant entry to deserving and contributing newcomers.

In terms of the utility of the democratic racism framework, Henry and Tator (2000) emphasize that the ‘myth’ that Canada was founded by French and Canadian nations enacts democratic racism by obscuring the contribution of ‘non-Whites’ to the Canadian nation. The present analysis uncovered very little evidence of this myth in the discourse analyzed. In fact, as noted above, the contribution of immigrants in Canada’s earliest nation-building years was commonly mentioned in the reports. Yet, the analysis uncovered another ‘myth’ in the discursive construction of Canadian national identity, involving the claim that Canada had always been open to and welcoming of immigrants from around the world. To this end, the democratic racism that surfaced in the reports was not one of obscuring the contributions of immigrants to Canadian nation-building, but was one that denied the racial discrimination that was explicit in Canadian immigration policy for nearly a century. This reflects the manner in which policy discourse was shaped in large part to garner state legitimacy in the eyes of varied stakeholders, including potential immigrants and Canadian nationals who might be unaware of the nation’s discriminatory past.

5.612 Fairness

By definition, fairness is a central element of democracy, and, as such, is a widely valued principle in liberal democratic societies. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Three, the emergence of a fair and objective immigrant selection system is widely heralded as marking the official end of discrimination in Canadian immigration.

Accordingly, the fairness of Canada's immigration program and the democratic nature of the Canadian state were emphasized throughout the reports in reference to various dimensions of the immigration process:

Canadians' belief that all human beings should be treated with fairness and dignity must be reflected in the policies and practices of their government. For its part, the immigration and citizenship program will strive for excellence in providing its services both home and abroad (CIC, 1998b: xiv).

Canada's immigration program is based on nondiscriminatory principles – foreign nationals are assessed according to the same criteria regardless of race, nationality, ethnic origin, colour, religion or gender (CIC, 2005a: 16).

As part of the federal Innovation Strategy, the Government of Canada is committed to working in partnership with the provinces and territories, professional regulatory bodies and stakeholder groups to address the barriers to successful economic integration. An important objective is the development of fair and transparent processes to assess and recognize foreign credentials before and after an immigrant's arrival (CIC, 2003a: 26).

Throughout the reports, the Canadian state and the Canadian (non-immigrant) population were presented as sharing in the belief in fairness and democracy relating to immigrants of various origins. In this way, fairness was established as a feature of Canadian identity and as the backbone of the Canadian nation. By articulating the fact that Canada's immigration program operates according to principles of fairness and non-discrimination, the state's legitimacy was pursued through appeals to both Canadians and immigrants. The discourse offered assurance that CIC abides by the wider values of the nation by ensuring fairness and transparency in its immigration program, confirming that potential newcomers will not be discriminated against. This established a subtle distinction between 'Canadians' and 'immigrants' by constructing the latter group as 'different' from Canadians through the implication that

discrimination against immigrants is possible. In some instances, emphasizing the highly democratic nature of Canadian society involved obscuring well-documented discrimination:

With passage of the *Canadian Citizenship Act* in 1947, so began the promotion of a great national identity that has put newcomers to this country on an equal footing with residents born here and helped shape the strong, united, independent and free Canada of today (CIC, 2007b: 3).

Throughout the reports, Canadian immigration history was rewritten so as to obscure the discrimination and *lack* of fairness that characterized much of this history. Moreover, aligning the omission of historical racism with claims of fairness and freedom directly served the state's quest for legitimacy with respect to audiences that might be unaware of the long history of discrimination in immigration, including potential immigrants, newcomers, and Canadian nationals. In terms of contemporary immigration practices, emphasizing the fairness of the Canadian system through references to the Citizenship Act obscures the manner in which access to the rights and benefits of citizenship remains regulated and racialized (for instance, through temporary labour migration programs; see Basok, 2002; Bauder 2006; Satzewich, 1991). More generally, claims of fairness and non-discrimination pertaining to immigrant selection and integration operated as discourses of democratic racism that served state legitimacy by suggesting that the immigration program is structured in accordance with the broader liberal values of Canadian society. Claiming that immigrants are on equal footing as Canadian-born citizens operated as an implicit denial of structural discrimination, suggesting that, if immigrants do not succeed in Canadian society, the Canadian system

is not at fault. In these instances, the framework of democratic racism was upheld by the analysis.

At other times, claims of fairness coincided more directly with negative portrayals of immigrants:

Access to Canada's institutions is a privilege. Fairness requires that access not be afforded to those who abuse Canada's hospitality (CIC, 1994c: 55).

CIC's activities ... are designed to ensure that newcomers have fair but controlled access to Canada and to reassure Canadians that CIC is proactively managing risk (CIC, 2003b: 12).

Immigration has a role to play in addressing labour market challenges and my³⁷ goal is to ensure the immigration program better responds to our needs as a country in a way that is fair, transparent and adheres to the rule of law, while protecting the health, safety and security of Canadians (CIC, 2006a: 3).

In these examples, immigrants were implicitly presented as a risk to the Canadian nation and the Canadian public, such that a binary polarization was again established between immigrants, on the one side, and Canadians and the Canadian state, on the other side. This type of direct pairing of negative 'Other' representations with disclaimers of fairness is a defining feature of discourses of discrimination toward immigrants in democratic contexts (see, for instance, van Dijk, 1997, 1993a, 1992). At the same time, however, an ambiguous line between 'good' and 'bad' immigrants that could not clearly be reduced to 'race' was drawn, and the ability of the state to negotiate this line in the interests of the Canadian nation, Canadian citizens, and ('good') immigrants was emphasized. In this way, the legitimacy of state activities was articulated with respect to multiple audiences. Emphasizing Canada's non-

³⁷ 'My' refers to Monte Solberg, Minister of CIC at the time.

discriminatory approach to immigration informed a discourse of fair and equitable governance directed toward Canadians, ‘good’ immigrants, and the interests of capital and labour. At the same time, the boundaries of Canada’s imagined community were clearly drawn to exclude newcomers who threaten the health, safety, and security of Canadians.

5.613 Economic Strength

Although Henry et al. (2000) primarily address Canadian national identity in reference to a particular vision of the cultural fabric of the nation, the present analysis revealed that, in the context of immigration policy, the economic strength of the nation in a global setting emerged as a defining feature of Canadian national identity. Supporting the framework of immigration policy outlined by Simmons (2010, 1999; see also Chapter Two of this thesis), the reports clearly articulated the prevailing ‘imagined future’ of the nation as a sophisticated player in a global marketplace. In this context, economic considerations were constructed as more than just a goal of immigration; rather, Canada’s status as a strong economic player was entrenched in the nation’s very identity. By extension, the contribution of immigrants to upholding the nation’s economic identity was prominent in the reports, again ingraining (economic) immigration as a necessary component of Canadian nation-building and establishing the legitimacy of the immigration program. In this regard, skilled workers were highlighted as being vital to the state’s ability to meet Canada’s needs in a knowledge-based economy, in light of the fact that these immigrants are highly educated and represent a flexible, skilled workforce that will ensure Canada’s global competitiveness:

Canada needs immigrants if it wants to continue to develop and grow in the future. Specifically, Canada needs to attract highly skilled

workers...as an essential part of maintaining its competitive position in a knowledge-based...world economy (CIC, 1999b: 3).

In an era of increased globalization with critical skill gaps in the labour market and concern over demographic trends, the selection of skilled worker immigrants who can successfully settle in Canada is vital for the long-term economic development of the country (CIC, 2002b: 13).

Immigration can contribute to addressing both short- and long-term labour market needs by attracting people with the right mix of skills and talents to support economic growth today and in the future. With other industrialized countries confronting similar challenges with respect to sustaining population and economic growth, Canada will be operating in an increasingly competitive worldwide market for higher skilled workers (CIC, 2007a: 6).

Immigration has played an important role in building the strong and vibrant economy that Canadians have come to enjoy. To remain competitive in the global economy, Canada needs to continue to draw on the talents and skills that immigrants bring with them (CIC, 2008b: 15).

Skilled worker immigrants were thus defined first and foremost in terms of their ability to serve the needs of the Canadian nation; these immigrants were depersonalized and depicted as resources that will help maintain Canada's position as a competitive player in a world market. Business immigrants, investors, and temporary workers were similarly constructed in terms of their economic contributions to the Canadian nation:

Migration is a positive force for economic and social development. CIC continues to promote Canada as a destination of choice for talent, innovation, investment and opportunity. Canada's immigration policy facilitates the entry into Canada of new immigrants and temporary residents who are able to contribute to the labour market and economy through the skills they bring, their business experience, or through capital they invest (CIC, 2006b: 21).

[...] We must work with partners to consistently promote Canada as a destination of choice, adopt policies that encourage the retention of newcomers such as students and temporary foreign workers and select applicants who have greater potential to succeed early upon their arrival in Canada. Recent initiatives such as the Action Plan for Faster

Immigration and the introduction of the Canadian Experience Class will improve Canada's ability to compete for skilled labour (CIC, 2009b: 15).

Intersecting images of economic immigrants and the Canadian nation clearly served as a vehicle for presenting CIC as a responsive, responsible, and forward-thinking state entity that acts to support the nation's interests:

The Speech from the Throne in September 2002 highlighted the important role that CIC plays in the Canadian economy, while the federal Innovation Strategy stresses the need for a skilled workforce. CIC has made it a priority to deliver results for the Canadian economy (CIC 2003b: 12).

We are maximizing this country's social, cultural, and economic benefits by working to respond to labour-market needs, attracting and retaining skilled foreign workers, and ensuring that we have the policies and programs in place to support the successful integration of newcomers to this country (CIC 2007a: 3).

CIC contributes significantly to strengthening Canada's social foundations, to building a 21st century economy and to ensuring Canada's role in the world (CIC, 2004b: 9).

By articulating the fact that CIC grants entry to 'good' immigrants (that is, immigrants who are economically valuable to the Canadian nation), the importance of immigration in securing Canada's national prosperity and international standing was emphasized. Moreover, the centrality of Canada's international economic standing to the nation's identity meant that articulations of CIC's ability to select economic immigrants directly served the state's quest for legitimacy. Yet, representations of the Canadian nation and the Canadian state were also intertwined with portrayals of family-class immigrants:

Canadian immigration policy and legislation have a long tradition of supporting family reunification. The support of family sponsors assists new immigrants in achieving self-reliance and more quickly adapting to their new circumstances (CIC, 2002b: 13).

Reuniting families is an important tradition in Canada's immigration program, as it allows foreign nationals to be sponsored by close relatives or family members in Canada. This component [of the immigration program] is based on the belief that people who immigrate to Canada will tend to establish themselves more easily if their family supports them (CIC, 2004b: 19).

Family reunification remains a key objective of IRPA. In order to facilitate the reunification of families, Canadian citizens and permanent residents may sponsor close relatives to become permanent residents. Canadian citizens or permanent residents who are 18 years of age or older may qualify as sponsors. In order to ensure that sponsored relatives are adequately supported and do not need to rely on social assistance, sponsors must meet certain criteria and are responsible for financially supporting their relatives for a period of three to 10 years, depending on their age and relationship to the sponsor (CIC, 2008a: 18-9).

Family-class immigration thus allowed the Canadian state and the Canadian nation to be portrayed as supportive and appreciative of the institution of the family, while offering assurance that family-class immigrants will come to be productive members of society through the help of their sponsors. In this way, discourse on family-class immigration was directly framed within considerations on the nation's economic integrity. Family-class immigrants were presented as dependents who require the financial support of their sponsors in order to succeed in Canadian society. In this way, family-class immigrants were discursively constrained in their role as family members, and were not acknowledged as productive immigrants. This group was thus portrayed as a potential to burden the nation, who stand to interfere with the nation's economic integrity. In this way, a binary polarization was constructed between economic immigrants and family-class immigrants. In the context of the state's quest for legitimacy, the expressed support of family reunification upheld the state's social commitment to family values, and served to obscure the inherent devaluing of family-class immigrants relative to economic immigrants. This discourse protected the legitimacy of CIC's activities from

both sides: audiences that might protest family-class immigration on economic grounds were appealed to through reassurances regarding the sponsorship program, while humanists likely to reject a strictly economic immigration system as well as immigrants seeking to have their family join them in Canada were appealed to through acknowledgement of the importance of family reunification.

The centrality of the pursuit of state legitimacy in shaping policy discourse, and the extent to which this pursuit shaped portrayals of both immigrants and the state, was also evident in the reports associated with the IPR of the 1990s. Part of the IPR involved a legislative review by an independent panel of consultants, which resulted in the tabling of a report containing policy recommendations (Trempe et al., 1998). Following the release of this report, public hearings were held across the country over a period of several weeks, in which individual Canadian citizens and organizations responded to the recommendations that the advisory group had outlined. Following these hearings, the report *Building on a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century* (CIC, 1998a) was released by CIC. It was noted in the early pages of this report that the feedback from the public hearings on *Not Just Numbers* revealed “concern with the report’s perceived economic, market-oriented focus” (CIC, 1998a: 6). This statement is meaningful here in light the impact that this public reaction seemed to have on policy discourse in the immediate aftermath of the hearings.

Specifically, the analysis of *Building on a Strong Foundation* (CIC, 1998a) revealed a clear downplaying of economic concerns and an emphasis on the importance of the social and humanitarian considerations of immigration that was unparalleled in all other reports. This report stood out in terms of its heightened articulation of the value

of the family as an integral aspect of Canadian identity, and its emphasis on the centrality of family reunification to the immigration program. The report also stressed that “immigrants are social as well as economic beings” (CIC, 1998a: 14):

The assessment of successful establishment for independent immigrants is based on their economic potential. Economics, however, is only part of the story. Highly skilled immigrants make an invaluable contribution to Canadian society. As they integrate into communities, these immigrants become integral parts of all facets of Canadian society. They enrich the cultural and social fabric of Canada (CIC, 1998a: 28).

As this shift suggests, the audience plays an important role in the framing of policy discourse. The state was clearly engaged in a concerted effort to address perceived concerns associated with the immigration program and to demonstrate that the immigration program serves both Canadians, immigrants, and the Canadian nation more broadly. Yet, as the current analysis suggests, the specific elements of the discourse that are played up depends on the prevailing social atmosphere within which state legitimacy is being sought.

Overall, Canada’s economic competitiveness and high standing in the international economic order were presented in the reports as a source of national pride and a defining feature of Canadian national identity. This economic discourse enabled CIC to address the interests of both capital and labour by demonstrating how the state prioritizes the national economy by matching the flow of immigrants to meet economic needs. In turn, this served to demonstrate how CIC upholds the material and symbolic standing of Canada in the international order. This discourse also allowed the state to ‘prove’ the value and worth of economic immigrants to the varied audiences of the reports. In this way, economic immigrants were symbolically included in the state’s imagining of Canada’s national community, constructed as valuable economic

contributors and thus as worthy future citizens, while family-class immigrants were ambiguously positioned with respect to the national community, yet nevertheless presented as allowing the nation to meet specific social goals. The state's quest for legitimacy was thus evidenced through discursive assurance that the current immigration program is the best possible approach for Canadians, corporate Canada, and a large population of immigrants.

With respect to democratic racism, the analysis revealed many of the same themes discussed by other authors pertaining to the discourse of immigrant skill and the implicit devaluation of family-class immigrants (see Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Satzewich & Lioudakis, 2007; Thobani, 2000a, 2000b). Although the current analysis did not reveal explicit opposition to family-class immigrants, it found that family-class immigrants were occasionally presented as potentially burdensome to the nation, and as less valuable than economic immigrants. To this end, insofar as family-class immigrants are interpreted as having been racialized relative to economic immigrants, then the privileging of the latter group can be interpreted, to some extent, as an expression of democratic racism. At the same time, however, the bureaucratic categorization of immigrants is not clearly reducible to a single dimension such as 'race.' To this end, the extent to which the discourse of skill and economic identity is evidence of 'racism' is not entirely clear. This issue is discussed further later on in this chapter.

5.62 Discourse of Multiculturalism: Diversity and Tolerance

The theme of diversity revealed contradicting sub-texts that served to variably represent both immigrants and Canadians, while consistently presenting the Canadian state as

respectful and welcoming of all peoples, and depicting the Canadian nation as multicultural and pluralistic:

Canada is a multicultural and diverse country that is open to the world, with an immigration program that enjoys public support and a track record of successfully integrating generations of newcomers (CIC, 2005a: 8).

Canada is among the most ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse countries in the world. The Government of Canada is proud of the contributions that all communities make to the social, civic, cultural and economic fabric of this country, and of the efforts that all Canadians make to welcome and encourage newcomers' full participation in our society (CIC, 2010b: 6).

I³⁸ believe the characteristic that most defines Canadians is their welcoming nature. It has been a constant throughout our evolution as a country. Wave after wave of newcomers, first from Europe, then from all corners of the earth, have found themselves welcomed in Canada. They have also found opportunity and tolerance in a country that genuinely appreciates cultural diversity (CIC, 2007b: 3).

In these examples, both Canadians and the state were portrayed as welcoming and tolerant. By extension, immigrants were implicitly constructed as 'different' than 'Canadians.' In this way, although diversity was presented as being valued in Canada and respected by Canadians, a binary polarization of 'Canadians' and 'diverse immigrants' was also evident. In this way, both immigrants and Canadians were homogenized within their respective group boundaries. As mentioned for previous themes, the Canadian state was coupled with Canadians in the polarization between Self and Other (with statements such as "our society" and "our evolution as a country"). Canadians and the Canadian state were thus both portrayed as being supportive of 'diverse' newcomers, and as constituting a nation that has a long history of welcoming

³⁸ In this instance, "I" refers to Diane Finley, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada at the time.

immigrants from around the world. As discussed in previous sections and as illustrated by the above examples, the theme of diversity revealed a selective re-writing of Canadian immigration history, wherein historical discrimination was obscured. Similarly, the contemporary racialization of immigration policies and practices and the persistence of discrimination in Canadian society were implicitly denied through references to the welcoming, pluralistic nature of the Canadian nation.

At other points throughout the reports, the racialization of immigrants was more explicit:

Settlement programs and services assist immigrants in becoming participating and contributing members of Canadian society and promote an acceptance of immigrants by Canadians. While helping newcomers adapt and learn about their rights, freedoms and responsibilities and the laws that protect them from racial discrimination, settlement programs also sensitize Canadians to different cultures and how diversity strengthens the economy and community life (CIC, 2002a).

Immigrants' need for the state's assistance in order to become productive members of Canadian society served as an implicit negative representation of newcomers and an overt positive representation of the state. Moreover, the racialized identity of immigrants (and their difference from Canadians) was constituted through the explicit mention of newcomers' legal protection from racial discrimination. Interestingly, in contrast to the vast majority of the policy discourse (which emphasized Canadians' tolerant and welcoming nature), the above example suggests an acknowledgement of the broader presence of discrimination in Canadian society and the need for Canadians to be educated about the value of diversity brought about by immigrants. Again, this served to polarize immigrants and Canadians as racialized opposites, while simultaneously constructing the state in a patriarchal role as guardian, protector, and

educator of both newcomers and Canadian nationals. State legitimacy was thus documented in reference to immigration by establishing the fact that the state protects immigrants while simultaneously using their ‘diversity’ to broaden the horizons of Canadians and the Canadian nation. In this context, the presence of institutionalized discrimination in the immigration program and Canadian society was negated, and the legitimacy of the immigration program was ‘proven.’

In other instances, references to multiculturalism seemed to acknowledge the heterogeneity of the broader Canadian population, somewhat deconstructing the racialized binary between Canadians and immigrants:

Multiculturalism fosters increased intercultural understanding, and supports the goals of Canadians living in a society where they are treated fairly and equitably, regardless of their background (CIC, 2009b: 35).

In response to our ever-increasing diversity and to ensure that our Multiculturalism Program reflects the needs of all Canadians by promoting integration, the Government of Canada has implemented three policy objectives for the Program: building an integrated, socially-cohesive society; making institutions more responsive to the needs of Canada's diverse population; and engaging in international discussions on multiculturalism and diversity (CIC, 2010b: 5).

These examples illustrate the inconsistent manner in which immigrants and Canadians were concurrently represented in reference to diversity and multiculturalism. In instances where immigrants and Canadians were *not* polarized as distinct (racialized) groups, Canada’s national community was constructed as inclusive of diverse newcomers and Canadian nationals alike. Yet, diversity was still presented as a potential challenge to social cohesion; implicitly, this contributed to a ‘folk construction’ of immigrants (see Chapter One), in the sense that ethnic minorities (regardless of legal immigrant status) were portrayed as ‘different.’ To this end, the line

between immigrants and ethnic minority Canadians was inconsistently and ambiguously drawn. Yet, in all cases, the Canadian state and the Canadian nation were consistently framed in reference to tolerance and the value of diversity. In this way, the pursuit of state legitimacy through multicultural discourse was evident throughout the reports, for instance, through comments about the state's commitment to multicultural programs, and through repeated references to CIC's role in ensuring the equitable treatment of all members of Canadian society. The state's activities pertaining to immigration were thus presented so as to appeal to both newcomers and Canadian nationals of all backgrounds, as well as to broader interest groups that advocate against discrimination.

5.63 Discourses of Moral Panic

5.631 Balance and Burden

As discussed in Chapter One, the 'immigration question' in Canada commonly revolves around public concerns pertaining to the balance between economic and non-economic immigration. This discourse contributes to an image of economic (particularly skilled worker) immigrants as productive and valuable newcomers, while family-class immigrants are comparatively devalued and constructed as a potential burden to Canadian society. This devaluing of family-class immigrants is often interpreted in racialized (and gendered) terms (see Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Thobani, 2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999). In political and public contexts, the sponsorship agreement³⁹ is presented as a safeguard against family-class immigrants' reliance on public programs. These

³⁹ As discussed in Chapter One, in order for family-class immigrants to gain admission to Canada, a sponsor (i.e., a family member of a designated relationship) must sign an agreement in which they commit financial responsibility for the sponsored immigrant for a pre-determined period of time, depending on the relationship between the sponsor and the immigrant.

points were visible throughout the CIC reports, and contributed to a binary polarization between family-class immigrants and economic immigrants:

The [immigration program's] changes are also aimed at rebalancing immigration so that Canada selects a greater share of immigrants who can contribute quickly to its economic development. This may mean a decrease in the share of immigrants in other categories (CIC, 1994c: 29).

The lower number [of immigrants to be accepted in 1995] will allow the immigration program to be gradually reoriented in later years to applicants who can make an immediate contribution to the Canadian economy by increasing the proportion of the economic component in relation to the family (CIC, 1994a: 7).

The government is committed to ensuring that newcomers to Canada can integrate and contribute to Canada as quickly as possible, without adding to the burden on social programs. This means raising selection standards; ensuring that Canadians honour their responsibilities towards sponsored family members; and achieving an appropriate balance between the economic and family components of immigration (CIC, 1994a: 7).

As these examples illustrate, the assumption that family-class immigrants are unlikely to contribute to the nation was implicit, serving to marginalize this group as valuable members of Canada's national community. Economic immigrants, in contrast, were portrayed as self-sufficient contributors who are worthy of inclusion in the Canadian nation. These images were built upon an undercurrent of 'moral panic,' conceptualized in terms of the potential risk associated with family-class immigrants and sponsorship default:

The government believes strongly in the principle of family reunification based on the responsibility of the family itself to provide the resources for supporting its sponsored members. Compliance with sponsorship undertakings is key to achieving integrity in the family class program. Default occurs when a sponsored immigrant whose essential needs were guaranteed by the sponsor for a set period received social assistance (CIC, 1998a: 26).

In order to ensure that sponsored relatives are adequately supported and do not need to rely on social assistance, sponsors must meet certain

criteria and are responsible for financially supporting their relatives for a period of three to 10 years, depending on their age and relationship to the sponsor (CIC, 2008a: 19).

The privilege of immigrating or resettling in Canada must be balanced with 'reciprocal obligations,' or responsibilities. Thus, for example, the privilege of sponsoring the immigration of a family member must be balanced with the responsibility to provide for that person once in Canada (CIC, 1998a: 10).

The identity of sponsors as Canadian-born or former immigrants was typically not articulated, and was rendered largely irrelevant in the context of potential sponsorship default. In this context, the state was presented as ensuring that family-class immigrants will not become a burden to Canadian taxpayers:

The government proposes to expand Citizenship and Immigration Canada's power to undertake collection action against defaulting sponsors and to share the proceeds with the provinces (CIC, 1998a: 26).

