Myths of Missile Defense: International Ambition Driven by Domestic Politics

by

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

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This dissertation investigates the paradoxical revival of strategic missile defense, a resurgence notable for high economic, diplomatic, and strategic costs and a lack of imminent threats. Despite historically incurring substantial costs, including massive downstream costs, with more projected in the near future, it is fundamentally flawed, both technologically and strategically. It creates significant diplomatic hurdles in arms control, spurs arms races, incentivizes first-strike postures and countermeasures like MIRVing ICBMs, and creates a world where we are less safe with it than we were without it.

This study challenges the idea that this resurgence is driven by legitimate national security needs, instead arguing that it is best understood as a form of overexpansion—a self-defeating policy of aggression. Although Jack Snyder's theory of Coalition logrolling provides insights into overexpansion, it falls short in explaining the specific dynamics of missile defense resurgence, particularly concerning the timing, involvement of actors without direct benefits, and the lack of effective democratic oversight.

Using historical process tracing and organization theory, this dissertation uncovers that the resurgence is driven by an informal network of actors bound by resource dependencies, including financial connections, information exchanges, and personnel dynamics. These actors strategically leverage resources to ensure survival, mitigate uncertainty, resist autonomy infringements, and access necessary resources. This approach allows a more nuanced understanding of the resurgence's timing, accounting for shifts in resource distribution (financial

and political) following exogenous events.

The dissertation tracks how network actors strategically shaped their environment to benefit the network, employing tactics that transcended immediate personal gains. It highlights their efforts to manage uncertainties, manipulate organizational environments, and create demand for network-provided resources. The study examines strategies to buffer against environmental fluctuations, including strategic secrecy, information management, and practices for perpetual resource acquisition. Network actions that undermined international agreements for the network's advantage, while resisted by actors with minimal network ties, are also analyzed.

The resurgence of strategic missile defense is best understood through an organization theory lens, focusing on resource dependencies and network behaviors. This perspective comprehensively explains the policy's revival, emphasizing an influential network's strategic actions and motivations within the US defense policy sphere.

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In honor of Ben Bruncaj, your impact expands daily like ripples in a pond. You are reflected in the people that love you, and they love you deeply. For you, some Rage Against the Machine: *"Weapons not food, not homes, not shoes; Not need, just feed the war cannibal animal; I walk the corner to the rubble that used to be a library; Line up to the mind cemetery now; What we don't know keeps the contracts alive and movin'; They don't gotta burn the books they just remove 'em"* – Rage Against the Machine, *Bulls on Parade*

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I: Introduction and Overview

Explaining the Pursuit of the Self-Defeating Policy of Strategic Missile Defense

"Our goal is simple: to ensure that we can detect and destroy any missile launched against the United States — anywhere, anytime, anyplace."
   -President Donald J. Trump, announcing Missile Defense Review, January 17, 2019[1]

"It's not a defense of the United States. It's a conspiracy to allow them to milk the government. They are creating for themselves a job for life."
   -Dr. Nira Schwartz, former TRW Inc. Senior Engineer, March 2000[2]

In 1993, following the end of the Cold War, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin declared that the Soviet Union's threat had "receded to the vanishing point," and therefore, it was the "end of the Star Wars era." This declaration marked the end of the United States' pursuit of homeland missile defense. Secretary Aspin stated that the shift away from national missile defense was "the end of a battle that had waged in Washington for over a decade."[3] Four years later, Joseph Cirincione, then Director for Non-Proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, penned a comprehensive post-mortem for the failed pursuit of national missile defense, citing the same four major issues listed by Secretary Aspin and reiterated by leagues of impartial experts: the technology did not exist and was deemed impossible, the projected costs of even attempting to build a system were prohibitive, the pursuit of a system would be dangerously destabilizing to "strategic stability," and the lack of a missile threat to address made the pursuit of a missile defense system unnecessary.[4] Indeed, national missile defense was fully dead for the second time.

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[1] Donald Trump, *Remarks by President Trump and Vice President Pence Announcing the Missile Defense Review* (Arlington, VA: The White House, 2019).

[2] William J Broad, "Missile Contractor Doctored Tests, Ex-Employee Charges," *New York Times* (2000).

[3] Melissa Healy, "'Star Wars' Era Ends as Aspin Changes Focus," *Los Angeles Times*1993, http://articles.latimes.com/1993-05-14/news/mn-35185_1_star-wars.

[4] See: Joseph Cirincione, "Why the Right Lost the Missile Defense Debate," *Foreign Policy*, no. 106 (1997). These formidable obstacles to missile defense will be fully explained below.

Despite these daunting issues, strategic missile defense (SMD) rose from its grave in less than ten years to once again become a key feature of US defense policy.[5] The monumental roadblocks that had ended the Star Wars era in 1993 were entirely disregarded by 2002 when President George W. Bush unilaterally withdrew the USA from the ABM Treaty, which had outlawed the deployment of national missile defenses since 1972. The Bush administration created a new Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to ensure a massive effort to build missile defenses of all kinds, with a future goal of full "phased and layered" missile defenses to protect the US homeland. *Why and how did the United States undergo the massive undertaking known as the pursuit of national missile defenses?* That is the core question asked by this dissertation. At first glance, the answer to this question seems self-evident; many people might argue that the US is pursuing national missile defenses for national security reasons, specifically so that it could defend itself better. However, this is not the answer to this question. Scholars disagree sharply about the answer to this puzzle.

Scholars and experts remain puzzled about the US pursuit of national missile defenses primarily because after decades of research and development and hundreds of billions of dollars invested, the technical issues preventing a workable system are still deemed insurmountable. While the technical issues will be fully explained below, in short, when an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is launched, it not only travels at over 15,000 mph to reach the other side of the globe in less than thirty minutes but also most of its flight is in outer space where simple decoys (called countermeasures) can be easily dispersed, rendering it impossible for a

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[5] For this dissertation, the terms strategic missile defense, SMD, homeland missile defense, and national missile defense are used interchangeably, as experts and advocates frequently use them all. When referring specifically to the program name, used from the late 1990s until 2002, it will be capitalized as in National Missile Defense. The generic term has been commonly used since then.

missile defense system to discriminate and find the warheads launched by the missile and shoot

them down during the flight. Because of this central problem of countermeasures easily

defeating any national missile defense system, impartial experts have argued for decades that

pursuing national missile defenses is fundamentally futile.

Moreover, the pursuit of national missile defenses is puzzling because the costs of

developing a large enough system to defend the United States are incalculably enormous. The

US has already spent over $400 billion pursuing missile defenses since the 1960s without ever

inventing a defensive system that can stop any long-range ICBMs that travel through outer

space. Many citizens have been led to believe that missile defenses are possible and improving

because building defenses against shorter-range missiles that stay in the atmosphere is possible

(e.g., the famous Iron Dome system in Israel). However, short-range missiles are much slower

and stay in the atmosphere, so cheap decoys cannot easily accompany them. Further, missile

defenses are costly for reasons beyond the fact that they are difficult to invent. Even after

development, the costs will always be at least three times more expensive than building offensive

missiles. The math is simple because each incoming offensive missile requires being targeted by

at least three defensive anti-missile missiles. Thus, defenses are at least three times more

expensive (three missiles for each one), and the interceptor missiles are much more sophisticated

than incoming ballistic missiles. Hence, the high cost of defenses is essentially prohibitive since

defeating a defense system by overwhelming it with much cheaper missiles is much more

affordable than making an effective defensive system.

Additionally, the pursuit of national missile defenses is puzzling to many experts since

reliance on nuclear deterrence to provide "defense" of home territory has proven to be stable and

effective, while building up missile defenses has been predicted to cause a new Cold War-type

arms race. Indeed, when the USA left the ABM Treaty and re-launched its national missile defense programs, many experts, including then-Senator Joe Biden, said this move marked the beginning of a new arms race. Experts reasoned that the USA would essentially force Russia and China to build up their nuclear missile arsenals to ensure the existence of their deterrence capabilities by maintaining enough missiles to overwhelm any new US missile defenses.

Finally, the renewed pursuit of national missile defenses in 2003 perplexed many observers since the Cold War was over, and no major new missile threat was emerging. Almost all leaders thought it had lost its rationale when the Cold War ended. Leaders who wanted to resurrect the pursuit of national missile defenses created new justifications on the basis that North Korea was slowly developing new missile capabilities. These proponents of missile defense put forth the suspect argument that while the USA could deter Russia and China, it might not be able to deter North Korea.[6] This convoluted and illogical justification for re-launching missile defenses underscores the need to fully answer the question: how and why did the USA decide to pursue national missile defenses despite these insurmountable problems and strategic dangers?

Competing theoretical explanations for the renewed pursuit of Strategic Missile Defenses

Structural realism typically views states as unitary, rational actors prioritizing their survival in an anarchic world, thus requiring that they be self-reliant for their security.[7] Based on

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[6] Because the North Korean threat was clearly insufficient, fairly quickly, the MDA's acquisition authority allowed the development of missile defense to become untethered from real-world threats and instead based acquisition decisions on the technological capabilities of the defense industry, independent of need. Laura Grego, George Nelson Lewis, and David Wright, *Shielded from Oversight: The Disastrous Us Approach to Strategic Missile Defense* (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2016).

[7] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Waveland Press, 2010)., John J Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (WW Norton & Company, 2001).

this need to maintain security, offensive realism, an aggressive variant of structural realism, argues that states maximize their power to achieve security.[8] For offensive realists, the world is one in which states cannot feel entirely secure, and the rational response is the pursuit of power: "The best defense is a good offense."[9] This perspective posits that an effective strategic missile defense makes sense as a strategy toward achieving nuclear superiority and can be used to "facilitate winning a nuclear war at a reasonable cost."[10] From this perspective, an effective strategic missile defense that allows for an effective counterforce option (an option to "win" a nuclear war) is highly desirable because it breaks the constraints of mutual deterrence. A great power like the USA does not want to be prevented or deterred by others. Even if relatively "benign," a great power would desire nuclear superiority, if possible, to best defend its interests. In short, this view argues that states seek the pursuit of domination or superiority, and missile defenses are essential to stopping retaliation after using force.[11] Notice that this leading view of the purpose of strategic missile defenses is not simply to defend the USA but to enable the threat and use of force. It is well-known that this view of strategic missile defense as an offensive weapon (essential for first-strike capability) is the primary justification for the programs from a hawk's perspective.

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[8] John J Mearsheimer, "Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I)," *International Relations* 20, no. 1 (2006)., John J Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)* (Cornell University Press, 2017).

[9] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

[10] Matthew Kroenig, *The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters* (Oxford University Press, 2018).

[11] Zakaria argues that offensive realists are better understood as "influence" maximizers rather than power maximizers, but for our purposes, that is a distinction without difference, see: Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, vol. 82 (Princeton University Press, 1999).

While some scholars have used offensive realist arguments to explain the pursuit of strategic missile defenses, this argument for SMD is not sufficient or accurate for other offensive realists who argue that states are not mindless aggressors but rational actors who think strategically.[12] Like other structural realists, these offensive realists understand that nuclear weapons have little utility as offensive weapons (particularly when both sides possess such weapons) due to the substantial cost of an eventual retaliatory strike. Since strategic missile defenses do not work and will not work, are costly, and will likely make the state worse off strategically, rational actors should not willingly engage in the self-defeating pursuit of this strategy.[13] Instead, states will attempt to maximize power (and therefore security) aggressively only when the benefits exceed the costs of doing so.[14] Consequently, most offensive realists would not argue offensive realism explains the pursuit of strategic missile defenses.

Defensive realism (the less aggressive variant of structural realism) often emphasizes that an overaggressive policy can often be harmful.[15] Defensive realists argue that states incorporate the aggression of potential adversaries into the calculus of determining whether or not to balance. Being strategic actors that understand adversaries will respond to perceived aggression, states will not attempt to maximize their power in all circumstances.[16] Instead, states prioritize

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[12] For a hawk perspective, see: Keir A Lieber and Daryl G Press, "The Nukes We Need-Preserving the American Deterrent," *Foreign Aff.* 88 (2009).

[13] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

[14] Eric J Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," *Security Studies* 6, no. 4 (1997). p.11

[15] Waltz also has argued that structural realism should not be used to explain specific state behavior, as it is not a "theory of foreign policy." However, like most theories in IR, it is used as a lens through which we may attempt to understand the factors motivating specific state behavior. See: Waltz.

[16] Stephen M Walt, *The Origins of Alliance* (Cornell University Press, 1990)., Stephen M Walt, "Keeping the World Off Balance: Self Restraint and Us Foreign Policy," *Available at SSRN 253799* (2000).

maximizing their security. States understand that SMD is a destabilizing technology due to the high probability that it may be interpreted as an aggressive act by adversaries because of its potential to undermine deterrence and free the "defended" state to pursue an adventurous policy. Knowing that SMD is both aggressive strategically and fundamentally flawed technologically, defensive realism does not explain this policy in terms of balancing behavior. Instead, leading defensive realists have argued that this type of self-defeating policy is a pathology of state behavior. To explain such a pathology, defensive realists must incorporate domestic factors to understand this puzzling behavior.[17]

Overall, structural realism can use balancing logic to explain many state behaviors.[18] However, there are situations where states overrespond to threats or engage in overaggressive and overexpansionist policies that traditional conceptions of balancing would not have predicted.[19] Historically, great powers have shown a tendency to engage in self-defeating behavior, specifically regarding overaggressive foreign policy. Counterproductive foreign policies include aggression that results in balancing responses and imprudent expansion, where the costs outweigh any supposed benefits. Policies resulting in suboptimal outcomes such as overextension, overstretch, or overexpansion are all instances of such self-defeating behavior.[20]

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[17] Waltz., Kenneth Waltz, "Missile Defenses and the Multiplication of Nuclear Weapons," *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics* 6 (2004)., Scott Douglas Sagan and Kenneth Neal Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate* (WW Norton New York, 2013)., Joseph M Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988).

[18] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

[19] For a discussion on states under responding to threats, see: Randall L Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power*, vol. 101 (Princeton University Press, 2006).

[20] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (Vintage, 2010)., Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Cornell University Press, 1991)., Charles Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Cornell Univ Pr, 1994)., Richard Rosecrance, "Overextension, Vulnerability, and Conflict: The" Goldilocks Problem" in International Strategy (a Review Essay)," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995).

This behavior is counterproductive in that it exerts a cost (economic, strategic, political, or a combination of the three) that far outweighs any intended benefit of the behavior. When the cost is severe enough, it can have devastating consequences for the overexpansionist state.[21]

Overaggressive military policies that trigger balancing behavior from international rivals (known as self-encirclement) or imperialistic foreign policies that drain the aggressor's resources at the expense of its domestic population (traditional overextension) are both types of overexpansion.[22] This dissertation argues that pursuing national missile defense is a variety of overexpansion. While such behavior is often linked with policies of territorial expansion, strategic missile defense does not need to be related to territorial expansion to be counterproductive. By undermining the constraints of deterrence and allowing for "freedom of action," strategic missile defense offers an expansion of influence and an increase in policy options, rather than territorial gains, for the aggressor.[23] Due to the lack of territorial expansion, this dissertation suggests strategic missile defense is a variation of overexpansion, easiest understood as "internal overexpansion."[24]

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[21] Kennedy.

[22] On self-encirclement, see: Snyder., Scott David Parrish, *The Ussr and the Security Dilemma: Explaining Soviet Self-Encirclement, 1945-1985* (Columbia University, 1993). On encirclement, see: Andrea Bartoletti, *Escaping the Deadly Embrace: How Encirclement Causes Major Wars* (Cornell University Press, 2022)., On overextension, see: Kennedy., Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1983)., William C Wohlforth, "Gilpinian Realism and International Relations," *International Relations* 25, no. 4 (2011).. Overexpansion is an encompassing term relating to both concepts, coined by Jack Snyder, Snyder., Jack Snyder, "Imperial Temptations," *The National Interest*, no. 71 (2003)., and Jack Snyder, "Imperial Myths and Threat Inflation," in *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear* (Routledge, 2009).. See also: Alfred W. McCoy, "The Decline and Fall of the American Empire," *The Nation*, December 6, 2010.

[23] For a rundown of the causes of territorial expansion, including inadvertent expansion, see: Nicholas D. Anderson, "Push and Pull on the Periphery: Inadvertent Expansion in World Politics," *International Security* 47, no. 3 (January 1 2023), accessed 8/7/2023, http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00454.

[24] While overextension, overstretch, and overexpansion are typically understood as external to the state, Kennedy refers to the idea of "external overextension" in his study of imperial overstretch, which I believe provides an opening for the concept of "internal overextension" and therefore "internal overexpansion." See Kennedy. Internal

In his treatise on overexpansion, Jack Snyder used historical process tracing work built primarily on accounts from historians to determine that domestic groups with parochial interests are the primary drivers of overexpansion. The logrolling and favor trading that held these coalitions together, with varying interests supporting policies in which they had no direct benefit so they could secure reciprocal support, resulted in outcomes that were more expansionist than any (or at least most) groups within the coalition would have otherwise preferred. These self-interested groups logrolled together to push for aggressive policies that did not align with the specific desires of any of the groups. These coalitions justified their preferred expansionist and imperialist policies via flawed arguments that claimed security is achieved through aggression. These propagandist arguments have been historically linked to policies of self-defeating aggression, "rationaliz[ing] … the interests of groups that derive parochial benefits from expansion," including military spending and domestic politics.[25]

Arguments Advanced and Answers Offered

Strategic missile defense generates harmful incentives for state actors, even those with status quo desires.[26] Historical process tracing research conducted on other documented cases of states engaging in policies of overexpansion has identified parochial interests, logrolled together

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overexpansion also conceptually aligns with the concept of "internal balancing" through a buildup of a state's own capabilities, as opposed to balancing via alliances, as a strategic response to state aggression or power. See: Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. p.168

[25] Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*.

[26] Charles L Glaser, "Do We Want the Missile Defenses We Can Build?," *International Security* 10, no. 1 (1985)., Charles L Glaser, "Why Even Good Defenses May Be Bad," *International Security* 9, no. 2 (1984)., Charles L Glaser and Steve Fetter, "Should the United States Reject Mad? Damage Limitation and Us Nuclear Strategy toward China," *International Security* 41, no. 1 (2016)., Waltz, "Missile Defenses and the Multiplication of Nuclear Weapons."

into informal coalitions, as primary drivers of these policies.[27] While these policies are justified via strategic myths espoused by motivated actors, frequently, members of these coalitions would come to believe these myths or even find themselves trapped, by their rhetoric, into policies they no longer preferred.[28]

Coalition theory, built around these historical cases, argues that democratic systems should be expected to, and historically have been able to, constrain the domestic pressures pushing policies of overexpansion. This tempering of overexpansion (though admittedly, not an out-and-out immunity to it) is caused by the ability of democracies to serve as a check on concentrated interests, diffusing power through elections, allowing for the relative strength of varied interests that opposed overexpansion (compared to other domestic contexts), and creating electoral incentives for politicians not to support overly expansionist policies.[29] Democracies are also argued to limit information monopolies and possess free and open debate norms, contributing to the overexpansion tempering effect. Additionally, a democracy's policymakers (even those with self-interested incentives to pursue policies of aggression) should be motivated to halt policies that risk causing the state severe harm.[30]

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[27] According to Snyder, these logrolled coalitions Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*.

[28] For more on this concept of propaganda warping the perception of elites, known as blowback, see: Stephen Van Evera, "Militarism," (2004)., Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Cornell University Press, 2013)., Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*., and Jeffrey Lewis, "Bum Dope, Blowback, and the Bomb: The Effect of Bad Information on Policy-Maker Beliefs and Crisis Stability," in *Three Tweets to Midnight: Effects of the Global Information Ecosystem on the Risk of Nuclear Conflict*, ed. Benjamin Loehrke, Harold Trinkunas, and Herbert Lin (Hoover Institution Press, 2020).

[29] An effect that is theoretically weaker when dealing with low profile and low budget policies of expansion. This is an addendum that Snyder credits to Stephen Walt.

[30] An action that Snyder equates to killing the goose that lays the golden egg.

However, democracy is not, thus far, effectively able to constrain the driving pressures pushing for the development and deployment of strategic missile defense in the United States. This project demonstrates that the pursuit of strategic missile defense is a policy of overexpansion, driven by a domestic coalition of parochial interests, using myths of security through expansion as justification, thus broadly aligning with Snyder's theory of coalition-driven overexpansion. However, the conception of logrolled coalitions, while a vital and foundational theoretical lens, is not entirely sufficient in explaining why this push for a self-defeating policy of aggression has been both successful and durable despite the readily apparent costs and downsides.

Building off the academic foundations of Coalition Theory and the literature concerning organizational behavior, inter-organizational networks, coalitions, the influence of such networks on policy, and the ability of these networks to manage their environment, this dissertation suggests a slight modification of Snyder's theory that maintains and incorporates the theory's general logic. The coalitions of parochial interests that drive overexpansion are best understood as informal networks comprised of self-interested actors bound through mutually dependent resource exchange, including the exchange of policy support (logrolling) emphasized by Coalition Theory.[31] While the core argument and general mechanics of Snyder's coalition theory remain the same, specifying that this coalition is an informal network built on mutual dependencies (and indirect dependencies) allows for a theoretically coherent argument explaining actor behavior and

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[31] Snyder argues that a theory of international politics rooted in his work on overexpansion would need to be premised on the concept of formal and informal organizations with varying levels of resources, including firms, bureaucracies, and the state itself. These groups would seek to advance their interests, sometimes requiring formal or informal arrangements with other organizations. Snyder argues that "under conditions of uncertainty," these organizations will attempt to build support for their policy preferences (and remove support from policy preferences incompatible with their own) using various methods, including misinformation. See: Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. p.316-317. Snyder refers to the formal and informal organizations as "conflict groups" based on the work of proto-organization theorist Georg Simmel, see: George Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations* (Simon and Schuster, 2010).

motivation, coalition formation, environment manipulation, and network resiliency. Leaning heavily on an understanding of Organization Theory that heavily emphasizes resource dependencies (and is, naturally, informed by Resource Dependence Theory and the resource dependence-centric variant of Policy Network Theory), this holistic perspective of organization and network incentives allows us to understand how and why self-interested actors participate in, potentially even unknowingly, interorganizational networks which contribute to the adoption of counterproductive policies.

This perspective supplements Snyder's coalition-driven overexpansion model, enhancing the causal logic and providing a coherent motivating logic for all parties. These complimentary theories are not the only way to understand interorganizational relationships or policy networks, but they center a perspective on organizational behavior and interaction that allows for the incorporation of Coalition Theory with explanations for coalition formation, policy shift, environmental manipulation, actor motivation, and accounts for the impact of exogenous events. It highlights essential elements of organization and network behavior that are overlooked or without coherent theoretical causal motors in descriptive historical accounts of missile defense explanation. Resource dependence theory offers an understanding of how organizations responding to changes in the external environment, such as projections of continued diminishing defense budgets in the wake of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, can create cartelized conditions within the defense industry that allowed for increased effectiveness by interest group coalitions.[32] It also explains theoretically predictable outcomes of network actions,

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[32] This organization-created cartelization (in response to shifting distributions of resources, and therefore, a shifting of dependencies) provides an addendum to the incorporation of the timing of industrialization as an initial step in the causal chain, which attempts to explain domestic structure, see: Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*., p. 56

such as adjustments to acquisition practices, increased secrecy concerning network output, and the elevation of status for the Missile Defense Agency. Coalition theory argues that, due to logrolling, the policy resulting from coalition pressure is more extreme than the desires of any individual group. This expansionist effect is only magnified with a resource-dependence network framing, as actors that do not directly benefit from any particular policy also have incentives to contribute to the push for aggressive policy, resulting in more dramatic outcomes than the specific goals they seek.

This perspective incorporates multiple connection methods, resulting in coalition ties that are more extensive than just the favor trading of the original interpretation. These bonds include the personnel exchange of revolving door employment, which serves multiple functions, including resource exchange between organizations, and provides a behavior motivation for involved actors. This lens allows a method to coherently incorporate external environmental events (such as the attacks of September 11 and various national elections) through their impact on the distribution of tangible and intangible resources. This dissertation provides a novel framing of strategic missile defense as a policy of overexpansion. It provides a novel application of a logically coherent multi-theoretical lens to supplement Snyder's Coalition Theory of Overexpansion. This supplementary argument that an informal coalition of parochial interests driving policies of overexpansion (specifically the push for strategic missile defense) is best understood as a network of self-interested actors connected by resource dependencies increases the explanatory power of the original argument. It also provides a theory-driven causal understanding of behavior that has contributed to this overexpansion, including the behavior of actors who may not directly benefit from the counterproductive policy.

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This project examines historical case studies, utilizing documents such as previously classified private communications, investor calls, personal memoirs of key actors, corporate and government reports, and journalistic accounts of the day, among other sources, to provide detailed examinations of the events in question, while demonstrating how the behaviors are explained via organizational incentives and resource dependencies.

Roadmap

The argument made in this dissertation is that strategic missile defense is a case of overexpansion, justified through the use of propagandist arguments historically used to promote offensive policy but propelled by an informal network of actors connected by resource interdependencies, who responded to changing resource distributions in their post-Cold War environment via behavior that is entirely consistent with a multi-theoretical lens centered on resource dependence theory. This argument is demonstrated and evaluated using historical process tracing in case studies covering the rebirth and solidification of strategic missile defense.

These case studies demonstrate that network actors (behaving in ways entirely consistent with the multi-theoretical lens) in responding to a change in resource availability and access enacted a series of mergers and acquisitions that resulted in a semi-cartelized system. These actors manipulated the organizational environment to enhance the political value around missile defense by shifting the perception of the nuclear ballistic missile threat posed to the United States and shifting the perception of the policy solutions that previously were considered sufficient. The actors undercut diplomatic agreements that limited missile defense and mitigated the threat necessary to justify it. Furthermore, the actors managed uncertainty concerning the future of missile defense by elevating the government agency overseeing the system, enhancing

secrecy and decreasing oversight surrounding the technology, and embedding strategic missile defense into the United States' military strategy.

While not all actors involved necessarily contributed to this policy push, many were deliberately and strategically involved, and all benefited from the network's actions. These benefits included government contracts, financial compensation from large corporations or advocacy philanthropic organizations, future employment, and prestige increases individually and organizationally. These behaviors are understood through the multi-theoretical lens of this argument and the underlying shared logic of these theories. This perspective is meant to supplement the novel conception of Snyder's Coalition Theory while providing theoretically sound and consistent motivations for all involved actors, even those without direct benefits from policy outcomes. It enhances the theory's explanatory power and can better explain why the argued constraints of democracy were insufficient in preventing this case of overexpansion.

Chapter II: Why Missile Defense is Overexpansion argues that strategic missile defense is a self-defeating, expansionist policy. It addresses the foundational flaws in strategic missile defense that prevent it from achieving its stated goals, including the technical and fundamental issues that undercut its effectiveness and the strategic flaws it cannot override. This section also discusses how the system counterintuitively makes the United States *less* safe, even given the extreme assumption that the technology worked perfectly. In addition to establishing the limited benefit of SMD, this section briefly examines the strategic costs, including its damaging impact on arms control, the balancing responses from Russia and China, and the economic costs (including the substantial downstream costs of qualitative arms racing). These aspects, taken together, provide the basis for the novel inclusion of missile defense as a policy of overexpansion.

Chapter III: Overexpansion, the Strategic Myths of Missile Defense, and an Organization Theory-Based Conception of the Missile Defense Network explains the theoretical perspective of the argument. The chapter looks at how other theories could attempt to explain the overexpansion of missile defense. Then, it describes how Snyder's Coalition Theory can coherently insert and expand within the logic of organization theory, emphasizing resource dependence. An understanding of the Missile Defense Network is laid out, and theory-driven inferences are made regarding actor motivations, consistent with evidence provided by public and private actions, statements, and organizational and network contexts. This section will also briefly describe the flawed arguments of overexpansion used to support strategic missile defense.

Chapter IV: Generating a Threat - The Rumsfeld Commission and a National Commitment to Missile Defense examines the push for strategic missile defense during the Clinton administration. Actors in the missile defense organizational environment responded to the changing resource distribution, which resulted from the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, with deliberate actions – such as an extensive series of merges and acquisitions - intended to assure current and future access to a dwindling allotment of resources. This behavior resulted in a consolidation of the defense industry and a semi-cartelized system. Network actors, including many with direct dependencies on defense contractors, deliberately politicized missile defense deployment and intentionally inflated the perception of a ballistic missile threat to the United States despite the intelligence community (and most disinterested experts) arriving at the opposite conclusion. Key network actors, such as congress members directly involved with SMD advocacy organizations, provided specific instruction and recommended action to other network actors in ways designed to shift policy regarding missile defense while informing them that relying on "facts and logic" will cause them to "lose [the] battle." Historical process tracing demonstrates

that actors who benefited directly from their involvement in the missile defense network worked to deliberately inflate the perception of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, heighten the political salience of the issue, and overstate the capabilities of the technologies, resulting in a de facto decision to develop/deploy national missile defense by the end of the Clinton administration.

Chapters 5 and 6 use process tracing to examine actions taken by network actors during the George W. Bush administration. Chapter 5 studies actions that mitigated domestic uncertainties surrounding strategic missile defense, and Chapter 6 analyzes behavior that managed international roadblocks. *Chapter V: Cultivating the False Perception of a Viable Policy Solution - Decreasing Uncertainty and Manipulating the Perception of Missile Defense* traces the process of mitigating uncertainty surrounding long-term resource acquisition for actors in the missile defense network. This was done by solidifying strategic missile defense as a long-term policy solution. This behavior of network actors in this chapter is consistent with a causal chain of behavior rooted in resource dependencies. Through the institutional elevation of the MDA, expanded control over acquisitions, decreases in oversight methods, and increases in secrecy, network actors took deliberate actions to avoid external influence over testing and acquisition while creating an illusion of satisfaction regarding the technological development of missile defense (an illusion that disinterested experts did not believe). Furthermore, efforts were taken to institutionally, physically, and strategically embed strategic missile defense into the policy landscape of the US for reasons more coherently explained by resource dependence logic than justified by external threats or technological development. These actions, taken together, provided a strategic basis for the continued growth of missile defense, removed potential institutional checks that might restrict it, and made it politically more difficult to roll back.

