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Canadian Immigration Policy And The Alien Question, 1896-1919: The Anglo-Canadian Perspective

Donald Howard Avery

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CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE ALIEN QUESTION,
1896-1919: THE ANGLO-CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

by

Donald Howard Avery

Department of History

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Graduate Studies
The University of Western Ontario

London, Canada

Marth 1973

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Donald Howard Avery

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Abstract

The entry of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants into Canada in massive numbers between 1896 and 1914 had major economic, social and political consequences from the Anglo-Canadian perspective. To develop rapidly the Canadian economy needed large numbers of agriculturalists, farm labourers, domestics, construction workers and miners. British, American and Western European sources produced an insufficient supply of manpower willing to accept low-paying low status jobs. As a result, immigrants from both the Orient and Continental Europe were recruited in order to provide an agricultural and industrial proletariat.

Although the primary motive for encouraging this influx was economic, certain standards of cultural acceptability were demanded by the Anglo-Canadian public. Therefore, at the turn of the century, Orientals, despite their economic utility, were found culturally undesirable and their entry was restricted. It was generally believed, however, that Continental European immigration should be continued since the overwhelming percentage of these immigrants would be rapidly assimilated.

The attempts to reconcile the cultural adaptability aspect of immigration policy with the economic utility factor represents the dilemma associated with Canadian

immigration policy prior to the Great War. In general, most Canadians believed that the economic advantages outweighed other considerations and that some progress was being made towards assimilation.

The war period confirmed the growing suspicion of Anglo-Canadians that the permissive immigration policy had weakened the nation by allowing in too many aliens who were unwilling or unable to perform the functions of Canadian citizenship. In response to the wide-spread disillusionment of Anglo-Canadians towards the 'open door' immigration policy, and the disturbing presence of the non-Canadianized foreigner, in 1919 the Immigration Act was dramatically altered. Under the new regulations immigrants from enemy alien countries were totally excluded along with pacifist sectarian 'classes'; immigrants from the Orient were more effectively controlled; and immigrants who advocated Bolshevist ideas were not only excluded, but were also subject to rapid deportation. Ethnic, cultural and indeed political acceptability had triumphed over economic consideration. Whether these priorities were to be permanent, with Canadians prepared to accept a slower rate of economic growth in order to safeguard the Anglo-Canadian way of life became one of the major questions of the 1920's.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Canada, like so many nations of the western hemisphere, can trace the origins of its unique population and growth pattern to the arrival of immigrants from Europe, Asia and the United States. From Confederation until World War I with few exceptions two main principles operated in immigration policy-making: the reluctance of the government to impose major restraints on any type of immigration which could make a contribution to the economy; and the growing acceptance of the Immigration Branch's active role in recruiting immigrants for Canada.

Under the terms of the British North America Act (Section 95) the responsibility for immigration was to be shared by the federal and provincial governments. However, there was little disagreement among the provinces in 1867 that in order to avoid confusion it would be necessary to have some degree of centralized authority. Proposals were made to replace the existing maze of British Colonial enactments with new federal statutes. Between 1868-74, a general policy understanding was effected between the Dominion government and the various provinces in regard to promotional activities and the exclusion of 'undesirables'.¹

The most important statute enacted in this period was the Immigration Act of 1869. Under Section 16 of the Act, the Governor-in-Council was given authority to prohibit the landing of all pauper immigrants until funds for their support and transportation were forthcoming.² During the next two decades provision was made for the exclusion of 'diseased' and criminal immigrants. By 1896, the framework for an immigration screening system had been devised but the allocation of funds to enforce these regulations was minimal.³

Restrictions directed against specific ethnic groups were written into the law by 1896. Under the Chinese Immigration Act of 1885, a head tax of \$50 was levied against Chinese labourers. Provision was also made to limit the number of Chinese arriving on each ship.⁴ Significantly, the responsibility for administering the 1885 Act belonged to the Department of Trade and Commerce and not to the Immigration Branch.⁵ This anomaly suggested that concern for expanding trade with the Orient took precedence over restricting the entry of the Chinese. By some dichotomy of reasoning, the importation of Chinese workers was regarded as a completely different matter from the encouragement of the 'white' settler.

Despite the enactments to exclude 'undesirables', most of the efforts of the Immigration Branch between 1870-1896 stressed the promotional aspect. Bonuses were paid to

steamship agents and immigration agencies for directing immigrants to Canada; immigration agents were appointed to tour the United States, Great Britain and Europe distributing pamphlets and extolling the opportunities of Canada. However, in spite of these tactics, the expected influx did not materialize.⁶

While Canada waited, the westward immigrant stream flowed towards Brazil, Argentina and the United States. The powerful economic and social incentives of the United States acted as a virtual magnet drawing millions of European immigrants to her shores. British immigrants in particular were attracted by the greater economic opportunities of the American Republic; many who landed in Halifax or Quebec City picked up their bags and continued their journey southward. Nor were nineteenth century Canadians indifferent to the American option; by 1900, there were over a million former Canadians residing in the United States.⁷ In the period 1867-96 Canada was truly "a demographic railway station" with most of the passengers leaving.⁸

Although the importance of immigration in the development of Canada and particularly the West was generally acknowledged, the administration of immigration policy did not receive high government priority until 1897. From 1869 until 1892 the Department of Agriculture supervised the operation of immigration agencies, and administered the

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Immigration Act. In 1892, however, the Immigration Branch was moved to the Department of the Interior. It was argued that the direct involvement of the Interior in administering public lands in western Canada would result in the most efficient use of the few competent officials available.⁹

The administrative changes made by the Conservatives did not increase immigration dramatically between 1892-1896. In 1893, the best year, 29,632 immigrants arrived in Canada; but in 1896 only 16,835 were recorded.¹⁰ Part of the explanation for this low figure was the insistence by the Conservative government that they intended to follow a 'selective' immigration policy, in comparison to the open door policy of the United States. The immigration priorities of the Conservatives were outlined by Sir Charles Tupper in 1895:

... we do not encourage mechanics, general labourers and navies, or persons following the professional or lighter callings, unless they go out on the advice of friends already settled in the country or possess some special qualification. It is with these classes that the great desire for emigration exists, but to encourage it to any extent might be to create congestion and difficulty in Canada....¹¹

Yet another important factor was the policy of retrenchment adopted by the Conservative government, during a period of depressed economic conditions. This trend was reflected in the annual expenditures of the Immigration Branch. In 1895-96 only \$120,100 was allotted

to the Branch, as compared to \$209,532 for 1892-93.¹² This reduction necessitated a substantial cut-back in the number of immigration agents, particularly in the United States. The following table illustrates the changes:

TABLE SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF
CANADIAN IMMIGRATION AGENTS
IN 1892-3 AND 1895-6¹³

Year	Agents in G.B.	Agents in U.S.A.	Agents in Europe
1892-93	8	41	2
1895-96	6	4	1

The election of the Liberal government of Wilfrid Laurier in 1896 was to significantly expand the annual influx of immigrants. That the change in administration coincided with a period of world-wide prosperity was a fortunate occurrence. During the next fifteen years Canada was to experience extensive economic growth: the Gross National Product increased from \$1057,000,000 in 1900 to \$2235,000,000 in 1910; railway track nearly doubled from 18,140 miles in 1901 to 30,795 miles in 1914; wheat production rose from 20,000,000 in 1896 to 209,000,000 in bushels in 1913; mining production which was valued at \$50,000,000 in 1900 jumped to \$122,000,000 in 1910.¹⁴ The population increase in the prairie provinces between 1896 and 1913 was well over a million; by 1913, 20% of the

population of Canada was located in this region, compared to only 7% in 1895.¹⁵

The factors relating the pattern of western settlement to Canadian economic expansion in the Laurier period have received considerable attention. A.R.M. Lower has written

The long chain of technical devices between grain field and ultimate market was not satisfactorily functioning. Early frost danger had been overcome, and 'Manitoba No. 1 hard' had won its reputation. Men saw profit ahead. Therefore, they began once more to go west. Their needs worked back to the east, keeping factories busy. Thus the snowball started. As it rolled, it was made larger by the new railway programme, both of which were to bulk so large in the Laurier regime.¹⁶

Wheat production, railroad building and the development of industry in both the extractive and manufacturing sectors were to provide the blueprint for Canadian prosperity.¹⁷ To make this dream a reality, strong willing workers were needed to cultivate the vast acres of virgin prairies, to build the railroads and supply the manpower for an expanding industrial system. To recruit vast numbers of workers as quickly as possible was the task that faced Laurier and his government in 1896.

The formulation of Canada's immigration policy from 1896-1914 resulted from the interplay of elected officials and civil servants associated with the Immigration Branch. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, as Prime Minister from 1896-1911

shared with Clifford Sifton and Frank Oliver the major responsibility for the general trends of the policy in the period. Although Laurier made very few pronouncements on the type of immigration he favoured, there were indications that his nineteenth century liberal antipathy to coercion made him extremely reluctant to implement "any proposal that the Dominion Government should use legal means to override the theoretical rights of free entry".¹⁸

Moreover, as an astute politician determined to remain in office, Laurier was very much aware of the enormous political power vested in the Anglo-Canadian economic elite, particularly those who were connected with the labour intensive industries.¹⁹ Thus, Laurier's ideological leaning and the stance of powerful corporations made him incline towards the 'open door' approach.

It is significant that Laurier, despite his French Canadian background, did not appreciably alter the immigration policy to meet the demands of French Canadian critics such as Frederick Monk who argued that instead of recruiting European immigrants for the West "we should devote our energies principally in keeping our people [French Canadians] in this country".²⁰ Nor did French immigration from overseas reach significant totals. In 1907, French Canadian nationalist Armagne Lavergne complained that official statistics showed that only 9,140 French immigrants had come since 1896. Lavergne charged that there was

"conspiracy against French immigration which is carried on in the Interior Department"²¹ Although Lavergne's conspiracy thesis was an exaggeration, he was correct in one important assumption: the Department of the Interior was dominated by Anglo-Canadians between 1896-1914. The portfolio for the Interior was held exclusively by men of Anglo-Canadian background who reflected the biases of western Canada.

Clifford Sifton, Minister of the Interior 1896-1905, personified this western expansionist outlook. For Sifton, rapid population growth particularly in the West was an essential ingredient for national prosperity. After a rapprochement had been reached with Laurier over the contentious Manitoba School Question, Sifton began to transform the Immigration Branch into one of the most dynamic agencies of the government.²² But it was not only administrative reforms that made Sifton's influence on the Immigration Branch so decisive; it was also his ability to convince the Cabinet that an ambitious policy for recruiting immigrants should receive top government priority.²³ The increase in the annual budgets allocated to the Branch reflected his persuasiveness: from a modest \$120,100 spent by the Tupper government in 1896, Sifton was authorized to expand the budget to \$387,000 in 1899. By 1905, Sifton's last year as Minister, the amount had increased to a staggering \$900,000.²⁴

One of Sifton's first actions as Minister was to reshuffle or replace the civil servants connected with the Department of the Interior. Many of his former business and political friends from Manitoba, such as James Smart, W.F. McCreary, J. Obed Smith, and W.D. Scott were inserted into the bureaucracy.²⁵ For the most part these men shared the background and views of their chief: many were westerners; they were Anglo-Canadian Protestants; they had business or professional experience; and they were imbued with the belief that the key to a prosperous West lay in expanding large scale wheat production.²⁶ Sifton's first Superintendent of Immigration, however, was Frank Pedley, who had been both a Toronto Lawyer and a Liberal organizer in Ontario before his appointment.²⁷ W.T.R. Preston, a journalist and staunch Liberal was Sifton's choice to head the overseas recruiting operation based in London. Preston was a highly controversial figure throughout Sifton's term of office because of his connection with the Canadian Labour Bureau and his involvement with the somewhat mysterious North Atlantic Trading Company.²⁸ One of Sifton's most pressing concerns was to force the railways to select their specific grant from the public reserves so that the remainder could be used for settlement. With the reserves question partially solved, Sifton was in a much improved position to proceed with the development of western Canada.²⁹ Sifton felt that free homestead land, adjoining cheap

railway land, would encourage many settlers to specialize in commercial wheat farming.³⁰ Agents of the Immigration Department fanned out through the Midwest to remind land hungry American farmers of the presence of the last major source of good cheap land in North America.³¹ Canadian agents also made untiring efforts to interest sectarian groups residing in the United States such as the Mormons, the Hutterites and the German-Catholics to come to "the last best west". The Canadian government was prepared to arrange bloc settlement grants for these groups and to guarantee special rights by Order-in-Council.³² In respect Sifton's American policy there was general agreement that Canada was receiving a good class of agriculturalist from this source although there was criticism of the expense entailed and the manner in which large land companies were allowed to dispose of real estate.³³

Sifton's British immigration policy was more controversial. Despite the rapid increase in British immigration from 11,813 in 1900 to 65,887 in 1905, there were many unsatisfactory aspects associated with the policy.³⁴ The number of farmers, farm labourers and domestics, the groups which were to receive top priority, remained at an unsatisfactory level. W.T.R. Preston, Overseas Commissioner of Immigration, after conducting a thorough investigation in 1900

indicated his own doubts concerning the possibilities of stimulating increased emigration by British agriculturalists:

A great deal has been said and written in Canada about the desirability of securing a movement on the part of the so-called tenant farmers towards the North-west Territories. ... But one has only to be thrown into contact with these people here to be assured that they are not likely to leave their positions of ease and comfort upon English farms, and assume cheerfully the alleged responsibilities attached to pioneer life in a new country.³⁵

Sifton and his associates offered to arrange bloc land grants and reduced transportation rates for groups of Britishers interested in founding colonies on the prairies. However the unhappy outcome of the Barr Colony undertaking (1902) acted as a deterrent to future United Kingdom group settlement projects.³⁶ By 1904 it was becoming very noticeable that many of those British immigrants who came to Canada as 'farm labourers', soon gravitated into the towns and cities. Arthur Puttee, the Labour M.P. for Winnipeg severely criticized the practice of bringing large numbers of farm labourers into the country to maintain a "fluid labour market" for farmers.³⁷ Puttee charged that urban wage earners were being required "to bear the whole brunt of carrying labour on the labour market for nine months in order that the farmer may use it for two or three months".³⁸ The Canadian Trades and Labor Congress was more concerned, however, over the practice of Canadian manufacturers recruiting skilled labour in Great Britain:

"tending as it does to flood the labor market...and thus tending to reduce wages to the lowest possible level".³⁹ The apparent collusion between W.T.R. Preston, Overseas Commissioner of Emigration, and employment agencies such as the Canadian Labour Bureau, resulted in a sensational exposé during 1904.⁴⁰

The decision to allow large eastern European bloc settlements in the West was not made entirely by Sifton. Just before the Laurier Government took office, the Conservatives had begun to negotiate for the entry into Canada of large groups of Bukovinians and Galicians (Ukrainians) who wished to emigrate en masse from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.⁴¹ Because these people were primarily agriculturists, Sifton decided to encourage them by offering them lands in the Edmonton and Dauphin districts of western Canada. Sifton took advantage of another windfall of agriculturalists in 1898. Through the intercession of the English Quakers, the Government was made aware of the desire of thousands of pacifistic Doukhobors to leave their homeland in eastern Europe and escape from a bitter Russification campaign. Once again bloc settlements were arranged and special guarantees in respect to freedom of religion and exemption from military service were given by an Order-in-Council of 1899.⁴² In response to complaints that western Anglo-Canadians were being

inundated by unassimilatable foreigners, Sifton and other Government spokesmen pointed to the example of the Icelanders and the Mennonites who by 1900 were highly regarded as good industrious citizens. Sifton affirmed his own belief that 'the Canadian Way of Life' would win over these latest arrivals.⁴³

Despite the heavy inflow of Britishers, Americans, Ukrainians and Doukhobors, the Government was still anxious to bring more agriculturalists and domestics into the country. The Scandinavian countries had produced disappointing totals; and France and Germany, another possible source of first class settlers were closed to direct Canadian recruiting by strict laws calculated to keep agriculturalists at home.⁴⁴ Nor were these countries anxious to provide settlers for the overseas possession of an imperial rival, such as Great Britain. It was to combat these difficulties that the Canadian Government through the Immigration Branch and Preston entered into a clandestine agreement with the North Atlantic Trading Company. This secret syndicate of European booking agents was an attempt to circumvent the regulations of Germany and other European countries who objected to the direct recruitment of their nationals.⁴⁵ After 7 years the Canadian Government withdrew from the costly agreement following vociferous complaints from the Opposition charging massive irregularities in the operation of the scheme,

and dissatisfaction with the preponderance of southern and eastern Europeans being recruited for Canada.⁴⁶

It was significant that neither the administration of the Alien Labour Law or the Chinese Immigration Act were the responsibility of the Immigration Branch.⁴⁷ As a result, it was not necessary for Clifford Sifton to assume a strong stance on either of these contentious matters, although there is evidence to indicate that he opposed the large scale entry of both American contract workers and Orientals.⁴⁸ However, in general Sifton opposed a restrictive immigration policy, a point of view which he clearly expressed in the House of Commons in 1899: "it is no part of the duty of the government under the law to appoint agents for the purpose of keeping people from Canada".⁴⁹ As a result, during the Sifton administration very little attention was devoted to excluding immigrants, either for ethnic, occupational or even health reasons.⁵⁰

The departure of Sifton from the Cabinet in 1905 and the criticism from within the Liberal Party of certain aspects of the Immigration Branch activity left the future of an aggressive recruitment policy uncertain. It was in a sense ironic that the man chosen to succeed Clifford Sifton as Minister of the Interior should have been Frank Oliver. Oliver had attacked Sifton's immigration policy both in the House and in his newspaper, the Edmonton Bulletin.

According to Oliver the policy of permitting large bloc settlements of eastern Europeans and special exemptions was wrong. The development of Western Canada would be irreparably harmed by "having the millstone of this Slav population hung around our necks...."⁵¹ In Oliver's term no large colony grants were made and after a protracted controversy over homestead regulations, most of the Doukhobors left the prairies and resettled in British Columbia.⁵²

The Immigration policy, as it developed under Frank Oliver between 1905-11 seemed, on the surface at least, to have a different emphasis. During his term of office a number of restrictive amendments were added to the Immigration Act. In introducing the new clauses in 1906 Oliver informed the House that the bill "[is] not an Act to promote immigration, it is an Act to regulate immigration".⁵³ Oliver even suggested the desirability of following the American example and imposing a head tax of \$2.00 on every immigrant. This proposal was, however, later deleted.⁵⁴ Under this Act, an attempt was made to define more precisely "an immigrant", extending the definition to include other than steerage passengers which had hitherto been in effect. Reference was made to certain prohibited classes under clauses 26-30, as well as to the establishment of administrative machinery to carry out more thorough medical inspections at ocean ports.⁵⁵

While the head tax regulations governing the admission of the Chinese remained outside Oliver's jurisdiction until 1911, the rising tide of anti-Oriental sentiment could not be ignored completely.⁵⁶ Orders-in-Council were passed in 1907-08 which, although they did not name specific ethnic groups, were calculated to decrease the flow of Hindus and Japanese into the country. These were: the continuous-journey qualification which prohibited the entry of any immigrant unless he came directly from his native country; and the landing-money qualification which enabled the Governor General-in-Council to determine the amount of money which an immigrant had to have on his possession upon landing at a Canadian port.⁵⁷ In addition a 'Gentleman's Agreement' was effected in 1907 whereby Japan agreed to voluntarily restrict the entry of her nationals into Canada. As a result of this agreement and the fact that the Japanese diverted their attention to Manchuria from 1907 until 1914, Japanese immigration was substantially reduced from the peak period of 1907.⁵⁸

The Immigration Act of 1910 was an even more comprehensive attempt to establish the ground rules of Canadian immigration. The Orders-in-Council of 1907-1908 relating to direct passage, and landing money were incorporated into the Act under Section 37. Section 38 provided wide discretionary powers for Governor-in-Council to exclude temporarily or permanently "immigrants belonging

to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada or of immigrants of any specified class, occupation or character."⁵⁹ The addition of Section 41, providing for the deportation of anarchists, reflected the growing Anglo-Canadian concern over 'radicals' who threatened the capitalist system. It also indicated a tendency to duplicate similar American legislation of 1903.⁶⁰

Although Immigration enactments were made progressively more restrictive during Oliver's term, an unpublicized recruitment policy was maintained throughout. Table A on the following page indicates the extent to which Oliver accepted the view that the prosperity of Canada depended upon the influx of thousands of immigrants, many of whom were industrial workers rather than agriculturalists.⁶¹

Part of the explanation for the large influx of immigrants, a substantial proportion of whom were from continental Europe, was related to the unflagging commitment of the Laurier Government to railroad construction. In 1911, according to Mackenzie King, Oliver's strong objections to the importation of alien navvies were overruled by Laurier's determination to meet the labour requirements of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company.⁶² The mining boom in Northern Ontario and the rapid increase in manufacturing also required an abundant labour supply.

The defeat of the Liberals in 1911 produced very

TABLE A: Male Immigrants Entering Canada through Ocean Ports, July 1, 1906 to March 30, 1914⁶¹

	<u>Overseas</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Farmers & Farm Labourers	262,501	31.76	221,405	48.05	483,906	37.59
Gen. Labourers	310,072	37.52	131,561	28.55	441,633	34.30
Mechanics	139,723	16.91	62,110	13.47	201,833	15.67
Clerks & Traders	59,766	7.23	18,543	4.03	78,309	6.09
Miners	19,654	2.37	10,261	2.23	29,915	2.33
Not Classified	<u>34,820</u>	<u>4.21</u>	<u>16,884</u>	<u>3.67</u>	<u>51,704</u>	<u>4.02</u>
TOTALS	<u>826,536</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>460,764</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>1,287,300</u>	<u>100</u>

little change in immigration policy. The Conservative Minister of the Interior, Dr. W.J. Roche affirmed this trend. In a speech to the Commons given in 1914, he insisted that aside from closing the Pacific ports to all immigration in 1913, the policy followed by the Conservative government "is the policy, in the main, that has been enforced for some years, and is being continued under the auspices of myself as Minister of the Interior".⁶³ As a result, although the Conservatives had previously deprecated the enormous amount of money expended by the Liberals on immigration recruitment, and attacked the entry of culturally inferior immigrants their policies were open to criticism on these very grounds. Immigration expenditure increased to an all time high with the estimates of 1914, some \$1,450,000.; a greater number of continental Europeans entered the country than on any previous occasion; and even the influx of Orientals was higher than at any period since 1907.⁶⁴

With the outbreak of the Great War large scale immigration was halted, but the 'Alien Problem' remained.⁶⁵ Anglo-Canadian hostility was intensified towards 'non-preferred' aliens such as Orientals, and certain groups of continental Europeans. Of equal significance was that Anglo-Canadians added many other aliens to the 'undesirable' category: the enemy alien who offered aid and comfort to the Hun; and the pacifist sectarian whose selfish insularity

was only too obvious. Moreover, there were strong suspicions that certain allied aliens such as Finns and Russians were prepared to rock the foundations of Canada's capitalistic system. Indeed, by 1919, with the changes in the Immigration Act ethnic, cultural and indeed political acceptability appeared to have triumphed over economic considerations.

CHAPTER I

¹Norman Macdonald, Canada: Immigration and Colonization 1841-1903 (Toronto, 1968), pp. 95-99; John D. Cameron, "The Law Relating to Immigration to Canada, 1872-1942", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1945, pp. 5-25.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴"An Act to Restrict and Regulate Chinese Immigration Into Canada", Statutes of Canada, 1884-85, Chap. 71.

⁵Charles J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, (Toronto, 1941), pp. 35-47.

⁶Norman Macdonald, Canada: Immigration and Colonization, pp. 205-06.

⁷Warren Kalbach, The Impact of Immigration on Canada's Population (Ottawa, 1970), pp. 38, 99.

⁸A.R.M. Lower, Colony to Nation (Toronto, 1964), pp. 409-10.

⁹John D. Cameron, "The Law Relating to Immigration", p. 39; Norman Macdonald, Canada: Immigration and Colonization, p. 146.

¹⁰"Return", re Immigration Branch, Dominion of Canada, Sessional Papers (hereafter Sessional Papers), 1902, no. 68, p. 2.

¹¹"Reports of the High Commissioner, Sir Charles Tupper", Sessional Papers, 1896, no. 13, p. 7.

¹²"Return", re Immigration Branch, Sessional Papers, no. 68, pp. 2-3.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴ O.J. Firestone, Canada's Economic Development, 1867-1953 (London, 1958), pp. 65; Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book I: Canada 1867-1939 (Ottawa, 1954), pp. 69-71; Fifth Census of Canada, 1911 (Ottawa, 1913), vol. II, pp. 42-44, (hereafter cited as Census of Canada).

¹⁵ Report of the Royal Commission ... Book I, p. 69-71.

¹⁶ A.R.M. Lower, Colony to Nation, p. 424.

¹⁷ According to O.J. Firestone, Canadian Economic Development, p. 210, between 1896-1913, "the number of persons working in manufacturing doubled, the real output rose 130 per cent, and the value of fixed capital employed, increased 2 3/4 times in real terms".

¹⁸ Mabel Timlin, "Canada's Immigration Policy, 1896-1910", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 1960, vol. XXVI, 4, p. 518.

¹⁹ John W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton in Relation to His Times (Toronto, 1931), pp. 265-273.

²⁰ Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (hereafter cited as Debates), 1899, p. 8535.

²¹ Ibid., 1907, pp. 6151, 1556.

²² Karl Bicha, The American Farmer and the Canadian West 1896-1914 (Lawrence, Kansas, 1968), pp. 54-60.

²³ Ibid.; Harold Troper, Only Farmers Need Apply (Toronto, 1972), pp. 10-17.

²⁴ Debates, 1905, p. 7686.

²⁵ The major officials under Sifton's administrations were as following:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Previous Occupation</u>	<u>Political Affiliation</u>
James Smart	Deputy Minister (1896-1905)	businessman, lawyer	Liberal
W.W. Cory	Deputy Minister (1905-1919)	lawyer	Lib.
Frank Pedley	Supt. (1896-1904)	lawyer Lib. organizer	Lib.

(continued)

Name	Position	Previous Occupation	Political Affiliation
W.D. Scott	Supt.	land agent	?
W.T.R. Preston	Asst. Supt. (London) (1898-1906)	journalist Liberal organizer	Lib.
J. Obed Smith	Asst. Supt. (1908-1919)	lawyer Lib. organizer	Lib.
W.F. McCreary	Commissioner (Winnipeg) (1896-1900)	lawyer political	Lib.
J. Obed Smith	Commissioner (Winnipeg) (1900-09)	lawyer Lib. organizer	Lib.
J. Bruce Walker	Commissioner (Winnipeg) (1908-1919)	journalist	Lib.

The Canadian Dictionary of Parliament, 1867-1967 (Ottawa, 1968), p. 391; Henry James Morgan, ed., The Canadian Men and Women of the Time (Toronto, 1912), pp. 260, 893, 917, 1006, 1031, 1038, 1136; J.W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton, pp. 95-100.

²⁶ Harold Troper, Only Farmers Need Apply, pp. 12-23.

²⁷ Henry Morgan, Canadian Men and Women, pp. 893, 917.

²⁸ Debates, 1899, p. 8575; Ibid., 1904, p. 7301-03; Ibid., 1905, p. 8177.

²⁹ Karl Bicha, The American Farmer, pp. 55-60.

³⁰ Chester Martin, Dominion Lands Policy (Toronto, 1938), pp. 408-415.

³¹ Karl Bicha, The American Farmer, pp. 9-61; Harold Troper, Only Farmers Need Apply, pp. 36-41.

³² Karl Bicha, The American Farmer, pp. 99-109; Victor Peters, All Things Common (Minneapolis, 1965), pp. 40-41.

³³ Paul Sharp, Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada (Minneapolis, 1948), pp. 7, 111-112; Clifford Sifton Papers, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter Sifton Papers), W.F. McCreary to Clifford Sifton, Nov. 4, 1901.

³⁴Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (hereafter Royal Commission B. & B.), Book IV, (Ottawa, 1968), pp. 238-42.

³⁵Sessional Papers, 1900, no. 13, p. 13; Sir Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Public Archives of Canada, 28640, C.R. Devlin to Prime Minister Laurier, Dec. 8, 1898.

³⁶Helen Evans Reid, All Silent, All Damned: the Search for Issac Barr (Toronto, 1969), p. 45-70; Immigration Branch Records, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter I.B.), 60868, C.W. Speers, Travelling Immigration Inspector to W.D. Scott, Supt. July 24, 1904; Sifton Papers, J.A. Smart to Clifford Sifton, March 23, 1903.

³⁷Debates, 1904, p. 7302.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Proceedings of the 18th Annual Session of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada, 1902, p. 16.

⁴⁰Debates, 1904, pp. 7301-06; Sifton Papers, William Mulock, Minister of Labor to Clifford Sifton, June 15, 1904.

⁴¹Vladimir Kaye, Ukrainian Settlements in Canada, 1896-1900 (Toronto, 1964), pp. 120-30.

⁴²George Woodcock, & Ivan Avakumovic, The Doukhobors (Toronto, 1968), pp. 132-40.

⁴³Debates, 1898, pp. 6828-30; Ibid., 1903, p. 6604.

⁴⁴Sessional Papers, 1902, no. 25, p. 116; Norman Macdonald, Canada: Immigration and Colonization, pp. 203-210.

⁴⁵J.W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton, pp. 141-42; I.B. 113228, #3-#4, W.T.R. Preston to James A. Smart, Oct. 27, 1899.

⁴⁶According to Departmental Records, the syndicate brought 70,953 bonused immigrants to Canada and received \$367,245.85 for their efforts over a seven year period. I.B., 113228, #9, Report of Accountant, Department of the Interior, March 25, 1908; Ibid., Deputy Minister James Smart to M.E. Kohlan, Secretary, North Atlantic Trading Company, April 14, 1906.

⁴⁷ The Alien Labour Law, passed by Parliament in 1897 was under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice 1897-1901 and under the Department of Labour, 1901-1919. The Immigration Branch did not assume responsibility for enforcing the Chinese Immigration Act until 1911.

⁴⁸ Mabel Timlin, "Canada's Immigration Policy, 1896-1910", pp. 519-20.

⁴⁹ Debates, 1899, p. 8568.

⁵⁰ Debates, 1899, p. 8509; Ibid., 1903, p. 6591; Ibid., 1906, p. 5969.

⁵¹ Debates, 1901, p. 2939.

⁵² W.S. Waddell, "Frank Oliver and The Bulletin", Alberta History, Vol. V, No. 3, 1957, p. 16; Mabel Timlin, "Canada's Immigration Policy, 1896-1910", pp. 525-24.

⁵³ Debates, 1906-07, pp. 5196, 5205, 5220.

⁵⁴ "An Act Respecting Immigration and Immigrants", Statutes of Canada, (1906), 6 E. VII, Chapter 93.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ C.J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, pp. 64-75.

⁵⁷ J.D. Cameron, "The Law Relating to Immigration", pp. 265-69; Statutes of Canada, 7-8 Edward VII, Vols. I-II, p. clxii.

⁵⁸ C.J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, pp. 93-105.

⁵⁹ "An Act respecting Immigration", Statutes of Canada, 9-10, Edward VII, Chap. 27, S.37, 38.

⁶⁰ Ibid., S.41; Debates, 1910, pp. 5869-70.

⁶¹ These statistics have been computed from data in Sessional Papers, 1907-08 to 1915, nos. 25, pt. 2, Report of the Supt. of Immigration.

⁶² Mackenzie King Diary, Public Archives of Canada.

⁶³ Debates, 1914, p. 1612. According to the annual returns of the Immigration Branch, between 1900-01 and 1914 some 2,939,439 immigrants entered Canada. These immigrants could be classified as follows:

(continued)

British	American	European	Oriental	Others
no. 1,192,039	no. 933,344	no. 739,213	no. 54,232	no. 20,611
% 40.55	% 31.76	% 25.5	% 1.84	% .7

These statistics were however, notoriously inaccurate. Karl Bicha, The American Farmer, pp. 113, 115.

⁶⁴ Debates, 1914, pp. 1611, 1617, 1622, 4955.

⁶⁵ Harold Troper, Only Farmers Need Apply, p. 11.

CHAPTER II

ORIENTAL IMMIGRATION

Asiatic immigration to Canada was part of a much broader movement felt all along the Pacific slope. The first Orientals to arrive in significant numbers were the Chinese. Many came north from California during the late 1850's in the wake of reports of gold strikes in British Columbia. The Japanese arrived in the 1880's, but it was not until the 1890's that their increasing numbers made them noticeable. Large numbers of East Indian immigrants did not enter until 1905.¹

The approach to Asiatic immigration by the federal government differed from its policy in respect to American and European immigration. No agents were commissioned, no promotional literature was distributed, no plans were made for the agricultural settlement of Orientals.² Most of the impetus for the mass movement of Asiatics into Canada was provided by syndicates in the countries of origin, making direct connections with the employment agents of labour intensive industries in Canada. From the perspective of the

entrepreneur, the Oriental worker ideally suited the needs of the capitalistic labour market:

The Chinese in British Columbia as affecting the rapid development of the country are living machines differing from artificial and inanimate machinery in this, that while working and conducing to the same end with the latter they are consuming the productions and manufacturers of this country, contributing to its revenue and trade, and at the same time expanding and developing its resources.³

But because of the pronounced racial, cultural, and economic impact of Oriental immigration on Canadian society, a strong movement for restrictive measures developed towards each of the Asiatic groups.

Since the impact of Oriental immigration was regional rather than national, the British Columbia Legislature and various civic organizations, took the initiative in passing regulatory measures. Often these restrictions were in opposition to national policies, and Canada's international obligations. Conflict then resulted between the two tiers of government, which paralleled the situation in the United States.⁴ By 1907-1908 the Dominion government, faced with the prospect of mass disorder, yielded to pressure from the coast province for more effective regulation. However, the issue of Oriental immigration remained a topic of national controversy throughout the period under study. Indeed, it

represents a unique chapter in the continuing debate over what constitutes a suitable immigration policy for Canada.

Anti-Oriental sentiment in British Columbia dated back to the 1860's. The Chinese had poured into the colony from California after the news of the gold strikes of 1858. By 1863, it was estimated that the total number of Chinese in British Columbia was about 2,500.⁵ The first attempt to restrict the numbers of Chinese immigrants was made in 1864. A motion was made in the House of Assembly at Victoria to tax all Chinese immigrants ten dollars.⁶ The motion was not passed, largely because of the acute labour shortage. As the British Colonist stated in 1865, "if we cannot obtain one class, we must content ourselves with another".⁷ This utilitarian attitude was soon altered. The collapse of the mining boom, the departure of white miners, and the increasing occupational diversification of the Chinese immigrants, tended to focus public attention on the Chinese presence.⁸ At this stage, however, the matter was regarded more as a local issue. When British Columbia entered Confederation in 1871, there does not appear to have been any special concern about the federal government having authority over immigration.⁹

The 1870's witnessed the gradual polarization of

opinion as to the desirability of Chinese immigrants. A resolution introduced by John Robson, the member from Nanaimo in the British Columbia legislature of 1872, to tax Chinese \$50.00 a year was defeated. A similar fate awaited his proposal to prohibit Chinese from being employed on provincial or federal public works.¹⁰ However, a bill prohibiting Chinese from voting in provincial elections was passed in 1872, which deprived the Chinese, many of whom had previously enjoyed the franchise, of voting rights.¹¹ In 1876, a resolution passed the House which suggested that "it is expedient for the government to take some steps (at as early a date as possible) to prevent this Province being overrun with a Chinese population to the injury of the settled population of the country".¹²

Organized resistance to Chinese immigration also developed with the emergence of the Workingman's Protective Association in Victoria, for the purpose of achieving "the mutual protection of the working class of British Columbia against the great influx of Chinese; to use all legitimate means for the suppression of their immigration".¹³ Although the organization only lasted one year, its work was soon taken up by other labour organizations, notably, the Knights of Labor.¹⁴ The Workingman's Protective Association was

the forerunner of more militant anti-Asiatic organizations, which were to appear in British Columbia. The most famous of these associations was the Asiatic Exclusion League.

At this stage, however, most of the agitation took place within constitutional channels. In 1878, a resolution was passed for the first time in the legislature, forbidding the employment of Asiatics on provincial public works, as well as an act placing a special tax on Chinese residents of the province. Both were ultimately declared unconstitutional by Judge J. H. Gray of the Supreme Court of British Columbia on the grounds that the legislation was an attempt to drive the Chinese out of British Columbia.¹⁵ He also pointed out that such provincial legislation was "interfering at once with the authority reserved to the Dominion parliament as to the regulation of trade and commerce, the rights of aliens, and the treaties of the Empire".¹⁶ Gray's ruling was to form the basis for future federal disallowance of legislation encroaching upon federal power. The ruling was frequently cited during the next forty years.¹⁷

In 1884-1885, the Macdonald government disallowed three anti-Chinese acts passed by the British Columbia legislature: "An Act to Prevent Chinese from Acquiring Crown Lands", "An Act to Prevent the Immigration of Chinese", and

"An Act to Regulate the Chinese Population of British Columbia".¹⁸ Actually, the debate over Chinese exclusion had reached the federal house in 1879, when the veteran politicians, Amor de Cosmos and Noah Shakespeare, the member from Victoria, had presented a petition, supported by some 1,500 British Columbia residents, urging that Chinese labour not be employed in building the transcontinental railway.¹⁹ Despite this pressure, the only concession the British Columbian members were able to achieve was a committee of investigation which did recommend that no Chinese be employed on Dominion public works.²⁰ But nothing was done to implement the recommendation. Despite these representations, in 1881 the railway contractor for the Pacific side of the Canadian Pacific Railway, Andrew Onderdonk, began to import thousands of Chinese coolies. It is estimated that during the next four years, some 10,000 Chinese coolies were brought into British Columbia, despite the loud and vehement protests of the citizens of that province and their elected representatives.²¹ But to these outraged screams of protest, Prime Minister John A. Macdonald turned a deaf ear. He believed that the state must play a vital role in developing the national transportation system, and he regarded the completion of the C.P.R. as essential to national unity.²² Macdonald was prepared to

give the contractors a free hand in recruiting Chinese labour. This response was not surprising, in that Onderdonk had previously informed Macdonald that unless Chinese labour was utilized, the C.P.R. would be delayed "twelve years longer than necessary".²³ As a result, Macdonald's stance in the House was uncompromising. He admitted that he personally was opposed to the permanent presence of the Chinese, but he pointed out that the Chinese had not brought their wives so that "there is no fear of a permanent degradation of the country by a mongrel race".²⁴ But he argued that "there is such a want of white labor in British Columbia that if you wish to have the railway finished within any reasonable time, there must be no step against Chinese labor".²⁵ It is significant that, contrary to Macdonald's prediction, by 1891 there were 8,900 Chinese in the coast province. This figure represented about one tenth of the total population.²⁶ Public agitation was finally sufficient to stir the Prime Minister into action. A Royal Commission was appointed on July 5, 1884 with two Commissioners: the Hon. J. A. Chapleau, Secretary of State for Canada, and Mr. Justice J. H. Gray of the Supreme Court of British Columbia.²⁷

The testimony presented before the Royal Commissioners in 1884-1885 represented the different arguments that were to

be utilized by both critics and defenders of Oriental immigration throughout the entire period 1880-1914.

For the critics, reference was made to the racial, the cultural, and the economic problems that would result from prolonged reliance on this type of immigration; the greatest stress, however, was placed on the racial and cultural factors. In contrast, the supporters of 'limited' Chinese immigration tended to minimize the racial and cultural aspects and rather to stress the economic necessity of Chinese labour. It is possible, indeed, to detect the clear difference between the working class perspective and management associated with labour intensive industries. Class distinctions can therefore be regarded as having appreciable influence in affecting the attitude towards the Chinese presence.

It is significant that even the supporters of Chinese immigration did not envisage the Chinese assimilating with the white residents of the province. Rather, as Macdonald and others stated, the Chinese were only temporary residents, whose numbers would be limited by climatic and economic factors.²⁸ In time they would, therefore, be replaced by the more efficient white labour as the economy of British Columbia advanced. Adolphe Chapleau, one of the Commissioners of the 1885 Inquiry, confidently announced his satisfaction with the

existing situation:

I would be ashamed to be a British subject . . . if I believed for a moment that the survival of the fittest would be the survival of the Chinese race on this continent. The Chinese have said themselves that they do not want to come to this part of our country, that its climate is too cold.²⁹

A similar position was assumed by his fellow Commissioner, Judge J. H. Gray, who ridiculed the expressed fears from a "strong broad shouldered superior race" to the competition from "a small, inferior, and comparatively speaking, feminine race".³⁰

The inferiority of the Chinese, however, was not interpreted as being sufficient to cause any undue concern. In respect to morality, the Chinese were described as being inordinately law-abiding. Such anti-social characteristics as the prevalence of Chinese prostitutes and opium smoking were dismissed as social problems affecting only the Chinese community.³¹ Of the 154 Chinese women in the province as of September, 1884, Commissioner Gray estimated that 70 were prostitutes.³² In fact, Sir Matthew Begbie, Chief Justice of British Columbia, speculated that perhaps the absence of immorality among the Chinese accounted for their sterling work habits: "if Chinamen would be less industrious and economical, if they will but occasionally get drunk, they would no longer

be the formidable competitor with the white men. . . . There would no longer be the cry for their suppression".³³

Yet in the last analysis, despite the arguments showing that the Chinese were not that 'bad', the fundamental point stressed by the defenders of Chinese immigration was the economic necessity of this type of labour. Moreover, it was not labour that would be used at all levels of the industrial process; Chinese labourers were to form a very necessary industrial and agricultural proletariat. Thus, despite the claim made by Macdonald and others justifying the use of Chinese coolie navvies because of the scarcity of white labour, an argument that was used in other sectors of the economy, was that if high wages were demanded by all, it would not be possible to pay them to any.³⁴ This attitude was clearly revealed in the testimony of entrepreneurs associated with both the salmon canning and coal mining industry. Robert Ward, the agent for several large fish canneries, informed the Commission that the Chinese seemed ideally suited to that type of work, and that their labour was vitally needed to make the British Columbia canneries competitive.³⁵ This point was heartily endorsed by industrialist, Sir Robert Dunsmuir³⁶, in relation to the use of Chinese labour in the coal mines of Vancouver Island:

White men decline to do the work given to the Chinese and could not live in this country at the present prices of products at the prices paid the Chinamen. . . . If the mine owners were compelled to pay the wages now asked and obtained by white labourers . . . they, [the mine owners] could not compete in the markets now open to them, especially San Francisco, the principal market for British Columbia coal, where other foreign coal product is carried as ballast.³⁷

B. M. Pearse, the former Surveyor General of the British Columbia government, aptly summed up the view of the labour intensive industries when he stated that "if all the Chinese were withdrawn from the province, it would, I believe, paralyze all industries, and cause widespread ruin."³⁸

It is also notable that the defenders of Chinese immigration attempted to convince the working class that British Columbia could build a healthier society because of the presence of cheap Chinese labour. Far from acting as an obstacle for the upward social mobility of the "sober, industrious, frugal . . . labouring men", it would free them from the prospect of having to be employed "in grovelling work, which wears out the body without elevating the mind".³⁹ Moreover, the presence of large numbers of Chinese domestics would improve the quality of life for the wives of the white workers, freeing them for "pursuits of a higher and nobler character."⁴⁰

Few of the arguments set forth by the defenders of Chinese immigration were accepted by either the working class, or even by many white businessmen. David Gordon, the member for Vancouver, echoed the views of other elected representatives from British Columbia when he stressed the danger of jeopardizing the future of the province by allowing the Chinese to gain a foothold: "Shall the fair prospects of this Pacific province be marred with the flood of the worst and most degraded element of paganism, and make a reformatory for Asiatic criminals and a nursery of vice".⁴¹ Gordon's stress on the degraded social habits of the Chinese was very much in keeping with the major focus of the anti-Chinese movement. In contrast to the views of those who had argued that Chinese immorality was self-contained, and would not affect the white population, a much different image was presented. Superintendent Bloomfield, of the Victoria Police, claimed that in his city, Chinese prostitutes lured Caucasian youths into their brothels, and that their men used opium and other sinister devices to produce white women for their brothels.⁴² It was also alleged that "not only are the Chinese injuring the white people, but they are demoralizing the Indians of the province".⁴³ Certainly the presence of Chinatowns with the filthy living conditions, the blatant presence of prosti-

tutes, and the presence of opium dens was generally regarded as a real menace to the healthy state of the community.⁴⁴

The displacement of white workers by Chinese in many ways represented the most serious charge directed by labour organizations such as the Knights of Labor. It was argued that the presence of Chinese workers who accepted low wages, who lived at a subsistence level, and who exhibited a willingness ". . . to be treated like beasts of burden"⁴⁵ would discourage white immigrants from coming to British Columbia. Moreover, British Columbia was faced with the danger of a rigid class society being created with a permanent Chinese proletariat sub-stratum, and a few wealthy industrialists.⁴⁶ The very essence of a democratic society hung in the balance.

Emphasis was also placed on the demoralizing effect Chinese labour would have on the white workers. The Knights of Labor predicted the disintegration of a working class consciousness among the white labourer, particularly the skilled mining class:

Thus our boys will have very little chance to be employed in the mines. . . . In consequence our boys grow up to near manhood without an opportunity to earn any part of their living, such as they might have were there no Chinese.⁴⁷

Even some businessmen expressed concern over the demoralization of the British Canadian worker because of the presence

of Chinese labour. Mr. Robins, the Superintendent of the Vancouver Coal Mining and Land Company, informed the Royal Commission that in his opinion young men of working class background now rejected, "the manual (unskilled) labour of their fathers as only fit for an inferior race. . . ." He warned of the danger of creating "a class of idlers who will not conduce to the well-being of the state".⁴⁸

The submission of the Royal Commission Report to the House of Commons in 1885 by Secretary of State, Adolphe Chapleau, was an event of considerable importance. In his comments to the House, and in his section of the report, Chapleau stressed that in British Columbia there was considerable division of opinion on the matter of Chinese Immigration. At opposite poles there were the intelligent minority who thought no legislation necessary, believing that the law of supply and demand would apply and the matter regulate itself; and the "well meaning, but strongly prejudiced minority whom nothing but absolute exclusion of Chinese would satisfy."⁴⁹ The attitude of the majority of the citizens of British Columbia, Chapleau asserted, was in favour of "moderate restrictions based upon police, financial and sanitary considerations. . . ." ⁵⁰ He therefore recommended that the wishes of the majority be respected.

The Chinese Immigration Act of 1885 reflected Chapleau's approach. Popular support for regulation was to be acknowledged by the imposition of a capitation tax and restrictions placed on the number of labourers that could be carried on each ship.⁵¹ The reaction to the Chinese Immigration Act by residents of British Columbia was not favourable. In Victoria, shortly after the bill was introduced, a mass public meeting denounced the bill as singularly inadequate; abuse was heaped on the Macdonald government for its indifference to the Chinese peril.⁵² In Ottawa, the British Columbia members attacked certain specific aspects of the regulatory machinery. For example, there was concern that the exemption of certain classes of Chinese such as diplomats, merchants, students, and tourists from the provisions of the Act would create serious problems of enforcement.⁵³ It was also claimed that the head tax of \$50.00 would not be sufficient to deter Chinese immigration, and efforts were made to have it increased to \$500.00.⁵⁴ Similarly, the provision that a quota of one Chinese passenger per every 50 tons of the carrying vessel was felt to be insufficient to prevent large scale importation of coolies by the shipping companies.⁵⁵

Between 1886 and 1903 considerable agitation developed over the continued influx of Chinese into British Columbia, and

the economic role that the Chinese were assuming in the society of that province. Table A reveals how many Chinese immigrants were reported in the years 1886-1915:

TABLE A
CHINESE IMMIGRATION INTO CANADA, 1886-1915⁵⁶

	<u>Entered</u>	<u>Exempt Head Tax</u>		<u>Entered</u>	<u>Exempt Head Tax</u>
1886	212	1	1901	2,544	26
1887	124	-	1902	3,587	62
1888	290	-	1903	5,329	84
1889	894	112	1904	4,847	128
1890	1,166	97	1905	77	69
1891	2,126	12	1906	168	146
1892	3,204	6	1907	291	200
1893	2,258	14	1908	2,234	752
1894	2,109	22	1909	2,106	695
1895	1,462	22	1910	2,302	688
1896	1,786	24	1911	5,320	805
1897	2,471	24	1912	6,581	488
1898	2,192	17	1913	7,445	367
1899	4,402	17	1914	5,512	238
1900	<u>4,257</u>	<u>26</u>	1915	<u>1,258</u>	<u>103</u>
	<u>28,953</u>	<u>394</u>		<u>49,601</u>	<u>4,851</u>

The Census of 1901 showed that there were over 16,000 Chinese in British Columbia, and noted that they comprised over 10% of the provincial population. Economically, the Chinese had become involved in the lumbering, coal mining, and salmon canning industries.⁵⁷ Culturally, the Chinese continued to manifest those traits which the exclusionists of 1885 had found so distasteful. In the debate over the exclusion of the Chinese, and the strict regulation of their activities in the

province of British Columbia, there was considerable divergence of opinion both at the provincial and federal level.

Within British Columbia, anti-Chinese sentiment, especially on the part of the labouring classes, did not really subside after the passage of the Chinese Immigration Act. A major reason for this continued hostility can be traced to the presence of thousands of unemployed Chinese labourers as a result of the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway in November, 1885.⁵⁸ Destitute and unaided by the provincial government, the Chinese desperately sought employment at any wage. Many gravitated towards the salmon canning industry, where already large numbers of Chinese were being employed; by 1900 it was estimated that of the 10,000 workers employed in the fish canneries about 6,000 were Chinese.⁵⁹ In the lumber industry they performed most of the menial tasks and received about one-half of the wage paid to white workers. This factor made further recruitment attractive to the forest industries.⁶⁰ It was, however, from the mining industry that the most vocal opposition towards Chinese workers emanated; a trend that had been very much in evidence during the Royal Commission Inquiry of 1885.⁶¹ The increased number of Chinese miners, not only in the coal mines of Vancouver Island but also in the gold mines of the Cariboo district; the continued

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use of Chinese strike-breakers; the appalling number of mining accidents, many of them involving Chinese miners, aroused the British Columbia labour organizations.⁶²

Coal mining unions, in particular, took the lead in calling for legislation that would substantially reduce the employment of Chinese workers. In 1891, a petition signed by 1,421 miners and residents of Nanaimo, Wellington, and Comox was sent to the British Columbia government protesting the use of Chinese labour in the coal mines.⁶³ Although no action was taken at the time, because of the enormous political influence of Robert Dunsmuir, pressure continued to mount.⁶⁴ In 1898 labour was successful in having the Coal Mines Regulation Act passed, which prohibited the employment of Chinese labourers underground.⁶⁵ However, the victory was of very short duration; in the following year the Privy Council declared the Act unconstitutional.⁶⁶

The disallowance of British Columbia anti-Chinese legislation throughout the period 1878-1903, illustrated the pronounced division of opinion over the Chinese issue.⁶⁷ In British Columbia there were numerous elements that strongly supported extensive Chinese immigration, and opposed any attempt to restrict the economic activities of Chinese workers. In the mining industry, actions of the Dunsmuir interests

vividly illustrated the extent to which economic considerations took precedence over social and political factors. Despite intense public pressure, they continued to employ large numbers of Chinese workers in their mines.⁶⁸ Representatives of commercial farming interests also indicated strong support for the retention of Chinese labour. According to Mr. Charles Hope, member of a prominent Vancouver engineering company, without Oriental labour the agricultural sector of British Columbia would be adversely affected: ". . . dairy herds would have to be reduced, land would have to go out of cultivation, and many of the 'small' fruit gardens would also go out of cultivation".⁶⁹ From various sources opposition to the possible loss of Chinese domestic help was also recorded.⁷⁰

The question of Chinese immigration remained more than a local issue throughout the period 1880-1903; it was the source of a major national debate. Moreover, the divergence of opinion was even more marked than in British Columbia, a trend aptly illustrated by the opposing positions assumed by national organizations, both economic and cultural.

The voice of 'big business' was most effectively and most consistently articulated by the Canadian Pacific Railway. The C.P.R. was one of the leading exponents of the 'open door' policy for Chinese immigrants. On several occasions the

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president of the corporation went on record as favouring Chinese immigration as necessary for national prosperity. In 1896, for instance, Sir William Van Horne, rebuked the Vancouver World for its anti-Chinese campaign. According to Van Horne, this anti-Chinese hysteria could be traced to the most disreputable elements in society. He stated that white labour was paid more after the influx of Chinese than before, and that in many ways the Chinese labourer was a superior asset to the country compared to certain Southern Europeans:

We of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company have had a pretty large experience with Chinese and European labourers, and we know from the stores accounts that an average Chinese labourer spends much more than one Italian labourer, and no objection is made to the latter, although they come here with a view to earning a certain amount of money and going home again, as is the case with the Chinese. And in point of morality and good behaviour, the Chinese can give this class odds.⁷¹

Four years later, Thomas Shaughnessy, the new C.P.R. President, announced his hostility towards any suggestion to increase the poll tax. His major arguments centred on the dilatory effect such a move would have on the C.P.R. steamship service, "involving a loss of earning to us of one hundred thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand dollars per annum".⁷² The inevitable result would mean discontinuance of the China connection; Canadian trade, he argued would, therefore, be the

real loser.

At the same time that such large corporations such as the Canadian Pacific were expounding economic arguments in favour of Chinese immigration, the Protestant Churches were emphasizing the moral and religious implications. In 1882, when the question of Chinese exclusion was being proposed by members from British Columbia, the Canada Presbyterian declared that "in a free country like this, to forbid the entrance of any certain race . . . is simply monstrous. . . ." ⁷³ Nor did the Presbyterian Church accept the Chinese Immigration Act as a permanent creation. At the 1895 General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Canada, a pro-Chinese resolution was introduced by Principal Grant, of Queen's University, to the effect that "a Committee be appointed to wait upon the Government with the request that the legislation discriminating against the Chinese be repealed. . . ." ⁷⁴ But rather than effect a repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act the pro-Chinese element in the Presbyterian and Methodist churches was unable to prevent the increase of the head tax to \$100.00 in 1900, to \$500.00 in 1903. ⁷⁵ That is not to say, however, that both churches did not attempt to dissuade the Dominion government. To both the Presbyterian and Methodist churches, the Chinese resident in Canada was not only a possible convert to

Christianity, but also "the fact that many of them return to their own land after a few years residence in this country, makes it the more important that they should bear back with them gold tried in the fire, that they may make others rich".⁷⁶ What essentially concerned Protestant church leaders was the effect which Canadian restrictive legislation would have on their China missions.⁷⁷

In contrast to the support for Chinese immigration revealed by national corporations and the Protestant churches, the national trade union organization, the Trades and Labor Congress, manifest distinct hostility towards the entry of the Chinese. As early as 1892 the TLC had endorsed a policy of total exclusion of Chinese, and an annual poll tax of \$100.00 for those in the Country.⁷⁸ The Congress changed its stance somewhat by 1895 when it endorsed the idea of a \$500.00 head tax "in order to save native workers from an unjust competition with a class of human beings who in their actual condition are an injury to every civilized country".⁷⁹ That same year the executive of the TLC had found it necessary to launch an open and somewhat vitriolic attack on the Presbyterian church for their endorsement of a policy in favour of removing the disabilities from Chinese immigrants.⁸⁰ In keeping with the essence of the anti-Chinese arguments of 1885 the TLC Executive

referred to the abysmal level of cleanliness and morality maintained by the Chinese. It was even suggested that the Chinese were conspiring to weaken white society through a sinister use of drugs and by fostering the spread of debilitating diseases.⁸¹

Pressure from the TLC as well as the British Columbia unions continued to be directed against the Dominion government.⁸²

To cope with the criticism the Dominion government adopted two procedures. In June, 1900, an amendment to the Chinese Immigration Act of 1885 increased the head tax to \$100.00; three months later Laurier appointed a Royal Commission to investigate both Chinese and Japanese Immigration.⁸³

That the Japanese were included in this investigation was significant; it reflected the extent to which the Japanese had emerged as a second threat to a "white British Columbia".

The increasing Japanese presence in Canada was a phenomenon of the 1890's. Although the Japanese authorities, between 1885 and 1907, issued some 10,513 permits to immigrants⁸⁴ destined for Canada, the majority entered after 1896.

Because of the incomplete nature of immigration statistics, it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of immigrants.

Between 1897 and 1901, for instance, some 15,280 Japanese landed at Canadian ports, although the Census of 1901 indica-

ted that there were only 4,738 Japanese in the country.⁸⁵

Table B indicates the number of Japanese immigrants between 1900 and 1908 to have been 11,925.⁸⁶ Of greatest importance was that some 8,125 entered in the first ten months of 1907.⁸⁷

TABLE B
JAPANESE IMMIGRATION INTO CANADA, 1900-1915

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>
1900-01	6	1908	858
1901-02	-	1909	244
1902-03	-	1910	420
1903-04	-	1911	727
1904-05	354	1912	675
1905-06	1,922	1913	886
1906-07	2,042	1914	681
1907-08	7,601	1915	380
	<u>11,925</u>		<u>4,871</u>

Although it might have been expected that the Dominion government, aware of the anti-Japanese agitation from British Columbia, would have implemented restrictive legislation, such was not the case. Only the Chinese were affected by restrictive measures implemented between 1900 and 1903, suggesting that external considerations made the Laurier government hesitant to pass legislation restricting Japanese immigrants. This distinction in the legislation between the treatment of Chinese and Japanese raised a very sensitive issue. Did exclusion essentially depend upon the international leverage which the

'sender' nation could exert on the Canadian government? Or were Canadians prepared to accept the principle that there was a significant distinction between various types of Orientals, therefore, necessitating a sliding scale of acceptability?

From the Ottawa perspective there is little question but that the international implications of Japan's emergence as a "great" power by the turn of the century had considerable bearing on Canadian immigration policy towards Japanese immigrants. Japan had removed most of the emigration restrictions on her nationals as far back as 1868, although at one time these rulings had not applied to labourers. In 1884, when Japanese labourers were permitted to leave, a great number gravitated to the sugar plantations of Hawaii, operated primarily by wealthy Americans.⁸⁸ Moreover, by the 1890's large groups of Japanese labourers had begun to arrive in British Columbia. In 1891 it was suggested that they should also be subject to the head tax.⁸⁹ The reason that no such measures were adopted could in large part be attributed to the fact that in 1894 Britain and Japan had signed a treaty of commerce and navigation. One stipulation of the treaty was that the subjects of each power were granted "full liberty to enter, to travel or reside in any part of the dominions and possessions of the other contracting party".⁹⁰

The Canadian attitude towards this development was interesting. In the first place, neither the Conservative government nor its successor, the Liberal government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, were prepared to accept the principle of free entry of Japanese emigrants. The Conservatives declared that some arrangement along the lines worked out by Japan and the United States in 1894 should be negotiated. This would assure that Canadian regulations in respect to the exclusion of labourers would take priority over the treaty. However, because of the lack of agreement whether the artisan was to be included in the labourer category, the negotiations stalled and the defeat of the Conservative government in 1896 curtailed further negotiations.⁹¹

The position assumed by the Laurier government was rather paradoxical. On one hand it refused to become committed to the treaty, while at the same time it refused to countenance the existence of any discriminatory provincial legislation which either excluded the Japanese or restricted them from any occupational pursuits.⁹² The problem of establishing a head tax against Japanese, of course, was not only the existence of the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty, but the realization that the Japanese would regard any such measure as a grave national insult. As a result, Imperial as well as Canadian interests

would be adversely affected by Japanese hostility.

The stance adopted by the British Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain was also somewhat paradoxical. At the Colonial Conference of 1897, and again in an 1899 dispatch to Ottawa, Chamberlain had suggested that the Canadian government consider implementing restrictive legislation modelled on the Act passed by the Parliament of Natal.⁹³ This Natal Act established a literacy test in a European language as the basis for immigration exclusion rather than specifically naming the Japanese as an 'undesirable' class. It was Chamberlain's contention that "the operation of an educational test . . . is not a measure to which the government of Japan can take exception".⁹⁴ Consultations revealed that the Japanese were insistent that the literacy test should be given "in any prescribed language", not merely in a European language. The Japanese indicated that they would regard a Natal Act as ill-disguised discrimination.⁹⁵ As a result, when the British Columbia government passed their own 'Natal Act' in 1900, Joseph Chamberlain strongly urged the Laurier government "to do nothing especially at the present time to impair existing relations with Japan".⁹⁶ The Imperial demand for disallowance of the provincial legislation was quickly acted upon by the Dominion government.⁹⁷

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As a gesture of conciliation, the Japanese government announced the implementation of a policy that would appreciably restrict the number of Japanese immigrants arriving in Canada. Instructions were issued whereby the various prefectures in Japan were to entirely prohibit the emigration of labourers from their district, unless they had a certificate from the Japanese consul in Vancouver indicating that the person had been a previous resident of British Columbia, or was a member of the family of a permanent resident. Diplomats, merchants, and students were excluded from the regulations.⁹⁸ A fairly extensive campaign was waged by the various consular officials, and by the Japanese residing in Canada, emphasizing the marked distinction between Japanese and Chinese. One pamphlet, entitled "The Anti-Japanese Petition, Appeal in Protest Against a Threatened Persecution" pointed out that the presence of Japanese labourers would not cause economic dislocation, in that "it was a physical impossibility for them to live in Canada and accept a scale of wages lower than that of white workers".⁹⁹ With their small numbers, their high standard of living, their willingness to learn English and to accept Christianity, it was claimed that the Japanese presented no threat to Anglo-Canadian society.¹⁰⁰

Although these arguments might have impressed Anglo-

Canadians living east of the Rockies, they made little impact on British Columbians. The Japanese had become a very real threat in all sectors of the economy; in fact, they were soon to displace the Chinese as the bete noire of organized labour. The outbreak of industrial disorder in the salmon fishing industry in the spring of 1900 aptly illustrated this trend.

The 1900 strike of the Fraser River salmon fishermen dramatized the new role that Japanese had assumed in the industrial life of British Columbia. While the Chinese had been previously employed in the low-paying positions in the canneries, until 1892 almost all of the fishermen were whites or Indians.¹⁰¹ The possession of the highly coveted fishing licences enabled the fishermen to negotiate favourable contracts with the canneries. After 1892, however, the number of licences was dramatically increased from 500 to 721 with many of these new licences going to Japanese fishermen.¹⁰² Concern over the development was expressed by labour organizations such as the Fraser River Fisherman's Protective and Benevolent Association, especially since the Japanese fishermen had acted as strike-breakers during the 1893 salmon-canning strike.¹⁰³ The fact that large numbers of Japanese were arriving annually and locating at the Japanese fishing colony at Steveston, apparently with the encouragement of the Fraser River Salmon

Packers' Association, increased the hostility of the fisherman's union.¹⁰⁴ When in the spring of 1900 the salmon packing companies announced a uniform contract price, substantially lower than in previous years, the scenario appeared complete.¹⁰⁵

During the strike of 1900, the attempt on the part of the white union to elicit the support of either the Chinese canning workers, or the Japanese Fishermen's Benevolent Society ended in failure.¹⁰⁶ In both cases the reason for the failure appears similar: neither felt any sense of class unity for the white fishermen who had often abused them; the important role of labour contractors, or headmen among both the Chinese and Japanese meant that the Oriental workers could be more easily manipulated by the canning companies.¹⁰⁷ It was, in fact, alleged that the most prominent Japanese contractor, Kamackichi Oki, who was also Vice-President of the Japanese Benevolent Society, received \$1,500 for his valuable services in bringing the Japanese fishermen back to work.¹⁰⁸

The political leverage of the canning companies was exerted to have the militia called out to defend the Japanese strike-breakers, and to have certain of the white union leaders arrested as "criminal agitators". These measures helped to break the strike.¹⁰⁹ However, public resentment against the use of the militia, and the use of Japanese strike-breakers,

united labour with considerable middle class support.¹¹⁰ The Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly vigorously criticized the Dominion government for sacrificing public interest in order to gratify the wishes of the canning magnates.¹¹¹ The Trades and Labor Congress, at its 1900 annual convention discussed the involvement of Japanese in the fishing industry.¹¹² A strong resolution was passed calling upon the Laurier government to provide "an effective check . . . upon the immigration of Asiatic coolie labor. . . ."¹¹³ However, no measures were implemented.¹¹⁴

In 1906 there was a dramatic upsurge in Japanese and East Indian immigration and the British Columbia racial situation began to deteriorate alarmingly. Developments in California between 1905 and 1907 added to the tension in British Columbia. Of major importance was the sequence of events in San Francisco: the formation of the militant Asiatic Exclusion League in 1905; the crisis over the school segregation of the Japanese children in 1906; and the anti-Japanese riots of May, 1907.¹¹⁵ Asiatics had been arriving in Vancouver at the rate of more than a thousand per month in 1907. The provincial legislature passed a Natal Act but Lieutenant Governor Dunsmuir reserved the bill.¹¹⁶ With yet another shipload of Asiatics ready to disembark, Gordon Grant,

Secretary of the newly created Vancouver Branch of the Asiatic Exclusion League, telegraphed Laurier that "if any Asiatics were landed, disorders may occur".¹¹⁷ The next day white mobs swept through the Chinese and Japanese sections of Vancouver.¹¹⁸ The prospect of a race war appeared to be a distinct possibility. In the wake of the disturbances, and in the light of the disclosures involving the Dominion government and its representatives, the Laurier government was placed in a very embarrassing position. Mackenzie King, the Deputy Minister of Labour, indicated in his Diary that Laurier was extremely shocked at the developments in Vancouver, and appalled at the outspoken criticisms made by the Trades and Labor Congress.¹¹⁹ The barrage of letters, many of them threatening further disturbance, only added to the Prime Minister's anxiety.¹²⁰ From his actions it appears that Laurier had finally begun to appreciate the gravity of the situation, and the need for decisive action. The Dominion government searched for the solution to the Asiatic controversy in a number of ways. First there was the overt mission of Mackenzie King, and the covert mission of W.W.B. McInnes to secure information about the reasons for the riots; then there was the attempt on the part of Mackenzie King and Postmaster General Rodolphe Lemieux to negotiate international

agreements so as to curtail the immigration at its source; and finally, there was the task of reinforcing the Immigration Act in order to effectively exclude Oriental immigrants.

Mackenzie King was entrusted with the task of heading the three Royal Commissions created, to investigate the West Coast problem. They were: the Royal Commission on Methods by which Oriental Labourers Have Been Induced to Come to Canada; the Royal Commission Into Losses Sustained by the Japanese Population of Vancouver; and the Royal Commission Into Losses Sustained by the Chinese Population of Vancouver.¹²¹ After conducting the hearings in British Columbia, what most impressed King was the fact that the disturbance was not merely a labour dispute, "but has become a race agitation".¹²² In his view the explanation for the strong racial animosity stemmed from the massive influx of thousands of Asiatics, a stream of immigration that threatened to flood a 'white' British Columbia.¹²³ The reason behind the sudden upsurge in the number of Asiatic labourers after 1905, King maintained, was directly related to arrangements between Canadian corporations and Oriental labour agencies. For instance, in explaining the arrival of the 8,125 Japanese in 1907, he concluded that this movement was directly related to the activities of Japanese emigration companies. In particular, the evidence

secured by the Commission revealed the role assumed by one such organization, the Canadian Nippon Supply Company.¹²⁴

The founder of the Company was a Mr. S. Gotoh who had lived previously in the United States and supplied Japanese labour to a number of American railways. In 1901 he emigrated to British Columbia, and almost immediately entered into a supply contract with the Canadian Pacific Railway. By the end of that year about thirty per cent of the labourers employed by the C.P.R. Pacific division were Japanese and Gotoh had emerged as the railway's sole supply agent for Japanese workers.¹²⁵ Gotoh was then quickly able to take advantage of his early success and create a very effective supply organization, primarily because of two great advantages. In the first place, Gotoh was able to effectively provide a liaison between the Anglo-Canadian employer and the Japanese labourers. As he confidently stated, "if there is no such contractors like ourselves I dont [sic] think they can hardly handle these emigrants [Japanese] without having any trouble. . . ."126

The Canadian Nippon Supply Company was also able to establish contact with many of the powerful Japanese emigration companies; the most notable was the Tokyo Society which was alleged to have "as managers and stockholders . . . the leading businessmen and politicians of Japan".¹²⁷

In 1907, Gotoh and his associates appear to have been quite successful in convincing the Japanese government to relax the emigration regulations pertaining to Japanese labourers.¹²⁸ A key factor affecting the change in Japanese regulations was the evidence of contracts that the Canadian Nippon Company had arranged with companies closely related to both the Dominion and Provincial governments: one agreement was with the Chief Purchasing Agent of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway; the other, with James Dunsmuir, owner of Wellington Collieries, and Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia.¹²⁹

In the case of the G.T.P., what made the arrangement so noteworthy, was that the Laurier government had assured organized labour on several occasions that Oriental navvies would not be used in the construction of the railway.¹³⁰ Yet the evidence secured by the Royal Commission clearly showed that E. G. Russell, Chief Purchasing Agent of the G.T.P. in December, 1906, had entered into an agreement with S. Gotoh. By this agreement the Canadian Nippon Company would supply 5,000 Japanese navvies at a rate of \$1.50 a day.¹³¹ The involvement of David Hays, brother of Charles M. Hays, President of the G.T.P. in these negotiations with the Canadian Nippon Company made the complicity of the G.T.P. all the more apparent.¹³²

However, the assurance by the management of the G.T.P. that no contract had been validated by the railway company enabled King to dismiss the charges claiming that "this Commission is not called to inquire into future intentions of any parties."

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The actions of ~~Lieutenant~~ Governor Dunsmuir were not as easily explained. In his role as private capitalist, Dunsmuir had contracted for Japanese labourers; then, in his capacity as Lieutenant Governor he had reserved a provincial bill prohibiting the entry of Orientals into the province.¹³⁴ This blatant conflict of interest resulted in widespread agitation against both Dunsmuir and the Laurier government. Representatives of labour organizations charged that the Dominion government and the great corporations had entered into collusion to flood the Province of British Columbia with cheap Oriental labour.¹³⁵ It was grimly predicted that if such policies continued "it must result in the secession of British Columbia, or war with Japan".¹³⁶

Mackenzie King, in his Royal Commission Report, tended to support the demands of organized labour. He warned that "unless methods are adopted sufficiently effective to prohibit . . . the importation of contract labour from Japan . . . the Canadian Nippon Company and other like concerns will carry

on a traffic in Japanese labour the like of which has not been equalled in the importation of any class of coolie labour that has ever been brought to our shores".¹³⁷

In reference to the sudden arrival of over 2,000 East Indians, Mackenzie King claimed that a similar supply system to that operated by the Japanese had just begun to develop. The major difference was that in contrast to the Chinese and Japanese companies which had extensive political and economic influence in their respective countries, the Indian system was a small scale operation. Most of the Sikh immigrants were recruited at the village level in the Punjab through the intermediary of influential Brahmins.¹³⁸ These men, King asserted, were primarily "desirous of exploiting their fellow subjects . . .," especially a Brahmin named Davischand who acted as the liaison between the Sikh immigrant and the British Columbia lumber companies.¹³⁹ As part of his operation Davischand arranged loans for the immigrants in order to cover the passage costs, usually at 15-20% interest, and was granted the monopoly of supplying the Sikh workers with the necessities of life in the lumber towns.¹⁴⁰ But perhaps it was because Davischand's operation was not overly efficient or extensive that public agitation against East Indian immigration had become so intense. In addition to the usual complaints that such coolie labour was a menace

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to white workers, there were reports in 1906 and 1907 of hundreds of destitute East Indian immigrants suffering from lack of food, clothing and housing.¹⁴¹ Mackenzie King, in fact, recommended that East Indian immigration be curtailed not only because of the economic problems associated with their entry, but also on humanitarian grounds.¹⁴²

Other reports on conditions in British Columbia were supplied by W.W.B. McInnes, a prominent Vancouver Liberal.¹⁴³ While Mackenzie King stressed the racial and economic complications associated with Asiatic immigration, W.W.B. McInnes concentrated on the political and international implications. In contrast to the public hearings conducted by King, the approach of McInnes had been to infiltrate the Asiatic Exclusion League. One interesting feature of the League's activity that McInnes discovered was that radical labour and socialist elements did not dominate the leadership of the organization: "neither the International Executive of Socialists nor the Western Federation of Miners receive any countenance from the mass of the people, and have no appreciable influence beyond the coal mining districts of Vancouver Island and the interior of the Province".¹⁴⁴ In fact, McInnes claimed the socialists "have no pronounced hostility to Asiatics. Their line being to represent them in the light of fellow victims of Capitalism".¹⁴⁵ It appears from McInnes' reports that the executive

of the Vancouver branch of the League was primarily composed of middle class elements.¹⁴⁶

But if the Asiatic Exclusion League was not primarily a working class organization, it still possessed certain ominous characteristics. According to McInnes, "the League is the most powerful and the covered channel through which undesirable American influences will be exerted on British Columbia political and industrial affairs".¹⁴⁷ The activities of pro-American elements within the Vancouver branch, the declared intention of the American Executive to expand their operation into British Columbia, and the indications that another incident would be manufactured were cited by McInnes as clear evidence that the Laurier government would have to act quickly in order to prevent possible American annexation.¹⁴⁸ The strong stand taken by President Roosevelt in dispatching the American fleet to the Pacific coast made the situation even more critical: "already the sentiment is freely expressed among the masses here [Vancouver] that it is to be the American fleet that British Columbia must have for protection; that the British fleet will never return here".¹⁴⁹

Even before the Laurier government had received all of the reports from Mackenzie King and W.W.B. McInnes, negotiations had been initiated with the Japanese government. The

major obstacle in effecting an agreement with the Japanese government involved the matter of racial pride. As Sir Joseph Pope, Undersecretary of External Affairs, explained to Laurier: "The fact is that the Japanese regard the Treaty of 1894 as the formal recognition by England and the world generally, of their equality with the European powers. The Chinese war, and above all the Russian war, have placed them in the first rank, and they are not going to submit to be treated as an inferior race."¹⁵⁰ He did indicate that the Japanese government was now prepared to take all the necessary measures to restrict immigration, and according to Lemieux, the Gentleman's Agreement "is on the whole a good one which will effectively stop the agitation in British Columbia because it will remove the cause of that agitation. . . ."¹⁵¹ Although both Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the cabinet were not entirely convinced that the agreement rather than a formal treaty was satisfactory, eventually the compromise was approved.¹⁵² One important aspect of the compromise was that the Canadian government was allowed to make public the decision on the part of the Japanese government "to take efficient means to restrict immigration to Canada. . . . [with] a view to meeting the desires of the government of the Dominion so far as is compatible with the spirit of the treaty and the dignity of the

state".¹⁵³ Specific reference was made to the emigration of contract labourers, as well as artisans, who were to be prohibited unless specifically requested by the Canadian government.

One important aspect associated with the diplomatic negotiations with Japan was the attempt on the part of the American government to use Canada as a medium in dealing with both Britain and Japan. Quite clearly the American authorities had been delighted over the Asiatic disturbances in British Columbia especially since they believed that Britain would have to accept the fact that "the British commonwealth along the Pacific will take precisely the same attitude as the American states along the Pacific".¹⁵⁴ In order to facilitate closer co-operation between Britain and the United States, arrangements were made to have Mackenzie King visit Washington in January, 1907.¹⁵⁵ At the conference between President Roosevelt and Mackenzie King, the American President received a full account of developments in Canada pertaining to the Asiatic controversy. He also impressed upon Mackenzie King the desirability of representation being made to the British Colonial Office explaining the common problems faced by Canada and the United States over Asiatic immigration.¹⁵⁶ Despite the initially hostile reactions on the part of both Prime

Minister Laurier and the British government to this seeming interference by the American President in an Imperial 'problem', the point had been made.¹⁵⁷ Mackenzie King's mission in London in March, 1908, effectively convinced the British government that Japanese immigration to the Pacific slope must be curtailed; on this basic assumption, Britain, Canada, and the United States were now in agreement.¹⁵⁸

The other major accomplishment achieved by Mackenzie King's overseas mission was his ability to convince the Colonial Office that immediate and drastic action would have to be taken to prevent massive numbers of East Indians from descending upon British Columbia. The Imperial officials indicated a willingness to revive a neglected aspect of the Indian Emigration Act of 1885 which prohibited Indians from leaving the country under contract to work in Canada.¹⁵⁹ The British authorities also adopted an understanding attitude to the various measures which the Canadian government had proposed as a solution to the Oriental immigration problem.¹⁶⁰

By 1908, it was clear that Chinese immigration had been rather effectively curtailed through the implementation of the \$500.00 head tax, while Japanese immigration was now going to be restricted by the Japanese government.¹⁶¹ The only major remaining problem was to control emigration from Japanese

colonies from places such as Hawaii, and to restrict immigration from the Indian sub-continent. The issuing of two Orders-in-Council, under Section 20 of the Immigration Act, provided the solution. By the Order-in-Council of January 8, 1908, the Governor-General in Council could prohibit the landing in Canada of immigrants not coming from the country of birth or naturalization upon a through ticket purchased in that country.¹⁶² Because there was no direct steamship connection between British Columbia and either Hawaii or India, immigrants from these regions would be excluded. The Order-in-Council of June 3, 1908, provided for the Governor-General in Council to prohibit the entry of any Asian immigrant who did not have \$200.00 in his possession, excluding those Asians "with whose countries the government of Canada has special arrangements".¹⁶³ As a result, Japanese immigrants were protected by the 'Gentleman's Agreement'.

These enactments appeared to cope with both Japanese and East Indian immigration. However, by the spring of 1908 there was evidence that steamship agents were prepared to circumvent the regulation in order to bring East Indians to Canada. Not only was there a possibility of a direct service between Vancouver and Calcutta, but the legality of the indirect passage regulation was challenged. The response by

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the Laurier government was decisive. When the courts declared the original Order-in-Council invalid, the Dominion government immediately replaced it with a more legally acceptable regulation. Moreover, pressure was placed on the Canadian Pacific to abandon plans for steamship service from India.¹⁶⁴ As a result of these restrictions, the Sikh population in Canada declined from about 5,179 in 1907-1908 to 2,342 by the census of 1911.¹⁶⁵

The apparent success of the Laurier government in coping with the Oriental problem was very short-lived. In February, 1908, even after the 'Gentleman's Agreement' with Japan had been announced, the British Columbia government passed an immigration law requiring an educational test for Asiatics. Wisely, Laurier refrained from disallowing the legislation, and it was later declared to be unconstitutional by the British Columbia Supreme Court.¹⁶⁶ However, the incident clearly revealed the intention of the McBride Conservative government to exploit the Asiatic issue to maximum political advantage.¹⁶⁷ It had already been apparent that the federal Conservatives were going to adopt similar tactics.

Throughout the Asiatic controversy, Robert Borden, the leader of the opposition, had consistently maintained that his party recognized "the provincial character of the question

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of Oriental immigration and the right of the Province to regulate it, provided only that the method of doing so does not conflict with national or Imperial interests".¹⁶⁸ Borden also stressed that the Conservative party was committed to the idea that "British Columbia must remain a white man's country . . ." and that Imperial policy would have to be modified so that British Columbia and Canada received "the same measure of justice . . . as is meted out to any other part of the Empire".¹⁶⁹ The Conservatives, in opposing the Lemieux Agreement, increased their popularity in British Columbia and they were able to capture five out of the seven seats during the 1908 federal election.¹⁷⁰

The Oriental problem continued to plague the Dominion government. In 1909, Charles Hays, the redoubtable President of the Grand Trunk Pacific, renewed his efforts to secure Asiatic navvies.¹⁷¹ Rumor of the proposal spurred organized labour into immediate agitation. Despite the assurance by Laurier that the government had no intention of allowing Oriental navvies to be imported into the country, organized labour, especially in British Columbia, remained intensely suspicious.¹⁷² The increase in the number of Chinese immigrants, averaging 1,500 between 1908 and 1910, added to the tension.¹⁷³ With the disclosures in 1910 of widespread evasion of the head

tax, racial animosity once again flared.

In September, 1910, it was alleged that approximately one million dollars in revenue had been lost through circumvention of the Chinese Immigration Act.¹⁷⁴ Thousands of Chinese labourers entering through British Columbia ports had successfully masqueraded as Chinese merchants, a stratagem made possible by the existence of an organization that provided the immigrants with credentials and funds. The Conservative party claimed that the conspiracy involved a number of people: the Chinese interpreters; John Bowell, the Deputy Controller of Chinese immigration at Vancouver; and members of the Vancouver Liberal Association, notably Robert Kelly, the President, and the Hon. William Templeman, Minister of Inland Revenue.¹⁷⁵ However, the Report by the Royal Commissioner, Judge Murphy, only recommended prosecution of the Chinese interpreters, all of whom had conveniently fled the country.¹⁷⁶ All other parties were exonerated. Enraged by this "whitewash" the Conservatives launched a sustained attack on the Liberals in the House of Commons.¹⁷⁷ Public reaction in British Columbia to the charges was generally unfavourable to the Liberal government.¹⁷⁸ Although the Laurier government announced in 1911 that the administration of the Chinese Immigration Act would come under the jurisdiction of the Immi-

gration Branch, in order to achieve greater efficiency, public reaction remained hostile.¹⁷⁹

The defeat of the Liberal party in 1911 ended the fourteen year search by the government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier to find a compromise solution to the Oriental problem. Basically the government had attempted to avoid total exclusion of any of the Asiatic groups involved, and to balance imperial, national and provincial interests. In this approach they had been opposed by the majority of people from British Columbia who increasingly favoured almost total Asiatic exclusion. The Liberals had also been faced with the Conservative appeal for a 'white' British Columbia from the luxury of the opposition position. From 1911 until 1914, however, the roles were reversed; now the Conservatives had to chart a passage through the perilous shoals of provincialism, racism and class animosity.

It was certainly obvious to the Borden government that ill-feelings towards Orientals in British Columbia had not abated. The expanded use of Orientals by the large employers of labour in the primary industries such as fishing, lumbering and mining deepened the hostility of white labour.¹⁸⁰ This animosity was particularly noticeable during the Vancouver Coal Strike of 1913 when some of the companies involved brought

in Japanese and Chinese strike-breakers. As a result, bloody riots were precipitated, necessitating the intervention of the militia.¹⁸¹

But many white merchants, businessmen and farmers were becoming alarmed by the extent of upward social mobility demonstrated by the Japanese. The activities of the powerful Japanese Mitsu Company created special concern, especially since it became apparent that a branch plant operation composed of Japanese associates could operate in British Columbia without any difficulty.¹⁸² In addition, there was mounting apprehension over the increased Japanese ownership of prime agricultural land. In August, 1913, Prime Minister Borden was informed that the Boards of Trade in the Okanagan Valley had approached the provincial government with a demand for an Oriental land exclusion bill.¹⁸³ This bill, to be modelled on the California Land Act of 1913, would have prevented further agricultural land from being purchased by Japanese farmers.¹⁸⁴ Although Borden appears to have been relieved that no such legislation was forthcoming, he indicated his own premonitions towards the Japanese in a letter to Sir Joseph Pope:

These energetic people are reaching out in every direction throughout that Province and are continually engaging in new associations under such

conditions that the white races cannot possibly compete with them.¹⁸⁵

At the same time that concern was increasing over Japanese activities, the prospect of further East Indian immigration was increasing. By 1913 there was a revival of interest on the part of East Indians in both Canada, and in the sub-continent of India for establishing colonies in British Columbia. There were rumours of a direct passage connection being established between Calcutta and Vancouver, a manoeuvre which would render obsolete the Direct Journey Exclusion Regulation.¹⁸⁶ It was also claimed that any discriminatory incidents would be used to advantage by Sikh nationalists to inflame native sentiment against British rule.¹⁸⁷

In British Columbia there was a strong clamour for restrictive measures. The Vancouver City Council indicated that only the total exclusion of Hindus would be acceptable; indeed, the City Council strongly suggested that the Immigration Act be amended to exclude all Asiatics from entering the province.¹⁸⁸ Premier McBride suggested that the Dominion government pass a "Natal Act", which would provide the means of excluding most of the Orientals.¹⁸⁹ Towards these proposals, both the Immigration officials and the politicians were favourably inclined.

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But international factors had to be considered. Borden had attacked the 'Gentleman's Agreement' in 1908, but as Prime Minister, in 1913 he was not prepared to run the risk of alienating the Japanese.¹⁹⁰ The Order-in-Council of October, 1913, was a partial solution to the problem. This regulation prohibited the landing at any port of entry in British Columbia of any immigrant of either the artisan or common labour category. This regulation was to apply until March, 1914, although it was later extended until September, 1914.¹⁹¹

If the Borden government assumed that the Japanese were deceived by the stratagem they were mistaken. In December, 1913, the Japanese Consul General, T. Nakamura, sharply rebuked the Canadian government for violating the spirit of the Lemieux Agreement. He pointed out the anomaly that while the Canadian government closed the ports that Asiatics would use to enter British Columbia, "it does not close entries of Canada on the Atlantic Coast and the borders of the U.S.A. . . . through which, practically, enter all Europeans and Americans. . . ." ¹⁹² In this instance the complaint did not alter the exclusionist trend.

It is significant that the confrontation over the 'closed door' policy was to involve the East Indians rather

than the Japanese. In May, 1914, the "S.S. Komagata Maru", with 376 East Indian immigrants on board, arrived at Vancouver.¹⁹³ When the immigration officials began to deport some of the East Indians, the rest of the passengers seized control of the vessel, and repulsed attempts on the part of the Vancouver police to board the ship. A bloody confrontation was narrowly avoided by the intervention of prominent members of the Sikh community of Vancouver, and by the desire of the Borden government to reach a peaceful compromise.¹⁹⁴ As a result, the Sikh immigrants accepted the ruling of the Canadian courts upholding the Immigration regulations, and turned the ship back to the Japanese crew. In exchange, the Canadian government agreed to provide \$4,000.00 in supplies, thus enabling the ship to return to Calcutta.¹⁹⁵

The incident revealed that while many Anglo-Canadians criticized the heavy handed approach of the Immigration officials in dealing with the Sikh leaders, there was general support for a forceful policy of Oriental exclusion. In the House of Commons the basic criticism of Frank Oliver, former Minister of the Interior, was not over the harsh treatment afforded the Sikhs, rather he indicted the government for their "soft line" approach.¹⁹⁶ Nor did Laurier raise his voice in protest; instead he chided the Conservatives for not

effecting a Gentleman's Agreement with India and China.¹⁹⁷

At the provincial level, the British Columbia Liberals took advantage of the situation to charge the Conservative party, both federally and provincially, with being pro-Oriental.¹⁹⁸

Quite clearly the Asiatic issue had lost none of its political appeal.

Within the Conservative party, Harry H. Stevens, the member for Vancouver, had been one of those most in favour of using force against the Sikhs. He informed Borden that the Canadian position could not have been impressed on the Sikhs "unless a display of force had been used. . . . This brought leaders to their senses and once they gave in, others were like children following readily".¹⁹⁹ Stevens took advantage of the crisis to propose an amendment to the Immigration Act totally excluding the entry of all Orientals.²⁰⁰

Actually, the whole question of extensive immigration exclusion had been discussed earlier in the session. In February, 1914, E. N. Lewis, the member for West Huron, had introduced a bill in the House of Commons calling for the exclusion of immigrants south of 50° North latitude and east of 20° East longitude.²⁰¹ The Superintendent of Immigration, W. D. Scott, had actually responded very favourably to the measure claiming that the bill "would not only finally dispose

of the Hindu question", but also exclude those immigrants deemed undesirable from southern and central Europe.²⁰² The outbreak of war in August, 1914, temporarily diverted public attention from the 'Immigration Problem'.²⁰³

By 1914 the controversy over Oriental immigration had gone through a number of important changes. The original policy of 1885 of restricting but not prohibiting Chinese immigration had been extended to the Japanese and the East Indian immigrants. At the same time, however, pressure from British Columbia for total exclusion of all Orientals had increased in intensity. The explanation for the exclusionist agitation can be attributed to both economic and cultural factors. In an economic sense the Asiatic immigrant in British Columbia consistently assumed the role of a pawn in the prolonged struggle between capital and labour. The fact that the "captains of industry" regarded them as the ideal industrial proletariat, made them the source of fear and the object of hatred by white workers. Moreover, as the Orientals began to move out of the extractive industries and become engaged in agriculture and commerce, other economic groups in the province joined the anti-Asiatic campaign. In a cultural sense, the vast majority of British Columbians not only regarded Asiatics

as impossible to assimilate, but they maintained that the presence of large blocs of such aliens would prevent the creation of a universal Canadianism. Significantly, many Anglo-Canadians elsewhere in Canada now shared these sentiments.

CHAPTER II

¹ Charles J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient: A Study in International Relations (Toronto, 1941), pp. 1-103.

² It is notable that in 1906 not a single homestead entry was made by Orientals. In 1914, the total was still very low: 5 Chinese, 3 Japanese and 4 East Indians. Sessional Papers, 1906-07, no. 25, pt. I, p. xxiii; ibid., 1915, no. 25, pt. I, p. xxi.

³ Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration (Ottawa, 1885), p. LXX.

⁴ Various studies have described the tension that existed between the administration of Theodore Roosevelt and the California government. This was particularly pronounced in 1907, when the American government was placed in a very tenuous diplomatic position with the Imperial government of Japan as a result of discriminatory legislation passed by the State government and the municipal authorities of San Francisco. Raymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (St. Paul, Minn., 1966), pp. 128-145.

⁵ C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 20.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ British Colonist, May 18, 1865, cited, ibid., p. 23.

⁸ Ibid., p. 24.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

¹¹ C. J. Woodsworth, p. 25; Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia: A History (Vancouver, 1958), p. 492.

¹² Journals of British Columbia, 1876, p. 46, cited, C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 25.

¹³Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, A Century of Labour in B.C. (Vancouver, 1967), p. 9.

¹⁴The Knights of Labour first appeared on the Canadian scene in 1881. By 1885 there were locals situated at Nanaimo, Victoria, Vancouver and New Westminster. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

¹⁵C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 26.

¹⁶Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration (Ottawa, 1885); Sessional Papers, 1885, no. 54a, app. G, p. 382, cited, ibid., p. 26.

¹⁷A. Between 1884 and 1914 the power of Federal disallowance was used 18 times to overrule anti-Oriental British Columbia legislation. These Acts were as follows:

47 Vict., 1884, c.3 (B.C.). An act to prevent the immigration of Chinese. Reported to the Minister of Justice, April 7, 1884. (Hereafter, only the date when reported will be cited.)

48 Vict., 1885, c.13 (B.C.). An act to prevent the immigration of Chinese. March 26, 1886.

61 Vict., 1898, c.28 (B.C.). An act relating to the employment of Chinese or Japanese persons on works carried out under franchises granted by private acts. November 8, 1898; May 29, 1899.

62 Vict., 1899, c.46 (B.C.). An act to amend the "Coal Mines Regulation Act". November 14, 1899; April 12, 1900.

62 Vict., 1899, c.50 (B.C.). An act to amend the "Placer Mining Act". November 14, 1899; January 12, 1900; April 12, 1900.

64 Vict., 1900, c.11 (B.C.). An act to regulate immigration into British Columbia. January 5, 1901; September 4, 1901.

64 Vict., 1900, c.14 (B.C.). An act relating to the employment on works carried on under franchises granted by private acts. January 5, 1901; September 4, 1901.

- 2 Edw. VII, 1902, c.34 (B.C.). An act to regulate immigration into British Columbia. November 14, 1902.
- 2 Edw. VII, 1902, c.38 (B.C.). An act relating to the employment on works carried on under franchises granted by private acts.
- 2 Edw. VII, 1902, c.48 (B.C.). An act to further amend the "Coal Mines Regulation Act". November 14, 1902.
- 3 Edw. VII, 1903, c.12 (B.C.). An act to regulate immigration into British Columbia. October 1, 1903.
- 3 Edw. VII, 1903, c.14 (B.C.). An act relating to the employment on works carried out under franchises granted by private acts. October 1, 1903.
- 3 Edw. VII, 1903, c.17 (B.C.). An act to further amend the "Coal Mines Regulation Act". October 1, 1903.
- 3 & 4 Edw. VII, 1903-04, c.26 (B.C.). An act to regulate immigration into British Columbia. November 16, 1904.
- 5 Edw. VII, 1905, c.28 (B.C.). An act to regulate immigration into British Columbia. April 19, 1905; September, 1905.
- 5 Edw. VII, 1905, c.30 (B.C.). An act relating to the employment of works carried on under franchises granted by private acts. April 19, 1905; September 1905.
- 5 Edw. VII, 1905, c.36 (B.C.). An act further to amend the "Coal Mines Regulation Act". April, 1905; September, 1905.
- 8 Edw. VII, 1908, c.23 (B.C.). An act to regulate immigration into British Columbia. November 19, 1908.

B. Two anti-Oriental bills were also reserved by respective Lieutenant-Governors throughout the period:

- 60 Vict., 1897, no. 40 (B.C.) An act relating to the employment of Chinese or Japanese persons on works carried out under franchises granted by private acts. October 15, 1897; December 22, 1897.

7. Edw. VII, 1907, c.21A (B.C.). An act to regulate immigration into British Columbia. November 27, 1907.

G. La Forest, Disallowance and Reservation of Provincial Legislation (Ottawa, 1955), pp. 89-97, 114-115.

¹⁸ Munro, p. 44.

¹⁹ M. Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 280; Woodsworth, p. 29.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 28.

²¹ Pierre Berton, The Last Spike, p. 204.

²² Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald, vol. II, pp. 301-315.

²³ A. Onderdonk to Macdonald, June 14, 1882, Macdonald Papers, no. 144771.

²⁴ Debates, 1883, 905.

²⁵ Debates, April 12, 1882, 1476.

²⁶ Woodsworth, p. 41.

²⁷ In the first section of the report, Chapleau concentrated on the experience of the Chinese in California. He then extended his analysis to the British Columbia context. In the second section Gray confined himself entirely to a survey of public opinion in British Columbia. Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration (Ottawa, 1885).

²⁸ Debates, 1883, 1905.

²⁹ Debates, 1885, 3010.

³⁰ Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration (Ottawa, 1885), p. LXIX.

³¹ Ibid., ix, 52, 55.

³² John Munro, "British Columbia and the Chinese 'Evil'", p. 47.

³³ Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration (Ottawa, 1885), p. 71.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 85.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Robert Dunsmuir was British Columbia's "First Capitalist". From a small coal mining operator in the 1860's, he had by the 1880's secured a dominant position in the rapidly expanding coal mining industry. To this he added the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway, as well as a fleet of steamers. His political influence was also formidable. No British Columbia government could afford to ignore his views. Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia: A History (Toronto, 1958), pp. 305-309.

³⁷ Ibid., p. XVIII.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 95.

³⁹ Ibid., p. LXIX.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. LXXIV.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 140.

⁴² Ibid., p. 83; ibid., p. 48.

⁴³ Debates, 1884, 976.

⁴⁴ Report, p. 125.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 156.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 88.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 158.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. xvii.

⁴⁹ Ibid., cii; Debates, 1885, 3006.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Canada, Statutes, 1884-1885, chap. 71, "An Act to Restrict and Regulate Chinese Immigration Into Canada".

⁵² John Munro, "British Columbia and the Chinese Evil", p. 47.

⁵³ Debates, 1885, 3012.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 3022.

⁵⁵ C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 35.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 287.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 38-47; Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, pp. 14, 19, 23; Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia, pp. 303, 306, 332.

⁵⁸ C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, pp. 38-67.

⁵⁹ Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration (Ottawa, 1902), p. 145.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 276-277.

⁶¹ Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration, 1902, p. 90.

⁶² The list of mining accidents in the Vancouver Island collieries illustrates a shocking incidence:

April 17, 1879 - 11 killed in Wellington Explosion
 July 1, 1884 - 23 killed in South Wellington Explosion
 May 3, 1887 - 148 killed in Nanaimo Explosion
 July 24, 1889 - 75 killed in Wellington Explosion
 Feb. 15, 1901 - 55 killed in Cumberland cave-in
 Sept. 30, 1901 - 17 killed in Extension Fire
 Oct. 25, 1909 - 32 killed in Extension Explosion

Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, pp. 8-9.

⁶³ C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p.

⁶⁴ Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 305; Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, pp. 6, 8, 13.

⁶⁵ C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 42.

⁶⁶ See fn. 64.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

68

"Report of the Executive Committee of British Columbia", Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Convention of the Trades and Labor Congress. (Hereafter, Proceedings, TLC), (Toronto, 1903), p. 30.

69

Laurier Papers, 73388. Charles Hope to Laurier, May 16, 1903.

70

Laurier Papers, 68819. F. Argus to Laurier, April 1903; ibid., 73872. T. F. Gavin, Manufacturers and Shipping agent, Vancouver, to Laurier, June 5, 1903,

71

Van Horne, also like his predecessors before the Royal Commission in 1885 justified the Chinese use of opium by emphasizing that "it is essentially a quiet habit". Ibid., 5749. Sir William Van Horne to J. C. McLagan, July 17, 1896.

72

Ibid., 41460. Thomas Shaughnessy to Laurier, January 26, 1900.

73

Canada Presbyterian, May 26, 1882, cited in, Edward Christie, "The Presbyterian Church in Canada and Its Official Attitude Towards Public Affairs and Social Problems, 1875-1925", unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of History, University of Toronto, 1955, p. 329.

74

W. H. Parr and D. J. O'Donoghue to Principal Grant, July 12, 1895.

75

C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 45.

76

Report of the Foreign Missions Committee' Acts and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Canada. (Hereafter cited as Presbyterian Acts and Proceedings), 1902, (United Church Archives), p. 105.

77

In both the Presbyterian Acts and Proceedings (1900-1914) and the Journal of Proceedings of the General Conferences of the Methodist Church (1900-1914) the concern over the missions was periodically expressed. Rev. F. R. MacLeod, Synod Clerk, Synod of Montreal, also stressed this point in a letter to Laurier, May 19, 1903. Laurier Papers, 73471-43474. For the purpose of this study no extensive examination of the degree of involvement of either the Presbyterian or Methodist churches will be attempted. However, one study relating to the West China missions of the Methodist church revealed the following

information for the 1919 operation in that region:

Number of Stations	10
Number of Outstations	81
Total Church Membership	2,082
Total Chinese Contributions	69,958

Our West China Mission: Being A Somewhat Extensive Summary By The Missionaries on The Field of The Work During The First Twenty-Five Years of The Canadian Methodist Mission in The Province of Szechwan, Western China (Toronto, 1920), p. 456.

⁷⁸ H. A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada; Their Development and Functioning (Toronto, 1948), pp. 68-69.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ I.B., file 23635, no. 1, W. H. Parr and D. J. O'Donoghue to Principal Grant, July 12, 1895. In addition to attacking the Chinese, the Executive of the TLC accused Principal Grant of arrogance and stupidity for his part in directing the pro-Chinese resolution through the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Proceedings of the T.L.C., 1900, pp. 7-8.

⁸³ C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, pp. 44-45.

⁸⁴ Ibid., pp. 48-50, Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration (Ottawa, 1902), p. 331.

⁸⁵ C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, pp. 51-52.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 289.

⁸⁷ Report of the Royal Commission on Methods by Which Orientals Have Been Induced to Come to Canada (Ottawa, 1908), pp. 60-66.

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 74-81. Charles Young and Helen Reid, The Japanese Canadians (Toronto, 1939), p. 4.

⁸⁹ C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 48.

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90 Ibid., p. 49.

91 J. D. Cameron, "The Law Relating to Immigration to Canada, 1867-1942", unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1945.