In December 2004, a pilot project was launched with the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and the Province of Ontario to facilitate the collection of debts owed by defaulting sponsors. Sponsors in Ontario who default on sponsorship commitments may now have their income tax or GST refunds withheld to pay back the province for social assistance costs incurred by family members they have sponsored. The intention is to expand this pilot nationwide (CIC, 2005a: 20).

CIC continues to work with the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and the provinces on measures to collect debts owing from sponsors (CIC, 2006a: 15).

To preserve public support for family class immigration, it is critical that sponsors meet their obligations to provide for the essential needs of their sponsored relatives. Links will be established with the provinces to ensure that defaulting sponsors are identified and compelled to carry out their responsibilities (CIC, 1998b: 11).

Overall, intersecting representations of family-class immigrants, their sponsors and the Canadian state served state legitimacy by documenting the role of the state in guaranteeing that the economic security of the nation would not be compromised by

family-class immigration. The boundaries of Canada's national community were thus drawn so as to marginalize family-class immigrants *and* defaulting sponsors. Through these constructions, subtle discrimination against family-class immigrants was articulated. Default on sponsorship was never expressed in terms of concern for family-class immigrants' well-being, but, rather, was addressed exclusively in terms of the well-being of the nation. The Canadian state's legitimacy, in this regard, was documented in terms of its ability to minimize the burden imposed by family-class immigrants, and thus to preclude the need for public 'panic' about family-class immigration.

As noted earlier in this chapter, the problematization of family-class immigrants is often taken as evidence of racial discrimination when considered in the context of Canadian immigration history (see Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Boyd, 1997; Thobani, 2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999; see also Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007). As discussed in Chapter Three, the liberalization of family-class immigration in the 1950s brought about an influx of immigrants from 'non-traditional' source countries. In contemporary immigration flows, large numbers of 'non-White' immigrants (particularly Asian women) arrive through the family-class stream. As such, critical scholars commonly discuss family-class immigration in racialized and gendered, such that the attribution of burden to family-class immigrants is often interpreted as an expression of democratic racism (and sexism). While not disputing the possible value of this interpretation, it is also relevant to point out that 40% of family-class immigrants are male, and that a large proportion of skilled worker applicants are of Asian origin. In this regard, insofar as Canadian immigration policy discourse reflects philosophies and agendas guiding

immigration policy and programming, then the construction of family-class immigrants as burdensome stands to affect *all* immigrants within that category, regardless of gender, ethnicity, or ‘race.’ As such, it is argued here that category of admission is a tangible factor in defining membership in Canada’s national community that is not easily reducible to the bureaucratic category’s majority demographic composition, nor can it be exclusively linked to the socially constructed image of a family-class immigrant as a female dependent and an economic immigrant as an independent male.

5.632 Border Security: Health and Safety Threats

Throughout the reports, immigrants were commonly presented as real or potential threats to the well-being of Canada as a nation and to the Canadian population:

CIC...protects the public health and safety of Canadians through the medical examination of all immigrants and certain visitors, and protects the security of Canadian society by identifying and removing individuals who are not entitled to enter or to remain in Canada (CIC, 2000: 5).

From a medical perspective, CIC’s overarching goal is to ensure that the vast majority of immigrants are healthy when they arrive in Canada, thus minimizing risks to Canadians and preventing undue demands on Canada’s already overburdened health and social services (CIC, 2003b: 33).

As Canada seeks to attract and welcome permanent and temporary residents, CIC has a critical role to play, in partnership with other federal departments, in protecting the health, safety and security of Canadians. Globalization of markets and ease of travel increase risks, ranging from epidemics such as SARS and influenza, to the spread of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, to chronic conditions that can affect the overall health of Canadians (CIC, 2008a: 8-9).

Health thus served as a ‘legitimate’ means for problematizing immigrants, drawing on global health trends and also appealing to concerns of national well-being. It was telling that threats to public health were clearly attributed to immigrants, with no recognition that Canadians within the country or those who travel outside the country can contribute

to the spread of infectious diseases. In this context, health served as a means of constructing a binary polarization between Canadians and immigrants. This finding is particularly interesting in light of evidence that, upon their arrival in Canada, immigrants are, on average, healthier than the native-born Canadian population (known as the “healthy immigrant effect”; see Ali et al., 2004; Chen et al., 1996; McDonald & Kennedy, 2004). Moreover, the portrayal of immigrants as a health threat was framed so as to document the legitimacy of state activities pertaining to the screening of immigrants.

For instance, the image of immigrants as a health threat, and the manner in which the state acts to minimize this threat, emerged through discussions of the ‘Migration Health Task Force,’ a joint initiative between CIC and Health Canada. The Task Force was charged with the following responsibilities:

[...] to define the current public health and population health challenges resulting from migration to Canada; to examine how well Canada’s current migration health management system is meeting these challenges; and to develop a series of strategic objectives and proposed actions to modernize Canada’s system of managing migrant health (CIC, 2005b: 35).

Discussions of the Task Force clearly contributed to a binary polarization of immigrants and Canadians on the basis of health ‘difference.’ Indeed, as reported in one document, the Task Force was explicitly established in light of the fact that “most [immigrants] come from countries with health backgrounds, beliefs and customs that are very different from those in Canada” (CIC, 2005b: 35). Importantly, highlighting the fact that health risks are largely associated with immigrants from countries with ‘different’ customs both racialized these immigrants, and operated directly in the state’s quest for legitimacy. Racializing the immigrant ‘health risk’ legitimized the possibility of

heightened scrutiny of immigrants from ‘non-traditional’ source countries, rendering suspicion of racialized immigrants legitimate. More generally, portraying immigrants as health threats served as a basis for presenting the Canadian state as the protector of the Canadian nation and the Canadian public. By acknowledging the ‘threat’ associated with immigrants from non-traditional source countries while emphasizing the steps being taken by CIC to protect against these risks, the state’s ability to protect the physical well-being of Canadian citizens was established. In this way, the potential threat to legitimacy imposed by the health ‘threat’ of immigrants was refuted through assurances that the state was taking every effort to protect Canadians from (racialized) immigrants.

Aside from the health threats associated within immigration, terrorism and organized crime also emerged as central elements of the discourse of moral panic:

In the face of growing threats to Canadian security, CIC supports a key government-wide priority to build safer communities. In this context, CIC identifies and denies admission to those who do not comply with the *Immigration Act* (e.g., suspected terrorists or members of organized crime groups). It also detects evolving patterns of abuse of the citizenship, immigration and refugee programs and detains or removes people who pose a serious risk to Canadians or who are not legally entitled to remain in Canada (in particular, those who have committed serious criminal offences or war crimes) (CIC, 1999b: 6-7).

Growing international migration has increased the possibility of Canadians being exposed to outbreaks, infectious diseases, acts of terrorism and transnational organized crime. A range of mitigating strategies has been adopted across government and with international partners to reduce the possibility of these threats impacting the Canadian population (CIC, 2010b: 15).

Like the United States and many other countries, Canada has been operating in a state of heightened security since September 11, 2001. The critical need to intensify efforts to protect North America is widely acknowledged. Terrorist attacks and continuing international tensions have changed Canadians’ perceptions of our vulnerability in terms of

public safety and security, and have raised concerns about how we select and admit people to Canada (CIC, 2003b: 30).

As these examples illustrate, CIC's role as guardian of the Canadian nation and protector of the Canadian people was constituted through representations of international immigrants as threats. Moreover, Canadians were simultaneously, albeit implicitly, portrayed as good, law-abiding citizens who do not pose a threat to public safety. Canadians were also, once again, homogenized with respect to their fears and perceptions, and were constructed as sharing the same beliefs as the Canadian state.

These findings pertaining to the immigrant 'threat' must be interpreted within the social context of international migration in recent years. Since the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in 2001, the fear of racialized 'Others' has become an increasingly prominent sentiment in the Western world. Political discourse, particularly in reference to national security, border control, and international migration, has become ever more imbued with xenophobia and heightened suspicion toward 'outsiders' (Ibrahim, 2009; Nagel, 2002). The SARS health scare of 2003 added a further dimension of fear associated with international migration to Canada. In these contexts, the racialized construction of immigrants as dangerous 'Others' is rendered acceptable through 'legitimate' concerns over national well-being. Calling specific attention to the 9/11 attacks in the policy reports effectively located the threat to the Canadian nation within a stereotypical image of a male, Islamist terrorist. This served to profile the threat the Canadian nation in a very concrete, racialized, gendered, and religious-specific way.

It is interesting to note here that representations of immigrants as health and safety threats in the CIC reports preceded the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the SARS outbreak, indicating that these events did not directly prompt a *new* vision of

immigrants as safety and health threat. What did change, however, was the *nature* of this theme in the reports of the decade 2000, where security and health risks were framed as increasingly pressing concerns, as evidenced by an emphasis on increasing collaboration between multiple federal departments to ensure border control, the sophistication of the methods being used to screen immigrants, and the perceived necessity of extensive efforts to protect Canadian society from potential threats associated with immigration. In this regard, the intensity and focus of the state's quest for legitimacy changed in response to world events. Major scares such as terrorism and health pandemics threaten to instill fear in the population about the ability of the state to protect the national community. The current analysis revealed how, in the context of this fear, racialized immigrants were constructed as the principal source of threat, while Canadians were implicitly constructed as a vulnerable population in need of state protection. Legitimacy, in this context, was established through a convincing discourse regarding the steps being taken by the state to protect the Canadian public against 'bad' immigrants while simultaneously permitting the entry of 'good' (i.e., economic) immigrants.

5.633 Illegal Migration and Human Trafficking

In the CIC reports, illegal migration and human trafficking were identified as inherent features of global migration, and as prominent concerns for the Canadian state and other stakeholders:

Migrant smuggling, including trafficking in women and children, is an increasing concern for the international community...CIC recognizes that human security and migration issues cannot be addressed in isolation and that they require effective cooperation and exchange of information. CIC works closely with domestic and international partners to promote and protect Canadian interests relating to migration, refugee and

citizenship issues in international and multilateral forums. The Department has an enviable worldwide reputation in combating the illegal traffic in people (CIC, 1999b: 6).

Activities devoted to preventing illegal migrants from reaching Canada are key to any effective enforcement program in terms of cost to the taxpayer, program integrity and public safety (CIC, 2000: 21).

[CIC] contributes to the management of international migration and travel by combating illegal migration, including trafficking in people, while facilitating the movement of legitimate travelers (CIC, 1998b: 17).

The discourse on illegal migration and human trafficking operated to create a distinction between ‘legitimate’ migrants, victim migrants, and fraudulent migrants. It is also relevant to note here the explicit gendered portrayal of women and children as vulnerable victims in need of state protection. As noted for other themes, however, the portrayals of migrants were, in large part, secondary to positive portrayals of the Canadian state. Indeed, the state’s quest for legitimacy was clearly visible in references to CIC’s efforts to establish an effective program that both ensures Canadians’ safety and assists victims of trafficking. In this way, the state was presented so as to appeal to Canadians concerned with the threat and costs of illegal migration, while ensuring the state’s commitment to protecting vulnerable migrants. This discourse thus sought to establish the Canadian state as a humanitarian entity in the eyes of a wide variety of national and international stakeholders.

At the same time, however, despite emphasizing migrants’ potential vulnerability, the discourse on human trafficking was not unequivocal in its portrayal of immigrants as victims:

In May 2006, the Minister announced that the federal government has adopted new measures to help victims of human trafficking in Canada. Trafficking in persons violates the basic human rights of its victims. [...] To assist victims of human trafficking, temporary resident permits can be

issued for up to 120 days. The permit will enable victims to recover from the impact of this crime. Victims who receive temporary resident permits will also be exempted from the processing fee, and will be eligible for health-care benefits under the new Interim Federal Health program. The new measures have been carefully designed so that only *bona fide* victims of human trafficking will benefit from them (CIC, 2006a: 24-25; italics added).

As part of the Department's commitment to protecting victims of human trafficking, guidelines were released in May 2006 which encourage immigration officers to issue possible victims a short-term temporary resident permit (TRP). A longer-term TRP can be issued when it is established that the person is a victim of trafficking. The initial permit is fee-exempt. The permit gives access to health care and counselling via the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP) (CIC, 2007a: 26).

Would-be victims of human trafficking were commonly presented as potential abusers of the Temporary Resident Permit system, and thus were placed under a shadow of suspicion. In doing so, vulnerable victim migrants were at once distinguished from, as well as conflated with, fraudulent migrants. Again, the state's quest for legitimacy in the context of this theme reflects the broader social context of contemporary international migration, wherein human trafficking and smuggling are generating increasing demand for political action (see Laczko & Gramegna, 2003). In the present analysis, addressing potentially fraudulent victims of human trafficking tied into the state's quest for legitimacy by documenting the state's ability to distinguish between 'bona fide' and fraudulent trafficking victims. By portraying immigrants in these two polarized roles, CIC's concern for genuine victims and willingness to assist vulnerable migrants was articulated, while the department's ability to protect the Canadian nation from fraudulent, criminal immigrants was emphasized. In this way, representations of both the state and victims of trafficking (genuine and fraudulent) served to establish CIC's

activities as securing a safe and peaceful world for Canadians, ‘good’ immigrants, and vulnerable victims.

In terms of democratic racism, illegal migration and human trafficking serve as a site for articulating doubt about populations of newcomers that tend to be widely constructed in racialized terms. On the one hand, conceptualizing asylum seekers as would-be frauds obscures the racialized persecution that often prompts forced migration. Moreover, as Richmond (2001) points out, the requirements for obtaining asylum in Canada are such that immigrants from particular regions, such as central and southern African countries, face tangible difficulties in qualifying for selection as a Convention refugee. Efforts to stem illegal residence of asylum-seekers in Canada similarly racialize refugee protection; as Richmond (2001) explains, “the list of countries whose nationals now require a visitor’s or transit visa includes virtually all Third World countries known to have generated reactive migration flows in recent years” (p.18). To this end, granting the potential abuse of the refugee system provides ground for preserving racialized patterns of refuge in Canada, embedded in the distinction between ‘illegal/fraudulent’ asylum-seekers and ‘bona fide’ victims.

5.7 Conclusion

The present chapter sought to demonstrate that immigration policy discourse in the Canadian context is best understood in reference to the state’s quest for legitimacy in the face of immigration controversies and the effort to appeal to diverse stakeholders. In the current analysis, this quest for legitimacy involved a distinct imagining of the Canadian nation that variably defined and represented different groups of immigrants,

while simultaneously representing the Canadian population and the Canadian state in largely positive, shared terms of national self-glorification.

Underlying this analysis was the objective of evaluating the notion of democratic racism. More specifically, the chapter sought to address whether, in the context of immigration policy discourse, the deployment of discourses of dominance associated with democratic racism can actually be interpreted as racism. This chapter thus speaks to a socially and sociologically relevant topic of contention. From a social perspective, it is critical to assess what constitutes racism such that anti-racist initiatives can appropriately address new and subtle expressions of discrimination. However, as illustrated by the Canadian examples discussed at the beginning of this chapter (i.e., about Rob Ford and the Centre for Immigration Policy Reform), uncovering and challenging racist talk is difficult when racism is elusive, or even “invisible or unwittingly practiced” (Henry & Tator, 2000: 287). From a sociological perspective, this issue bears on the conceptual challenges of defining ‘racism’ and determining the extent to which racialization, accomplished through expressions of ‘difference’ or ‘diversity,’ can be interpreted as racism. As demonstrated in this chapter, it is theoretically necessary, from a sociological perspective, to evaluate the social context within which racialization occurs in order to more fully comprehend the place of ‘race’ in contemporary democratic societies, wherein racial (and other) discrimination is prohibited by law and evokes widespread social disapproval. Given the intersections between racialization, ‘racism,’ and contemporary immigration trends in Canada, immigration policy discourse offers a conceptually fruitful avenue for pursuing these issues.

Overall, the present chapter demonstrated that discourses of dominance commonly interpreted as ‘democratic racism’ are not exclusively discourses of racism. Rather, in the Canadian immigration policy context, these discourses involved elements of both inclusivity and exclusivity, wherein immigrants were inconsistently and ambiguously constructed in both positive and negative lights, depending on the immediate context in which the state’s legitimacy was being pursued (that is, the social issue and/or the audience being addressed). At times, ‘immigrants,’ as a broad group, were at times depicted as outsiders who stood in binary opposition to Canadians and the Canadian state, and at other times portrayed as insiders that contribute to the Canadian nation. On other occasions, the primary polarization was between family-class immigrants and economic immigrants, in which case the former were marginalized while the latter were positioned as insiders to the Canadian nation. In some instances, an ill-defined distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants was evident while, in other instances, ‘immigrant’ or Canadian status was unclear, resulting in, for instance, a marginalization of defaulting family-class sponsors, or a ‘folk’ construction of visible minorities as immigrants.

In all of these instances, interpretations of democratic racism would be hinged on the assumption that immigrants were conceptualized exclusively in terms of ‘race.’ Yet, in cases where this type of ‘Othering’ occurred in the discourse analyzed, it often was not clearly reducible to ‘race,’ nor could it necessarily be interpreted as racist *per se*. In the case of family-class immigrants, for instance, the framework of democratic racism would suggest that the widespread problematization of this group is evidence of racism. Yet, the extent to which this is the case is not entirely clear, given the complex

intersections between bureaucratic category of admission, gender, 'race,' social class, and even age. In this regard, the present analysis provided an empirical confirmation of Satzewich's (1998) suggestion that democratic racism is perhaps too broadly conceptualized, in light of its assumption that all expressions of racialization are necessarily racist. In Satzewich's (1998b) example, "it is difficult to see why critics of employment equity and supporters of the federal government's policy of multiculturalism should necessarily be labeled as democratic racists" (p.38). The present analysis upholds this conclusion by illustrating that democratic discourses of dominance do not, in all instances, seem to revolve around 'race,' but, rather, are deeply embedded in complex and multi-dimensional conceptualizations of immigrants. To this end, the present chapter suggests that, in contexts where references to 'race' are obscure to the point of being highly evasive or 'invisible,' the extent to which they should be labeled 'racist' is questionable; labeling them as such may thus serve to construct (rather than simply identify) racism.

Overall, the present chapter uncovered both the usefulness and the limitations of the democratic racism framework. In support of this framework, the discourses of dominance uncovered in the analysis served to erase internal divisions, conflicts, and inequalities within Canadian society, and acted to obscure racial discrimination at Canadian borders in both historical and contemporary contexts. At the same time, however, the constraints of the framework, including its focus on race in isolation from other highly pertinent dimensions of discrimination (e.g., gender), and the tendency to locate democratic racism in discourses that are at times 'invisible' in their allusion to 'race,' is somewhat problematic. To this end, the present chapter highlights the ongoing

challenge associated with the concepts of 'race' and 'racism' in sociological research, particularly in the context of Canadian immigration. The upcoming chapter indirectly addresses this issue by calling attention to the statistical measurement of immigrants in Canada.

CHAPTER SIX: STATISTICAL MEASUREMENT AS DISCOURSE

“Statistics are to bodies and social types what maps are to territories: they flatten and enclose” (Appadurai, 1993: 333-4).

6.0 Introduction

In 20 years, nearly half (46%) of Canadians over the age of 15 will be born somewhere else in the world, or have at least one foreign-born parent, according to new Statistics Canada diversity projections released this morning (Vallis, 2010, March 9).

A new report from Statistics Canada reveals that...in 1991, only 12 per cent of established male immigrants with a university degree were in jobs that required little education, such as taxi or truck driving. In 2006, that number had risen to 21 per cent. The trend among established degree-holding female immigrants was similar (Weeks, 2009, December 23).

Newcomer Numbers: **44%**: Proportion of GTA residents born in another country. **43%**: Proportion of newcomers to Canada since 1985 who have settled in the Toronto area. **100-plus**: Languages and dialects spoken in Toronto. **252,000**: New immigrants to Canada in 2009. **23,000**: Refugees arrived in 2009. Source: Statistics Canada (Doolittle, 2010, August 18).

These excerpts from media reports on immigration demonstrate that official data occupy a distinct presence in Canadian immigration discourses. Politicians, the media, and various experts commonly present ‘newcomer numbers’ to debate the merits and costs of immigration to the Canadian nation. Through these discourses, immigration data enter the public consciousness and inform Canadians about the ‘face’ of their nation. Statistics from official sources hold weight in public and political debates and planning. They can provide the basis for legitimizing policy continuation or, alternatively, policy change. They can also be used by advocacy groups to lobby for funding or programming. In short – there is power in numbers.

In principle, the objectivity of official measures used to produce statistical knowledge ensures accurate understandings of population groups, suitable program development, and appropriate distribution of public resources. However, official data collection occurs within social, political and normative contexts that shape the impetus for data collection, the nature of the data collected, the measures used to collect data, and the fashion in which data are interpreted and used (see Bélanger et al., 2010; Boyd & Norris, 2001; Curtis, 2002; 1994; Kertzer & Arel, 2002a; King-O'Riain, 2007; Nobles, 2002, 2000; Rallu et al., 2006). Existing work has documented the manner in which immigration and ethnic diversity in Canada have generated political and social demands for particular data (e.g., on visible minorities) (Boyd et al., 2000; Goldscheider, 2002). Yet, the manner in which official measurement constructs 'immigrants,' as types of people with particular social locations in the Canadian imagined community, has not been addressed, despite the theoretical and practical relevance of such an analysis.

To this end, the present chapter reports results of a critical discourse analysis of the *Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada* (LSIC) questionnaire and analytical reports. An examination of the LSIC stands to elucidate in detail the bureaucratic construction of immigrants in Canada. The LSIC is the only official survey in Canada that provides a focused examination of recent immigrants in Canada; as such, it is likely to contribute widely to the manner in which immigrants in Canada are statistically constructed and understood in a wide variety of contexts. Moreover, the content of the LSIC questionnaire can be viewed as evidence of the issues that have been identified as being most relevant to study from the standpoint of officials and experts. Examining the

questions asked, the manner in which they were asked, and the questions not asked allows for a consideration of the ideological influences shaping data collection. An analysis of LSIC materials can thus be revealing of the Canadian state's imagining of Canada's national community by highlighting the manner in which recent newcomers are socially constructed by official measurement.

The chapter argues that the LSIC reflects concerns and tensions surrounding the presence of immigrants from non-traditional source countries in Canada. The questionnaire constructs these immigrants' identities in accordance with the broader public and political discourses on immigration in Canada. The chapter illustrates that the LSIC contributes to the social construction of recent immigrants' identities by measuring them first, as ethnic beings, and second, as their bureaucratic categories of admission. These identities are clearly located within an individualistic, 'gender-neutral' human capital framework that mirrors Canadian immigration policy and policy discourse. The LSIC thus informs the construction of Canada's imagined community along the lines of ethnicity and mode of entry to the end of upholding prevailing dominant understandings of immigrants in broader academic, policy, and public environments.

This chapter's analysis is informed by two major bodies of scholarly work. The first pertains to census-taking and the political project of official data collection. The second body of work relates to critical examinations of migrant typologies. These literatures are, to a large degree, distinct; indeed, critiques of migrant typologies are often not articulated in reference to the issue of measurement. However, as the upcoming discussion illustrates, measurement and typological constructions of

immigrants are actually quite intertwined. The present chapter articulates this connection and draws together these literatures by locating them within the theoretical context of imagined communities and imagined futures.

6.1 Population Measurement

Much of the existing work on the ‘political project’ of measuring population groups has focused on censuses. Numerous authors have argued that censuses played a central role in historical nation-building (Alonso & Starr, 1987; Anderson, 2006; Appadurai, 1993; Boyd et al., 2000; Clark, 1998; Curtis, 2002, 1995, 1994; Dunae, 1998; Nobles, 2000; Urla, 1993). In this literature, census-taking is interpreted as having been directly involved in defining national communities by allowing states to meticulously “count the objects of [their] feverish imagining” (Anderson, 2006: 169). Both Curtis (2002) and Anderson (2006) view censuses as a means by which states historically solidified their own existence, enabling them to define both their catchment area and their constituents. According to Curtis, the census also enabled the Canadian modern state to “translate visions of social relations in Canada into authoritative numerical accounts” (Curtis, 2002: 17). In a vastly different context – namely, colonial states in Southeast Asia – Anderson (2006) similarly comments on the role of the census in states’ social imagining. Anderson points out that precolonial population measurement involved enumeration of specific segments of populations in the form of tax-rolls and levy-lists. This served to document population members who were eligible for taxation and military conscription. However, under colonialism, states developed increasingly sophisticated means of enumerating entire populations under their domain, including

previously ignored population members such as women and children. Given the nature of colonial rule in Southeast Asia, ethnic-racial classification was central to colonial states' efforts to numerically capture populations. As Anderson (2006) explains:

The new demographic topography put down deep social and institutional roots as the colonial state multiplied its size and functions. Guided by its imagined map it organized the new educational, juridical, public-health, police, and immigration bureaucracies it was building on the principle of ethno-racial hierarchies... (p.169).