Chapter VI: Maintaining the Perception of a Policy Problem: Altering Perceptions of Alternative Solutions, Managing Constraints, and Perpetuating a Justifying Threat analyses actions guided by network actors to maintain the justification for missile defense, in part through the undercutting of alternative solutions, specifically diplomatic agreements and arrangements that contributed to deterrence, arms control, and non-proliferation. The undercutting and dissolution of these arrangements contributed to an increase in the specific variety of threats used to justify strategic missile defense (rogue states with limited nuclear capabilities) as well as to dissolve the agreement in which deterrence, a primary alternative solution to the problem of ballistic missile vulnerability, was embedded.

II: Why Missile Defense is Overexpansion

"We should expect the Chinese nuclear arsenal to grow substantially and Russia to resist reductions below the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty—and to prepare seriously to break out."[33]
> *- James Miller, Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, responding to 2019 Missile Defense Review, Feb. 13, 2019*

"The president has made clear that we have a tried-and-true practice here. We know how to win these races, and we know how to spend the adversary into oblivion."[34]
> *- Marshall Billingslea, Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, May 21, 2020*

"The arms race has already begun. After the US withdrew from the nuclear defense treaty, that's exactly what happened."[35]
> *- Russian President Vladimir Putin, Dec. 17, 2020*

Great powers have historically shown a tendency to engage in self-defeating behavior.[36] Overly aggressive foreign policies can result in costs outweighing benefits and the state being in a more vulnerable position, both economically and strategically. While variants of these behaviors have gone by many names, Snyder's catchall terminology of "overexpansion" is the most useful in identifying shared causes and symptoms.[37] Typically, great powers can relatively easily absorb the costs of economically imprudent behavior.[38] However, some overly aggressive policies have

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[33] Kingston Reif, "Trump Seeks Missile Defense Buildup," Arms Control Association, last modified March, accessed. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-03/news/trump-seeks-missile-defense-buildup.

[34] Jonathan Landay and Arshad Mohammed, "U.S. Prepared to Spend Russia, China 'into Oblivion' to Win Nuclear Arms Race: U.S. Envoy," Reuters, last modified May 21, accessed. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-armscontrol-idUSKBN22X2LS/.

[35] Christy Cooney, "Putin Warns 'the Arms Race Has Begun' and Vows to Make More Hypersonic Nukes in Chilling Threat to America," The U.S. Sun, last modified December 17, accessed. https://www.the-sun.com/news/1988693/putin-arms-race-begun-hypersonic-nukes-america/.

[36] See: Kennedy; Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*; Rosecrance; Kupchan.

[37] Other names include overextension, overstretch, and overreach.

[38] For a predictive argument concerning the overextension of the United States abroad, specifically regarding the excessive military bases and the associated economic costs, see: McCoy..

more severe costs and potentially existential consequences.[39] Overly aggressive actions by a state will trigger balancing behavior from rivals, leading to what has been called "self-encirclement."[40] If not sufficiently aware of its role in this behavior, and if unable to adjust accordingly, the aggressor state may respond with balancing behavior of its own.[41] This response can result in strategically dangerous situations ranging from arms racing to outright war, especially if a state attempts to break the encirclement with a preventive attack.[42] In addition to self-encirclement, overly aggressive states can find themselves stretched thin, engaging in fruitless endeavors that drain energy and resources and provide little to no benefit. This behavior is known by varying names, including overextension and overstretch.[43] This study begins from the premise that the pursuit of missile defense is a variant of such an overly aggressive, self-defeating policy, best understood as "internal overexpansion."[44]

This study does not focus on once again proving that pursuing strategic missile defenses is self-defeating and overly aggressive since this has been widely understood since before the ABM

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[39] See Walt's Balance of Threat theory: Walt, *The Origins of Alliance*.

[40] Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*.

[41] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics: New Edition* (Princeton University Press, 2017).

[42] For more on how both misperceptions and dangerous incentives created by arms racing can lead to war, see: Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*., Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *International Security* 22, no. 4 (1998).

[43] Kennedy.

[44] While Snyder's conception of overexpansion is typically viewed as an outwardly expanding endeavor including territorial expansion and boots-on-the-ground conflict, the internal overexpansion of missile defense is not focused on territorial expansion or boots-on-the-ground conflict, but rather the looming potential elimination of deterrence of the United States, creating a growing window of opportunity for attack by the United States and an increasing "freedom of action."

Treaty in 1972.[45] That treaty outlawed the full deployment of strategic missile defenses to preserve "strategic stability" and lead to an end of the U.S.-Soviet arms race as both great powers had come to recognize that pursuing missile defenses was futile and that the pursuit of missile defenses drove arms racing and made everyone worse off. This chapter aims to briefly lay out these well-known arguments about why strategic missile defenses will never work reliably and are still self-defeating—facts that are still true today, 50 years after the ABM Treaty. Readers familiar with the overwhelming critiques of missile defense can skip this chapter and move on to chapter 3. Readers unfamiliar with the problems of missile defenses can see the abundant and overwhelming arguments for why strategic missile defenses will never work reliably as defenses against a first strike or improve national security.

This chapter will make the case for why strategic missile defense is an example of overexpansion, triggering both self-encirclement and overextension effects. This chapter will outline the technical and tactical concerns that prevent missile defense from effectively providing security. It also addresses the strategic concerns and the dangerous incentives that missile defense creates for adversaries, would-be status quo actors, and even policymakers within the US. Due to these dangerous incentives and the inherent flaws in the system, strategic missile defense fails in its argued primary goal of protecting the United States from a nuclear attack, even if the system were to hypothetically work perfectly. Instead, it creates incentives in the strategic arena that make the United States less safe than it would be otherwise.

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[45] Igor Ivanov, "The Missile-Defense Mistake: Undermining Strategic Stability and the Abm Treaty," *Foreign affairs* 79, no. 5 (2000), accessed 2023/11/11/, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20049885.

Technical Concerns: Strategic Missile Defense Will *Never* Work

The United States has pursued strategic missile defenses since the 1950s, when strategic missiles were first invented. The US has spent over 200 billion dollars on missile defenses (with 20.3 billion dollars allotted for "missile defense and defeat" activities in 2021 alone) and still has no functional defense against strategic missiles. Despite this, during his war of words with North Korea over its nuclear arsenal in 2017, President Trump famously repeated what some missile defense advocates have argued—that the U.S. missile defense system would be 97% effective against intended targets. This claim, by any relevant measure, is entirely untrue.[46] In testimony under oath before Congress, the head of the Missile Defense Agency reluctantly admitted that the United States' capability of intercepting an ICBM from North Korea today is "very limited," in fact, likely zero. While the US would most likely be unable to provide any real defense against a North Korean first-strike attempt, it would have no possibility of providing a meaningful defense against an attack from Russia or China. There are four primary reasons for this: 1) the speed of ICBM missiles, 2) the vulnerability of radar installations, 3) the incredible effectiveness of having more missiles than an opponent can shoot down, and 4) the fact that it must operate essentially perfectly on the first try against an unknown and "reactive adversary intent on defeating it."[47]

The Speed of ICBMs

There is often confusion about U.S. missile defense capabilities because the United States has successfully built missile defenses against shorter-range missiles. Shorter-range missiles are slower and never leave the atmosphere, so the U.S. can track and possibly shoot down a significant

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[46] For a debunking of this claim, see: Laura Grego, "No, Missile Defense Will Not Work 97 Percent of the Time," Union of Concerned Scientists, last modified October 13, accessed 2019. https://allthingsnuclear.org/lgrego/missile-defense-will-not-work-97-percent.

[47] United States, *Strategic Defenses: Two Reports by the Office of Technology Assessment* (Princeton University Press, 1986).

number of these missiles, maybe as high as 60% for the slowest, shortest-range missiles, and some lesser percentage of longer-range missiles could be intercepted as well. Strategic missiles, the longest-range missiles, best known as Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), are very different from these shorter-range missiles. ICBMs fly halfway around the globe in 30 minutes or less at speeds of over 15,000 mph (roughly 20 times the speed of sound). The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system used for the United States' homeland defense relies on interceptor missiles performing kinetic strikes against the incoming warhead (also known as a Hit-to-Kill technique). A kinetic strike relies on objects building up kinetic energy by traveling at very high speeds and releasing that destructive energy at the moment of impact, ideally resulting in total disintegration. Interceptor missiles also fly at nearly matching speeds. These intense speeds limit the margin for error of interceptors to essentially none. As explained by Philip Coyle, former assistant Secretary of Defense and former Director, Operational Test and Evaluation at the Pentagon, "If a target is going 15,000 miles an hour and so are you with your interceptor, and if you miss by an inch, you miss by a mile … [Strategic missile defense is] the most difficult thing the Pentagon has ever tried to do."[48]

Many believe the problem of defending against a small object traveling 15,000 mph has already long been overcome.[49] However, it is still a legitimate challenge and has been described

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[48] Terrell Jermaine Starr, "Why Cyberattacking North Koreas Nuke Program May Be America's Best Option," Jalopnik, last modified March 7, accessed 2018. https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/why-cyberattacking-north-koreas-nuke-program-may-be-ame-1793059125?rev=1488924548163.

[49] In 2001, Trent Lott said that the BMDO "hit a bullet with a bullet, and it does work. We can develop that capability," while the Heritage Foundation argued that there was "undeniable evidence that a defense against the present and growing threat of ballistic missiles is technologically possible," see: Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright, and Stephen Young, "An Assessment of the Intercept Test Program of the Ground-Based Midcourse National Missile Defense System," *Defense & Security Analysis* 18, no. 3 (2002).

as trying to "hit a bullet with a bullet"—a very tall order.[50] ICBMs, specifically the reentry vehicles that carry the warhead payloads, are smaller, faster and can be highly maneuverable (depending on the complexity of the countermeasures), and challenging to track. To complicate matters further, because the GMD system relies on Hit-to-Kill technology for its interceptions, it must directly contact the warhead—a target that can be less than ½ a meter long.[51] It must be a direct hit because the system relies on kinetic energy for destruction, and the warhead must be destroyed. Testing and history have demonstrated that hitting the shell without making a direct hit with the warhead will not destroy the warhead and often will not even knock it off target.[52] To be clear, the difficult task of hitting a bullet with a bullet that is an ICBM ballistic intercept is not the central hang-up of strategic missile defense—that will be addressed later. It *is* incredibly challenging, though, and it needs to be successfully done the first time it is tested in a real-world situation. A failure to stop an attack, an event made more likely because of the system being deployed, could result in absolute devastation.

For a missile defense system to effectively defend against an incoming nuclear-armed ICBM, it must be highly successful in intercepting a high-speed and tiny target with little to no warning in unplanned conditions. It needs to be highly successful at this on the first try. One meter off or one second slow could result in tremendous devastation. Intercepting a straightforward "rudimentary" ICBM is an incredible technological feat; however, this is not even the main technological hurdle preventing strategic missile defense from being an effective system.

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[50] It should be noted that an ICBM intercept is significantly more difficult than hitting a bullet with a bullet, as the fastest bullets only travel at speeds of 1,800 mph… and are not being shot through space.

[51] Typical measurements on warheads are often classified, but the re-entry vehicle for the re-entry vehicle (Mk-21 RV) for the W-87, manufactured in the second half of the 1980s, was less than 2 meters.

[52] George N Lewis and Theodore A Postol, "A Flawed and Dangerous Us Missile Defense Plan," *Arms Control Today* 40, no. 4 (2010).

Vulnerability of Radars

The GMD system relies on a combination of satellites and radar for both tracking and discrimination capabilities. A radar such as the Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), whose initial fielding was completed in late 2021, is designed to aid in differentiating between warheads and rudimentary countermeasures. However, due to the nature of the tasks they are designed for, such sensors and radars cannot be contained in hardened silos like ICBMs and are, therefore, vulnerable to attack. A more likely scenario is that cyberattacks or other electronic attacks target these systems. In the Spring of 2021, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report detailing the "persistent testing shortcomings" of the Missile Defense Agency regarding cybersecurity dating back several years. Like interceptors, radar and satellites must prove accurate the first time they are used in combat. However, they also must be robust enough to withstand any cyberattack that could take place the moment they are needed.

Overwhelming Defenses and the Problem with Discrimination in Space

This chapter has laid out why the interception of an incoming ICBM is so challenging due to the warhead's tremendous speed and small size and the need to make a direct strike with the warhead for Hit-to-Kill technology to work. An even more daunting and arguably insurmountable task for strategic missile defense is the ease with which the capabilities of the GMD can be overwhelmed. An overwhelming attack comes in two methods, each with variants: 1) Overwhelming with real targets, which can include nuclear-equipped missiles or utilizing multiple warheads per missile, or 2) Overwhelming with decoys, which can include using replica decoys, decoys designed to be all slightly different, or overwhelming with anti-simulation decoys.[53]

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[53] Steve Fetter et al., "Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned Us National Missile Defense System," (2000).

Overwhelming with Real Targets and Losing a Numbers Game

The first approach is straightforward: deploy too many real nuclear targets for the missile defense system to counter. This would be an easily performed feat for a great nuclear power like Russia. There are 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) currently part of the GMD system (this number became classified this year, but the most recently known number is 44), with more scheduled to be added and potentially already have been.[54] Overwhelming the defense becomes an even more manageable feat when one considers that multiple GBIs will be used to attempt to intercept each incoming ICBM. This salvo interception technique (launching multiple interceptors per target) improves the probability of successful interception, assuming the interceptors do not all miss their target due to the same flaw. However, the technique also quickly diminishes the number of ICBMs that can be defended against by the system. If the GMD launched just two interceptors per target (as was done in a March 2019 test performed by the MDA), it would immediately half the number of targets the system could theoretically handle.[55]

Despite this, missile defense advocates often argue that the system would be 97% effective against intended targets. Achieving this effectiveness would require not only firing an intercepting salvo of at least four missiles but also is built on assumptions that are akin to leaps of faith.[56] The 97% argument means that the 44 GBI (the last verified amount before being made classified in 2023; however, eventual plans increase that amount by 20) could intercept 11 incoming warheads

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[54] Gary Pennett, *Department of Defense Press Briefing on the President's Fiscal Year 2019 Defense Budget for the Missile Defense Agency* (2018).

[55] Matt Korda and Hans M Kristensen, "Us Ballistic Missile Defenses, 2019," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 75, no. 6 (2019).

[56] Grego,

in a best-case scenario.[57] Developing more than 11 nuclear-equipped ICBMs is a much more feasible prospect for emerging nuclear powers.

However, overwhelming the defense with real targets is achieved in ways other than launching more ICBMs than there are GBIs. States can also do this by using missiles that carry multiple warheads. This technology is known as Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) and is employed by both Russia and China (among others).[58] Russia recently developed the RS-28 Sarmat missile (also known as the Satan II), which entered into "combat duty" in September 2023.[59] The RS-28 can be equipped with ten large warheads or up to 16 smaller ones.[60] China has also upgraded its ICBM program to be MIRV capable.[61] ICBMs with MIRV capability do not necessarily imply a high number of warheads on each missile. A recent analysis by the Federation of American Scientists suggests that China has put a low number of warheads on each MIRV-capable missile (e.g., three) while using part of the payload for "decoys and penetration aids" to "ensure penetration of US missile defenses."[62] While MIRVed missiles can have their warheads aimed toward a single location, they can also disperse to strike targets of

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[57] Even when including additional GBI being deployed, MIRVed ICBMs quickly create a losing numbers game.

[58] Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler, and Shane Mason, *The Lure & Pitfalls of Mirvs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age* (Stimson Center, 2016).

[59] "Russia Puts Advanced Sarmat Nuclear Missile System on 'Combat Duty'," Al Jazeera, last modified September 2, accessed. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/2/russia-puts-advanced-sarmat-nuclear-missile-system-on-combat-duty.

[60] Missile Defense Project, "Rs-28 Sarmat," Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified November 26, 2019, accessed. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/rs-28-sarmat/.

[61] Hans M Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 75, no. 4 (2019).

[62] Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Reynolds, "Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2023," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 79, no. 2 (2023/03/04 2023), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178713.

distances as far as 1,500 km away from one another.[63] As noted above, this allows for a situation where an accidental launch becomes even more damaging due to countermeasures implemented to overwhelm defenses. An accidentally launched MIRVed missile could hit multiple targets across a vast distance due to being equipped with countermeasure technology to avoid interception.

Overwhelming with Decoys and the Fatal Flaw of Physics in Space

Strategic missile defense systems can also be overwhelmed without multiple nuclear warheads by using decoys. These decoys make it difficult for radar and infrared sensors to determine what is an actual danger and what is a decoy. To understand the effectiveness of decoys, it is necessary to briefly discuss the phases of flight of an ICBM: the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases.[64] The boost phase is when the missile operates in a powered flight propelled by a rocket booster. This phase typically lasts between 60-300 seconds (1-5 minutes). During the second phase of the flight, the midcourse phase, the rocket no longer propels the ICBM. In the midcourse phase, the missile "coasts on a ballistic trajectory through the vacuum of outer space."[65]

It is crucial for the effectiveness of the decoys that this portion of the flight takes place in outer space. This is due to the nature of physics and the type of countermeasures available for deployment. The midcourse phase is the longest flight phase for ICBMs launched toward the US

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[63] Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, "Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (Mirv)," last modified August 28, accessed January 2, 2020. https://armscontrolcenter.org/multiple-independently-targetable-reentry-vehicle-mirv/.

[64] Some argue that the flight should be broken down into four phases, including a phase known as the ascent phase, which would take place in the "post boost or early midcourse" of the flight. Others treat the term ascent phase as being synonymous with the boost phase. See: National Research Council, *Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for Us Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives* (National Academies Press, 2012).. As "highly effective countermeasures" can be deployed "within seconds of the end of powered flight," this "quasi boost-phase" suffers from the same fundamental flaws as midcourse defenses and is treated as such in this paper. George N Lewis and Theodore A Postol, "How Us Strategic Antimissile Defense Could Be Made to Work," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 66, no. 6 (2010).

[65] George N Lewis, *Ballistic Missile Defense Effectiveness*, vol. 1898, *AIP Conference Proceedings* (AIP Publishing LLC, 2017).

across either buffering ocean. The final stage of the flight, the terminal phase, is when the missile re-enters the earth's atmosphere and falls downward towards its target in a phase that lasts tens of seconds.[66] There are different strategies for using decoys as countermeasures. One school of thought relies on decoys that look identical to the warhead. Dummy warheads or warhead-shaped balloons make it difficult for the missile defense system to differentiate between the real target and the fakes.[67] These decoys, known as replica decoys, are designed to make it difficult for missile defenses to discriminate between actual targets and the decoys. An issue that could arise from this is that the replicas would need to be perfect replicas or risk providing indicators to the radars/sensors on what the actual target is.

A viable way around the problems associated with replica decoys needing to be perfect replicas is by taking the opposite approach. Instead of making the decoy a replica of the warhead, make the warhead look like a simple replica or even make decoys and real warheads look similar but different from one another and different from the initial appearance of the warhead. This approach to creating decoys is known as anti-simulation. To prevent missile defense systems from noticing minor discrepancies between the warhead and decoys, the ICBMs can utilize a "booster fragmentation" technique. Booster fragmentation essentially uses a variety of small strategic explosives or cutting mechanisms to break the rocket booster into varying-sized pieces of debris. By design, the warhead also looks like debris (an example method of doing this, suggested by

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[66] George Lewis and Frank von Hippel, "Improving Us Ballistic Missile Defense Policy," *Arms Control Today* 48, no. 4 (2018).

[67] Examples of such a decoy include the Inflatable Exoatmospheric Object (IEO), flight-tested by the United States in the 70s, and the Lightweight Replica LREP. For more see: Anthony H Cordesman, *Strategic Threats and National Missile Defenses: Defending the Us Homeland* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002); Lewis. Global Security, "Decoys," last modified July 21, accessed January 5, 2020. https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/decoys.htm.

George Lewis, is attaching crumpled sheets of aluminum foil).[68] A similar suggestion is to encase the warhead within an enveloping metalized mylar balloon and release it along with numerous similar balloons. Due to the nature of radar waves and their inability to pass through very conductive materials (e.g., aluminum foil and similar metals that could serve as a thin coating), the radar would be unable to determine what was within each balloon.[69]

Since these countermeasures are being deployed in space while the missile is in its midcourse phase, they can take advantage of certain inherent advantages of physics laws applying to objects in space. Advantages include: 1) Heavy and light objects released from a missile traveling in the vacuum of space will travel at essentially identical speeds and on nearly identical trajectories;[70] 2) Due to the lack of wind resistance, objects traveling in space with little structural strength - such as mylar balloons - can maintain their shape; and 3) Objects in space gain and lose energy via radiation, which allows the sun's radiation to play a role in the countermeasures. These factors, especially when considered together, allow for a wide range of simple countermeasures to be very effective. Decoy balloons could increase their temperature by enclosing a small heater within the balloon. This heater would avoid discrimination of the balloons' contents by preventing infrared sensors from identifying the nuclear warhead's heat signature. However, an even simpler option is available for missiles launched during the day. The surface material of objects in space and how that surface material reacts with the sun's radiation primarily determines the object's equilibrium temperature. The temperature of aluminum balloons can be changed hundreds of degrees by coating them in varying amounts of paint. Different amounts of paint allow for different

[68] Lewis.

[69] Fetter et al.

[70] Lewis.

amounts of "solar absorptivity and infrared emissivity."[71] This fact allows for temperature manipulation and makes infrared sensors an ineffective means of discrimination. Furthermore, even if empty, these balloons should be expected to travel through the vacuum of space in nearly identical paths.[72] Similar methods of confusing the sensors and radars that missile defense systems rely on for discrimination involve hiding the warhead within a cloud of radar-reflecting chaff (with an alternative means for disrupting infrared sensors, such as powerful flares).[73] Additional methods of altering the signature of the warhead are available, including those that would lower the signature via coating or decrease the signature using a cooling shroud (such as insulating the warhead and using a small amount of liquid nitrogen) to make the warhead "effectively invisible to the kill vehicle."[74]

The Adversary is Intelligent and Reactive

While some aspects of strategic missile defense (such as intercepting small objects at incredible speeds) are exceptionally tough challenges, they can be "solved" given enough time and money dedicated to the problem. However, as argued by the Office of Technology Assessment, the successful development and deployment of strategic missile defense is "far more than a purely technological accomplishment, such as reaching the moon or splitting the atomic nucleus," because there are adversaries building countermeasures and counter-countermeasures, constantly

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[71] Fetter et al.

[72] Lewis.

[73] Radar-reflecting chaff can be formed simply using lightweight conducting wire cut to specific lengths.

[74] Fetter et al.

evolving a threat that must be defeated the first time it is faced, and every time that it is faced. "The moon and the nucleus did not hide, run away, or shoot back."[75]

Even without decoys, a simple countermeasure can be effective: encasing the reentry vehicle in an aluminum-coated mylar balloon that inflates to several times larger than the RV.[76] A ½ meter long target enveloped in an inflated balloon 10 meters in diameter makes the chances of a direct hit with the warhead significantly lower. The creation of such countermeasures is a far more straightforward technological task than the construction of an ICBM able to carry a warhead to the United States. We should assume any state capable of developing such a nuclear-capable ICBM would also be able to equip multiple countermeasures. Various strategies can overwhelm midcourse defenses, and daunting discrimination problems caused by simple and relatively cheap tactics can also undermine them completely. When it comes to strategic missile defense, the game is heavily rigged in favor of the offense: 1) They must prepare for an unknown number of ICBMs coming at an unknown interval, at an unknown time, from an unknown location, with an unknown number and variety of countermeasures; 2) The defending state has to respond to the attack at potentially inopportune times in suboptimal conditions; 3) The attacking force is significantly aided by the vacuum of space, which enhances its countermeasures; 4) The defending side essentially must be flawless in its defense, on the first try, with no real-world testing, against every target, while the attacking state only needs to be successful with one missile; and 5) Strategic missile defense places the United States on the unfamiliar ground of being at an economic disadvantage. As explained by NORTHCOM chief Adm. Bill Gortney, the United States is on the

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[75] States.

[76] The balloon could also be heated via various cheap and simple methods, including an attached handheld-sized heating unit or even paint to reflect/attract solar radiation.

wrong side of the "cost curve" and is left "shooting down not-very-expensive rockets with very expensive rockets … it's a very, very expensive proposition."[77] Developing interceptors with effective kill vehicles is significantly more expensive than developing ICBMs with countermeasures that can be purchased "from the local hardware store and supermarket."[78] Since 1999, there have been at least seven upgrade attempts, redesigns, or outright restarts of the kill vehicle project. The most recent effort, the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), was shut down because "technical design problems were so significant as to be either insurmountable or cost-prohibitive to correct."[79] The current replacement, the Next-Generation Interceptor (NGI), is scheduled to be deployed in 2027. Due to the nature of these arguments, they will all remain valid over time, even as the technology develops.[80]

In a scenario where the United States possessed a fully functional, effective, nationwide strategic missile defense, it would still not protect the United States from attack by a state that had already determined it was willing to suffer existential destruction. WMDs can be delivered more easily and cheaply by methods other than ICBMs. As argued by Sen. Levin, "There are other, far more likely means of delivering a weapon of mass destruction than a ballistic missile," such as a

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[77] Jordana Mishory, "Gortney: U.S. Must Shift Bmd Dollars to 'Correct Side' of Cost Curve," *Inside the Pentagon* 31, no. 14 (2015), accessed 2021/05/12/, https://www.jstor.org/stable/insipent.31.14.09.

[78] Michael C Sirak, "Experts: Missile Defense Plan Neglects Countermeasures," *Inside Missile Defense* 5, no. 9 (1999).

[79] Jen Judson, "Pentagon Terminates Program for Redesigned Kill Vehicle, Preps for New Competition," Defense News, last modified August 21, accessed 2019. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/08/21/dod-tanks-redesigned-kill-vehicle-program-for-homeland-defense-interceptor/.

[80] Fetter et al.

"small plane, truck, ship, or briefcase, because these methods would be more accurate, more reliable, less costly, harder to detect, and—unlike a ballistic missile—have no 'return address.'"[81]

These include shorter-range missiles fired from offshore positions, missiles that strategic missile defense currently has no viable solution for, and WMDs delivered via unconventional means. These alternative means are not necessarily a backup plan caused by missile defense. There are strategic and economic benefits to engaging in these alternative methods, and in many scenarios, they may be the preferred option by adversaries.

Strategic Concerns: Strategic Missile Defense Results in Self-Encirclement and Overextension Regardless of Effectiveness

As explained by Kenneth Waltz, "The best thing about [strategic missile defenses] is that they won't work. The worst thing about them is that merely setting development and deployment in motion has damaging effects on us and on others."[82] These damaging effects create the conditions that allow the pursuit of missile defense to be considered a form of overexpansion—a self-defeating, overly aggressive policy. Having covered the well-trodden ground of explaining the technical fundamental flaws of missile defense, the remaining portion of this chapter will cover the strategic concerns of missile defense and how the pursuit of a homeland missile defense leads to both self-encirclement and overextension.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons has been considered the "first effect" of missile defense among critics.[83] This proliferation comes in two varieties: vertical and horizontal. Vertical proliferation can manifest itself in a pure increase in nuclear weaponry but also a modernization

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[81] Carl Levin, "A Debate Deferred: Missile Defense after the September 11 Attacks," *Arms Control Today* 31, no. 9 (2001), accessed 2021/11/08/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23626602.

[82] Waltz, "Missile Defenses and the Multiplication of Nuclear Weapons."

[83] Kenneth Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *American Political Science Review* 84, no. 3 (1990).

of existing capabilities to ensure that they will be more likely to penetrate any hypothetical homeland missile defense the United States may build.[84] This includes more advanced countermeasures, hypersonic glide technology, MIRVing ICBMs, and further development of alternative delivery methods. This vertical proliferation is because national missile defense cuts the legs out from underneath deterrence. This vertical proliferation is conducted to maintain (or re-establish) the second-strike capability that allows deterrence to exist.

Deterrence is effective, in large part, due to uncertainty. A state (provided it had the offensive capability) could always attempt a counterforce assault against an adversary, attempting to take out all of its nuclear weaponry in a debilitating first strike. However, without an effective missile defense system, such an attempt would not be effective and would only invite reprisal destruction. This is because a state could never be sure that it destroyed all of its adversary's nuclear weapons—some would be expected to survive the strike. Theoretically, an effective strategic missile defense would remove the uncertainty from a counterforce strike by "mopping up" any remaining adversarial weapons used in a counterattack.[85] Without the threat of a reprisal attack, deterrence cannot exist.

It is with this understanding that missile defense is best understood as an offensive system because it places us in a world where offense has the advantage. This world creates first-strike incentives for states, including the United States, to engage in preventive or preemptive attacks. As dictated by the logic of realism, rationally behaving states with the capability to do so will attempt to preserve their deterrent by finding means to circumvent the strategic missile defense.

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[84] Jeffrey Lewis, "The Nuclear Option: Slowing a New Arms Race Means Compromising on Missile Defenses," *Foreign affairs*, February 22, 2021.

[85]Ibid.

This can be done using countermeasures and other penetration aids, developing other well-known means of delivery outside the scope of missile defense, and increasing the number of warheads available so that missile defense systems, even if effective, will be overwhelmed.

This vertical proliferation by adversaries can (and has) been pointed to as justification for vertical proliferation in America, such as when former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David Trachtenberg argued that the United States needed to "close a [modernization] gap" with Russia. This push for reprisal modernization, spurred initially by missile defense, places the countries square in the middle of a new arms race—a fact that many outside experts have readily agreed on. Arms control agreements that could pacify arms racing are also made more difficult due to missile defense, as its existence has proven to be a key sticking point in negotiations.[86] Therefore, the technical quagmire of missile defense has costs that stretch far beyond the price tag of the technology itself, even financially. The actual costs of missile defense also must factor in the price tag of the modernization efforts that are largely justified by the new arms race spurred on by homeland missile defense.

