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Thinking about your thesis?

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Redefining Security

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Introduction

What is "security"? Does the word "security" possess a precise and commonly accepted meaning The concept of security is often referred to in no uncertain terms: politicians refer elusively to measures which need to be taken in order to increase national security and individuals frequently use the term to describe a particular feeling of well-being or to denote a state of financial health. In fact, security has come to mean so many different things to different people that it may have no precise meaning at all. In a seminal conceptual piece on security, Arnold Wolfers characterizes security as an "ambiguous symbol" and draws attention to the potential mischief which the ambiguity of the symbol can cause.   He argues that "while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for broad consensus, ... (the concept of security) may be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favours with an attractive and possibly deceptive name."[1] If Wolfers is correct, and security is potentially a deceptive symbol, then our options are either to avoid using the concept entirely or to begin chipping away at the analytical problems underlying the way the concept of security has been conceived of. This paper seeks to understand the way the concept of security has been treated in the past and to offer some concrete suggestions as to some methods or strategies which could be used to enhance security in the future.

Levels of Security?

Besides experiencing difficulties with putting forward precise definitions of security, analysts have found it especially dif-ficult to compare one "level" of security with another.   For instance, what is seen to be a threat to security at the individual level might not be significant at the national level of analysis, or threats to security which occur at various levels, both state and individual, may be responded to at multiple levels of analysis.[2] Furthermore, there is not necessarily any connection between measures taken to enhance security at one level and increments in security at another level – that is, an increase in the aggregate of "security" among individual citizens does not always translate into greater security for the state or for the leaders of a state.[3] Nevertheless, making a distinction for analytical purposes between levels of security can help in thinking more clearly about different aspects of security: in particular,

a distinction between the "individual," "national" and "systemic" levels of analysis is made here because these typologies seem to offer considerable exploratory power.[4]   The paper, therefore, is divided into three sections and in each section the "traditional" approach to the concept of **security** at that level is considered; some of the more recent contributions to the concept of security at that level are overviewed; and then some suggestions regarding methods of enhancing either individual, national or systemic security are made.

The Individual Level of Analysis

Philosophers have long grappled with the concept of security, the roots of insecurity and the **conditions** which contribute to security.   Hobbes puts forward, perhaps, the most pessimistic exposition of mankind's condition of insecurity. For Hobbes, men must live without security, except for what their own strength and inventiveness can supply them with, whenever men live in a condition of anarchy or "Warre". According to Hobbes:

> During the time men live without a common Power
> to keep them all in awe, they are in that
> condition which is called Warre and such a
> Warre, as is of every man, against every man
>   Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a
> time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to
> every man; the same is consequent to the time,
> wherein men live without other security, than
> what their own strength, and their own
> invention shall furnish them withal. In such
> condition there is ... continuall feare, and
> danger of violent death; And the life'of man,
> solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.[5]

Further complications are created by the fact that, according to Rousseau, most methods for self-protection which are undertaken in order to increase the individual's own sense of security simultaneously menace others. For Rousseau:

> It is quite true that it would be much better
> for all men to remain always at peace. But so
> long as there is no security for this, every-
> one, having no guarantee that he can avoid
> war, is anxious to begin it at the moment
> which suits his own interest and so forestall
> a neighbour, who would not fail to forestall
> the attack in his turn at any moment favour-
> able to himself, so that many wars, even
> offensive wars, are rather in the nature of
> unjust precautions for the protection of the

           assailant's own possessions than a device
           for seizing those of others.[6]

Both Hobbes and Rousseau are preoccupied by the condition of physical insecurity in which man finds himself – for Hobbes threats to man's physical security, indeed man's survival, are derived from man's fearful nature and the lack of an overarching authority, while for Rousseau continual physical insecurity is dictated by uncertainty about the motives of others. But are threats to man's physical security the only kinds of threat relevant to individual security? There is no real doubt that humans have a basic right to physical security: a right not to be subjected to murder, torture, mayhem, rape, or assault.[7] Yet even in societies where physical security is relatively assured, individuals feel insecure. They may feel insecure because of a low sense of self–worth, because of perceptions of threat to their family or because of concerns arising out of larger issues including fears about population growth, world hunger, or threats to the environment. Although these sorts of fears may not, in the short–term, threaten the physical security of the individual and may, indeed, be a product of the individual's exaggerated fears, they can nevertheless exert a deleterious effect.

Consequently, more contemporary analyses of security have attempted to incorporate the notion of subjectively–perceived security into the definition of security. For instance, Wolfers ultimately defines security in' an objective sense as the absence of threats to acquired values," and "in a subjective sense, as the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."[8] Christian Bay distinguishes further between two types of subjective security: "subjective external security" refers to the degree of consistent reassurance the individual senses in that he or she, or the loved ones, are objectively secure; and "internal subjective security" refers to the security deriving from self–acceptance and selfinsight.[9]

Clearly, new concepts of security are beginning to incorporate subjectively–rooted assessments of security. Whereas security formerly referred primarily to an objective measure of physical security, any assessment of individual security must now include an assessment of the individual's own sense of security.[10] But are subjective and objective aspects of security separable in any meaningful way? Any objective assessment of security will be itself the product of the analyst's own subjectively–derived ideas about the conditions, probabilities and nature of security. Therefore, in order to understand more fully the components of contemporary notions about individual security, it seems most pertinent to explore more fully some facets of subjective security.

There are a number of problematic aspects to subjective security which militate against its conceptual usefulness. First,

there remain some doubts about whether absolute subjective security is indeed desirable. For instance, Christian Bay points out that it may be the case that "modest amounts of anxiety may be necessary **to keep** humans alert and agile, intellectually and **emotional**ly."[11] Secondly, we are not certain whether humans require some **basic level of subjective** security in order to function nor do we know what effect inadequate amounts of security can have on an individual. For example, Abraham Maslow argues that every human being has two forces within him. One set of forces clings to security or safety; the other set of forces seeks to grow and gratify higher needs involved with intellectual and emotional **"being."** What this means, according to Maslow, is that in the choice between giving up safety and giving up growth, safety will ordinarily win out: "safety needs are prepotent over growth needs."[12]

However, despite Maslow's research, it is still not known to what extent the individual's subjective security needs must be satisfied before the individual can become a fully functioning human being. A third problem with assessing subjective security stems from the profound differences among individuals in terms of security requirements. Robert Jervis' research on the cognitive and motivational processes of human psychology argues that in-dividuals differ in their subjective security requirements. According to Jervis, there are two aspects to assessing subjective security requirements: first, individuals differ about their perceptions of threats to their security; and second, people differ, about how much they value increments of security. Thus, a person facing relatively the same threatening conditions as another may experience a relatively higher sense of insecurity, or some individuals may be more willing to pay a higher price to gain increments of security than others.[13]

If Jervis is correct, and each individual's subjective security needs differ, then this would seem to imply that strategies and methods which seek to enhance individual security will need to be tailored to each individual. This is a daunting task, and one which suggests that enhancing security at the individual level is, if not impossible, at least practically unattainable. However, it must also be remembered that what is practically important is not to somehow attain high levels or absolute subjective security for each individual, but to devise methods and strategies which to some degree enhance the individu-al's security. In order to do so we need first to understand that subjective security is in practical terms immeasurable, except insofar as subjective security denotes the absence of subjectively-felt insecurity.

Secondly, it is important to assess the different degrees and kinds of individual insecurity.   By devising policies and strategies which alleviate or eliminate individual insecurities,

the individual's subjective security can be enhanced in a roundabout way. In this context, therefore, strategies which enhance subjective security are any actions or poliⅭies which ameliorate, remove, or reduce the individual's perceptions of insecurity.

Finally, any attempt to ameliorate insecurity will necessitate that we try to understand the physical, psychological and social realities of those who are experiencing insecurity, and then try to eliminate the causes of their particular insecurities. At first glance such an endeavour might also seem overwhelming, but because many kinds of personal insecurity will have common causes (i.e. poverty, foreboding of nuclear war, worker alienation), the elimination or amelioration of some of the root causes of commonly-felt insecurities can promise quick results in terms of higher levels of personal security for all individuals.   Therefore, whereas the research thus far on individual security seems to have been overly preoccupied with the task of somehow defining and attaining subjective security, arguably an alternative approach which seeks merely to alleviate or eliminate subjectively-perceived insecurities may bear more fruit in the form of higher levels of individual security all around.

The National Level of Analysis

The "traditional" approach to security at the national level is embodied in what is referred to as the "realist" paradigm.[14] For the realists it is basically a Hobbesian world with no escape from eternal conflict. The realist vision of national security is based on lessons from history which teach that security is best obtained through preponderant military strength, through the ability to threaten attack by superior forces and through the demonstration of resolve rather than conciliatoriness in the face of the enemy.[15]

Realists can trace through history incidents which demonstrate the parabellum doctrine that "if you want peace, prepare for war."[16] In a similar sense, realis,t orthodoxy seems to assume that if a nation wants security in an anarchical world, obtaining superiority of power in the form of weapons is the most preferred strategy. Nations are advised, for instance, by the "classical" realist thinker Hans Morgenthau to seek the maximum of power obtainable under the circumstances because "all nations must always be afraid that their own miscalculations and the power increases of nations might add up to an inferiority for themselves which they must at all costs avoid."[17]

The realist preoccupation with obtaining security through superior strength in a largely anarchic world order is seen in definitions of national security which emphasize a nation's ability

to deter or sustain an attack. For example, Walter Lipmann writes that:

> A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.   This definition implies that security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it.[18]

The realist preoccupation with security through military strength is also manifested in many national security policies, of which the best illustration is the national security policy of the Reagan adminstration. The origins of the Reagan administration's national security policy can be found in the founding statement of the Committee on the Present Danger. In the statement, the Soviet Union is perceived to be the principal threat to national security: "The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup."[19] Consequently for the Reagan administration, every aspect of U.S. national security policy was judged on its capability to protect the United States military from the perceived Soviet threat.

Why do politicians and self-professed "realists" define national security in such excessively military terms, and why do they resort to such rhetoric about the enemy whenever they talk about security? It may be because politicians have found it easier to focus the domestic public's attention on military threats to security, real or imagined, rather than on non-military ones. Certainly it may be easier to build a consensus on military solutions to national security problems than to get agreement on the other means of influence that a country can bring to bear on problems that it faces.

Another explanation, however, attributes the militaristic rhetoric surrounding national security to **deep psychological** images of the enemy. Patrick Blackett has written that "once a nation bases its security on an absolute weapon, such as the atomic bomb, it becomes psychologically necessary to believe in an absolute enemy."[20] However, it could also be argued that it is first psychologically necessary to believe in an absolute enemy before a nation can base its security on atomic weapons or weapons of mass destruction — that is, a nation's citizens would not tolerate such kinds of defence unless they held stark, menacing images of the enemy. The psychological roots of enemy imagery have received scant attention in the literature[21] but findings in the field of attribution theory regarding "mirror imaging" indicate that enemy images are the product of human tendencies to believe only the

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worst about our enemies (and the best about ourselves) and to deny information about the enemy which conflicts with strongly-held images.[223

If we reject the realist assumption that military strength must be the primary characteristic of any national security policy, what are some other emerging visions of national security? Chief among the various alternative approaches to national security is the idea that disarmament would most contribute to national security. Disarmers or abolitionists argue that military capability remains associated with national security in the minds of most people because of images that are carry-overs from a time in which they once had some relationship to international relations, however, in reality, "the burgeoning growth of military capabilities has been the chief source of insecurity."[23]

For disarmers the very process of arming increases tensions and exacerbates hostilities.   Indeed, the dynamics of such a process are described by John Herz and Herbert Butterfield as a "security dilemma." Reduced to its essentials, the theory of the security dilemma states that attempts by the state or the individual to gain security through power accumulation tend to provoke the insecurity of others, stimulating them to enhance their security, which in turn threatens the security of the other side.   Thus, the security dilemma describes the measures and countermeasures each side takes which can incite a vicious spiral of increasing insecurity.[24] The most obvious manifestation of the security dilemma is the arms race: one nation's attempt to enhance its security through stockpiling weapons may stimulate the nation's adversary to obtain more weapons, with the final result that there is less security for both sides.[25]

The idea underlying the security dilemma – that one nation's attempt to enhance its security through power accumulation may threaten the security of others – seems to have engendered an entire school of thought which proposes obtaining national security by decreasing or eliminating a nation's preponderant power – that is, through unilateral or bilateral disarmament. Essentially, the argument is that disarmament can enhance national security by reducing each side's fears about preemption, accidental war and miscalculated attack, thus contributing to greater security overall.[26] Also significant is the notion that disarmament can free resources conducive to development, which can in turn enhance national security. Thus, in the Final Document of the 1987 United Nations Conference on the Relationship between disarmament and development it states that:

> Disarmament would enhance security both directly and indirectly. A process of disarmament that provides undiminished security at progressively lower- levels of armaments

> could allow additional resources to be devoted
> to addressing non-military challenges to
> security, and thus result in enhanced overall
> security.[27]

The recognition seems to be dawning that security for nations no longer means simply devising defence against invasion or nuclear destruction. On the contrary, strategies based on disarmament seem to hold the promise of higher levels of security overall.

It was mentioned previously that other concepts of national security are being developed in addition to the realist and the disarmament perspectives. Another recently emerging approach to national security is the concept of "alternative security." Alternative security describes a plethora of defence measures including neutralism, non-alignment, nuclear-weapons free zones, civilian defence, non-nuclear neutral zones and non-provocative conventional defence measures.[28] According to a prominent exponent of alternative security methods, Ulrick Albrecht, there is no consensus as to the exact conceptual meaning of "alternative security," or "alternative defence" as it is sometimes referred to, "but this lack of conceptual clarity, like that of democracy or socialism and other political bywords, does not impair [its] political appeal."[29]

Despite its ambiguous nature, the main underlying purpose of proposals for alternative security seems to be to gradually wean nations and leaders away from their dependence on force for security, not by the direct process of abolishing weapons and the military but by the more indirect strategy of substitution. Less threatening "non-provocative" weapons, "civilian-based" defence systems, "transarmament" plans and a shift toward "disengagement" are all alternative security measures which are meant to act as interim substitutes for present-day defence systems, which are by and large based on nuclear weapons.[30]

However, one criticism must be made about the entire concept of alternative security. The various proposals for alternative security are principally intended to enhance the security of small states.[31] But it seems that the advocates of alternative security systems are mainly seeking changes in the national security policies of small states so that if a war should come, and if a war is fought on one's own territory, the preservation of the society and environment will be possible because comparatively less harmful types of weapons will be relied upon for defence and conflict escalation levels will likely remain relatively low (i.e. below the nuclear threshold).[32] Apparently, the advocates of alternative security policies are also preoccupied with the notion that national security policies must somehow cope with military threats. But, perhaps, the analysis of national security must

broaden its focus from thinking only about military threats and defences.