92 C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, pp. 48-71.

93 At the Colonial Conference of 1897 the problems of Japanese immigration was discussed, at which time Chamberlain had made clear his opposition of substantial numbers of Asiatics "alien in civilization, alien in culture", into Australia, South Africa and Canada. At the same time he made reference to the need not only to safeguard the sensibilities of the coloured peoples within the Empire, but also the Japanese government. He suggested, therefore, that the Natal Act, passed in 1896, would be an acceptable compromise in that no specific reference was made to any nation, or ethnic group, but that merely a European based literacy test was established. Ibid., p. 54.

94 Ibid., p. 57.

95 H. I. London, Non-white Immigration and the 'White' Australia Policy (New York, 1970), p. 11.

96 C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 62.

97 Ibid., see fn. 64.

98 J. D. Cameron, "The Law Relating to Immigration", p. 126.

99 Laurier Papers, 10272; K. T. Takahashi, "The Anti-Japanese Petition Appeal In Protest Against A Threatened Persecution".

100 Ibid. The Japanese Consul General in Montreal, F. Hosse, actually informed Laurier in 1903 that one reason for the high number of Japanese included in the 1901 census tracts of British Columbia could be attributed to the inclination of impersonation by the Chinese immigrants who after the decisive defeat of China in 1894 "have assumed a great many of them, English customs and pretended to be Japanese". F. Hosse to Laurier, February 3, 1903; Laurier Papers, 69840. It is

also noteworthy that in 1899, the General Superintendent of the Methodist church, Reverend A. Carman, had vigorously complained to Laurier about any attempt to place the head tax on the Japanese: "these people, who are industrious, and of an independent spirit, and will work into Canadian citizenship at least as readily as the Galicians". Rev. A. Carman to Laurier, April , 1899; Laurier Papers, 31994.

¹⁰¹ Harry Keith Ralston, "The 1900 Strike of Fraser River Salmon Fishermen", unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia, 1965, p. 11.

¹⁰² Ibid., pp. 49-51.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 66. Ralston points out, however, that the racial antagonism manifest by the white fishermen towards the Japanese greatly impeded any attempt to form a common front.

¹⁰⁴ In April, 1900, the Independent, a labour newspaper published in Vancouver, referred to the visit of Frank Burnett, a wealthy salmon canning magnate to Japan as directly related to the arrival of thousands of Japanese. The Independent claimed that over 7,000 Japanese entered Canada between January and April, 1900, whereas the Immigration Branch only indicated six for the entire year. Independent, May 19, 1900, p. 1, cited, ibid., pp. 96-101.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 106-109.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 115-123.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 134, 143.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 146.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 118, 137.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 141. The canning companies use of special police, Pinkerton spies, had already caused a certain degree of public hostility. Moreover, the actual requisition for the militia had not come from the Semlin administration; three magistrates connected with the cannery operations had signed the necessary order. On July 24, 1900, 200 militia men arrived in New Westminster. Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, p. 36.

111 Ibid., p. 139.

112 Proceedings of the T.L.C., 1900, pp. 18-20.

113 Ibid.

114 The political ramifications of the situation were revealed by one British Columbia Liberal who informed Laurier that unless some action was taken "it will be impossible to return one Liberal member for this province". Laurier Papers, 46496. Frank Burnett to Laurier, June 14, 1900. The pressure on the Laurier government was alleviated by the appointment of the Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration, and by the restrictive policies implemented by the Japanese government. Although no accurate immigration returns exist for the years 1900-1904, it appears that very few Japanese, probably no more than 200 a year entered. C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 64.

115 Raymond Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (Seattle, 1966), pp. 130, 142, 173.

116 Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia (Toronto, 1958), pp. 350-352.

117 Laurier Papers, 128852. Gordon Grant to Laurier, September 7, 1907.

118 The Japanese Consul-General submitted a claim of \$13,519 on behalf of the Vancouver Japanese affected by the riots. Eventually the Canadian government settled for \$9,175. "Report of the Investigation Into Losses Sustained by the Japanese Population of Vancouver", Sessional Papers, 1909, no. 36, pp. 102-104. The Chinese submission was for \$26,774.61, of which \$26,217.12 was eventually paid by the Canadian government. "Report of the Investigation Into Losses Sustained by the Chinese Population of Vancouver", Sessional Papers, 1910, no. 36, pp. 99-100.

119 William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary, September 18, 1907, (Public Archives of Canada) p. 2096.

120 Ibid. Laurier Papers, 12053. (Albert J. Healey, Sec., TLC, Edmonton to Laurier, September 10, 1907; ibid., 133161, W. B. Embree, Greenwood Miners Union No. 22, Greenwood, B.C., to Laurier, December 2, 1907; ibid., 131071, Mrs. A. W.

22

Matheson to Laurier, October 28, 1907; ibid., 129477, C. H. Richardson, President, Local 2378, U.M.W. of A., Morinville, Alta. to Laurier, September 17, 1907; ibid., 129509, P. R. McDonald, Mayor of Rossland, British Columbia, to Laurier, September 19, 1907; ibid., 131345, W. W. Quinn, City Clerk, Vancouver, to Laurier, November 2, 1907. There was also extensive correspondence with Mr. Gordon Grant, the Secretary of the Vancouver Branch of the Asiatic Exclusion League. Ibid., 129451, 129772, 131504, 136754.

121 Mackenzie King Diary, October 7, 1907, p. 2104; ibid., October 12, 1907, p. 2108; ibid., October 21, 1907, p. 2115.

122 Mackenzie King Diary, January 25, 1908, p. 2176; Laurier Papers, 131662, Mackenzie King to Laurier, November 9, 1907.

123 Report of the Royal Commission on Methods by Which Oriental Labourers Have Been Induced to Come to Canada (Ottawa, 1908), pp. 53-54.

124 Ibid., p. 15. The presence of these Oriental immigration companies which brought the immigrants to Canada, and which maintained a strong paternalistic influence over these people had been disclosed in 1885, at the time of the first Chinese Royal Commission. Several witnesses made reference to the sinister influence of the so-called Six Chinese Companies, representing the six districts of the Kwang Tang province, the region from where most of the coolies were brought. Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration, 1885, pp. 134-135. J. D. Cameron, "The Law Relating to Immigration", p. 114.

125 Report of the Royal Commission on Methods by Which Oriental Labourers Have Been Induced to Come to Canada, 1907, p. 13.

126 "'Testimony', The Royal Commission on Methods by Which Oriental . . .", King Papers, C-29478, C-30391.

127 Ibid., C-29731.

128 From the testimony of witnesses that appeared before Royal Commissioner Mackenzie King, and from correspondence seized in the offices of the Canadian Nippon Company, it

appears that great efforts were made by Gotoh and his associates to keep the Japanese diplomatic representatives from discovering their negotiations with the Grand Trunk Pacific. F. Yoshy to S. Gotoh, August 10, 1907. Ibid., C-30182.

129 Report of the Royal Commission on Methods by Which Oriental . . ., pp. 18-19.

130 G. R. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, Vol. II (Toronto, 1962), pp. 226-227.

131 E. G. Russell to S. Gotoh, December 10, 1906, cited in, Report of the Royal Commission on Methods by which Orientals . . . p. 18.

132 Evidence. The Royal Commission on Methods by Which Oriental . . ., King Papers, C-29707.

133 Ibid., C-29902.

134 J. Saywell, The Office of Lieutenant Governor; A Study in Canadian Government and Politics (Toronto, 1957), p. 214.

135 Laurier Papers, 136400, Mrs. A. W. Mattheson to Laurier, February, 1908. There was considerable pressure within the British Columbia Liberal Party to have Dunsmuir replaced. According to one Liberal, Dunsmuir, because of his actions had "defied both governments and made all your protestations on the Asiatic question ridiculous. . . . He has allowed his private interests to supersede his public obligations". Ibid., 133486, F. J. Deane, Nelson, B.C. to W. Templeman, Minister of Inland Revenue, December 8, 1907.

136 Ibid., Albert Healey, Sec. TLC, Edmonton, to Laurier, September 10, 1907; C. H. Richardson, President Local 2378, U.M.W. of A., Morinville, Alta. to Laurier, September 17, 1907.

137 Report of the Royal Commission on Methods by Which Oriental . . ., p. 54.

138 "Testimony", The Royal Commission on Methods by Which Oriental . . ., King Papers, C-29682.

139 Davischand apparently had previously resided in Vancouver at which time he made contact with many lumber companies. His

nephew was a foreman at the Millside Lumber complex where by 1907 there were 150-200 Sikhs and 20-30 whites employed. Ibid., C-29869.

140 Ibid., C-29737.

141 Laurier Papers, 129135, A. Bethune, Mayor of Vancouver, to Laurier, September 11, 1907. Organized labour in British Columbia had quickly taken the position that the Sikhs were but another "coolie class [that] tends always to degrade the white workers. . . ." Ibid., 116802, H. F. Pullen to Laurier, December 14, 1907; ibid., Christian Sivertz, Secretary TLC, Victoria, to Laurier, December 17, 1906.

142 "Oriental Immigration. D. Enquiry Under Royal Commission by Deputy Minister of Labour Into Methods by Which Oriental Labourers had Been Induced to Emigrate to Canada. Portion of Report Relating to Immigration From India and China". Sessional Papers, 1911, no. 36, pp. 97-98.

143 W.W.B. McInnes was a member of a prominent Vancouver Liberal family and the son of former Lieutenant-Governor, T. R. McInnes. He had also been the Liberal member for Vancouver 1896-1898. It appears that McInnes sought these special missions, for he informed Laurier that he had previously been employed as a secret service agent for the Department of Indian Affairs, "over a troublesome situation in Michigan". J. Saywell, The Office of Lieutenant Governor, p. 137; Laurier Papers, 129162-129163, W.W.B. McInnes to Laurier, September 11, 1907.

144 Ibid., 131596, McInnes to Laurier, November 18, 1907.

145 Ibid., 134026, McInnes to Laurier, December 20, 1907.

146 Ibid., 131593, McInnes to Laurier, November 7, 1907; ibid., 136303-136313, McInnes to Laurier, February 13, 1908.

147 Ibid., 131596, McInnes to Laurier, November 18, 1907.

148 McInnes claimed that instructions had been issued to the pro-American element in the Asiatic League to "deliver a riot in March", and to encourage "every man to come to the parade with a rifle and revolver". Ibid., 136615, McInnes to Laurier, February 19, 1908. Actually, the recourse to violence, and the

pro-American sentiments appears to have alarmed men such as Gordon Grant, Secretary of the League. Grant actually informed Laurier that he had recommended that the Vancouver League "make no alliances with any other than exclusively British organizations". Ibid., 136754, Gordon Grant to Laurier, February 24, 1908.

149 Ibid., 136303-136313, McInnes to Laurier, February 13, 1908.

150 Ibid., 133521, Sir Joseph Pope, Under-secretary for External Affairs, to Laurier, December 9, 1907.

151 Ibid., 133709, Rodolphe Lemieux to Laurier, December 10, 1907.

152 Ibid., 134156, Laurier to Lemieux, December 23, 1907.

153 Count Hayashi, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Rodolphe Lemieux, December 23, 1907, cited in, C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 293.

154 President Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, September 11, 1907, cited in, Raymond Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, p. 201.

155 According to Raymond Esthus, which side first broached the idea of Mackenzie King going to London to explain the Canadian and American position on Japanese immigration is uncertain. Ibid., 221-222. Mackenzie King in his Diary seems to imply the suggestion emanated from Roosevelt. Mackenzie King Diary, January 25, 1908, pp. 2176-2182.

156 Raymond Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, pp. 222-224; MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography (Toronto, 1958), pp. 154-156. Laurier Papers, 135842, T. Roosevelt to Laurier, February 1, 1908; ibid., 135847, Laurier to T. Roosevelt, February 20, 1908.

157 Ibid.

158 Ibid.

159 J. D. Cameron, "The Law Relating to Immigration to Canada", p. 269; MacGregor Dawson, Mackenzie King, pp. 160-164.

160 Cameron, "The Law . . .", p. 164; Dawson, Mackenzie King, p. 274.

161 Although Japanese immigration was substantially decreased after 1907, it still was over 400 for almost every year before 1914. And the fact that many of these immigrants were women, meant that the Japanese population in Canada, unlike the Chinese and East Indians, would have a reasonably good chance for natural increase. C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, pp. 91, 289.

162 Statutes of Canada, 7-8 Edw. VII, vols. I-II, p. clxii.

163 Ibid.

164 Canadian Annual Review (Toronto, 1908), pp. 119-120; MacGregor Dawson, Mackenzie King, pp. 162-166.

165 J. D. Cameron, "The Law Relating to Immigration to Canada", pp. 261-262; C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 103.

166 C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 93. Laurier was strongly advised by British Columbia Liberals that the Dominion government should handle the matter very delicately. Laurier Papers, 135393, Julien Roy to Laurier, Telegram, January 20, 1908.

167 There were numerous rumours circulating within British Columbia that Joseph Martin, the fiery former Premier, and bête noire to both the Federal Liberals and the McBride Conservatives was going to attempt to use the Asiatic Exclusion League as a means of obtaining political power in either the federal or provincial field. As a result, McInnes informed Laurier, "the provincial government is strongly desirous of having the League broken, and could be counted upon to co-operate toward that end". Ibid., 131596, W.W.B. McInnes to Laurier, November 18, 1907.

168 In August, 1907, Borden had actually toured Western Canada, and in his speeches the provincial right to restrict Oriental immigration was emphasized. Manitoba Free Press, August 27, 1907.

169 C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 84. Laurier was to be reminded by a trade unionist that "Canada has already

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done much for Imperial interests, as the recent generous contributions on Canada's behalf, made by Lord Alverston in the Alaskan Boundary Award. . . ." Laurier Papers, 134008, Albert Healey, Sec. TLC, Edmonton, to Laurier, December 19, 1907.

¹⁷⁰The Liberals had previously held all seven seats. After the 1908 election they were reduced to 2 seats. J. M. Beck, Pendulum of Power (Toronto, 1968), pp. 106, 119.

¹⁷¹Laurier Papers, 160620, Charles Hays to Laurier, October 4, 1909; ibid., 161982, Hays to Laurier, November 10, 1909. Laurier's refusal was very much based on political factors. Ibid., 161983, Laurier to Hays, November 12, 1909. See more extensive discussion, chapter five.

¹⁷²G. R. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, Vol. II, p. 226.

¹⁷³C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 101.

¹⁷⁴Ottawa Free Press, September 23, 1910; Vancouver Province, October 6, 1910.

¹⁷⁵Debates, 1910-1911, 9831, 9833; ibid., 1911, Second Session, 285-286. Mackenzie King, the Minister of Labour, had previously dismissed Templeman as a man "of no ideas", and deplored the fact that such a man had been given responsibility over such a delicate matter as Chinese immigration. Mackenzie King Diary, November 9, 1909, p. 2251; ibid., December 1, 1909, p. 2261.

¹⁷⁶Debates, 1910-1911, 9831-9840; ibid., 1911, 283-287.

¹⁷⁷Ibid.

¹⁷⁸Actually the Laurier government was very much on the defensive in British Columbia over the immigration policy. Not only the Chinese head tax scandal, but also the contravention of the Alien Labour Law brought the Immigration Branch under intense attack. Vancouver News Advertiser, September 7, 1911. See chapter five, page 288 for a more extensive discussion of the Alien Labour Act.

¹⁷⁹Sessional Papers, 1913, no. 25, p. 68.

180 Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, pp. 40, 57.

181 Ibid., pp. 57-58. The impact of the Chinese and Japanese miners is extensively discussed in chapter six.

182 George Foster, Minister of Trade and Commerce informed Borden that while Section 148, chapter IX, Revised Statutes of British Columbia, 1911, prohibited companies incorporated in China or Japan from operating in British Columbia, this did not apply against Japanese companies incorporated in the province. Sir Robert Borden Papers (Public Archives of Canada), 17140. Hereafter referred to as Borden Papers. George Foster to Borden, September 26, 1913.

183 Borden Papers, 17124, T.R.E. McInnes to Borden, August 9, 1913. In 1907 there had been considerable controversy over a proposal by a group of Japanese businessmen to bring in 50 Japanese families and settle them in a colony on C.P.R. land east of Calgary. At this site the extensive cultivation of sugar beets would be undertaken, as well as the establishment of a sugar factory. On this occasion the opposition was sufficiently strong that the scheme never materialized, although a few Japanese farmers did settle near Gleichen. Howard Palmer, "Anti-Oriental Sentiment in Alberta, 1880-1920", Canadian Ethnic Studies, vol. II, December, 1970, No. 2, pp. 44-46.

184 The California situation provided an alarming case study of the dangers of Japanese upward social mobility. In respect to land ownership by 1915 it was estimated that some 1,773 farms in that state were owned by Japanese, employing over 17,000 labourers, 96% of whom were Japanese. Carey McWilliams, Factories in the Field (Boston, 1939), p. 111.

185 Borden Papers, 17134, Borden to Sir Joseph Pope, August 20, 1913.

186 By 1913 even the churches in British Columbia were very much opposed to Sikh immigrants entering the province. Borden Papers, 145283, Rev. E. Scott, editor of The Presbyterian Record, January 25, 1912; ibid., 145284, Rev. W. H. Vance, Secretary, Vancouver Ministerial Association, telegram to Borden, January 26, 1912; ibid., 17130, Governor General Connaught to the Colonial Secretary, August 15, 1913; ibid., 17141, Borden to W. J. Roche, Minister of the Interior, September 26, 1913.

187. Ibid., 17212, Hugh Matier, telegram to Borden, December 6, 1913. T.R.E. McInnes in a letter to Borden, April 27, 1914 suggested that the Sikh nationalists in order to gain entry into British Columbia "will hold the threat of a revolting India to enforce their demands". Ibid., 17340.
- 188 Ibid., 17217, Borden to W. J. Roche, December 10, 1913.
- 189 Ibid., 17152, W. D. Scott, Supt. of the Immigration Branch, memorandum, to Mr. Mitchell, September 30, 1913.
- 190 Ibid., 17217, Borden to W. J. Roche, December 10, 1913.
- 191 Ibid., 17164, Governor General Connaught to the Colonial Secretary, October 16, 1913. J. D. Cameron, "The Law Relating to Immigration", p. 278.
- 192 Borden Papers, 17263, T. Nakamura, Japanese Consul General, to Borden, December 24, 1913.
- 193 Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 369.
- 194 Borden Papers, 17463, Commander Hose, telegram to Naval Dept., July 20, 1914; ibid., 17460, H. H. Stevens, M.P. for Vancouver, to Borden, July 21, 1914.
- 195 Ibid., 17383, Blake Robertson, Asst. Supt. of Immigration, to Borden, June 26, 1914.
- 196 Debates, 1914 -- Oliver, 4214, 4296, 4562.
- 197 Ibid., -- Laurier, 4565.
- 198 Canadian Annual Review, 1914, p.
- 199 Borden Papers, 17460, H. H. Stevens to Borden, July 21, 1914.
- 200 Debates, 1914, 5026, Stevens.
- 201 Borden Papers, 17313, W. D. Scott, memorandum to W. J. Roche, February 13, 1914.
- 202 Ibid.

203 As a result of the war there was an appreciable decline in the number of Chinese from 5,512 in 1914 to 1,258 in 1915. For the Japanese the decline was from 856 in 1914 to 592 in 1915. C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, pp. 287, 289.

CHAPTER III

EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION TO CANADA

Immigration from Europe between 1901 and 1921 assumed much greater significance than it had at any time previously in the history of Canada. Over 800,000 immigrants from western, southern and central Europe streamed into the country.¹ Indeed, it was the influx of these immigrants that so dramatically altered the ethnic character of Canada. In 1871, those Canadians of British and French origin composed 92.62% of the Canadian population.² By 1911 the British percentage had declined to 54.08% and the French to 28.5%.³ At the same time, the percentage of the population of European background increased from 6.72% in 1871 to 13.84% in 1911.⁴ Table A illustrates the percentage of each of the major European groups in 1911.

TABLE A
SELECTED ETHNIC GROUPS OF EUROPEAN ORIGIN IN CANADA, 1911⁵

<u>Name</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	
Armenians)	3,880	.05]
Turks)			
Greeks	3,594	.05]
Jews	45,411	.63] Non-preferred
Italians	75,681	1.05]

<u>Name</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	
Belgian	9,593	.13] Preferred
Dutch	54,986	.76	
Finnish	15,497	.02	
German	393,320	5.48	
Scandinavian	107,585	1.49	
Austro- Hungarian	129,103	1.79] Marginal
Polish	33,365	.46	
Russian	43,142	.06	

The explanation for the extensive influx of European immigrants can be attributed to the traditional push-pull symbiosis. In many of the European countries, there were conditions that made emigration appear as an attractive alternative to remaining in the existing situation. The push factor was very strong in sections of the Austro-Hungarian Empire such as Galicia; but weak in countries such as Belgium and France. Economic conditions, cultural and racial considerations, political attitudes were all factors in determining the decision to emigrate. Similarly, the image that the immigrants had of the economic, cultural and political characteristics of Canada influenced their decision to locate in this country.⁶

Even after emigration, the European background of the immigrants remained very important in affecting the pattern of their adjustment to the Canadian milieu. This was particularly true for those ethnic or sectarian groups that had been

persecuted minorities in the European context. In many cases the fear over forceful assimilation that had been so much a part of their European experience made them suspicious of the Canadian government and Anglo-Canadian cultural institutions. At the same time the bloc settlements and lack of a vigorous Canadianization program made it possible for these groups to retain a very distinctive ethnic and cultural life.⁷

The attitude of the Dominion government and the Anglo-Canadian community towards European immigrants was based on a mixture of economic and cultural considerations. The rationale for the expenditure of thousands of dollars in recruiting immigrants was based on the economic utility of these immigrants. In the Sifton era, at least, priority was given to those immigrants who would make good agriculturalists.⁸ A new wave of European farmers was needed to settle the clay belt of northern Ontario and cultivate the vast plains of western Canada. These arrivals would also provide a source of farm labourers and domestics thereby providing an added incentive for Anglo-Canadians to remain on the land. It is significant that despite the protests of many Anglo-Canadian nationalists that a highly selective European immigration policy was necessary in order to facilitate the assimilation of these immigrants, exclusion of European immigrants

on cultural or racial grounds was very rare. Indeed, for most of this period, cultural factors seemed far less important than economic considerations. Because these immigrants were Caucasians assimilation was not regarded as a long-term problem. Most Canadians appeared to believe that the new arrivals would be quickly Canadianized once they became acquainted with the free enterprise system and British democratic institutions. The influence of the public school system was deemed particularly important in transforming the immigrants.

This did not mean that Canadian immigration policy between 1896 and 1914 failed to differentiate between the various types of European immigrants. It is clear that a definite distinction was made between ethnic and national groups who were non-preferred, and those that were preferred.⁹ Generally, the immigrants from southern Europe fell into the non-preferred category: Armenians, Greeks, Turks, Italians, Bulgarians, etc. In addition, the Jews were usually added to the list.¹⁰ The category of preferred immigrants tended to vary during this period. However, immigrants from France, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, Germany, Finland and Switzerland were constantly encouraged to immigrate.¹¹ In contrast, Slavic immigrants particularly those of Ukrainian,

Polish or Russian background, as well as Hungarians, were regarded as marginally acceptable.¹² Though their cultural traits were deplored by Anglo-Canadians, economic considerations were predominant. For most of the period 1896-1914, Slavic immigrants were encouraged to settle in Canada.

While it is impossible to examine in detail the adaptation of each agrarian European group, the Canadian experience with the Doukhobors and the Ukrainians is of particular importance, and will be discussed later in this chapter. In these two case studies, the degree of inter-action between economic and cultural considerations by both the Anglo-Canadian community and the Dominion government is quite clearly revealed. Similarly, the reaction of the sectarian or ethnic group itself in responding to the Canadian milieu provides another valuable perspective. Since both of these groups were primarily agriculturalists, an analysis of their adaptation provides a basis for comparison with the assimilation of the industrial immigrant to be discussed in the next two chapters.

The Canadian bias against the southern Europeans was based on a mixture of racial and environmental assumptions, combined with an awareness of the American experience with these immigrants.¹³ Although the fully developed pseudo-eugenic theories that were to be popularized by writers

such as Madison Grant had not emerged by the 1890's, the belief in a hierarchical structure of racial types was widespread.¹⁴ Moreover, men such as George Parkin and Principal Grant disseminated the idea that a northern climate produced a superior racial stock, the Anglo-Saxon. Parkin theorized that the rigorous Canadian environment was an effective deterrent against ". . . the vagrant population of Italy and other countries of southern Europe".¹⁵ This exclusion was also advantageous, since southern European Catholics were often regarded as a threat to democratic institutions. Lurid stories about a sinister Popish plot to seize power in the United States reached Canadians through the American press and through the medium of such nativist organizations as the Protestant Protective Association.¹⁶ The brief success enjoyed by the P.P.A. among Anglo-Canadians in the 1890's revealed the strength of the anti-Catholic phobia.¹⁷ In addition, many Canadians associated southern Europeans with anarchism, socialism and crime. As early as 1890, Sir John A. Macdonald had critically commented on the disastrous effect of southern European immigration on American society: "It is a great country, but it will have its vicissitudes and revolutions. Look at the mass of foreign ignorance and vice which has flooded the country with socialism, atheism and all other isms".¹⁸

The inclination for southern European immigrants to gravitate to urban centres was regarded as another reason for their disqualification. Throughout this period, the city was regarded as a necessary evil; but the tendency towards extensive urbanization was deplored by most elements of the Anglo-Canadian community.¹⁹ Moreover, what made the urban growth so dangerous was that large numbers of southern Europeans and Jews would congregate in unsanitary ethnic ghettos.²⁰ In these confines, immorality, disease, crime, and radicalism would flourish.

The Anglo-Canadian reaction to the various types of southern European immigrants provides an interesting contrast. The Armenians, the Greeks and the Jews were generally believed to possess most of the unacceptable traits associated with the southern European stereotype. The Italians were regarded as somewhat better in that they engaged in occupations other than peddling and money lending. Anglo-Canadians respected good hard labour, and in this respect the Italian worker had few peers. But the presence of Italian ghettos in the large cities remained a source of concern.

The Canadian experience with Armenian and Jewish immigrants also presents a significant comparison. Both groups were pushed out of their countries of origin by

religious and racial persecution; both, therefore, were primarily refugees. In addition they followed similar trades in the large urban centres where they located. The similarity extended to their non-preferred status. On both economic and cultural grounds, the Armenians and Jews were regarded by the Anglo-Canadian community and by government officials as undesirable. Here the similarity ends. While the Armenians were almost entirely excluded, thousands of Jewish immigrants entered Canada between 1901-1911.

The Christian Armenians, primarily located in the Ottoman Empire, had long been the object of the sympathy of the western world as a result of the periodic persecutions at the hands of the Moslems.²¹ Nor was Canada able to remain aloof from the controversy over the Armenian refugees. In both 1896 and 1905, proposals were submitted to both the Imperial and Canadian governments to create an Armenian colony in western Canada. The initiative was taken by a number of missionaries who had been involved with the Armenians in Turkey.²² Emphasis was placed on the fact that western Canada already had a cosmopolitan population, and that Canada would be making a great humanitarian contribution. Particular reference was made to the suitability of the Armenians as skilled farmers.²³ Although the Imperial government periodically showed some interest in the scheme, there was little evidence of any support in Canada.

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Even the C.P.R., which usually pushed hard for such colonization ventures, indicated that they felt that the Armenians were not "desirable settlers who will suit the country".²⁴ These negative views were shared by Immigration officials who stressed the climatic unsuitability of the Armenians, and pointed out their occupational preferences and undesirable personal habits.²⁵ In 1905, W. D. Scott, Superintendent of Immigration, stated his objections very clearly: "From my knowledge of these people I do not think we want them in Canada. They are invariably peddlers in the cities and through the country".²⁶

As a result of this hostility towards Armenian immigrants, there were only 1,550 admitted into the country between 1901 and 1911, while the total Turkish population in 1911 was scarcely 4,000.²⁷ However, the agitation for the entry of Armenians revived following World War I. After a genocidal campaign was launched against these people by the Turkish government, there was intense pressure to allow large numbers of these refugees into the country, but the Canadian government did not act.²⁸

The history of large scale Jewish immigration to Canada dates back to the 1870's and 1880's, when a large number of Jews from Russia, Poland and Roumania fled because of the

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pogroms.²⁹ During the serious pogrom of 1881-1882, the Canadian High Commissioner, A. T. Galt, pressed for the settlement of the Jewish refugees in Canada, and began negotiations for a tract of land in the Northwest territories to be reserved for Jewish colonization.³⁰ Although Prime Minister Macdonald eventually agreed to the Jewish immigration, there was an appreciable difference in attitude between himself and the High Commissioner to the future and present value of these immigrants. For Galt, the Jews were "a superior class of people, partly farmers, but generally trade people . . . a large proportion will still be found with sufficient means to establish themselves in Canada. . . ."³¹ Macdonald was not quite so charitable: "The Old Cloi move is a good one - A sprinkling of Jews in the Northwest would do good. They would at once go for peddling and politics and would be of much use in the New Country as Cheap Jacks and Chapmen".³² Despite Macdonald's cynicism, land grants were given to nine separate Jewish colonies in western Canada.³³

Among Canada's Jews there was considerable enthusiasm for the colonization ventures, an enthusiasm not shared by many of the Immigration Branch officials. According to Immigration Agent, William Hespeler, the Jewish immigrants were "very inferior ordinary labourers" and he grimly predicted

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that "those people . . . never will become agriculturalists".³⁴ By 1888 even A. T. Galt was prepared to admit that he was mistaken and he lamented the fact that "the Jews have sold their crops, the cattle I gave them and turned to their natural avocation for peddling".³⁵ It was only through the continued assistance of Jewish benevolent organizations that the total collapse of the colonies was prevented.

This episode underlined the important role which Jewish benevolent societies played in channeling the flow of central European Jewish refugees into Canada. One of the earliest of these associations was the Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent Society. This society maintained close contact with Jewish organizations overseas such as the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Jewish Colonization Association, the Mansion House Committee, and L'Alliance Israelite in Paris.³⁶ These organizations performed the functions of a pressure group, as well as a clearing house for the placement and care of Jewish immigrants. In 1890, as a result of an advancement of funds by a wealthy Jewish philanthropist, The Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent Society became a much more dynamic organization, the Baron de Hirsch Institute.³⁷ Although the Montreal office was originally staffed and financed primarily by British or Canadian born Jews, most of the work of the Institute was directed towards

eastern European Jews who formed the vast majority of the immigrants from 1880-1914.³⁸ Despite certain cultural differences between the two groups of Jews, there seemed to have been little hesitancy on the part of Anglo-Canadian Jews to help the destitute immigrants from eastern Europe.³⁹ The Montreal Jewish charities alone were able to subscribe, by 1915, about \$125,000 annually for this purpose.⁴⁰

What made the Jewish situation so controversial was that there were numerous attempts during Laurier's administration to settle large numbers of European Jews in Canada. In 1900, when thousands of Roumanian Jews were left homeless, it was suggested that these people should be assisted to enter Canada.⁴¹ The non-agricultural inclination of the Jews was cited by Sifton and the Immigration officials as the main reason for denying aid. In July, 1900, Sifton assured the House of Commons that instructions had been issued to Canadian Immigration officials overseas "that no encouragement should be given to the movement of Roumanian Jews to Canada", a response which the members of the Opposition heartily concurred with.⁴² Deputy Minister J. A. Smart concurred with these sentiments. In December, 1900, he wrote: "the Jewish people do not become agriculturalists". They will become "additions to the population of our cities and towns" and "such additions do not . . .

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contribute to the . . . development of natural resources".⁴³ Nevertheless, in 1900-1902, approximately 2,000 Roumanian Jewish refugees found their way to Canada, their passage paid by various Jewish philanthropic organizations.⁴⁴ The unfavourable reaction of other ethnic groups to their arrival was, however, recorded by W. F. McCreary, Commissioner of Immigration. In 1902 he wrote to Sifton about the racial tension existing in Manitoba: "The Galicians and Germans . . . say they came to this country to get rid of the jews [sic] who ruined them, and if they are followed by the same class, then they say they desire to leave this country again".⁴⁵ This ethnic animosity towards Jewish immigrants was even more pronounced in the French Canadian districts of Montreal where thousands of Jews located prior to 1914.⁴⁶

One of the most ambitious efforts of Jewish colonizers came in the wake of the 1905 pogrom in Russia. In 1907, Laurier was approached by a group of British Jews, headed by Israel Zangwill, with a proposition that not only should Canadian laws pertaining to the Sabbath be amended to facilitate the employment opportunities of Jewish immigrants, but also that Canada should create a separate colony for Jewish immigrants in the Canadian west:

I still venture to think that your experience with other groups of more or less illiterate immigrants

supplies no clue towards Canada's duty towards a project following on one of the greatest massacres in history, a colonization that would draw from the best classes, as well as from the poor, and would be initiated and safeguarded by a wealthy international organization bent on ending a tragedy nineteen centuries old.⁴⁷

Laurier remained indifferent towards this proposal. He flatly rejected any suggestion that the Lord's Day Act could be revised to accommodate Canada's Jewry. He also declared that "to allow Jews to form themselves into a separate organization is impossible. We do not allow that to Jews or to any other body". Jewish immigrants, Laurier asserted, were free to enter as any other individual "who is willing to work". Canada, however, only gave assistance to those immigrants who were "agriculturalists, farm labourers and domestic servants".⁴⁸

But if the official response of Prime Minister Laurier was negative towards assisted Jewish immigration, both Laurier and other members of Parliament were well aware of the commitment on the part of the Canadian Jewish community towards the welfare of Jewish immigrants. Every Jewish immigrant who entered Canada was in effect bonded by the Baron de Hirsch Society. No Jewish immigrant was deported until the Institute was notified. The fact that only 137 Jews were deported between 1902 and 1914, is testimony of the effectiveness of the Society's activity.⁴⁹

Moreover, the existence of 18 separate Jewish colonies in western Canada by 1914 illustrates the ability of the Jewish community to counter-balance Immigration Department policies.⁵⁰ It also revealed the attempt on the part of the Baron de Hirsch Society to help the Jewish immigrants become successful agriculturalists. Despite the fact that most of these colonies were very small, and in reality consisted of nothing more than the granting of continuous homesteads for 40 to 60 families, they performed a useful function. The settlements enabled Jewish spokesmen to claim that Jewish immigrants were indeed agriculturalists and should, therefore, be regarded as preferred immigrants.

The Baron de Hirsch Society also assisted the urban Jews, who by 1921 represented almost 83% of the Jewish population of Canada.⁵¹ Under the Society's auspices religious classes and night schools were organized. A legal aid committee and a welfare department helped the newcomer adjust to the Canadian community. A labour bureau attempted to cope with the fact that most of the immigrants who sought employment were either tailors or were unskilled workers.⁵²

The political influence of the Jewish community in Canada, especially in urban centres such as Montreal and Winnipeg was utilized to increase the flow of Jewish immigrants

to Canada. The presence of powerful Jewish businessmen on the Board of Directors of the Baron de Hirsch Society suggests the degree of political leverage which the Society would have been able to exert: Samuel Jacobs (prominent Montreal lawyer, co-founder of the Jewish Times), Mark Workam (President of Dominion Steel Corporation, Chairman, Board of Directors, Eastern Trust Co., etc.), Sir Mortimer Davis (President of Imperial Tobacco Co.), Lyon Cohen (L. Cohen & Sons Coal Merchants and Dredging Contractors, President of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, 1908-1912).⁵³

The Jewish vote in federal constituencies such as Outremont and Montreal Cartier was also of major importance. Moreover, by 1917 the Jewish plurality of Montreal Cartier had elected their own M.P. in the person of Samuel Jacobs.⁵⁴ In Winnipeg the political involvement of the Jewish population was evident as early as 1904 when a Jewish Alderman was elected in North Winnipeg.⁵⁵ In 1910, S. Hart Green, a prominent Jewish lawyer was elected as a Liberal M.L.A. for the "North End", and quickly asserted his influence on behalf of Jewish immigrants. For example, in 1911 Green informed Frank Oliver of the concern that "constituents of mine, people with large and influential family connections in North Winnipeg" had towards the rigid enforcement of the Immigration Act. He

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strongly urged Oliver to arrange matters so that Jewish immigrants "would receive a little additional consideration".⁵⁶

Jewish immigration, stands forth as an example of an ethnic group desired neither economically nor culturally by the host society.⁵⁷ Through the group's own sense of ethnic cohesiveness, and its ability to employ economic and political pressure at the opportune times, the entry of over 54,000 of its members was effected between 1900 and 1914.⁵⁸ It is not surprising that Immigration officials such as J. Bruce Walker should have bitterly resented the tendency on the part of Canadian Jews to "look upon our Immigration laws as something of a joke, to be evaded or violated at every opportunity. . .

.⁵⁹ This tendency was not limited to the Jews, they were merely more successful than other ethnic groups.

Italian immigration is another example of an "undesirable" ethnic group which was able to overcome considerable Anglo-Canadian oppression. The Immigration Branch statistics indicate that some 70,436 Italians entered Canada between 1901 and 1911.⁶⁰ However, in the case of the Italians, as in the case of most ethnic groups who arrived in Canada during this period, there is an obvious discrepancy between these statistics and the 1911 Census statistics which showed an increase in the Italian population of only 34,577.⁶¹ The explanation is that

the Immigration officials did not record re-emigration figures. In the case of the Italians, re-emigration was particularly pronounced among unskilled labourers whose practice of re-turning to the homeland on a seasonal basis was widely recognized both in Europe and in the United States.⁶² That the Canadian environment provided an additional incentive to re-emigrate was vividly described by an Italian newspaper in 1901:

They really left Italy with great sorrow and hope to go back to their country and they shudder when they think they will have to go back to British Columbia, not so much from fear of the unknown work and the climate of this remote country as from the fear of not being able to return home.⁶³

Italian immigration prior to 1906 was not that substantial, largely because the economic opportunities in Canada as compared to those offered in the United States did not provide the same powerful incentive. Most of the male immigrants were interested primarily in unskilled labour rather than farming.⁶⁴ Thus, it was only when Canada embarked upon the grandiose scheme of building two additional transcontinental railways that Italian labourers in large numbers began to gravitate towards the Dominion. The opening up of the mining frontier in northern Ontario after 1907, and the increased productivity of the iron and steel industry, also acted as a magnet for Italian labourers.⁶⁵

But in the immigration priorities of the period, it was agriculturalists rather than industrial workers that Canada sought. And indeed, very early in his administration, Clifford Sifton indicated a distinct hostility towards Italian immigrants, an inclination shared by most of his subordinates. In 1901, Sifton informed his Deputy Minister of his strong feelings on the matter:

I have explained at least a dozen times that I don't want anything done to facilitate Italian immigration. . . . No steps are to be taken either to assist or encourage Italian immigration to Canada. . . . this is the policy of the Department. You will of course understand that this is to be done without saying anything that will be offensive.⁶⁶

Sifton's instructions appear to have been obeyed, a task facilitated by Italian legislation of 1901 which made it illegal for any booking agent to arrange passage to Canada by indirect passage. Since none of the Italian lines sailed directly to a Canadian port this Italian measure appeared to Sifton as advantageous: "If the new law discourages or prevents Italian immigration into Canada I regard that as being so much the better. . . ." ⁶⁷ Sifton's views were shared by both the Deputy Minister, J. A. Smart, and the Commissioner, W. F. McCreary. ⁶⁸ This policy of deterring Italian immigration actually continued throughout the pre-war period. In 1907, and again in 1909, W. D. Scott, the Superintendent of Immigration announced his

opposition to the entry of Italians.⁶⁹ Actually, a number of Italian unskilled labourers were turned back at the American border in 1909 "on the grounds that there was no demand for such and that they were without the required amount of money".⁷⁰ Nor did the Immigration Branch seem very much inclined to encourage Italian agriculturalists into Canada, despite growing interest in Canada on the part of Italian emigrants, and the Italian government.⁷¹

In 1910, W. D. Scott informed the Italian Inspector of Emigration in New York City that any project attempting to place Italian immigrants in rural Canada was doomed: "so far as I know there has not been up to the present any number of Italians who have taken up land in the west. . . ."⁷² The Dominion Land's Branch statistics strongly supported Scott's contention, for they revealed that only 207 homesteads had been granted to Italians, or .0006% of the total number of entries between 1901-1911.⁷³ But despite the obvious discouragement of Italian immigration, between 1912 and 1914 some 49,334 Italians arrived in Canada, a figure which represents 41% of the total Italian immigration for the entire period 1900-1914.⁷⁴ The vast majority of these immigrants were industrial workers, mostly railroad navvies. It appears, therefore, that official policy towards the Italians as well

as towards the Jews could be circumvented. For the Jews it was the strength of the ethnic group that overcame obstacles; for the Italians it was the forces of economic power in Canada, a trend that is extensively discussed in the following chapter.

Immigrants from western Europe had been traditionally regarded in a favourable light by the majority of Anglo-Canadians. In an economic sense, most of these immigrants were either agriculturalists, domestics or skilled workers. As such, they were regarded as a definite economic asset. In a cultural sense, because most of these immigrants were from countries with a relatively high standard of living, the majority were not only literate, but accustomed to commercial agriculture. It is not surprising, therefore, that Anglo-Canadians should have believed that these newcomers from western Europe would be easily accommodated into Canadian society. The desirable qualities of the western European immigrants was reinforced by the successful Canadian experience with previous arrivals.⁷⁵ The impact of this experience varied, however, with the degree of western European settlement in the various areas of Canada. Table B illustrates the geographical distribution of western European immigrants in both 1911 and 1921, showing that most of the immigrants

settled in western Canada.⁷⁶

TABLE B
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS

<u>Region</u>	<u>Percent Born in Northwestern Europe</u>	
	<u>1911</u>	<u>1921</u>
Canada	1.80	1.51
Alberta	6.36	4.53
Saskatchewan	5.95	4.33
British Columbia	4.41	2.91
Manitoba	4.66	3.46
Ontario	0.96	0.73
Quebec	0.33	0.47
Nova Scotia	0.38	0.41
New Brunswick	0.27	0.25
Prince Edward Island	0.22	0.38

There is little doubt that the Canadian Immigration authorities made a continuing effort to recruit French, Belgian, Scandinavian, and German immigrants. The Reports of the Immigration Branch, the statements made by Cabinet ministers emphasized the importance of attracting immigrants from all of these regions. Yet the fact remains that between 1901 and 1911 relatively few French and Belgian immigrants came to Canada. The total number of French immigrants was 18,364. For the Belgians, the number was 9,961.⁷⁷ Moreover, the French immigrants were quickly absorbed into the French Canadian community, although because of the small numbers they did not substantially strengthen the French Catholic presence in Canadian society. For the Belgians, their numbers remained small; in 1911 there

were less than 10,000 distributed in many different provinces.⁷⁸ As a result neither the French nor the Belgians maintained a pronounced separate identity.

The failure of the Canadian government to successfully recruit large numbers of immigrants from France and Belgium was a major issue with French Canadians, especially members of the Nationalist party. Both Henri Bourassa and Armand Lavergne attacked the Laurier Liberals for their seeming indifference towards immigrants from these countries.⁷⁹ But while it might have been an important controversy in Quebec, and among French Canadians in western Canada, most Anglo-Canadians remained unconcerned over the sparse numbers of Francophone-Catholic immigrants. Indeed, given the nature of Anglo-Canadian Protestant assertiveness, it might be argued that the majority of Anglo-Canadians were rather pleased that no such influx from France and Belgium materialized.⁸⁰

In sharp contrast, Anglo-Canadians manifest considerable concern over the insufficient numbers of immigrants from the Scandinavian countries and from Germany. These were the immigrants that were most highly prized. In a cultural sense, not only were they from highly advanced countries, but because they were Protestant, it was believed they would strengthen the Anglo-Protestant character of the country.

As early as the 1870's the Scandinavian countries appeared to be a most likely source of settlers for Canada's vast emptiness. In 1873, the Canadian government sent a special Emigration agent to the Scandinavian countries with instructions to recruit immigrants. One of the lures was the promise of Scandinavian colonies, consisting of some 80,000 acres of good land in western Canada.⁸¹ The results were disappointing, by 1901 there were only 31,042 Scandinavians in Canada.⁸² What made the small number all that more glaring was that between 1832 and 1902 over two million people left Iceland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark.⁸³

In the competition for Scandinavian immigrants the United States was the clear victor over Canada. A large part of the American success can be related to very obvious factors: greater economic opportunity in a more developed industrial system; the presence of existing colonies of Scandinavians who helped to integrate the newcomers into the American milieu, and often acted as effective recruiting agents; the existence of direct passage by the Scandinavian-American line to New York; as well as the more favourable image of the United States being climatically and culturally more palatable than the bleak Canadian alternative.⁸⁴ Even the advantage of state-assisted immigration, with the payment

of the bonuses and the distribution of government immigration literature was denied to Canada. The "oppressive laws" against recruitment, whether decisive or not, became a major rationalization in accounting for Canada "getting such a small share" of the immigrants.⁸⁵

Prior to 1897, the only really successful Scandinavian colonization project had been the Icelanders. Between 1876 and 1880, some 2,000 Icelandic immigrants, driven out of their homeland by disastrous climatic and economic conditions, settled along the west shore of Lake Winnipeg.⁸⁶ Despite the early difficulties of adaptation, by 1896 the Icelandic residents of Manitoba were regarded as exemplary citizens. Not only had they advanced economically, they had begun to be assimilated by the Anglo-Canadian community of Manitoba.⁸⁷ It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1897 Clifford Sifton should have informed Thomas Greenway, the Liberal Premier of Manitoba, that he was prepared to grant a large colony to the Icelanders in western Manitoba in the hope of attracting an additional influx of Icelandic immigrants.⁸⁸

Sifton also made a sustained attempt to recruit immigrants from the other Scandinavian countries. Report after report of the Immigration Branch emphasized the desirability of "this class of settler".⁸⁹ Nor were there any dissident voices.

Anglo-Canadians appeared unanimous in their favourable reaction to both the economic and the cultural qualities of the Scandinavians.⁹⁰ One trait that Sifton certainly appreciated was the inclination of Scandinavians to remain in the rural areas of Canada. In contrast to other ethnic groups, they resisted the lure of the 'big city'; even by 1921 less than 20% were urbanized.⁹¹ Moreover, as farmers and farm labourers they were felt to have few peers.

In the industrial sphere Scandinavian workers were also highly esteemed. In both railroad construction and maintenance work, most of the railway companies used Scandinavians primarily in supervisory positions. They were usually utilized as foremen, overseeing the squads of Asiatic, southern European and Slavic labourers.⁹² As miners, Scandinavian workers also excelled; the Swedes, in particular, were renowned for their skill and hard work.⁹³

There was considerable interest, as well, in bringing Scandinavian domestics to Canada, especially to western Canada. Actually the Conservatives in 1892 had launched a major study of the possibilities of such recruitment. The High Commissioner, Sir Charles Tupper, had been particularly impressed with their qualities: "The Scandinavian servant girls are clean, honest, industrious and intelligent. They are generally

well domesticated . . . accustomed to low wages and a simple quiet life".⁹⁴ As a result, it was believed that they would be admirably suited to western Canadian conditions.

In the period 1899 to 1906 a sustained effort was made to recruit immigrants from the Scandinavian countries. The agency in charge of this recruitment campaign was the North Atlantic Trading Company, the rather nebulous syndicate of European shipping interests which was to receive cash rebates and an advertising budget to promote the flow of immigrants from continental Europe. One of the major arguments used in establishing the arrangement was that this operation would secure more Scandinavian immigrants.⁹⁵ In this respect, the agreement was not successful; the N.A.T.C. was unable to divert Scandinavians towards Canada in appreciable numbers. For instance, in 1904-1905 they composed only 3% of the total immigration or 4,118. In 1906-1907 the numbers declined to 2,296 or 2%.⁹⁶ In fact, Frank Oliver maintained that the failure of the N.A.T.C. to maximize "the returns of qualified arrivals from Norway, Sweden and Finland", illustrated that the shipping syndicate was "not carrying out its agreement in good faith".⁹⁷

Nor did the situation improve after the cancellation of the contract with the N.A.T.C. J. Obed Smith, the Superin-

tendent of European Emigration, submitted a report in 1910 showing the numbers of Danes and Swedes that had immigrated to North America between 1903 and 1908:⁹⁸

	<u>DENMARK</u>		<u>SWEDEN</u>	
	<u>To U.S.A.</u>	<u>To Canada</u>	<u>To U.S.A.</u>	<u>To Canada</u>
1903	11,471	243	35,479	370
1904	17,920	530	18,533	300
1905	11,812	381	20,520	240
1906	12,283	353	21,242	315
1907	11,787	545	19,325	350
1908	7,510	380	8,873	350

These statistics vary considerably with those collected by the Immigration Branch. The official figures showed an average of 2,455 Danes and Swedes entering between 1903-1908, and a total of 40,658 Scandinavian immigrants entering between 1901-1911.⁹⁹ Actually, one is inclined to place more credence in Smith's citation. Although, the Scandinavian population of Canada did increase from 31,042 in 1901 to 107,535 in 1911, it appears that a large percentage of this increase can be attributed more to American than to European sources.¹⁰⁰

Scandinavians from the United States were regarded as the most superior type of immigrant. Not only did they have all of the sterling qualities associated with the Scandinavian race, but also they had already adapted to the North American environment. Most had acquired skills and money which gave

almost total assurance of successful settlement.¹⁰¹ The cultural traits of the Scandinavians were also praised by Anglo-Canadians. Commissioner McCreary, in 1902, informed Sifton very clearly that "most of the Scandinavians we will get will be from the United States, and can speak English".¹⁰² One enthusiastic supporter pointed out that because they were primarily Protestant, the Scandinavian immigrant would act as an effective counter-weight to the increasing Catholic population.¹⁰³ This favourable image was reinforced by two of the more perceptive commentators on Immigration -- J. S. Woodsworth and Dr. J.T.M. Anderson. According to Woodsworth, Scandinavians were "sober, industrious and thrifty, [and] in every way very excellent citizens".¹⁰⁴ Dr. Anderson was even more enthusiastic, describing them as "the very best immigrants that have ever come to Canada from foreign countries."¹⁰⁵

In the debate over the acceptable type of European immigrant, the German ranked a close second to the Scandinavian. Certainly the Immigration officials were very much committed to the idea of recruiting these people, the Deputy Minister informing Preston in 1901 that "there is no class of workers that Canadians are so willing to welcome as German settlers. . . ."¹⁰⁶ Even the super-critical Frank Oliver,

in contrast to his scathing attacks on the Galician, lavished praise on the German immigrant: "He is a man of dominant race, of untiring energy, of great foresight; he is a man of sterling honesty and reliability. . . . He is not only a producer, he is a citizen. . . ." ¹⁰⁷ The image of the German immigrant was also of the highest among most writers. For J. S. Woodsworth, the German could be classified "as white people like ourselves . . . among our best immigrants". ¹⁰⁸

But German immigration was also plagued with the same problems as Scandinavians: a very protective and vigilant government opposing emigration; and the magnetic lure of the United States, already having a large percent of the population of Germanic background. ¹⁰⁹ A third factor which applied to Scandinavia, but not nearly to the same extent as Germany, was that Canada was very much identified with the imperial power of Great Britain. Thus, if Germany did not send its surplus population to its own colonies it was very much more inclined to allow these immigrants to go to the neutral United States rather than to a belligerent English colony. Thus the United States received some 341,498 immigrants between 1901 and 1910 as compared to 20,942 for Canada. ¹¹⁰ James A. Smart informed a select committee of the House of Commons of this problem when he reviewed his eight years as Deputy Minister:

One of the difficulties we have is the fact that Canada belongs to a foreign nation. When an immigrant goes to the United States he is helping to make a new nation, he is a part of it, but when they come to Canada they come practically to a British country -- it is like going to Great Britain. I have no doubt that for many years that has worked tremendously to the advantage of the United States in getting people.¹¹¹

Although the immigration returns only indicate that 20,239 German immigrants entered the country, this figure is misleading.¹¹² The entry of German speaking settlers from European countries other than Germany, as well as German-Catholics from the United States also had to be considered.¹¹³ As a result, the census of 1911 revealed an increase of 82,819 from 1901 (27%).¹¹⁴ What is significant with that figure is that many of those classified as Germans in the Census, were in essence only German-speaking, most having spent considerable time in North America. One study estimated that of the pre-1914 German-speaking immigrants 44% were from the Russian Empire, 6% were from Roumania, part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 18% were from the United States, and only 12% were from the German Empire.¹¹⁵

Because of their long experience in Canada, those of German nationality could be found in many different occupations. However, by far the most pronounced occupational trait was that of farming. There was definitely an inclination

to settle in rural areas, illustrated by the fact that in 1921 only 13.64% were located in urban centres over 30,000.¹¹⁶ Similarly, the number of homesteads secured by Germans was quite high. Between 1901 and 1911 some 7,324 homestead entries were submitted by Germans, or 29% of the total German immigrants of that period.¹¹⁷ This contrasted dramatically with the Italian agricultural performance.

One of the most rural German-speaking groups in Canada were the Mennonites. Although these people had emigrated from Russia, they were considered as Germans by Canadian Immigration officials. Moreover, as much as they considered themselves a part of any national culture, it was German.¹¹⁸ In their religious services, in their schools and in their homes they spoke the German language. But their German character was in essence that of the sixteenth century in that the Mennonites were primarily a religious, not an ethnic entity. As a sectarian group the inner cohesiveness was maintained by an adherence to certain religious and social values. Because of their three hundred year tradition of separate cultural existence, from the respective host societies, Holland, Prussia, and Russia, it is not surprising that the Mennonites should assume that Canadian conditions would be similar.¹¹⁹

Between 1873 and 1880, following rather involved nego-

tiations with the Liberal government of Alexander Mackenzie, some 7,000 Mennonites established colonies in Manitoba. Motivated by cultural reasons rather than the economic motivation of the Icelanders, the Mennonites represent the first of the communal groups to establish themselves in the new Canadian nation. As a result there were certain characteristics associated with the Mennonites which were equally applicable to other groups such as the Doukhobors, the Hutterites, the German Catholics and the Mormons.¹²⁰

The situation in Russia during the 1870's had reached a point where the cultural survival of the Mennonites appeared to many of their leaders to be very seriously jeopardized. The Russian government spurred by the powerful Slavophil element, began to carefully re-examine the status of the Mennonites, especially their relationship to the state. Several aspects of this relationship resulted in official reaction against this exclusive religious group. Because of their religious beliefs the Mennonites would not submit to military service in any form. They held constitutional guarantees dating from the days of Catherine the Great to reinforce their conscientious objections. But to the increasingly nationalistic Russian administrators this exemption was unwarranted; indeed, it appeared to violate one of the basic tenets of

citizenship. Combined with this refusal to adopt full citizenship obligations was the Mennonite practice of educating their children in their own schools, using German not Russian as the language of instruction. Mennonites operated their colonies as independent economic and political entities. To the Slavophiles, "the presence of an unassimilated group of sectarians and foreigners, with living standards far above that of the native Russian peasant, was still more distasteful".¹²¹ In a series of successive enactments the independence of the Mennonite community came under assault: first, the colonies became part of the ordinary administrative divisions resulting in redistribution of some Mennonite land, and the payment of taxes; secondly, the Mennonites were compelled to teach the Russian language in their schools, and Russian teachers were appointed; and finally, the military exemption extended to the Mennonites was rescinded.¹²² The combination of these pressures, especially the threat of military service, produced the traditional Anabaptist group response: "withdrawal, flight, emigration, - this was by now their institutionalized reaction to any major threat to their dogmas of their faith. . . ."¹²³

But if the motivation of the Mennonites in emigrating was cultural, the attraction of the Mennonites to the Canadian

government and to the Canadian public was distinctly economic. One of the major arguments used by the Mackenzie government in justifying the extensive concessions to the Mennonites was the fact that the west desperately needed competent agriculturalists.¹²⁴ The Anglo-Canadian community of Manitoba basically agreed once they had adjusted to the cultural peculiarities of these immigrants.¹²⁵ As the influential Manitoba Free Press stated: "The attention which will be drawn to our country by the movement, will have the effect of bringing here a great share of the steady immigration which for years has been filling up the Western States".¹²⁶

Finnish immigrants were in a somewhat similar category as the Mennonites in that they were theoretically citizens of the Russian Empire, but quite obviously they were a distinct ethnic group. However, they were tended to be classified by Canadian Immigration officials with the Scandinavians rather than with the Russians. Regardless of the category, the 21,220 Finns who entered Canada between 1900 and 1914 were regarded as preferred immigrants.¹²⁷

The reasons for the Finnish emigration was a combination of economic and political motivation. Economically, the Finns found themselves in a similar condition as the Ukrainian immigrants in that the majority of the land was controlled by

aliens (Swedes and Russians).¹²⁸ As a result, the Finns in rural areas were either rather impoverished small farmers or agricultural labourers. By 1900, large numbers of these unskilled men began to gravitate towards the urban centres.¹²⁹ The dissatisfaction with Russian domination was appreciably intensified with the renewal of the 'Russification' program. In 1899, the Finnish army was disbanded, and all Finnish males of military age became liable for conscription in the Russian army. It was also announced that measures were to be adopted for the gradual imposition of Russian as the official language of the country. The Finnish reaction to this 'Russification' was twofold: radical political action, and emigration.¹³⁰

By 1905, a strong Social Democratic Party had developed among the Finns in the urban areas, closely allied with the Russian Bolsheviks since both groups aimed to be free from the government of the Czar. Actually, the political and social upheavals of 1905 in Finland were led by members of the Social Democratic Party, an involvement which necessitated rather rapid emigration. Many of the leaders of the movement fled to the United States. However, they maintained close contact with the followers, and urged them to immigrate to North America. One such nationalist leader, Matti Kurikka, the socialist editor of The Worker (Tyomies), urged mass

emigration from Finland to North America:

We shall discover the historical salvation of our people through emigration. In Finland the working class may eat only raw herring and drink skimmed milk. Everything is much better in America. It is not worth while for the working people to remain in Finland.¹³¹

Between 1901 and 1911 some 158,832 Finns responded to the call for emigration to North America, the vast bulk of them to the United States. They tended to settle in those regions such as Michigan and Minnesota that resembled western Finland, such as the province of Vaasa, with a northern climate, and with lakes and forests interspersed with forest clearings. Although most of these immigrants were agriculturalists they soon became involved in lumbering, and especially mining activity. They did manage, however, to retain much of their peasant heritage and customs: they lived in Finnish enclaves, socializing among themselves, marrying within the ethnic group; they remained isolated from American political and social involvement, making little attempt to learn English, showing very little inclination to strive "for leadership and upward social mobility in the first generation".¹³²

The large scale Finnish emigration was greeted with enthusiasm by Canadian Immigration officials. Special reference was made to the fact that the Finnish settlers appeared to be admirably suited to life in the Canadian Shield.¹³³

One Finnish promoter suggested an agricultural region that was "fairly well timbered, and if possible interspersed with lakes and rivers. . . ." ¹³⁴ In 1903-1904, W.T.R. Preston informed his superiors that if the Finnish emigrants could be assured of being able to settle in the same type of region ¹³⁵ they might favourably consider Canada.

One proposal was submitted by three prominent Finns that an Immigration Association be set up under their auspices, and supported by the Canadian government, to facilitate the immigration of Finns to Canada, and effectively divert them from the United States. It was claimed that the time was quite propitious to attempt such an immigration scheme, because of the easy adaptability of Finnish immigrants to Canadian conditions since they "are very largely agriculturalists", and had extensive experience with "wood-cutting, timber floating, etc." ¹³⁶

In this instance the Deputy Minister did not seem overly enthused, mainly because the government had previously had an unfortunate experience in bringing "experts" to Canada. ¹³⁷ He also indicated some caution in admitting into Canada immigrants who might be the cause of social and political disorder:

I thought that perhaps we might take advantage of any oppression that might exist and secure many

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good people for Canada, but then again it has occurred to me that perhaps these persons may not be of a class that it would be of any advantage to secure as residents.¹³⁸

To what extent Smart was aware of the growing radicalism among the Finnish workers of northern Michigan and Minnesota is not revealed.¹³⁹ Although, much the same pattern was also to develop in northern Ontario in the mining towns, there was little evidence of this in 1903.¹⁴⁰ Smart might have been influenced by the fact that a utopian socialist Finnish Colony had been established in British Columbia in 1901 on Malcolm Island. This venture, referred to as the Sointula experiment attracted considerable attention in British Columbia.¹⁴¹ Despite the avowed socialist principles underlying the colony, the Victoria Colonist, spokesman for the Anglo-Canadian community of that city, showed no hesitation in welcoming the settlement. In fact, the Colonist optimistically predicted that the Sointula colonists might be the vanguard of two million Finnish immigrants "which would fill up the waste places of northern British Columbia".¹⁴²

Immigration from central Europe, especially from the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires formed a major segment to Canada's population by 1911. Many of these immigrants were

of Slavic origin, although there were others such as Roumanians and Magyars who although usually considered in the same category by Immigration officials, were quite distinct.¹⁴³ All substantially increased in numbers during the decade 1901 to 1911. For instance, the Russian population increased by 23,317 (118%), the Polish by 27,080 (431%), the Austro-Hungarian by 110,925 (610%), and the Bulgarians and Roumanians by 5,521 (1,560%).¹⁴⁴ Many of these Central European immigrants, but particularly those of slavic background, gravitated to the rural areas of western Canada where by 1911 they formed a substantial proportion of the population. The regional distribution of slavic-born is illustrated in Table C.¹⁴⁵

TABLE C
PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION BORN IN SLAVIC COUNTRIES, 1911

	<u>Percentage</u>
Canada	2.91
Manitoba	11.66
Saskatchewan	11.05
Alberta	8.01
Ontario	1.40
British Columbia	2.38
Quebec	1.13
Nova Scotia	0.44
New Brunswick	0.20
Prince Edward Island	0.02

The emigration pattern from the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires displayed certain similarities. In both

cases, minority groups, who had been relegated to positions of cultural or economic inferiority, decided to emigrate. In the case of the Russian Empire, these were the Finns, the Mennonites, the Doukhobors, the Poles, and the Ukrainians; in the case of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was primarily a movement of Ukrainians from the provinces of Galicia and Bukowinia.¹⁴⁶ Initially both the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian governments were reluctant to permit large scale emigration when it threatened economic dislocation. But with certain of the minorities, the emigration actually alleviated not only a long standing economic problem, but a serious political-social difficulty as well.¹⁴⁷

The year 1899 was an eventful one for Slavic immigration to Canada. In the Russian Empire the expansion eastward of the agricultural frontier had been greatly accelerated by the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Canadian government was warned in 1899 that the completion of the Trans-Siberian would mean "that the [Slavic] emigrants will reach the Nasiri Land on the Pacific Coast at a third of the expense, which he must spend to reach the Northwest. . . . If the Dominion will neglect these two or three years the source can be regarded as dried up".¹⁴⁸ To a government committed to increasing Canada's population, this threat

tended to intensify immigration recruitment efforts. This decision to make a concerted effort to attract Slavic peasant farmers to Canada has been attributed to Clifford Sifton, especially in reference to his famous remark exalting the economic value of "the stalwart peasant in a sheep-skin coat, born on the soil. . . ." ¹⁴⁹ Yet the fact remains that the Conservative Minister of the Interior, T. Mayne Daly, as well as High Commissioner, Sir Charles Tupper, had in 1895 begun negotiations for the immigration of Ukrainians with Dr. Josef Oleskow. ¹⁵⁰ What Sifton did was to expand a rather small scale operation into a full scale venture. Deputy Minister James A. Smart in 1899 clearly revealed the intention of the Department: "we are determined to make this year one of the best we have had for Immigration. . . ." ¹⁵¹ The arrival of over 7,400 Russian Doukhobors in that year, as well as the arrangement with the North Atlantic Trading Company provided the means of realizing the goal. Although the Doukhobor immigration was over by 1900, Ukrainian immigrants continued to pour into Canada. By the end of the Sifton era the N.A.T.C. claimed that it had directed over 70,000 Ukrainians to Canada. ¹⁵²

One of the major incentives used by Sifton, in addition to the generous bonus arrangement with the N.A.T.C., was the granting of bloc settlements to the Slavic immigrants from

Russia and Austria-Hungary. This lure of free land with the opportunity of maintaining a definite ethnic and cultural cohesiveness was particularly attractive to groups such as the Russian Doukhobors and the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina. The motivation of these Slavic peasants in emigrating, their subsequent adjustment to the Canadian environment is a major topic outside the scope of this thesis. But the influx of Slavic immigrants will be considered from the perspective of the Anglo-Canadian community: how did Anglo-Canadians initially regard these immigrants? To what extent did the economic utility compensate for the cultural undesirability of these immigrants in the early years of contact? Did the economic prosperity and the upward social mobility achieved by many of the Slavic immigrants alter the original feelings of the Anglo-Canadian community?

In 1898 the Doukhobors, like the Mennonites before them, emigrated from Russia when it appeared that their religious and communal life was threatened. The Doukhobors (spirit wrestlers) were a Russian peasant lay community that separated from the Orthodox church around the middle of the eighteenth century. The central feature of Doukhor religion was that God in the form of a Christ spirit dwells within each man and that each man can be guided by the divine voice from

within. Since the direction for their behaviour must come from within, they denied the right of any external authority, such as the state, to dictate their actions. They regarded it sinful to kill even in war because all men contained this divine spark.¹⁵³

Their history and beliefs were passed from one generation to the next by the singing of traditional psalms and hymns. This gave the group a sense of unity and a feeling of being a special people. Despite their claims that they submitted to no authority, by a dichotomy of reasoning, most of the sect submitted to a spiritual-temporal leader whose authority was almost dictatorial. The Doukhobors revered their leader a prophet in whom the divine spark was magnified many times. He was a living Christ whose presence, along with their oral traditions, made the Bible obsolete and priests, ikons, festivals and churches unnecessary.

During the 1880's, the sect became the target of a determined Russification campaign carried out by a Slavophil army and the Orthodox church. The Doukhobors refused to accept basic civil obligations: military service, an oath of allegiance to the Tsar and compulsory school attendance for their children. All of these demands were fundamentally at variance with Doukhobor beliefs, and so they initiated a

policy of passive resistance. Despite the Siberian exile of their leader, Peter Verigin, and the implementation of punitive measures, the Doukhobors remained adamant.¹⁵⁴ It was at this point that a number of English Quakers, such as Aylmer Maude and Arthyr St. John, in co-operation with prominent Russian anarchists such as Count Leo Tolstoy and Prince Peter Kropotkin, began to make plans for the evacuation of the sect from Russia.¹⁵⁵ In 1898, negotiations with the Canadian Immigration officials and the representatives of the Canadian Pacific Railway were initiated through Canadian and British Quaker intermediaries.¹⁵⁶ The successful Mennonite experiment; the favourable impression created by the Doukhobor delegates; the financial and moral support of the English Quakers; the determination of the Immigration officials to rapidly settle the empty lands north of the C.P.R. mainline; all these favourable factors convinced the Canadian government to sign an agreement with the Doukhobors.¹⁵⁷

By the agreement of 1898, the Dominion government agreed to allocate some 500,000 acres of land to the 7,400 Doukhobor immigrants, distributing these colonies in three regions: Thunder Hill colony, 6 townships near Yorkton; the South Colony, 15 townships, also near Yorkton; and the Saskatchewan colonies, consisting of 20 townships near Prince

Albert.¹⁵⁸ This decision was made despite the efforts made by Alymer Maude and the Doukhobor members of the Committee to secure one large tract near Edmonton. The reason for the government's refusal was two-fold: politically, it would have been dangerous to place the Doukhobors in a district which was already complaining that it was being inundated with Ukrainians; and from the cultural perspective, it was felt that one large colony would impede future Canadianization.¹⁵⁹

There were several problems associated with the Canadian land grant to the Doukhobors which were to lead to serious misunderstandings and the eventual relocation of the majority of the sect to British Columbia.¹⁶⁰ Although the Quaker intermediaries explained to the Doukhobors that they must live according to "the laws of Canada", certain concessions were not spelled out in any signed agreement.¹⁶¹ Exemptions from military service as conscientious objectors was granted under existing legislation and re-affirmed by an Order-in-Council (1898).¹⁶² Freedom of religious worship was assured, and since it usually was the churches in this period that supervised education, no great difficulty was foreseen in the educational sphere. What was not pointed out was that education was a provincial responsibility and that

in the near future the area where the colonies were located would become part of the province of Saskatchewan.¹⁶³ Ownership of land also appeared to present no problem. The Mennonites had already benefitted from amendments to the Dominion Land Act which allowed for a community approach rather than requiring improvements to be made to each individual homestead. This privilege was now extended to the Doukhobors. However, it is significant that the requirement of the Dominion Land Act for an oath of allegiance to be sworn or affirmed before full title to homestead lands could be obtained did not appear to have been discussed.¹⁶⁴

At the same time that the Dominion authorities were negotiating for the entry of the Doukhobors into Canada, Ukrainian immigrants were arriving in the country.¹⁶⁵ Most of these immigrants were from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, primarily from the provinces of Galicia and Bukovina. The motivation for their appearance in Canada was primarily economic, although cultural problems were a factor. Land was by far the most important incentive to immigrate. Within Galicia and Bukovina most of the land had become concentrated in the hands of the Polish or Roumanian aristocrats.¹⁶⁶ One report indicated that the average holding of each peasant was less than 12 acres, which accompanied by burdensome taxes

and fees imposed by the state, the landowners, and the church (the Ruthenian Greek Catholic), meant that the life of the peasant was extremely harsh. Nor was there much opportunity for upward social mobility for the vast majority of the Ukrainian peasants. In Galicia the Polish landlords not only deprived the Ukrainians of equal educational opportunities (the rate of literacy being only 51% in 1900), but also excluded them from positions in government or the professions. Many of these same conditions applied in Bukovina where the Roumanian landowners were just as oppressive as their Polish counterparts.¹⁶⁷ The Austrian officials, although somewhat reluctant to allow a massive exodus of Galician labourers, recognized the serious economic and social problem. In fact, Count Badeni, the Prime Minister of Austria had previously indicated his support for overseas settlement: "The majority of these people . . . are mere peasants only speaking Polish or Ruthenian and being often unable to read or write. For these men emigration is usually the last hope".¹⁶⁸

During the 1890's there was increased activity within the Ukrainian community of nationalist-cultural organizations such as the Prosvita Society. Composed of Ruthenian Catholic clerics, and professional men such as Professor Joseph

Oleskow, the Prosvita Society attempted to improve the situation of the Ukrainian peasantry by advocating immigration.¹⁶⁹

In 1895 Professor Oleskow made it quite clear to Sir Charles Tupper that any Canadian arrangement must be a colonization venture encouraging Ukrainians to transplant whole villages intact, not merely random immigration.¹⁷⁰

Between 1896-1900, 27,000 Ukrainians were settled in 10 colonies in Manitoba and 3 more tracts in the Northwest.¹⁷¹ Despite the guarantees made by shipping agents, many Ukrainians arrived almost destitute and the immigration officials were forced to provide food, supplies and implements to the newcomers. There is considerable historical debate over whether the Ukrainian settlers actually selected the marginal lands or were deliberately placed in these regions.¹⁷² The determination of the Ukrainians to settle in blocs and their preference for wooded areas complicated the issue. In 1897, W. F. McCreary informed Deputy Minister James A. Smart of this situation:

These Galicians are a peculiar people; they will not accept as a gift 160 acres of what we should consider the best land in Manitoba, that is first class wheat growing prairies land; what they particularly want is wood, and they care but little whether the land is heavy soil or light gravel. . . . They do not object to stones. . . . In my opinion it will be many years before they go extensively into grain raising. . . .¹⁷³

The cumulative effect of settling many Ukrainians on marginal land in outlying areas was to make it difficult for the majority of Ukrainians to expand their operation beyond a subsistence level. This economic disparity, coupled with geographic remoteness and linguistic differences isolated the group to a large degree from Anglo-Canadian society.¹⁷⁴

Public reaction to the arrival of the Doukhobors and Galicians in 1899-1900 was very much affected by party affiliation, and by the degree of proximity to the recent arrivals. The Galicians, first arrived on the scene, assumed the initial brunt of the attack. During the 1898 Session, Nicholas Flood Davin, the bombastic Conservative member from Assiniboia, claimed that "this is not immigration, it is deportation". According to Davin, the Germanic rulers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, faced with land shortage and surplus population, were encouraging the exodus of the least desirable Galicians, a theory that had some substance.¹⁷⁵

Clifford Sifton's defence was to point out that all recent immigrants appear strange to the host society, and he asserted that "the Galicians compare quite favourably with the Icelanders or Mennonites when they first came".¹⁷⁶ The Galicians were sturdy agriculturalists, not the "unemployed of the cities", and were motivated by a strong impulse to

improve their economic and social status in the free Canadian environment: "these people are not the proletariat that they have been represented to be".¹⁷⁷

By 1899, with the large influx of destitute Galicians, the debate over their acceptability increased in intensity.¹⁷⁸

In the Conservative press the Galicians were referred to as "Austrian outcasts", imbued with "dirty habits" and a "vicious character"; they were portrayed as "the scum of the earth".¹⁷⁹

The Toronto Mail and Empire undoubtedly set forth the most vicious commentary when it termed Sifton's European immigration policy as an attempt "to make of the North-West a sort of anthropological garden . . . to pick up the waifs and strays of Europe, the lost tribes of mankind, and the freaks of creation. . . ."¹⁸⁰ Specific reference was made to the fact that "these valuable lands are parcelled out among dirty, thieving, murderous Galicians and our strong Christian young men pass over the line".¹⁸¹ Actually this question of national inheritance being handed out to an inferior race became of central importance in the debate over Galician immigration throughout the period under examination.

It was during the Manitoba provincial election of 1899 that the most intense attacks were made not only on the Galicians but on the Doukhobors as well. The Conservatives

appear to have believed that the key to electoral victory was to discredit Clifford Sifton, because of his close identification with the Greenway Liberals. The best chance of discrediting Sifton seemed to be through denouncing his immigration policy.¹⁸² Circumstances aided this approach. The difficulties encountered by the Galicians during the early part of the winter appeared to support the allegation that Sifton had imported a class of permanent paupers. The sudden presence of these immigrants at the election time was used to arouse fears that "Mr. Greenway is depending upon that class of votes to keep him in power".¹⁸³ The split within the ranks of western Liberals over the entry of these Slavic immigrants was another trump card. The views of Frank Oliver were quoted extensively in Conservative papers such as the Winnipeg Morning Telegram. Late in the election campaign, the Telegram urged the Manitoba voters to ask as Frank Oliver had asked "whether a few thousand Canadians can assimilate the hordes of Russians transported to the Northwest".¹⁸⁴

Despite the fierce counter-attack launched by Western Liberal newspapers, especially the Sifton's Manitoba Free Press, the fomenting of anti-foreign feeling appeared to have made a considerable impact.¹⁸⁵ Whether it was the decisive issue in the election is a moot point. Sifton was however

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sufficiently concerned over the anti-alien sentiment that he reconsidered his previous policies. Instructions were issued to Canadian officials in England to inform the North Atlantic Trading Company that Galician immigration was to be temporarily curtailed. Sifton was also beginning to have reservations about the desirability of the Doukhobors. ¹⁸⁶

The Canadian experience with the Doukhobors and Galicians from 1900-1902 has many similarities. Both groups performed useful economic functions: not only did they cultivate the land, but they also provided a source of cheap labour for harvesting and for railway construction. Reports continued to reach the Immigration Branch about the amount of land that each group had cleared, and about the amounts of equipment and supplies purchased from Anglo-Canadian businessmen. Sifton was assured by a prominent Liberal in Yorkton that most of the businessmen of the town, including many Conservatives, regarded the Doukhobors in a very favourable light. ¹⁸⁷ J. G. Turriff, one of Sifton's most reliable political informants added his favourable reaction, stressing that "in Rosthern where they deal, they are looked upon as the very best settlers in the vicinity". ¹⁸⁸

The Ukrainians were even more inclined to become involved in the Anglo-Canadian economic system. One of the

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representatives of Massey-Harris, the large farm machinery company, informed the Immigration agents that his corporation found the Galicians to be excellent farmers and valuable citizens. In 1899 they had purchased machinery worth over \$14,000 from their representatives.¹⁸⁹ At the local level, merchants in towns such as Strathclair also indicated that they regarded the presence of the Ukrainians as a market for their goods.¹⁹⁰ The Ukrainian peasants already were conditioned in the Old Country to depend upon an alien merchant class, Jewish merchants for the most part, and had not developed a merchant class of their own.¹⁹¹ Farmers in western Canada tended to regard the presence of the Ukrainian settlers in a positive way, particularly since these less affluent agriculturalists were prepared to work as farm labourers for part of the year, especially during the harvest. The Yorkton Enterprise stated that if it had not been for the presence of the Galicians, the bountiful harvest of 1901 could never have been gathered. Many of the young women showed an inclination to accept domestic service, and therefore did much to meet the almost insatiable demand in the rural areas of western Canada for domestics. In 1903 it was estimated that over 1,200 Galician girls were employed as domestics.¹⁹³

There was also considerable optimism among Immigration officials that the Doukhobors and the Galicians were rapidly adopting the customs of the country. In his 1900 Annual Report, the Superintendent of Immigration, Frank Pedley, triumphantly asserted that "it would appear to be only a question of a very short time before the Doukhobors are thoroughly Canadianized".¹⁹⁴ Immigration officials maintained that the Ukrainians were even more rapidly being Canadianized. Reports from field men such as C. W. Speers pointed to the enthusiasm on the part of the Ukrainian parents for establishing public schools in their districts; the result was that "the young people are speaking English, and fast becoming Canadianized".¹⁹⁵ Another correspondent praised the tendency on the part of some Ukrainians "to substitute their unpronounceable Russian names for English . . . as they recognize the difficulty Canadians have in doing business with them, under present circumstances".¹⁹⁶ What was apparent to the more astute observers was that the promising start made towards Canadianizing the Doukhobors and Ukrainians in the early years of settlement resulted more from a lack of institutional completeness of these immigrant groups rather than the effectiveness of Anglo-Canadian assimilationist policies.¹⁹⁷

In the case of the Doukhobors, the problem of claiming their land grants and the absence of Peter Verigin until 1902, fragmented the group. While many Doukhobors tried to continue communitarian practices, an independent group centered in the North Colony favoured making individual claims for homestead land. In October, 1902, Doukhobor radicals protested what they felt was the growing materialism of the sect. They freed their livestock, divested themselves of their possessions, and set off 2,000 strong on an abortive pilgrimage.¹⁹⁸

The events puzzled and disturbed the Anglo-Canadian public. The pilgrimage according to the Manitoba Free Press brought "the dark ages into the dawning twentieth century".¹⁹⁹ J. Obed Smith, the Commissioner of Immigration could not comprehend why the Doukhobors would destroy their property, and embark upon such a strange pilgrimage. He concluded that either they were mad or that they had been stirred up by irresponsible agitators, or that it was a devious attempt "to elicit sympathy", and secure state assistance.²⁰⁰ Whatever the reason, Smith and other Immigration officials suggested that the government show no signs of weakness; a hard line approach was all that was necessary "to bring them to the right way of thinking".²⁰¹

The arrival of Peter Verigin in December, 1902, freed at last from his Russian exile, had a profound effect on the Doukhobor community. Within a few months of his arrival Verigin succeeded in uniting all but a few Doukhobors into a communal organization. Furthermore, he convinced the sect to set up a committee to make land entries on behalf of individuals. This move, he explained to his followers, was merely a formality; the land would be held in common. These tactics placated the Dominion government and gave Verigin a three year space before the final oath had to be taken. In the interim, Verigin endeavoured to put the colonies on a sound economic basis by encouraging the able bodied men to work outside the community; with these earnings he mechanized farming practices.²⁰²

Soon after his arrival in 1902 reports reached Ottawa that the Doukhobor leader had asserted his control, and that under Verigin's leadership the sect would soon "be in a very prosperous position, and be among our best settlers".²⁰³ From the perspective of the Dominion government, support of Peter Verigin meant the establishment of order and stability among the 'troublesome' sect. As a result, in 1903, the Dominion authorities were prepared to aid Verigin in regaining internal control over the radical members of the sect, now

calling themselves the Sons of Freedom. The fact that the radicals resorted to nudism and incendiarism provided the Dominion government with the pretext of prosecuting the dissidents, a trend particularly noteworthy since Peter Verigin initiated the charges.²⁰⁴

The honeymoon relationship between the Immigration officials and Peter Verigin was not to last long. By 1904-05 it had become quite apparent to many that Verigin, despite his protestations, had no intention of allowing his people to be Canadianized. In particular, he opposed sending the children to school, especially the girls. It was alleged in 1902 and later, that Verigin was aware that as long as Russian remained the language of the home, and the women were kept in the fields, "his place is secure and they can defy assimilation".²⁰⁵ Verigin also indicated that he was not prepared to repay the money expended in 1899 by the Committee for assisting the immigration of the Doukhobors, claiming that such expenditures had not been authorized by the sect. The Doukhobor leader actually charged the Canadian government with trying to initiate the practices of the Russians in extracting money from his people.²⁰⁶ By 1905, so disillusioned had some Immigration officials become at the lack of "progress" in the Doukhobor community that they were pre-

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pared to suggest that the government should aid the Doukhobor independents rather than Verigin, "and see that no unwarranted action is taken by the leaders . . . to intimidate or abuse in any way the rights of individuals who want to establish themselves along individual lines".²⁰⁷

After the resignation of Sifton in 1905, the new Minister was Frank Oliver, who had long denounced the privileges extended to "Sifton's pets".²⁰⁸ Relations between the Dominion government and the Doukhobors soon deteriorated. There was growing hostility from the Anglo-Saxon neighbours of the Doukhobors and the small town retail merchants who suffered a loss of trade due to the Doukhobor tendency to buy supplies in bulk from the major centres such as Winnipeg.²⁰⁹ According to one prominent resident of Yorkton the Doukhobor religious manifestations were a mere fraud, and that they were so committed to materialism, "being Jewish in their desire for money", that any ruse was adopted to avoid civic obligations. He also asserted that nothing could ever be accomplished unless they curtailed the power of the Doukhobor leader: "a blow at Verigin's station is worth many blows elsewhere."²¹⁰ Moreover, with thousands of more pliable immigrants pouring into the west, the government was no longer concerned with losing a few thousand troublesome Doukhobors, particularly since

it would illustrate to their political opponents their resolute position towards "undesirables".²¹¹

By the spring of 1907, Frank Oliver appeared determined to make the Doukhobors conform to the regulations of the Dominion Land Act. A special study of the problem by Rev. John McDougall, a Methodist missionary, had already recommended "that Doukhobors be no longer allowed to hold land without cultivating it and becoming citizens of the country".²¹²

In May, 1907, Oliver decided to act. Despite the protests from the pro-Doukhobor group, and the personal intervention by Clifford Sifton, nothing was able to divert Oliver from his goal.²¹³ The Dominion government reclaimed some 1,618 homesteads, or approximately 260,000 acres of land.²¹⁴ Significantly, there was very little public criticism of the government's actions. Even the Protestant churches manifest little concern over the seizure, perhaps because of their own failure to make any headway with the Doukhobors.²¹⁵

The reaction of the Doukhobor community was that their traditional suspicion of government again had been justified. The radicals protested by setting out on a pilgrimage in the fall of 1907. The onset of winter stopped the marchers at Fort William where nude demonstrations and their destitute condition won little sympathy from the local authorities. The

Dominion government arranged for rail transportation to take the group back to Saskatchewan.²¹⁶ Meanwhile, Anglo-Canadian spokesmen were calling for the deportation of the Doukhobors to another country.²¹⁷

In 1907, Peter Verigin, at last realized that the Dominion authorities were determined to make the Doukhobors conform. He appreciated that if the sect continued to claim homestead land, they must acknowledge certain civil obligations.²¹⁸ As a result, in the spring of 1908 the Doukhobor leader decided to move the bulk of the community to British Columbia. Through a gradual purchase of land, made in Verigin's name, the 5,000 Doukhobors were able to accumulate some 14,403 acres in the Kootenay Valley by 1912. Although they retained some property in the prairies, the Doukhobor leadership now emanated from the coast province. As a result, the Doukhobors became more of a provincial problem after 1908, rather than a Dominion responsibility. The possibilities of conflict between Anglo-Canadians and the Doukhobors was, however, even more pronounced. British Columbians, and the provincial government tended to adopt a much more intolerant stance towards the Doukhobors than had been the case initially on the prairies.²¹⁹

The cultural experience of the Ukrainians tended to differ from the Doukhobors in that their institutional incom-

pleteness extended much longer. It was not really until after 1908 that the Ukrainians of Canada began to definitely develop an active lay and sectarian leadership. From 1902 to 1908 it appeared that the Anglo-Canadian forces of assimilation were going to achieve their goal.

From the perspective of the Dominion government, the Canadianizing of the foreigner was not the responsibility of government, rather it was the function of the churches, the schools, and the community. The essential question then became which churches and which schools were going to perform this function? Inevitably, the issue of Canadianizing the Ukrainians became a matter of conflict between the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches. For Anglo-Canadians, the educational aspects of the question were of great importance.

The Protestant churches were aware of the serious ramifications associated with the influx of thousands of continental Europeans, almost all of whom were non-Protestant. But the response of these churches was influenced by several factors. In the first place, there was a feeling of humanitarian obligation towards the immigrant, a belief that the Church "should welcome the stranger to our shores whatever may be their nationality or their religion".²²⁰ The change in the character of immigration, after 1896, with the large

influx of Ukrainians altered considerably the position of the churches. There is little doubt that both the Presbyterians and the Methodists regarded the Galician as quite a different specimen from the Scandinavian, or the German immigrant. Canada, it appeared, had embarked upon the same course as the United States of allowing these "less desirable immigrants into the country, alien in race, in language, in loyalty to our Empire".²²¹ The need for decisive action was stressed in order to prevent the same type of social deterioration that had been evidenced in the United States with "lawlessness, lynchings . . . and other deeds which are a disgrace to our civilization".²²² It was generally accepted by both the Presbyterians and the Methodists that only through rapid assimilation of these "foreigners" could the fabric of Canadian society be saved: "Education and evangelical christianity are the only gastric juices capable of digesting these foreign elements. . . ." ²²³

The initial attempts on the part of the Protestant churches to make inroads among the Ukrainian settlers were not very successful. The lack of missionaries qualified in the language, the shortage of financial resources, the existence of the large self-contained ethnic colony, all these factors made conversion extremely difficult. Moreover, with thousands

of new immigrants arriving every year, the task increased in difficulty. For the Presbyterians, it was only their mission hospitals that were successful in making contact with the Ukrainian settlers. Once the medical service was curtailed, these immigrants quickly lost interest.²²⁴ It was largely as a result of its own failure to cope with the immigrants, combined with the indications of disunity among the Ukrainian immigrants, that a new approach was adopted.

By 1902, it was apparent that despite the efforts on the part of the Roman Catholic hierarchy and itinerant Russian Orthodox priests, the Ukrainians were still searching for a religious organization that would meet their needs. The Roman Catholic priests, although they had permission to use the Ruthenian rite, still had to overcome ethnic and linguistic differences. If they were French Canadians, they were regarded as outsiders; if they were Polish, they were regarded as the enemy. For the Russian Orthodox priests, the difference between Catholic and Orthodox was still substantial. The Ukrainians from the Austrian Empire still manifested nationalistic resentment against the Russians.²²⁵

The emergence of the All-Russian Orthodox Church, of Bishop (Metropolitan) Seraphim, claiming over 50,000 adherents, added another dimension. In 1904 an arrangement was

established between the priests of the All-Russian Orthodox Church, who had repudiated Seraphim's leadership, and the Presbyterian Church. As a result, a new religious organization was created, the Independent Greek Church (I.G.C.). The structure of the I.G.C. illustrated the extent to which it became the satellite of the Presbyterian Church: all ministers of the I.G.C. were to have the status of colporteur in the Presbyterian Church; all expenses were to be assumed by the Presbyterian Board of Home Missions; funds were provided for the publication of The Ranok, the journal of the I.G.C.; scholarships were arranged for the education of select young men from the Ukrainian community at Manitoba College. The Presbyterian Church was particularly anxious to create both a religious and a secular Protestant elite within the Ukrainian community.²²⁶

The experiment was not a success. Most Ukrainians appear to have regarded the I.G.C. as the agent of Anglicization, and proselitizing Protestantism. By 1912, even the Presbyterian Church was prepared to admit that the I.G.C. had outlived its usefulness; in that year, the decision was made to immediately phase out the separate existence of the I.G.C.²²⁷

The Methodist Church also attempted to extend its influence among the Slavic settlers through missions and by the

establishment of a satellite church. Missions were established in urban centres such as Edmonton and Winnipeg, and in rural areas such as Pagan, Alberta.²²⁸ However, the problem of overcoming linguistic and ethnic differences prompted the Methodists to support the Polish Independent Church in 1908. It seems quite clear that the Methodists were impressed with the temporary success of the Independent Greek Church, and hoped for similar results by their relationship with the Polish Independent Church. The venture was abortive; by 1912, the Polish Independent Church had severed all ties with the Methodists.²²⁹

Concern over the inability of the Protestant churches to convert appreciable numbers of Slavic immigrants was intensified by the obvious interest manifest by the Roman Catholic church in these immigrants. In particular, Archbishop Adelard Langevin of St. Boniface seemed to regard the entry of large numbers of non-Protestants as a means of reversing previous Roman Catholic defeats over education.²³⁰ Langevin's strong interest in the Ukrainians had long been noted, but by 1909 the threat assumed menacing proportions. Arthur Ford, writing in The Christian Guardian warned his readers of this trend:

The Roman Catholic Church has grown very aggressive through the west in its efforts to reach

the Ruthenians. It claims practically the whole 125,000 as being properly within its fold. If these 125,000 can be included in the sway of the Archbishop of St. Boniface, it can be seen how enormously will his influence in the west be increased. . . . Without doubt the ultimate aim of the Roman Catholic Church is to bring the children of these 125,000 Ruthenians into separate schools.²³¹

By 1910 the educational aspect had become the dominant issue in the minds of many leading Anglo-Canadians. Indeed there was fear that the Roman Catholic hierarchy would be able to reach the thousands of Ukrainians in western Canada and thereby alter the character of the provincial school system. There was evidence that the leaders of the Ukrainian community had shown some willingness to co-operate with Archbishop Langevin.²³² Furthermore, many Ukrainians were becoming aware of the need to preserve ethnic traditions. The increased percentage of Ukrainians in rural areas of western Canada was the product of steady Ukrainian influx through immigration, and the steady outflow of Anglo-Canadians to urban centres. This meant that Ukrainians were becoming much more influential in rural politics. Most important, the increased number of local school boards controlled by Ukrainian trustees began to influence the character of the public school and to weaken its assimilative thrust.²³³

The impact of large scale European immigration into Canada between 1896 and 1914 was appreciable. In economic terms, these immigrants provided much of the manpower for the many industrial developments during this period, especially in the sphere of railway construction and mining production. But the greatest stress was placed on the contributions of these immigrants in the agricultural sector of the economy.

The role of the European immigrant farmer, the "stalwart peasant", received considerable publicity by the Immigration Branch, especially during the Liberal administration. The evidence seems to support this favourable assessment. In the Prairie Provinces the population increase was phenomenal during the decade 1901-11: Manitoba from 225,000 in 1901 to 461,000 in 1911; Saskatchewan from 91,000 to 492,000; and Alberta from 73,000 to 374,000.²³⁴

Much of the rapid population and agricultural expansion in Western Canada was directly associated with the immigration of these European immigrants. From a meagre 321 entries in 1896 the annual number of homestead entries for European immigrants increased to a high of 8,953 entries by 1911. Throughout the period under study the European immigrants represented approximately 20% of those who made homestead entry.²³⁵ Moreover, they opened up new regions of the Prairie

Provinces and northern Ontario. The European immigrant, arriving much later than the British and Canadian settler, and with none of the capital resources of the American settler, was forced to accept homesteads in the less fertile Park Belt.²³⁶ Studies of land settlement in western Canada generally agree that these marginal lands would only be colonized "by those who will be content with a standard of living lower than that demanded by the average English-speaking settler".²³⁷ Many of these European immigrants, especially those from Central Europe came from countries where inferior lands had been cultivated for centuries.²³⁸ The small size of the homestead grants did not present an obstacle; not only was their method of farming more intensive, it was also more diversified. The ability of these immigrants to succeed was revealed by the high density of rural population in the predominantly 'foreign' districts in western Canada, and by the small number of abandoned farms.²³⁹ The economic achievements of the European immigrants was succinctly stated in 1914 by Reverend S. C. Murray, a prominent Presbyterian minister: "Located on lands shunned by others, they are redeeming to productiveness vast areas that Canadians would not touch".²⁴⁰ In the pre-1914 boom era, most Anglo-Canadians were inclined to agree with this assessment.

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CHAPTER III

¹ Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (hereafter Royal Commission B. & B.), Book IV (Ottawa, 1968), p. 248.

² Ibid., p. 22.

³ Fifth Census of Canada, 1911 (Ottawa, 1913), II, p. 367 (hereafter Census of Canada).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ The push-pull symbiosis has been thoroughly discussed by a number of authors. One of the more concise explanations can be found in William Peterson, Planned Migration (Berkeley, 1955), pp. 1-15.

⁷ The decision on the part of the Dominion government to allow ethnic groups to occupy large areas of land, and to restrict all other settlers from that region, was made initially with the Mennonites in 1873. See Norman Macdonald: Canada: Immigration and Colonization 1841-1903 (Toronto, 1968), pp. 197-234; C. A. Dawson, Group Settlement: Ethnic Communities in Western Canada (Toronto, 1936), pp. xiii-xx. ✓

⁸ Karl Bicha, The American Farmer and the Canadian West, 1896-1914 (Lawrence, 1968), pp. 83, 99. Harold M. Troper, Only Farmers Need Apply (Toronto, 1972), pp. 5-7, 33-35; J. W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton in Relation to His Times (Toronto, 1931), pp. 132-144.

⁹ The terms 'preferred', 'non-preferred' were not officially used until after 1919. In fact, it was only in 1923 by P.C. 183 that terms specifically cited. Robert England, The Colonization of Western Canada (London, 1936), pp. 82-88. In March, 1919, W. D. Scott informed J. Obed Smith that preferred immigrants, those who would "be admitted as usual" were the

following: Britain, France, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Norway, and Switzerland." I.B., file 18040, vol. I, Scott to Smith, March 23, 1911. J. Obed Smith, Superintendent of Emigration, London, in April, 1920, indicated he was discouraging immigration from continental Europe. Smith to F. C. Blair (sec.), April 27, 1920, I.B., file 653, no. 2.

¹⁰ Prior to 1914, however, directives were given to discourage immigrants from southern Europe, on both economic and cultural grounds. The Immigration files relating to these ethnic groups clearly indicate this trend.

¹¹ Immigration files pertaining to these national groups indicate a generally favourable attitude on the part of the Immigration Branch. This, however, changed after the war. By P.C. 1203, of June 9, 1919, all emigration from enemy alien countries was prohibited.

¹² In the Immigration Branch files relating to Galicians, Russians, Poles, Hungarians, there is not the same consistency of attitude as was the case with either the non-preferred, or the preferred, both before and after the war. Robert England, Colonization of Western Canada, pp. 82-88.

¹³ Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New York, 1964), pp. 78-89; John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto, 1965), pp. 72-73; Allan Smith, "Metaphor and Nationality in North America", Canadian Historical Review (CHR), vol. LI, 3, 1970, pp. 250-254.

¹⁴ John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New York, 1966), pp. 56-67.

¹⁵ George Parkin, Great Dominion, pp. 213-215; cited Carl Berger, The Sense of Power (Toronto, 1970), p. 131.

¹⁶ John Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 77-87.

¹⁷ J. T. Watt, "Anti-Catholicism in Ontario Politics: 1894", Ontario History, vol. 59, (1967), pp. 57-67.

¹⁸ Empire, October 2, 1890, cited Carl Berger, The Sense of Power, p. 164.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 160, 180-182.

²⁰ Ibid. This topic is extensively discussed in chapter seven.

²¹ There had been massacres of Armenians in 1894, and again in 1896. A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford, 1957), pp. 354, 368; John Haslip, The Sultan: The Life of Abdul Hamid II (London, 1958), pp. 208, 217, 224.

²² I.B., file 27114, Frank Pedley to Father Giraud, March 4, 1899; ibid., Rev. R. Chambers, Woodstock, Ontario, to Robert Kerr, Passenger Agent, C.P.R., April 4, 1904.

²³ I.B., file 27114, no. 1, Rev. R. Chambers to Sir P. Currie, January 28, 1896; ibid., Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, to Governor General Aberdeen, March 3, 1896; ibid., Rev. R. Chambers to Robert Kerr, April 4, 1904; ibid., P. Stevens, British Consulate, Batoum, to Marquis of Lansdowne, November 10, 1904.

²⁴ Ibid., Robert Kerr to James A. Smart, Deputy Minister of the Interior, April ?, 1904.

²⁵ Ibid., J. A. Smart to Robert Kerr, April 8, 1904; ibid., W. D. Scott, Superintendent of Immigration, to W. W. Cory, Deputy Minister of the Interior, February 10, 1905; ibid., Clifford Sifton to Governor General in Council, February 15, 1905.

²⁶ Ibid., W. D. Scott to W. W. Cory, February 10, 1905.

²⁷ Royal Commission on Bilingualism & Biculturalism, IV, pp. 238-239; Census of Canada, 1911, 2 (Ottawa, 1913), p. 366.

²⁸ This stance compared rather dramatically with the reaction towards Jewish refugees fleeing from the Russian Empire prior to 1917, and from Poland and Russia between 1919-22.

²⁹ Benjamin Sack, A History of the Jews in Canada, vol. I (Montreal, 1945), pp. 178-179.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 180.

³¹ A. T. Galt to Sir John A. Macdonald, February 3, 1882, cited ibid., p. 182.

³² Sir John A. Macdonald to A. T. Galt, February 27, 1882, cited ibid., p. 263.

³³ Ibid., p. 183. I.B., file 60868, no. 3, W. D. Scott to Loring Christie, Prime Minister's Office, March 20, 1916.

³⁴ William Hespeler to John Lowe, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, July 10, 1883, cited A. J. Arnold, "Jewish Immigration in the Era of Macdonald and Laurier", unpublished paper, Canadian Historical Association Meetings, Montreal, June, 1972, p. 14.

³⁵ A. T. Galt to A. M. Burgess, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, January 30, 1888, cited, A. J. Arnold, "Jewish Immigration", p. 19.

³⁶ Benjamin Sack, Jews in Canada, p. 206.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ I.B., file 541782, no. 4, Perelmutter Report; ibid., Jewish Chronicle, February 7, 1909.

³⁹ Peter Rose (ed.), The Ghetto and Beyond (New York, 1969), pp. 235, 239.

⁴⁰ I.B., file 541782, no. 4, Baron de Hirsch Institute and Hebrew Benevolent Society of Montreal, Fifty-Second Annual Report (September, 1915), p. 48.

⁴¹ A. J. Arnold, "Jewish Immigration", p. 45.

⁴² Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (hereafter cited as Debates), 1900, 10349-10350. Nicholas Flood Davin, Conservative Member for made specific reference to the Jewish settlers in western Canada pointing out that they had proved to be "quite unfit for farming". He strongly urged the Laurier government not to advance any funds to assist other Jews to settle in western Canada. Ibid., 1900, 10352.

⁴³ J. A. Smart to Clifford Sifton, December 10, 1900, cited, A. J. Arnold, "Jewish Immigration", p. 42; Sifton to

Smart, April 15, 1901; ibid., p. 43. The tendency of the Jews to gravitate to urban centres was revealed by the 1921 Census which indicated that 82.77% of the Jews in Canada lived in urban centres over 30,000.