However, the dangers of this modern arms race are more severe than those of its Cold War forebearer. One or both sides could soon come to believe that missile defense is effective and, therefore, deterrence has been eliminated. Arguably, even more dangerous is if a state believes that its adversary perceives that missile defense is effective. Under this scenario, a state would logically assume that its adversary believes that the constraints of deterrence have been eliminated. If this were the case, a state that understands that missile defense is ineffective could still find itself in a world where it is in its best interest to strike first. This incentive is due to the window of

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[86] Ibid.

vulnerability it now finds itself in. They would be incentivized to strike first even if they only believe that their adversary may soon come to think that missile defense could be effective, as they would find themselves in a closing window of opportunity.[87]

The United States would understand the incentives that a power such as China or Russia would have to strike first and, therefore, would also be aware of its own incentives to engage in a preventive strike. Even a status quo power that finds itself in a growing nuclear window of vulnerability will have incentives to disable the "eyes" of the missile defense system by attacking space-, land-, and sea-based radar and sensors. Such a disabling strike could easily be perceived as an indication of an oncoming direct attack and justify a "preemptive" strike. If the threat of a counterforce attack becomes a legitimate option, states will have incentives to, at minimum, move to a launch-on-warning posture. This sort of posture *dramatically* increases the likelihood of a launch due to accident or miscalculation, the sort that missile defense advocates use as justification for missile defense.[88] This move toward an alert posture has been seen from China, as the Department of Defense's 2019 report on China's military developments states that there is "increasing evidence" that China is moving toward a Launch-on-Warning (LOW) posture. This requires the "mating" of warheads to ICBMs, a practice that was traditionally not performed by the Chinese military as they kept their arsenal at peacetime posture.

Furthermore, hypothetically, if a President who made claims of missile defense being 97% effective were to believe those claims, and if this President were also short-tempered, it is not unreasonable to think that, in possessing unilateral authority to launch a nuclear weapon, such a

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[87] Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*.

[88] Scott Douglas Sagan, *The Limits of Safety* (Princeton University Press, 2020).

President may launch an attack without expecting a devastating response in return.[89] In such a hypothetical, the only things preventing a nuclear war would be 1) A change of heart by this President, 2) A convincing argument by someone in the room, or 3) Reliance on a pseudo-coup attempt, thereby undermining democracy.

Strategic missile defense and the "freedom of action" it could allow, combined with repeated pushbacks against arms control and nuclear treaties by the United States (along with the failure to ratify others), creates incentives for horizontal proliferation.[90] With the end of the constraining effect that deterrence provides against imprudent behavior visible on the horizon, non-nuclear states have incentives to develop nuclear weapons and diversify deployment strategies. The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate points out that such alternative means of delivery offer cost and reliability advantages for developing states, even without the threat of missile defense. The incentives to use such alternative means would only increase with a deployed missile defense that is believed to be effective. An increase in the use of alternative means (such as by "unmanned airplane" or "smuggled across the border" on a ship or truck) also increases the risk of accidental use or theft by non-state actors.[91]

While missile defense advocates suggest that missile defense allows for enhanced "freedom of action" by the United States, this means that the United States – without the constraining effects of deterrence – would be free to engage in further aggressive foreign policy.

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[89] A false belief in ease of victory or an incorrect interpretation of the cost-benefit analysis of war are misperceptions that increase the likelihood of war. Van Evera argues that a false optimism is "almost necessary" for there to be war, see: Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict.*. See also: Jack S Levy, "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems," *World Politics* 36, no. 1 (1983)., Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914*, vol. 2 (Cornell University Press, 1989).

[90] Waltz, "Missile Defenses and the Multiplication of Nuclear Weapons."

[91] National Intelligence Council, *Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States through 2015* (1999).

This enhances the incentives for any action taking place on the periphery of the United States' sphere of influence to become enflamed into a crisis or potentially even a nuclear exchange.

The arguments in this chapter are well-known in this missile defense debate but remain valid. Strategic missile defense is a system with fundamental flaws. Even an idealized version of strategic missile defense still makes the United States less safe as it creates incentives for horizontal and vertical proliferation (which quickly becomes arms racing) and with all the economic costs that includes. It makes arms control agreements harder to reach. It creates multilateral incentives for first-strike attacks. Strategic missile defense enhances incentives for states to engage in strikes against satellites and radar installations. It enhances incentives for states to shift to a LOW posture, increasing the likelihood of an accidental nuclear launch or a miscalculation leading to an unnecessary launch. Missile defense enhances incentives for states to use unconventional methods of nuclear delivery, which increases the likelihood of the theft of a nuclear weapon. Missile defense increases the probability of both preventive and preemptive strikes among nuclear powers. Strategic missile defense does not, in any meaningful way, increase the safety of those in the US nor those living elsewhere. It is, by any reasonable measure, a case of overexpansion.

III: Overexpansion, the Strategic Myths of Missile Defense, and an Organization Theory-Based Conception of the Missile Defense Network

Theories of Overexpansion

This chapter will examine the rationales for developing and deploying strategic missile defense—a policy of overexpansion—by addressing systemic and domestic arguments. Specifically, this chapter looks at answers as to why the United States actively and aggressively pursued the self-defeating policy of strategic missile defense after the end of the Cold War, when there was a shortage of viable nuclear ballistic missile threats facing the United States. In explaining the critical strategic arguments that falsely justify strategic missile defense, the chapter's domestic argument draws from Snyder's Coalition argument that logrolling is the primary driver of overexpansion. While logrolling does contribute to overexpansion, the coalition that serves as the driving force behind missile defense is a network of actors connected through resource interdependencies and behaving in a manner consistent with organization theory and theories built on its foundation.

This framing allows for incorporating logrolling practices but also explains the behavior of many champions of strategic missile defense. Resource interdependencies contribute to the formation of linkages between these actors and the establishment of a policy network. While Snyder suggests that "diffused elite interests" and "mass democratic politics" would help mitigate the dangers of overexpansion, this resource interdependence perspective demonstrates how the network of involved actors can establish a policy monopoly by holding political power and using powerful ideas to shape the perception of the policy and policy area.

Strategic missile defense is a destabilizing system that directly leads to self-encirclement by other nuclear powers and potential nuclear powers (along with increased incentives for first use

among all parties) and creates incentives that would lead to accidental launches being more likely due to hair-trigger postures as well as potentially more devastating results due to countermeasures such as MIRVed missiles. It is a techno-strategic quagmire that incurs both the costs (economic, strategic, and diplomatic) of its fundamentally flawed technology and the ripple costs of the new arms race that it justifies and perpetuates.

Systemic Explanation for Overexpansion: Structural Realism and its Variants

As with other forms of overexpansion, an accurate understanding of the development and deployment of strategic missile defense is not reached via systemic conditions. *Structural realism*, the dominant lens of systemic analysis, can provide no direct explanation in either of its variants. From a *defensive realism* perspective, the arguments against missile defense are clear: the United States already receives historic security from existential threats from its powerful nuclear deterrent and advantageous geographic location; a missile defense system will not prevent any additional attacks from taking place but will, instead, incentivize them due to adversarial fear of a US first strike being potentially possible due to missile defense allowing for a counterforce strike.[92] Missile defense also creates more substantial incentives for states to explore non-ICBM delivery methods that were already the more plausible avenues of any potential first strike. Missile defense, never capable of providing 100% assurance from a devastating nuclear missile slipping through, will not give the politicians the assurance needed to disregard any hypothetical nuclear blackmail.[93] Additionally, despite arguments for missile defense as a nonproliferation tool, it is a cause of balancing behavior by other states, including the internal balancing of upward proliferation. It

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[92] Stephen M Walt, "America Is Really, Really Secure," last modified Feburary 23, 2012, accessed. https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/23/america-is-really-really-secure/.

[93] Sagan and Waltz., Waltz, "Missile Defenses and the Multiplication of Nuclear Weapons."

serves as a roadblock to arms control agreements of substance with China and Russia.[94] Furthermore, the existence of missile defense and claims about its effectiveness continually run the risk of a US policymaker believing the United States operates with immunity and, therefore, engages in reckless behaviors.[95]

Structural conditions post-Cold War also did not provide any rational justification. Numerous intelligence estimates released in the years immediately following the decision to pivot away from strategic missile defense (the ending of the space-centric systems of the Reagan and Bush I administrations: SDI and Brilliant Pebbles) anticipated no new ICBM nuclear threats in the 10-15 years following the pivot (a forecast which proved accurate). Experts argued that pursuing strategic missile defense would lead to arms racing, especially with China and Russia (a forecast that also proved correct). The IC determined that an ICBM would not be the most likely method used if a newly nuclear-capable actor wanted to attack the United States. New nuclear-capable ICBM threats were not on the horizon. Strategic missile defense would be a destabilizing force for strategic stability with China and Russia. It was a fundamentally flawed technology that could be overwhelmed in multiple ways, making accidental launches more likely. Even if the technology worked, the most likely avenues of nuclear attack from non-state actors were outside the scope of the strategic missile defense program.

As noted, strategic missile defense is a destabilizing technology that compels states to engage in arms racing and incentivizes first-strike attacks.[96] Theories that equate power maximization with security, such as *offensive realism*, also struggle to adequately explain the development and

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[94] Walt, *The Origins of Alliance*.

[95] For more on these misperceptions leading to risky behavior, see Van Evera's Type IV Realism: Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*.

[96] Waltz, "Missile Defenses and the Multiplication of Nuclear Weapons."

deployment of strategic missile defense because of A) The fundamental technological flaws, B) The analysis by the intelligence community that a direct ICBM strike is not the likely way that a nuclear attack against the United States would take place under most scenarios; 3) The tremendous opportunity cost of strategic missile defense and its ripple effects; and 4) The "use them or lose them" incentives given to adversaries.[97] Power maximizing theorists argue that nuclear supremacy is rational.[98] However, pursuing strategic missile defense would not achieve such hypothetical supremacy; instead, it would incentivize non-ICBM strikes, adversarial first strikes, and strikes against radar/satellites. It would also greatly incentivize the development of nuclear weapons designed to avoid strategic defenses or to exploit their well-known vulnerabilities. It would be irrational in the self-harm it caused. There is no systemic explanation of the pursuit of strategic defense short of a desire to instigate a nuclear war in hopes of winning it—a genuinely irrational perspective. Offensive realism, while placing a much larger emphasis on power than its security emphasizing sister theory, still does not view states as "mindless aggressors" but as strategic actors.[99] Offensive realists believe that states will seek to maximize their relative power when the benefits of doing so exceed the costs.[100] However, the technical and strategic flaws of the system ensure there is no relative power increase provided by strategic missile defense, and the incentives it creates significantly increase the potential chances of accidental launches and undesired nuclear war.

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[97] For more on the fundamental flaws of missile defense, see Fetter et al.. For more on "use them or lose them" and windows of vulnerability/opportunity, see Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*.

[98] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*; Kroenig.

[99] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

[100] Labs.

While structural explanations cannot give a satisfactory explanation for the United States' decision to deploy strategic missile defense from either a power maximizing or a security maximizing perspective, defensive realism does allow for the fact that states may sometimes engage in pathological behavior, like overexpansion, that can find an explanation at the domestic level.[101] The following section briefly explores Jack Snyder's explanation for imperialistic overexpansion rooted in a domestic political rationale. It explains how that argument can be incorporated into a more holistic Organization Theory-based argument emphasizing resource dependencies. This perspective includes traditional defensive realism factors that contribute to pathological behavior, including political rationales and misperceptions caused by organizational incentives. It also smoothly incorporates Snyder's coalition logrolling explanation using resource dependence logic and networks of direct and indirect dependencies while providing theoretically coherent explanations for organizational behavior that contribute to the inability of traditional democratic checks to provide oversight or significant restraint. It expands the scope of Snyder's perspective by emphasizing the importance of personnel exchange and stressing the impact of exogenous events.

Domestic Politics Explanation for Overexpansion

Strategic Myths of Missile Defense Justification

Using historical process tracing work built primarily on accounts from historians, Jack Snyder found that repeatedly throughout history, incidents of great power overexpansion could not

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[101] While Waltz argued that his theory should not be used as a lens to view specific state policies, defensive realism is a tool commonly used in examinations of state behavior, including by Waltz himself. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*., Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*., Labs. It should be noted that neoclassical realism also argues that irrational state behavior can be explained by looking at domestic issues, see: Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998)., Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," *International Security* 17, no. 1 (1992).

be satisfactorily explained by strategic conditions and instead were best understood using domestic explanations. However, throughout history, advocates of aggressive self-defeating policies of overexpansion routinely used flawed, illogical, and misleading arguments of security being provided by aggression, or "strategic myths," to justify the policies.[102] Research for this dissertation has revealed that the internal overexpansion of missile defense is no different in that strategic myths serve as justification for strategic missile defense.[103] The rhetoric of the arguments frames SMD as a defensive system, even though the arguments follow the same logical scaffolding of security through aggression used to justify prior cases of overexpansion. The following section will briefly highlight a few of those strategic myths. It is essential to point out that in examining the justifications for strategic missile defense, this project uncovered examples of *every* imperial myth identified by Snyder.[104] In justifying strategic missile defense, just like in the historical examples of overexpansion, none of the arguments stand up to legitimate scrutiny. However, they appear plausible at first blush (especially when all taken together) to convince many of the need to continue down a path that increases the likelihood of nuclear weapon use.

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[102] Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*.

[103] It is important to note that even though network actors used these justifications because they support their preferred policy outcome and not the inverse, that does not mean that the rationale is irrelevant. As noted by Dan Lindley in his research on the use of analogies, "in any ongoing policy process where policies are debated and refined, justifications for policies also shape policies," adding that, "Even if an analogy was not used in the very first reaction by a policy maker, the first formulation of a policy debate, or in an initial decision does not mean that it will not shape beliefs and perceptions later on," see: Dan Lindley, "Flights of Fancy: The Misuse of Analogies and British Planning for Strategic Bombing in the Interwar Period," (2006).. Furthermore, as will be noted, even if some of the network members who push the myths only do so for strategic purposes, that does not prevent the myths from having a "blowback" effect for members or contributing to the norms of a network.

[104] Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*; Snyder, "Imperial Temptations."; Snyder, "Imperial Myths and Threat Inflation," in *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear*.

Offensive Advantage: Aggressive Strategy Succeeds (Advantage of Aggression)

A dominant strategic argument to justify aggressive self-defeating policy is that aggressive behavior is the best way to ensure security. Historically, this is framed as an offensive advantage, with the aggressor gaining the upper hand due to surprise and seizing the attack initiative.[105] In a nuclear world, where an entire nuclear war could be fought in the span of an afternoon, the aggressive policy is the policy that puts a state in a position to strike without facing devastation in response. While the most overt superhawks will argue for nuclear first strikes as an offensive strategy, aggression strategies are also framed as necessary for maintaining the status quo.[106] This argument suggests a turning away from deterrence and arms control in favor of a world where nuclear use becomes increasingly likely for all parties. This argument frames missile defense as a strategic enabler. This perspective sees missile defense not just as a protective shield but as a means of augmenting the United States' ability to assert its interests globally without the constraints of nuclear blackmail or the fear of missile attacks. Such a strategic advantage, if possible, would reduce vulnerability to threats, thus enhancing the U.S.'s offensive capabilities. This enhancement is not about initiating attacks but the power to exert influence and act decisively in international affairs without deterrence or hesitation. The implementation of a robust missile defense system sends a message of strength and alters the strategic calculations of potential adversaries. It endows the U.S. with a broader freedom of action, allowing assertive international engagement, secure in the knowledge that its homeland and overseas interests are shielded from ballistic missile threats.

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[105] Snyder, "Imperial Myths and Threat Inflation," in *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear*.

[106] Elbridge Colby identifies this superhawk argument in Elbridge Colby, "If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War," *Foreign affairs*, November/December, 2018. See also Keir A Lieber and Daryl G Press, "The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence," *International Security* 41, no. 4 (2017). Damage limitation, counterforce strike, and left-of-launch strategies are frequently used phrases in support of missile defense under the logic of aggressive advantage.

These arguments frame aggressive strategies as ensuring security with a quick and painless victory or limiting the damage caused by adversaries. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review makes this "aggressive advantage" argument. The NPR argued, "the United States will strive to end any conflict and restore deterrence at the lowest level of damage possible for the United States," clarifying that "US missile defense and offensive options provide the basis for significant damage limitation." As the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance argued, "offensive strategic systems and strategic missile defense systems must be integrated and be one strategic force team."[107] Some academics argue that first-strike "counterforce" strategies could be viable, but this perspective discounts the severe levels of uncertainty that would act as a restraining mechanism.[108]

Paper Tigers: Self-Contradictory Appraisal of Adversaries

Paper tiger arguments are traditionally based on the premise that the adversary is an existential threat and, if left unchecked, will cause tremendous harm and destruction. However, thwarting them with an aggressive policy will be relatively easy. This boils down to an argument that implies an understanding of the great ability and capability of the adversary when framing them as a threat but removing those characteristics from their description when viewing them as the target of policies of aggression. These self-contradictory appraisals allow these adversaries to be used to justify the need for aggressive policy but not a potential source of harm in response to those policies or a reason to have concern that the policies of aggression might fail. When dealing

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[107] Riki Ellison, "Left of Launch," MDAA, last modified March 16, accessed 2019. https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/alert/3132/.

[108] Lieber and Press, "The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence."

with missile defense arguments, these paper tiger arguments typically come in two variants: arguments about rationality and technical capability.

Paper Tiger Variant: Self-Contradictory Rationality

Self-contradictory rationality arguments frame certain adversaries as irrational. Thus, deterrence (referred to as "deterrence by punishment" when used in this argument) is ineffective in preventing a nuclear attack. Robert Joseph, for example, argued that deterrence by punishment would not be effective against certain adversaries due to "their nature" and that "we need to shift the focus to deterrence through denial."[109] Deterrence by denial is the argument that the potentially increased chance of a failed nuclear attack, which was already not assured, will prevent an attack from happening at all when the already existing possibility of failure and the all-but-promised destruction of the attacker could not. Deterrence through denial, like deterrence by punishment, rests on the logic of altering the cost-benefit of a strike. The paradox in this missile defense argument is that it requires an actor who would disregard an assurance of its destruction yet be rational enough to be deterred from attacking based on the increased probability of a failed attack. This argument focuses on adversaries that include rogue states and terrorist organizations, neither of which can pose an existential threat via nuclear ballistic missiles, nor, especially for terrorist organizations, can they be confident in the success of an already limited attack. The actor is simultaneously seen as so irrational that an extraordinarily high cost would not deter an attack but so conscious of cost-benefit calculations that a mild increase in the chances of failure would. This

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[109] Robert Joseph, "Nuclear Deterrence and Regional Proliferators," (1997).

argument relies on a simultaneously rational and irrational adversary—an easily thwarted

existential threat—in other words, a paper tiger.[110]

Paper Tiger Variant: Self-Contradictory Technological Advancement

A similar paper tiger argument justifies missile defense and disregards criticisms

concerning countermeasures. As noted in the previous chapter, countermeasures are an

extraordinarily challenging hurdle for strategic defenses to clear. Missile defense advocates and

organizations frequently dismiss this by arguing that countermeasures that would give issue to

midcourse defenses are "complex" and that the program defends against "simple" threats.[111] This

framing implies that adversaries cannot create countermeasures that could disrupt defense.

However, developing an ICBM is a technically tricky feat to accomplish, and any state capable of

doing so would have the capability to create countermeasures.

Even simple countermeasures utilizing balloons, paint, and the vacuum of space are an

arguably insurmountable challenge for mid-course defenses. The paper tiger argument requires

that an adversary state be sufficiently advanced enough to develop an ICBM yet unable to build

countermeasures. As Ted Postol has argued, "It is unimaginable that an adversary could not build

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[110] Even if we could remove the inherent paper tiger paradox, however, we would still face a logical issue with deterrence when denial is applied to the nuclear realm. Deterrence relies on a cost-benefit analysis from a rational actor. The higher the costs of an action relative to the benefits of said action, the more likely an actor is to be deterred from performing that action. Total nuclear retaliation from the United States would place the costs at such a significantly high level that it borders on incalculable. Deterrence by denial does not focus on the costs but instead attempts to lower the benefits of an action. If they decrease the probability of a successful nuclear strike, then they reduce the benefits of performing that strike. However, because this deterrence by denial is only argued to deter states with a limited nuclear arsenal, we are forced to assume that these states in question would not be attempting counterforce strikes but rather countervalue strikes, as there is no realistic possibility of a successful counterforce attack. We must assume that "benefit" would be extracted via damage to civilians and population hubs. The damage that a single successful countervalue strike against the United States would give such a high degree of "benefit" to the attacker (considering the "cost" in this equation is void) that it seems inconceivable a state determined to commit such an attack would be deterred by a lower probability of success.

[111] Missile defense systems have also failed in testing against "simple" threats on multiple occasions.

these countermeasures and [yet] be able to build an ICBM with a nuclear warhead."[112] To justify strategic missile defenses, advocates must argue that adversaries are advanced enough technologically to build ICBMs capable of landing nuclear warheads in the United States. However, these adversaries are also too technologically stunted to equip said ICBMs with countermeasures that can be constructed "with materials from the local hardware store and supermarket."[113] The absurdity of such an argument was highlighted during a hearing of the National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations subcommittee when the Missile Defense Agency Director Kadish confirmed that all states known to have developed intercontinental ballistic missiles have also developed countermeasures for those missiles and when asked if he had any reason to believe that emerging missile states would behave differently, eventually admitted: "absolutely not."[114]

Power Shifts: Windows of Opportunity and Vulnerability

Arguments concerning shifts in the balance of power have also been repeatedly used to justify self-defeating, aggressive policies. These arguments have been used to justify preventive strikes but have caused otherwise non-adversaries to rally against aggressors by taking bold actions first.[115] These arguments, which push states to act on the offensive before would-be adversaries get the chance, typically manifest in two ways: 1) To justify the immediate deployment of defenses

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[112] Sirak.

[113] This argument on the limited requirements needed for effective countermeasures was made by Dr. Richard Garwin.

[114] *Missile Defense: A New Organization, Evolutionary Technologies and Unrestricted Testing*, Second ed., *Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2002).

[115] Snyder, "Imperial Temptations."

and 2) To justify first-strike attacks because of defenses. In other words, they justify the need for the immediate deployment of missile defenses by arguing that other states are rapidly developing nuclear capabilities and may strike at any moment. Sen. Bob Smith (R-NH) argued this before Congress, stating that "we cannot delay any longer … if we wait for a ballistic missile to rain down upon our nation, wreaking chaos and destruction, it will be too late."[116] Other powershifting arguments suggest that technology is rapidly developing to the point that incentives for a first-strike counterforce attack are too large to ignore, placing us effectively in a "use them or lose them" situation regarding nuclear arsenals. Counterforce attacks rely on the premise that any adversary missile missed in the initial strike will be "cleaned up" via missile defenses before they can cause harm to the United States. Without these defenses, a counterforce strike becomes completely unviable, as the possibility of missiles launching early or surviving the initial strike is too large to ignore.

Falling Dominoes: Every Element is Vital and Can Lead to Collapse

In addition to arguments about offensive advantage, technological advancement, and power shifting, falling domino arguments also support aggressive policy based on the idea that bold action is required to prevent setbacks on the periphery of the aggressor state's domain. These arguments suggest that if these potential setbacks are allowed to transpire, they will snowball, resulting in a threat to the state. While the causal mechanism of this argument can exist in many forms, Snyder highlights how allies and adversaries of a state can begin to doubt the state's "resolve to fight for its commitments." This doubt leads to the state losing credibility, diminishing its power and influence internationally and domestically.[117]

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[116] *Congressional Record*, by House of Representatives, 104 Cong., Second sess., Vol. 142, pt. 80 (1996).

[117] Snyder, "Imperial Myths and Threat Inflation," in *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear*.

Advocates for strategic missile defense also argue that it is an essential element for damage limitation strategies that underwrite "US extended deterrence and security assurance relationships."[118] This "underwriting" argument implies that allies will lose faith in the credibility of US extended deterrence, and alliances will collapse without missile defenses. Advocates argue that missile defenses are essential for extended deterrence because the systems "ensur[e] that the United States has the freedom to employ whatever means it chooses to respond to aggression without risk of enemy escalation to homeland strikes."[119] Missile defense advocates argue that extended deterrence is improved by missile defense because the US public would be more supportive of actions taken if they believed missile defenses protected the United States, and allies would recognize this fact.[120] This argument is an explicit modern spin on a classic domino argument, implying that without strategic missile defenses enabling the United States to have complete freedom of action to intervene internationally, the system of alliances from which the United States benefits will collapse.

On the contrary, it is far from a fact that national missile defense would enhance extended deterrence. One criticism of the argument is that SMD would not sufficiently change the calculations for American leaders (e.g., would leaders take actions resulting in a nuclear strike on America even if they were confident that missile defenses were 95% effective?).[121] Other

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[118] Oliver Thränert and Kerry M Kartchner, "From Offense to Defense? Extended Deterrence and Missile Defense," in *The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, Nato and Beyond* (Georgetown University Press, 2015).

[119] As argued by former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, see Brad Roberts, "Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia," *NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series*, no. 1 (2013).

[120] James M Lindsay et al., "Limited National and Allied Missile Defense," *International Security* 26, no. 4 (2002).

[121] George Lewis, Lisbeth Gronlund, and David Wright, "National Missile Defense: An Indefensible System," *Foreign Policy* (1999).

criticisms note that damage limitation strategies enhance first-strike incentives and make forward-deployed radars more attractive targets.[122] The criticisms of national missile defenses not being designed to target the most likely method of attack from rogue states or terror groups also still hold. Likely, the drawbacks of the national missile defense's impact on extended deterrence outweigh the argued benefits.

Bandwagons and Big Stick Diplomacy

These myths argue that states do not push back against aggression but rather align with it, believing that aggressive actions will make friends and allies. However, this frequently backfires, leading to tighter encirclement by opposition forces. Missile defense advocates have argued that tough talk and tough actions are beneficial in the pursuit of missile defense, insisting that aggressive behavior would get the desired results. The United States, when pushing for the aggressive policy of deploying missile defense, insisted that Russia and China, in the long run, would not feel threatened and there would be no arms racing. However, both Russia and China have pointed to US missile defenses (as justification or in actuality) as the reason for their need to develop their nuclear programs further.

El Dorado

El Dorado myths exaggerate the benefits of imperial expansion, sometimes ideologically, to justify overexpansion and preventative war. In the case of missile defense, this myth has repeatedly manifested itself through arguments that frame missile defense as essential for world peace, the spread of democracy, or vital security interests. In this context, missile defense is

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[122] Charles L Glaser and Steve Fetter, "The Limits of Damage Limitation," *International Security* 42, no. 1 (2017). James H Lebovic, "The Law of Small Numbers: Deterrence and National Missile Defense," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 4 (2002).

positioned not just as a security measure but as a tool for obtaining lofty goals, such as achieving world peace. Such an example was used by President Bush while advocating for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (and, by extension, the deployment of missile defenses), declaring that the treaty was not "in our interests or the interests of world peace."[123]

Domestic Explanation: Logrolled Coalitions of Parochial Interests

As with other variations and examples of overexpansion, systemic conditions cannot fully explain the development and deployment of strategic missile defense. It is, therefore, essential to examine *innenpolitik* theories of explanation, as Snyder did in his initial examination of overexpansion.[124] Snyder's domestic politics argument for explaining overexpansion essentially has two elements: 1) A coalition of domestic interests logrolling together to "capture" the state, and 2) Strategic myths spread via the "propaganda resources" of the state are used to justify the aggressive policy that the coalition supports. Snyder argues that in addition to self-interest, actors within the logrolled interests can continue to push self-defeating policy despite the real dangers and consequences if they are rhetorically tied to public statements they have made (likely due to reputational costs or they come to believe the strategic myths due to rhetorical blowback).[125]

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[123] George W. Bush, "President Bush Speech on Missile Defense," cnn.com, last modified May 1, accessed. http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/05/01/bush.missile.trans/.

[124] While it is possible to argue against the inclusion of strategic defense as a form of overexpansion, as it does not incorporate traditional territorial expansion, strategic defense is an offensive policy that is critical in protecting freedom of action, and through first strike counterforce attacks, can potentially undercut the constraints of deterrence, allowing an expansion of influence rather than territory.

[125] Coined by Van Evera and originally dealing with military organizations, blowback refers to an organization "imbibing" and acting on its own propaganda, see: Van Evera, "Militarism.", Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. For more on blowback, see Lewis, "Bum Dope, Blowback, and the Bomb: The Effect of Bad Information on Policy-Maker Beliefs and Crisis Stability," in *Three Tweets to Midnight: Effects of the Global Information Ecosystem on the Risk of Nuclear Conflict*. See also the work of Van Evera (who coined the term) on discussions of states believing in myths. Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security* 9, no. 1 (1984); Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*.

Crucially, one element that is not incorporated within Snyder's argument is exogenous events and the impact that this has on developing domestic networks. This concept is included within an organization theory perspective emphasizing resource dependence logic, as it inherently impacts the distribution of resources (tangibly and intangibly). Such exogenous events, such as the end of the Cold War and the resulting projections of decreases in defense industry funding, can trigger a series of behaviors that are logical from an organization theory perspective, such as the mergers and acquisition wave within the defense industry of the 1990s. This behavior and the resulting increase in power for the remaining actors in the defense industry cannot be understood simply via favor training and logrolling interests. However, such logrolling behaviors can be understood through a resource dependence emphasizing theoretical lens. Furthermore, organizational behaviors that greatly assisted in the development and deployment of missile defenses (such as increases in secrecy and decreased oversight surrounding the program) are excluded from the narrative of logrolling but are completely coherent from an organization theory perspective that emphasizes resource dependencies.[126]

This dissertation largely agrees with Snyder's influential examination of the drivers of overexpansion. However, I believe that this supplementary explanation can provide an expanded explanation for the "hijacking" of policy by narrow interests—and that these interests "pool … their power in a coalition"—via the impact of personnel exchange and the influence of idea dispersal through network linkages. Snyder argues that early industrializing democratic systems successfully prevent overexpansion because they "strengthen diffuse interests opposed to overexpansion." However, an organization theory perspective helps explain how some traditional

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[126] Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R Salancik, *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective* (Stanford University Press, 2003).

democratic checks, such as the congressional role of oversight, can be ameliorated via organization buffering and bridging strategies (including the obfuscation of evaluation practices and the use of personnel exchange to create advocacy or even cooptation, in oversight bodies). Snyder's argument has foundations rooted in the logic of power and resource dependence.[127] This dissertation builds upon Snyder's argument about logrolling with an organization theory perspective emphasizing resource dependence logic.[128]

This supplementary addition allows for a clearer understanding of all actors' motivations and better explains how the state can be "hijacked" by interests. Accordingly, varying domestic groups, each working in their best interest and connected to other contributing individuals and organizations via dependence-based linkages, led to policies of overexpansion, even though not all of the groups experienced a direct benefit from the policies. Organization theory helps explain specific actions and strategies taken by these organizations that perpetuate the existence of the missile defense policy network. Understanding the motives of these domestic groups allows scholars to understand their interactions and how this leads to the existence of a missile defense policy network. Analyzing this network demonstrates how this internal overexpansion avoided the constraining effects of "diffused elite interest" and "mass democracy" that Snyder argued could have a moderating impact. Resource dependence logic explains 1) how and why a policy network exists to support strategic missile defense, 2) how and why interest groups would log roll their policy preferences together to provide mutual support, and 3) how and why the policy network

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[127] For more on vote trading and logrolling see: Dennis C Mueller, "Public Choice: A Survey," *Journal of Economic Literature* 14, no. 2 (1976). and William H. Riker and Steven J. Brams, "The Paradox of Vote Trading," *American Political Science Review* 67, no. 4 (1973), http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1956545.