Strategies to enhance or maintain national security must also emphasize economic, social, environmental and political threats.[33] For example, a nation's security today depends just as much on its economic health and on its ability to cope with unexpected domestic problems as on its military preparedness. Therefore, national security policy must also include emergency plans to cope with such threats as interruptions in the flow of critically needed resources; a drastic deterioration in environmental quality or the dwindling of the global supply of resources; unprecedented national disasters (i.e. earthquakes); violence in Third World countries; urban conflict, (exacerbated, perhaps, by the presence of large numbers of poor immigrants and unemployed workers); and terrorist attacks.   All these types of threats endanger the quality of life of a nation and need to be considered and prepared for the formulation of every national security policy.

Another healthy corrective to the current preoccupation with defining national security in terms of weapons stockpiles would be to define national security policy in terms of the fears which one's adversaries may have — that is, to try to recreate the tears which a state's enemies may have and then attempt to alleviate those fears or insecurities.[34] In this regard the old Jewish saying "Fear the man who fears you" is of special relevance: one must try to understand the fears felt by other states in order to increase one's own national security. Security policies which attempt to alleviate the insecurity of adversaries and which attempt to prepare for unexpected natural, economic and social disasters may, in the end, prove to be more efficacious national security policies than either the realist, disarmament-oriented or alternative security proposals being circulated today.

The Systemic Level of Analysis

During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, diplomats and politicians came to realize that a nation's security could be more effectively enhanced by allying with other nations. For instance, during the 1900s coalitions of nations formed which were variously referred to as "balances of power," "concerts" or "alliances." All the coalitions however, sought to expand the power and security of each member nation-state by uniting its military force with other like-minded states.[35]   The modern twentieth century versions of these kinds of coalitions are referred to as "regional security systems" with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Organization of American States (OAS) being the most prominent examples of such kinds of regional security systems.[36]

Underlying all these types of coalitions there remains the conviction that national security is best preserved and enhanced through alliances which can boast of, or demonstrate, preponderant military strength. In a sense, security is seen as a "zero-sum" game where increases in the military security of one alliance or bloc make the other side less secure. However, newer approaches to enhancing security at the global level emphasize that the pursuit of security can no longer be conceived of as a zero-sum game. New systemic-level thinking stresses that nations, and opposing blocs of nations, share interests; interests which, if threatened or destroyed, would be detrimental to the security of both sides. Therefore strategies which increase the security of one side, and in doing so also add to the security of the other side, are actively sought – it is, so to speak, a global security game which need not add up to zero.

What are some emerging concepts of global security which emphasize the existence of common interests? The primary shared interest of nations must be to avoid nuclear war, and in this regard there have been many proposals which seek to establish a type of "common security" based on nuclear-weapon free zones and negotiated conventional balances. The report of the Palme Commission on Common Security, for instance, proposes as a medium-term measure the creation in Europe of a battlefield nuclear-weapons free zone and a 150 kilometres wide disengagement zone on both sides of the NATO-Warsaw Pact demarcation line.[37]

But there have also been other proposals for security which are based on more general, shared interests. For example, Karl Deutsch has developed the concept of "security communities": groups of states which develop reliable expectations of peaceful relations between them and which do not expect or fear the use of force (i.e. Canada and the U.S.).[38]   And Barry Buzan has considered the emergence of "security complexes," in which the security interests of a group of states are linked together so closely (i.e. Western Europe) that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another, with the result that they seem to lie in an "oasis" of relative security compared to the rest of the "fractious" international system.[39]

But one problem with the proposals for common security, security communities and security complexes is that they all require close physical proximity and/or a degree of cultural commonality between the members; one would not speak of a security community between Pakistan and Paraguay for instance. In this respect, the proposals seem to incline more toward a regionally-based rather than a systemic-level conception of security. Are there any proposals to enhance systemic-wide security which are not necessarily based on territorial proximity for their success? Recently the term "security regime" has been coined to describe the existence of tacit or explicit rules, principals and decision

making procedures which exist in order to preserve or enhance shared security interests among any and all nations and among international organizations. A security regime exists when nations or organizations coordinate their behaviour according to shared principles, procedures and rules.

For instance, Nation A and Nation B may seek to control the arms competition between them by making up rules and setting up interdependent decision-making bodies which constrain each nation's pursuit of a larger stockpile of weapons. Besides acting as a constraint on each nation's behaviour, continued adherence to the regime's rules and principles encourages each nation to gradually develop more stable expectations about the other's behaviour. Thus, by specifying what constitutes their shared interests and then by seeking to coordinate their action so as to ensure outcomes based on their shared interests, security regimes can serve to strengthen the security of their members, which may number anywhere from two to hundreds of member nations and organizations. Some examples of successful security regimes are the various arms control agreements between the superpowers.[40]

A resounding strength of security regimes is that their creation and maintenance does not rely on "altruistic" or "conciliatory" behaviour.   Systemic-level thinkers have been criticized in the past for their utopian illusions about international behaviour and their unwarranted faith in the selfless qualities of human nature.[41] But the kind of global thinking which advocates the creation of security regimes relies on a nation's self-interest or "selfishness' in order for regimes to come into being. Security regimes are based on the shared self-interest of nations in averting war and preserving peace.

Unfortunately, however, security regimes are not necessarily stable or durable institutions; one nation may violate the rules of the regime if it is in its self-interest to do so. Therefore, it is argued that the members of a security regime must remain on guard against powers arising from within the regime which threaten to violate its rules and procedures and they must also be prepared to defend themselves against other nations outside the regime which may issue military threats or resort to the use of nuclear weapons.[42] What kinds of security policies do systemic-level thinkers advocate which can combat these kinds of threatening scenarios? Arguably, the first priority of a global security perspective must be to guarantee that the life, health and survival of humanity is assured.[43] But holding to such a principle may mean that a nation must demonstrate conciliatoriness (appeasement) in the face of a threat from another nation or bloc to attack using weapons of massive destruction.

Therefore, taking a systemic-level perspective on security might require taking the viewpoint that in the face of a suf f i-

ciently dangerous and potent threat, the sovereignty and independence of a nation-state may have to be sacrificed for the sake of human survival.[44]   In the long run, however, by working to establish security communities, security• complexes and security regimes we can hope to transform each nation's fixation with <u>national</u> security into a preoccupation with first ensuring <u>world</u> survival, universal well-being and systemic-wide security. Indeed, the evolution toward a systemic-level perspective on security may result in a state of affairs where the issuance of a nuclear threat or even the contemplation of an attack using weapons of mass destruction would be unheard of.

To effect such changes in the concept of national security is a tall order. However, there have been cases in history where government policy has been changed to reflect systemic rather than national interests because of an enlightened public's concern about issues important to global survival (examples are the conclusion of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the INF Treaty in 1987). Therefore, one force which could effect a change toward a systemic security perspective is an informed and determined public. To pin our hopes for change on the prospect of a tidal change in world public opinion is not entirely utopian because mounting evidence indicates that a deep sea-change in world opinion is actually taking place. The evidence that leaders are replying to – indeed, are being carried along on a world-wide wave of desire for security through peace – is seen in the dismantlement of the Berlin Wall; the changes in Eastern Europe; the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan; the elections in Nicaragua, Namibia and Eastern Europe; the release of Nelson Mandela; the superpowers' agreement to eliminate chemical weapons as well as the growing movement to negotiate large-scale cuts in carbon monoxide emissions. But if there is not, ultimately, an even greater shift toward more globally-oriented security concerns in the future, including a move to create more security regimes, security communities, security complexes and associations based on common security, then the game of international relations runs the risk of becoming a "negative-sum" game in which all nations and all individual citizens feel less and less secure.

Conclusion

In order to reach a better understanding of the concept of security and so as to suggest some strategies which could more effectively enhance security, the differences between individual, national and systemic-level approaches to security have been considered. It was argued that the focus at the individual level of analysis on individual physical security and on objectively and subjectively-defined concepts of security could be broadened by attention to individual insecurities and the methods and strategies

Notes

1. Arnold Wolfers <u>Discord and Collaboration</u> (Baltimore, 1962), p.147.

2. For a more elaborate explanation of the problems surrounding the analysis of security at different levels see Robert Linden, "The Security Bind in East Europe," <u>International Studies Quarterly,</u> Vol.26 No.2, June 1982, p.158-159.

3. Thomas Schelling in <u>Micromotives and Macrobehavior</u> (New York, 1978) succinctly describes the problem of translating the needs of individuals (i.e. for security) into national needs and behaviour. Schelling shows that there is not necessarily any relationship between what he calls "micromotives" and "macrobehavior."

4. In a chapter entitled "Conceptions of Security: Individual, National and Global" in <u>Political Discourse,</u> Bhikhu Parekh and Thomas Pantham (eds.) (London, 1987), Christian Bay also makes use of this kind of typology for analyzing the concept of security, except that he refers to global rather than systemic security.

5. Thomas Hobbes, <u>Leviathan,</u> C.B. Macpherson (ed.) (London, 1968) p.185-186.

6. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, <u>A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe,</u> Translated by E.E. Vaughan (London, 1917), p.7879.

7. Henry Shue <u>Basic Rights</u> (Princeton, 1980), p.20. Robert 0. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, eds., <u>Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy,</u> (Kingston & Montreal, 1988).

8. Arnold Wolfers, <u>Discord and Collaboration, op cit,</u> p.150.

9. Christian Bay, "Conceptions .of Security: Individual, National and Global", <u>op cit,</u> p.131.

10. On the other hand, one might argue that the insecurity that both Hobbes and Rousseau are describing is due to a pervasive sense of personal insecurity rather than to mere physical insecurity. Furthermore, the situation of Hobbesian fear may in fact be a product of subjectively-felt fears and not a reflection of the "objective" situation.   Therefore, the distinction I make between the former preoccupation with physical security, and the more contemporary focus on subjec- tively-felt security, may be a false one. Nevertheless, the confusion simply proves my next point, which is that it is

difficult in any case to make a distinction between subjective and objective security.

11. Quoted in Christian Bay, "Conceptions of Security..., op. pit., p.132. Bay is referring in this context to the work of Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, (Princeton, 1957), (originally published in 1844) p.142.

12. Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psycholoav of Being, (Princeton, 1968) (originally published in 1962) p.47.

13. Robert Jervis "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics Vol.30 No.2, January 1978, p.174-175 and Perception andMjApsL⁻gon'prQLiternationalPitic (Princeton, 1976).

14. The term "realist" was originally coined to describe those who "describe what is" while the term "idealist" denotes those who describe "what ought to be." John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago 1951).

15. Of course, the debate about the various tenets of realism, "neorealism" and "structuralism" as well as the continuing discussion about whether realism is a paradigm or tradition in international relations, reaching back to Thucydides, St. Augustine, Hobbes, Machiavelli and Reinhold Niebuhr still continues unabated. For some illuminating discussions about the nature of realist thought *see* Kenneth Thompson & Robert J. Myers, eds., Truth and Tragedy (New Brunswick 1977); James Der Derian & Michael J. Shapiro, International/Intertextual Relations (Lexington, Mass., 1989); R.B.J. walker "Realism, Change and International Relations Theory" International Studies Quarterly Vol. 31, 1987; and David Campbell "Recent Changes in Social Theory: Questions for International Relations" in Richard Higgott, Ed.1, New Directions in internatinalRelti,P&---1-nPesct.ves (Canberra, 1988).

16. For instance, Thucydides is often referred to as the first "realist" and his account of the Peloponnesian War is cited by realists for its lessons about the causes of war. However, a close reading of his account tells us that for Thucydides the cause of the Peloponnesian War was due mainly to Sparta's fear of the preponderant growth in power of Athens: "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta." Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War, Translated by Rex Warner (New York, 1980) p.49. Thus, one could argue that the Athenians drive to obtain superiority of power may have actually caused war, contrary to realist doctrine.

17.   Hans Morgenthau, politics Among Nations (London, England, 1978 edition), p.228.

18.   Walter Lippman, V.FS_gD Policy:hiS.dofthe Republiq (Boston, 1943), p.51. Quoted in Barry Buzan, PALp_312,..._tuAtra and Fear (Department of International Studies: University of Warwick, 1983), p.216.

19.   The founding statement of the Committee of the Present Danger and an analysis of its profound effect on the formulation of the Reagan administration's national security policy is found in Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels (New York, 1982), p.36–52.

20.   Patrick Blacknett quoted in Mark Sommer, Beyond the Bomb (New York, 1985) p.159–160.

21.   For some information on this subject see Robert Jervis Ihg Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, 1970); and the work of psychologist John Gleisner reviewed by John P. Holdren in "The Enemy Within", New Internationalist, March, 1983.

22.   Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet–American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report," Journal of social Issues, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1961, p.45–50; Thomas Homer Dixon, "They and We: An Empirical and Philosophical Study of a Theory of Social Conflict", Unpublished thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1989.

23.   Anatol Rapoport "Whose Security Does Defence Defend?" in Defending Europe: Options for Se uritv1 D. Paul (ed.) (London, 1985) p.272.

24.   John Herz, Idealism and Realism, op. cit.. p.158.

25.   For a more elaborate analysis⸀of the cause of the arms race and the roots of the security dilemma see Herbert Butterfield, History and human Relations (London, 1951), pp.21–22.

26.   See, for example, Admiral Eugene Carrol, Jr. "A New Concept for Security in the Nuclear Age" in End the Arms Race: Fund Human Needs, Proceedings of the Vancouver Centennial Peace and Disarmament Symposium: (Vancouver, 1986); Anatol Rapoport "Whose Security Does Defence Defend?",op. cit.; Charles Osgood "Suggestions for Winning the Real War with Communism," Journal of .Conflict Resolution, December 1959, p.295 and the disarmament proposals aired at the United Nations Disarmament and Development Conferences, particularly in 1978.

27.' United Nations <u>Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development,</u> 24 August–September, 1987 (United Nations: New York, 1987), p.3.

28. For more information on these measures *see* S. Lodgaard, "Nuclear Disengagement in Europe," <u>Bulletin of Peace Proposals,</u> Vol. 17, No. 3-4 1986; Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces" , <u>International Security,</u> Vol. 12, No. 4, Spring 1988, p.48; and Bent Sorenson "Security Implications of Alternative Defence Options for Western Europe," <u>Journal of Peace Research,</u> Vol. 22, No. 3, 1985, p.197.

29. Ulrich Albrecht, "Alternative Designs of European Security, the Palme Commission Report and the Conventionalization of Forces," in Derek Paul (ed.), <u>Defending Europe: Options for, Security</u> (London, 1985), p.144.