⁴⁴ Benjamin Sack, Jews in Canada, pp. 206-209.

⁴⁵ Sifton Papers, 101841, W. F. McCreary, Commissioner of Immigration to Clifford Sifton, January 14, 1902.

⁴⁶ In 1911 there were various examples of this hostility. In 1914, H. Boulay (Rimouski), suggested, for instance, that an amendment be made to the Immigration Act providing for "the exclusion of Jews as well as Chinamen and Hindus". Debates, 1914, p. 1618.

⁴⁷ Laurier Papers, 125241, Israel Zangwill, London, Jewish Territorial Organization, to Laurier, May 10, 1907. In 1916, Zangwill was quoted as saying that for the Jewish Homeland "he always thought that the Jews might get a piece of Canada or Australia". Secretary of State, Chief Censor Papers, 147-C-I, vol. 30, "Copy of Press Dispatch, New York," March 13, 1916.

⁴⁸ Laurier Papers, 125241, Laurier to Zangwill, May 10, 1907; ibid., 125378, Laurier to Zangwill, May 20, 1907; Jewish Times, Montreal, May 31, 1907.

⁴⁹ Dominion of Canada, Sessional Papers, (hereafter Sessional Papers), 1915, no. 25, pt. II, p. 79.

⁵⁰ There were 4 colonies in Manitoba; 11 in Saskatchewan and 3 in Alberta. I.B., file 60868, no. 4, F. C. Blair, Secretary to W. W. Cory, Deputy Minister of Immigration and Colonization, January 29, 1921.

⁵¹ W. Burton Hurd, Racial Origins and Nativity of the Canadian People, Census Monograph no. 4 (Ottawa, 1937), p. 633. (Hereafter, Hurd, Racial Origins).

⁵² I.B., file 541782, no. 4, Baron de Hirsch Institute Fifty-Second Annual Report (September, 1915), p. 48.

⁵³ B. M. Greene (ed.), Who's Who and Why, 1921 (Montreal, 1921), pp. 1253, 674, 1557.

54 Jacobs was one of the founders of the Jewish Colonization Association, as well as being the Liberal Member for Montreal Cartier from 1917-38. Benjamin Sack, Jews in Canada, p. 207, p. 218; J. K. Johnson, The Canadian Directory of Parliament, 1867-1967 (Ottawa, 1968), p. 289.

55 T. Peterson, "Ethnic and Class Politics in Manitoba", in Martin Robin (ed.), Canadian Provincial Politics (Toronto, 1972), p. 78.

56 I.B., file 72552, no. 3, S. Hart Green of Chapman & Green Barristers & Solicitors, Wpg. to Frank Oliver, April 28, 1911.

57 In the case of the Jews, it is possible to argue that there were indeed two host societies: one English, one French. Neither seemed to show much preference for Jewish immigrants.

58 Royal Commission on B & B, IV, pp. 238-239.

59 I.B., file 541782, no. 4, J. Bruce Walker, Commissioner to W. D. Scott, November 26, 1917. One incident in 1910 particularly aroused the Immigration officials. It was claimed that several representatives of the Baron de Hirsch Institute had threatened Immigration Agents at St. John, N.B., that unless they allowed Jewish immigrants into the country "the Jewish people . . . will kick you out and the next time they will kick Laurier out". I.B., file 541782, no. 1, Dominion Immigration Agent to W. D. Scott, January 13, 1910.

60 Royal Commission on B & B, IV, pp. 238-239.

61 Census of Canada, 1911, II, pp.

62 Robert Foerster, in his book Italian Immigration (Cambridge, 1919), pp. 327, 41, concluded that much of the discrepancy between the American Immigration statistics which showed that 2,098,360 Italians entered the United States between 1900-1910, and the 1910 Census which found only 1,343,125 additional Italians, could be attributed to re-emigration. Foerster also examined Italian statistics and found that the percentage of unskilled labourers who returned to Italy was very high:

1908 - 83.4%	1913 - 78.7%
1909 - 74.0%	1914 - 77.0%
1910 - 76.1%	1915 - 83.1%
1911 - 75.4%	1916 - 83.9%
1912 - 81.5%	

⁶³ I.B., file 28885, no. 1, Corriere Della Sera, "The Arrival in Montreal", May 4, 1901.

⁶⁴ Abstracts of Reports of the Immigration Commission, (U.S.A.), vol. I, (Washington, 1911), pp. 559-562.

⁶⁵ H. A. Innis, Settlement and the Mining Frontier (Toronto, 1936), pp. 327-336.

⁶⁶ Sifton Papers, 89315, Clifford Sifton to J. A. Smart, November ?, 1901; ibid., Sifton to Smart, November 21, 1901.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 89316, Sifton to Smart, November 21, 1901.

⁶⁸ J. A. Smart, 'Evidence', Select Committee of the House of Commons on Agriculture and Colonization, 1906, p. 316. I.B., file 113228, no. 9, no. 10.

⁶⁹ I.B., file 28885, no. 2, W. D. Scott to Keville Doherty, Department of Agriculture, April 13, 1907; ibid., Scott to T. J. Stewart, M.P., Hamilton West, May 14, 1909.

⁷⁰ Ibid., Scott to Stewart, May 14, 1909.

⁷¹ One enquiry from a Falciola Alberto, Pavia Province, Italy, to W. D. Scott in March, 1909, stressed the fact that he had specialized training in "the cultivation of wines". In the reply, W. D. Scott indicated that this specialty would be of little use in Canada, and suggested to Alberto that he need not consider coming to Canada unless he was prepared "to take a place as a farm labourer or go into farming on your account with the necessary capital. . .". Ibid., Alberto to Scott, March 23, 1909; ibid., Scott to Alberto, May 12, 1909.

⁷² Ibid., W. D. Scott to Professor Bernardo Atto Lico; February, 1910. A. V. Spada makes the point that many of the Italian immigrants were deterred from engaging in farming in Canada because of both their previous Italian experience, and

their reaction to large scale grain farming in Western Canada. For the southern Italian farmer the problem of trying to derive a livelihood from the "burned-out hills, of dead rocks, of the malevolent winds burning his crops", had been most trying, an experience aggravated by the fact that most often he was only a sharecropper or farm labourer. But at least in Italy these peasants had the village community. When they faced the prospect of farming in Canada it seems that they regarded it from not only the perspective of their previous negative experience, but also that it was a type of farming they had no familiarity with. Moreover, a homestead on the prairies meant isolation in a strange and often hostile country. A. V. Spada, Italians in Canada (Montreal, 1969), pp. 80-82.

⁷³ Sessional Papers, 1900-1911, no. 25, pt. I, "Report of the Deputy Minister".

⁷⁴ Sessional Papers, 1912-1915, no. 25, pt. II, "Report of the Superintendent of Immigration".

⁷⁵ There was an appreciable number of Canadians of German background prior to the major influx of immigrants. In 1901, for instance, nearly 6% of the Canadian population were of German origin, ranking as the third largest single ethnic group in Canada. Report of the Royal Commission on B. & B., Book IV, p. 248.

⁷⁶ Burton Hurd, Racial Origins, p. 615.

⁷⁷ Royal Commission on B. & B., IV, pp. 238-239.

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 248-266; the census of 1911 revealed that only four provinces had a Belgian population over 1000. They were: Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec, Saskatchewan, and only Manitoba and Quebec that had over 2000. Census of 1911, II, pp. 162-316.

⁷⁹ Debates, 1907, pp. 1141, 6145-6151, 6196, 6242.

⁸⁰ Certainly there was little evidence that the Immigration officials were ever troubled over the failure of large numbers of French immigrants to materialize, except perhaps during the political controversy over the issue in 1907. In

1904, Clifford Sifton, when asked why the Dominion government did not encourage the movement of French Canadians in Quebec to the Canadian West, totally rejected the proposal. Debates, 1904, 7329.

⁸¹ Norman Macdonald, Canada: Immigration and Colonization, p. 206.

⁸² Report of the Royal Commission on B. & B., Book IV, pp. 247-248. Scandinavians only represented 0.58% of the Canadian population in 1901.

⁸³ Norman Macdonald, Canada: Immigration and Colonization, p. 205.

⁸⁴ I.B., file 77, no. 3, Report, J. Obed Smith, Asst. Superintendent of Emigration, London, June 6, 1910; ibid., no. 1, T. R. Preston, to Frank Pedley, Superintendent of Immigration, October 18, 1901.

⁸⁵ Ibid., no. 1, T. Mayne Daly, Minister of the Interior to Sir Charles Tupper, Canadian High Commissioner, London, April 3, 1895; ibid., W.T.R. Preston, to Lord Strathcona, Canadian High Commissioner, London, May 29, 1899.

⁸⁶ The volcanic eruption of Mount Hecla in Iceland in 1873 seriously disrupted the agricultural system and brought severe hardship that the pressure to emigrate was extremely strong. W. L. Morton, Manitoba: A History (Toronto, 1957), pp. 162, 177, 223.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 309.

⁸⁸ Thomas Greenway Papers (Public Archives of Manitoba), Clifford Sifton to Premier Thomas Greenway, February 20, 1897.

⁸⁹ Sessional Papers, 1901, no. 25, p. 118. "Report of Commissioner W. F. McCreary"; ibid., p. 86, "Report of Commissioner J. O. Smith".

⁹⁰ In the House of Commons Debates throughout the period 1896-1914 both political parties enthusiastically endorsed Scandinavian immigrants. J. W. Dafoe, in his study of Sifton certainly emphasized the positive view that Sifton had of these immigrants. J. W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton, p. 140.

91 Burton Hurd, Racial Origins, p. 633. The number of homesteads filled by Scandinavians between 1901-1911 was 12,085 or 53% of the immigration during this period. Sessional Papers, 1902-1912, no. 25, pt. I, "Report of the Deputy Minister".

92 The ethnic differences in the railroad and mining labour force are discussed in chapter five and six.

93 The number of Swedes that entered Canada as miners was approximately 336, or 3% of the Swedish immigration from 1906-1914.

94 I.B., file 77, no. 1, Memorandum. Sir Charles Tupper, September 28, 1892. Tupper placed particular emphasis on the low wages that these girls were receiving pointing out that in Sweden "wages run low For servant girls \$25. per annum is a good wage in the town". Nor was the situation that much different in Denmark for which Tupper had secured the following wage schedule, applicable to the labour market in Copenhagen: On a per month basis:

	<u>Lowest</u>	<u>Highest</u>	<u>Average</u>
Female cooks	\$ 3.75	\$ 8.04	\$ 5.36
House maids	1.07	4.28	3.00
Wet nurses	5.36	8.04	6.70
Nurses	2.14	3.22	2.70

95 Ibid., W.T.R. Preston to Lord Strathcona, May 29, 1899.

96 Report of the Royal Commission on B. & B., Book IV, pp. 238-239.

97 I.B., file 113228, no. 9, Frank Oliver to Lord Strathcona, April 14, 1906.

98 Ibid., 77, no. 3, Report, J. Obed Smith, June 6, 1910.

99 Sessional Papers, 1904-1909, no. 25, pt. II, "Report of the Superintendent".

100 The Report of the Commissioner of Immigration in 1901 illustrated the differential between those Scandinavians coming by ocean port as compared to those crossing from the United States:

	<u>Ocean Ports</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Swedish	294	462	756
Danish	84	80	164
Norwegians	<u>194</u>	<u>377</u>	<u>571</u>
	572	919	1,491

Sessional Papers, 1902, no. 25, pt. II, p. 116.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 1906, no. 25, pt. II, p. 98; J. W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton, p. 140.

¹⁰² Sifton Papers, 101872, W. F. McCreary to Clifford Sifton, January 22, 1902. Ibid., 76167.

¹⁰³ C. A. Duff-Miller, London, England, to A. G. Blair, Minister of Railways, November 18, 1901.

¹⁰⁴ J. S. Woodsworth, Strangers Within Our Gates (Toronto, 1909), p. 96.

¹⁰⁵ J.T.M. Anderson, The Education of the New Canadian (Toronto, 1918), p. 39.

¹⁰⁶ I.B., file 113228, no. 1, J. A. Smart to W.T.R. Preston, August 26, 1901.

¹⁰⁷ Debates, 1901, p. 2934.

¹⁰⁸ J. S. Woodsworth, Strangers Within Our Gates, p. 100.

¹⁰⁹ It was estimated in 1909 that some 11 million Germans resided in the United States. Abstracts of the Immigration Commission, vol. I, p. 242.

¹¹⁰ Abstracts of Reports of the Immigration Commission, vol. I, p. 215; Report of the Royal Commission on B. & B., IV, pp. 238-239.

¹¹¹ J. A. Smart, 'Evidence'. Select Committee of the House of Commons on Agriculture and Colonization, 1906, p. 309.

¹¹² Royal Commission on B. & B., IV, pp. 238-239.

¹¹³ In chapter one, the German-Catholics are more extensively discussed.

- 114 Census of 1911, FI. p. 367.
- 115 Joseph Boudreau, "The Enemy Alien Problem in Canada, 1914-1921", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, U.C.L.A., 1964, p. 16.
- 116 Burton Hurd, Racial Origins, p. 633.
- 117 Sessional Papers, 1902-1912, no. 25, pt. I, "Report of the Deputy Minister".
- 118 E. K. Francis, In Search of Utopia (Altona, 1955), pp. 16-27.
- 119 The Eastern and Western Reserves were located in the province of Manitoba. These Reserves were areas set aside by the federal government for the exclusive occupancy of a homogeneous group of settlers, to be divided according to their own plans. Norman Macdonald, Canada: Immigration and Colonization, p. 197.
- 120 Ibid., p. 61.
- 121 Ibid., p. 32.
- 122 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
- 123 Ibid., p. 35.
- 124 Ibid., pp. 55-56.
- 125 W. L. Morton, Manitoba: A History, pp. 161, 174-185.
- 126 Manitoba Free Press, November 30, 1872. Lady Aberdeen, the wife of the Governor General, after her visit to Manitoba gave a similar positive assessment of the sect. "The Menonites are most desirable emigrants: they retain their best German characteristics, are hard working, honest, sober, simple, hardy people; they bring money into the country, and can settle in a woodless place which no other people will do". Lady Aberdeen, My Canadian Journal, 1872-78 (London, 1891), p. 332.
- 127 Royal Commission on B. & B., IV, pp. 238-239. Reports of the Immigration Branch between 1896-1914 certainly emphasized the attractive qualities of the Finnish immigrants.

128 Martha Isobel Allen, "A Survey of Finnish Cultural, Economic and Political Development in the Sudbury District of Ontario", unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of History, University of Western Ontario, 1954, p. 7.

129 Ibid., pp. 7, 11. A report submitted by the Finnish Consul in Canada; Akseli Rauanheimo in 1925 estimated that only 16% of the Finnish population lived in urban centres. I.B., file 651, no. 3.

130 Eino Jutikkala, "Toward Independence: A Survey of the History of Finland to 1920", in The Finns in North America: A Social Symposium (Hancock, Michigan, 1969), ed. by Ralph Jalkanen, pp. 14, 20.

131 Reino Kero, "The Background of Finnish Emigration", ibid., p. 58.

132 Carl Waisanen, "The Social Problems of the Finns in America", ibid., pp. 202, 207; according to Ralph Jalkanen, "The Possibilities of Preserving A Particular Culture", the Finns found it particularly difficult to learn English in that Finnish language had no common root words with either English or any of the Teutonic languages. This meant that linguistic adaptation was much more formidable for Finns than it was for Scandinavians or Germans. Ibid., p. 221.

133 I.B., file 651, no. 3, Report of Count Karl Mannerheim, Professor Frederickson and Dr. W.T.R. Preston, enclosed in letter, Preston to J. A. Smart, July 15, 1903.

134 Ibid., enthusiastic reports had also been submitted by Canadian promoters H. A. McKibbin, Secretary, Port Arthur Board of Trade, to Clifford Sifton, March 28, 1901, Sifton Papers, 82801; J. C. Scott, General Manager, Quebec & St. John Railway, to Laurier, November 8, 1901, Laurier Papers, 58909.

135 Ibid., Preston to Smart, July 15, 1903.

136 Ibid., Report of Count Karl Mannerheim.

137 Ibid., Smart to Preston, August 4, 1903.

138 Ibid., Smart to Preston, August 6, 1903.

139 The Lake Superior mining regions were very much dominated by Finnish workers especially after the political purges following the general strike of 1905 in Finland. This trend has been described by Professor Betten: Many socialist leaders became political exiles and emigrated to the Mesabi iron range of Minnesota where there already existed a large Finnish immigration population. The newcomers lectured and published periodicals supporting the socialist movement among Finnish immigrants. The influx of left-wing activists reinforced socialist inclinations rooted in the homeland. Neil Betten, "The Origins of Ethnic Radicalism in Northern Minnesota, 1900-1920", The International Migration Review, IV, 1970, no. 2, p. 46.

140 Many of the Finnish immigrants who settled in northern Ontario who came directly from Finland, as well as those who came via the United States were socialists. In many communities, these socialist or 'Red' Finns formed the majority of the population, a situation which created considerable social problems when non-socialist or 'White' Finns attempted to settle in the district. I.B., file 651, no. 3, Akseli Räuanheime Report, 1925; Martha Allen, "A Survey of Finnish Cultural, Economic and Political Development . . .", pp. 85-95.

141 J. Donald Wilson & Jorgen Dahlie, "Negroes, Finns, Sikhs: Education and Community Experience in British Columbia", Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs, Symposium on Languages and Cultures in a Multi-Ethnic Society, Ottawa, May, 1971, p. 13.

142 Victoria Colonist, April 22, 1901, cited ibid., p. 13. By 1903, there were 240 residents, with many of the amenities of a settled community: a newspaper, Time (Aika), edited by Kurikka; a school; a library, but no churches. However, because of internal dissension, lack of proper economic base, by 1914, the population amounted to only about 250. Ibid., pp. 13-16.

143 No special reference is made in this chapter to either Roumanian or Hungarian immigration. In the case of Hungarian, by 1911 there were less than 10,000 in Canada; in fact they were lumped together in the 1911 census with the Lithuanians and Moravians, two ethnic groups with whom they had very little in common. John Kosa, Land of Choice: the Hungarians in Canada (Toronto, 1957), p. 4.

- 144 Census of 1911, II, p. 367.
- 145 Hurd, Racial Origins, p. 617.
- 146 This theme has been discussed by authors such as Reino Kero, "The Background of Finnish Emigration", in The Finns in North America (ed.) by Ralph Jalkanen, p. 58; E. K. Francis, In Search of Utopia, pp. 16-27; George Woodcock & Ivan Avakumovic, The Doukhobors (Toronto, 1968), pp. 1-106; Victor Turek, Poles in Manitoba (Toronto, 1967), pp. 1-35.
- 147 Ibid.
- 148 Vladimir Kaye, Ukrainian Settlements, p. 125, Dr. J. Oleskow, Vienna, Austria, to the High Commissioner, Lord Strathcona, May 20, 1899.
- 149 J. W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton, p. 319.
- 150 The initial contact between Dr. Oleskow, the representative of the Ukrainian Prosvita Society, and the Canadian government resulted in some 300 Ukrainians around Winnipeg and Edmonton, but the first large group came out in 1896. Vladimir Kaye, Ukrainian Settlements, pp. 28, 37.
- 151 James Mavor Papers (University of Toronto Archives), J. A. Smart to James Mavor, February 9, 1899.
- 152 I.B.
- 153 Woodcock & Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, pp. 1-34.
- 154 Ibid., pp. 56-83.
- 155 Ibid., pp. 108-134.
- 156 One of the key men in Canada to facilitate the entry of the Doukhobors was Professor James Mavor, Head of the Department of Political Economy at the University of Toronto. Mavor had previously had contact with officials in the Immigration Branch because of his reputation of being an expert on western Canada. In his autobiography, Mavor described his experience with the Doukhobors. James Mavor, The Windows of the World, vol. II, (Toronto, 1923), pp. 1-37.

157 J. A. Smart informed Lord Strathcona in November, 1899 that the Immigration Branch was determined to actively recruit immigrants from continental Europe. Smart to Lord Strathcona, November 30, 1899, I.B., file 113228, no. 4. Smart also indicated that he was favourably impressed with the Doukhobors. J. A. Smart to James Mavor, February 9, 1899, Mavor Papers. Thomas Shaughnessy, C.P.R. President, was also enthusiastic about the influx of the Doukhobors, and he exerted pressure to have them admitted. Woodcock & Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, p. 132. One final asset was the impression, created by Mavor and the English Quakers, that the Doukhobors would soon become financially independent, in much the same manner as the Mennonites. James Mavor to V. Tchertkoff, October 31, 1899. Mavor Papers.

158 Woodcock & Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, p. 136.

159 C. A. Dawson attributes this decision to break up the colonies into three sections rather than one large reserve, as an attempt on the part of the Doukhobors to duplicate the settlement pattern in Russia. C. A. Dawson, Group Settlement, p. 10. James A. Smart, however, in his correspondence with Thomas Shaughnessy, clearly indicated that it was the Dominion government that favoured the three separate reserves. I.B., file 65101, no. 3. Woodcock & Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, p. 135, argue that the Dominion authorities actually imposed this settlement pattern on the Doukhobors.

160 Most of the members of the Christian Community of Universal Brotherhood moved to British Columbia in 1908.

161 Woodcock & Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, pp. 135-135.

162 Ibid., p. 137.

163 Ibid., p. 136.

164 Ibid., pp. 134-137.

165 The arrival of a number of Ukrainians in 1896 from the Austrian province of Bukovina caused considerable agitation. The fact that many of these immigrants were destitute and lacked leadership created substantial resentment in the Edmonton district. Dr. Oleskow was also very concerned that the Immigration Branch had allowed rather unscrupulous steamship agents

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to bring these Ukrainians into the country. Vladimir Kaye, Ukrainian Settlement, pp. 323, 90.

¹⁶⁶ Paul Yuzyk, The Ukrainians in Manitoba (Toronto, 1953), p. 27.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 28-29.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 48, Count Badeni to W. Barrington, Ambassador of the United Kingdom, Vienna, Austria, October 12, 1895.

¹⁶⁹ The Prosvita Society, founded in the 1860's was the most important of several Ukrainian nationalist societies. It was committed to the task of providing guidance and advice to the Ukrainian peasants in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, especially in the matter of immigration. In particular, it tried to prevent the recurrence of the disastrous emigration ventures in South America. Vladimir Kaye, Ukrainian Settlement, pp. 10-15.

¹⁷⁰ Oleskow's plan was described by Sir Charles Tupper in a detailed fashion: . . . his plan would be to advise at the outset the immigration of farmers with capital only, and to settle them in groups. . . . He would advocate placing the settlers in village communities, a system to which they are accustomed, and which fosters village industries. . . . This would of course involve the granting of a reservation of land. Sir Charles Tupper, High Commissioner for Canada, London, to the Minister of the Interior, August 1, 1895, cited, ibid., p. 21.

¹⁷¹ A survey of the Ukrainian colonies or settlements in 1901 revealed a total of ten settlements in Manitoba, and in the Northwest Territories, with a total population of 27,036:

Manitoba

Dauphin, including Sifton & Ethelbert	5,000
Shoal Lake	1,200
Pleasant Home-Gimli	1,400
Stuartburn	3,000
St. Norbert	100
Gonor	300
Whitemouth	200
Cook's Creek	200

Poplar Park	36
Brokenhead	600
Total	12,536

Northwest Territories

Edmonton District	9,000
Rosthern District	1,000
Yorkton & Saltcoats	4,500
Total	14,500

I.B., file 139859, J. Obed Smith, Commissioner of Immigration to the Secretary, Department of the Interior, February 1, 1901.

¹⁷²Vera Lysenko, in her book, Men in Sheepskin Coats (Toronto, 1947), cites Sifton as saying that although "it was hardly fair to place there . . . it was . . . like their old home and they went there willingly", pp. 123-124. Rev. A. E. Smith, in his autobiography All My Life (Toronto, 1949), recalled that when he first arrived in Manitoba in 1898 the Ukrainians were being directed to "an area of low, cheap land, covered with willow scrub", p. 27. Whatever the reason for their particular location, the orientation on the part of the Ukrainian farmers towards subsistence, diversified agriculture was quite a contrast to the type of capitalist farming that was beginning to assume such importance in western Canada. W. L. Morton, Manitoba: A History (Toronto, 1957), pp. 309-310.

¹⁷³W. F. McCreary, Commissioner of Immigration to James A. Smart, May 14, 1897, cited Vladimir Kaye, Ukrainian Settlement, p. 160. C. W. Speers, the General Immigration Agent, in his numerous reports to the Immigration Branch, 1896-1901, emphasized the attractiveness of the parkland for the Ukrainian settlers. I.B., file 60868, no. 1.

¹⁷⁴T. Peterson, "Ethnic and Class Politics in Canada", in Martin Robin (ed.), Canadian Provincial Politics, pp. 73-74.

¹⁷⁵Debates, 1898, 6828.

¹⁷⁶Ibid., 6828-6830.

¹⁷⁷Ibid., 6929. Sifton informed the House of Commons in 1899 that he believed that Canada was quite capable of

handling "five or six thousand" Galician immigrants a year "for the next ten or fifteen years". Ibid., 1899, 8505. The fact that some 10% of all homesteads entered between 1901-1911 were made by Slavic settlers obviously justified Sifton's faith in these immigrants as agriculturalists. Sessional Papers, 1902-1912, no. 25, pt. I, Report of the Deputy Minister.

178 The Conservative Papers that commented critically on Galician immigration were as follows: The Colchester Sun, Truro, April 17, 1899; The Summerside Journal, P.E.I., May 17, 1899; the Owen Sound Sun, May 23, 1899; the Kingston News, June 23, 1899; The Standard, Hawkesbury, Ont., July ?, 1899; Ottawa Citizen, December 21, 1898; Peterborough Evening Times, March 21, 1899; Quebec Mercury, March 22, 1899; Montreal Daily Star, April 18, 1899; Toronto Mail and Empire, April 11, 1899; Toronto Saturday Night, April 15, 1899; St. Thomas Journal, March 22, 1899; London Free Press, March 22, 1899; Halifax Herald, March 18, 1899; The Daily Times, Moncton, March 21, 1899.

In western Canada those papers that were negative on this issue were: Edmonton Bulletin, January 5, March 30, April 10, ; Elkhorn Advocate (Man.), March 30, 1899; Minnedosa Tribune (Man.), April 13, 1899; Morden Chronicle (Man.), May 25, 1899; Saskatchewan Herald, Battleford, N.W.T., May ?, 1899; Morning Telegram, (Wpg.), October 13, 27, November 15, 25, 28, ; Brandon Independent, November 30, 1899. I.B., file 34214, no. 5, contains clippings from these papers.

179 Halifax Herald, March 18, 1899, Ed.; Quebec Mercury, March 22, 1899, Ed.

180 Toronto Mail and Empire, April 10, 1899, Ed.; ibid., April 11, 1899, Ed.

181 Colchester Sun, Truro, Nova Scotia, April 17, 1899, Ed.

182 Sifton's influence is aptly described by John W. Daffoe, Clifford Sifton and His Times, pp. 46-48, and by A. R. McCormack, "Puttee and the Liberal Party: 1899-1904", C.H.R., 1970, no. 2, pp. 144-155.

183 The Morning Telegram (Wpg.), November 15, 1899, Ed. The Telegram had by 1899 become the official organ of the Manitoba Conservative party.

184 Edmonton Bulletin, October 7, 1899, Ed., cited the Morning Telegram, October 13, 1899, Ed.

185 Manitoba Free Press, December 9, 1899, Ed. accused the Conservatives of the rankest form of racial prejudice. Other Liberal papers, especially the Brandon Sun, September 14, 1899, also attacked the Conservatives for their nativism.

186 Reports reached Sifton from both Commissioner W. F. McCreary and Superintendent Frank Pedley concerning the reluctance on the part of the Doukhobors and Galicians to look after their own affairs. I.B., file 65101, no. 4, McCreary to Pedley, September 1, 1899; ibid., Pedley to McCreary, November 23, 1899. In July, 1900, Smart informed Preston that Galician immigrants were to be appreciably reduced. I.B., file 113228, no. 4, Smart to Preston, July 18, 1900.

187 Sifton Papers, 85598, James Parker, Yorkton, N.W.T., to Clifford Sifton, August 27, 1901.

188 Ibid., J. G. Turriff, Carlyle, N.W.T., December 3, 1902. One study revealed that by 1902 the Doukhobors had acquired 592 horses, 401 oxen, 865 cows, 400 sheep and more than 3,000 chickens. In terms of equipment they had 292 wagons, 199 plows, 48 mowing machines, 22 horse-drawn hay racks and 29 disc harrows. In short, all of the characteristics of a successful North American farming operation were in evidence. Woodcock & Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, p. 173.

189 I.B., file 60868, no. 1, N. B. Peck, Manager, Massey-Harris, excerpt, cited in letter, C. W. Speers to Frank Pedley, February 9, 1900.

190 I.B., file 34214, no. 4, C. W. Speers to J. A. Smart, June 20, 1899.

191 Michael Marunchak, The Ukrainian Canadians: A History (Winnipeg, 1970), p.

192 Yorkton Enterprise, January 17, 1902.

193 Sessional Papers, 1903, no. 25, pt. II, p. 124.

194 Ibid., 1900, no. 25, pt. II, p. 6.

195 Ibid., 1903, no. 25, pt. II, p. 127.

196 F. W. Annand, Dominion Government Agent, to J. A. Smart, September 19, 1900, cited Vladimir Kaye, Ukrainian Settlement, p. 368.

197 According to one author, institutional completeness consists of "the presence of formal organizations in the ethnic community . . . that have the effect of keeping the social relationship of the immigrants within its boundaries". Raymond Berton, "Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and Personal Relations of Immigrants", in W. E. Mann (ed.), Canada: A Sociological Profile (Toronto, 1968), p. 193. The ethnic church, the ethnic press, the influence of kinship are some of the aspects of this institutional completeness. Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New York, 1964), p. 198 and Robert Park, The Immigrant Press and Its Control (New York, 1922), p. 41 also give a rather good account of the problem.

198 Woodcock & Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, pp. 164-174.

199 Manitoba Free Press, October 31, 1902.

200 I.B., file 65101, no. 6, J. Obed Smith, Commissioner, to Frank Pedley, August 9, 1902; ibid., Smith to Frank Pedley, November 3, 1902.

201 Ibid., no. 8, Smith to J. A. Smart, May 15, 1903; ibid., C. W. Speers to W. D. Scott, May 4, 1903.

202 Woodcock & Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, pp. 182-200.

203 I.B., file 65101, no. 8, W. D. Scott to J. Obed Smith, February 18, 1903; ibid., C. W. Speers to W. D. Scott, March 30, 1903.

204 Ibid., J. O. Smith to W. D. Scott, May 26, 1903; ibid., J. Obed Smith to Joseph Elkington, Philadelphia, November 23, 1903. The R.N.W.M.P. found themselves in a dilemma in respect to the practice of nudism since it was obvious that "in all infractions of the law, it is on account of their religious belief". Ibid., Commissioner Perry to the Comptroller, November 29, 1902. However, in November, 1903, three

of the ringleaders of the pilgrimage of 1903, as well as three men who had set fire to the property of Community Doukhobors, were sentenced to two years' imprisonment. Ibid., J. Obed Smith to W. D. Scott, November 11, 1903. In keeping with the Victorian assumptions about the fragile nature of women, the officials saw the Doukhobor men as the cause of any disturbance, and treated the women very leniently. In 1905, for instance, when sixteen men and an equal number of women appeared in Yorkton nude the men were examined by two doctors and committed in the asylum, while the women were described as being "quite sane", who were merely "the silly dupes of the agitators. . . ." Ibid., no. 9, C. W. Speers to W. D. Scott, August 28, 1905.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., R. Talmay, Yorkton, to J. A. Smart, June 21, 1904; Woodcock & Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, p. 189.

²⁰⁶ Mavor Papers, James Mavor to Clifford Sifton, May 18, 1904.

²⁰⁷ I.B., file 65101, no. 9, C. W. Speers to W. D. Scott, May 3, 1905. In 1906 there were 849 Independent Doukhobors as compared to 7,852 Community Doukhobors under Verigin's leadership. Woodcock & Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, p. 198.

²⁰⁸ Debates, 1901, 2937. In chapter two there is a discussion of Sifton's relations with Frank Oliver.

²⁰⁹ Mavor Papers, B. E. Chaffey to James Mavor, May 14, 1907.

²¹⁰ Ibid., J. K. Johnston, Yorkton, to Frank Oliver, March 11, 1907.

²¹¹ Woodcock & Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, p. 216.

²¹² Ibid., pp. 218-221.

²¹³ Sifton certainly expressed concern over the deterioration of relations with the Doukhobors "after the amount of time and trouble that has been taken to avoid it". However, Sifton's representation to Oliver and Laurier appears to have been ignored. Mavor Papers, Clifford Sifton to James Mavor, June 3, 1907.

214 Woodcock & Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, pp. 221-222.

215 In the Christian Guardian, the official paper of the Methodist Church, praise was given the government efforts "that favoured the communistic ownership of property". The Christian Guardian, May 22, 1907, p. 4. There was no protest over the seizure of the Doukhobor homesteads.

216 The civic authorities demanded that the Dominion government intervene and assume responsibility for these Doukhobors. In rebuttal the Immigration officials declared that they were no longer immigrants, and it was a matter of provincial jurisdiction. They insisted that if violations of the criminal law occurred it was up to the government of Ontario to take action. I.B., file 65101, no. 8, James Murphy, Mayor of Fort William to Frank Oliver, January 8, 1908; ibid., L. M. Fortier, Acting Superintendent to James Murphy, January 8, 1908; ibid., Fortier, memorandum to Mr. Cote, Deputy Minister of Justice, October 2, 1907; ibid., Allen Aylesworth, Minister of Justice to Frank Oliver, February 13, 1908.

217 In April, 1908 the Ontario government loaded the Doukhobors on a train destined for Yorkton, Saskatchewan. Almost immediately the Saskatchewan authorities branded the action as "unjustifiable and unfriendly". A major inter-provincial confrontation was only narrowly avoided because of the intervention of the Dominion government. Ibid., Frank Ford, Deputy, Attorney General, Saskatchewan, telegram to Frank Oliver, April 29, 1908; Manitoba Free Press, May 16, 1908; Premier Walter Scott, Saskatchewan, to W. W. Cory, Deputy Minister of the Interior, May 28, 1908; ibid., Cory to Scott, May 29, 1908. In March, 1908 Dr. Chisholm, M.P. for East Huron, denounced the Doukhobors as "moral lepers" and called for the deportation of the radicals. Toronto Daily News, March 14, 1908, included ibid.

218 Woodcock & Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, pp. 224-234.

219 ibid., p. 244.

220 The Presbyterian Witness, April 30, 1881, cited, Edward Christie, "The Presbyterian Church in Canada and Its Official Attitude Towards Public Affairs and Social Problems, 1875-1925", unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of History, University of Toronto, 1955, p. 172.

- 221 The Presbyterian Record, April, 1900, cited ibid., p. 177.
- 222 The Presbyterian Record, December, 1902, cited ibid., p. 189.
- 223 The Presbyterian Record, September, 1901, cited ibid., p. 189. Similar expressions of opinion are found in The Christian Guardian during this period. George Emery, "Methodism on the Canadian Prairies, 1896-1914", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia, 1970, p. 234. The activities of the Baptists among the European immigrants is discussed in Rev. C. C. McLaurin, Pioneering in Western Canada (Calgary, 1939), pp. 144-153. Apparently some success was achieved among the Germans. Ibid., p. 186. The Anglican church also was aware of the immigrant problem, and the Church Camp Mission by 1912 operated among the foreigners in nine different diocese. Report of the Missionary Society of the Church of England in Canada for 1912 (Toronto, 1912), p. 70.
- 224 Report of the Home Mission Committee, Western Section, Presbyterian Acts and Proceedings, 1903, pp. 5, 13-14.
- 225 Archbishop Adelard Langevin, as early as 1896 had become involved with the Ukrainian immigrants. J. Skwarok, The Ukrainian Settlers in Canada and Their Schools (Toronto, 1959), pp. 23-25; Paul Yuzyk, The Ukrainians in Manitoba, pp. 71-73; Michael Marunchak, The Ukrainian Canadians, pp. 103-105. The advantage that the Russian Orthodox priests had was that they were often generously financed by the Russian government. Yuzyk, Ukrainian Settlement, p. 72.
- 226 Yuzyk, Ukrainian Settlement, pp. 71-73. Report of the Board of Home Missions, Presbyterian Acts and Proceedings, 1905, p. 4; 1906, p. 13; 1907, pp. 7-15; 1908, p. 6; 1911, pp. 18-20.
- 227 Ibid., 1912, p. 31.
- 228 George Emery, "Methodism on the Canadian Prairies", pp. 232-249, 273-286.
- 229 Ibid., pp. 235, 241-243, 411.

²³⁰ Vladimir Kaye, Ukrainian Settlement, p. 222. In 1902 Archbishop Langevin had taken the lead in demanding that bilingual schools be granted to Ukrainians. M.F.P., January 6, 1902, p. 3.

²³¹ The Christian Guardian, October 6, 1909, p. 8; ibid., September 29, 1909, p. 4.

²³² This trend became particularly noticeable after the arrival of Bishop Nicleas Budka in 1912. J. Skwarok, Ukrainian Settlers . . . and Their Schools, pp. 24-28.

²³³ Even before Budka's arrival, Ukrainian school trustees had begun to take advantage of the bilingual clause of the Manitoba School Act, especially since the regulation of 1908 made it possible for each school district to become bilingual without the approval of the Manitoba Department of Education. Statement by Dr. Thornton, Minister of Education, cited, Manitoba Free Press, January 13, 1916, p. 4. Moreover, radical and religious differences between Poles and Ukrainians had appeared to have broken down somewhat, and there was a considerable degree of co-operation between the two groups on the matter of bilingual schools. W. L. Morton, Manitoba: A History, p. 309.

²³⁴ D. A. McArthur, "Immigration in Canada, 1900-1930", in Pioneer Settlement: Comparative Studies by Twenty-Six Authors (New York, 1932), edited by W.F.G. Joerg, p. 22.

²³⁵ Sessional Papers, 1896-1915, no. 25, pt. I, Report of the Deputy Minister of the Interior.

²³⁶ Historians such as James B. Hedges, Building the Canadian West (New York, 1939), pp. 62, 153, and A. S. Morton and Chester Martin, History of Prairie Settlement and Dominion Lands Policy (Toronto, 1934), pp. 518, 523, indicate that some 90% of the American immigrants purchased lands when they settled in western Canada. In many cases, these purchases were adjoining to their homestead grants.

²³⁷ R. W. Murchie, "Agricultural Land Utilization in Western Canada", in Pioneer Settlement: Comparative Studies by Twenty-Six Authors, p. 17.

²³⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

239 W. A. Mackintosh, Prairie Settlement (Toronto, 1934), pp. 3, 84, 102-103, indicated in his study that in the Central European districts of western Canada there were normally at least 10 persons per square mile, a much higher figure than in the English-speaking districts. He also indicated that in the 'foreign districts' the rate of farm abandonment was only about 2 1/2%, while in the English-speaking districts it ranged as high as 55%.

240 Reverend S. C. Murray, District Superintendent of Presbyterian church cited, The Presbyterian Record, August, 1914, in Edward Christie, The Presbyterian Church in Canada and Its Official Attitude Towards Public Affairs and Social Problems, 1875-1925". M.A. thesis, p. 340.



CHAPTER IV

THE 'FOREIGN NAVVY' AS AN INDUSTRIAL PROLETARIAT

Two of the most important factors determining the rate and pattern of Canadian economic growth during the period from 1896 to 1914 were the expansion of the railway system and the massive influx of immigrants. Throughout both the Laurier and Borden era, the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy required abundant new supplies of labour, both skilled and unskilled. As a result there was a strong commitment to the idea of an "open door" immigration policy, particularly on the part of the entrepreneur. But the question of labour supply was not simply economic; it had had consequential and, at times, explosive cultural and racial overtones. Indeed the debate over which groups should be admitted to the country constituted one of the most important aspects of the social history of this entire period. Whose influence would prove to be decisive in determining the character of the Canadian population -- the big businessman, driven by the logic of economic growth and power, or the Canadian nationalist, determined to admit

only those immigrants capable of easy assimilation into the existing population?

Nowhere was the clash of ideologies more pronounced than in the question of wholesale importation of immigrant railroad labourers, commonly referred to as "navvies". By exploring the social and economic conditions connected with the employment of navvies, the underlying attitudes of the Anglo Canadian, particularly those of the managerial class, towards the unskilled immigrant worker are revealed.

There is no doubt that the connection between the railroad construction and immigration was direct and immediate. The opening up of the prairies, and the resultant demand not only for feeder lines but additional transcontinentals to move the bountiful harvests, acted as a tremendous catalyst for railway building.¹ This was, of course, a process that worked both ways. As has so frequently been the case in Canadian history, railway construction preceded settlement.² During the period under review, the railway aspect of the railway-settlement symbiosis took precedence. Colonization railroads were clearly seen as a means of placing settlers in developing regions.³ In this process immigrants would satisfy several needs: they would serve as a source of labour in the construction of the roads; their

crops would provide an additional revenue base; and ultimately their labour could be utilized in developing industries.⁴ Moreover, from the point of view of immigration policy, work on railroad construction gangs would be a means of initiation whereby the newcomers could adapt to the Canadian environment.⁵

In its stated policy, both the Laurier and Borden governments clearly gave priority to the recruitment of agricultural settlers.⁶ This meant that immigration officials tended to see the recruitment of foreign labourers to work on railway construction as an aspect of the settlement process. But while the federal policy may have given priority to agricultural immigrants of an "acceptable" ethnic group, the urgent demands of the railroads for cheap and readily available labour created a serious problem. If the immigrant settler was only interested in railway construction work until he became established, if he was, in consequence, only a temporary member of the industrial labour force until a better opportunity presented itself, then the unskilled labour market would be very unstable. Yet one of the vital ingredients of rapid industrialization is the existence of what Professor H. C. Pentland has called a capitalistic labour market:

By a capitalistic market is meant one in which the actions of workers and employers are governed

and linked by impersonal considerations of immediate pecuniary advantage. In this market the employer is confident that workers will be available whenever he wants them; so he feels free to hire them on a short term basis, and to dismiss them whenever there is a monetary advantage in doing so. . . . labour to the employer is a variable cost. . . . From a broader point of viewpoint, the capitalistic labour market represents a pooling of the labour supplies and labour needs of many employers, so that all may benefit by economizing on labour reserves.⁷

To maintain such a market in Canada, it was necessary to do much more than import large numbers of unskilled immigrants. In addition, these immigrants had to be of a type prepared to seek employment in the low paying, exacting jobs associated with labour intensive industries. Implicit in this argument was the idea that a permanent proletariat might not be a bad thing.

The ethnic composition of the railroad proletariat was to change substantially during the 1896-1914 period. The Irish Catholic navvies, who had been so important in building the railroads of the 19th century, were no longer available in sufficient quantity. The great wave of Irish immigration had subsided. Indeed, during the period 1901-1911, the number of Irish immigrants coming to Canada numbered only 10% of those coming from England and 25% of those coming from Scotland.⁸ It is also worth noting that in occupational

terms, during this period there were more farmers, farm labourers, and mechanics coming from Ireland than there were general labourers.

In terms of numbers, English and Scottish immigrants could have provided the necessary replacement for the Irish navvies.⁹ This was particularly true between 1904 and 1914 when approximately 995,107 immigrants, or 41% of the total number of emigrants leaving Great Britain came to Canada.¹⁰ This alteration of the pattern of British emigration flow away from the United States and towards Canada was greeted with considerable enthusiasm by immigration officials.¹¹ This favourable reaction was magnified by the belief that the quality of the British immigrants was improving.¹² But if these immigrants were attractive to government officials, large employers of unskilled labour were not so impressed. Few of these British immigrants were in the category of unskilled labour -- only 15.6% as compared to 51.5% for the European immigrants who arrived in the same decade, 1901-1911.¹³ Moreover, many of the British immigrants who came over as navvies proved to be very troublesome.

One of the most celebrated incidents of this nature occurred in 1897 when the Canadian Pacific Railway was preparing to expand its Crow's Nest Pass line, an endeavour for

which it required a large supply of labour. On this occasion, an attempt was made by Immigration officials to find work on the Crow's Nest Railway for some one thousand Welsh farmers and farm labourers who wanted to settle in western Canada.¹⁴ The project was very much in keeping with the settlement-railroad arrangement. The initial income of the immigrants would be supplemented, and the railway companies would be provided with a large pool of unskilled labour. The C.P.R. was immediately interested.¹⁵

But the arrangement was not a success, largely because the Welsh workers were not prepared to tolerate the low wages or the camp conditions. Their ability to focus public attention on their plight proved embarrassing to both the C.P.R. and the Canadian government.¹⁶ Indeed, the incident created such a stir in Britain that James A. Smart, Deputy Minister of the Interior, warned the C.P.R. President that unless the situation was rectified ". . . immigration to Canada could be very materially checked".¹⁷ But Thomas Shaughnessy, the President of the C.P.R., was not a man easily cowed or intimidated. In a very blunt letter, he rejected the validity of the complaints and expressed his disdain for the British labourer:

Men who seek employment on railway construction are, as a rule, a class accustomed to roughing

it. They know when they go to the work that they must put up with the most primitive kind of camp accommodation. . . . I feel very strongly that it would be a huge mistake to send out any more of these men from Wales, Scotland or England. . . . it is only prejudicial to the cause of immigration to import men who come here expecting to get high wages, a feather bed and a bath tub.¹⁸

The sentiments that Shaughnessy expressed were shared by many Canadian entrepreneurs; they wanted hardy, malleable labourers whose salary requests would be "reasonable", who were not unionized, and who could not use the English-Canadian language press to focus public attention on their grievances.¹⁹ Shaughnessy also articulated a certain bias held by many Canadian entrepreneurs, and many western Canadians, that the British labourer was not suited either physically or psychologically to the conditions on the frontier.²⁰

Even many of the Immigration officials manifest distinct reservations about recruiting British labourers. In 1897, for instance, when the matter of bringing British navvies into the country to aid in the construction of the Crow's Nest Railway was first being discussed, W. F. McCreary, the Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration, indicated his objection to the project: "The English are no use whatever on the railroad, or, in fact, for that matter, almost any place else".²¹

It was evident that many employers discriminated against British immigrants, a situation which disturbed many in the Old Country.²² In 1907, the editor of the East Anglian Daily Times, complained to Sir Wilfrid Laurier that the Grand Trunk Railway had refused jobs to several immigrants "because they were Englishmen".²³ Although Laurier denied that such discrimination existed, studies of the employment practices of railroad construction companies have revealed that the charge had appreciable substance.²⁴

The source of labour supply which would most perfectly accommodate the capitalistic labour market was to be found in the Orient. In this region the supply of unskilled labourers was unlimited. Asiatics, moreover, of all immigrant groups, could be cast most easily into the role of a permanent proletariat.²⁵ There had, of course, always been a direct connection between transcontinental railroads and the importation of oriental labourers. Sir John A. Macdonald had been prepared to override the sustained and vociferous objections of British Columbia that no Chinese be employed on the road gangs building the C.P.R.²⁶ According to Macdonald, the shortage of white construction workers necessitated a choice for the people of British Columbia: "either you must have this labour or you cannot have a railway".²⁷ To make the

decision more acceptable the Prime Minister emphasized that these Chinese navvies were only a temporary addition to the labour force. Hence there need be ". . . no fear of a permanent degeneration of the country by a mongrel race".²⁸ Yet it is significant that contrary to this prediction, most of the Chinese remained in British Columbia. By 1891 they constituted about one-tenth of the total population of the coast province.²⁹

The Oriental worker was regarded by many businessmen associated with labour intensive industries as the ideal worker for an expanding economy.³⁰ But from the point of view of both Canadian workers and Canadian racial nationalists, the Chinese immigrant, in particular, was regarded as highly undesirable.³¹ Both groups agreed that the social behaviour of the Chinese was deplorable, that they lived in overcrowded and filthy conditions, and that they were "a non-assimilating race".³² To organized labour, however, the matter was even more crucial; not only would the Chinese presence create a mongrelized nation, but it would also produce an autocratic economic and political system:

They [the Chinese] are thus fitted to become all too dangerous competitors in the labour market, while their docile servility, the natural outcome of centuries of grinding poverty and humble submission to a most

oppressive system of government renders them doubly dangerous as the willing tools whereby grasping and tyrannical employers grind down all labour to the lowest living point.³³

What is important about the involved subject of Chinese immigration is that even as the exclusionist forces were gaining in strength, the voice of the business groups was still heard loudly and clearly in Ottawa.³⁴

The C.P.R. and other railroad companies continued to agitate for an "open door" arrangement allowing Asiatic labourers into the country, and strenuously opposed any increase in the head tax.³⁵ It is also apparent that the C.P.R. continued to employ a considerable number of orientals, and established arrangements with emigration organizations such as the Canadian Nippon Supply Company not only to import Japanese labourers, but also to control them while they were in the employ of the railway company.³⁶ But perhaps of even greater significance was the fact that the state-supported Grand Trunk Pacific was also seriously contemplating importing Oriental labour. In December, 1906, a tentative agreement was made between the representatives of the Canadian Nippon Company and E. G. Russell, Purchasing Agent of the Grand Trunk Pacific.³⁷ Public statements by prominent officials of the G.T.P. served to confirm the belief that the railway company

intended to import Asiatic workers. In March, 1907, Frank Morse, Vice President and General Manager, was quoted as saying that "no transcontinental had yet been constructed without the assistance of oriental labour".³⁸ In September, while the ashes of Vancouver's Chinatown smoldered, the General Manager of the Grand Trunk, Charles M. Hays, gave a provocative analysis of the labour requirements of the trans-continental:

We will employ the kind of immigrants on the line that the Government allows into the country. Am I opposed to the entrance of Oriental labour, you ask? Well, you need cheap labour, don't you, and why should we reject the oriental if we cannot get the supply we require from any other source?³⁹

Hays might also have added that the rising cost of labour was a major consideration for the Grand Trunk. Indeed, with the extensive industrial activity, particularly the appreciable railway construction, wages for unskilled labour had soared. Between 1903 and 1907, the daily wage of white navvies in British Columbia had increased from \$1.50 to as high as \$3.00. The advance was even more spectacular for oriental navvies; for this group the daily wage had advanced from \$1.00 to \$2.50.⁴⁰ According to the Royal Commission Appointed to inquire into the methods by which Oriental Labourers have been induced to come to Canada (1908), the

impact of these high wages was to render ineffective the hitherto prohibitive head tax.⁴¹ The situation had been, therefore, very conducive for Asiatic immigration.⁴²

Naturally the railway companies welcomed this state of affairs; for the Laurier government, however, the situation was fraught with grave danger. This was dramatically shown by the Vancouver riots of September, 1907, and the subsequent growth of the Asiatic Exclusion League.⁴³ In 1908, the Dominion government responded to the protests emanating from British Columbia with two Orders-in-Council: the first excluded immigrants from coming to Canada other than by continuous journey from their country of birth, or citizenship; the second stipulated that immigrants from India had to have \$200.00 in their possession upon landing in Canada.⁴⁴ These Orders-in-Council complemented the celebrated Gentleman's Agreement between Canada and Japan of December, 1907. This arrangement had provided that control of Japanese immigration, especially from the labouring classes, would rest with the Japanese government.⁴⁵

These developments, however, did not mean that railroad entrepreneurs such as Charles M. Hays had discarded the notion that oriental labourers should be imported; nor did the arrangements of 1907-1908 mean that the Laurier Government

would be unresponsive to future suggestions that the regulations be relaxed. This was illustrated in 1909 when Charles Hays once again proposed an "open door" immigration policy.⁴⁶ Laurier's rationale for rejecting this overture was neither racial nor economic. He took his stand on purely political grounds:

The condition of things in British Columbia is now such that riots are to be feared if Oriental labour were to be brought in. You remember that in our last conversation upon this subject I told you that if the matter could be arranged so that you could have an absolute consensus of McBride, the dangers would probably be averted, but with the local government in active sympathy with the agitators the peace of the province would be really in danger and that consideration is paramount with me.⁴⁷

The fact that in the 1908 federal election the Liberals had lost five out of the seven seats they had previously held in British Columbia clearly weighed heavily with Laurier.⁴⁸ He was also no doubt influenced by the mounting evidence that both the federal and provincial Conservatives would in the future make even greater use of the "yellow peril".⁴⁹

By 1907, therefore, the Canadian railroad companies had reached an impasse with regard to a cheap labour supply. British workers were clearly unsuitable as an industrial proletariat, while oriental labourers could not be imported in sufficient quantities for ethnic and cultural reasons.

The response of the Canadian "captains of industry" to the situation was to turn increasingly towards central and southern Europe for their "coolie labour". Yet, this approach also embarrassed the Dominion government; by 1907 the idea had become popular in Canada that southern Europeans were of "inferior stock", inclined towards crime and immorality.⁵⁰ A distinction was made, however, between southern Europeans and central Europeans; the latter group, it was widely believed, were superior in a racial sense, as well as having preferable cultural qualities which were derived from their agrarian way of life.⁵¹

This bias against southern Europeans had been evident in the immigration priorities established during Clifford Sifton's term as Minister of the Interior, 1896-1905.⁵² In 1897, for example, W. F. McCreary, Commissioner of Immigration, had prevailed upon the Minister of Railways, Andrew Blair, to exert "mild" pressure on the C.P.R. to desist from importing Italian navvies from the United States.⁵³ According to McCreary, the Italians and many other southern Europeans were birds of passage, coming into the country with no intention of settling on the land or making any positive contribution.

In contrast, encouragement had been given to railway companies by the Dominion government to employ central Euro-

pean settlers. The railway companies had found this group appealing because "they ask no light-handed work . . . they have been obedient and industrious".⁵⁴ This docility was perhaps not surprising, for in 1900, James A. Smart, the Deputy Minister of the Interior, had made it very clear to his subordinates that the central European settler-labourer should be discouraged from adopting collective bargaining tactics. "They should be told when they need work they had better take the wages they are offered."⁵⁵

The 1901 strike of the maintenance-of-way employees, "the humble and unlettered trackmen" provided an example of how the foreign worker was regarded by the C.P.R.⁵⁶ The strike also revealed the extent to which the Dominion government was willing to accommodate the company.

The C.P.R. was bent on smashing the strike; it refused to cooperate with representatives of the strikers, and denounced the President of the Brotherhood of Railway Trackmen as a "foreign agitator".⁵⁷ It also set about recruiting strike breakers both in Canada and from the United States. These tactics placed the Laurier government in a very awkward position.

The attempt by the Canadian Pacific to use the Winnipeg immigration officers "not only to recruit scabs

...", but to coerce the Galician and Doukhobor workers, threatened to destroy the credibility of the Immigration Branch with both the immigrants and organized labour.⁵⁸ But Commissioner J. Obed Smith, of the office, refused to accommodate the Company despite pressure from the C.P.R.⁵⁹ His predecessor, W. F. McCreary, however, held a different view. He informed Clifford Sifton that the consequences of strained relations with the C.P.R. "would be disastrous for Canadian immigration ventures".⁶⁰

Ultimately it was the McCreary attitude which prevailed. The C.P.R. was allowed to import "four or five hundred pauperized Italians" from the United States in contravention of the Alien Labour Law.⁶¹ This Act, passed in 1897, forbade companies from bringing contract labour into Canada, or in any way encouraging or assisting the importation of alien workers.⁶² By the time of the strike, however, the Dominion government was not directly responsible for the enforcement of this legislation, rather enforcement depended upon individual action before the courts.⁶³ Mackenzie King, the Deputy Minister of Labour, brought the Alien Labour Act to the attention of the C.P.R. President, but the Dominion government otherwise ignored the situation.⁶⁴ During the next three years, the Canadian Pacific not only continued to import

Italian navvies from the United States, but actually developed a scheme whereby these men were supplied on a regular basis by an organization operating out of Montreal.⁶⁵

By 1904 there were between six and eight thousand destitute Italian labourers in Montreal. Urged by Montreal civic officials, the Montreal Trades and Labour Council, the Montreal Italian Immigration Society and the Italian Consul in the city, the Laurier government was finally forced to act.⁶⁶ A Royal Commission was established under the chairmanship of Judge John Winchester, which ultimately indicted the C.P.R. in a scathing fashion.⁶⁷ Yet no attempt was subsequently made to strengthen the Alien Labour Law.⁶⁸ If anything, the trend was in the opposite direction.

Between 1906-1908 actual construction on the various sections of the Grand Trunk Pacific and the National Trans-continental was initiated; the "new" railway boom was about to begin.⁶⁹ In keeping with the optimism of the period, in 1907, Frank Morse, the Vice President and General Manager of the Grand Trunk Pacific, stated that his company needed 20,000 navvies, and suggested that the Laurier government consider advancing the fares of these men in order to expedite recruitment.⁷⁰ Given the attitude which had developed towards British and Oriental navvies it is not surprising that

in this situation the contractors of the Grand Trunk Pacific and National Transcontinental now turned towards southern Europe for the fulfillment of their labour needs. Their recruitment programme, however, ran counter to the prejudices which had developed among Immigration officials, and in the country at large, against the admission of immigrants from this region. The Immigration Branch was primarily interested in agricultural immigrants who could be temporarily utilized in railroad construction work. They were prepared to adopt a tough line against the indiscriminate entry of "inferior" immigrants simply to meet the short-term needs of railway contractors. Hence, they attempted to enforce rigorously the continuous journey and money reserves regulations.⁷¹

From the point of view of railroad contractors, the Scandinavian and Galician settler-labourers favoured by the Immigration officials had several disadvantages.⁷² In the first place, these settler-labourers would only be available during the late spring and summer, quitting in August in order to harvest their crops.⁷³ Moreover, these immigrants were sufficiently thrifty that they quickly established themselves full time on the land, and so moved out of the labour market. In contrast, the Italian labourers were not interested in settling on the land; in fact, many of them

returned at the end of the construction season to the United States or to Italy. The Italians also preferred to remain aloof from other ethnic groups, "to form companies and board themselves, building little camps for that purpose, as they can do so for less than \$4.50 per week".⁷⁴ They also often followed the practice of working with the contractor through headmen or padrone.⁷⁵ Both the padrone system and the isolation of the camps held advantages for the contractor. Their internal discipline made the Italian labourers a reliable group; while their lack of contact with Canadian workers, especially with Canadian trade unions, tended to minimize the danger of a strike occurring.⁷⁶

In the clash between the Immigration Branch and the Railroad companies, the federal politicians were inclined more often than not to support the interests of the companies. When the need arose, the "open door" could usually be achieved by the large employers of labour through their political leverage. This was clearly indicated in the period 1910-1913 when Liberal and Conservative ministers acceded to the demands of the railway contractors for a relaxation of regulations pertaining to the immigration of navvies. During 1910, both the C.P.R. and the Grand Trunk Pacific exerted pressure on the government to admit "railroad labourers . . .

irrespective of nationality. . . ." The Grand Trunk Pacific contractors further insisted that they had to have southern Europeans who were "peculiarly suited for the work. . . ."77 After Laurier had been approached by Duncan Ross, a lobbyist for the construction firm of Foley, Welch & Stewart, during his "famous" 1910 tour of western Canada, the Dominion government capitulated on the issue.⁷⁸ By this time, of course, the prestige of the Laurier government was riding on the rapid completion of the Grand Trunk Pacific.⁷⁹ In this situation, neither the cause of Canadian racial purity, nor the opposition of organized labour, nor the objections of the Immigration Branch, nor the combined opposition of Frank Oliver, the Minister of the Interior, and William Lyon Mackenzie King, the Minister of Labour, could offset the influence of the railway contractors. Mackenzie King vividly described the mood of the Laurier cabinet:

Oliver is strong in his opposition to labour being brought into the country for work on railroads that ultimately is not going to be of service for settlement and favours making restrictions on virtually all save northern people of Europe. I agree with him, but we are about alone in this, others preferring to see railroad work hurried.⁸⁰

The coming to power of the Conservatives in 1911 did not significantly disrupt the government-contractor relationship; indeed, the ability of the business lobby to influence

immigration policy decisions was again clearly revealed in 1912. In that year the Immigration officials resumed their attempts to limit the number of southern Europeans entering Canada as railway navvies in response to increasing public complaints that those immigrants "constituted a serious menace to the community".⁸¹ However, the Minister of the Interior, Robert Rogers, was too good a politician to offend powerful vested interests. When it was brought to his attention by both Donald Mann of the Canadian Northern, and Timothy Foley, one of the leading contractors of the Grand Trunk Pacific; that the restrictions were unnecessary and indeed harmful, Rogers overruled his subordinates.⁸² The result was the free entry of alien navvies.⁸³

The admission of large numbers of southern Europeans, particularly Italian labourers, showed that the long standing goal of bringing into the country only the settler-labourer type of immigrant had been displaced by a policy of importing an industrial proletariat. Immigration statistics reveal that the percentage of unskilled labourers, as compared to the total male immigrants entering Canada, had increased from 31% in 1907 to 43% in 1913-1914.⁸⁴ In contrast, the percentage of agriculturalists decreased from 38% in 1907 to 28% in 1914.⁸⁵ Similarly, the ethnic aspects of immigration

policy revealed that there was a steady advance in the percentages of central and southern European immigrants from 29% in 1907 to 48% in 1913-1914.⁸⁶

Economic priorities were paramount in determining the attitude of the successive Dominion governments towards the industrial utilization of the immigrant navy. Completion of the Grand Trunk Pacific and the Canadian Northern was of such crucial importance that the Ottawa authorities seemed prepared to allow railroad contractors a free hand in the operation of the construction camps. This laissez-faire stance was adopted despite abundant evidence that working conditions were not only unsanitary but also hazardous.⁸⁷ The Annual Reports of the Department of Labour showed that the number of fatal accidents associated with the operation and construction of railroads was unusually high. Between 1904-1911, for example, out of a total of 9,340 fatal industrial accidents in Canada, 23% were related to the railway industry.⁸⁸ Even these statistics do not tell the true story. It was not until 1912 that the Dominion government required contractors receiving public funds to register fatalities occurring in their camps.⁸⁹ Even with this provision there was some question as to whether the number of recorded deaths of foreign labourers were always accurate: "'Oh, some Russian is buried there' was the passing

remark that commonly designated an unkempt plot in the vicinity of an erstwhile camp."⁹⁰ The human and economic consequences of the high rate of accidents connected with railroad construction were also illustrated in a report written by J. Bruce Walker, Commissioner of Immigration, in 1910. Walker reported that one of the reasons for the shortage of labour in the National Transcontinental construction camps around Fort William was that many Galician and Polish labourers would not accept construction jobs because "the majority of men now engaged in rock work are afraid of it on account of the numerous accidents. . . ."91

The contractors were also given a free hand with respect to the standards of accommodation provided in the construction camps. Although there was an obligation on the part of the head contractor, who accepted federal funds, to provide for the basic needs of the men, contractual arrangements and actual practice seemed often to have been at variance.⁹² Controversy over unsanitary conditions in navy camps, of course, has had a long history in Canadian railway construction.⁹³ In 1897 the C.P.R. had been charged with mistreating a group of Welsh navvies, and complaints continued to reach the attention of the federal government throughout the period under review.⁹⁴ In October, 1910, the

Edmonton Trades and Labor Council made representation to the Minister of Labour about the improper treatment of construction workers employed by the Grand Trunk Pacific.⁹⁵ The Council pointed out the disgraceful condition of the camps; the prevalence of typhoid fever within the camps; the inadequacy of the food and accommodation supplied to the men while en route to the job site; and the delays which were occurring in the payment of wages. Frank Plant, an official of the Department of Labour, was dispatched to Alberta to investigate the charges and submit a report. Plant noted some abuses, but, in general, he exonerated the Company and its leading contractors, especially Foley, Welch & Stewart, from the charges.⁹⁶ With respect to the living conditions within the camps, Plant noted that the accommodation was adequate, and the food generally wholesome. None of those interviewed, he optimistically reported, had had "any grievance as to treatment, food or accommodation".⁹⁷

Critics of the contracting companies were not so easily satisfied. It was alleged in labour circles that the government inspectors visited the bush camps only infrequently, and spent most of their time "at the end of steel", close to civilization.⁹⁸ It was further alleged that the men were often intimidated by the power of the head contractor who

". . . along the grade . . . is supreme . . . not unlike a Tartar chieftain".⁹⁹ The prospect of being dismissed, miles from settlement, was enough to deter most men.¹⁰⁰ And for the foreign worker, who was often unable to communicate in English, who was manipulated by an "ethnic straw-boss", and who had a basic mistrust of state officials, the government inspector simply did not offer a viable channel of protest.¹⁰¹

Conditions in the railroad construction camps of the Grand Trunk Pacific and the National Transcontinental continued to be an issue until the outbreak of war. In 1913, for example, another raft of complaints led to an investigation of the Foley, Welch & Stewart camps. Once again, however, the company was exonerated.¹⁰² This conclusion brought an angry response from militant elements in the labour movement.

According to the Eastern Labour News ". . . the false statements made as to living conditions . . . and given wide publicity in the capitalist press, will wisen up the workmen so that they will vote for a man to represent themselves, and not for the lying parasites who will always be against them".¹⁰³

The failure of government officials to redress their grievances turned many alien construction workers in the direction of radical labour. By 1912, the growing labour radicalism in the construction camps was a source of concern

to many of those who had immediate contact with these foreign workers.¹⁰⁴ What made it appear even more ominous was the fact that neither the companies involved, nor the federal or provincial governments, nor the institutionalized churches, nor even the Trades and Labor Congress seemed prepared to assume responsibility for the physical and spiritual needs of the alien navy.

The problem faced by the churches in relation to the foreign workers stemmed from insufficient resources and faulty organization.¹⁰⁵ The energies of the Presbyterian and Methodist churches, in particular, were consumed by the thousands of immigrants who were located on homesteads, or in urban ghettos.¹⁰⁶ That is not to say, however, that these two churches did not appreciate the need to both Christianize and Canadianize the immigrant in the bush camps. The Presbyterian Church, for example, in successive reports submitted by superintendents of the Northern Ontario Missions, manifest a profound concern for the welfare of the foreign worker.¹⁰⁷ But despite an initial commitment towards the Scandinavian workers in this region, it was not until 1909 that the Presbyterian church made an attempt to extend the missionary work to other nationalities.¹⁰⁸ Nor does it appear that this

effort among the foreign workers was very successful. In his 1912 Report, J. D. Brynes, the Superintendent of Northern Ontario Missions, referred to the fact that "little or nothing has been done for the thousands of foreigners pouring into this district".¹⁰⁹ The following year Brynes expressed alarm over the consequences of this spiritual deprivation: "many of these foreigners . . . are reading socialistic literature of the rankest type. We need missionaries who, understanding their language and ideals may direct their minds towards the true socialism taught by Jesus".¹¹⁰ Similar appeals also emanated from the British Columbia and Alberta missions.¹¹¹

The failure of the established churches in coping with the foreign workers was responsible for the formation of the Reading Camp Association, in 1899, by a young Presbyterian minister, the Reverend Alfred Fitzpatrick.¹¹² Fitzpatrick's concern was not specifically religious.¹¹³ Rather, he was interested in Canadianizing the men, teaching them the English language and introducing them to the native "ideals of citizenship, and . . . life".¹¹⁴ The Reading Camp Association attempted to elicit the support of the businessman-philanthropist, especially those associated with railways and mining operations, in its efforts to Canadianize the immigrant

worker. By 1912, the Association was supported financially by all three transcontinental railways, as well as by leading members of the Toronto business community.¹¹⁵ Writing in 1919, one business contributor rationalized his support for the Association in these words:

I am not very strong on Religious matters but my business training tells me that the work you are doing will go a long way to educate foreigners and rough fellows out on our Frontier and after all that is where the trouble in the Industrial World is most ready to break out or I might say that is amongst men of this type that the I.W.W. and Bolsheviki find their ground for sewing [sic] their seed, therefore I am pleased to help support the work.¹¹⁶

Yet if a segment of the business community out of enlightened self-interest were prepared to support at least some basic Canadianization work among the alien labourers, the federal government indicated no interest in such an undertaking. Successive appeals by the Association to both the Liberal and Conservative governments had all failed. For its efforts the Association was "slapped . . . over the back with the British North America Act, and referred . . . back to the provinces".¹¹⁷ Most of the provinces were likewise indifferent to the appeals of the Association, assuming, perhaps, that responsibility for these workers rested with the Dominion government.¹¹⁸ From Fitzpatrick's perspective, what made this rejection all the more frustrating was that neither

level of government, federal or provincial, had implemented their own Canadianization programmes among the immigrant workers in the industrial camps.¹¹⁹

The Canadian Trades and Labor Congress also seemed quite unconcerned about the plight of the foreign navy during most of the period under study. The Congress seems to have concerned itself mainly with the introduction of restrictive immigration measures designed to safeguard the job security of Canadian workers.¹²⁰ But even in this effort the T.L.C. directed its efforts mainly against British skilled mechanics and orientals. In 1911, however, the Congress began to display a greater interest in the problems of the alien worker. A resolution was passed at the Annual Convention calling for the services of the T.L.C. solicitor to be extended to the unskilled labourers in the construction camps "so as to prevent these workers from being intimidated by contractors and local law enforcement agencies".¹²¹

One explanation for the greater interest shown by the T.L.C. at this stage was to be found in the growing influence of the Industrial Workers of the World among the unskilled workers.¹²² The I.W.W. threat revealed itself in various strikes among the construction workers employed by contractors of the Grand Trunk Pacific and the Canadian Northern.¹²³ One

of the most serious strikes occurred in 1912 among the 7,000 navvies engaged in the construction of the Canadian Northern Railway.

Although the strike only directly affected one company, and did not extend beyond the borders of British Columbia, the incident had a number of wide-reaching implications. An article in the British Columbia Federationist of April 5, 1912, hailed the walkout as "an object lesson as to what a movement animated by an uncompromising spirit of revolt . . . can accomplish among the most heterogeneous army of slaves that any system of production ever assembled together".¹²⁴ In a later edition, the Federationist noted that ethnic antagonism that the railway contractors had utilized in dividing the men had been laid aside: "Canadians, Americans, Italians, Austrians, Swedes, Norwegians, French and Old Countrymen all on strike . . . a hint to King Capital to look for some other country more healthy for him to exploit labourers in than this".¹²⁵ Initially there seemed to be a reasonable chance for an I.W.W. victory, but increasingly the position of the employers improved as the power of both provincial and federal governments was brought to bear on the dispute. The high degree of class unity exhibited by the workers in the early stages of the strike was eroded by the ability of the contractor to hire "scab" labour from employment agencies in Vancouver

and Seattle.¹²⁶

The British Columbia Federationist alleged that the McBride government had rushed detachments of provincial police to the railway camps not only to protect the strike breakers, but also to arrest the strike leaders on trumped up charges.¹²⁷ There certainly appeared to be little evidence that the police had been dispatched to protect the strikers from the violence of professional thugs employed by the contractors.¹²⁸ The Borden government soon revealed its willingness to co-operate with management. Despite the objections of organized labour, few contractors had difficulties circumventing the Alien Labour Law in their efforts to import navvies from the United States. There is evidence that Donald Mann of the Canadian Northern and Timothy Foley, one of the principle contractors had prevailed upon Robert Rogers, the Minister of the Interior, to issue instructions allowing certain regulations to be waived by officials of the Immigration Department.¹²⁹ Furthermore, the Dominion government refused to consider a union request that a conciliation and arbitration board be established. The official reason given for this refusal was that railroad construction belonged to "a class of labour to which the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act could only be applied by the mutual consent of the employers

and employees".¹³⁰

Time worked against the strikers. As the Federationist so succinctly stated, "the threat of hunger makes cowards of us all".¹³¹ That the strike had been broken was clearly indicated in September when the Canadian Northern announced that most of the men had returned to work, and "the places of the others had been filled".¹³²

In the peak years between 1911-1914, an estimated 50,000 workers were engaged annually in the construction of the various transcontinentals and provincially-chartered railways.¹³³ The abrupt cessation of most of these projects, due to the unsettled international situation of 1914, meant that a high percentage of these labourers became unemployed.¹³⁴ The foreign navvy, whom the railroads had relied upon to supply the cyclical demands for construction labour, found the transition most difficult. Many navvies emigrated to the United States but large numbers drifted into the cities and towns, often destitute and unfamiliar with Canadian society. Here they became a focal point of racial tension and labour radicalism. Under the banner of economic growth, the Laurier and Borden governments had given a high priority to railroad construction. The amount of new track laid was impressive but the social costs were high.¹³⁵

CHAPTER IV

¹ Morris Zaslow, Canadian North, pp. 199-223; O. D. Skelton, The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier (Toronto, 1921), pp. 415-418; W. L. Morton, Manitoba: A History (Toronto, 1957), pp. 275-278, 298-300; James B. Hedges, Building the Canadian West: the land and colonization policies of the Canadian Pacific Railway (New York, 1939), pp. 34, 47, 129-130, 140-142, 390-391; G. R. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, vol. II (Toronto, 1963), pp. 12-19, 54-55.

² H. G. J. Aitken, "Defensive Expansionism: The State and Economic Growth in Canada", in W. T. Easterbrook and M.H. Watkin, Approaches to Canadian Economic History (Toronto, 1967), pp. 203-210.

³ Morris Zaslow, Canadian North, pp. 167-171, 180-181, 187-194, 215-222; James B. Hedges, Building the Canadian West, pp. 129-130, 140-141.

⁴ This point has been developed by the authors cited in fn. 1.

⁵ Immigration Branch, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter, I.B.), file 39145, W.F. McCreary, Commissioner of Immigration, Wpg. to Andrew G. Blair, Minister of Railways and Canals, June 21, 1897; Sessional Papers, 1900, no. 25, pt. 2, pp. 111, 147; ibid., 1902, no. 25, pt. 2, pp. 122, 139; ibid., 1903, no. 25, pt. 2, p. 111; ibid., 1904, no. 25, pt. 2, pp. 98-100.

⁶ Canada-A Handbook of Information for Intending Emigrants (Ottawa, 1874); Sessional Papers, 1896, no. 13, pt. 7, Annual Report of the High Commissioner, Sir Charles Tupper; House of Commons, Debates, 1897, p. 4067 (hereafter Debates); Sessional Papers, 1913, no. 25, pt. 2, p. 77; ibid., 1914, no. 25, pt. 2, pp. 80, 106; Debates, 1914, p. 1612; Norman Macdonald, Canada: Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903 (Toronto, 1968), pp. 148, 197; John W. Dufoe, Clifford Sifton in Relation to His Times (Toronto, 1931), pp. 132-144; W.T.R. Preston, My Generation of Politics and Politicians (Toronto, 1927), pp. 216-217; O.D. Skelton, Life of Laurier, pp. 46-47; Karl Bicha, "The Plains Farmer . . .", pp. 414-435.

⁷ H.C. Pentland, "The Development of a Capitalistic Labour Market in Canada", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXV (November, 1959), pp. 450,460.

⁸ Lloyd Reynolds, The British Immigrant, pp. 32-45; Sessional Papers, 1902-1915, Report of the Superintendent of Immigration.

⁹ Immigration from France is not discussed in this paper for two reasons. In the first place, the total number of French immigrants between the years 1900 and 1914 was only 25,273. Moreover, in terms of occupation, only 15% of the male immigrants arriving in the period 1906-1914 were placed in the general labourer category. (Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book IV, pp. 238-239; Sessional Papers, 1907-1908 to 1915, Report of the Superintendent of Immigration).

¹⁰ Rowland Berthoff, British Immigration in Industrial America, 1790-1950 (Cambridge, 1953), p. 21; Lloyd Reynolds, The British Immigrant, p. 299.

¹¹ Lloyd Reynolds, The British Immigrant, p. 21; Sessional Papers, 1907-1908, no. 25, pt. 2, pp. 67, 85; ibid., 1911, no. 25, pt. 2, pp. 75, 95; ibid., 1912, no. 25, pt. 2, pp. 70, 94.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Lloyd Reynolds, The British Immigrant, p. 46.

¹⁴ I.B., file no. 39501, Memorandum, James A. Smart (Deputy Minister of the Interior), 1897, n.d.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., James A. Smart to Thomas Shaughnessy, October 26, 1897.

¹⁷ Ibid. In October, 1897, the Canadian Agent in Cardiff, Wales, W.L. Griffith, informed Smart that as a result of the statements appearing in the press "matters are very ugly here. The people are prepared to mob me. . . ." W.L. Griffith to J.A. Smart, October 25, 1897.

¹⁸ Ibid., Thomas Shaughnessy to James A. Stewart, October 27, 1897.

- ¹⁹ Martin Robin, "British Columbia: The Politics of Class Conflict", in Martin Robin (ed.), Canadian Provincial Politics (Scarborough, 1972), pp. 29-30. Similar American studies have revealed the same trend: Neil Betten, "The Origins of Ethnic Radicalism in Northern Minnesota, 1900-1920", International Migration Review, IV, no. 2 (Summer, 1970), pp. 51, 55; Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (Chicago, 1969), pp. 320-321. This trend has also been described from the ethnic perspective by Joseph Kirschbaum, Slovacs in Canada (Toronto, 1967), pp. 69-76.
- ²⁰ John W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton, pp. 148-152, 322; Lloyd Reynolds, The British Immigrant, pp. 41-45, 72-73; Carl Berger, A Sense of Power, pp. 181, 260; Edmund Bradwin, The Bunkhouse Man, pp. 94, 211.
- ²¹ Basil Stewart, "No English Need Apply" or, Canada as a Field for the Emigrant (London, 1909), pp. 25-40; G.F. Plant, Overseas Settlement: Migration from the United Kingdom to the Dominions (London, 1951), pp. 59-60; Special Report on Immigration, dealing mainly with co-operation between the Dominion and Provincial Governments and the movement of people from the United Kingdom to Canada, Arthur Hawkes, Commissioner (Ottawa, 1913), pp. 10, 20-22.
- ²² Sir Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter, Laurier Papers), 125151, Editor, East Anglican Daily Times, Ipswich, to Laurier, May 8, 1907.
- ²³ Ibid., 125152, Laurier to Editor, East Anglican Daily Times, May 10, 1907; Edmund Bradwin, The Bunkhouse Man, pp. 94, 211; G.R. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, vol. II, pp. 194-195; I.B., file 571672, no. I, W.D. Scott to Lord Strathcona, January 11, 1907.
- ²⁴ I.B., file 39501, W.F. McCreary to James A. Smart, October 30, 1897.
- ²⁵ "Evidence", Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration, 1885, pp. 55-57, 85, 95; Report (Gray's Section), p. lxix; Carl Berger, The Sense of Power, p. 231; Charles J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, pp. 35-38.
- ²⁶ Charles Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 29; Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia: A History, p. 280.

²⁷Debates, 1882, 1477; Andrew Onderdonk, the chief contractor of the British Columbia section had informed Macdonald in 1882 that unless he was allowed to import Chinese coolies, the C.P.R. would not be finished for another twelve years, Macdonald Papers, 144771. A. Onderdonk to John A. Macdonald, June 14, 1882. Eventually Onderdonk brought over 10,000 Chinese into British Columbia. Pierre Berton, The Last Spike, p. 204.

²⁸Debates, 1883, 1905.

²⁹Charles Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 41.

³⁰See fn. 25.

³¹"Evidence", Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration, 1885, pp. 48, 83, 125, 140; Debates, 1883, 904; ibid., 1884, 975-976.

³²"Evidence", Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration, 1885, p. 46.

³³Ibid., p. 156.

³⁴The Laurier government received numerous letters from large employers of labour, both agricultural and industrial, particularly when in 1903 it was proposed to increase the head tax to \$500.00.

³⁵Laurier Papers, 5749, Sir William Van Horne, President of C.P.R. to J.C. McLagan, Editor of Vancouver World, July 17, 1896; ibid., 41460, Thomas Shaughnessy to Laurier, January 26, 1900; ibid., 71362, D. McNicoll, General Manager, to Laurier, March 31, 1903.

³⁶Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Methods by which Oriental Labourers have been induced to Come to Canada (Ottawa, 1908), pp. 5, 13, 18, 54. Mackenzie King Papers (King Papers, P.A.C.), C-29731, C-29478.

³⁷Report of the Royal Commission . . . Oriental Labourers, pp. 15, 19; Sessional Papers, 1909, no. 36, Report of the Deputy Minister of Labour, pp. 111-112; King Papers, C-30258-30259.

³⁸The Bruce Times, March 7, 1907; I.B., file 594511, no.1.

³⁹ Montreal Daily Herald, September 28, 1907; I.B., file 594511, no. 2. For an account of the anti-Asiatic riots see Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia: A History, pp. 350-351.

⁴⁰ The Labour Gazette, vol. VII, 1906-1907, p. 261; Sessional Papers, 1911, no. 36, Report of the Deputy Minister of Labour, p. 95.

⁴¹ Sessional Papers, 1911, no. 36, p. 95.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia: A History, pp. 350-351. Extensive correspondence on the activities of the Asiatic Exclusion League are to be found in the correspondence between W.W.B. McInnes and Laurier during 1907 and 1908. Laurier Papers, 129162, 131593, 131596, 134026, 136303, 136615.

⁴⁴ John Duncan Cameron, "The Law Relating to Immigration to Canada, 1867-1942", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of Law, University of Toronto, 1942, pp. 265-269; R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1874-1923 (Toronto, 1958), p. 164; Charles Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, pp. 82-94, 103, 289; Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, 1839-1964 (Princeton, 1966), pp. 160-175.

⁴⁵ The negotiations associated with the "Gentleman's Agreement" are fully documented in the Laurier Papers, the King Papers, and the Rodolphe Lemieux Papers (P.A.C.)

⁴⁶ Laurier Papers, 160620-160621, Charles Hays to Laurier, October 4, 1909; ibid., Hays to Laurier, November 10, 1909; G.R. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, vol. II, pp. 226-227.

⁴⁷ Laurier Papers, 161983, Laurier to Hays, November 12, 1909. There are indications that in 1912 the G.T.P. approached the British Columbia government requesting their assent to the importation of Chinese navies. The McBride government refused. A.W. Currie, The Grand Trunk Railway in Canada (Toronto, 1957), p. 412.

⁴⁸ Charles Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 94. Although Laurier's biographer, O.D. Skelton stressed the fact that "Laurier sacrificed British Columbia's seats rather than compete with Mr. Borden in concessions to the exclusionists. . . ." it was quite apparent that there were limits to this sacrifice. (O.D. Skelton, Sir Wilfrid Laurier), p. 348.

⁴⁹ Charles Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, pp. 96-99; Ottawa Free Press, September 23, 1910; Vancouver Province, October 6, 1910; Debates, 1911, 286, 9815-9850.

⁵⁰ Allan Smith, "Metaphor and Nationality in North America", Canadian Historical Review (CHR), LI, no. 3, (September, 1970), p. 250. J.S. Woodsworth, Strangers Within Our Gates, p. 159. John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1955) has provided an excellent study of American bias towards southern European immigrants

⁵¹ This point was made in countless letters from Immigration officials, especially in I.B., file 594511, nos. 1-6.

⁵² Sifton appears to have had a very low opinion of Italian immigration. Clifford Sifton Papers, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter, Sifton Papers), 89315, Sifton to Smart, November 16, 1901.

⁵³ I.B., file 39145, no. 1, W.F. McCreary to A.G. Blair, June 21, 1897.

⁵⁴ I.B., file 60868, no. 1, C.W. Speers, Travelling Immigration Inspector to Frank Pedley, Superintendent of Immigration, January 24, 1900.

⁵⁵ I.B., file 39145, no. 1, James A. Smart to W.F. McCreary, June 5, 1900.

⁵⁶ John Wilson, The Calcium Light: Turned on by a Railway Trackman (St. Louis, 1902), introduction.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 42.

⁵⁸ I.B., file 39145, no. 1, J. Obed Smith, Commissioner, to Frank Pedley, June 24, 1901; ibid., Smith to J.W. Leonard, General Superintendent Western Division, C.P.R., June 25, 1901; Inland Sentinel, cited John Wilson, The Calcium Light,

p. 51; The Voice, cited ibid., p. 51.

⁵⁹ I.B., file 39145, no. 1, J. Obed Smith to Frank Pedley, June 26, 1901.

⁶⁰ Sifton Papers, 83178, W.F. McCreary to Clifford Sifton, July 3, 1901. McCreary was a Winnipeg lawyer who had been very active in civic affairs during the 1880's and 1890's. After three years as Commissioner of Immigration (1897-1900) he was elected for the federal constituency of Selkirk. The Canadian Guide, 1903 (Ottawa, 1903), p. 111. It does appear from both his stand in 1901, and his previous attempts to work in a co-operative fashion with the C.P.R., that McCreary regarded the support of the C.P.R. as very important to the cause of the Liberal Party.

⁶¹ Ibid., J. Obed Smith to Frank Pedley, June 26.

⁶² W.D. Atkinson, "Organized Labour and the Laurier Administration", pp. 20-35; Martin Robin, Radical Labour, pp. 54-55.

⁶³ Martin Robin, Radical Labour, p. 55; H.A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada, pp. 483, 488.

⁶⁴ Mackenzie King to Thomas Shaughnessy, July 3, 1901, cited, John Wilson, The Calcium Light, p. 46.

⁶⁵ I.B., file 39145, no. 1, J. Obed Smith to W.D. Scott (the new Superintendent of Immigration), May 7, 1903; Report, Royal Commission to Inquire into the Immigration of Italian Labourers to Montreal, and alleged fraudulent practices employment agencies (Ottawa, 1904), p. 19.

⁶⁶ I.B., file 28885, no. 2, Chevalier Honore Catelli, President, Montreal Italian Immigration Society to Dr. A.D. Stewart, April 15, 1904; Catelli to Stewart, April 29, 1904; Dr. Peter Bryce, Immigration Medical Inspector, to James A. Smart, April 23, 1904; Sessional Papers, 1906, no. 36, Report of the Deputy Minister, p. 88.

⁶⁷ Royal Commission to Inquire into the Immigration of Italian Labourers. . . . , p. 72.

⁶⁸ H.A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada, pp. 483, 488.

⁶⁹G.R. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, vol. II, pp. 159-163, 172-183, 214-217.

⁷⁰The Bruce Times, March 7, 1907; I.B., file 594511, no. 2, Frank Morse to Acting Superintendent of Immigration, L.M. Fortier, October 15, 1907. Morse had been hired as General Manager of the G.T.P. by Charles Hays, and apparently the choice was disastrous. G.R. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, vol. II, p. 224. Peter Veregin, the Doukhobor Leader, publicly announced his intention to try and recruit 10,000 Russian railway labourers as an illustration of his good will towards The Canadian Government. James Mavor Papers (University of Toronto Archives (hereafter Mavor Papers), James Mavor to George Cox, Toronto, April 12, 1907. It is significant that by the period 1910-1914 some 50,000 navies were also required annually. Labour Gazette, July, 1911 - June, 1912, XII, p. 721. See also Monthly Reports Pertaining to Railroad Construction, 1910-1914.

⁷¹Extensive correspondence by Immigration officials on this problem of restriction is located in I.B., file 594511, nos. 2-6; Sessional Papers, 1911, no. 25, pt. 2, p. 104; ibid., 1914, no. 25, pt. 2, p. 144. What also troubled Canadian Immigration officials was the difficulty of deporting "undesirable" non-naturalized Slavic and Italian labourers who entered Canada from the United States. I.B., file 594511, no. 3, F.H. Larned, Acting Commissioner-General, Immigration and Naturalization, June 16, 1909.

⁷²In 1908, W.D. Scott had taken considerable exception to the ethnic groups which the Grand Trunk Pacific was attempting to import into Canada. I.B., file 594511, no. 2, W.D. Scott to J.T. Davis, May 4, 1908.

⁷³I.B., file 571672, no. 1, Blake Robertson, Immigration Special Inspector, to Frank Oliver, October 10, 1907.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Ibid. The padrone system has been extensively discussed by American studies on the subject of Italian immigration. Maldwyn Jones, American Immigration (Chicago, 1961), pp. 190-192, provided a very succinct explanation of how the system worked. The Royal Commission to Inquire into the Immigration of Italian Labourers. . . ., p. 19, provides a vivid description of how the padrone Gerardo Cordasco operated.

76 Edmund Bradwin, The Bunkhouse Man, pp. 110-111; Proceedings before the Royal Commission on Industrial Relations, 1919 (Department of Labour, Library, Ottawa), Edmonton Hearings, pp. 12, 52; ibid., Cobalt Hearings, pp. 1757, 1764.

77 I.B., file 594511, no. 3, W.D. Scott to D. McNicoll, Vice President, July 6, 1910; ibid., J.O. Reddie, G.T.P., to W.D. Scott, April 1, 1910.

78 Laurier Papers, 182131, Duncan Ross to Laurier, February 27, 1911; I.B., file 594511, no. 3, W.W. Cory, Deputy Minister of the Interior, to W.D. Scott, July 16, 1910.

79 I.B., file 594511, no. 3, W.J. Bartlett, Secretary, Winnipeg Trades and Labour Council to Frank Oliver, Minister of the Interior, August 3, 1910. Attorney General, W.J. Bowser, of the British Columbia government, in September, 1911, charged the Immigration Branch with consciously violating the Alien Labour Law by allowing railway companies to import navies from the United States (Montreal Daily Star, September 5, 1911; Vancouver News Advertiser, September 7, 1911).

80 The King Diary, January 10, 1911, P.A.C.

81 I.B., file 594511, no. 3, Report, J.M. Langley, Chief of Police, to Mayor Alderman, City of Victoria, B.C., August 28, 1911; ibid., no. 5, J. Bruce Walker, Commissioner of Immigration, to W.D. Scott, March 12, 1912.

82 ibid., no. 5, Donald Mann to W.D. Scott, August 20, 1912; ibid., Timothy Foley to Robert Rogers, March 27, 1912. Three quarters of the total construction mileage was awarded to Foley Brothers in their many different partnerships. They were an American contracting company which had considerable experience with both the C.P.R. and the Canadian Northern. G.R. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, vol. II, p. 176.

83 I.B., file 594511, no. 5, Memorandum, Office of the Minister of the Interior to W.W. Cory, Deputy Minister of the Interior, April 2, 1912. John D. Cameron, The Law Relating to Immigration, p. 278.

⁸⁴ Statistics tabulated from Sessional Papers, 1907-1908, no. 25, pt. 2, Report of the Superintendent of Immigration; ibid., 1915, no. 25, pt. 2, Report of the Superintendent of Immigration.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid. For the railway contractors the outbreak of conflict in the Balkans meant that many of their Bulgarian navies rapidly returned to Europe. The Christian Guardian, November 12, 1912, Ed.

⁸⁷ There was quite a difference of opinion between the accounts included in labour newspapers such as The Voice and the official reports of investigators sent out by the Department of Labour and the Immigration Branch.

⁸⁸ Statistics tabulated from Sessional Papers, 1913, no. 36, Report of the Deputy Minister of Labour, p. 72.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 12.

⁹⁰ Edmund Bradwin, The Bunkhouse Man, pp. 153, 200, 212.

⁹¹ I.B., file 594511, no. 3, J. Bruce Walker to W.D. Scott, February 16, 1910.

⁹² Edmund Bradwin, The Bunkhouse Man, pp. 81, 144-153, 200, 206. The Department of Labour had the responsibility of enforcing the Fair Wages Regulation (1900) which established certain employment practices applicable to employers who were receiving either a federal subsidy or guarantee. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, pp. 70-71; Sessional Papers, 1907, no. 36, Report of the Deputy Minister of Labour, pp. 64-67.

⁹³ Partial accounts of camp conditions are included in Pierre Berton, The Last Spike, pp. 110, 194-205, 275-279; Terry Coleman, The Railway Navies, pp. 66, 80; A.W. Currie, The Grand Trunk, pp. 28-29.

⁹⁴ I.B., file 39501, no. 1, James A. Smart to Thomas Shaughnessy, October 26, 1897. Also see pages 9-10. In 1906 a series of complaints were submitted by a party of Scottish navies concerning the construction camps of the Grand Trunk Pacific. I.B., file 751672, no. 1, Lord Strathcona,

High Commissioner, to Frank Oliver, December 5, 1906.

⁹⁵ Sessional Papers, 1912, no. 36, pp. 88-100.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Edmund Bradwin, The Bunkhouse Man, pp. 206, 216.

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 198, 206-213.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Sessional Papers, 1914, no. 36, p. 58.

¹⁰³ Eastern Labour News, May 24, 1913.

¹⁰⁴ Edmund Bradwin, The Bunkhouse Man, p. 234.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 219-220. In this study the author has restricted his analysis to the Methodists and Presbyterians. Certainly the role of the Catholic Church in the bush camps among the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic navies would be a study of considerable importance.

¹⁰⁶ Apparently the Methodist Church spent about a quarter of a million dollars on their missions among the foreigners between 1896 and 1914. George Emery, "Methodist on the Canadian Prairies, 1896-1914", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia, 1970, p. 346. The Presbyterians were also very much committed. See Presbyterian Church in Canada, 'Report of the Board of Home Missions', Acts and Proceedings of the General Assembly (hereafter cited as Presbyterian Acts and Proceedings), 1900-1914, (United Church Archives). W.G. Smith, Building the Nation: The Churches' Relation to the Immigrants (Toronto, 1920), pp. 65-77, 127-128, 176, 193.

¹⁰⁷ Report of the Board of Home Missions, Presbyterian Acts and Proceedings, 1901, p. 12; ibid., 1907, p. 12.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 1909, p. 9.

- ¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 1912, p. 12
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid., 1914, p. 23.
- ¹¹¹ Ibid., 1912, p. 18; ibid., 1913, pp. 44, 57.
Although there was an attempt to relate the churches to labour prior to 1914, the Labour Churches really did not emerge in Canada until 1919. Richard Allen, The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada, 1914-1928 (Toronto, 1971), pp. 13, 37, 80-103.
- ¹¹² Frontier College Papers, 1919, P.A.C. (known as the Reading Camp Association until 1919), A. Fitzpatrick to H.H. Fudger, President, Robert Simpson Co., November, 1919; Alfred Fitzpatrick, University in Overalls, pp. x, 13; Edmund Bradwin, The Sunkhouse Man, pp. 14-17.
- ¹¹³ Frontier College Papers, 1912, A. Fitzpatrick to Dr. M.E. Church, December 2, 1912.
- ¹¹⁴ Ibid., 1912, A. Fitzpatrick to H.H. Fudger, November, 19, 1919.
- ¹¹⁵ Ibid., 1912, A. Fitzpatrick to James Hales, July 31, 1912; ibid., Fitzpatrick to J.B. Skeaff, Manager, Bank of Toronto, July 29, 1912.
- ¹¹⁶ Ibid., 1919, Wallace Robb, President of The Cannuck Supply Co., Montreal, November 14, 1919.
- ¹¹⁷ Ibid., A. Fitzpatrick to R.H. Grant, Minister of Education, Government of Ontario, December 17, 1919.
- ¹¹⁸ Ontario had been the first province to provide financial assistance, with amounts ranging from \$25.00 in 1900 to \$1,750.00 in 1912. Ibid., A. Fitzpatrick to R.H. Grant, December 17, 1919. In 1919 both Saskatchewan and Alberta indicated that they would provide \$250.00 each; ibid., Augustus Ball, Deputy Minister of Education, Government of Saskatchewan, to Fitzpatrick, November 5, 1919; ibid., John Ross, Deputy Minister of Education, Alberta, to Fitzpatrick, February 1, 1919.
- ¹¹⁹ Numerous authors urged government to move in this direction, most notably, J.S. Woodsworth, Strangers Within Our Gates, J.T. M. Anderson, The Education of the New

Canadian, W.G. Smith, Building the Nation: The Churches in Relation to the Immigrant, Edmund Bradwin, The Bunkhouse Man, and of course Fitzpatrick, University in Overalls.

120 Edmund Bradwin, The Bunkhouse Man, p. 134; Proceedings of the Twenty-sixth Annual Session of the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (1910), p. 41. I.B., file 594511, no. 3, L.M. Fortier, Acting Superintendent of Immigration to P.M. Draper, September 1, 1910.

121 Proceedings of the Twenty-seventh Annual Session of the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (1911), p. 83.

122 Edmund Bradwin, The Bunkhouse Man, p. 234; H.A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada, p. 299. An excellent account of the success achieved by the I.W.W. among the unskilled labourers is by Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the International Workers of the World, pp. 24, 26, 151.

123 G.R. Stevens, The Canadian National Railways, vol. II, pp. 194-195.

124 British Columbia Federationist, April 5, 1912, p. 1.

125 Ibid., June 8, 1912, p. 1.

126 Ibid. The Western Wage Earner, April, 1909, p. 4.

127 British Columbia Federationist, June 29, 1912, p. 1., ibid., June 22, 1912, p. 1.

128 Ibid.

129 I.B., file 594511, no. 3. Donald Mann to W.D. Scott, August 26, 1912; ibid., Timothy Foley to Robert Rogers, March 27, 1912. See discussion on page

130 The Labour Gazette, August, 1912, p. 191.

131 British Columbia Federationist, May 6, 1912.

132 The Labour Gazette, July, 1912, p. 79.

133 Ibid., February, 1912, p. 721. See monthly reports, The Labour Gazette, July, 1910 - July, 1914.

134 In September, 1914, The Labour Gazette reported that railway construction had "somewhat halted upon the advent of war. . . ." Ibid., September, 1914, p. 332. Throughout the next twelve months continual reports were made on the number of unemployed navies who had gravitated to cities such as Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Vancouver. Ibid., October, 1914 - September, 1915. Ibid., Passim.

135 The amount of railway mileage in Canada more than doubled between 1896 and 1914. By 1921, only taking the Canadian Pacific system and the railways owned by the Dominion government, there were 39,452 miles of track. G.R. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, vol. II, pp. 17, 519.

CHAPTER V

THE IMMIGRANT MINER

Many of the trends that were discernible in the immigration of foreign navvies to Canada, between 1896 and 1914 were also applicable to the utilization of immigrant miners.¹ Both groups tended to conform to the dictates of the capitalistic labour market, although there were certain differences in the pattern of employment.¹ While the demand for railroad construction workers tended to be seasonal, the mining operations functioned year round unless an over-supply of the mineral on the market necessitated a reduction in production. But one factor was crucial to both the railroad contractor and the mining operator: the need to minimize labour costs. The search for cheap, unskilled labour, non-unionized and malleable was a major pre-occupation of mine managers. It is not surprising, therefore, that the mining lobby should actively "push for an 'open door' immigration policy. One mining authority stated: "Canadians won't work in a mine. They are quite willing to boss the job but they are not going to do the rough work themselves. . . . What we want is brawn and muscle, and we get it".²

By 1911 over 50% of the mining labour force were immigrants.³ The economic and social impact of this influx of thousands of immigrant miners was far reaching. There is little doubt that the presence of these men made possible the extensive development of this area of the Canadian economy. In contrast to the railroad construction crews of the 1880's and 1900's, where the Anglo-Saxon navy had not been the major component, the largest percentage of miners in Canada were Anglo-Saxon. Many had come from parts of the British Isles where their family tradition in mining went back several generations. In general, Anglo-Saxon miners regarded themselves as members of a skilled trade and reacted decisively to any attempts by management to alter the ethnic composition or the skill requirements of the labour force as an attack upon their calling.

The ethnic animosity between Anglo-Saxon and foreign workers was a factor that tended to vary in terms of regions and over time. Whereas the Anglo-Saxon trade union leaders tended to regard the Italian, the Slavic and especially the Asiatic worker as an undesirable competitor in the early part of the century, by 1914 there were definite indications of ethnic co-operation in labour organizations such as the United Mine Workers of America and the Industrial Workers of the World.