[128] Snyder argued that if he were to create a theory from his findings, it would be based on the premise that individuals belong to groups of people using resources to pursue common interests. In this argument, Snyder specifically references Georg Simmel and his conflict group concept, a forbear of organization theory. See: Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. p.316

was able to "capture" the government and implement a policy that is not in the strategic interest of the state.

The remainder of this chapter examines the organization theory, emphasizing resource dependence logic, and explores the conceptual basis for network formation among self-interested actors. Also discussed are interest coalitions that impact policy decisions, specifically policy networks built on interdependent linkages on resource dependence. The analysis that results from this framing of the policy network offers a more robust understanding of overexpansion in a democratic state with diffuse interests, such as the United States.

A substantial and growing body of literature explores the use of organization theory in explaining state behavior. This behavior includes foreign policy,[129] military posture,[130] nuclear second-strike capabilities,[131] and potential nuclear deterrence failure.[132] There is also a growing and wildly diverse body of research exploring policy network influence on foreign policy and international relations, including informal policy networks.[133] Broad policy network concepts have likewise been utilized in describing the development of strategic defense during the Reagan administration, and journalists have highlighted linkages between missile defense advocates

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[129] Graham T Allison, *Essence of Decision* (New York: Addison, Welsey, 1971). Corinna Freund and Volker Rittberger, "Utilitarian-Liberal Foreign Policy Theory," *German foreign policy since unification: Theories and case studies* (2001).

[130] Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Cornell University Press, 1986).

[131] Wu Riqiang, "Living with Uncertainty: Modeling China's Nuclear Survivability," *International Security* 44, no. 4 (2020).

[132] Scott D Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (1994). Sagan and Waltz.

[133] Christopher Ansell and Jacob Torfing, "The Network Approach and Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Policy as Public Policy?: Promises and Pitfalls*, ed. Klaus Brummer et al. (Manchester: Manchester University Press). For an exploration of informal policy network influence on foreign policy, see John J Mearsheimer and Stephen M Walt, *The Israel Lobby and Us Foreign Policy* (Macmillan, 2007).

during the G.W. Bush administration.[134] Some research explaining the select behaviors of defense contractors has also utilized resource dependence theory.[135]

An Organization Theory-Based Supplement to Snyder's Coalition Model

The following section will address the theoretical approach that supplements, extends, and enhances Snyder's Coalition Model.[136] There are a wide variety of interpretations of organization theory. This project relies on the resource dependence school of organization theory, emphasizing organizations, their motivations, their interactions with their environment (including network formation), and how these interactions alter organizational behavior.[137] The core of this perspective is as follows: *organizations are open systems that require external resources for survival and strive to mitigate and manage uncertainty while maintaining as much autonomy as possible to ensure their ability to acquire these necessary resources now and in the future.*

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[134] For an examination of "pushers" and "pullers" in the development of SDI, see Erik K Pratt, *Selling Strategic Defense: Interests, Ideologies, and the Arms Race* (L. Rienner, 1990). The work of Hartung et al. has also used terms such as "web" and "axis" when discussing linkages between NMD supporters. See Michelle Ciarrocca and William Hartung, "Axis of Influence: Behind the Bush Administration's Missile Defense Revival," *World Policy Institute* (2002); William D Hartung et al., "Tangled Web 2005: A Profile of the Missile Defense and Space Weapons Lobbies," *World Policy Institute–Arms Trade Resource Center. http://www. worldpolicy. org/projects/arms/reports/tangledweb. html* (2006).

[135] Gerald R Salancik, "Interorganizational Dependence and Responsiveness to Affirmative Action: The Case of Women and Defense Contractors," *Academy of management journal* 22, no. 2 (1979).

[136] For more on the use of multi-theoretical approaches in policy studies, see: Paul Cairney, "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: How Do We Combine the Insights of Multiple Theories in Public Policy Studies?," *Policy Studies Journal* 41, no. 1 (2013).

[137] This approach incorporates the resource dependence school of organization theory, covering both Resource Dependence Theory and a resource dependence-based version of Policy Network Theory (see: Pfeffer and Salancik., Hugh Compston, *Policy Networks and Policy Change: Putting Policy Network Theory to the Test* (Springer, 2009)., Ian Bailey et al., "The Fall (and Rise) of Carbon Pricing in Australia: A Political Strategy Analysis of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme," *Environmental Politics* 21, no. 5 (2012).

Organization Theory

Organizations (formal and informal) are coalitions of individuals, often defined in the literature by their pursuit of a goal ("social structures created by individuals to support the collaborative pursuit of specified goals").[138] Organization-specific goals, while ostensibly their core motivator, may change due to environmental changes.[139] However, all organizations are unified by the shared goal of survival. Pfeffer and Salancik accounted for this goal in their foundational explanation of organizations, arguing that "organizations are… a process of organizing support sufficient to continue existence."[140] This dissertation utilizes this broad understanding of organizations (formal or informal) as coalitions of individuals collaboratively pursuing a primary goal of continued organizational existence (and secondary context-dependent goals).[141]

Due to this pursuit of survival, organizations attempt to manage uncertainty and maintain autonomy whenever possible. Autonomy over decision-making is desired because it equates with the organization's ability to make decisions regarding internal resources and pursue external

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[138] W Richard Scott and Gerald F Davis, *Organizations and Organizing: Rational, Natural and Open Systems Perspectives* (Routledge, 2015). Shafritz and Ott, in their collection of works on organization theory, refer to organizations simply as "a social unit with some particular purposes," see: J.M. Shafritz and J.S. Ott, *Classics of Organization Theory*, 5th ed. (Harcourt College Publishers, 2001). As organizations are coalitions, it is certainly within reason for members of the said coalition to leave the organization when not receiving sufficient satisfaction from involvement. Pfeffer and Salancik.

[139] For an example of goal-change for organizations, see Pfeffer's discussion on the March of Dimes in Jeffrey Pfeffer, *New Directions for Organization Theory: Problems and Prospects* (Oxford University Press on Demand, 1997).

[140] Pfeffer and Salancik.

[141] This generic understanding is synthesized from organization concepts used by ibid.; Scott and Davis; Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations-I," *Administrative science quarterly* (1956). For a discussion of the contested value of considering "organizational goals" beyond acquiring resources necessary for survival, see Roderick Arthur William Rhodes, *Control and Power in Central-Local Government Relations* (Routledge, 2018).

resources without external interference. However, mitigating uncertainty and protecting autonomy is insufficient for ensuring survival, as seeking survival is not a straightforward goal.[142] Organizations are open systems and thus not entirely self-contained or wholly self-sufficient. Organizations require resources obtained only from outside the organization, in its environment.[143] External elements, such as other organizations, make up that environment.

Resource Dependence Theory of Organizations

Environment Uncertainty and Organizational Constraints

This idea that organizations try to ensure their survival but require external resources suggests that, to varying degrees, every organization must interact with the larger environment as both a source of uncertainty and constraint.[144] Uncertainty is unavoidable and not necessarily a problem, but it becomes an issue when uncertainty concerns access to necessary resources for the organization. This uncertainty can arise for various reasons, including "incomplete information, inadequate understanding of available information, and undifferentiated … alternatives."[145] Uncertainty can also impact an organization's ability to perform core functions, potentially impacting its ability to acquire needed resources and the "distribution of critical resources in the

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[142] This project adopts the commonly accepted open systems perspective of organizations and networks. For more on this perspective, see Daniel Katz and Robert L Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations*, vol. 2 (Wiley New York, 1978); Howard Aldrich, "Organizational Boundaries and Inter-Organizational Conflict," *Human relations* 24, no. 4 (August 1971); Scott and Davis.

[143] Howard E Aldrich and Jeffrey Pfeffer, "Environments of Organizations," *Annual review of sociology* 2, no. 1 (1976).

[144] Pfeffer and Salancik; Werner Nienhüser, "Resource Dependence Theory-How Well Does It Explain Behavior of Organizations?," *management revue* (2008).

[145] Gudela Grote, *Management of Uncertainty: Theory and Application in the Design of Systems and Organizations* (Springer Science & Business Media, 2009).

environment."[146] The key to uncertainty is, therefore, its impact on an organization's ability to make successful decisions; when dealing with vital resources, it can potentially impact an organization's survival, so we expect organizations to do what they can to mitigate these variables.

In addition to the inherent uncertainty of an organization's environment, other organizations may possess critical resources necessary for survival. Owning resources needed by another gives an organization power. The power level varies depending on 1) the resource's criticality, 2) the substitutability of the resource, and 3) the number of alternative options for obtaining the resource.[147] The scarcity and concentration of resources (specifically critical resources) can constrain an organization's possible actions. When decision options are limited or choices are constrained by the environment (e.g., an essential resource is held by another organization), the organization's autonomy decreases. Organizations strive to maintain their autonomy because as independence decreases, uncertainty increases. When an organization's autonomy decreases, so does its ability to ensure its survival, and so the dependent organization's survival becomes increasingly under the independent organization's control. Organizations will seek to minimize or manage this dependency-based uncertainty that stems from the environment and, in doing so, attempt to maintain organizational autonomy.[148]

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[146] Nienhüser.

[147] For more on what allows resources to become more valuable (along with similar perspectives from the strategic management and Resource-Based View (RBV) literature regarding VRIN attributes), see Richard M Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," *American sociological review* (1962); David Ulrich and Jay B Barney, "Perspectives in Organizations: Resource Dependence, Efficiency, and Population," *Academy of Management Review* 9, no. 3 (1984); Pfeffer and Salancik; William D Oberman, "A Conceptual Look at the Strategic Resource Dynamics of Public Affairs," *Journal of Public Affairs: An International Journal* 8, no. 4 (2008).

[148] Due to the dependencies that critical resources create, organizations cannot avoid restrictions on their autonomy and seek to minimize these restrictions with methods such as mutual dependencies, among others. See: Christine Oliver, "Network Relations and Loss of Organizational Autonomy," *Human relations* 44, no. 9 (1991)., Tyler Wry, J Adam Cobb, and Howard E Aldrich, "More Than a Metaphor: Assessing the Historical Legacy of Resource Dependence and Its Contemporary Promise as a Theory of Environmental Complexity," *Academy of Management annals* 7, no. 1 (2013).

Intangible Resources and Perceptions

The resources that organizations depend on are not just tangible resources, including money, but also intangible resources, including information, access, and legitimacy.[149] Legitimacy is a unique resource in that its existence is perceptual, and its function, from an organizational survival perspective, is to aid in acquiring other resources.[150] Organizations take these resources from the environment and transform them as needed through various activities. An organization embedded within a more extensive system is perceived as legitimate if its activities align with network goals.[151] Conversely, the organization would be considered illegitimate if the "values" implied by an organization's activities do not align with the "norms of acceptable behavior" in the network. Due to its function in aiding resource acquisition, organizations value perceptions of legitimacy from actors they depend on for resources. Because an organization's behavior and ability to acquire resources are constrained by the existing environment and the need for perceived legitimacy, the environment from which it receives needed resources ultimately shapes its behavior and the values it supports. Additionally, information provided by other actors within the network helps inform organizations with whom they ought to cooperate.[152] This provides the incentive to

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[149] Resource types are discussed later in this chapter.

[150] Parsons refers to legitimacy as the "appraisal of action in terms of shared or common values in the context of the involvement of the action in the social system" and suggests that organizations legitimize themselves by justifying to their environment their right to exist and crucially, their right to acquire critical resources and transform them. See: Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (Free Press, 1960).

[151] John Dowling and Jeffrey Pfeffer, "Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and Organizational Behavior," *Pacific sociological review* 18, no. 1 (1975).

[152] Ranjay Gulati and Martin Gargiulo, "Where Do Interorganizational Networks Come From?," *American journal of sociology* 104, no. 5 (1999).

be a good partner and helps explain the shared interlocks that form the network.[153] The logic of this panopticon effect parallels that of blowback. Rather than just individuals learning, accepting, and repeating flawed arguments as accurate, organizations are incentivized to accept certain concepts and practices primarily beneficial to their existing network. This acceptance is advantageous to the organization via a self-reinforcing loop. Organizations can also benefit from indirect dependencies, particularly the decrease in uncertainty created by those indirect dependencies becoming solidified. This includes indirect dependencies of intangible resources, such as when an actor benefits from and depends on the network's existence, which can only exist (even informally) due to another network member's tangible or intangible resources with whom they do not interact directly. [154]

Strategies for Dealing with Uncertainty and Environmental Constraints: Buffering, Bridging, and Environmental Manipulation

Organizational dependence on outside actors gives those actors power and influence over the organization.[155] External actors that provide an organization with a critical resource typically are the actors that are most likely (and most able) to exert influence over the organization.[156]

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[153] Ranjay Gulati, "Network Location and Learning: The Influence of Network Resources and Firm Capabilities on Alliance Formation," *Strategic management journal* 20, no. 5 (1999), accessed 2023/10/18/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3094162.

[154] Mark Borman and Frank Ulbrich, *Managing Dependencies in Inter-Organizational Collaboration: The Case of Shared Services for Application Hosting Collaboration in Australia*, *2011 44th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences* (IEEE, 2011).

[155] Similar arguments are made in the Stakeholder Theory literature, which has many overlaps with Resource Dependence Theory. For a resource dependence perspective on stakeholder theory, see, Timothy J Rowley, "Moving Beyond Dyadic Ties: A Network Theory of Stakeholder Influences," *Academy of Management Review* 22, no. 4 (1997); Jeff Frooman, "Stakeholder Influence Strategies," *Academy of Management Review* 24, no. 2 (1999).. For a look at the distinctions between the theories, see: Shawn L Berman, Robert A Phillips, and Andrew C Wicks, *Resource Dependence, Managerial Discretion and Stakeholder Performance*, vol. 2005, *Academy of management proceedings* (Academy of Management Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510, 2005).

[156] Ulrich and Barney.

Organizations are answerable to these external actors to varying degrees and must determine to what degree they will comply with the influence.[157] Actors who possess critical resources can include government agencies and politicians. Coalitions within the realm of missile defense policy exert influence through multifaceted and sophisticated methods, each reinforcing the coalition's strategic objectives. These methods encompass a range of activities, from shaping public discourse to exerting direct political pressure.

Organizations use multiple strategies to manage the inherent uncertainties of these dependencies. Although multiple typologies have been used to categorize the behavioral strategy of organizations,[158] the most common understanding groups the behaviors as bridging and buffering strategies.[159] Understanding these differing strategies provides building blocks for understanding interorganizational behavior and explaining the behavior of actors in the missile defense network.[160] These strategies rely on the understanding that organizations deal with environmental uncertainty by attempting to control the environment and the impact that the environment has on the organization (e.g., demands placed on the organization to receive necessary resources from the environment, including demands on behavior and demands for

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[157] Aldrich and Pfeffer; Wry, Cobb, and Aldrich.

[158] For instance, Hillman et al. found it best to frame the behaviors as either "active" or "reactive," which they felt aligned closely to buffering and bridging. Amy J Hillman, Gerald D Keim, and Douglas Schuler, "Corporate Political Activity: A Review and Research Agenda," *Journal of management* 30, no. 6 (2004).

[159] Martin B Meznar and Douglas Nigh, "Buffer or Bridge? Environmental and Organizational Determinants of Public Affairs Activities in American Firms," *Academy of management journal* 38, no. 4 (1995); Mary L Fennell and Jeffrey A Alexander, "Organizational Boundary Spanning in Institutionalized Environments," *Academy of management journal* 30, no. 3 (1987). Frans AJ Van den Bosch and Cees BM Van Riel, "Buffering and Bridging as Environmental Strategies of Firms," *Business Strategy and the Environment* 7, no. 1 (1998).

[160] It should be noted that some in the literature consider there to be three broad behavioral strategies: bridging, buffering, and boundary redefinition. For this dissertation, boundary redefinition is understood as an extension of the linkage-centric behavior described by bridging. A compelling argument can also be made for boundary redefinition as a buffering strategy, insulating from the influence of the larger environment by constructing a smaller, more predictable network to work with. For more on this, see Fennell and Alexander.

resources possessed by the organization).[161] When it is impossible to control the environment, organizations deal with the uncertainty by making the environment as predictable as possible.[162]

Buffering strategies are intended to protect the organization from the influence of the environment (especially dramatic external shocks) either by "amplify[ing] the organization's protective boundaries" to insulate it from the environment or by attempting to "actively influence" the environment through "advocacy advertising."[163] Organizations buffer by accumulating critical resources when possible to hold a sufficient supply should environmental changes impact their supply.[164] They also, due to a need to acquire external resources, must prove competent at performing the tasks that are expected of them. This can result in organizations attempting to control the evaluation of their output when possible to ensure they continue to receive support from the environment required for resource acquisition.[165] Additionally, when dependent on government actors, organizations can attempt to influence the behavior of these government actors and thus alter potential dependencies by providing them with relevant information beneficial to the organization.[166] Furthermore, public behavior is more open to influence than private behavior.

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[161] For more on demand creation, see John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1998).

[162] Katz and Kahn.

[163] Meznar and Nigh suggest political contributions should also be considered as a buffer activity aimed at shaping the environment. However, an argument could be made for viewing it as a bridging activity, creating a different mutual dependency. For more, see Meznar and Nigh; Timothy P Blumentritt, "Foreign Subsidiaries' Government Affairs Activities: The Influence of Managers and Resources," *Business & Society* 42, no. 2 (2003). Van den Bosch and Van Riel.

[164] Jessica L Darby et al., "The Implications of Firm-Specific Policy Risk, Policy Uncertainty, and Industry Factors for Inventory: A Resource Dependence Perspective," *Journal of Supply Chain Management* 56, no. 4 (2020).

[165] Aaron Wildavsky, "The Self-Evaluating Organization," *Public Administration Review* 32, no. 5 (1972), accessed 2023/10/19/, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/975158., Pfeffer and Salancik.

[166] Philip H Birnbaum, "Political Strategies of Regulated Organizations as Functions of Context and Fear," *Strategic management journal* 6, no. 2 (1985).

Increased secrecy around behavior allows the organization to "be the interpreter of its own actions and effectiveness."[167] Controlling the information available for evaluation by increasing secrecy, controlling self-evaluation criteria, limiting external evaluation when possible, and being ambiguous regarding the satisfaction of external evaluation criteria is behavior consistent with organization theory due to the incentives created by the primary drive of the organization. Insulation from the environment, therefore, comes from various organizational strategies, such as decreased organizational transparency or increased organizational complexity.[168] Organization (and, by extension, networks of organizations) incentives to poorly self-evaluate and hinder external evaluation also contribute to our understanding of why actors would continue to support self-defeating policy.[169]

Beyond having incentives to be poor self-evaluators, including incentives to craft favorable criteria by which their output is evaluated, organizations also push to minimize uncertainty surrounding organizational behavior when possible.[170] This would include preferring organizational behavior that increases the probability of long-term acquisition of resources over behavior that would leave long-term resource acquisition unknown and prioritizing support for policies or resource use that would increase prestige and wealth for the organization and

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[167] Pfeffer and Salancik.

[168] Organization theory arguments suggest militaries are biased toward offensive strategies due to organizational autonomy. For one, the increase in the complexity of offensive strategies compared to defensive strategies will make civilian oversight significantly more difficult. For more on this argument, see Posen; Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *International Security* 9, no. 1 (1984); Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict.*. Missile defense strategies are inherently much more complex than traditional concepts of defense, in part due to the implied inclusion of counterforce attacks.

[169] Stephen Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Nonself-Evaluation by States and Societies," in *Perspectives on Structural Realism* (Springer, 2003).

[170] Allison., Posen.

network.[171] The need to prioritize policy and resource use that would increase prestige and wealth, along with incentives to be poor self-evaluators and establish obtainable evaluation criteria, creates incentives for organizations and network actors to see "the necessary as possible.[172] This tendency, made out of a need for uncertainty mitigation, a need for support by external actors, as well as likely cognitive motivated biases, influences assessments of external conditions in establishing the justification for biased self-evaluations.

Organizations need their resources, particularly their output, to have external value. Sometimes, this requires additional resources or utilizing other actors to alter the external perception of the value of the resource.[173] However, not only does there need to be a perceived need, but the perceived need must align with the organizational output.[174] Thus, organizations and network actors have incentives to perceive the world and the "lessons of history" so that the need for their resources not only exists but aligns with the organization's capabilities.[175] This is understood to be a cause of flawed offensive doctrine due to strategists having a narrow, improbable, and often illogical window of even potential success being incentivized to view that

[171] Jack S Levy, "Organizational Routines and the Causes of War," *International studies quarterly* 30, no. 2 (1986).

[172] Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914*., Levy, "Organizational Routines and the Causes of War.", Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984."

[173] David J Teece, "Transactions Cost Economics and the Multinational Enterprise an Assessment," *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 7, no. 1 (1986)., Riitta Katila, Jeff D Rosenberger, and Kathleen M Eisenhardt, "Swimming with Sharks: Technology Ventures, Defense Mechanisms and Corporate Relationships," *Administrative science quarterly* 53, no. 2 (2008).

[174] As Dan Lindley argued, organizations work to "establish demands which they are uniquely qualified to satisfy," see: Lindley.

[175] Cases from which analogies are built are not selected in a vacuum but rather are selected because they advance the interests or preferences of the actor making the analogy, see: MJ Peterson, "The Use of Analogies in Developing Outer Space Law," *International Organization* 51, no. 2 (1997).. Not only does organization theory incentivize actors to learn the "wrong lessons" from historical analogies that benefit the organization, but it also incentivizes actors to select ill-fitting cases from which to build these justifying analogies. Lindley.

"necessary" window as very possible. These optimistic miscalculations are a pathology of organizations and can explain expectations of favorable circumstances and over-optimistic assumptions of organizational ability.[176] In the case of missile defense, this perspective can be used when viewing potential adversaries with self-defeating lenses and believing that an entirely scripted test under perfect, planned, and extraordinarily simple circumstances, even if those circumstances are illogical and highly implausible, serve as a viable testing scenario. This same sort of miscalculation of optimism can apply to technological development and overconfidence in the organization's effectiveness (and, by extension, the network).

While buffering strategies attempt to insulate the organization from external influence, bridging behavior involves dealing more directly with the environment, often through establishing interorganizational linkages and interdependencies.[177] Bridging behavior can also include adjusting the organization to better align with the "external expectations" of the environment.[178] Bridging behavior can help organizations manage uncertainties created by dependencies by turning them into interdependencies.

Linkages with actors in the environment that possess critical resources can come in many forms. Organizations can tighten established relationships through alliances or joint ventures that involve coordinating activities or sharing expertise, knowledge, and resources.[179] An organization can also attempt to eliminate the uncertainty from an interdependent relationship by merging with

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[176] Lindley.

[177] Scott and Davis.

[178] Meznar and Nigh.

[179] Jeffrey Pfeffer and Phillip Nowak, "Joint Ventures and Interorganizational Interdependence," *Administrative science quarterly* (1976). Deanna Malatesta and Craig R Smith, "Lessons from Resource Dependence Theory for Contemporary Public and Nonprofit Management," *Public Administration Review* 74, no. 1 (2014); Scott and Davis.

another organization and absorbing critical resources.[180] When organization absorption is not a viable option, organizations can embed their dependent relationship within multi-organizational network arrangements to leverage other actors in the network, improve their relative power, and decrease their uncertainty.[181]

Additional uncertainty-reducing linkages, especially within the political environment, include appointing individuals with political connections to organization boards. These individuals assist in acquiring resources (including legitimacy), and those with better connections and access provide organizations with more value.[182] Boards of directors allow organizations to co-opt other environmental actors, including the government, giving them access and influence over potential resources.[183] Personnel exchanges are beneficial to the organization in both directions. However, recent research has shown that anti-trust laws have slowed mergers and direct board-based linkages. However, third-party boards, funding organizations, and board interlocks with those organizations have served as alternative variants of these linkages.[184] The appointment of current

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[180] Jeffrey Pfeffer, "Merger as a Response to Organizational Interdependence," *Administrative science quarterly* (1972); Jerayr Haleblian et al., "Taking Stock of What We Know About Mergers and Acquisitions: A Review and Research Agenda," *Journal of management* 35, no. 3 (2009); Donald Palmer et al., "The Friendly and Predatory Acquisition of Large Us Corporations in the 1960s: The Other Contested Terrain," *American sociological review* (1995). Tiziana Casciaro and Mikolaj Jan Piskorski, "Power Imbalance, Mutual Dependence, and Constraint Absorption: A Closer Look at Resource Dependence Theory," *Administrative science quarterly* 50, no. 2 (2005).

[181] Jonghoon Bae and Martin Gargiulo, "Partner Substitutability, Alliance Network Structure, and Firm Profitability in the Telecommunications Industry," *Academy of management journal* 47, no. 6 (December 2004).

[182] There are additional sources of value beyond connections, including an individual's skills, knowledge, and reputation. Eitan Goldman, Jörg Rocholl, and Jongil So, "Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?," *The Review of Financial Studies* 22, no. 6 (2009); Richard H Lester et al., "Former Government Officials as Outside Directors: The Role of Human and Social Capital," *Academy of management journal* 51, no. 5 (2008).

[183] Pfeffer and Salancik; Brian Boyd, "Corporate Linkages and Organizational Environment: A Test of the Resource Dependence Model," *Strategic management journal* 11, no. 6 (1990)., R.S. Burt, *Corporate Profits and Cooptation: Networks of Market Constraints and Directorate Ties in the American Economy* (Academic Press, 1983).

[184] Johannes M Drees and Pursey PMAR Heugens, "Synthesizing and Extending Resource Dependence Theory: A Meta-Analysis," *Journal of management* 39, no. 6 (2013)., Joseph Rosenstein, "The Board and Strategy: Venture Capital and High Technology," *Journal of Business Venturing* 3, no. 2 (1988).

or former government members provides value to the organization. Still, value is also added when organization representatives engage in "personal service," including serving as an elected official, an administration or political agency member, a consultant, or a special committee member.[185] It benefits organizations when individuals associated with them find their way into influential government roles. The establishment of these linkages is important beyond the mitigation of uncertainty. Once established, linkages also provide avenues for parallel linkages to be formed, and it becomes more likely that future exchanges of varying types will occur between linked actors.[186] For similar reasons, organizations with representatives in committees, boards, and forums are more likely to connect with other organizations with representatives in these structures. This increased likelihood results from the established trust (and decreased uncertainty) created by previous interdependent relationships.[187]

Resource Dependency-Based Policy Network

The previous sections of this chapter have used organization theory and the related logic of resource dependence to explain organizational motivations, actions, and strategies in the context of their environment. Those assumptions and their implications lead to the following

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[185] Research on the organization benefits of personal service conducted by Hillman et al. indicates that these appointments are the result of corporate strategy by the organizations, and organizations engaging in representative personal service saw a positive value increase. For more on personal service, see Amy J Hillman, Asghar Zardkoohi, and Leonard Bierman, "Corporate Political Strategies and Firm Performance: Indications of Firm-Specific Benefits from Personal Service in the Us Government," *Strategic management journal* 20, no. 1 (1999); Kathleen A Getz, *Selecting Corporate Political Tactics*, vol. 1991, *Academy of Management Proceedings* (Academy of Management Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510, 1991).

[186] Philip Leifeld and Volker Schneider, "Information Exchange in Policy Networks," *American Journal of Political Science* 56, no. 3 (2012).

[187] Leifeld and Schneider refer to such groups as political opportunity structures. In addition to the argument of the mitigated uncertainty, transaction costs arguments offer a complementary explanation of the benefits of maintaining established relationships. Philip Leifeld and Volker Schneider, *Institutional Communication Revisited: Preferences, Opportunity Structures and Scientific Expertise in Policy Networks* (Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2010). David Knoke, "Policy Networks," *The SAGE handbook of social network analysis* (2011).

understandings: 1) Organizations are open systems with a primary motivation of ensuring their survival; 2) Organizations require critical resources (such as funding) that exist in the environment; 3) Organizations are dependent on other actors in the environment; 4) Organizations strive to manage uncertainties to improve their chances at survival; 5) To manage the uncertainty created by resource dependencies, organizations engage in bridging behavior, including making dependencies mutual, and creating environmental linkages such as mergers, joint ventures, alliances, acquisitions, personal service by organizational representatives, and having representatives serve on boards of directors (including boards of third parties with co-membership which includes critical actors); 6) To protect autonomy (and manage related uncertainties) organizations engage in buffering actions that include increased complexity, vagueness concerning the satisfaction of external demands, and decreased transparency; and 7) Organizations behave strategically and can attempt to shape the environment by altering demands for the organization's resources and influencing policy decisions. This understanding establishes the logic and motivation of policy networks.