30. For more information on non-provocative defence systems and civilian based defence systems see Dietrich Fischer, "Invulnerability without threat: The Swiss Concept," <u>JolArnal of Peace Reseaxq,</u> Vol XIX, No. 3, 1982; for information on transarmament see Johan Galtung, <u>There Are Alternatives</u> (Nottingham, 1984); and for a review of the concepts underlying nuclear disengagement and nuclear-weapons free zones see Carolyn Stephenson "Alternative Methods for International Security: A Review of the Literature," <u>Peace and Change,</u> Fall, 1981.

31. Christian Bay argues that as the world's leading superpower, the United States is "the only great power that is really free to pursue alternative security policy options." Christian Bay, <u>op. cit.,</u> p.136.   Theoretically such is the case, however, I would argue that in practical terms any leader in an arms race of such magnitude is left with little leeway to initiate policy changes because of the dynamics of the arms race itself (i.e. the dynamics of the military-industrial complex) and the leader's perceived stake in preserving the present international system. It is therefore incumbent upon the smaller or middle powers to take responsibility for experimenting with alternative security policies in the hope that they may eventually be adopted by the superpowers. The fact that most of the alternative security proposals aired today originate in Western Europe and are intended for use in defending Europe indicates that the smaller nations are beginning to shoulder this responsibility.

32. Johan Galtung, <u>There are Alternatives. op cit,</u> p.162.

33. The idea that national security policies must cope with more than military threats is not entirely my own but is the

product of a conversation with Dietrich Fischer in February 1988.

34 Some analysis of alternative strategies of conflict management (i.e. reassurance rather than deterrence) are proposed in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, <u>Psychology and Deterrence</u> (Baltimore, Maryland, 1989).

35 For a comprehensive description of all these types of alliance systems see Inis Claude, <u>Power and International Relations</u> (New York, 1962).

36. The term "regional security systems" is referred to by Richard J. Barnet in "Regional Security Systems" Richard B. Grey (ed.), <u>International Security Systems</u> (Ithasia, Illinois, 1969).

37. The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme <u>Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament</u> (London, 1982)

38. Karl Deutsch <u>Political Community at the International Level</u> (Random House, Inc: New York) 1954.

39. Barry Buzan, <u>on cit,</u> p.115.

40. I.e. the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT I & II]), the Intermediate Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty and the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the agreements to control the spread of nuclear weapons (i.e. the Non-Proliferation Treaty) and the measures to decrease the likelihood of accidental nuclear or conventional war (i.e. the Hotline Agreement and the Stockholm Accord. For more information on security regimes see Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes" <u>Internation41 Organization</u> Vol. 36 No. 2 Spring 1982 P.357; Arthur A. Stein "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," <u>International Organization,</u> Vol. 36, No. 2 Spring 1982, p.299; Janice Stein "Detection **and Defection:** Security Regimes and the Management of International Conflict," <u>International Journal,</u> Vol. XL, No. 4 Autumn, 1985, p.599.

41. For instance see Arnold Wolfers' caustic criticism of the globalists (he calls them moralists) in <u>Discord and Collaboration, op. cit.,</u> p.164 and see Hans Morgenthau's critique of the utopians in <u>Politics Among Nations, op. cit.,</u> p.3, 43.

42. Arthur Stein "Coordination and Collaboration ..., <u>op. cit.</u>

43. Christian Bay, <u>op. cit.,</u> p.145-146.

44. It is on this point that I fundamentally disagree with Jonathan Schell in his interesting book The Abolition (New York, 1984). In Part II Schell argues that all nations must abolish their nuclear weapons but must retain the knowledge to rebuild them so as to able to credibly threaten retaliation if one nation rebels and threatens to blackmail all the others with the threat of nuclear war. Although there may be little that is inherently wrong with threatening nuclear retaliation, I do not believe that a systemic perspective on security could conceive of any grounds, or any human value, which warrants the initiation of nuclear war. Furthermore, given the unknown effects of a few megatons on the sensitive ozone layers, I would argue, against Schell, that there is no value which is worth risking the use of a few nuclear bombs, even for the purpose of nuclear retaliation.

Peacefui-anversion:

A Training Centre for Peacekeepers

Across Canada several communities are facing the closure of nearby military bases. In Nova Scotia consultants Peter Langilie and Erika V. Simpson developed the following proposal to convert CFB Cornwallis to a training centre for UN peacekeepers.

Over the past four decades, Canadian governments have earned considerable respect, both at home and abroad, for maintaining an exemplary commitment to the United Nations and multinational peacekeeping. The award of the Nobel prize to both Prime Minister Pearson in 1956 and to UN peacekeepers in 1988 signifies the sincere appreciation of the international community. It can be argued that peacekeeping has been the least expensive and yet also the most high profile commitment of the Canadian Armed Forces. Canada's Chief of Defence Staff, General *de* Chastelain, acknowledges that peacekeeping is viewed by most Canadians as *the raison d'etre* of our defence effort. Professor Albert Legault, a Canadian defence analyst, also notes that in a 31-one year period between 1949 and 1980, the non-recoverable cost to Canada for our participation in peacekeeping operations was $266 million dollars, approximately 0.4 percent of the total defence budget in that period. In short, this relatively minor investment has brought Canada remarkable international credit.

A renaissance of interest in both the United Natio* and multinational peacekeeping operations has accompanied the end of the Cold War. Several longstanding conflicts are slowly being resolved and there are now greater prospects that peacemaking will follow from peacekeeping. Whereas most analysts concur that there is a low probability of being involved in a major conventional war in the near future, there is a high likelihood Canada will be involved in a wide range of future peacekeeping operations. Canada's past Chief of Defence Staff, General Paul Manson, acknowledges that the demand for Canadian peacekeeping expertise is likely to continue. He writes:

> With their reputation and experience, the Canadian forces will surely be able to make an important contribution to international stability through peacekeeping in the coming years. For this effort to be most effective, however, Canada should work with her peacekeeping partners and the United Nations to develop new and better ways to keep the peace in a changing world. *(Canadian Defence Quarterly,* Summer 1989)

Recent peacekeeping experiences have demanded innovation and entailed new tasks in areas such as election-monitoring, verification, policing and the provision of humanitarian assistance. In the aftermath of the Gulf war, serious consideration is being accorded to expanding the scope of operations to include preventive peacekeeping, maritime peacekeeping as well as the collective security enforcement operations that were initially envisaged under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter. Security Council members have submitted proposals for the development of rapidly deployable stand-by forces. Last year, the UN Secretary General appealed to member states to identify troops and material that can in principle be made available to the UN through regional co-operation and burden-sharing. In May 1991, Parliamentarians for Global Action also called on gov emments to set up UN peacekeeping training centres in each region of the world.

The international community is beginning to respond. For example, the Netherlands recently made a commitment to allocate air, land and naval forces to future UN missions. The Scandinavian countries have already established four peacekeeping training centres and arranged cost-saving areas of specialization.

Canada's involvement in nearly every UN peacekeeping mission to date has provided considerable experience and expertise in areas such as communications and logistics. Yet insufficient attention has been devoted to consolidating, building-upon or sharing this knowledge. Although there are numerous combat training facilities in Canada, we have yet to develop a peacekeeping training centre. In fact, there is no on-going or institutionalized peacekeeping training programme in Canada.

In the opinion of several internationally-acknowledged experts, Canada's peacekeeping training programme has been neglected. With an institutional bias toward acquiring combat training and equipment, there has been a reluctance to devote scarce resources or a facility to train for peacekeeping. Brigadier-General Clay Beattie (mt.) credits Canada with having great experience and expertise in peacekeeping but as he says, "with

A Canadian Forces helicopter In UN service in Central America: Six nations mere involved. (UN Photo)

,,, challenges and tasks, there is -a to be done to improve our training programme. We can meet the new challenges if we are better structured and more formally prepared. A number of crucial areas now deserve special attention."

Now, in the event of a peacekeeping posting, a one-to-two week programme of briefings and seminar instruction is usually all that supplements regular training. More specialized training in the important areas of conflict resolution and negotiation is neglected. Canadian experts in this field acknowledge that there are problems and risks in deploying peacekeepers who have not been provided with adequate information regarding their posting, the foreign culture, the political climate or with basic language training. This ad *hoc* and reactive approach to preparation is difficult to understand when there are currently 1,926 Canadian armed forces personnel deployed to 10 UN peacekeeping operations. As former Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Robert Falls, acknowledges, "if Canada is going to be in the peacekeeping business, it ought to be training people adequately for the job."

The objectivei of a peacekeeping training centre are straightforward: it would facilitate the development of standardized training and operational procedures and it would ensure that the necessary *expertise* and forces were readily available. In turn, it would serve to enhance the planning and safe management of future operations. Lieutenant Colonel Christian Harleman, a former Commander of the Swedish UN Training centre, writes that the purpose of their training programme is "to give individuals and units a wider specialized knowledge of their various fields and to acquaint them with current security, political, cultural, religious and ethical conditions in those places of the world where they will be called upon to serve."

The development of a peacekeeping training centre would make it possible to conduct operational training for officers, civilians, and for complete military units in their peacekeeping roles. With the benefit of advance training, Canadian forces could be much more rapidly mobilized and deployed to a theatre of operation.

A Canadian peacekeeping training centre would also offer the opportunity to host a larger multinational training programme. The co-ordination and co-operation required in multinational operations could be pre-planned and re-hearsed in joint exercises and simulations

PLOUGHSHARES MONITOR

conducted on the base and in the surrounding communities. Brigadier General William Yost (ret.), Director of the Conference of Defence Associations, acknowledges that Canada has a lot to contribute to teaching other armed forces about peacekeeping and in this respect "we shouldn't hide our light under a bushel".

A number of internationally-recogs experts now recommend the development of a Canadian centre that could also host a multinational peacekeeping training programme. General Indar.fit Rikhye emphasizes, "such a training centre should not only be for Canadians, who are invited to almost all missions, but for other countries, especially those who lack the ability and resources to organize such a training establishment" Lt. Colonel Christian Harleman,

Canada has a lot to contribute to teaching others about peacekeeping.

Director of Peacekeeping Operations at the International Peace Academy, also recognizes Canada's extensive experience in *this* field and suggests that it is time to support other countries with this knowledge and understanding of peacekeeping. As well, Sir Brian Urquhart, a former Under-Secretary General of the United Nations, states:

[A Canadian peacekeeping training centre] could *be* extremely beneficial not only to Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations but also to a number of neighbouring countries. Existence of such a training centre for the countries of the Western hemisphere could be a great advantage at a time when there is going to be increasing demand for peacekeeping contingents from a far wider range of countries than hitherto.

With an identified training centre and ear-marked forces, Canada would also be well positioned to host one of the first UN stand-by forces. As the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, recently stated, "the other major lesson of the Gulf War is that if we strengthen the capacity of the UN to respond to breaches of security more effectively, in the future, we shall render such breaches less likely."

Joint funding arrangements for multi-

national training could be negotiated through the Canadian Government's Military Training and Assistance Programme (MTAP). At a minimum, participating member states would have to be responsible for providing return transportation and salaries to their respective contingents. Indeed, Canada could develop such a centre and programme without great expense.

CFB Cornwallis is virtually unique in already having facilities for this type of training. As a longstanding school for basic training, it includes an array of residences, administrative offices, training halls, drill areas, classrooms and recreational centres. Given the recent decision to reduce recruit enrolment at Cornwallis by 56 percent, there will be ample space and facilities for a peacekeeping training centre.

Situated on the Annapolis Basin, Cornwallis provides easy access to a range of resources and terrain. In addition to the 615-acre-base, there is a 3000-acre site 10 miles away in Granville that currently accommodates a firing range. Air transport is presently available within 50 miles at CFB Greenwood. An underutilized airfield near Digby is within 10 miles. The Annapolis Basin and nearby Bay of Fundy would also provide a challenging environment for future maritime peacekeeping training. In addition, Cornwallis *has an* ideal geostrategic location for rapid deployment to operations'in the Middle East, Central America, Eastern Europe, and Africa.

Over the past 400 years, the surrounding Annapolis community has suffered numerous violent conflicts, changing hands on seven occasions in the struggle to establish control over North America. From these conflicts a new country emerged — Canada a nation that has since set numerous international precedents in its commitment to promote peace and security.

The prospect of accommodating a peacekeeping training centre would be appealing to the local community, the larger Annapolis Valley region and the province of Nova Scotia. This is a common security initiative with obvious advantages to all related parties. As a clear commitment to regional development and constructive internationalism, the decision to develop a peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis would receive widespread popular and political support. •

"Canada's NATO Commitment:

Current Controversies, Past Debates, and Future Issues"

Erika Simpson

Introduction

Canada has been a committed member of NATO since its founding in 1949. It has been one of Canada's most controversial commitments—as evidenced by the recent debate about NATO enlargement and the controversy over NATO's bombing of Kosovo and Serbia. In fact, we can probably expect yet another debate about Canada's commitment to NATO later this year as Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy has promised to question the Alliance's continued reliance on nuclear deterrence. There is also bound to be future dissension over whether the allies should undertake a 'second round of expansion', taking in countries like Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. While issues related to NATO expansion and the war in Kosovo have dominated the news lately, it is also useful to stand back and look at Canada's overall relationship to NATO. This essay surveys some current controversies, past debates, and possible future issues related to Canada's NATO involvement since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War.

Current Controversies

Expanding NATO Membership could be Risky

Last spring, before the war in Kosovo, NATO was preparing for its fiftieth anniversary celebration in April. The plans were to have a big party in Washington, Celine Dion was to sing, and NATO jet fighters were to fly in formation overhead. One achievement the allies wanted to celebrate was NATO's expansion from 16 to 19 members, taking in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the first round of NATO enlargement.

NATO expansion had been vigorously opposed by the Russians—every political party in Russia was opposed—but at the last moment President Boris Yeltsin agreed not to forcefully oppose NATO's enlargement. Yet the issue still raised a great deal of controversy. Expansion was seen by some as a fall-back to regional alliance formations and balance of power politics. There were fears it represented a reversal back to the policy of containment, to the focus on military force, to collective defence, and possibly extended deterrence. Others viewed expansion as a challenge to current efforts, under the United Nations (UN) for example, to coordinate security at lower levels of defence expenditure. In many respects, the issue of expansion raised other questions about priorities and preferences–should we expand a regional collective defence organisation, possibly at the expense of efforts to reform a universal collective security organisation, like the UN?

There were others who wrote about the possibility that NATO expansion could risk another security dilemma, that efforts NATO made to increase its security could lessen Russia's sense of security, leading possibly to greater tensions, and possibly military competition—to another arms race in a divided Europe. Others argued that the West was being short-sighted. We—that is the West—were urging Russia to undertake

onerous democratic and market reforms in a difficult period of transition. At the same time, NATO expansion would provide Russian nationalists with another excuse to turn back the clock, and reverse reforms.