In this context, population measurement was directly implicated in the state's efforts to build a nation's infrastructure, yet was also central to the bureaucratic construction of imagined communities along ethno-racial lines.

Other work has more pointedly addressed the central issue of measuring race and ethnicity in official contexts. It is relevant to note that, while this work has not typically been directly focused on immigration, it indirectly speaks to immigration, in the sense that interest in data on race and ethnicity historically arose with the merging of 'different' population groups. Boyd et al. (2000), for instance, demonstrate that early census-taking in North America was infused with motivations relating to nation-building. In this context, documenting racial hierarchies was tied into efforts to define the boundaries of states' domination. In the early 20th century, for example, Canadian Censuses included explicit questions about 'race' and 'racial origin,' and also provided enumerators with express instructions on how to categorize respondents accordingly (Boyd et al., 2000). For instance, measurement was structured such that offspring of ethnically mixed marriages (that is, between 'whites' and 'other races') were documented as 'non-white.' This classification subsequently excluded them from official privileges associated with 'whiteness' (Boyd et al., 2000). Official data were

thus implicated in historically constructing Canada's national community in both material and symbolic terms by reifying boundaries that "...derived from and reaffirmed prevailing ideologies in which white was superior and dominant in relation to other non-white groups" (Boyd et al., 2000: 40).

Boyd et al. (2000) further demonstrate that variations in the official measurement of race over time in Canada reflect changing conceptualizations of race and race relations. For instance, the declining acceptability of 'racial' questions in the mid-20th century led to shifts in the manner in which race was operationalized in official surveys. In 1951, the notion of 'ethnic origin' replaced official survey questions on 'race' in Canada (Boyd, 1999). Issues surrounding race and race relations shaped not only the manner in which questions were asked, but also the demand for certain data. For example, in the later decades of the 20th century in Canada, concerns over racism and equality brought about unique data needs that influenced both the impetus for data collection as well as the nature of data collected in official surveys. Canada's multiculturalism policy in 1971, the enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, and the implementation of the Employment Equity Act in 1986 all represented specific political projects that required data in order to implement and evaluate their mandate. These social concerns and administrative needs led to modifications of population measurement. Demands for data on visible minorities, for instance, led to the inclusion of a visible minority question on the Canadian Census for the first time in 1996. Again, these changes illustrate that questions asked and response options provided on official surveys are shaped by broader social and political understandings

of social groups and their membership in society, as well as broader political pressures for particular data.

Research on official surveys other than censuses has also documented the manner in which ideological assumptions shape measurement of population groups. For instance, in a critical examination of national surveys on foreign spouses in Taiwan and South Korea, Bélanger et al. (2010) contend that ideological influences and prevailing stereotypes influenced the production of statistics on migrants by shaping the assumptions underlying questionnaire construction. Bélanger et al. argue that the surveys demonstrate three ideologies: (1) a desire to ‘erase’ differences and assimilate migrant women into Taiwanese or Korean society; (2) the location of these women in patriarchal families; and (3) a nationalistic attitude that positioned foreign spouses as inferior ‘others.’ These ideologies meant that immigrant women were first and foremost constructed as foreigners married to Taiwanese or Korean men. The questionnaire also implicitly and paternalistically constructed foreign brides as a potentially vulnerable group of women in need of help. Bélanger et al. (2010) further conclude that these official measures aimed to some extent at controlling immigrant spouses, in the sense that the surveys implied an interest in assimilation, yet may also reinforce exclusion and stereotypes by painting immigrant spouses in specific lights.

As the above literature demonstrates, official data collection is inherently political, and occurs within broader social and ideological contexts that define the phenomena that are relevant to measure, how these phenomena are understood, and, by extension, how they are approached in survey construction and data collection. The above review, however, also hints at the inherent categorization entailed in the

measurement of population groups. Generation of statistics from both census and non-census instruments necessarily entails grouping of cases. It follows that, in data analysis and interpretation, individuals are located within particular groups – for instance, according to gender, ‘race’/ethnicity, occupation, immigration status, etc. By constructing statistical boundaries around categories, individuals are, in essence, located within a series of typologies that, taken together, circumscribe the reality of their lives. In the context of official measurement, individuals’ location within a typology also stands to render them an object of public policy (see Schneider & Ingram, 1993), thereby directly affecting their positioning to the state and to other groups in society. In this regard, official measurement is implicated in defining group boundaries (often to exclusionary ends), shaping access to resources and rights, influencing identity formation, and affecting broader views about different social groups (Abramson, 2002; Alonso & Starr, 1987; Blum, 2002; Curtis, 2002, 1994; Kertzer & Arel, 2002b). To this end, it is relevant to address existing work criticizing the tendency to locate immigrants in mutually exclusive categories, in light of the fact that measurement both depends on conceptualizations of such categorizations, and is also implicated in upholding these categorizations.

6.2 Constructing Immigrants: Problematic Dichotomies

One of the main categorizations of immigrants that has been addressed in the literature speaks directly to the gendered construction of women immigrants – namely, the ‘wife’ or ‘worker’ dichotomy. This dichotomy, which is pervasive in both research and policy contexts, has been problematized by Piper (2003) and Piper and Roces (2003). As Piper

(2003) explains in reference to South East and East Asian women migrants, “scholars concerned with women’s migratory patterns typically discuss women as either migrants for marriage or as overseas contract workers ... (i.e. the woman as worker or as ‘bride’)” (Piper, 2003: 458). As a result of a mutually exclusive conceptualization of women migrants as either economic migrants or family migrants, these women’s multiple roles as workers, spouses, parents, and, more broadly, society members and potential future citizens, are obscured. Indeed, the tendency to study women as either ‘workers’ or ‘wives’ misrepresents complex migratory pathways wherein these analytical categories are, in reality, blurred, variable, and fluid (see Piper & Roces, 2003).

Another migrant categorization that has been problematized involves the distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ status. Goldring et al. (2009) point out that binary conceptualizations of migrant legality do not reflect the reality of migrants’ various legal statuses. As an alternative, the authors introduce the concept of precariousness to capture a continuum of migrant legality, and to document the connections between precarious status and citizenship. Goldring et al. (2009) illustrate the value of a non-dichotomous approach by documenting the numerous possible pathways toward precariousness. The authors demonstrate that, in Canada, migrant precariousness is legally produced through temporary foreign worker programs or loss of status. Temporary foreign workers are, by definition, conferred precarious status by the state in light of their limited access to social programs and their pre-determined restriction from future citizenship. Moreover, their legal status is directly tied to their relationship with an employer; if this relationship is terminated, the migrant risks loss of

legal status. Permanent residents are also not exempt from precariousness. Legal residents can lose their status under certain circumstances, such as if they are convicted of a criminal offense, or if they fail to remain in Canada for the duration required to meet residency requirements. Refugee claims made from within the country entail a lengthy determination process. Throughout this process, claimants can find themselves in various states of precariousness that can either lead to permanent status or formal designation of non-status. Overall, as Goldring et al.'s (2009) work demonstrates, immigrants can occupy a range of social locations that fall along a continuum of legality. These varying gradations of immigrant status confirm the inaccuracy of a simplistic, binary conceptualization of migrant legality.

Although not expressly articulated in the above work, it can be argued that official measurement is intimately implicated in upholding distinctions between 'wives' and 'workers,' and between 'legal' and 'illegal' migrants. Immigrants typically enter their destination country under a certain 'immigrant' designation (e.g., temporary foreign worker, economic-class permanent resident, family-class permanent resident, etc.). Insofar as official data are collected according to these bureaucratic categories and are subsequently used in scholarly research, then immigrants stand to be continually reconstructed within the boundaries of the categories for which data were collected. Thus, taking as an example the 'foreign brides' surveys discussed by Bélanger et al. (2010), by virtue of the fact that these women entered their country of destination with the designation of 'foreign bride,' the subsequent collection and analytical use of data on this group maintains this categorization. In this example, women's categorization as 'wives' (as opposed to workers, even if they are, in fact, employed) was also linked to

ethnic measurement, leading to their dual construction as wives and foreigners. In reference to Goldring et al.'s (2009) work, the authors illustrate the inaccuracies associated with dichotomous conceptualizations of migrant legality, as discussed above.

Yet, they also note:

There are no efforts to collect large-scale systematic data about people with confusing or no migratory status...Estimates of the number of people without an authorized migratory status in Canada range from 200,000 to 500,000. This range reflects the problem of defining the population in question and the absence of systematic empirical analyses of 'the numbers' by academics, government, or NGOs (Goldring et al., 2009: 242).

As this statement indicates, collection of official data is typically limited to immigrants with official legal status. By extension, statistical analyses conducted by state departments, academics, or other experts on the basis of these data will maintain the legal/illegal distinction. This conclusion speaks to the link between official data collection and subsequent considerations of migrants.

These two examples shed light on the manner in which official measurement contributes to the social construction of immigrants, both in an immediate sense (i.e., in terms of conceptualization and operationalization) and in a broader sense (in terms of the manner in which these categorizations are deployed through use of the resulting data). Insofar as data – and the associated representations of immigrants – enter into the public and political sphere, they become implicated in the construction of imagined communities and the positioning of immigrants within the national imagination. To this end, the present chapter explores the intertwining of official measurement and migrant categorization in the construction of Canada's imagined community. The chapter specifically examines the LSIC questionnaire and data reports to evaluate the

representations of immigrants that are embedded in official measurement, and to consider how these representations are circumscribed in categorical terms relating to gender, 'race'/ethnicity, and bureaucratic category of admission. In this way, the chapter addresses how the social construction of immigrants through official measurement contributes to the broader construction of Canada's imagined community.

6.3 Data Sources

The upcoming analysis addresses both the LSIC questionnaire and Statistics Canada analytical reports of the LSIC results. These two sources of data provide important insight into the contemporary bureaucratic construction of immigrants in Canada through statistical knowledge.

6.31 LSIC Questionnaire

The LSIC is dedicated to understanding Canada's recent immigrant population, and, as previously noted, is the only official Canadian survey having recent immigrants as its target population. Conducted jointly by Statistics Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the LSIC was developed in the interest of generating information on immigrant adaptation, settlement, and integration. Although other official data sources (including the Census) contain questions about immigration status, these measures typically address basic demographic considerations (e.g., country of birth, citizenship, landed immigrant status, year immigrated to Canada), and do not consider the immigrant settlement experience. As such, the LSIC was conducted in order to fill existing knowledge gaps on recent immigrants in Canada (Ruddick et al., 2005). The

survey was officially implemented in order to provide detailed information on the settlement process to “federal and provincial governments, immigrant settlement assistance agencies, non-governmental organizations, and researchers” (Grondin, 2007: 46).

The LSIC is presented by Statistics Canada as “a comprehensive survey designed to study how newly arrived immigrants adjust over time to living in Canada [that will] provide a clear understanding of how the settlement process unfolds for new arrivals” (Chui, 2003: 5). The survey was designed through a process of consultation with federal departments and a committee of external researchers with expertise in immigration. Wherever possible, questions were drawn from existing Statistics Canada surveys in order to allow comparability between different population groups. A pilot questionnaire was developed, and focus group testing was conducted. The pilot questionnaire was implemented in the first wave of the survey. Based on these results and in consultation with experts and federal departments, existing content was modified and new content was added. It should be noted that the survey consisted of predominantly closed-ended questions (although some questions allowed respondents to select ‘other’ and specify an answer that was not included as a response option). The present chapter specifically addresses the LSIC Wave 3 questionnaire.⁴⁰ A summary of this questionnaire is provided in Appendix C.

⁴⁰ As a longitudinal survey, the LSIC was performed in three waves, with the questionnaires from the second two being modified slightly from the previous wave. All three questionnaire versions were analyzed in advance of writing this chapter. Although there were changes across the different versions of the questionnaire that may affect statistical comparability of longitudinal data, these changes were not substantial from a sociological perspective. As such, the chapter discusses only the Wave 3 questionnaire. This version is the most recent of all three, and presumably reflects the ‘best’ version of the questionnaire from an official standpoint, having incorporated revisions of earlier waves. A summary of the changes can be found in the LSIC Microdata User Guide, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/imdb-bmdi/document/4422_D1_T1_V3-eng.pdf.

6.32 LSIC Reports

Examining the Statistics Canada analytical reports associated with the LSIC adds another level of understanding to the construction of immigrants through statistical knowledge. The reports document statistical ‘realities’ about immigrants that are commonly cited in broader discourses, as revealed in the opening pages of this chapter. The reports examined in this chapter were typically authored by one or more analyst employed at Statistics Canada, at times in collaboration with consultants from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (see Appendix D). Although it might be tempting to interpret the content of these reports as reflecting the interests and opinions of these authors alone, the reports were developed within a state context, and, as such, likely reflect a particular organizational logic (see Acker, 1990; Clegg & Dunkerley, 1980 regarding the notion of organizational logic). More important than this point, however, is the fact that these reports were published under the auspices of the Canadian state. The content of the reports thus enters the public domain as official, privileged knowledge about immigrants (see van Dijk, 1993a, 1989, regarding the power of discourse emerging from official sources; see also Chapter Two of this thesis).

6.4 Methods

The LSIC questionnaire and analytical reports were obtained from Statistics Canada’s official website. In order to select relevant publications for analysis, substantive reports on immigration were searched, including ones geared toward a general audience and ones intended for scientific and policy-oriented audiences (e.g., research papers,

technical papers). Publications were verified for use of LSIC data, and documents that were exclusively based on the LSIC results were included in the present analysis.

The LSIC Wave 3 questionnaire and the selected analytical reports were content analyzed. Major themes were identified and analyzed as a form of discourse, and were interpreted within the conceptual framework of this thesis. Particular consideration was given to the manner in which the questionnaire and statistical reports reflected and informed categorical conceptualizations of immigrants, and the implications of these categorizations for the symbolic positioning of immigrants relative to Canada's imagined community.

6.5 Results

6.5.1 Immigrant Identity: Ethnicity

The analysis revealed that ethnicity, particularly in reference to social networks, occupied a central place in the LSIC. Indeed, the questionnaire contained numerous questions about immigrants' co-ethnic affiliations. Respondents were asked to quantify how many of their connections in various social contexts involved individuals who belonged to the same 'ethnic or cultural group' as them (with response options being 'all of them,' 'most of them,' 'about half of them,' 'few of them,' or 'none of them'). This question was asked in reference to: (1) new friends; (2) neighbours; (3) members of community groups or organizations in which the respondent was involved; (4) children's school friends; (5) co-workers; (6) business partners; (7) employees; (8) clients; and (9) business suppliers. If respondents reported obtaining employment through a friend, they were asked whether this friend was from the same ethnic/cultural

group as them. In some instances, they were asked to clarify how many of the individuals in the groups listed above were also recent immigrants to Canada (with the same response options as previously noted). In addition, respondents were asked about the importance of their ethnic/cultural group membership as follows:

- (1) How important is it to you that the people providing health care are of the same ethnic or cultural group as you? [*response options: very important; important; not very important; not important at all*]
- (2) When you think of others in Canada from the same ethnic or cultural group as yourself, how close would you say that you feel to them? [*response options: very close; close; not very close; not close at all*]
- (3) How important is it for you to maintain ties with others in Canada from the same ethnic or cultural group as yourself? [*response options: very important; important; not very important; not important at all*]
- (4) How important is it for you to establish and maintain ties with others in Canada who are not from the same ethnic or cultural group as yourself? [*response options: very important; important; not very important; not important at all*]
- (5) How important is it for you to carry on the values and traditions of your ethnic or cultural group or your homeland? [*response options: very important; important; not very important; not important at all*]
- (6) How important is it for you that [selected child's name] knows and carries on the values and traditions of your ethnic or cultural group or your homeland? [*response options: very important; important; not very important; not important at all*]
- (7) Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not strong at all and 5 is very strong, how strong is your sense of belonging to your ethnic or cultural group?
- (8) Is [selected child's name] currently studying the language or traditions of your ethnic or cultural group or homeland at school or in special classes? [*response options: yes; no*]
- (9) Would you like to have [selected child's name] study the language or traditions of your ethnic or cultural group, or of your homeland? [*response options: yes; no*]

These questions define immigrants as ethnic beings, and identify ethnicity as a key principle according to which immigrants structure their lives. It is notable that, in question 3 above, respondents were asked about the importance of maintaining ties with people in Canada who are of the same ethnic group as them, yet, in question 4, they were asked about *establishing* and maintaining ties with people who are not from the same ethnic group as them. The implication here is that immigrants' initial ties in Canada are expected to be with people of the same ethnicity.

As questions 8 and 9 above suggest, language also emerged in the LSIC questionnaire as a means of constructing immigrants as ethnic beings. Indeed, many of the previously outlined questions were directly repeated to address language (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Examples of LSIC Language Questions

What language do you speak most often at home?
In what language [is/was] [selected child's name] mainly taught at school?
In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with your business partner(s)?
In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with your employee(s)?
In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with your clients?
In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with your suppliers?
In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with the people you [work/worked] with?
In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with the clients of the company you [are/were] working for?
In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with the suppliers [of the company you are/were working for]?
How important is it to you that the people providing health care speak your language?
Does [selected child's name] understand and speak the language of your homeland?

How important is it for you that [selected child's name] continues to understand and speak the language of your homeland?
How important is it for you that [selected child's name] learns to understand and speak the language of your homeland?
How important is it to you that [selected child's name] speaks English well? [<i>repeated for French</i>]

These questions are indicative of interest in determining the degree of co-ethnic affiliations, particularly in the context of economic exchanges (i.e., in a business context), as well as retention of ethnic/cultural practices. In this regard, the LSIC seemed geared toward collecting information about ethnic enclaves. As Li (2003c) notes, ethnic enclaves are often constructed in political and public discourses as potentially detrimental to the integration process, and as being at odds with mainstream Canadian society. In this context, it is assumed that, insofar as ethnic enclaves “restrict their members and shield them from alternative norms, values, and behaviours, they can discourage immigrants from full participation in society and perpetuate segregation” (Employment and Immigration Canada; cited in Li, 2003c: 8). Alternatively, although evidence indicates that ethnic enclaves can have a detrimental impact on the economic well-being of immigrants (Warman, 2007), they have also been interpreted as a resource that promotes social cohesion (Qadeer & Kumar, 2006). Either way, the extensive questions on ethnic affiliations serve to represent immigrants as ethnic beings, thereby defining ethnicity as a foremost factor in immigrants’ lives.

Building on this point, the LSIC contained extensive questions about immigrants’ competence in English and French and their intentions to improve their language skills (see selected examples, Table 6.2).

Table 6.2 Examples of LSIC Questions on English and French Language Skills⁴¹

How well can you speak English? [<i>also asked for French</i>]
How easy is it for you to tell someone in English what your address is? [<i>also asked for French</i>]
How easy is it for you to tell someone in English what you did before immigrating to Canada? [<i>also asked for French</i>]
How easy is it for you to understand a message in English over the phone? [<i>also asked for French</i>]
How easy is it for you to tell a doctor who speaks only English what the problem is? [<i>also asked for French</i>]
How easy is it for you to ask someone who speaks only English to re-arrange a meeting with you? [<i>also asked for French</i>]
How well can you write in English? [<i>also asked for French</i>]
How well can you read in English? [<i>also asked for French</i>]
Since your last interview, do you think that your English has improved? This includes reading, speaking and/or writing English. [<i>also asked for French</i>]
Have you taken any steps to improve your English, other than English language training? [<i>also asked for French</i>]
What steps have you taken to improve your English? [<i>also asked for French</i>]
How important it is for you to learn or improve your English? [<i>also asked for French</i>]
Since your last interview, have you tried to find information about English or French language training?

What is most interesting about these questions is that they effectively reduced communication to language skill. In this regard, language proficiency of immigrants

⁴¹ It should be noted that skip patterns are embedded in the LSIC. For instance, in reference to language skills, if a respondent indicated that English was their native language and that they speak English most often at home, they were not asked about English language training or their ability to use English in different situations.

who speak English or French stood as cultural competence, while integration was equated with linguistic competence in basic exchanges.

The LSIC questionnaire also included a small number of questions about discrimination, which further revealed heightened interest in the ethnic identity of the LSIC population:

Now I would like to end this section by asking you a few questions about discrimination. Discrimination may happen when people are perceived as being different from others. Since your last interview, have you experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly by others because of your ethnicity, culture, race or skin colour, language or accent, or religion? (Statistics Canada, 2005: 28).

If participants responded that they had experienced discrimination, they were asked to specify which of the above factors (i.e., ethnicity, culture, race or skin colour, language or accent, or religion) was the reason for this discrimination (with the ability to mark all that applied, yet no option to specify 'other'), along with the frequency with which they had experienced discrimination, and the setting within which it had occurred (e.g., on the street; in a store, bank or restaurant; at work; when looking for a place to live, etc.). What is notable here is that the response options for experiences of discrimination were exclusively constructed around the presumption of 'racial'/ethnic difference. The questions also reveal the primacy that was attributed to ethnic identity over other dimensions of social existence; most notable, in this regard, was the absence of gender. Gender was not an option in questions on discrimination, nor could respondents specify another response option. Again, these findings both reflect assumptions about who 'immigrants' are, in the eyes of the state, and contribute to the broader construction of immigrants as 'ethnic' foreigners in Canada.

The construction of immigrants in terms of ethnicity and ethnic affiliations was also visible in the LSIC reports:

One reason for the high proportion of co-ethnic friendships may be because immigrants are more likely to carry on the traditions and values of their ethnic or cultural group or their homeland with friends who are of the same background (Ruddick et al., 2005: 85).

Most immigrants reported that their new friends were from the same ethnic or cultural background. This may ease the integration process of new immigrants while helping to maintain ethnic or cultural ties with their homeland, which was also important to new immigrants. However, meeting friends who are not co-ethnic may facilitate a better understanding of local norms and establish local networks (Ruddick et al., 2005: 89).

These statements dichotomize ‘Canadian’ values and traditions from ‘ethnic’ values and traditions, positioning immigrants *and* non-immigrant ethnic groups in Canada on the borders of the Canadian national community by suggesting that their ethnic status is at odds with their ability to understand Canadian norms, and that their ethnic networks segregate them from the Canadian population.

The implication that immigrant integration can be hindered by ethnic group membership was visible elsewhere in the reports:

Examining new friends by ethnicity reveals variations in the extent to which newcomers make friends within their own ethnic group. The majority of East/Southeast and South Asians reported that all or most of their new friends are co-ethnic (90% and 77%, respectively), followed by 58% of Eastern Europeans. This difference in social network composition may affect the type and quantity of resources flowing through newcomers’ social networks, and help explain differences in the integration process by ethnicity (Ruddick et al., 2005: 85).

In Ruddick et al.’s (2005) interpretation of the statistics, networks composed of larger numbers of ‘ethnic’ are presented as being less rich in the resources that will aid newcomers’ integration into Canadian society. In other words, ‘ethnic’ friends were

presented as maintaining the ‘foreignness’ of newcomers, and as hindering immigrants’ ability to become more like ‘Canadians.’ The implication here was that different groups are inherently more equipped for success in Canadian society, based solely on their ‘ethnic’ status.

Concerns over ethnicity also surfaced implicitly in the LSIC questionnaire in the form of questions about family sponsorship. These questions also revealed evidence of the broader problematization of family-class immigrants in Canada (discussed in previous chapters). Respondents were specifically asked the following questions pertaining to their sponsorship experience and intentions:

- (1) Do you currently live with your sponsor?
- (2) In the past 12 months, how often have you seen or talked to your sponsor?
- (3) Was your immigration sponsored by your current spouse/common-law partner?
- (4) In the past 12 months, what kind of help has your sponsor given you? [*response options: financial; information; legal help; child care; basic needs; general support; transportation; language help; find/look for work; emotional support; other; no help from sponsor*]
- (5) Are you currently sponsoring or do you intend to sponsor anyone/anyone else to come to Canada?
- (6) Who are you currently sponsoring/do you intend to sponsor to come to Canada?