Resource Dependencies and Policy Networks

The understanding of policy network behavior utilized in this project rests on the conceptual foundation of resource dependence-based Organization Theory.[188] Within a kind of

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[188] Critics of policy networks argue that they are simply a metaphorical shorthand that does not matter beyond the specific relationships that form their base. For more on this critique, see Keith Dowding, "Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network Approach," *Political Studies* 43, no. 1 (1995); Keith Dowding, "There Must Be End to Confusion: Policy Networks, Intellectual Fatigue, and the Need for Political Science Methods Courses in British Universities," *Political Studies* 49, no. 1 (2001).). This dissertation takes a Marsh-Smith perspective of policy networks as an element that both constrains and facilitates the behaviors of involved actors. Marsh-Smith adopted a tri-dialectical perspective of networks in which the networks were involved in three continually self-reinforcing and reforming relationships: between the network and policy outcomes, the network and the context it existed in, and between the network and the actors that comprised it. For more, see David Marsh and Martin J Smith, "Understanding Policy Networks: Towards a Dialectical Approach," *Political Studies* 48, no. 1 (2000); David Marsh and Martin J Smith, "There Is More Than One Way to Do Political Science: On Different Ways to Study Policy Networks," *Political Studies* 49, no. 3 (2001); David Toke and David Marsh, "Policy Networks and the Gm Crops Issue: Assessing the Utility of a Dialectical Model of Policy Networks," *Public administration* 81, no. 2

twisted "Babylon" of varying interpretations of policy networks, there is continued disagreement on the meaning and naming of the concept.[189] Some scholars interchange the term "governance network" with "policy network."[190] Others have gone in the other direction and created typologies to insert various networks based on characteristics.[191] These typologies vary based on the size and stability of the network membership. Despite these varying approaches, analysts find organizational links are relationships based on resource dependencies.[192] Most also agree that these networks attempt to control the policy landscape (either by changing or maintaining it). These attempts are often successful, and research has shown that decision-makers in organizations that depend on government agencies have positive perceptions of their ability to influence the government.[193]

In framing these relationships, this dissertation relies on Compston's conceptualization of policy networks: "A policy network is … a set of political actors who engage in resource exchange over … (policy decisions) as a consequence of their resource interdependencies."[194] This definition

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(2003).. For arguments about the network mattering due to third-party power dependence leveraging, see Bae and Gargiulo.. For arguments regarding the perception of the network and a "vision of interdependence" shaping actor behavior, see Pinar Ozcan and Kathleen M Eisenhardt, "Origin of Alliance Portfolios: Entrepreneurs, Network Strategies, and Firm Performance," *Academy of management journal* 52, no. 2 (2009).

[189] Tanja A Börzel, "Organizing Babylon-on the Different Conceptions of Policy Networks," *Public administration* 76, no. 2 (1998).

[190] Ansell and Torfing, in *Foreign Policy as Public Policy?: Promises and Pitfalls*; Jenny M Lewis, "The Future of Network Governance Research: Strength in Diversity and Synthesis," *Public administration* 89, no. 4 (2011).

[191] Roderick Arthur WIlliam Rhodes and David Marsh, "New Directions in the Study of Policy Networks," *European journal of political research* 21, no. 1-2 (1992).

[192] Compston.

[193] Birnbaum.

[194] Compston. Hugh Compston, "Networks, Resources, Political Strategy and Climate Policy," *Environmental Politics* 18, no. 5 (2009). Ian Bailey and Hugh Compston, "Resource Exchange, Political Strategy and the 'New' Politics of Climate Change," in *Climate Change and the Crisis of Capitalism: A Chance to Reclaim, Self, Society and Nature*, ed. Mark Pelling, David Manuel-Navarrete, and Michael Redclift (London: Routledge, 2011).

builds on existing understandings of organizational motivations. It identifies the causal driver established in this dissertation: survival-motivated actors (seeking to mitigate uncertainty and protect autonomy) acting strategically to shape the environment (including policy) to acquire vital resources and satisfy direct dependencies (or indirect dependencies).[195] This interpretation of policy network behavior rests on a few assumptions: 1) There are policy choices to be made; 2) Actors (organizations and individuals) possess tradable resources; 3) Actors have preferences regarding policy; 4) Actors also have perceptions about policy problems and potential solutions; 5) Actors have strategies for maximizing their chances of realizing their policy preferences; and 6) Actors are incentivized to regulate their interactions.[196] These incentives are based on the previously discussed need to manage uncertainty. It is also necessary to reiterate the assumption that actors require specific critical resources from the environment (which can create perceptions of policy problems).

This theoretical foundation informs an understanding of individual and organizational behavior and interaction, an understanding of actor motivations, and why actors motivated by resource dependence needs would be driven by interests other than the state's strategic interests. This theoretical framing also allows us to understand how mutually supporting networks based on resource exchange and personnel linkages can insulate policy decisions from the mitigating impacts of "diffused elite interests" and "mass democracy" that Snyder suggested could protect from overexpansion. When those in the network (through resource interdependencies) can gain institutional control over the issue, limit outside interference, and use powerful ideas (such as

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[195] A key element of Compston's interpretation of policy networks is that it specifically includes individuals as "political actors" along with organizations.

[196] Compston, *Policy Networks and Policy Change: Putting Policy Network Theory to the Test*.

strategic myths) to shape perceptions of the issue, a policy monopoly has been established that can severely limit the impact of the democratic influences suggested by Snyder.[197]

Furthermore, understanding the concept of "legitimacy" in resource dependence and how it can be utilized to facilitate the acquisition of other resources helps carry some of the intellectual burden facing "rhetorical blowback" in explaining how actors could push forward with a policy once its status as a self-defeating strategy becomes clear. The concept of blowback allows for the possibility of actors in an organization believing myths previously established by the organization or for a "political context that forces elites to live up to their own rhetoric."[198] Placing the actors in a political context and an organization theory-based resource-dependence context further shows how actors could become "trapped" by the need to be perceived as legitimate by those possessing the required resources.

As previously discussed, policy network theory assumes that actors perceive problems in the world and believe, to some degree, that their preferred policy preferences can help solve these problems. In the context of missile defense, an inability to acquire necessary resources could be understood as a problem perceived by an organization. This problem could be caused by an external shock in the environment that disrupted an established dependency flow or resulted in a redistribution of resources.[199] An example of such an external shock would be the collapse of the Soviet Union, which eliminated a threat that justified a multibillion-dollar industry.

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[197] Frank R Baumgartner and Bryan D Jones, "Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems," *The Journal of Politics* 53, no. 4 (1991); James L True, Bryan D Jones, and Frank R Baumgartner, "Punctuated Equilibrium Theory," *Theories of the policy process* (1999).

[198] Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*. Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*; Lewis, "Bum Dope, Blowback, and the Bomb: The Effect of Bad Information on Policy-Maker Beliefs and Crisis Stability," in *Three Tweets to Midnight: Effects of the Global Information Ecosystem on the Risk of Nuclear Conflict*.

[199] For research discussing the impact of exogenous shocks and how that impacts networks, see Hyun Hee Park and R Karl Rethemeyer, "The Politics of Connections: Assessing the Determinants of Social Structure in Policy

Policy Network Actors and Resources

Actors in policy networks include organizations and individuals in both the public and private spheres that are assumed to be motivated primarily by survival and the need to acquire specific resources. These resources can be physical, such as money, or intangible, such as access to policymakers. It is not the possession of a resource that makes it valuable for an actor but rather the perception of possession and the perception that the resource can be transferred meaningfully. The literature on commonly exchanged resources includes studies of policymaking power,[200] regulation authority,[201] veto power, access to policymakers or other influential individuals,[202] technical or political information,[203] and political support.[204] Further studies of resources focus on

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Networks," *Journal of public administration research and theory* 24, no. 2 (2014). Other perspectives of policy networks, including the advocacy coalition framework perspective, also incorporate the impact that external shocks can have. See Hank C Jenkins-Smith and Paul A Sabatier, "Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework," *Journal of public policy* 14, no. 2 (1994); Paul A Sabatier and Christopher M Weible, "The Advocacy Coalition Framework," *Theories of the policy process* 2 (2007).

[200] Dominique Jacomet, "The Collective Aspect of Corporate Political Strategies: The Case of Us and European Business Participation in Textile International Trade Negotiations," *International Studies of Management & Organization* 35, no. 2 (2005).

[201] John Kay, *Foundations of Corporate Success: How Business Strategies Add Value* (Oxford Paperbacks, 1995).

[202] Jean J Boddewyn and Thomas L Brewer, "International-Business Political Behavior: New Theoretical Directions," *Academy of Management Review* 19, no. 1 (1994); David P Baron, "Integrated Strategy: Market and Nonmarket Components," *California management review* 37, no. 2 (1995).

[203] Birnbaum. Franz Urban Pappi and Christian HCA Henning, "Policy Networks: More Than a Metaphor?," *Journal of theoretical politics* 10, no. 4 (1998); Thomas Medvetz, "Murky Power:"Think Tanks" as Boundary Organizations," in *Rethinking Power in Organizations, Institutions, and Markets* (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2012); Boddewyn and Brewer.

[204] Pappi and Henning; Jacomet; Jeffrey Pfeffer, "Size, Composition, and Function of Hospital Boards of Directors: A Study of Organization-Environment Linkage," *Administrative science quarterly* (1973).

cooperation with policy implementation,[205] private investment,[206] and increased legitimacy.[207] Furthermore, these resources also have "negative" uses (using the resource, for example, to aid an adversary or restrict a resource).

In the following case studies, network actors include both public (politicians, military organizations, and agencies with dominion over policy areas) and private actors (corporations, defense contractors, private financial foundations, and advocacy think tanks). The three case studies of missile defense development and deployment show that state policy is not driven primarily by strategic considerations or systemic concerns but by the work of self-interested actors attempting to acquire resources by pushing the national missile defense policy. The case studies show how actors with direct and indirect dependencies deriving from missile defense behave in a manner readily explained by and consistent with organization theory and demonstrate resource-dependent behavior as they attempt to mitigate uncertainty by limiting external interference. The actors in the network also repeatedly perpetuate the strategic myths that have historically been used to justify cases of overexpansion. Using organization theory concepts and the logic of resource dependence, we can set some expectations on what we would see if actors were behaving in a manner consistent with and explainable by this organization theory-based domestic political understanding.

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[205] Jean J Boddewyn and Peter J Buckley, "Integrating Social and Political Strategies as Forms of Reciprocal Exchange into the Analysis of Corporate Governance Modes," *British Journal of Management* 28, no. 4 (2017).

[206] Boddewyn and Brewer.

[207] Joop Koppenjan and Erik-Hans Klijn, *Managing Uncertainties in Networks: A Network Approach to Problem Solving and Decision Making* (Psychology Press, 2004). Mark C Suchman, "Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches," *Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (1995); Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*; Boddewyn and Brewer; Baron.

IV: Generating A Threat - The Rumsfeld Commission and a National Commitment to Missile Defense

This chapter details the missile defense network's influence during the Clinton administration years. It demonstrates how defense contractors, with an even more significant relative influence following the mergers of the 1990s, funded advocacy organizations and politicians with parochial interests that contributed to a deliberate effort to shift the perception of their external environment. This chapter explores the roadblocks that prevented an assured deployment of a national missile defense program, along with the repeated attempts of network members to circumvent those roadblocks until the influential Rumsfeld Commission.

The Path to the Birth of National Missile Defense

Death of Star Wars (and a Diminished Role for the BMDO)

The stated goal of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete."[208] Despite spending tens of billions of dollars, the program never developed into a viable missile defense system. The Soviet Union collapsed, the Cold War ended, and the justification for the strategic defense (and its multi-billion-dollar price tag) dissolved. George H.W. Bush's implementation of Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) refocused the program, but it was still envisioned to provide continental coverage. As President Clinton's Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, said, SDI was "designed to meet a threat that ha[d] receded to the vanishing point."[209] The Reagan-Bush era Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was later changed to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)

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[208] Ronald Reagan, *Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security:" Star Wars" Sdi Speech* (White House, 1983).

[209] "Goodbye Star Wars," *New Scientist*, May 22, 1993.

in a move that "reduced [its] bureaucratic standing within the Defense Department," with the organization no longer reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense.[210] The organization was reoriented away from the SDIO's focus on providing a national defense against ICBM attacks and accidental launches from sophisticated states. Instead, it shifted focus toward theater defenses intended to protect against short-range and regional threats.[211] As part of the reorientation came a change in leadership, with Lt. General Malcolm O'Neill replacing SDIO Director Henry Cooper (who would become chairman of missile defense pressure group High Frontier). Funding levels also changed for the organization, with the five-year appropriation for the BMDO being reduced over 30 percent from the first Bush administration's final request.

In November of 1993, the Clinton administration, as part of its continued effort to develop theater missile defense systems without violating the ABM Treaty, contacted Russia to "clarify" a distinction between theater and national ABM defenses. The administration attempted to establish a clear demarcation line between ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) and ATBM (anti-tactical ballistic missile) systems.[212] The Clinton administration's decision to push forward with THAAD tests was partly due to the domestic pressure of the new Republican-led Congress and their Contract with America.

The organization and programs responsible for national missile defenses were redesignated and renamed with the shift to theater defenses. The primary adversary that justified strategic defense was dissolved. Government-sponsored intelligence analyses in 1993 and over

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[210] Andrew Futter, *Ballistic Missile Defence and Us National Security Policy: Normalisation and Acceptance after the Cold War* (Routledge, 2013).

[211] David Raikow, "Sdio Changes Its Letterhead to Bmdo," *Arms Control Today*, 1993.

[212] Dunbar Lockwood, "Senators Appear Skeptical of Abm Treaty Modifications," *Arms Control Today* 24, no. 3 (1994).

the next two years noted a lack of a viable threat that would justify a strategic defense against limited strikes. The idea of a strategic national missile defense covering the United States was essentially dead.

However, not just the newly named BMDO was undergoing a shift. The defense industry was in the midst of a "profound change [which was] going to affect every one of us," according to Robert Bradshaw, VP of Grumman Corp.[213] Lawrence Korb, an analyst with Brookings, described the shifting organizational environment that was taking place for these companies, and how it drastically impacted the distribution of resources, the resources available, and necessitated an altering of strategy, noting that "there's a declining pie with the same number of people who want a piece. Obviously, they've got to fight like hell."[214] Not only were the funding resources available for defense contractors dwindling, but the financial uncertainty made them less attractive places of employment, costing them personnel resources.[215]

One night in 1993, Les Aspin and William Perry invited executives of the biggest defense contractors in the nation to a dinner. According to Norman Augustine, the then head of Martin Marietta, "I remember I said, 'Les, this is awfully nice of you to invite us all to dinner, we're all pleased to have a free meal, but why are we here?' And he said, 'Well, in about 15 minutes, you're going to find out. You probably aren't going to like it.'"[216] The Clinton administration informed the executives that the defense budget, already on a five-year slide, would only

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[213] Steve Berg, "Prospect of Peace Has defense workers Fearful of Economic `Disaster'," *Star-Tribune Newspaper of the Twin Cities Mpls.-St. Paul*, 20 May, 1990, METRO.

[214] Ibid.

[215] Steve Berg, "Military Industries Urged to Serve Civilian Economy," *Star-Tribune Newspaper of the Twin Cities Mpls.-St. Paul*, May 21, 1990, METRO.

[216] Jonathan Chang and Meghna Chakrabarti, "The Last Supper: How a 1993 Pentagon Dinner Reshaped the Defense Industry," WBUR, last modified March 1, accessed. https://www.wbur.org.

decrease further and faster. Perry said, "We expect defense companies to go out of business. We will stand by and watch it happen."[217] The administration encouraged the defense industry to diversify its capabilities so that it was not so dependent on the public sector and to engage in mergers and acquisitions. As Augustine put it, while it would have been "much better to have ten strong competitors than two," their choice was "more precisely characterized as one between having ten weak competitors with dubious futures or two strong ones with hopeful futures."[218]

This set off a rapid series of mergers and acquisitions that resulted in the defense industry. In 1991, there were $300 million worth of mergers in the defense industry; by 1994, that number climbed to an annual rate of $10 billion.[219] The industry went from having 51 corporations considered "prime contractors" at the dawn of the decade to five.[220] However, while this might seem like a standard resource dependence response to a shifting environment, and it is, the defense industry is not a traditional industry due in large part to the government being the key customer and provider of resources. While all organizations will attempt to manipulate their environment, when possible, to acquire necessary resources, this strategy is uniquely impactful in the defense industry. The defense industry is uniquely capable of "circumventing the market mechanism" via political activities.[221]

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[217] John A. Tirpak, "The Distillation of the Defense Industry," *Air and Space Forces Magazine*, July 1, 1998.

[218] Ibid.

[219] Gerald Abbott and Johnson Stuart, "The Changing Defense Industrial Base," *Strategic Forum*, November 1, 1996.

[220] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, *State of Competition within the Defense Industrial Base* (2022), https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/15/2002939087/-1/-1/1/STATE-OF-COMPETITION-WITHIN-THE-DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE.PDF., Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry, *Final Report of the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry* (2002), https://history.nasa.gov/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf.

[221] Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky, " Restructuring the U.S. defense Industry," *International Security*, 22 December, 1999.

However, political pressure alone could not permanently prop up the entire industry; the forced mergers and declining budget were evidence of that. During a roundtable discussion amongst defense industry financial experts in 1993, Byron Callan, that year serving as an analyst of warfare and engineering stocks for Prudential Securities and VP Merrill Lynch and Global Coordinator of the aerospace/defense stocks sector, noted two issues. There was a reason to be optimistic because of the potential for "sophisticated weapons" and "electronic warfare programs," but also that "optimism has to be tempered" because, as he put it, Russia is "the engine of the technical arms race," was "broke."[222] The industry needed a new engine.

Creating a Political Issue

Contract with America and the First Attempt at the Rebirth of National Missile Defense

During the 1994 midterm elections, national missile defense again became a focal point in the national conversation. Congressional Republicans made national missile defense the lone foreign policy plank of the Contract with America (a set of policies promised to be enacted in the first 100 days of the new congressional term). Before its incorporation into the Contract with America, network members primed voters to view national missile defense as necessary. In large part, the priming was thanks to Frank Gaffney, who described the issue of national missile defense just a few months before as moving "in the direction of oblivion."[223] Despite a lack of post-Cold War issue salience, Gaffney repeatedly argued that missile defense would be a powerful political tool. He claimed that "there is no issue that is more likely to energize the American public than the anger that results when they discover that we are not defended against

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[222] "Roundtable Discussion on Aerospace/Defense Electronics," *The Wall Street Transcript*, 22 March, 1993.

[223] John J. Fialka, "Reagan-Era Aide Seeks to Persuade Gop to Push for Smaller Version of Star Wars Missile Defense," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 4, 1996.

missile attack."[224] While in the Reagan administration as Richard Perle's assistant, Gaffney was referred to as a "one-man SDI lobby." He established the Coalition to Defend America (CDA) in the middle of 1994 to help further the cause.[225]

This loose coalition was comprised of organizations and individuals, including former members of the Reagan administration (including former Secretaries of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Donald Rumsfeld), as well as retired military leaders, GOP members of Congress, and other political figures (such as missile defense advocate Steve Forbes). The coalition also included Gaffney's Center for Security Policy,[226] which publicly stated that its membership had "the purpose of educating the American people about the dangers inherent in their present vulnerability."[227] By early November 1994, the Coalition launched a national radio and television ad campaign devoted to reviving the popularity of national missile defense. This included a "powerful" radio ad arguing that the United States was vulnerable to missiles launched "at your hometown right now" from "a renegade country."[228] The CDA got 193 congressional candidates to sign a pledge agreeing to support the cause.[229]

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[224] Pat Towell, "Gop Tries to Heat up Debate on Anti-Missile Programs," *CQ Weekly*, April 1, 1995.

[225] Frances Fitzgerald, *Way out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War* (Simon and Schuster, 2001).

[226] The Coalition to Defend America and the Center for Security Policy received funding from the defense industry, representing a portion of their annual budgets.

[227] "Summit Post-Mortem: Clinton Does Give Away Us Missile Defense Options," Center for Security Policy, last modified October 3, accessed. https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/1994/10/03/summit-post-mortem-clinton-does-give-away-u-s-missile-defense-options-2/.

[228] "Advocates Take to the Airwaves to Promote Missile Defense Agenda," *Inside the Army* 6, no. 39 (September 26 1994), accessed 2021/04/27/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43976675.

[229] Peter H. Stone, "Aiming High," *National Journal* 27, no. 282 (February 4 1995).

Gaffney used polls and focus groups to build support within the GOP and convince elected officials that the best way for them to acquire political support was to support national missile defense.[230] Consultant Frank Luntz, who was credited by Bob Livingston (R-LA) for refining the pitch of the Contract with America into "something that was salable," was hired by the Coalition to do their public opinion polling on missile defense.[231] Gaffney suggested that there was "latent political support" for missile defense in his pitch to Newt Gingrich that missile defense be included in the Contract.[232]

In January of 1995, to capitalize on the political momentum of GOP control of both houses in the midterm election, missile defense advocates in Congress pushed forward with a bill outlining the defense tenets established in the Contract. This bill, the National Security Revitalization Act, demanded deploying a national missile defense system at "the earliest possible moment." Work to establish political support for the National Security Revitalization Act began with a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Only individuals with direct connections to organizations that benefited from the development of missile defense provided testimony, including Keith Payne (then of the National Institute for Public Policy), Kathleen Bailey (then of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), and Theodore Gold (then of Hicks and Associates).[233] Payne and Bailey both served on the CSP Board of Advisors.

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[230] Fialka.

[231] Peter H. Stone, "Architect of Gop Plan Builds on Reputation," *The Orlando Sentinel*, February 12, 1995, https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-1995-02-12-9502130261-story.html.

[232] Fialka.

[233] Payne, who made his name in the 1980s arguing that winning a nuclear war was possible, founded the NIPP, served as a Center for Security Policy's Advisory Board member, and worked in the Bush administration as a deputy assistant Secretary of Defense. Bailey, then with LLNL, a laboratory co-founded by Edward Teller with a self-described "long history working with the DoD on advance missile defenses," would go on to become a member of CSP's Advisory Board, become a senior associate at NIPP, and served on the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Board under Condoleezza Rice. Gold, then of Hicks & Associates (a subsidiary of Science Applications

In his introduction to the hearing, Armed Services Committee Chairman and Senator Strom Thurmond stated that they were a "distinguished panel of experts" brought in to address "why the United States should invest significant resources to develop and deploy defenses against ballistic missile attack."

However, despite the attempts to capitalize on the midterms immediately with a quick victory, the network could not hold together the Republican majority to support the National Security Revitalization Act.[234] On February 15th, due to concerns about cost and with intelligence officials arguing that the threat of long-range missiles was relatively low, a Democrat-led amendment to the bill passed 218-212. GOP leadership watched as two dozen Republicans defected and agreed to the amendment added by John Spratt (D-SC) that stripped the bill of the passage, assuring that national missile defense would be fielded at "the earliest practical date." The new amendment instead prioritized military "readiness" and theater defenses. In response to these defections, Gaffney had the CSP issue a media release referring to defectors as the "dirty two dozen" and demonstrated his ability to use media as punishment.[235] At least temporarily, the first attempt at policy change (using the Contract to mandate the deployment of a strategic

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International Cooperation), served as a four-year chair for the DoD's Ballistic Missile Defense Advisory Committee and would go on to become the Director of the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program at the IDA, established by the DoD.

[234] Eric Schmitt, "Missile Defense Divides G.O.P. On Part of Bill before House," *The New York Times*, February 16, 1995, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/16/world/missile-defense-divides-gop-on-part-of-bill-before-house.html.

[235] "Breach of Contract: America Can Accept No Substitute for House Republicans' Pledge to Defend the United States," Center for Security Policy, last modified February 17, accessed 2020. https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/breach-of-contract-america-can-accept-no-substitute-for-house-republicans-pledge-to-defend-the-united-states-2/.

missile defense) was halted.[236] The costs of strategic missile defense and the lack of a viable

threat were too much to overcome.

"You Didn't Do Your Job" – The Pivot from Facts to Emotions and the Test Run of a New Team B

This reprieve would prove to be only a temporary setback in the push toward national

missile defense. Part of the problem with solidifying Republican support was the cost-benefit of

missile defense. Those in the Party who were wavering were concerned about cost, technical

feasibility, need, or some combination thereof. Missile defense advocates understood the need to

sidestep cost-benefit analysis. Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) demonstrated this

understanding in his speech to defense industry representatives roughly two weeks after the

republican defections, where he suggested that if missile defense advocates "keep relying on the

facts and the logic, then we're going to lose this battle."[237]

During his speech, Weldon noted that defense contractors needed to leverage the political

power of their thousands of employees. The initial failure to do this meant that the contractors

"didn't do [their] job."[238] He argued that once the defense industry puts political pressure on

Congress, MOCs would "walk on their knees" to please the industry. Weldon explained that to

apply this pressure, "there's a whole host of coalitions to bring in," including labor unions, and

that "those coalitions can get members [of Congress] to listen so they will stop making votes in a

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[236] Eric Schmitt, "House Votes $628 Million More for Pentagon's Missile Defense System," *New York Times*, June 15, 1995, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/15/us/house-votes-628-million-more-for-pentagon-s-missile-defense-system.html.

[237] "Rep. Weldon: 'You Didn't Do Your Job': Lawmaker Urgers Industry to Organize Grass-Roots Missile Defense Push," *Inside the Army*, March 13, 1995. Jennifer Weeks, "Switch Off Star Wars Sequel," *The Christian Science monitor* (August 24 1995), https://www.csmonitor.com/1995/0824/24191.html.

[238] "Rep. Weldon: 'You Didn't Do Your Job': Lawmaker Urgers Industry to Organize Grass-Roots Missile Defense Push."

vacuum."[239] According to accounts of the meeting, Weldon informed the industry representatives they needed to apply pressure to laborers and subcontractors at plants to get in touch with their congressional representatives to suggest that there would be a "price to pay" if missile defense was cut.[240] Weldon explained to the defense industry representatives at the American Defense Preparedness Association that they could shift the public perception of the need for missile defense, saying, "We can *create the mood* in the country to see missile defense in its rightful position" [emphasis added].[241] Weldon explained, "We're at an opportune time … but if we can't find the process, we won't win the war."[242]

Weldon's speech further highlighted the relationship between the defense industry and Congress. He explained that "we're going to give you [in the defense industry] the process" to "create" the aforementioned national mood.[243] He explained that to create this mood, "we need your help and cooperation" and that congress members like himself would provide the "mechanics."[244] He announced that he was creating a Missile Defense Caucus in Congress and assured those in attendance that this caucus would be able to provide guidance and assistance. Weldon, Chair of the House Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, and Duncan

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[239] John Robinson, "New Group to Wage Grass Roots Campaign for Missile Defense," *Defense Daily* 186, no. 44 (1995).

[240] Ibid.

[241] David C. Morrison, "No End to War over 'Star Wars'," *National Journal*, 1995 Apr 01, 1995.

[242] Robinson.

[243] "Rep. Weldon: 'You Didn't Do Your Job': Lawmaker Urgers Industry to Organize Grass-Roots Missile Defense Push."

[244] Robinson.

Hunter (R-CA), Chair of the Subcommittee on Military Procurement,[245] formed this promised

caucus along with Democrats Pete Geren (D-TX) and John Spratt (D-SC) to "build [broad]

support" in Congress.[246] Weldon would proudly note, the following winter, that in the year

following its formation, the "efforts of the caucus have led to four" congressional hearings on

missile defense (no such hearings had been held in the previous two years).[247]

In early 1995, Heritage Foundation analysts who previously believed the ABM Treaty to

be an "insurmountable obstacle to deployment" determined that their best strategy for success,

rather than seeking incremental changes, was to push to get out of it altogether.[248] To help

solidify political willpower behind the issue, Henry Cooper (the former Director of SDIO and

founder of High Frontier) and Dr. Lowell Wood (of LLNL and the key figure behind SDIO's

"Brilliant Pebbles") decided to take advantage of the new Congress to build support. Years

before, while working on a subproject of SDI, an X-ray laser known as Project Excalibur, Wood

came under fire from a whistleblower at LLNL who alleged Wood and longtime mentor, Edward

Teller, provided letters and briefings to Washington that overstated the stage and ability of the X-

ray laser, in order to secure funding. Roy Woodruff, the whistleblower, argued that they were

providing "technically inaccurate" information over multiple years and giving unauthorized

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[245] For the 1995/96 cycle, Hunter was among the top ten recipients of PAC funding from defense contractors among congressional candidates. William D Hartung, "Reports - Peddling Arms, Peddling Influence: Exposing the Arms Export Lobby," *World Policy Journal* (October 1996 1996), https://worldpolicy.org/2009/11/13/report-exposing-the-arms-export-lobby-world-policy-institute-research-project/.

[246] Ranking minority member of the House National Security Committee, Ronald Dellums (D-CA), was initially displeased with Spratt and Geren joining the caucus but reportedly spoke with them shortly after finding out about the caucus and said that things were "cool." Elaine M Grossman, "Jcs Rejects White House Initiative to Reduce to 2,500 Nuclear Weapons," *Inside the Pentagon*, March 16, 1995.

[247] Curt Weldon, "Why We Must Act at Once," *Orbis* 40, no. 1 (1996).

[248] Baker Spring, "The Heritage Foundation: Influencing the Debate on Missile Defense," *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* 7, no. 3 (November 2002), https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/fpa/fpa_nov02_spring.pdf.

secret briefings. Woodruff claimed that because of Wood and Teller, the lab had moved away from being "an apolitical, objective research facility."[249] Cooper, while working on a review of SDI for then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in 1990, recommended shifting focus away from the Soviet Union and toward a "defense against limited attacks from any of a growing number of states." Cooper later admitted that they "had little reason to focus on any particular nation as a threat and hence took on a "global" focus."[250]

Early in the 104th congressional term, Cooper and Wood traveled to a conference in Philadelphia to meet with Representative Jack Kemp (R-NY), co-founder of Empower America. According to Cooper, they met with Kemp to **"**urge that a 'Team B' (or a competitive intelligence analysis) be established at the Heritage Foundation to help lay plans for [a missile defense] revival."**[251]** Following the meeting, Kemp met the president and founding trustee of the Heritage Foundation, Edwin Feulner Jr., persuading him to establish a Team-B style unit "distinct from the continuing Clinton administration" at the foundation.**[252]** Later that year, Feulner was appointed Vice-Chairman of the National Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform, also known as the Kemp Commission.

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[249] Deborah Blum, "Weird Science: Livermore's X-Ray Laser Flap," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 44, no. 6 (1988); Edward Reiss and Reiss Edward, *The Strategic Defense Initiative*, vol. 23 (Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[250] Henry F. Cooper, "November 22, 2016 — Global Defense: First from the Sea; Then from Space!," last modified November 21, accessed August, 2019. http://highfrontier.org/november-22-2016-global-defense-first-from-the-sea-then-from-space/.

[251] The term Team B references the 1976 Team B experiment, which was an instance of competitive intelligence analysis (or alternative analysis) that has proven less accurate than the initial analysis of the intelligence community and is widely viewed as a source of threat inflation that substantially aided in the restarting of the Cold War. Henry F. Cooper, "June 18, 2019—First from the Sea, Then from Space!," High Frontier, last modified June 17, 2019, accessed July 30, 2019, 2019. http://highfrontier.org/june-18-2019-first-from-the-sea-then-from-space/. Anne Hessing Cahn, *Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the Cia* (Penn State Press, 2007).

[252] Cooper, "November 22, 2016 — Global Defense: First from the Sea; Then from Space!"