Despite these criticisms, plans were made for NATO to expand in any case. But the big party last April was cancelled in favour of a quiet meeting about what to do about the crisis in Kosovo. The black ties and tuxedos were never unpacked.

Now that the first round of expansion has taken place, NATO policy-makers must forge a consensus among 19 allies—as NATO officially runs by consensus, not majority vote—to decide who will be accepted in the 'second round'. There will still be risks that expansion, the first or the promised second round, could lead Russia to eventually move some of its conventional or nuclear arsenal into defensive positions along a newly-defined border, along a new Central Front.

We also do not know which countries to invite into NATO during the second round. Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, and Bulgaria want membership. NATO policy-makers are merely uttering ambiguous phrases right now, such as 'the door is open' to NATO expansion. Their reluctance stems, in part, from concerns about the risk of undermining the credibility of NATO's article 5. I call article 5 'the three Musketeers' article. It guarantees that an attack against one is an attack against all. This is by far the most important article in NATO's founding treaty. For example, during the Kosovo debate, the fact that Serbia's President had not actually attacked a NATO ally was raised as a salient issue. Technically, Mr. Slobodan Milosovic had not violated article 5. This important article raises other troubling questions. For instance, if Hungary, now a NATO ally, is drawn into a war with Romania over Transylvania, an

area over which they have argued for centuries, are we automatically involved? Both countries made a great effort to patch up their differences in order to be invited into the NATO club. But a few years or decades from now, if they fall into an armed conflict (just as Greece and Turkey—NATO allies—have done), would we be left in a quandary about our article 5 commitment?

It is fair to say that NATO expansion posed, and will continue to pose, a daunting challenge and commitment; one that is not entirely risk–free.

The War in Yugoslavia and the Debate at Home:

Most recently, the Canadian government's strong support of NATO's actions in Serbia and Kosovo during the war seemed to many to be proof of the country's loyalty to the Alliance. For example, the fact that the Canadian government, along with most of the other allies, did not publicly raise doubts and reservations about the decision to bomb Serbia and Kosovo was presented by the United States Information Agency as proof of these countries' basic allegiance to NATO .[1]

However, the bombing did incite substantial public discussion about the role Canada should take in NATO's management of the crisis in Kosovo and Serbia. It also prompted fears about the measure of Canada's NATO obligations in case the war spilled over into the rest of the Balkans. During the crisis in Kosovo, concerns were voiced about whether Canada should condone bombing a sovereign country that had not attacked any member of the Alliance, and that was technically out of NATO's territory of responsibility. That CF-18 Canadian fighter planes were sent to assist with the aerial

bombing of Serbia and Kosovo prompted debate over whether air strikes were necessary or morally unjustifiable.[2]

Considerable controversy also arose over the prospect of contributing ground forces to Kosovo. Many radio hot-line shows burned up the airwaves on this issue, and the question of whether we should take in refugees. The Defence Department housed thousands of refugees, temporarily, at various Canadian Forces bases. Not surprisingly, the possibility of a ground war in the former Yugoslavia incited a great deal ofdebate across the country and in the media.

While it is not yet known whether the federal cabinet was internally divided about all these sorts of questions, certain comments by Lloyd Axworthy indicate that, as Foreign Minister, he harboured reservations about unequivocally supporting NATO's actions in the Balkans.[3] Put simply, the war served to remind Canadians that NATO membership entails obligations and commitments that might be difficult to sustain.

As a NATO member, Canada has been a committed contributor to this international organization, and governments have wanted to remain constructively engaged for fifty years. But just ask anyone within a relationship and they can tell you that any commitment entails obligations—challenging obligations that may be comforting at times, while very trying at others—sometimes even grounds for separation in more demanding circumstances. It is worth reflecting on how Canada has managed its relationship with NATO since the end of the Cold War.[4]

Debates since the End of the Cold War

Challenge and Commitment:

The Mulroney government's 1987 *Defence White Paper*, was called "Challenge and Commitment," or sometimes rather derisively the 'coffee table white paper' because of its many colour photographs. In 1987 the Defence Department promised a significant increase in defence spending—because of, ostensibly, the challenge from the Soviet Union—and it promised to strengthen Canada's NATO commitments. Specifically, the government intended to acquire a fleet of 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines at a cost of 10-12 billion dollars. It wanted to double our troop strength in Europe and modernise our equipment on NATO's Central Front for high-intensity warfare. Basically, the government committed to spend 183 billion dollars on defence over the next fifteen years until the year 2002. It was a very expensive package for countering the primary threat of the Cold War.

Then a couple of years later, in 1989, the Conservatives suddenly announced an abrupt change in defence policy, freezing defence spending. They cutback major capital expenditures. The nuclear submarines were cancelled, as well as new main battle tanks, and plans to deploy a division in Europe. It was evident, to almost everyone, that the nature of the threat from the Soviet Union—the challenge—had changed. We no longer had to, or could, devote so much money and resources toward improving our collective defence, particularly our NATO commitments.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and the Persian Gulf War in the winter of 1991, Canadians continued to debate whether there was any reason for Canada to retain its NATO commitments, especially its expensive troop commitment in Europe. The government spent approximately 1 billion dollars a year merely to maintain our troops in Europe—and that did not include the cost of training and equipping the rest

of the Armed Forces, which were also structured primarily for big-league NATO roles, including war in Europe, with all the related costs of equipment, training and supply.

Withdrawal from the Central Front in Germany:

The government's September 1991 announcement of its intention to withdraw all but 1200 troops from the Central Front in Germany came as no great surprise. It was estimated that a gradual withdrawal would result in financial savings of some 1.2 billion dollars over five years. Then in February 1992, the Minister of Finance announced plans to withdraw Canada's contingent from Europe completely. The members of the Canadian delegation were given only a few hours' notice of the change in policy. Initially the decision was difficult for them to justify, especially since Prime Minister Mulroney had only a few months before assured Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany that Canada intended to retain a visible military presence on European soil. The European allies and the American military representatives at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) sharply criticised the timing of Canada's decision, particularly as it was taken without consulting the other allies through proper channels.[5]

On the other hand, Canadian delegates to NATO and SHAPE in Brussels consoled themselves by pointing to the significant role Canada's Ambassador to NATO was playing in establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). They also lauded Canada's commitment to European security through its peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia.[6]

Canadian Efforts to Promote NACC and Peacekeeping

The idea of according former Warsaw Pact nations associate membership in NATO had been broached by Prime Minister Mulroney in 1991. When the possibility of associate status was rejected—mainly by Britain and France because of the security guarantee it entailed—the Canadian Ambassador to NATO worked to institute a form of NATO membership for the Eastern Europeans under NACC auspices.[7]

The portrayal of Canada's contribution to the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia as a renewed contribution to European security was also a source of consolation to the Canadians in Brussels, whose efforts were assisted by the high media-profile of the Commander of the UN Forces, Canadian General Lewis Mackenzie. Indeed, it was not long before Canadians at NATO headquarters were receiving requests from the other allies, including Americans, for more information on peacekeeping. While high-level representatives from allied countries such as Britain and Germany pointed out that Canada's most valuable contribution to European security remained the maintenance on European soil of troops ear-marked for NATO, in the early 1990s it seemed as if the sudden shift of interest to peacekeeping might somehow brighten Canada's image at NATO headquarters.[8]

Although Canada's status at NATO headquarters appeared to diminish with the announcement of the troop withdrawal, the general attitude of the Canadian delegation was one of resignation; indications were that the Canadian announcement was a precursor to similar announcements of reductions and cut-backs among the other allies. It was clear that Canada would remain an active participant in the North Atlantic Council, in the hundreds of committees at NATO and SHAPE, and in the discussions surrounding the implementation of the 'New Strategic Concept.' As NATO's Secretary-General,

Manfred Woerner, assured the allies in February 1992, after the announcement of the troop withdrawal, Canada would meet its other commitments to NATO.[9]

Canada's Continuing Alliance Commitments:

Despite the end of the Cold War, many of Canada's other NATO commitments remained unchanged after the 1992 announcement. For instance, the nation retained the capability to dispatch an expeditionary brigade group, two squadrons of CF-18s, and an air defence battery to Europe. The government was responsible for maintaining a Canadian Forces battalion prepared to deploy to Europe with the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force or the NATO Composite Force. Canadians continued to serve as part of the NATO Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and as aircrew aboard NATO AEW aircraft. Canadian destroyers and frigates were prepared to sail with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic while eleven destroyers and frigates, one supply ship, three submarines, fourteen long-range patrol aircraft and twenty-five helicopters retained their role in patrolling the North Atlantic as part of NATO's 'augmentation' forces. Canada was to do its part to defend NATO's Canada-U.S. region a well as contribute to the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), which is responsible for the defence of NATO's largest single land mass. Canada also offered the allied countries its facilities and territory for military training, such as those at CFB Goose Bay in Labrador and CFB Shilo in Manitoba, and the underwater naval testing range at Nanoose Bay in British Columbia.[10]

The Conservative government continued to demonstrate its support for NATO through other means. The portion of the infrastructure budget at NATO headquarters paid by Canada, although not widely known, was viewed at NATO headquarters as a significant

contribution. The government's intention to retain approximately 650 Canadian personnel at NATO and SHAPE as military planners, attachés, and representatives on the Canadian delegation was also seen to be an important commitment. And the announcement regarding the renewal of a ten-year contract to train approximately 6,000 German Armed Forces annually at CFB Shilo and CFB Goose Bay was described as yet another example of Canada's intention to help strengthen the Alliance. Although aboriginal residents complained about the environmental effects of low-flying jets, and Goose Bay was slated to be closed as the United States deemed it too expensive for training purposes, German and other NATO planes continued to train at this base.[11]

The Chretien Government's Defence Review:

In November 1993, the new Liberal government of Jean Chretien announced a comprehensive review of Canadian defence policy, precipitating another debate about Canada's NATO commitments. By February 1994, a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons was established to initiate consultations and report to the government. In testimony before the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, some policy-makers continued to argue that the Alliance had to remain a priority for both defence and foreign policy. They emphasised the wide array of new conflicts in the world, particularly in Europe, the instability of the Russian leadership, and the remaining military threat. They advised that the government ensure the country had modern military equipment and sufficient tri-service personnel to fulfill the strategic requirements of deterrence as well as NATO's New Strategic Concept. Canada, they argued, must continue to structure and train its military for mid-to-high intensity combat

operations. In testimony before the Special Joint Committee, they acceded that Canada

should contribute to United Nations' peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, but such

contributions should remain a low priority for the Canadian Forces relative to their

general combat capability for defending Canada and its allies. As some argued, the

alternatives posed a risk to security and stability as well as to Alliance relations. In their

opinion, NATO was adapting to this new environment of uncertainty, and NATO alone

retained the political coherence and military capabilities to ensure collective defence and

security.[12]

     Others argued that NATO was now less a priority given the disintegration of the

Soviet military threat and the disappearance of both the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. They

noted the unlikelihood of an attack across Europe's Central Front, and frequently cited the

historic inability of military alliances to combat diffuse threats such as ethnic conflict,

environmental degradation, and human rights violations. Some suggested that Canada

should de-emphasize its military commitments to NATO while retaining a diplomatic and

consultative presence in the higher councils of the Alliance. Alternatively, many favoured

increasing Canada's foreign aid and contributions to UN agencies and operations. There

were also related proposals for new defence priorities that would emphasize the

monitoring and surveillance of Canadian territorial waters and air space as well as expand

the country's commitment to peacekeeping operations under UN auspices. Rather than

attempt to maintain a general-purpose, combat-capable army, navy, and air force, there

were calls for specialization. Accordingly, Canadian Forces should be restructured and

retrained in order to contribute more productively to peacekeeping and the various

initiatives outlined in the 1992 UN *Agenda for Peace*. Given this new

environment, there would be unnecessary risks and expenses in adhering to the prevailing assumptions, practices, and institutions of the past fifty years.[13]

In the midst of this defence review, the government announced its commitment to the conversion of Canadian Forces Base Cornwallis in Nova Scotia into a multinational training centre for UN and NATO-affiliated personnel. At the new Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, the government planned to sponsor some training for military and civilian personnel from countries participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace, as well as from developing countries under Canada's Military Training Assistance Program. This decision provoked yet more controversy about peacekeeping training and the advisability of establishing a privatized peacekeeping training centre.[14]

NATO and the 1994 Defence White Paper

In December, the Department of National Defence released *The 1994 Defence White Paper*, announcing that Canada would remain a full and active member of NATO. The monolithic threat to Western Europe had disappeared, and the principal responsibility for European defence lay with the Europeans, but at the same time, the government valued the transatlantic link and recognised that the Alliance had made progress in adapting to a post-Cold War world. The *White Paper* noted in particular those aspects of NATO that reflected a cooperative approach to European security relations, including the creation of NACC, Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the development of the Combined Joint Task Force Concept. According to the *White Paper*, this perspective on NATO 'underpinned' the future of Canada's Alliance commitments. In the event of a

crisis or war in Europe, the contingency forces Canada maintained for all multilateral operations would immediately be made available to NATO.[15] Yet for the first time, the Defence Department consistently referred to Canada's NATO defence commitments after pointing out the country's UN obligations. This seemed to herald a fundamental reordering of Canada's defence priorities.[16]

The Costs of NATO Enlargement:

Predictably, the release of this *White Paper* in 1994 did not terminate the debate over the measure and extent of Canada's NATO commitments. Gradually some high-level foreign and defence policy advisors became concerned about the costs of NATO enlargement for Canada. Prime Minister Jean Chretien initially supported expanding NATO membership from sixteen to twenty member states (adding Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia). However, estimates of the costs of enlargement tended to vary widely, in part because of uncertainty about the number of new members that should be admitted. Nevertheless, in 1997 many high-level American officials agreed that NATO expansion would cost somewhere between US$27 billion and US$35 billion over the next 13 years. Would Canada's defence costs jump with NATO enlargement?

Behind-the-scenes, some senior policy-makers worried about the looming costs of NATO expansion in the twenty-first century, and about the extent to which Canada should or could support the rebuilding of the newer allies' defence systems. In the weeks prior to ratification of the enlargement decision in the United States Congress, the US State Department concurred with NATO's revised assessment that enlargement could cost only $1.5 billion rather than $27-35 billion. Yet these wide variations in estimates

among such reputable analysts as the United States Congressional Budget Office, the Pentagon, the State Department, and NATO headquarters raised more questions about the measure of Canada's NATO commitments, and about whether all these estimates might prove to be low. Even as the Alliance opened the door to the first round of expansion, many Canadians worried about the potential cost of Canada's NATO obligations.[17]

Future Issues

NATO's Nuclear Strategy and the Middle Powers Initiative:

One issue that promises to incite further controversy revolves around Canada's critique of NATO's reliance upon nuclear deterrence strategy. The NATO Summit in Washington last April opened the door to a broad-ranging review of NATO's nuclear weapons policy. NATO's New Strategic Concept, which since 1991 has reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to relying upon nuclear weapons, will be reviewed and re-examined. Pressure from the leaders of the Middle Powers Initiative and the Non-Nuclear Weapon States, particularly from key policy-makers in Canada, Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Japan, may result in a serious review of the Strategic Concept. In particular, key policy-makers from the Middle Powers Initiative could influence NATO's decision-making regarding its nuclear commitments, leading to important and subtle shifts in the Alliance's deterrence strategy over the period between 2000-2002.