Respondents who had indicated in a previous LSIC interview that they had intended on sponsoring a family member were also asked the following questions, as applicable:

- (1) Did you sponsor or are you currently sponsoring your spouse/common-law partner to come to Canada?
- (2) Since your last interview, has your spouse/common-law partner immigrated to Canada?
- (3) Did you sponsor or are you currently sponsoring your children to come to Canada?

- (4) Since your last interview, have your children immigrated to Canada?
- (5) Did you sponsor or are you currently sponsoring your parents to come to Canada?
- (6) Since your last interview, have your parents immigrated to Canada?
- (7) Did you sponsor or are you currently sponsoring your grandparents to come to Canada?
- (8) Since your last interview, have your grandparents immigrated to Canada?

Interest in measuring sponsorship experiences and intentions is not politically neutral, but can be linked to concerns over sponsorship default and the influx of ‘unskilled’ immigrants. Moreover, although the above questions regarding sponsorship do not make any reference to ethnicity, concerns over the extended familialism of certain ethnic groups have been historically entrenched in Canadian immigration discourse (Daniel, 2005; Li, 2003c; Satzewich, 1993; Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007). As discussed in Chapter Three, controversy surrounding the liberalization of family-class sponsorship rights in the 1950s has often been interpreted as evidence of a discriminatory bias against certain ethnic groups’ ‘unreasonable’ commitment to family. As Li (2003c) notes: “Immigration discourse periodically dwells on the extended familialism of other cultures as a challenge to managing the ‘unchosen’ family-class immigration” (p.7). In this context, LSIC questions about sponsorship are arguably built around broader concerns relating to the sponsorship of immigrants from non-traditional source countries.

6.52 Immigrant Identity: Mode of Entry

The analysis revealed that, in the LSIC reports, immigrants’ mode of entry into Canada was the primary way in which their lives were circumscribed. In other words, the

avenue through which immigrants gained entry into Canada, either as an economic immigrant, an accompanying spouse of an economic immigrant, a family-class immigrant, or a refugee served as the primary basis according to which immigrants were categorized through the presentation of statistics.

The construction of immigrant identity in terms of bureaucratic admission category was accomplished in several ways. The first relates to the fact that the LSIC explicitly gathered data on mode of entry (and, notably, is the only official data source for which this information is available). As noted in one report: “the LSIC...contains information regarding newcomers’ immigration category, an important variable for understanding the issues and motivations of immigrants to Canada” (Grondin, 2007: 45). The manner in which information about immigrants’ mode of entry was presented in the reports further informed the social construction of immigrants in two main ways: first, by virtue of the descriptions themselves, and, second, through the subsequent organization of data according to these categories.

Each report began by clearly defining the objectives of Canada’s immigration program and the different types of immigrants corresponding to these goals. These portions of the reports all articulated some version of the fact that Canadian immigration policy is constructed around three broad goals: to foster a strong and viable economy, to reunite families, and to honour the country’s commitment to humanitarian efforts. These three objectives were then linked to their corresponding immigrant type and the manner in which these immigrants are selected (namely, based on skills and experience for skilled worker principal applicants in the economic class; other economic criteria for business and investment immigrants; family relationships for

spouses and dependents accompanying economic immigrants as well as for family-class immigrants; or status as a refugee). These categories were typically described as follows:

Skilled worker principal applicants are selected based on a number of criteria including their education, language ability and employment skills. These immigrants are deemed to be more likely to succeed in the labour force and contribute to the Canadian economy (Chui & Tran, 2005: 3).

Immigrants admitted under the economic category are persons who have actively sought to settle in Canada and have presumably prepared themselves for the transition – some may have been recruited. They are selected as individuals but may be accompanied by a spouse and dependent(s) (Ruddick et al., 2005: 10).

In the economic class, spouses and dependent children are admitted along with the principal applicants, without being individually skills-tested (Grondin, 2007: 48).

The family reunification category is made up of individuals who are joining family members already in Canada. Immigrants are sponsored by a relative in Canada who is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident and who has taken responsibility of providing support for their settlement [...]. There are no selection criteria for immigrants admitted under this category (Ruddick et al., 2005: 12).

The refugee category is made up of Convention refugees and other refugee-like persons who are deemed to require protection or relief. These persons may not have wanted to leave their country of origin, and may not have had the opportunity to prepare for moving to Canada (Ruddick et al., 2005: 12).

The sex distribution of these categories was typically also presented at this point in the reports: in the LSIC sample, 77% of principal applicants in the economic class were men, 75% of spouses of economic class immigrants were women, 63% of family-class immigrants were women, and 51% of refugees were women). These categories were subsequently used throughout the reports as the primary means of organizing and presenting data. In this regard, it is notable that, when results were reported for the

different immigrant groups, they were typically not disaggregated by sex for each immigrant type. In the absence of this information for individual results, the sex distribution of immigrant categories reported at the outset of the reports operated as a way of discursively gendering the subsequent statistics.

In terms of the descriptions of specific groups of immigrants, economic immigrants (and, most directly, skilled workers) were portrayed as active and skilled individuals who are suitable for inclusion in the Canadian nation. They were presented as having actively readied themselves for immigration to Canada, and as being likely to contribute to the economy (particularly compared to other immigrant types); as noted in Ruddick et al.'s (2005) statement above, some of these immigrants may have even been recruited by the Canadian government or employers for their abilities and their expected contribution to the nation. This representation portrays economic immigrants as desirable and contributing future citizens of Canada, and as necessarily more likely to succeed in Canadian society compared to other types of immigrants. Having already presented skilled workers as predominantly males (77%), this group was subsequently statistically constructed as male, such that 'successful' immigrants were presented as being men.

The manner in which skilled economic immigrants were described in the reports contrasts sharply with the manner in which skilled worker spouses (and dependents) and family-class immigrants were presented. Descriptions of spouses (and dependents) of skilled worker principal applicants emphasized the fact that these newcomers were 'self-selected' as opposed to having been selected by 'Canada.' While the reports emphasized the fact that principal applicants are selected for their skills and therefore

their ability to contribute to Canada, it is made equally clear that spouses of these applicants are granted entry as 'followers.' The dependent status of these spouses was portrayed through the organization of statistics for this group throughout the remainder of the reports. In all cases where statistics were presented for spouses of skilled worker principal applicants, the data were reported together for 'spouses and dependents' of skilled worker principal applicants (with results for principal applicants reported as a separate category). This automatic categorization of economic-class spouses with their dependent children is seen here as a very meaningful component of the construction of immigrant women through official measurement. Having already statistically identified principal applicants as male and their spouses and dependents as female, presenting statistics according to these divisions established gendered representations of male breadwinners on the one hand, and 'women and children' on the other. Although all of these immigrants (principal applicants, spouses, and dependents) technically fall within the economic class, they were never measured or interpreted on equal ground. More specifically, statistics were never presented separately for spouses and dependents, nor were results ever presented together for principal applicants and their spouses. Also meaningful is the grouping together of spouses and dependents of skilled workers as a single, distinct category; this infantilized women and constructed them as passive dependents, more on parallel ground with children than with their skilled worker spouse. The grouping of spouses and dependents together thus contributed to the construction of spouses as unskilled women that are dependent on their (principal applicant) husbands/partners.

Furthermore, while it is true that spouses of economic-class principal applicants are not granted entry based on skills testing of their own abilities, they are often highly educated, and their skill-level *is* taken into account in the evaluation of principal applicants. Under the point system, principal applicants are awarded points for their spouse's education level (under the Adaptability factor).⁴² In other words, spouses' formal education contributes directly to the selection of skilled worker principal applicants and professionals. This fact, however, is not mentioned in a single LSIC report analyzed here. The exclusion of this information ties into the social construction of skilled workers' spouses as passive (female) dependents by denying their role in the success of their partner's application.

Descriptions of family-class immigrants also stood in clear contrast to the portrayal of economic immigrants as active, contributing newcomers. As described above, family-class immigrants were presented as passive, unskilled immigrants who were self-selected (i.e., not selected by 'Canada') and who were being taken care of by their family in Canada. Nowhere in the reports was it mentioned that only specific types of relatives are eligible for entry under the family-class (see Chapters One and Three), nor was it noted that these immigrants must pass health and security screening prior to being granted entry to the country, thereby inaccurately representing family-class immigration as largely uncontrolled and unregulated. Moreover, the presence of family members is widely acknowledged as playing an important role in immigrant settlement (Boyd, 1991, 1989; Creese et al., 2008; Omidvar & Richmond, 2003; Satzewich, 1993;

⁴² See <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/factor-adaptability.asp>.

Stewart, 2006; VanderPlaat et al., 2009; Walton-Roberts, 2004b, 2003), a point that will be discussed later in this chapter.

It is also relevant to note that the reports typically discussed data in a comparative fashion across immigrant types. This structure of data presentation reified these labels as a meaningful way of identifying immigrants, and naturalized these groupings as the most legitimate way of evaluating newcomer success. Having already described the features of these groups in terms of their mode of entry in the immigration program, the reiteration of these categories throughout the reports and the use of these categories to organize statistical knowledge served to construct immigrant types as having concrete group boundaries. These categorizations thus homogenized immigrants within the groups, erasing internal differences of immigrants within these categories. In this way, immigration mode of entry was presumed to speak directly to immigrants' situations and personal characteristics. Overall, statistical categorization within these groups reduced immigrants' lives to the objectives of the immigration program, and oversimplified the complexity of immigration pathways and the multi-dimensionality of immigrants' motivations and experiences.

It should also be noted that statistics were not always presented for all groups of immigrants. The reports typically presented statistics for family-class immigrants; refugees; skilled worker principal applicants; skilled worker spouses and dependents; and 'other' economic immigrants (i.e., business and investor immigrants; live-in-caregivers; provincial and territorial nominees). Disaggregated statistics were not presented for 'other' economic immigrants in light of the fact that this group, together, represented only 10% of principal applicants in the economic component of the LSIC

sample (i.e., skilled workers represented 90% of economic-class principal applicants) (Ruddick, 2005). Although this decision was based on methodological constraints of statistical analysis, it nevertheless served to render the settlement experiences of certain immigrants invisible.

Overall, by organizing statistical data according to mode of entry categorizations, these groupings were reified and transformed into identifiable and veritable social types; in this way, intra-group variations in experiences were homogenized through statistical aggregation, and immigrants' experiences were constructed as being exclusively a function of their mode of entry category. More broadly, the categorization of data according to mode of entry is likely to be reiterated in subsequent references to LSIC data (e.g., in the media, or in research reports). In this way, the bureaucratic categorization of immigrants is likely to carry beyond the pages of the Statistics Canada reports, thereby contributing to broader representations of immigrants according to their mode of entry.

6.53 Immigrants and Economic Considerations: An Individualistic Focus

The analysis also revealed that the LSIC and its accompanying reports had an individualistic, human capital focus, with an emphasis on individual immigrants as the unit of analysis, and heightened attention to the economic dimensions of immigrants' lives. This finding suggests that the LSIC was influenced by broader neo-liberal discourses on immigrant self-sufficiency, and by the immigration program's human capital focus.

In terms of human capital, education and language skills represented approximately 16% (79 questions) and 14% (69 questions) of all LSIC questions, respectively. Examples of questions about education and training included:

- (1) What is the highest level of formal education you attained outside Canada?
- (2) What was your major field of study or specialization for your highest level of education attained outside Canada?
- (3) What was the language of instruction of your highest level of education attained outside of Canada?
- (4) Since your last interview, have you taken any education or training in Canada, excluding language instruction?
- (5) Since your last interview, have you taken or are you presently taking any other/any English language training? [*also asked for French*]
- (6) Do you plan to take (other) English language training in the future? [*also asked for French*]
- (7) Do you think you will start taking this English language training...? [*response options: within the next month; within the next 6 months; within the next year; within the next two years; in two years or more. Also asked for French.*]
- (8) Since your last interview, have you had any problems or difficulties in getting English or French language training?
- (9) Including all courses or training you have taken, what is the highest level of formal education you attained in Canada?
- (10) Since your arrival, have you obtained a license or certification to practice [your] profession or trade or to use the professional or trade title in your province?

Considerations of economic integration, in the form of questions about employment and income, represented an additional 21% and 13% of the 495 substantive LSIC questions, respectively (see Table 6.3 for examples of questions).

Table 6.3 Examples of LSIC Employment and Income Questions

When did you start working for [employer name]?
How did you find this job?
What kind of work do you do in this job?
Since your last interview, have you worked for any other job or business?
Is/was this job related to any education or training you were taking or are currently taking?
In [your] job, would you say your qualifications and skills are being...? [<i>response options: adequately used; underused</i>]
How many hours per week do/did you usually work in this job/business?
In this job, what is your wage or salary before taxes or other deductions?
Since your last interview, have you been out of work for seven or more consecutive days?
At any time since your last interview, did you look for work?
Since your last interview, have you had any problems or difficulties in finding a job in Canada?
Is your common-law partner/spouse working?
How much have you/you and your family received from all jobs <u>within Canada</u> ? This is before taxes and deductions. Include commissions, tips, and bonuses.
How much have you/you and your family received from all jobs <u>outside Canada</u> ? This is before taxes and deductions. Include commissions, tips, and bonuses.
Could you give me an estimate of your total personal income before taxes and deductions from all sources <u>inside and outside Canada</u> in the last 12 months?
In the past 12 months, what was your main source of personal income?
How would you describe your present financial situation? Would you say that you... [<i>response options: have more than enough money to meet your basic needs; have just enough money for your basic needs; do not have enough money to meet your basic needs</i>]

Overall, of the 495 questions of substantive content (that is, excluding demographic questions and interview ‘entry’ and ‘exit’ questions – see Appendix C), approximately 64% of the survey addressed topics that are directly linked to considerations of human capital and/or economic integration (that is, education, employment, and language skills).

Not surprisingly, the LSIC's emphasis on human capital and economic integration was mirrored in the LSIC statistical reports. Of the seven analytical reports considered here, three (Chui & Tran, 2005; Grondin, 2007; Tran & Chui, 2006) were fully concerned with the labour market involvement of immigrants. The remaining reports considered other topics, but nevertheless still dedicated much of their analyses to matters of employment and economic integration. Table 6.4 offers a summary of the topics included in each report.

Table 6.4 Summary of LSIC Reports

Report	Main Topics
<p><i>Immigrants' Perspectives on their First Four Years in Canada: Highlights from three waves of the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada</i> (Schellenberg & Maheux, 2007)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - what immigrants like and dislike about Canada - reasons for immigrating and for staying - quality of life and material well-being after arrival - quality of life and material well-being after being in Canada four years - challenges in the labour market - types of obstacles immigrants experiences when seeking employment - barriers to employment - accessing language training - finding housing - accessing health care - assessments of life in Canada

Report	Main Topics
<p><i>Knowledge of Official Languages Among New Immigrants: How Important is it in the Labour Market?</i> (Grondin, 2007)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ability to speak English/French - perceived importance of improving ability to speak English/French - language training - means used to improve language skills - employment rates - job changes - link between knowledge of English/French and type of job held (included analysis of proportions of immigrants with: a high-skill job, a job in intended field, a job similar to job held before immigrating, a job related to training, average hourly wage)
<p><i>Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: A Portrait of Early Settlement Experiences</i> (Ruddick et al., 2005)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - reasons for choosing Canada - choosing where to live - adapting to a new linguistic environment - health status - use of health services - problems accessing health care - education - training - credential assessment - employment (including employment rates; labour market characteristics by age, gender, official language knowledge, and country of origin; labour force status and hours worked; occupational classifications; number of jobs held; job satisfaction; reasons for leaving a job or not working; problems finding employment) - financial status (including analysis of savings; personal income levels; employment earnings; loans obtained) - settlement (including examination of ethnic/cultural ties; satisfaction with life in Canada; sponsorship intentions) - challenges to integration (including analysis of housing; accessing health care; accessing education; accessing training; finding employment)

Report	Main Topics
<i>Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: Process, Progress and Prospects</i> (Chui, 2003)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - choice of destination - housing - health status and use of health services - education - training - labour market entry
<i>Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: Progress and Challenges of New Immigrants in the Workforce</i> (Chui & Tran, 2005)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - employment rates within first two years after arrival - employment rates compared to Canadian average - number of jobs held - employment in intended occupations - lack of Canadian work experience and barriers to employment - reasons for not working - job satisfaction
<i>Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: A Regional Perspective of the Labour Market Experiences</i> (Tran & Chui, 2006)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - labour market experiences (variables included employment rates, employment in intended occupations, problems entering labour market, reasons for not working, number of jobs held) for 11 regions in Canada (Atlantic Canada, Québec, Montréal, Ontario, Toronto, Ottawa-Gatineau, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, Alberta, Calgary, British Columbia, Vancouver)
<i>New Immigrants' Assessments of their Life in Canada</i> (Houle & Schellenberg, 2010)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - social capital - material well-being in Canada (considered in terms of employment, income, and housing tenure) - comparison of immigrants' material well-being in Canada compared with their well-being country of origin

As this table suggests, the LSIC provided opportunities for an extremely detailed consideration of immigrants' human capital, along with the manner in which this human capital was implicated in immigrants' economic integration (in terms of employment, labour market participation characteristics, and barriers to economic integration) and

their broader material well-being in Canada. Evidently, these were not the only topics of consideration in the reports, which also addressed topics such as health and health service utilization, housing, satisfaction levels, and views about life in Canada. Nevertheless, the reports are notable for their focus on individual-level variables pertaining to economic integration and human capital. This focus is viewed as meaningful here for three main reasons.

First, as suggested by the descriptions of the LSIC questionnaire and reports provided throughout this chapter (see also Appendices C and D), the LSIC seems to have been largely constructed around concerns pertaining to the integration of immigrants from non-traditional immigration source countries. Indeed, the declining economic performance of recent immigrants relative to previous cohorts is commonly attributed to the shift in immigrant source countries (see Picot & Sweetman, 2005). It is important to consider this point in reference to the previous chapters of this thesis. Chapter Four illustrated the manner in which concerns over immigration from Asian source countries manifested in media's portrayals of marriage immigrants. Chapter Five demonstrated that policy discourse was largely constructed around maintaining the legitimacy of the state's immigration program in the public eye. It is also important to recall that various federal departments were involved in the development of the LSIC questionnaire. From a public and political perspective, insofar as immigrants do not meet the expectations laid out in the immigration program, the value of immigration to the Canadian nation stands to be questioned; this, in turn, holds implications for public support of state programs and policies. The LSIC and the associated analytical reports

can thus be linked to state concerns pertaining to the success (or lack thereof) of ‘ethnic’ immigrants with respect to the objectives of the immigration program.

Second, insofar as the neo-liberal, individualistic focus of immigration policy is reflected in the LSIC, then immigrants’ own views are, to some extent, obscured. In this regard, it is interesting to actually consider some of the results offered by the LSIC:

LSIC respondents were also asked to identify which of the reasons cited was the most important in their decision to stay in Canada [...] Almost 80% cited one of four reasons – quality of life (32%), the desire to be close to family and friends (20%), the future prospects for their family (18%) and the peaceful nature of the country (9%)” (Schellenberg & Maheux, 2007: 5).

Explicitly economic-related reasons were endorsed by comparatively lower proportions of immigrants as their main reason for staying in Canada, with 3.1% citing job opportunities, 0.3% citing Canada’s business climate/free market, and another 0.3% citing salary/pay (Schellenberg & Maheux, 2007: 20). These statistics suggest that state concerns do not necessarily mirror immigrants’ concerns. Thus, while the LSIC may offer detailed self-report statistics on immigrants’ lives in Canada, immigrants’ own interests and concerns were not necessarily reflected in the survey.

Third, the individualistic focus of the LSIC questionnaire and reports goes against widespread evidence that the family unit is a central consideration throughout all stages of the migration process, including integration. This point has been supported by research in Canada (e.g., Boyd, 1991, 1989; Creese et al., 2008; Omidvar & Richmond, 2003; Satzewich, 1993; Stewart, 2006; VanderPlaat et al., 2009; Walton-Roberts, 2004b, 2003) and beyond (Booth et al., 1997; Cobb-Clark, 2001; Khoo, 2003; Khoo & Mak, 2000; Mak 1997; Ong, 1999). The individualistic focus of the LSIC also ignores the fact that 71% of immigrants in the LSIC target population arrived with

family members, with 42% of arriving as a family of two or more adults with children, 23% arriving as two or more adults without children, and 4% arriving as a single adult with children. These statistics support the argument that the ‘autonomous immigrant’ is largely a fiction (see Creese et al., 2008; Walton-Roberts, 2003). It follows that the LSIC stands to miss out on the role of the household and various family members in settlement and integration processes, despite the relevance of this information in both material and theoretical contexts.

This latter point also ties into the previous discussion of migrant categorization. Conceptual and methodological challenges associated with defining and measuring the family as a unit of analysis contrasts sharply with the ease of measuring individual immigrants, defined according to their mode of entry. Simplistic typologies of individual immigrants (such as the typology provided by mode of entry) circumscribe definable identities that can be directly addressed in statistical terms in both policy and scholarly contexts. What these typologies miss, however, is an appreciation of the multiplicity of roles within which immigrants are situated, and the fact that an imposed categorization may not reflect immigrants’ views about themselves or their own lives. In this way, despite its stated objective of understanding immigrants’ experiences, the LSIC may, in fact, be missing out on how immigrants function as part of a family unit within Canada.

6.6 Conclusion

The present chapter examined the LSIC questionnaire and its accompanying statistical reports. The objective of this analysis was to demonstrate how official measurement can

operate as a form of discourse that reflects broader social norms and interests, and that acts to socially construct immigrants as ‘types’ of beings in the analytical imagining of Canada’s national community. Overall, the findings suggest that immigrants’ identities as ‘ethnic’ newcomers clearly shaped the development of the LSIC questionnaire. The LSIC seems to have been designed not so much to examine the settlement of immigrants *per se*, but to evaluate the degree to which new immigrants were maintaining ethnic connections versus integrating into Canadian society. Overall, immigrants’ identity as ethnic beings emerged as one of the foremost considerations informing data collection. It follows that ethnicity stands to figure centrally in the social imagining of the national community that results from the use of LSIC data in political, scholarly, and public arenas.

Importantly, as numerous critical scholars have noted (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991; Barker, 1981; Li, 2007, 2003c; 2001; Satzewich, 1998; Thobani, 2000a, 2000b; 2007; see also Chapter Five of this thesis), with the declining social acceptability of explicitly ‘racial’ discourse, concepts such as ethnic and cultural difference have become euphemisms for ‘race,’ particularly in the context of immigration. Linguistic difference has also been identified as a means of circumscribing ethnic/cultural group membership, and thus acting as a means of racialization (Arel, 2002; Gonick, 2000; Hill, 2008; Leeman, 2004; Thobani, 2000b; Urciuoli, 1996). Applying this perspective to the present analysis, it is possible to argue that the LSIC stands to racialize ‘ethnic’ immigrants and speakers of non-Canadian languages (i.e., English and French) by portraying them as essentially different from Canadians, both in terms of their social interactions and their values and traditions. Inherent in this construction of difference is

marginalization of 'ethnic' immigrants with respect to Canada's national community, effected through subtle representations of barriers to full integration imposed by co-ethnic affiliations and the tendency to dichotomize 'ethnic' and 'Canadian' social networks, norms, values and traditions. Insofar as these differences are objectified and statistically reified by the LSIC, this survey can be interpreted as an instrument of racialization.

Using mode of entry as the dominant way of organizing data in the LSIC reports served to reify these categorizations, and statistically circumscribed immigrants within their roles as workers, spouses, family members, *or* refugees. Although data according to mode of entry may be important insofar as it informs settlement service planning, the statistical focus on mode of entry also entails important implications. Indeed, these categorizations and the presentation of selected statistical knowledge around immigrant mode of entry are socially relevant, in part due to the perceived objectivity of mode of entry categories and the supposed objectivity of statistical information. Statistical knowledge stands to inform how groups of immigrants are perceived, evaluated, judged, and treated in the eyes of policy-makers and society members. Furthermore, categorization can be linked to identity formation, influencing how individuals come to view the organization of society and their respective place, as a member of a particular category, among other categories of peoples (Kertzer & Arel, 2002a). Newcomers legally entering a foreign country literally become their category of entry. These immigrants become further constituted as discursive formations through official measurement, wherein they are statistically and thus politically and socially constructed according to the dimensions that were selected for official measurement.