Management tended to go through a very different experience. Before 1900, management openly stressed the positive attributes of the non-Anglo-Saxon worker; but by 1914, the foreign worker because of his involvement with radical labour unions and socialist organizations was viewed as a threat to the capitalist economic system. The social consequences of multi-ethnic tensions were reflected in mining communities across the country. The prevalence of drunkenness, social vice, brawling and homicide tended to be blamed increasingly on the foreign worker. As these communities advanced beyond the initial "boom" stage, the Anglo-Canadian segment of the population became less patient with the polygot character of many urban areas. The many strange languages and bizarre customs became an affront to the Anglo-Canadian management and merchant class. As a result, by 1914, there was growing pressure on the Dominion government to weigh these disadvantages against the imperatives of economic development.

The influence of mining interests in determining immigration policy was not as evident as in the case of the railway companies and contractors. While it was admitted that the mining industry was important, especially in British

Columbia, Alberta, northern Ontario and Nova Scotia, it was the provincial governments more than the federal governments upon whom the most effective leverage could be exerted. It was primarily the provincial governments that had direct jurisdiction over mining operations, and they were the major recipients of mining royalties.⁴ Still the federal government was susceptible to the pressures of powerful mining companies as various trends indicate.

In the first place, the growing importance of mining to the Canadian economy could not be overlooked. Between 1895 and 1907 the productivity of the Canadian mining industry more than quadrupled, with both the metallic and non-metallic sectors of the industry experiencing rather phenomenal growth. Table A indicates the change for certain selected areas of the industry.

TABLE A
PRODUCTION LEVELS OF THE CANADIAN MINING INDUSTRY⁵

<u>Value of Product</u>	<u>Value of Product</u>		<u>% Increase</u>
	<u>1900 (\$)</u>	<u>1910 (\$)</u>	
<u>Canada</u>	47,956,862	122,004,932	154
Metallic ores	25,161,151	48,978,790	95
Fuel	14,095,477	37,514,108	166
<u>British Columbia</u>	14,679,777	24,581,338	67
Metallic ores	10,559,369	13,455,627	27
Fuel	3,902,438	8,413,098	116

<u>Nova Scotia</u>	9,042,003	17,059,122	89	
Metallic ores	1,277,349	294,921	nil	(333% decline)
Fuel	7,366,165	15,468,662	110	
<u>Ontario</u>	10,417,576	49,727,400	377	
Metallic ores	3,767,054	30,693,460	715	
Fuels (petroleum)	2,072,200	4,795,467	131	
<u>Alberta</u>	718,645	10,515,074	1,363	
Metallic ores	--	--	--	
Fuel	686,645	7,854,275	1,044	

The occupational and demographic aspects of this mining "boom" were also very significant. Whereas in 1901 the number of miners in Canada was only 28,650 or 1.8% of the total male labour force, by 1911 the number had increased to 62,767, representing 2.6% of the male workers of the country.⁶ Although a large number of Canadian-born workers became involved in the mining operation, during this decade, of all the industries of Canada, mining showed the highest percentage of foreign-born;⁷

TABLE SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF IMMIGRANT MINERS OF TOTAL MINE WORK FORCE FOR SELECTED PROVINCES, 1911⁸

<u>Province</u>	<u>Total Miners</u>	<u>% of Immigrant Miners</u>
Nova Scotia	17,134	28
Ontario	16,839	48
British Columbia	15,560	84
Alberta	5,164	88

an average of 52% for the industry as a whole.

The fact that the mining community was aware of the need for abundant supplies of immigrant labour can be discerned from the pressure the mining lobby exerted on the Dominion government to allow a free flow of labour into the country. In 1907, the Canadian Mining Journal, official organ of the mining industry, went even further, and pointed out that since "the Federal Government employs emigration agents in Europe. . . . It should be quite feasible not only to select the proper class of workers across the ocean, but to place them exactly where they are needed".⁹

The position of the Dominion government towards the mining companies was quite different from its stance towards the railway companies. In contrast to the active support given to the recruitment of the immigrant navy, the Immigration Branch remained neutral on the issue of attracting miners to Canada. It does appear, however, that every benefit of doubt was given to the mining companies in their assertion that more miners were needed. Thus, the 1906 Immigration Guidelines stipulated that if a miner indicated that he intended to go to Canada ostensibly as a farm labourer he would qualify for the bonus.¹⁰ The Immigration Branch also appeared to adopt a very casual attitude towards the

recruitment of miners in Great Britain, Europe and even the United States by mining companies during lengthy industrial disputes to act as strike-breakers.¹¹

The very nature of the mining operation meant that a large number of men were needed rather quickly; it was also necessary that these men should include both skilled and unskilled workers. There were distinct gradations of skill within every mine, a pattern that was usually reflected in the ethnic composition of the work force. As a result, the supervisors, the certified miners and the skilled mechanics were normally either Anglo-Saxons or Scandinavians. At the other end of the mining spectrum, the underground labourers, the miners' helpers, and the surface labourers were composed of diverse ethnic groups, varying as to the region where the mine was located.¹² The value of such an ethnic caste system extended beyond pure economics. One prominent mine manager of the period, Edmund Kirby, outlined the reasoning behind the company's personnel policy: "In all the lower grades of labour and especially in smelter labour it is necessary to have a mixture of races which includes a number of illiterates who are first-class workmen. They are the strength of the employer, and the weakness of the union".¹³

British-born workers formed the single most important element in the mines of the country. Both in terms of numbers and mining experience, the British miner assumed a predominant influence on the development of the mining labour force. Indeed, there were a number of characteristics associated with the British mining tradition that differentiated this type of work from ordinary unskilled labour. Although the work in the mines was often very exacting, the miner had a sense of being his own boss. Underground, the miner made the decision as to how a particular seam would be worked; his skill with hand tools maximized the amount of productivity. In Britain, miners were usually paid by the number of tons they mined. Because of the skill and experience required, miners regarded their work as not just a job but a calling. Young men entered the mines usually before the age of twelve and worked their way through from door tender, to pit-pony drawer, to drawer, to timberer, and eventually to miner. In mining regions such as South Wales, Lancashire and south-western Scotland, generations of miners were so produced.¹⁴

This craft mentality was reinforced by a common sense of collective security. The danger associated with mining meant that "every man had to depend on every other man".¹⁵ Carelessness, and ignorance in the mines could be fatal to all

concerned, and the miners were subject to intense group discipline. In Great Britain, with a mining labour force consisting of almost 100% native-born workers, this group discipline was quite effective. Another aspect of the group solidarity was the degree of commitment to labour unions. As one British miner stated, "everybody belonged to unions -- it was taken for granted as a normal part of life. Both for protection on the job and as a social group, the union was a permanent and necessary institution".¹⁶ British miners attempted to transfer intact this highly-structured system across the Atlantic. Technological and managerial innovations, however, operated against the transplantation of the British system into North America.

Between 1880 and 1910 mining was going through a period of substantial change throughout North America. With the extensive introduction of machinery in the mines, the ratio of skilled worker to unskilled worker was dramatically altered. For example, in the coal mines, the extensive use of blasting and undercutting machines decreased the importance of the skilled pickman. Even those officially classified as certified miners did not have the degree of experience and training that had been demanded earlier. Accompanying these changes in mining techniques, there was a growing tendency on

the part of management to downgrade safety precautions, as long as the supply of unskilled immigrant labour appeared to be inexhaustible.¹⁷

Great Britain remained the largest single source of miners that entered Canada during this period. Although it is difficult to ascertain exactly how many British miners entered between 1901 and 1914, statistics are available for the period 1906-1914 which reveal that 14,401 British miners entered the country, constituting about 62% of the total number of immigrant miners.¹⁸ The distribution of these British miners was also a factor. From the statistics available it appears, for instance, that the coal mining districts of Nova Scotia and Vancouver Island had a higher percentage of British-born than did the coal mining districts of Crow's Nest Pass or northern Ontario. In these two regions, Italian, Slavic and Finnish miners were of particular importance.¹⁹

Italian miners represented about 8% (1,744) of the immigrant miners coming to Canada between 1906-1914 from overseas. In mining regions such as the Crow's Nest Pass they usually constituted between 10-20% of the mining labour force. As a result, the number of Italian labourers in the mining industry was dramatically out of proportion to their representation in either the immigration statistics (3.5%, 1901-11) or

in the census statistics (.63%, 1911).²⁰

Most Italian labourers were from a peasant society; they had been without property and were accustomed to an irregular employment pattern offering little job security and low pay.²¹ While in North America the Italians usually organized themselves into small groups presided over by a banker, contractor or padrone who made contracts on behalf of the men and sometimes acted as a straw boss.²² These intermediaries were particularly useful to management during labour disputes. With their short range goals and strong group loyalties, the Italians seldom took part in work stoppages or trade union activities. Their value to management in this respect was well known. The manager of a Rossland copper mine commented in 1901: "How to head off a strike of muckers or labourers for higher wages without the aid of Italian labour I do not know".²³

The importation of Slavic miners, Russians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Poles, provided another major source of labour. Approximately 2,500 Slavic miners or 11% of the total entered Canada between 1906-1914.²⁴ In the Crow's Nest region and in northern Ontario they also represented between 10-20% of the labour force of the mines.²⁵ The majority of these Slavic miners came from an illiterate peasant background. Very

often they, like their Italian counterpart, were prepared to endure wage and working conditions that were unacceptable to the Anglo-Canadian miners. The major difference between the Slav and the Italian immigrant was that the Slav was more often prepared to remain permanently in Canada than the Italian.²⁶

The Finns, who came from an essentially agricultural background, were another ethnic group which became heavily committed to the mining occupation. Between 1906 and 1914 some 781 Finnish miners, or 3.4%, entered Canada from overseas.²⁷ The Finns tended to congregate in northern Ontario, becoming involved in the mining operation at Sudbury, Cobalt and Copper Cliff. In industrial disputes, the Finns tended to be more militant than the Italians or the Slavic workers. This trend became even more pronounced with the arrival of large numbers of Finnish miners from northern Michigan after the prolonged Copper Strike of 1905.²⁸

Undoubtedly the most controversial non-Anglo-Saxon group of miners were the Chinese and Japanese. It was this group that best suited the dictum of enhancing "the strength of the employer and the weakness of the union".²⁹ It is significant, however, that the Asiatic presence in the mining industry was primarily restricted to British Columbia, and was most pronounced in the coal mines of Vancouver

Island.³⁰

The Chinese were the first Asiatic group to engage in mining operations, appearing during the gold rush of 1858-66. However, the use of Chinese as wage labourers in the mines did not develop until the 1870's on an appreciable scale. Their employment was restricted primarily to the coal mines of Robert Dunsmuir, British Columbia's first industrial tycoon. In many ways Dunsmuir's use of Chinese labour can be attributed to his determination to prevent the white miners from forming effective unions. The bloody strike of 1877 was broken when Chinese were imported as strike breakers. With the emergence of the militant Knights of Labor in mining centres such as Nanaimo in 1882, controversy over the use of Chinese labour became more vocal.³¹ At the hearings of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration in 1885, the views of the British miners were forcefully stated by the Knights of Labor. Particular reference was made to the fact that at the Wellington collieries the Chinese "monopolize every employment, save the digging and running the machinery".³² Significantly the Knights of Labor did not argue that the Chinese were any cheaper than white labour, instead they pointed out that with white workers "the work is almost invariably better and quicker done".³³ The major industrial threat of the Chinese, according to labour

representatives, stemmed not from their cheapness of inefficiency, but rather from their submissiveness:

Their docile servility, the natural outcome of centuries of grinding poverty and humble submission to a most oppressive system of government renders them doubly dangerous as the willing tools whereby grasping and tyrannical employers grind down all labour to the lowest living point.³⁴

Yet another aspect stressed by the Knights of Labor was the disastrous effect the presence of the Chinese miners would have on the British mining community. John Young, a British-born miner from Nanaimo, gravely told the Royal Commission that if Orientals were allowed to dominate even the unskilled labouring positions around the mines, this would have disastrous repercussions for the "mining profession".

At present there is practically no openings for boys in the mines of this district; very few are employed; Chinamen being almost exclusively employed. Under such conditions a race of practical miners, trained from childhood to the difficulties and dangers of mining, can hardly ever arise, and there is a danger of the calling dropping into the hands of the most ignorant class.³⁵

The insistence on the part of Robert Dunsmuir interests that without Chinese labour "coal mining would be seriously retarded", and the determination of the Dominion government to prevent any international incident from emerging over the discrimination against Orientals, meant that the Dunsmuir

interests were able to continue employing Chinese labour both underground and above ground.³⁶ However, in 1901 James Dunsmuir startled the province with the announcement that the Wellington Colliery Company would immediately dismiss all Oriental employees. This declaration was very enthusiastically applauded by organized labour as an indication that the Dunsmuir Corporation "has at last arisen to a full sense of its true duty to the people of this Province..."³⁷ The real reason for the transaction does not appear as altruistic. James Dunsmuir had succeeded his father as President of Wellington Collieries Company and his political aspirations had obviously altered the Company's personnel policies. During his term as Premier, 1900-1902, Dunsmuir, not wishing to further alienate labour representatives, recruited no Asiatic workers.³⁸ But this anti-Asiatic policy did not last long. In 1903 James Dunsmuir reversed his decision when the Western Federation of Miners, one of the most militant American mining unions, threatened to gain a foothold on Vancouver Island. The strikers were hounded out of their homes, and large numbers of Orientals were imported and used as strike breakers.³⁹ At the Trades and Labor Congress meeting in September, 1903, the British Columbia delegates pointed out to the assembly that "the mines are now being operated

principally by Chinese and Japanese notwithstanding the fact that a provincial enactment prohibits their employment underground".⁴⁰

The multi-ethnic character of the Canadian mining industry can be discerned by an analysis of the 1911 labour force in the mining centres across the nation. On Vancouver Island, although the British-born remained the largest component in Nanaimo (80%) and Ladysmith (66%), the Oriental and Slavic presence was noticeable, especially at Ladysmith where it was 16% for the Slavic population and 3% for the Asiatic.⁴¹ In the Dunsmuir mines, the Oriental workers continued to assume an important role even after the Dunsmuir family sold out to Mackenzie & Mann in 1911. This trend is indicated by the following statistics:

TABLE B
AN ANALYSIS OF THE LABOUR FORCE AT THE UNION MINE, 1911⁴²

<u>Character of Labour</u>	<u>Underground</u>		<u>Above Ground</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>No. em- ployed</u>	<u>Average Daily Wage</u> \$	<u>No. em- ployed</u>	<u>Average Daily Wage</u> \$	
Supervision & Clerical Assistance	42	9.00-3.57	7	6.00-4.00	49
Whites - Miners	374	5.50-3.30	--	--	374
Miners' Helpers	2	3.00	--	--	2
" Japs, 47; Chinese, 97	144	2.25-1.75	--	--	144
Labourers	130	3.30-2.47	47	3.02-2.47	177
Mechanics and Skilled Labour	38	3.85-3.30	47	3.85-3.30	85
Boys	24	2.47-1.37	14	1.65-1.10	38
Miners - Japs, 67; Chinese, 98	165	3.50-2.90	--	--	165
Japanese	6	1.76	12	1.60-1.10	18
Chinese	71	1.76-1.60	136	1.65-1.10	207
Indians	--	--	--	--	--
TOTALS	<u>986</u>		<u>263</u>		<u>1,259</u>

In the mining regions of the Rocky Mountains, there was an even greater variety of ethnic groups. The British-born in most areas were less than 50% of the mining population, with Italian and Slavic workers composing the majority of the mining population.⁴³ One study, conducted by the Royal Commission on Coal, analysed the ethnic composition of the labour force for selected mining centres:⁴⁴

TABLE C
THE ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION IN ALBERTA MINES, A PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN

	<u>Crow's Nest</u>	<u>Leth-bridge</u>	<u>Drum-heller</u>	<u>Mountain Park</u>	<u>Braz-eau</u>	<u>Edmon-ton</u>
British	44	40	61	41.5	44.5	60
American	1	2	2	1	2	1
Slavic	24	32	26	34	24	19
Fr. & Belgium	7	-	1	-	-	2
Italian	14.5	15	3	17.5	25	-
Other Euro-peans	8.5	8	7	5	5	18
Finns	-	-	-	-	-	-
Oriental	-	3	-	-	-	-
	100	100	100	100	100	100

The absence of Orientals from the coal mines in this region was indeed a notable factor.⁴⁵ There were also few Orientals located in the metalliferous mines of the district, although certainly there had been serious consideration given to the use of this type of labour during the industrial unrest at the turn of the century. In 1902, Thomas Blackstone, Vice-President of the Centre Mine in the Rossland District, suggested

to Clifford Sifton that "the present would be a good time to let up on the Chinamen and Jap". Not only would these Orientals be a useful addition to the work force, Blackstone reasoned, but "the country generally, seeing the condition to which the policy of the labour organizations has brought us, will be inclined to turn a deaf ear to their further requests for further restrictions".⁴⁶ Blackstone's request was ignored, and the following year the Dominion government raised the head tax to a rather prohibitive \$500 for all Chinese labourers. While the Laurier cabinet was generally sympathetic to the representations of the mine operators, the political opposition to Oriental labour in British Columbia was becoming too intense to allow further immigration. As an alternative, the Dominion government was prepared to allow the importation of large numbers of European immigrant miners into this region from 1901-1911.⁴⁷

In northern Ontario the various mining centres that had mushroomed in the decade 1901-1911 contained a very high percentage of non-Anglo-Saxons. At Cobalt, for instance, in 1901 the Anglo-Canadians represented 46%; French Canadians, 30%; and diverse European groups composed the remainder: 11% Slavs, 2% Italians, and 1% Finnish.⁴⁸ Sudbury, founded in the 1880's, experienced a 50% population increase in this

decade. Nevertheless its ethnic composition in 1901 was similar to Cobalt: Anglo-Saxons, 56%; French-Canadians, 34%; and Europeans, 10%.⁴⁹ It was in the smaller settlements at the mines themselves that the largest percentage of European immigrants were located. At the Creighton Mines (Creighton), out of 1,061 men employed, the following ethnic groups were represented:⁵⁰

Germans	20	Polish	168
Bulgarians	33	Finns	209
French	31	Italians	314
Spaniards	35	English (speaking)	151

Even in the mining industry in Nova Scotia, especially in the dominant coal mining industry, the number of non-Anglo-Saxons appears to have appreciably increased. By 1911, of the 14,977 coal miners in the province some 4,302, or 28%, were immigrants.⁵¹ Although it is difficult to ascertain exactly how many of these immigrant miners were British or continental European, an ethnic breakdown of Sydney and Glace Bay reveals a substantial increase in the percentage of central and southern Europeans:

TABLE D
PERCENTAGE OF CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN EUROPEANS IN
SYDNEY AND GLACE-BAY, NOVA SCOTIA⁵²

	<u>C. & S. Europeans, 1901</u>	<u>C. & S. Europeans, 1911</u>
Sydney	1%	10%
Glace Bay	2%	8%

The consequences for the Anglo-Canadian miners of this multi-ethnic mining labour force were considerable. As previously cited, the British miner was faced with a serious challenge to the concept of mining as a skilled trade, as a craft or calling. Moreover, with the introduction of many illiterate and non-English speaking European and Asiatic workers into the mines, the accident rate dramatically increased. The correlation between Oriental workers and high accident rate had been a matter of long contention on Vancouver Island, with substantial evidence to support the miners' claims. For instance, the Dunsmuir mines, the only operations to use Oriental labour extensively had a high incidence of industrial accidents:⁵³

TABLE E
FATAL ACCIDENT LEVEL ON VANCOUVER ISLAND, 1879-1909

<u>Date</u>	<u>No. Killed</u>	<u>Location & Co.</u>	<u>Cause</u>
April 17, 1879	11	Wellington	Explosion
Jan. 24, 1881	65	Wellington	Explosion
July 1, 1884	23	South Wellington	Explosion
May 3, 1887	148	Nanaimo	Explosion

Jan. 24, 1889	75	Wellington	Explosion
Feb. 15, 1901	55	Cumberland	Cave-in
Sept. 30, 1901	17	Extension	Fire
Oct. 25, 1909	<u>32</u>	Extension	Explosion
Total	<u>406</u>		

The illiterate European miner appears to have been not much better in coping with the dangerous aspects associated with mining. In northern Ontario, for instance, in 1908 a report of E. T. Corkill, Ontario Inspector of Mines, indicted mining operators in the Cobalt region for their callous attitude towards the safety of their men: "32.6 percent of the accidents which have resulted in fatalities in 1908 in Ontario were caused by neglect, carelessness, or incompetence of mine managers".⁵⁴ In 1908, a contemporary account of the mining industry at Cobalt reinforced this official indictment. According to the author, the mining companies imported cheap labour in the form of "Polacks, Dagoes and Finlanders". Not only were these men paid low wages, but the mining companies skimped on safety precautions assuming that "men are cheaper than timbers".⁵⁵ Statistics for 1908 showed that of the 47 mining fatalities, some 26 of them had foreign names, while in 1914 of the 38 miners killed, 21 of them were definitely foreign.⁵⁶ The Ontario Mining inspectors continued to emphasize the number of foreigners involved in mining accidents.

In 1914, for instance, an overall survey of the industry was prepared with the conclusions confirming the disastrous manpower losses through the use of unskilled alien miners:

Anyone looking over the list of mining statistics . . . cannot but be struck with the large percentage of names of foreign origin. . . . In part, this may be due to unfamiliarity with the English language and the difficulty of comprehending quickly spoken orders in an emergency. Mental traits have also to be reckoned with, and the fact that very few of these men were miners before coming to this country. . . . 57

Within the mining industry, reaction to criticism of the mining operation was somewhat mixed. The high accident figures for both the Cobalt region and Vancouver Island were obviously unacceptable. As a result, the Canadian Mining Journal directed a number of harsh editorials towards the few irresponsible companies employing incompetent workers "where their ignorance or unfitness may endanger the lives of their fellow labourers. . . ." 58 However, the Canadian Mining Journal at various times stressed that the situation of the miners, especially in the Cobalt region, was rather favourable. In 1912, when the eight-hour day was being discussed, the Journal asserted that "under normal conditions the miner's lot . . . is less dangerous and brings high remuneration than that of almost any other similar class". 59

In sharp contrast to the views of the Canadian Mining

Journal, the Anglo-Canadian miners did not believe they were receiving a fair share of the return derived from mineral production, particularly when they faced such risks. Statistical evidence seems to substantiate their claim. In 1900 the average wage of the miner in the silver, silver-lead and silver-cobalt mines was \$1,025; in 1910 it had decreased to \$928.00. In contrast, the total value of silver production had increased by 400%.⁶⁰ In coal mining, although the miners were better off in 1910, they did not improve their position nearly as much as the mining companies. In 1900 coal miners received an average salary of \$509.00; in 1910 it had increased to \$616.00, or a 21% advance. At the same time the mining companies had expanded the total value of productivity some 150%.⁶¹

It is not surprising, therefore, given the high accident rates, the relatively low wages, and the enormous profits apparently being made by the mining companies that the miners should have attempted to improve their position through collective action. However, one of the major problems in organizing the mining workers was the ethnic differences between the workers. Most union leaders recognized that management regarded the racial inter-mixture as a highly desirable means of maintaining industrial order. Socialist newspapers such

as the Western Clarion tried to educate the workers to overlook racial differences: "Hypocritical and treacherous they set us one against the other. . . . They have in the past antagonized the English-speaking races against the Italian, the Hun and the Slav. In the West they are setting the European against the Asiatic. . . ."62

The Western Federation of Miners (W.F.M.) had been one of the first labour unions to make a determined effort to recruit European immigrants. Founded in 1893 as an industrial rather than craft union, the W.F.M. attempted to organize all the workers in the mining industry. The stated purpose of the W.F.M. was "to create the various miners' unions of the west into one central body; to practice those virtues that adorn society and remind man of his duty to his fellow men; the elevation of the position and the maintenance of the rights of the miner".63 A basic tenet of the union was its open attitude towards the European immigrant miner, in sharp contrast to the negative position of the American Federation of Labor.64 This positive attitude was illustrated in 1903, when the Executive of the W.F.M. recommended that the union's ritual and constitution be translated into Italian, Slavic and Finnish to encourage class solidarity among the miners of the different nationalities.65

The Western Federation of Miners was the first mining union to gain a foothold in Canada. During the period 1899-1903, the W.F.M. extended its operation northward into the metalliferous and coal mines of British Columbia and Alberta.⁶⁶

In the Canadian metalliferous mines, the W.F.M. used the same tactics they had employed in organizing the workers in the mines of Idaho and Montana. Their strategy was to enlist all miners in the union; to demand higher wages; and to employ the strike weapon when companies refused to grant concessions.⁶⁷

Another major factor, and indeed a vital consideration in the decision of the W.F.M. to expand northward, was to prevent Canadian mining operations from continuing when the American portion of a mining district was paralyzed by strike action. This tendency was most pronounced when mining companies had operations on both sides of the border. Thus the 1901 strike at Rossland was aimed directly at Le Roi Mining Company which also had a smelter in Idaho. However, Canadian mining operations at the Centre Star and the War Eagle Mines were also affected by the strike when they refused to recognize the W.F.M. and to increase the pay of the unskilled muckers.⁶⁸

The 1901 strike was an important event in the pattern of industrial relations that developed in this period. In the first place, the mine managers, particularly Edmund Kirby, the

manager of the War Eagle Company, violently denounced the strike as the work of American union desperadoes, "who created a long reign of terror and assassinated and dynamited the Bunker Hill and Sullivan Mines in Idaho".⁶⁹ Kirby also alleged that the British miners who formed the majority of the work force were opposed to the strike, and that it had been engineered by American agitators, using the ignorant European miners as pawns. To prevent the Canadian mining industry from being dominated by violent, anarchistic elements, Kirby informed his superiors that the mine management was justified in adopting extreme tactics.⁷⁰ One of the weapons utilized by the mining companies was the importation from the United States of numerous strike-breakers, usually Italians or Slavs. This practice was, of course, in direct violation of the Alien Labour Law, and organized labour throughout the Dominion denounced this move as a flagrant violation of the statute.⁷¹ For instance, the Federated Metal Trades Council of Toronto stridently demanded that the Laurier government "use all their power and influence toward having the Alien Labor Law enforced in its entirety".⁷² The Trades and Labor Congress at its 1901 Convention discussed the situation of the mining companies importing "alien labourers into that section . . .", and denounced these actions as a deliberate plan of the "Smelter

Trusts of the United States" to subdue the workers.⁷³ Even Mackenzie King, the Deputy Minister of Labour, and a former opponent of the rigid enforcement of the Alien Labour Law, became converted to labour's point of view in order "to stop wholesale importation".⁷⁴ However, despite being twice convicted of violations of the Alien Labour Law, the mining companies imported a sufficient number of strike-breakers to re-open the mines, and the strike collapsed. A black list system was then utilized by the companies, resulting in most of the striking miners being forced to leave the region.⁷⁵

The failure of the W.F.M. to effectively organize the metalliferous miners in 1901 was soon followed by a disastrous effort to mobilize the coal miners on Vancouver Island. The 1903 strike on Vancouver Island was primarily directed against the Dunsmuir mines, and they were held at the same time that the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees (C.B.R.E.), an industrial railway union, engineered a strike against the Canadian Pacific Railway. In both cases the corporations were victorious.⁷⁶ Moreover, the Gordon Royal Commission, appointed by the Laurier government to investigate the source of the industrial unrest, produced a strongly worded anti-labour Report. According to the Commission the strike was caused by "the intrigues of a few men . . . to serve the desires and

ends of a handful of dictators residing in the United States, and who were not in any way amendable to the laws of this country. . . ." The W.F.M. was specifically branded as a "revolutionary socialist" type of labour union, an "illegitimate" organization that should not be tolerated in Canada.

In order to prevent any further disturbances, the Commission recommended that measures be adopted to prevent the involvement in industrial disputes "of any person residing outside of the Dominion" unless by the mutual consent of management and labour. To make this provision workable, the Commission suggested that punitive measures be adopted making it illegal for a non-British subject "to procure, or incite any employee in Canada to quit the employment without the consent of the employer. . . ."⁷⁷

Almost immediately, Senator Lougheed, a prominent Calgary lawyer, introduced a bill in the Senate to amend the Criminal Code to provide for the arrest and imprisonment of alien labour agitators.⁷⁸ At its 1904 Convention the Trades and Labour Congress (T.L.C.) roundly condemned "that most unfair 'Industrial Commission' report, and the Lougheed Bill".⁷⁹ A national legal defence fund was also organized by the T.L.C. to aid the Rossland Miners Union, an affiliate of the W.F.M., in their legal struggle against the Centre Star Company. In this instance, the Company was

awarded some \$12,500 in damages for losses sustained during the strike after the Rossland Miners Union had been found guilty of conspiracy to prevent men from working in the company's mines. The case was appealed, and in 1905 the matter was settled by a compromise between the company and the union. Meanwhile, labour in British Columbia had won the passage of the Martin Bill which protected unions from injunctions and their funds from liability. By this stage, however, the W.F.M. was prepared to leave the coal mining sector, and to concentrate its activity on the metallurgical workers. Although the W.F.M. was to remain a greatly feared and controversial union, especially in northern Ontario, the union that attracted the greatest national attention after 1903 was the United Mine Workers of America.⁸⁰

The United Mine Workers of America (U.M.W.A.) was another industrial union concentrated in the coal industry, that attempted to enlist the support of the immigrant miner. Organized in 1890, the United Mine Workers had only a meagre membership of about 10,000 in 1897. However, between 1897 and 1902 the U.M.W.A. won a number of notable victories in the bituminous fields of Illinois and Kentucky, as well as the 1902 spectacular victory in the anthracite fields of Pennsylvania. As a result of the wage gains, the improved working

conditions, and the continuing high employment levels, the United Mine Workers expanded in number to 400,000 in 1913.⁸¹ In its organizational campaign the U.M.W.A. was committed to trying to organize all of the coal mining workers of North America in order to eliminate non-union competition within any given district. Their organizers gave special attention to the immigrant miners in recognition of the growing importance of the non-Anglo-Saxon in the coal mines of North America.⁸²

The attempt to enlist the support of the immigrant coal miner was illustrated at the bi-national conference of that year. U.M.W.A. President, John L. Lewis, set forth the basic principles of the union in respect to the alien: "The foreign-speaking mine workers have the same interests in the U.M.W.A. as all others who are members. . . . It is our duty ~~to give~~ them every reasonable opportunity of understanding the mission of the union. . . ."⁸³ As a result, the U.M.W.A. officially adopted the practice of distributing literature in the Italian, Slavic and Finnish languages to the miners.

The activities of the U.M.W.A. in Canada illustrated the impact which the bi-national industrial union could have on a single industry. As was the case with the W.F.M., the U.M.W.A. was, in effect, forced to expand into Canada in order to prevent the coal mining operators in Canada from destroying the effectiveness of their American based strikes. They were

also forced to include all Caucasian workers in the union, although significantly, neither the parent union nor its Canadian branches admitted Oriental workers.⁸⁴ In carrying on its organizational work, the U.M.W.A. organized three districts in Canada: District 26 in Nova Scotia; District 18 in western Alberta and eastern British Columbia; and District 26 among the miners on Vancouver Island. It also made available its extensive strike-fund, as well as the use of its professional organizers in an attempt to achieve substantial break-through in these three regions.⁸⁵

Undoubtedly the most difficult task for the U.M.W.A. organizers was to mobilize the coal miners of Nova Scotia. The powerful Dominion Coal Company was in a strong position to defy even a large union such as the U.M.W.A. As the largest single producer of coal in the nation, the Company was able to exert immense economic and political influence on both the provincial and federal governments.⁸⁶ Obviously aware of his strong position, the Dominion Coal Co. President, James Ross, in 1909, flatly refused to negotiate with the U.M.W.A.: "Our Company will never consent to be dominated by a foreign labour union whose interests may be allied with those of our competitors in the United States, and we will, in the interests of the preservation of our mines and our property, in which the people of Nova Scotia are jointly interested with us, stand

firmly by the decision".⁸⁷ As a result of this determined corporate stance the organizers of the U.M.W.A. called a strike for July, 1909.

Between 1909-1911, Nova Scotia was the scene of a bitter industrial struggle. The polarization of the forces of capital and labour were clearly visible in the periodic eruptions of violence, and the acrimonious propaganda disseminated by the two sides. In fact, the major tactic of the mining interests was to use the press in order to utterly discredit the U.M.W.A. in the eyes of the Canadian public.

Even before the strike started, the Canadian Mining Journal charged that there was a real correlation "between the American raids upon our Eastern coal markets and the efforts of the United Mine Workers of America to control the workingmen of Nova Scotia".⁸⁸ Increased American coal sales to the St. Lawrence markets was cited as corroborating proof.⁸⁹

The violence of the U.M.W.A. was another theme stressed by the Journal especially after rioting broke out, and the militia had to be called in to restore order. The Journal called upon the Dominion government to deport the agitators, pointing out that "this is about the only safeguard that remains".⁹⁰ What made the situation appear so critical, the Journal asserted, was that the trade union demagogues had foisted on

the workers "a crude form of socialism, which is in reality a variant of anarchism modified by opportunism and illiteracy".⁹¹

The government had a distinct responsibility, therefore, of requiring the foreign worker to observe the Canadian law and customs or "the stranger shall oust the sons of this young nation and impose his customs upon us".⁹²

The Journal continually stressed the major role assumed by the alien miner in the strike, rather than the British-born. One of the correspondents of the Canadian Mining Journal, in describing a mass meeting of the miners, pointedly commented on the physical characteristics of those on strike: "the broad faces of the Huns and Poles, the bristling moustaches of the Belgians, and the dark complexions of the Italians. . . ." It was quite apparent, therefore, that this rally "was a dismal exposure of the true nature of this lamentable strike". Foreign workers were being manipulated by alien agitators.⁹³

The industrial tactics adopted by the Dominion Coal Company were eventually successful. Not only did the U.M.W.A. fail in its bid for recognition, but the pay of the miners was reduced by 10%.⁹⁴ Nor did the future of the U.M.W.A. in Nova Scotia appear very bright. In spite of its denunciation of "foreign agitators", the Dominion Coal Company continued to import aliens for use in the mines. In a report submitted by John Bruce to

the T.L.C. in 1913 this trend was described:

In order to keep the workers divided the policy of the corporation is to import the most ignorant class possible, most of whom cannot speak a word of English, and among the nearly 6,000 employees the majority are composed of Italians, Germans, French, Polanders, Russians, Bohemians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Hungarians, Croatians, Ruthenians, Austrians, Newfoundlanders and negroes, forming such a polyglot mass existing under such conditions of mutual mistrust that it is sheer impossibility to arrive at any understanding on the question of organization. . . .⁹⁵

The social conditions existing in the industrial 'fiefdoms' of the Dominion Coal Company, places such as Glace Bay and Springhill were also a matter of considerable debate. The Dominion Coal Company owned much of the residential land upon which they had erected houses for the workers. These homes were rented to the miners "during good behaviour".⁹⁶ According to the Canadian Mining Journal, the involvement of the Dominion Coal Company in the real estate field had positive connotations. Company owned homes were described as model housing with each residence having "four rooms and a kitchen, with a front verandah, surrounded by a good sized plot of land sufficient for garden use . . . all priced very reasonably".⁹⁷ The loyalty of the miners was strengthened by this benevolent approach by the corporation. In sharp contrast, a report prepared by the Trades and Labor Congress in 1914 showed a totally different situation. Reference was made to the workers "being herded

together in shacks that are indescribably filthy".⁹⁸ It was alleged that alcoholism, social vice, and ethnic hostility were fostered by these substandard living conditions; the environment was akin to a human jungle with "every man working against his fellow man".⁹⁹

The social tensions associated with the "Company town" were also very pronounced in northern Ontario and in western Canada. In mining centres such as Porcupine, Copper Cliff and Cobalt, the mining companies were able to exert rather effective leverage on the men. A man dismissed and blacklisted by a company such as the Hollinger Mining Company in Porcupine faced the unenviable task of trying to get back to "civilization" if the company decided to make it difficult for him. As one miner stated before the Mathers Royal Commission (1919), "in a large company a man has practically to sign away his right to think in order to get a meal ticket".¹⁰⁰

Cobalt was generally regarded as one of the worst examples of the single industry town. One of the reasons for this situation was undoubtedly the remoteness of the town and the reluctance of any of the twelve companies involved to take a lead in supplying the necessary residential facilities. In the early years living conditions were so bad that the miners were forced to secure accommodation at Haileybury and New

Liskeard.¹⁰¹ When companies such as Nipissing Mining Company, by far the largest single producer, rented either land for workers to build homes or leased company owned cottages to the miners, the charges were usually very high. The sanitary conditions in the area were also inadequate, resulting in a very serious typhoid epidemic in 1909, with over 5% of the population affected.¹⁰²

During industrial disputes the displacement of 'trouble-makers' by the Nipissing and other companies, was facilitated by evicting strikers from company owned land. Nor were the companies prepared to allow any further attempts at union activity to go unchallenged. A Central Employment Bureau was established to keep the records of all employees with special attention given to "the records of undesirables". Continual complaints were made against the blacklist system, as well as the practice of employing private detective agencies and company police. It was alleged, with it appears a high degree of validity, that these 'protective' agencies were staffed by "gunmen . . . bartenders and pool room sharks", a tendency made all the more deplorable when the federal and provincial governments were prepared to grant these men positions in the administration of justice.¹⁰³ As Edmund Bradwin succinctly stated, "the frontier town is practically muzzled. Too often

it owes its very existence to the money being spent by some
 big company in its midst".¹⁰⁴ Civic docility took the form

of compliant merchants, circumspect churches, co-opted lawyers,
 co-operative police, corrupted magistrates and a biased news-
 paper. In the case of the Cobalt Daily Nugget and the Sudbury
 Journal an examination of their coverage of local affairs
 reveals a very pro-corporate stance.¹⁰⁵

In the mining towns there was strong evidence that the
 foreign worker had, by 1914, begun to reject the view that
 Canada was the land of limitless opportunity; instead, there
 was a growing sense of exploitation.¹⁰⁶ Part of this feeling of
 hopelessness resulted in excessive drinking, a behaviour pattern
 that the Cobalt mining companies obviously did not discourage
 since there were 35 'blind pigs' in Cobalt in 1907.¹⁰⁷ In-
 deed, it seems to have been assumed by the mining companies that
 taverns and houses of ill-repute were necessary elements in the
 maintenance of an industrial labour force.¹⁰⁸

Similar situations existed in the mining regions of
 western Canada. The reports of the Royal North West Mounted
 Police made continual reference to the number of violent
 crimes committed in the coal mining camps of western Alberta.
 Many of these resulted in death or serious injury as the

result of the combination of alcohol, concealed weapons and ethnic rivalry. Another problem was the incidence of social vice, with centres such as Fernie containing a notorious red light district.¹⁰⁹

The failure of Canadian social organizations to provide for the physical and spiritual needs of the immigrant miner meant that increasingly these men became even further alienated. At the local level many of the Anglo-Canadian residents of these mining towns appeared to feel only misgivings, not humanitarian concern for the foreign miners. For instance, the Sudbury Journal on numerous occasions denounced the large numbers of foreigners committed to local gaols, and the prevalence of violent crimes.¹¹⁰ In fact, by February, 1914, the Journal recommended "the revision of the immigration laws", in order to provide for a more "restrictive entrance into this country. . . ."¹¹¹

Although the Protestant churches expressed concern over the plight of the immigrant population it does not appear that they were any more successful in reaching the immigrant miners than they had been with the railroad navvies. Reverend J. D. Brynes, the Superintendent of Northern Ontario Missions of the Presbyterian church, on several occasions commented on the lack of impact which the message of the church was making

on the foreign worker in contrast to the strong impact of socialist doctrines.¹¹² A similar pessimistic report was presented by the Presbyterian Board of Home Missions (Western Section) at the 1913 General Assembly. The report strongly urged more activity among the miners in the Crow's Nest Pass Presbytery, "who, in such an alarming degree are alienated from the Church and beyond its means of Grace".¹¹³

It would be wrong, however, to assume from the degree of social enmity and the failure of Anglo-Canadian institutions to make a great impact on the foreign miners, that these men were content to remain fragmented, and docile. Over a period of time, the old ethnic antagonisms tended to break down, facilitated by the common danger that all men shared within the mines, and by the fact that "linked to the outside world only by steel track, they and their families faced the lonely isolation . . . which forced them to live together amicably".¹¹⁴ This sense of working class unity was increased by resentment towards the working conditions, the low wages, the inadequate housing and the condescension exhibited by Anglo-Canadian management. Socialist ideas and membership in radical unions, although deprecated by the majority of Anglo-Canadians, tended to reinforce a sense of class unity that bridged the difference between ethnic groups.

Many of the European miners demonstrated that they were not prepared to tolerate an economic system that relegated them to a perpetually inferior position. As one labour historian has stated:

The unskilled worker believed his income would not be improved by upward employment. He did not have the education for managerial status, and ethnic groups who had arrived earlier controlled the skilled jobs. The new arrival realized that he could not become a brakeman, crane operator, locomotive fireman, machinist or switchman. He could be a semi-skilled miner or pitman, and, in unusual cases foreman or shift captain; but corporations hired few foremen relative to workers and far fewer shift captains.¹¹⁵

It appeared that in many instances, the immigrant miners were prepared to adopt even a more radical position than the Anglo-Canadian miners. As one labour historian has recently observed, "far from weakening labor organizations, the Polish, Lithuanians, Slovak, and Ukrainian mine workers, and their communities, supported labor protest more enthusiastically than many other groups and were essential to the establishment of unionism permanently in the coal fields".¹¹⁶

Canadian socialist newspapers such as the Western Clarion stressed the enormous potential of the European workers in the struggle to overthrow the capitalist system. Ukrainian workers were described as "men of action", while the Finnish workers received great praise for their pronounced "class

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consciousness and solidarity. . . ."¹¹⁷ In fact, the Western Clarion complained that the Anglo-Saxon worker compared unfavourably to his European counterpart because of his reluctance to take direct action against the source of his exploitation.¹¹⁸ Actually, this optimistic outlook towards the 'foreign' worker appeared to be substantiated by developments in coal mining District 18, the region with the highest percentage of European miners.

In contrast to the dismal efforts to organize in Nova Scotia, the United Mine Workers were quite successful in District 18. By 1907 the union had 18 locals, a paid up membership of 2,313, and had achieved a district wide agreement with the coal producers, although only a few companies actually conceded full recognition to the U.M.W.A.¹¹⁹ A major breakthrough occurred in 1909 when the largest company in the district, the Crow's Nest Pass Coal Company, signed an agreement granting to members of the U.M.W.A. priority in hiring.¹²⁰ That is not to say, however, that the coal companies, and especially the powerful Crow's Nest Pass Coal Company, were prepared to concede recognition without a fight. In 1906 most of the companies in the region had organized themselves into the Western Coal Operators' Association to offset the presence of a powerful binational union.¹²¹ A major confrontation

developed between the two organizations in April, 1911 when 7,000 men, the majority of whom were members of the U.M.W.A., went on strike over the issue of the closed shop. The strike soon became a matter of national significance because it posed the threat of a drastic fuel shortage in western Canada. The settlement in late October, 1911 was a dramatic victory for the U.M.W.A. Based on the favourable report of the Industrial Disputes Board the new contract made provision for the check-off system, a uniform day-wage scale throughout the District, and an increase in wages. In return for the generous settlement, the union agreed to extend the contract until March 31, 1915.¹²²

The successful confrontation in District 18 was followed in short order by the momentous Vancouver Island Strike of 1912-13. In many ways this strike sharply defined the fundamental issues between the miners and management. In economic terms, wage increases in the mining industry on the Island had not advanced after 1907. For instance, at the Wellington Colliery in 1901, miners were receiving between \$3.00-\$4.50 a day; in 1907 they received between \$3.30-\$6.00 a day; and in 1913 they received between \$3.30 and \$5.50 a day, an actual decrease in the maximum earnings.¹²³ At the same time that the miners were concerned over wages, they

became even more aroused over the presence of Oriental miners. By 1913 the number of white underground workers had decreased to 56% of which 22% were miners while the Orientals had risen to 44%, 20% being miners.¹²⁴ To the miners the increased number of Orientals underground meant not only a serious threat to the mining 'calling', but also a real menace to mine safety. The memory of decades of human wastage through accidents, many of them needless, strengthened the sense of bitterness. In 1909, for instance, when some 57 men had been killed at the Extension Mine, the men initiated a legal suit charging the Wellington Collieries Company with negligence by ignoring safety regulations which were "the result of hundreds of years of experience in England and elsewhere".¹²⁵ Actually, the 1912-13 strike was precipitated by the safety controversy, and made more intense by the rapid increase in the number of Oriental miners.¹²⁶

On September 16, 1912 the workers at the Union or Comox mine of the Canadian Collieries took "a day holiday" to protest the inaction on the part of the Company in dealing with a gas problem, and to demand the reinstatement of the men of the Gas Committee who had been dismissed for reporting the dangerous gas level.¹²⁷ The Canadian Collieries Company

responded to the challenge: a lock-out was instituted, and the company began to recruit strike-breakers. For almost eight months the Company negotiators ignored the offers of the Vancouver Board of Trade, and the British Columbia government to arbitrate.¹²⁸ On May 1, 1913, an order was issued by the executive of the United Mine Workers to call a general strike of all the mine workers of Vancouver Island.¹²⁹

The strike assumed many of the characteristics of a class war. Both the coal companies and the politicians were determined to ruthlessly crush the labour unions. The apparent pro-U.M.W.A. company stance of the McBride government, especially in condoning the industrial practices of the Canadian Collieries Company, was a subject of considerable controversy. The practice of having non-English speaking strike-breakers as fire-bosses in the mines, as well as the wholesale certification of large numbers of Orientals as bona fide miners, created great bitterness.¹³⁰ In August, 1913, the British Columbia Federationist claimed that at one sitting of the Miners' Examination Board 50 Orientals were certified as bona fide miners.¹³¹

The role assumed by the Dominion government, especially the Minister of Labor, T. R. Crothers, also alienated the miners. Crothers appeared to accept the Company contention

that the Lemieux Act did not apply in this case because the miners were engaged in an illegal strike.¹³² As a result, he refused to call for compulsory conciliation. Labour spokesmen claimed that the Minister of Labour made no attempts to investigate the miners' contention that working conditions were hazardous or that the strikers were being provoked unmercifully by company police, and by strike-breakers.¹³³

The Immigration Branch was another government department that appeared to support corporate power. Evidence of favoritism in the enforcement of Immigration regulations seemed apparent. On one hand labour organizers and socialists were harassed, while on the other hand the mining companies were allowed to recruit strike-breakers in the United States in direct contravention of the Alien Labour Act.¹³⁴ What made this appear even more outrageous was that while the companies brought in the hordes of strike-breakers, the Canadian Mining Journal, and other organs of the mining industry, could blame all the trouble on the American based "parasitic labour-union demagogues".¹³⁵ In rebuttal to these charges of alien influence, the British Columbia Federationist made pointed reference to the obvious ambivalent attitude of the mining community which saw nothing wrong with the operation of American owned companies, such as the Western Fuel Company, or an industry which

would "not hesitate to bring foreigners into the country to take the place of the (British-born) strikers".¹³⁶ In September, 1913, the Trades and Labor Congress exerted its influence to try and force the Borden government to rigorously enforce the Alien Labour Law.¹³⁷ By this time, however, the situation had dramatically deteriorated. On August 12, the outbreak of widespread violence at Nanaimo and Ladysmith brought direct state intervention.

The utilization of the militia to restore order, and the arrest of 256 men, illustrated the determination of the authorities to deal forcefully with the situation.¹³⁸ To the strikers this intervention was final proof that the political support of "the mean, dirty, despicable methods used by the 'foreign' coal mining despots of Vancouver Island", revealed the fact that "the state is a class institution the function of which is to beat down the members of the working class. . . ."¹³⁹ Most of the labour union and socialist papers minimized the extent of the violence and tended to blame the outbreak on the refusal of the companies to negotiate and the presence of Oriental and 'foreign' strike-breakers, many of whom were hired to intimidate the strikers.¹⁴⁰ Labour spokesmen were highly critical of 'Napoleon' Bowser, the British Columbia Attorney General for resorting to military force "to break the

the spirit of the striking miners". The members of the 72nd militia regiment, most of whom were from a middle class Anglo-Canadian background, were denounced as the tool of the capitalist class. Many of the unions in the province actually altered their constitutions so as to exclude militia members from union membership.¹⁴¹

There is little doubt, however, that the Attorney General had appreciable public support in his decision to use the military.¹⁴² The bogey of 'alien agitators' arousing the illiterate foreign workmen into a blind anarchist riot was sufficient to alarm many Anglo-Canadians. And indeed, the reports sent back by the officers commanding the militia stressed that "the bulk of the crimes committed was attributed to members of the I.W.W. chiefly composed of aliens, people without any sense of responsibility or respect for life or property".¹⁴³ It was significant that the authorities should regard the presence of U.M.W.A. organizers as insufficient to arouse public alarm, and therefore felt it necessary to introduce the spectre of the Industrial Workers of the World. While the I.W.W. had made appreciable headway among the railroad navvies and lumber workers in British Columbia, they had not organized a single mining local.¹⁴⁴ But in many ways the allegation that the bulk of strikers were aliens and

members of the I.W.W., although a gross distortion, reveals the deep concern that many Anglo-Canadians were experiencing over the ability of the industrial unions to incorporate workers of all races.¹⁴⁵

The military intervention did not end the strike; indeed, it continued until June, 1914. But it had become evident that management had the upper hand: the mines continued in operation with the use of strike-breakers; widespread unemployment in the province prevented the miners from seeking alternate sources of employment; and the U.M.W.A. indicated that it could not afford indefinitely the \$16,000 per week strike-pay.¹⁴⁶ Even the strong pressure exerted by the Trades and Labor Congress, for another government review of the situation, did not produce any positive result. The settlement illustrated that the mining companies had triumphed. The U.M.W.A. was not recognized, and many of those miners who had assumed a major role in the strike were blacklisted.¹⁴⁷

Despite the failure, the Vancouver Island Strike must be regarded as one of the most important industrial confrontations of the pre-war period. The polarization of capital and labour had reached a point where proposals for a general strike had reached the point of serious consideration.¹⁴⁸

What made the polarization even more significant is that increasingly corporate management had stressed not only the presence of American agitators, but also the dangerous role assumed by the alien worker. Managerial concern over the increased radicalism on the part of the foreign miner can be detected in the editorials of the Canadian Mining Journal. By November, 1914, the Journal had launched a campaign to persuade companies to reduce the number of immigrant miners because of their many undesirable qualities: unfamiliarity with the English language; mining inexperience; "and a certain lack of resourcefulness in the presence of danger, amounting to inertia or even stupidity. . . ." ¹⁴⁹ Emphasis was placed on the importance of establishing "a strong force of capable and experienced miners . . .", presumably Anglo-Saxon. ¹⁵⁰ It is noteworthy that only the European miner, not the Oriental, was singled out. Industrial obedience was obviously still appreciated.

CHAPTER V

¹ H. C. Pentland, "The Development of a Capitalistic Labour Market in Canada", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXV, 1959, p. 450. A more extensive discussion of the concept of the capitalistic labour market is provided in chapter five.

² Professor Arthur Coleman, University of Toronto, 'Address', February 29, 1912, Empire Club of Canada: Addresses . . . During the Session of 1911-12 (Toronto, 1913), p. 163.

³ Fifth Census of Canada, 1911 (Ottawa, 1913), vol. II, pp. 42-43, (hereafter cited as Census of Canada). The total number of miners was 62,706 of whom 29,890 were Canadian born and 32,816 were immigrants.

⁴ Under the British North America Act national resources were given to the provinces. However, this provision did not extend to Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta whose natural resources remained under Dominion control until 1930. As a result Alberta coal reserves, estimated at 327 billion tons in 1905 were sold and then leased by the Dominion authorities until 1930. Chester Martin, Dominion Lands Policy (Toronto, 1938), pp. 452-456.

⁵ Census of Canada, 1911, vol. V, p. 158.

⁶ Ibid., pp. vi, xviii, xx.

⁷ Ibid., p. xxi.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 7, 74, 88, 155.

⁹ The Canadian Mining Journal (Toronto), June 15, 1907, p. 195.

¹⁰ Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, (hereafter cited as Debates), 1906, p. 3406.

¹¹ Throughout the period under study the Trades and Labor Congress tried to force the Dominion government to have Immigration officials bar the entry of miners from both Great Britain and the United States. H. A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada (Toronto, 1948), pp. 484-485.

¹² This ethno-class trend among the mine workers has been aptly described by Neil Betten, "The Origins of Ethnic Radicalism in Northern Minnesota, 1900-1920", International Migration Review, IV, 1970, no. 2, pp. 44-55 and Donald Sofchalk, "Organized Labor and the Iron Ore Miners of Northern Minnesota, 1907-1936", Labor History, XII, 1971, no. 2, pp. 214-239.

¹³ Cited in Martin Robin, "British Columbia: The Politics of Class Conflict", in Canadian Provincial Politics (Scarborough, 1972), pp. 29-30.

¹⁴ John Brophy, A Miner's Life (Madison, 1964), pp. 6, 16, 20, 29.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁷ Rowland Berthoff, British Immigrants in Industrial America, 1790-1950 (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 29, 55. The American Immigration Commission, 1907-1910, presided over by Senator Dillingham made specific reference to the trend whereby management increasingly utilized cheap and "expendable" foreign labour. Abstracts of the Immigration Commission (Dillingham Commission), vol. I (Washington, 1911), p. 646.

¹⁸ Sessional Papers, 1902-1915, no. 25, pt. II, Report of the Superintendent of Immigration.

¹⁹ Census of Canada, 1911, vol. II, pp. 162-172, 188-189, 220-228.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 367.

²¹ Robert Foerster, The Italian Emigration of Our Times (Cambridge, Mass., 1919), pp. 349-350. The Immigration Commission in the United States (1910), found that one out of every twelve miners in the bituminous coal fields was Italian. Ibid. A similar percentage of Italian miners were involved in the coal mines of the Kootnays.

²² A somewhat exaggerated account of the influences of the Padrone system was contained in the Dillingham Commission, II, vol. 37, chapter V. Revisionist studies by H. Nelli, Italians in Chicago, 1880-1930 (New York; 1970), have tended to de-emphasize the role of the Padrone after 1890.

²³ Laurier Papers, 85632, Edmund Kirby to T. L. Blackstone, Toronto, January 31, 1901.

²⁴ Sessional Papers, 1901-1915, no. 25, pt. I, Report of the Superintendent of Immigration.

²⁵ Census of Canada, 1911, vol. II, pp. 162-172; 220-228.

²⁶ The migratory behaviour of the Italians is more thoroughly discussed in chapter four.

²⁷ Sessional Papers, 1901-1915, no. 25, pt. I, Report of the Superintendent of Immigration.

²⁸ By 1911, mining communities in northern Ontario such as Beaver Lake, Creighton Mines, Carson Mines, had developed a fairly substantial Finnish population. Martha Isobel Allen, "A Survey of Finnish Cultural, Economic and Political Development in the Sudbury District of Ontario", unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of History, University of Western Ontario, 1954, pp. 3, 12, 58. Ralph Jalkanen (ed.), The Finns in North America: A Social Symposium (Hancock, Michigan, 1969), pp. 202, 209; Neil Betten, "The Origins of Ethnic Radicalism in Northern Minnesota, 1900-1920", pp. 44-55.

²⁹ See page 7.

³⁰ Most of the coal mining companies on Vancouver Island employed Oriental workers as surface labour. Only the Wellington Colliery Company Ltd. owned and operated by the Dunsmuir family until 1911 used Oriental labour underground. A survey of the Report of the Minister of Mines, Province of British Columbia, (published in Victoria between 1901-1914), revealed this trend.

³¹ Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration (Ottawa, 1885), pp. 155-157.

³² Ibid., p. 158. The Knights of Labor, an American industrial union, first appeared in British Columbia in Nanaimo in 1883. Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, pp. 12-15.

³³ Ibid., p. 156.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 90.

³⁶ The intervention of the Dominion government in disallowing discriminatory legislation passed by the British Columbia Legislature has been discussed in chapter two. The Wellington Collier Company Ltd. remained the only coal company in British Columbia to employ Orientals underground throughout the period under study. In 1901, for instance, some 21% of the labour force underground were Orientals; at the same time, 63% of the surface workers employed by the Dunsmuir's were Orientals. By 1911, the percentage of Orientals underground had decreased to 14%, and a similar decrease of surface Oriental workers to 57% had occurred. However, with the sale of the Wellington Collier Company to the railroad entrepreneurs, Mackenzie & Mann, in 1911, the percentage of Orientals underground increased dramatically to 44% in 1913, although the percentage of Oriental surface workers decreased to 44%. The industrial consequences of the increase in Orientals underground, especially the emergence of an Oriental mining group were vividly revealed during the 1913 Vancouver Island Strike. Report of the Minister of Mines, Province of British Columbia, 1901, (Victoria, 1902), p. 1208; ibid., 1911, p. 232; ibid., 1913, p. 348.

³⁷ Report of the Executive Committee for British Columbia, Proceedings of the 17th Annual Session of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada, 1901, pp. 19, 28-29, (hereafter cited as Proceedings of the T.L.C.)

³⁸ From the statistics of the Report of the Minister of Mines, Province of British Columbia, 1901 (Victoria, 1902), p. 1194, it does not appear that the dismissal took place immediately. In 1901, there were still 130 Orientals working underground, and 160 working above ground.

³⁹ Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, p. 40.

⁴⁰ Proceedings of the T.L.C., 1903, p. 30.

⁴¹ Census of Canada, 1911, vol. II, pp. 170-171.

⁴²The Union or Comox mine was located 60 miles north of Nanaimo. Annual Report of the Minister of Mines, Province of British Columbia (Victoria, 1912), p. 256.

⁴³Census of Canada, 1911, vol. II, pp. 162-165, 168-171.

⁴⁴Cited, Charles McMillan, "Trade Unions in District 18, 1900-1925: A Case Study", unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Alberta, 1969, pp. 85-86.

⁴⁵None of the coal mining companies in the British Columbia portion of the Kootenays employed Oriental workers either underground or above ground throughout the period under study. Annual Report of the Minister of Mines, Province of British Columbia, 1900-1915. Periodically the U.M.W.A. expressed concern that the coal mining companies might attempt the importation of Orientals. Fernie, District Ledger.

⁴⁶Sifton Papers, 92780, T. Blackstone to Clifford Sifton, May 1, 1902.

⁴⁷For a more extensive discussion see chapter two.

⁴⁸Census of Canada, 1911, vol. II, pp. 220-230. At Cobalt the rate of growth had been phenomenal, from a spot in the wilderness to a thriving centre of 5,638 in four years. Ibid., vol. I, p. 540. The following statistics illustrate this rapid growth:

	Total Value Production	Men Underground	Men Above	Total Wages
1904	\$ 136,217	29	28	\$ 12,300
1906	3,764,113	471	586	581,253
1908	9,284,869	1,325	1,089	2,159,055

Eighteenth Annual Report of the Ontario Bureau of Mines (1909), vol. XVIII, pt. I. (Toronto, 1910), pp. 14-15.

⁴⁹Gilbert Stelter, "The Origins of a Company Town: Sudbury in the Nineteenth Century", Laurentian University Review, vol. 3, no. 3, (February, 1971), pp. 4-5.

⁵⁰Report of Superintendent of New Ontario, J. D. Byrnes Acts and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Canada (hereafter Presbyterian Acts and Proceedings), 1914, 20.

- 51 Census of Canada, 1911, vol. VI, pp. 154-155.
- 52 Ibid., 1901, vol. I, p. 298; ibid., 1911, vol. II, pp. 188-189.
- 53 Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, p. 9; Annual Report of the Minister of Mines, Province of British Columbia, 1900-1915.
- 54 Report of the Ontario Bureau of Mines, 1908 (Toronto, 1909), p. 78.
- 55 W.H.P. Jarvis, Trials and Tales in Cobalt (Toronto, 1908), pp. 110, 115.
- 56 Report of the Ontario Bureau of Mines, 1914, pp. 86-87. The study revealed that of the 21 foreigners killed in mining accidents there were 6 Slavs, 7 Italians, 7 Finns and 1 German.
- 57 Cited in the Canadian Mining Journal (Toronto), November 15, 1914, Ed., p. 726.
- 58 Ibid., May 15, 1909, Ed., p. 291.
- 59 Ibid., October 15, 1912, Ed.
- 60 Miners in the silver mining industry, especially the lead-silver end of operation, experienced an appreciable decline in wages in the lead-silver end of the operation from an average salary of \$1,041.50 in 1900 to \$893.28 in 1910 (16%). Management salaries remained constant; \$1,654.66 in 1900 and \$1,650.44 in 1910. Census of Canada, 1911, vol. V, pp. xxi, xxix, xxx, 154-157.
- 61 In the coal industry, the discrepancy between value of production and wages was not so extreme. It must be kept in mind, however, that although the wages of miners did actually increase by 21%, it varied between regions. In Alberta, for instance, the increase was 32%, compared to the 27% increase in Nova Scotia and only 7% increase in British Columbia. However, the British Columbia miners still remained the highest paid in the nation with an average wage of \$753.00, followed by the Alberta miners with \$707.00, while the Nova Scotia miners remained the lowest paid with an average wage of \$550.00, some 12% below the national average. It must also be taken into account that the value of coal produced per worker

increased substantially in all three regions: 45% in Alberta, 19% in British Columbia, and 19% in Nova Scotia. In both Alberta and British Columbia the value of industrial productivity was more than the advance in wages. Ibid., pp. xxxiii-xxxv, 154-157.

⁶²The Western Clarion (Vancouver), February 13, 1909, Ed.

⁶³Cited Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (Chicago, 1969), pp. 34-35.

⁶⁴The anti-alien position to the craft based American Federation of Labor is discussed in various studies. Probably one of the clearest accounts is in Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, pp. 127, 270-275.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 38-39.

⁶⁶Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, pp. 27-30; Martin Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour, 1880-1930 (Kingston, 1968), pp. 44-47.

⁶⁷Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, pp. 37, 67-75.

⁶⁸Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, p. 35.

⁶⁹Edmund Kirby to George Gooderham, Toronto, February 6, 1900, Laurier Papers, 42039.

⁷⁰Kirby even threatened to employ armed private guards if the Dominion government did not take action to protect private property. Ibid.

⁷¹The Alien Labour Law, passed in 1897, provided for the exclusion of workers from the United States who had been recruited by companies operating in Canada. See Chapter One for a more extensive discussion.

⁷²Sifton Papers, 77240, John Francis, President of the Toronto Metal Trades Council, to Clifford Sifton, November 25, 1901.

⁷³Proceedings of the T.L.C., 1901, p. 36.

⁷⁴William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary (Public Archives of Canada), October 2, 1901, p. 276. It is notable that some of the miners accused Mackenzie King with being pro-management. Horace Evans to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, December 29, 1901, Laurier Papers, cited Martin Robin, Radical Politics, p. 54.

⁷⁵Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, p. 33.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 37-41.

⁷⁷Report of the Royal Commission on Industrial Disputes in the Province of British Columbia (Ottawa, 1904), pp. 65, 76.

⁷⁸Martin Robin, Radical Politics, p. 72. The Lougheed Bill did not become law.

⁷⁹Proceedings of the T.L.C., 1904, p. 12.

⁸⁰Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, pp. 33-38.

⁸¹Joseph Rayback, A History of American Labor (New York, 1966), pp. 209-211.

⁸²Charles McMillan, "Trade Unions in District 18, 1900-1925: A Case Study", unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Alberta, pp. 84, 190.

⁸³President John L. Lewis, Report, published in the United Mine Workers Journal, vol. 21, no. 35, January 20, 1910, p. 1. Cited in ibid., p. 86. By 1919, the United Mine Workers had a number of Slavic, Italian and Finnish organizers in the Canadian districts. The District Ledger (Ferne, published by the U.M.W.A.), April 18, 1919, Ed.; Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, p. 57.

⁸⁴Charles McMillan, "Trade Unions in District 18", p. 86.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 206. The amount of strike assistance fund varied, as the figures for the following years indicate:

1905 - \$ 2,842	1911 - \$381,000
1907 - \$ 2,100	1913 - \$584,500
1909 - \$10,000	

⁸⁶The Dominion Coal Company, incorporated in 1893, increased its productivity in the next 20 years over 500%. In

1912, the company was merged into the Dominion Steel Corporation at which time it operated 20 collieries in Nova Scotia, employing 12,000 men. The Canadian Mining Journal, November 1, 1909, p. 664; ibid., September 1, 1914, pp. 570-581; ibid., April 1, 1908, p. 97. Eugene Forsey, Economic and Social Aspects of the Nova Scotia Coal Industry (Toronto, 1926), pp. 5-11, 26.

⁸⁷ Canadian Annual Review, 1909 (Toronto, 1910), p. 299.

⁸⁸ The Canadian Mining Journal, March 1, 1909, Ed., p. 130.

⁸⁹ Canadian Annual Review, 1909, p. 298.

⁹⁰ The Canadian Mining Journal, July 15, 1909, Ed., p. 451.

⁹¹ Ibid., September 1, 1909, Ed., p. 515.

⁹² Ibid., August 1, 1909, p. 473.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid., June 15, 1911, Ed.

⁹⁵ British Columbia Federationist, April 4, 1913, Ed.
The Immigration authorities denied that they aided the Dominion Coal Company in importing alien labour. I.B., file 195281, no. 4, W. D. Scott to W. W. Cory, Deputy Minister, Interior, March 13, 1914.

⁹⁶ During the 1909 strike at Glace Bay, large numbers of miners were forcibly evicted by the Dominion Coal Company from their rented residences. Proceedings of the T.L.C., 1909, p. 73. Eugene Forsey, The Nova Scotia Coal Industry, p. 24.

⁹⁷ The Canadian Mining Journal, September 1, 1914, p. 586.

⁹⁸ British Columbia Federationist, April 4, 1913, p. 1;
Proceedings of the T.L.C., 1914, p. 32.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Testimony of William Defeu, before the Mathers Royal Commission on Industrial Relations, 'Evidence', Cobalt, 1919, (Department of Labour, Library, Ottawa), p. 1785.

¹⁰¹Harold Innis, Settlement and the Mining Frontier (Toronto, 1936), pp. 328, 336.

¹⁰²On land, the 'ground rent' ranged from \$1 to \$1.25 per foot of frontage; on houses, the rent on buildings valued at \$1,000 ranged from \$25 to \$35 a month. Ibid., p. 328.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 326; Testimony of Joseph Gorman, before the Mathers Royal Commission, 'Evidence', Cobalt, 1919, p. 1764; ibid., pp. 1790-1794. The Trades and Labor Congress denounced the use of private detective agencies at its 1907 convention. Proceedings of the T.L.C., 1907, p. 10.

¹⁰⁴Edmund Bradwin, The Bunkhouse Man (Toronto, 1972), p. 217.

¹⁰⁵Cobalt Daily Nugget, 1909-10; The Sudbury Journal, 1912-14.

¹⁰⁶Testimony of William Defeu, Mathers Royal Commission, Cobalt, 1919, 'Evidence', p. 1790.

¹⁰⁷Harold Innis, Settlement and the Mining Frontier, p. 327. The Canadian Mining Journal, August 1, 1914, Ed.

¹⁰⁸Harold Innis, Settlement and the Mining Frontier, pp. 325-328.

¹⁰⁹Sessional Papers, 1915, no. 28, Report of Superintendent J. O. Wilson, 'K' Division (Lethbridge), p. 28.

¹¹⁰The Sudbury Journal, January 6, 1913, Ed.; ibid., May 29, 1913, Ed.; ibid., July 17, 1913, Ed.; ibid., August 7, 1913, Ed.; ibid., October 2, 1913, Ed.; ibid., January 1, 1914, Ed.

¹¹¹Ibid., February 5, 1914, Ed.

¹¹²Report of the Board of Home Missions, Presbyterian Acts and Proceedings, 1912, p. 12; ibid., 1914, p. 23.

¹¹³Ibid., 1913, p. 293. The Methodist Church operated missions at both Frank and Bellevue, in the Crow's Nest Pass District, in an attempt to reach the immigrant miner. The venture was not very successful. George Emery, "Methodism on the Canadian Prairies", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia, 1970, pp. 288-290.

114 Andy der Otter, "Social Life of a Mining Community: the Coal Branch", Alberta History, vol. 17, 1969, no. 4, p. 7.

115 Neil Betten, "The Origins of Ethnic Radicalism in Northern Minnesota", p. 51.

116 Victor Greene, The Slavic Community on Strike: Immigrant Labor in Pennsylvania Anthracite (Notre Dame, 1968), p. 94. Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, pp. 229-236, 270-272.

117 The Western Clarion, March 23, 1907, Ed.; ibid. January 23, 1909, Ed.

118 Ibid., March 23, 1907, Ed.

119 Charles McMillan, "Trade Unions in District 18", p. 93.

120 Ibid., p. 100. The growth in productivity in District 18 was phenomenal. In the British Columbia section of the region, coal production increased 1,419% from 1907 to 1913. The Crow's Nest Coal Company in 1913 was responsible for the bulk of the total production in the Kootenay region. Annual Report of the Minister of Mines, Province of British Columbia, 1907, pp. 194-195. Ibid., 1913, p. 330.

121 Charles McMillan, "Trade Unions in District 18", p. 60. By 1911, some 13 companies belonged to the Western Coal Operators' Association. Canadian Annual Review, 1911, p. 334.

122 Charles McMillan, "Trade Unions in District 18", pp. 335-336.

123 Annual Report of the Minister of Mines, Province of British Columbia, p. 121; ibid., 1907, p. 348; ibid., 1913, p. 366. An analysis of the 1911 Census indicates that the coal miners in British Columbia only received a 7% increase in wages between 1901-1911 as compared to the 32% increase in Alberta. Census of Canada, 1911, vol. V, pp. xxxiii-xxxv, 154-157.

124 Annual Report of the Minister of Mines, Province of British Columbia, 1914, p. 349.

125 British Columbia Federationist, November 14, 1913, p. 1.

126 In the space of two years, 1912-14, the number of Oriental certified miners increased by 93, almost a 100% increase. These Oriental miners were confined to the Canadian Collieries Ltd. Annual Report of the Minister of Mines, Province of British Columbia, 1914, pp. 348-350. The Canadian Mining Journal, October 1, 1913, p. 601 attempted, in rather unconvincing fashion, to justify the presence of these Oriental miners.

127 Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, pp. 55-57. The Canadian Mining Journal, September 15, 1913, Ed., branded the strike as an illegal walkout. This interpretation was supported by The Report of the Royal Commission in the Matter of the Coal-Mining Labour Troubles on Vancouver Island, 1912-13 (Ottawa, 1913), pp. 10-15.

128 British Columbia Federationist, February 12, 1913, Ed.; ibid., March 7, 1913, Ed.

129 Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, pp. 57-59. The year 1913 was a very active one for the U.M.W.A. In addition to the strike on Vancouver Island, there was a major strike in Colorado. Graham Adams Jr., Age of Industrial Violence 1910-15 (New York, 1966), p. 151.

130 It was alleged by the British Columbia Federationist, May 10, 1913, Ed., that not only was the McBride government prepared to drive the white miners out of the mines, but they were also prepared to grant the Asiatic miners cultural privileges.

131 Ibid., August 22, 1913, Ed.

132 Ibid., August 7, 1913, Ed.; Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, p. 58.

133 There was a marked divergence of opinion concerning the causes of violence between the British Columbia Federationist, August 15, 1913, Ed., and The Report of the Royal Commission in the Matter of the Coal-Mining Labour Troubles on Vancouver Island, submitted by Commissioner S. R. Price in August, 1913, pp. 21-23.

134 Proceedings of the T.L.C., 1913, p. 106.

- 135 The Canadian Mining Journal, September 15, 1913, p. 567.
- 136 British Columbia Federationist, August 8, 1913, p. 2.
- 137 Proceedings of the T.L.C., 1913, p. 131.
- 138 Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, pp. 59-60.
- 139 British Columbia Federationist, August 7, 1913, Ed.; ibid., November 7, 1913, Ed.
- 140 Ibid., August 15, 1913, Ed.; ibid., November 7, 1913, Ed.
- 141 Ibid.; Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, p. 60.
- 142 Canadian Annual Review, 1913, p. 682.
- 143 Department of National Defence Papers (P.A.C.), file 363-17, 1210, Report of Lt. Col. Hall, Officer in Command, Civil Aid Force to Vancouver Island, to District Officer in Command, Military District 11 (British Columbia).
- 144 Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, pp. 52-60.
- 145 Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, p. 127, indicates that the I.W.W. had by 1913 made appreciable headway in organizing the Oriental Lumber workers in the state of Washington.
- 146 Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, p. 61.
- 147 Proceedings of the T.L.C., 1914, p. 56; Toronto Globe, March 4, 1914, p. 1.
- 148 Paul Phillips, No Power Greater, p. 60.
- 149 The Canadian Mining Journal, November 15, 1914, Ed.
- 150 Ibid.

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CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL REFORM AND THE IMMIGRANT, 1909-1914

By 1914 the ethnic composition of Canadian society had been appreciably altered. The British-born percentage of the population had actually decreased, despite the largest number of British arrivals in Canada's history. At the same time, the percentage of European immigrants increased from 9% in 1901 to 14% in 1911.¹ What made this trend all the more significant was the high percentage of South, Eastern and Central Europeans. In 1901 these "continental" Europeans immigrants exceeded those from North Western Europe by 20%; increasing to 124% in 1911 and to 144% in 1921.² The immigration returns for 1913-14, revealed that of the 400,000 immigrants entering the country, some 48% of the total came from Central and Southern Europe.³ It is not surprising, therefore, that a contemporary scholar of immigration should have concluded that, "if the war had not come in 1914, it is safe to say that Canada, by the years 1917 and 1918, would have been faced with a preponderating Continental influx".⁴

Anglo-Canadians were clearly disturbed by the recent immigration trends. The problems of adjusting the immigrant to Canadian society had increased in complexity with the inclination of many of the recent immigrants to gravitate to

urban centres. The emergence of ethnic ghettos in cities such as Fort William, Winnipeg, Edmonton, Calgary, and Vancouver produced a situation where the Anglo-Canadian felt that he had "walked out of Canada and to have stepped into an entirely foreign town"⁵ These ghettos were characterized by: excessive overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions, high crime rates, commercialized vice, obvious indigency, and the breeding ground of civil disorder. For many Anglo Saxons, the image of the typical foreigner was no longer that of a placid, hardworking peasant wearing a sheepskin coat; but rather the disturbing vision of some swarthy "bohunk or Pollack", eyes glazed with cheap liquor, ready to commit a heinous crime.

Those who wished to improve Canadian society were now joined by those seeking to safeguard Canadian society and the question of the assimilation of the European immigrant became supremely important. The Protestant churches and charitable organizations tried to improve the environmental conditions of the immigrant while they attempted to inculcate Anglo-Canadian Protestant values. The public school, provided the immigrant child not only with educational training, but with exposure to Canadian values. The ultimate goal of the assimilationists was the destruction of Old World loyalties, and a weakening of the transplanted ethnic institutional framework. It is not surprising, therefore, that

the ethnic communities should attempt to resist these forces by influencing the character of the public school system. For the Anglo-Canadian reformer the educational process was the agent of Canadianization; for the clerico-nationalistic ethnic leaders it was a means of perpetuating their own national cultural heritage. By 1914 there was no middle ground between these two positions.

The Census figures of 1911 created a new awareness among Canadians of the population trends of the previous decade. The total population of the Dominion was assessed at 7,204,527; this was a 34% increase over the 1901 level. However, critics quickly pointed out that if Canada had maintained its 20% rate of natural increase over the decade some one million Canadians would have been added to the population through natural increase. If this assumption was valid, the bold assertion by the Immigration Branch that over 1,788,369 immigrants had been added to Canada's population between June 1900 and March 1911 was obviously false.⁶

In the House of Commons and through the press, the Conservatives took advantage of the opportunity to ridicule Liberal immigration pretensions.⁷ The most bitter attacks were directed, however, against the quality not the quantity of the immigrants. It was particularly on the American statistics that the Conservatives concentrated, a not unusual strategem since this had been one of the aspects of the

immigration program most highly praised by Liberal supporters. In the House of Commons, the Conservative leader, R.L. Borden, cited the returns from the American Commissioner-General of Immigration between July 1, 1909 - June 30, 1910. These returns indicated that although some 116,377 United States citizens had entered Canada, in actual fact, Canada had only experienced a net gain of 22,000 immigrants in the migration exchange in that year.⁸ George Foster, succinctly summed up the views of his party and a broad cross-section of Canadian public opinion when he referred to the difference between the Liberal immigration pretensions and the reality of the situation. "We have been pluming ourselves upon despoiling our neighbours of a number of their eligible cultivators and other inhabitants, but it seems to be without any real reason."⁹ Despite efforts on the part of the Liberals to question the veracity of the American statistics, and their emphasis on the Canadian gain in material wealth, the Conservative charges were not refuted successfully.¹⁰

The whole question of the displacement of Canadians by European immigrants also began to assume shape in this debate over immigration trends. The Ottawa Free Press posed the very fundamental question: "Are we maintaining an Immigration corps merely to bring people to Canada, as a way-house to the United States... are we still contributing our thousands of young people each year to the millions of the American Republic?"¹¹ Canada, the demographic railway

station, had been a recurring theme in nineteenth century immigration discussions. Records showed thousands of immigrants, many of them British, had landed in Canada and then proceeded to the United States. But during the Laurier period, immigration reports had stressed that a high percentage of the immigrants who came to Canada from Europe had remained in the country.¹² There was, however, another dimension added to the debate by the high percentage of immigrants from Europe, especially those from eastern and southern Europe. It was argued that these predominantly low skill immigrants, with their inclination to endure harsh conditions and low financial return, were actually forcing native Canadians out of the various occupations, and even out of the country. Although the so-called Gresham's theory of immigration, or the Displacement Theory, did not become academically respectable until the 1920's, there were many Anglo-Canadians of the pre-war period who would have accepted the basic tenet that "'cheap' men drive out 'dear' men"; the view that continental European immigrants entering at the bottom of the Canadian social structure forced out Canadian born professionals and skilled workers at the top.¹³ In the literature pertaining to immigration between 1909-1914 there were allusions to this phenomenon occurring. J.S. Woodsworth, an influential Methodist Minister, in his book Strangers Within Our Gates (Toronto, 1909), declared emphatically that the effects of massive immigration would

lead to a situation whereby "within a few years the people with lower standards of living will drive out all competitors. The economic question becomes the social question".¹⁴

Asiatic immigration was a striking example of the dilemma: cheap labour gave economic advantages but produced a labour force that was considered unassimilable. Moreover, there was the well-articulated arguments that, indeed, cheap sub-human oriental labour would drive white men out of British Columbia. By 1914, public opinion was in favour of Oriental exclusion rather than restricted Oriental immigration. Many of the same prejudices operated to bar the entry of other 'coloured' immigrants such as American negroes who had attempted to settle the Canadian West in 1910-1911.¹⁵ Assimilation of non-whites was believed to be neither possible nor desirable.

The whole bogey of 'race suicide' became a matter for public discussion. C. A. Magrath, the M.P. for Lethbridge, Alberta wrote an influential book on the subject in 1910, called Canada's Growth and Some Problems Affecting It (Ottawa, 1910). Magrath called for consideration of racial and cultural factors in determining immigration policy, stressing that immigration "deals with the life blood of the nation".¹⁶ As one speaker informed the Empire Club in 1911, the influx of eastern Europeans would probably mean a sharp drop in the birth rate of the Anglo-Canadian population. Reference was made to the trends in the United States which

indicated that "the decline in the birth rate of United States stock began when the immigrants began to come".¹⁷

The explanation for the phenomena was attributed to economic and social environmental factors; those ethnic groups engaged in the hard manual work at the bottom of the social spectrum tended to be those with the high birth rate, "because the only people breeding to-day are the primitive or semi-primitive people".¹⁸ The obvious lesson was that if Anglo-Canadians continued to import low level immigrants from Europe to perform the arduous tasks, eventually these 'foreigners' would, through natural increase and immigration, form a majority of the population.

The future role of white immigrants in Canada was also a matter of considerable controversy. For most Canadians prior to 1914, Canadianization meant the assimilation of the immigrants, or, at least, the white immigrants into the Anglo-Canadian pattern. Early in the century it had been maintained that even the more unattractive ethnic groups, such as the Galicians, the Doukhobors, and the Italians should be and would be assimilated.¹⁹ But even at this stage some Anglo-Canadians had expressed reservations about the nature of the process. Frank Oliver has been one of the most outspoken critics:

I have heard members say that these strange people, these Slavs, will assimilate. Do you know what the word assimilate means? It is a nice sounding word. Do you know that it means that if you settle on a farm on the prairies amongst them or in their neighbourhood you must

depend for the schooling of your children on the tax-paying willingness and power of people who neither know or care nothing about schools? Do you know that it means the intermarriage of your sons and daughters with those who are of an alien race and of alien ideas? That is assimilation, or else there is no assimilation.²⁰

A strong undercurrent of racial bias remained among Anglo-Canadians. This was revealed in 1909 when there was considerable protest that novelist Ralph Connor (Reverend C.W. Gordon) had transgressed the grounds of decency when he allowed a fictional marriage to occur between "a poor foreign boy and ... a great English lady".²¹ Although the popularity of pseudo-genetic theories was not that widespread prior to 1914 in Canada, there was still a well-established hierarchy of national groups in the minds of most Anglo-Canadians.²² For the most part, however, these differences were believed to be based on cultural and environmental factors rather than racial or genetic elements. As a result, there was general support for the idea of assimilation.

Actually most of the debate over assimilation was focused on the effectiveness of the process, not on the desirability. Most critics of the immigration policy pointed out that conditions in Canada prevented the proper functioning of the assimilationist forces. The most obvious deficiency was the small Anglo-Canadian population in some areas in relation to the large numbers of European immigrants. C.A. Magrath was distressed by the fact that Canada, a nation of seven million, was trying to absorb 200,000 immigrants annually,

To encourage so many people of diverse backgrounds, he felt, illustrated a disastrous myopia. Reference was made to the difficulty encountered by the United States in assimilating their annual increment of immigrants which represented at most, one percent of their total population; for Canada to attempt to assimilate over three percent was not only "unhealthy", but actually a "danger to the country".²³ The situation appeared even more alarming in 1913 when over 400,000 immigrants poured into the country.

What Magrath and others saw as the end result of the influx of thousands of immigrants from continental Europe was a situation similar to that which had developed in the United States, especially in the urban areas: "The shocking condition of filth, immorality and crime -- the feeders of various forms of insanity -- bred and developed to an alarming extent in city slum life, largely fed by an unhealthy immigration".²⁴ A study for the Canadian Commission on Conservation in 1911 by Dr. Charles A. Hodgetts provided extensive documentary evidence that thousands of Canadians lived "in squalor, dirt, darkness, dampness and disease".²⁵ Dr. Hodgetts made specific reference to the presence of the ethnic ghetto as "a problem which concerns every city, town, and district in Canada and must be grappled with right now."²⁶ The description of the Italian ghetto of Sault Ste. Marie was cited to show the extent of the problem: "This colony is crowded into a lot of miserable shacks filthy both outside

and inside; no cellars, no drainage, closets on the surface of the ground, vile beyond description; water from shallow wells which were dirty and unfit for use, and most of them located within a few feet of the closets."²⁷ According to Hodgetts, the blame for the disgusting urban housing conditions was threefold: there was the greed of the immigrants who in their eagerness to get money ... "often live more like swine than human beings"; there was the avarice of the slum landlords who were able, with the aid of local politicians, to sabotage the Health and Sanitary laws; and there was the shocking indifference of the Canadian nation to "invite and encourage settlers to come to this country when we have not even adequate accommodation to offer them ... at a fair rental".²⁸ Hodgetts warned his audience of the dangers to the community of allowing the slum to survive and grow: "The slum, like the tentacles of the devil fish, receives its prey within its walls, retains and engulfs him ... This is an infection productive of infections, a contagion which as it spreads through the slum, creates new slum dwellers as it passes, leaving its victims stricken with inertia, slothfulness, drunkenness, criminality."²⁹

The Protestant churches had already assumed a major role in bringing the social conditions in the cities, especially in the ethnic ghettos, to the attention of the Canadian public. In September 1909, The Christian Guardian warned its readers that they must be aware of the fact that "there

are great masses of ... foreign speaking immigrants crowding into our cities and towns ... almost uncared for"³⁰

J.S. Woodsworth, the Superintendent of All-Peoples' Mission, in the same issue, stated that "in all cities and towns of any size there are large foreign colonies ... between 20 and 30 nationalities, nearly all the kinds that come from Europe and many from Western Asia".³¹ In subsequent issues Woodsworth took the lead in stressing the need for the church to allocate additional funds in order to cope with the problems associated with the ethnic ghetto. Woodsworth most effectively aroused public interest in the immigrant problem with the publication of his book, Strangers Within Our Gates (1909). In this study Woodsworth stressed the social problems associated with integrating the Slavic immigrant into Anglo-Canadian Society since "centuries of poverty and oppression have, to some extent animalized him".³²

Of primary concern to the Protestant churches was the debilitating effect of alcohol on the immigrant male. J.W. Woodsworth blamed alcohol for turning the Slavic immigrant into a "quarrelsome and dangerous" individual.³³ Another Winnipeg Minister, C.W. Gordon (Ralph Connor), in his novel The Foreigner (1909), stressed the inability of the Slav to cope with alcohol: "A single beer keg is an object of consuming interest to the Galician and subjects his sense of honour to a considerable strain."³⁴ He portrayed Slavic festive occasions, such as weddings, not as moments of

dignity, but barbaric happenings:

In the main room dance and song reeled on in uproarious hilarity. In the basement below, foul and fetid, men stood packed close drinking while they could ... In the dim light of a smoky lantern, the swaying crowd, here singing in maudlin chorus, there fighting savagely to pay off old scores or to avenge new insults, presented a nauseating spectacle.³⁵

The fact that so many of the continental European immigrants were single men, usually under age thirty, was often cited as a factor explaining the alarming incidence of crimes relating to excessive drinking and sexual immorality. Statistics for 1921 certainly showed an appreciable surplus in the percentage of male immigrants; for Italians the figure was 88%; for Slavs it was 38%.³⁶ J.S. Woodsworth, in an article in The Christian Guardian, in 1913 vividly described the difficult situation faced by many of these male immigrants.³⁷ On one hand, as many of them were unskilled labourers, they were faced with an irregular pattern of employment; sometime they were able to secure work for only seven or eight months of the year. At the same time, they found their earnings eaten away by the rapidly advancing cost of living which kept them on the verge of indigency. In social terms it meant that a labourer could not afford to bring his family to Canada, "unless he is willing to maintain his family below a decent standard". Yet by remaining in the state of "the homeless man", the immigrant labourer represented a menace to public morality because of his susceptibility to the lure of alcohol and prostitutes.³⁸

The immigrant presence and the problems of prostitution were very much closely associated in the minds by many Anglo-Canadian reformers. On one hand, there seemed to be very definite proof that a high percentage of immigrant girls were being forced into commercial vice because of their economic and social conditions. Social reformers such as Woodsworth and Professor W.F. Osborne of Wesley College remained convinced that squalid housing and low paying jobs in the ghettos of Canadian cities "were driving a large part of the female population into virtual prostitution".³⁹ Class factors as well as ethnic and social factors were stressed by organized labour. The Western Wage Earner, the official publication of the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council: charged that "the starvation wages of mills, factories, department stores, and sweat shops drive women to the brothels, and until woman is crowned with economic freedom, the evil will spread until the very homes of the nation will be threatened with the moral leprosy that has stolen the blush of shame from the cheek of womanhood".⁴⁰

The Protestant churches were also very much obsessed with the idea that thousands of immigrant girls were "literally sold into bondage and held by force" by white slavers. It was generally believed that an international system existed to supply prostitutes for the many houses of ill repute throughout the world. Throughout 1909-1914 there were numerous public charges that girls for the brothels were

being brought to Canadian cities where they were "broken in and inured to the business", and then distributed to the large American market.⁴¹ Despite the protestations from both the Immigration Branch and the Dominion Police that no evidence of such a "white slave traffic" existed, the agitation gained in intensity. In 1913, the Anglicans, the Presbyterians, and the Methodists at their national conferences denounced the immigration and police officials for their dereliction of duty.⁴² Immigration officials and police officers throughout the country were perplexed and angered at these charges. From the immigration point of view there was considerable consternation that the hysteria would seriously decrease the flow of immigrant domestics, both from Great Britain and Europe.⁴³

But if there was a difference of opinion over the extent of prostitution among the immigrants, there was general agreement about the danger that the foreigner presented to the maintenance of law and order. This concern extended to both the rural and urban areas of the country. In the rural areas of Saskatchewan and Alberta, the responsibility for law enforcement rested with the Royal Northwest Mounted Police. As early as 1903, Commissioner A. Bowen Perry indicated the great need to familiarize the foreigner with Canadian law and British tradition, "that from the first they should be impressed with the fair, just and certain enforcement of the laws, and that they should be educated to their observance".⁴⁴

In order to meet this great challenge, Perry urgently requested a substantial increase in the size of the force. This request was not acted upon by Prime Minister Laurier. As a result, the size of the force was not expanded until after 1911. Throughout this period, therefore, the R.N.W.M.P. were consistently understaffed, while the population "increased five times".⁴⁵

The attitude on the part of the officers in charge of the various divisions towards the Central and Southern European immigrants was, at the early part of the century, quite tolerant. Most of the Reports stressed the hard working nature of the Slavic settlers although continual reference was made to their custom of taking the law into their own hands in coping with some wrong. But as more and more European immigrants poured into the western provinces, a new note began to emerge from the police annual reports. The prevalence of concealed weapons, usually knives, made even minor disagreements potentially fatal for the participants. This dangerous situation was aggravated by the number of so-called festive occasions where so often "a drunken carousal resolved itself into a tragedy".⁴⁶ The large number of violent and often tragic family quarrels, the high incidence of sexual crimes, (in comparison to Anglo-Canadian standards), produced a reaction of disgust from the law-enforcement personnel, especially towards "the low class eastern European element,"⁴⁷ Commissioner Perry in his annual report for 1909

made specific reference to "these revolting cases" concluding that the explanation for "such gross ignorance ... could only result from an absolute lack of moral training in the home".⁴⁸

What added to the consternation of the law-enforcement agencies was not only the high crime rate among the foreigners, but also the difficulty of apprehending the criminals. The foreign community, especially those of Slavic and Italian background, manifested a deep suspicion toward the police. According to various R.N.W.M.P. Superintendents, it was almost impossible to obtain reliable information relating to the crime, or to convince Galicians to testify. This defensiveness was primarily attributed to the illiteracy and superstitious nature of these immigrants. In one case, because semi-drought conditions had followed the execution of a Galician murderer, "it was claimed that the absence of badly needed rain was due to the execution of Zebbley, and if any more persons were punished the further consequences would be disastrous".⁴⁹ In another report reference was made to the problem of Galician suspects who fled to Austria, and thus placed themselves beyond the reach of the law since Canada did not have any extradition arrangement with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The superintendent warned, that allowing this situation to continue "would be putting a premium on crime if they could escape justice by simply returning to their old home".⁵⁰ On the eve of World War I, the law-

enforcement difficulties associated with the continental European immigrants appeared even more formidable to the R.N.W.M.P. than was the case a decade earlier. Far from instilling in these people a sense of "British justice", a deplorable situation existed whereby many of these "foreigners" remained isolated in their ethnic colonies. One constable reported that large numbers of immigrants had never seen a policeman: "In one place I was asked ... if I was an agent for sewing machines".⁵¹

Many of the observations made by the officers of the R.N.W.M.P. in respect to the foreigner were duplicated by civic officials throughout Canada. At the 1913 Annual Convention of the Chief Constables, the President of the Association expressed the views of the majority of those assembled; when he stressed the need for strict enforcement of the law when foreigners were involved: "I refer to this because I have found amongst a certain class of foreigners, a disposition to perpetuate customs which are foreign to us and which, if established here, would not be in the moral or material interests of our people".⁵² In Montreal, the presence of large number of Jewish immigrants from South and Eastern Europe was blamed for the rising crime rate; one French Canadian member in the House of Commons asserted that it was primarily Jewish "ruffians and thugs who terrorize our peaceful citizens".⁵³

But it was in the cities of western Canada that newcomers

presented the greatest threat to law and order. The threat came not only from increased lawlessness in the ghettos, but also the possibility that migrant foreign males, large numbers of whom were often unemployed and homeless, might be mobilized into full scale civil disorder. In transportation entrepots such as Winnipeg and Fort William, and mining centres such as Fernie and Ladysmith, there were sporadic incidents which revealed the mob potential of the aliens. This trend towards urban anarchy had been particularly noticeable during periods of industrial conflict: the 1906 street railway strike in Winnipeg; the 1910 freight handlers' strike in Fort William; and the coal miners' strike in Fernie, (1911) and in Nanaimo and Ladysmith (1913). In all of these situations the violence had been attributed to a combination of discontented hordes of ignorant and barbaric European immigrants and the presence of professional agitators.⁵⁴

The 1906 street railway strike was in many respects a preview of the 1919 Winnipeg Strike. Although the role of the "foreign element" did not receive the broad press as coverage as it did in 1919, it was necessary for Mayor Sharpe to read the Riot Act and to petition for the use of the Militia to cope with the unruly crowds in the predominantly foreign North End of Winnipeg.⁵⁵ Moreover, the concern on the part of Anglo-Canadians towards the alien increased as the pattern of European settlement in Manitoba began to alter. No longer was the majority of the Ukrainian and other Slavic

immigrants going to the land; instead, an increasing proportion were seeking employment in the cities, especially Winnipeg. The growth of Winnipeg from 42,340 in 1901 to 136,035 in 1911, an increase of roughly 221% had been a most dramatic occurrence, in itself, but when combined with the increase in the number of Slavic dwellers, the result had crucial social consequences. In 1901, there had been approximately 3,000 Central Europeans (including Poles, Russians, Ukrainians and Jews) in the city, or 9% of the total city population; by 1911 the number had increased to 22,296 or 15% of the total.⁵⁶ Moreover, most of these people were located in a definite geographical area of the city, an urban ghetto in the "North End". The following table showing the ethnic background and occupational status of one section of the North End illustrates the predominantly 'foreign' and working class character of this part of Winnipeg:

Table A: Report on Housing Survey, Ward Five District; Selkirk Ave. on the South; Alfred St. on the north; Slater St. on the east; Mackenzie St. on the west.⁵⁷

<u>Nationalities of Heads of Families</u>		<u>Occupations of Heads of Families</u>	
Russian	695	Labourers & Teamsters	282 30%
Austro-Hungarian	46	Clerks & Shopkeepers	92 10%
Romanian	33	Merchants	69 7%
German	22	Building Trades	68 7%
British	77	R.R. employees	52 5%
Canadian Born	39	Tailors	42 5%
Scandinavian	8	Plumbers	33 4%
Other	5	Mechanics	27 3%
Total	932	Painters	24 3%
		Professionals	23 3%
		Clerks & Accounts	22 3%
		Other	198 20%
		Total	932 100%

In contrast to neighbouring Anglo-Saxon working class districts, there was a very high percentage of unskilled labourers and a very low percentage of 'white collar' employees in the North End. There was very little opportunity for the 'foreigners' to obtain the position of clerks, in part because the vast majority of these companies were owned by Anglo-Canadians. However, by 1906 there was a European-born merchant class, often Jewish, as well as an increasing number of European trained professionals who began to locate in the North End.⁵⁸

Many of these educated immigrants in the North End had previously been associated with the Ukrainian and Social Democratic party in Europe, and they brought their sense of political radicalism to the Canadian milieu. This trend was revealed in 1907 when a branch of the Social Democratic party was formed in the city under the leadership of Paul Crath, Myroslaw Stechishin, Sam Blumenberg, Matthew Popovich and Jacob Penner. The Social Democrats also founded their own newspaper The Red Flag (1907) and The Toiling People (Robochny Narod, 1909). These papers advocated many European socialist themes: support for the Second International; advocacy of militant atheism; ridicule for the Greek Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches; and predictions concerning the inevitability of class struggle between the proletariat and the capitalist classes.⁵⁹

The militancy and the dedication of these 'foreign'

socialists created a degree of apprehension on the part of many Anglo-Canadians in Winnipeg. Evidence of the growing strength of socialist doctrines appeared on all sides. For instance, by 1908, the May Day parade had become an annual institution. This ritual was followed by the spectacle of thousands of aliens being harangued by demagogic speakers "in German, Yiddish, Russian and Galician"⁶⁰

Negative Anglo-Canadian reaction to the alien agitator was clearly revealed in 1908 when strenuous efforts were made by Winnipeg civic officials to prevent Emma Goldman, the famous anarchist from visiting the city. In April 1908, Mayor J.H. Ashdown, a wealthy Winnipeg merchant, wrote a strongly worded letter of protest to the Minister of the Interior.⁶¹ Ashdown claimed that Emma Goldman's reason for visiting Winnipeg was "to create trouble ... and build up a centre among the foreigners in our midst". That such a disreputable alien, a person regarded as "thoroughly undesirable" by most Americans, should even be allowed to address an Anglo-Saxon audience was considered to be unwise; but to allow her to appear before a foreign group was to invite disaster:

... we have a very large foreign population in this City, it consists approximately of 15,000 Galicians, 11,000 Germans, 10,000 Jews, 2,000 Hungarians and 5,000 Russians and other Slavs and Bohemians. Many of these people have had trouble in their own country with their Governments and come to the new land to get away from it but have all the undesirable elements in their character that created the trouble for them before. They are just the right crowd for

Emma Goldman or persons of her character to sow seeds which are bound to cause most undesirable growths in the future⁶²

Various groups of citizens in Winnipeg lodged formal protests with civic authorities in connection with her public appearances. The local branch of the Women's Christian Temperance Union denounced the presence of "a foreigner of such character and reputation", especially since she directed her appeals "to those scarcely Canadianized".⁶³ In this instance, the Immigration officials were unable to prevent Emma Goldman's entry since under the Immigration Act there was no provision for the exclusion of an anarchist.⁶⁴ Ashdown, in fact, indicated that if the Immigration Act was powerless to deal with such a situation amendment should be made to the Criminal Code strengthening the authority of the local police and Courts.⁶⁵ Although the suggestion was not acted upon, the tactics of harassment adopted by the Winnipeg Police were sufficient to terminate the lecture series prematurely. It is notable that in the 1910 amendment to the Immigration Act, a section was added (Section 41) which specifically provided for the deportation of any professed anarchist such as Emma Goldman.⁶⁶

Mayor Ashdown's attempts to control the immigrant element also extended to the religious sphere. In April 1909, as a prominent Methodist, he strongly urged the Laymen's Missionary movement to allocate more money to the Home Mission work among the immigrants in Winnipeg: "It is the

heathen or the non-civilized are worth looking after in their own country, surely the same must be true of them when they come to our land where their presence may be such a corrupting influence."⁶⁷ By 1909, the Protestant Churches in Winnipeg had already implemented a programme geared to the needs of the immigrants. Ministers such as J.S. Woodsworth and C.W. Gordon were in the forefront of the movement to improve the social milieu of the immigrants while at the same time inculcating a sense of Canadianism. Woodsworth's work in particular, as Superintendent of All-People's Mission in north Winnipeg, attracted national attention. What was perhaps most notable about the Woodsworth approach was the fact that he was primarily concerned with the social well-being of the immigrants not their conversion.⁶⁸ Two flourishing kindergartens were operated to give the children of immigrants an opportunity of overcome linguistic deficiencies before starting public school; fresh air camps were also established; and Sunday schools were operated throughout the year. For the adults, night classes in civics and English were established along with Sunday afternoon 'People's Forums' designed to attract immigrants alienated by ordinary religious services. Settlement houses such as North End House functioned as neighbourhood social service agencies.⁶⁹

Woodsworth and other Protestant clergymen in Winnipeg were also concerned about the double-standard manifest by the Anglo-Canadian community towards the immigrant. In a scath-

ing article published in the Manitoba Free Press in 1909, Woodsworth exposed the hypocrisy of many Anglo-Canadians in Winnipeg who on one hand deplored the squalid living conditions of the foreigners, while at the same time they exploited the bewildered immigrants. Special reference was made of the fact that "the owners of some of the vilest dens in the city were our 'best' (!) people--our society people, our church people, and for these houses they obtain in some cases, double the legitimate rentals"⁷⁰ What attracted most public attention was the 1910 exposé of the contradiction between the expressed intent of the Anglo-Canadian community to uplift the moral standards of the immigrants in a city where civic officials sanctioned the existence of a flourishing "Red Light" District. In November, 1910, Reverend J.G. Shearer, Secretary of the Moral and Social Reform Council of Canada, informed the Toronto Globe that in his opinion Winnipeg had the rottenest condition "... of social vice to be found in any city in Canada."⁷¹ As a result of the agitation, a Royal Commission was appointed by the provincial government to investigate the situation.⁷² One of the most significant aspects of the inquiry was the effect that the existence of the segregated, seamy, condoned, commercialized, vice had on the immigrant population.⁷³ Reverend Shearer, in his testimony before the Commission maintained that the social harm inflicted on the foreigner was quite extreme, especially since there was a very high concentration of immigrant families

within the 'red light' district. He reminded the Commission that these people "came from almost all countries to become fellow citizens of ours, and naturally their first impression of Canadian ideals, institutions and respect for law and order would be received from what was going on in the segregated area of permitted vice".⁷⁴ J.S. Woodsworth, in his testimony, further substantiated the charges by Rev. Shearer when he pointed out that of the 662 families in this zone the following ethnic groups were represented: Ruthenians (194); English (145); Hebrew (92); Polish (70); German (43); Canadian (41); Scotch (20); Assyrian (12); Russian (10). Woodsworth also made reference to the growing prevalence of immorality among the children in the district, especially the foreign children.⁷⁵

Although the incumbent mayor, Sanford Evans, had been very much involved with establishing the 'red light' district, he was returned to office in the civic election of 1910. The fact that Evans received substantial support from the foreign districts of the North End disillusioned reformers such as J.S. Woodsworth: "the foreign elements was unaccustomed to civic elections and had had very little knowledge of the rival candidates or their policies. To a large extent foreign electors were in the hands of key men, who in turn were cogs in political machines."⁷⁶ The wholesale distribution of liquor to the foreign voters was a matter of particular censure.