The issue that NATO has promised to review is of historical, practical, as well as theoretical interest. After fifty years of relying upon nuclear weapons for our defence, recent developments, including the end of the Cold War, have presented an opportunity to enter the new millennium with a plan for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Many

distinguished world figures are arguing that the risk of retaining nuclear arsenals in perpetuity far outweighs any possible benefit imputed to nuclear deterrence. They believe that the end of the Cold War has created a new climate for international action to eliminate nuclear weapons, an opportunity that must be exploited quickly or it will be lost. They see the Middle Powers Initiative as a bold attempt to encourage NATO leaders to 'break free from their Cold War mindsets' and move rapidly to a nuclear weapon-free world.

Hundreds of international and nongovernmental organisations have focused on abolishing nuclear weapons, and to buttress this grassroots effort the Middle Powers Initiative was launched in 1998. Countries without nuclear weapons coalesced and are now lobbying the nuclear-armed nations to disarm themselves. Canadian Senator Douglas Roche is the chairman of the Middle Powers Initiative, and joining Canada as members are other non-nuclear weapon states, such as Germany, Norway, Sweden, Japan, and Mexico. Whereas NATO's Strategic Concept has hardly changed on the issue of maintaining reliance upon nuclear weapons since 1991, the Washington Summit Communiqué, issued by NATO heads on April 24, 1999, committed NATO to 'review' its strategic policy. At a news conference on April 24, Foreign Minister Axworthy confirmed the willingness of NATO "to have a review initiated" of its nuclear weapons policies. Explaining that this was the thrust of the recommendations that came out of the report of Canada's Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Axworthy added: "It's a message that the [Canadian] Prime Minister took [to] certain NATO leaders... I think we have now gained an acknowledgement that such a review would be appropriate and that there

would be directions to the NATO Council to start the mechanics of bringing that about."[18]

This gives the non-nuclear weapon states in NATO, and the 12 abstainers on the New Agenda Coalition's 1998 resolution at the UN, a new opportunity to press for a 'quality review', not a perfunctory one. Members of the Middle Powers Initiative, headed by Senator Roche, believe that the NATO communiqué strengthens the possibility that appropriate representations can be made to a number of important countries around the world. Indeed, it was Canada, in its official policy statement, that urged NATO to begin a nuclear weapons review, and this was carried into the NATO Summit. Members of the Middle Powers Initiative are expected to press for further changes to NATO's deterrence strategy in the near future.[19] Success will depend on whether a new coalition of leaders from countries respected by the Nuclear Weapon States—especially by the United States—generates sufficient political momentum and media attention.

Conclusion

Canada's policy record since the end of the Cold War indicates that we will remain committed to NATO, but on somewhat different terms than before. One seldom reaches the silver or golden anniversary in any relationship without experiencing doubts and the occasional shift in terms of commitment. Still, as many concede, this has been a relatively successful alliance over the last fifty years. The challenge for Canada, once again, is to remain constructively engaged—to chart a safer course—and to ensure NATO responds cost-effectively and responsibly. Canada must remind the other NATO allies that some arguments, controversy, debate, and dissension can and should be

expected in what is alleged to be a democratic relationship—indeed, they may help improve this longstanding institution.

Biographical Note:

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[1]Diana McCaffrey and Katherine Starr, eds., "Consequences of Kosovo – Views from Western Europe and Canada," United States Information Agency, Office of Research and Media Reaction, 9 July 1999, available at http://www.usia.gov/admin/005/wwwh9709.html Most recently, it has come to light that NATO was internally fractured. For example, see "The Dilemmas of War: What went wrong for NATO?" CBC Television, 11 June 1999, online transcript available at http://tv.cbc.ca/national/pgminfo/kosovo3/nato.html and "NATO's inner Kosovo conflict," BBC Two program, 20 August 1999, online transcript at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid 425000/425468.stm

[2]For some Canadian reservations about Canada's NATO commitments, see and "Canada on the attack: daily military updates," CBC News Online. Available at http://www.cbcnews.cbc.ca/news/indepth/canadaattack/updates.html and "Canadians against war on Yugoslavia," available at http://www.stopwar.net/

[3]On Axworthy's reservations about the war, see "Mission to Moscow," CBC television, The National Online, online transcript of Axworthy's comments available at http://tv.cbc.ca/national/pgminfo/kosovo2/axworthy990426.html and "Lloyd Axworthy's biggest test," *Globe and Mail*, 16 June 1999.

[4]See Erika Simpson, *NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders confront Critics* (forthcoming fall 2000: McGill-Queen's University Press) for a detailed analysis of

Canada's approach toward NATO after the end of the Cold War, 1987-1999 (ch. 1) and during the Cold War years, 1957-1987 (chs. 2-9).

[5]Confidential interviews at NATO and SHAPE Headquarters, October 1992; "NATO greets troop pullout from Europe 'with regret'," *Montreal Gazette*, 27 February 1992 and "Canadian troop pullout upsets allies in NATO," *Globe and Mail*, 5 March 1992.

[6]Briefing by Ralph Lysyshyn, Deputy Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, NATO headquarters, October, 1992 on NACC and interviews of Angela Bogden, Canadian Delegation, and Glen Brown, Canadian Liaison Officer, NATO headquarters, Brussels, October 1992.

[7]Prime Minister's Office, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Speech to Stanford University, 29 September 1991; "Throw Soviets a 'lifeline,' Mulroney says," *Globe and Mail*, 30 September 1991; and interviews of Angela Bodgen and Glen Brown, Canadian Delegation, NATO headquarters, Brussels, October 1992.

[8]Interview with John Barrett, Disarmament, Arms Control and Cooperation Section, Political Affairs Division, NATO headquarters, October, 1992. On Canada's growing commitment to European security through peacekeeping in Europe in 1992, see comments by Colonel Tony Anderson, "NATO members gang up on Canada over pullout," *Globe and Mail*, 9 April 1992 and "Germans plan to expand UN role," *Globe and Mail*, 10 July 1992.

[9]"NATO greets troop pullout from Europe 'with regret'," *Montreal Gazette*, 27 February 1992. Despite Woerner's comments, apparently a classified report was issued at NATO headquarters that took Canada to task for the withdrawal. Confidential interview, NATO headquarters, October 1992.

[10]According to Canada, Parliament, Report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, "Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future," (Ottawa: Publications Service, Parliamentary Publications Directorate, November 1994), 21; DND, Minister of National Defence Marcel Masse, "Statement on Defence Policy," Ottawa, September 1991, 18; DND, Associate Minister of National Defence, Mary Collins, "Canada and North Atlantic Security," 5; and Alex Morrison, "Canadian Defence Policy and Burden-Sharing in NATO," ed. Barbara McDougall, *et al.*, *Canada and NATO: The Forgotten Ally?* (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), 49.

[11]According to comments by Dr. Erika Bruce, Office of Information and Press, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, October 19, 1992; a report by the NATO Defence Planning Committee, "Enhancing Alliance Collective Security," December 1988 cited by Alex Morrison, "Canadian Defence Policy and Burden-Sharing in NATO," *Canada and NATO*, 41; an interview with Lieutenant-Colonel J. van Boeschoten, Deputy, National Military Representative, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, October 1992; and a DND News Release, AFN: 61/92, 10 December 1992. On Goose Bay and the grounds for the American withdrawal, see "Germany aims for peace role," *Globe and Mail*, 12 July 1994 and "Ottawa lost Goose Bay duel," *Globe and Mail*, 9 July 1991.

[12]Although this is a generalization of different positions, it is evident in various presentations to the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy. For example, see the testimony of Professor Michael Hennessy and Professor Greg Kennedy in Minutes and Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's Defence Policy, issue no. 2, (19 April 1994); the testimony of Vice Admiral Daniel Mainguy (ret.) of the Defence Associations National Network, issue

no. 4, (26 April 1994); Lt. Col Ernest Wesson (ret.) and Col. Sean Henry (ret.) of the Conference of Defence Associations, issue no. 3, (20 April 1994); and the testimony of Professor David Haglund, Professor Robert Spencer, and Lt. Col. John Marteinson, issue no. 5, (27 April 1994).

[13]Once again, this is an approximation of various arguments and proposals. For testimony which reflects this approach, however, see for example the testimony of those affiliated with the 'Canada 21 Council,' including Donald Macdonald, Professor Janice Stein, and Maurice Archdeacon in Minutes and Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's Defence Policy, issue no. 3, (20 April 1994). See also the analysis put forward by Professor Harriet Critchley, issue no. 10, (9 May 1994); Admiral Robert Falls (ret.), issue no. 4, (26 April 1994); and, H. Peter Langille, issue no. 26, (21 June 1994). On the detailed recommendations of the Canada 21 Council see, *Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century*, (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, 1994). On the *Agenda for Peace*, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General, 31 January 1992, (New York: United Nations), 1992.

[14]Department of National Defence, *Backgrounder*, "Cornwallis: A Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre," (February 1994). For details, see DND, *1994 Defence White Paper*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1994), 34, 37, 38 and Common Security Consultants, [H. Peter Langille and Erika Simpson], *A 1994 Blueprint for a Canadian and Multinational Peacekeeping Training Centre at CFB Cornwallis* (Halifax: Government of Nova Scotia, 1994), reprinted in Minutes and Proceedings of the Special

Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's Defence Policy, issue no. 21, June 14, 1994. For more on the controversy surrounding peacekeeping training, see "Liberal Foreign Policy Handbook," (Ottawa, May 1993); Common Security Consultants and Stratman Consulting Inc. [Brigadier-General Clayton Beattie], *CFB Cornwallis: Canada's Peacekeeping Training Centre-A Blueprint for a Peacekeeping Training Centre of Excellence* (Halifax: Government of Nova Scotia, 1993), reprinted in Minutes of Proceedings of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, issue no. 45, April 1, 1993; H. Peter Langille and Erika Simpson, "Combat skill isn't enough for Canada's peacekeepers," *Globe and Mail*, 10 September 1993; and, Common Security Consultants, "CFB Cornwallis: Canada's Peacekeeping Training Centre," (Halifax: Government of Nova Scotia, 1991).

[15]DND, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 30, 36.

[16] See for example, *Ibid*., 27-39.

[17] For more information, see Erika Simpson, "The Looming Costs of NATO Expansion in the 21st Century," *International Journal*, vol. 54, no. 2, spring 1999, 324-328, 338.

[18]Lloyd Axworthy quoted in Senator Douglas Roche, Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative, "Analysis of NATO Action on Nuclear Weapons," April 28, 1999, available at http://sen.parl.gc.ca/droche/ On the recommendations that came out of the Foreign Affairs Committee, see Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century*, December 1998, available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/1/FAIT/Studies/Reports/faitrp07-e.htm

[19]Notwithstanding the rhetoric of the Canadian government's stand on NATO and nuclear weapons, it is noteworthy that Canada recently abstained on crucial nuclear disarmament resolutions put forward by the New Agenda Coalition at the 1998 and 1999 sessions of the UN First Committee, and voted against resolutions put forward by China and Russia to strengthen the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. For more information on Canada's weak voting record, see Senator Douglas Roche, "Canada's voting record at the UN First Committee," special issue on Ridding the World of Nuclear Weapons, *Press for Conversion!*, December 1999.

New Threats to the Alliance's Security and Strategies to Reform NATO

gy: Erika Simpson

NATO needs a much greater transformation of its structures and procedures if it is to serve the common security interests of the allies and others. Traditional policies should be seriously reconsidered and perhaps drastically reevaluated. Old ways of thinking no longer apply to the world in which we live. This article suggests new types of threats to allied security and proposes alternative strategies to reform NATO so as to enhance international security.

CONDUCT INDEPENDENT THREAT ANALYSIS

For decades, NATO's assessment of threats has been shaped and influenced by American military threat analysis. This development was not considered a serious problem until recently. As George Bush explained during the second presidential debate with John Kerry: "We all thought there was weapons there, Robin. My opponent thought there was weapons there. That's why he called him a grave threat. I wasn't happy when we found out there wasn't *weapons,* and we've got an intelligence group together to figure out why."[1] While Prime Minister Tony Blair has been largely exonerated for taking American intelligence at face value, many will not accept this sort of backhanded logic in future wars. In the future, domestic publics will demand hard evidence of a country's professed transgressions, even if American politicians argue that such evidence exists but cannot be released for security reasons. Some of the lessons of the war against Iraq are that NATO allies need to undertake more of their own independent military threat analysis. They need to institute the infrastructure and procedures necessary to carry out such independent threat analysis and share their findings.[2]

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SHARE ALTERNATIVE THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE

In conjunction with United Nations monitoring agencies and international watchdog institutes, NATO could unite with like-minded nations to provide the UN Security Council with timely and accurate threat assessments based on new information and possibly conflicting analysis of the threat. Such alternative threat assessments could play a valuable role in reducing tensions and defusing arms spirals in the weeks and months preceding possible multilateral or unilateral actions (such as air strikes).

Naturally, critics will retort that sharing intelligence, especially contrary evidence on the nature of the threat, will not necessarily prevent the US administration from undertaking preemptive or unilateralist measures. For

many American diplomats, the lessons of the Kosovo

North Atlantic Council Meeting, Dec 2004 - NATO

campaign in 1999 and the Franco-German rebuff in 2003 reinforced their belief that NATO is far too cumbersome and bureaucratic. Now that targets have to be approved by 26 members, "coalitions of coalitions"[3] may seem more practical, as exemplified by the United States' "coalition of the willing" in Iraq. Even if one or more of the non-US NATO allies puts forward contradictory evidence about the nature of the threat, the US and members of its "fast alliance" may choose not to accept such evidence. A great deal will depend on the quality of the intelligence and in this respect, France, Germany, and the UK could have a lot to offer. NATO headquarters should inculcate a culture where competing

interpretations of threats are encouraged among the twenty-six allies.