It is also important to address the silences surrounding gender within the LSIC and its associated reports. As discussed, the highly gendered nature of immigration at all stages – from the decision to migrate, the migration journey, and settlement and integration (see Boyd, 2006; Boyd & Greico, 2003; Pedraza, 1991) – was not acknowledged in the LSIC. The structural dimensions of gender inequality and the different challenges that men and women from different regions of the world are likely to experience in Canadian society was completely absent in the questionnaire. In cases where differences between men and women were addressed in the LSIC reports, gender was reduced to sex, involving simple sex-disaggregation of statistics. Although this type of consideration is an important starting point, it offers only a superficial understanding of the differences between women and men immigrants, and downplays the centrality of gender as a dominant organizing feature of social life.

In terms of other silences, as discussed in the results section, while the LSIC did collect some information on social networks, it was largely silent on the issue of household strategies or considerations of the family unit in the context of settlement and adaptation. In this regard, the LSIC clearly reflects the neo-liberal focus of current immigration policy. Creese et al.'s (2008) comments on the implications of a human capital focus and the associated silence surrounding the family is particularly relevant here:

The focus of immigration policy on human capital, an individualistic concept, cannot adequately recognize the binding of a particular immigrant within complex household relationships and resources... This lack fails to fully acknowledge the complex but undeniable links between economic and social life that carve out conditions under which immigrants and refugees come to participate in the labour force, make friends, raise children and ultimately become 'Canadian' in quite specific ways (Creese et al., 2008: 272).

Moreover, as discussed in the present chapter, focusing on human capital measures that pertain most directly to the individual immigrant ties into simplistic typological categorizations. It follows that the intersection between immigrants' different social roles within a family unit is dually obscured – first, through individual-level human capital variables, and, second, through their location within a 'mode of entry' typology. The human capital focus and neglect of the immigrant family speaks to the extent to which family reunification is a subordinate objective of the immigration program.

More generally, the measurement of immigrants pertains directly to theoretical understandings of Canada's imagined community. As discussed in the early pages of this chapter, the existing literature interprets censuses in terms of a state's interest in enumerating and defining the population under its control. In historical contexts, census-taking represented a means of both material and symbolic nation-building. In contrast, special surveys, such as the LSIC, are reflective of a perceived need to understand and address particular social issues, yet similarly act to characterize the population of interest in reference to national goals and concerns. Moreover, as suggested by the opening quotes of the present chapter (see also van Dijk, 1995), politicians and the media regularly use official data reports to support or refute arguments relating to immigration policy. The knowledge gathered and presented in official reports thus enters into the immigration debate, and stands to influence policy agendas and public opinion. It follows that representations of immigrants surfacing in public and political immigration discourses are influenced in part by the measures and constructs underlying data collection. In this way, the categorization and measurement of immigrants is tied into the discursive construction of Canada's national imagined

community. Recognizing these interconnections is central both to critical scholarship and to efforts aimed at understanding immigrants' lives in Canadian society.

CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION

“Discourses have enormous power not only to represent social groups but also to identify, regulate, and even construct social groups – to establish who is ‘we’ and who is ‘other’ in the imagined community of the nation-state” (Henry & Tator, 2002: 27).

7.0 Introduction

The overarching goal of this thesis was to examine the social construction of the Canadian imagined community in direct relation to immigration discourse. In order to accomplish this goal, three analyses of immigration discourses were conducted: one pertaining to media, a second pertaining to CIC policy activities, and a third pertaining to official statistical measurement. By taking a multi-faceted approach that addressed various sites of discourse, the thesis uncovered subtleties, continuities, and contradictions associated with constructing Canada’s imagined community in the global era of contemporary immigration. In order to tie these results together, the present chapter provides a brief summary of the findings in reference to the thesis’s research questions. The thesis’ limitations and future research directions are subsequently addressed. The chapter concludes with some final thoughts on immigration discourse in Canada.

7.1 Summary and Discussion

The overarching research question guiding this thesis was: In an era of globalization and widespread international immigration, how is the Canadian national community imagined and discursively constructed in reference to immigration? In order to elaborate on this query, the following specific research questions were articulated:

- (1) How do specific immigration discourses (media, policy, and measurement) represent immigrants?
- (2) How are family-class and economic immigrants differentially characterized and represented in discourses?
- (3) How are immigrants racialized and gendered in these representations?
- (4) How might these various representations be put in service of the Canadian state?
- (5) How do these representations operate to define the boundaries of Canada's national imagined community?

The present section briefly summarizes the thesis's findings in relation to each of these questions.

- (1) *How do specific immigration discourses (media, policy, and measurement) represent immigrants?*

Across discourses, the thesis revealed that discursive representations of immigrants were about far more than just immigrants – rather, representations of immigrants also served as a basis for socially constructing Canadians *and* the Canadian state in the imagining of the Canadian nation. Media discourse focused most clearly on the Asian contingent of marriage immigration, and revealed concern over the impact of immigration from non-European source countries and the burden of non-economic immigrants to the Canadian nation. In this context, marriage immigrants were largely portrayed as undeserving frauds who take advantage of Canadians and the Canadian immigration system. Asian-Canadians were ambiguously portrayed, inconsistently labeled as immigrants *and* Canadians. 'Canadians' were portrayed as unwitting victims of unscrupulous immigrant frauds, or, alternatively, as victims of an unreasonable state.

For its part, the Canadian state was variably defined in direct relation to immigrants and Canadians. The state was at times portrayed as having been ineffective in protecting national borders, and, in other instances, as doing its best to keep dangerous immigrants out of the country. The state was also often portrayed as imposing undue strain on Canadians through the sponsorship program, either in terms of financial burden, or in terms of the 'red tape' associated with spousal reunification. In this way, representations of marriage immigrants in media discourse were inextricably intertwined with representations of Canadians and the Canadian state.

For its part, policy discourse was shown to be operating directly in the interests of state legitimacy. In this context, immigrants were variably represented so as to document the ability of the state to support and maintain the integrity of the Canadian nation. Ambiguous lines were often drawn between 'good' and 'bad' immigrants, with would-be immigrants and newcomers being inconsistently defined as contributors to the Canadian nation, as marginal members of Canadian society, or as outsiders that need to remain beyond Canadian borders. These various representations of immigrants directly served as a means for constructing the Canadian population and the Canadian state, both of which were portrayed as sharing in the goal of welcoming 'deserving' or 'good' immigrants, and as being tolerant and accepting of 'diverse' immigrants with 'different' (i.e., non-Canadian) customs and traditions. The state was further portrayed as protecting the nation's physical and symbolic borders from 'bad' or 'burdensome' immigrants.

Of all three discourses, measurement discourse was the most subtle, yet nevertheless revealed how immigration serves as a site for relationally defining

immigrants, Canadians, and the Canadian state as the three main contingents of the Canadian nation. In this discourse, immigration category of admission and immigrants' ethnic identity were foremost. Dichotomies between immigrants and Canadians were established through questions that opposed immigrants' 'ethnic' practices and traditions from 'Canadian' practices and traditions. Underlying measurement discourse was the neo-liberal agenda of the Canadian state, which served to define immigrants in individualistic, human capital terms. The state thus defined itself in neo-liberal terms by virtue of defining the objects of its inquiry relative to this agenda.

(2) How are family-class and economic immigrants differentially characterized and represented in reference to the Canadian nation?

This research question was addressed in two different ways: first, through a re-examination of Canadian immigration history with an eye to the specific intersection between family-based and economic immigration; and, second, through the examination of the three immigration discourses.

The historical examination (Chapter Three) revealed that family-based immigration and economic immigration have intersected in different ways over time. In early post-Confederation immigration, the family served as the ideal unit of immigration, being the centre of both economic production and social reproduction (although, as discussed in Chapter Three, this was not uniform, with access to family-based immigration serving as a direct means of racializing and gendering belonging in the Canadian nation). As the economic needs of the nation evolved, so too did the relationship between economic and family-based immigration. Increasingly, the ideal immigrant was conceptualized as a skilled resource; accordingly, immigrant families

became less central to national development and increasingly problematized as a drain on the nation. The analyses of contemporary immigration discourses elaborated on these representations.

Across all discourses, economic immigrants were clearly portrayed as valuable members of the Canadian national community, and were characterized unproblematically as contributors to the nation. In the context of media and policy discourse, this emerged through explicit references to economic immigrants' status as skilled members of the Canadian nation. In measurement discourse, affirmation of economic immigrants' desirability was implicit, conveyed through the individualistic, economic focus of the LSIC and the underlying neo-liberal bias of measurement discourse.

In contrast, family-class immigrants were often represented in direct opposition to economic immigrants, or were otherwise marginalized relative to the Canadian national community. Media discourse on marriage immigrants, for instance, explicitly portrayed this group of immigrants as unskilled, fraudulent, and undeserving of belonging in the Canadian nation. Moreover, media representations informed a dichotomous construction of 'good' (economic) and 'bad' (marriage) immigrants that clearly operated in gendered, racialized, and bureaucratic (i.e., category of admission) terms. The highly individualistic, economic focus of measurement discourse was most closely geared toward examining immigrant skill, language ability, and economic status at the individual level. In this way, the importance of the immigrant *family* was denied, and, by extension, family-class immigrants were marginalized as contributors to the Canadian nation. In policy discourse, Canada's acceptance of family-class immigration

served as a rhetorical means for documenting the welcoming nature of the Canadian population and the Canadian state. However, these immigrants were still portrayed as dependents and potential burdens on the nation.

(3) How are immigrants racialized and gendered in these representations?

Of the three discourses considered in this thesis, media discourse most vividly gendered and racialized immigrants. In media portrayals of marriage immigrants, Asian immigrants were clearly constructed as racialized ‘Others’ whose practices and norms are problematic and threatening to Canadian national identity. This racialization extended to the Asian-Canadian population, and symbolically served to document the threat that ‘immigrants’ from non-Asian countries pose to Canadian institutions and values. The gendering of marriage immigrants emerged through representations of female marriage immigrants as sexualized deviants and portrayals of male marriage immigrants as criminals and terrorists.

The other discourses were comparatively subtle, reflecting the institutional contexts within which these discourses were produced. Policy discourse racialized immigrants by emphasizing the diversity of newcomers and the tolerance of the Canadian population in welcoming newcomers, thereby constructing a racialized dichotomy between ‘immigrants’ and ‘Canadians.’ The LSIC subtly racialized recent immigrants by emphasizing immigrants’ ethnic interactions and documenting interest in these immigrants’ preservation of their ethnic and cultural values and traditions versus their acceptance of Canadian values and traditions. Considerations of gender were largely absent from both policy discourse and measurement discourse, thereby

operating to preserve existing gender biases in immigration by failing to acknowledge them.

(4) How might these various representations be put in service of the Canadian state?

Media discourse operated as a cautionary tale against ‘non-traditional’ and ‘overseas’ marriages wherein Canadians were warned to find love ‘at home.’ In this way, the problematization of marriage immigrants can be seen as acting in direct service of the Canadian state’s scrutiny of spousal sponsorship applications, justifying intrusive measures against both immigrants and their Canadian sponsors in the name of protecting the nation. Policy discourse similarly acted to legitimize the sponsorship program and state activities more generally. By constructing a dichotomy of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants, policy discourse acted as assurance that the state takes all steps necessary to ensure the best possible outcomes for Canada, Canadians, and deserving immigrants. Here, immigration discourse was clearly not only about immigrants, but was used to speak directly to the Canadian state’s ability to serve all stakeholders in an era of globalization and international immigration. On the one hand, this involved confirming Canada’s need for ‘good’ immigrants and providing assurance that these newcomers will succeed in Canada and contribute to the nation. It also involved demonstrating the state’s ability to safeguard the Canadian nation against would-be frauds, criminals, or terrorists, as well as immigrants who might be a burden to the economy (namely, family-class immigrants). For its part, the LSIC can be seen as facilitating categorical evaluations of immigrants in reference to immigration admission categories. The LSIC also operated in the interests of the state by measuring aspects of

immigrants' lives that are directly relevant to the state's neo-liberal agenda, while failing to consider aspects *not* on this agenda and neglecting to focus on what might matter most to *immigrants* in the context of settlement and integration.

(5) *How do these representations operate to define the boundaries of Canada's national imagined community?*

Across all discourses, tension existed between the principles of multiculturalism and tolerance in Canadian society and the changes attributed to immigration from non-traditional source countries. In media discourse on marriage immigration, the boundaries of the Canadian nation were constructed so as to racialize and marginalize marriage immigrants and Asian-Canadians to the Canadian national community while being inclusive of 'deserving' economic immigrants. In contrast, policy discourse operated to directly locate 'good' immigrants (namely, economic immigrants and, inconsistently, family-class immigrants) within the borders of the Canadian national community in both historical and contemporary contexts. Simultaneously, the state's ability to safeguard the nation from 'bad' (fraudulent, criminal) immigrants was paramount, and operated to marginalize immigrants who could be perceived as threatening national integrity. For its part, official measurement operated to reify bureaucratic categories of admission and thus to position immigrants to the Canadian nation in specific reference to those categorizations. Moreover, the LSIC findings were revealing of a perceived need to conceptualize and operationalize migrants within identities that can be deployed to understand new immigrants' 'differences,' and to determine how these differences interfere with immigrant integration, defined in individualistic and 'Canadian-centric' terms. As such, in the formation of the Canadian

national community represented in measurement discourse, family-class immigrants and, more generally, immigrant families, were subtly marginalized as a relevant site of inquiry, while immigrants' ethnic identities emerged as a discernable topic of concern.

Overall, the discursive representations uncovered in this thesis suggest that Simmons' (2010, 1999) understanding of the 'imagined future' guiding current Canadian immigration policy extends beyond the policy context. Rather, a particular vision of the Canadian nation manifests in broader discourses on immigration, directly contributing to the social construction of immigrants, Canadians, and the Canadian state and, by extension, the Canadian national imagined community. Across media, policy, and measurement discourses, an overarching theme was that the purpose of immigration is to serve the economic needs of the nation, and that the state needs to maximize the benefits of the immigration program while minimizing the potential threats to the Canadian nation associated with international immigration. Moreover, the multicultural and diverse nature of the nation was widely acknowledged in different discourses (although not unproblematically). In this way, the 'imagined future' guiding immigration policy is visible in public realms in the form of dominant discourses that construct both the value and risks associated with contemporary international immigration. These discourses convey narratives about immigration in which immigrants, in general, and specific groups of immigrants, in particular, are socially constructed in relational terms alongside Canadians and the Canadian state.

It is relevant at this point to also reflect back on Benedict Anderson's theorizing about nations. The present thesis demonstrated that insight into Anderson's understanding of nations as imagined communities can be fruitfully gained by

considering various dimensions of national immigration discourses. This contention is based on two key points. The first pertains to the role of immigration in defining a nation's insiders and outsiders in both material and symbolic terms, thereby enabling national identity to be simultaneously defined. The second pertains to the centrality of communications in the nation-building process associated with defining a national community.

On the first point, as demonstrated throughout this thesis, immigration brings about social questions and controversies that shed light directly on the issue of national identity. Immigration necessarily involves allowing certain people into and keeping others out of a nation's geographic and social space (although, as illustrated in this thesis, the boundaries of these two spaces do not always coincide). In doing so, the qualities and characteristics of a nation and its community members are simultaneously defined. By virtue of granting newcomers entry via different categories of admission, immigration policy establishes gradations of belonging to the Canadian nation in both material and symbolic terms. Moreover, the Canadian stance on immigration is linked with representations of national identity, presented to widespread audiences around the world. In this way, immigration stands as a central site for defining the desired characteristics of the national community. Importantly, across the discourses examined, it was clear that immigration is a source of contention and concern. In particular, immigration from non-traditional source countries, and that which does not directly service the nation's neo-liberal goals, remains an object of contention and inquiry. Yet, the place of immigrants in Canada's national community does not fall strictly within dichotomous conceptualizations of 'us' and 'them.' In cases where dichotomous

constructions emerged, they could not be neatly attributed to any single dimension (or any straightforward combination of dimensions) such as 'race,' ethnicity, gender, or mode of entry. Often, 'immigrants' were constructed in ambiguous terms and were inconsistently positioned with respect to other groups of immigrants, Canadians, the Canadian state, and, by extension, Canada's imagined community. It is thus impossible to speak uniformly of 'immigrants' as 'Others' who are symbolically positioned on the margins of the Canadian national community. Indeed, this thesis suggests that the symbolic place of immigrants in Canada's imagined community is much more multi-dimensional, amorphous, and context-specific than is often implied by simplistic 'immigrants as outsiders' or 'us versus them' conceptualizations. To this end, it is theoretically important to conceptualize the notion of imagined communities in fluid rather than concrete, dichotomous terms.

The second main point of Anderson's work addressed in the present thesis pertains to the role of communications in defining a national community. In a geographically expansive country populated by tens of millions of people, direct communication among all community members is not feasible. As such, public discourses disseminated through various communication media hold a critical role in expressing ideologies, in socially constructing national identity, and in defining national belonging. In this context, discourses on immigration constitute an important site for defining the contours of the Canadian national community. Indeed, as demonstrated in this thesis, discourses on immigration abound with representations of immigrants, Canadians, and the Canadian state. Taken together, these discursive representations

constitute an elaborate, multi-dimensional imagining of the Canadian nation that is communicated to widespread national and international audiences.

In sum, the present thesis demonstrates that representations of immigrants and immigration serve, in symbolic terms, as vehicles for defining the public image of the Canadian nation. In the imagining of the Canadian nation in official contexts, immigration serves as a means for bolstering Canada's national and international image as a sovereign, competitive, tolerant, and socially-just nation. The admission of large numbers of diverse immigrants alongside discourses of tolerance and fairness conveys to national and international communities that Canada is a desirable place to live and work. Canada's official multicultural status and rhetorical celebration of diversity discursively operates as 'evidence' that the nation has overcome its highly discriminatory history. The 'Canadian-centric' nature of the imagined future guiding current immigration policy and the reality of structural inequality in both national and global contexts are thus obscured by discourses of tolerance, democracy, and inclusion. They are also obscured by discourses that 'legitimately' construct immigrants as threats or social burdens. Moreover, insofar as specific groups of immigrants are represented in discourse as frauds, criminals, or social leeches, then the ideological stage has been set for their marginalization in the Canadian nation in both symbolic and material terms. In the bigger picture, positive images of immigrants serve to augment Canadian national identity, while negative images of immigrants serve as a counterpoint for articulating a vision of the ideal Canadian citizen. The social construction of immigrants thus affords the opportunity to simultaneously co-construct Canadians and the Canadian state, such

that immigration operates as a key site for defining the Canadian national imagined community.

7.2 Limitations and Future Directions

It is relevant at this point to address the thesis' limitations, which fall into two categories: the first pertains to data limitations, and the second relates to the highly interpretive nature of discourse analysis. These limitations are discussed in reference to future directions for research.

With respect to data limitations, a shortcoming of the present thesis was its reliance on textual materials that may or may not be entirely representative of the respective discourses under examination. The impact of this limitation was minimized through systematic efforts to gather a comprehensive data set, and to analyze materials to the point of thematic saturation. In the examination of media coverage of marriage immigrants, articles from a total of four newspapers over a ten year time period were examined. As discussed in this chapter, three of these newspapers (namely, the *Globe and Mail*, the *Toronto Sun*, and the *Toronto Star*) emerged from a keyword search of a newspaper database as the publications with the most numerous relevant articles. The fourth newspaper (the *National Post*, which was not included in the primary database used) was purposively sampled in order to obtain as national a perspective as possible. The limitations of this approach are evident. First, the analysis addressed only a small selection of print news media in Canada. Second, reliance on electronic search engines means that only articles included within the electronic database would be captured by the search. Third, the fact that two of the four newspapers are Toronto-focused might

also suggest that the findings pertain to a local or regional perspective. These limitations are offset in part by the fact that three of the four publications (excluding the *Toronto Sun*) are the most widely circulated and nationally read newspapers in Canada. The fact that local or regional newspapers in other areas of Canada may or may not offer the same portrayals as the newspapers analyzed thus does not negate the widespread dissemination of particular messages about marriage immigrants accomplished by the publications analyzed here. Future research could explore in more detail regional variations in portrayals of marriage immigrants in order to determine whether the representations uncovered here are upheld or subverted in other publications. Future research could also involve media analyses that address in more detail other categories of migrants in Canada. As noted in Chapter Four, widespread research in Canada has documented the racialization and criminalization of immigrants in media portrayals. However, specific analyses have not addressed representations of immigrants in direct reference to their category of admission. Such analyses are relevant in light of the fact that the merits and challenges of immigration are largely debated in reference to bureaucratic immigrant types. The present thesis provided a useful case study of the manner in which one particular group of immigrants is constructed with respect to Canada's national community. However, additional media research could explore this topic further by addressing other immigrant types and other publications.

The data limitations of Chapters Five and Six similarly relate to the selection of materials for analysis. In Chapter Five (policy discourse), key annual reports about CIC's policy activities and objectives were selected in order to best capture the Canadian state's perspective on immigration, as it is being presented to the broader

social world. These materials, evidently, cannot be taken as representative of any individual state actor's opinions or even necessarily as the template for state activity. This concern was less relevant here because the goal was not to uncover state actors' 'true' opinions of immigrants and their place in the Canadian nation. Rather, the objective was to discern how the Canadian national community is formally imagined and plated for public consumption through official state discourse, in reference to state legitimacy and democratic racism. The materials analyzed were suited to these objectives. Future research could consider how the content of internal state documents map onto, or diverge from, the images of immigrants, Canadians, the state, and the nation that surface in publicly available reports. Such an analysis could shed additional light on the frameworks of state legitimacy and democratic racism addressed in Chapter Five.

Indeed, from a theoretical perspective, Chapter Five suggests that additional critical reflection on the democratic racism framework is necessary, at least in terms of its usage in the immigration literature (as opposed to the literature on visible minorities, which the present thesis did not evaluate, and for which theoretical implications may be different). In terms of the continued usage of the democratic racism framework, a more moderate alternative may be appropriate in the context of immigration. More specifically, it may be suitable to explore the development of a concept such as 'democratic Othering' or 'democratic xenophobia.'⁴³ A concept such as this could capture the fact that distinctions of 'us and them' and sentiments directed at the exclusion of immigrants may be embedded in democratic language but are not neatly

⁴³ I would like to acknowledge and thank Dr. Jeff Hopkins for suggesting the possible utility of the 'democratic xenophobia' label.

reducible to 'race' (as shown in Chapter Five). Alternatively, it may be necessary to abandon some (but not all) elements of the democratic racism framework (that is, some of the discourses of dominance associated with this framework), or to engage in a very careful application of the framework so as to avoid overextending claims of racism. On this latter point, although not all discourses of dominance outlined by Henry et al. (2000) were evaluated in Chapter Five, sociological reflection on each discourse described by the authors suggests a highly context-specific and thoughtful application is necessary so as to maximize the utility of the framework. Indeed, some discourses of dominance outlined by Henry et al. (2000) are much more convincingly 'racist' than others. For instance, claims of non-racism followed by an overtly negative comment about a racialized minority (i.e., "I'm not racist, but...") seem suitably labeled democratic racism. On the other hand, opposition to Canada's multicultural policy could exist on various grounds, and may not in all cases be borne out of racist beliefs or attitudes. To this end, although a complete abandonment of the framework is by no means advocated here, a more modest theoretical approach may be warranted.

In terms of Chapter Six, it is necessary to acknowledge that the LSIC is far from the only survey instrument on immigrant settlement, nor does it represent the sole source of official knowledge on immigrants in Canada. Similarly, the reports published in association with the LSIC do not represent all that there is to glean from the LSIC. To this end, the social construction of Canada's national community via the LSIC depends in part on the manner in which the LSIC results are used in public, political, and research contexts. Nevertheless, the LSIC is the only official and nationally representative survey of recent immigrants in Canada, and thus the questionnaire

provides insight into the manner in which newcomers and their lives are conceptualized in official research contexts. Overall, future research could expand upon Chapter Six's analysis in two ways. First, research could investigate the manner in which the LSIC data are utilized in other contexts (e.g., in scholarly research, or among community and advocacy groups). Such an analysis could provide insight into the manner in which representations of immigrants in the LSIC questionnaire do or do not feed into the wider usage and interpretation of the data. Second, it would be useful to conduct similar critical examinations of other instruments used in immigration research in order to uncover the political projects within which they were designed, the ideological biases encoded within their measures, and, by extension, their contribution to the broader statistical construction of immigrants in reference to Canada's imagined community.