The connection between liquor laws and the electoral process was a matter of great controversy in western Canada during this period. Many reformers viewed the foreign vote as a major obstacle in achieving prohibition. Continued reference was made to the high prevalence of alcohol addiction among foreign workers, and the reluctance of foreign males to recognize alcohol as a cause of their degradation. But the Anglo-Canadian reformers, many of whom were from evangelical Protestant backgrounds, were convinced that the foreigner must be saved from himself.⁷⁷ State enforced prohibition was, therefore, essential. However, in Manitoba and other provinces, temperance forces had encountered strong opposition from the 'machine' politicians and their foreign allies. By 1912, many Anglo-Canadian reformers were convinced that only with the enfranchisement of English-speaking women would the electoral influence of the alien male be overcome, and victory be achieved.⁷⁸ L. St. George Stubbs, an influential Winnipeg lawyer, was roundly applauded at the 1912 Manitoba Grain Growers' Convention when he speculated "surely my wife is more capable of voting than the ignorant Galician!"⁷⁹

The debate over the 'foreign vote' was a matter of both local and national importance throughout the period under study. As early as 1898-1900, the Conservatives had charged that Clifford Sifton's main purpose in flooding western Canada with Slavic immigrants was to insure the political

supremacy of the Liberal Party. However, in their turn, the Conservatives attempted to capture the 'foreign' vote when presented with the opportunity.⁸⁰ But while the tactics utilized by the political parties towards the immigrant voter were intriguing, there was another more important aspect associated with the foreigner and the electoral process. This relates to the gradual change in attitude on the part of the immigrant voter, especially the Ukrainian, towards the importance of the franchise. By 1912-14, the Ukrainian voter in western Canada was being marshalled, behind a campaign to obtain cultural and economic concessions for their ethnic group. This trend was directly related to the emergence of an active Ukrainian nationalist elite, particularly in Manitoba.

In the initial years of immigration, most of the Ukrainian settlers were located in rural areas of the Canadian West, concerned with the rather formidable task of building a shelter, clearing the land, planting the crops, finding temporary employment, and establishing rudimentary social organizations. Since most of the immigrants were illiterates and were engaged primarily in manual work "language difficulties did not impede cooperation"; in fact, they had little if any reason to demand linguistic privileges since they were either isolated from Anglo-Canadian society, or they moved into special economic categories reserved for members of their linguistic group.⁸¹ The behaviour of many

of the educated members of the Ukrainian community in Canada showed striking similarity to their Old World pattern. It was common for these men to pose as intermediaries between the Anglo-Canadian community and the Ukrainian settlers.⁸² What made this elite group appear so attractive to the Anglo-Canadians was their claim that they were interested in facilitating the rapid assimilation of their Ukrainian countrymen. In performing their function of intermediaries between the host society and the immigrant group these men were usually able to receive appreciable material benefits. Canadian political parties found these "ethnic entrepreneurs" indispensable at election time and rewarded them accordingly.

At the federal level, the Liberal party had been quick to appreciate the advantages in using the ethnic elite as a means of insuring that the ethnic vote was delivered en bloc to the Liberal candidate. In particular, foreign language newspapers were regarded as a most effective vehicle in the 'proper' political education of the immigrant. Prior to the 1904 Federal election the Liberal organizers distributed patronage to various newspapers believed to be sympathetic to the "cause". It was decided that financial aid should be given to the Canadian Farmer, a paper published in Ukrainian that was touted as being an effective propaganda organ among both the "Ruthenians ... (and) a very large proportion of Poles".⁸³ In Assiniboia, J.G. Turriff requested aid for a Hungarian Catholic newspaper, on the grounds that "the

Hungarians all through my constituency went solid for the Government⁸⁴ Even Frank Oliver, who had previously deplored the influence of the 'foreign' vote, solicited aid for the German language newspaper Herold (Edmonton) pointing out that the German voters "are generally inclined to support the Government".⁸⁵

The presence of so many staunch Liberals within the ranks of the Immigration Department officialdom in western Canada helped ensure that the foreign voter would recognize his proper sense of responsibility at the ballot box. The Immigration Branch also employed key men in the ethnic communities as interpreters; one important function of these liaison officials was to interpret to their countrymen the correct way to vote. During the 1904 election, the Commissioner of Immigration, J. Obed Smith used men such as Cyril Genik (Ukrainian interpreter) extensively in political organizational work, particularly in Clifford Sifton's constituency:

I had a telephone message from Mr. Dafee this morning with reference to the Galicians in your Division, and I am sending up officer Genik to look into the matter ... From what I can gather, there are six families near Elm Valley containing probably eight votes, and there may be fifty votes in the City of Brandon.⁸⁶

Considerable attention was also devoted to naturalizing immigrant voters just prior to the election. C.W. Speers, the travelling Immigration Inspector, indicated in February 1904, that he had located over 2,500 Galicians who were

entitled to the franchise. Speers informed Sifton that he was initiating immediate action "to take up the naturalization of these people with Mr. Smith (J. Obed), and devise the best means to have this accomplished".⁸⁷

One of the major complaints of the Manitoba Liberals during this period was the use of the provincial franchise during Dominion elections. Although Immigration officials and compliant judges were able to naturalize thousands of immigrants prior to the election, Liberal organizers were unable to ensure that the names of these duly qualified immigrants would appear on the voters' list. In 1904, John W. Dafoe informed Clifford Sifton that unless the Ukrainian electors were placed on a federal voters' list they "will be hopelessly confused to whom they are indebted to for the privilege of the franchise".⁸⁸ It is significant that by 1908 the Liberals in Manitoba appeared to have lost control of the immigrant vote in both federal and provincial elections. Federally the Liberals won only two seats in 1908, and it was only by 69 votes that Clifford Sifton carried his Brandon constituency.⁸⁹

Provincially, the Conservatives, although they had been elected in 1899 on an anti-alien platform, soon supplanted the Liberals as the beneficiary of the ethnic vote; five successive electoral victories were achieved through the advantage derived from the mass support of the immigrants.⁹⁰ In maintaining the loyalty of the ethnic community, the

Conservatives utilized the Public Works Department, the Provincial Police and their control over the voter's list. Material benefits were also extended to pro-Conservative ethnic newspapers such as The Canadian Ruthenian.⁹¹ However, undoubtedly the greatest lure presented to attract the foreign vote was the bilingual school system.

The important trend associated with the bilingual school system was that provisions made to safeguard bilingualism in 1897 had been construed as legal basis for a multi-lingual system. Basic to the development of the bilingual school system had been the declaration contained in the Laurier-Greenway Compromise to the Manitoba School Question (section 258): "when ten of the pupils of any school speak the French language or any language other than English as their native tongue, the teaching of such pupils shall be conducted in French, or such other languages and English upon the bilingual school system".⁹² From the original intent, which had been geared to the needs of the French, Mennonite and Icelandic community, bilingual schools had expanded so that by 1916 the number of children enrolled in rural bilingual schools was one-sixth of the total school enrolment for those areas. Of this total, 111 were Ruthenian-Polish schools with some 114 bilingual teachers.⁹³

Part of the explanation for this trend was the policy adopted by the Roblin Government. In 1905, the Ruthenian Training School for teachers, was established first in

Winnipeg, (1905-07), and then moved to Brandon (1907-16). Although there had been some initial suspicion among the Ukrainians that the Training School would be an agent of assimilation, it soon became the focal point of Ukrainian nationalists, "the root of Ukrainian culture in Canada"⁹⁴ The role of the Training School graduates in cooperation with local Ukrainian school trustees, was very influential in proliferating the number of Ukrainian bilingual districts. This development was aided by a relaxation of provincial regulations. In 1908, the Manitoba Department of Education decided to allow any school district to become bilingual without the consent of the Department. The Coldwell amendment to the School Act in 1912 further facilitated the establishment of bilingual schools, and opened the door to the possibility of bilingual schools in both rural and urban areas.⁹⁵

By 1912, the degree of political involvement by the Ukrainians was quite different from merely casting the vote blindly for one of the Anglo-Canadian parties. In rural areas there was a trend whereby the local elite, or the wealthy farmers, became involved in municipal government. By 1908, the municipality of Stuartburn had elected a Ukrainian reeve, and four other municipalities were to follow by 1914.⁹⁶ This same trend was evident in urban areas of the province when in 1912 Theodore Stefanik was elected as an alderman in Winnipeg. In fact, the Ukrainian community in Winnipeg was

displaying pronounced vitality. An educated elite, many of whom were socialists had emerged including men such as Taras Ferley, former teacher at the Brandon Training School, and young intellectuals such as Orest Zerebko and Paul Arsenych. In 1910 these three men founded The Ukrainian Voice, a socialist-nationalist newspaper that advocated the creation of a strong and vital Ukrainian culture in western Canada.⁹⁷

The emergence of the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church as an influential element among the Ukrainians added another factor. The arrival of Bishop Nykyta Budka in December 1912, gave fresh impetus to the creation a 'national' church. In 1913 Budka had the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church incorporated, a move prompted by the desire of many Ukrainians to secure greater independence from the Roman Catholic church. A newspaper, The Canadian Ruthenian (Kanadiysky Rusin), founded in 1911, provided Budka with a means of communicating with the mass of Ukrainian immigrants, and strengthened the position of his church. The most important theme stressed by Budka was the need to preserve the educational rights of the Ukrainians, in order to guarantee "the nation's foundation".⁹⁸

The pronounced Ukrainian nationalist sentiment manifest by both the lay and clerical elites in Canada was related to a change in the political climate of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the period 1910-14, Ukrainian nationalists in Europe were mobilizing the political power of the Ukrainian

population to secure cultural and economic concessions. There was, in fact, great optimism that the Austrian officials would eventually agree to the creation of a separate Ukrainian state within the confines of the Hapsburg Empire. It is significant that many Ukrainian intellectuals and clerico-nationalists, such as Bishop Budka, appeared to believe that by utilizing these tactics in Canada, similar special status for Ukrainians could be achieved.⁹⁹

One aspect of the campaign for greater cultural rights was the attempt on the part of the Ukrainian elites to form a common front with other Slavic groups. In Winnipeg, for instance, there was a high degree of interaction among Ukrainian, Polish and Russian intellectuals and workers, as illustrated by the vitality of the Social Democratic Party.¹⁰⁰ Another important development was the gradual absorption, in both the urban and rural areas of Manitoba, of the Poles into the more numerous and dynamic Ukrainian community.¹⁰¹

A second aspect of the nationalist campaign was the degree of cooperation achieved between Archbishop Langevin of the Roman Catholic Church, and Bishop Budka. Throughout the period 1910-14, Langevin had attempted to establish a coalition with the Slavic immigrants; by 1914 he had appeared to have succeeded. In fact, Bishop Budka's identification with the Roman Catholic hierarchy was so strong that it aroused hostility among many of the nationalistic lay elite.¹⁰²

A third trend, was Bishop Budka's enthusiastic support

of the Conservative Party of Sir Rodmond Roblin. Budka's decision is not surprising. This was the government which had already proven accommodating to the interests of Ukrainian cultural retention. Moreover, with the increasing importance of Ukrainian support, the Roblin government was expected to be even more cooperative in the future. The results of the 1914 provincial election strengthened this optimistic perspective; the Conservatives lost most of the predominantly Anglo-Saxon seats, and were only elected because they "swept the non-British ridings."¹⁰³ Certainly Bishop Budka seemed to believe that the Roblin government was in his debt when he informed his followers that "if we ... contrive to be tactful with the new legislature and promote unity and discretion amongst ourselves, we shall be able to gain very important concessions for our nationality in Manitoba".¹⁰⁴

The 1914 Manitoba election marked a major transition both in terms of courting the ethnic vote and resolving the educational controversy. The degree of electoral corruption was excessive, even by contemporary standards.¹⁰⁵ Liquor flowed freely, bribery was rampant, and the Conservative organizers had a field day with the undecipherable Slavic names on the voters' lists. According to the Manitoba Free Press, an examination of the list at a polling station in the village of Komarno revealed gross manipulation:

Wasyl Drucekowski appears again on the same list as Wasyl Kluczkowski ... Alex Cymbaluk blossomed forth twice as Alex Cybulak. John Blowatzuk admitted that he was on the list again as John Glavacz. Leon Ukramik was first on the list as Leon Szpakowski There were dozens of others like him. A large measure of the credit for this is freely given to F.S. Szablewski, the debonair land inspector, whose success in 'organizing' is giving him a 'standin' with the bosses of the Conservative machine.¹⁰⁶

In their election campaign the Liberals had attempted to gain Anglo-Canadian votes by attacking the concessions given to the immigrants without openly denouncing the bilingual school system.¹⁰⁷ The strategy was successful to a point. The Liberals had been supported by various social groups committed to Canadianizing the immigrant: the Manitoba Grain Growers Association, the Winnipeg Trades and Labour Council and the Manitoba Political Equality League.¹⁰⁸

Even the Orange Lodge, long a bastion of support for the Conservative party, switched its allegiance in protest to the privileges conferred on the "foreign" schools in 1912 by the Coldwell Amendment to the Manitoba School Act. At their annual convention in Brandon, the Orange Lodge passed a resolution denouncing the changes as "Rome inspired"; the Grand Master of Manitoba also issued a manifesto urging Orangemen to oppose any candidate who was not prepared to pledge himself against the Coldwell Amendment.¹⁰⁹ The fact that many Orangemen heeded the advice of the titular leader was substantiated by Sir Rodmond Roblin after his narrow victory in 1914: "I have no humiliation in saying that the

reduced majority of the Government is the result of the distrust that was created in the minds of our Orange friends regarding our policy in connection with the retention of Separate Schools."¹¹⁰ Yet beneath this show of bravado the provincial Conservative party was badly shaken by the electoral results. Hugh John Macdonald, former Conservative leader, admitted his own uneasiness over the prominence of the bilingual school issue in the politics of the period, "for having been through the long fight on the school question, I dreaded its revival"¹¹¹

Hugh John Macdonald's premonitions were warranted. The cultural and social issues in Manitoba were producing a distinct polarization of the Anglo-Canadian community against the militant alien elites and the political parties that courted the alien vote. In the vanguard of the movement against "this unholy alliance", was John W. Dafoe, editor of the Manitoba Free Press. By 1914, Dafoe had altered his public position considerably from the previous decade when he had not only defended Sifton's continental European immigrants, but also had been involved in marshalling the foreign vote. According to his biographer, over the previous five years, Dafoe had become gravely concerned that the Canadian west faced a great peril from hyphenated Canadianism.¹¹² As was the case with many other Anglo-Canadians, Dafoe believed that the public school system would be a most effective vehicle of assimilation; that it would create "a national

sense and a national responsibility ... from the great mixture of races within our gates".¹¹³ By 1914, however, Dafoe expressed pessimism about the assimilative capacity of the public school because of the concessions granted to the various ethnic groups.

This scepticism was shared by other exponents of Canadianization. As early as 1910, J.S. Woodsworth had stressed the fact that few immigrant children advanced much beyond grade three or four; he also pointed out that "there are from 26,705 to 40,707 children of school age in Manitoba who are not attending any school".¹¹⁴ What this brief educational experience meant was that few of the immigrant children were able to acquire proficiency in the use of English or to develop any lasting sense of civic pride or responsibility.¹¹⁵ Nor was the problem confined to Manitoba. Studies of the foreign population of western Canada tended to reveal an alarmingly high level of illiteracy and inability to use English. According to the 1911 census, the rate of illiteracy in the three prairie provinces was 13.31% for Manitoba, 13.70% for Saskatchewan, and 12.72% in Alberta.¹¹⁶ Even more disturbing was the presence of over 100,000 aliens in these provinces that could not speak English. By far the highest percentages were found among Slavic immigrants: Ukrainians 39.8%, Austro-Hungarians 35.0%, Poles 27.2%, Russians 27.1%.¹¹⁷ The fact that a much higher percentage of women than men were deficient in the English language

meant that the home environment was in general an unlikely place for the children to learn English.

Whether the bilingual school system was really a serious impediment for the immigrant in learning English was uncertain. Some of the Manitoba school Inspectors' reports certainly indicated that this was the case; yet there were other reports that stated considerable progress had been made.¹¹⁸ Generally speaking in those schools that were isolated from Anglo-Canadian influence, where the teachers were unqualified, and where two or more ethnic groups were competing to have bilingual instruction in their separate languages, results were disappointing. One inspector reported visiting a Polish-Ruthenian bilingual school (12 Ruthenian-21 Polish pupils) where "not a child knew that they were attending school in Manitoba, that Manitoba was a Province in Canada, and that Canada was a part of the Empire".¹¹⁹

By 1914 there was a growing concern that the bilingual schools had become the vehicle of the hyphenated Canadianism, especially since many of the bilingual teachers were outspoken Ukrainian nationalists. Anglo-Canadian suspicion was intensified when Ukrainian intellectuals such as Professor Pietro Karmansky ridiculed Canadian society:

... it is not everybody who looks upon culture from the standpoint of the Canadian art lover. The latter loves the wild yells of the prairie cowboy, symbol of ox-like satisfaction. It is charged that all Galicians look upon Canada as an absolutely savage country, a country of holdups and thieves and devoid of ideals and ethics. Do they? Well, then prove that they are mistaken.¹²⁰

The apparent coalition between Ukrainian intellectual such as Karamansky, and religious authorities, such as Bishop Budka and Archbishop Langevin, led J.W. Dafoe to charge that a conspiracy existed which was dedicated "to destroying Canadian citizenship and smashing Canadian nationhood".¹²¹ In a series of over one hundred editorials between 1911-16 Dafoe outlined details of "the plot" to spread bilingual schools and drive Anglo-Canadians from rural Manitoba:

A systematic campaign, well organized and financed, was being directed against English people in this Province in every district in which the non-English elements of the population obtained a foothold. In some cases, a policy of colonization was pursued whereby families were induced to take up residence in a particular district until the necessary 10 pupils were secured ... whereupon a demand was made for a bilingual school"

Farming small areas, they (Ruthenians) grow in numbers until they soon constitute the majority of the rate-payers Once the majority is assured the agitator- usually a priest- appears in the background, and there follows the putting into office of a board of Ruthenian school trustees, the dismissal of the English teacher, the engaging of a Ruthenian teacher The exodus of the English then begins and keeps up until the settlement is almost entirely non-english.¹²²

Dafoe's concern over the growth of ethnic particularism extended beyond the borders of Manitoba. The Free Press duly noted the confident statements by Bishop Budka in August, 1914, when the prelate predicted the rapid extension of Ukrainian political activities, and national propaganda not only in Manitoba, but in the other provinces of the Dominion, "wherever there exists a group of our people".¹²³ Evidence

seems to indicate that by 1914 clerico-nationalist leaders had begun to organize Ukrainian communities in Saskatchewan and Alberta along the same lines as in Manitoba.

In Saskatchewan there was no statutory guarantee for bilingual schools, although provision was made for a publicly-supported separate school system where the teaching in the French language was permitted. However, these separate schools were subject to the regulations of the Saskatchewan Department of Education. The bilingual schools in Saskatchewan evolved from the reluctance of the Liberal government of Walter Scott to rigorously enforce the Education Act, and the pressure of non-English groups for special privileges.¹²⁴ Provisions were made for each school district through the authority of the local trustees to employ a bilingual teacher; and a portion of each school day was set aside for the teaching of Ukrainian and other 'foreign' languages.¹²⁵ In order to supply a sufficient number of bilingual teachers, in 1909 the Saskatchewan government established the English School for Foreigners at Regina. The overwhelming majority of its student body were Ukrainian.¹²⁶ Yet another trend was the emergence of private schools, which were removed from state control. These schools were found frequently in the German Catholic and the Mennonite districts. What made them appear insidious to the Anglo-Canadian was that instruction in English remained minimal.¹²⁷

The reluctance on the part of the Scott government to

insist on greater use of the English language in the provincial schools, both separate and private, resulted in steadily mounting Anglo-Canadian criticism. By 1914, the political opponents of the Scott Government were receiving support from organizations such as the Orange Lodge, and the Saskatchewan School Trustees in denouncing the Liberals for their subservience to the 'foreigners'.¹²⁸

Bilingual schools were also a matter of considerable controversy in Alberta where a similar legal framework existed for separate schools.¹²⁹ However, in sharp contrast to developments in Saskatchewan, the provincial government of A.L. Sifton was not prepared to countenance the increased use of the Ukrainian language or Ukrainian teachers in the schools. Demands for the use of a Ruthenian reader and the establishment of a Ukrainian Training School were rejected. In 1913, the Minister of Education, J.R. Boyle, took the offensive against the Ukrainian nationalists. He argued that the threat of outside forces necessitated "strong measures on the part of the Department of Education"¹³⁰ Legislation was enacted providing for compulsory school attendance, and the powers of recalcitrant Ukrainian school boards were curtailed by placing the district under government trusteeship. Moreover, Boyle cancelled the teaching certificates of Ukrainians instructors who had been certified in the province of Manitoba, on the assumption that the Ukrainian campaign for cultural rights was being directed from

Winnipeg. These measures aroused intense hostility among Ukrainian nationalists. The Alberta Ukrainian organizations denounced the attempts on the part of the Sifton government to obstruct the educational opportunities of the Ukrainian Canadian citizens.¹³¹ The Canadian Ruthenian, voice of Bishop Budka, also joined the attack interpreting the government's actions as an attempt to curry the favour of militant anti-Ukrainian groups "who dislike the Ukrainians because of their industry, skill, good norms, prosperity, or simply because they are 'foreigners'".¹³² There may have been some truth in the allegation. Not only did Anglo-Canadians in the province resent the emergent Ukrainian Catholic nationalism, but immigrants from the United States manifest little sympathy towards the concept of cultural pluralism. Moreover, with a small French Canadian population there was no core group to initiate demands for bilingual schools.¹³³ The provincial Slavic community itself was divided. The Russian Orthodox community in the Edmonton region gave little encouragement to the cultural aspirations of the Ukrainian Catholics, and indeed there was pronounced hostility between the two groups.¹³⁴

Conditions in British Columbia for non-English minorities was considerably different from the situation in the prairie provinces. In the first place, the overwhelming preponderance of British-born, meant that the minorities did not have the political leverage that they were able to utilize in the other western provinces. The geographical location of the

province, isolated from contact with the rest of Canada by the mountain barrier, and in close proximity to Asia's teeming population was an added dimension to the British Columbia psyche. Their fear of an Oriental inundation resulted in a definite racist attitude being adopted by Anglo-Canadians towards non-whites, and even towards non-Anglo-Saxons.¹³⁵ By 1912, the Asiatics in British Columbia had been severely restricted in their civil rights. In economic terms provincial legislation had been passed denying employment to Asians on any job holding either a Department of Public Works contract or being conducted on Crown lands.¹³⁶ In political terms, Asiatics had lost the right to vote in municipal, provincial, and eventually federal elections through the provisions of the Provincial Elections Act of 1897. This Act provided that "no Chinaman, Japanese, or Indian shall have his name placed on the register of voters for any electoral district, or be entitled to vote at any election."¹³⁷ It is significant, however, there was no exclusion of Orientals from the public schools of British Columbia. Despite the obvious racial bias directed against Orientals in other spheres, the right of every child, regardless of colour, race or creed to obtain a public school education was upheld. Because of the small number of Asiatic children the race issue did not affect the educational system.¹³⁸

However, the assimilationist aspect of the public school became a source of conflict between the Anglo-Canadian

community and another ethnic minority- the Doukhobors. The 1908 exodus of the Doukhobors from Saskatchewan and their re-location in the Kootenay district of British Columbia had not solved the dilemma of trying to integrate the sectarian group into Anglo-Canadian society. By 1912, there was open hostility between the Doukhobors and their Anglo-Canadian neighbours, especially the local merchants, who resented the refusal of the sect to utilize the retail outlets in places such as Grand Forks and Nelson.¹³⁹ These Anglo-Canadians also denounced the Doukhobors for their evasion of civic responsibility; in particular, they charged that Peter Verigin, the Doukhobor leader, was thwarting the assimilationist function of the public schools.¹⁴⁰

Resistance to the public school, whether unilingual or bilingual was the instinctive reaction of the Doukhobors. For Peter Verigin, schools were not only unnecessary, but also dangerous to the beliefs and unity of the Doukhobors: "the schools bring children up, educating their minds for killing all creatures; second they learn children swindling and third lead children to alienation of their fathers".¹⁴¹ He also regarded the entire process of Canadianization, with its exposure to British values, as being a socially destructive form of indoctrination.¹⁴² However, Verigin was sufficiently realistic to recognize that some amount of minimal concessions must be made to the state enforced educational system; as a result a school was established on

Doukhobor lands.¹⁴³ It was only when the government of Sir Richard McBride, in a most arbitrary fashion, began to force the sect to conform to government regulations, and even to suggest the desirability of making the Doukhobors subject to military service, that Peter Verigin initiated a program of civil disobedience.¹⁴⁴ The schools were closed down, nude demonstrations occurred, and the Doukhobors once again threatened emigration.¹⁴⁵ The British Columbia government quickly responded to the Doukhobor defiance. Parents were fined and imprisoned when they refused to send their children to school; with the passage of the Community Regulation Act (1913), an attempt was also made to provide for the distraint of the possessions of the Doukhobor Community for the offences of its members.¹⁴⁶ These harsh measures were generally greeted with approval by the Anglo-Canadian population of the province. The New Westminster News-Advertiser, provided a representative cross-section of public opinion when it declared that "no organized state can permit all kinds of lawlessness to people because they claim religious immunity". Education was deemed vital in order to prevent the Doukhobors from remaining "in the present condition passing down such traditions to another generation and creating a vested interest in anarchy".¹⁴⁷ Although the outbreak of war diverted public attention from the Doukhobor 'problem', and provided a more congenial atmosphere for temporarily effecting a conciliation between the sect and the provincial government,

the seeds of future conflict were to remain.

Throughout western Canada on the eve of the Great War there was an uneasy feeling that despite the efforts of the public schools to reach out to the children of the 'stranger' this work had only been partially successful. Moreover, the educational needs of adult immigrants had been almost totally ignored. There was a growing sentiment that tended to emphasize not only the increased involvement of the State in the field of education, but also the importance of co-ordinating the work of education on a national scale. As was so often the case, much of the inspiration for this national approach to civic education was derived from the various programmes in operation in the United States.

By 1914 several organizations were in existence in the United States attempting to cope with the social, economic, and political problems created by the millions of 'new' immigrants so graphically described by the Congressional (Dillingham) Commission Report of 1910.¹⁴⁸ One of the most important of these organizations was the North American Civic League for Immigrants created in 1907 as the result of the cooperation of settlement houses, social agencies such as the Y.M.C.A., and philanthropic businessmen.¹⁴⁹ The North American Civic League was able to interest state governments in Americanizing schemes. Thus by 1914 some six different states had embarked on various programmes, ranging from

extensive night school activities to immigrant protective agencies, and housing commissions.¹⁵⁰ The federal government became involved in 1914 when the Bureau of Education agreed to establish a special Division of Immigrant Education. This action gave official government sanction to the Americanizing crusade and brought to public attention the need to raise level of literacy and proficiency in the use of the English language.¹⁵¹ In that same year another government agency, the Federal Bureau of Naturalization, agreed to sponsor a series of citizenship classes throughout the country.¹⁵²

In Canada, there were indications that similar developments might materialize. There were a number of settlement houses in operation, although these tended to be denominational. In Winnipeg, for example, North End House was operated by the Methodist Church and Robertson House was directed by the Presbyterians.¹⁵³ The Y.M.C.A. was also active in many Canadian cities but on a much reduced scale from its American operation.¹⁵⁴ There was also Frontier College or the Reading Camp Association founded in 1899 by Alfred Fitzpatrick for the purpose of instilling the proper concept of Canadian citizenship and ideals among the foreign workers.¹⁵⁵ Fitzpatrick operated his institution on the assumption that eventually either the Dominion or provincial governments would "assume full responsibility for the education of the frontiersman."¹⁵⁶ In this campaign Fitzpatrick encountered considerable difficulty. The Federal government

consistently maintained that the education of the foreign worker was a matter of provincial responsibility.¹⁵⁷

Although some of the provinces, particularly Ontario, provided some financial assistance, the amount was insufficient.¹⁵⁸ What kept the Reading Camp Association financially solvent was the support of the business community.

Fitzpatrick was not alone in trying to develop Canadianization programs among the adult immigrants. The Dominion Educational Association, a national body of educators formed in the 1890s, at its 1904 Convention, passed a resolution urging the various Provincial Departments of Education "to assume fuller responsibility and make some adequate provision for the social well-being and education of the men on the frontier"¹⁶⁰ It also called upon the educational authorities to ensure that "patriotism should continue to form a prominent feature of the instruction given in all our schools"¹⁶¹ Periodically the Association also introduced resolutions calling on the Dominion government to establish a national Bureau of Education in order to accelerate the development of a common nationality. Consistently the delegates from Quebec opposed this suggestion, and nothing materialized from the agitation.¹⁶²

In May 1914, the whole question of Canadian citizenship standards came under national review. The discussion emanated from the introduction into the House of Commons of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Bill. Although

the ostensible purpose of the bill was to establish the basic criteria for British nationality throughout the Empire, the debate on the bill concentrated on the status of aliens in Canada. One of the major reasons for the attention given to the future position of aliens emanated from the changes in the naturalization procedure. Under the old system, the immigrant submitted an affidavit to a judge, or commissioner, which established the fact that he had been domiciled in Canada for three years, and that he was of good character. Unless specific objections were raised, the immigrant received his naturalization certificate in short order.¹⁶³

The 1914 Bill stipulated that the alien had to be in the country for five years, that he was of good character, that he was able to illustrate "an adequate knowledge of the English language", and that his application was deemed acceptable by a superior court judge.¹⁶⁴ The Bill also provided the Secretary of State with discretionary power to nullify any naturalization by withholding "the certificate as he thinks most conducive to the public good, and no appeal shall lie from his decision".¹⁶⁵

The reasons for the more stringent regulations had both political and nationalistic motivation. There is little doubt that the Dominion Conservatives believed, with due cause, that the ethnic vote in western Canada was a great asset to their Liberal opponents. In fact, two months before the introduction of the Naturalization Bill, R.B.

Bennett, Conservative member for Calgary, informed Prime Minister Borden that hundreds of aliens were being fraudulently naturalized by Liberal organizers in preparation for the next federal election.¹⁶⁶ Borden gave instructions to the Minister of Justice, Charles Doherty to investigate the matter, and apparently the results of the investigation strengthened his determination to alter the naturalization system.¹⁶⁷

During the debates, the racial suitability of certain ethnic groups for citizenship received attention. The attitude that certain groups should be either excluded or have their civic rights curtailed was very much in keeping with a private member's bill introduced earlier in the Session by E.L. Lewis, (West Huron) calling for the restriction of immigration from that area of Europe south of latitude and east of longitude in order to prevent Canada from becoming "a nation of organ-grinders and banana sellers".¹⁶⁸ Although this bill received no support, during the Naturalization bill debate, the Conservatives insisted that immigrants from southern and eastern Europe required additional time in the country before they would be able to appreciate the advantages of Canadian citizenship; in fact the inclusion of the provision calling for a knowledge of English was primarily directed at this group.¹⁶⁹ Favourable references were made to provisions in the United States which made it quite difficult for the unacceptable Southern European aliens to become naturalized.¹⁷⁰

The civic rights of Orientals also came under review. In this instance, however, there was concern on the part of British Columbia politicians that the Nationalization Bill might extend the franchise to East Indians, who were British subjects. Premier Richard McBride actually telegraphed Prime Minister Borden requesting that the bill be amended:

"strongly urge you consider inserting proviso to section three making it clear that no naturalized person could ask for rights over riding jurisdiction of legislation given by B.N.A. Act to provinces."¹⁷¹ No action was taken on the matter, although the Borden government indicated to the Imperial authorities that the political rights of coloured British citizens would have to be further clarified.¹⁷²

Perhaps the most significant matter raised during the debate on the British Nationality and Naturalization Bill was the problem of double nationality.¹⁷³ Many European countries did not recognize any change in nationality by their former citizens, despite the fact that these people had become naturalized subjects of another nation. This restriction applied especially to German nationals, although it also applied to other European immigrants as well. The anomaly of the situation did not, however, create any difficulty in June 1914. The Naturalization Bill clearly stated that despite the double nationality status, German applicants for naturalization would receive "all political and other rights powers, and privileges"; in other words they were entitled to

"the status of natural-born British subjects".¹⁷⁴ That such a generous provision should have been extended to Germans is not surprising when it is appreciated that both political parties praised the inclination of German immigrants "to fit themselves in every way to be good British subjects".¹⁷⁵ The outbreak of war, in August, 1914, was to dramatically change this favourable perspective.

CHAPTER VI

¹Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism (hereafter, Royal Commission B. & B.), Book IV, (Ottawa, 1968), pp. 238, 248.

²W. Burton Hurd, Racial Origins and Nativity of the Canadian People, Census Monograph no. 4 (Ottawa, 1937), p. 586.

³Dominion of Canada, Sessional Papers (hereafter Sessional Papers), 1915, no. 25, Part II, p. 79.

⁴Robert England, The Colonization of Western Canada (London, 1936), p. 82.

⁵J. R. Lumby, "The Stranger Within Our Gates", Proceedings of the Fifty-first Annual Convention of the Ontario Educational Association, April 9-10-11, 1912 (Toronto, 1912), p. 356.

⁶Canadian Annual Review, 1911 (Toronto, 1912), pp. 394-96.

⁷Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (hereafter cited as Debates), 1911, pp. 8112-8130.

⁸Ibid., pp. 8112-13.

⁹Ibid., p. 8116.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 8120.

¹¹Ottawa Free Press, 1911, cited Canadian Annual Review, 1911, p. 396.

¹²The emphasis on the high percentage of immigrants who remained in the country can be discerned from the Annual Reports of the Supt. of Immigration, Sessional Papers, 1900-1915, No. 25, Part II.

¹³W. Burton Hurd, Racial Origins and Nativity of the Canadian People; A.R.M. Lower, Colony to Nation (Toronto, 1957), p. 482.

¹⁴J. S. Woodsworth, Strangers Within Our Gates (Toronto, 1909), pp. 195, 226.

¹⁵These subjects are discussed more extensively in other chapters. For the Orientals see chapter two; for the coloured immigrants from the United States, see chapter three.

¹⁶C. A. Magrath, Canada's Growth and Some Problems Affecting It (Ottawa, 1910), p. 53.

¹⁷Rev. J. H. MacMillan, "Problems of Population", Address to the Empire Club, Nov. 30, 1911, Empire Club of Canada: Addresses . . . During the Session of 1910-11 (Toronto, 1912), pp. 82-83.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹The concern of the Protestant Churches in this regard has been described in chapter four.

²⁰Debates, 1901, p. 2934.

²¹Ralph Connor, The Foreigner (Toronto, 1909), p. 326; The Christian Guardian, Dec. 29, 1909, p. 10.

²²Carl Berger, The Sense of Power (Toronto, 1970), pp. 116, 129-133; John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New York, 1966), pp. 135-36, 156.

²³C. A. Magrath, Canada's Growth, pp. 71-74.

²⁴Ibid., p. 128.

Henry Vivian, "City Planning", Address to the Ottawa Canadian Club, Oct. 22, 1910, Addresses Delivered Before The Canadian Club of Ottawa, 1910, (Ottawa, 1911), pp. 100-108.

²⁵Dr. Charles A. Hodgetts, "Unsanitary Housing", Addresses to the Second Annual Meeting of the Commission on Conservation, Quebec City, Jan. 17, 1911 (Ottawa, 1911), p. 32.

²⁶Ibid., p. 34.

²⁷Ibid., p. 33.

- ²⁸ Ibid., pp. 33, 37, 42.
- ²⁹ Ibid., p. 30.
- ³⁰ The Christian Guardian, Sept. 8, 1909, Ed..
- ³¹ Ibid., p. 10. Statistics were cited by Woodsworth showing that Winnipeg had 25,000 Immigrants, Regina had 22,000 and Fort William 6,000.
- ³² J. S. Woodsworth, Strangers Within Our Gates, p. 136.
- ³³ Ibid..
- ³⁴ Ralph Connor, The Foreigner, p. 34.
- ³⁵ Ibid., p. 35. The Christian Guardian, Dec. 29, 1909, p. 10 urged every Canadian to read the book.
- ³⁶ Fifth Census of Canada, 1911, (Ottawa, 1913), II, pp. 342-366. (Hereafter cited as Census of Canada.) W. Burton Hurd, Racial Origins, p. 595. The surplus of males for American immigrants was only 11%.
- ³⁷ The Christian Guardian, July 16, 1913, p. 9.
- ³⁸ Ibid..
- ³⁹ Ibid., April 14, 1909, p. 9.
- ⁴⁰ The Western Clarion (Vancouver), Dec. 18, 1909, Ed.. The allegation that there was a direct correlation between the wage system and immorality was denounced by the official publication of The Canadian Manufacturers Association, Industrial Canada (Toronto), June, 1913, p. 1448.
- ⁴¹ Montreal Herald, July 30, 1910, Ed.; Ottawa Free Press, June 12, 1910, Ed..
- ⁴² Montreal Star, Feb. 18, 1913; London Free Press, June 20, 1913. Both the Women's Christian Temperance Union and the National Council also pressured the Dominion government to launch an investigation of the white slave traffic. Canadian Annual Review, 1911, p. 366; Mrs. Ava Gordon,

Gordon, Convener of the National Council of Women to W. D. Scott, Supt. of Immigration, Immigration Branch Records (hereafter I.B.), file no. 813739, #1.

⁴³The Canadian Pacific Railway indicated its concern over the charges and urged the Dominion authorities to quash the allegations. I.B., file no. 813739, #1, C.E.E. Ussher General Passenger Agent to W. D. Scott, Dec. 5, 1913. The Chief Constables Association, attacked the veracity of the churchmen involved in the White Slave Campaign, dismissing them as "self-appointed irresponsible slummers". Ibid., Presidential Address, Chief Constables Association of Canada, Ninth Annual Convention, Halifax, June 25-27, 1913.

⁴⁴Annual Report of the Commissioner A. Bowen Perry, Nov. 1, 1903, Sessional Papers, 1904, no. 28, p. 2.

⁴⁵Ibid., 1912, p. 81.

⁴⁶Ibid., 1914, p. 20.

⁴⁷Report of Supt. G. E. Sanders, Regina, Ibid., 1909, p. 33. The crimes involving rape and incest most shocked the R.N.W.M.P. officers.

⁴⁸Annual Report of Commissioner A. Bowen Perry, Ibid., p. 1910, p. 81.

⁴⁹Annual Report of Supt. A. R. Cuthbert, "G" Division, Ibid., 1911, p. 75.

⁵⁰Annual Report of Supt. G. E. Sanders, "E" Division, Ibid., 1906, p. 45.

⁵¹Annual Report of Commissioner A. Bowen Perry, Ibid., 1912, p. 8.

⁵²Chief Carpenter, Chief of Police, Edmonton, Alberta, Address to the Chief Constables Association of Canada: Ninth Annual Convention, Halifax, June 25-27, 1913, I.B., file 813739, #1.

⁵³Debates, 1914, p. 1618.

⁵⁴These incidents in transportation centres and mining towns have been described in chapters four and five.

⁵⁵ Manitoba Free Press, March 30, 1906, ibid., March 31, 1906, p. 1; ibid., April 2, 1906, p. 1.

⁵⁶ Census of Canada, 1901, I, p. ; ibid., 1911, II, pp. 372-73.

⁵⁷ Report on the Housing Survey of Certain Selected Areas of the City of Winnipeg conducted, March, 1921, City of Winnipeg Health Department, Public Archives of Manitoba, cited in Morris Mott, "Nativism in Manitoba, 1917-1923", unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1970, pp. 117.

John Marlyn, Under the Ribs of Death (Toronto, 1964); Alexander Brian McKillop, "Citizen and Socialist: The Ethos of Political Winnipeg, 1919-1935", unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1970, pp. 29, 83-88.

⁵⁸ Paul Yuzyk, The Ukrainians in Manitoba (Toronto, 1953), p. 97. Michael Maranchuk, The Ukranian Canadians (Winnipeg, 1970), p. 225.

⁵⁹ William Rodney, Soldiers of the International: A History of the Communist Party of Canada, 1919-29 (Toronto, 1968), p. 10.

⁶⁰ Canadian Annual Review, 1909, p. 306.

⁶¹ I.B., file 800111, J. H. Ashdown to Frank Oliver, April 9, 1908.

⁶² I.B. file 800111, J. H. Ashdown to Frank Oliver, April 9, 1908. Ashdown's estimate of the size of the alien population in Winnipeg was somewhat exaggerated.

⁶³ There was wide-spread public interest in the anarchists in 1908 as a result of the arrest of several leading anarchists in the United States, including Alexander Berkman, husband of Emma Goldman. Manitoba Free Press, April 4, 1908. Winnipeg District Minute Book Women's Christian Temperance Union, April 8, 1908, Public Archives of Manitoba.

⁶⁴ I.B., file 800111, W. D. Scott to Frank Oliver, Dec. 15, 1908; ibid., J. H. McGill, Immigration Officer, Vancouver, to W. D. Scott, Dec. 15, 1908.

⁶⁵I.B., file 800111, J. H. Ashdown to Frank Oliver, April 9, 1908.

⁶⁶Emma Goldman's lecture series in Winnipeg terminated abruptly when it was rumoured that the city police intended to arrest the anarchist speaker for holding a public meeting on Sunday in violation of the Lord's Day Act. Manitoba Free Press, April 8, 1908, p. 1. Statutes of Canada, 9-10 Edward VII, chap. 27, p. 14.

⁶⁷J. H. Ashdown to Rev. James Allen, April 20, 1909; Home Missions Report, Methodist Church of Canada, cited George Emery, "Methodism on the Canadian Prairies", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia, 1970, p. 194.

⁶⁸George Emery, "Methodism on the Canadian Prairies", p. 249. The Social Gospel thrust of the Protestant churches has been thoroughly discussed in Richard Allen, The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada 1914-28 (Toronto, 1971), pp. 3-35.

⁶⁹George Emery, "Methodism on the Canadian Prairies", pp. 249-53; Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics (Toronto, 1963), pp. 40-43. The Presbyterian Church operated the Robertson House in North Winnipeg which performed many of the same functions as All-People's Mission. A vivid account of the Robertson House operation was provided in Mutchmor: The Memoirs of James Ralph Mutchmor (Toronto, 1965), pp. 68-81.

⁷⁰Manitoba Free Press, March 12, 1909. Similar articles appeared in The Christian Guardian in April, 1909.

⁷¹Toronto, Globe, Nov. 12, 1910, p. 1.

⁷²Joy Cooper, "The Red Light District in Winnipeg: an Issue in Civic Politics", unpublished manuscript, University of Manitoba, 1969, Public Archives of Manitoba.

⁷³An appeal was actually made to the Commissioner of the Dominion Police, Col. Sherwood, from the Moral and Social Reform Council of Winnipeg, complaining that "a large portion of the inmates of these bawdy houses are aliens who have been in the country only a few months. It is estimates (sic) that there are about 216 girls in the segregated areas and that from fifty to sixty per cent of them are subject to deportation under our immigration law". I.B., file 800129,

W.W. Buchanan, Secretary of the Moral and Social Reform Council to Col. A. P. Sherwood, Nov. 9, 1910.

⁷⁴ Royal Commission on Segregated Vice in Winnipeg, transcript, Public Archives of Manitoba, p. 523.

⁷⁵ Ibid., vol. 7, p. 47.

⁷⁶ Manitoba Free Press, Dec. 14, 1910, p. 4.

⁷⁷ John Thompson, "The Prohibition Question in Manitoba, 1892-1928", unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of History, University of Manitoba, 1969, pp. 3, 55.

⁷⁸ It is interesting that the Winnipeg chapter of the Women's Christian Temperance Union went on record favouring the enfranchisement of the alien woman. According to the W.C.T.U. the immigrant woman would vote against the liquor traffic if she were given the chance: "So would you if your eyes had been blackened as often by a drunken husband". Winnipeg District Minute Book, W.C.T.U., March 10, 1914.

⁷⁹ Winnipeg Tribune, Feb. 2, 1912, p. 9.

⁸⁰ The assault of the Conservative press on Clifford Sifton was discussed in chapter four.

⁸¹ John Simon, "A Sociological Analysis of Multiculturalism", unpublished paper presented Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs, Symposium on Languages and Cultures in a Multi-Ethnic Society, Ottawa, May 21-23, 1971.

⁸² Ibid.. Arthur May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 160, 172, 187, 344, 477. Robert Park, The Immigrant Press and Its Control (New York), 1922, p. 41, 127.

⁸³ Clifford Sifton Papers, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter Sifton Papers), 133579, J. W. Appleton, Manitoba Free Press to Clifford Sifton Nov. 10, 1910.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 141816, J. G. Turriff to Clifford Sifton, Nov. 25, 1904. Turriff was to represent Assiniboia East for the Liberal Party in four elections, 1904-17.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 136257. Frank Oliver to Clifford Sifton, March

22, 1904. Other foreign language newspapers supported by the Liberal Party in 1904 included: the Polish weekly Głos Kanadyjski published by Father Kulawy, and St. Peter's Bole published by the German Catholic Benedictine Fathers in Saskatchewan. Ibid., 134678, W. F. McCreary to Clifford Sifton, April 12, 1904; ibid., 127193, J. G. Turriff to Clifford Sifton, Feb. 26, 1904.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 120363, J. Obed Smith, Commissioner of Immigration to Clifford Sifton, Nov. 23, 1903.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 120421, C. W. Speers to J. B. Harkin, Private Secretary to Clifford Sifton, Dec. 15, 1903; ibid., 140545, Speers to Harkin, Feb. 4, 1904.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 127153, J. W. Dafoe to Clifford Sifton, April 9, 1904.

⁸⁹ The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1909, Ed. Arnott Magurn (Ottawa, 1910), p. 67.

⁹⁰ Quite a different interpretation of Roblin's attitude towards the Ukrainians is provided by Hugh Ross, Thirty-five Years in the Lime Light, Sir Rodmond Roblin and His Times (Winnipeg, 1936), p. 85.

⁹¹ Premier Rodmond Roblin, to Mrs. Colin Campbell (wife of Attorney-General Colin Campbell), Aug. 25, 1913, Colin Campbell Papers, Public Archives of Manitoba.

⁹² W. L. Morton, Manitoba: A History (Toronto, 1957), p. 271; C. B. Sissons, Bi-Lingual Schools in Canada (Toronto, 1917), pp. 117-138.

⁹³ Statement made by Dr. Thornton, Minister of Education, Province of Manitoba, cited in the Manitoba Free Press, Jan. 13, 1916, p. 8; C. B. Sissons, Bi-Lingual Schools, p. 141.

⁹⁴ J. Skwarok, Ukrainian Settlers in Canada and Their Schools (Toronto, 1959), p. 67.

⁹⁵ Odarka Trosky, The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church in Canada (Winnipeg, 1968), p. 8.

⁹⁶ Vladimir Kaye, Early Ukrainian Settlement in Canada, 1896-1900 (Toronto, 1964), pp. 172, 358; Paul Yuzyk, The

Ukrainians in Manitoba, p. 145.

⁹⁷ Paul Yuzyk, Ukrainians in Manitoba, p. 117; Michael Maranchuk, The Ukrainian Canadians: a History (Winnipeg, 1970), p. 224.

⁹⁸ Paul Yuzyk, Ukrainians in Manitoba, pp. 74, 197; Odarka Trosky, The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church in Canada, pp. 8-11; Canadian Annual Review, 1913, p. 568.

⁹⁹ Arthur May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914, pp. 340, 430-31, 434.

¹⁰⁰ Alexander Brian McKillop, "Citizen and Socialist", pp. 83-88.

¹⁰¹ Victor Turek, Poles in Manitoba (Toronto, 1967), p. 35, 42; W. L. Morton, Manitoba: A History, p. 309. The classic story on Polish immigration by William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (New York, 1958), documents the failure of a substantial number of educated Poles to emigrate to North America.

¹⁰² Odarka Trosky, The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church in Canada, pp. 9-10.

¹⁰³ T. Peterson, "Ethnic and Class Politics in Manitoba", in Martin Robin, Canadian Provincial Politics (Scarborough, 1972), p. 75.

¹⁰⁴ Manitoba Free Press, Aug. 3, 1914.

¹⁰⁵ T. Peterson, "Ethnic and Class Politics in Manitoba", pp. 74-77.

¹⁰⁶ Manitoba Free Press, May 21, 1914, Ed..

¹⁰⁷ Lionel Orlikow, "A Survey of the Reform Movement in Manitoba, 1910-1920", unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of Manitoba, 1955, pp. 135-143.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid...

¹⁰⁹ The Sentinel (Toronto), July 2, 1914, p. 1.

- 110 Canadian Annual Review, 1914, p. 607.
- 111 Sir Colin Campbell Papers, Hugh John Macdonald to Sir Colin Campbell, July 17, 1914.
- 112 Murray Donnelly, Dafoe of the Free Press (Toronto, 1968), pp. 57, 71.
- 113 Manitoba Free Press, July 13, 1914, Ed..
- 114 J. S. Woodsworth, "Canadians of To-Morrow", Proceedings of the Canadian Club of Toronto, 1909-1910 (Toronto, 1910), p. 144.
- 115 Ibid., p. 148.
- 116 J.T.M. Anderson, "The School and the Newer Citizen of Canada", Proceedings of the National Conference on Character Education, Winnipeg, October 20, 21, 22, 1919, p. 96.
- 117 Ibid...
- 118 A complete survey of school Inspectors' Reports are included in the W. J. Sisler Papers, Public Archives of Manitoba, C. B. Sisson, Bi-lingual Schools in Canada, pp. 134-156 tended to dismiss the value of bilingual schools among the Slavic immigrants as utterly useless.
- 119 Sisler Papers, Department of Education, Inspector Reports, Ivan Arden School, #1427.
- 120 Cited Manitoba Free Press, March 5, 1914, p. 1. Pietro Karmansky had been brought to Manitoba by Bishop Budka. Michael Maranchuk, Ukrainian Canadians, pp. 234-236; C. B. Sisson, Bi-Lingual Schools in Canada, pp. 125-126.
- 121 Manitoba Free Press, March 5, 1914, Ed..
- 122 Murray Donnelly, Dafoe of the Free Press, 71-73; Manitoba Free Press, Feb. 19, 1916, Ed.; ibid., Jan. 25, 1916, Ed..
- 123 Manitoba Free Press, Aug. 3, 1914, Ed..

- 124 C. B. Sisson, Bi-Lingual Schools in Canada, 159-165.
- 125 Canadian Annual Review, 1915, p. 676.
- 126 J. Skwarok, The Ukrainian Settlers in Canada, p. 67; Michael Maranchuk, Ukrainian Canadians, pp. 122-24.
- 127 C. B. Sissons, Bi-Lingual Schools in Canada, p. 165, 180-183.
- 128 The Sentinel, Dec. 10, 1914, Ed.; Keith McLeod, "Politics, Schools and the French Language, 1881-1931", in Norman Ward and Duff Stafford, Politics in Saskatchewan, (Don Mills, Canada, 1969), pp. 124-151.
- 129 C.B. Sissons, Bi-Lingual Schools in Canada, pp. 159-165.
- 130 Ibid., pp. 165-179; J. Skwarok, The Ukrainian Settlers in Canada, 90-100; Arthur Sifton, Premier of Alberta, had definite proof of this Ukrainian intrigue: "I was talking to my brother (A.L. Sifton) the other day and he told me that they had fought this question (bilingual schools) out in Alberta and had completely won out. He told me further that the only trouble they ever had on the question did not arise from the religious conviction of the Ruthenian people but was wholly the result of the intrigues of scallawags sent up from Manitoba by the organization there." Dafoe Papers, Clifford Sifton to J.W. Dafoe, May 18, 1915.
- 131 The News (Nowyny, Edmonton), Oct. 7, 1913, cited, Michael Maranchuk, Ukrainian Canadians, p. 143.
- 132 The Canadian Ruthenian, Nov. 8, 1913, cited, J. Skwarok, The Ukrainian Settlers, p. 99.
- 133 C.B. Sissons, Bi-Lingual Schools in Canada, pp. 159-165.
- 134 J. Skwarok, The Ukrainian Settlers, pp. 158-165.
- 135 George Woodcock & Ivan Avakumovic, The Doukhobors (Toronto, 1968), pp. 243-245.
- 136 Despite attempts to exclude Orientals from the coal mines of the province, the judicial interpretation by the Privy Council prevented the enactment of such laws. Union

Colliery Co. of British Columbia v. Bryden, (1899), cited, Bora Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (Toronto, 1966), pp. 991-94.

137 Section eight of the Provincial Elections Act, Revised Statutes of British Columbia, 1897, c. 67, cited Bora Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law, p. 994. The legality of the disfranchisement of Orientals was upheld by the decision of the Privy Council, Cunningham and Attorney-General of British Columbia v. Tomey Homma and Attorney General of Canada (1903), cited ibid., pp. 994--97. Ivan Head, "The Stranger in Our Midst: A Sketch of the Legal Status of the Alien in Canada", The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 1964; Vol. II (Vancouver, 1964), pp. 126-133.

138 Charles Young, The Japanese Canadians (Toronto, 1939), pp. 147-49; C. J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient (Toronto, 1941), pp. 92, 108, 110, 123, 145.

139 Professor James Mayor Papers, University of Toronto (hereafter Mayor Papers), Peter Verigin to James Mayor, Oct. 15, 1912. In 1912, there were 3,988 Community Doukhobors distributed in several colonies in the Kootenay District of British Columbia; the sect owned 14,403 acres of land. George Woodcock & Ivan Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, pp. 242-44.

140 George Woodcock & Ivan Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, pp.

141 Mayor Papers, Peter Verigin to James Mayor, Oct. 15, 1912.

142 Ibid.

143 George Woodcock & Ivan Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, pp. 246-48.

144 Ibid. Actually it was the Royal Commissioner, William Blakemore, who had been appointed to investigate the Doukhobor situation, who recommended the cancellation of the 1899 Dominion Order-in-Council exempting the Doukhobors from military service.

145 I.B., File 65101, #9, W. D. Scott, Supt. Immigration, to C.E.E. Usher, Passenger Agent, C.P.R., Jan. 19, 1913. A Doukhobor appeal to the Quakers and other pro-Doukhobor organization was made more dramatic when it was accompanied

by a long list of atrocities perpetuated against Doukhobors by both provincial and dominion authorities. Ibid., J. B. Caldwell, Editor, The Gospel Trumpet, to Governor-General, the Duke of Connaught, July 19, 1913; ibid., W. D. Scott, to Sir Joseph Pope, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sept. 25, 1913.

146 George Woodcock & Ivan Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, pp. 244-251.

147 New Westminster News-Advertiser, March 7, 1914. It is interesting that organized labour also manifest pronounced hostility towards the Doukhobors. British Columbia Federationist, Jan. 23, 1914, Ed..

148 Abstracts of Reports of the Immigration Commission (U.S.A.), Vol. I (Washington, 1911).

149 Gerd Korman, Industrialization, Immigrants and Americanizers (Madison, 1967), p. 148; Edward Hartmann, The Movement to Americanize the Immigrant (New York, 1967), p. 29.

150 Edward Hartmann, The Movement to Americanize the Immigrant, pp. 64-87.

151 Ibid., pp. 98-102.

152 Ibid., pp. 102-103.

153 George Emery, "Methodism on the Canadian Prairies", pp. 249-53; Mutchmor: The Memoirs of James Ralph Mutchmor, pp. 68-81. W. G. Smith, Building the Nation: The Churches Relation to the Immigrant (Toronto, 1922), pp. 185-86.

154 Alfred Fitzpatrick, The University in Overalls (Toronto, 1920), pp. 70-81; Frontier College Papers, Public Archives of Canada, 1912-13, Alfred Fitzpatrick to C. M. Copeland, Provincial Committee, Y.M.C.A., Toronto, Jan. 3, 1912.

155 Alfred Fitzpatrick, The University in Overalls, pp. 10-21; Reverend J. B. MacDougall, Building the North (Toronto, 1919), p. 135.

156 Frontier College Papers, Alfred Fitzpatrick to D. McNicoll, Second Vice-President, C.P.R., Dec. 19, 1912.

157 Ibid., 1919, A. Fitzpatrick to R. H. Grant, Dec. 17, 1919.

158 Ontario had been the first province to provide assistance; the amount ranged from \$25.00 in 1900 to \$1,750.00 in 1912. Ibid., 1912-13, A. Fitzpatrick to J. B. Skeaff, Manager, Bank of Toronto, July 31, 1912.

159 In 1912, 200 Toronto businessmen donated \$250.00 each in support of the Reading Camp Association. Ibid., 1912, A. Fitzpatrick to James Hales, Traders Bank, Toronto.

160 Minutes of the Proceedings of the Fifth Convention of the Dominion Educational Association, Winnipeg, July 26-29, 1904 (Toronto, 1905), pp. 26-27.

161 Ibid..

162 Minutes of the Convention of the Dominion Educational Association, Ottawa, Jan. 31-Feb. 1, 2, 1917 (Ottawa, 1917), pp. 45-57.

163 Debates, 1914, pp. 4540, 4844.

164 Ibid., pp. 41, 46-48, 4178, 4537-4544. Statutes of Canada, 1915, 4-5 George V, chap. 27, pp. 2-5.

165 Statutes of Canada, 1915, 4-5 George V, chap. 27, p. 2.

166 Sir Robert Borden Papers, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter Borden Papers), R. L. Borden to R. B. Bennett, March 24, 1914.

167 Ibid., 88926, Robert Borden to Charles Doherty, Minister of Justice, March 24, 1914.

168 Debates, 1914, p. 1642. A similar bill had been introduced by E. N. Lewis in 1910. Debates, 1909-10, p. 3134.

169 Ibid., pp. 4133, 4145, 4150.

170 Ibid., p. 4133.

¹⁷¹Borden Papers. 88941, Sir Richard McBride to Prime Minister Borden, Telegram, June 5, 1914.

¹⁷²Ibid., 88942, Borden to McBride, Telegram, June 5, 1914; ibid., 88945, Lord Harcourt to Governor-General, Duke of Connaught, June 10, 1914.

¹⁷³Debates, 1914, pp. 4177, 4532.

¹⁷⁴Statutes of Canada, 1915, 4-5 George V. chap. 27, p. 3.

¹⁷⁵Debates, 1914, pp. 4139, 4177.

CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE ALIEN QUESTION,
1896-1919: THE ANGLO-CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

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Chapter VII

THE ENEMY ALIEN PROBLEM, 1914-1918

World War I was to seriously disrupt ethnic relations within many countries but most notably in those nations containing heterogeneous population. Thus for Canada, a pluralistic society, in fact if not in name, the war subjected inter-ethnic relations to tremendous strain as the conflict increased in intensity. The concept of national service became an obsession with the majority of Anglo-Canadians; any manifestation of hyphenated Canadianism, even French-Canadianism, was regarded as disloyalty. For the enemy alien, already suspect because of his association with the enemies of the British Empire, refusal to accept the will of the majority became tantamount to treason. In the name of national security enemy aliens were to be denied civil rights; under the banner of a national crusade to save civilization, enemy aliens were to be forced into the cultural pattern of the dominant Anglo-Canadian majority.

In 1914, approximately 8% of Canada's population might be classified technically as "enemy aliens". The group comprised those of German background and a wide variety of ethnic groups originating from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The

Census of 1911 had revealed that there were some 393,320 residents of Canada of German background, representing almost 6% of the population of Canada. The Austro-Hungarian population was estimated at 129,103, or about 2% of the population of Canada.¹

It was not, however, the number of enemy aliens that created concern; it was their regional distribution. According to the census of 1911 the German population of Canada was distributed throughout many provinces with the majority located in Ontario, (192,320) followed next by Saskatchewan (68,628), Nova Scotia (38,844), Alberta (36,862), Manitoba (34,530) and British Columbia (11,880).² In contrast, citizens of Austro-Hungarian background were located primarily in Saskatchewan (41,651), Manitoba (39,665), Alberta (26,427), and Ontario (11,771).³ Yet another difference was the higher percentage of Germans born in North America as compared to the Austro-Hungarians. Using the prairie provinces as an example, of the 136,968 Germans in 1916, only 31% were born outside of North America; of the 136,250 Austro-Hungarians, 59% were born outside of North America.⁴

By 1914, the German population of Canada had well established historical roots. The German settlers of Lunenburg, Nova Scotia and the German-speaking Mennonites of Waterloo County, Ontario arrived in the eighteenth century.⁵ German immigration during the early part of the twentieth century had been actively encouraged; in both economic and

cultural terms German immigrants had been regarded as highly desirable additions to Canadian society. As late as May, 1914, the Toronto Mail & Empire had strongly endorsed a proposal to create a colony of German 'junkers' near Bassano, Alberta arguing that the "exceptional success for a large colony of well-financed German farmers is bound to attract the attention of the large agricultural population of the Fatherland".⁶ German investment and business activity in Canada had also been encouraged before the War; indeed, the C.P.R., a corporation whose name was synonymous with Canadian development, listed a substantial number of German shareholders.⁷

Although the official attitude of the Dominion government was favourable towards German immigration until the outbreak of hostilities, the growing tension between the German and British Empires between 1909-14 did necessitate certain security investigations. In 1909, for instance, there was some concern among members of the Canadian General Staff that German businessmen and immigrants were acting as agents of German imperialism. Not only were German businessmen suspected of acting as intelligence agents, but there was speculation that they were seeking to divert a substantial portion of Canadian trade away from Great Britain and towards Germany.⁸ A report in one of the leading German newspapers, Deutsche Tages-Zeitung that Germans living in Canada "will constitute ... a counterpoise ... to the jingoism of the

British", confirmed many of the suspicions of Canadian and British military officials.⁹

The function of the foreign language press during periods of international crisis also became a matter of debate in 1909. During the 'naval crisis' of that year the largest German language newspaper in western Canada, Der Nordwesten (Winnipeg), adopted a sympathetic approach to German policies, and commented on "the spiteful expressions, ... against Germany".¹⁰ Although at the time no reprisals were directed against Der Nordwesten throughout the years 1909-14 the conflict of loyalties faced by German-Canadian newspapers and organizations became more difficult. With the outbreak of war in August, 1914, the German population of Canada found themselves officially classified as enemy aliens.

The official guidelines for the treatment of enemy aliens in Canada during World War I were set forth in a series of acts and proclamations. By far the most important statute was the War Measures Act, which specified that during the state of "war, invasion, or insurrection.... the Governor in Council may do and authorize such acts ... orders and regulations, as he may ... deem necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada...." Specific reference was made to the following powers: censorship or all forms of communication; arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation; control of harbours; transportation

in Canada; trading and production; disposition of property. It was also stated under the War Measures Act that any enemy alien who had been arrested or detained would not be released upon bail without the permission of the Minister of Justice.¹¹

Prime Minister Borden, in a Proclamation of August 15, 1914 elaborated further on the status of enemy aliens:

That all persons in Canada, of German or Austro-Hungarian nationality, so long as they quietly pursue their ordinary avocations be allowed to continue to enjoy the protection of the law and be accorded the respect and consideration due to peaceful and law-abiding citizens; and they be not arrested, detained or interfered with, unless there is reasonable ground to believe that they are engaged in espionage, or engaging or attempting to engage in acts of a hostile nature, or are giving or attempting to give information to the enemy, or unless they otherwise contravene any law, order-in-council or proclamation.¹²

Under these terms of reference it was quite apparent that German-Canadians would be allowed freedom. Provision was made for the internment of only three categories of enemy aliens: German and Austrian reservists who attempted to leave Canada; all subjects of the enemy powers who attempted to leave the country "with the view of assisting the enemy"; all enemy aliens attempting to engage in espionage, to provide information to the enemy, or provide any form of assistance.¹³

The status of German and Austro-Hungarian reservists was certainly a major problem that faced the Canadian authorities. Neither the German nor the Austro-Hungarian

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governments recognized any change of nationality of their former subjects, therefore, all those immigrants of military age were expected to return to Europe immediately in order to assume their military obligations.¹⁴ Moreover, some of the ethnic elite in Canada strongly supported this concept of European loyalty. On July, 27, 1914, while the world waited breathlessly for the Austrian reaction to the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand, Bishop Nykyta Budka issued a pastoral letter calling upon his Ukrainian parishioners to remember their duty to Austro-Hungarian Empire if war should occur:

The Canadian Ruthenian Ukrainians ... make evident their sentiments in church services for the assassinated ones, and in their prayers for the fate of their native land....

To Canada there came an official appeal that the Austrian subjects who are duty bound to serve in the army should return to Austria in order to be prepared to defend the state.

All Austrian subjects must be at home in positions to defend our native land, our dear brothers and sisters, our Nation. Whoever should receive the call should feel obligated to go to the defence of our threatened Fatherland. To all who have not received the call or who have not reported to the army, but who are liable to military service, and to all deserters, the Emperor has granted amnesty, which means freedom from punishment, if they will immediately report to the consulate and leave for the old country to defend the Fatherland.¹⁵

The Anglo-Canadian reaction to Bishop Budka's pastoral letter, especially in western Canada, varied. Undoubtedly the most outspoken hostility emanated from the Manitoba Free Press whose editor, John W. Dafos, raised not only the national security issue, but the problem of a pluralistic

society: "The episcopal proclamation of Bishop Budka is a striking manifestation of the danger that this country may become a land inhabited by different peoples, speaking foreign tongues and cherishing divergent national ideals."¹⁶

The Free Press editor indirectly attacked the pro alien stance of the Manitoba Conservatives when he derided the nationalistic pretensions of members of the Ukrainian elite "of the stamp of Karmanski engaged by the Roblin government."¹⁷

The Winnipeg Telegram, the official organ of the Roblin government, rushed to the defence of the Ukrainian nationalists. In a series of editorials the Telegram presented persuasive arguments to justify toleration of the enemy aliens, particularly the Ukrainians, and attacked the motives of the self-styled Anglo-Canadian patriots "whose master, Hon. Clifford Sifton, was instrumental in bringing many of these people to Canada...."¹⁸

The sharp divergence of opinion between the Free Press and the Telegram was indicative of the tendency of most Anglo-Canadian newspapers in 1914 to approach the enemy alien problem from the perspective of political partisanship.¹⁹

There were also indications that at this stage in the war, the majority of Anglo-Canadians did not regard the Slavic immigrants from the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a serious security threat. This complacency was attributed to the general belief that the war would be of short duration; moreover, assurances of loyalty had been forthcoming from

large numbers of Russians, Poles, and Ukrainians who had disassociated themselves from Bishop Budka. In fact, Russian Orthodox Ukrainians in Winnipeg issued a statement declaring that they wished to "unanimously protest against Bishop Budka's actions...."²⁰ Bishop Budka, realizing the gravity of his indiscretion, issued a second pastoral letter on August 6, 1914, ordering his clergy "to read this letter ... and impress upon Ruthenians generally their solemn duty to the great British Empire".²¹

It is significant, however, that some of the Anglo-Canadian establishment of Winnipeg should have continued to regard the enemy alien situation in that city as extremely dangerous. On August 31, 1914, J.A.M. Aikins, a prominent Conservative M.P., wrote to Prime Minister Borden concerning the foreigners "not thoroughly loyal to the British in this war, and that there are inimical organizations here which are in communication with others in the United States".²² The possibilities of a class conflict between the hordes of impoverished foreigners and the affluent Anglo-Canadians was also stressed. Aikins stated that these aliens might take advantage of the war "for the destruction of property, public and private, and no one can tell when individuals or some portion of the people here may do crazy and wicked things".²³ To counteract both the external and the internal threat, Aikins suggested the appointment of numerous secret service agents to operate among the foreigners.²⁴ Dominion officials

did not act upon this proposal despite the support it received from Arthur Meighen, the Solicitor General, who had close ties with Aikins and other members of the Winnipeg establishment.²⁵

Despite the warnings about Slavic unrest in 1914, and for most of 1915, Dominion security authorities felt that the greatest threat to Canada came from militant German elements in the United States.²⁶ In October, 1914, Lieutenant Colonel W.N. Gartshore, Officer in Command at London, Ontario, warned that the thousands of enemy alien reservists in the United States might take advantage of the weakness of the military situation in southwestern Ontario: "the western portions of Ontario between this (London) and Windsor, are quite unprotected, and could be flooded with filibustering parties between darkness and dawn".²⁷ Reports reached Canadian military intelligence of suspicious activities being carried out by German-American communities in various American cities, especially New York and Chicago; in the case of Chicago one agent reported that "should the Germans achieve a signal success I believe that we in Canada are in danger of a repetition of the events of 1866 on a larger scale".²⁸ In September, 1914, Prime Minister Borden had been informed by the British Ambassador in the United States of a possible German assault from either upper Michigan or Wisconsin. Both these states had large German-American populations.³⁰ In this instance, Prime Minister Borden deemed the situation to

be sufficiently serious to call a special meeting of the Militia Council to draw up contingency plans to cope with the threat of unemployed, destitute enemy aliens making forays into Canada "this autumn or in the early winter".³¹

The security precautions against an external raid were not really tested, although there were numerous reports from border points of enemy alien activities.³² Moreover, as trouble in Ireland developed in 1916, there was great concern that dissident Sinn Fein elements in the United States would unite with German-Americans for an attack on Canada.³³ There was also anxiety that German agents would masquerade as Jews, Scandinavians or Finns in order to gain access to Canada.³⁴ This fear was particularly pronounced in northern Ontario where the large Finnish communities in the neighbouring states were believed to be centres of pro-German activity, and there was a constant flow of Finns across a virtually unpatrolled border.³⁵ What made the problem of control difficult was the increasing demand for American harvest labour because of manpower shortages in Canada.

As early as July, 1915 reports reached the Canadian authorities that American agents might try to enter the country posing as harvest hands, "the object of their being able to destroy the ripened crops by fire".³⁶ Throughout both 1915 and 1916 similar rumors circulated. In April, 1916, Eugene Fiset, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, warned the Commissioner of Customs that the demand for large numbers

of American harvest hands presented a distinct threat to national security: "If the enemy means trouble, how better could he land ten or twenty-thousand enemy reservists in Western Canada and have them rendezvous at strategic points on a fixed date."³⁷

By the end of 1916 there was considerable support for a regular border patrol by the R.N.W.M.P. to prevent German agents from entering Canada, and as well to keep enemy aliens located along the border under control. However, Commissioner Sherwood of the Dominion Police reiterated his position that there was no major threat either German agents, or other undesirables entering Canada.³⁸ As a result, no action was taken on the suggestion of systematic policing of the international border.

But if the external threat from Germans was believed to be under control by 1916, there was growing public hysteria over the 'enemy within'. The agitation over the presence of enemy aliens in Canada assumed several forms. It was feared that enemy aliens living in Canada would work as a fifth column ready to aid a possible enemy invasion or to act as saboteurs.³⁹

Measures had been adopted early in the war for a system of enemy alien registration, and for the internment of those enemy aliens considered dangerous.⁴⁰ The initial Proclamation of August, 1914, provided for the arrest and detention of three categories of enemy aliens. However, as the war continued

it became necessary to formulate more stringent regulations. The Order-in-Council (P.C. 2194) of September 20, 1916 provided for the registration of "every alien of enemy nationality residing or being in Canada who has no permanent place of residence or abode in Canada". Registered enemy aliens could receive a certificate of parole and remain at large if this was judged to be in the public interest.⁴¹ Except for the large cities which maintained special Registrars of Alien Enemies, the supervision of these aliens became the responsibility of the local chief constable.

The Annual Report of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police of 1916 illustrated the sense of optimism the authorities revealed towards the enemy alien situation: "the fair and impartial treatment of this population by the authorities and the admirable self-restraint on the part of the loyal population towards the enemy alien and the recognition by these nationalities that as long as they pursue their ordinary avocation ... they would not be interfered with ... has produced a singularly quiet and orderly year in the West".⁴² Thus despite the fact that over 80,000 enemy aliens were registered, only 8,579 were actually interned. In respect to the nationality of the prisoners there were 2,009 Germans, 5,954 Austro-Hungarians, 205 Turks, 99 Bulgarians, and 312 miscellaneous.⁴³ These 8,579 prisoners of war were located in some 24 different camps, although most were placed in either Kapuskasing (Ont.) or Vernon (B.C.).⁴⁴ According to

Major-General Otter, Director of Internment Operations, the treatment of the interned enemy aliens was "humane"; the fact that the government spent over four million dollars maintaining these camps, and the very low death rate of $1\frac{1}{3}\%$, tend to substantiate this assertion.⁴⁵ The enormous cost of maintaining these eight thousand men was sufficient to deter the authorities from suggesting massive internment of enemy aliens.

Yet such demands were constantly forthcoming: from cities such as Winnipeg and Fort William; from rural areas in western Canada close to large foreign colonies; and from isolated mining towns with polyglot populations.⁴⁶ The fear of the enemy alien was intensified by the fact that in many areas with the enlistment of the young men only the women, children and old men remained to face "the evil designs of the aliens".⁴⁷ Any enemy alien who held a responsible position in the district was suspect: the doctor, the postmaster, and the merchant.⁴⁸

German businessmen found themselves especially suspect. One of Major-General Otter's first pronouncements had been to warn the Canadian public about this group: "it is the German commercial agents and men in similar positions, who are most likely to prove dangerous.... It is in this direction that the Registrars will have their most difficult work to do".⁴⁹ Numerous German businessmen across the country were subjected to economic discrimination, social

ostracism and even internment. The unhappy war-time experience of Martin Nordegg, the Canadian representative of a German investment syndicate, vividly reveals this trend. In 1906, Nordegg had been sent to Canada by the German Development Company with some \$60,000 of investment capital. These funds were primarily used in the development of a Coal Mines in west-central Alberta. Brazeau Collieries near the town of Nordegg were jointly owned by the German Development Company, the Mackenzie and Mann Company Ltd., and a British investment firm. In 1914, Canadian authorities under the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act temporarily seized control of the shares owned by the German Development Company to ensure that none of its assets would be used to aid the enemy. Martin Nordegg, the mine manager, was effectively squeezed out of his position of influence with the Brazeau Collieries Ltd., primarily by the Mackenzie and Mann interests who took advantage of the enemy alien status of Nordegg to increase their own control over the mining company. Nordegg also encountered suspicion and physical intimidation within the mining community that he founded, not only from the Anglo-Canadian residents of the town, but later from the Italian miners once Italy had entered the war on the side of the Allies in 1915. In 1917 Nordegg was advised by his political friends, most notably, Andrew Haydon, an organizer for the Liberal party, to seek exile in the United States.⁵⁰

Opinion leaders in the German and Austrian communities, notably church ministers and newspaper editors, were another group viewed with intense suspicion by Anglo-Canadians. This was not surprising; before the war these men had been charged with obstructing assimilation. After 1914 it was a logical extension of the same type of thinking to accuse them of obstructing the war effort.

In spite of the favourable reputation that the Lutheran Church had enjoyed prior to the war as one of the Protestant denominations, by 1916-17 this institution had become very definitely suspect. Reports reached military intelligence of the seditious activities of Lutheran ministers throughout the country, but particularly those in western Canada.⁵¹ One report by a secret agent in 1917 found the situation in Winnipeg to be critical, in large part due to the activities of "the Lutheran clergy ... who act as paid or unpaid agents of the Kaiser and who do his bidding as Teutomaniacs, either by conviction or persuasion".⁵² An assessment was made of the 18 Lutheran churches as well as the other 11 Protestant pro-German churches in the city; the survey also included the "11 or 12 Jewish Synagogues, which are overwhelmingly pro-German as to both leadership and membership".⁵² The agent concluded his report with the very ominous warning that 60% of Winnipeg's population were from Austria, Russia, Germany, the Balkan states and the Scandinavian countries, "and are overwhelming pro-German" in their sentiments.⁵⁴

Public agitation over the presence of enemy alien newspapers had been pronounced at the outbreak of war. But while there were demands for the complete suppression of German-language newspapers such as the Berliner Journal (Kitchener) the West Canada, (Winnipeg) Der Nordwesten (Winnipeg) Der Courier (Regina) and the Alberta Herold (Edmonton), these newspapers were shielded by party affiliations.⁵⁵ The role of partisan politics in this controversy was clearly illustrated by a clash in the Alberta Legislature in October 1914. Conservative M.L.A., T.M. Tweedie, introduced a resolution calling for the provincial Attorney General to suspend the publication of the Alberta Herold, (Edmonton) and to prosecute the editor for treasonable utterances. The response of the provincial Liberal government was one of indignation. The Minister of Agriculture, Duncan McKeller, denounced the motion as "a dirty tory trick".⁵⁶

By the spring of 1915, however, the pressure for some degree of censorship was mounting from both the general public and security authorities. In February, 1915, Major-General Fiset, Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence, informed the Deputy Minister of Justice of the need "to prepare an Order-in-Council giving authority to deal with the publication of baseless rumours concerning the war".⁵⁷ In June, 1915, by Order-in-Council, the Press Censorship Branch was created under the auspices of the Secretary of State. The man chosen as Chief Press Censor was Lieutenant Colonel

Ernest J. Chambers, a journalist by training and a military man by inclination.⁵⁸

It was clear that from the perspective of the censorship officials, there was a vast difference between the English-language papers and the foreign-language press. This attitude can be discerned in the censorship system which was established. Guidelines were established for all Canadian newspapers but English language publications were expected to observe the guidelines voluntarily, "each editor receiving general instructions from the Chief Press Censor."⁵⁹ This self-regulatory approach was facilitated by the fact that most of those associated with press censorship were drawn from the ranks of the powerful English-language dailies. In contrast, no representatives of the foreign-language press were involved in press censorship in policy-making positions; it became clear that the Orders-in-Council which established certain censorship practices and prescribed penalties for the publication of "objectionable" materials were intended only for the foreign newspapers.⁶⁰ Chambers justified the double standard in a circular letter sent to all foreign-language newspapers in 1916: "The reason that editors of Canadian English papers are permitted a broad scope in publishing war news items [is] because they depend on the knowledge and good sense of their English readers to distinguish between official and reliable news and news that comes from suspicious sources...."⁶¹

In private correspondence with John W. Dafoe, editor of the Manitoba Free Press, Chambers stated that the best way of dealing with German-language papers such as Der Nordwesten "is to close them up".⁶² However Commissioner Perry, of the R.N.M.P. in Regina, did not agree. The Commissioner argued that since aliens in Western Canada were going to desire foreign-language newspapers it would be preferable to have them read papers published in Canada rather than "having dangerous publications printed in other countries smuggled into Canada."⁶³ This consideration was made all the more significant because of the militant anti-British pronouncements of American German-language papers.

The activities of Louis Hammerling, a German-Jew living in New York, created great apprehension among Canadian security officials. By 1915, Hammerling had organized the American Association for Foreign Language Newspapers which "succeeded in getting the larger share of the money that was expended by the German and Austrian government to influence the foreign-language press in the United States".⁶⁴ The pro-German strategy of Hammerling was well appreciated by the British and Canadian officials. In July, 1915, Bonar Law warned the Canadian government to keep a close watch on Hammerling because of his powerful influence not only on Germans but also on "Polish and other Slav, as well as the Jewish and Italian elements in the United States...."⁶⁵ Serious consideration was given to proposals aimed at

counteracting Hammerling's influence in the United States and Canada.

The Alberta Herold, one of the most pro German foreign-language newspapers, definitely was strongly suspected of carrying out editorial policies dictated by the German government. There was considerable pressure to have the paper suppressed, a policy that would have undoubtedly been implemented had not the Herold folded in October, 1915.⁶⁶

Special concern was expressed, however, that the editors of the paper, Messrs. von Hammerstein and Krankenhagen, both of whom had fled to the United States, would continue to foment unrest among western Canada's German population through German newspapers published in Duluth and Chicago.⁶⁷ As a result of this fear of the German-language press in the United States, very rigorous measures were adopted; in August 1916, 33 different publications were prohibited entry.⁶⁸

The position of the German-language papers published in Canada was regarded as somewhat different than those published outside the country. The editors of these ethnic papers also regarded themselves as the guardians of the customs and language for their people and spoke out defiantly against the nativist. Nor did these editors subscribe to the view maintained by government officials that ethnic papers were allowed to continue publishing as a gesture of toleration. Bold editorials maintained the right of such publications to exist and operate in an independent fashion. Far

from presenting a threat to national unity, many German editors emphasized their role as agents of Canadianization. According to G. L. Maron of Der Nordwesten, there was "no nationality or race in Canada more willing to acquire a knowledge of the English language than we German-Canadians ... a paper ... in their own language is, therefore a necessity ... to educate them, to enlighten them ... in short to make desirable citizens of them...."⁶⁹

Undoubtedly the most outspoken German newspaper editor of the war period was C. E. Eymann of Der Courier (Regina). The major complaint against Eymann was not that his paper published items which were sympathetic to the German war effort, or that anyone associated with the paper was involved in espionage, but rather that Der Courier was too militant in upholding the rights of the German community, and of fostering a sense of "Germanism". In October, 1916 Eymann wrote: "German-Canadians ... you have one and all something in common, the German mother tongue, German blood '... I make an appeal to your hearts. Be united' united' united'"⁷⁰ In upholding these ideals, and in reacting to nativist attacks on German-Canadians as "alien enemies," Eymann, became involved in organizing the German-Canadian Provincial Association of Saskatchewan, which considered running ethnic candidates in the 1917 provincial election. The appeal of the Association was very ethno-centric: "The men from other nationalities cannot understand our wants and

they can't defend our rights successfully."⁷¹

The views of the authorities towards this boldly stated ethnicity were quite negative. In 1915 Colonel Chambers refuted Der Courier's editorial line by insisting that "there is only one "Canadianism possible, and that is, 'British Canadianism'".⁷² Germanism, he reminded Eymann, had become associated with sly and ignoble intrigue, the policy of treachery, the re-introduction of savage brutality. Furthermore, continuation on the part of Der Courier to espouse "Germanism," Chambers warned, "can only lead to the most unfortunate results."⁷³ What was clearly implied was the suppression of Der Courier, a policy which Chambers advocated on several occasions.⁷⁴ It was significant that the Liberal government of Saskatchewan adopted a tolerant attitude towards Der Courier.⁷⁵ This partisan bulwark helped the paper to survive until April, 1917 when a mob of Anglo-Canadian militants and veterans wrecked the offices of Der Courier in Regina.⁷⁶

The German press had borne the brunt of public and official disfavor throughout the war. However, by 1916 Ukrainian-language newspapers began to appear as more of a menace to many Anglo-Canadians. What accounted for the delayed reaction was the confusing heterogeneity of national, ethnic, religious and political characteristics of enemy aliens of the Austro-Hungarian category. In a national sense, the Austro-Hungarian Empire included many

dissident Slavic nationalities such as Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians who were not particularly sympathetic to the war aims of the Viennese authorities. There was a possibility that these groups might identify eventually with the Slavic movement in Czarist Russia. The Austrians were determined to prevent a pan-Slav League from emerging. One very successful propaganda tactic of the Hapsburg government was to appeal to Ukrainian nationalist aspirations with the promise of a separate Ukrainian state to be set up within the Empire. Throughout 1914-17, Austrian propaganda contrasted the freedom which Ukrainians would enjoy under the Hapsburgs as compared to the subjection which Ukrainians would encounter under the Romanov dynasty of Russia.⁷⁷

The policy of the censorship officials in respect to the publications of the various ethnic groups originating in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, was influenced by several factors. In the first place, there was the official policy that no journalistic assault on either Great Britain or her allies was to be permitted: "any criticism levelled against the Russian Empire during the continuance of the present war can only be regarded as equally serious as if levelled against the British Empire."⁷⁸ As a result, those Ukrainophile elements in Canada, who were usually very anti-Russian, came under almost immediate disfavour. The Uniat hierarchy in Canada, most notably Bishop Budka, bore the brunt of suspicion, largely because of the historic connection with the

Hapsburg Monarchy. The Church in North America countered the dissemination of Russian propaganda by firmly espousing the cause of an autonomous Ukraine within the Austro-Hungarian Empire.⁷⁹

As was the case with pro-German literature, organizations in the United States were very much involved in stirring up anti-Russian sentiment. One such organization was the Ukrainian National Association located in Jersey City, New Jersey. Through their journal, Svoboda, long a respected Ukrainian publication, the Association attempted "to facilitate the efforts made by a large section of the Austrian ... peoples, as well as by politicians of good will in many lands towards uplifting and establishing the national life of the Ukraine."⁸⁰ Because of its virulent anti-Russian flavor, Svoboda was one of the first Ukrainian periodicals to be banned from Canada in January, 1916.

The censorship authorities also began to exert pressure on the Ukrainian press to refrain from publishing anti-allied sentiments and to moderate its outspoken criticisms of Anglo-Canadian institutions. It is noteworthy that both the Chief Press Censor and the Censor for Western Canada were influenced by their contact with the English-language editors in western Canada; by far the most influential was John W. Dafoe.

As the war progressed, Dafoe's views on press censorship changed appreciably. In 1915, at a meeting of the

Winnipeg Canadian Club, Dafoe had emphatically announced his personal opposition to newspaper censorship: "to suppress news which its readers are entitled to have ... or to deprive any section of the population of its right to have diversified newspapers".⁸² However, within a year Dafoe was prepared to support rather rigorous censorship.

The fragmentation and inefficiency of the bilingual school system in Manitoba appears to have been a major factor in convincing Dafoe and other Anglo-Canadian reformers that the 'foreigner' would have to be controlled. Dafoe's strong opposition to the bilingual system had been strongly supported by his employer Clifford Sifton in May, 1915:

The whole bilingual system so far as possible ought to be wiped out. It is a mine of trouble and faction fighting. The American principle is the only safe one.... I would like to see the Free Press take an uncompromising stand upon this question and fight it to the finish So far as popularity is concerned you can rely upon it that such a stand will not diminish the popularity of the paper. On the contrary, it will give you a standing with the kind of people whose support is valuable.⁸³

The victory of the Manitoba Liberal party in the provincial election of 1915 provided the means to achieve the abolition of bilingual schools. Swept into power on a wave of Anglo-Canadian support, the Liberals began to assault on Section 258 of the Manitoba School Act, the section providing for bilingual instruction.⁸⁴ In January, 1916, the Minister of Education, Dr. Thornton announced his intention to create

an English unilingual educational system not because of "prejudice in favour of the English language", but rather because of the fact "that among so many different nationalities there was an absolute need of a common medium of communication".⁸⁵ Countless statistics were cited to justify his contention that Manitoba education was in a state of utter chaos: the percentage of students in bilingual schools represented one sixth of the total school enrolment; almost every nationality in the province was demanding bilingual instruction; and a trend was developing "... towards the elimination of teachers who have been teaching English entirely".⁸⁶ A national unilingual school system was the

only answer not only for present and future generations of Anglo-Canadians, but especially for the second generation immigrant. This sentiment was sermonized by the Free Press: "the Ruthenian who is not taught English is tied to his settlement; is condemned to the roughest and hardest form of labour; and is left defenceless against schemers.... On the other hand to the Ruthenian child educated in English all the doors of opportunity are open; he becomes in fact, as well as in name, the citizen of a great country."⁸⁷ To achieve this end it was necessary to appeal to a higher law than the rights of parents: "the children are the children of the state of which they are destined to be citizens; and it is the duty of the state that they be properly educated".⁸⁸

The varying reactions to the bilingual question by the

different ethnic groups ruled out the possibility of a united non-Anglo Saxon opposition. Icelandic Manitobans were more prepared than any other ethnic group to accept the abolition of bilingual privileges. Protestant in religion, predominantly English speaking, and already well integrated into Anglo-Canadian economic, social and political society, the Icelandic population was prepared to accept the dictates of Anglo-conformity. Statements made by Icelandic members of the legislature, and by the Icelandic press were sufficiently favourable for the Free Press to emphatically declare that "the experience of the Icelanders is the complete answer to nine-tenths of the arguments in favor of bilingualism".⁸⁹

Russian Orthodox spokesmen as well as Ukrainian and Polish Protestants also announced their support of the Norris government. The Russophile position was outlined by V. P. Hladyk, editor of the Russian People (Winnipeg). In this testimony before the Manitoba Legislature Hladyk warned the members not to appease the Ukrainian pseudo-nationalists. He stressed that these nationalists intended to aid Germany by creating disunity both in Canada, and in the Russian Empire.⁹⁰

The Ukrainian and Polish Protestants, that rather unique product of Protestant proselytizing among Slavic immigrants proved to be were very eloquent supporters of the government's actions. Men such as A. Dojacek, publisher of the

Ukrainian periodical, the Canadian Farmer (Winnipeg), E.M. Glowa, of the Polish newspaper, Ranok (Winnipeg), M. Bellegay, editor of the publication, The Canadian (Edmonton) and Paul Crath, a government translator, represented an elite group of Canadianized cleric and lay intellectuals.⁹¹ Through their respective newspapers these men were believed to perform a useful function in explaining government policy to their ethnic group; as well, there was a tendency on the part of Anglo-Canadian officials to regard the Dojaceks and the Craths as the true spokesmen of the Slavic residents of the province. Fred Livesay, the Press Censor for the West, felt so strongly about the significant role which could be played by a loyal elite that he advocated direct federal support for the educated Slavic Protestant intelligentsia to facilitate rapid Canadianization.⁹²

But if an Anglicized ethnic elite was regarded by some Anglo-Canadians as the key to the solution of the assimilation problem, these men were branded as traitors to their ethnic background by the Ukrainian-Canadian nationalists. As the controversy continued it appeared that the supporters of unilingual schools formed a decided minority within the Manitoba Slavic community. Socialists such as Taras Ferley and others associated with the Ukrainian Voice joined ranks with Bishop Budka in fighting the kulturkampf.

As the only Slavic member of the Manitoba Legislature, Ferley assumed a leading role in defending Ukrainian cultural

rights. Ferley spoke in favour of a compromise solution which would allow limited bilingual privileges in the public schools of the province. He advocated the teaching of the non-English language in the first two grades in school districts where 75% of the children spoke that language; in grades 3 to 8 he suggested that the second language be regarded as a teaching subject. Such provisions, he felt, would illustrate that Canada was prepared to recognize the cultural contributions of 'new Canadians': "it is ... a great asset to a Canadian citizen to be able to speak besides Shakespeare's language, also the language of Rousseau, Hugo, Schiller, Goethe, Pushkin, Tolstoi, ... Schevchenko ... and others."⁹³

In contrast to Ferley's low-key approach, other Slavic groups assumed a militant stance. At a meeting of the "League of Liberty, Fraternity and Equality," one Polish-Canadian speaker suggested that the abolition of the bilingual school system was a diabolical plot on the part of "... the English jingoes and Orangemen ... who desire to deprive the Polish youth from having an opportunity to enter the teachers' profession, or any positions above digging sewers and cutting lumber".⁹⁴ Bishop Budka went even further asserting that bilingualism was the right of the Canadian Ukrainians, and "no power on earth can make the Ruthenian in Canada forget his mother tongue".⁹⁵ It is not surprising, therefore, that the Ruthenian prelate should become the target of Anglo-Canadian criticism.

In March, 1916 during the debate over bilingual schools, Liberal member D. A. Ross charged that Bishop Budka was actually an Austrian spy; that he was not even a Bishop but an officer of the Austrian army; and that Budka was doing his utmost to divide the Canadian nation by his policy of racial Balkanization.⁹⁶ From various sections of the Anglo-Canadian community there were demands for the internment of the Ruthenian Ecclesiastic.⁹⁷ A spirited defence of the Bishop was made by various Catholic and Ukrainian groups. The Catholic Truth Society of Manitoba boldly asserted that the Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba, Premier Norris, and Premier Scott of Saskatchewan all had evidence in their possession which would reveal how earnestly Bishop Budka had worked among the Ukrainians to instill allegiance to the British Empire.⁹⁸ The editor of The Canadian Ruthenian, J. Petrushevich, launched an impassioned defence of not only Bishop Budka, but of Canadian Ukrainians. Petrushevich referred to the agitation over "His Grace" as part of a systematic attempt on the part of Anglo-Canadian demagogues to slander the Ukrainian people. This strategem, he warned, might have disastrous consequences for national unity: "Once an impression, however, unfounded, but reflecting upon the integrity of a quarter million of Canadian citizens finds its way into official records and minds of the population it is almost impossible to undo...."⁹⁹

Military authorities generally supported the allegation

that Bishop Budka was potentially dangerous to national security. In February 1916, Lieut. Colonel C. W. Rowley of the Winnipeg Military District charged that Bishop Budka was in close communication with the Austrian Consul at St. Paul.¹⁰⁰ The arrival of Orest Zarebko a young Ukrainian nationalist in Winnipeg, after attending a meeting of the Ukrainian National Association in New Jersey, was disturbing. First, Zarebko was alleged to have been sent by pro-Austrian Ukrainians in the United States to announce the decision of the Austrian government to create an autonomous Ukraine under Austrian suzerainty.¹⁰¹ A second disturbing feature was the reception Zarebko received in Winnipeg; according to Livesay, "Zarebko, an agnostic, has been entertained since his arrival here by Bishop Budka".¹⁰² There was even greater consternation when Zarebko became the new editor of the Ukrainian Voice. On May 24, 1916, in a biting editorial the Ukrainian Voice attempted to stir up resistance to unilingual proposals: "The abolition of our schools is a trick of the 'Canadian' to engulf us. Should they succeed they will go further ... they would forbid us to speak our own language in our homes: they would forbid us to read our own newspapers and books ... to Canadianize our children forcing us to accept in our churches the 'Protestant' preachers...."¹⁰³

The defiance on the part of the Ukrainian elite was received by almost total intolerance by men such as J. W. Dafoe and the press censorship officials. J. W. Dafoe in

reply to the editorial in the Ukrainian Voice, demanded that "the man responsible for this lying, hateful production ought to be taken by the scruff of the neck and thrown back to his native Galicia."¹⁰⁴ Bishop Budka and Thomas Ferley were equally damned as irresponsible agitators, and told that if they were dissatisfied with Manitoba's education system, they could "pack ... (their) trunk and go back to ... (their) happy home in war-torn Europe".¹⁰⁵ Colonel Chambers in keeping with his attitude that continued agitation over the abolition of bilingual schools was "a danger to national security," sternly warned Zabrebko, editor of the Ukrainian Voice, that such inflammatory editorials would lead to the suppression of his newspaper.¹⁰⁶ Abolition of bilingual schools in Manitoba, had produced a sense of mission that the foreigner must be immediately Canadianized.

A similar trend had developed in Saskatchewan in 1917 when Premier William Martin, bowing before intense pressure from Anglo-Canadians introduced and provided for several changes in the educational system. Provision was made for compulsory school attendance and the use of German, Ukrainian and Polish in the public schools was prohibited. In fact, only French was allowed as a primary language of instruction.¹⁰⁷ In neither Manitoba or Saskatchewan had the view of the 'foreigners' been seriously considered. The Anglo-Canadian majority manifest a pronounced determination to exclude the foreigner from the decision making process; indeed, the future political

position of the alien was becoming a matter of considerable debate. This trend was particularly pronounced during the Conscription Crisis of 1917.

It is difficult to separate the controversy over the implementation of conscription and the electoral status of the enemy aliens. The passage of the Military Service Act in June 1917 made it inevitable that a Dominion election would be held during the war. In such an election the voting power of the enemy alien was regarded as crucial, especially if the western Liberals remained loyal to Laurier. The War-Time Elections Act and the Military Voters' Act were the response of a Conservative Party which felt very insecure about its popularity as the war continued. The fact that such an illiberal measure did not prevent the coalition between the western Liberals and the Conservatives was indicative of the growing conviction of Anglo-Canadians that the rights of aliens were secondary; winning the war was paramount. The 'khaki' election of December, 1917, with the overwhelming Unionist victory, illustrated the unity of the Anglo-Canadian community, especially in western Canada.

The possibility of a war-time election had been seriously considered by the Liberal party in April, 1917. Laurier had paid particular attention to political trends in western Canada seeking the advice of prominent western Liberals such as John W. Diefenbaker. According to Diefenbaker, the Conservative party would be defeated unless some new factor

enters the contest and gives them a good battle cry".¹⁰⁸ It was significant that in the Spring of 1917 many Conservatives shared Dafoe's assessment that the Borden government would be vulnerable if an election were called. The Liberals had already swept into power in British Columbia and Manitoba in 1915; when the provincial governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan called general elections for June, 1917, the Conservatives feared the worst.

The Alberta Provincial Election, June 7, 1917 returned the Liberals, led by A. L. Sifton, to power with 34 seats to the Conservatives 19.¹⁰⁹ The campaign had been exceedingly bitter and the Conservatives to a large extent blamed the defeat on the overwhelming support the Sifton government received from the aliens. Even prior to the election, the Calgary Herald, the chief Conservative paper in the West, had speculated whether the Alberta Liberals were going to naturalize another 30,000 aliens as they had done prior to the 1913 election.¹¹⁰ The defeat of T. M. Tweedie, a prominent Calgary Tory, and the small plurality of the Conservative leader Edward Michener, were both directly attributed to the alien vote. In a letter to Borden, June 11, Michener announced that, "the Swedes voted solidly against me and so did the other foreigners". Michener warned Borden "that unless steps were taken before a federal election to disfranchise all the enemy alien born they will have the balance of power to defeat most of our candidates in the Provinces."