PROMOTE AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONCILIATION THROUGH NATO

Admittedly, fostering an atmosphere of conciliation and acceptance may take a long time. As the Ditchley Foundation concluded in a recent discussion of NATO's future role: "Whatever the underlying causes, most of us agreed that this level of transatlantic insult had not been seen before and that it had contributed to an unnecessary crisis, the effects of which would be with us for some time. There was a good deal of broken crockery about."[4] During the presidential debates, John Kerry appealed to American citizens to vote for him, stating "I believe America is safest and strongest when we are leading the world and we are leading strong alliances."[5] He criticized George Bush for attacking Iraq too quickly before ensuring a strong coalition was in place. In the future, another important way to promote an atmosphere of conciliation would be for the United States (and Canada) to refrain from viewing threats to North American security as markedly different from, and more important, than threats to Europe.

The failure of the nuclear weapon states to implement their Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations means that many countries, like Iran and North Korea, have the rationale they seek to obtain nuclear arsenals of their own.

DECLINE PARTICIPATION THROUGH NORAD IN SPACE-BASED PROGRAMMES

After the Cold War's end, the decline of the Soviet threat meant that the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) was no longer as important to North American security. But now some argue that preparing for possible warfare in space is necessary, and the US (possibly in conjunction with Canada) should work through NORAD to develop space-based interception capabilities. In Europe and Canada, concerns have long been raised about possible contributions to the US military's global surveillance, warning, and

communications systems. As one observer has pointed out, the American government needs to be especially careful that it is not perceived to be intent upon erecting some kind of "Fortress America."[6] Accordingly, NATO governments should maintain official positions of non-participation in the US missile and space-based defence programme because it is not configured in a manner consistent with international disarmament and proliferation interests and the prevention of weaponization of space. In addition, the allies should organize preliminary discussions on the contents of a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in space. Such a treaty could build on the longstanding commitment of most of the world's states to the basic tenets of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (although the Bush and Putin administrations chose to abandon the ABM Treaty). Of course, US government participation in such discussions is unlikely at present, but many states with space capabilities might participate. And if discussions were organized to ensure representation by non-governmental entities, including corporate space interests, US corporations with an interest in non-weaponized space might participate. Such discussions could set the groundwork for actual treaty negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament or elsewhere when conditions for progress are more propitious.[7]

SAVE THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) FROM CHARGES OF HYPOCRISY

The failure of the nuclear weapon states to implement their NPT obligations under Article VI of the NPT means many countries, like Iran and North Korea, have the rationale they seek to obtain nuclear arsenals of their own. As a result, the upcoming "Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty" (RevCon) faces daunting challenges. The original nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France, and China) have not lived up to their obligations under Article VI of the NPT to move decisively toward the irreversible elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Such inaction "invites charges of hypocrisy when these same countries seek to deny access to nuclear technologies to nonnuclear weapons states - and moreover, threaten and carry out military preemption to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other countries as in the case of the US and UK concerning Iraq."[8]

Prior to the NPT's Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting at the UN in 2004, the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) and Pugwash Canada sponsored a roundtable for

Canadian officials and NGO representatives. The paper *Building Bridges: The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies* is based on this event. It *recommended* building bridges between NATO member states and those of the New Agenda Coalition, which focuses on nuclear disarmament. The aim is to strengthen the "moderate middle" of the nuclear debate. It discussed building a bridge between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states to .)pen the road to substantive disarmament and non-proliferation progress. It also made recommendations regarding Canada's role and responsibilities with respect to the US ballistic missile defence project and Tossible weaponization of space.[9]

Hight NATO states calling for more speed in implementing commitments to the NPT supported a New Agenda Coalition resolution 3t the UN. They built a bridge on he long road to nuclear disarmament. The bridge gained extra trength when Japan and South Korea joined with the NATO 8 - Belgium, Canada, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway and Turkey. These states, along with the New Agenda countries Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden - now form an impressive centre in the nuclear weapons debate and can play a determining role in the outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.[10]

Lust as Canada and Germany took the lead in NATO by asking the Alliance to review its reliance on deterrence, the non-nuclear weapon states in NATO, the New Agenda Coalition, and the Middle Powers Initiative will play a significant role. Seven NATO states have ̄wined with Canada, which for two years had stood alone in NATO in supporting the New Agenda resolution. The fact that such important NATO players as Germany, Norway, The Netherlands and Belgium have also now taken a proactive stance indicates that they want to send a message to the US to take more significant steps to fulfilling commitments already made to the NPT. As retired Canadian Senator Douglas Roche, thair of the MPI states, "The situation the NPT finds itself in is so serious and the threat of nuclear terrorism ̣93 real that governments need to put aside their quarto& and power plays and take meaningful steps to ensure that the NPT will not be lost to the world dough erosion."[11]

MAINTAIN LOW LEVELS OF DEFENCE SPENDING

The European allies in NATO and Canada have made laudable efforts to *decrease* their *defence* spending. Since 2001, the non-US NATO members' spending on NATO has been less than 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Over the last three years, however, the United States has laid out 3.6 percent of its GDP on its defence commitments worldwide. Canada expended 1.2 percent, approximately the same percentage as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Spain. The Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, and the UK ranked at or above this average. All other NATO members fell below this average highlighting the fact that American remonstrations to spend more are failing to convince.[12]

Big-ticket costly weapons systems are unlikely to find Osama bin Laden or prevent a terrorist attack.

For example, Germany is making drastic cuts in equipment and slimming down its organizational structures; its focus has switched to peacekeeping, crisis management, and the war against terrorism, rather than defending itself from Cold War attacks. Similarly, Canada has refrained from markedly increasing its defence spending on capital and equipment in favour of a modest increase to the number of available peacekeepers. Even US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld acknowledges that big-ticket costly weapons systems are unlikely to find Osama bin Laden or prevent a terrorist attack. When US army officials expressed confidence that they would capture bin Laden in 2004, "they cited better intelligence - not powerful new arms - as the basis for their optimism."[13] Increasing defence spending to American levels is not an option for responsible policymakers.

Although some European and Canadian defence lobbyists bemoan lower levels of defence spending, domestic publics will not tolerate higher levels. The newer allies will have a tough time coming up with the money to bring their militaries up to NATO's basic standards of interoperability. In the biggest defence contract by a former Soviet bloc country since the end of the Cold War, Poland agreed to buy 48 US-made F-16 jet fighters for US$3.5 billion. Such modernization will cost Poland about $7.76 billion through 2012. Like Poland, all the new allies are facing steep modernization costs to replace obsolete or inadequate equipment. But the target force goals they agreed to with NATO prior to joining

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the Alliance are proving difficult to reach.[14] (Those goals, outlining the contribution to the Alliance that each member intends to make, are classified by NATO).

CALCULATE DEFENCE SPENDING FAIRLY

In forthcoming analysis of the allies' abilities to meet an agreed-on set of pledges related to their capabilities, the "Prague Capabilities Commitments," the NATO countries need to consider alternative sorts of commitments-such as UN and NATO-sponsored peacekeeping because they improve the Alliance's military preparedness and close the spending gap between the US and its European allies. Even the EU's efforts to field a rapid-reaction force of 60,000 personnel should count as a monetary contribution to NATO's security. After all, the United States calculates the percentage of GDP spent on NATO incorporating all US defence spending worldwide - including US spending in the Middle East on defence and American foreign military assistance to Columbia. It makes sense to reply to American concerns about burden-sharing by asking NATO officials to calculate spending estimates on all types of defence expenditures, particularly peacekeeping under NATO and UN auspices.

NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan - UN

CONTRIBUTE MORE HEAVILY TO PEACEKEEPING UNDER NATO AUSPICES

Most of the NATO allies, including the United States, are participating more heavily in peacekeeping under NATO auspices than in the past. Recent new NATO missions include commanding the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and assisting in Poland's command of a NATO-supported peacekeeping force in Iraq. NATO is also improving its ability to act far beyond Europe and North America through a major restructuring that includes cutbacks at NATO headquarters in Belgium and a stronger presence in the United States. A command centre in Norfolk, VA, "Allied Command Transformation," is overseeing this

modernization. More robust, rapidly deployable capabilities will change NATO into a much more nimble, deployable, action-oriented organization. The most significant development has been the institution of a 20,000-strong "NATO Response Force," ready to deploy within days.

At the same time, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) is contributing 25,000-32,000 alliance and non-alliance troops. And until mid-2003, the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina included about 13,000 NATO and non-NATO troops. In June 2003, the forces were reduced to 7,000 and since the end of 2004, the mission has been transferred to the EU. Furthermore, NATO members have been patrolling the Mediterranean since the terrorist attacks of 2001, a mission called *Operation Endeavour.*

But the risk is that as NATO involves its allies in more and more "out-ot-area" operations similar to those in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and now Iraq, the rest of the world may come to perceive NATO peacekeepers as defenders of the American empire. As such, while NATO should continue to increase its commitment to peacekeeping, there needs to be a complementary return to the UN as the chief guarantor of safety. This will help to avoid the widespread perception that the "NATO club" consists mainly of Northern, "rich," "white" nations based in North America and Europe.

RETURN TO THE UN WITH INCREASED FUNDING AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO SHIRBRIG AND A FUTURE UN EMERGENCY SERVICE

The UN continues to experience a funding crisis due to member states' failure to honour their financial obligations. Member states of the UN invest an average of $1.40 in UN peacekeeping activities for every $1,000 spent on their own armed forces. For example, for every dollar that it has invested in UN peacekeeping, the United States has tended to spend over $2,000 on its own military.I[5] The NATO allies need to contribute more money and personnel to UN peacekeeping or run

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the risk of being accused of trying to channel all actions through NATO peacekeeping. One effective way to do this would be to contribute standby forces and equipment to the UN's Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). Sixteen countries are members of the brigade, which successfully monitored the ceasefire between Eritrea and Ethiopia, but more contributors and resources are needed. While SHIRBRIG aims to provide the UN with a jump-start, rapid deployment force of as many as 5,000 troops within 30 days notice, plans are

The risk is that as NATO involves its allies in more and more "out-of-area" operations similar to those in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and now Iraq, the rest of the world may come to perceive NATO peacekeepers as defenders of the American empire.

afoot to establish a UN Emergency Service (UNES). It would be a UN 911 that could avert genocide and armed conflict worldwide, not just in Sudan and Rwanda but in all regions of the world, including NATO's backyard. While NATO's new "Rapid Reaction Force" runs the risk of being perceived as US-led and status quo oriented, each participating state in SHIRBRIG would reserve the right to decide whether to deploy national personnel on a case-by-case basis. This would ensure that its final composition would be wider and more inclusive. Moreover, UNES would be composed of professional volunteers, military police, and civilians working directly for the UN. This would reduce the pressure on national decision-making and the immediate demand for national armed forces in UN peace operations.[16]

CONCLUSION

NATO has limited time and a small window of oppor- :unity to take advantage of its fairly benign reputation. it is highly unlikely that this regional military alliance rill be seen in such a positive light ten years from now. Right now, NATO is well-situated to make the impor- :ant changes proposed in this article because the NATO allies did not acquiesce to American pressure to join the war on Iraq. It was evident from France, Germany, Belgium, and Canada's reluctance to join the war that not everyone could agree on the best methods and most efficient means of achieving commonly valued objec- ±ves, including ousting Saddam Hussein. The important

lesson is that every NATO ally - not just the current hegemon - now has a duty and responsibility to put forward alternative proposals to enhance international and national security. The foreign ministers of the allied powers may not be able to summon fleets of frigates in aid of their diplomacy or threaten to use nuclear weapons, let alone decide to use them. But they can carry briefcases stocked with practical proposals and promises of more money to put toward alternative strategies. -

Notes:

1.   'Transcript: second presidential debate," online: http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004c.html.

2.   For a detatied analysis of NATO's progress-and lack of progress-on instituting new infrastructure and procedures since 9/11, see Eric R. Terzuolo, "Regional Alliance, Global Threat NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1994-2004," online: htip://www.nato.irt'acadtellowiO3-041terzuolo.pdf

3.   The term "coalition of coafrtions" was used by US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell and quoted by Bob Woodward, *Bush at War,* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002) p. 49.

4.   The Ditchley Foundation's News and Conference Reports, Report by the Director, 'The *Future* Role of NATO", February 21-23, 2003, p. 1, online: http://www.ditch-ley.co.uk/news/13.htm.

5.   "Transcript: first presidential debate," online: littp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debatereferee/debate_0930.htrnl.

6.   Ann Denholm Crosby, "Defining Security Environments for Global Governance: Canada and the US 'Global Protection System'," *Global Governance,* 4, 1998, pp. 331-353.

7.   Canadian Pugwash Group and the Middle Powers Initiative, *Building Bridges; The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies,* a policy paper for the government of Canada, online: http://www.pugwashgroup.ca.

8.   Statement of the International Pugwash Council, Seoul, Korea, 9 October 2004, online: *http://www.pugwash.orglreports/pac/544eou112004-statement.htm.*

9.   See *Building Bridges: The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies.* A shorter version for an international audience, *Building Bridges: What Middle Powers Can Do to Strengthen the NPT,* is online: the Middle Powers Initiative website: http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/pubs.htrnl. For further discussion of NATO nuclear policy and attempts to modify it, see Erika Simpson, "NATO's Nuclear Weapons Policy: relationships to the 2000 and 2005 NPT Review Conferences, the paragraph 32 process and future Canadian policy," paper presented to the CPG-MPI Roundtable, 27 February 2004, online: the Canadian Pugwash Group website: http://www.pugwashgroup.ca.

10.   According to Douglas Roche, "A New Bridge to Disarmament," Waging Peace, website of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 1 November 2004, online: http://www.wagingpeace.orearticles/2004/10/30_roche_new-bridge-disarmament.htm.

11.   *Ibid*

12.   NATO Press Release, "Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence," 1 December 2003, Table 3, online:: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03146e.htm.

13.   Sanford Gottlieb and Christopher Hellman, "Weapons won't defeat terrorism," *USA Today,* 22 March 2004, online: http://64.177.207.201/pages/8_542.html.

14.   "Integrating New Allies into NATO," October 2000, Ch. 3, Restructuring and Modernization, p. 2, online: htip://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=2665&sequence.O.

15.   Roger Coate, ed., US Policy and the Future of the United Nations, (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994) p. 12.

16.   Howard Peter Langille, Bridging the Commitment-Capacity Gap: A Review of Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing *UN* Rapid Deployment Capabilities (United States: Centre for UN Reform Education), August 2002 online: *http://www.centerforunreform.org/publications_listofpublications.asp.*

Thinking about your Thesis

Here's advice on how to get started

When **Erika Simpson** finished her PhD dissertation in political science at the University of Toronto in 1995, she knew her experience could help other graduate

Soon after, as a newly minted professor teaching international relations in the political science department of the University of Western Ontario, she realized that the lessons she learned would be helpful to the graduate students.

suggestions from the graduate workshops for MA and PhD political science students at Western and comments from several colleagues, she wrote a document of useful advice for would-be thesis writers. It now serves as a

hand-out for all grad students in Western's political science department (even though it's not "official departmental policy"). Many of her observations are also applicable to graduate students in other departments, especially in the social sciences.