The second main limitation of this thesis pertains to the interpretation of materials selected for analysis. As Henry and Tator (2002) note, "discourses resonate with very dissimilar meaning and consequences for both the producers of the text and the diverse communities of readers" (p. 227). In other words, the present interpretation of discursive formations does not necessarily reflect the intended purpose of the producers, nor is it likely to be the only possible interpretation of the data. Indeed, qualitative critical discourse analysis is often charged with being too impressionistic and subjective (see Bryman & Burgess, 1994). Effort was taken to minimize this bias by being as transparent as possible with the data, providing representative quotes that directly informed the conclusions being drawn. At the same time, the present thesis also operates on the underlying tenet that research is not an entirely neutral, unbiased endeavour. As discussed in Chapter Two, critical discourse analysts recognize the

interpretive nature of their projects, and accept this feature as a necessary and useful part of a socially engaged, reflexive and reflective social science. This thesis is thus not intended to offer the final, authoritative word on the role of immigration discourse in constructing Canada's national imagined community. Rather, it is intended to offer a new piece of dialogue that can stimulate further thought on this matter.

7.3 Conclusion

Regardless of how they are represented in discourse or perceived in Canadian society, the reality is that immigrants are part of the economic, political, and social fabric of life in Canada; in other words, regardless of whether they are *imagined* as being part of Canada's national community, they *are* part of Canada's national community. They work, they consume, and they pay taxes. They advocate and they vote. They contribute to their communities in tangible and intangible ways. Despite the language employed here, they are not a '*them*' that stand in opposition to an '*us*'; indeed, day-to-day life in Canada does not operate along clear-cut lines of 'Canadian' versus 'immigrant.'

Immigrants are integral and often indiscernible parts of Canada's social landscape who engage in multiple social roles that are not necessarily captured in the 'immigrant' label. It follows that simplistic discursive constructions misrepresent the reality of immigrants' lives. Nevertheless, discursive dichotomies, even ones that are diffuse and ambiguous, stand to fragment Canadian social space in important ways by shaping ideologies and, hence, attitudes and behaviours.

It is also impossible to ignore the fact that recent or former newcomers to Canada are employed in arenas of media, policy, and research. In other words,

immigrants do not stand exclusively as objects of discourse, but are also involved in *producing* discourses on immigration, including the discourses analyzed in this thesis. Granted, it is not possible to discern the voices of immigrants versus non-immigrants as producers of the discourse analyzed here. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the role of immigrants in discursive production, thereby avoiding unrealistic dichotomies of ‘Canadians’ as producers of discourse and immigrants as powerless subjects of discourse.

As an extension of this point, it is also relevant to point out that discourse is a site of contestation and symbolic struggle. Alternative discourses that dispute and resist racialized and gendered discourses of marginalization and exclusion, albeit more diffuse than dominant discourses, *do* exist. In order to bolster the power of discourses of resistance, immigrant advocates engaged in cultural politics must come armed with a politicized understanding of cultural representations, and recognize the power of imagery in shaping perceptions of the ‘reality’ of immigration. Simultaneously, reflexivity on behalf of scholars, journalists, and policy-makers can contribute to a better understanding of the implications of categorizations and characterizations in shaping social belonging. Only in this way can the Canadian nation – as an imagined entity – be re-imagined in more inclusive terms.

REFERENCES

- Abella, I. & Trooper, H. (1982). *None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe 1933-1948*. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys.
- Abramson, D. (2002). Identity counts: the Soviet legacy and the census in Uzbekistan. In D.I. Kertzer and D. Arel (eds.), *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*, pp.176-201. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Abu-Laban, Y. (1998a). Keeping 'em out: Gender, race, and class biases in Canadian immigration policy. In V. Strong-Boag, S. Grace, A. Eisenberg, and J. Anderson (eds.), *Painting the Maple: Essays on Race, Gender, and the Construction of Canada*, pp.69-82. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Abu-Laban, Y. (1998b). Welcome/STAY OUT: The contradiction of Canadian integration and immigration policies at the millennium. *Canadian Ethnic Studies* XXX(3): 190-212.
- Abu-Laban, Y. & Gabriel, C. (2002). *Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity, and Globalization*. Peterborough: Broadview.
- Acker, J. (1990). Hierarchies, jobs, bodies: a theory of gendered organizations. *Gender and Society* 4(2): 139-158.
- Agnew, V. (2007). The conundrum of inclusion: racialized women in public policy reports. In V. Agnew (ed.), *Interrogating Race and Racism*, pp.325-351: Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Agnew, V. (2003). *Gender and Diversity: A Discussion Paper*. Available online <http://www.yorku.ca/cfr/publications/publications.htm>. Retrieved 19 December 2009.
- Aguilar, D. & Lacsamana, A. (2004). *Women and Globalization*. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
- Alcoba, N. (2010, August 18). Mayoral candidate Rob Ford defends controversial immigration comments. *The National Post*. Available online <http://news.nationalpost.com/2010/08/18/mayoral-candidate-rob-ford-defends-controversial-immigration-comments/>. Retrieved 19 November 2010.
- Ali, J. S., McDermott, S., & Gravel, R. G. (2004). Recent research on immigrant health from Statistics Canada's Population Survey. *Canadian Journal of Public Health*, 95(3), I9-I13.

- Almost half of Ford supporters don't think Toronto would benefit from newcomers: poll. (2010, September 21). *The Globe and Mail*. Available online <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/toronto/city-votes/almost-half-of-ford-supporters-dont-think-toronto-would-benefit-from-newcomers-poll/article1716607/>. Retrieved 15 November 2010.
- Alonso, W. & Starr, P. (eds.). (1987). *The Politics of Numbers*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Anderson, B. (2006). *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso.
- Appadurai, A. (1996). *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
- Appadurai, A. (1993). Patriotism and its futures. *Public Culture* 5(3): 411-429.
- Arat-Koc, S. (1999). Neo-liberalism, state restructuring and immigration: changes in Canadian policies in the 1990s. *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 34(2), 31-56.
- Arat-Koc, S. (1992). Immigration policies, migrant domestic workers, and the definition of citizenship in Canada. In V. Satzewich (ed.), *Deconstructing a Nation: Immigration, Multiculturalism, & Racism in '90s Canada*, pp. 229-242. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing.
- Arel, D. (2002). Language categories in censuses: backward- or forward-looking? In D.I. Kertzer and D. Arel (eds.), *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*, pp.92-120. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Armstrong, J. (2003, November 20). Last illegal refuge of the brokenhearted; Thousands of women in immigration void as marriages to sponsors break down. *The Globe and Mail*, p.A1.
- Aulakh, R. (2009, December 26). Two sisters, two paths. *The Toronto Star*, p.GT1.
- Aulakh, R. (2009, June 29). Wanted: Punjabi fiancé...with a Canadian cousin. *The Toronto Star*, p.A1.
- Aulakh, R. (2009, January 31). She was the ticket to a better life. *The Toronto Star*, p.A01.
- Aulakh, R. (2009, January 11). 'No peace ... even in death'; Accusations, rebuttals fly between families at funeral for woman stabbed in grocery store. *The Toronto Star*, p.A2.

- Back, L. & Solomon, J. (2000). *Theories of Race and Racism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Baden, S. & Goetz, A.M. (1997). Who needs [sex] when you can have [gender]?: Conflicting discourses on gender at Beijing. *Feminist Review* 56: 3-25.
- Balibar, E. & Wallerstein, E. (1991). *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. London: Verso.
- Balkisoon, D. (2010, August 17). Mayoral candidates clash on immigration. *The Toronto Star*. Available online <http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/torontomayoralrace/article/849139--mayoral-candidates-clash-on-immigration>. Retrieved 2 November 2010.
- Ballard, R. (1990). Migration and kinship: the differential effect of marriage rules on the processes of Punjabi migration to Britain. In C. Clarke, C. Peach, & S. Vertovek (eds.), *South Asians Overseas: Contexts and Communities*, pp. 219 – 249. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bannerji, H. (2000). The paradox of diversity: the construction of a multicultural Canada and “women of color.” *Women’s Studies International Forum* 23 (5): 537-560.
- Barker, M. (1981). *The New Racism*. London: Junction Books.
- Basch, L., Glick Schiller, N., & Szanton Blanc, C. (1994). *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. London: Routledge.
- Basok, T. (2002). *Tortillas and Tomatoes: Transmigrant Mexican Harvesters in Canada*. Quebec City: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
- Bauder, H. (2008). The economic case for immigration: neoliberal and regulatory paradigms in Canada’s press. *Studies in Political Economy* 82: 131-152.
- Bauder, H. (2006). *Labor Movements: How Migration Regulates Labor Markets*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bélanger, D. (2010). Marriages with foreign women in East Asia: bride trafficking or voluntary migration? *Population and Societies* 469: 1-4.
- Bélanger, D., Hong, K.-T., & Wang, H.-Z. (2007). *Threatening nationalism, patriarchy and masculinity: Constructions of transnational marriages between Vietnamese women and East Asian men in Vietnamese mass*

media. Paper presented at the IPAR Conference on International Marriage Migration in Asia, September 13-14, Seoul, Korea.

- Bélangier, D., Lee, H.-K., & Wang, H.-Z. (2010). Ethnic diversity and statistics in East Asia: 'foreign brides' surveys in Taiwan and South Korea. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33(6): 1108-1130.
- Bell, S. (2000, May 19). Cataloguing coercion, abuse: Researchers find mail-order brides often are victims of poverty, family pressure, and myths of Western affluence. *The National Post*, p.A10.
- Bercuson, D.J. (1990). Syndicalism sidetracked: Canada's One Big Union. In M. van der Linden & W. Thorpe (eds.), *Revolutionary Syndicalism: An International Perspective*, pp. 221–236. Aldershot: Scolar Press.
- Bielski, Z. (2009, April 30a). I do...and I'm gone. *The Globe and Mail*. Available online <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/article1138892.ece>. Retrieved 26 October 2010.
- Bielski, Z. (2009, April 30b). Till immigration papers do us part. *The Globe and Mail*, p.L4.
- Blackwell, T. (2004, April 7). Fake migrants pay for sham marriages. *The National Post*, p.A1.
- Bolaria, B.S. & Li, P.S. (1988). *Racial Oppression in Canada, 2nd ed.* Toronto: Garamond Press.
- Booth, A., Crouter, A.C., & Landale, N. (1997). *Immigration and the Family: Research on U.S. Immigrants*. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a theory of practice*. R. Nice, translator. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boyd, M. (2006). *Gender Aspects of International Migration to Canada and the United States*. Paper presented at the International Symposium on International Migration and Development, Turin, Italy, 28-30 June. Available online http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~boydmon/research_papers/immigrant_women/P08_Boyd.pdf. Retrieved 10 July 2010.
- Boyd, M. (1999). Canadian, eh? Ethnic origin shifts in the Canadian census. *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 31(3): 1-19.

- Boyd, M. (1997). Migration policy, female dependency, and family membership: Canada and Germany. In P.M Evans and G.R. Wekerle, eds., *Women and the Canadian Welfare State: Challenges and Change*, pp.142-169. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Boyd, M. (1992). Gender, visible minority and immigrant earnings inequality: reassessing an employment equity premise. In V. Satzewich (ed.), *Deconstructing a Nation: Immigration, Multiculturalism, & Racism in '90s Canada*, pp. 279-322. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing.
- Boyd, M. (1991). Immigration and living arrangements: elderly women in Canada. *International Migration Review* 25(1): 4-27.
- Boyd, M. (1989). Family and personal networks in international migration: recent developments and new agendas. *International Migration Review* 23: 638-670.
- Boyd, M. & Grieco, E. (2003). *Women and Migration: Incorporating Gender into International Migration Theory*. Migration Information Source Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute. Available online <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=106%20>. Retrieved 10 July 2010.
- Boyd, M., Goldmann, G., & White, P. (2000). Race in the Canadian Census. In L. Driedger & S.S. Halli, *Race and Racism: Canada's Challenge*, pp. 33-54. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Boyd, M. & Norris, D. (2001). Who are the "Canadians"?: Changing census responses 1986-1996. *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 33(1): 1-24.
- Boyd, M. & Pikkov, D. (2005). *Gendering Migration, Livelihood and Entitlements: Migrant Women in Canada and the United States*. Occasional Paper # 6. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Available online http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~boydmon/research_papers/immigrant_women/O P6_Boyd_Pikkov.pdf. Retrieved 21 July 2010.
- Boyd, M. & Vickers, M. (2000). 100 years of immigration to Canada. *Canadian Social Trends* 58: 2-12.
- Boyle, P., Halfacree K., & Robinson V. (1998). *Exploring Contemporary Migration*. New York: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd.
- Brennan, R. (2006, May 10). Sham marriages a temptation for some desperate immigrants. *The Toronto Star*, p.A6.

- Brieger, P. (2006, May 10). Student wanted money to stay in Canada: \$25,000 needed for a marriage of convenience. *The National Post*, p.A13.
- Brown, J.M. (2006). *Global South Asians: Introducing the Modern Diaspora*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bryman, A. & Burgess, R.G. (1994). *Analyzing Qualitative Data*. London: Routledge.
- Buchignani, N. & Indra, D.N. (1985). *Continuous Journey: A Social History of South Asians in Canada*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
- Burr, V. (1995). *An Introduction to Social Constructionism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Calliste, A. (1993). Race, gender, and Canadian immigration policy: blacks from the Caribbean, 1900-1932. *Journal of Canadian Studies* 28(4): 131-148.
- Campbell, C. M. (2000). *Betrayal and Deceit: The Politics of Canadian Immigration*. Vancouver: Elston-Wolf.
- Campbell, C. M. (1989). *A Time Bomb Ticking: Canadian Immigration in Crisis*. Toronto: The Mackenzie Institute for the Study of Terrorism, Revolution and Propaganda.
- Canada. (1887). An Act to Amend the "Chinese Immigration Act." *Acts of the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada, 1873-1951*. Ottawa: Brown Chamberlin, Law Printer to the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty.
- Capdevila, R. & Callaghan, J.E.M. (2008). 'It's not racist. It's common sense.' A critical analysis of political discourse around asylum and immigration in the UK. *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology* 18, 1-16.
- Chapleau, J.A. & Gray, J.H. (1885). *Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration*. Available online <http://www.canadiana.org/ECO/ItemRecord/14563?id=700aeb5d43d8f4ce>. Retrieved 8 May 2010.
- Chen, J., Ng, E., & Wilkins, R. (1996). The health of Canada's immigrants in 1994-95. *Health Reports*, 7(4), 33-45.
- Chui, T. (2003). *Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: Process, Progress and Prospects*. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 89-611-XIE. Ottawa: Minister of Industry.
- Chui, T. & Tran, K. (2005). *Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: Progress and Challenges of New Immigrants in the Workforce*. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 89-615-XIE. Ottawa: Minister of Industry.

- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2010a). *Facts and Figures: Immigrant Overview Permanent and Temporary Residents 2009*. Available online <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/research-stats/facts2009.pdf>. Retrieved 10 October 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2010b). *Report on Plans and Priorities 2010-2011*. Available online <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2010-2011/inst/imc/imc-eng.pdf>. Retrieved 11 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2009a). *Facts and Figures: Immigrant Overview Permanent and Temporary Residents 2008*. Available online <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2008/index.asp>. Retrieved 10 January 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2009b). *Report on Plans and Priorities 2009-2010*. Available online <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2009-2010/inst/imc/imc-eng.pdf>. Retrieved 11 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2008a). *Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration 2008*. Available online http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/immigration2008_e.pdf. Retrieved 11 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2008b). *Report on Plans and Priorities 2008-2009*. Available online <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2008-2009/inst/imc/imc-eng.pdf>. Retrieved 11 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2007a). *Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration 2007*. Available online http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/immigration2007_e.pdf. Retrieved 11 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2007b). *Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008*. Available online <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2007-2008/CI-CI/ci-ci-eng.pdf>. Retrieved 11 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2006a). *Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration 2006*. Available online http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/immigration2006_e.pdf. Retrieved 11 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2006b). *Report on Plans and Priorities 2006-2007*. Available online <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2006-2007/CI-CI/ci-ci-eng.pdf>. Retrieved 11 May 2010.

- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2005a). *Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration 2005*. Available online http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20060126125333/http://www.ic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/immigration2005_e.pdf. Retrieved 10 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2005b). *Report on Plans and Priorities 2005-2006*. Available online <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/tbs-sct/cmn/archives-eng.asp>. Retrieved 11 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2004a). *Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration 2004*. Available online <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20060116233849/http://www.ic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/immigration2004-e.pdf>. Retrieved 10 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2004b). *Report on Plans and Priorities 2004-2005*. Available online <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/tbs-sct/cmn/archives-eng.asp>. Retrieved 11 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2003a). *Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration 2003*. Available online <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20060205134530/http://www.ic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/immigration2003-e.pdf>. Retrieved 10 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2003b). *Report on Plans and Priorities 2003-2004*. Available online <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/tbs-sct/cmn/archives-eng.asp>. Retrieved 11 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2002a). *Pursuing Canada's Commitment to Immigration: The Immigration Plan for 2002*. Available online <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20060205134044/http://www.ic.gc.ca/english/pub/anrep02.html>. Retrieved 11 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2002b). *Report on Plans and Priorities 2002-2003*. Available online <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/tbs-sct/cmn/archives-eng.asp>. Retrieved 27 March 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2000). *Report on Plans and Priorities 2000-2001*. Available online <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/tbs-sct/cmn/archives-eng.asp>. Retrieved 11 May 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (1999a). *Canada – The Place to be. Annual Immigration Plan for the Year 2000*. Available online <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20060205134408/http://www.ic.gc.ca/english/pub/anrep00.html>. Retrieved 15 February 2010.

- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (1999b). *Report on Plans and Priorities 1999-2000*. Available online <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/tbs-sct/cmn/archives-eng.asp>. Retrieved 30 March 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (1998a). *Building on a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century: New Directions for Immigration and Refugee Policy and Legislation*. Cat no. Ci51-86/1998. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (1998b). *Report on Plans and Priorities 1998-1999*. Available online Available online <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/tbs-sct/cmn/archives-eng.asp>. Retrieved 15 March 2010.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (1994a). *A Broader Vision: Immigration and Citizenship Plan 1995-2000, Annual Report to Parliament*. Cat no. IM 306/10/94. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (1994b). *Into the 21st Century: A Strategy for Immigration and Citizenship*. Cat no. MP43-332/1994E. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- Clark, A.K. (1998). Race, 'culture,' and mestizaje: the statistical construction of the Ecuadorian nation, 1930-1950. *Journal of Historical Sociology* 11(2): 185-211.
- Clegg, S. & Dunkerley, D. (1980.) *Organization, Class and Control*. London: Routledge.
- Clements, W. (December 24, 2004). A-wassailing, ready or not. *The Globe and Mail*, p.A18.
- Cobb-Clark, D. (2001). The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia. *Australian Economic Review* 34(4): 467-477.
- Collacott, M. (2002). *Canada's Immigration Policy: The Need for Major Reform*. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute.
- Constable, N. (2005). *Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Constable, N. (2003). *Romance on a Global Stage: Pen Pals, Virtual Ethnography, and "Mail-Order" Marriages*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cornell, S. & Hartmann, D. (2007). *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World, 2nd ed.* Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.

- Côté, A.; Kerisit, M., & Côté, M.-L. (2001). *Sponsorship...For Better or for Worse: The Impact of Sponsorship on the Equality Rights of Immigrant Women*. Ottawa: Status of Women Canada.
- Cotrell, A.B. (1990). Cross-national marriages: a review of the literature. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 21(2): 151-169.
- Creese, G. (2007). From Africa to Canada: bordered spaces, border crossings, and imagined communities. In V. Agnew (ed.), *Interrogating Race and Racism*, pp.352-385. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Creese, G., Dyck, I., & McLaren, A.T. (2008). The 'flexible' immigrant? Human capital discourse, the family household and labour market strategies. *International Migration and Integration* 9: 269-288.
- Creese, G. & Kambere, E.N. (2003). "What colour is your English?" *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 40(5): 565-573.
- Creese, G. & Peterson, L. (1996). Making the news, racializing Chinese Canadians. *Studies in Political Economy* 51: 117-145.
- Croes, H. & Hooimeijer, P. (2009). Gender and chain migration: the case of Aruba. *Population, Space and Place* 16: 121-134.
- Curry, B. (2009, April 20). Jilted bride takes immigration protest to Parliament. *Globe and Mail*, p.A4.
- Curry, B. (2009, January 22). Marriage was genuine, Guinean immigrant tells panel. *Globe and Mail*, p.A7.
- Curry, B. (2008, July 10). Government to hold talks on 'bad faith' marriages. *The Globe and Mail*, p.A5.
- Curry, B. (2008, May 21). Fraud squads chase down marriages of convenience. *Globe and Mail*, p.A1.
- Curtis, B. (2002). *The Politics of Population: State Formation, Statistics, and the Census of Canada, 1840-1875*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Curtis, B. (1995). Expert knowledge and the social imaginary: the case of the Montréal check census. *Social History* 28(56): 313-346.
- Curtis, B. (1994). On the local construction of statistical knowledge: making up the Census of the Canadas, 1861. *Journal of Historical Sociology* 10(4): 416-34.

- Daniel, D. (2005). The debate on family reunification and Canada's Immigration Act of 1976. *American Review of Canadian Studies* 35(4): 683-703.
- Das Gupta, T. (1995). Families of Native Peoples, Immigrants, and People of Colour. In N. Mandell and A. Duffy, eds., *Canadian Families: Diversity, Conflict and Change*, pp. 141-174. Toronto: Harcourt Brace.
- Dauvergne, C. (2003). Evaluating Canada's new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in its global context. *Alberta Law Review* 41: 725-744.
- Department of Manpower and Immigration Canada. (1974). *The Immigration Program*. Ottawa: Department of Manpower and Immigration Canada.
- Deshaw, R. (2006). The history of family reunification in Canada and current policy. *Canadian Issues*, Spring: 9-14.
- Doolittle, R. (2010, August 18). Ford goes on the defensive. *The Toronto Star*. Available online <http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/torontomayoralrace/article/849313>. Retrieved 20 October 2010.
- Dunae, P.A. (1998). Making the 1891 Census in British Columbia. *Social History* 31(62): 223-239.
- Ehrenreich, B. & Hochschild, A.R. (eds.). (2003). *Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Ehrlich, S. (2007). Legal discourse and the cultural intelligibility of gendered meanings. *Journal of Sociolinguistics* 11: 452-477.
- Elliot, J.L. & Fleras, A. (1992). *Unequal Relations: An Introduction to Race, Ethnic and Aboriginal Dynamics in Canada*. Toronto: Prentice Hall.
- Elliott, R., Jones, A., Benfield, A., & Barlow, M. (1995). Overt sexuality in advertising: a discourse analysis of gender responses. *Journal of Consumer Policy* 18: 187-217.
- Employment and Immigration Canada. (1989). *Immigration to Canada: Issues for Discussion*. IM 061/11/89. Ottawa: Employment and Immigration Canada.
- Ericson, R., Baranek, P., & Chan, J. (1987). *Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News Organizations*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Every, D. & Augoustinos, M. (2007). Constructions of racism in the Australian parliamentary debates on asylum seekers. *Discourse and Society* 18(4): 411-436.

- Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. London: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (2001). The Dialectics of Discourse. *Textus* 14(2): 3-10.
- Fairclough, N. & Wodak, R. (1997). Critical Discourse Analysis. In T. van Dijk (ed.), *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Vol.2: Discourse as Social Interaction*, pp.258-284. London: Sage.
- Feagin, J.R. & Feagin, C.B. (2003). *Racial and Ethnic Relations, 7th ed.* Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Feds look out for immigration fraud. (2009, March 11). *The Toronto Sun*, p.26.
- Ferree, M.M., Lorber, J., & Hess, B.B. (1999). *Revisioning Gender*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Fife, R. (2004, November 17). Stripper revelation prompts MPs to call for Sgro resignation. *The National Post*, p.A7.
- Fife, R. (2004, November 15). Minister ok'd exotic dancer's visa. *The National Post*, p.A4.
- Fiske, S.T. & Taylor, S.E. (1984). *Social cognition*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Fleras, A. & Elliot, J.L. (2003). *Unequal Relations: An Introduction to Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada, 4th ed.* Toronto: Prentice-Hall.
- Fleras, A. & Kunz, J.L. (2001). *Media and minorities: Representing diversity in a multicultural Canada*. Toronto: Thompson.
- Francis, D. (2002a). A \$150 -million-a-year deadbeat dilemma. *National Post*, Oct 15, p.FP3.
- Francis, D. (2002b). *Immigration: The Economic Case*. Toronto: Key Porter Books.
- Francis, D. (1993). *A Matter of Survival: Canada in the 21st Century*. Toronto: Key Porter Books.
- Freeze, C. & Jimenez, M. (2004, November 27). Strippers put Ottawa program at centre stage. *The Globe and Mail*, p.A1.