This impression of impending disaster in the Prairie Provinces seemed to be further substantiated by the results of the Saskatchewan provincial election of June 25. By a margin of 51-6, the Liberals swept the feeble Conservative party aside. In nearly every constituency the victor had majorities in excess of 500 votes, and in 14 constituencies the majorities exceeded 1,000. The common denominator in all of these 14 ridings was a large foreign population.¹¹²

The Conservatives were not indifferent to the imbalance of the alien vote. Duncan McKellar, an unsuccessful candidate for Voudra, a north Saskatchewan constituency, wrote to Borden complaining about the manipulation of the foreign voters by Liberal interpreters, as well as the dilatory effect which the passage of the Military Service Act had on the Conservative campaign.¹¹³ Of more importance was a memorandum analyzing the Saskatchewan election sent to the Hon. Robert Rogers, Minister of Public Works, who in turn gave it to Borden. Particular emphasis was placed on the dilatory effect of having so many of Saskatchewan's Anglo-Saxon voters, (about 30,000), serving overseas. It was the non-British and the 'slackers' who were in ascendancy; it was these undesirables who had repudiated the Conservative party not the "people" of Saskatchewan. "In every single constituency in which the British predominated we had a majority or made a good showing and every Conservative who won did so in a predominantly English speaking constituency."¹¹⁴

For the next month Borden was deluged by mail, referred to him by Robert Rogers, Arthur Meighen, and R. B. Bennett, most letters stressing the precarious position of the Conservative party in the West.¹¹⁴ The prominent role assumed by Robert Rogers, the Minister of Public Works, in this campaign to disfranchise the enemy alien was particularly noteworthy. In his Manitoba provincial career, Rogers had been the chief organizer of the Conservative party; he had been especially skillful in mobilizing the alien vote. However, with the defeat of the Roblin government in 1915 Rogers appears to have recognized the electoral possibilities of the anti-alien appeal. This transition was clearly illustrated by the altered editorial stance of the Winnipeg Telegram, a newspaper controlled by Rogers and previously sympathetic to the foreign element.¹¹⁵ By 1917, the Telegram had become one of the most anti-alien newspapers in Canada.¹¹⁶

Pressure was also coming from the eastern wing of the Conservative party to disfranchise the aliens. Even before the elections in Alberta and Saskatchewan, John A. Currie, a Conservative back bencher, voiced the need for immediate action. On May 21, he had introduced a private member's bill in the House of Commons seeking to amend Section 79 of the Criminal Code so as to make it illegal for anyone of alien descent to participate in an election. His bill stipulated that violation of this proviso would result in imprisonment for a term of not less than two years, together with for-

feiture of civil rights, and all property to the Crown.¹¹⁷ To the great relief of most Conservatives, who regarded Currie as a maverick, the bill never got past first reading. The date of March 31, 1902, which differentiated those falling within the limits of this proposed measure, was later to be utilized in the War-time Elections Act.¹¹⁸ But while there were forces on one side strongly urging Borden to disfranchise the aliens, there were other factors which acted as a deterrent. By far the most important one was the attempt to bring the western Liberals into a coalition. After Borden's failure to enlist Laurier's support for conscription, in May 1917, it had been the western and Ontario Liberals who had ensured the bill's passage.¹¹⁹ By July, 1917, it was becoming increasingly apparent that there was growing support for the idea of coalition from this branch of the Liberal party.

The possibility of polarizing the electorate so as to create an Anglo-Saxon party, dedicated to un-hyphenated Canadianism was by no means a new political aspiration. Men such as D'Alton McCarthy had espoused this ideal back in the 19th century. However, in 1917, as probably at no other time in Canadian history the conditions were most conducive to the realization of such a goal. The controversy over the Military Service Act had divided English and French Liberals into opposite camps, and from the passage of this Act in July 1917 until October there was a gradual movement by Anglo

Canadian Liberals of Ontario and the West to join forces with the Borden government. The formation of the Unionist party represented the outcome of this new alignment. Its goal was the creation of a National Party, composed of Anglo-Canadians, totally dedicated to winning the war. While political manoeuvring was not absent from the deliberations of the Unionists there appears to have been a widespread commitment to the ideal of patriotism over partyism.¹²⁰

But before the Unionist coalition was created in October, 1917, the Borden government had set about to "shift the franchise from the doubtful British or anti-British of the male sex and to extend it at the same time to our patriotic women,..."¹²¹ On September 6, 1917, Arthur Meighen, Minister of the Interior, introduced the Military Voters' Bill and the Wartime Elections Bill in the House of Commons. Meighen's justification for the legislation was clear and direct: "the franchise of peace time is founded on peace service and the franchise of war time on war service".¹²² The nature of the two bills reflected that dictum. The Military Voters' Act extended the federal franchise to the nearest female relatives (wives, widows, mothers and sisters) of Canadian soldiers overseas. To be eligible such relatives had to be over twenty-one years of age and British subjects.¹²³ The Wartime Elections Act removed the franchise from several categories of subjects. Thus, anyone who had applied "for a certificate of exemption from

combatant military service on conscientious grounds" was not entitled to vote. Another clause disqualified ethnic groups such as the Doukhobors and Mennonites who had earlier received exemption from military service by orders-in-council. By far the most controversial proposal in the bill was that every British subject naturalized after March 31, 1902, who was born in an enemy country, or whose mother tongue was that of any enemy country, was to be disfranchised. The only exception to these broad disqualifications was made in the case where such a person had volunteered and been accepted for military service.¹²⁴

Despite the threats from western Liberals such as J. H. Buchanan, M.P. for Lethbridge, that any infringement of the electoral rights of the enemy aliens would undermine a coalition, many western Liberals supported the legislation.¹²⁵ J. G. Turriff, an old-guard western Liberal, who had made skillful use of the foreign vote during his lengthy political career, illustrated the acceptance of the move when on September 5, he informed J. W. Dafoe that "the Government cannot do otherwise than introduce rather strong Franchise measures".¹²⁶ Clifford Sifton, the man who was responsible for the presence of many of the continental immigrants acquiesced to the disfranchisement of the enemy alien. On September 7, Sifton sent Dafoe a confidential telegram: "In view of the contents of the Franchise Act I do not think any comment should be made upon it by the Free Press until

you and I have an opportunity of discussing the matter and I think it would be wise for you to come over for that purpose. ..."¹²⁷ The Free Press did not comment on the Wartime Elections Act until September 13, and then only to point out that abnormal times produced abnormal actions. In fact, the Free Press argued, that the Wartime Elections Act "supplies a new and powerful argument in support of the theory that union government is necessary to the further efficient government of the country."¹²⁸ Quite clearly Dafoe and Sifton accepted Arthur Meighen's concept of wartime service.

Although the War Time Elections Act was denounced by Liberal members in the House of Commons and by most Liberal newspapers throughout the country, the legislation did not appreciably affect the possibilities of forming the Unionist party. How important the Act was in ensuring an electoral victory for the Unionist government was another point. John W. Dafoe, who had fervently championed the cause of the Unionists, claimed that the magnificent victory would have been achieved "without the disfranchisement of electors of alien origin...."¹²⁹ In contrast, Frank Oliver, who had remained loyal to Laurier, asserted in the Edmonton Bulletin that the War-time Elections Act was a crucial importance, not only because of the disfranchisement of those falling within its scope but because of the fact that, "certified copies of naturalization papers were refused again and again by returning officers if offered by a suspected Liberal."¹³⁰

The contrasting opinions offered by the Free Press and Bulletin in their analyses of the election results revealed the difficulty of assessing the effect of the War-time Elections Act on the Unionist victory.

The restrictions of the War-time Elections Act and the subsequent Dominion election triggered a varied response from the spokesmen of different alien groups. The Mennonite Bishops of Ontario in July, 1917, indicated that since they and their co-religionists had been released from the provisions of the Military Service Act they were prepared to accept the principle, "that all such bodies including ourselves should not have a vote in such a election."¹³¹ A similar reply was received from the Doukhorbor community, one respondent assured Arthur Meighen that, "the act will ... guard against injustice and will obviate the embarrassing position in which we should have inevitably found ourselves."¹³² Nor were the pro Austrian Ukrainians who were led of Bishop Budka overly distressed by the War-time Elections Act. Budka, himself, seemed to have been relieved at being able to achieve a degree of immunity from military conscription for Canadian-Ukrainians.¹³³ However, there were other elements in the Ukrainian, Russian and German communities which bitterly resented the War-time Elections Act. The most militant critics were young educated Ukrainians, many of whom had contributed to the war effort by active participation in the Canadian Armed Forces.¹³⁴ This

interest in the allied war effort on the part of Ukrainians was enhanced in 1916-17 by the German military conquest of most of the Russian Ukraine. Proposals were made by several Ukrainian organizations that a Ukrainian-Canadian Battalion be formed to help establish a free Ukraine. It was also maintained by some influential Ukrainians that the recruitment of Ukrainians in the western provinces would have a very great and beneficial effect in convincing the Canadian-Ukrainian that "he is part and parcel of Canada and the Empire".¹³⁵ However, these suggestions encountered only hostility on the part of the military officials and Anglo-Canadian politicians.¹³⁶

During the 1917 Dominion election the enemy aliens, indeed all non-English elements in Canadian society were subjected to considerable harassment. The Halifax explosion which occurred just prior to the election once again raised the bogey of enemy alien sabotage; as a result, Borden was deluged with demands for the mass internment of enemy aliens.¹³⁷ To rally the Anglo-Canadian voters, especially in western Canada, behind the Unionist government, newspapers such as the Free Press exploited the anti-alien sentiment.^{138a} The response of the 'new' Canadians to this renewed assault from the Anglo-Canadians was described by the Canadian Ruthenian just prior to the 1917 election: "it is the custom in Canada during the war that when anything happens or goes wrong the failure is put on those inhabitants of Canada who

came from enemy countries.... If the wheat crop doesn't turn out, fault of enemy alien; train jumps track, fire, strike all fault enemy alien. In the election if some chauvinistic Canadian politician is defeated, it is the fault of enemy aliens."¹³⁹ Nor did it appear that demonstrations of loyalty to Canada would offset the deep antagonism towards the enemy aliens. For instance, there had been an attempt in October, 1918, on the part of H. A. Mackie, the Unionist M.P. for Edmonton East to remove the political disabilities from 'loyal' Ukrainians. He relayed a request from a local Ukrainian association that stated this group would accept non-combatant service in exchange for the repeal of the War-time Elections Act, Mackie sent a series of telegrams to other western Unionists to obtain their reactions to repealing the Act.¹⁴⁰ Of the M.P.'s who responded, the majority favoured the retention of the franchise disqualification of the enemy alien. The comments of many M.P.'s were openly hostile, including all three of the Winnipeg M.P.'s.¹⁴¹ There were indications of public support for Senator Bradbury's proposal that enemy aliens should be disfranchised for life.¹⁴² An attempt early in 1919 by the Saskatchewan government to champion the cause of restoring the franchise to enemy aliens met with formidable resistance. According to James Calder, Minister of Immigration and Colonization, and former member of the Saskatchewan cabinet, any further move to support return of the franchise to enemy aliens

"would mean the surrounding of the old Museum [Saskatchewan Legislature] by an army of many thousands in a very few days".¹⁴³

The final year of the war witnessed an intensification of the anti-alien sentiment among Anglo-Canadians. Public opinion, especially organizations such as the Great War Veterans' Association, increasingly forced the Dominion authorities to consider placing additional restrictions on the enemy alien population. When government appeared too reluctant to act, the returned men took matters into their own hands. Indeed, by the end of the war, the status of the enemy alien were very much in jeopardy. As early as 1915 there had been incidents of violence against enemy aliens perpetrated by soldiers particularly following the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915. In Victoria, B.C. a mob broke into German club rooms and business establishments. So intense were emotions that a mob advanced towards Government House and threatened Lieutenant-Governor Barnard whose wife was of German descent.¹⁴⁴ Calgary also experienced its share of mob violence. Off duty members of the Canadian Army wrecked a number of local establishments frequented by German-Canadians. The fact that this vigilante action was staunchly defended by a Calgary populist paper, the Fairplay revealed that a growing number of Anglo-Canadians were willing to condone mob violence against the enemy alien.¹⁴⁵ The prevalence of this mob violence prompted a Ukrainian newspaper

Robithyche Slovo (Toronto) to refer to these incidents as "Canadian pogroms". Unflattering comparisons were made with the situation in Czarist Russia: "In Russia the pogroms were prepared by the black hundred, and at present in Canada something similar was created and does almost the same work".¹⁴⁶

By 1918 the veterans' organizations had emerged as a major force whose demands had to be seriously considered by the Dominion government. The Great War Veterans' Association, formed in 1917, was the largest association claiming 16,000 members by the middle of 1918; other groups included the Army and Navy Veterans, the Grand Army of Canada, the Great War Next of Kin Association etc..¹⁴⁷ Throughout the early part of 1918, the G.W.V.A. in particular, exerted pressure on the Borden government to deal harshly with the enemy aliens. Suggested measures were numerous: all enemy aliens not engaged in work of national importance should be subject to economic conscription; no enemy aliens should be allowed to hold public office; all enemy alien newspapers should be suppressed; and "all questions having to do with Aliens [should] be taken out of the hands of the Provincial Authorities...."¹⁴⁸ Borden was informed in March 1918 of the importance of taking decisive action:

... we respectfully point out to you, that an adverse decision of our Union Government, elected as it was, with a majority of seventy members, by the Soldiers' vote, the Soldier Women's vote, and the patriotic

41.

people of this Dominion, will be received with the greatest disappointment, with what consequences to our Communities and Districts where such Aliens are in undue numbers, we view with the utmost gravity. 149

Fear that the Borden government would accede to the demands of the veterans certainly was evident among many immigrant groups. In the Soda Lake district of Alberta, for example, there was widespread apprehension that the property of all enemy aliens would be confiscated. At a public meeting held at Vegreville, some 200 Ukrainian settlers expressed concern that the federal government intended to implement the confiscatory resolution passed by the Edmonton branch of the G.W.V.A. in January 1918. A two man delegation consisting of A. Shandro, MLA and P. Svarich were appointed to make representations to the federal government. The response of the authorities to this incident was rather revealing. In the first place, there was an initial attempt to brand Shandro as an agent provocateur. In part this harsh reaction stemmed from real concern that "such rumors will create a spirit of unrest amongst the Alien Enemy population to the detriment of the country." 150 There was, however, some awareness on the part of the authorities that the unrest was the product of a fundamental concern on the part of alien over his place in Canadian society. As a result, in February, 1918 Prime Minister Borden made an official statement reaffirming the guarantees that the property rights of enemy aliens 151 would be protected by the

government of Canada.

It was significant, however, that in April 1918, the Amendment to the Dominion Lands Act, included a clause stating very precisely that "letters patent for a homestead shall not issue to any person who is not a subject of His Majesty by birth or naturalization". What made this clause so important was that during most of the war naturalization certificates had not been granted.¹⁵² Moreover, not only had the new naturalization provisions not been finalized; but there was evidence that the new Act would discriminate against enemy aliens. As a result many enemy aliens feared that they would be denied naturalization, and thereby forfeit the ownership of their homesteads. The situation was not improved by statements made by Anglophones such as Senator Bradbury that the removal of the enemy aliens from this land would be beneficial because "they are not producers to any great extent...."¹⁵³ Further encroachments on the rights of enemy aliens were in evidence during the late summer and fall of 1918. By Order-in-Council of August 5, every enemy alien over 16 was required to register with the closest Enemy Alien Registrar and report periodically thereafter to this authority.¹⁵⁴ On September 25, by Order-in-Council (P.C. 2381) publication of newspapers, or any printed matter in an 'enemy alien language' was absolutely prohibited without a licence from the Secretary of State.¹⁵⁵ The following languages were listed as enemy alien: "German,

Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Turkish, Roumanian, Russian, Ukrainian, Finnish, Estonian, Syrian, Croation, Ruthenian and Livonian".¹⁵⁶ Indications that the category of enemy alien had been extensively expanded was included in an accompanying Order-in-Council of the same date P.C. 2384. This enactment pertained to unlawful associations; six of the 14 associations were either Ukrainian or Russian. It was also stipulated that no meeting with the exception of religious services could be held in German, Austrian, Turkish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Russian, Ukrainian or Finnish. Violation of these regulations could result in a prison sentence (5 years), and/or a fine of \$5,000.¹⁵⁷ There was considerable outcry from the ethnic community over the two Orders-in-Council. The Ukrainians were particularly incensed that they should be placed in the same category as Germans; in fact the trauma was sufficient to bring six Ukrainian newspapers, despite their ideological differences, together into a common front - the Ukrainian Press Committee. The Chairman of the Committee, F. Dojacek, in October, 1918 made representation to Prime Minister Borden protesting against the suppression of Ukrainian newspapers.¹⁵⁸ With the end of the war, the Borden government was prepared to adopt a somewhat more conciliatory stance. By an Order-in-Council of November 13, (P.C. 2693) an amendment was provided whereby the Secretary of State was authorized to issue licences to enemy alien publications, "provided that a true translation

of all matter they contain is printed in parallel columns in either English or French".¹⁵⁹ Within a month, the major Ukrainian language papers were back in operation; by the Order-in-Council of April 9, 1919, P.C. 703, all restrictions were removed.¹⁶⁰ In contrast, German, Bulgarian, Turkish and Hungarian language newspapers were not allowed to circulate freely until January, 1920.¹⁶¹

The signing of the Armistice in November, 1918, did little to dissipate the intensity of Anglo-Canadian sentiment against the enemy alien. Four years of devastating warfare had changed the Anglo-Canadian image of the Germans. No longer were Germans regarded as the most desirable type of immigrants; the German had become the barbaric Hun. Negative feelings towards the Slavic enemy aliens were derived only in part from their status as belligerents. Anti-Slavic hostility stemmed primarily from the fact that many Anglo-Canadians obstinately believed that the Slavic nationalists in Western Canada had obstinately resisted assimilation. Anglo-Canadians feared that if the cultural pretensions of these alien groups were not firmly discouraged, the Balkanization of Western Canada would inevitably occur. The presence of the alien, both enemy and allied in the economic system also became a matter of great debate by the end of the war. The proposal that the enemy alien be subject to industrial conscription at a wage equal to that

received by the Canadian soldier (\$1.10 a day) had received support from both the G.W.V.A. and various employers. But whereas the G.W.V.A. saw the enemy alien as a cultural-national opponent, the employer tended to view the alien worker as an economic unit. As a result, throughout most of the war economic perspective predominated.

CHAPTER VII

¹Fifth Census of Canada, 1911 (Ottawa, 1913), vol. II, p. 367, (hereafter cited as Census of Canada). There were also 3,880 Turkish immigrants, ibid. It was estimated in 1918 that there were a total of 522,423 persons of German or Austrian origin. Canadian Annual Review, 1918 (Toronto, 1919), p. 529.

²Canadian Annual Review, 1915, p. 353.

³Ibid.

⁴Census of Prairie Provinces: Population and Agriculture, 1916 (Ottawa, 1918), pp. 220-222.

⁵Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (hereafter, Royal Commission B. & B., Book IV, (Ottawa, 1968), pp.

⁶Toronto Mail & Empire, May 14, 1914, Ed.

⁷Ottawa Free Press, Sept. 20, 1909, Ed.

⁸The visit to Canada of Baron von Nettlebladt in 1909 caused particular apprehension because of his previous role as the head of the German Secret Service in South Africa. Department of Militia and Defence Headquarters (hereafter D.N.D.), file C-655, 81, General Gwatkin, Records, Chief of the General Staff, to Captain B. White, Military Operations (hereafter M.O.) Branch, Whitehall, England, March 29, 1909; ibid., White to Gwatkin, April 13, 1909; ibid., C.E. Burns to Major Cladwell, April 19, 1909 ibid., Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia to Brigadier-General W.D. Otter, April 27, 1909.

⁹Cited, Ottawa Free Press, July 27, 1909; D.N.D., file C-655, General Gwatkin, to Captain White, Sept. 7, 1909.

¹⁰Cited Manitoba Free Press, Sept. 12, 1909.

¹¹ Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, Chapter 206, vol. IV, pp. 1-3.

¹² Canadian Gazette, Aug. 15, 1914, enclosed, D.N.D., C-965, #8. Prime Minister Borden indicated in his diary that in his interview with the Austro-Hungarian Consul, the Hapsburg representative spoke very reasonable as to the condition and reaction of the people (Austro-Hungarian nationals). Borden Diary, Aug. 12, 1914.

¹³ Canadian Annual Review, 1914, p. 282.

¹⁴ G. B. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (11 vols., London, 1927-1938).

¹⁵ The Canadian Ruthenian, Aug. 1, 1914, translated and cited in, Paul Yuzyk, The Ukrainians in Manitoba (Toronto, 1953), p. 187.

¹⁶ Manitoba Free Press, Aug. 5, 1914, Ed..

¹⁷ Ibid..

¹⁸ Winnipeg Telegram, Aug. 8, 1914, Ed..

¹⁹ In December, 1914 Dafoe indicated in a letter to Laurier that if a federal election was called, he believed that the Conservatives would launch "an appeal to National prejudices" and exploit the connection between the Dominion Liberal party and the foreign voters. John W. Dafoe Papers, Public Archives of Canada, (hereafter Dafoe Papers), Dafoe to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Dec. 8, 1914.

²⁰ Manitoba Free Press, Aug. 11, 1914, Ed.; ibid., Aug. 6, 1914, Ed.; ibid., Aug. 18, 1914, Ed; The Sentinel (Toronto, official publication of the Orange Lodge), Aug. 20, 1914, Ed.. Canadian Annual Review, 1914, pp. 278-279.

²¹ Ibid., p. 279; The Canadian Ruthenian, Aug. 6, 1914, Ed.. Dr. Alex Sushko, the editor of the paper also declared his own allegiance "to our new Fatherland".

²² Sir Robert Laird Borden Papers, (Public Archives of Canada, (hereafter, Borden Papers), 105962, J.A.M. Aikins to Prime Minister Borden, Aug. 31, 1914. At the time Aikins was regarded as one of Canada's outstanding lawyers; he was

President of the Canadian Bar Association 1914-29; he was the western solicitor of the C.P.R.; in 1915 he became the leader of the Manitoba Conservative party; in 1916, he became Lieutenant Governor of the province. W. Stewart Wallace (ed.), The Canadian Dictionary of Canadian Biography (Toronto, 1967), p. 4.

²³ Borden Papers, 105962, Aikins to Borden, Aug. 31, 1914.

²⁴ Ibid., 106322, Aikins to Borden, Nov. 12, 1914.

²⁵ Borden Papers, 106132, Arthur Meighen to Prime Minister Borden, Sept. 4, 1914. There were rumors that the Ukrainian-Ruthenian League in rural Manitoba were engaged in subversion. Commissioner Bowen Perry, R.N.W.M.P. to Comptroller, Ottawa, Oct. 13, 1914, Borden Papers, 106193.

²⁶ Ibid., 105989, Sir A.P. Sherwood to Loring Christie, Private Secretary, Prime Minister Borden, Sept. 4, 1914; ibid., 106354, Sherwood to Borden, Nov. 20, 1914; D.N.D., C-965, #2, Sherwood to Major-General Gwatkin, Chief General Staff, Sept. 25, 1914.

²⁷ D.N.D., C-965, #2, Lt. Col. W.M. Gartshore to Prime Minister Borden, Oct. 14, 1914.

²⁸ Ibid., Report of Agent, Tacoma Washington, to Chief Naval Officer, Esquimalt, B.C., Oct. 7, 1914; ibid., John McKee, Brooklyn, N.Y., to J.D. Hazen, Acting Minister of Militia & Defence, Oct. 19, 1914.

²⁹ Ibid., Report J.D. Sisler, Agent, Chicago, Aug. 9, 1914.

³⁰ Ibid., British Ambassador, Washington, to Governor General, Duke of Connaught, Sept. 3, 1914.

³¹ Ibid., Prime Minister Borden to J.D. Hazen, Acting Minister of Militia & Defence, Sept. 14, 1914.

³² Fraternal organizations such as the German Athletic Association which held a convention in Buffalo, N.Y., in 1916 were particularly suspected of subversive activity. Ibid., Lt. Col. J.S. Campbell, St. Catharines to Lt. Col. H.C. Sickford, Niagara-on-the-Lake, July 2, 1916.

³³ Ibid., #14, Prime Minister Borden to Major-General Gwatkin, May 8, 1916; ibid., War Office, London, to Governor General, Duke of Connaught, cyphered telegram, May 9, 1916.

³⁴ Ibid., #9, C.W. Bennett, Consul General, New York City, to Governor General, July 8, 1915; ibid., British Consul General, San Francisco, memorandum, to British Embassy, Washington, Oct. 25, 1916.

³⁵ Ibid., #2, Judge C.R. Fitch, Fort Frances, Ont., to Judge Coatsworth, Toronto, Dec. 18, 1914.

³⁶ Ibid., #9, P.J. Keenan, Admiral, Sask., to Governor General, July 26, 1915; ibid., Surgeon-General, Deputy Minister of Defence, to Sir A.P. Sherwood, Aug. 8, 1915; ibid., British Consulate-General, San Francisco, memorandum, British Embassy, Washington, Oct. 25, 1916; ibid., Agent, #16, San Diego, to Secretary of the Militia Council, March 10, 1916; ibid..

³⁷ Borden Papers, 106690, Eugene Fiset to Commissioner of Customs, April 2, 1916.

³⁸ D.N.D., C-965, #20, Sir A.P. Sherwood to Major-General W.D. Otter, March 8, 1916.

³⁹ Ibid., #3-10, in passim.

⁴⁰ Canadian Annual Review, 1914, p. 278; Major-General W.D. Otter, Internment Operations, 1914-20, (Ottawa, Sept. 30, 1920), p. 3.

⁴¹ Borden Papers, 56666, C.H. Cahan to C.J. Doherty, Sept. 14, 1918.

⁴² Canadian Annual Review, 1916 (Toronto, 1917), p. 433.

⁴³ Borden Papers, 56666, Cahan to Doherty, Sept. 14, 1918; Otter, Internment Operations, p. 6.

⁴⁴ Otter, Internment Operations, p. 6.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 6, 12.

⁴⁶ D.N.D., #8-9, in passim.

⁴⁷ Ibid., #21, A Soldier's Mother, Midland, Ontario, to Prime Minister Borden, May 28, 1917.

⁴⁸ Ibid., #17, in passim.

⁴⁹ Canadian Annual Review, 1914, p. 278.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 286; ibid., 1915, pp. 363-64.

⁵¹ D.N.D., C-965, #15, William Carr, Parry Sound to the Minister of Department of National Defence, Sir Sam Hughes, March 6, 1916; ibid., J. Albert Moore, Army and Navy Board, Methodist Church, Toronto, to Sir Sam Hughes.

⁵² Ibid., #24, Report of Agent #50, Dec. 30, 1917.

⁵³ Ibid., Ten of the Lutheran Churches were German, eight were Scandinavian.

⁵⁴ Ibid., Prime Minister Borden received numerous reports concerning Lutheran ministers attempting to raise money for the German war effort.

⁵⁵ Herbert Karl Kalbfleisch, The History of the Pioneer German Language Press of Ontario (Toronto, 1968), pp. 105-114; Manitoba Free Press, Sept. 21, 1914, Ed. W. Enz, "German-Language Newspapers of Manitoba before World War I," Canadian Ethnic Studies, vol. II, Dec. 1970, pp. 61-65.

⁵⁶ Manitoba Free Press, Oct. 25, 1914, Ed.

⁵⁷ Secretary of State Papers, Chief Press Censor Branch, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter, C.P.C.), 104-2, vol. 150, Deputy Minister of Militia & Defence, to Deputy Minister of Justice, Feb. 27, 1915.

⁵⁸ Col. Chambers had been the former proprietor of the Calgary Herald (1888-89), and the editor of the Canadian Parliamentary Guide; W. Stewart Wallace, Dictionary of Canadian Biography, p. 128.

⁵⁹ C.P.C., 196-1, vol. 43. J. Fred Livesay had previously been manager of the Western Associated Press Ltd.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 195-2, vol. 157, Col. Chambers to District Intelligence Officer, Victoria, Oct. 29, 1918. When a newspaper was deemed dangerous, the Secretary of State, acting upon a report prepared by Col. Chambers, issued instructions to the Deputy Postmaster General to deny the newspaper the use of the mails. D.N.D., C-965, file, 2022, Chambers to Assistant Director, Military Intelligence, Aug. 6, 1917.

⁶¹ C.P.C., vol. 157, Secret memorandum for Foreign newspaper publishers,

⁶² Ibid., 119-N-1, #1, Col. Chambers to J.W. Dafoe, Sept. 13, 1915.

⁶³ Ibid., 119-C-1, vol. 19, Col. Chambers to Fred Livesay, Feb. 7, 1916; ibid., Chambers to Major-General Gwatkin, Aug. 29, 1918.

⁶⁴ Robert Park, The Immigrant Press and Its Control (New York, 1922), p. 390. The presence of some 20 million Germans in the United States, served by 532 German-language newspapers, made this organization appear very menacing.

⁶⁵ D.N.D., C-965, #0, Bonar Law, Colonial Secretary to Governor General, July 1, 1915.

⁶⁶ Arthur Meighen, the Solicitor-General had vigorously pushed for the suppression of the Herold in July, 1915. C.P.C., 119-A-1, vol. 18, Arthur Meighen to Charles J. Doherty, Minister of Justice, July 13, 1915.

⁶⁷ Ibid., Col. Chambers to R.M. Coulter, Deputy Postmaster-General, Dec. 27, 1915.

⁶⁸ Ibid., vol. 157, Einard Finstand, editor of the Canada Skandinaven (Vanc.) to Fred Livesay, Western Press Censor, Jan. 13, 1916. Although Finstand represented just one newspaper, his viewpoint was accepted by most ethnic newspaper editors. Canadian Annual Review, 1916, p. 433.

⁶⁹ Borden Papers, DC, 454, (1), G.L. Maron to Col. E.J. Chambers, Sept. 13, 1918.

⁷⁰ Der Courier, Oct. 4, 1916, translation enclosed, C.P.C., 119-C-E, vol. 19.

- 71 Der Courier, Aug. 16, 1916, Ibid..
- 72 Ibid., Col. Chambers to C.E. Eymann, Nov. 24, 1915.
- 73 Ibid., Chambers to Eymann, Nov. 10, 1915.
- 74 Ibid., Chambers to Secretary of State, Martin Burrell, Jan. 11, 1918.
- 75 Ibid., Chambers to Fred Livesay, Feb. 7, 1916.
- 76 Ibid., R.B. Bennett, M.P. Calgary, to Chambers, May 26, 1917.
- 77 Arthur May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 428.
- 78 C.P.C., 196-2, vol. 43, Col. Chambers to the editor of the Canadian Ruthenian, Aug. 15, 1915.
- 79 This matter was discussed in chapter seven.
- 80 C.P.C., 144C-144B, Aims of the Ukrainian National Committee. The Ukrainian-Language Newspaper Narodna Wola (The People's Will), Published in Scranton, Pa. was another major exponent of this separate Ukrainian state.
- 81 Manitoba Free Press, Feb. 3, 1916, Ed..
- 82 J.W. Dafoe, "The Press As a Factor in the Formation of Public Opinion", Addresses to The Canadian Club of Winnipeg, 1915, (Winnipeg, 1915), pp. 62-64.
- 83 Dafoe Papers, Clifford Sifton to J.W. Dafoe, May 18, 1915.
- 84 Previously the Liberal party had equivocated on the educational issue for fear of losing the ethnic vote. C.W. Gordon, Postscript to Adventure: An Autobiography of Ralph Connor (New York, 1938), p. 163.
- 85 Manitoba Free Press, Feb. 29, 1916, p. 1.

⁸⁶ Ibid., March 1, 1916, p. 10. According to Dr. Thornton there were 126 French bilingual schools, 61 German and 111 Ruthenian and Polish. ibid., Jan. 13, 1916, p. 8.

⁸⁷ Ibid., June 20, 1916, Ed..

⁸⁸ Ibid., May 18, 1916, Ed..

⁸⁹ Ibid., Feb. 7, 1916; Ed.; ibid., Feb. 17, 1916, Ed..

⁹⁰ Ibid., March 8, 1916.

⁹¹ A. Dojacek had been a colporteur in the Methodist Church prior to the war; he was regarded by the Western Press Censor as a man "devoted to the propagation of a loyal and broad Canadian nationality". C.P.C., 196-44, Fred Livesay to Col. Chambers, Nov. 20, 1915. Paul Crath provides an example of a second generation Ukrainian-Canadian who went through the Canadianization process sponsored by the Presbyterian Church: he attended Manitoba College, and upon graduation, a position of translator was secured for him. C.P.C., 144-F-1, vol. 28, Livesay to Chambers, March 3, 1916.

⁹² Ibid., 196-2, vol. 44, Livesay to Chambers, April 7, 1916; ibid., Livesay to Chambers, April 27, 1916.

⁹³ Manitoba Free Press, Feb. 29, 1916, Ed..

⁹⁴ Ibid., Jan. 31, 1916.

⁹⁵ Northwest Review (Wpg.), Feb. 26, 1916, p. 1.

⁹⁶ Manitoba Free Press, March 1, 1916, p. 1.

⁹⁷ Col. Chambers in a letter to F.E. Davis, Assistant Director of Military Intelligence, Militia Headquarters, Ottawa, June 16, 1916 called for Budka's immediate arrest.

⁹⁸ Manitoba Free Press, March 2, 1916, Ed..

⁹⁹ C.P.C., 196-1, vol. 43, J. Petrushevich to Col. Chambers, April 3, 1916.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 144-F, vol. 28, Col. Chambers to Fred Livesay, Feb. 23, 1916; ibid., 196-4, vol. 44, Fred-Livesay to E.J. Boak, March 30, 1916.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 196-4, vol. 44, Fred Livesay to Col. Chambers, May 1, 1916; Livesay to Chambers, July 12, 1916.

¹⁰² Ibid.. The fact that Zarebko had been naturalized was cited as one reason for his apparent belief that he would not be interned.

¹⁰³ Ukrainian Voice, May 24, 1916, cited, Manitoba Free Press, June 20, 1916.

¹⁰⁴ Manitoba Free Press, June 20, 1916, Ed..

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., Jan. 18, 1916; ibid., Jan. 24, 1916.

¹⁰⁶ C.P.C., 144-A-1, vol. 27, Col. Chambers to Livesay, Jan. 3, 1916; ibid., Chambers to Orest Zarebko, July 8, 1916.

¹⁰⁷ Canadian Annual Review, 1918, p. 688.

¹⁰⁸ Laurier Papers, Sir Wilfrid Laurier to John W. Daffoe, April 66, 1917, cited, Ramsay Cook, "Daffoe, Laurier, and the Formation of Union Government", Canadian Historical Review, XLii (3), Sept., 1961, p. 26.

¹⁰⁹ Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1917 (Ottawa, 1917), p. 462.

¹¹⁰ Calgary Herald, June 18, 1917, Ed., cited, L.G. Thomas, The Liberal Party in Alberta, (Toronto, 1959), p. 176.

¹¹¹ Borden Papers, 123090, Edward Michener, to Prime Minister Borden, June 11, 1917.

¹¹² Parliamentary Guide, 1917, pp. 476-496.

¹¹³ Borden Papers, 123112, Duncan McKellar to Prime Minister Borden, July 4, 1917.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 123132. Memorandum on the Saskatchewan provincial election, 1917.

115 C.P.C., 196-2, Fred Livesay to Colonel Chambers, Sept. 3, 1916.

116 Winnipeg Telegram, July 11, 1917.

117 Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (hereafter cited as Debates), 1917, p. 1862.

118 Joseph Boudreau, "The Enemy Alien Problem in Canada, 1914-21, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of History, University of California, 19 . It is also noteworthy that in the spring of 1917 W.F. O'Connor, Borden's legal adviser, drafted several franchise bills, one of which included a literacy test. ibid., p. 81.

119 Ramsay Cook, "Dafoe, Laurier and the Formation of the Unionist Government", pp. 26-30.

120 The Brandon constituency was one notable example of such political manoeuvring. Dafoe Papers, J.W. Dafoe to Clifford Sifton, Oct. 5, 1917.

121 Borden Papers, Meighan to Prime Minister Borden, Oct. 17, 1916, 33498.

122 Debates, 1917, p. 5585.

123 Statutes of Canada, 1917, 7-8 George V, c.39, s. 154.

124 Ibid..

125 Borden Papers, 123136, J.H. Buchanan to Prime Minister Borden, July 3, 1917.

126 Dafoe Papers, J.G. Turriff, to Dafoe, Sept. 5, 1917.

127 Sifton Papers, Clifford Sifton to J.W. Dafoe, Sept. 7, 1917.

128 Manitoba Free Press, Sept. 13, 1917, Ed..

129 Ibid., Dec. 21, 1917, Ed..

130 Edmonton Bulletin, Dec. 19, Ed..

- 131 Borden Papers, 123146, Mennonite Bishops, Ontario to W.G. Weichel, M.P., Waterloo, July 14, 1917, enclosed letter C.J. Doherty, Minister of Justice to Borden, July 20, 1917.
- 132 Sifton Papers, Peter Makaroff to Arthur Meighen, enclosed in letter, Meighen to Clifford Sifton, Sept. 6, 1917.
- 133 Borden Papers, 124006, Bishop Budka to Prime Minister Borden, June 19, 1917.
- 134 Paul Yuzyk, The Ukrainians in Manitoba, pp. 187-88.
- 135 Borden Papers, , M.A. Kremar, Edmonton, to R. B. Bennett, Nov. 24, 1916.
- 136 D.N.D., C-965, #20, Officer Commanding Military District # 13 (Alberta), to Secretary, Militia Council, Dec. 23, 1916;
- 137 Borden Papers, RLB, 995, in passim.
- 138 Manitoba Free Press,
- 139 The Canadian Ruthenian, Dec. 10, 1917, p. 8.
- 140 Meighen Papers, 0002340-43, H.A. Mackie, to Prime Minister Borden, Oct. 4, 1918.
- 141 Ibid., 000242, G.W. Allan (Wpg. South) to H.A. Mackie, Oct. 21, 1918; ibid., 000235, Dr. Blake (Wpg. North), to Mackie, Oct. 6, 1918; ibid., 000236, G.W. Andrews (Wpg. Centre), to Mackie, Oct. 7, 1918.
- 142 Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada, 1918, p. 435.
- 143 Borden Papers, 54538-42, Arthur Meighen, to Borden, Feb. 1, 1919.
- 144 Joseph Boudreau, "The Enemy Alien Problem in Canada", p. 31.

145 Canadian Annual Review, 1915, pp. 355-56; Fairplay, Feb. 19, 1916, p. 10.

146 Robithyche Slovo, April 21, 1917. C.P.C.-144-12, vol. 29.

147 Canadian Annual Review, 1918, pp. 585-87.

148 Ibid., Borden Papers, 134936, G.W.V.A. to Borden, March 27, 1918.

149 Borden Papers, 134936, G.W.V.A. to Borden, March 27, 1918. Borden indicated in his Diary that "the Resolutions presented to us [by the G.W.V.A.] did not indicate a high order of intelligence". Borden Diary, Public Archives of Canada, March 26, 1918.

150 Borden Papers, 132971, T.A. Wroughton, Supt. 'G' Division, Alberta, to Commissioner Perry, Feb. 15, 1918; ibid., 132963, A.P. Sherwood, Chief Commissioner of the Dominion Police, to Comptroller R.N.W.M.P., Feb. 11, 1918.

151 Borden Papers, 132971, E. Effenberger, R.N.W.M.P. Constable to Supt. Wroughton, Feb. 18, 1918; ibid., 132974, Copy Speech, Feb. 20, 1918.

152 Statutes of Canada (1918), 9-10 George V, c.19, s.7.

153 Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada, 1918, p. 441.

154 Borden Papers, 56667-69, C.H. Cahan to C.J. Doherty Minister of Justice, Sept. 14, 1918; Canadian Annual Review, 1918, p. 580.

155 Order-in-Council, P.C. 2381- September 25, 1918. Statutes of Canada (1919), 10-11 George V, p. Ixxi-Ixxii.

156 Ibid.

157 Order-in-Council, P.C. 2384, September 25, Ibid., Ixxvii-Ixxx. According to William Rodney, Soldiers of The International (Toronto, 1968), p. 18, P.C. 2384 was issued on September 27.

158 Borden Papers, 48158, F. Dojacek, Ukrainian Press Committee, Oct. 22, 1918; Paul Yuzyk, Ukrainians in Manitoba, p. 188.

159 Order-in-Council, P.C. 2693, Statutes of Canada (1919), Ixxiii; C.P.C., File 364, vol. 164, Col. Chambers, Chief Press Censor, S.N. Curtiss, Manager, Pacific Press Publishing Association, Dec. 13, 1918.

160 C.P.C., File 364, vol. 164, List of enemy publications receiving licenses.

161 Herbert Kalbfleisch, History of German Language Press, p. 112.



CHAPTER VIII

THE ALIEN AND THE CANADIAN ECONOMY, 1914-18

The economic aspects of the enemy alien problem during the war were of immense importance in understanding the intensity of Anglo-Canadian anti-alien sentiment in 1919. The issue was related to both the nature of the Canadian economic system, which was predicated upon the availability of abundant, cheap labour, and to the additional demand for labour created by the war. The economic rights of the aliens became a subject of national debate. During 1914-15, the controversy centred around two main issues: were enemy aliens to be allowed to hold jobs that deprived Anglo-Canadians and 'loyal' aliens of work; were enemy aliens to be permitted to occupy positions which offered opportunities for subversion? By 1916-17, the war effort had absorbed all available manpower supplies; a new complexion had been cast on the issue. Now the question was asked: should aliens, both enemy and allied, be allowed to refuse work; should they be permitted to strike? In addition, there was strong pressure exerted on the Canadian government to sanction the importation of labour from the

United States and from the Orient. And by 1917 another variable had been added; the impact of the Russian Revolution, and the spread of 'Bolshevist' ideas within Canada.

One of the earliest indications that war would have an appreciable impact upon the Canadian economic system came in 1913 with the outbreak of the Balkan War. It was reported that large numbers of Bulgarian navvies were preparing to return to their homeland after receiving news of war. According to the Christian Guardian, ". . . nearly three thousand have quit work on the National Transcontinental, and it is freely predicted that the exodus would mean a year's delay in the completion of the work". Similar manpower shortages were reported by the Canadian Northern and the Canadian Pacific.¹ But if the Balkan War had produced a delay in railway construction its effects were minor as compared to the virtual cessation of railway construction caused by the outbreak of the First World War.

In many ways the immediate economic impact of the war in 1914 was quite opposite from that of 1913; there was now a surfeit of unskilled foreign labour available, rather than a shortage.² Moreover, in combination with the unemployment that affected thousands of these 'foreigners', many of whom

were designated as 'enemy aliens', there was overt discrimination directed against them. Large numbers were dismissed from their jobs for 'patriotic reasons'.³ The presence of large numbers of idle, impoverished aliens in itself presented a threat to national security and to local law and order.

Throughout the first year of the war, concern was expressed about the plight of the unemployed railway navvies. Thomas Shaughnessy, President of the C.P.R. was sufficiently concerned about the difficult situation of these men, for both humanitarian and security reasons, to recommend large scale internment of unemployed enemy aliens.⁴ Senator Hewitt Bostock, a wealthy British Columbia rancher, and proprietor of the Vancouver Province suggested the internment of unemployed navvies as a security precaution. He claimed that immediate action was vital in British Columbia where there was the possibility of destruction of railway property from "these Austrian . . . Tramps".⁵

The government reaction to these suggestions of mass internment was cool. The desire to be fair to enemy aliens, the prohibitive cost of confinement, and the spectre of creating an idle, dependant class supported by public funds; all these considerations acted as deterrents. For politicians such as Arthur Meighen, a much better policy would be to grant

every unemployed alien 40 acres of land which could be cultivated under government supervision: "These Austrians are workers as a rule and those I know would jump at the chance to acquire a small piece of land. They can live on very little".⁶ Although this particular proposal was not implemented government policy was formulated on the premise that the enemy alien "must be allowed to seek work".⁷ However, as the war continued, it became more and more difficult to prevent economic discrimination from being applied against immigrants from the domains of the Central Powers.

The treatment of the enemy alien in the mining industry illustrated the trend that applied in most sectors of the economy. In the early stages of the war a conciliatory attitude was adopted by both management and labour organizations. The Canadian Mining Journal in August, 1914, noted that though a large percentage of the miners in the country were of Austro-Hungarian or German background, "many of them were well pleased with conditions in America and are out of sympathy with the military madness of Germany".⁸ Mining companies were asked to show consideration for those enemy aliens who appeared loyal by allowing them to retain their jobs. The Journal also suggested that allied alien employees, especially Russians, Roumanians, and Finns, should be afforded

every opportunity of returning to Europe to fight. The Journal urged the mining companies to assure allied alien miners wishing to return overseas that "they should be given first consideration when men are wanted after the war".⁹

In many mining communities there was strong resentment shown towards companies employing enemy aliens in preference to Anglo-Saxon miners or aliens from allied countries. A representative for the Dominion Steel Corporation at Glace Bay complained to the Dominion Police that county constables had attempted to intimidate a number of enemy alien employees of his company.¹⁰ The Dominion Steel official hastened to add that the enemy alien miners had caused no trouble and that the disturbance was due entirely to Anglo-Canadian agitators.¹¹ It is significant that both the Dominion Steel Corporation and the Dominion Coal Company were very much committed to the idea of using enemy aliens despite intense local criticism voiced by the Sydney Daily Post that these workers "should be behind barbed wire", rather than being coddled by the large corporations.¹² The Solicitor of the Dominion Coal Company, Hector McInnes, informed the Borden government that although his company was intensely patriotic, it had to employ enemy alien miners in order to maintain full production. A major problem was the scarcity of men who would undertake the rough, dirty

jobs: "our Lower Province people will not do it. . . ."13

Resentment against the employment of enemy alien miners was even more pronounced in northern Ontario. The presence of German entrepreneurs was linked with the privileges extended to the enemy alien miners.¹⁴ One Anglo-Canadian from Porcupine, Ontario expressed a fairly widespread opinion in a letter to the Toronto Globe:

Why is it that so many alien enemies are employed and British workmen cannot get work? Why is it that so many alien enemies do not find it at all necessary to keep their opinions to themselves, but openly and loudly proclaim their pro-German sympathies?

The arrogance of these alien enemies has received no check from the authorities . . . Can it be because the management of the mines, from which the community derives its living is pro-German . . .¹⁵

In this region patriotic considerations were also brought to bear in considering the enemy alien problem. The Northern Miner (Cobalt) linked the failure to intern the enemy alien, with the unenthusiastic response of other loyal mine workers towards military recruitment. "When British citizens go away to fight, their places are filled by Austrians and other alien enemies, [this] has great weight with the man underground".¹⁶ The paper also demanded that alien enemies not be appointed to positions vacated by Italian Reservists returning to their homeland warning that "nothing could

militate more against recruiting".¹⁷ There were also reports that certain enemy aliens had threatened allied aliens who had expressed willingness to enlist in the Canadian forces.¹⁸ However, the most vivid illustration of hostile relations between enemy and allied miners occurred in the Crow's Nest Pass mining region.

In June, 1915, allied miners at Hillcrest, Alberta held a public meeting and proclaimed in a strongly worded motion: "We, as workers, absolutely refuse to work with the Alien enemy".¹⁹ In his report on the incident one military official warned, "this cannot be considered as a local question at all as the whole of the Crow's Nest Pass will be affected by the action taken in this case, if not the whole Dominion".²⁰

From the perspective of the allied miners there were a number of factors underlying the belligerent attitude towards the enemy alien miners. The war itself had fanned the latent distrust of the Anglo-Canadian miner against the foreigner to an even greater degree. Ethnic rivalry was intensified among Italians, Russians and other allied aliens and enemy aliens such as Germans and Ukrainians. Furthermore, the economic slump in the western coal mining industry had caused high unemployment. There was also great anxiety that an enemy alien saboteur would plant an explosive in the mines. This

fear was most intense at Hillcrest where in June, 1914, a mine explosion had killed 236 men.²¹

Throughout the controversy the Crow's Nest Coal Company refused to dismiss their enemy alien employees arguing that these men had proven themselves to be efficient and reliable workers. The Company also claimed that if these men were dismissed the situation would become even more dangerous in that "a starving man is liable to do something desperate"²² Faced by this pro-enemy alien stance, in June, 1915, the 'loyal' miners threatened to strike. It was significant that the enemy alien miners attempted to assure the allied workers that: "reports of alleged incendiary activities were groundless; and that the great majority of enemy aliens were naturalized Canadians".²³ Indeed, workers suggested that they were prepared to accept citizenship as a criteria for employment. Eventually a compromise solution was reached. All married enemy aliens were taken back on the job, and unmarried ones were to receive work when it was available.²⁴ But internment of these miners remained a distinct possibility.

The unsympathetic position towards the plight of the enemy alien by certain mine union executives was given little prominence in the deliberations of the Trades and Labor Congress. The majority of the T.L.C. delegates were not distress-

sed by the 'patriotic' dismissals. The 1915 Convention was content to pass motions demanding that various levels of government adopt measures to ameliorate the effects of this 'forced' unemployment.²⁵ A resolution submitted by the London T.L.C. proposed that the unemployed Central European workers should be encouraged by the Ontario government through homestead grants and financial aid to settle in Northern Ontario. Attention was drawn to the fact that many immigrants had come originally to Canada as agriculturalists and it was only because they lacked capital that these men had gravitated into the cities and the industrial labour market. The matter could be rectified, however, by taking advantage of "a strong and industrious agricultural people" to develop the uncultivated and harsh lands of "New Ontario".²⁶ In many ways, the paternalistic outlook, of the eastern craft unionists, 'the labour aristocracy' was similar to that of entrepreneurs such as Thomas Shaughnessy and politicians such as Arthur Meighen.²⁷

In other areas of Canadian society, enemy aliens experienced overt economic and social discrimination, especially after the Parliament Building fire of February, 1916. The tense situation was not improved by public statements from men such as G. W. Brown, Lieutenant-Governor of Saskatchewan that the enemy aliens in western Canada "made little secret of

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their desire to see the flag of Germany waving over the Canadian West".²⁸ A public campaign was launched aimed at removing all enemy aliens from the public service. Such organizations as the Toronto Board of Trade, and various other patriotic bodies gave this movement their support.²⁹ The British government expressed its concern over the threat to imperial security posed by aliens in responsible positions; in 1916, bowing to these pressures the Borden government substantially reduced the number of enemy aliens in the public service.³⁰

At the same time that measures were being taken to bar enemy aliens from positions of responsibility in the civil service, there was a growing demand for unskilled workers in both the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy. Between 1915-18 extraordinary efforts were made to mobilize all the available manpower in Canada for 'essential' war production. Additional workers were recruited in the United States particularly to help with the harvest of the wheat crop in western Canada. In the pre-war years a nationwide publicity program promising high wages, and low rail fares had encouraged thousands of eastern and western Canadian city workers to help.³¹

The enormous importance of wheat production to the

allied war effort caused harvest labour to be regarded as one of the most important services a non-combatant could perform. In June, 1915, Sir Herbert Ames, a prominent Montreal conservative, actually suggested, in a letter to Martin Burrell, Minister of Agriculture, that "an 'industrial army' be recruited for two months' service. They might be badged and organized into companies and sent up west under discipline [sic]. . . . If you advertise that such action would be accepted in lieu of military service and that to get in the crop will be to help Canada and the Empire, I believe you could secure many sixty-day recruits".³²

Early in the war, the harvest excursions were also regarded as a means of encouraging large numbers of unemployed aliens to settle on the land; in 1915, the British Columbia government, faced with 6,000 unemployed in Vancouver, evinced great interest in having large numbers of those men go to the prairie provinces as harvesters.³³ The response from the governments of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba was not enthusiastic.³⁴ In fact, the Alberta Minister of Agriculture indicated that his province did not want any labour from the coast province: not only did he feel that there was a possibility of a serious welfare problem developing after the harvesting was completed; but also that large numbers of these

men were believed to be "industrial workers of the world [sic] hindoes [sic] and other undesirables".³⁵ Eventually a compromise was reached whereby each provincial government sent representatives to Vancouver to screen the prospective harvesters.

Again in 1916, the governments of the prairie provinces faced an acute shortage of harvest labour. The manpower inventory conducted by the Immigration Branch in the summer of 1916 revealed that even by taking certain industrial workers from their jobs during the harvest, the supply would fall short of the demand.³⁶ As a result, government officials sought to lure harvesters from the United States. Advertisements were placed in American newspapers urging Americans to look northward for additional employment: "CANADA WANTS 40,000 HARVEST HANDS. When your crop is harvested, help your Canadian neighbour".³⁷ Instructions were given to Canadian Immigration agents that the money qualifications of the Immigration Act were to be relaxed, and every effort was to be made to facilitate the entry of American harvesters. By the end of September, some 4,055 Americans had crossed into Canada, attracted by the generous wages (\$3.00 per day), and the cheap (1¢ per mile) rail fare from border points.³⁸

The entry of American harvesters in large numbers

throughout 1916-17 was not regarded favourably by all government officials. Those men responsible for security, such as the Major-General Fiset, the Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence, pointed out in 1916 the possibility "that a most dangerous element may be introduced into [sic] our communities. . . ."39 Particular concern was manifest that members of the Industrial Workers of the World would take advantage of the opportunity "to go to Canada to burn crops or destroy property".40

The basis for this fear of I.W.W. harvesters was primarily related to the rapid growth of the Agricultural Workers' Association (A.W.O.) a branch of the I.W.W. "composed of all local unions whose members worked in the agricultural districts of the United States and Canada".41 The success of the I.W.W. in organizing the migratory agricultural labourers who were generally acknowledged to be the most wretched and racially diverse group of workers, stunned farmer capitalists.42 Because farmers throughout the United States were extremely prosperous due to the flood of war-time orders, the A.W.O. was able to achieve its immediate goals of improved conditions for a rapidly expanding membership.43 However, the hostility against the I.W.W. on the part of farmers also adversely affected the A.W.O. Farmers throughout the grain belt began to

form vigilante committees to terrorize I.W.W. organizers.⁴⁴ In addition, a sustained propaganda campaign was launched against the Wobblies accusing them of being violent anarchists working in league with the German government. It is significant that Canadian farmers and government officials tended to accept uncritically these charges levelled at the I.W.W. in the United States.⁴⁵

During 1916, there was ample evidence of Canadian security efforts to detect I.W.W. agents in western Canada. The provincial police forces, the R.N.W.M.P. and the Immigration authorities were alerted to watch the border. The Immigration Commissioner, in Winnipeg, J. Bruce Walker, sent an immigration inspector into North Dakota to establish contact with American law enforcement personnel and receive information about local I.W.W. workers who might attempt to come to Canada.⁴⁶ By September, 1917, Walker was able to inform his superiors that Immigration officers, working in conjunction with the R.N.W.M.P., had been able to effectively exclude I.W.W. workers. Walker also indicated that "our legal action in these cases has not rested upon very solid foundation, yet we have prevented any serious number of the members of this organization from entering the country".⁴⁷ This extra-legal activity was encouraged by instructions which Superintendent

Scott had issued earlier in the year: "the fact that a man belongs to the I.W.W. is not in itself sufficient to absolutely debar his entry to this country and of course it could not be sufficient to bring about his deportation. However, there are usually other features connected with the majority of these cases which enable us to deal with them. . . ."⁴⁸ Undesirable persons were rejected on the basis of lack of sufficient funds, non-direct passage, or some other technicality.

Those members of the I.W.W. that escaped detection at the border were usually treated harshly when they were apprehended later. In October, 1917 the Saskatchewan Provincial Police arrested five suspected I.W.W. organizers who had attempted "to stir up trouble amongst the other farm labourers in that district (Yorkton) [and] tried to get every workman to join them to strike for higher wages".⁴⁹ However, the charge laid against these men was not seditious conspiracy or even causing a public disturbance; they were found guilty of a violation under Section 33 of the Immigration Act which pertained to illegal entry. They were also found guilty of violating Section 41, which provided for the deportation of anyone "who by word or act create or attempt to create public disorder in Canada".⁵⁰ As a result, these men were sentenced to a thirty-day jail term with deportation upon release.⁵¹

By the spring of 1918 I.W.W. efforts to organize farm labour appeared to have failed. In April, 1918, the superintendent of the Saskatchewan Provincial Police informed Colonel Sherwood that "this organization appears to be unknown in Saskatchewan".⁵² Similar reports were received pertaining to Manitoba and Alberta.

The mobilization of sufficient industrial labour to meet the demands of increased production presented a tremendous challenge to the Dominion government during the war years. The government was vitally interested in recruiting extra labour and ensuring that industrial strikes did not paralyze the war effort. As a result, Dominion authorities became even more alarmed over the infiltration of I.W.W. and socialist agitators, especially into those industries with a high percentage of foreign workers.

By 1916, burgeoning Canadian industries were looking towards the United States to augment the national labour force. In response to war time priorities the Immigration Branch and the Department of Labour were very lenient in applying the restrictions set down in the Alien Labour Law.⁵³ But by allowing Canadian businessmen to actively recruit American labour, and thus intimidate Canadian employees with the threat of dismissal, the Dominion government became increasingly

unpopular with Canadian workers. As a result, the government made an attempt to supervise the labour relations of companies which had been allowed to import large numbers of American workers. Guide-lines were established stating that American labour should be recruited only if Canadian workers could not be located. There was to be no international recruitment during a legal strike. When it became apparent that companies, such as the Canadian Steel Foundries⁵⁴ (Welland), and the Algoma Steel Corporation (Sault Ste. Marie) had been dismissing Canadian employees while importing Americans, severe reprimands were issued.⁵⁵ However, Sir Joseph Flavelle, Director of the Imperial Munitions Board, took exception to this harassment of 'essential' industries. On several occasions he stressed the need to maintain a high level of production and argued that American labour was essential in achieving this goal.⁵⁶

With the entry of the United States into World War I, in April, 1917, the supply of industrial labour from south of the border was substantially reduced. As a result, an alternative source of manpower was now required, especially since it was estimated that Canada would face a shortage of 100,000 workers in 1918.⁵⁷ In the search for a solution to the problem, it is not surprising that Canadian agricultural and industrial

interests should have approached the Dominion government to allow Oriental labour to enter the country.⁵⁸ In January, 1918, a direct proposal for Chinese immigration emanated from the British Columbia Fruit Growers' Association that "the only possible adequate supply of labour under existing conditions is Oriental. . . ." ⁵⁹ It was also emphasized that the Chinese would be brought into Canada as indentured labourers only on a temporary basis; after the war they would be returned to China. Favourable references were made to the French experience of using indentured Chinese coolie labour during the war; in fact, it was pointed out that most of the Chinese bound for France were actually transported by rail across Canada.⁶⁰

The argument was also advanced that the war-time labour market enabled Chinese to improve dramatically their financial position in British Columbia. It was alleged that by demanding exorbitant wages the Chinese agricultural worker soon had enough money to buy land. Moreover, the Chinese farmer, by being able to secure labour from his Chinese compatriots more cheaply than could the white farmer, was able to consistently undersell his white competitor. The increase in the number of Orientals owning farm land was offered as clear evidence of this trend.⁶¹

These arguments for additional Chinese immigration found few adherents in the province. There was widespread opposition to the scheme, especially from organized labour. The British Columbia Federationist claimed that the British Columbia Fruit Growers' Association was the tool of the "Big Interests" whose ultimate intention was "to replace white men in coal mining, metal mining, lumbering, logging, shipbuilding . . . in every line of business in which the Big Interests of the country are represented".⁶² The plot was "nation-wide"; the means of achieving success was the Unionist government whose election was engineered by "the Big Interests". The Federationist maintained that as soon as "the deal" was completed the vanguard of 17,000 Chinese coolies held at the Williams Head Quarantine Station would "flood Western Canada".⁶³

Despite the pressure from various elements of the agricultural and business community the Borden government recognized the dangerous implications of large scale Oriental immigration.⁶⁴ In fact, the Federationist made reference to previous incidents involving Oriental immigration when "the streets of Vancouver ran with blood".⁶⁵ Veterans' organizations in Vancouver had adopted an uncompromising stance and there was evidence that they would offer forcible resistance to the prospect of "a yellow Canada as far east as Winnipeg".⁶⁶

By early February, the official representation of the Trades and Labor Congress, and the President of the British Columbia Federation of Labour, V. R. Midgley, had received official assurance from Prime Minister Borden that no indentured Chinese labourers would be allowed into Canada until all other possibilities had been exhausted.⁶⁷ It is noteworthy that the pro-business Montreal Gazette claimed that the labour situation had reached the critical stage, and presented the challenge to organized labour to rectify the situation:

The supply of white labour is diminishing. . . . If the Chinese labour can be obtained we should not hesitate to employ it. . . . If Labor Councils will not approve the introduction of Chinese on the farm, let them provide the alternative. . . . From mere prejudice they would risk the shortage of food in Britain and France.⁶⁸

Although the Chinese importation question appeared settled, the problem of securing additional sources of labour for agriculture and the war industries remained unsolved. There was, however, growing support for the idea of conscripting the white labour already in the country. In January, 1918, the Borden cabinet discussed the labour question at length, "and practically decided against compulsion".⁶⁹ The major reason for the negative decision was the strenuous opposition to industrial conscription by the Trades and Labor Congress. Their position had been forcefully stated during

a meeting of government, business and labour representatives. However, the T.L.C. Executive did agree to ask its members to co-operate in the registration of all men and women over the age of sixteen, under the authority of the Canada Registration Board. Failure to register was made punishable by fines, imprisonment, loss of civil rights, exclusion from employment, and denial of the right to travel by public conveyance.⁷⁰

Organizations such as the Canadian Manufacturers' Association hailed this policy as "a nation-wide application to Canada of the message which Nelson flung from the mast of his flag ship at Trafalgar: England expects that every man this day will do his duty".⁷¹ Once registration was under way, management began to suggest that the government should go one step further than mere registration; the enemy alien should be forced to perform useful work. In February, 1918, I. R. Poole, the Secretary of the Mountain Lumber Manufacturers' Association, informed Borden that government action was needed to obtain more efficiency from English speaking workers. He strongly urged that "the foreigner . . . be shown that they must not go idle. . . ." ⁷² The Canadian Mining Journal suggested that it might be a wise policy for the Dominion government to implement a policy whereby "alien

enemies who are unwilling to do a full day's work in the mines may find themselves under military guard doing much more disagreeable work clearing the farms of Northern Ontario".⁷³

Some enemy aliens had already been utilized as industrial conscripts. Even as early as 1916, the practice had been adopted of releasing interned prisoners of war under contract to railroad and mining companies. This practice was in line with the government's attempts to minimize the expenditure associated with maintaining the internment camps. Under the terms of the Hague Convention, prisoners could be utilized in working for their own comfort (obligatory), or for the advantage of the Government (paid), or in the service of private enterprise (paid).⁷⁴

The decision on the part of the military officials that the interned men should be made available to the private sector was welcomed by management of both the railway and mining companies. In the case of the C.P.R., the use of such labour could be justified on several grounds: the necessity of maintaining efficient service on a national basis; and the short supply of any alternative source of cheap, dependable labour.⁷⁵ As these interned men could be employed at a rate of pay equal to that of a Canadian soldier (\$1.10 per day) and were not susceptible to trade union influence, the economic

benefits were rather obvious.⁷⁶

The C.P.R. employed this type of labour, using the men both in its Rocky Mountain and Lake Superior Divisions. In both regions their lines were in close proximity to major internment camps. Despite the claim by Otter that this opportunity to work afforded "a means of distracting the individual mind from the monotony and restraint of his internment", there was strong evidence that many of the men were dissatisfied with working conditions.⁷⁷ In one instance, 32 former interned men who refused to work for the C.P.R. were sentenced by a North Bay Court to six months' imprisonment at the Burwash Prison Farm.⁷⁸ One of the prisoners telegraphed Major-General Otter to protest tactics of the C.P.R., and the unfairness of the courts: if one wants to leave, ". . . the C.P.R. constable on the division brings him back to work to the C.P.R., he is sentenced by the court to six months. . . . We all ask in a body that we be released from here. . . ." ⁷⁹

It became quite apparent that Major-General Otter was not prepared to either allow the men their freedom, or to permit their loafing. This hard line was revealed in October, 1917, when Commandant Major Dales of the Kapuskasing Camp reported to Otter that some men were refusing to chop wood even though they were being paid. After an official investi-

gation by the neutral Swiss Consul, Beny Iseli, the men still refused to work. Otter then ordered that food and wood supplies be withheld from these men. By the end of October, the protest was over.⁸⁰

The advantages of securing a cheap and docile labour force was also very appealing to various mining companies. One of the most interested employers was the Dominion Steel Corporation, the industrial giant of Nova Scotia. Of course, the Steel Company had already had considerable experience with utilizing enemy aliens, having maintained this industrial practice despite labour opposition. In fact, the President of the Company, Mark Workman, continued to maintain that "there is no better way of handling aliens than to keep them employed in productive labour".⁸¹ In December, 1917, Workman approached Prime Minister Borden, just before Borden's departure for England, with a rather grandiose proposal; Workman suggested that three or four thousand enemy prisoners interned in Great Britain "Austrians or Bulgarians preferred", be transferred to the mines of Cape Breton Island.⁸² Unfortunately for the Dominion Steel Company, an inquiry by Borden revealed that no large contingent of P.O.W.'s was being held in Great Britain.⁸³

The use of interned aliens by various corporations was a matter of growing concern to the Executive Committee of the

Trades and Labor Congress. Although there were few objections to the railway companies using these men as navvies, a different attitude was assumed when it appeared that aliens would displace unionized workers. In the spring of 1916, during a recruiting campaign in Cobalt, Captain Malloy, the local M.P., indicated that he intended to approach the Prime Minister with the suggestion that interned aliens be used in the mines of Northern Ontario. These men would be paid half salary with the remainder of their wages to be set aside for the Patriotic Fund.⁸⁴ Organized labour, on general principles, opposed the use of interned aliens in this type of situation. The union leadership was even more perturbed, by this case, because negotiations were underway between management and the union on a new wage scale. President Watters of the T.L.C. wrote to the Minister of Justice charging the Mine Managers' Association with conspiring to maintain unsatisfactory working conditions. Watters strongly emphasized, "the menace to the peace and well-being of the community that may arise should the alleged contemplated action of Captain Malloy be taken. . . ."⁸⁵ In this instance Doherty hastened to assure the President of the T.L.C. that the government had no intention of using interned labour in situations where it would be detrimental to "others in the same line of work or industry. . . ."⁸⁶

But to Canadian industrialists, the question of using interned labour was secondary in comparison to the issue over the proper conduct of enemy alien employees. By 1916 management was exerting strong pressure on the Dominion officials to adopt a stern position towards all enemy aliens who were involved in work stoppages in essential industries. Demands for government intervention were a feature of the 1917 strike in the Crow's Nest Pass Mining District. Management asked that the militia be called out to protect company property. A deputation of managers was dispatched to Ottawa to convince the government to allow the importation of strike breakers. There were several pre-war precedents for this course of action by management, notably, the 1913 coal strike on Vancouver Island.

The newly-appointed government Director of Coal Operations, W. H. Armstrong, viewed the presence of special detachments of the R.N.W.M.P. in District 18 as a "most beneficial influence".⁸⁷ The fact that Armstrong was regarded as the choice of the mine managers rather than the miners of the district, made the presence of the police appear illustrative of government coercion.⁸⁸ The mere presence of the R.N.W.M.P. did not satisfy many of the mine owners. W. A. Wood, President of the Vallance Coal Company, urged Prime Minister Borden to send troops into District 18 in order to "make the foreigners

work at the point of a bayonet",⁸⁹ An even more ambitious proposal was made by the President of the Calgary News-Telegram, that the Dominion government should take over the operation of the mines, forcing the miners to work under military discipline. However, the Dominion authorities, particularly Minister of Labour, T. Crothers, was reluctant to consider "any attempt by coercive measures to compel miners to work. . . .", whether they were English-Canadian workers or foreigners.⁹¹

In 1917, the Borden government, well aware of the fact that prices had outstripped wages, adopted a conciliatory stance towards the demands of the foreign worker for better working conditions and union recognition. While working to avert a crippling strike in the western coalfields Prime Minister Borden was frustrated in his efforts to persuade the mining companies to make a reasonable compromise. On one occasion, he sharply rebuked Sir William Mackenzie for the hard-line attitude towards collective bargaining adopted by the management of a Drumheller mine owned by the Canadian Northern. "I see no justification for Manager's attitude and urge that men be permitted to exercise this right which is recognized in practically all industries in Canada".⁹²

The escalating incidence of industrial disorder through-

out 1917-18 created strong pressure for decisive Dominion intervention. In 1917 there were 141 strikes; by 1918 the number had increased to a record 169.⁹³ Increasingly, the pro-management spokesmen began to attack independently minded locals of industrial unions such as the United Mine Workers of America (District 18); on the grounds that this organization was dominated by irresponsible and dangerous aliens. In October, 1917, H. A. Lovett, President of the North American Collieries, strenuously complained to Prime Minister Borden that the "ordinary workmen, largely of alien extraction who cannot even read or write are being paid more every fortnight than the responsible and educated officials of the mines".⁹⁴ Other mine owners and operators took a similar position. According to the President of Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company it was necessary to take a firm stand against these alien workers "as they are absolutely insatiable".⁹⁵ Estimates of the number of alien unionists in the region was substantiated by various R.N.W.M.P. reports which stressed the volatile nature of these workers, their impatience with slow-moving bargaining procedures and their tendency to resort to drastic action.⁹⁶ It was also a foregone conclusion that the radical leaders of the U.M.W.A. owed their positions to the alien voters; one report singled out a Mr.

Biggs, President of District 18 miners, commenting that "he is probably dishonest and an agitator . . . otherwise he would not have been elected . . . and supported by the foreign element".⁹⁷ Other reports stressed that the strike vote was

only carried by the almost total support of the foreign workers; English workers usually were described as opposing such action. Another report optimistically declared that some "ten or twelve men of very strong I.W.W. tendencies. . . ." into the open so that the authorities would be able to apprehend them.

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It was also significant that the anti-alien prejudices of management were reinforced by many of the more conservative Anglo-Saxon trade unionists and labour lawyers. In December, 1917, a former attorney of the U.M.W.A. in District 18, wrote to Arthur Meighen denouncing the attitude of the union in respect to the war effort. He attributed the disintegration of any semblance of responsibility and patriotism to the new breed of union leader who had emerged since the outbreak of the war. And what made it possible for these labour demagogues to achieve such power, he asserted, was the predominance of the alien worker:

The foreign element among the miners preponderantly out-number the English-speaking members. Their ideals and their methods are not merely different from the notions of the old-time

leaders . . . but on war matters are diametrically
opposed.⁹⁹

Meighen's correspondent stressed that the labour aspect of alien domination was too critical to national security for the Dominion government to remain aloof. He suggested close co-operation with the International Office of the U.M.W.A. which was concerned over the number of 'wild-cat' strikes, and the growing radicalism of the rank and file. With this co-operation it might be possible "to gradually change the officials of the District".¹⁰⁰ It is notable that many of the mining companies were already moving towards a rapprochement with the head office of international unions such as the U.M.W.A. In October, 1917, H. A. Lovett, the President of North American Collieries had pointed out to Prime Minister Borden that the men who were inciting the workers were not in any way authorized by the international officials, and urged him to take action against these "mavericks" who did not have the authority of the international headquarters.¹⁰¹ Significantly, government representatives held informal talks towards the end of 1918 with the International Office of the U.M.W.A. and the Western Coal Operators to discuss the growing radicalism of the western miners.¹⁰²

By 1918, there was growing empathy between the Canadian business executives and conservative Anglo-Canadian trade

unionists. The lines of communication had been opened up by common concern over the radicalization of some industrial unions, and the growing fear of the foreign influence in the trade union movement. In the spring of 1917, the government appointed a leading T.L.C. trade unionist, Gideon Robertson, first to the Senate, and then to the Cabinet as Minister without portfolio.¹⁰³ Sir George Bury, Vice-President of the C.P.R., informed Prime Minister Borden that businessmen "strongly believed that the Government is fortunate in having Senator Robertson as one of its members".¹⁰⁴ Bury hinted that since Robertson "deserves the confidence of labour, the Unionist Government might take advantage of his talent in the labour portfolio". This suggestion came at a time when Borden was aware of the dissatisfaction of businessmen towards Minister of Labor, T. W. Crothers, especially for his 'soft line' towards the foreigners.¹⁰⁵ From the business perspective, Gideon Robertson's professed advocacy of firm measures against foreigners and labour radicals made him a particularly appealing replacement for T. W. Crothers.¹⁰⁶

Throughout the spring and summer of 1918, serious consideration was given by the Unionist government to measures that would maintain a high level of productivity, and reduce the loss of work days caused by industrial disputes. In

April, 1918, by Order-in-Council (P.C. 815), the so-called "Anti-Loafing Law" was enacted, which provided that "every male person residing in the Dominion of Canada should be regularly engaged in some useful occupation".¹⁰⁷ Although the measure did not specifically refer to the alien population, the Act was clearly aimed in that direction. According to the Registrar of Enemy Aliens in Montreal, it would now be possible to coerce "these Austrians . . . that are loafing around and having a good time", into accepting employment with industrial concerns.¹⁰⁸ Another aspect of the Act was that it provided an additional vehicle to intimidate alien workers in radical trade unions. In April, 1918, three prominent businessmen-politicians, H. S. Clements, W. F. McLean and G. B. Nicholson brought this aspect of the alien menace to the attention of the House of Commons. Clements boldly charged that "at least one-third of the total membership of the labour unions of Canada consist of enemy aliens or aliens of neutral countries".¹⁰⁹ Moreover, what made this situation so ominous, Clements asserted, was the fact that these alien enemies, pro-German agitators, ". . . had been taught from their earliest infancy that only by force can they get what they want, and I submit, that they should be controlled by force".¹¹⁰ There were also alarming reports from business interests in northern Ontario

and British Columbia that the insidious threat of the I.W.W. had assumed critical proportions.¹¹¹ In February, 1918,

I. R. Poole, President of the Lumber Manufacturers' Association informed Borden that the I.W.W. were active in the lumber camps of British Columbia and that unless the government intervened there would be serious strikes, particularly since the I.W.W. had made appreciable headway with the foreigners.

According to the writer, unless the government outlawed the I.W.W., seized its propaganda, and made it clear to the foreigners "that they must not go idle", the situation in the lumber industry in British Columbia would be chaotic.¹¹² This

assessment was further substantiated by the influential Sir Joseph Flavelle, Chairman of the Imperial Munitions Board.

On a number of occasions during the spring of 1918 he complained to Borden about the activities of American agitators and German sympathizers in disrupting the shipbuilding industry in both Ontario and British Columbia.¹¹³

The behaviour of enemy aliens and foreign socialists in cities with large foreign populations, as well as in the mining and lumbering communities was an additional source of concern throughout 1918. In the eyes of most security officials, Winnipeg remained the most likely place for troubles with the alien to develop. In part, this sense of alarm, was

attributed to the constant representations from members of the Anglo-Canadian establishment for strong measures in order to curb the alien. Trouble had occurred in 1917 when a group of foreign workers went on strike. On this occasion, the military commander of the district, Major General Ketchen, had urged the Militia Council to give him the power "to arrest the leaders who are alien enemies", who were also "the leaders of the Social Democrats in the Labor Party".¹¹⁴ In August, 1918, a series of strikes affected the city. Once again the enemy alien was blamed. A representative of Manitoba Gypsum Company, one of the firms affected by the strike, charged that "all of the men who have gone out are of alien nationality, many of them not naturalized".¹¹⁵ Again the military officials concurred. In this instance, the Registrar of Alien enemies informed Colonel Sherwood of the high percentage of enemy aliens among the strikers. Reference was also made of the growing hostility of Winnipeg citizens towards the "lenience with which these Alien Enemies are treated. . . ."¹¹⁶ As a solution to the situation, he strongly recommended sending the strikers off to the Kapuskasing internment camp, a policy which "would have a very beneficial effect upon the labor situation as regards alien enemies".¹¹⁷

In May, 1918, Prime Minister Borden had been suf-

ficiently alarmed at the reports of I.W.W. and socialist activity among the alien population that he appointed C. H. Cahan, a Montreal lawyer, to conduct a special investigation.¹¹⁸

In his July Report, Cahan indicated that there was "considerable mental unrest among the Peoples of Slavic origin in Canada, Russian, Ukrainian and Austrian, which is directly attributable to the dissemination in Canada of the Socialistic doctrines, espoused by the Russian Revolutionary element, and more recently by the Bolsheviki party in Russia. . . ." ¹¹⁹

He tended to reject the contention that this social and industrial unrest was "due to German propaganda".¹²⁰ In Cahan's opinion, widespread unrest was due to exhaustion from the war effort: "the dominant moral purpose of the people to sacrifice everything to ensure the successful prosecution of the war is sadly weakened".¹²¹ Cahan did not interpret the overall situation as one requiring special measures. Within two months, Cahan dramatically altered his assessment of the alien problem. In a lengthy memorandum to the Minister of Justice on September 14, 1918, Cahan urged the Dominion government to not only continue to regulate the activities of specified enemy aliens such as Germans, Austrians, Bulgarians and Turks, but for administrative purposes this category should now include Russians, Finns, and Ukrainians, who earlier in the war had

been classified as allied aliens. Cahan provided a detailed explanation for this drastic proposal:

The Russians, Ukrainians and Finns, who are employed in the mines, factories and other industries in Canada, are now being thoroughly saturated with the Socialistic doctrines which have been proclaimed by the Bolsheviki faction of Russia. For several years before the outbreak of the war, leaders of an association known as the Industrial Workers of the World, commonly known as the I.W.W. had employed large sums of money in publishing in English and in certain foreign languages, newspapers, pamphlets and leaflets advocating the destruction of all state authority, the subversion of religion, and the obliteration of all property rights. . . . There is evidence that some of the leaders of the Bolsheviki movement in Russia and of the Red Guard in Finland were formerly prominent officials of the I.W.W. in America. . . . Since the outbreak of the present war, revolutionary groups of Russians, Ukrainians and Finns have been organized throughout Canada, and are known as The Social Democratic Party of Canada, The Ukrainian Revolutionary Group, The Russian Revolutionary Group and others. . . . The Bolsheviki Associations in Canada have gone so far as to form their own Soviets in certain industrial communities. . . . Delegates from Bolsheviki organizations in Russia have recently come to the United States, and no doubt to Canada to organize and inflame their comrades in America. . . . The Bolsheviki are enemy aliens.¹²²

In September there appeared to be little doubt in Cahan's mind that the dangers threatening Canada from German subversion, I.W.W. infiltration, and Bolshevik propaganda were all part of one gigantic conspiracy being engineered by Imperial Germany. According to Cahan, "the German government is making use of Bolshevik agitators . . . [as part of] its

clearly defined policy of creating difficulties for its enemies in their own and in neutral countries".¹²³ Cahan insisted that Russians, Ukrainians and Finns were under German control "and are undoubtedly being used by Germany to carry on its political propaganda among the foreign industrial population of Canada".¹²⁴ Reference was made to the sensational revelation by an American agent in Petrograd that the Germans had supplied 50,000,000 gold roubles to Lenin and Trotsky to aid the revolutionary movement in Russia.¹²⁵ The marked contrast between Cahan's report made in July and his Report of September may in part be attributed to change in British and American foreign policy towards Russia and an uneasiness that internal unrest was linked to international Bolshevik intrigue.

In April, 1917, Canadian Immigration officials had detained Leon Trotsky on his return to Russia. He had been released after consultation with the British Colonial Office.¹²⁷ Throughout 1917 and until May, 1918, groups of Russian Bolsheviks were permitted to depart from Vancouver for Russia while the the Canadian authorities stood by.¹²⁸ This Canadian inaction was an extension of the British governments early reaction to the unstable political situation in Russia. Britain asked Canada and the other members of the

British Empire to "do nothing which might suggest to the Russian people that we or our allies are their enemies while Germany is their friend".¹²⁸ It was only in May, 1918, that the British Colonial Secretary proposed to the Canadian government that Russians travelling under documents issued by the Bolshevik government or its representatives abroad, should not be admitted into any countries in the British Empire.¹²⁹ As a result more stringent guidelines were soon imposed. During the summer urgent requests were made by Britain that the allies along with Japan and the United States dispatch an expeditionary force to Siberia to keep Germany from transferring further divisions to the western front. Because of the uncertainties of the Russian political scene the Canadian cabinet, after much debate, finally authorized the dispatch of a contingent of 5,000 men to Vladivostock.¹³⁰ An advance party sailed from Vancouver in October. This decision was very unpopular generally with Canadians and was to become even more so after the signing of the Armistice.¹³¹ One aspect of the Siberian situation that tended to alarm security officials were the reports that large numbers of Russians were leaving Vladivostok ostensibly trying to return to North America. From agents' descriptions, these Russians appeared to be dangerous both to Canada and the United States:

The majority of them speak fluent English . . . all seemed sufficiently intelligent to be active in furtherance of I.W.W. or Bolshevik propaganda and all were of a most suspicious and hostile personal manner. They were typical of a very large number of Bolshevik sympathizers now thronging this port. 132

The existence of local chapters of the Russian Social Democratic Party, the Russian Revolutionary Group and the Russian Workers' Union in cities such as Vancouver, Winnipeg and Toronto, as well as in the mining areas of northern Ontario and British Columbia, made the forthcoming arrival of external agitators appear even more ominous.

The Finns were another ethnic group which had already shown themselves to be highly susceptible to Bolshevik teachings. The radicalism of the Finns in the lumbering camps had been a matter of comment even prior to the war. Moreover, in 1911, the nationally chartered Canadian Finnish Organization had affiliated itself with the Social Democratic Party of Canada. As the Finnish wing of the S.D.P., the Canadian Finnish Organization very quickly became a radical force of considerable influence within the Finnish-speaking community of Canada. By establishing its headquarters in the nickel-mining centre of Sudbury, one of the principal Finnish communities of the Dominion, and through its newspaper Vapaus ("Liberty"), socialist and Marxist doctrines were given considerable

currency.¹³³ In addition, the I.W.W. made appreciable headway among Finnish workers in British Columbia and northern Ontario. By 1918, there were numerous documented cases concerning I.W.W. organizers who were Finnish or had carried inflammatory pamphlets designed to appeal to Finnish workers. One letter of instruction from I.W.W. headquarters expressed jubilation that "the Finnis [sic] are getting active there [B.C.]. . . ."¹³⁴ In another case, a Finnish I.W.W. organizer from the United States was detected in Fort William "attempting to distribute literature received from Duluth to the Finnish workers in the lumber camps".¹³⁵

The possibility of Finns and others associated with the I.W.W. slipping across the border had become a major issue by the fall of 1918. In later August, 1918, the Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence, Sir Eugene Fiset, sent an urgent memorandum to the Superintendent of Immigration. In this document, Fiset indicated that he had proof that a major I.W.W. invasion was imminent, particularly in British Columbia. According to Fiset, regular immigration screening was not sufficient to cope with the threat. Instead he suggested legislation be passed which would allow the police "to arrest I.W.W.s and aliens on an open charge". The Immigration Act, Fiset suggested, if amended might serve this

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function.¹³⁶ Superintendent Scott then appealed to the Deputy Minister of Justice for legislation which "will enable us to deal with these people under the Immigration Act". Scott asked that the I.W.W. be specifically labeled as "unsuitable" under the provisions of Section 38, subsection (c).¹³⁷ In reply, the Minister of Justice indicated that as a result of the deteriorating situation, legislation was being considered to cope with the problem.¹³⁸

The Chief Press Censor added his influence for coercive action. Colonel Chambers had long advocated the suppression of all foreign language newspapers; he was particularly insistent with respect to socialist papers such as Vapaus (Finnish, Sudbury), Russkoye Slovo (Russian, Toronto) and Robotchyj Narod (Ukrainian, Winnipeg). Chambers claimed to have evidence that "these papers have some secret means of communication with the Bolsheviki leaders in Russia".¹³⁹ The most dangerous was believed to be Robotchyj Narod, published by the Ukrainian Social Democrats in both Russian and Ukrainian; this paper had a fairly wide circulation among Slavs in Western Canada.¹⁴⁰ On September 5, 1918, Chambers brought the question of the suppression of Robotchyj Narod to the attention of the Secretary of State. He reminded the

Minister that with the decision by the British authorities in the fall of 1918 to curtail Bolshevist literature throughout the Empire "there is no longer any reason to consider the susceptibilities of the Bolsheviki anarchistic element in Russia. . . . I consider that the time for action has fully arrived".¹⁴¹

Cahan's observations in September, 1918, generally concurred with the viewpoints of the security officials that national security required that regulations be established to control "the Bolsheviki . . . enemy alien".¹⁴² He therefore suggested specific legislative measures: Russians, Ukrainians and Finns should be required to register with the Alien Enemy Registrars throughout the country; their foreign language newspapers should be suppressed by allowing publications in only English and French; those radical associations that had a high percentage of these aliens should be declared unlawful, and a penalty imposed on those who continued to belong. Cahan also urged the Dominion government to create a special organization to supervise the security measures, "to be known as the Public Safety Branch of the Department of Justice".¹⁴³ Action on Cahan's Report was quickly forthcoming. On September 25, 1918, by Order-in-Council (P.C. 2381), most of the foreign language press was suppressed; by

Order-in-Council (P.C. 2384), fourteen political organizations were declared unlawful:

- The Industrial Workers of the World
- The Russian Social Democratic Party
- The Russian Revolutionary Group
- The Russian Social Revolutionists
- The Russian Workers Union
- The Ukrainian Revolutionary Group
- The Ukrainian Social Democratic Party
- The Social Democratic Party
- The Social Labour Party
- Group of Social Democrats of Bolsheviki
- Group of Social Democrats of Anarchists
- The Workers International Industrial Union
- Chinese Nationalist League
- Chinese Labour Association. ¹⁴⁴

Penalties for violating these two laws were extremely severe: fines up to \$5,000 could be imposed and/or a maximum prison term of five years.¹⁴⁵ In October, 1918, the newly established Public Safety Branch under the Department of Justice was to have special jurisdiction in the enforcement of the legislation. C. H. Cahan was appointed Director of the Branch.¹⁴⁶

There were, however, several differences between Cahan's Report, and the two Orders-in-Council that were to have substantial importance. In the first place, not all foreign language newspapers were banned; rather, a list of enemy alien languages was provided. Significantly, Yiddish was not included, despite the belief among many security officials that the Russian Jews had provided the leadership in

the Bolshevik Revolution.¹⁴⁷ As a result, the Yiddish socialist newspaper, The Jewish Daily Forward, published in New York city by Abraham Cahan, was still allowed into the country.¹⁴⁸ In addition, Canadian Yiddish papers such as the Montreal Eagle remained uncensored.¹⁴⁹

It also became apparent that such extensive coercion also produced wide-spread opposition from various elements in Canadian society. In the face of strong pressure from the ethnic communities affected, from organized labour, and even from within the Cabinet, the regulations were modified. By Order-in-Council (P.C. 2521) of October 15, all Russian, Ukrainian and Finnish language publications were allowed to resume operations under certain restrictions; they had to receive a licence from the Secretary of State and publish English or French translations in columns parallel with the foreign text.¹⁵⁰

On October 29, the representatives of the Trades and Labor Congress, Tom Moore and P. M. Draper were able to secure relief for trade unions affected by Section 9 of P.C. 2384. This Section had stipulated that "no meeting . . . except . . . meetings for religious services . . . shall be held . . . or any part thereof conducted in the languages of any country . . . with which Canada is at war, or in the language

of any of the languages of Russia, Ukraine or Finland. . . ."

The change provided for the use of such languages "as may be necessary for the purpose of informing those attending . . . who do not understand either the English or the French language. . . ."151

Yet another alteration was the removal of the Social Democratic Party from the category of "Unlawful Association". In many ways, this was the most important concession because it ran directly counter to the views of C. H. Cahan, and other advocates of the hard-line approach. Cahan on numerous occasions branded the Social Democrats as "the mainspring of all other Bolshevist agitation in Canada. . . ." since it acted as a central co-ordinating agency for other anarchistic and socialist groups "among the Ukrainians, Finns, Russians and Austrians, supplying to each branch literature in its own language".¹⁵² The fact that many of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party were Anglo-Saxon did not deter Cahan from his determination to suppress the organization.¹⁵³

Exception was taken to the outlawing of the Social Democratic Party by T. A. Crerar, Minister of Agriculture and Newton Rowell, President of the Privy Council and Minister responsible for the North West Mounted Police. Crerar argued that although individual members of the party

may have made radical pronouncements, "the party, through its party programme, and in its contests in elections, made it clear that the constitutional course was the one it followed".¹⁵⁴ A favourable comparison was made by Crerar between the Social Democrats and the British Labour party in terms of electoral programme. He demonstrated that the Social Democrats were well within the British tradition. In addition, Crerar questioned the intentions of C. H. Cahan whom he accused of having singled out the Social Democrats "as the particular object of his attention".¹⁵⁵ The police raids and arrests appeared to Crerar to be completely unnecessary, and to be "the very negation of the first principles of Democracy".¹⁵⁶ Rowell's objections were, in substance, almost identical, in that they re-echoed the reluctance of 'Gladstonian' liberals to justify repression: "If we wish to combat their ideas there is only one way to do it, and that is by those who are opposed to them combatting them in public argument or propaganda".¹⁵⁷

With the Cabinet divided on the issue, Prime Minister Borden approached conservative labour leaders of the T.L.C., Tom Moore and P. M. Draper, for their opinions. They urged that the Social Democrats be reinstated as a legitimate organization.¹⁵⁸ In November, 1918, the Social Democratic Party

was removed from the prohibited list; two other organizations, the Finnish Social Democratic Party and the Revolutionary Socialist Party of North America were added.¹⁵⁹

The incident involving the Social Democratic Party revealed, among other things, that the Unionist government was prepared to adopt a double standard in their application of the September Orders-in-Council. Although the propaganda and agitation of Anglo-Canadian socialists and radical labour leaders was a matter of great concern, there was reluctance to resort to the same severe measures as were applied against foreign socialists. A memorandum prepared for the Solicitor General in June, 1919, showing cases related to sedition and possession of prohibited literature revealed inequities in the dispensation of justice. ~~Most of the~~ Anglo-Canadians received very light sentences, in most cases a small fine rather than a prison sentence.¹⁶⁰

The ability of the English-Canadian socialist to secure fair legal treatment was revealed in December, 1918, in the case of three Ontario trade unionists, Arthur Skidmore, Harry Cheesman and Charles Watson. In fact, the arrest of Arthur Skidmore, President of the Stratford Trades Council, became a cause célèbre. Skidmore was charged under Order-in-Council (P.C. 1241) for possession of prohibited literature. In

December, 1918, he was sentenced to 30 days in jail and a fine of \$500. Organized labour was aroused. Threats were made of a general strike throughout Ontario unless Skidmore was released.¹⁶¹ In addition, Tom Moore, President of the T.L.C., made a direct appeal to Prime Minister Borden.¹⁶² The fact that Moore was highly regarded by Borden and the reluctance of the Dominion government to stir up further hostility among previously moderate trade unionists was clearly evident. In late December, Justice Minister C. J. Doherty ordered the release of Skidmore, Cheesman and Watson.¹⁶³

In contrast, the foreign radical felt the unmitigated force of the law, especially in areas with large foreign populations. In Sault Ste. Marie the local magistrates in a number of instances did not allow the accused aliens the option of a fine, but rather sentenced them to prison.⁴ Where the fine was imposed, it was often so enormous that the defendant had no choice but to accept the long prison sentence. In two cases, the option was a fine of \$1,000 or three years in prison, and in three other cases the option was a fine of \$5,000 or five years.¹⁶⁴

This tendency to deal harshly with "enemy aliens" was clearly revealed in the case involving Michael Charitinoff, the former editor of the Robotchyj Narod (Winnipeg).

Charitinoff had been under surveillance as early as 1917; he was described by the Censorship authorities as "a rather intelligent Bolshevik . . . calling himself the ambassador of the Bolshevik government in Western Canada".¹⁶⁵ In October, 1918, Charitinoff was arrested and charged with possession of illegal literature. Judge Hugh John Macdonald, a prominent member of Winnipeg's Anglo-Canadian community, sentenced the young Ukrainian socialist to three years' imprisonment and a fine of \$1,000.¹⁶⁶ Almost immediately there was an outcry from Anglo-Canadian trade unionists in the city against the severity of the sentence. The Western Labor News, the organ of the Winnipeg Trades and Labor Council, charged that "the only possible explanation for such a draconian sentence is that the magistrate who pronounced the sentence was obsessed with the mania of the war had for the moment had forgotten to be judicious".¹⁶⁷ Great concern was also expressed by the editor of the Western Labor News, Rev. William Ivens, for the physical well-being of the prisoner. Ivens alleged that "Charitinoff lies between life and death in what may prove a fatal illness, in a windowless cell in the penitentiary".¹⁶⁸ Although this charge was staunchly repudiated by the Winnipeg Tribune, which cited statements by Charitinoff's lawyer confirming that his client was in good

health, the labour paper did not back down. Instead, additional allegations were made that the authorities had actually forced Charitinoff's council to forsake his client, clear evidence that the government was prepared to go to great length to crush protest. Thus Charitinoff became another name on the growing list of western labour martyrs, joining David Wells, and Albert (Ginger) Goodwin.¹⁶⁹ During the mass protest rally of the Socialist party of Canada in the Walker Theatre on December 22, 1918, Charitinoff was the focus of attention, and the chairman, Alderman John Queen, in fact opened the meeting by making reference to his presence on the platform: "Here is this man Charitinoff for you to look at. He is not going to speak but he is here".¹⁷⁰

Members of the Winnipeg Trades and Labor Council, at the request of the socialist element who had assumed ascendancy, arranged a Defence Fund for Charitinoff. R. B. Russell, the Secretary of the T.L.C. Press Committee, and one of the leading socialists in the Council, assumed responsibility for raising money in Winnipeg and other industrial centres.¹⁷¹

In December, 1918, Russell solicited aid from Joseph Knight, an Edmonton labour leader of pronounced radical proclivities. In his letter, Russell emphasized the need for class solidarity, stressing the importance of the Anglo-Canadian

socialists showing support for immigrant socialists:

I suppose you have seen the trouble we are having with the Chartinoff [sic] case and as we have something like a bill of \$1000.00 to date . . . I hope you will be able to get around and dig up something from the slaves who come within your grasp. We are solely in need of financial help with this case, the lawyers are again making an appeal, and we are using the Trades Congress executive, who are now in Ottawa, about to meet the Government".¹⁷²

Apparently Russell's appeal to Knight was a successful one, for a short time later he wrote a letter expressing his appreciation for the financial assistance, and also informing Knight of developments in Winnipeg: ". . . I got the money you raised for Chartinoff [sic] and we are still having bother, but are arranging another mass meeting to demand his acquittal, as he is only out on bail".¹⁷³ The combined influence of the T.L.C. labour representation, and the legal aid Charitinoff was able to secure were sufficient to effect his release by March, 1919, even though he had pleaded guilty.¹⁷⁴

The Winnipeg T.L.C. also became involved in the controversy over the Ukrainian Labor News. In the spring of 1919, an attempt was made to suppress the Ukrainian Labor News for publishing inflammatory articles. What made the charge appear unfair was the fact that the Western Labor News was allowed to continue in operation, despite an even more radical editorial policy. Fred Livesay, the Western Press Censor,

justified this dichotomy on cultural-ethnic grounds:

It is true that the Western Labor News . . . is about on a par [with Ukrainian Labor News].. But that paper is published and circulated entirely among English speaking people, who have in the English press a means of correcting mis-statements and false impressions. One may suppose that it would be extremely difficult to put this paper out of business. It might provoke industrial disturbances. But the Ukrainian Labor News . . . is on a different footing. As a foreign language paper it cannot enlist the general sympathy of the laboring classes. . . . This is not a case for supervision but for ruthless suppression.¹⁷⁵

This effort to silence the Ukrainian paper was effectively challenged by the representatives of the Winnipeg T.L.C.

In April, 1919, R. B. Russell sent a strongly worded letter to the Chief Press Censor: "In the opinion of the Trades & Labor Council Press Committee, we see nothing of an objectionable nature in the publication of the Ukrainian Labor News".¹⁷⁶

The representation was sufficient to deter the authorities from closing down the Ukrainian paper.¹⁷⁷

Similar examples of unity among Anglo-Canadian and alien workers were evident in mining centres, especially in western Canada. In Fernie, Alberta, the focal point of District 18 of the United Mine Workers of America, a number of Ukrainian workers were charged, tried, and sentenced for having in their possession copies of the outlawed newspaper, The Worker.¹⁷⁸ What obviously worried the Anglo-Canadian

element of Fernie, especially the management of the coal mines in the region, was the fact that the Ukrainian miners were becoming militantly radical. The visit of Matthew Popovich, former editor of the Winnipeg socialist newspaper Rabotchyj Narod, in September, 1918, so alarmed the civic authorities that they had prevented Popovich from speaking.¹⁷⁹ In Fernie, the local leadership of the U.M.W.A. responded violently to this oppression of the foreign born. Charges were made that a conspiracy existed between the Dominion government and the coal mining companies to destroy the trade union movement. It was alleged that the campaign was directed by C. H. Cahan, who was labeled a tool of big business for attacking the foreign miners who supported trade union activity.¹⁸⁰ Reference was made to the purge of the most intelligent members of the Ukrainian mining community: "it is from [this] . . . class that the selections are being made for the jail not only in Fernie but in other parts of Canada".¹⁸¹

It was becoming clear by January, 1919, that opposition to government policies was bringing alien socialists and Anglo-Canadian socialists and radical trade unionists together, particularly in western Canada.¹⁸² This trend was in evidence in Calgary in March, 1919, when the Western Labor Conference gave birth to the syndicalist organization, the "One Big

Union".¹⁸³ A resolution was passed declaring that "the interests of all members of the international working class being identical that this body of workers recognize no alien but the capitalist".¹⁸⁴ Another resolution introduced by Jack Kavanagh, Secretary of the Vancouver T.L.C., urged the meeting to adopt a protective stance towards the enemy alien:

Be it resolved that this congress declares all organized alien enemies worthy of protection of organized labor, and that it demands of the government to deport only such alien enemies as wish to be deported, naturalized or unnaturalized.¹⁸⁵

What made the resolution notable was that it ran counter to the prevailing nativism which characterized the national labour movement of the pre-war period. It was even reported by an agent in British Columbia that Kavanagh had strongly supported the concept of worker brotherhood with Orientals; hitherto an unheard of attitude: "formerly the Chinese and Japanese were looked upon as enemies of the working man, but that they are now with them".¹⁸⁶ There was evidence forthcoming in June, that a branch of the O.B.U. had been formed among the Chinese workers of Vancouver, and that the pamphlet 'One Big Union' had been translated into Chinese, and was being distributed freely.¹⁸⁷

The 'Red Scare' in Canada during 1919 reflected the

'apprehension on the part of Anglo-Canadians at the growing militancy of the lower class of workers who were predominantly alien. Throughout the last part of 1918-19 the labour issues had begun to assume the proportions of a national emergency. Canada was believed to be on the brink of a revolution engineered by external powers, and to be led from within by aliens and 'white' agitators. What was heard was the strident voice of the business community blaming the unrest on the alien. Business asked that the smouldering fires of insurrection be stamped out by firm government action. The alien worker, because of his radicalism and instability, was no longer an asset to the industrial system. In fact, the alien was portrayed as the instrument of potential destruction.