This is a shortened version of Dr. Simpson's document. The original version, including references, can be found at http://publish.uwo.ca/~simpson/ publish/ on the Web.

When embarking on a thesis, it's essential to choose a topic early and give yourself plenty of time to do your preliminary research. You'll need to scan the latest journals and books related to your interests and search the Internet to determine whether anyone has already written extensively on your topic, and who the main authors are in your area. Also make sure you review at least three other theses in your department's collection or the university library. Ask yourself how much theory you want to incorporate into your thesis, how widely relevant you want it to be, and what potential employers might want to see on your resumé.

In framing a research question, you need to pin down exactly what it is you want to find out, and what problem you will examine. For example, if you are interested in improving United Nations peacekeeping efforts and you would like to work for the UN, your question might be: How has the UN financed its peacekeeping operations?

Once you've done your early research and framed a relevant question, prepare a brief written statement for your supervisor, defining concepts where necessary. Think about whether your research question can be further narrowed down.

Outline the topic's significance: Is it timely? Does it relate to a practical problem? Does it fill a research gap? Does it relate to broader theoretical principles or general theory? Does it sharpen the definition of an important concept or relationship? Does it have implications for a wide range of practical problems?

You'll also need to establish whether your question is related to a theoretical problem, previous theoretical research, or a debate in the literature. Discuss whether you will

parts, whether you will make theoretical propositions in the introduction or discuss theoretical implications in the conclusion, and indicate whether you are writing a theoretical and/or policy-relevant thesis.

You may prefer an alternative research methodology (for example, an interpretive, critical, comparative, or historical approach). But by at least attempting to answer the following questions, you should make significant progress in designing your research project. Moreover, you may encounter a thesis examiner who wants to know what your independent and dependent

Once your topic is chosen and approved, you need to step up your research efforts, and continue them year-round, not only in the crucial months before the final deadline.

variables are. Try to assert your propositions in the form of one-sentence hypotheses. Now ask the hypotheses in the form of questions. Do any of your propositions overlap and can any questions be eliminated? Do they make common sense or are they far-out and controversial?

Although you don't need to use a positivist explanation, you should think about your possible independent, intervening, and dependent variables. If you want to explain the dependent

you suspect are the most significant independent variables? Can you argue that given A, you expect B will occur? Are there exceptions? Can you narrow your list of independent (and intervening) variables to include only those most significant? What evidence could you turn up to prove or disprove your propositions? What might lead you to reject your propositions? What levels of analysis will you study?

If you decide to use the case-study approach, ask yourself whether your case selection was biased, and recognize that many theses end up with fewer case studies than initially planned. If the bulk of your evidence comes from logical reasoning (for example, game theory or rational choice theory), determine what counter-arguments seem to oppose or contradict your reasoning. Or, if your method is more historical or interpretive, ask how much detailed chronological explanation you need.

What scale will you use to measure significant factors or variables (such as quantitative, semi-quantitative, qualitative)? Will you undertake the kind of research necessary to measure your variables (for example, mathematical, survey, public opinion, in-depth interviews, content analysis)? Are any important concepts in need of measurement (intensity, frequency, amount, number)? How will you assess the measure of change, significance or importance?

Year-round research

Once your topic is chosen and approved, you need to step up your research efforts, and continue them year-round, not only in the crucial months before the final deadline.

Don't be discouraged if, at the beginning, you are overwhelmed by too much information. Your most highly relevant research may take place in the weeks and months leading up to the penultimate draft. Remember that you are looking for patterns and trends, and that you must think about how you will structure your analysis. Think about all the alternative approaches you could take, and be prepared to defend your chosen method.

You are moving toward being able to make theoretical and policy-relevant conclusions, and you need to be

your research methodology. Ideally they will be logical, and a new contribution to knowledge. Be prepared to advance a central argument or thesis based on your research, and explain how the evidence generally confirms or refutes your initial suppositions. How would you now qualify your research propositions? Should you reword them to be more accurate?

When it comes to the actual writing, you can save time by working on the main body of the thesis first and leaving the introduction and conclusion until the end. Remember that you can repeat some introductory points in your conclusion.

When you do finally write the introduction and conclusion, consider any mistakes you've made, and what you would do differently now. Assess your method of gathering information, and ask yourself how would you improve your research process. With your supervisor, discuss how your conclusions could be fed back into theory. What are the theoretical implications of your research?

> During the first year or semester, read as much as possible. Don't be shy about talking to your supervisor. Brainstorm. Write down ideas on file cards. Throw most of them away. Follow your hunches.

In the conclusion, you may mention what you intend to research in the future, knowing what you know now. In light of your work, indicate areas that are ripe for further research. While writing the conclusion, students often tend to refine their arguments and write excellent summaries. Perhaps you could move some of this material to the introduction, where it might be more useful to the reader.

When at the final draft stage, every section, paragraph, and sentence should advance your overall argument. Excise any sections that are there only because you did the research, not because they are necessary to your thesis.

Headings should explain and reflect the table of contents. In the abstract, state your argument clearly. Tests and evidence should be explained fully. Note the sources of all your charts and graphs. Acknowledge and address legitimate counter-arguments. Summarize the debate of which your thesis is a part, and specify what previous literature it confirms or revises.

Your thesis will be read by scholars in your field; it may also by read by non-specialists. It should be well organized and clearly presented so that readers may easily grasp the significant points. Other graduate students and friends can give useful advice before you submit your thesis. Don't assume that any confusion is due to their stupidity or ignorance, and instead consider how you might constructively use each criticism or suggestion.

The term "final draft" should mean "the best I can do". Read your drafts carefully. Pages and footnotes or end-notes should be consistently numbered. Your advisors will have suggestions, and you should feel free to debate them. But you have the final responsibility for content, presentation and errors.

Common thesis problems During the first year or semester, read as much as possible. Don't be shy about talking to your supervisor. Brainstorm. Write down ideas on file cards. Throw most of them away. Follow your hunches.

It's crucial to learn how to search for information using the Internet. Update your bibliography as you conduct your research, in the proper format on your computer. You can

Write a draft once you have done 50 percent of your research. Then fit your remaining research information into your draft. Many people continue to do research because they are afraid of writing. Remember: You do not have to read everything.

Decide which style to use – Modern Language Association or American Psychological Association, making sure that your chosen style is acceptable by the official thesis guideline issued by your department. Be consistent, and footnote your sources and bibliography correctly from the beginning.

Err on the side of over-footnoting. Study journal articles in your field to assess when and what they footnote. Be careful not to paraphrase someone's analysis and pass it off as your own. If you have not provided evidence in the main body of your writing to back up an assertion, you can list in a footnote or endnote the materials that would buttress your argument. Statements of fact should be properly documented. Quotations and interviews need to be properly noted. Frequently ask yourself if you can footnote a comment rather than retain it in the main text, to eliminate confusion and save time.

When explaining a concept or theory, such as post-modernism or realism, do not use critics' works. Cite original authors, not someone else's interpretation of an original idea, and footnote the original source.

Tackling the first draft

As you write the first draft, refrain from editing and proofreading. Considerable time can be wasted editing on the computer. If you dislike writing first drafts, take the attitude, "I'm just going to bang out a few pages", and strive for at least three pages a day. Remember to give the reader signposts to indicate where you are going. For instance, restate your interpretation of the findings and provide conclusions that summarize preceding paragraphs. Use many headings and sub-headings.

By the time you write the last chapter, the first chapter will need to be revised. This is not a disaster, and is actually expected. In fact, you will probably do many serious revisions of your entire thesis. Don't be discouraged – you can get

> Among graduate students, pro-crastination is common and expected, for a variety of reasons.

Your computer's spellcheck will not pick up all your errors so carefully read your draft before handing it to your professor. It is usually better to be late than to submit a poorly written or unedited draft. You will be judged in part based on the clarity of your writing and the quality of your presentation.

Print your work frequently. Keep copies of your disks and your drafts in different locations just in case of fire, tornadoes and earthquakes. For peace of mind, save your work every day. Solve any computer or printer problems now, not when deadlines loom.

Among graduate students, pro-crastination is common and expected, for a variety of reasons. To combat the problem, schedule rewards (such as exercise) after completing X hours of work. Study at the library with others. Prioritize long-term and short-term goals. Ask for more feedback from your advisor. Set short-term deadlines. Work when you will be least bothered, and don't socialize during study times. Reward yourself with lunch, coffee, a chat with a friend. Ask yourself whether you are overbooking your time because you are afraid to work on your top priority – your thesis! Just say NO!

Another common problem is writer's block. The way out of this one is to write anything. Write why you hate your research project. Your inner critic is fond of phrases such as: This is stupid! You don't know anything and you should do more research! You better go back and correct that sentence! Tell your inner critic to get lost. Then write as if you were explaining your ideas to a friend or a relative, someone who is not a critic but a fan.

E-mail progress reports to your supervisor if you cannot drop by frequently. Vow to keep in touch, especially if you are having problems. ᑌᗩ•ᗩᑌ

Thinking about Your Thesis?

Essential questions, techniques, and tips the

MA or PhD candidate could ask of a thesis in preparation—and

the supervisor or examiner could also consider.

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Thinking about Your Thesis?
Erika Simpson

Writing a MA thesis or PhD dissertation is a difficult and time-consuming endeavour. Some students produce chapters based on sound research frameworks and methodology with seemingly little effort or hands-on guidance. Most would-be scholars, however, struggle valiantly. This guideline to thinking about the MA or PhD thesis is meant to act as a map or compass—not a directive.[1]

A Set of Questions

The MA or PhD candidate might ponder the following set of questions before undertaking a thesis. Alternatively, the newly-minted professor or inexperienced thesis supervisor might pose these sorts of questions to the graduate student. While the MA or PhD candidate should not be expected to answer them all, just thinking about them beforehand, and discussing them with a supervisor, should help the student to write a better thesis. Variants of these questions may also arise during the oral defence.

Selecting a Research Topic:

Try to choose a topic early. Scan the latest journals and books related to your interests. Conduct some database searches on the Internet using key words that interest you. What are other researchers and academics doing in your field of interest? Has someone already written extensively on your favourite topic? Who are the main authors in your specialized area? Overview at least three other theses in your department's collection or the university library.

Compared to other students, how much theory do you want to incorporate into your thesis? How relevant do you want your thesis topic to be? What topic might potential employers be interested in seeing on your *resumé*?

Framing Your Research Question:

Compose your thesis question. What is it you are specifically interested in finding out about? What is the problem you intend to examine? How can this topic be framed in the form of a question? For example, let us say you are interested in improving UN peacekeeping efforts and you would like to work for the United Nations. Your specific question might be: "How has the UN financed its peacekeeping operations?" Alternatively, you might be interested in the problem of nuclear proliferation. Your specific question might be: "Why did South Africa decide to rid itself of nuclear weapons?" Discuss your possible thesis question with others.

Present your supervisor with a brief written statement of the problem. Define concepts where necessary. Express the problem in the form of a question. Can your research question be further narrowed down? Describe the significance of the problem with reference to one or more of the following criteria: Is it timely? Does it relate to a practical problem? Does it relate to an influential, wide or critical population? Does it fill a research gap? Does it permit generalization to broader theoretical principles or general theory? Does it sharpen the definition of an important concept or relationship? Does it have implications for a wide range of practical problems?

The Theoretical Framework:

Can your problem be related to a theoretical framework? Can the problem be related to previous theoretical research? What set of theoretical questions are you asking? What debate

in the literature are you addressing? Can your research fill a theoretical gap? Does it answer one or many aspects of a theoretical debate? Will you present the theory (including the methodology and important concepts) in a separate chapter or in parts? Will you make theoretical propositions in the introduction? Could you discuss theoretical implications in the conclusion? To what extent do you want to write a theoretical and/or policy-relevant thesis?

Formulating Researchable Propositions:

You may decide not to use a "positivist" framework to organize your thesis, preferring an alternative research methodology (*e.g.* "interpretive," "critical," "comparative," "historical" approach, *etc.*). But by at least attempting to answer the following "positivist" (*i.e.* "causal," "empirical," "scientific") questions, you should make significant progress in terms of designing your research project. Moreover, you may encounter a thesis examiner who wants to know, "What are your 'independent' and 'dependent' variables?"

First, could you transform your theoretical propositions into researchable propositions? Try to assert your propositions in the form of one-sentence "hypotheses." Now ask the hypotheses in the form of questions. Do any of your propositions overlap and can any questions be eliminated? Do they make common sense or are they far-out and controversial?

Although you do not need to use a positivist explanation, you should at least think about your possible independent, intervening, and dependent "variables."[2] What you want to explain is the dependent variable (B). Why does B occur? The independent variables (A) contribute to B. What do you suspect are the most important or significant independent variables? Can you argue that Given A, you expect B will occur? Are there any exceptions? Can you narrow your list of independent (and intervening) variables to include only those that you suspect are most

important and significant? Remember that a MA or PhD thesis is not supposed to be a *magnum opus*. Focus your analysis upon the variables that you suspect are most important.

What criteria might you use to evaluate the "testability" of your research propositions? In other words, what kinds of evidence could you turn up to prove and disprove your propositions? What kinds of evidence might lead you to reject your propositions? What kind of evidence would you need? What sort of evidence do you expect to get? Are you looking for evidence stemming from individual-level, state-level or systemic-level interactions? What levels of analysis will you study during the research process?

How will your present your evidence? For example, if you decide to use the case-study approach, why did you select your particular case studies? Was your case-selection biased? Recognize that many theses end-up with fewer case studies than was initially planned. Are all your cases well chosen? Alternatively, if the bulk of your evidence is derived from logical reasoning (*e.g.* "game theory," "rational choice theory," *etc*.), what "counter-arguments" seem to oppose or contradict your reasoning? On the other hand, if you are inclined to be more historical or interpretive, how much detailed chronological explanation do you need to provide?

What scale will you use to "measure" significant factors or variables? (*e.g.* quantitative, semi-quantitative, qualitative?) Are you prepared to undertake the kind of research necessary in order to measure your variables? (*e.g.* mathematical, survey, public opinion, in-depth interviews, content analysis?) Are any important concepts in need of measurement? (*e.g.* intensity, frequency, amount, number?) How will you assess the measure of change, significance or importance?

Conducting Research:

The research process should happen all year around, not in the crucial months before the final deadline for submission. Do not be discouraged if, at the beginning, you are overwhelmed by too much information. Much of your most highly-relevant research may take place in the final weeks and months leading up to the penultimate draft.

What patterns, trends, or series are you looking for during research? How are you going to structure your analysis of the evidence? Why? What alternatives have you considered? Why is your method preferable? What are its advantages and disadvantages?