Cooper led this Heritage Foundation Team-B study group. It included James Abrahamson (the former director of SDI to whom Wood gave private unauthorized briefings during his work on Project Excalibur). Additional members included the founder of CSP, Frank Gaffney, the founder of High Frontier, Gen. Daniel Graham, and the co-founder of Empower America and future Lockheed and Boeing lobbyist, former Representative Vin Weber (R-MN). It also included an assortment of individuals who worked on SDI or in SDIO and its successors, including SDI System Architect and former Deputy Director of BMDO Dr. Edward Gerry, SDI Director of Technology (and eventual Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Dr. Michael Griffin, and SDI Director of Directed Energy Dr. Jack Hammond. Team B also included Dr. William Graham, a member of the Rumsfeld Commission who served as Science Advisor to the President during the Reagan administration and VP of Defense Group Inc. The Heritage Team-B also included several members of the NASC for Gaffney's CSP, including Gen. Charles Horner, commander-in-chief of US Space Command; Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Sven Kraemer, Policy Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; William Schneider of the Rumsfeld Commission, PNAC, and Under-Secretary of State during the Reagan administration; as well as Dr. William Van Cleave and General Bernard A. Schriever. The Team also included Senator Malcolm Wallop, who in 1992 won CSP's Keeper of the Flame Award.

In June 1995, just months after the GOP's February setback in Congress, the Team B report was issued and published in the Wall Street Journal. The report argued that the United States had the capability to develop "affordable, effective" missile defenses and was only lacking "proper understanding" and "political will."[253] Team B claimed that the "need for vigorous

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[253] Cirincione.

missile defense [was] more acute than ever" and that "Congress… should seek ways to remove the obstacles to effective missile defenses posed by the ABM Treaty, including possible withdrawal," from the Treaty. The report also urged expedited work on Brilliant Eyes, a space-based sensor program tied closely to missile defense. Furthermore, Team B also aggressively pushed the concept of sea-based defenses, which could be incorporated into an expansive missile defense system with forward deployments, allowing for both boost phase defenses to coastal nations and a larger number of midcourse defenses.[254] Representative Robert Dornan entered the Heritage Team B report into the congressional record immediately after its publication.[255]

That same month, the House of Representatives voted to approve an increase in funding of $628 million to the Clinton administration's Defense Department's budget bill, with the majority devoted to developing a national missile defense.[256] This was pushed by the GOP-dominated House National Security Committee (on which Representative Dornan served), along with an additional $135 million to fund Brilliant Eyes.[257] Much like the increases in funding for missile defense in the House's version of the Defense Authorization bill, the Senate's version also increased funding beyond Clinton's proposed budget, with a $490 million increase on national missile defense and a similar increase to Brilliant Eyes funding.

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[254] Spring.

[255] Dornan has been given the nickname "B-1 Bob" due to his staunch support of all military technologies, including missile defense, see Daniel Sneider and Scott Baldauf, "Bob Dornan," *The Christian Science monitor* (February 2 1996), https://www.csmonitor.com/1996/0202/02101.html. Robert Dornan, "Ballistic Missile Defense through Navy Upper Tier," *Congressional Record*, June 8, 1995.

[256] Schmitt, "House Votes $628 Million More for Pentagon's Missile Defense System."

[257] Ronald E Powaski, *Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981-1999* (Oxford University Press, 2000); John Isaacs, "Cold Warriors Target Arms Control," *Arms Control Today* 25, no. 7 (1995), accessed 2020/12/07/, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.uoregon.edu/stable/23625703.

During this time, the Senate GOP floated language for the Defense Authorization Act that included a stipulation to deploy a multisite missile defense system by 2003. The White House let it be known to the Senate that this would put the United States in violation of the ABM Treaty and that if such language were passed, the president would veto the bill. Some missile defense advocates, such as Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), believed that the "need" to renegotiate the ABM Treaty had already been established, so "bumping up against" the treaty was not a problem.[258] Other advocates, however, were not interested in renegotiating the treaty at all but favored leaving or disregarding the agreement. Experts at the time, such as Jack Mendelsohn of the Arms Control Association, argued against the logic of undercutting the ABM Treaty just to push defenses designed to protect us against nuclear attacks, saying that it did not "make sense to sacrifice reductions to 3,500 strategic warheads … in the one nation you know can really hurt you because you want to protect against a potential rinky dinky nation that might get a half-dozen short-range missiles." Mendelsohn argued that undercutting arms control with Russia in order to defend against potential future attacks from rogue states was "the wrong end of the stick."[259] The debate at the time was not just between the GOP and Democrats (who were pushing to ensure that the missile defense aspect of the Defense Authorization bill, known as the Missile Defense Act of 1995, would not violate the ABM Treaty by engaging in a filibuster), but also between the defense hawks of the GOP and the fiscal hawks.[260]

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[258] Bradley Graham, "Congress to Push for a National Missile Defense," *The Washington Post*, September 5, 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/09/05/congress-to-push-for-a-national-missile-defense/54258fd7-2a75-42bf-aaf1-649a002a9b34/?utm_term=.620b2e19b025.

[259] David C. Morrison, "Spar Wars," *National Journal*, 1995 Mar 04, 1995.

[260] John Isaacs, "Senate Says Yes, Maybe," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 51, no. 6 (1995).

Driving Toward Political Conflict: The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1996 and the Dole Campaign

The pushback by the White House, combined with the threatened filibuster from Senate Democrats, proved to be an effective enough firewall against missile defense advocates and led to a compromise on language.[261] Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS), along with Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD), assigned a bipartisan group that included Senators Carl Levin (D-MI), Sam Nunn (D-GA), John Warner (R-VA), and William Cohen (R-ME) to draft new language for the missile defense bill. This group resolved two key issues: (1) they determined that they would not commit to a multi-site system, and (2) they would not commit to a specific deployment deadline. This new Senate resolution committed the United States to developing but not deploying a multi-site national missile defense system until the government had an opportunity to make assessments based on several factors: the existence of a threat, the utility of the system, and its impact on relations with Russia and international agreements.[262] While replacing a commitment to deploy with a commitment to develop for future deployment was, for some, like Sen. Dorgan (D-ND), a "distinction without a difference," Levin defended the compromise by arguing it had "plenty of ifs, ands, and buts before any decision to deploy is made."[263]

On September 6, 1995, after the Senate returned from recess, this bipartisan group's new missile defense language was put to a vote and overwhelmingly approved, 85 to 13. Majority

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[261] Jack Mendelsohn, "Abm Treaty Remains Threatened by Continuing Us Push for Tmd," *Arms Control Today* 25, no. 7 (1995).

[262] Thomas Duffy, "Sen. Levin Sees Presidential Bid Behind Sen. Dole's Missile Defense Flip-Flop," *Inside Missile Defense* 1, no. 5 (November 22 1995), https://www.jstor.org/stable/43968054.

[263] Isaacs, "Senate Says Yes, Maybe."

Leader Dole was reported to have said some "very warm and very fuzzy" things regarding the new language and "praised" it when he brought it back to the Senate from the bi-partisan group.[264] Senator Warner also thanked Dole by name for his assistance with the compromise.[265] While admitting he would have preferred the Missile Defense Act went further in its directives, Dole voted in favor of the new amendment. At the time, it seemed as if the effort to commit the United States to deploying a multi-site national missile defense system had once again been delayed, with increased funding but no deployment date commitment.[266]

However, despite the Senate compromise, individuals in the network still worked to acquire critical resources for the pursuit of missile defense. On September 22nd, Representative Weldon applied his influence as a lawmaker to justify missile defense, sending a letter to Secretary of Defense Perry demanding an update on an in-progress intelligence estimate concerning the ballistic missile threat to the United States. Weldon noted in the letter that the BMDO informed him they were told the estimate would not be complete until "late November at the earliest." Weldon argued that this "foot-dragging" by the intelligence community was "unacceptable" and that the delay "create[d] the appearance that the administration [was] playing political games with information" and raised "questions about the ability of our intelligence organizations to meet their most basic missions." Weldon also requested "assurance" that the

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[264] Duffy.

[265] United States Senate, *Congressional Record*, First ed., vol. 141 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1995).

[266] The compromise amendment was not without its critics, including Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND), who argued that the compromise was "instead of saying 'we are going to deploy a multiple-site national missile system,' they say, 'we are going to develop for deployment a national multiple-site missile system," and he felt this was a "distinction without a difference." See: Isaacs, "Senate Says Yes, Maybe."

estimate would not be "manipulated in any way for political purposes."[267] There is no indication

that before this letter Weldon received any information that pointed to intelligence manipulation,

nor anything to suggest that any such manipulation was taking place.

On October 2, 1995, just weeks after the Senate and Dole himself voted to approve this

new language, the Majority Leader sent a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services

Committee, Strom Thurmond (R-SC), changing his position. Dole now insisted that when they

went to conference with the House, the conferees needed to produce language requiring a 2003

deployment deadline for national missile defense. In the letter, Dole emphasized the political

opportunity that he believed the Missile Defense Act presented for the Republican Party and, by

extension, for himself. Dole wrote to Thurmond that the conference between the Senate and

House would "provide a unique opportunity to demonstrate the unwavering commitment of

Republicans to protect America."[268] Senator Levin, who Dole selected to draft the compromise

language that Dole now rejected, claimed to have never seen anything like that happen before in

the Senate. He believed Dole's change of heart was most likely a change of political strategy: "I

think obviously it is the presidential race and the primaries."[269] Dole would go on to state,

regarding the compromise amendment, that "there can be no doubt that this bill and this

amendment take concrete steps toward establishing effective theater and national missile

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[267] United States. Congress. House. Committee on National Security, *Ballistic Missile Defense: Hearings Held February 28 and March 14, 1996* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996).

[268] John Isaacs, "Play It Again, Bob," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 52, no. 3 (1996).

[269] Duffy.

defense."[270] Levin argued that Dole's letter to Thurmond "made it a lot more complicated to resolve the issue."[271]

The build-up to Senate Majority Leader Dole's decision to change his mind and insist on deployment began in late March of that year. In what has become known as his Five Global Realities speech, Dole outlined "multifaceted threats" facing the United States and his prescriptions for facing these threats. He warned against a "resurgent Russia," a China with "international ambitions," and the threat of nuclear rogue regimes. He also outlined what actions America needed to take concerning these threats, explicitly mentioning the pursuit of missile defense systems and the utility of preventative attacks. Bob Dole launched his presidential campaign less than two weeks after giving this speech.[272] In June of 1995, Dole penned an op-ed for the *New York Times* in which he championed Reagan-era foreign policies–specifically naming ballistic-missile defense–that he argued "led to victory in the Cold War."[273] Despite Majority Leader Dole's initial vote of support for the compromise language in the Senate bill, his letter to Thurmond insisting on "a minimum" deployment of a multi-site ground-based national missile defense system by 2003 caused Republicans to "rally around" it.[274] As a result of the letter, the GOP elected not to select missile defense language that was approved overwhelmingly

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[270] Isaacs, "Senate Says Yes, Maybe."

[271] Richard Lardner, "Need for Tmd Coordinator Advocated: New Army 'Primer' Advances Service's Position on Missile Defense Issues," *Inside Missile Defense* 1, no. 5 (November 22 1995), accessed 2023/12/05/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43968055.

[272] Richard L. Berke, "Now Officially, Dole Is Making a Run for '96," *The New York Times*, April 11, 1995, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/11/us/now-officially-dole-is-making-a-run-for-96.html.

[273] Bob Dole, "Who's an Isolationist?," *New York Times*, June 6, 1995, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/06/opinion/who-s-an-isolationist.html.

[274] Jack Mendelsohn, "Dole Pushes for Nationwide Bmd 'Deployment' by 2003," *Arms Control Today* 25, no. 9 (1995), accessed 2023/12/06/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23625862.

by the House and Senate and insisted instead on a 2003 deployment date. The influence of the presidential race on Dole's decision-making was made clear in his letter to Thurmond: he closed by stating that if the President vetoed the defense authorization bill because of the missile defense language, it would fall upon the president "to explain to the American people why he chooses to keep our country vulnerable to ballistic missiles and rejects protecting Americans from this escalating threat."[275]

The Quelling of Powell: The Network Pushes Out a Top Contender

While Dole was undoubtedly one of the top contenders for the Republican nomination, there were numerous challengers in the fall of 1995, including retired General Colin Powell. In the last week of September 1995, a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll showed that Powell held an advantage over Clinton in a head-to-head election and that Clinton held an advantage over Dole, with both prospective nominees in a dead heat for the nomination.[276] Earlier in the year, it was reported by *Defense Daily* that in response to their questioning, Powell indicated that he aligned with the Clinton administration regarding national missile defense. He believed that a wide variety of factors (political, security, and budgetary) combined to make such a system irrelevant to the world at that time and that the threat facing the United States did not warrant a national

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[275] Jack Mendelsohn, "Dole Pushes for Nationwide Bmd 'Deployment' by 2003," *Arms Control Today* 25, no. 9 (November 1995), http://libproxy.uoregon.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/dole-pushes-nationwide-bmd-deployment-2003/docview/211216335/se-2?accountid=14698 http://alliance-primo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/openurl/UO/uo_services_page??url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&genre=article&sid=ProQ:ProQ%3Apoliticalscience&atitle=Dole+pushes+for+nationwide+BMD+%27deployment%27+by+2003&title=Arms+Control+Today&issn=0196125X&date=1995-11-01&volume=25&issue=9&spage=19&au=Mendelsohn%2C+Jack&isbn=&jtitle=Arms+Control+Today&btitle=&rft_id=info:eric/02719754&rft_id=info:doi/.

[276] "Election Today? It's Powell-Poll," *Chicago Tribune*, September 27, 1995, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1995-09-27-9509280216-story.html.

defense.[277] This report was highlighted by the Center for Security Policy, which argued that Powell erred in pushing back against the immediate deployment of a national missile defense.[278] On October 2, 1995, the CSP published a list of questions for General Powell ostensibly designed to position him as aligned with Clinton on missile defense and separate from the party's position.[279] These questions were published the same day Dole sent his letter to Senator Thurmond, reversing course on compromise language and insisting on a 2003 deployment deadline for a national system.

One month after CSP's list of questions was published and Dole's letter to Thurmond was sent, a group of conservative leaders staged a press conference that urged Powell not to run. These leaders included Paul M. Weyrich, the co-founder of the Heritage Foundation, who called Powell a "trojan horse," and Frank Gaffney of CSP, who specifically referenced Powell's opposition to missile defense as a reason to push back against his potential candidacy.[280] Less than one week later, General Powell announced that he would not be running for the presidency in 1996, implying he did not have a calling for politics at that level as a reference to the protest against him from the previous week.[281]

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[277] "Powell Urges Theater Defenses; Says '96 Defense Request Not Enough," *Defense Daily* 182, no. 25 (February 8 1995).

[278] "Christopher-Perry Join the Debate on Missile Defense - Will the House Defend Clinton's Program - or Defend America? ," last modified February 14, accessed. https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/1995/02/14/christopher-perry-join-the-debate-on-missile-defense-will-the-house-defend-clintons-program-or-defend-america-2/.

[279] "The 'Right Stuff'? 20 Questions for Colin Powell, Other Candidates on Key Security Policy Issues," last modified October 2, accessed 2019. https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/1995/10/02/the-right-stuff-20-questions-for-colin-powell-other-candidates-on-key-security-policy-issues-2/.

[280] John M. Broder, "Powell Warned Not to Run by 10 Conservative Groups: Politics: Gop Leaders Vow to Oppose Ex-General Should He Enter Presidental Race. They Say His Moderate Social Views Are Antithetical to Republican Voters.," *Los Angeles Times*, November 3, 1995, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-11-03-mn-64407-story.html.

[281] Francis X. Clines, "The Powell Decision: The Announcement; Powell Rules out '96 Race; Cites Concerns for Family and His Lack of 'a Calling'," *New York Times*, November 9, 1995,

Laying the Groundwork for Intelligence Politicization – The Strategic Undermining of the Intelligence Community and Another Push for Deployment

Pushback by Intelligence – NIE 95-19

While the Levin-lead compromise amendment seemed to put National Missile Defense on the back burner, Dole's October letter to Strom Thurmond shifted party support from development to deployment. The Heritage Foundation followed its June Team B report with an article stating that missile defense was necessary to prevent nuclear blackmail and defend America's interests and allies.[282] After learning of Dole's push to undercut the compromise amendment, Levin and Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR) wrote to the Director of Central Intelligence, John Deutch, to confirm the legitimacy of critical claims in the authorization bill.[283] In the letter to DCI Deutch, the senators made five requests: (1) confirmation that "the missile proliferation trend" was toward long-range, sophisticated missiles, (2) confirmation that North Korea could deploy an ICBM that could reach Alaska or beyond in five years, (3) confirmation that there was a "danger that determined countries" would get ICBMs in the "near future" and "with little warning" via means other than indigenous development, (4) the likelihood that countries would acquire ICBMs with little warning via any means, and finally (5) any other information that DCI Deutch found relevant.[284] While this was taking place, House and Senate conferees composed new draft language for the Defense Authorization bill. This new language

https://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/09/us/powell-decision-announcement-powell-rules-96-race-cites-concerns-for-family-his.html.

[282] Richard Fisher, "Building a More Secure Asia through Missile Defense," *Asian Studies Center Backgrounder*, no. 138 (October 24 1995), https://www.heritage.org/missile-defense/report/building-more-secure-asia-through-missile-defense.

[283] Senate, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 - Conference Report*, by Congressional Record, 104 Cong., 1 sess., Vol. 141, pt. 204 (Washington, DC, 1995).

[284] Ibid.

departed significantly from the bipartisan Senate compromise and pushed for a firm 2003 deployment date.

Responding to Levin and Bumpers at Deutch's request, Joanne Isham, the CIA Director of Congressional Affairs, wrote that "the Bill language overstates what [the intelligence community] currently believe[s] to be the future threat."[285] Isham's letter, which was made public a week later, addressed concerns regarding states developing or acquiring capabilities to strike the United States. Concerning third-party aid, Isham argued that the intelligence community "believes it is extremely unlikely any nation with ICBMs will be willing to sell them." Isham also said the intelligence community would be aware "many years in advance" of a state developing capabilities to strike the United States with an ICBM.[286]

Isham's letter summarized the recently completed National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 95-19) on the "Emerging Missile Threat to North America During the Next 15 Years." The key takeaway from the NIE, and the first sentence in the executive summary, was that "No country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states and Canada."[287] According to John E. McLaughlin, Vice Chairman for Estimates of the National Intelligence Council, there were six key takeaways from NIE 95-19:[288] 1) North Korea had the most advanced ballistic missile program among states that were considered potentially hostile to the

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[285] Central Intelligence Agency, *Letter to the Honorable Carl Levin*, by Joanne O. Isham (cia.gov, 1995). Isham also sent similar letters to senators Strom Thurmond (R-SC) and Sam Nunn (D-GA).

[286] Ibid.

[287] *Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years*, by DCI (1995).

[288] *Intelligence Analysis of the Long Range Missile Threat to the United States*, Second ed., *Select Committee on Intelligence* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996).

United States. They were developing the Taepo Dong II, and the NIC acknowledged it had the potential to eventually reach western portions of Hawaii and Alaska. 2) "No country other than the declared nuclear powers" will develop or obtain ballistic missiles that could reach the "contiguous 48 States or Canada by 2010." The DPRK was the only "potentially hostile" country to potentially reach any of the 50 states by 2010.[289] 3) The IC was confident that they would be able to "detect and identify" flight tests of any state's development ICBMs at least five years before they were deployed and would also "probably detect other additional indicators years before flight testing." 4) The IC expected no state with ICBMs at that time to sell them, at least partially out of fear of them being used against the state in question. 5) Within the next 15 years, states might obtain "short-range missiles" or "cruise missiles." These missiles could be used for "land attack" or "launch[ed] from ships [which] would be easier and less detectable than an ICBM program." However, this was viewed as an "unlikely course." 6) The ICs estimate is a projection of the next 15 years, but analysis, monitoring, and intelligence collection would continue during that time.

The Clinton Veto of the Defense Authorization Act

On December 15, 1995, Defense Secretary William Perry sent a letter to Speaker Gingrich explaining that the language of the FY-1996 Defense Authorization bill overstated the threat posed to the United States. On the same date, Perry also released a Statement of Administration Policy noting that the bill would "require deployment … of a costly missile defense system to defend the [United States] from a long-range missile threat which the

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[289] The President's Summary of the NIE notes that they have "no evidence Iran wants to develop an ICBM." Still, even if Iran were motivated to develop one, it would not be able to do so before 2010. Iraq is said to be "severely constrained" by sanctions and inspections and would require "at least 15 years" to get a working ICBM "even with substantial foreign assistance." It also notes that countries not hostile to the US (India, Israel, and Japan) could develop ICBM capability in as little as five years but are unlikely to do so within the next 15.

Intelligence Community does not believe will ever materialize in the coming decade."[290] While Dole made it clear he wanted to use missile defense as a political wedge issue that would make the Clinton administration appear weak, the administration emphasized both the cost of the system and the lack of threat established by the recently completed NIE.

Following the release of the unclassified summary of the NIE and the administration's pushback against the authorization bill in response, a concerted effort by missile defense advocates led by Representative Weldon began a pre-emptive pushback against the likely presidential veto. The pushback against NIE 95-19 would be a two-pronged effort. Missile defense advocates argued that 1) despite what the NIE stated, there was still a viable threat against the United States that warranted a strategic missile defense, and 2) the NIE was a product of intelligence politicization and manipulation by the Clinton administration to thwart a National Missile Defense. Weldon emphasized both elements of this pushback. Regarding the existence of a threat, Weldon argued that the IC's evaluation failed to "lessen [his] concerns" about the ICBM threat to the US. Regarding politicization claims, he pushed Senator Larry Combest (R-TX), the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to hold joint hearings regarding the NIE. Weldon argued that the intelligence community's report was being used as a tool of the administration "to do what they have not been able to do themselves" and that the timing of the letter's release was "so coincidental," with the implication being that it was politicized intelligence.[291] This initial volley by Weldon attempted to both maintain the argument that a viable threat existed as well as discredit the NIE as a tool of manipulation by the executive

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[290] U.S. Senate, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 -- Conference Report*, by Congressional Record, 104 Cong., 1 sess., Vol. 141, pt. 204 (Washington DC, 1995).

[291] Richard Lardner, "Key Republican Plans Hearings on Nie: Administration Rejects Gop's View of Ballistic Missile Threat to Us," *Inside Missile Defense* 1, no. 7 (1995).

branch. While Weldon was pushing back against the NIE, missile defense advocates in the Senate wrote to Secretary of Defense Perry expressing their commitment to missile defense and making clear their opposition to a potential demarcation line in the ABM Treaty that would make distinct theater and strategic defenses. The opposition was framed around the argument that a demarcation between the systems would "den[y] our troops the protection they would otherwise be afforded." This was about the Navy's "lower-tier" and "upper-tier" systems.[292] This argument effectively allows national and theater missile defense advocates and anti-arms agreement hawks to join in agreement of the same position, logrolling their support.

This was a contentious political strategy. On December 28, 1995, President Clinton vetoed H.R. 1530, the FY 1996 Defense Authorization Act, arguing that the bill's missile defense provisions would "waste tens of billions of dollars" and force a national commitment to a "specific technological option."[293] Clinton also noted that the provision would conflict with the ABM Treaty. Included within the Defense Authorization bill was a pay raise for military service members, and to avoid criticism of his veto, Clinton "welcomed separate action on the pay raise" and promised to "sign it as soon as [he] get[s] it."[294] Despite this assurance, there were still attempts to squeeze the veto for political advantage: Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee Strom Thurmond (R-SC) found it "especially ironic that during this holiday season, President Clinton has flatly rejected a pay raise" for the military.[295] Senator Robert Smith (R-

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[292] John Kyl et al., "Senators Warn Administration on Tmd Funding for Fy-97," *Inside the Pentagon* 12, no. 2 (1996), accessed 2021/04/28/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43992867.

[293] Todd S. Purdum, "Clinton Vetoes Military Authorization Bill," *The New York Times*, December 29, 1995, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/29/us/clinton-vetoes-military-authorization-bill.html; Inside the Pentagon, "White House, Republicans Spar over Vetoed Defense Authorization Bill," *Inside the Pentagon* 12, no. 1 (1996).

[294] Purdum.

[295] Pentagon.

NH) of the SASC argued that Clinton held the authorization bill "hostage" and that the incident

was "a perfect example … of the basic differences between the two political parties."[296]

Additionally, in what could be viewed as an indication that missile defense was not entirely

viewed by its supporters as a purely defensive technology, Rep. Robert Dornan (C-DA), Chair of

the House National Security Military Personnel Subcommittee, referred to the president as

"Peacenik Clinton" in his criticism of the veto.[297] Senator Spence further highlighted a division

between the president and the GOP when he noted that "on a purely political level [the veto]

clearly defined the stark differences between the Clinton administration and this congress" on

issues like missile defense while making reference to Contract with America.[298]

     Missile defense advocates in Congress were unable to get enough votes to override the

presidential veto and decided to remove the language mandating a firm 2003 NMD deployment

from the defense authorization bill but still included a $450 million increase in funding and

publicly declared their intention to move forward with a free-standing national missile defense

bill. With the language mandating a deployment deadline removed and the deployment of a

national missile defense once again prevented, President Clinton signed the Defense

Authorization Act on February 10, 1996, with continued funding for NMD. The same roadblocks

that thwarted previous attempts at deployment remained, even as those in the network continued

to view missile defense as a potentially valuable political resource as well as a financially

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[296] Robert (NH) Smith, "Ballistic Missile Defense," *Congressional Record* 142, no. 13 (January 31 1996), https://www.congress.gov/104/crec/1996/01/31/CREC-1996-01-31-pt1-PgS586.pdf.

[297] This is not the only time that Dornan has referred to Clinton as a "peacenik." He also called him a "nerdy little flower child peacenik" during the 1992 presidential campaign. David G. Savage, "Key Republicans Split on Clinton Moscow Trip Issue," *Los Angeles Times*, October 11, 1992, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-10-11-mn-466-story.html.

[298] *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996--Veto Message from the President of the United States*, Second ed., 142 vols. (Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 1996).

lucrative endeavor. It was also evident that there was an intentional effort to resist the parsing

and detangling of missile defense systems (such as efforts to prevent demarcation in the ABM

Treaty) and, instead, roll them all together as part of a layered missile defense.

Military Leadership at Odds with Congressional Missile Defense Hawks

As national missile defense became a valuable political resource, concerns about costs

and viable threats created tensions between military leadership and congressional hawks. In

January of 1996, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Owens and vice

chiefs of staff for each service sent a letter to Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology Paul Kaminski.[299] The letter argued that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council

(JROC) believed that missile defense spending should be significantly less than what GOP

members wanted. The JROC noted that the "current and projected ballistic missile threat …

shows Russia and China as the only countries able to field a threat against the U.S. homeland."[300]

GOP missile defense advocates like Representative Weldon continued to insist, however, that

there must be a threat, stating that "for anyone to say that there is no threat for 15 years is

outrageous."[301] This strategy treated the idea of an immediate threat as a certainty regardless of

evidence. When pushed on an accurate time frame, Weldon remained vague: "I don't have a

magic number, but it's certainly less than 15 [years]."[302]

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[299] Other signatories of the letter, beyond Owens, included Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald Griffith, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Joseph Prueher, Assistant Marine Corps Commandant Ge. Richard Hearney, and Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Thomas Moorman.

[300] Daniel G Dupont, "Despite Congressional Increases...: Requirements Panel Recommends Holding Missile Defense Spending at $2.8 Billion/Year," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 2 (1996); *Abm Treaty and Us Ballistic Missile Defense*, Second Session ed., *Committee of Foreign Relations* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996).

[301] Herb Kohl et al., "Citing Jroc Recommendations...: Senate Democrats Ask Perry to Cap Nmd Funding in Fy-97 at $500 Million," *Inside the Pentagon* 12, no. 6 (1996).

[302] Ibid.

Missile defense advocates in Congress continued to insist widespread support for a national defense system existed. Weldon, for example, suggested that the JROC shifted money away from ballistic missile defense only because "the Joint Chiefs [were] boxed into a corner" in creating savings for recapitalization. Weldon implied that these funding shifts hardly indicated a lack of faith or need in ballistic missile defense. Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Thomas Moorman, however, referred to the recapitalization efforts of the Joint Chiefs by saying that they intended to shift money to "fund the highest-payoff, highest-priority efforts" and, as noted in the letter from Admiral Owens, away from programs such as national missile defense because of the "risk" as well as concerns about its ability against "more sophisticated emerging threats."[303] Weldon argued that the Joint Chiefs pushed to move funding away from national missile defense as part of a resource problem and that the services had to "take [funds] where they can get it." He argued that "missile defense [became] a cash cow" for them. Weldon failed to explain in his argument why the Joint Chiefs would decide to move funding away from national missile defense if it was a necessary program that could succeed against a viable threat. Others associated with the network, such as Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA), dismissed the suggestion that the JROC was "under the gun" and instead claimed that they were "Washington bureaucrats." At a March 7th hearing held by the House National Security Committee military procurement and R&D committees, Hunter did not even allow for this defense of the JROC—that they were operating under systemic constraints—and thus implied that they misunderstood both the technology and the threat.[304]

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[303] "But Need for Savings Prompted Review . . .: Jroc Member Says Missile Defense Recommendations Were 'Threat-Driven'," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 4 (1996), accessed 2020/10/11/, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.uoregon.edu/stable/43970840.

[304] Committee on National Security, *Hearing on Ballistic Missile Defense*, by Duncan Hunter, 104th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996).

These debates about funding and public support were also indications of the power of an emergent missile defense network. At the same time that Hunter and Weldon pushed back against shifts in funding, the looming retirement of BMDO director Gen. Malcolm O'Neill presented another point of contention. Weldon suggested in Congress that the White House was going to lower the stature of the position from a three-star General to a two-star position to " downplay the whole potential threat for missile defense."[305] Weldon organized a letter to Secretary of Defense Perry signed by over twenty other congressional representatives, including Spence, Hunter, Livingston, and members of Weldon's missile defense caucus, urging the administration to keep O'Neill on and referring to him as "an invaluable asset."[306] Weldon, who joked with reporters that he would move to impeach Clinton if O'Neill were to be fired, also wrote his own letter to Perry stating that he had "worked closely" with the General and viewed him as one of the BMDO's "greatest assets."[307] The reaction to the potential departure of O'Neill revealed two things: his relationships with members of Congress were viewed as a critical resource, and the prestige of the position was identified as a valuable asset for missile defense advocates.