CHAPTER VIII

- ¹The Christian Guardian, Nov. 12, 1913, Ed..
- ²The virtual cessation of railroad construction affected approximately 50,000 navies, most of whom were aliens. This trend has been described in Chapter Five.
- ³Canadian Annual Review, 1914, pp. 277-281; ibid., 1915, pp. 352-364.
- ⁴Borden Papers, 105935, Thomas Shaughnessy to Martin Burrell, Minister of Agriculture, Aug. 26, 1914.
- ⁵Department of National Defence Records, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter, D.N.D.), #9, Senator Hewitt Bostock to Senator Lougheed, Aug. 2, 1915.
- ⁶Arthur Meighen Papers, Public Archives of Canada, (hereafter Meighen Papers), 105995, Arthur Meighen to Prime Minister Borden, Sept. 4, 1914.
- ⁷D.N.D., C-965, #9, Colonel A.P. Sherwood, Chief Commissioner of the Dominion Police, memorandum to Major-General Gwatkin, Chief of the General Staff, Aug. 8, 1915.
- ⁸The Canadian Mining Journal, Aug. 15, 1914, Ed..
- ⁹Ibid..
- ¹⁰D.N.D., C-965, #7, D.A. Noble, Special Agent, Dominion Steel Corporation, to Colonel Sherwood, May 6, 1915
- ¹¹Ibid., Noble to Sherwood, May 4, 1915; ibid., Noble to D.H. McDougall, General Manager, Dominion Steel Corporation, June 2, 1915.
- ¹²Sydney Daily Post, May 17, 1915, p. 3.

¹³Borden Papers, 106499, H. McInnes to A.E. Blount, Private Secretary to Prime Minister Borden, May 17, 1915.

¹⁴Newspapers such as the Sudbury Journal on several occasions made reference to the presence of German agents in northern Ontario prior to the war, purchasing large areas of nickel rich land. The Sudbury Journal, Feb. 24, 1916, Ed..

¹⁵Toronto Globe, June ? , 1915, enclosed D.N.D., C-965, #8.

¹⁶The Northern Miner, Oct. 9, 1915, Ed..

¹⁷The Northern Miner, Nov. 13, 1915, strongly praised the decision of the English management of the Mining Corporation of Canada in dismissing all their enemy alien employees.

¹⁸D.N.D., C-965, #13, Private Robert Pitman, recruiting agent, to Minister of Militia & Defence, Nov. 29, 1915.

¹⁹Ibid., #9, Report of E.J. May, to Colonel E.A. Cruikshank, District Officer in Command, M.D. #13, June 28, 1915.

²⁰Ibid.; Canadian Annual Review, 1915, p. 355.

²¹D.N.D., C-965, #9, Report of E.J. May, June 28, 1915.

²²Ibid., Canadian Annual Review, 1915, p. 355.

²³D.N.D., C-965, #9, Petition, allied enemy miners to Major May, June 26, 1915.

²⁴Ibid., Officer Commanding, M.D. #13 to Secretary, Militia Council, July 13, 1915; ibid., Brigadier-General W.E. Hodgins, Adjutant-General to Colonel Sherwood, July 2, 1915.

²⁵Proceedings of the Thirty-first Annual Session of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada (1915), pp. 16-17. Hereafter Proceedings of the T.L.C..

²⁶Ibid., p. 17.

²⁷ The indifference towards the alien worker on the part of the T.L.C. Executive is discussed in Chapter Five.

²⁸ Canadian Annual Review, 1916, p. 433.

²⁹ Borden Papers, 117413, F.G. Morley, Secretary of the Toronto Board of Trade, to Prime Minister Borden, Feb. 17, 1916; ibid., 117429, Board of Trade, Oshawa, to Borden, Feb. 17, 1916; ibid., 117396, W.L. Cockshutt, M.P. Brantford, to Borden, Feb. 10, 1916.

³⁰ Ibid., 7457, Sir George Perley, Canadian High Commissioner, to Bonar Law, Colonial Secretary, April 20, 1916; Canadian Annual Review, 1916, p. 432.

³¹ Prior to the war harvesters had been able to earn as much as \$30.-\$40. a month. Vancouver Province, Aug. 18, 1915, Ed..

³² Immigration Branch Records, Public Archives of Canada, (hereafter, I.B.), 29490, #4, Sir Herbert Ames to Martin Burrell, Minister of Agriculture, June 25, 1915.

³³ Ibid., W. Banford, Dominion Immigration Officer, Toronto, to W.D. Scott, Supt. of Immigration, May 13, 1915; ibid., W.D. Scott to W.W. Cory, Deputy Minister of the Interior, June 5, 1915.

³⁴ Ibid., Martin Burrell, to Sir Richard McBride, Premier of British Columbia, Aug. 4, 1915; ibid., Duncan Marshall, Minister of Agriculture, Alberta, to Martin Burrell, July 39, 1915.

³⁵ Ibid., Duncan Marshall, Minister of Agriculture, Alberta, to Martin Burrell, July 39, 1915; ibid., J. Bruce Walker, Commissioner of Immigration (Wpg.), July 31, 1915.

³⁶ Ibid., #5, J. Bruce Walker to W.D. Scott, July 24, 1916; W.D. Scott to Mr. Mitchell, (Private Secretary to Arthur Meighen, Minister of the Interior, July 28, 1916; Even the 20,000 Canadian troops that had been utilized in gathering the 1915 harvest were not available. Ibid., Scott to Major-General Fleet, Deputy Minister of Militia & Defence, July 14, 1916.

³⁷ Ibid., #6, Pamphlet;



³⁸ Ibid., W.D. Scott, "Circular letter to Canadian Immigration Agents in the United States," Aug. 2, 1916; ibid., Scott to W.W. Cory, July 14, 1917.

³⁹ Borden Papers, 106690, Major-General Fiset to Commissioner of Customs, April 2, 1916.

⁴⁰ I.B., 917093, #1, Anonymous to John B. Brook, Deputy Customs Collector, Gateway, Montana, Aug. 12, 1916, enclosed, letter Brook to W.D. Scott, Aug. 29, 1916.

⁴¹ Melvyn Dobofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (Chicago, 1969), pp. 314-15.

⁴² By August, 1916, the A.W.O. could claim some 12,000 members, Ibid., p. 316.

⁴³ The A.W.O. demanded: the ten hour a day, a minimum wage and sanitary room and board. Ibid., p. 317-18.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 384.

⁴⁵ I.B., 917093, #1, W.D. Scott to T.G. Winter, Minnesota Commission of Public Safety, July 16, 1917.

⁴⁶ I.B., 917093, #1, J. Bruce Walker to W.D. Scott, Aug. 2, 1917.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Walker to Scott, Sept. 18, 1917.

⁴⁸ Ibid., Scott to Harvey McCarter, of Macdonald & Nisbet (Barristers, Vanc.) May 1, 1917; ibid., Scott to T. Crothers, July 21, 1917.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 917093, #1, Bruce Walker to W.D. Scott, Oct. 11, 1917.

⁵⁰ Ibid., Walker to Scott, Oct. 11, 1917. Two of the accused were forced to spend three months in jail while American Immigration officials checked on their nationality. Both of these men complained bitterly over their treatment, emphasizing that they had not willfully violated the Immigration law. ibid., David Moon to W.D. Scott, Dec. 8, 1917. Immigration officials, were, however, not impressed. ibid., J. Bruce Walker to W.D. Scott, Oct. 11, 1917.

⁵¹ Another notable case involved a suspected I.W.W. agent, Philip Lintz whose activities in Alberta had actually come to the attention of the British Military Attache in Washington. Report of Lieutenant-Colonel R.H. van Deman, Chief Military Intelligence, U.S. Army, enclosed in letter, Lieutenant-Colonel M. O'Brien, British Military Attache to Assistant Director of Military Intelligence, Ottawa, July 28, 1917. D.N.D., C-2102. Immigration officials and the Alberta Provincial Police harassed Lintz until he finally left the country. I.B., 917093, #1, Bruce Walker to W.D. Scott, Oct. 27, 1917; D.N.D., C-2102, Supt., Alberta Provincial Police, to Major de Kam, District Intelligence Officer, Calgary, Aug. 20, 1917.

⁵² I.B., 917093, #1, Supt. C.A. Mahoney, Saskatchewan Provincial Police, to Col. Sherwood, April 4, 1918; ibid., Bruce Walker to W.D. Scott, March 15, 1918.

⁵³ Sir Joseph Flavelle Papers, Public Archives of Canada, file 74, W.D. Scott to Sir Joseph Flavelle, Director of Imperial Munitions, Aug. 11, 1916.

⁵⁴ Ibid..

⁵⁵ Ibid., W.D. Scott to Sir Joseph Flavelle, Aug. 9, 1916; ibid., Scott to Flavelle, Sept. 11, 1916.

⁵⁶ I.B., 29490, #6, J. Frater Taylor, President of the Algoma Steel Corporation, to Sir Joseph Flavelle, Aug. 17, 1917; ibid., W.D. Scott to C.E.E. Usher, General Passenger Agent, C.P.R., Aug. 19, 1917.

⁵⁷ Canadian Annual Review, 1918, p. 330.

⁵⁸ Vancouver Sun, Feb. 2, 1918, Ed..

⁵⁹ Victoria Daily Colonist, Jan. 17, 1918; ibid., Jan. 15, 1918.

⁶⁰ Ibid..

⁶¹ Saturday Night, Dec. 1, 1917, Ed.; Vancouver World, Jan. 22, 1918, Ed..

⁶² British Columbia Federationist, Jan. 25, 1918, Ed..

- ⁶³ Ibid..
- ⁶⁴ Vancouver World, Feb. 8, 1918, Ed..
- ⁶⁵ British Columbia Federationist, Jan. 18, 1918, Ed..
- ⁶⁶ Vancouver Sun, Feb. 7, 1918.
- ⁶⁷ Diary of Sir Robert Borden, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter, Borden Diary), Jan. 21, 1918; ibid., Jan. 24, Vancouver World, Feb. 8, 1918.
- ⁶⁸ Montreal Gazette, March 23, 1918, Ed..
- ⁶⁹ Borden Diary, Jan. 24, 1918.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid.; Canadian Annual Review, 1918, pp. 490-99.
- ⁷¹ Industrial Canada, May, 1918, Ed..
- ⁷² Borden Papers, 56588, I.R. Poole to Prime Minister Borden, Feb. 11, 1918.
- ⁷³ The Canadian Mining Journal, May 1, 1918, Ed..
- ⁷⁴ Major General W.D. Otter, Report of Internment Operations 1914-1920 (Ottawa, 1920), pp. 9-14.
- ⁷⁵ In June, 1915, Lord Shaughnessy, President of the C.P.R. publicly defended the right of the Company to use P.O.W. labour, Daily Mail (London), June 19, 1915, cited Canadian Annual Review, 1915, p. 354.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 10; Secretary of State Papers, Internment Operations File, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter Internment Operations Papers), file, 3326, vol. 5, Major-General Otter, to F.L. Manklyn, Executive Assistant, C.P.R., June 12, 1916.
- ⁷⁷ W.D. Otter, Internment Operations, p. 10.
- ⁷⁸ Internment Operations File, 3326, vol. 5, General Manager, C.P.R., to Major-General Otter, April 20, 1917.

⁷⁹Ibid., John Aronee, P.O.W., to Otter, translated telegram, May 14, 1917.

⁸⁰Ibid., 5330, vol. 7, Major Dales to Otter, Nov. 14, 1918.

⁸¹Borden Papers, 43110, Mark Workman to Prime Minister Borden, Dec. 19, 1917.

⁸²Ibid..

⁸³Ibid., 43097, Prime Minister Borden to A.E. Blount, July 1, 1918.

⁸⁴Proceedings of the T.L.C., 1916, pp. 42-43.

⁸⁵J.C. Watters to C.J. Doherty, June 22, 1916, cited ibid., p. 43.

⁸⁶Ibid..

⁸⁷Borden Papers, 120385, A. Bowen Perry, Commissioner N.N.W.M.P., to Prime Minister Borden.

⁸⁸It is notable that the local of the U.M.W.A. and the District Officers disagreed on the acceptability of Armstrong. In February, 1918 the Drumheller local of the U.M.W.A., (1746) warned Borden that they no longer had any faith in Armstrong's impartiality. Borden Papers, 120437. In contrast, the Indiannapolis office informed Borden that they entirely supported the actions of W.H. Armstrong. Ibid., 120440, Biggs & Ed. Brome to R.L. Borden, Feb. 22, 1918. This incident revealed the growing rift between the officers of the District and the rank and file. Charles McMillan, "Trade Unions in District 18, 1900-1925: A Case Study", unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1968, pp. 138-39.

⁸⁹Borden Papers, 120351, W.A. Wood, Vallance Coal Co., to Prime Minister Borden, May 16, 1917.

⁹⁰Ibid., 120363, C.M. Thompason, President of the Calgary News-Telegram, to Robert Rogers, Minister of Public Works, June 26, 1917.

⁹¹Borden Papers, R.L.B., 1124(1), T.W. Crothers, Minister of Labour to Prime Minister Borden, Oct. 25, 1917.

⁹² Ibid., 120436, Prime Minister Borden to Sir William Mackenzie, Feb. 21, 1918.

⁹³ Canadian Annual Review, 1918, p. 330.

⁹⁴ Borden Papers, 120213, H.A. Lovett, to Prime Minister Borden, Oct. 22, 1917.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 120221-A, James Warren, Managing Director, Consolidated Mining and Smelting, to C.B. Gordon, Vice-President, Imperial Munitions Board, Nov. 27, 1917.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 120265, Christen Junget, Crow's Nest Pass Sub-District, to Officer R.N.W.M.P. Inspector, Commanding 'D' Division, McLeod, Alberta, Jan. 29, 1918; ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 120385, Report, Inspector Tuckin, to Officer Commanding 'D' Division, Oct. 4, 1917.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 120421, Arthur Meighen to Prime Minister Borden, Feb. 9, 1918, enclosed anonymous report, to Arthur Meighen, Dec. 31, 1917.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 120213, H.A. Lovett, to Borden, Oct. 22, 1917.

¹⁰² Charles McMillan, "Trade Unions in District 18", pp. 147, 154.

¹⁰³ Martin Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour 1880-1930 (Kingston, 1968), pp. 138-39.

¹⁰⁴ Borden Papers, R.L.B., 1124-Aug. 3, 1917, Sir George Bury to Prime Minister Borden.

¹⁰⁵ Throughout 1917-18, coal operators in District 18 has denounced Crothers. Ibid., 120363, C.M. Thompson to Robert Rogers, June 26, 1917; ibid., 120287, Smith Curtis, Kamloops, Mines to Prime Minister Borden, May 4, 1917. By April, 1918, Borden had taken the position that "Crothers is becoming more and more useless. It is necessary to arrange his elimination". Borden Diary, April 21, 1918.

¹⁰⁶ In February and March, 1918, Robertson had informed other members of the Cabinet of his hostility towards radical trade unions and the foreign worker. Borden Papers, ; G.D. Robertson to T.W. Crothers, Feb. 20, 1918; ibid., 132543, Robertson to Borden, March 27, 1918.

¹⁰⁷ Canadian Annual Review, 1918, p. 491; Borden Diary, Sept. 10, 1918. On August, 5, 1918 by Order-in-Council (P.C. 1925), much more stringent penalties were provided to enforce the "Idleness Act", Statutes of Canada, 9-10 Geo. V, xciii.

¹⁰⁸ Department of Justice Papers, Public Archives of Canada, Registrar of Alien Enemies, Montreal, to Colonel Sherwood, June 19, 1918.

¹⁰⁹ Debates, 1918, p. 976-79.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 978. At the time Borden dismissed Clement's motion as "absurd". Borden Diary, April 22, 1918.

¹¹¹ There were various reports from military intelligence in northern Ontario of labour radicalism among the Finns in northern Ontario. D.N.D., C-2102, in passim.

¹¹² Borden Papers, 56588, I.R. Poole to Prime Minister Borden, Feb. 11, 1918.

¹¹³ Ibid., 56596, Sir Joseph Flavelle to Prime Minister Borden, Feb. 22, 1918; ibid., 133275, Flavelle to Borden, May 16, 1918.

¹¹⁴ D.N.D., C-2665, Major-General Ketchen, G.O.C., M.D. #10, to Secretary of the Militia Council, July 7, 1917.

¹¹⁵ Cited, Building Bulletin, Aug. 15, 1918, clipping enclosed, Secretary of State Papers, Chief Press Censor File, 170, vol. 156.

¹¹⁶ Department of Justice Papers, File 2059 for the year 1918, Registrar of Alien Enemies, Winnipeg, to Colonel Sherwood, Aug. 17, 1918.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

118 Borden Papers, 56642, Prime Minister Borden, May 19, 1918. Borden indicated in his Diary (Aug. 23, 1917) that C.H. Cahan had asked to be appointed to some position where he could be of national service. The appointment of Cahan caused deep resentment from the U.M.W.A. newspaper at Fernie, The District Ledger (Oct. 24, 1918) which stated that "Mr. Cahan's is particularly unsuited for the task".

119 Ibid., 56656, C.H. Cahan to Prime Minister Borden, July 20, 1918.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid., 56668, C.H. Cahan to Prime Minister Borden, Sept. 14, 1918.

123 Ibid., 56688.

124 Ibid., 56669.

125 Ibid.

126 D.N.D., C-2051, Major-General Otter to General Gwatkin, Chief of the General Staff, April 7, 1917; William Rodney, Soldiers of the International.

127 D.N.D., C-2051, Malcolm Reid, Immigration Officer, Vancouver, to Colonel Sherwood, June 21, 1917; ibid., Major-General Fiset, Deputy Minister of Defence to Deputy Minister of Marine, Dec. 18, 1917.

128 Ibid., Colonel Chambers to J. Swettenham, Director of Official Press Bureau, London, March 14, 1918.

129 Ibid., Walter Long, Colonial Secretary to Governor-General, Duke of Connaught, May 23, 1918.

130 John Swettenham, Allied Intervention in Russia 1918-1919 (London, 1967), pp. 127-129.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid., Report, Intelligence Officer, American Expeditionary Forces, Siberia, to Director of Intelligence Washington, Oct. 14, 1918.

133 William Rodney, Soldiers of the International, pp. 34-35.

134 D.N.D., C-2102, Fred Hardy, Secretary, General Recruiting, I.W.W., to Bruno Kaario, Vancouver, May 17, 1918.

135 Ibid., Report of R.N.W.M.P. Sgt., Fort William to Supt. of District, Oct. 16, 1918.

136 I.B., 917093, #2, Major-General Fiset to W.D. Scott, Aug. 26, 1918.

137 Ibid., W.D. Scott to E.L. Newcombe, Deputy Minister of Justice, Sept. 6, 1918.

138 Ibid., Newcombe to Scott, Sept. 9, 1918.

139 Secretary of State Papers, Chief Press Censor File, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter C.P.C.), 144-A-2, vol. 28, Fred Livesay, Western Press Censor, to Colonel Chambers, Aug. 13, 1918; ibid., Chambers to the Secretary of State, Martin Burrell, Sept. 5, 1918.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid.

142 Borden Papers, 566677-81, C.H. Cahan to Prime Minister Borden, Sept. 14, 1918.

143 Ibid.

144 Statutes of Canada, (1919) 9-10 Geo. V., pp. lxxi-lxxiii, lxxvii-lxxx.

145 Ibid.

146 Martin Robin, Radical Politics, p. 166; William Rodney, Soldiers of the International, pp. 17-18.

147 Nathan Glazer, The Social Basis of American Communism, (New York, 1961), pp. 65-68.

148 Abraham Cahan, founder of the Jewish Daily Forward enjoyed considerable prestige among the very large Jewish population of New York city (estimated as 25% of the total population by 1910), but also among Jews in Canada. The appeal was particularly strong among Jewish socialists. Ibid., p. 68. Melvyn Dobofsky, When Workers Organize (Amherst, 1968), pp. 7, 17, 33, 60. ¶

149 Although some concern had been expressed over the views of the Eagle, no action was taken. British Ambassador, Washington, to Sir Joseph Pope, Feb. 15, 1919, C.P.C., 147-A, vol. 29. Ibid., Colonel Chambers to H. Wolafsky, Owner of the Eagle, March 3, 1919.

150 Ibid.

151 Borden Papers, 48169, C.H. Cahan, Director of Public Safety to Prime Minister Borden, Oct. 29, 1918.

152 Ibid., 56676, C.H. Cahan to Prime Minister Borden, Sept. 14, 1918; ibid., 56698, Cahan to Borden, Oct. 21, 1918; ibid., C.P.C., 292, vol. 124, Colonel Chambers, Chief Press Censor, memorandum, Dec. 31, 1918.

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid., 137871, T.A. Crerar, memorandum to the Privy Council, Sept. 24, 1918.

155 Ibid.

156 Ibid.

157 Borden Papers, 56708, Newton Rowell, to Prime Minister Borden, Oct. 29, 1918. It is significant that Rowell was not highly esteemed in the Cabinet, and Borden apparently had a very low opinion of Rowell's ability. Borden Diary, Sept. 14, 1918.

158 Borden spoke very highly of T.L.C. Officials Tom Moore, P.M. Draper and John Bruce. In fact, he took Draper with him to the Versailles Peace Conference. Borden Dairy, Oct. 30, 1918, Oct. 31, Nov. 7.

- 159 William Rodney, Soldiers of the International, p. 18.
- 160 Borden Papers, 60974-78, memorandum for the Solicitor-General, Department of Justice, June 20, 1919.
- 161 Toronto Globe, Dec. 26, 1918, p. 1.
- 162 ibid., Dec. 30, p. 1.
- 163 Skidmore only actually served 12 days of his sentence. Borden Papers, 60974-78, memorandum for the Solicitor-General, June 20, 1919.
- 164 ibid..
- 165 C.P.C., 144-A-1, vol. 27, Fred Livesay, Western Press Censor to Colonel Chambers, April 24, 1918; ibid., Aug. 13, 1918.
- 166 Upon hearing the sentence Colonel Chambers wired his congratulations to General Ketchen, O.C., M.D. #10, Oct. 3, 1918. C.P.C., 144-A-2, vol. 28.
- 167 The Western Labor News, Oct. 3, 1918, Ed..
- 168 ibid..
- 169 ibid., Nov. 1, 1918, Ed.. David Wells was a 24 year old conscientious objector who had been arrested in 1918 held in Minto Barracks, Winnipeg, and died in an asylum some three weeks after being arrested. None of the reasons for the death satisfied the Winnipeg TLC, and Rev. Ivens in particular believed that foul play was involved. Ibid.; (Martin Robin, Radical Labour, p. 156.) Ginger Goodwin, former Secretary of the Trail Smeltermen's Union and Vice-President of the British Columbia Federation of Labour was killed by a police constable in the Cumberland District of British Columbia. His death precipitated a one day general strike throughout the province in July 1918. Martin Robin, Radical Politics, p. 152.
- 170 Western Labor News, Dec. 28, 1918, p. 1.
- 171 R.B. Russell a Winnipeg machinist, was a prominent member of the local branch of the Socialist Party of Canada.

According to D.C. Masters, he was also "a most influential member of the Winnipeg Trades and Labour Council. D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike (Toronto, 1950), pp. 3-4.

172 Royal Canadian Mounted Police Records, Headquarter, Files Re: Winnipeg Strike, vol. 7, R.B. Russell to Joseph Knight, Dec. 7, 1918.

173 Ibid., R.B. Russell to Joseph Knight, Jan. 7, 1919.

174 Ibid., Testimony, Board of Inquiry Michael Charitinoff Deportation, July 16, 1919, Statement by Marcus Hyman, Defence Attorney. Charitinoff has been spelled at least five different ways in official documents.

175 C.P.C., 144-A-1, vol. 27, Fred Livesay, Western Press Censor, to Colonel Chambers, April 17, 1919.

176 Ibid., R.B. Russell to Colonel Chambers, April 28, 1919.

177 Ibid., Colonel Chambers to R.B. Russell, May 1, 1919.

178 The District Ledger, Nov. 21, 1918, Ed.; ibid., Dec. 12, 1918, Ed..

179 Ibid., Sept. 12, 1918, Ed..

180 Ibid., Oct. 24, 1918, Ed..

181 Ibid.

182 Martin Robin, Radical Politics, pp. 160-164.

183 Ibid., pp. 170-180.

184 C.P.C., 279-12, vol. 125, Excerpt memorandum prepared for Colonel Chambers, April 22, 1919.

185 Ibid.

186 D.N.D., C-2817, #3, Agent Butler to Major Davis, Assistant Director of Military Intelligence, June 19, 1919.

187 ibid...

Chapter IX

NATIVISM AND IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION, 1919

Let every hostile alien be deported from a country the privileges of which citizenship he does not appreciate, and let the men who have saved the free institutions and the lives of all our people be given that preference in opportunity that they have won by their sacrifices....¹

1919, the year which heralded the official end of war with the signing of the Versailles Treaty, did not ameliorate the strong animosity manifest by many Anglo-Canadians towards their former enemies, the Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Bulgarians and Turks. Public pressure mounted for the deportation of enemy aliens already in the country and attempts were made to close the door to any future immigration from the domains of the Central Powers. There was also widespread agitation for the immediate imposition of discriminatory economic regulations against these enemy aliens; it was argued that the returned soldiers deserved the jobs and even the land that enemy aliens had secured. Many Anglo-Canadians were not prepared to countenance the full restoration of the enemy aliens' civil rights, notably the franchise and freedom of the press.

Sacrifice and commitment to the national war effort became the major criteria for determining the post-war policy to be adopted in dealing with a second group of

aliens, the sectarian pacifists. The good conduct of the Mennonites, Hutterites, and Doukhobors was insufficient to save these groups from bitter hostility. In the minds of Anglo-Canadians, these sectarians had failed to perform one of the most basic responsibilities of citizenship-- military service. Furthermore, they had shown no enthusiasm for the Canadianization program implemented during the war, particularly in respect to the unilingual school system. There were also indications that these groups had 'profiteered' during the war; Anglo-Canadians feared that this new affluence would permit these sectarians to increase their communal holdings throughout Western Canada.

However, the most dangerous threat to the Anglo-Canadian economic system emanated from a third group of aliens, the Bolsheviks. After 1917, the Russians, Ukrainians, and Finns were regarded with deep distrust. The circulation of inflammatory Bolshevik literature, the growing radicalization of labour as evidenced by the paralyzing strikes of 1917-18 and the growing syndicalist movement in the West, produced almost a 'siege mentality' in the thinking of many Anglo-Canadian government officials and private citizens. As the industrial conflict reached a climax with the Winnipeg Strike, in May 1919, the preponderance of British immigrants in the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, the O.B.U. and the Central Strike Committee in Winnipeg created such enormous concern among Anglo-Canadian businessmen and security

officials that the concept of 'the dangerous alien' was re-defined to include British-born agitators.

In the early months of 1919 the Borden government was deluged by a great wave of submissions demanding the mass deportation of enemy aliens.² Patriotic societies, such as the Orange Lodge, stressed the fact that the enemy aliens had illustrated disloyal behaviour during the war; doubt was expressed that the enemy aliens could ever "be classed as Loyal British Citizens, or become true citizens of the Empire."³ Many municipalities urged the Dominion government to consider mass deportation as the only means of avoiding civil disorder resulting from the clash between the enemy aliens and the returned soldiers.⁴

Certainly the most volatile ingredient in the post war situation was the returned serviceman. Civil disorders involving veterans had occurred in Calgary in 1915 and in Regina in 1918. In 1919, with over 3,000 veterans returning each month and the country gripped by an economic recession, the rôle that the demobilized army was going to assume in Canadian society was very uncertain.⁵ The years of savage warfare in the trenches of Flanders had produced a highly critical attitude towards politicians who engaged in partisan jousting while the soldiers gave their blood; many soldiers felt a strong sense of resentment towards financiers and manufacturers whose voracious appetite for

profit seemed to give considerable credibility to socialist allegations about 'the capitalist conspiracy.'⁶ Highly respected for his war service, and potentially capable of fighting injustice and tyranny in Canada as well as in Europe, there were indications that the sense of frustration with war profiteering and the high level of unemployment among the returned men might trigger an assault on the financial moguls.

While the rich and powerful might be verbally denounced, they remained remote and outside the daily experience and contact of the veteran. Not so the enemy alien who was present everywhere 'babbling' in his foreign dialect and 'peddling' his foreign papers. It was quite apparent to the veteran that many aliens had prospered during the war. The once despised 'bohunk' of the neighbourhood, who had been the object of disdain before the war, now enjoyed relative affluence and what seemed even more important, he had a job. With large numbers of veterans unable to find employment, the issue of alien labour became extremely combustible. The Great War Veterans' Association (G.W.V.A.), charged that many of these employed enemy aliens made no secret of their espousal of militaristic Prussian values. This determination of the G.W.V.A. to force the expulsion of the enemy alien was clearly stated by J.O. Newton, Vice-President of the Winnipeg G.W.V.A.: "Having seen the Hun in his naked ugliness, and having suffered so

much at his hands, the boys are determined that the alien enemy in Canada must move on...."7

The attitude of the Dominion government towards the returned soldiers was generally one of caution. In 1918, Prime Minister Borden had been solicitous in receiving petitions and delegations from veterans' organizations. Although Borden remained cool towards demands for the immediate mass internment and deportation of aliens, pressure continued to mount. Early in January, 1919, the Dominion government found itself forced to take action in outbreaks of mutiny and rioting among the Canadian troops in Great Britain; later in the month violent clashes between aliens and veterans began to occur sporadically throughout Canada.⁸

On January 28, 1919, a very ugly incident between enemy aliens and veterans developed in Winnipeg, long a hot-bed of ethnic tension. An angry mob gathered at the Swift Company meat packing plant to protest against the retention of alien employees. According to one eye witness "they might have demolished the whole building...had not the civic and military officials intervened."⁹ Mayor Gray of Winnipeg addressed the mob, urging them to respect private property, but sympathizing with their anti-alien campaign: "We want to get the aliens out and I am with you in that, but let us do it constitutionally. Go back to the city and show them you will give them a chance to get rid of the

aliens and if they don't do it, then is the time for reckoning."¹⁰ Later in the day the German Club and the Socialist Party headquarters were wrecked; then the mob swept along Main Street "beating up foreigners, or apparent foreigners."¹¹ An attack on the business establishment of Samuel Blumenberg, a prominent Jewish socialist followed. Unable to find Blumenberg, the mob "seized the woman [Mrs. Blumenberg] and forced her to kiss the Union Jack."¹² Finally the mob vented their wrath on the premises: "Everything possible to smash was smashed up...."¹³

The complicity of The Winnipeg Telegram in these events was strongly suspected. A picture of Sam Blumenberg had appeared on the front page of the paper on the day before his store was raided. Blumenberg claimed that he had anticipated violence against his person on this occasion: "I saw the Winnipeg Telegram and then I knew, they were looking for me."¹⁴ The Telegram made no apologies for the violence directed against the alien. In reporting the riot, the newspaper contrasted the manly traits of the Anglo-Saxon veterans to the cowardly and furtive behaviour of the alien:

It was typical of all who were assaulted, that they hit out for home or the nearest hiding place after the battle, and that none reported to the hospitals.... According to the police, most of the men assaulted were wily enough to 'play possum' and pretend to be seriously hurt, until they could make good their escape.¹⁵

A second aspect of the anti-alien campaign of the Telegram, an approach imitated by many other papers across the country, was to justify the recourse to mob violence. In response to an editorial from the Winnipeg Tribune, which was the only Winnipeg daily to deplore the brutal attacks on the foreign population, the Telegram boldly declared that the action was justified because of a 'higher-law': "there are worse things than violence. One of these worse things is the toleration of treason amongst us."¹⁶ However, at this stage both the Winnipeg Tribune and the Manitoba Free Press disassociated themselves from the scurrilous outlook of The Telegram.

Perhaps an even more significant aspect of the January riots was the complicity of the police and the military. No attempt was made to protect the foreign citizenry from the mob. The Western Labor News referred to the City Police as "ambulance orderlies" content to pick up the victims after they had been sufficiently battered by the crowd.¹⁷ Neither of the federal security forces, the R.N.W.M.P. nor the military, made any attempt to intervene. The Assistant Adjutant General of Military District 10, L. Goldstein, admitted that he had received information on January 26th, that trouble was brewing, but he refused to take any action or to inform the city police on the grounds that: "It was not my duty, I was a military officer then.... It is always impressed on an officer serving in a position

like I was serving never to pass on information he may receive except to the officer he is responsible to."¹⁸ The officer had underestimated the magnitude of the outbreak: "I didn't think any person would be attacked, except, perhaps, one or two individuals."

The tendency on the part of local politicians and security officials to yield to the anti-alien pressure of the veterans became even more pronounced in February and March of 1919. On February 3, a crowd of about 800 veterans appeared before the Manitoba Legislative Building demanding immediate government action against the enemy alien. They protested: the presence of over 24,000 enemy aliens in Winnipeg alone; the fact that many of these enemy aliens had jobs with both private enterprise and the public service; the continued use of the German language in public schools. Premier Norris refuted the charges. He insisted that checks had been made of the civil service and there was no evidence that enemy aliens were in the employ of the government. He denied that the government was allowing the teaching of German in the public schools.

As for the alien problem in general, Norris left little doubt that he personally was in favour of mass deportation. Norris conceded, however, that his government was restricted by constitutional considerations from ordering deportation, but that strong representations had been made to the Dominion government for immediate action on the matter.¹⁹

As an expression of his determination to cope with the enemy alien problem, Norris announced the creation of the Alien Investigation Board on February 7, 1919.²⁰

The Board was to have the authority to conduct the registration of enemy aliens (thereby continuing the work of the Enemy Alien Registrars despite the end of hostilities overseas) and to issue registration cards to all those aliens of enemy nationality that were considered 'loyal' Canadians.²¹ It was strongly suggested to all employers in the province that they should employ only those aliens who had duly certified registration cards.²²

The underlying purpose of the Norris government in creating a provincial Alien Registration Board was to placate the veterans. Although there was an attempt to give the four man Board an image of judicial impartiality by appointing a county court judge, R.H. Meyers, as chairman, two appointees were veterans while the fourth member represented organized labour.²³ Reports of the proceedings revealed that the enemy alien did not always receive a fair hearing: the lack of proficiency in spoken English hampered many aliens from stating their case clearly; a large audience of hostile veterans was usually present at the Registration Hall; and no provision was made for the alien to receive legal representation.²⁴ In May the first group of undesirable aliens were brought before Judge Meyers for sentencing. He ordered that the three men be interned

commenting that "it would be up to the military to decide what would be done to them, whether they were to be deported or not."²⁵

Yet another dimension of the enemy alien problem was that large numbers of these persecuted people, in the face of sustained hostility and harassment, indicated that they were planning to leave Canada. For instance, following the Winnipeg riots of January 26-28, the Winnipeg German community despatched a memorandum to Prime Minister Borden complaining bitterly about the popular press "which has without exception fostered the prevailing bitter feelings"²⁶ The threat was also made that if conditions did not improve the German community would reluctantly "seek other fields for their industry."²⁷ In that same month, J.A. Stevenson, a prominent free-lance journalist, informed Arthur Meighen that enemy aliens domiciled in western Canada were fearful that they would be assaulted by returned soldiers, and that their lands would be seized by the Dominion government: "they are now...anxiously enquiring if it is worth while putting in a crop. Many of them are actually laying plans to return to Europe to escape the persecution which they think is inevitable."²⁸ The results of such an exodus according to Stevenson would be disastrous: decline in the volume of grain production; increased burden of taxation on Anglo-Canadians; and "a hopeless dearth of labour for certain kinds of work which

Anglo-Saxons will not undertake."²⁹

However, in February, 1919, the Dominion government appeared to be primarily interested in avoiding strife between the enemy aliens and the veterans. Sir Thomas White, the Acting Prime Minister during Borden's absence at the Paris Peace Talks, became so concerned over the enemy alien situation that on February 3, he despatched the following telegram to Borden:

There are twenty-two thousand aliens, including six thousand eight hundred alien enemies in the City of Toronto with proportionate numbers in Southern Ontario industrial centres. The antagonism displayed by the returned soldiers together with difficulties connected with unemployment renders it very desirable that several thousands of these aliens who are anxious to return to European countries and willing to pay their passage should be permitted to go.³⁰

According to White the exodus of an appreciable number of aliens would greatly ease the tension in Canada, and if the aliens were agreeable there would be no major objection. The Canadian government would, in fact, be providing a useful service to the thousands of Germans, Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Russians who wished to be repatriated.³¹

The question of voluntary repatriation procedures was soon to be eclipsed by much more urgent considerations. With the threat of civil disorder increasing, White sent another telegram to Borden enquiring whether there would be

"any stipulation necessary in Peace Treaty to permit us under legislation to deport after conclusion of peace, Canadian residents of enemy nationality, who have been here for many years."³² Presumably, these enemy aliens were not to be given the choice; they were to be forced to leave the country. However, it was not stipulated whether these deportees were to be enemy aliens interned during the war, or enemy aliens found undesirable by quasi-judicial bodies such as the Alien Investigation Board.

In his reply, Prime Minister Borden assured White that Canada had the right under international law "to deport under legislation Canadian residents of enemy nationality...."³³ Other difficulties soon materialized: inadequate transportation facilities, civil war in Russia, and the reluctance of nations such as Holland and Italy to allow the landing "of passengers en route to other countries." These obstacles proved to be formidable barriers for any plan of "disposing of large numbers of Ukrainians, Russians and Bulgarians...."³⁴

On February 28, 1919 the German government lodged an official complaint with British authorities over "the reported plan of the Canadian government to deport all Germans from Canada."³⁵ In forceful tones the German government warned that such action would create an international crisis:

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The German government and the entire German nation would regard any deportment of German subjects en masse by His Majesty's Government ...as a measure of peculiar enmity for which, in view of the Armistice, there would be no real justification; it is added that such a course would be contrary to the principles advocated by President Wilson and would prove a serious menace to a lasting peace of reconciliation."³⁶

In reply, Canadian authorities gave assurance that "en masse deportation of German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian or Turkish subjects from Canada has not been decided upon and is not being seriously considered."³⁷ How strong British influence was in deciding this matter is not entirely clear. It seemed obvious, however, that the British wished to avoid any complications with Germany over this issue. Thus, in June, 1919, Lord Milner requested that the Canadian authorities prepare a comprehensive report including the names of all German P.O.W's being considered for repatriation "with a brief description of the causes of internment and your recommendation in each case as to whether or not the prisoner ought to be deported."³⁸

Lord Milner's request received prompt attention. The government was most anxious to expedite the final disposition of enemy aliens still being held in Canadian internment camps. Since January 1919 the government had been attempting to reconcile the insistent demands from some Anglo-Canadians for further internments and mass deporta-

tion of prisoners of war with the realities of an unstable international situation. The Order-in-Council (P.C. 158) passed January 23, 1919 to deal with the interned P.O.W's gave a rather broad interpretation to the criteria for deportation:

the Minister of Justice shall be authorized to direct the immediate expulsion, removal or deportation from Canada, for the purpose of their repatriation, of all such interned aliens of enemy nationality as he may consider dangerous, hostile or undesirable person to live in Canada, and that a direction by the Minister of Justice under his hand shall be sufficient authority for the purpose aforesaid.³⁹

The interned prisoner, therefore, had no appeal from the decision of the Minister of Justice, who acted on the recommendations of the various camp commandants, and the Director of Internment Operations, Major-General Otter.

As of December 1, 1918 there were some 2222 interned enemy aliens in the four remaining internment camps. In his Report, Sir William Otter was quite precise as to the future policy of the Internment Operations towards these interned aliens.⁴⁰ The 1700 Germans held were definitely regarded with considerable suspicion and Otter indicated that most were candidates for repatriation. For the 800 prisoners moved at the request of the Imperial authorities from confinement in the West Indies to Amherst, N.S., the matter was quite straight-forward; they would be deported. As for the remaining 900 Germans less than 10% were to be

allowed to remain in Canada, despite the fact that many had expressed a desire to settle.⁴¹ The official attitude towards those classified as 'Austrians' was much more lenient. Otter wrote: "...practically all [are] of the labouring class, and by whom no particular hostile feeling is shown."⁴² However, some camp commandants were unwilling to recommend the early release of internees alleged to be members of the I.W.W. or the Social Democratic Party.⁴³ It was not until February 1920 that the last internment station was closed. By that time some 1,964 P.O.W's had been deported.⁴⁴

The governmental delay in deporting interned aliens convinced many militant Anglo-Canadians that the Unionists had no intention of dealing sternly with these 'traitors'. Critics rejected the idea that transportation was not available. During a debate in the House of Commons in March, 1919, H.M. Clements stated "it is not necessary to wait for palatial ships in order that these aliens may be deported. Cattle ships are good enough for them...."⁴⁵

Perhaps it was a reaction to the charges of federal inactivity on the enemy alien question that the Dominion government proved to be so co-operative with the provincial alien investigation boards. In February, 1919, an Order-in-Council was passed which conferred upon the country and district court judges power to order the internment as prisoners of war "persons of alien enemy nationality resid-

ing or being within the designated locality."⁴⁶ Moreover, in response to requests from the Manitoba Alien Investigation Board for intelligence reports pertaining to aliens, the Dominion authorities proved to be very accommodating.⁴⁷ On March 15, the Deputy Minister of Justice asked the Acting Chief Commissioner of the Dominion Police to instruct the Registrar of Alien Enemies at Winnipeg to turn over all relevant information to the Alien Investigation Board.⁴⁸ Five days later, the R.N.W.M.P. Comptroller grudgingly advised his superior, Commissioner Perry that "in view of the request of the Deputy Minister of Justice it seems advisable to cooperate with the Board."⁴⁹ It appears that Arthur Meighen, the Acting Minister of Justice, was particularly interested in the work of the Alien Investigation Board. In a letter to R.L. Richardson, the editor of the Winnipeg Tribune and M.P. for Springfield, Meighen maintained that the provincial board had sufficient powers to cope with the alien problem: "The Judge having authority at Winnipeg is Judge Meyers. The most complete authority has been given him and anyone can make complaint and proof at any time."⁵⁰

The Dominion government also became involved in the controversy revolving around D.A. Ross, the erratic Liberal Member for Beausejour in the Manitoba Legislature. In April and May 1919, Ross became the leading crusader against the "sedition mongering" of the Ukrainian nationalists.⁵¹

Like many other Anglo-Canadians, Ross was unable to differentiate between the various groups with the Manitoba Ukrainian community; he believed that the community was monolithic in structure encompassing clerico-nationalists such as Bishop Budka, moderate socialist-nationalists such as Taras Ferley, and Bolsheviks such as Matthew Popovich.⁵² He appears to have believed that the entire Ukrainian elite accepted the leadership of Bishop Budka, and was committed to some sinister conspiracy. In a letter to Arthur Meighen, the Acting Minister of Justice, in April, 1919, Ross charged that the Ruthenian prelate was not only pro-German, but pro-Bolshevik as well. "At an address he [Bishop Budka] gave the other night before the Knights of Columbus he extolled Bolshevism and said it was the coming cult for the whole world. Is it any wonder that these poor ignorant people are filled full of revolutionary ideas when the head of the Ruthenian Church here says it is the coming cult."⁵³ Ross also declared that he had positive evidence that enemy aliens in rural Manitoba "have machine guns, rifles and ammunition to start a revolution in May and that they are going to divide up property equally among everybody."⁵⁴ According to Ross it was time for decisive action by the Dominion government or else the returned soldiers would turn against a "spineless government...which protects the disloyal and the enemy aliens among us."⁵⁵

Arthur Meighen was obviously interested in the dis-

closures, especially since R.L. Richardson had described Ross as a man "who can be relied upon."⁵⁶ However, subsequent reports from the R.N.W.M.P. inclined Meighen to the opinion that charges made by Ross were exaggerated.⁵⁷ Moreover, previous attempts to have Bishop Budka interned and deported had been thwarted because of lack of evidence.⁵⁸ In fact, by 1919, Bishop Budka was regarded by the Dominion security officials as a firm ally against the Bolshevik element in the Ukrainian community.⁵⁹

The tense enemy alien situation in Manitoba continued to attract national attention. On April 30, 1919, H.A. Mackie, M.P. for Edmonton East made the charge in the House of Commons that the Norris government was utilizing the Alien Investigation Board for partisan purposes in an attempt to mobilize the alien vote in preparation for the next provincial election.⁶⁰ According to Mackie, the provincial Liberal government was conspiring with the various nationalist organizations to sabotage the work of the Board by granting exemption cards indiscriminantly. It was alleged that "a politician in the employ of the Norris government has a room in the Labour Hall, and he gets these people to come and report to him and he tells them: 'Now here is your exemption card from deportation... the Norris government is preventing you from being deported'.⁶¹ The endless series of charges and counter-charges flying back and forth between H.A. Mackie and Premier Norris,

between D. A. Ross and the Alien Investigation Board, and even between the spokesmen for Bishop Budka and the Ukrainian Citizens League, tended to destroy the public faith in the effectiveness of the Alien Investigation Board.⁶²

It had been apparent by May, 1919 that Anglo-Canadians manifest deep hostility towards not only the enemy alien, but also towards those alien groups who challenged their cultural and economic supremacy. Moreover, with the depressed state of the economy coupled with a very obvious labour surplus, there was a growing tendency to minimize the economic value of the aliens, and concentrate instead on their cultural acceptability. This trend was particularly notable in the Anglo-Canadian attitude towards sectarian groups such as Mennonites, Hutterites and Doukhobors. The debate over Bill #52 in the Commons between March and July of 1919 illustrated the extent to which immigration policy could be affected by anti-alien hysteria.

Immigration into Canada during World War I had primarily come from one source--the United States. Of the 207,334 immigrants that entered the country, 163,584 or 78% of the total were Americans.⁶³ Although many of these immigrants were industrial labourers and harvesters, in 1917 there were enquiries from Mennonites and Hutterites from the United States who were prepared to enter the country

on a permanent basis. This trend became quite pronounced by the fall of 1917 when the American military authorities began to exert pressure on these sectarian groups to perform military service. These Mennonites and Hutterites saw emigration to Canada as the only solution to their dilemma.⁶⁴ In October, 1917, Arthur Meighen, Minister of the Interior, informed his subordinates that he favoured the entry of the Mennonites and Hutterites because "these people are a desirable class of agriculturalist...."⁶⁵ Support was quickly forthcoming from Val Winkler, the Manitoba Minister of Agriculture, who emphasized that the Mennonite immigrants "are much the same class of people as our Menonites [sic] in Manitoba who have made first class settlers here."⁶⁶ In fact, there was a tendency to equate the two groups with the more progressive Bergthal Mennonite element.⁶⁷

Curiously enough the motivation for the Mennonite and Hutterite exodus from the United States did not concern immigration officials. In fact, a special effort was made to assure these groups that they would not be subject to the Military Service Act.⁶⁸ Nor had the Dominion authorities expressed misgivings over the Hutterites' insistence upon legal recognition of their communal form of property ownership; immigration officials simply advised the Hutterite representatives to check with the various provincial governments.⁶⁹ In a circular letter of June 1918 W.D. Scott advised American Mennonites and Hutterites that

there were no major obstacles preventing them from coming to Canada. Scott was convinced that the Immigration Branch had to take the initiative immediately to lure these prosperous immigrants north "as there will never come a time when these people will be as much interested."⁷⁰ One of the most persuasive arguments used to win over sceptical western cabinet ministers was the announcement that the Hutterites were prepared to expend "near one million dollars for their lands."⁷¹

The Unionist government and the Department of Immigration of Colonization, in particular, badly misjudged the degree of animosity generated by the proposed entry of the Mennonites and Hutterites from the south. There was already rather violent opposition directed against Canadian Mennonites because of their pacifism, their determination to maintain their own German language schools, and their system of land holding. Anglo-Canadian hostility towards Mennonite immigrants settling in the country was expressed in an open letter to Prime Minister Borden from the Board of Home Missions and Social Service of the Presbyterian Church: "all persons entering the country as settlers should be prepared to undertake their fair share of all the national burdens, including that of national defence, and that the strongest discouragement should be given to the instituting of schools in which work is carried on in the

German, or other foreign languages."⁷²

From all four western provinces by the fall of 1918 there were complaints pertaining to the influx of Mennonites and Hutterites. In sharp contrast to its previously favourable attitude towards these immigrants, the Manitoba government announced its strong opposition to any plan to allow these immigrants into the province. In July 1918 Minister of Education, Dr. R.S. Thornton informed T.A. Crerar, Minister of Agriculture in the Borden government, that he objected to the Dominion authorities giving guarantees to immigrants who would not accept national "duties, burdens and responsibilities."⁷³ This position was reiterated by Premier Martin of Saskatchewan.⁷⁴

By the fall of 1918, the Manitoba and Saskatchewan governments were involved in separate educational campaigns against the bilingual private schools that the Mennonites had established. In both provinces, school inspectors declared that these private schools were inadequate and unilingual public schools were set up under the supervision of an official trustee.⁷⁵ The full power of the state was employed against the conservative Furstenland people and others who refused to comply with school attendance regulations. Fines and imprisonment were meted out to the obdurate.⁷⁶ Faced by this assault on their cultural identity, the more orthodox Mennonites appealed to the

Dominion government for reaffirmation of their educational rights.

The question of Mennonite educational rights was bound up with constitutional considerations involving overlapping federal and provincial jurisdictions. The original terms negotiated between the Mennonite delegates and John Lowe, of the Canadian Department of Agriculture in 1873, extended to the Mennonites "the fullest privilege of exercising their religious principles...without any kind of molestation or restriction whatever, and the same privilege extends to the education of their children in the schools."⁷⁷ Yet in the summer of 1918 when a delegation of Mennonite Bishops from Saskatchewan petitioned Prime Minister Borden to reaffirm their educational rights, Borden declined stating that "the government does not feel that it would be justified in interfering...."⁷⁸ Instead, Borden urged the Mennonites to appeal to the courts. It was not until 1919 that the final judicial decision was rendered which rejected the Mennonite position.⁷⁹

In addition to their pacifism and their identification with educational controversy, the Mennonites and Hutterites encountered Anglo-Canadian hostility because of their extensive land purchases, particularly in British Columbia and Alberta. In August, 1918, Premier Oliver of British Columbia informed Dominion authorities that the purchase of large tracts of arable land in the interior of the

province had aroused members of the G.W.V.A. who objected "To allowing Germans to settle close to the land which the returned soldiers are supposed to be going on."⁸⁰ Similar complaints emanated from Alberta. According to one provincial M.L.A. to allow Mennonites to settle land adjacent to areas in which the returned soldiers might locate "is so base a treachery to Canadians that very undesirable results are inevitable."⁸¹ The Calgary Eye Opener, the popular publication edited by Bob Edwards, denounced the Mennonites as "a bunch of German Cattle", and declared that any attempt by James Calder to impose these immigrants on Alberta would not be tolerated.⁸²

Public agitation against these sectarians caused the Minister of Immigration & Colonization, J.A. Calder, to make a western tour in September-October, 1918, to determine the extent of public hostility towards these new immigrants.⁸³ In October, 1918, at a public meeting in Moose Jaw, Calder made a public statement indicating his support for legislation that would prohibit the entry into the country of any immigrant who refused to assume full citizenship obligations.⁸⁴ Still the Mennonite and Hutterite influx was not halted. In fact, W.D. Scott, Superintendent of Immigration, maintained that far from discouraging Mennonite immigration "we had steady instructions to give encouragement to the movement".⁸⁵

But the failure to comply with the dictates of public

opinion led to an intensification of the assault on Mennonite and Hutterite immigration. The major assault against the entry of the sectarians emanated primarily from the various veterans' organizations. In April, 1919 an Alberta G.W.V.A. deputation left for Ottawa "to appeal to the Dominion government for a cessation of Mennonite and Hutterite immigration; similar requests poured into Ottawa from other veterans' organizations and patriotic societies.⁸⁶ One of the strongest positions was assumed by the Winnipeg branch of the G.W.V.A. which threatened that if the Borden government did not appoint a royal commission to investigate the entry of the Hutterites, the G.W.V.A. and other sympathetic organizations intended to send representatives to Washington to implore the American government to prevent the emigration of these "slackers".⁸⁷ The Winnipeg Canadian Club, composed of leading businessmen not only from the city, but also western Canada, strongly endorsed the position of the G.W.V.A. in respect to exclusion. In a telegram dispatched to J.A. Calder, the Minister of Immigration and Colonization, exception was taken to "the admission of Hutterites and Mennonites and other similar bodies into Canada under special privileges and ask that we receive prompt assurance...that no more will be admitted...."⁸⁸

In the face of this sustained public pressure on May 1st, 1919 the Dominion government passed an Order-in-Council (P.C. 923) authorizing that steps be taken to exclude from

the country "all persons who may be regarded as undesirable because, owing to their peculiar customs, habits, modes of living and methods of holding property, they are not likely to become readily assimilated or to assume the duties and responsibilities of Canadian citizens within a reasonable time."⁸⁹ A second Order-in-Council was issued on June 9th, 1919 (P.C. 1204) stating that after that date "the landing in Canada...is hereby prohibited of the Doukhobor, Hutterite or Mennonite class."⁹⁰

Although provision was made for the future exclusion of the Doukhobor immigrants under the Order-in-Council P.C. 1204, controversy over Doukhobors domiciled within Canada centered on the question of whether their communal lands in British Columbia should be expropriated by the Dominion government. Throughout the war the antagonism towards the sect had been growing, essentially as a result of their pacifism, their failure to conform to the educational system, and the nude parades organized by radical members. Of critical importance was the fact that the Doukhobors owned thousands of acres of land in British Columbia that many "patriotic" citizens maintained would be ideal for the soldier settlement.⁹¹ As early as February, 1918 reports circulated to the effect that Peter Veregin was prepared to sell the Doukhobor lands to the Dominion government and take his sect back to Russia.⁹² In April, 1919, immigration officials were informed that Peter Veregin had claimed

he would sell the Doukhobor holdings for two million dollars to the Soldier Settlement Board.⁹³ Almost immediately a nation-wide controversy ensued.

The opposition towards the Doukhobors was substantial. The local organizations such as the Trail Reconstruction Board announced that all steps should be taken "to get rid of these law breakers...returning...these people to the country that they really belong."⁹⁴ The Great War Veterans Association were insistent that the Doukhobor lands be immediately confiscated, and distributed to the soldier settlers. It also appears that the Grand Forks branch of the G.W.V.A. had tried to intimidate the Doukhobors. On April 29, Peter Veregin wrote to Arthur Meighen, Minister of the Interior complaining that an unruly group of veterans had forced him into a discussion concerning the sale of Doukhobor lands.⁹⁵ He also charged that the real leadership for the coercion emanated not from the returned men, but from disgruntled Grand Forks merchants.⁹⁶ Meighen's refusal to intervene, strengthened the belief among pro-Doukhobor groups that a grave injustice would be perpetrated against the sect while "it (the Dominion government) flounders from one blunder to another...always yielding to local pressure."⁹⁷

A vigorous campaign was launched by Professor James Mavor to mobilize Anglo-Canadian opinion against any attempt to expropriate Doukhobor lands. On May 1, 1919 Mavor letter to Thomas White, the Acting Prime Minister;

copies of the "open" letter were also circulated among newspapers, civic groups, labour unions, agrarian organizations, and politicians. In his letter Mavor charged that a conspiracy existed "of local tradesmen, local farmers, local politicians and local speculators." It was the land speculators whom Mavor attacked most vehemently, since they would certainly profit if the improved Doukhobor lands changed hands.⁹⁸ Mavor's appeal to the Anglo-Canadian conscience was not in vain. Prominent Liberal Unionists such as Michael Clark and T.A. Crerar defended the secretaries in the House of Commons.⁹⁹ In a Manitoba Free Press editorial, John W. Dafoe asserted: "the Dominion Government would have no justification for disturbing them in the possession of properties...."¹⁰⁰ Local newspapers also issued strong statements in favour of toleration. The Grand Forks Sun warned the local readers that intimidation Doukhobors "would see the district disgraced" while the Nelson Daily News reminded its readers that "mass violations of the law is a form of licence which tends to anarchy...."¹⁰¹

By the end of May, 1919, the antagonism towards the Doukhobors had subsided. Despite a series of nude demonstrations involving the radical Sons of Freedom in the fall of 1919, no further consideration was given to uprooting the sect.¹⁰² However, in order to satisfy nativist sentiment the Borden government found it necessary, in June, 1919, to include provisions for the future exclusion of

Doukhobors in the new Immigration regulations.¹⁰³

The agitation against the enemy aliens and the pacifist aliens found expression in various changes in the Immigration regulations. On April 7, 1919, James A. Calder, the Minister of Colonization, introduced Bill #52 "to amend the Immigration Act." Throughout April-July 1919, the Immigration Act was subject to intense scrutiny by parliamentarians and by the Anglo-Canadian public.¹⁰⁴

The status of the enemy alien was the issue of greatest controversy. In 1914, under the War Measures Act the entry of immigrants from enemy countries was prohibited during the continuation of hostilities; in November, 1918, this prohibition was continued under Order-in-Council P.C. 616.¹⁰⁵ There was strong public pressure, however, for an amendment whereby immigrants from Germany, Austro-Hungary and Turkey would be added to the list of prohibited classes of immigrants under Section 3 of the Immigration Act.¹⁰⁶ In this manner, the future entry of enemy aliens would require a further amendment to the Immigration Act.¹⁰⁷ However, Bill #52 only added one group of enemy aliens to the 'prohibited classes' subject to exclusion: "enemy aliens or persons who have been alien enemies who were or may be interned on or after the eleventh day of November, one thousand nine hundred and eighteen, in any part of His Majesty's dominions or by any of His Majesty's allies...."¹⁰⁸

It was, therefore, only the 'dangerous' enemy alien who was to be excluded on a permanent basis.

Most immigrants from enemy countries were excluded on a temporary basis under Section 38 of the Immigration Act which provided that the Governor-in-Council with discretionary powers to "prohibit or limit...for a stated period or permanently the landing...of immigrants belonging to any nationality or race...deemed unsuitable...."109 As a result, in June 9th, Order-in-Council P.C. 1203 made provision for the exclusion "of immigrants who are alien enemies or who have been alien enemies during the war...and formerly subjects of Germany, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey...."110 However, exceptions were to be made for "those races or nationalities...who have declared their independence...or whose independence is recognized by the Peace Conference or whose government is placed under the control of a Mandatory Power."111

The explanation for the use of Order-in-Council rather than a statutory amendment was directly related to economic considerations. Even as the war raged, Deputy Minister W.W. Cory had advised his Minister, J.A. Calder, that the Department of Immigration and Colonization must adopt a long range view and discourage the enactment of rigid guidelines in respect to post-war German immigration. "Having due regard for the danger of admitting Germans to Canada, I must still confess that I am not opposed to the

entry of bona fide agriculturalists mentally and physically admissable, who have sufficient money to purchase their land, and intend to start farming operations at once.¹¹² During the Immigration debate of 1919 Calder had also made pointed reference to the fact that Canada must remain an active participant in the international competition for immigrants.¹¹³ Stress was placed on the importance of continued immigration to a healthy Canadian economy: to share the burden of the large national debt assumed during the war; to maintain the production of staple exports, especially wheat; to provide traffic for the extensive railway system; to provide a source of labour and consumers for an evolving Canadian manufacturing system.¹¹⁴

While recognizing that Canadian public opinion demanded immediate action against enemy aliens, Calder argued strenuously for the need to maintain a flexible immigration policy: "some of those who were our enemies yesterday are looked upon as our allies today." As examples, Calder cited the status of the Ukrainians, the Poles and the Czechs.¹¹⁵ Despite opposition criticism that this use of the Order-in-Council was tantamount to "abdicating the functions of Parliament," the government was able to retain its discretionary powers in respect to enemy aliens.¹¹⁶

A similar trend was discernible in relation to the Doukhobors, Hutterites, and Mennonites. Order-in-Council

P.C. 1204 provided for the exclusion of immigrants of this class "owing to their peculiar customs, habits, modes of living and methods of holding property and because of their probable inability to become readily assimilated or to assume the duties and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time after their entry."¹¹⁷ However, the insertion of an explanatory clause "owing to conditions prevailing as the result of war..." gave an indication that the government considered the regulations to be of temporary duration.¹¹⁸

In addition to the pressure to exclude specific groups such as the enemy and the pacifist aliens, there was considerable support for the idea that Canada should not accept immigrants from certain regions because of their racial deficiencies. By 1919, the writings of pseudo-geneticists such as Madison Grant (The Passing of the Great Race) had made a powerful impact on some Anglo-Canadians.¹¹⁹ During the debate on Bill #52 Hume Cronyn, the M.P. for London, Ontario actually cited Madison Grant's theories to support his arguments against having lesser breeds in Canada: "if you introduce a large number of strange people who cannot be assimilated poisonous currents are set up...."¹²⁰ Evidence was cited from the Reports of the American Commissioner of Immigration which referred to the high percentage of mental defectives found among the "new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe."¹²⁰ The Canadian experience was alleged

to be similar. To protect Canada from these 'undesirable' immigrants, Cronyn proposed an amendment to exclude, for a five year period, immigrants from specific geographical regions; this would have meant the exclusion of southern and eastern Europe coming directly from Europe, as well as those who sought entry via the United States.¹²² The advantages of adopting a definite statutory enactment rather than Order-in-Council, setting forth the regions from which Canada would accept immigrants, Cronyn maintained, were numerous. It would make it more difficult for large employers of labour, steamship companies and labour bureaus to pressure the government in their attempts to secure cheap labour. It would limit the power of a member of an ethnic pressure group to secure the entry of "his fellow countrymen...to share in his good fortune."¹²³ In summary, Cronyn warned that unless very firm policy was embodied in legislation the political and economic pressure of these groups favouring an 'open door' immigration policy would triumph: "We would then be back again in exactly the position in which we have always been, and subject perhaps to a flood of less desirable people, a flood which by its very volume would divert the less currents in northern Europe...."¹²⁴

Despite the pronounced anti-alien sentiment that prevailed in 1919, Anglo-Canadian Members of Parliament were not prepared to embrace such a drastic proposal for exclu-

sion. Eventually, Cronyn was persuaded to withdraw his bill, in part, because of the measures adopted by the Unionist government to limit 'undesirables'.¹²⁵ Calder, on several occasions, reiterated that a 'new' approach to immigrant recruitment was being implemented with selection being restricted to those "who could be properly absorbed into the life of the community."¹²⁶ He noted that practical measures were embodied in both the Immigration Act and in accompanying Orders-in-Council to achieve this goal.

Towards Oriental immigrants no additional measures were specifically implemented; however, a number of previous restrictions were re-instituted. In the case of Section 37, it was possible by Order-in-Council to require Oriental immigrants to have in their possession a large sum of money.¹²⁷ Similarly, under Section 38 Immigration officials had the discretionary power of excluding Oriental immigrants who arrived "otherwise than by continuous journey from the country of which he is a native or naturalized citizen."¹²⁸ This provision was aimed primarily at East Indian immigrants. Moreover, under the provisions of Section 38, an Order-in-Council, P.C. 1202 was passed on June 9, 1919 providing that "until otherwise ordered, the landing in Canada at any port of entry in British Columbia...of any immigrant of the following classes or occupations, viz., skilled and unskilled labour, is hereby prohibited."¹²⁹ Because the vast majority

of immigrants landing in British Columbia ports were Orientals, the regulation was obviously aimed in that direction.

There were also indications that the Dominion authorities intended to limit not only Oriental workers, but European unskilled labourers as well. By amendment to Section 3 of the Immigration Act it was stipulated that after July 1919, a literacy test in English, French "or some other language or dialect" would be administered to all immigrants over the age of fifteen.¹³⁰ In justifying the inclusion of the literacy test, J.A. Calder pointed out that although Canadians in the past had been undecided on the issue, it now appeared that "the great majority of the people in Canada have made up their minds definitely that this country is not going to be flooded with illiterates."¹³¹ Supporters of the bill referred to the adoption of the literacy test by the American government in 1917;¹³² Hume Cronyn actually warned that unless Canada adopted a similar measure the country would receive the hordes of southern European peasants that normally gravitated towards the United States.¹³³ The importance of excluding inferior types of immigrants was also related to growing concern over the incidence of alien criminality. Solicitor-General Hugh Guthrie confirmed the apprehension of many Anglo-Canadians when he informed the House of Commons

that "the population of our penitentiaries and prisons is almost 75 per cent aliens."¹³⁴

The attempt to use the Immigration Act as a means of protecting Canada from dangerous foreigners was certainly evident in Bill #52, especially with reference to those sections relating to both exclusion and deportation.

Section 3 provided for the exclusion of individuals who belonged to organizations advocating the overthrow of organized government, or which advocated assassination of government officials, or the unlawful destruction of property.¹³⁵ Significantly, the amendment to Section 41 provided for the deportation of "any person other than a Canadian citizen" who belonged to such organization or professed such views.¹³⁶ The fact that an alien had established domicile was immaterial; if he were found guilty under Section 41 he became liable for immediate deportation. Nor was naturalization any safeguard. During June, 1919, the Naturalization Act was amended to facilitate the deportation of naturalized Bolshevik aliens.¹³⁷

On June 18th the Secretary of State introduced Bill # 138 Naturalization Act Amend "to amend and consolidate the acts relating to British nationality, naturalization and aliens. Provision was made for the 'de-naturalization' of any person who had "shown himself by act or speech to be disaffected to His Majesty...."¹³⁸ The enemy alien was particularly vulnerable. Revocation of the certificate of

naturalization was possible for any alien who had been the legal subject of enemy countries.¹³⁹ Because Austria and Germany did not recognize any loss of nationality, this provision theoretically affected almost all immigrants from these regions unless they could establish a sound case for removal from that category.¹⁴⁰ It also authorized the Secretary of State to decide which enemy alien's certificate should be revoked.¹⁴¹ Despite criticism that the revocation of the certificate was retroactive legislation which violated certain basic principles of law and ethics, the amendments went into effect July 7, 1919.¹⁴²

In the Spring of 1919 the passage of legislation amending the Immigration and Naturalization Acts took place against a national backdrop of social tension and labour unrest which has few parallels in Canadian history. Parliamentarians had been generally responsive to Anglo-Canadian hostility towards enemy aliens and pacifist aliens. However, by June, 1919, the 'Red Scare' was to create extensive support for even more drastic revisions of these Acts. On June 7th, 1919, there was a second amendment to Section 41 of the Immigration Act: offending British-born subjects were now liable to political deportation in the same manner as other alien agitators.¹⁴³ The 'alien' had now become all those who challenged "the Canadian Way of Life."

CHAPTER IX

¹Winnipeg Telegram, Jan. 28, 1919, Ed..

²Sir Robert Borden Papers, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter, Borden Papers), Series OCA, file 252, in passim.

³Borden Papers, 830042, Resolution, Kitchener Loyal Orange Lodge, Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, to Prime Minister Borden, Feb. 6, 1919.

⁴Ibid., 83057, Resolution, City of West Vancouver, to Prime Minister Borden, Feb. 12, 1919.

⁵Canadian Annual Review, 1919, pp. 48-49.

⁶Throughout March - July, 1919, there were reports of rioting among Canadian troops in Great Britain awaiting their return to Canada. The most serious was at Kimmel Camp where several men were killed, and there were stories of the troops marching under a red flag. ibid., pp. 46-48.

⁷Manitoba Free Press, Feb. 4, 1919, p. 1.

⁸Canadian Annual Review, 1919, pp. 48-50.

⁹Deportation Board of Enquiry Hearings, the Sam Blumenberg Enquiry, Aug. 1, 1919, Royal Canadian Mounted Police Archives, Ottawa, (hereafter, Blumenberg Enquiry), testimony of Batsford, p. 111.

¹⁰Vancouver Sun, Jan. 27, 1919, p.1.

¹¹Blumenberg Enquiry, July 15, 1919, testimony of Albert Reames, secret agent, R.N.W.M.P., p. 37.

¹²Ibid...

- ¹³ Ibid., p. 39.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., July 17, testimony of Sam Blumenberg, p. 69.
- ¹⁵ Winnipeg Telegram, Jan. 29, 1919, p. 1.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., Jan. 28, 1919, Ed..
- ¹⁷ Western Labor News, Jan. 31, 1919, p. 1. Blumenberg Enquiry, July 15, testimony of Albert Reames, pp. 35, 45.
- ¹⁸ Blumenberg Enquiry, Aug. 1, 1919, testimony of L. Goldstein.
- ¹⁹ Manitoba Free Press, Feb. 4, 1919, p. 1, Ed.; Winnipeg Telegram.
- ²⁰ Manitoba Free Press, Feb. 4, 1919, p. 1.
- ²¹ Ibid..
- ²² In a biting editorial of Feb. 19, the Winnipeg Telegram called upon Anglo-Canadians to reassess their priorities: "Are we to assume that Canadians have reached that stage of luxury - loving where it is essential that we should import a race of inferior beings to do our work."
- ²³ In the first three months of the Board's existence 3,000 cases were processed; of these 500 were denied certificates. Manitoba Free Press, May 7, 1919, p. 4.
- ²⁴ Ibid..
- ²⁵ Ibid., May 14, 1919, p. 4.
- ²⁶ Borden Papers, 106794, G.L. Maron, editor Der Nordwesten, Rev. L.F. Tank, Rev. W.L. Kohn, memorandum to Prime Minister Borden, Feb. 24, 1919.
- ²⁷ Ibid..

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²⁸ Meighen Papers, 000256, J.A. Stevenson to Arthur Meighen, Feb. 24, 1919.

²⁹ Ibid... Similar reports of frightened enemy aliens came from other areas of Canada. In Sudbury, a group of Ukrainians, after a number of them had been attacked by returned soldiers, appealed for assistance in order "to return to our native countries". Department of Justice Files, Public Archives of Canada, file 2266, 1919, Albert Cawdron, Acting Commissioner of Police, to the Minister of Justice, July 28, 1919.

³⁰ Borden Papers, 83164, Sir Thomas White to Prime Minister Borden, Feb. 3, 1919.

³¹ Ibid.., 83091, White to Borden, Feb. 25, 1919.

³² Ibid.., 83152, White to Borden, Feb. 11, 1919.

³³ Ibid.., 83073, Borden to White, Feb. 19, 1919.

³⁴ Ibid.., 83101, Canadian High Commissioner, George Perley, to White, March 17, 1919.

³⁵ Ibid... Immigration Branch Records, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter, I.B.), file 912971, Swiss Ambassador, London, England to Lord Curzon, Feb. 28, 1919, enclosed representation from the German govt..

³⁶ Ibid...

³⁷ Ibid.., Acting Deputy Minister Immigration to Sir Joseph Pope, Under-Secretary of External Affairs, Dec. 3, 1919.

³⁸ Secretary of State Records, Internment Operations Files, Public Archives of Canada, (hereafter, Internment Operations), file #6712; W. Stuart Edwards, Acting Minister of Justice, memorandum to Major-General Otter, June 19, 1919.

³⁹ Order-in-Council, P.C. 158, Jan. 23, 1919, copy enclosed, Internment Operations, file 6712; ibid.., E.L. Newcombe, Deputy Minister of Justice, May 1, 1919, to Major-General Newcombe, May 1, 1919. b

⁴⁰ Ibid., Report, Major-General Otter, to the Acting Minister of Justice, Dec. 19, 1918.

⁴¹ Ibid..

⁴² Ibid..

⁴³ Ibid., Lt. Colonel W.E. Date, Commandant, Kapuskasing, to Major-General Otter, May 12, 1919.

⁴⁴ Major-General Otter, Internment Operations, 1914-1920 (Ottawa, 1920), p. 14.

⁴⁵ Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (hereafter cited as Debates), 1919, p. 753.

⁴⁶ Winnipeg Tribune, Feb. 14, 1919, p. 12; Order-in-Council, P.C. 56, January 11, 1919, devolved authority from the Dominion Minister of Justice to the provincial Attorney-General for the enforcement of the coercive regulations established by Orders-in-Council of Sept. 25, 1918. Statutes of Canada, 1919, 9-10, Geo. V., Vols. I-II, p. lxxx.

⁴⁷ Royal Canadian Mounted Police Records, Criminal Investigation Branch, Public Archives of Canada, (hereafter, R.C.M.P. Records), R.J. Mansfield, Sec. Alien Investigation Board to Commissioner Bowen Perry, Feb. 26, 1919.

⁴⁸ Ibid., E.L. Newcombe, Deputy of Minister of Justice, to A.L. Cawdron, Acting Chief Commissioner of Police, March 15, 1919.

⁴⁹ R.C.M.P. Records, Comptroller, A.L. Maclean, to Commissioner Perry, March 20, 1919. The R.N.W.M.P. remained active in registering enemy aliens; in fact, between April and September, 1919, some 55,000 monthly reports on enemy aliens were made. Those aliens who did not register were fined or jailed. Dominion of Canada, Sessional Papers, (hereafter cited Sessional Papers), 1920, no. 28, Report of Commissioner Perry, pp. 13-14.

⁵⁰ Meighen Papers, 000267, Arthur Meighen to R.L. Richardson, April 3, 1919.

⁵¹Ibid., 000270, D.A. Ross to Arthur Meighen, April, 8, 1919.

⁵²See Chapters Three and Six for an account of Bishop Budka, Taras Ferley and Matthew Popovich.

⁵³Meighen Papers, 000279, D.A. Ross to Arthur Meighen, April 16, 1919.

⁵⁴Ibid., 000270; D.A. Ross to Meighen, April 8, 1919.

⁵⁵Ibid..

⁵⁶Ibid., 000278, R.L. Richardson to Meighen, April 11, 1919.

⁵⁷Ibid., 000274, Meighen to D.A. Ross, April 11, 1919.

⁵⁸On two occasions in 1918 Bishop Budka had been charged with sedition; on both occasions he had been acquitted. Canadian Annual Review, 1918, p. 581. Debates, 1919, p. 646. In February, 1919, Bishop Budka challenged the G.W.V.A. to make formal charges of sedition; an enquiry was held, and the charges were all dismissed. Debates, 1919, p. 1936-39; Toronto Star, March 22, 1919.

⁵⁹In September, 1918, Colonel Chambers, the Chief Press Censor had interviewed Bishop Budka on the matter of Bolshevik subversion, especially with reference to the newspaper Rabotchyj Narod. Secretary of State Records, Press Censor Branch, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter C.P.C.), file 144-x A-2, Colonel Chambers to the Secretary of State, Sept. 29, 1918.

⁶⁰Debates, 1919, p.

⁶¹Ibid..

⁶²Manitoba Free Press, May 7, 1919; ibid., May 8; ibid., May 10; Winnipeg Telegram, May 13. By May 9, the Ukrainian Citizens League initiated legal action to test the constitutionality of the Alien Investigation Board. Winnipeg Tribune, May 10, 1919.

⁶³ Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book IV (Ottawa, 1969); pp. 239-40.

⁶⁴ Victor Peters, All Things Common (Minneapolis, 1965), pp. 239-240.

⁶⁵ I.B. 58764, #1, W.W. Cory, Deputy Minister of the Interior, Oct. 20, 1917.

⁶⁶ Ibid., Val Winkler to Arthur Meighen, Jan. 31, 1918.

⁶⁷ Frank EPP, Mennonite Exodus (Altona, 1962), pp. 59-61. The Canadian Agent of the Hutterites was Michael Scott, a Winnipeg Real Estate Agent, who wrote to the Deputy Minister, explaining that the Hutterites had a total of 1,200 horses. Various reports lauded the affluence of the Hutterites. Ibid., Michael Scott, Wpg. Real Estate Agent to W.W. Cory, Deputy Minister, Feb. 5, 1918; ibid., J. Bruce Walker, Commissioner of Immigration, Wpg., to W.D. Scott, Jan. 30, 1918.

⁶⁸ Ibid., J.G. Koehen, Canadian Government Agent, Omaha, Nebraska, to W.J. White, Inspector of United States Agencies, Sept. 28, 1917; ibid., W.W. Cory to W.D. Scott, Oct. 20, 1917; ibid., W.W. Cory to W.D. Scott, March 18, 1918.

⁶⁹ Ibid., Michael Scott to W.W. Cory, Feb. 5, 1918; ibid., W.W. Cory to Michael Scott, Feb. 7, 1918.

⁷⁰ Ibid., W.D. Scott to W.W. Cory, Aug. 27, 1918.

⁷¹ Ibid., Alexander Adams, legal representative for the Hutterites, Wpg., to J.A. Calder, Minister of Immigration & Colonization, Oct. 19, 1918.

⁷² Borden Papers, 12161, Rev. J.H. Edmison, Secretary, Board of Home Missions and Social Service, Presbyterian Church in Canada, to Prime Minister Borden, Oct. 3, 1918.

⁷³ Thomas A. Crerar Papers, Douglas Library, Queen's University (hereafter Crerar Papers), R.S. Thornton, Minister of Education, Manitoba, to T.A. Crerar, July 7, 1918.

- ⁷⁴ Canadian Annual Review, 1918, pp. 426-28, 686-688.
- ⁷⁵ E.K. Francis, In Search of Utopia (Altona, 1955), pp. 177-186. Canadian Annual Review, 1918, pp. 426-28.
- ⁷⁶ E.K. Francis, In Search of Utopia, pp. 165-168.
- ⁷⁷ John Lowe, Minister of Agriculture to Mennonite Delegates, July 2, 1873, cited, ibid., p. 44.
- ⁷⁸ Borden Papers, 121124, Prime Minister Borden to Rev. J.W. Wall, May 14, 1918.
- ⁷⁹ E.K. Francis, In Search of Utopia, pp. 185-86.
- ⁸⁰ I.B. 58764, #2, John Oliver, Premier, B.C., to A.L. Jolliffe, Immigration Agent, Vancouver, Aug. 23, 1918.
- ⁸¹ Borden Papers, 121174, W.A. Rae, Alberta, M.L.A., to Prime Minister Borden, Oct. 7, 1918. W.A. Buchanan, the highly respected M.P. for Lethbridge, informed Borden of the potentially explosive situation resulting from the presence of the Hutterites and Mennonites. Borden Papers, 121148, W.A. Buchanan to Borden, Sept. 25, 1918.
- ⁸² Calgary Eye Opener, Oct. 5, 1918. As it turned out by 1922 there were 14 Hutterite colonies located in Alberta. Victor Peters, All Thing Common (Minneapolis, 1965), p. 51.
- ⁸³ Prime Minister Borden, in his Diary, makes several references to the agitation over the Mennonites and Hutterites, and his consultation with various western Ministers on the matter. Sir Robert Borden Diary, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter Borden Diary), Sept. 11, 1918, Sept. 16, 1918.
- ⁸⁴ Canadian Annual Review, 1918, p. 428.
- ⁸⁵ I.B., 58764 #4, J.A. Cote, Acting Deputy Minister, I. & C., to the Acting Minister of I. & C., Oct. 11, 1918, ibid., W.D. Scott, to J.A. Cote, Oct. 26, 1918.
- ⁸⁶ Ottawa Citizen, April 16, 1919; Vancouver Sun, April 21, 1919.

- ⁸⁷ Vancouver Sun, April 15, 1919, Ed..
- ⁸⁸ Winnipeg Canadian Club Minutes, Dec. 1914-Feb. 1923, Public Archives of Manitoba, Minutes of Emergency Meeting of the Executive Committee, April 6, 1919.
- ⁸⁹ Order-in-Council, P.C. 923, enclosed, I.B. 58764, #3.
- ⁹⁰ Statutes of Canada, 1919, 9-10, Geo. V, vol. I-II, p. x.
- ⁹¹ George Woodcock and Ivan Avokumovic, The Doukhobors (Toronto, 1968), pp. 241, 252-55.
- ⁹² Vancouver World, Feb. 12, 1918, Ed..
- ⁹³ I.B., 65101, #10, P.T. McCallum, Grand Forks, British Columbia to the Commissioner of Immigration, April 1, 1919.
- ⁹⁴ I.B. 65101, #10, George Reimann, Secretary of the Trail Reconstruction Board, to the Hon. J.W. Farris, Attorney-General, British Columbia, May 3, 1919.
- ⁹⁵ James Mavor Papers, University of Toronto Archives, (hereafter Mavor Papers), Peter Veregin to Arthur Meighen, Minister of the Interior, April 29, 1919.
- ⁹⁶ Ibid...
- ⁹⁷ Creerar Papers, 1919, James Mavor to T.A. Creerar, May 7, 1919.
- ⁹⁸ "Open Letter to Sir Thomas White," Department of Justice Records, Public Archives of Canada, 1919, file 1325. Meighen denied that there was any conspiracy against the Doukhobors in a letter to James Mavor. Mavor Papers, Arthur Meighen to James Mavor, May 8, 1919.
- ⁹⁹ Debates, 1919, pp.

¹⁰⁰ Manitoba Free Press, May 14, 1919, Ed.. F.W. Godsal, one of the leading defenders of the Doukhobors, claimed that the Free Press editorial was a crucial turning point in the campaign. Mavor Papers, F.W. Godsal to James Mavor, June 5, 1919.

¹⁰¹ Grand Forks Sun, May 2, 1919; Ed.; Nelson Daily News, May 3, 1919 Ed..

¹⁰² The incidents began in July 1919; by August 8, the Premier of British Columbia, John Oliver, was pressing the Immigration authorities to deport the Sons of Freedom found guilty of nudism. However, the immigration authorities claimed that they had no statutory basis for taking such action. Grand Forks Gazette, July 13, 1919, Ed.; Vancouver World, July 8, 1919, Ed.; I.B., 65101, #10, John Oliver, Premier, B.C., to W.W. Cory, Deputy Minister of Immigration & Colonization, Aug. 8, 1919; ibid., F.C. Blair, Secretary, Dept. I.&C. to W.W. Cory, Nov. 12, 1919.

¹⁰³ By Order-in-Council P.C. 1204, the immigrants belonging to the Doukhobor "class" were denied entry. Statutes of Canada, 1919, 9-10. Geo. V., vols. I-II, p. x.

¹⁰⁴ Debates, 1919, p. 1866. Thirty-five members of the House of Commons spoke on the amendment; the vast majority favoured the restrictive policy.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 1867.

¹⁰⁶ Several M.P.'s suggested restricting immigration to Great Britain, France and the United States. Ibid., pp. 1920.

¹⁰⁷ Senator G.B. Bradbury was one of the most vociferous exponents of definite statutory enactment, and of arresting the trend towards government by Order-in-Council. Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada, 1919, pp. 414-416.

¹⁰⁸ Statutes of Canada, 1919, 9-10, Geo. V., (hereafter Immigration Act, 1919), vol. I-II, c. 26, s. 3, ss. x (p).

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., s. 38.

110 "P.C. 1203, June 9, 1919," Statutes of Canada, 1919, 9-10, Geo. V., vols., I-II, p. x.

111 Ibid...

112 I.B., 682, #2, W.W. Cory to J.A. Calder, May 22, 1917.

113 Debates, 1919, p. 1867..

114 Ibid., pp. 1867-1873.

115 Ibid., 1919, p. 771.

116 Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada, 1919, p. 414.

117 "P.C. 1204, 1919", Statutes of Canada, 1919, 9-10, Geo. V., vols. I-II, p. x.

118 Ibid...

119 Madison Grant in his book The Passing of the Great Race (New York, 1916), popularized many of the pseudo-genetic theories that stressed the racial inferiority of non-Nordic races. The role of these racial theorists in the United States is vividly described by John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New York, 1966), pp. 135-36, 156.

120 Debates, 1919, p. 1969.

121 Ibid., 1919, pp. 1969, 2280.

122 Ibid., 1919, pp. 2280-81.

123 Ibid., 1919, p. 2281-82.

124 Ibid., 1919, p. 2282.

125 Ibid., 1919, pp. 2283.

126 Ibid., 1919, pp. 1867, 1870.

127 "An Act respecting Immigration, 1910", Statutes of Canada, 9-10 Edward VII c. 27, s. 37.

128 Ibid., s. 38, ss. (a).

129 "P.C. 1202, 1919," Statutes of Canada, 1919, 9-10, Geo. V, vols. I-II, pp. ix-x.

130 Immigration Act, 1919, s. 3, ss. (t). A Literacy Test was also included in the amendment to the Naturalization Act in 1919, Statutes of Canada, 9-10, Geo. V, c. 38, s. 2, s.s. (b).

131 Debates, 1919, p. 1916.

132 Ibid., 1919, p. 1953.

133 Ibid., 1919, p. 1916.

134 Ibid., 1919, p. 4357.

135 Immigration Act, 1919, s. 3, ss. (o).

136 Ibid., s. 41.

137 "An Act to amend and consolidate the Acts relating to British Nationality, Naturalization and Aliens, 1919," Statutes of Canada, 9-10 Geo. V, Chap. 38, s. 2, ss. (2). In the amendment to the Naturalization Act in 1914, the waiting period before Naturalization could take place had been extended from three to five years. Statutes of Canada, 1915, 4-5 Geo. V, Chap. 27, s.

138 Ibid., s. 7, ss. (1).

139 Ibid., s. 7, ss. (2).

140 Hugh Guthrie, the Solicitor General emphasized that Germans and Austrians, maintained dual nationality, and therefore could be de-naturalized. Debates, 1919, p. 4122. Those groups excluded from the provisions of the Act were the following: those having served in the Canadian or

Allied forces, those members of ethnic groups opposed to enemy governments, whose aliens, who were British subjects by birth.

141 "Naturalization Act, 1919," s. 8, ss. (4).

142 Ernest Lapointe, Samuel Jacobs and William Euler were the most vocal opponents of the amendments. Debates, 1919, pp. 4118-23, 4130-33. In response to the criticism, Prime Minister Borden tried to minimize the extent to which the changes in the Naturalization Act were related to the anti-alien sentiment in Canada; in particular, Borden claimed that the amendments were necessary to dovetail Canadian regulations with Imperial policy with respect to British Nationality. Ibid., p. 4344.

143 "An Act to amend an Act of the present session entitled An Act to amend The Immigration Act, 1919", Statutes of Canada, 1919, 9-10 Geo. V., Chap. 26, s. 41.

CHAPTER X

THE 'RED SCARE' IN CANADA, 1919

The hatreds and fears stirred up by World War I did not die with the Armistice of 1918; social tension spread in an ever widening circle. Anglo-Canadians who had learned to despise the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians had little difficulty in transferring their aroused passions to the Bolsheviks. Though the guns were silent on the Western Front, Canadian troops were now being sent to Siberia "to strangle the infant Bolshevism in its cradle."¹ In September 1918 the Borden government had declared war on Bolshevism in Canada. With a volley of repressive Orders-In-Council and a new emphasis on security investigations, the government sought to define the role of Red activists within the country. Although the Dominion security authorities worked untiringly to enforce the restrictions placed on radical organizations, little progress was made.

In the early months of 1919 industrial management and the Dominion authorities were seriously alarmed at the upsurge in radical activity. Not only had the alien worker become more militant, but there was evidence of the growing co-operation between the radical alien and Anglo-Canadian socialist trade union leaders. Reports indicating that many

disgruntled veterans were beginning to show interest in radical trade unions and socialist platforms made the situation appear even more critical.

The explanation for some of the unrest could be found in postwar economic and social conditions: the widespread unemployment which resulted from the shutdown of the war industries was aggravated by the return of thousands of veterans. A wave of strikes resulted from the combined effect of the government's failure to control profiteering and management's intransigency in meeting the wage demands of the workers. The anxiety aroused by nation-wide disorder was further intensified by the outbreak of Seattle General Strike in February and the founding of the One Big Union in March.

The Mathers Royal Commission appointed in April 1919 represented a serious but belated attempt of the part of the Dominion government to explore all facets of industrial unrest and bring public attention to many of the unique problems faced by the alien worker in the reconstruction period. However, before the Commission completed a report of its findings, the Winnipeg General Strike had begun on May 15. The gravity of the situation was undeniable with sympathy strikes materializing across the country.

To many observers the Winnipeg Strike appeared as something more than a desperate protest from frustrated labour.

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The R.N.W.M.P. had compiled a mountain of circumstantial evidence linking labour unrest with international conspiracy, restive veterans with potentially dangerous socialist organizations, and industrial unionism with revolution. The critical situation appeared to require decisive action; as a result, in early June, drastic changes were made in both the Immigration and Naturalization Acts to facilitate the deportation of radical agitators. On June 17, the Dominion government intervened in the Winnipeg Strike by arresting twelve strike leaders. Still at the end of a series of deportation hearings and criminal trials two questions remained controversial. Was syndicalism tantamount to revolution? Was the role of the aliens in the Winnipeg Strike primary or peripheral?

Canadian concern over the threat of an international Bolshevik conspiracy had been pronounced during the latter part of 1918. On September 25, 1918, the Borden government had passed two Orders-in-Council (P.C. 2381, P.C. 2384) which had enlarged the category of enemy alien to include those aliens with Bolshevik leanings. Stringent penalties had been established for membership in certain radical alien organizations, as well as the outlawing of numerous radical alien publications.² Nor had the end of the First World War ended the threat. In December, 1918, Prime Minister Borden, while attending the Paris Peace Talks, had

been briefed by British intelligence on the magnitude of the Bolshevik conspiracy. As a result, Borden had informed his Cabinet of British reports which indicated "that the Bolshevik government of Russia is making a very active and to some extent a successful propaganda [effort].... Very large credits are placed in the hands of their agents. There is reason to believe that the same efforts will be extended to Canada and the United States soon."³ This suspicion was certainly reinforced by evidence of a Bolshevik conspiracy accumulated by C.H. Cahan, the Director of the Public Safety Branch who was in constant communication with American authorities, particularly Attorney-General A. Mitchell Palmer.⁴

In January 1919 Acting Prime Minister Sir Thomas White was told that the United States Department of Justice was convinced that a large fund had been established by the Bolsheviks to foster revolution in the North America. Cahan concluded that a number of radical newspapers and periodicals published in Canada "are probably financed by this fund."⁵ New York City was generally believed to be the focal point of the Bolshevik organization in North America.

But despite the apprehension over the Bolshevik menace, the Unionist government was not prepared to maintain its previous level of repression against radicals. Canadian public opinion appeared to favour a return to peace-time conditions; organized labour, ethnic organizations and

Anglo-Canadian liberals were particularly vocal in demanding the restoration of civil liberties.⁶ As a result, in January 1919, the Unionist government cautiously began to dismantle some of its more oppressive security measures.

This policy of conciliation was denounced by many security officials. C.H. Cahan felt so strongly over the matter that he submitted his resignation to the Acting Prime Minister, Sir Thomas White. In a letter to Major General Gwatkin, the Chief of the General Staff, Cahan explained his decision to resign:

... I have failed to obtain the support of government in my efforts to eradicate the pernicious propaganda....

No effective efforts are being made in the way of enforcement by federal authorities to enforce federal laws; and if efforts are made by the local authorities to enforce federal laws they receive no encouragement from the federal government.

It would appear that the mere threat of a strike is sufficient to force the government to repeal existing laws, or else to intervene and remit the penalties imposed by the courts against offenders....

In reply, Major General Gwatkin left no doubt that he was strongly sympathetic to Cahan's views on the need for continued vigilance; "You have warned those in authority, those who have a stake in the country, of the danger which besets them; and one day they will regret that, adopting the tactics of the ostrich, they took no measures for their

own protection."⁸

The views of Cahan and Gwatkin were representative of the thinking of many other security officials who were disturbed by the spread of Bolshevist ideas among the aliens. Bolshevism represented a menace to the values which these officials, with their particular class background, held as sacred: personal property, hierarchical structures, religious principles, and the sanctity of the family unit.⁹ Suggestions were made that Bolshevist propaganda should be countered by the publication of evidence of Bolshevist bestiality. A report filed by the official correspondent with the Canadian forces in Siberia relating to the Soviet practice of 'nationalizing' women was widely circulated.¹⁰ A much more ambitious venture was launched by Colonel Chambers, the Chief Press Censor. He suggested to the Secretary of State that organizations such as the Canadian Clubs, St. George's Clubs, St. Andrew's Clubs, as well as the universities might be utilized to combat "the fallacies of the Bolshevist propagandists...."¹¹ Letters were dispatched to the presidents of several Canadian universities urging a series of public lectures by eminent academics on historical or sociological problems which "would have a most beneficial effect at the present juncture."¹²

In 1919 Canadian security officials were interested in following the American example of utilizing the deportation proceedings to deal with the problem of alien agitators.¹³

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However, Section 41 of the Immigration Act only made provision for the deportation of those who openly advocated the violent overthrow of constituted authority; there was no clear cut provision condemning an individual for membership in certain Canadian organizations which advocated such views.¹⁴ The difficulty in obtaining sufficient proof of seditious utterances meant that Section 41 was rather ineffectual. In February, 1919, W.D. Scott, Superintendent of Immigration, informed the Comptroller of the R.N.W.M.P. that "the great difficulty about instituting deportation proceedings at the present moment is that the onus of proof is on ourselves...."¹⁵ As a result, there was pressure for an amendment to Section 41 in order to provide more sweeping powers in deporting alien Bolsheviks.

The tendency to link Bolshevism in a derogatory way with certain ethnic groups was very pronounced among security officials. One interpretation for the success of the Bolshevists in Russia emphasized that "the backbone of the Bolshevik army consists of Chinese mercenaries...that nearly all of the firing parties engaged in executions are Chinese, and the Chinese are rapidly gaining more and more influence in Russia."¹⁶ The growing involvement of the Chinese in radical Canadian unionism confirmed dangerous spread of Bolshevism among the 'lesser breeds'.¹⁷

Lieutenant Colonel A. P. Hamilton, Director of Cable Censorship, agreed with Chambers as to the extent of Chinese

involvement, and also emphasized that in Russia "an extraordinarily large proportion of the Bolshevist leaders are Jews."¹⁸ Not only did this fact have certain racial overtones according to Hamilton, but it also revealed the danger of a racial or cultural minority "which numerically is insignificant and which is inspired by the bitterest animosity towards the people who form the vast majority of the inhabitants of the country."¹⁹ It was well known that the doctrines of radical socialism held great appeal for many East European Jews now living in North America.²⁰ New York City with its Jewish population numbering 250,000 was regarded as the headquarters of the Bolshevist movement in Canada and the United States.

The presence of radical organizations among the Russians, Ukrainians and Finns of Western Canada and Northern Ontario was also a matter of considerable concern in the reconstruction period. High on the list of 'dangerous' Ukrainian groups was the Ukrainian Labour Temple Association (U.L.T.A.). Founded in 1917 in Winnipeg ostensibly as a cultural and educational society, U.L.T.A. was an effective instrument for disseminating socialist ideas among the Ukrainians of Western Canada. This function became particularly important after the suppression of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (U.S.D.) in September 1918²¹ as many of the U.L.T.A.'s supporters were U.S.D. party members.

The Canadian Finnish Organization performed a similar

function among the Finnish socialists of Northern Ontario. Centered in Sudbury, the C.F.O. had been such an outspoken exponent of Bolshevik ideas that it was banned by the Order-in-Council (P.C. 2384) of September 1918. By January, 1919 the C.F.O. was officially reinstated and once again resumed its propaganda work in the Canadian Finnish community.²²

There were also several Russian socialist organizations which were regarded as subversive, notably the Russian Workers' Union.²³ In February, 1919, there were reports that the Russian Workers' Union had established a number of cells throughout Western Canada.²⁴ The centre of activity appeared to be Vancouver with a network of agents reaching into the mining districts of the province and the large Russian settlements on the prairies. One of these agents, Theodore Razanoff, was closely watched by the R.N.W.M.P. secret operatives as he travelled through Northern Alberta and Saskatchewan. Several of these agents were able to secure Razanoff's confidence, and their reports indicated the existence of a Bolshevik conspiracy.²⁵ According to one of these agents, Razanoff stated that "the strike started in Seattle and that it would finish up here in Vancouver and we will get the Soviet government."²⁶ Razanoff claimed to have access to unlimited funds which would be put to use at an opportune time.²⁷ Various reports to the R.N.W.M.P. also indicated that substantial funds were being sent from New York City to radical ethnic organizations in Vancouver.²⁸

The usual contact places were poolrooms located in the foreign districts which formed a link with the aliens working in the industrial camps: "it is a well known fact that men working in the woods and construction camps get any mail coming to them at various pool rooms."²⁹

Evidence of an international conspiracy had been growing throughout the early part of 1919. In January, the call from Moscow had been received announcing the formation of the Third International...; although no Canadian organizations were to send delegates to the inaugural conference in March, 1919, there was some interest among Canadian socialists in the proceedings.³⁰ The Seattle General Strike of February

1919 had aroused appreciable support from the more radical Canadian trade unionists, particularly in Western Canada.³¹

Some viewed this weapon as a legitimate means of compelling intransigent management to accept collective bargaining principles and to offer workers a fair return for their labour. More radical anarchosyndicalists saw the general or sympathetic strike as a means of weakening an outmoded capitalistic system. At the founding convention of the One Big Union in March 1919, fraternal greetings were sent to Russian workers and there was majority support for the use of the general strike as a last resort in industrial disputes.³² Another aspect of the founding which perturbed many Anglo-Canadians was that the O.B.U. represented a dangerous fusion of Bolshevik aliens, notably Jews,

Ukrainians, Finns and Russians, with socialist Anglo-Saxon trade unionists.³³

To many security officials the threat of a general strike was regarded as a prelude to a Canadian revolution. The prospect of Bolshevik violence in certain Canadian cities, but especially Vancouver and Winnipeg, caused the Acting Prime Minister, Sir Thomas White, to cable Sir Robert Borden in Paris advising of the need for strong security precautions:

Plans are being laid for revolutionary movement (in British Columbia) which if temporarily successful would immediately bring about serious disturbances in Calgary and Winnipeg where socialism is rampant. We think most desirable British Government should bring over cruiser from China station to Victoria or Vancouver.... Situation is undoubtedly serious and getting out of hand by reason of propoganda from Seattle and workers and soldiers.³⁴

However, Prime Minister Borden balked at the idea of asking for British assistance. Instead he suggested utilizing the R.N.W.M.P. and "if necessary increase their forces by judicious enlistment."³⁵

The ramifications arising from the employment of the alien in the industrial labour force became a matter of national concern in early 1919. One aspect of this issue was the fear that the returned soldier would be radicalized and lured into socialist organizations if industrialists continued to employ large numbers of alien workers in pre-

ference to ex service men. On the West Coast, the situation was particularly acute: in February, 1919, the Vancouver Sun estimated that there were 2,500 unemployed veterans in the city.³⁶ There was intense pressure from returned soldiers' organizations on government and business to dismiss not only enemy aliens, but also Italians, Russians and Orientals from their jobs.³⁷

Faced by the hostile public and press opinion and the threat of violence, it was not surprising that by February, 1919 employers should adopt discriminatory policies towards their non-Anglo-Canadian workers. In response to G.W.V.A. demands the British Columbia Employers Association announced that letters would be sent to every member organization recommending that alien enemies "be forthwith dismissed and such positions be filled preferably by returned soldiers."³⁸ The B.C. Manufacturers' Association was soon to follow this lead. A spokesman for the British Columbia Loggers' Association revealed that 80 of its member firms had pledged that they would offer employment to the returned soldiers and dismiss alien enemies.³⁹ By March the Vancouver Sun began to express optimism over the improvement in the economic opportunities for veterans.⁴⁰

The decision of the Dominion government to establish the Royal Commission on Industrial Relations on April 4, 1919 indicated the degree of concern of the federal authorities over the alien worker.⁴¹ The Commission included two

representatives each from the public, employers, and labour; the Chairman was Chief Justice T.G. Mathers. Between April and June 1919 the Commission travelled from Victoria, British Columbia to Sydney, Nova Scotia, holding hearings in 28 industrial centres across the nation.⁴² One major aspect of the inquiry was the extent to which industrialists were employing alien workers rather than veterans. From the testimony of industrialists before the Commission an ambivalent attitude towards this issue emerged. Some of the industrialists argued that the alien was "usually doing work that white men don't want," and that it would "be a shame to make the returned soldier work at that job."⁴³ Other employers emphasized the economics of the situation pointing out they "should be very glad to see white men take the position if he could afford to work for the wage that the Oriental works for."⁴⁴

But in those regions where there was high employment among the returned soldiers, and where the alien workers had become entrenched in radical unions, management illustrated a strong tendency to deprecate the utility of the alien labour force. W. Henderson, a mine operator at Drumheller, Alberta, informed the Commission that the unstable industrial climate of the region could only be reversed by instituting hiring practices which gave preference to the Anglo-Canadian workers, "men that we could talk to ... men that would come in with us and co-operate with us, and

we would say we want to make your life worth while as well as our own...."⁴⁵ Several mine managers stressed the fact that alien workers could not be expected to respond in a responsible manner since they were "more or less illiterate" and not imbued with British values having come from countries with tyrannical governments.⁴⁶ There was also the implicit assumption that the alien was not capable of improvement as he was inferior genetically, a viewpoint stated by Rathbone Smith, General Manager of an Edmonton district railway. When asked about the feasibility of greater consultation between capital and labour, Smith replied:

The train man and mechanic is a very intelligent man, and is a man that has brains, and while I cannot go so far as to say the section man has not, they are foreigners very often, and not of equal intelligence. ... you take a Canadian and an Austrian, we wouldn't put them on an equal footing.⁴⁷

In northern Ontario, various mining officials commented on the new militancy the foreign workers, especially since the Russian Revolution. According to E. J. Crelyle, Superintendent of the British American Nickel Company in Sudbury, the unrest among the Slavic workers was due to Bolshevik ideas: "They think the millenium has come".⁴⁸ Many of the mining representatives indicated that their companies had released large numbers of socialist aliens and that it would be a good thing if these aliens were forced to leave not only the mining regions but Canada.⁴⁹

Following the war, there had been a general cut back in the labour force in northern Ontario. The International Nickel Company had dismissed 2200 of their 3200 employees. There was considerable evidence that the large majority of those who lost their jobs were foreigners.⁵⁰ The general trend away from the utilization alien labour in the Canadian mining industry, was predicted in an editorial in the Canadian Mining Journal on November, 1918:

In the past the mining industry has depended very largely for labor supply on the newly arrived immigrant, particularly for the more arduous and less highly paid occupations.