- Friesen, J. (2005, February 23). Slain woman kept marriage concealed: What may have started as an act of kindness ended in her death by strangulation. *The Globe and Mail*, p. A12.
- Friscolanti, M. (2004, December 4). Romanian stripper at centre of Sgro row violated no-touching bylaw. *The National Post*, p.A8.
- Giles, H. & Robinson, W.P. (eds.). (1990). *Handbook of Language and Social Psychology*. Toronto: J. Wiley & Sons Ltd.
- Gilley, B. (2006). The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: results for 72 countries. *European Journal of Political Research* 44: 499-525.
- Girard, D. (2005, January 27). Conservatives to hold talks on immigration. *The Toronto Star*, p.A06.
- Glick Schiller, N. (1999). Transmigrants and nation-states: something old and something new in the U.S. immigrant experience. In C. Hirschman, J. DeWind, & P. Kasinitz (eds.), *Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience*, pp. 94-119. New York: Russell Sage.
- Glick Schiller, N., Basch, L., & Szanton Blanc, C. (1995). From immigrant to transmigrant: theorizing transnational migration. *Anthropological Quarterly* 68(1): 48-63.
- Glick Schiller, N., Basch, L., & Szanton Blanc, C. (1992). *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity and Nationalism Reconsidered*. New York: New York Academy of Sciences.
- Godfrey, T. (2009, August 12). 'My love for her is real': Chinese bride denied entry. *The Toronto Sun*, p.3.
- Godfrey, T. (2009, June 24). Jimmy D's fight for love: Air Canada retiree seeks status for wife. *The Toronto Sun*, p.9.
- Godfrey, T. (2008, November 21). His prayers unanswered; 79-year-old minister's application to sponsor Chinese wife ignored for two years. *The Toronto Sun*, p.12.
- Godfrey, T. (2004, January 3). G'bye to the Rock? Feds may force Newfoundland's mayor's wife back to Cuba. *The Toronto Sun*, p.18.
- Godfrey, T. (2003, September 20). Used 'n' abused: Polish Alliance rallies to help keep sex-exploited women in Canada. *The Toronto Sun*, p.5.

- Godfrey, T. (2003, September 10). Marriage scam: Polish women forced to be sex slaves to bogus husbands. *The Toronto Sun*, p.18.
- Godfrey, T. (2003, March 5). Outbreak of bogus brides. *The Toronto Sun*, p.18.
- Godfrey, T. (2000, January 3). Ottawa warned of Chinese illegals; migration from China will be problematic: report. *The Toronto Sun*.
- Goldberg, D.T. (1992). The semantics of race. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 15: 543-567.
- Goldberg, D.T. (ed.). (1990). *Anatomy of Racism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Goldring, L., Berinstein, C., & Bernhard, J.K. (2009). Institutionalizing precarious migratory status in Canada. *Citizenship Studies* 13(3): 239-265.
- Goldscheider, C. (2002). Ethnic categorizations in census: comparative observations from Israel, Canada, and the United States. In D.I. Kertzer & D. Arel (eds.), *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*, pp.71-91. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gonick, M. (2000). Canadian = blonde, English, white: theorizing race, language and nation. *Atlantis* 24(2): 93-104.
- Grabb, E.G. (2007). *Theories of Social Inequality, 5th ed.* Toronto: Nelson.
- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, editors and translators. New York: International Publishers.
- Green, A.G. & Green, D. (2004). The goals of Canada's immigration policy: A historical perspective. *Canadian Journal of Urban Research* 13(1): 102-139.
- Greenburg, J. (2000). Opinion discourse and Canadian newspapers: The case of the Chinese "Boat People." *Canadian Journal of Communication* 25(4): 517-537.
- Greenburg, J. & Hier, S. (2001). Crisis, mobilization and collective problematization: "Illegal" Chinese migrants and the Canadian news media. *Journalism Studies* 2(4): 563-83.
- Grondin, C. (2007). *Knowledge of Official Languages Among New Immigrants: How Important Is It in the Labour Market?* Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 89-624-XWE. Ottawa: Minister of Industry.
- Gwyn, R. (1995). *Nationalism Without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.

- Ha, T.T. & Peritz, I. (2007, September 15). Bomb suspect's Quebec journey. *The Globe and Mail*, p.A8.
- Habermas, J. (1984). *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Hacking, I. (2000). *The Social Construction of What?* Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.
- Hall, S. (1997). Introduction. In *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, S. Hall (ed.), pp.1-12. London: Sage.
- Hawkins, F. (1991). *Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Hawkins, F. (1988). *Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern, 2nd ed.* Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Hawkins, F. (1972). *Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Hay, C. (1996). Narrating crisis: the discursive construction of the winter of discontent. *Sociology* 30(2): 253-277.
- Henry, F. & Tator, C. (2002). *Discourses of Domination: Racial Bias in the Canadian English-Language Press*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated.
- Henry, F. & Tator, C. (2000). The theory and practice of democratic racism in Canada. In M.A. Kalbach & W.E. Kalbach (eds.), *Perspectives on Ethnicity in Canada: A Reader*, pp.285-302. Toronto: Harcourt.
- Henry, F., Tator, C., Mattis, W., & Rees, T. (2000). *The Colour of Democracy in Canada: Racism in Canadian Society, 2nd ed.* Toronto: Harcourt Brace.
- Hier, S.P. & Greenburg, J.L. (2002a). Constructing a discursive crisis: Risk, problematization and illegal Chinese in Canada. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25(3): 490-513.
- Hier, S.P. & Greenburg, J.L. (2002b). News discourse and the problematization of Chinese migration to Canada. In *Discourses of Domination: Racial Bias in the Canadian English-Language Press*, pp.138-162. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated.
- Hill, J.H. (2008). Language, race and white public space. *American Anthropologist* 100(3): 680-689.

- Horall, S.W. (1980). The Royal North-West Mounted Police and labour unrest in Western Canada, 1919. *Canadian Historical Review* 61(2): 169-190.
- Houle, R. & Schellenberg, G. (2010). *New Immigrants' Assessments of their Life in Canada*. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11F0019M — No. 322. Ottawa: Minister of Industry.
- Hsia, H.-C. (2007). Imaged and imagined threat to the nation: the media construction of the 'foreign brides' phenomenon' as problems in Taiwan. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 8(1): 55-85.
- Hunt, L. (2004). *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Husband, C. (1994). Crisis of national identity as the 'new moral panics': political agenda-setting about definitions of nationhood. *New Community* 20(2): 191-206.
- Ibrahim, M. (2005). The securitization of migration: a racial discourse. *International Migration* 43(5): 163-187.
- Iverson, J. (2009, April 6). Marriage fraud targeted; lawsuit filed, group seeks immigration changes. *The National Post*, p. A4.
- Jackson, P. & Penrose, J. (1993). Placing "race" and nation. In P. Jackson and J. Penrose (eds.), *Constructions of Race, Place and Nation*, pp.1-26. London: UCL Press.
- Jain, A. (2008, May 28). Foreigners wed, then fled. *The Toronto Sun*, p.9.
- Javed, N. (2009, January 13). Pregnant mom won't be deported. *The Toronto Star*, p.A13.
- Javed, N. (2008, December 30). Red tape tearing Toronto family apart. *The Toronto Star*, p.A04.
- Jimenez, M. (2006, July 29). They went abroad seeking wedded bliss. Now they say their marriages were a fraud. *The Globe and Mail*, p.A1.
- Jimenez, M. (2006, June 1). Red tape swept aside, couple to reunite at last. *The Globe and Mail*, p.A2.
- Jimenez, M. (2006, May 25). Twist in red tape at Immigration keeping husband and bride apart. *The Globe and Mail*, p.A9.
- Jimenez, M. (2006, May 11). Arranged marriages becoming more common, officials say. *The Globe and Mail*, p.A12.

- Jimenez, M. (2004, December 4). Controversy, attacks all part of bump and grind of handling difficult immigration file, minister says. *The Globe and Mail*, p.A4.
- Jimenez, M. (2004, November 24). Romanian defends minister's action in granting permit. *The Globe and Mail*, p.A9.
- Jiwani, Y. (2006). *Discourses of Denial: Mediations of Race, Gender and Violence*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Jiwani, Y. (1998). On the outskirts of empire: race and gender in Canadian TV news. In V. Strong-Boag, S. Grace, A. Eisenberg, and J. Anderson (eds.), *Painting the Maple: Essays on Race, Gender, and the Construction of Canada*, pp.53-68. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Justice Canada. (1960). *Canadian Bill of Rights*. Ottawa: Justice Canada.
- Karim, K.H. (1993). Constructions, deconstructions, and reconstructions: competing Canadian discourses on ethnocultural terminology. *Canadian Journal of Communication* 18(2): 197-218.
- Kearney, M. (1995). The local and the global: the anthropology of globalization and transnationalism. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24: 547-65.
- Kelley, N. & Trebilcock, M. (1998). *The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Kertzer, D.I. & Arel, D. (2002a). *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kertzer, D.I. & Arel, D. (2002b). Censuses, identity formation, and the struggle for political power. In D.I. Kertzer & D. Arel (eds.), *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*, pp. 1-42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Keung, N. (2009, March 31). Ottawa sued over alleged marriage frauds. *The Toronto Star*, p.GT01.
- Keung, N. (2008, May 23). Rent-a-guest scheme tipped off immigration. *The Toronto Star*, p. A1.
- Keung, N. (2004, December 26). Christmas reunions wrapped in red tape. *The Toronto Star*, p. A20.
- Khoo, S.-E. (2003). Sponsorship of relative for migration and immigrant settlement intention. *International Migration* 41(5): 177-199.

- Khoo, S.-E. & Mak, A. (2003). Career and family factors in immigrant adjustment. In M.W. Charney et al. (eds.), *Chinese Migrants Abroad: Cultural, Educational, and Social Dimensions of the Chinese Diaspora*, pp. 181-203. Singapore: University Press.
- King-O'Riain, R.C. (2007). Counting on the 'celtic tiger': adding ethnic census categories in the Republic of Ireland. *Ethnicities* 7(4): 516-542.
- Kirkham, D. (1998). The Reform party of Canada: a discourse on race, ethnicity and equality. In V. Satzewich (ed.), *Racism and Social Inequality in Canada: Concepts, Controversies, and Strategies of Resistance*. Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing.
- Knowles, V. (2007). *Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy 1540-1990, Revised Edition*. Toronto: Dundurn Press.
- Kobayashi, A. (1994). Unnatural discourse: 'race' and gender in geography. *Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 1(2): 225.
- Kobayashi, A. & Johnson, G.F. (2007). Introduction. In G.F. Johnson & R. Enomoto (eds.), *Race, Racialization, and Antiracism in Canada and Beyond*, pp.3-16. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Kobayashi, A. & Peake, L. (1997). *Urban Strategies on Immigration and Immigration in Canadian Cities*. Report prepared for Metropolis Project. Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada.
- Kofman, E. (2003) Foreword. In N. Piper & M. Roces (eds.), *Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration*, pp.ix-x. Lanham: Rowman & Littleman.
- Kondo, D.K. (1990). *Crafting Selves: Power, Gender, and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese Workplace*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Laczko, F. & Gramegna, M.A. (2003). Developing better indicators of human trafficking. *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 10(1), 179-198.
- Lauser, A. (2008). Philippine women on the move: marriage across borders. *International Migration* 46(4): 85-110.
- Lauser, A. (2006). Philippine women on the move: a transnational perspective on marriage migration. *Internationales Asienforum* 37 (3-4): 321-37.
- Leeman, J. (2004). Racializing language: a history of linguistic ideologies in the U.S. Census. *Journal of Language and Politics* 3(3): 507-534.

- Li, P.S. (2007). Contradictions of 'racial' discourse. In V. Agnew (ed.), *Interrogating Race and Racism*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 37-54.
- Li, P.S. (2003a). *Destination Canada: Immigration Debates and Issues*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Li, P.S. (2003b). Deconstructing Canada's discourse of immigrant integration. *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 4(3): 315-333.
- Li, P.S. (2003c). The place of immigrants: The politics of difference in territorial and social space. *Canadian Ethnic Studies* XXXV(2): 1-13.
- Li, P.S. (2001). The racial subtext in Canada's immigration discourse. *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 2(1): 77-97.
- Li, P.S. (1988). *The Chinese in Canada*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Lilja, M. (2009). Theorizing resistance: mapping, concretism, and universalism – the new feminist concepts of our time? *The Resistance Studies Magazine* 1: 3-19.
- Lilley, B. (2010, September 28). Serious debate needed on immigration numbers. *The Toronto Sun*. Available online <http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2010/09/28/15509306.html>. Retrieved 3 November 2010.
- Lu, M.C.-W. (2008). Commercially arranged marriage migration: case studies of cross-border marriages in Taiwan. In R. Palriwala & P. Uberoi (eds.), *Marriage, Migration and Gender*, pp.125-151. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Lukacs, G. (1971). *The History of Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialects*. London: Merlin Press.
- Luke, A. (2002). Beyond science and ideology critique: developments in critical discourse analysis. *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics* 22: 96-110.
- Ma, J. & Hildebrandt, K. (1993). Canadian press coverage of the ethnic Chinese community: a content analysis of the Toronto Star and the Vancouver Sun, 1970-1990. *Canadian Journal of Communication* 18(4): 479.
- Mahtani, M. (2008). How are immigrants seen – and what do they want to see? Contemporary research on the representation of immigrants in the Canadian English-language media. In J. Biles, M. Burstein, & J. Frideres (eds.), *Immigration and Integration in Canada in the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 231-251. Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University.

- Mahtani, M. (2001). Representing minorities: Canadian media and minority identities. *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 33(3): 93-133.
- Mahtani, M. & Mountz, A. (2002). *Immigration to British Columbia: Media Representation and Public Opinion*. Vancouver Centre of Excellence, Research of Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis Working Paper No. 02-15. Available online <http://mbc.metropolis.net/assets/uploads/files/wp/2002/WP02-15.pdf>. Retrieved 18 January 2010.
- Mak, A. (1997). Skilled Hong Kong immigrants' intention to repatriate. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 6(2): 169-184.
- Mandel, M. (2006, July 9). Runaway spouses get golden ticket; jilted partners, scammed by foreign lovers, want immigration laws changed. *The Toronto Sun*, p.6.
- Mannheim, K. (1997). *Ideology and Utopia*. London: Routledge.
- Marling, R. (2010). The intimidating Other: feminist critical discourse analysis of the representation of feminism in Estonian print media. *Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research* 18: 7-19.
- Mascini, P. & van Bochove, M. (2009). Gender stereotyping in the Dutch asylum procedure: 'independent' men versus 'dependent' women. *International Migration Review* 43(1): 112-133.
- Massey, D.S., Arango J., Hugo G., Kouaouci A., Pellegrino A., & Taylor J.E. (1994). An Evaluation of International Migration Theory: The North American Case. *Population and Development Review* 20: 699-751.
- McDonald, J. T., & Kennedy, S. (2004). Insights into the "healthy immigrant effect": health status and health service use of immigrants to Canada. *Social Science & Medicine* 59: 1613-1627.
- McKay, D. (2003). Filipinas in Canada – deskilling as a push toward marriage. In N. Piper & M. Roces (eds.), *Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration*, pp.23-52. Lanham: Rowman & Littleman.
- Merali, N. (2009). Experiences of South Asian brides entering Canada after recent changes to family sponsorship policies. *Violence Against Women*, 15, 321-339.
- Merali, N. (2008). Theoretical frameworks for studying female marriage migrants. *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 32: 281-289.
- Miles, R. & Brown, M. (2003). *Racism*, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.

- Minar, D.W. (1961). Ideology and Political Behavior. *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 5(4): 317-331.
- Nagel, C.R. (2002). Geopolitics by another name: immigration and the politics of assimilation. *Political Geography* 21(8): 971-987.
- Nakamatsu, T. (2003). International marriage through introduction agencies: social and legal realities of "Asian" wives of Japanese men. In N. Piper & M. Roces (eds.), *Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration*, pp.181-202. Lanham: Rowman & Littleman.
- Nakano Glenn, E. (1999). The social construction and institutionalization of gender and race: An integrative framework. In M.M. Ferree, J. Lorber & B.B. Hess (eds.), *Revisoning Gender*, pp.3-43. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Narayan, U. (1995). "Male-order" brides: immigrant women, domestic violence and immigration law. *Hypatia* 10(1): 104-119.
- Ng, R. (1992). Managing female immigration: a case of institutional sexism and racism. *Canadian Women's Studies* 12(3): 20-23.
- Ng, R. (1990). Immigrant women: the construction of a labour market category. *Canadian Journal of Women and Law* 4: 96-112.
- Nieguth, T. (1999). Beyond dichotomy: concepts of the nation and the distribution of membership. *Nations and Nationalism* 5(2): 155-74.
- Nobles, M. (2002). Racial categorization and censuses. In D.I. Kertzer and D. Arel (eds.), *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*, pp.43-70. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nobles, M. (2000). *Shades of citizenship: race and the census in modern politics*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Omi, M. & Winant, H. (1994). *Racial Formation in the U.S. from the 1960s to the 1990s, 2nd ed.* New York: Routledge.
- Omidvar, R. & Richmond, T. (2003). *Immigrant Settlement and Social Inclusion in Canada*. Toronto: Laidlaw Foundation.
- Ong, A. (1999). *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- O'Toole, M. (2009, January 7). Slain woman's father-in-law charged with killing her in Mississauga store. *The National Post*, p.A4.

- Oxman-Martinez, J., Martinez, A. & Hanley, J. (2001). Trafficking women: gendered impacts of Canadian immigration policies. *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 2(3): 297-313.
- Palriwala, R. & Uberoi, P. (eds.). (2008). *Marriage, Migration and Gender*. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Papastergiadis, N. (2000). *The turbulence of migration: globalization, deterritorialization, and hybridity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Parai, L. (1975). Canada's immigration policy, 1962-1974. *International Migration Review* 9(4): 449-477.
- Pedraza, S. (1991). Women and migration: the social consequences of gender. *Annual Review of Sociology* 17: 303-325.
- Pe-Pua, R. (2003). Wife, mother, and maid: the triple role of Filipino domestic workers in Spain and Italy. In N. Piper & M. Roces (eds.), *Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration*, pp.157-180. Lanham: Rowman & Littleman.
- Picot, G. & Sweetman, A. (2005). *The Deteriorating Economic Welfare of Immigrants and Possible Causes: Update 2005*. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11F0019MIE — No. 262. Ottawa: Minister of Industry.
- Piper, N. (2003). Wife or worker? Worker or wife? Marriage and cross-border migration in contemporary Japan. *International Journal of Population Geography* 9: 457-469.
- Piper, N. (1999). Labour migration, trafficking and international marriage: female cross-border movements into Japan. *Asian Journal of Women's Studies* 52(2): 69-99.
- Piper, N. & Roces, M. (eds.). (2003). *Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration*. Lanham: Rowman & Littleman.
- Puttagunta, P.S. (1998). "Invasion" of the "immigrant hordes": An analysis of current arguments in Canada against multiculturalism and immigration policy. PhD Dissertation. The University of British Columbia.
- Qadeer, M. & Kumar, S. (2006). Ethnic enclaves and social cohesion. *Canadian Journal of Urban Research* 15(2, Supplement): 1-17.
- Rallu, J.-L., Piché, V., & Simon, P. (2006). Demography and ethnicity: an ambiguous relationship. In G. Casseli, J. Vallin, G. Wunsch & D. Courgeau (eds.), *Demography: Analysis and Synthesis, Vol. III*, pp.531-549. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

- Rex, J. (1983). *Race Relations in Sociological Theory*. London: Routledge.
- Richmond, A. (2001). Refugees and racism in Canada. *Refuge* 19(6): 12-20.
- Robinson, K. (1996). Of mail-order brides and 'boys' own' tales: representations of Asian-Australian marriages. *Feminist Review* 52:53-68.
- Rubin, G. (1975). The traffic in women: notes on the political economy of sex. In R.R. Reiter (ed.), *Toward an Anthropology of Women*, pp. 157-210. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Ruddick, E., Bergeron, J., Grant, M., Justus, M., Kustec, S., Potter, S. et al. (2005). *Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: A Portrait of Early Settlement Experiences*. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 89-614-XIE. Ottawa: Minister of Industry.
- Satzewich, V. (1998a). Introduction. In V. Satzewich (ed.), *Racism and Social Inequality in Canada: Concepts, Controversies and Strategies of Resistance*, pp.11-24. Toronto: Thompson Education Publishing, Inc.
- Satzewich, V. (1998b). Race, Racism, and Racialization: Contested Concepts. In V. Satzewich (ed.), *Racism and Social Inequality in Canada: Concepts, Controversies and Strategies of Resistance*, pp.25-45. Toronto: Thompson Education Publishing, Inc.
- Satzewich, V. (1993). Migrant and immigrant families in Canada: state coercion and legal control in the formation of ethnic families. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 24(3): 315-338.
- Satzewich, V. (1991). *Racism and the Incorporation of Foreign Labour: Farm Labour Migration to Canada since 1945*. New York: Routledge.
- Satzewich, V. (1989a). Racism and Canadian immigration policy: the government's view of Caribbean migration, 1962-1966. *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 21(1), 77-97.
- Satzewich, V. (1989b). Racisms: the reactions to Chinese migrants in Canada at the turn of the Century. *International Sociology* 4(3): 311-327.
- Satzewich, V. & Liidakis, N. (2007). *'Race' and Ethnicity in Canada: A Critical Introduction*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press.
- Schellenberg, G. & Maheux, H. (2007). *Immigrants' Perspectives on their First Four Years in Canada: Highlights from three waves of the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada*. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11-008. Ottawa: Minister of Industry.

- Schneider, A. & Ingram, H. (1993). Social construction of target populations: implications for politics and policy. *American Political Science Review* 78(2): 334-347.
- Scott, M (2010, March 2). Niqab dispute sparks debate over the right to veil. *The Montréal Gazette*. Available online <http://www2.canada.com/story.html?id=2633767>. Retrieved 26 October 2010.
- Sears, D. (1988). Symbolic racism. In P. Katz & D. Taylor (eds.), *Towards the Elimination of Racism: Profiles in Controversy*, pp.53-84. New York: Plenum.
- Simmons, A.B. (2010). *Immigration and Canada: Global and Transnational Perspectives*. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc.
- Simmons, A.B. (1999). Immigration Policies: Imagined Futures. In S.S. Halli & L. Driedger (eds.), *Immigrant Canada: Demographic, Economic, and Social Challenges*, pp.21-50. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Simmons, A.B. (1998). Racism and immigration policy. In V. Satzewich (ed.), *Racism and Social Inequality in Canada: Concepts, Controversies and Strategies of Resistance*, pp.87-114. Toronto: Thompson Education Publishing, Inc.
- Simmons, A.B. (1994). Canadian immigration policy in the early 1990s: a commentary on Veugelers and Klassen's Analysis of the breakdown in the unemployment-immigration linkage. *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 19(4): 525-534.
- Simmons, A.B. (1990). 'New wave' immigrants: origins and characteristics. In S. Halli, F. Trovato & L. Driedger (eds.), *Ethnic Demography: Canadian Immigrant, racial and cultural variations*, pp.141-159. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.
- Simmons, A.B. & Keohane, K. (1992). Canadian immigration policy: state strategies and the quest for legitimacy. *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 29(4): 421-452.
- A Simple Remedy. (2008, May 22). *The Globe and Mail*, p.A20.
- Smith, A.D. (1995). *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Smith, S.J. (1993). Immigration and nation-building in Canada and the United Kingdom. In P. Jackson and J. Penrose (eds.), *Constructions of Race, Place and Nation*, pp.50-80. London: UCL Press.
- Spencer, C. (2009, April 23). Left reeling from runaway spouses. *The Toronto Sun*, p.22.