The Shift to 3+3

In February 1996, Defense Secretary Perry and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Paul Kaminski announced that the administration was altering its

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[305] Curt Weldon, "Missile Defense," *Congressional Record*, February 27, 1996.

[306] Daniel G Dupont, "Expecting Lt. Gen. O'neill to Retire This Year...: Lawmakers Urge Pentagon to Keep Bmdo Director in Office as Long as Possible," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 3 (1996).

[307] "Gop Lawmaker Urges Pentagon to Keep Bmdo Director in Office Awhile," *Inside the Army* 8, no. 4 (January 29 1996), accessed 2021/04/28/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43978845.

approach to missile defense from a strategy of "technology readiness" to one of "deployment readiness."[308] This shift in strategy was part of a plan known as 3+3. Perry announced that this meant the administration was readying itself for "a deployment decision in three years." After three years of development, there would be a determination of a "threat situation that warranted a deployment," and the system could be deployed in another three years if warranted.[309] In his announcement, Perry referred to the JROC and their criticisms that the administration was using too many resources on missile defense and not adequately focusing on current threats instead of potential future threats. As noted, these JROC critiques were based heavily on threat assessments baked into NIE 95-19, conducted by the intelligence community.

The shift from a technology readiness program to a deployment readiness program was a substantial achievement for the network. On April 9, 1996, Under Secretary Kaminski released a memo indicating that the administration was "fully committed to a ''3 plus 3' program for National Missile Defense" and directed the BMDO to create a joint program office for the handling of national missile defense (JPO NMD). This shift effectively compressed the technological timeline of the system from a process that could take well over a decade condensed into a six-year time frame. Much of the compression would be felt in the testing and evaluation of the system, with the testing and evaluation process being performed concurrently with deployment and a much heavier reliance on modeling and simulation.[310] Senator Levin would later criticize this shift by saying that it forced the decision on the crucial issue of the

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[308] William Perry, *Dod News Briefing with Secretary of Defense William J. Perry* (mda.mil: Missile Defense Agency, 1996).

[309] Ibid.

[310] "National Missile Defense Program (Nmd)," Global Security, accessed. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy1997/dot-e/other/97nmd.html.

deployment of NMD to be "constrained by an artificial timetable."[311] Conversely, missile defense advocates viewed the 3+3 plan with its "at minimum six years until deployment" as insufficient compared to a guaranteed deployment date.

The Defend America Act of 1996: Another Attempt at a Deployment Commitment

The 3+3 plan was rooted in the threat assessments contained in the NIE 95-19, which had already been heavily criticized by missile defense advocates in the network. These criticisms ranged from arguments that the estimate was unintentionally inaccurate (it demonstrated a "lack of depth and content") to claims that it was an example of intentionally politicized faulty intelligence (the NIE's conclusions were "sanitized" by the Clinton administration).[312] Congressional network members amplified these criticisms by leveraging their institutional authority to question individuals who generated the threat estimate in congressional hearings and to establish panels to investigate and oppose the estimate. On February 22, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) held a hearing on "Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad." During this hearing, DCI Deutch faced questioning on intelligence estimate creation and the threat of specific rogue states.[313]

Six days after the SSCI hearing, CSP Director Frank Gaffney gave testimony at an HNSC hearing, along with Dr. William Graham and Dr. Keith Payne.[314] Both Graham and Payne were

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[311] Carl Levin, "Toward an Agreement with Russia on Missile Defense," accessed. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-04/features/toward-agreement-russia-missile-defense.

[312] "Spence Asks Gao to Review Intelligence Estimate on Missile Threats," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 5 (March 6 1996), https://www.jstor.org/stable/43968167.

[313] United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, *Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad: Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second Session ... Thursday, February 22, 1996* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996).

[314] United States General Accounting Office, *Foreign Missile Threats - Analytic Soundness of Certain National Intelligence Estimates*, GAO/NSIAD-96-225 (1996).

members of the CSP Advisory Council.[315] In his testimony, Gaffney referred to ballistic missile

attacks as "the single greatest menace to U.S. national security." Gaffney referred to the IC's

estimate as "pollyannish" and seconded the argument made by CSP Board Member Rep. Weldon

that it was "the most politically biased intelligence brief [he had] ever seen." In Gaffney's

testimony, he argued that it was an "unmistakabl[e]" trend that ICBMs were "coming into the

hands of ever more dangerous nations" and that without missile defense, there was "little if any

disincentive" to the pursuit of ICBMs by rogue states.[316] Gaffney also made technological paper

tiger arguments about rogue states adding countermeasures to ICBMs: it was, he suggested,

"unlikely that, in the face of American defense, a rogue developing nation will deem it

worthwhile to sink more of its limited resource trying to end-run us by adding to ... the quality of

its vulnerable ballistic missile force." Crucially, Gaffney also gave what he referred to as "an

urgent recommendation," which was "*Get a second opinion!*" (Emphasis added by Gaffney in

the printed version of his remarks).

In this recommendation, Gaffney specifically cited both the Team B experiment

conducted in 1976, which he referred to as a "much more sober, pessimistic *and accurate*

evaluation of the Soviet threat" (emphasis added by Gaffney), as well as the Heritage Foundation

Team B analysis he participated in the prior year. It is necessary to note that the Team B

experiment has historically proven to be a key example of intelligence politicization,

significantly less accurate than the analysis conducted by the CIA at the time, and a key catalyst

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[315] Center for Security Policy, *Precision-Guided Ideas: 2002 Annual Report* (Washington, DC: 2002).

[316] Security.

in reigniting the Cold War arms race.[317] In his recommendation for a new Team B, Gaffney also

referenced the Heritage Foundation's Team B analysis from 1995 that he participated in, which

determined that "the Clinton Administration's portrayal of the ballistic missile threat is

unjustifiably sanguine, particularly with regard to threats to the territory of the United States."[318]

Following this testimony, William Graham (who was Chair of the SDI Advisory

Committee for the DoD) argued that the NIE fell victim to the "classic problem of intelligence,"

which he determined was "distinguish[ing] the absence of evidence from evidence of absence

that something is taking place." Graham further criticized the NIE with a claim that would be

echoed in later months and years that "ballistic missiles do not need to have a long-range to

threaten the United States" and used an example of missiles launched from an off-shore ship to

support this argument. This argument, it should be noted, uses an example that could not be

defended nor prevented by a midcourse strategic missile defense system even under ideal

conditions. Graham argued that the U.S. needed to "deploy … national missile defenses as

rapidly as possible, to discourage or dissuade potential proliferators from developing, building,

buying or otherwise obtaining offensive ballistic missiles, as well as to counter the many ballistic

missile threats that already exist." In his testimony, Dr. Graham utilized multiple strategic myths

of missile defense, specifically the paper tiger myth of self-contradictory rationality.

While Graham's testimony focused on "evidence of absence" in mobilizing strategic

myths, Payne's testimony focused on the threat of nuclear blackmail and coercion. He argued

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[317] For more on the 1976 Team B incident, see Anne Hessing Cahn, "Team B: The Trillion," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 49, no. 3 (1993); Cahn, *Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the Cia*; Maria Ryan, "Filling in the 'Unknowns': Hypothesis-Based Intelligence and the Rumsfeld Commission," *Intelligence and National Security* 21, no. 2 (2006); Gordon R Mitchell, "Team B Intelligence Coups," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 92, no. 2 (2006).

[318] Heritage Foundation Missile Defense Study Team, "Defending America: Ending America's Vulnerability - an Update," last modified March 15, accessed 2019. https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/defending-america-ending-americas-vulnerability.

against the NIE 95-19 conclusions, claiming that "fundamental uncertainties hinder the ability to forecast … ballistic missile threats." Payne justified his claims based on the possibility of a "rapid change in political relations" with states that already possess the ability to strike the United States. As a co-founder of NIPP, he concluded his testimony by saying that the United States should "now take … steps necessary to establish the legal … basis for the deployment of national missile defense."[319] His testimony drew on his 1980 co-authored article, "Victory is Possible," in which he argued that the US "must possess the ability to wage nuclear war" and develop a "plausible theory of how to win" through a "combination of counterforce offensive targeting … and ballistic missile and air defense." Payne suggested that the United States should plan to fight a nuclear war in this way to keep casualties down to a "level compatible with national survival and recovery."[320]

Missile defense advocates pushed for a thorough review of NIE 95-19 by the Government Accounting Office. On the same day as Gaffney's testimony, Representative Floyd Spence (R-SC), who would later win the Keeper of the Flame award in 2000 from Gaffney's CSP, sent GAO Comptroller General Charles Bowsher a letter requesting that the review "compare and contrast the assumptions, conclusions, methodology, evidence, and treatment of alternative views in the 1995 NIE with the aforementioned 1993 NIEs."[321] As the Chair of the House National Security Committee (HNSC), Spence wanted a comparative accounting of the three NIEs and to "contrast the conclusions" of NIE 95-19 with the "large body of unclassified scholarly analysis on this same topic." On the same day that he sent the letter, he claimed in a

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[319] Security.

[320] Colin S Gray and Keith Payne, "Victory Is Possible," *Foreign Policy*, no. 39 (1980).

[321] "Spence Asks Gao to Review Intelligence Estimate on Missile Threats."

congressional hearing that because "the question of politicization has been raised," his "committee [would] have to address [the question of politicization] in a more comprehensive and detailed fashion in the future." He maintained that after a GAO review, the committee could "pursue the issue" of NIE politicization from a "stronger position."[322] Two weeks following the request for the GAO to contrast the findings of the intelligence community against unclassified scholarly analysis on the same topic, the Heritage Foundation released a follow-up to their Team B study, *"Defending America: A Near- and Long-Term Plan to Deploy Missile Defenses." This follow-up,* "Defending America: Ending America's Vulnerability," recommended a review of the administration's previous ballistic missile threat assessment, pushed for a withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, encouraged the need for supplemental space-based missile defense, argued that the ballistic missile threat was growing, and implied that the NIE was politicized intelligence.[323] According to Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation, the Foundation was actively working to sway senators on issues regarding the ABMT.[324]

A day before the release of the Heritage Foundation's study, former DCI James Woolsey said in a hearing before the House National Security Committee that the differences between the NIE and other reports "lies much more in the questions that [were] asked."[325] Woolsey argued that the NIE was flawed because of its focus on the continental United States and that "to focus an NIE on a threat to the contiguous 48 states, in my judgement, is to focus on a subset and not a

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[322] Ibid.

[323] Team,

[324] Specifically, convincing Senators that any attempts at establishing "Succession" on the ABM Treaty (the transition from the Soviet Union to Russia) would be considered a substantial shift and would require a two-thirds Senate approval, see: Spring.

[325] Lucius Outlaw, "Woolsey Expected to Head One Panel: Cia Taking Steps to Establish Ballistic Missile Threat Review Groups," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 20 (1996).

particularly useful subset of the strategic problems that are posed for us by other countries [in] possession of ballistic missiles in the post-Cold War era."[326] Woolsey also argued that the NIE should address "not only threats which we actually see," but also should explore "the possibility of technically feasible threats." In suggesting that the concept of threat be expanded from actually existing evidence to possibility and probability, Woolsey suggested that anything that was "technically feasible" constituted a threat. Echoing the 1976 Team B experiment in competitive analysis during the Ford administration, Woolsey's framework dramatically increased the number of threats.

In addition to the unified efforts of those in the network who argued for missile defense, there were also in-network debates regarding how best to use the resources available for missile defense. BMDO Director O'Neill claimed in a congressional hearing on March 20th that "if [he] had one additional dollar [he]'d put it in [missile defense] technology." Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) pushed back against suggestions that a lack of resources was hampering development. Shelby argued that the BMDO had "squandered the resources provided by [the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee] last year [1995]" and that while the funding for the organization has been sufficient, the "BMDO has never fielded anything."[327] Defending against the accusation of wasted resources, O'Neill noted that there had been a significant streamlining of personnel, noting that "with a cut of 900 people, there is no growth in bureaucracy that I see." The Senator from Alabama (home to multiple defense contractor corporations) pointed out that

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[326] DCI Woolsey was a former Honorary Co-Chair of the National Security Advisory Council for CSP, a Co-Chair for the Committee on the Present Danger, VP of Global Strategic Security at Booz Allen Hamilton (2002-08), and served on the board of directors for Martin Marietta See: State Department, "Mr. R. James Woolsey," State Department, last modified January 20, accessed. https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/isab/75737.htm. and Militarist Monitor, "James Woolsey," last modified January 5, accessed. https://militarist-monitor.org/profile/james-woolsey/.

[327] Lucius Outlaw, "O'neill Defends Agency against Charges: Key Senator Rips Bmdo, Claims Organization Has'squandered'resources," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 7 (1996).

all the people removed from the process were contractors rather than anyone on the Washington side of the ledger.[328] While both parties in this particular battle supported the development of national missile defense, it serves as another indication that network members have aligned goals when useful to them but still act in their own personal (in this case, electoral) and organizational self-interest.

In the context of in-network debates about resources, on March 21, 1996, one day after this hearing, Senate Majority Leader Dole and House Appropriations Committee Chairman Rep. Bob Livingston introduced identical bills into their respective houses of Congress, both titled "Defend America Act of 1996."[329] These bills declared that the United States already possessed "the technological means to develop and deploy" a national missile defense system that would be "highly effective" against limited attacks.[330] The bill required that the system would be "augmented over time" to create a "layered defense against larger and more sophisticated … threats," which served the dual purpose of logrolling different missile defense variants together and encouraging the support of hawks with a long term focus on China and Russia. The bill asserted that the threat was "significant and growing, both quantitatively and qualitatively."[331] During the press conference given for the bill's introduction, Dole made the political nature of

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[328] Ibid.

[329] Ann Curley, "Dole, House Gop Propose Antimissile System," CNN, last modified March 21, accessed. http://edition.cnn.com/US/9603/missile_defense/.

[330] For Senate, see: *S. 1635 (104th): Defend America Act of 1996*, by Senate, 104 Cong., Second sess. (1996).. For House, see: *H.R. 3144 (104th): Defend America Act of 1996*, by House of Representatives, 104 Cong., Second sess. (1996).

[331] Ibid

this issue very clear: "Right now, the United States has no defense–and I repeat, no defense–against ballistic missiles. If it is left up to the Clinton administration, it will stay that way."[332]

Given the push and pull taking place among missile defense advocates, actors were pressuring and influencing others within the network to achieve their aims. Two weeks before the bill's introduction, a staff assistant on the House Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee, Bill Inglee, sent a memo to Representative Livingston regarding the need to unify the GOP after the prior failures regarding missile defense.[333] This memo cited "differences" within the GOP regarding policy specifics that have "crippled our efforts to move [national missile defense] forward."[334] One especially contentious element referenced in the memo was the DAA's handling of the ABM Treaty and language calling for a withdrawal by the United States from the agreement. Inglee argued in the memo that conservative members in the party should demand that the language advocating for withdrawal stay in the bill. Senator Dole's staff informed him that "they have to have [language calling for a withdrawal] if they are to have any chance [of passing the bill] in the Senate," even as they received pushback on this front from more moderate members of the party.[335] Network members outside Congress also voiced opinions that factored into the political calculus. Inglee pointed out that Frank Gaffney was "very

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[332] Isaacs, "Play It Again, Bob."

[333] Bill Inglee would later go on to work at Lockheed Martin from 2001-2010 as Vice President, Global Security Police, before becoming a senior partner at Inglee Sauer Moseley Strategies. Inglee would also serve as a "full-time senior advisor" to Secretary of State Tillerson from February-June 2017. See: OpenSecrets, "Employment History: William Inglee," OpenSecrets, accessed. https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/rev_summary.php?id=21472. and The American University in Cairo, "Mr. William B. Inglee," aucegypt.edu, accessed. https://www.aucegypt.edu/about/leadership/board-trustees/mr-william-inglee.

[334] Douglas Berenson, "Gop Emphasizes Need for Unity on Measure: Republican Leaders Ready to Unveil National Missile Defense Legislation," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 6 (1996).

[335] Sheila Foote, "Senate Panel Puts Off a Vote on Republican Missile Defense Bill," *Defense Daily* 191, no. 16 (April 22 1996), https://archive.org/stream/ABCNews19781979/Defense-Daily-01-96-to-01-97-d.txt.

upset about any reference to amending the ABM Treaty" because he believed any reference to the Treaty "legitimizes it," and he "has been trying to stir up people against it."[336]

In addition to the divisions within the missile defense network that the memo from Inglee demonstrated, it further emphasized a critical element of the strategy being pursued by the GOP: using missile defense as a political wedge issue against the president. Inglee's memo noted that "a veto is expected, but [national missile defense] will be laid squarely on the president's doorstep." This was not just another attempt to make national missile defense a political issue but instead to politicize the very need for missile defense. Missile defense advocates could use the "leadership interest" created in part due to Livingston's involvement to not only make deployment a wedge issue but "to push the [weapons of mass destruction] threat to the political foreground."[337]

The political weaponization of the DAA was further emphasized by Senator John Warner (R-VA) during a press conference on the day of the bill's announcement. Warner stated that the Defend America Act would "focus the eyes of every single American on the president."[338] HNSC Chairman and Representative Spence, in a statement released with the bill's announcement, attempted to further politicize the bill by referencing the president's veto of the Defense Authorization Act the previous December. Spence claimed that when Clinton vetoed the authorization bill, he "vetoed Congress's desire to ensure that the American people [were]

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[336] Berenson.

[337] Cirincione.

[338] Douglas Berenson, "Gop Lawmakers Split over Election Day Relevance of Nmd Issue," *Inside Missile Defense*, April 3, 1996.

protected against the threat of ballistic missiles."[339] Senator Smith of New Hampshire made it clear to journalists that messaging to the general population was the key: the issue needed to be "defined correctly" to voters and tied in with the "terrorist era."[340] Smith also stressed that if national missile defense was "defined as 'Star Wars,' then we lose that debate."

With political messaging at the center of network strategy, missile defense advocates returned to the debate about development versus deployment. On April 17th, the American Defense Preparedness Association and National Defense University Foundation co-sponsored a breakfast that featured Representative Weldon as a speaker. Weldon argued that the GOP would attempt again to pass a missile defense bill in the FY-97 Defense Authorization Act that echoed the language in the vetoed version of the FY-96 Authorization. Weldon stressed that the critical issue was a commitment to deploy and that "without that commitment to deploy, nothing's going to move forward." He remained unsatisfied with the 3+3 plan because "we know what's going to happen three years from now: If we don't commit to deploy now, three years from now will be four, five" and "by 2005, we'll still have no capability" for national missile defense.[341] In arguing for deployment, Weldon insisted that "we have the capability today." Connecting capability to the political value of the issue, especially for electoral politics, Weldon noted that if the GOP were able to get a missile defense bill with a locked-in deployment to the White House by "late summer [or] early September, and that becomes a major issue in September, [he] would

[339] Jim Snyder, "Bill Calls for Nmd System by 2003: House and Senate Republicans Introduce'defend America Act of 1996," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 7 (1996).

[340] According to defense newsletter *Inside the Pentagon,* a GOP house aide supported Smith's claim by arguing that "NMD will move voters" if threats were stressed to them. Elaine M Grossman, "Air Force May Resist Lawmakers'push to Accelerate C-17 Procurement," *Inside the Pentagon* 12, no. 13 (1996).

[341] Elaine M Grossman, "In Crafting Fy-97 Defense Authorization Bill...: Rep. Weldon: Gop Intends to Stand Firm on Missile Defense Deployment," *Inside the Pentagon* 12, no. 16 (1996).

not mind having that happen."[342] Despite his criticisms of the 3+3 plan, he acknowledged that it

was a sign of progress for the network; he reminded the audience that the administration had

already shifted its position in the past year by locking policymakers into a deployment decision

in three years. Weldon claimed credit for this shift and suggested that the administration

developed the plan "because of what we did last year."

     Weldon's focus on the FY-97 defense authorization, as opposed to the Defend America

Act, was primarily because the DAA faced congressional resistance in both chambers. House

Democrats pushed for amendments to make the DAA adhere to the ABM Treaty and limit

funding. Simultaneously, in the Senate, it was clear that a filibuster was on the table.[343] There

were also growing concerns regarding the Defend America Act's costs, making it less palatable

for more fiscally conservative GOP members. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary

Assessments released a report on May 1 regarding the DAA's potential costs, arguing that it was

"impossible to estimate precisely" because of its vagueness and larger implications. The CSBA

nevertheless estimated a cost of $5 billion for a "very limited" missile defense system that might

not meet the "highly effective defense" requirement of the bill.[344] They estimated that a "more

ambitious but still relatively limited" system could cost between $25 and $29 billion, with an

estimated $44 billion for an "augmented" system that incorporated space-based sensors and

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[342] *North Korea's Nuclear Program: The Challenge to Stability in Northeast Asia*, First Session ed., *Committee on International Relations* (House of Representatives 2003).

[343] There were also reports citing congressional GOP aides that stated the political value of the president vetoing the Defend America Act was so high for the GOP that if Democrats in Congress allowed the bill to reach the president, they would potentially refrain from putting NMD language in the FY-97 Defense Authorization. While this reporting is relying heavily on unnamed sources, it does hint that for many in the missile defense network the important aspect is the political gain, rather than the actual missile defense deployment. Douglas Berenson, "Gop Lawmakers May Keep Nmd Policy Items out of Fy-97 Authorization," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 9 (1996).

[344] This estimate relied on an estimate made two weeks prior by BMDO Director O'Neill.

"kinetic-energy interceptors." The group also stressed the need to include costs beyond the financial creation of the system to account for the technology potentially becoming "obsolete" if the government "invests too much too soon" and for the strategic concerns that would come with a system that undermined the ABM Treaty.[345] These strategic concerns included enhanced incentives for arms racing.

Concerns about the Defend America Act grew after the Congressional Budget Office projected costs of $10 billion, or roughly $7 billion more than the amount allocated by the administration for NMD. The CBO also included projected costs through 2010, which they argued would "range from $31 billion to $60 billion for a layered defense that would include both ground- and space-based weapons." Not included in these estimates were costs for operation or support following deployment.[346] President Clinton referenced the DAA and the CBO estimate of its expenses in a May 22nd speech at the US Coast Guard Academy. The DAA, he suggested, would force the deployment of "a costly missile defense system that could be obsolete tomorrow." The deployment requirement meant that the US would "leap before we look" and "before we know the details and the dimensions of the threat we face." Clinton's language in this speech opposed deployment based on financial and opportunity costs. His language also reflected the uncertainty about the threat the GOP had been pushing following NIE 95-19.[347] The President's language regarding the level of threat was significantly less decisive

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[345] Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, *Accelerated National Ballistic Missile Defense Program Could Be Very Costly* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA338704.pdf.

[346] Craig Cerniello, "Push for National Missile Defense Stalled by Cbo Report on Costs," *Arms Control Today* 26, no. 4 (1996).

[347] William J Clinton, "Remarks at the United States Coast Guard Academy Commencement in New London, Connecticut," UCSB, last modified May 22, accessed. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-united-states-coast-guard-academy-commencement-new-london-connecticut.

than that of his Secretary of Defense, who declared in a speech a month before that "we do not need a national missile defense system because our nation is not now threatened by missiles of mass destruction. No rogue nation has ICBMs."[348] In his speech, Perry stressed the need to maintain development rather than deployment for missile defense because a limited focus would allow the US to keep up with developing technologies rather than pursue a system "capable of defending against thousands of warheads being launched" like the Strategic Defense Initiative.[349]

In addition to excessive costs, fears that the DAA would lead to a return to SDI also decreased support for the measure. Robert Bell, the Senior Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control for the NSC, argued, for example, in a speech at the National Defense University Foundation Breakfast that the DAA was an attempt to establish a foothold for developing an SDI-like system.[350] Bell focused on phrasing in the DAA requiring that initial deployment be "augmented over time to provide a layered defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic missile threats." Bell suggested that the "bill [was] a stalking horse for a return to a Reagan-era SDI" that "reinstates vintage Reagan-era ideology" and "reflects an antipathy to the ABM Treaty." The DAA's language was "code for a return to the original … 'astrodome' SDI concept for stopping even an all-out Russian nuclear strike."[351] Bell also responded to the concerns of defense advocates about NIE 95-19 and its focus on contiguous states, saying the "analysis is in

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[348] William Perry, "Protecting the Nation through Ballistic Missile Defense," Department of Defense, last modified April 25, accessed.
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CbxxReKBn3cJ:https://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx%3FSpeechID%3D956+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.

[349] Ibid.

[350] Senate, *Defending America against Wmd*, by Robert Bell, 104 Cong., Second sess., Vol. 142, pt. 79 (Congressional Record, 1996).

[351] Ibid.

[the estimate]" and that if the goal is to defend Alaska and Hawaii, "both the Air Force and the Army have on their own initiative put together quick response, treaty-compliant, relatively low-cost deployment options that could defend Alaska and Hawaii against an attack involving just a few warheads."[352] He also rejected claims that NIE 95-19 was a case of intelligence politicization, stating that "categorically the answer to [the question asking if there was politicization of the NIE] is "no."[353]

With increased concerns about estimated cost and intentional politicization, the DAA was pulled from the House floor by the end of May.[354] In hopes of quelling worries about the affordability of the DAA in the House, Representative Spence asked for cost projections for the Department of Defense's 3+3 plan, additional NMD plans being developed by the Army (known as Quick Response Options A and B), and the Air Force's plan known as the Minuteman Option. The sticker shock of the CBO estimates was real for Congress members, and the pushback against these cost estimates was multi-pronged. In addition to Spence's request for new analysis by the CBO, the Center for Security Policy pushed back specifically against DAA critic John Spratt (D-SC) with an article entitled "Why Doesn't Rep. John Spratt Want His Colleagues to Know About a Cheap, Effective, Near-Term Missile Defense Option?" The article accused Spratt of intentionally attempting to bury missile defense options noted in the Heritage Foundation Team B report.[355]

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[352] Ibid.

[353] Lucius Outlaw, "Bell Rejects Republican Claims Threat Assessment Was Tainted," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 10 (1996).

[354] "House Pulls Missile Defense Bill," *UPI Archive: Washington News*, May 22, 1996, accessed 2020/11/25/, https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A441196445/STND?u=s8492775&sid=STND&xid=1b684135.

[355] Center for Security Policy, "Why Doesn't Rep. John Spratt Want His Colleagues to Know About a Cheap, Effective, near-Term Missile Defense Option?," last modified May 31, accessed. https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org.

By the summer of 1996, the Defend America Act seemed unlikely to pass, but it was already being used in the political construction of strategic myths. On June 3rd, President Clinton released a Statement of Administration Policy declaring that if the Defend America Act were "presented to the President in its current form, the President would veto the bill."[356] The SAP justified the President's position based on several factors, including the program's cost, its design to "defend against a threat that does not now exist," the technological infeasibility, and the destabilizing effect that it would have on the international arena (including the ABM Treaty). Senator Dole attempted to bring the Defend America Act up for a vote on June 4th but failed to pass a cloture vote to prevent a Democratic filibuster. Dole resigned from his Senate position one week later, on June 11th, to focus his attention on his presidential campaign. Dole's inner circle included close colleague Donald Rumsfeld, who had served with Dole decades earlier in the House.[357] Rumsfeld was a senior campaign advisor along with Elizabeth Dole[358] before his appointment on August 27th as the chairman of Dole for President Inc. during a campaign staff shakeup.[359] Writing about the push for the DAA, John Pike of the Federation of American

[356] William J Clinton, "Statement of Administration Policy: S. 1635 - Defend America Act of 1996," The American Presidency Project, last modified June 3, accessed 2020. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-administration-policy-s-1635-defend-america-act-1996.

[357] Michael Wines, "For Its Stretch Drive, Dole Campaign Turns to a Turnaround Artist," *New York Times*, September 26, 1996, accessed November 13, 2019, https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A150452245/STND?u=s8492775&sid=STND&xid=e4f826e5.

[358] Elizabeth Dole served as president of the Red Cross. The chairman of the board at the time was CEO of Lockheed Martin, Norman Augustine. Elisabeth Bumiller, "Elizabeth Dole Is Eager to Keep Strength Subtle," *New York Times*, July 16, 1996, http://libproxy.uoregon.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/docview/109640020?accountid=14698. Elizabeth Dole was part of the inner circle and while she did not attend campaign staff meetings, she did "quite often" converse with Rumsfeld and her husband about the campaign and her perspective on it.

[359] Kenneth R. Weiss, "Dole Touts Tax Plan and Alters Campaign Staff," *Los Angeles Times*, August 28, 1996, http://libproxy.uoregon.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/docview/2047702237?accountid=14698.

Scientists called the bill "essentially a creature of the Dole for President effort" designed to "create a campaign soundbite" of Clinton rejecting missile defense. Pike referred to the bill as "divorced from larger national security objectives."[360] Senator James Exon (D-NE) was concerned that the legislation was "intractably ensnarled in presidential politics" and served as a loyalty test for the GOP.[361]

While the bill was seemingly on ice in the Senate following Dole's failure to pass a cloture vote and subsequent departure from office, missile defense advocates and opponents continued to argue about the numbers as others attempted to breathe new life into the House bill. In early June, the CBO director, June O'Neill, responded to the additional estimate request from Representative Spence, which cited in-house estimates provided by the Air Force and Army, with various plans ranging from $4-8 billion, significantly less than the prior CBO estimate.[362] Missile Defense advocates like Weldon jumped on these new numbers to renew the push for DAA, arguing that proponents could now "use specific numbers as opposed [to] the $60 billion number" from the prior estimate.

Soon after the CBO gave the new estimates to Representative Spence, Representative Spratt sent a letter to colleagues in Congress to clarify the differences between the missile systems used in the CBO estimate for Representative Spence and those the DAA would deploy

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[360] John Pike, "Star Wars -- Clever Politics in the Service of Bad Policy," *Journal of the Federation of American Scientists* 49, no. 5 (September/October 1996), https://fas.org/faspir/pir0996.html.

[361] Helen Dewar, "Democrats Thwart Dole on Missile Plan," *The Washington Post*, June 5, 1996, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/06/05/democrats-thwart-dole-on-missile-plan/fc6f2779-da6d-4de6-854b-874e511687a8/.