...

Hard manual labor will in the future be much more at a discount than it is to-day, and if men can achieve results by the substitution of machinery is it not progress?"⁵¹

The tendency on the part of the Dominion government and businessmen to be conciliatory towards the returned soldier became even more pronounced as evidence was secured that the O.B.U. had embarked upon an intensive campaign to involve the returned soldier in the organization. In Winnipeg, there was evidence that efforts were being made to infiltrate the local branch of the Great War Veterans' Association (G.W.V.A.) for the purpose of securing a pro-socialist executive. According to the local intelligence officer, "the object in view is the lining up and education of sol-

diers to the idea of 'One Big Union'."⁵²

In Vancouver the activities of labour-socialist Sam Gothard in organizing the 'Comrades of the Great War', and W.A. Pritchard who was instrumental in the formation of 'The Soldiers and Sailors Labor Club' greatly alarmed the authorities. The officer commanding the local R.N.W.M.P. detachment even declared that "... if the disturbing elements win over a large number of returned men then the situation will become very serious."⁵³ What made the situation appear ominous was the fact that in Vancouver and Winnipeg emergent police unions were establishing ties with radical labour.⁵⁴ Security officials were pessimistic about recruiting veterans to serve in the militia during an emergency. In a confidential report one R.N.W.M.P. official stated that in the event of an outbreak of trouble in Vancouver, "there would not be more than 20 men on whom they [the military authorities] could rely on for duty in Vancouver, and about 25 in Victoria."⁵⁵

The fear that Anglo-Saxon socialist trade unionists would be able to forge an alliance between the two most dangerous elements in Canadian society, the radical alien, and the returned soldier, caused intense concern on the part of security officials. One R.N.W.M.P. intelligence report from British Columbia, dated May 9, 1919 listed the 17 most dangerous agitators in the province; they were all Anglo-Saxons, and included such men as J.S. Woodsworth,

J. Kavanagh and W.A. Pritchard.⁵⁶ In terms of national origins, 11 of these men were born in Britain, 3 were born in the United States, and 3 were born in Canada.⁵⁷ Thus the great majority of these men were born outside the country, a fact which was increasingly stressed by those responsible for maintaining security. Certainly in Vancouver the R.N.W.M.P. felt that blame for the unrest resided with the group of "clever and dangerous individuals at the head of affairs in the Trades and Labour Council...."⁵⁸ If these men could be removed from the scene, there was the assumption that an explosive situation would be defused. The District Intelligence Officer of Military District 11 strongly urged that deportation of the British-born be seriously considered:

It is interesting to note that most of these men hail from the Old Country, and it would be a splendid thing for this district to have them returned there as soon as possible.... Without these leaders the Bolsheviks would be helpless.⁵⁹

At this stage, however, the Unionist government was not prepared to place the British-born labour agitator in the same class as the alien Bolshevik; in fact, the government backed up its expressed intention to proceed with the dismantling of wartime security measures by repealing in April, 1919 two Orders-in-Council, P.C. 2381 (Censorship) and P.C. 2384 (Unlawful Association).⁶⁰ Many of those arrested under these regulations were subsequently released.⁶¹

On May 7, 1919, Arthur Meighen, the Acting Minister of Justice, informed the House of Commons that although the War Measures Act would remain in effect until the Royal Proclamation officially ending the state of war, most of the regulations would be gradually phased out.⁶² However, the outbreak of the Winnipeg Strike eight days later was to create tremendous agitation for the Dominion government to once again exercise extraordinary powers in order to cope with the 'Reds'.

The Winnipeg General Strike, May 15 - June 28, 1919, brought the elements of class and ethnic conflict together in a massive confrontation that not only divided a city but also a nation. Winnipeg became the microcosm where all facets of the 'Red Scare' were clearly exposed: the anti-alien propaganda, the charges of international conspiracy, the inter-action between security forces and the Winnipeg establishment, and finally the attempt to use the Immigration machinery to deport not only the alien agitator, but also the British-born radical.⁶³ The sequence of events associated with the Winnipeg Strike has been well documented: the breakdown of negotiations between management and labour in the building and the metal trades was followed by the decision of the Winnipeg Trades and Labor Council to call a general strike for May 15.⁶⁴ The response was dramatic; between 25,000 and 30,000 workers left their jobs.⁶⁵

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Sympathetic strikes took place in Vancouver, Calgary, Lethbridge, Edmonton, Saskatoon, Regina, Prince Albert, Brandon, Port Arthur, Fort William, Toronto and a number of other small centres.⁶⁶ Between May 15 and June 30, 1919 Winnipeg and many other cities were seriously divided along class and ethnic lines.

One of the most persistent themes running through local reporting of the the strike (except by the Western Labor News) was the torrent of abuse directed against the radical alien. The Winnipeg establishment working through the Committee of One Thousand founded their own publication, The Citizen, and enlisted strong support in their campaign to vilify the foreigner from The Telegram, the Manitoba Free Press, and the Manitoba Veteran.⁶⁷ It was quite apparent that John W. Dafoe, editor of the influential Manitoba Free Press shared the collective paranoia of the Citizens' Committee towards the alien.⁶⁸ The Free Press blamed the present crisis on the breakdown of old style craft unionism by alien influences; the One Big Union was characterized as an attempt "to employ these masses of rough uneducated foreigners, who know nothing of our civilization, to brow beat and over-ride the intelligent and skilled craftsman."⁶⁹ The Winnipeg Strike was described as the handiwork of enemy aliens and a few irresponsible Anglo-Saxon agitators:

Lenin and Trotsky ... have as their special bodyguard, battalions of Letts and Chinamen, who upon occasion intimidate, slug, or if necessary murder....

It is through the solid fanatical allegiance of the Germans, Austrians, Huns and Russians in the labour unions that the Red Five-- Russell, Veitch, Robinson, Ivens and Winning, ⁷⁰ have climbed to power in the labor organization.

The Free Press strongly advised that the best way of undermining the control which the "Red Five" exercised over the Winnipeg labour movement was "to clean the aliens out of this community and ship them back to their happy homes in Europe which vomited them forth a decade ago."⁷¹

Security officials had their own ideas about the ethnic composition of the strikers. A comprehensive intelligence report dated March, 1919 had indicated that there were two groups of socialists in Winnipeg: the English, or "white element", and the foreigners. The English group which was estimated to number about 200 men, included members of the Socialist Party of Canada, the Social Democratic Party, and the Socialist Revolutionary Party of Canada.⁷² The foreign element was composed largely of Ukrainians who lived in the north end of the city and belonged to the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party of Canada. The Ukrainian socialists of Winnipeg were regarded as the nerve centre of a network stretching from Ontario to the Rockies.⁷³ The report of one R.N.W.M.P. agent stated:

The majority of their members are working in the mine fields of Western Canada, although I find

that there are quite a number of them in Ontario. Apart from the agents in the coal fields, all of these living in this city are well known to us, as we have a secret agent working amongst them who is a member of the Party. This organization is at present marking time, and is waiting to see what the English speaking party is going to do.⁷⁴

These disclosures were consistent with the belief of security officials that the Winnipeg based Ukrainian Labour Temple Association (U.L.T.A.) exerted a sinister influence on the Slavic miners of District 18. The work of Matthew Popovich of the U.L.T.A. among these miners had previously aroused considerable apprehension.⁷⁵ The suspicion that a conspiracy existed was confirmed on May 24, 1919, when some 6,200 miners of the United Mine Workers of America went out on strike bringing coal production in the region to a standstill.⁷⁶ At the same time the local activities of the Ukrainian Labour Temple Association during the Winnipeg Strike was a source of great concern. Not only did the Ukrainian Labour Temple serve as a headquarters for the foreign-born strikers, it was also a central agency for disseminating socialist propoganda.⁷⁷ As a result, the R.N.W.M.P. maintained close surveillance on prominent members of the U.L.T.A. such as Matthew Popovich and Jacob Penner.⁷⁸ A number of Russian-Jewish socialists in Winnipeg were also believed to be involved in the Bolshevik conspiracy. High on the list of suspects were Sam Blumenberg, Solomon Almazoff and Michael Charitinoff.

Sam Blumenberg had arrived in Winnipeg in 1912 and almost immediately became involved in the Socialist Party of Canada and the Social Democratic Party.⁷⁹ Blumenberg's presence at the famous Walker Theatre rally in December, 1918, had been notable, not only because of his rousing speech in defence of the Soviet government, but also because he appeared to endorse the creation of a Bolshevik state in Canada.⁸⁰ The role of the Winnipeg Telegram in inciting the returned men against Blumenberg in January, 1919, revealed the extent to which he was feared by the Winnipeg establishment.⁸¹

Solomon Almazoff was another Jewish socialist who had previously come to the unfavourable attention of the Winnipeg establishment. Early in 1919 Almazoff had been refused admission to the Manitoba Bar because of "his very anarchistic views".⁸² This involvement with radical movements seemed to be confirmed in March, 1919, when Almazoff visited a number of prominent Jewish socialists in New York City. While in New York, Almazoff reportedly attended a meeting of the National Socialist Organization. On this occasion A.K. Martens, generally regarded as one of the leading Soviet agents in the United States, had addressed the gathering.⁸³ After Almazoff's return to Winnipeg Canadian security authorities detailed a secret agent to watch his activities. This agent, Harry Daskalud, a Ukrainian with somewhat dubious credentials, submitted a secret report

alleging that Almazoff attended a meeting of the Young Jewish Socialist Party held on May 2, 1919, justifying the use of violence as a means of obtaining political authority.⁸⁴ Moreover, he was actively involved in raising money, ostensibly for the Jewish Relief Fund, but to the authorities it seemed that Almazoff had a more sinister purpose for the funds.⁸⁵

One of the most dangerous socialists in Winnipeg was believed to be Michaël Charitinoff. Of Russian-Jewish background, Charitinoff had arrived in Winnipeg in 1914; from 1914-18 he had been employed in the C.P.R. Shops.⁸⁶ By 1918, Charitinoff had become a leading member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party and editor of Rabotchny Narod. In August 1918 Charitinoff's radical behaviour led the Western Press Censor to describe the editor as "the ambassador of the Bolshevik government in Canada."⁸⁷ Charitinoff was arrested under Order-in-Council P.C. 2381 in October, 1918.⁸⁸ Charitinoff soon became a martyr to the Winnipeg socialists; not only were they able to secure his release on bail, but his appearance at the Walker Theatre rally of December 22 served as a symbol of unity between the socialists of all ethnic backgrounds.⁸⁹ Charges against him were eventually dropped in January, 1919 although close surveillance was maintained.⁹⁰ By June, 1919 the security authorities indicated that there was evidence that Charitinoff was receiving not only instructions, but

money from Bolsheviks in the United States..

I learn from two sources that the sum of \$7,000 has been transmitted from the Bolshevist organization in the United States headed by L.A.C.K. Martens to Winnipeg to enable one Charitonoff [sic] 567 Selkirk Avenue, Winnipeg, to establish a revolutionary journal named 'Novy Vek'. I shall be grateful for any information which you can give me regarding this matter, or regarding Charitonoff. I believe he was editor of 'Robotchy Nerod' [sic].⁹¹

Pressure for strong action against the aliens in Winnipeg emanated very strongly from the Citizens' Committee of One Thousand, an organization that viewed itself as the defender of the Canadian Way of Life in the prairie city.⁹² Earlier in 1919 there was evidence that the "batter classes" of Winnipeg were prepared to use collective force in order to maintain the security of the city. In March, 1919, steps had been taken to establish a "Citizens' Protective Association".⁹³ Although the ostensible purpose of the Association was to help the authorities "in suppressing any incipient riots", there were indications that the Association was prepared to intimidate the "leading Socialists" of the city.⁹⁴

With the outbreak of the Strike many of the members of the Winnipeg establishment were quickly incorporated into auxiliary militia units which were to supplement the regular military and R.N.W.M.P. in maintaining civil order. Major-General Ketchen, the Officer in Command of the Manitoba

District had initially intended to recruit men from the various returned soldiers' associations but the strength of labour sympathizers within the ranks of these associations led him to seek a more 'respectable' element:

... I immediately called all loyal citizens, through the Citizens Committee (of One Thousand), to offer their [sic] services by joining the Militia, and this brought such a strong response, that the City Units were practically filled.... One feature ... is that practically every returned Overseas Officer has come forward, and this has been of great assistance in every way.⁹⁵

The degree of involvement of members of the Winnipeg establishment was dramatically increased on June 9, 1919. With the strike of the City Police, who were subsequently dismissed, 'Special Constables' were recruited by the Citizens' Committee of One Thousand to perform police functions. The consequences of the close connection between the Committee and the Special Police were felt almost immediately. On June 10, a clash occurred between the Specials and the strikers which revealed the degree of class and ethnic differences between the two sides.⁹⁶ It was the ethnic aspects, however, that received the greatest attention from the anti-strike papers. In a biting editorial, the Free Press condemned the "murderous assaults by riotous aliens."⁹⁷ The injuries suffered by one of the Specials, Sargeant-Major Coppins, V.C., received special coverage from the Winnipeg Telegram:

... three Austrians have the credit of so brutally attacking yesterday with their cowardly feet, a Canadian V.C., so that he was taken in a dying condition to the General Hospital.

The returned soldier who supports these cowardly alien brutes is worthy of being classed with them and not with that honourable body, the fighting men of the Canadian Expeditionary Force.⁹⁸

This appeal to the anti-alien sentiments of the returned men had remained one of the principal weapons of the Citizens' Committee. Many veterans were obviously influenced by anti-alien propaganda. However, others appear to have accepted the interpretation of the Western Labor News with respect to the hypocrisy of the Winnipeg establishment, in this matter:

Who brought the alien to Canada? It was not the workers. They opposed it by might and main. It was the men who are now prominent in the 1,000 Committees all over Canada. So long as they were serfs, abject serfs, they were-desirables; now that they have become a little better off and a little better informed they are aliens.⁹⁹

As the strike continued there was growing evidence that the Anglo-Saxon leaders of the Central Strike Committee might be able to effect a firmer coalition between not only the Anglo-Canadian workers and the aliens, but also between the aliens and a significant number of returned soldiers. Class differences appeared to be eclipsing ethnic antagonism, especially when men such as R.E. Bray, the veterans' repre-

representative on the Central Strike Committee, was able to establish closer contact with both the veterans and the aliens.¹⁰⁰ On June 14, a secret agent of the R.N.W.M.P. informed the Superintendent of the Winnipeg District that Bray was "at the present time the most dangerous person in the City, in view of the fact that he is a Returned Soldier and is using this to influence other Returned men and to camouflage his ulterior purpose."¹⁰¹ The agent stressed the urgency of the situation, by emphasizing that Bray had organized alien 'shock' troops to oppose the Special Police:

he (Bray) had been tipped of [sic] that a raid was going to be made on the Aliens of the North End ... and that he had secured a car and a girl who could speak their lingo ... and had gone ... to Liberty Hall and all the Pool Rooms etc. to tell the Aliens that the Police were coming and for them to get ready to give them a hot reception ... from the way the Bohunks beat it for home to get something to fight with the Police would sure get all that were coming to them.

...

In the continuation of my conversation with Bray he stated that this affair was going to end in a fight and when I lamented the fact that we had no guns Bray said 'Don't worry about guns, we'll have them. We have got between three and four thousand men, ready and instructed to be in certain places when the 'Alarm' is sounded and they will get into the citizens cars which are to carry the militia to Minto Barracks, pass themselves off as Militiamen until they get inside the Barracks, get possession of the rifles, turn them on the real soldiers and seize the Barracks.¹⁰²

As the class conflict in Winnipeg deepened, there was growing agitation from the Citizens' Committee of One

Thousand for decisive action by the Dominion government. Such action was soon forthcoming, largely as a result of the influence of A.J. Andrews, one of the leading members of the Citizens' Committee, and Gideon Robertson, the Dominion Minister of Labour. On May 26, Andrews had been appointed by Arthur Meighen, the Acting Minister of Justice, "to represent that Department in Winnipeg."¹⁰³

It was significant that in the terms of reference of Andrews' appointment, he was given authority to handle "general matters pertaining to the strike, also to take action against agitators if necessary."¹⁰⁴ During the negotiations Andrews worked with Gideon Robertson, who had arrived in the city on May 26; Andrews also maintained close contact with Arthur Meighen, in respect to proposals dealing with the deportation of alien radicals.¹⁰⁵

The decision to employ the deportation weapon against both the radical aliens and the British-born leaders was made after Andrews perused security files. By the end of May, A.J. Andrews was of the opinion that there was insufficient evidence to warrant charging the Winnipeg Strike leaders with seditious conspiracy; furthermore he was concerned that "the publicity and stir resulting from the trial would do more harm than good."¹⁰⁶ Andrews, therefore, passed on to Ottawa the advice of R.N.W.M.P. Superintendent Starnes who argued that deportation hearings "would give far greater facilities to deal with the agitators without the cumbersome

machinery of a jury trial."¹⁰⁷

An amendment (Bill #52) had already been introduced into the House of Commons on April 7 and passed third reading on June 6. The amendment provided the means of deporting individuals suspected of the following crimes:

Whenever any person other than a Canadian citizen advocates in Canada the overthrow by force ... of the government of Great Britain or Canada ... or the overthrow by force ... of constituted law and authority, or the assassination of any official of the Government of Great Britain or Canada ... or advocates ... the unlawful destruction of property, or shall by word or act create or attempt to create a riot or public disorder in Canada or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining or teaching disbelief in or opposition to organized government....¹⁰⁸

The wording of the original amendment to Section 41 of the Immigration Act passed on June 6, however, did not meet the expectations of the anti-strike forces in Winnipeg. In particular, there was no clear cut provision for the deportation of the British-Born Strike leaders such as R.J. Johns, R.B. Russell, R.A. Bray and William Ivens. As a result, A.J. Andrews immediately telegraphed Arthur Meighen indicating his displeasure with the first amendment:

Section very disappointing, does not cover dangerous class not born in Canada ... only appears to cover non-naturalized aliens. Commissioner Perry had believed and assumed that could deport any undesirable save Canadian born. Anything less than this absolutely useless and will not meet the situation or satisfy citizens who if I inform them of the real facts will be greatly disheartened and disgusted.¹⁰⁹

Despite the fact that Bill #52 containing the amendments to the Immigration Act had already passed both the House of Commons and the Senate, the Dominion government responded to the warning issued by Andrews. On June 6th, a second amendment to Section 41 was rushed through three readings in Parliament in less than an hour; the amendment changed the words "any person other than a Canadian citizen who by word or act in Canada seeks to overthrow..." to "every person".¹¹⁰ It was now possible to deport all non-Canadian-born.

On June 7th, Andrews informed Arthur Meighen "of the importance of providing machinery whereby dangerous undesirable foreigners may be denaturalized and deported."¹¹¹ According to both A.J. Andrews and Gideon Robertson this action was necessary not only for removing those undesirables from the country, but also "because public opinion will be seriously opposed to deportation of British subjects if naturalized foreigners equally guilty of sedition and conspiracy are not similarly dealt with."¹¹² The Immigration and Justice authorities hurriedly made arrangements for some provision to denaturalize radical aliens.¹¹³ These changes were embodied in the amendment to the Naturalization Act (Bill #138) introduced into the House of Commons on June 7th.¹¹⁴

The public reaction to the various measures relating to deportation was generally favourable.¹¹⁵ Even the Executive

of the Trades and Labor Congress, once they had been assured by Prime Minister Borden that deportation of the British-born radicals would be used only as a last resort, accepted the legislative enactments. Gideon Robertson was convinced that the T.L.C. Executive, especially President Tom Moore, would not oppose the deportation "of those who have been actively instrumental in the general endeavour to destroy ... the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada for the purpose of promoting the One Big Union movement...." ¹¹⁶

By June 13, many of the Dominion authorities were convinced that the serious labour situation not only in Winnipeg, but throughout the country, justified extraordinary action. Sympathetic strikes had spread to other cities. Several were the direct result of visits made by O.B.U. agitators such as W.A. Pritchard and R.J. Johns. ¹¹⁷ Moreover, there was a distinct possibility of the nationwide railway strike, a development that Gideon Robertson blamed on "the Red element who have been persistently working among the railway men." ¹¹⁸ According to Robertson, the only solution to the crisis was to arrest and deport the radical agitators in Winnipeg and carry out similar actions across the country.

Our plan will probably be to remove a considerable number directly to train destined Internment Camp Kapuskasing ... it being thought very desirable that they should be removed promptly from here. Necessary Board of Inquiry to deal with individual

cases at leisure can than [sic] be arranged.

Suggest that it is desirable that similar action be taken at Vancouver and in Nova Scotia at an early date where similar work is being carried out.¹¹⁹

Apparently, Borden was sufficiently concerned over the situation that he was prepared to support Robertson's demand for strong measures.¹²⁰ On June 14, Borden indicated that he had received a dispatch from Robertson "informing us of the intention to arrest several strikeleaders [sic] who have formed a plot to overthrow the Govt. of the country and establish a soviet government."¹²¹ The following day, Borden held a special meeting with those Ministers responsible for security agencies; in attendance were Arthur Meighen, Acting Minister of Justice, Newton Rowell, President of the Privy Council, (Minister in charge of the R.N.W.M.P.) and General Gwatkin, Chief of the General Staff.¹²² The decision to deport the radicals was confirmed.¹²³

On June 16, R.N.W.M.P. Commanding officers across the country were provided with special authority to effect deportation.¹²⁴ In a telegram dated June 15, Commissioner Perry indicated, at this stage, that there were "one hundred and twenty on our list who should be deported, thirty six in Winnipeg."¹²⁵ A memorandum sent that same day by the Assistant Commissioner to the Superintendent in Western Canada declared that "the government has decided that all undesirables shall be interned and deported."¹²⁶ It also

tionaries will probably resort to 'direct action' which in their jargon means 'open violence'....¹⁸⁴ He noted that there were indications that "the seeds of sedition are being carried from Western to Eastern Canada."¹⁸⁵

Following the collapse of the Winnipeg Strike, Toronto became one of the major revolutionary centres in Canada. Here a number of prominent Bolsheviks such as Tim Buck and John Boychuk were engaged in spreading socialist propaganda.¹⁸⁶ By December, 1919, Montreal had also become a focal point of alien Bolshevik activity. A confidential report prepared on the security situation revealed that "the known 'Reds' in Montreal ... number about fifty, Becky Buhay, a Jewish girl of about twenty eight or thirty years of age, a sister of Michael Buhay ... being the cleverest and most outspoken. She is credited with being the leader amongst the English-speaking radicals, while another woman, Ray Mendelson [sic] is the leader of the foreign radicals."¹⁸⁷ Security officials felt that Bolshevik activity in Montreal was due to the large Jewish community and the close proximity to the American border.

This concern over the American Bolshevik influences remained at a very high pitch even after the Winnipeg Strike. Indeed, it was intensified in September, 1919 with the formation of the Communist Labor Party of America and the Communist Party of America; both these organizations looked to Moscow for guidance.¹⁸⁸ By November, 1919

son and the security authorities for immediate deportation, the resolve of the Unionist government wavered.¹³² What particularly surprised the government was the hostile reaction of the Executive of the T.L.C. When news of the Winnipeg arrests reached Tom Moore, he immediately contacted Prime Minister Borden and demanded that unless it could be conclusively proven there had been "apprehended insurrection" and that the arrested men had in their possession bombs or some other means of destroying human life or property, they should be released on bail. The T.L.C. also demanded that all those arrested should be given a public trial.¹³³

Labour unions across the country demanded just treatment for the Winnipeg strike leaders.¹³⁴

At the same time that pressure was being exerted from the labour front, there was a split over strategy within the ranks of those who had previously been united in combatting the strikers locally. The most important defection was that of J.W. Dafoe, who in an editorial of June 18, 1919 deplored the government's action: "Their arrests at this time may do the extremists an actual service. They were in the position of leaders of a senseless criminal strike which was nearing the point of collapse.... Their arrests will enable them to pose as martyrs in the cause of the workingmen..."¹³⁵

Dafoe recognized that Canadian public opinion would never tolerate such ruthless treatment of Anglo-Saxons despite their radical tendencies.

In response to this pressure, the Borden government gave assurances that it did not intend to employ Section 41 against the British-born agitators in Winnipeg or any other industrial centre.¹³⁶ Of equal significance was the decision on June 21 to release the Winnipeg Strike leaders, a gesture which was not extended to the four non-English radicals who remained lodged in the penitentiary.¹³⁷ The release of the Anglo-Saxon strike-leaders at this time also reflected the concern of the authorities over the possibilities of rioting breaking out in support of the imprisoned men. A parade of the pro-strike returned soldiers had, in fact, been called for June 21. Whether the authorities believed that the parade would be cancelled as a result of their conciliatory action is not clear; if this was their expectation they were disappointed.¹³⁸

On June 21, Mayor Gray read the Riot Act in an attempt to prevent an illegal pro-strike demonstration led by "Red" soldiers. The R.N.W.M.P. were then ordered to clear the streets. A violent confrontation ensued. In the melée scores were injured on both sides; two foreigners were killed by gunshot.¹³⁹ During the clash, Special Police and R.N.W.M.P. arrested some 31 foreign-speaking 'rioters'. This course of action tended to substantiate the allegations of the security officials who claimed that the demonstration had been organized by radical aliens.¹⁴⁰

A new wave of arrests followed the Winnipeg riot. On

June 24, J.S. Woodsworth, who had assumed the editorship of the Western Labor News after the arrest of William Ivens, was charged with seditious libel. Woodsworth's arrest was followed two days later by the detention of Fred Dixon, on the same charge.¹⁴¹ Despite the collapse of the Winnipeg strike on June 25, police activity against radicals was intensified.

On July 1st, a series of raids was carried out across the country on the homes of known agitators and the offices of radical organizations.¹⁴² These R.N.W.M.P. forays resulted in the seizure of a great mass of 'incriminating' material.¹⁴³ In Winnipeg, the Ukrainian Labor Temple and the homes of 30 socialists were raided. According to the Manitoba Free Press, "one effect of the raid, it is authoritatively declared, is to convince the authorities, more than ever, that underlying the present unrest in Canada, is a well defined movement to encourage revolutionary action."¹⁴⁴

The stage was set for the Dominion government to initiate legal action against those accused of radical activity. At this point, the Dominion authorities appear to have decided on two separate courses of action in dealing with the detained radicals: Anglo-Saxons would be given jury trials; the aliens would be subject to deportation hearings before a Board of Inquiry. Samuel Blumenberg, Michael Charitinoff,

Solomon Almazoff, and Oscar Schoppelrie appeared before an Immigration Board of Inquiry, presided over by Judge R.M. Noble. Crown counsel was A.J. Andrews; the defence was conducted by three labour lawyers, T.J. Murray, Marcus Hyman and E.J. McMurray. In many ways, the deportation hearings were considered to be a preview of the sedition trials of the eight Anglo-Canadian strike leaders. The prosecution introduced evidence which sought to connect the four alien defendants with the eight strike leaders.¹⁴⁵ As the first deportation hearing under Section 41, the Winnipeg Inquiry also assumed great importance. The Commissioner of the R.N.W.M.P. informed his Regional Superintendents "to defer any action [under Section 41] until you hear from the decision."¹⁴⁶ Andrews attempted to prove that the four accused men were revolutionaries under the definition in Section 41 of the Immigration Act. Secret agents such as Sergeant Reames of the R.N.W.M.P. and Harry Daskalud, a police informer, were brought before the Inquiry Board to testify against the accused.¹⁴⁷

Andrews also insisted that bail would not be granted until the defendants agreed to answer questions posed by the prosecution.¹⁴⁸ Although Counsel for the Defence pointed out that such a demand was a violation of basic British justice and that the onus for proving the case rested upon the prosecution, Andrews' argument was upheld by Judge Noble.¹⁴⁹

Defence lawyers also raised the question of why, if the four aliens were charged jointly with the same crimes as the eight Anglo-Canadian strike leaders, "they were not tried together."¹⁵⁰ Once again Judge Noble supported the Crown and ruled that aliens had no right to demand trial by jury, "there is a sharp distinction between a subject and an alien," he reminded the defence attorneys.¹⁵¹

The specific charge against the accused was that they had conspired to overthrow constituted authority. In prosecuting Blumenberg, the Crown built its case around his previous socialist involvement and his public address given at the Walker Theatre rally in December, 1918.¹⁵² The case against Charitinoff hinged on proving his connection with the North American Bolshevik network; Andrews asked Charitinoff whether he knew C.A.K. Martens, or had received "about the end of May a sum of \$7,000 sent to you from the United States."¹⁵³ Almazoff was also suspected of being a Bolshevik agent, primarily because of his ostensible contact with C.A.K. Martens and Abraham Cahan in New York City.¹⁵⁴ As evidence of sedition, the Crown introduced the testimony of police informer, Harry Daskalud, who alleged that Almazoff's speech before the Young Jewish Labor League was seditious.¹⁵⁵ The reason for Schoppelrie's detention appears to have been related to his American background, and the fact that he was a returned soldier with a reputation for radical behaviour.¹⁵⁶ On June 17,

1919, General Ketchen had noted that Schoppelrie was under surveillance because of his known implication "in revolutionary movements...."¹⁵⁷

The deportation proceedings resulted in the acquittal of Almazoff, while the other three were ordered deported.¹⁵⁸ However, both Blumenberg and Charitinoff had their appeals sustained at a later date by the Minister of Immigration and Colonization.¹⁵⁹ In the last analysis only Schoppelrie was deported, and not for violation of Section 41, but rather on a technicality: the Crown proved that he had crossed the border illegally some three years previously.¹⁶⁰

The failure of the Crown to finally convict Charitinoff and Blumenberg was connected with the fact that the evidence against them was almost entirely circumstantial. A special memorandum prepared for Calder on July 2, 1919 cautioned the government to act "in accordance with the ordinary conception of British justice," in applying Section 41.¹⁶¹ Two important points were made in the memorandum which differentiated the procedure to be followed under Section 41 from other deportation sections. Because the individual charged had already effected legal entry previously, the memorandum advised that it was the responsibility of the Department to show that statutory cause for deportation existed. If the case of the Department did not rest on definite evidence, it was dangerous to depend "on the accused to convict himself."¹⁶²

The other aliens arrested in Winnipeg on June 21 were not as fortunate. These men had been apprehended in the vicinity of the June 21 riot; as a result, they could be charged under the terms of Section 41 which provided: [that] "every person who ... by word or act creates or attempts to create any riot or public disorder ... shall be liable for deportation...."¹⁶³ By the end of June, 1919, most of the accused aliens had been fined or sentenced to jail; twelve of the unmarried un-naturalized aliens were scheduled for deportation and were sent to the Kapuskasing Internment Camp. ~~F64~~

The sentences reflected the militant nativism of many Anglo-Canadians in Winnipeg, a condition which seemed to have also affected the judiciary. Hugh John Macdonald, the presiding magistrate at most of the trials, made no secret of his strong anti-alien sentiments.¹⁶⁵ In a letter to Arthur Meighen, dated July 3, Macdonald emphasized that only an uncompromising approach towards the alien would quiet the current disorder:

... as Police Magistrate I have seen to what a large extent Bolsheviki ideas are held by the Ruthenian, Russian and Polish people, whom we have in our midst and how large a section of the Russian and German Jews hold similar views I am perfectly convinced that we have a very bad and dangerous element in the good city of Winnipeg. ... it is absolutely necessary that an example should be made ... they do not understand generous treatment and consider it is only extended to them because the Government is afraid of them: indeed, fear

is the only agency that can be successfully employed ... if the Dominion Government persists in the course that it is now adopting the foreign element here will soon be as gentle and as easily controlled as a lot of sheep.¹⁶⁶

It is significant that Arthur Meighen, in his reply, praised Macdonald's "insight ... as respects the alien population" and his willingness to co-operate in restoring law and order to Winnipeg.¹⁶⁷

This sentiment was not shared by T.J. Murray, the Defence Counsel appointed by the Winnipeg Trades Council who seriously questioned if the aliens, especially the twelve ordered deported, had received just treatment. In a memorandum to the Minister of Justice, Murray argued that the accused were the victims of circumstances rather than dangerous revolutionaries: "they are not at all the criminal type of men but are rather the type of men who have done the hardest of the lowest grade work, that is they are labourers pure and simple."¹⁶⁸ Moreover, Murray attributed the arrest of these aliens to the inexperience and bias of the Special Police, "who were ... over zealous ... to arrest men such as the above, merely because they were aliens and happened to be where they were liable to arrest."¹⁶⁹ Despite pleas for writs of habeas corpus and a review of their cases, all twelve were deported. In a telegram of October 30, 1919, T.J. Murray complained of the arbitrary action by the government:

We are astonished to hear that deportation has already taken place. We hereby strongly protest against deportation of these men until they and we be acquainted with the charges made against them and until an opportunity is afforded of refuting such charges. If rightly informed, consider present action your department contrary to British traditions. We await immediate reply.¹⁷⁰

An investigation revealed that Major General Otter, the Director of Internment Operations had ordered the twelve men deported along with the last group of interned enemy aliens.¹⁷¹ Otter's justification for the action was based on the premise that the twelve prisoners were dangerous, and since a steamer was sailing for Rotterdam on October 27, he was most anxious to get them out of the country in accordance with the general policy covering troublesome aliens.¹⁷²

The arrest of 22 members of the Russian Workers' Party in Vancouver, on July 18, 1919, who were later charged under Section 41, represented the most ambitious attempt to remove Bolshevik aliens from the country. The deportation hearings lasted almost three months; at the end of that time, fourteen Russians were designated for deportation.¹⁷³ The next stage was to return them to Russia. Here a new problem emerged. Russia was still in the throes of civil war, a situation which made it extremely difficult to land these deportees. Moreover, attempts to negotiate the return of the Bolshevik aliens to Soviet Russia were extremely awkward since a state of belligerency existed between the Soviets

and the British Empire.¹⁷⁴ It was eventually decided to return these men to Vladivostok.

However, the Defence Committee, organized by the British Columbia Federation of Labour, pointed out that landing these men in Vladivostok would result in "their being murdered in cold blood" by either the Japanese or the White Guard.¹⁷⁵ To prevent the Immigration authorities from carrying out the deportations, the Defence Committee threatened a general dock strike in Vancouver.¹⁷⁶ In addition, a note of protest had already been filed with the British Secretary of State for the Colonies by the Soviet government alleging that Russian nationals were being subjected to massive discrimination.¹⁷⁷ Faced with possibilities of labour unrest, as well as the threat of an international incident, the Dominion government backed down. The 14 Russians, however, remained in custody.¹⁷⁸

One of the reasons for the sustained attempts on the part of the Dominion government to deport these alien Bolsheviks was public pressure. Between July and November, 1919, demands were made for the government to deport all dangerous foreigners. In August, Maclean's Magazine ran a series of articles disclosing the extent of the 'Red' plot in North America. Similar in content to many of the pronouncements of C.H. Cahan, the articles claimed that the attempt "to create a Soviet Government in Winnipeg" was engineered by Bolsheviks, Jack Shapiro, Sauteri Nuorteva

and C.A.K. Märtens from their New York headquarters.¹⁷⁹

The fact that Shapiro had formerly resided in Toronto was not only cited as further evidence of the extent of the conspiracy, but also as evidence of how ineffectual Canadian Immigration authorities had proven to be in dealing with this dangerous Bolshevik.¹⁸⁰ In May, 1919, Shapiro had been deported to the United States, and the article claimed that this shift actually aided the Bolshevik conspiracy; parallels were drawn between the handling of the Shapiro deportation and the release of Leon Trotsky in 1917.¹⁸¹

The response of the Immigration officials to these allegations was soon forthcoming. In a memorandum prepared for J.A. Calder, the Commissioner of Immigration, W.R. Little, defended the actions of the Immigration Department in the Shapiro case. "The Department of Justice was anxious that this man should be deported to Siberia where he would no doubt have been executed under the regime of Admiral Kolchak."¹⁸² However, Shapiro was an American citizen and, therefore, the Immigration Department had no choice but to deport him to the United States.¹⁸³ The Shapiro case illustrated the nativist response of Canadian security officials in dealing with the Bolshevik alien; a hostile reaction which did not subside even by the fall of 1919. Indeed, Commissioner Perry, in August, warned that "later on in the year (early in November seems a likely date) revolu-

tionaries will probably resort to 'direct action' which in their jargon means 'open violence'...."184 He noted that there were indications that "the seeds of sedition are being carried from Western to Eastern Canada."185

Following the collapse of the Winnipeg Strike, Toronto became one of the major revolutionary centres in Canada. Here a number of prominent Bolsheviks such as Tim Buck and John Boychuk were engaged in spreading socialist propaganda.186 By December, 1919, Montreal had also become a focal point of alien Bolshevik activity. A confidential report prepared on the security situation revealed that "the known 'Reds' in Montreal ... number about fifty, Becky Buhay, a Jewish girl of about twenty eight or thirty years of age, a sister of Michael Buhay ... being the cleverest and most outspoken. She is credited with being the leader amongst the English-speaking radicals, while another woman, Ray Mendelson [sic] is the leader of the foreign radicals."187 Security officials felt that Bolshevik activity in Montreal was due to the large Jewish community and the close proximity to the American border.

This concern over the American Bolshevik influences remained at a very high pitch even after the Winnipeg Strike. Indeed, it was intensified in September, 1919 with the formation of the Communist Labor Party of America and the Communist Party of America; both these organizations looked to Moscow for guidance.188 By November, 1919

efforts were being made to prevent alien Bolsheviks from crossing between Canada and the United States.¹⁸⁹ In November, F.C. Blair of the Canadian Immigration Department conferred with A. Gaminetti, the U.S. Commissioner-General of Immigration (Department of Labour) on how to prevent the 'Red Element' from entering North America.¹⁹⁰ Both governments agreed to exchange information on Bolsheviks already in North America.¹⁹¹ Agreement was reached on procedures for the detention of any suspected Communist who tried to cross the border; Canadian authorities were also provided with detailed descriptions of those Communists and anarchists who had been deported to Russia on the 'S.S. Buford', December, 1919.¹⁹²

At the same time, the British Secret Service had established close contact with the R.N.W.M.P. and Military Intelligence in order to prevent Communists entering either country. Lists of immigrants rejected for political reasons from Great Britain as well as known Communists agents leaving Europe were transmitted to Canadian security authorities.¹⁹³ A major function of the Immigration Branch had now become the safeguarding of Canada's borders from the agents of Bolshevism.

The emphasis now placed on excluding radicals was clearly reflected in the Department's policy towards Finns, Russians and Ukrainians. This transition was particularly noticeable with respect to the Finns, who prior to 1914 had

enjoyed very high "ethnic status". In 1919, instructions were issued to discourage all Finnish immigration despite the proven economic utility of this ethnic group. In August, 1919, the request of a pulp and paper company for Finnish lumber workers was curtly rejected: "I am sorry to say that a number of Finnish people seem to be very busy spreading I.W.W. propoganda and occasionally one is found doing something worse. We are not, under the circumstances, taking any steps to encourage Finnish immigrants, especially of the labouring classes."¹⁹⁴

There was also growing agitation from various centres across the country that deportation proceedings should be mandatory for those aliens found guilty of any criminal activity.

In October and November, 1919, there was pressure for sterner measures against aliens which emanated from the fall assizes at both Peterborough and Port Arthur.¹⁹⁵ The 'presentment of the Grand Jury of Port Arthur' was particularly significant because of the city's large alien population and the outspoken nativism of the Anglo-Canadian establishment:

We would like to point out to your Lordship ... that all of the prisoners for trial are foreigners. ... We notice with regret that so many of our foreign population seem to consider it their duty to endeavour to destroy all constituted authority in this country and we would suggest that the proper course is to deport all foreigners who are not willing to live peaceably and abide by the laws of this country.¹⁹⁶

As a result, the Attorney-General of Ontario called the attention of the Immigration authorities to the fact "that serious crime in the Province of Ontario while not confined to foreigners is very largely committed at their hands."¹⁹⁷

In reply, the Immigration authorities admitted the presence of large numbers of undesirable aliens, but stressed the difficulty of excluding them purely on the basis of nationality; optimism was expressed that the new amendments to the Immigration Act "created greater safeguards...."¹⁹⁸

Certainly, the 1919 Annual Report by Commissioner Perry of the R.N.W.M.P. confirmed the effectiveness of using Section 41 in curbing alien radicalism: "In my opinion this has had a salutary effect in restraining many foreigners from actively associating themselves with the extremists ... who naturally resent any laws which curtails or adversely affects their efforts...."¹⁹⁹

In 1919, there was a spirited national debate on whether Canada should maintain an active immigration policy outside the-English speaking nations. Since many Anglo-Canadians equated Bolshevism with the recent eastern European immigrant, there was growing support for policies similar to the quota system under discussion in the United States.²⁰⁰ The Winnipeg Strike, the surplus of labour, and a short but sharp dip in the stock market removed some of the incentive for industrialists to lobby for the continued

importation of alien workers.

In July, 1919, the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, the long-time advocate of the 'open door' immigration policy sounded a cautious note: "Canada should not encourage the immigration of those whose political and social beliefs unfit them for assimilation with Canadians. While a great country such as Canada possessing millions of vacant acres needs population, it is wiser to go slowly and secure the right sort of citizens."²⁰¹ Ethnic, cultural and ideological acceptability had temporarily triumphed over economic considerations. Whether Canada was prepared to accept a slower rate of economic growth in the long run to ensure its survival as a predominantly Anglo-Canadian nation became one of the great debates of the 1920's.

CHAPTER X

¹James^o Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression (Toronto, 1967), p. 30.

²P.C. 2381, September 25, 1918; P.C. 2384, September 25, 1918, Statutes of Canada, 9-10, Geo. V, vols. I-II, pp. lxxi, lxxiii. See Chapter Eight for a more extensive discussion.

³Borden Papers, 60920, Prime Minister Borden to Council, December 2, 1918.

⁴Attorney General Mitchell Palmer and Commissioner of Immigration Anthony Caminetti, were both hard-line opponents of the radical alien. As a result, Canadian authorities tended to obtain and exaggerated account of the alien problem in the United States. John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New York, 1966), pp. 222-33; Robert Murray, Red Scare (Minneapolis, 1955).

⁵Secretary of State Papers, Chief Press Censor (hereafter C.P.C.), Public Archives of Canada, 292, vol. 125, C.H. Cahan, Director of the Public Safety Branch, to Sir Thomas White, Acting Prime Minister, January 7, 1919.

⁶Martin Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour (Kingston, 1968), pp. 174-177.

⁷Department of Militia and Defence Headquarters Records (hereafter D.N.D.), Public Archives of Canada, C-2051 (2), C.H. Cahan to Major General Gwatkin, Chief, General Staff, January 3, 1919.

⁸Ibid., Gwatkin to Cahan, January 4, 1919.

⁹The Anglo-Canadian middle class mentality was revealed in the numerous letters to Colonel Ernest C.J. Chambers, the Chief Press Censor, during the latter part of 1918 and throughout the spring of 1919. C.P.C., 292, vol. 125. The brief prominence of Chambers and C.H. Cahan illustrates the career pattern of these war-time security officials.

¹⁰C.P.C., file 292, vol. 125, W.E. Playfair, memorandum to Colonel Chambers, February 11, 1919. The Fernie District Ledger, the British Columbia Federationist and the Western Labor News all complained of the the tendency on the part of the dailies to publish anti-Soviet articles.

¹¹C.P.C., 104-5, vol. 105, Colonel Chambers to Martin Burrell, Secretary of State, January 9, 1919.

¹²Ibid., 292, vol. 124, Colonel Chambers to Reverend R. Bruce Taylor, Principal of Queen's University, February 6, 1919. Alfred Fitzpatrick, the Principal of Frontier College was successful in securing money from Canadian industrialists. Typical of Fitzpatrick's approach was a letter he sent to J.S. Willison, Chairman of the Reconstruction Board: "Bolshevik ideas are not only latent throughout Canada, but are openly expressed. In no place is this more apparent than in the camps, where large groups of unskilled workers of foreign extraction usually congregate. The Frontier College instructors offset much loose talk by their conduct and influence...." Frontier College Papers, Public Archives of Canada, 1919, Alfred Fitzpatrick to J.S. Willison, January 4, 1919.

¹³Canadian authorities had been duly impressed by American changes in the Immigration Act in October, 1918, and by the determination of the American government to deport alien agitators in the spring of 1919. John Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 221, 228-29. C.P.C., vol. 109, W.D. Scott, Supt. Immigration to Colonel Chambers, October 24, 1917; ibid., 292, vol. 124, Chambers to Scott, September 20, 1918; I.B. 969713, A.C. Geddes, British Ambassador in Washington, to Minister of Immigration & Colonization, June 5, 1919; ibid., 563236, #7, W.D. Scott to McClure Scanders, March 13, 1919.

¹⁴"Act respecting Immigration, 1910," Statutes of Canada, 9-10, Edward VII, Chapter 27, s. 41.

¹⁵I.B., 58764, #3, W.D. Scott to A.A. McLean, Comptroller, R.N.W.M.P., February 7, 1919.

¹⁶C.P.C., 292, vol. 124, Colonel Chambers to Malcolm Reid, Dominion Immigration Inspector, Vancouver, February 11, 1919.

¹⁷D.M.D., C-2817, #3, Agent Butler to Major Davis, Assistant Director of Military Intelligence, June 18, 1919.

¹⁸Ibid., C-2051, Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Hamilton, Director of Cable Censorship, February 13, 1919.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Nathan Glazer, The Social Basis of American Communism (New York, 1961), pp. 65-68.

²¹William Rodney, Soldiers of the International (Toronto: 1968), p. 18; The Fernis District Ledger, September 12, 1918.

²²William Rodney, Soldiers of the International, pp. 34-35.

²³The Russian Workers' Union was also to be the target of American security forces. In November, 1919, an extensive raid was carried out on meetings of the Russian organization in 11 American cities; hundreds of Russians were quickly processed for deportation. John Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 230-31.

²⁴William Rodney, Soldiers of the International, p. 23.

²⁵D.N.D., C-2817 (3), Report, Superintendent West, British Columbia Division, R.N.W.M.P. to A. McLean, Comptroller, R.N.W.M.P., April, 1919.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid., Major Jukes, D.I.O., B.C., to Lt. Colonel Davis, A.D.M.I., June 26, 1919.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰William Rodney, Soldiers of the International, p. 22.

³¹D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike (Toronto, 1950), pp. 52, 65-66; Martin Robin, Radical Politics, pp. 172, 179.

- ³² Martin Rebin, Radical Politics, pp. 173-77.
- ³³ William Rodney, Soldiers of the International, p. 35.
- ³⁴ Borden Papers, 60923, Sir Thomas White to Prime Minister Borden, Telegram, April 16, 1919.
- ³⁵ Ibid., Borden to White, Telegram, April 18, 1919.
- ³⁶ Vancouver Sun, February 4, 1919, p. 1. One survey conducted by the G.W.V.A. in B.C. showed that in one mining camp out of 513 miners, 383 were aliens. ibid.
- ³⁷ Anti-Oriental sentiment was at such a high pitch in February 1919, that both the City of Vancouver and adjoining New Westminster passed resolutions requesting the Dominion government to prevent any further influx. Vancouver Daily Province, February 4, 8, 1919; Immigration Branch Records, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter I.B.), 23635, Resolution, City of New Westminster.
- ³⁸ Vancouver Sun, February 1, 1919; ibid., February 3, 1919.
- ³⁹ D.N.D., C-2817 (2), Intelligence Report, enclosed letter, A.E. Jukes, District Intelligence Officer (D.I.O.), Vancouver, to Assistant Director of Military Intelligence, February 27, 1919.
- ⁴⁰ Vancouver Sun, March 26, 1919, Ed.
- ⁴¹ Canadian Annual Review, 1919, pp. 506-07.
- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ Mathers Royal Commission on Industrial Relations, 'Evidence', Victoria Hearings, April 28, 1919 (Canadian Department of Labour, Library, Ottawa), Testimony J.O. Cameron (President Victoria Board of Trade), p. 75; ibid., Testimony Paul Thompson, Manager of the Foundation Company of British Columbia, p. 91.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., Testimony of J.O. Cameron, p. 78.

⁴⁵ Ibid., Calgary Hearings, May 3, 1919, Testimony W. Henderson (Mine Operator), p. 100.

⁴⁶ Ibid., May 5, Testimony Mortimer Morrow (General Manager, Canmore Coal Co.); ibid., Testimony of J.R. Brodie (Manager Great West Coal Co.).

⁴⁷ Ibid., Edmonton Hearings, May 6, Testimony Rathbone Smith, p. 99.

⁴⁸ Ibid., Sudbury Hearings, May 17, Testimony E.J. Crelyle, p. 1942.

⁴⁹ Ibid., Testimony J.L. Agnew (Vice-President, International Nickel Co.), p. 1926.

⁵⁰ Ibid., Testimony J.L. Agnew, p. 1923; ibid., Testimony D.J. Fortin (Structural Steel Worker), p. 1972.

⁵¹ The Canadian Mining Journal, Nov. 15, 1918, pp. 384-85.

⁵² D.N.D., C-2817 (2), Report, Agent, R.N.W.M.P. (Wpg.), enclosed in letter Comptroller R.N.W.M.P. to Lt. Col. Davis, A.D.M.I., April 7, 1919.

⁵³ Ibid., Extract, secret monthly report, cited in letter, Comptroller, R.N.W.M.P. to Lt. Col. Davis, April, 1919.

⁵⁴ Many of the police forces across the country had become unionized by the spring of 1919; this trend was particularly pronounced in Winnipeg and Vancouver. D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, pp. 47, 55; Canadian Annual Review, 1919, pp. 496-97.

⁵⁵ D.N.D., C-2817 (2), Comptroller R.N.W.M.P. to Lt. Davis, May 14, 1919. W.A. Pritchard, a Vancouver socialist and active member of the O.B.U. claimed in May, 1919, that a strong effort was being made to attract members of the R.N.W.M.P. into the O.B.U. Vancouver Sun, May 16, 1919.

⁵⁶ D.N.D., C-2817, Major A.E. Jukes to Lt. Col. Davis, May 9, 1919.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Enclosed Report, D.N.D., C-2665, Major General Leckie, D.O.C., B.C., to Major General Ashton, April 26, 1919. The fact that Woodsworth was a well known Canadian-born reformer did not exclude him from the ranks of the agitator class. One intelligence report declared that "his sermons savoured of revolutionary teachings...." ibid., 2817, Agents Report, Gibson's Landing, June 9, 1919, enclosed letter Major Jukes, D.I.O., B.C., to Lt. Col. Davis, June 11, 1919.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 2817 (2), Major A.E. Jukes, D.I.O., to Major General Leckie, D.O.C., B.C., May 5, 1919; ibid., Major Jukes to Lt. Col. Davis, May 9, 1919.

⁶⁰ P.C. 702, April 7, 1919, Statutes of Canada, 9-10, Geo. V, Vols. I-II, pp.

⁶¹ Borden Papers, 60974-78, memorandum, Department of Justice, for the Solicitor General, June 20, 1919.

⁶² Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (hereafter cited as Debates), pp. 2149. Meighen had informed R.L. Richardson, M.P. for Springfield, in April that the government intended to remain vigilant to "any attempt ... to stir up people to the use of force or to incite revolution...." Meighen Papers, 000267, Meighen to Richardson, April 3, 1919.

⁶³ Several studies have examined the major events associated with the Winnipeg Strike: D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike; Martin Robin, Radical Politics, pp. 180-85; Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics (Toronto, 1959), pp. 99-131; Gerald Graham, Arthur Meighen: And Fortune Fled (Toronto, 1963), pp.

⁶⁴ D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, p. 40.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 44.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 91.

⁶⁷ Kenneth McNaught, attributes a very sinister motive to the anti-alien propaganda campaign of the Winnipeg establishment. Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, pp. 107-112.

⁶⁸ Murray Donnelly, Dafoe of the Free Press (Toronto, 1968), p. 105; Ramsay Cook, The Politics of John W. Dafoe and the Free Press (Toronto, 1963), pp. 98-101.

⁶⁹ Manitoba Free Press, May 22, 1919, p. 1.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² D.N.D., C-2665, Agents' Report to Commissioner Perry, R.N.W.M.P., March 22, 1919.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ In September, 1918 the civic officials in Fernie had attempted to prevent Popovich from speaking to the Ukrainian miners. The District Ledger, September 12, 1918. In March, 1919, the Chief of Police of Fernie had petitioned the Immigration authorities to deport four radical Ukrainian agitators pointing out that "if they could be sent back it would weaken the Local Socialists who hold office in the Miners' Union...." D.N.D., C-2817, Report enclosed, Major A.E. Jukes, D.I.O., B.C., to Lt. Col. Davis, A.D.M.I., March 11, 1919.

⁷⁶ Martin Robin, Radical Politics, pp. 190-192.

⁷⁷ William Rodney, Soldiers of the International, p. 25.

⁷⁸ Comptroller, R.N.W.M.P. to G.W. Yates, Private Secretary, Prime Minister Borden, July 28, 1919, cited ibid., p. 25.

⁷⁹ Deportation Board of Inquiry Hearings, the Sam Blumenberg Inquiry, July 15, 1919, Royal Canadian Mounted Police Archives, Ottawa (hereafter Blumenberg Enquiry), Testimony, A.J. Andrews, pp. 4-11.

⁸⁰ Ibid., Testimony, Sergeant Reames, R.N.W.M.P., p. 37.

⁸¹ Ibid., Testimony, Sam Blumenberg, p. 22.

⁸² Solomon Almazoff Inquiry, August 15, 1919, Testimony, A.J. Andrews, p. 56.

⁸³ Ibid., July 16, 1919, Testimony, A.J. Andrews, p. 21; ibid., August 15, p. 102.

⁸⁴ Ibid., August 8, 1919, Testimony A.J. Andrews, p. 139.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Charitinoff Inquiry, July 16, 1919, pp. 1-10.

⁸⁷ C.P.C., 144-A-2, vol. 27, Fred Livesay, Western Press Censor, to Col. Chambers, August 13, 1918.

⁸⁸ Western Labor News, October 5, 1918.

⁸⁹ Ibid., October 5, 1918; ibid., December 27, 1918, p. 1; Charitinoff Inquiry, pp. 10-22.

⁹⁰ Charitinoff Inquiry, July 16, 1919, pp. 10-22.

⁹¹ C.P.C., 144-A-1, vol. 27, A.A. McLean, Comptroller, R.N.W.M.P., to Col. Chambers, June 9, 1919. Security officials were convinced that a secret Bolshevik fund existed in Winnipeg. After the raids of June 17, Major General Ketchen informed the Adjutant General that: "evidence so far searched proves conclusively Bolsheviki money from United States has been received from United States; also Strike Committee working closely with supports 'One Big Union'. No doubt seriousness of conspiracy throughout West." Borden Papers, 62009. Major General Ketchen to Adjutant General, June 18, 1919. According to J.S. Woodsworth, this allegation of massive financing from Moscow was merely a myth: "There was absolutely no attempt to set up a Soviet government. The money which was said to be coming from Russia in large quantities was a collection of 250 dollars raised by some miners in Alberta to bring a lecturer from Winnipeg." J.S. Woodsworth Papers, Public Archives of Canada, Vol. 2, 622, J.S. Woodsworth to Hattie, August 25, 1921.

⁹² Murray Donnelly, Dafoe of the Free Press, pp. 104-106; Kenneth McNaught, Prophet in Politics, pp. 107-112.

⁹³D.N.D., C-2665, Secret Agent #47, R.N.W.M.P., to Supt. Starnes, R.N.W.M.P., March 24, 1919.

⁹⁴The Agent indicated that the Citizens Protective Association "intended to adopt a plan of systematic kidnapping ... [and] the liberal use of tar and feathers," ibid.

⁹⁵Royal Canadian Mounted Police files on the Winnipeg Strike, R.C.M.P. Archives (hereafter R.C.M.P. Collection, 1919), vol. 1, Major General Ketchen to Secretary of the Militia Council, May 21, 1919. It is interesting that Major General Ketchen had previously served as the staff adjutant to Colonel Steele during the successful operation against the alien strikers in Fort William in 1909. See Chapter Four.

⁹⁶D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, pp. 95-97.

⁹⁷Manitoba Free Press, June 11, 1919, ed.

⁹⁸Winnipeg Telegram, June 11, 1919, Ed.

⁹⁹Western Labor News, Special Strike Edition, #19, June 7, 1919, Ed.

¹⁰⁰R.E. Bray had been born in Sheffield, England; he had arrived in Winnipeg in 1903, at which time he had become involved in socialist activity in the city. He served in the Canadian Army overseas, and returned to Winnipeg following the end of hostilities. D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, p. 61.

¹⁰¹R.C.M.P. Collection, 1919, vol. 2, Special Agent W.H. McLaughlin, to Supt. Cortland Starnes, Manitoba Division, June 14, 1919.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Ibid., Supt. Starnes to Commissioner Perry, May 22, 1919.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., Starnes to Perry, May 27, 1919.

- 105 D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, pp. 76, 105; Roger Graham, Arthur Meighen: A Biography (Toronto, 1960) 238-51.
- 106 R.C.M.P. Collection, 1919, vol. 2, Supt. Starnes to Commissioner Perry, May 30, 1919.
- 107 Ibid.
- 108 "An Act to Amend The Immigration Act, 1919," Statutes of Canada, 1919, Geo. V, Chap. 26, s. 41.
- 109 Borden Papers, 61838, A.J. Andrews to Arthur Meighen, Telegram, June 6, 1919.
- 110 D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg Strike, pp. 102-104; "An Act to Amend an Act of the Present Session entitled An Act to Amend the Immigration Act," ibid.
- 111 Borden Papers, 61976, Gideon Robertson, Minister of Labour to F.A. Acland, Deputy Minister of Labour, telegram, June 7, 1919.
- 112 Ibid.
- 113 I.B. 28128, #3, J.A. Calder, Minister of Immigration & Colonization, June 10, 1919.
- 114 "An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Relating to British Nationality, Naturalization and Aliens, 1919," Statutes of Canada, 9-10, Geo. V, Chap. 38, s. 2. ss. (2); ibid., s. 8, ss. (4); Debates, 1919, p.
- 115 The absence of a dissenting vote in the House of Commons on the second amendment to Section 41 of the Immigration Act was indicative of this support for the government's action. D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg Strike, pp. 95-97.
- 116 Borden Papers, 61936, Gideon Robertson to F.A. Acland, June 14, 1919.
- 117 R.J. Johns, a British-born member of the Socialist party in Winnipeg, had apparently travelled to central Canada in an effort to secure support for the Winnipeg Strikers, D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg Strike, pp. 3, 70, 102, 133. W.A.

Pritchard, a British-born socialist from Vancouver, in early June 1919 travelled through Western Canada; he arrived in Winnipeg on June 10, ibid., pp. 8, 102; Martin Robin, Radical Politics, pp. 177, 179, 183.

¹¹⁸ Borden Papers, 61913, Gideon Robertson to Prime Minister Borden, June 13, 1919.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Diary of Sir Robert Borden, Public Archives of Canada, (hereafter Borden Diary), June 13, 1919.

¹²¹ Ibid., June 14, 1919.

¹²² Ibid., June 15, 1919.

¹²³ Ibid., June 16; ibid., June 17.

¹²⁴ R.C.M.P. Records, Criminal Investigation Branch, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter R.C.M.P. Records) 22/4, Vol. 70, telegram, J.A. Calder, Minister of Immigration & Colonization to Commissioner Perry, R.N.W.M.P., June 16, 1919. In addition, to providing the R.N.W.M.P. officers with the power of Immigration officers, Calder sent to Winnipeg "two experienced immigration officers authorized to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of Board of Inquiry." I.B., 961162, #1, Calder to Perry, June 16, 1919.

¹²⁵ R.C.M.P. Records, 22/4, vol. 70, Commissioner Perry to Comptroller A. McLean, June 16, 1919; D.N.D., C-3042, Major General Gwatkin to Major General Ketchen, telegram, June 15, 1919.

¹²⁶ R.C.M.P. Records, 22/4, Vol. 70, W.H. Routledge, Assistant Commissioner, R.N.W.M.P., Circular Memorandum, June 16, 1919.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg Strike, pp. 102-103.

¹²⁹ Ibid. Of the six Anglo-Saxons arrested in Winnipeg, all but George Armstrong were British-born. It appears that the authorities had committed a serious error in

scheduling Armstrong for deportation since he was Canadian-born. This complication was one factor in preventing the rapid deportation of the English-speaking strike-leaders, ibid., p. 106. R.J. Johns was arrested in Montreal; while W.A. Pritchard was apprehended in Calgary, ibid.

130 Ibid., p. 102.

131 Borden Papers, 61980, Arthur Meighen to A.J. Andrews, June 17, 1919.

132 Borden Papers, 62012, A.J. Andrews to Arthur Meighen, telegram, June 18, 1919. Andrews actually threatened to relinquish his position unless the government relied on his judgement.

133 Extract, letter Tom Moore, President of the T.L.C. to E. Robinson, Secretary Winnipeg Trades and Labour Council, June 24, 1919, cited Manitoba Free Press, November 21, 1919, p. 11; Borden Diary, June 20, 1919.

134 Even usually staid Labour organizations such as the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Firemen, Conductors, and Trainmen strongly opposed the deportation of the strike leaders. The Canadian Railroader (Montreal), June 28, 1919. The British Labour Party at its 1919 Convention actually passed a resolution calling upon the British Government to try and dissuade the Canadian authorities from carrying out the deportations. Vancouver Province, June 26, 1919.

135 Manitoba Free Press, June 18, 1919, Ed. A.J. Andrews admitted to Arthur Meighen that the opposition of the Manitoba Free Press to the use of Section 41 was a serious blow. Borden Papers, 62012, Andrews to Meighen, June 18, 1919.

136 Borden Diary, June 20, 1919; Extract, letter Tom Moore to E. Robinson, June 24, 1919, cited Manitoba Free Press, November 21, 1919.

137 D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg Strike, pp. 105-109; Kenneth McNaught, Prophet in Politics, pp. 108-111.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid. The Reports by the R.N.W.M.P. maintained that the first shots were fired by the crowd. Speech, Newton Rowell, Debates, 3843, 1919, pp. 3843. R.C.M.P. Collection, Reports of Sergeant Bimring, Constable Campbell, Operative McLaughlin, Agent #7.

140 Ibid. The foreign presence was emphasized in the Manitoba Free Press, June 22, 1919, and the Winnipeg Telegram, June 22, 1919. There was some apprehension that the radicals would try to seize control of the Alien Enemy Investigation Office, and by destroying the thousands of records, make it very difficult for the authorities to deport dangerous aliens. R.C.M.P. Records, 15/28, vol. 66, Report, Agent #50, Wpg., to Commissioner Perry, June 23, 1919.

141 Kenneth McNaught, Prophet in Politics, pp. 109-110.

142 Borden Diary, June 30, 1919; R.C.M.P. Collection, vol. 2, Commissioner Perry to Comptroller McLean, July 6, 1919.

143 Ibid.

144 Manitoba Free Press, July 2, 1919.

145 The preliminary trials for the eight strike-leaders were held before Magistrate Noble during the latter part of July and August, overlapping with the deportation hearings. D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg Strike, p. 115.

146 R.C.M.P. Records, C.I.B., 22/2, vol. 70, Commissioner Perry to Supt. Lethbridge District, July 5, 1919.

147 R.C.M.P. Collection, vol. 4, Report Sergeant Reames, July 24, 1919; ibid., Supt. Starnes to Commissioner Perry, July 24, 1919.

148 Schoppelrei Hearings, July 16, 1919, Testimony of A.J. Andrews, pp. 18-20; Blumenberg Hearings, July 16, Testimony of A.J. Andrews, pp. 6, 13, 16. Similar arguments were used by Andrews in the Charitinoff and Almazoff Hearings.

149 Schoppelrie Hearings, Testimony of Judge Noble, p. 20.

150 Ibid., p. 14.

151 Ibid., p. 45

152 Blumenberg Hearings, July 15, 16, 17; August 1.

153 Charitinoff Hearings, July 16, 17; ibid., July 17.

154 Almazoff Hearings, July 16; August 8, 14, 15, 16.

155 Ibid., August 15, Testimony of Harry Daskalud, p. 118.

156 Schoppelrie Hearings, July 16, 17, 18.

157 Borden Papers, 61983, Major General Ketchen to Adjutant General, June 17, 1919.

158 Almazoff Hearing, August 16; Blumenberg Hearing, August 15; Charitinoff Hearing, August 15; Schoppelrie Hearing, July 18; Manitoba Free Press, September 21, 1919.

159 Department of Justice Records, Public Archives of Canada, 1919, 2241, memorandum for the Deputy Minister re: Deportation of M. Charitinoff, September 12, 1919; ibid., 2239, memorandum for the Deputy Minister re: Deportation of Sam Blumenberg, September 12, 1919.

160 Ibid., 1992, memorandum for Deputy Minister, re: Deportation of Oscar Schoppelrie, August 14, 1919.

161 I.B., 563236, #7, Department of Justice, memorandum for J.A. Calder, July 22, 1919.

162 Ibid.

163 "An Act to amend an Act of the Present Session entitled An Act to amend the Immigration Act," Statutes of Canada, 1919, Geo. V, Chap. 26, s. 41.

164 Winnipeg Tribune, June 30, 1919, p. 1.

165 The severe sentence imposed on Michael Charitinoff in October 1918 had already earned Macdonald a reputation as

a very harsh Magistrate.

¹⁶⁶ Meighen Papers, 002537, Hugh John Macdonald to Arthur Meighen, July 3, 1919.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 002542, Meighen to Macdonald, July 11, 1919.

¹⁶⁸ Department of Justice Records, 1919, file 1760, T.J. Murray to the Minister of Justice, July 10, 1919.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ I.B. 912971, #2, T.J. Murray, telegram, J.A. Calder, Minister of Immigration & Colonization, October 30, 1919.

¹⁷¹ Department of Justice Files, 1919, file 1960, Deputy Minister Justice to Murray & Noble, November 5, 1919; ibid., Deputy Minister Justice, to Major General Otter, November 11, 1919.

¹⁷² Ibid., Major General Otter to Deputy Minister of Justice, November 15, 1919. Both R.N.W.M.P. Superintendent for Manitoba, C. Starnes and C. Newton, Chief Constable for Winnipeg, maintained that all twelve had been involved in the rioting, and were considered dangerous. Ibid., Supt. Starnes to Commissioner Perry, December 16, 1919; ibid., Chief Constable Newton, to Supt. Starnes, December 10, 1919.

¹⁷³ Department of Justice, 1919, file 2217, Commissioner Perry to J.A. Calder, telegram, July 11, 1919; Vancouver Sun, September 3, 1919, p. 1.

¹⁷⁴ I.B., 969713, F.C. Blair, Secretary, Immigration & Colonization to J.A. Calder, February 25, 1920.

¹⁷⁵ Meighen Papers, 017232, A.S. Wells, Secretary, British Columbia, Defence Committee, to Arthur Meighen, July 26, 1920.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ I.B., 961162, #1, Acting Deputy Minister, Immigration & Colonization to Sir Joseph Pope, Under-Secretary for External Affairs, May 26, 1920.

178 I.B., 859342, #3, F.C. Blair, memorandum to Thomas Gelley, Commissioner of Immigration, November 18, 1920. At this time the 14 Russians were still in detention in the New Westminster penitentiary. It is notable that Blair tried to have the Russians included on the "S.S. Buford", which had returned many American Bolsheviks to Russia in December, 1919. ibid.

179 Lt.-Col. J.B. Maclean, "Planning Soviet Rule in Canada," Maclean's Magazine, August, 1919, pp. 46-49.

180 Ibid.

181 Ibid.

182 I.B., 961162, W.R. Little, Commissioner of Immigration to J.A. Calder, August 5, 1919.

183 Ibid.

184 D.N.D., C-2817, Commissioner Perry cited, Major General Gwatkin to S.D. Newburn, Minister of Militia, August 9, 1919.

185 Ibid.

186 William Rodney, Soldiers of the International, pp. 29-31.

187 J.A. Calder to Sir George Foster, Acting Prime Minister, January 21, 1920, cited, ibid.

188 Ibid., p. 30.

189 In November, 1919, the American Justice Department under the leadership of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer had initiated a series of raids across the country, concentrating on the Russian Workers' Union.

190 I.B., 961162, #1, F.C. Blair, memorandum to C.H. Ireland (Secretary, J.A. Calder), November 24, 1919.

191 Ibid.

192 Ibid., John Clark, American Consul-General, Montreal to F.C. Blair, June 19, 1920; W.R. Little, Commissioner Immigration to Immigration Agents, Halifax, July 9, 1920.

193 Ibid., A.J. Cawdron, Acting Chief Commissioner, Dominion Police, to Supt. Immigration, June 24, 1919; ibid., Assistant Director, C.I.B., R.N.W.M.P., to F.C. Blair, August 4, 1920.

194 I.B. 651, #3, F.C. Blair to McFadden & McMillan, Lumber Co., Fort William, August 27, 1919.

195 I.B., 563236, #7, Deputy Attorney-General Ontario to F.C. Blair, November 3, 1919; ibid., Attorney General Bayly to Blair, Nov. 6, 1919.

196 Excerpt, contained in letter, Bayly to Blair, November 6, 1919. Port Arthur, Fort William was one of the few cities, along with Winnipeg, which organized a Citizen's Committee which assumed a para-military function.

197 I.B. 563236, #7, Bayly to Blair, November 13, 1919.

198 Ibid., Blair to Bayly, November 12, 1919.

199 "Annual Report of Commissioner Perry for 1919," Sessional Papers 1920, No. 28, pp. 12-13. Perry's estimate of 28 arrested under Section 41, and only 18 deported is rather low. It does not take into consideration those aliens who were still interned such as the 14 members of the Russian Workers' Union. Moreover, other radical aliens who had not established Canadian domicile were deported under other regulations, i.e. indirect passage.

200 John Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 308-324.

201 "Speech W.J. Bulman, President of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association," cited Industrial Canada (Toronto), July, 1919, pp. 120-122.

Chapter XI

CONCLUSION

In June 1919 Canadian immigration legislation underwent a series of restrictive changes which drastically altered the policies of the pre-war period. For a short time, arguments concerning political and cultural acceptability prevailed over purely economic considerations in setting the immediate postwar priorities. A number of previously acceptable ethnic groups from the Continent no longer met the requirements of the newly-amended Immigration Act and the accompanying Orders-in-Council.

The Germans, once considered the most attractive group of prospective immigrants, were barred from entry into Canada by Order-in-Council P.C. 1203 (June, 1919) as enemy aliens; Austrians, Hungarians, Bulgarians and Turks received similar treatment.¹ Hatred of enemy aliens was perpetuated both consciously and unconsciously in the literature of the period. In Breaking Prairie Sod (Toronto, 1920), a book written by a Methodist minister, the Reverend Wallington Bridgman, the militant nativism of the Anglo-Canadian was revealed. The author characterized "the Austro-Hun" [as a race] "who for innate, inborn, unnameable treachery, crime and devilishness have outdone hell itself...."²

Reverend Bridgman's bitter hatred of the enemy alien was re-echoed by many respectable members of the Anglo-Canadian community. Faced with widespread and bitter opposition from Anglo-Canadians, Immigration officials made no sustained effort to secure the repeal of the exclusionist Orders-in-Council against the enemy alien until 1922.³

In 1919 Slavic groups, particularly the Ukrainians, suffered the adverse affects of blatant nativist sentiment also. Although certain Ukrainians (notably Ukrainian veterans) protested publicly that Ukrainian-Canadians held a variety of separate and often conflicting religious and political viewpoints, most Anglo-Canadians were able to make only vague distinctions.⁴ Poles, Russians and Ukrainians were all 'Bolsheviks,' the nativists maintained. Undoubtedly the view of Reverend Bridgman that "if we get rid of these aliens we get rid of strikes" was an exaggeration. Nevertheless, this comment underscored the general feeling that the Slavic worker was a menace to industrial stability.⁵ Moreover, the continued resistance of the Ukrainian clerico-nationalists to the unilingual school system in the reconstruction period was regarded as another 'Bolshevik' tactic to undermine a vital Anglo-Canadian institution. Throughout 1919 many articles in newspapers and periodicals made derogatory references to the unsanitary habits and the criminality of Slavs living in urban ghettos such as the North End of Winnipeg.⁶

The postwar immigration from Russia to Canada between 1919-23 was very small. In the first place, few Russians or Ukrainians from the Soviet controlled areas were allowed to leave; nor were many of the immigrants who applied, accepted by Canadian authorities. ~~Even~~ 'White Russians' were not regarded favourably by Canadian immigration officials.⁷ The policy of the Department in respect to these groups was described by J. Obed Smith, the Superintendent of Immigration:

It has not been the practice of the Government to debar Russians as Russians and the Act does not so provide, but the general policy and the application of the general regulations tends definitely to keep out of Canada those who cannot be readily assimilated.⁸

The vexatious issue of assimilation was a major factor in debarring further immigration of Doukhobors, Mennonites and Hutterites in 1919. The refusal of these sectarians to accept military service had aroused intense resentment among Anglo-Canadians before 1919; but in the post-war period the animosity of the veterans created overwhelming pressure on these groups to enroll their children in the unilingual school system. The Supreme Court in 1919 declared that the Manitoba School Attendance Act was binding on the Mennonites. The Old Colony Mennonites immediately announced their decision to emigrate to Mexico and Paraguay in the spring of 1920.⁹

The post-war exodus of the Old Colony Mennonites was

not an isolated case. In the spring and summer of 1919, a large number of aliens were seriously considering leaving Canada as a result of the anti-alien hysteria and the economic discrimination directed towards them. However, because of difficulties in obtaining transportation, and the unfavourable political climate in Central Europe, a mass exodus did not occur. W.D. Scott, Superintendent of Immigration outlined the situation in a memorandum to J.A. Calder in December 1919:

For a time after the signing of the Armistice it was supposed a great many of the Ukrainians would return to their former homes. I understand that quite a number got as far as Montreal and owing to their disgust of Polish rule and their quarrel with the Peace Conference over the assignment of their country to Polish territory, they have decided that it is better to stay in Canada than go back to Europe. I think the movement back to Europe of these people will be very small indeed.¹⁰

The Toronto Telegram in an article of April, 1920, strongly disagreed with this assessment. According to the Telegram between December, 1919 and April 1920, some 150,000 aliens had left Ontario alone, "carrying away \$30,000,000 of Canadian money".¹¹ Because the Immigration Department did not maintain emigration figures, the actual magnitude of the alien exodus remained vague.

However, among those aliens who decided to remain in Canada there were certainly strong feelings of resentment because of the upsurge of cultural, economic and political discrimination directed against them by Anglo-Canadians.¹²

This resentment was kept alive by publications such as the Ukrainian Labor News which stressed the ill-treatment and repression of Ukrainian workers by their Anglo-Saxon bosses.¹³ One of the News's most stirring articles was an emotional account of the last days of T. Koreychuk, a labour organizer, who died in an internment camp in the fall of 1919. The Ukrainian Labor News sought to portray Koreychuk as a martyr and prophesied, "[that] the zeal for the struggle which you [Koreychuk] filled the hearts of Ukrainian labourers will remain for ever".¹⁴

In 1919, any nationalist tendency displayed by groups within the alien community came under violent attack from Anglo-Canadians throughout the country. In western Canada many previously inarticulate Anglo-Canadians were demanding not only the deportation of labour agitators, but also the forceful removal of ethnic elites who obstructed Canadianization programs. The loss of national equilibrium on the Alien Question was a matter of deep concern to more rational Anglo-Canadians such as Thomas Crerar. In April 1919, Crerar wrote:

A great majority of the people, as a result of the times we have lived through in the last four (sic) years, and are living through now, are not quite back to normal judgement. It is emphasized by the low nature of appealing to the prejudices of the returned soldiers.... Canadian psychology in the mass today has in it some of the elements of Bolshevism in embryo, only do not tell anyone I have said so....¹⁵

Aliens, many Anglo-Canadians believed, should have only two choices: rapid assimilation or speedy deportation. In a speech to the Manitoba Educational Association in July, 1919, Dr. J.T.M. Anderson, the Director of Education among New Canadians for the Province of Saskatchewan advocated the expulsion of ethnic elites who subverted the unilingual school system.¹⁶ Anderson also challenged the rationale of training aliens as teachers and then sending them back among their people as agents of Canadianization: "such have proven more apt to mislead".¹⁷ In Anderson's opinion, the best solution would be to send "earnest, efficient, Canadian teachers if we would have these children become Canadian.... Let our motto be: young Canada we stand on guard for thee".¹⁸

The high point of the post-war Canadianization movement was the National Conference on Canadian Character Education held in Winnipeg, in October 1919. At the invitation of a national committee of prominent Canadian businessmen, educators, and farm leaders, 1200 delegates attended.¹⁹ The majority were Canadians but observers came from the United States and Great Britain. According to the report by the Canadian Annual Review, "the influence of the gathering was considerable, the comments upon its success and value by those in attendance enthusiastic".²⁰ In fact, it was decided to make the Conference permanent; as a result, an Executive Committee of the National Council

in Character Education was created. One of the major resolutions declared: "It is the duty of the Federal Government to assume without avoidable delay its fair share in the financial burden, incidental to the Canadianizing of an immigrant population."²¹

At this stage the Dominion authorities appeared to be favourable to 'citizenship', but not 'educational' activity. During the 1919 debate on the Immigration Act, J.A. Calder, the Minister of Immigration and Colonization, had emphasized the responsibility of the Dominion government in this matter: "we must see to it that every possible assistance is given to them to become Canadian citizens".²² However, the actual degree of government involvement was very limited. The British North American Act and the vigorous opposition on the part of Quebec to any federal interference in the sphere of education, proved to be a formidable obstacle.²³

The B.N.A. Act was a major hurdle also for Alfred Fitzpatrick, the Principal of Frontier College. Fitzpatrick made repeated efforts to have the Dominion government assume the responsibility for Canadianizing the 'bunkhouse man'.²⁴ He noted that Anglo-Saxons were no longer willing to do the work on the frontier and European navvies would abandon it also if some effort was not made to help them:

The foreigner was brought to Canada under a wrong impression if not false pretenses. Canada owes him a clean bed, the privilege of learning the language and of becoming a citizen.

If he declines this privilege then and only then should we talk of deportation.... I do not think we should listen to those who cry to hell with the 'foreigner' and are not willing to take his place.²⁵

Now that the government had shouldered the responsibility for CNR railways, it should also be willing to assume its responsibility towards the foreign navies:

The employer is the man who has really the power of making education compulsory. You are the employer of thousands of workmen. Would you not be willing to pass the word to your engineers and foremen that all foreigners must spend a portion of each evening five evenings a week in learning the three R's? You could take the wind out of the sails of the labor agitators, make the Canadian National Railway immortal by adopting a ten hour day with two hours devoted to education...²⁶

No action was taken on Fitzpatrick's suggestion. A Dominion program for citizenship training was not implemented until 1946.

Colonization schemes which would provide an opportunity for Anglo-Canadians to regain control of rural Canada were under discussion throughout 1914-1918. There was optimism that in the reconstruction period many ex-servicemen would welcome the chance to 'go on the land'.²⁷ After consultations with the Imperial Government and the provinces, a central body was created to facilitate the settlement of Imperial veterans in rural Canada.²⁸

The Soldier Settlement Act (1917) provided a grant of 160 acres to three categories of ex-soldiers: those born

in Canada, those previously domiciled in Canada engaged in active service with either the British or allied forces, those returned men from Great Britain or "any of the self-governing Dominions".²⁹ In 1919 amendments to the Soldier Settlement Act granted the Board power to purchase agricultural land, as well as reserving all Dominion lands, within 15 miles of any railroad for soldier settlement purposes.³⁰

Dominion security officials were hopeful that soldiers' settlements would in time have a salutary effect in areas where the foreign element was predominant. One Intelligence officer stationed in Alberta reported:

there is now scattered throughout the country returned soldiers' settlements, whose influence in the districts will undoubtedly be of great benefit and a restraining influence on the foreign element who have habit of settling in colonies.³¹

Between 1919-1923, some 24,715 ex-servicemen received financial assistance from the Dominion government. As a result "more than 600,000 acres of land were brought under cultivation".³² However, by 1923 the high rate of abandonment and a sharp decline in the number of soldiers applying for land resulted in the Soldier Settlement Board being consolidated as the Land Settlement Branch of the Department of Immigration and Colonization.³³

The Canadian expectations for substantial British immigration appeared to have materialized when over 135,000 British newcomers arrived in the Dominion in 1919-1920.³⁴

However, the flow declined considerably during 1921-1922 because of reports of high post-war unemployment in Canada and the unwillingness of many potential British immigrants to follow an agricultural occupation.³⁵ This downward trend concerned the supporters of Imperial colonization projects especially since Great Britain was experiencing severe unemployment and over-crowding.³⁶ As a result, in 1922 the British government became actively involved in trying to place non-agricultural immigrants in Canada.

On May 31, the Empire Settlement Act passed the British Parliament. It provided for a series of co-operative undertakings with the Dominions such as: assisted passages for agriculturalists and domestics; joint involvement with land settlement schemes; involvement with private associations interested in Empire migration as well as approved societies engaged in assisting women and juveniles to migrate. Not surprisingly, the Salvation Army was high on the list.³⁷

Although British immigration to Canada rose significantly between 1922 and 1923 (75,501), a downward trend followed.³⁸ Throughout for the years 1922-29, immigration from Great Britain averaged about 50,000 persons a year.³⁹ Even more unsatisfactory than the total numbers involved were the occupational backgrounds of many newcomers.⁴⁰ Canadian immigration officials warned in 1920 that the character of British immigration and the economic needs of

Canada would be incompatible in the long term.

If the Mother Country could supply all the agriculturalists we require, the problem would be simple, but when you consider the comparatively small proportion of the Mother Country's population that is engaged in agriculture, it will be at once apparent that if Canada's requirements were made from that source, we would be, figuratively speaking, 'Killing the goose that lays the golden egg'.⁴¹


In 1919 American immigration was regarded as another likely source of Anglo-Saxon immigrants. During the debates on the Immigration Act, J.A. Calder, the Minister of Immigration and Colonization, had expressed confidence that wartime levels of immigration from the United States would continue.⁴² As evidence, Calder had cited statistics showing that in 1917 Canada had received 75,000 immigrants from the U.S.A., and in 1918, 60,000. Calder boldly predicted that in 1919-20 period the number of American immigrants would possibly amount to 100,000.⁴³ He also emphasized that although Canadian homestead land had been largely exhausted, there were "some millions of acres of the finest land open and ready for the plough held by people who are not making use of it...."⁴⁴ Calder expressed strong satisfaction with the recent formation of the Western Canada Colonization Association, an organization which would: assemble lands; run publicity campaigns to recruit American settlers; and arrange transportation and financing details.⁴⁵

The expectations of both the Immigration Department

and the Western Canada Colonization Association proved to be too optimistic.⁴⁶ American immigration declined from 40,000 in 1920 to under 20,000 per year for 1921-1925.⁴⁷ The flow of immigration northward was offset by heavy Canadian emigration to the United States. In 1922 it was estimated by the New York Times that over 40,000 Canadians had gone south in the first nine months of the year.⁴⁸

By 1922-23, British and American sources of farmers and agricultural workers had proved insufficient. As a result, there was growing pressure from business interests for the restoration of a vigorous Continental immigration policy. These views were clearly articulated by Lord Shaughnessy. In an address to the Junior Bar Association of Montreal, he asserted that not only should Canada encourage large numbers of Britishers but the country should also recruit immigrants from continental Europe which could "furnish us with thousands of rugged, splendid people...."⁴⁹ Clifford Sifton, in his famous 1922 speech to the Canadian Club of Toronto emphasized that another 500,000 'stalwart' European peasants could be placed in western Canada; he also advised that "there is one place in the world where any considerable number of useful farmer immigrants can be procured and that is in Central Europe, particularly Hungary and Galicia".⁵⁰

Organized labour took strong exception to the sugges-



tion that large-scale immigration should be resumed. Tom Moore, the President of the T.L.C., wrote an article in the Canadian Congress Journal (June, 1922) attacking the unofficial relaxation of regulations towards non-British agricultural immigration. He called it a devious plan "to rush in a heterogeneous conglomeration of people to furnish cheap labour for the farms, coal mines, railway construction and other industrial activities".⁵¹ Moore's statement reflected the frustration experienced by the T.L.C. in 1920-22 in convincing the Dominion government to review certain aspects of the immigration situation which were undermining the position of organized labour. In Moore's opinion, information should be gathered about: the expansion of private labour bureaus, the work of charitable institutions in promoting immigration and flagrant violations of the Alien Labour Act.⁵²

Between 1922 and 1925 there was a steady drift in Canadian immigration policy towards the pattern which had existed in the pre-war period. On June 2, 1922, Order-in-Council, P.C. 1204 passed in 1919 which excluded Mennonite and Hutterite settlers was amended; free entry of these immigrants was to be allowed providing that they would go on the land, and that none would become public charges.⁵³

The removal of the disabilities against these sectarians was followed in 1923 with the repeal of Order-in-Council, P.C. 1203 (1919) which had excluded enemy aliens.

Pressure from the German community, and from economic interests finally overcame the lingering anti-enemy sentiment produced by the war.⁵⁴

This removal of restraints was, however, confined to white immigrants. In the spring of 1923 the Chinese Immigration Act abolished the Head Tax on Chinese immigrants but limited the entry of Chinese to three groups: members of the Chinese diplomatic corps, children born in Canada, and merchants and students. In addition all Chinese were required to register with the Department of Immigration and Colonization before leaving the country.⁵⁵

There was also a renewal of negotiations with the Japanese government to more effectively regulate the entry of immigrants from that country.⁵⁶ However, the Toronto Globe had expressed the view of many Anglo-Canadians when it argued that Oriental exclusion must be followed by an active recruitment of white immigrants: "we attach ... equal importance to a policy, that is not so much anti-Oriental as pro-White ... a Canadian policy not only assuring the safety but promoting the development of our national estate".⁵⁷

A forward step towards an active Continental recruiting policy occurred in 1923. With the passing of Orders-in-Council, P.C. 183 and P.C. 185 (Jan. 1923) the Dominion authorities announced that the major criteria in selecting immigrants would be occupation not ethnicity.⁵⁸ Soon

newcomers from Germany, Holland, Belgium, France, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries were placed in the same preferred category along with those from Great Britain and the United States; the only difference was that immigrants from these countries had to secure a viséd passport.⁵⁹

Evidence that the Department of Immigration and Colonization was preparing to recruit large numbers of immigrants from continental Europe did not satisfy industrialists such as Edward Beatty, President of the Canadian Pacific Railway. In June, 1925, supported by Sir Henry Thornton, President of the Canadian National Railways, Beatty demanded that the railway companies be given the power to recruit immigrants in Europe without the inconvenience of having these immigrants rejected by Immigration officers.⁶⁰ In particular, they proposed that the overseas officials of the Colonization Departments of the two companies be granted the authority to issue certificates showing that the immigrant had occupational eligibility and/or guaranteed employment in Canada.⁶¹ Under such a scheme, Beatty argued, the railroads would be able to maintain a steady flow of agriculturalists from the 'non-preferred' regions of the Continent: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Poland, Germany, Czech-Slovakia, Jugoslavia, Austria, Hungary, and Roumania.⁶² Much to the chagrin of the Immigration Department the proposals of the

two companies were accepted by Prime Minister Mackenzie King.⁶³

The Railway Agreement of September 1925 was a serious defeat to the realization of a selective government-controlled immigration policy. W.J. Egan, the Deputy Minister of Immigration, expressed the views of his Department when he complained that "the scheme is wholly pernicious in that its practical effect is to make a rubber stamp of our inspection abroad".⁶⁴ With the exception of Asiatic immigration, economic utility once again superceded ethnic acceptability in setting immigration priorities.

Opponents of the 'open door' immigration policy, especially organized labour, might well have reiterated the 1919 views of the British Columbia Federationist with respect to pre-war immigration trends. "The large employers of labour have been behind the immigration policy of this country for many years. . . . Has not most of the railroad work in this land been done by men of foreign extraction? Did the employers consider the workers of British stock when their economic interests were to be enhanced by the employment of German, Austrian or even Asiatic labour?"⁶⁵

CHAPTER XI

¹"P.C. 1203, June 9, 1919", Statutes of Canada, 1919, 9-10 Geo. V, vols. I-II, p.x.

²Rev. Wellington Bridgman, Breaking Prairie Sod (Toronto, 1920), p. 256.

³Immigration officials had considered the possibilities of renewed German immigration even during the war. Immigration Branch Records Public Archives of Canada (hereafter I.B.), file 682 #2, J.A. Clader, Minister of Immigration and Colonization (hereafter I.&C.), to W.W. Cory, Deputy Minister, I.&C..

⁴Paul Yuzyk, The Ukrainians in Manitoba (Toronto, 1953), pp. ; Speech, W. Swystun, Rector of the Ukrainian Institute to the Ukrainian Educational Convention in Winnipeg, Nov. 25, 1919, cited Winnipeg Tribune, Nov. 26, p. 5.

⁵Rev. W. Bridgman, Breaking Prairie Sod, p. 196.

⁶Winnipeg Telegram, Jan. 28, 1919; ibid., June 18, 1919, Ed.; Canadian Annual Review, 1921, pp. 247-49; Thomas Crerar Papers, Queen's University Archives, 1919, Professor James Fowle to T.A. Crerar, Feb. 26, 1919.

⁷I.B., 2183, #2, F.C. Blair, Secretary, I&C. to W.W. Cory, May 14, 1920; ibid., Blair to Cory, Oct. 29, 1920.

⁸Ibid., J. Obed Smith, Supt. Emigration, London, Eng., to F.C. Blair, Feb. 28, 1921.

⁹Manitoba Free Press, Oct. 22, 1919, Ed.; Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 754; Frank Epp, Mennonite Exodus, (Altona, 1962), pp. 96-97.

¹⁰I.B., 963419, #1, W.D. Scott, Supt. I.&C., to J.A. Calder, Dec. 11, 1919.

¹¹ Toronto Telegram, April 1, 1920, cited, Canadian Annual Review, 1920, p. 246.

¹² Press censorship of enemy alien newspapers was not removed until January, 1921. Herbert Kalbfleisch, The History of the Pioneer German Language Press (Toronto, 1968), p. 112. It was not until the Dominion Election Act of 1920 that enemy aliens were fully restored in their electoral rights. Joseph Boudreau, "The Enemy Alien Problem in Canada, 1914-21", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, 1964, pp. 179-190.

¹³ The Ukrainian Labor News, published by the Ukrainian Labor Temple Association in Winnipeg remained the most influential Ukrainian socialist newspaper in the country. Throughout the 1920's there were strong pressure to have it suppressed. Department of Justice Records, Public Archives of Canada, 832/29, 1923.

¹⁴ Ukrainian Labor News, Oct. 29, 1919, p. 5.

¹⁵ Crerar Papers, 1919, T.A. Crerar to George Chipman, editor of the Grain Growers' Guide, April 15, 1919.

¹⁶ Manitoba Free Press, July 5, 1919; p. 4. Anderson had made similar comments in his book, The Education of the New Canadian (Toronto, 1918).

¹⁷ Manitoba Free Press, July 5, 1919, p. 4.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Canadian Annual Review, 1919, pp. 529; The principal organizers of the Conference were from Winnipeg; Professor W.F. Osborne, of the University of Manitoba; and W.J. Bulman, President of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association. The Planning Committee also included Henry Wise Wood, President of the United Farmers of Alberta and Norman Lambert, Secretary of the Canadian Council of Agriculture. Crerar Papers, 1918, W.F. Osborne to Crerar, July 13, 1918; ibid., Osborne to Crerar, Jan. 1, 1919.

²⁰ Canadian Annual Review, 1919, p. 528.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (hereafter cited as Debates), 1919, p. 1870.

²³ Donald Wilson, et. al., (ed.), Canadian Education: A History (Scarborough, 1970), pp. 290, 451-53.

²⁴ Frontier College Papers, Public Archives of Canada, 1919, Alfred Fitzpatrick to R.H. Grant, Minister of Education, Ontario, Dec. 17, 1919.

²⁵ Ibid., Fitzpatrick to J.D. Reid, Minister of Railways and Canals, April, 1919.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ H. Rider Haggard, "Reconstruction: Obligation and Opportunity" (July 20), ibid., Addresses to the Canadian Club of Ottawa for 1916 (Ottawa, 1917, pp. 34-37; W.C. Good, "Canada's Rural Problems", (Nov. 1916), Addresses to the Empire Club of Canada (Toronto, 1917), pp. 300-309.

²⁸ Sir Robert Borden Papers, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter Borden Papers), 88449, Colonial Secretary, Bonar Law to the Governor General, Duke of Connaught, Sept. 21, 1916; ibid., 88451, Prime Minister Borden, memo for 9 provincial premiers, Sept. 23, 1917; The Canadian Gazette, Feb. 22, 1917.

²⁹ 1918, Soldier Settlement Land Regulations, P.C. 1158, May 14, 1918, Section 4, ss. (b), Statutes of Canada, 9-10 Geo. V, vols. I-II, p. xxxviii. By stipulating that only soldiers from self-governing Dominions could apply, veterans from India were thereby excluded.

³⁰ Robert England, The Colonization of Western Canada (London, 1936), pp. 76-78.

³¹ Department of Militia and Defence (hereafter D.N.D.), C-3689, Major P.J. Jennings, District Intelligence Officer, British Columbia to Lt. Col. G.R. Pearkes, O.C., Dec. 1, 1921.

³² Robert England, Colonization of Western Canada, p. 79.

³³ Ibid., pp. 79-80.

³⁴ Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, (hereafter, Royal Commission B.&B.), Book IV (Ottawa, 1968), pp. 240-41.

³⁵ Ibid., Canadian Annual Review, 1920, pp. 242-45; Lloyd Reynolds, The British Immigrant (Toronto, 1935), pp. 48-52.

³⁶ Ibid..

³⁷ Robert England, Colonization of Western Canada, p.94.

³⁸ Royal Commission B.&B., Book IV, pp. 240-41.

³⁹ Ibid..

⁴⁰ Lloyd Reynolds, The British Immigrant, pp. 48-52, 77-83, 101-110.

⁴¹ I.B., 28128, #4, P.C. Blair to W.C. Kennedy, Dec. 7, 1920.

⁴² Debates, 1919, p. 2569.

⁴³ Ibid..

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 1873.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 2586. The Western Canada Colonization Association included prominent western Canadian businessmen such as Sir Augustus Nanton (Wpg.) as well as central Canadian financiers such as Sir J.S. Willison and Sir Joseph Flavelle. The original plan was for the organization to establish a fund of \$1,500,000 so that within a period of ten years 10 million acres of land could be purchased and settled. Sir Joseph Flavelle Papers, Queen's University Archives, 1920, Brigadier General H.P. Macdonald, President, W.C.C.A., to Sir Joseph Flavelle, June 15, 1920.

⁴⁶ Robert England, Colonization of Western Canada, p.99.

⁴⁷ Royal Commission B.&B., Book IV, pp. 240-41.

- ⁴⁸ Cited Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 269.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 270-71.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 270; John W. Dafoe Papers, Public Archives of Canada, Clifford Sifton to J.W. Dafoe, Dec. 1, 1922.
- ⁵¹ Canadian Congress Journal for June, 1922, p. 287.
- ⁵² Ibid.. These matters had been the subject of discussion at each of the annual Conventions of the T.L.C. between 1919-22. Proceedings of the 36th Annual Session of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada, 1920, pp. 21-23; Ibid., 1921, pp. 78-81; ibid., 1922, pp. 78, 181, 217.
- ⁵³ Frank Epp. Mennonite Exodus, p. 105.
- ⁵⁴ I.B., 653 #3, F.C. Blair to Charles Stewart, Minister of I. & C., March 21, 1923.
- ⁵⁵ "Chinese Immigration Act, 1923", Statutes of Canada, 1923, 13-14 Geo. V Chap. 38, Section 5, Canadian Annual Review, 1923, pp. 45-46.
- ⁵⁶ I.B., 9309, #12, Percy Reid. Chief Controller Chinese Immigration to W.J. Egan, Deputy Minister I. & C., Nov. 16, 1923.
- ⁵⁷ Toronto Globe, Aug. 7, 1923, cited Canadian Annual Review, 1923, pp. 768-69.
- ⁵⁸ Robert England, Colonization of Western Ontario, p. 98-99; Report, Deputy Minister W.J. Egan, Sessional Papers, 1925, no. 13, pp. 617.
- ⁵⁹ Report of T.B. Willans, Special Immigration Commissioner, Sessional Papers, 1925, no. 13, pp. 14-15; Canadian Annual Review, 1924, p. 189.
- ⁶⁰ Mackenzie King Papers, Public Archives of Canada, 94852, Joint Letter, Edward Beatty, President, C.P.R. and Sir Henry Thornton, President, C.N.R., June 13, 1925.
- ⁶¹ Ibid..

⁶²Ibid.; Robert England, Colonization of Western Canada, p. 84.

⁶³Despite the opposition of Immigration officials and the Canadian High Commissioner, Peter Larkin, the C.P.R. President was able to convince Prime Minister King of the merits of the plan. Beatty's reference to the approaching 1925 federal election appears to have enhanced his case. King Papers, 94859 Edward Beatty to Mackenzie King, Aug. 18, 1925; ibid., 94861, King to Beatty, Aug. 27, 1925.

⁶⁴I.B., 216882, #1, W.J. Egan to Edward Beatty, July 29, 1925.

⁶⁵British Columbia Federationist, cited in Western Labor News, Feb. 14, 1919, p. 7.

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