- Stasiulis, D. (1997). The political economy of race, ethnicity, and migration. In W. Clement (ed.), *Understanding Canada: Building on the New Canadian Political Economy*, pp.141-171. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Stasiulis, D. (1985). Racism and the Canadian State. *Explorations in Ethnic Studies* 8(1): 13-32.
- Stasiulis, D. & Jhappan, R. (1995). The fractious politics of a settler society: Canada. In D. Stasiulis and N. Yuval-Davis (eds.), *Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class*, 97-131. London: Sage.
- Statistics Canada. (2008). 2006 Census: Ethnic origin, visible minorities, place of work and mode of transportation. *The Daily*, 2 April. Available online <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/080402/dq080402a-eng.htm>. Retrieved 15 October 2010.
- Statistics Canada. (2007). *Immigration in Canada: A Portrait of the Foreign-born Population, 2006 Census*. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 97-557-XIE. Ottawa: Minister of Industry.
- Statistics Canada. (2005). *Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: Questionnaire Wave 3*. Available online http://www.statcan.gc.ca/imdb-bmdi/instrument/4422_Q1_V3-eng.pdf. Retrieved 10 January 2010.
- Statistics Canada. (1998). 1996 Census: Ethnic origin, visible minorities. Available online <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/980217/dq980217-eng.htm>. Retrieved 15 October 2010.
- Statistics Canada. (1993). *Ethnic Origin: The Nation, 1991 Census of Canada*. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 93-315. Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science and Technology.
- Statutes of Canada. (1923). *An Act Respecting Immigration*. Available online <http://www.canadiana.org/ECO>. Retrieved 28 May 2010.
- Statutes of Canada. (2001). *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*. Available online <http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-2001-c-27/latest/sc-2001-c-27.html>. Retrieved 2 June 2010.
- Statutes of Canada. (1910). *An Act Respecting Immigration*. Available online <http://www.canadiana.org/ECO>. Retrieved 5 May 2010.
- Steffek, J. (2003). The legitimization of international governance: a discourse approach. *European Journal of International Relations* 9(2): 249-275.

- Steger, M.B. (2009a). Globalisation and social imaginaries: the changing ideological landscape of the 21st century. *Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies 1*: 9-30.
- Steger, M.B. (2009b). Political ideologies and social imaginaries in the global age. *Global Justice: Theory, Practice, Rhetoric 2*: 1-17.
- Stewart, M.J., Neufeld, A., Harrison, M.J., Spitzer, D., Hughes, K., & Makwarimba, E. (2006). Immigrant women family caregivers in Canada: implications for policies and programs in health and social sectors. *Health and Social Care in the Community 14*(4): 329-340.
- Stoffman, D. (2002). *Who Gets In: What's Wrong with Canada's Immigration Program – and How to Fix It*. Toronto: Macfarlane Walter & Ross.
- Stoffman, D. (1993). *Toward a More Realistic Immigration Policy for Canada*. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute.
- Sutherland, C. (2005). Nation-building through discourse theory. *Nations and Nationalism 11*(2): 185-202.
- Sweetman, C. (ed.). (1998). *Gender and Migration*. Oxford: Oxfam.
- Thobani, S. (2007). *Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Thobani, S. (2001). Benevolent state, law-breaking smugglers, and deportable and expendable women: an analysis of the Canadian state's strategy to address trafficking in women. *Refuge 4*(19): 24-33.
- Thobani, S. (2000a). Closing ranks: racism and sexism in Canada's immigration policy. *Race & Class 42*(1): 35-55.
- Thobani, S. (2000b). Nationalizing Canadians: bordering immigrant women in the late twentieth century. *Canadian Journal of Women and Law 12*: 279-312.
- Thobani, S. (1999). Sponsoring immigrant women's inequalities. *Canadian Woman Studies 19*(3): 11-16.
- Thobani, S. (1998). *Nationalizing Citizens, Bordering Immigrant Women: Globalization and the Racialization of Women's Citizenship in Late Twentieth-Century Canada*. PhD Thesis, Simon Fraser University.
- Thompson, A. (2005, February 26). Volpe's smart move is merely a good start. *The Toronto Star*, p.L04.

- Thompson, A. (2004, December 4). Abrupt policy change led to 'strippergate.' *The Toronto Star*, p.L07.
- Thompson, J.H. & Weinfeld, M. (1995). Entry and exit: Canadian immigration policy in context. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 538: 185-198.
- Tonkin, E., McDonald, M., & Chapman, M. (eds.). (1989). *History and Ethnicity*. London: Routledge.
- Tran, K. & Chui, T. (2006). *Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: A Regional Perspective of the Labour Market Experiences*. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 89-616-XIE. Ottawa: Minister of Industry.
- Trempe, R., Kunin, R., & Davis, S. (1998). *Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration*. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services.
- Ungerleider, C. (1991). Media, minorities and misconceptions: the portrayal by and representation of minorities in Canadian news media. *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 23(3): 234-245.
- Urciuoli, B. (1996). *Exposing Prejudice: Puerto Rican Experiences of Language, Race and Class*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Urla, J. (1993). Cultural politics in an age of statistics: numbers, nations, and the making of Basque identity. *American Ethnologist* 20(4): 818-843.
- Vallis, M. (2010, March 9). Canada's foreign-born population expected to boom: Statistics Canada diversity report. *The National Post*. Available online <http://network.nationalpost.com/NP/blogs/posted/archive/2010/03/09/canada-s-foreign-born-population-expected-to-boom-statisics-canada-diversity-report.aspx>. Retrieved 2 November 2010.
- Van der Valk, I. (2003). Right-wing parliamentary discourse on immigration in France. *Discourse & Society* 14: 309-348.
- van Dijk, T.A. (2006). Discourse and manipulation. *Discourse & Society* (2): 359-383.
- van Dijk, T.A. (2002). Political discourse and ideology. Available online <http://www.discourses.org/OldArticles/Political%20Discourse%20and%20Ideology.pdf>. Retrieved 21 September 2010.
- van Dijk, T.A. (2001). Principles of critical discourse analysis. In M. Wetherall, S. Taylor and S.J. Yates (eds.), *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader*. London: Sage.

- van Dijk, T.A. (2000). Ideologies, racism, discourse: debates on immigration and ethnic issues. In J. Ter Wal & M. Verkuyten (eds.), *Comparative perspectives on racism*, pp. 91-116. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1997). Political discourse and racism: describing others in Western parliaments. In S.H Riggins (ed.), *The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse*, pp. 31-64. London: Sage.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1996). Discourse, Power and Access. In C.R. Caldas-Coulthard & M. Coulthard (eds.), *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp. 84–104. London: Routledge.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1995). Power and the news media. In D. Paletz (ed.), *Political Communication and Action*, pp. 9-36. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1994). *Racism and the Press*. New York: Routledge.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1993a). Denying racism: elite discourse and racism. In: J. Solomos & J. Wrench (eds.), *Racism and Migration in Western Europe*, pp. 179-193. Oxford: Berg.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1993b). *Elite Discourse and Racism*. London: Sage.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1993c). Principles of critical discourse analysis. *Discourse & Society* 4: 249-283.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1992). Discourse and the denial of racism. *Discourse & Society* 3: 87-118.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1989). Structures of discourse and structures of power. In J.A. Anderson (ed.), *Communication Yearbook 12*, pp. 18-59. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1988). *News as discourse*. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1987). Semantics of a press panic: the Tamil “invasion.” *European Journal of Communication* 3: 167-187.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1986). *News Analysis: Case Studies of International and National News in the Press: Lebanon, Ethnic Minorities and Squatters*. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1983). Discourse analysis: its development and application to the structure of news. *Journal of Communication* 33(2): 20-43.

- VanderPlaat, M., Ramos, H., & Yoshida, Y. (2009). *A Preliminary Investigation of the Contributions of Sponsored Parents and Grandparents in Canada*. Atlantic Metropolis Centre Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 25. Available online http://canada.metropolis.net/pdfs/fow_vanderPlaat_ramos_yoshida_WP25.pdf. Retrieved 29 December 2009.
- Vukov, T. (2003). Imagining communities through immigration policies: governmental regulation, media spectacles and the affective politics of national borders. *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 6(3): 335-353.
- Waldis, B., & Byron, R. (2006). *Migration and Marriage: Heterogamy and Homogamy in a Changing World*. Zurich: Lit.
- Walton-Roberts, M. (2004a). Rescaling citizenship: gendering Canadian immigration policy. *Political Geography* 23: 265-281.
- Walton-Roberts, M. (2004b). Transnational migration theory in population geography: gendered practices in networks linking Canada and India. *Population, Space and Place*, 10, 361-373.
- Walton-Roberts, M. (2003). Transnational geographies: Indian immigration to Canada. *Canadian Geographer* 47(3), 235-250.
- Wang, H. & Chang, S. (2002). The commodification of international marriage: cross-border marriage business in Taiwan and Vietnam. *International Migration*, 40(6), 93-116.
- Warman, C. (2007). Ethnic enclaves and immigrant earnings growth. *Canadian Journal of Economics* 40(2): 401-422.
- Weber, M. (1968). *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Weeks, C. (2008, December 23). Established immigrants increasingly stuck in low-education jobs. *The Globe and Mail*. Available online <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/article728989.ece>. Retrieved 12 October 2010.
- Wente, M. (2010, October 7). A few frank words about immigration. *The Globe and Mail*. Available online <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/time-to-lead/multiculturalism/a-few-frank-words-about-immigration/article1746816/>. Retrieved 11 November 2010.
- Wetherell, M. & Potter, J. (1992). *Mapping the Language of Racism: Discourse and the Legitimation of Exploitation*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Wetherell, M., Stiven, H., & Potter, J. (1987). Unequal egalitarianism: A preliminary study of discourses concerning gender and employment opportunities. *British Journal of Social Psychology* 26: 59-71.
- Whitaker, R. (1991). *Canadian Immigration Policy since Confederation*. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association.
- White, P. & Jackson, P. (1995). (Re)theorizing population geography. *International Journal of Population Geography* 1:11-23.
- Williams, R. (1977). *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wodak, R. (1996a). *Disorders of Discourse*. Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman Limited.
- Wodak, R. (1996b). The genesis of racist discourse in Austria since 1989. In C.R. Caldas-Coulthard and M. Coulthard (eds.), *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp. 107-128. London: Routledge.
- Wodak, R. & Matouschek, B. (1993). 'We are dealing with people whose origins one can clearly tell just by looking': critical discourse analysis and the study of neo-racism in contemporary Austria. *Discourse & Society* 4: 225-248.
- Wyer, R.S. & Srull, T.K. (eds.). (1985). *Handbook of Social Cognition, Vol.2: Applications, 2nd ed.* Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.
- Young, L. & Fitzgerald, B. (2006). *The Power of Language: How Discourse Influences Society*. London: Equinox.


APPENDIX A: CANADIAN IMMIGRATION LEVELS

Table A.1: Number of Immigrants Admitted to Canada, by Selected Regions of Origin, 1946-2000

Year	Total Immigrants Admitted	Immigrants from Britain	Immigrants from Europe (excluding Britain)	Immigrants from Asia
1946-1955	1,222,319	358,681	705,437	26,990
1956-1967	1,699,320	486,266	857,858	84,411
1968-1978	1,675,007	292,107	447,748	352,713
1979-2000	3,794,009	192,340	661,617	2,039,365
Total	8,390,655	1,329,394	2,672,660	2,503,479

Source: Adapted from Li (2003a: 32)

Figure A.1: Region of Birth of Recent Immigrants to Canada, 1971 to 2006



Note: 'Recent immigrants' refers to landed immigrants who arrived in Canada within five years prior to a given census.

Source: Statistics Canada (2007: 9)

Table A.2: Percentage of Permanent Residents Admitted in 2008, by Category of Admission

Category of Admission		% of Category	% of all Permanent Residents
Family Class	Spouses and partners	67.5	17.9
	Sons and daughters	4.91	1.3
	Parents and grandparents	25.3	6.7
	Other	2.30	0.6
	Total	100.0	26.5
Economic Class	Skilled workers, principal applicants	29.0	17.5
	Skilled workers, spouses and dependents	40.4	24.4
	Entrepreneurs, principal applicants	0.33	0.2
	Entrepreneurs, spouses and dependents	0.83	0.5
	Self-employed, principal applicants	0.17	0.1
	Self-employed, spouses and dependents	0.17	0.1
	Investors, principal applicants	1.82	1.1
	Investors, spouses and dependents	4.98	3.0
	Provincial/territorial nominees, principal applicants	5.63	3.4
	Provincial/territorial nominees, spouses and dependents	9.45	5.7
	Live-in-caregivers, principal applicants	4.14	2.5
	Live-in-caregivers, spouses and dependents	2.99	1.8
	Total	100	60.3

Source: Adapted from CIC (2009a)

Table A.3: Percentage of Male and Female Permanent Resident Immigrants by Source Region, 2008

Source Area	% of Male Permanent Residents in 2008	% of Female Permanent Residents in 2008
Africa and Middle East	21.7	19.9
Asia and Pacific	45.6	49.6
South and Central America	10.7	10.7
United States	4.6	4.4
Europe and the United Kingdom	17.4	15.6
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Adapted from CIC (2009a)

Table A.4: Percentage of Family Class and Economic Immigrants by Source Region, 2008

Source Area	% of Family Class in 2008	% of Economic Class in 2008
Africa and Middle East	14.2	20.9
Asia and Pacific	52.8	49.2
South and Central America	11.8	7.6
United States	7.1	3.3
Europe and the United Kingdom	14.1	18.9
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Adapted from CIC (2009a)

APPENDIX B: IMMIGRATION PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

The official objectives of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* with respect to immigration are:

- (a) to permit Canada to pursue the maximum social, cultural, and economic benefits of immigration;
- (b) to enrich and strengthen the social and cultural fabric of Canadian society, while respecting the federal, bilingual and multicultural character of Canada;
 - (b.1) to support and assist the development of minority official language communities in Canada;
- (c) to support the development of a strong and prosperous Canadian economy, in which the benefits of immigration are shared across all regions of Canada;
- (d) to see that families are reunited in Canada;
- (e) to promote the successful integration of permanent residents into Canada, while recognizing that integration involves mutual obligations for new immigrants and Canadian society;
- (f) to support, by means of consistent standards and prompt processing, the attainment of immigration goals established by the Government in Canada in consultation with the provinces;
- (g) to facilitate the entry of visitors, students and temporary workers for purposes such as trade, commerce, tourism, international understanding and cultural, educational and scientific activities;
- (h) to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society;
- (i) to promote international justice and security by fostering respect for human rights and by denying access to Canadian territory to persons who are criminals or security risks; and
- (j) to work in cooperation with the provinces to secure better recognition of foreign credentials of permanent residents and their more rapid integration into society.

Source: Statutes of Canada (2001)

APPENDIX C: INFORMATION ON LSIC

The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC) targeted landed immigrants who arrived in Canada between October 2000 and September 2001, and who were aged 15 years or older at the time of arrival. In order to meet inclusion criteria for the survey, immigrants must have applied through a Canadian Mission Abroad (i.e. individuals applying for permanent resident status from within Canada were not eligible; refugees who were granted asylum from within Canada were similarly not eligible for participation). The sampling frame for the survey was approximately 165,000 of the 250,000 persons admitted to Canada during the reference period. In total, a representative sample of 20,322 immigrants were selected from the target population; 12,128 of these responded to the first wave of the survey (conducted six months after their initial arrival in Canada), of which approximately 9,300 responded to the second wave (two years after arrival) and 7,700 responded to the third wave (four years after arrival) (Schellenberg & Maheux, 2007).

Table C.1: Overview of LSIC Questionnaire

Questionnaire Domain	# of questions (% of 495 questions)	Question topics
Social Interactions	65 (13.1%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How information (services, training, employment, etc.) was accessed • Contact with sponsor • Intention to sponsor • Help provided to other immigrants • Contact with family outside of Canada • Friendships and social contacts • Emotional connections and ability to ask for help • Participation in groups/organization • Experiences of discrimination
Language	69 (13.9%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Language spoken at home • Facility in speaking English/French in different situations (speaking with doctor, arranging a meeting, taking a phone message) • Facility in reading/writing in English/French • English/French language training (including course completion, reasons for non-completion, who paid for courses) • Other steps taken to improve English/French • Difficulties receiving training • Assistance sought to overcome difficulties

Questionnaire Domain	# of questions (% of 495 questions)	Question topics
Housing	32 (6.5%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Type of residence • Rent or own • Mortgage/loan • Money given to others towards their housing costs • Monthly cost of housing • Quality of housing (need for repairs) • Size of housing (number of rooms) • Satisfaction with housing • Difficulties finding housing • Help sought/received/not received to find housing • Intentions to move/purchase housing
Education	79 (16.0%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formal education outside Canada (highest level attained, country attained, language of instruction) • Education/training in Canada (excluding language instruction) • Additional courses/programs taken (including field of study, contribution to diploma/degree, who/how paid) • License/certification • Credential assessment • Plans for further education/training • Difficulties receiving education/training in Canada • Assistance sought/received/not received to overcome difficulties • Partner/spouse's education • Children's schooling • Perceived importance of children speaking English/French • Children's problems in school • Contact with children's school(s)

Questionnaire Domain	# of questions (% of 495 questions)	Question topics
Employment	102 (20.6%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Main employment activity/duties • Efforts to find work • Language spoken/ethnicity pertaining to business partner(s), employee(s), client(s), supplier(s), co-worker(s) • Job satisfaction • Difficulties finding work in Canada • Assistance sought/received/not received to overcome difficulties • Acceptance/non-acceptance of foreign work experience • Volunteer work • Partner/spouse's employment situation • Business ownership • Wage/salary (self, partner/spouse)
Health	43 (8.7%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality of personal health • Health insurance coverage • Medical/dental services used in past 12 months (self, children) • Medical problems • Stress • Difficulties accessing/using health services in Canada • Assistance sought/received/not received to overcome difficulties • Importance of language spoken by/ethnicity and sex of health service providers
Values and attitudes	22 (4.4%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Importance of ties based on ethnicity/culture • Importance of carrying on values and traditions of ethnic/cultural group or homeland (self, children) • Importance of learning/practicing values and traditions of Canada (self, children) • Children's knowledge of language of homeland • Children's attendance at special classes/schools for ethnic/cultural group • Sense of belonging to family, ethnic/cultural group, city, province, Canada, North America

Questionnaire Domain	# of questions (% of 495 questions)	Question topics
Citizenship	17 (3.4%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plans for settling in Canada • Reasons for staying or leaving Canada • Canadian citizenship status/intentions • Emigration plans
Income	66 (13.3%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Family income from sources within Canada (sources, amount) • Family income from outside Canada (sources and amount) • Personal income • Savings • Loans • Remittances
Perceptions of Settlement	12 (2.4%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Likes and dislikes about Canada • Difficulties in Canada • Perceived material well-being • Quality of life • Satisfaction with life (own, children, other family members)

APPENDIX D: LSIC REPORTS ANALYZED IN CHAPTER SIX

Table D.1: LSIC Reports Analyzed in Chapter Six

Title (Year)	Author(s)/Contributors	Department/Division
<i>Immigrants' Perspectives on their First Four Years in Canada: Highlights from Three Waves of the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada</i> (2007)	Grant Schellenberg and Helene Maheux	Social Analysis Division, Statistics Canada
<i>Knowledge of Official Languages Among New Immigrants: How Important Is It in the Labour Market?</i> (2007)	Chantal Grondin	Special Surveys Division, Statistics Canada
<i>Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: A Portrait of Early Settlement Experiences</i> (2005)	Elizabeth Ruddick, Jean Bergeron, Mary Grant, Martha Justus, Stan Kustec, Stephanie Potter ¹ Cindy Bryant, Patrice Dion, Jessie-Lynn MacDonald, Owen Phillips, Michelle Simard, Sylvain Tremblay ²	¹ Citizenship and Immigration Canada ² Statistics Canada
<i>Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: Process, Progress and Prospects</i> (2003)	Tina Chui	Housing, Family and Social Statistics Division, Statistics Canada.
<i>Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: Progress and Challenges of New Immigrants in the Workforce</i> (2005)	Tina Chui and Kelly Tran	Social and Aboriginal Statistics Division, Statistics Canada
<i>Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: A Regional Perspective of the Labour Market Experiences</i> (2006)	Kelly Tran and Tina Chui	Social and Aboriginal Statistics Division, Statistics Canada
<i>New Immigrants' Assessments of their Life in Canada</i> (2010)	René Houle and Grant Schellenberg	Social Analysis Division, Statistics Canada

Note: All reports were published by authority of the Minister responsible for Statistics Canada (Minister of Industry)

CURRICULUM VITAE

Andrea R. Flynn

Education

Doctor of Philosophy (Sociology)
The University of Western Ontario, London ON
2006 - 2011

Comprehensive Examinations: Diversity and Inequality; Classical and Contemporary Sociological Theory

Master of Arts (Sociology)
The University of Western Ontario, London ON
2004-2006

Thesis Title: “Defying Demographic Expectations: Induced Abortion, Contraceptive Use, and the ‘Culture’ of Birth Control in Cuba” (Supervisor: Dr. Danièle Bélanger)

Bachelor of Arts (Sociology and Psychology)
Memorial University, St. John’s NL
1999-2004

Scholarships and Awards

SSHRC Post-Doctoral Fellowship, 2010-2010 (\$80,500 – declined)

SSHRC Doctoral Fellowship, 2008-2010 (\$40,000)

Ontario Graduate Scholarship, Government of Ontario, 2008-2009 (\$15,000 – declined)

Western Graduate Research Scholarship, The University of Western Ontario, 2004-2010 (total value \$57,600)

Recruitment Scholarship, Department of Sociology, The University of Western Ontario, 2006 (\$1,500)

SSHRC Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canadian Graduate Scholarship – Master’s, 2005-2006 (\$17,500)

Ontario Graduate Scholarship, Government of Ontario 2005-2006 (\$15,000 – declined)

University Medal for Academic Excellence in Sociology, Memorial University, 2005

Named to Dean's List, Faculty of Arts, Memorial University, 2003-2004, 2001-2002, 2000-2001

Atlantic Accord Scholarship, Government of Newfoundland, 1999 (\$2,000)

District Scholarship, Government of Newfoundland, 1999 (\$1,000)

Memorial University of Newfoundland Entrance Scholarship, 1999 (\$2,000)

Professional Experience

Research Associate/Project Coordinator
Centre for Addiction and Mental Health
Social and Epidemiological Research Department
London, ON
April 2010 - present

Teaching Assistant, Statistics for Sociology
Department of Sociology
The University of Western Ontario
September - December 2008

Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Sociology
Department of Sociology
The University of Western Ontario
September 2004 - April 2006

Research Assistant (Dr. Danièle Bélanger)
Department of Sociology
The University of Western Ontario
September 2004 - April 2008

Publications

Flynn, A., & Graham, K. (2010). "Why did it happen?" A review and conceptual framework of perceived reasons for intimate partner violence. *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 15(3): 239-251.

Bélanger, D., & Flynn, A. (2009). The persistence of induced abortion in Cuba: Exploring the notion of an "abortion culture." *Studies in Family Planning* 40(1): 13-26.

Presentations

Flynn, A. "Portrayals of Family-Class Immigrants in Canadian Print Media: Decoding Messages about 'Belonging' to the Canadian Nation." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Sociological Association, 28 May 2009, Ottawa, Ontario.

Flynn, A., & Bélanger, D. «Différences Culturelles entre Deux Cultures de L'IVG: Les Cas du Vietnam et de Cuba.» Paper presented at the biennial meeting of AIDELF (Association Internationale des Démographes de Langue Française), 27 August 2008, Québec City, Québec.

Flynn, A., & Bélanger, D. "Why Does Abortion Persist? Exploring Cuba's Abortion Culture." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Population Society, 2 June 2007, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.

Rodriguez, G., Bélanger, D., Soto, N.G., Leon, M.G. & Flynn, A. "La toma de decisión para el aborto desde una perspectiva de género" [The decision to obtain an abortion from a gender perspective]. II Congreso de la Asociación Latinoamericana de Población, Guadalajara (Mexico), Sept. 3-5, 2006.

Other Relevant Experience

Volunteer conversational circle leader for recent immigrants
Cross-Cultural Learner Centre, London ON
2009-2010

Graduate student representative, Graduate Committee
Department of Sociology, The University of Western Ontario
2008-2009

Society of Graduate Students, Teaching Awards Committee
The University of Western Ontario
2004-2006