What kinds of theoretical- and policy-relevant conclusions can you draw? How confident are you of these conclusions given your research methodology? For instance, do you think 2-3 case-studies can lead to general conclusions? Is your comparative case-study method useful? Are your logical conclusions merely commonsensical, not a new contribution to knowledge?

At this stage, you should be prepared to advance a central argument or thesis based on your research. Does the evidence generally confirm or disconfirm your initial suppositions? How would you now qualify your research propositions? Should you reword them to be more accurate? And now that the bulk of your research is completed, what do your findings teach us? Do they teach us something important? Have they solved at least part of an important puzzle?

Introduction and Conclusion:

Save time and refrain from writing the Introduction and Conclusion until the main body of the thesis is written. Remember that some of the points you make in your Introduction can be repeated in your Conclusion.

When writing the Introduction and the Conclusion, you could consider the mistakes you made, their consequences, and seriousness. What would you do differently now that you have conducted the research? Assess your method of gathering information. How valid was it and how would you now improve your research process? With your supervisor, discuss how your conclusions could be fed back into theory. What theoretical implications does your research indicate? You could also mention how your findings could have an impact upon policy. What policy-relevant lessons can be learned from your research?

In the Conclusion, you may mention what you intend to research in the future, knowing what you know now. In light of your work, indicate areas that are now ripe for further research. While writing the Conclusion, students also tend to refine their arguments and write excellent summaries. Could you promote some of this material to the front, where it might do the reader more good?

Final Draft:

Can you excise sections that are there only, it seems, because you did the research, not because they are necessary to the logic of your argument? Every section, paragraph, and sentence should be there only if it advances your overall argument.

Headings need not be mere labels (*e.g.* "Background" or "Conclusion") but can be more descriptive and precise (*e.g.* "Is NATO Expansion Bound to Fail?"). Do your headings

explain and reflect the Table of Contents? In the abstract, have you stated your argument clearly so that there is no confusion about what is and is not argued? Tests and evidence should be explained fully. Have you noted the sources of all your charts and graphs? Have you acknowledged and addressed legitimate counter-arguments? Have you summarized the debate of which your thesis is a part, and specified what previous literature it confirms or revises?

Your thesis will be read by scholars familiar with your field of inquiry and it may also by read by non-specialists. Does it explain sufficient historical, technical, and theoretical background? Is it well-organized and clearly presented so that readers may easily grasp the significant points?

Remember other graduate students and friends can give useful advice before you submit your thesis for formal consideration. In reacting to their comments, it is mistaken to assume that their confusion is due to stupidity or ignorance. What are the reasons behind their confusion? How might you contend with each criticism or suggestion?

Of course, it is not a good idea to hand your friends or supervisor a manuscript with careless typing and spelling, single-spaced type, or faint print. The word "final draft" should mean "the best I can do." Have you carefully read your drafts? Are the pages and footnotes or endnotes consistently numbered? Your advisors will have suggestions, and you should feel free to debate those suggestions and reasons. But you have the final responsibility for content, presentation, and errors.

Common Thesis Problems

There are many well-known (and some rather unusual) techniques that can be used to conquer common thesis difficulties. Procrastination, in particular, can be a problem among MA and PhD candidates. The tips in this section are meant to help overcome standard barriers to thesis completion.

Problems Framing the Research Question:

During the first year or semester, try to read as much as possible. Browse through the library stacks. Scan related journal articles. Look at other MA or PhD theses for ideas about feasible topics. Narrow down your question as much as possible. Refrain from writing your *magnum opus.* There will be lots of time to do that later. Do not be shy to take your supervisor's time. Throw around ideas. Chat. Write down your interesting ideas on filecards. Throw most of them away. Follow your hunches.

Common Research Problems:

You do not have to read everything. Over-researching is a common problem. If you do not know how to search for information using the Internet, make sure you ask someone to teach you. Most graduate students are using the World Wide Web to quickly and efficiently conduct research.[3] Update your bibliography as you conduct your research, in the proper format on your computer. You can waste valuable time later looking up references you mislaid. Try to write a draft once you have done fifty percent of your research. Then fit your research information into your draft. Many people continue to do research because they are afraid of writing. You may need to bribe yourself to sit in front of your (blank) computer screen. Or force yourself to face a blank piece of paper.

Problems with Writer's Block:

Confronted with writer's block, start writing anything. Write why you hate your research project, write a letter to a friend explaining your thesis, write your mother an explanation of your research question. "I hate this thesis because..." "This is a stupid topic because...." Tell your inner critic to get lost. Your inner critic is fond of phrases such as: "This is stupid!" "You don't know anything and you should do more research!" "You better go back and correct that sentence!" Instead try to write as if you were explaining your ideas to a friend or a relative, someone who is not a critic but a fan. Also ask for your supervisor's email or postal address and write progress reports if you do not have time to drop-by frequently, or you are shy. Vow to keep in touch with your supervisor, especially if you are having problems. *Common Writing Mistakes:*

When explaining a concept or theory, such as "post-modernism" or "realism," do not use the critics' works to explain the concept. Take the time to examine and cite original authors. Moreover, do not cite someone else's interpretation of an original idea. For example, do not use undergraduate texts as a source of conceptual definitions. Examine and footnote the original source.

As you write the first draft, refrain from editing and proofreading. Considerable time can be wasted editing on the computer. If you dislike writing first drafts, take the attitude, "I'm just going to bang out a few pages." Strive for at least three pages a day. Remember to give the reader "signposts" to indicate where you are going. For instance, restate your interpretation of the findings and provide conclusions that summarize preceding paragraphs. Use many headings and sub-headings. Remind your erstwhile reader of what has already been explained. And

recognize that by the time you write the last chapter, the first chapter will need to be revised. This is not a disaster, and is actually expected. Indeed, you will probably have to do many serious revisions of your entire thesis. Do not be discouraged. You can get a lot more done than you think you can in a short time.

Computer Errors:

Your computer's spellcheck will not pick up all your spelling errors. Be sure to read over your draft before handing it to your professor. It is usually better to be late than to submit a poorly-written draft. You will be judged in part based on your writing ability. If you cannot write clearly, it is assumed you are not thinking clearly. Print-up your work frequently. Keep copies of your disks and your drafts in different locations just in case of fire, tornadoes, and earthquakes. For peace of mind, save your work everyday. If you are experiencing computer or printer problems, solve them now, not when deadlines loom.

Style Frustrations:

Purchase and study a style manual. Decide whether to use the Modern Language Association (MLA) or American Psychological Association (APA) style. Check that your chosen style is acceptable according to the official thesis guideline issued by your department or university. Be consistent and footnote your sources and bibliography correctly from the beginning. Do not make up your own distinctive style. For example, do not write pgs. instead of pp. Do not place the publisher before its location. Do not mix the MLA and APA documentation styles.

Err on the side of over-footnoting, rather than under-footnoting. Study journal articles in your field to assess when and what they footnote. Be careful not to paraphrase someone's

analysis and pass it off as your own. You cannot just change a few words here and there in a paragraph. If you have not provided evidence in the main body of your writing to back-up an assertion, you can list in a footnote or endnote the materials that would buttress your argument. Statements of fact should be properly documented. Quotations and interviews need to be properly noted. Frequently ask yourself, "Can I footnote this comment rather than retain it in the main text so as to eliminate confusion, save space, and retain the essay's coherence?" *Problems with Procrastination:*

Among graduate students, serious procrastination is common and expected. Why do you procrastinate?

- Other Activities are More Interesting. Most other activities promise a shorter-term pay-off (*e.g.* movies, socializing, sports).

- Loneliness. Studying is lonely. Being in the library is isolating. "Everybody else seems to be having a good time!"

- Too Much Work. You are behind. It is hard to decide where to begin and easier not to.

- Guilt. Other things need pressing attention. Laundry, broken-hearted friend, the dog needs a walk...

- Fear of Failure. You do not understand the topic and your supervisor is confusing. Other graduate students seem so informed and in control.

- Fear of Success. If you do well, everybody's expectations will rise. You will eventually fall on your face and embarrass yourself because deep-down, you know you are a failure.[4] By analyzing the reasons you procrastinate, you may be able to set-up the conditions to end procrastination. For example, you can schedule rewards (*e.g.* exercise) after completing X

hours of work. You can study at the library with others. You can prioritize long-term

and short-term goals. You can ask for more feed-back from your advisor. You can build

up your confidence by setting short-term deadlines.

Techniques to Conquer Serious Procrastination:

- Just Do It! Prioritize.

Get an egg-timer and apportion your time. Work when you will be least bothered. Do

not get sidetracked and socialize during study times. Reward yourself with short-term rewards

(*e.g.* lunch, coffee, cigarette, chat). Keep asking yourself, "Does this activity help me achieve

my top priorities?"

- Punish or Reward Yourself!

If procrastination is a serious problem, rewards may not be sufficiently compelling, and

you may have to resort to punishment. As it is difficult to punish yourself, you may need to get

someone else to do it for you. Write cheques to your least favourite organization. Give them to

your supervisor or a friend. If you do not complete a page, paragraph or chapter by the

deadline, s/he starts mailing cheques...$200 later, you may start writing!

- Just Say No!

When asked to make other commitments, say "I'll think about it" instead. If pressed, do a

little something but not a lot. Continually ask yourself whether you are overbooking your

time because you are afraid to work on your top priority (your thesis!)

- Banish worry thoughts! Get to the task!

Do a little bit at least. Divide the task into smaller chunks. Substitute the mental message, "I

should..." with "I'd like to..." Write down all the worst things that could happen on pieces of

paper. Put them aside. Read them a few months later. You will see that the worst things did not

happen. Life is a series of problems but the worst scenario seldom materializes. And if it does,

you will manage because you have inner reserves.

- Strive to Stay Balanced!

Smile! Get regular exercise. Eat properly. Do not burn the candle at both ends!

Put silly sticky notes and visual reminders everywhere: "Do not worry, be happy," "This too

will pass," and "In the giant cosmos of things, this is totally unimportant". Memorize this poem

by Goethe, one of the world's most beloved and prolific authors: *"What you can do or dream*

you can, begin it! Boldness has genius, power, and magic in it. Only engage and the mind

grows heated. Begin it and the work will be completed!"

I WOULD PREFER IF YOU CUT THE FOLLOWING...

Coping with Family, Friends, and Partners

Despite their best intentions, friends, relatives, and life partners can hinder the steady

progress of the "All-But-Dissertation" (ABD) student. These ten rules, written tongue-in-cheek,

could be tactfully distributed by the ABD as part of a coping strategy or politely proffered by the

concerned supervisor as a prelude to a serious discussion of the difficult problems that bedevil

many graduate students:

Your ABD (All-But-Dissertation) Plant: 10 Rules For Care and Feeding

1. Think of your ABD as a tender seedling that needs plenty of water and

careful tending before it grows into a sturdy MA sapling or PhD tree.

2. Expect your ABD will be susceptible to frequent bouts of procrastination,

depression, and "lackadaisicalness." Sometimes an ABD plant will wilt, despite the best

growing conditions. However, often an ABD will shoot upwards, exhibiting a surprising growth spurt in understanding. (The reasons for such rapid bursts of growth remain inexplicable).

3. Talk to your ABD plant. But do not focus upon the ABD's dissertation, its rate of progress, and when, exactly, it will finish growing. Instead talk to the ABD about pleasantries such as Mozart, puppies, gardening, and flowers.

4. Remember that if you were never an ABD, you have no idea of what it is really like. Even if everyone in your garden plot was an ABD, and you grew up surrounded by ABDs, you will not completely understand the growth process. Whereas you may suspect you would complete a thesis more speedily and efficiently, telling your ABD this will not help it grow more quickly.

5. Some ABDs grow to fruition more quickly than others. Many are stymied by poor soil conditions (*e.g.* lack of money), overcrowding (*e.g.* more family members), looming shade (*e.g.* loneliness) and overbearing heat (*e.g.* demanding friends and lovers). Sometimes ABDs overcome one problem simply to encounter another. Often what seems an insurmountable barrier to the ABD really isn't—if the ABD decides to grow over it.

6. The best growing environment for the ABD is simply to be left alone. Solitude. Time to focus on the primary task. The ABD impacted by too many earthly concerns cannot use finite amounts of energy properly and may not grow—may even fall over and decompose.

7. If you are a gardener in the ABD's plot of life, refrain from prodding, cutting-up or transplanting the ABD. Do not abruptly move your ABD to a different location or transplant the ABD into a larger, more expensive plot. If the ABD requires different growing conditions, the ABD will make them known—in any case, ABDs need very little to grow.

8. Recognize that most ABDs will attempt to grow in many directions at the same time. Often an ABD digresses into growing leaflets, expanding root systems, or meanders in different directions. Frequently inquire of your ABD whether this activity is necessary for proper growth: "Do you really need to do this now?" If the ABD is ambivalent, assist your ABD to resist these energy-wasters.

9. Have faith that one day, your ABD may bear fruit. It is as if the ABD has an invisible biological time-clock. An ABD driven by this time-clock will strive to meet deadlines, even those that are self-imposed. Stern admonitions, pointed reminders, and poignant tears, however, will not help the ABD to reach this final growth spurt more quickly. Indeed, too much prodding or chiding, and the ABD may grow away from you.

10. Be aware that the ABD that grows overly slowly may have to make way for other rapidly growing ABDs. For such an ABD, earthly existence will appear disappointing; good ideas fail to germinate; the fruit of long labour begins to rot. On the other hand, with careful attention and feeding, and a root structure firmly embedded in a deep understanding of the field, your MA sapling or your PhD tree will flower abundantly, bear fruitful ideas, spread hundreds of seedlings, and scatter many pages of leaves.

MA Workshops. Thank you to these workshop attendees for their tips. If you have other suggestions,

please email me at Simpson@julian.uwo.ca

[2] On the difference between independent, intervening, and dependent variables, see for example, Earl

Babbie The Practice of Social Research 3rd ed., (Wadsworth Publishing Company: Belmont, California),

1983 and Kjell Erik Rudestam & Rae R. Newton Surviving the Dissertation: A Comprehensive Guide to

Content and Process (Sage Publications: Newbury Park, California), 1992, ch. 2, pp. 11-16.

[3] For example, "Northernlights" at http://www.northernlight.com/docs/aboutintro.htm is an outstanding new

search engine for scholars and researchers. It searches over 3000 scholarly journals and magazines in its

Special Collection, as well as the World Wide Web. One-sentence abstracts of scholarly articles are sorted

into customized folders.

[4] These reasons for procrastination are summarized from Joan Fleet, Fiona Goodchild, Richard

Zajchowski Learning for Success: Skills and Strategies for Canadian Students (Toronto: Harcourt, Brace,

Jovanovich), 1990, ch. 3, pp. 25-34.