[362] It should be noted that in response to these estimates, the former head of the BMDO, Lt. Gen. Malcolm O'Neill, wrote to Rep. Weldon to suggest that the services were underestimating the costs of their programs, noting that he would consider the Army's estimate "high risk" and that he believes that, based on his own "personal evaluation," the KKV in the Air Force's plan "appears to me to be underestimated by approximately a factor of five." "O'neill: Air Force, Army Nmd Estimates Off the Mark," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 12 (June 12 1996).

by 2003. Spratt stated that "Chairman Floyd Spence asked the [CBO] to assess the costs of three specific ground-based, single-site [NMD] options," but the CBO's new estimate "does not provide a new or revised appraisal" of the DAA. Spratt clarified that Spence asked CBO to appraise only specific options of missile defense systems in the follow-up estimate, which was not a replacement or alternative to the prior $30-60 billion estimate. In response to a series of questions submitted by Representative Dellums (D-CA) of the HNSC, CBO Director O'Neill confirmed Spratt's claim that Spence's requested estimate was not a revision of the initial CBO estimate; the second estimate only took into account specific aspects of a missile defense system, as requested by Spence, and the CBO "understand[s] [that the Defend America Act] call[s] for greater capability," than what was requested for the estimate.[363] While NMD advocates were pushing for CBO estimates of specific aspects of the DAA in hopes of deflating coasts, critics remained unsatisfied with the initial CBO estimate that excluded post-deployment costs; Senators Exon and Bryon Dorgan (D-ND) requested additional estimates by the CBO that would include the DAA's operation and support costs. While the original estimate of $31-60 billion had been enough to derail the initial DAA push, the mid-summer estimate was significantly higher. The new CBO estimate, released in July, placed the DAA plan costs at as much as $116 billion over the following 20 years.[364]

The distinction between estimates was rooted in the system required by the Act for deployment. The DAA required a system "capable of providing a highly effective defense" against "limited, unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks." The systems analyzed in

[363] Lucius Outlaw, "With Defend America Act in Limbo...: Bickering over Nmd Numbers Continues as Cbo Defends Cost Estimates," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 14 (1996).

[364] Lucius Outlaw, "Gop Seeks to Counter Latest Assessment: New Cbo Analysis Puts Defend America Act's Nmd Costs at $116 Billion," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 16 (1996); Cirincione.

Spence's requested follow-up did not meet that standard. Furthermore, according to

Representative Spratt, none of the systems analyzed "would protect against unauthorized

attacks," and it is "doubtful they would provide a 'highly effective' defense against even a small,

accidental launch." Spratt's criticism of the DAA echoed the "stalking horse" claims made by

Robert Bell in that he believed the request for a "layered" system indicated a broader endgame

from some defense advocates. The original CBO estimate's language made clear that the system

requested by the DAA was significantly more expansive in scope.[365] These stalking horse

concerns about "layered" systems are indications that those pushing back against national missile

defenses were well aware that they were being rolled together with theater defenses by missile

defense advocates. In the wake of these cost estimate battles, there were also indications of the

self-interested motivations of actors involved in this process. On June 28th, a pair of Senators

from Alabama, Howell Heflin (D) and Richard Shelby (R), both defense advocates with local

interests, pushed for an amendment to the FY-97 Defense Authorization, ensuring that any

BMDO restructuring would "not result in a centralized bureaucracy" that would result in a loss

of jobs for the contractors and federal employees in Alabama. Notably, as discussed by Heflin on

the day of the amendment's introduction, "contracts that have been awarded [would] be executed

as planned."[366]

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[365] The CBO estimate addresses the "layered" question by stating "Through 2010, total acquisition costs would range from $31 billion to $60 billion for a layered defense that would include both ground- and space-based weapons. The wide range in estimate reflects uncertainty about two factors – the type and capability of a defensive system that would satisfying the terms of the bill, and the costs of each component of that system." The CBO also noted that "the [required] layered defense that would eventually follow … would likely be achieved by adding space-based weapons to the ground-based system."

[366] Lucius Outlaw, "Fearing Effects of Bmdo Joint Program Office...: Alabama Senators Move to Protect Huntsville Missile Defense Jobs," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 14 (1996).

Intelligence Politicization – Panels, Reports, and the Changing Definition of Threat

History Repeats – The Use of Panels to Undermine Intelligence and Create a Missile Defense Justifying Threat

Missile defense advocates pushed for national missile defense in the Defend America Act of 1996 despite many believing the bill would not succeed. This Sisyphean advocacy can be understood by viewing the situation through a resource-dependence lens. Many missile defense advocates regarded the concept of national missile defense, first and foremost, as a valuable political wedge issue, especially in presidential electoral politics. The belief was that by forcing the president to oppose a national missile defense, Clinton would appear soft on national defense. For these actors, even though the long-term goal was the deployment of national missile defense, they could extract resources even with a failed attempt. For politicians, these resources included voter opinion.

Other actors in the network did not receive electoral benefits but sought the actual deployment of national missile defense, either for self-interested or ideological reasons. For all of the actors and organizations in the network to acquire the resources they sought, there needed to be a reason to have a national missile defense. To justify missile defense deployment or frame it as a political issue, obtaining a critical environmental resource was necessary: the perception of a viable and imminent threat undeterred by nuclear retaliation. This perception of threat created a demand for missile defense as a product that would provide a perception of safety.

Because the idea of such an imminent threat ran counter to the national intelligence estimate in the NIE 95-19, the estimate and the intelligence community had to be undermined and contested. This undermining process relied on two primary arguments: 1) the NIE was a politicized document and, therefore, could not be accepted as an accurate view of potential threats, and 2) the NIE was a flawed document that was based on poor methodology and

therefore could not be accepted as an accurate view of potential threats. This undermining was performed, in part, by members of Congress making claims of politicization, including Senator Inhofe, who stated that the "national intelligence estimate was dramatically influenced by the White House."[367] Other MOCs in the network argued that the methodology was flawed or altered in some way that changed the analysis.[368] Others declared that the information was incorrect and that the president knew it, such as Senator Smith, who scolded Clinton from the Senate floor: "Something is wrong, Mr. President … you and I both know of the technology that is out there. We know it is being shipped all around the world. The Chinese have this missile technology, the Iraqis have it, the Iranians have it, the North Koreans have it, and Qadhafi would like to have it, and he may have it soon. It goes on and on."[369] Advocacy think tanks in the missile defense network offered in-house alternative analysis reports that contradicted the intelligence community, such as the Heritage Foundation's Team B reports. Missile defense advocates like CSP's Frank Gaffney and James Woolsey testified before Congress, criticizing the intelligence estimate. Other advocates, such as Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan, wrote that while there was a "lack of a visible threat" to the US, threats such as "missiles launched from rogue states such as North Korea" or "nuclear intimidation by the Chinese" still existed and justified missile defense (a technology that they refer to as a "new weapon").[370] These claims justified the formalization

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[367] James Inhofe, "The Missile Threat," *Congressional Record* 142, no. 13 (January 31 1996), https://www.congress.gov/104/crec/1996/01/31/CREC-1996-01-31-pt1-PgS582-2.pdf.

[368] Jon Kyl, "Potential Threat of Nuclear Missiles," *Congressional Record* 142, no. 13 (January 31 1996), https://www.congress.gov/104/crec/1996/01/31/CREC-1996-01-31-pt1-PgS583.pdf.

[369] Smith.

[370] Both Kristol and Kagan were co-founding members of PNAC. Kristol also served as a project director for the Bradley Foundation. Kagan served as a foreign policy advisor to Kemp in the early 1980s before joining the Reagan State Department. William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," *Foreign Aff.* 75 (1996).

of an undermining process through panels, government-mandated reports, and alternative intelligence analyses. The claims made by Senators Inhofe and Kyl were cited explicitly by Senator Bob Kerrey (D-NE) as the primary motivating factor for SSCI hearings and staff reports on the NIE later that year. The wheels were in motion on multiple fronts to formally undercut the NIE.

The GAO Report

In the halls of Congress during the spring of 1996, two simultaneous battles were being fought regarding strategic missile defense. The missile defense network fought a battle on one front over the projected costs of the national missile defense system demanded by DAA. These costs proved too high for the bill to overcome. The second front was the need for the deployment of strategic missile defense. In the previously mentioned February hearing concerning NIE 95-19, DCI Deutch received a series of questions concerning the intelligence estimate. The CIA's Director of Congressional Affairs, John Moseman, responded on behalf of the agency in a letter stressing that that "the conclusions of the NIE were in no way influenced by political pressure" and that there were "no discussions" between analysts and intelligence consumers regarding any relevant topic.[371] Moseman faced questions regarding the timing of the NIE release and concerning comparisons of the NIE to previous estimates made two years prior (similar to questions posed by Spence to the GAO). On the issue of timing, Moseman argued that it was "dictated by consumer pressure to complete production as soon as possible." Concerning previous estimates, he argued that while the NIE 95-19 was "not identical to" previous estimates, it was still "consistent" with them. Moseman argued that this discrepancy was due to information learned since 1993 and that the estimate was based on "the earliest realistic dates for

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[371] The letter would be made public during the summer of 1996.

development or deployment." The assessments were, in fact, conservative estimates based on a

"*possible, but unlikely*, pace of development" (emphasis added by Moseman). Moseman argued

that some of the necessary activities required to meet timeframes estimated in 1993 never took

place, and "as a result, the earliest realistic dates for deployment have slipped."[372]

Despite this clarification and refutation by the intelligence community, the missile

defense network still sought to undermine the intelligence analysis regarding ICBM threats

against the United States. On June 12, the GAO provided a classified briefing to members of

Congress on its analysis in response to Representative Spence's February request for an

examination of NIE 95-19 compared to previous NIEs from 1993 (NIE 93-17 and NIE 93-19).

On August 30, 1996, the General Accounting Office (later known as the Government

Accountability Office) published the supplemental report to that briefing. The GAO took issue

with the certainty of the phrasing of the primary judgment of the NIE, which said: "No country,

other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic

missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada." The GAO

argued that the NIE 95-19 creators erred, suggesting estimates were made with "clear (100

percent) certainty."[373]

The GAO based this determination on "caveats and the intelligence gaps" that the IC

itself pointed out within NIE 95-19. The GAO determined three other shortcomings of NIE 95-

19: 1) it did not give a numerical value for the probability of its critical judgments and instead

used "unquantified words or phrases" such as "likely" or "feasible, but unlikely;" 2) it did not

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[372] Select Committee on Intelligence, *Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad*, Second ed. (Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 1996).

[373] Ibid.

explicitly lay out its assumptions, and 3) it did not "develop alternative futures." The concern that the IC did not "develop alternative futures" is an argument that the IC should have included the "range of possible outcomes, including relatively unlikely ones." This criticism implies that the IC included the most likely outcome and disregarded the rest. However, as explained by Moseman, the assessment was built around the "possible, but unlikely, pace of development." So, while the IC did not account for all possibilities, it did incorporate unlikely outcomes into the estimation. This meant that "countries not hostile to the United States [such as] India, Israel and Japan [that] could develop ICBMs within as few as five years" were determined to be "unlikely to do so" and not deeply accounted for by the NIE.[374] While the GAO criticized NIE 95-19 for not "explicitly identify [its] critical assumptions," it also noted that the 1993 NIEs did not, as a rule, identify critical assumptions.

Despite these objections, the GAO noted that the IC "acknowledged dissenting views from several agencies" and also "explicitly noted what information [they did] not know."[375] Because the GAO included that in its comparison between NIE 95-19 and the two earlier 1993 NIEs, "the judgments … did not contradict each other." While the judgments of the NIEs were worded differently, "all three NIEs were not inconsistent with each other." The GAO argued that the IC implied but did not make explicit that an "attack against the [U.S.] from off-shore ships using cruise missiles … [was] unlikely to occur." It should be noted that even a technologically effective midcourse strategic missile defense could not prevent this particular attack.

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[374] Ibid.

[375] Ibid.

In the context of these conflicts over reports and intelligence, the various parties continued to demonstrate organizational behavior and attempted to mitigate the uncertainty caused by outside actors. After Rep. Spence sent a letter to the GAO requesting the review of NIE 95-19, DCI Deutch offered to establish a panel of "independent intelligence experts" to review the NIE's accuracy.[376] Deutch suggested that this review panel could replace the GAO review, as Deutch was uncomfortable with a probe into classified intelligence.[377] Deutch also offered to have DCI James Woolsey, a vocal critic of NIE 95-19, lead the panel. Spence rejected Deutch's offer, and the aforementioned GAO report was released as described. Deutch's offer to establish an in-house review panel led by a critic of the NIE in question was an attempt to safeguard organizational autonomy and oversight independence from other agencies in the government. This offer was not successful because Deutch was attempting to exchange a resource he did not solely possess. Furthermore, while Spence did not accept Deutch's offer for an independent analysis panel in exchange for canceling the GAO report, Spence did determine that an independent analysis panel would be used to evaluate the NIE beyond the GAO report.

In May of 1996, when the HNSC, chaired by Spence, released its committee report regarding the FY97 Defense Authorization bill, it recommended a congressional mandate for two panels dealing with the review of NIE 95-19 and the evaluation of the ballistic missile threat to the United States. Less than two weeks after the GAO report was published, the Defense Authorization bill that included Spence's recommendations for two new review panels was

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[376] Lucius Outlaw, "Gao Review of Nie Underway as Congress Considers Cia's 'B Team' Offer," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 8 (1996).

[377] "Gao Review of National Intelligence Estimate Nearly Complete," *Inside Missile Defense* 2, no. 10 (May 15 1996), https://www.jstor.org/stable/43968650.1

passed in Congress and became law in September of 1996. Those review panels would colloquially be known as the Gates Panel and the Rumsfeld Commission.

The Gates Panel – An Independent Analysis that Failed to Undercut the NIE

The first panel endorsed by Spence in the FY97 Defense Authorization Act directed DCI Deutch to "conduct a review of the underlying assumptions and conclusions" of NIE 95-19 within 45 days. In the HNSC report that recommended the review panel, the committee justified the establishment of the panel by noting that NIE 95-19 had its summary findings released "in the midst of the debate over" the Defense Authorization Act for FY96 and was "cited … to bolster the administration's position." The committee also cited James Woolsey by name when referencing his criticisms of the NIE, arguing that the "conclusions … and the timing … have given rise to charges that intelligence may have been politicized." These specific citations reveal that members of the network who undercut the legitimacy of the NIE were able to use those criticisms to justify formal reviews of the NIE and alternative threat analyses. DCI Deutch appointed former DCI Robert Gates to head the review panel, which began its work in October 1996.[378]

While the Gates Panel was underway, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was also investigating the matter, with SSCI Staff Director Charles Battaglia heading the inquiry. According to SSCI Vice Chair Kerrey, the investigation was necessary due to criticisms made by public figures that undermined the validity of the estimates because "if intelligence is not seen as completely objective, it has no value … that's why this committee reacts with vigor whenever

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[378] The panel was required to be comprised of "independent, nongovernmental individuals with appropriate expertise and experience." In addition to DCI Gates, the panel included Richard Armitage, Dr. Sidney Drell, Dr. Arnold Kanter, Dr. Janne Nolan, Henry "Harry" Rowen, and Major General Jasper Welch.

politicization is raised."[379] This explanation also indicated the power of criticisms made by individuals in the network. They were able to remove the value from a resource (intelligence and the perception of intelligence) through their criticisms and establish panels that could potentially alter the estimates. The SSCI indeed decided to defer the release of the staff inquiry report "for months" until after the November election and following the Gates Panel testimony.[380] Following the election, the Gates Panel sent the SSCI their unanimously agreed upon report on December 2nd, and Robert Gates testified before the SSCI on December 4th. On December 23rd, an unclassified version of the report was made available.

According to Kerrey, the publication of the staff report was delayed until after the 1996 election, in part over concerns of politicization. However, Kerrey also argued that "some of [the SSCI] members object[ed] to its publication" because "they just simply don't agree with the report's conclusion that the Estimate was not politicized."[381] Kerrey also argued, "Had the report found rampant politicization, they might have been more eager to see it broadly circulated." This demonstrates how members of Congress were able to wield their influence to prevent the publication of a report that might have had negative electoral consequences for them or their party.

The Gates Panel addressed the question of NIE 95-19 politicization and criticisms regarding the content and analysis of the estimate itself. On the issue of politicization, the Gates Panel "found no evidence of politicization" and was "completely satisfied" that the findings of

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[379] Central Intelligence Agency, *Nie 95-19: Independent Panel Review of "Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years"*, by Robert Gates (1996).

[380] Robert Gates, "Intelligence Analysis on the Long-Range Missile Threat to the United States," *Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence* (1996).

[381] Ibid.

the intelligence estimate were based on evidence and the "substantive analysis" of the analysts, declaring there was "no breach of integrity of the intelligence process."[382] The panel went further on this front, arguing that not only was there no evidence of politicization but "unsubstantiated allegations challenging the integrity of [the IC] … by members of Congress, are irresponsible."[383]

Concerning the content of the estimate, the Gates Panel suggested that the NIE was "politically naïve" and should have better preemptively accounted for criticisms and questions by those who disagreed with the findings. The panel also argued that the decision to not "more fully consider Alaska and Hawaii" and that they were considered separate from the other 48 states was "foolish from every perspective." The panel determined that the estimate was "rushed to completion" and that the "haste led to many of the presentational and analytical problems."[384] This criticism seemed to specifically target the actions of Representative Weldon and the letter he sent in September of 1995 urging the quick completion of the NIE alongside implied accusations of politicization. Following his testimony, Gates told reporters there "was politicization all right, but I think it was politicized on the hill."[385] This sentiment was echoed by fellow panel member Dr. Janne Nolan, who stated after the fact that "the only evidence of politicization we found was in Congress and not in the [intelligence community]."[386]

[382] *Nie 95-19: Independent Panel Review of "Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years".*

[383] Robert Gates and John Moseman, "Nie 95-19: Independent Panel Review of "Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years"," last modified December 23, accessed. https://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/oca961908.htm.
[384] Ibid.

[385] Bryan Bender and Sheila Foote, "White House Did Not Taint Intelligence Report, Panel Says," *Defense Daily* 193, no. 44 (December 5 1996).

[386] Amber Allen, "Q&a with Dr. Janne Nolan, Director of Nuclear Security," last modified October 13, accessed. https://www.americansecurityproject.org/qa-with-dr-janne-nolan-director-of-nuclear-security/.

According to the Gates Panel, however, the "most serious deficiency" of the 1995

intelligence estimate was that its conclusions were "based on a stronger evidentiary and technical

base than [was] presented in the estimate." In other words, the Gates Panel determined that the

NIE not only did not politicize the intelligence in order to buttress arguments made by the

executive branch but that "there was much that could have been added to the main text of the

estimate that would have strengthened the analysts' case."[387] The Gates Panel determined the IC

actually understated its positions in the NIE and could have gone further and been firmer in its

findings: "The case is even stronger than presented in the NIE."

According to the Gates Panel, the NIE could also have better demonstrated the "lengthy

time required to develop and test" ICBMs and "should have presented more information on the

technical obstacles to development" of an ICBM that could strike the US.[388] The NIE was "not

as categorical as it could have been that there would have to be a flight test" and that it would be

extraordinarily implausible for there not to be such a test because "no country in the world has

developed" long-range ICBM "without testing it." The Gates Panel also argued that the IC

should have accentuated its own qualifications and "should have pointed out that missile

development programs and [WMD] programs in other countries represent one of the highest

priority issues for US intelligence." The Panel also argued that the NIE should have better

clarified how the analysis changed from the previous estimates in 1993 and why. Gates

suggested that this shift in analysis (increasing the expected time it would take North Korea to

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[387] *Nie 95-19: Independent Panel Review of "Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years".*

[388] The Panel determined that the NIE also "failed to point out" that developing a missile that could threaten the US involved "two separate challenges," acquiring the hardware and system integration.

develop an ICBM) was not a problem with the analysis, as "North Korea is one of the areas where we felt the chain of analysis within the [IC] was very strong," and because ICBM development "is going more slowly than was anticipated in 1993."[389] The panel did suggest, however, that the NIE did not pay enough attention to the threats posed by ALCMs and sea-launched ballistic missiles. It is crucial to note that neither ALCMs nor ballistic missiles launched offshore would be defended by strategic missile defense.

Missile defense advocates charged that the Gates Panel's failure to identify politicization in the NIE "did a disservice to the Congress and to the process."[390] Weldon claimed to be "disturbed by [the] assertion that it was congressional pressure" that rushed the NIE process and that this claim was "patently false." Weldon was also critical that the panel did not "provide an opportunity for Members who charged politicization to be heard," which Weldon felt was the panel's responsibility to explore.[391] In response to the Weldon letter, Gates told the media that Weldon's interpretation of the situation was "inaccurate" and that it was indeed Weldon's letter in the fall of 1995 that "was a factor in accelerating the completion of the estimate."[392] Gates's response letter to Weldon noted that he was "offended and annoyed" that Weldon's letter to him was first sent to the press and cautioned that he did not "like being a pawn or being used." While Gates acknowledged that there were issues with the NIE, he maintained that Weldon's charges of

[389] John Diamond, "North Korea Still Far from Developing Icbm," *Index-Journal*, December 5, 1996, accessed 12/12/2019.

[390] Curt Weldon, "Weldon Lashes out at Gates for Absolving Cia of Politicization Charges," *Inside the Pentagon* 13, no. 4 (1997).

[391] Craig Cerniello, "Panel Upholds Nie Assessment of Ballistic Missile Threat to Us," *Arms Control Today* 26, no. 10 (1997).

[392] John Liang, Douglas Berenson, and Curt Weldon, "Gates Calls Weldon's Remarks A'mistake': Former Cia Chief Fires Back at Congressional Critics of Nie Assessment," *Inside Missile Defense* 3, no. 2 (1997).

politicization were "barking up the wrong tree." In addressing the issue of Bumpers and Levin receiving the initial letter from the IC summarizing the NIE, Gates stated that he was "convinced" that there was nothing more to the matter than "a lack of senior-level attention to what was going on and a lack of sensitivity to the questions that might be raised by the timing."[393]

Gaffney's Center for Security Policy was also critical of the Gates Panel's dismissal of politicization charges, rhetorically suggesting that intelligence analysts received promotions and transfers to new agencies for presenting an analysis that benefited the administration.[394] The CSP also suggested that the administration "manipulated the tasking, assumptions, personnel, methodology, and/or conclusions" of the intelligence estimate "even if it cannot be *clinically* proven" and argued there could be "little doubt" the estimate was used for political gain (emphasis in original).

While the effort to undercut NIE 95-19 was still underway, Senate Republicans began another attempt to mandate a national missile defense system deployment date when Senator Lott (R-MS) introduced the National Missile Defense Act as part of the Republican agenda. Lott made paper tiger arguments concerning terrorists as part of his introduction of the bill, as well as alluding to offensive advantage myths when he declared that the bill would put the nation on the path to lasting peace "through unquestioned strength."[395] That same day, Senator Lugar (R-IN)

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[393] John Liang and Robert M Gates, "Gates' Offended, Annoyed'by Congressmen's Actions: Former Cia Director Fires Back at Critic of Missile Threat Assessment," *Inside Missile Defense* 3, no. 4 (1997).

[394] "It Walks Like a Duck…: Questions Persist That Clinton C.I.A.'S Missile Threat Estimate Was Politically Motivated," Center for Security Policy, last modified Dec. 4, accessed. https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/it-walks-like-a-duck-questions-persist-that-clinton-c-i-a-s-missile-threat-estimate-was-politically-motivated-2/.

[395] Trent Lott, *Senate Republican Agenda*, vol. 143 (Congressional Record: Government Publishing Office, 1997).

introduced a compromise bill between Lott's National Missile Defense Act and the administration's 3+3 position called the Defend the United States of America Act, which required the development of a system that could be deployed by 2003 with a congressional vote in 2000. The NMD system under the Lugar bill would be required to comply with the ABM Treaty.[396]

These dueling missile defense bills created the context for continuing debate about the threat assessment of the NIE and for logrolling and resource-dependent behavior among missile defense backers in both the public and private sectors. In February of 1997, with two bills under consideration, the SASC committee heard testimony from DCI Tenet and DIA Director Lt. Gen. Patrick Hughes on ballistic missile threats. Hughes suggested that there could be a scenario where a rogue nation acquired "the capability to build and use a missile which could threaten [the] vital interests" of the United States; he also said it was "unlikely that any state … will develop or otherwise acquire" an ICBM that "could directly target the United States" in the next 15 years, beyond those already possessing that capability.[397] Tenet and Hughes agreed that the only other nation that could potentially develop an ICBM in 10-15 years was North Korea. At the same time that missile defense advocates in Congress continued to leverage threat assessments, the BMDO established a joint program office for NMD to manage better the different systems, including those run by the Army or Air Force.[398] In an effort to win valuable

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[396] Craig Cerniello, "Nmd Debate in Congress Heats up as Lott, Lugar Introduce New Bills," *Arms Control Today* 26, no. 10 (1997).

[397] United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, *Worldwide Threat Facing the United States: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Fifth Congress, First Session, February 6, 1997* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997).

[398] "National Missile Defense Joint Program Office Cost/Benefit Analysis," *Inside Missile Defense* 3, no. 8 (1997), accessed 2021/04/29/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43968356.

contracts, defense contractors Lockheed Martin, TRW, and Raytheon formed a joint enterprise dubbed United Missile Defense Company.

Rumsfeld Commission

These defense contractors played a crucial role in the Rumsfeld Commission's work, which began in January 1998. DCI Tenet named the members of the blue-ribbon panel required under the Defense Authorization Act, including its chair, Donald Rumsfeld, and the panel delivered its findings six months later. Janne Nolan, a member of the Gates Panel, would later refer to the appointment of the Rumsfeld Commission as a "serious mistake" made by Congress and "a turning point in the regrettable politicization of intelligence."[399] Over six months, the Commission met with teams of engineers from Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and the Aerospace Corporation, which sent engineers to discuss technology with the commission. Member Barry Blechman explained they would ask the engineers questions such as if "you had Scud technology … and you wanted to build an ICBM, how would you go about it … Easy ways to build on what is known."[400] Commission members also asked how long it would take engineers to build an ICBM if they were starting from the same position as a state like Iran. According to Blechman, "the answer was five years or less than five years."[401] The commission also held five "off-site" meetings with intelligence officials and defense contractors.[402] According to William Schneider,

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[399] Allen,

[400] Michael C Sirak, "Us Missile Makers Played Key Role in Rumsfeld Commission's Analysis," *Inside Missile Defense* 4, no. 15 (1998).

[401] Michael Dobbs, "How Politics Helped Redefine Threat," *The Washington Post*, January 14, 2002, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/01/14/how-politics-helped-redefine-threat/88aa747b-a0b3-41c7-9373-d1c9a9907091/?utm_term=.81424f4950e8.

[402] Michael C Sirak, "Countries with an Appetite for Missiles Will Get Them, Rumsfeld Says," *Inside Missile Defense* 4, no. 15 (1998).

the contractors were asked to put together a presentation for the commission on how "enabling technologies could be exploited to produce ballistic missiles that might pose a threat to the United States."[403]

The commission utilized a methodology that was unlike that of the intelligence community. The commission reached its conclusions using a "hypothesis-based analysis" methodology, also known as "worst case analysis," also utilized by the 1976 Team B.[404] This analysis looked for what was "conceivable" rather than what was likely and increased the likelihood of reaching a unanimous consensus. According to Garwin, "We did not gather all the facts and then ask what they meant. Rather, we asked what would be required in the 1990s to have a program to acquire long-range missiles of ICBMs and what facts supported or negated such a hypothesis."[405] Because the commission was mandated to assess the existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the United States, it did not consider the threat in the context of other threats, even if those other threats were more likely to occur.

Based on worst-case analysis, the commission concluded that the threat facing the United States was "broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the intelligence community." The commission stated that "These newer, developing threats in North Korea, Iran and Iraq … would be able to inflict major destruction on the US within about 5 years of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq)." While these findings were based on worst-case scenario logic and, therefore, did not look at what was probable or even plausible but rather what was conceivable, they were presented in

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[403] Sirak, "Us Missile Makers Played Key Role in Rumsfeld Commission's Analysis."

[404] Ryan.

[405] Richard L Garwin, "What We Did," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 54, no. 6 (1998).

terms of legitimately strong likelihood.[406] This resulted in an analysis that "answered different questions" than the 1995 NIE. As Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright of MIT described, "the Rumsfeld commission ignored probability, and the NIE ignored possibility" even as the assessments did "not actually contradict each other on the timeline of ICBM development."[407]

The findings of the Rumsfeld Commission echoed multiple strategic myths. The Commission argued that a significant implication of its research was that "warning time is reduced," hinting at power shift concerns. The Commission argued that "under some plausible scenarios, including re-basing or transfer of operational missiles, sea- and air-launch options, shortened development programs that might include testing in a third country, or some combination of these, the U.S. might well have *little or no warning* before operational deployment" of an adversarial ICBM. The commission also referenced domino theory arguments by tying peripheral concerns tightly together with existential threats to suggest that funding for ballistic missile capabilities by North Korea or Iran could serve as "a substantial immediate danger to the U.S., its vital interest and its allies." Congressional members of the Center for Security Policy in both the House and Senate referred to the report as a "wake-up call" and framed it as a stunning revelation. Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre later noted that even though "people feel the Rumsfeld report was revealing things … I didn't read anything in there I hadn't already heard from the intelligence community."[408]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not receptive to the Commission's findings. Chairman Gen. Hugh Shelton, in an August 24th letter to Senator Inhofe, argued that its conclusion that a

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[406] Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, "What They Didn't Do," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 54, no. 6 (1998).

[407] Ibid.

[408] Darcia R Harris, "Pentagon Leadership Defends Administration's Missile Defense Policy," *Inside Missile Defense* 4, no. 21 (1998).

rogue state could acquire ICBM capability "through unconventional, high-risk development programs and foreign assistance" was an "unlikely development" and that while rogue states "certainly" pose a threat to the United States they do so "through unconventional, terrorist-style delivery means," not by launching an ICBM at the United States.[409]

What aided the impact of the Rumsfeld Commission was a serendipitous rocket launch by North Korea on August 31st, which North Korea insisted was an attempt to launch a satellite into orbit. The failed rocket was not an ICBM, nor would the distance traveled have put it in ICBM range even if successful, nor would it have had the ability to reach Alaska or Hawaii. However, a developed version could have potentially reached US bases in Japan and Guam. Missile defense advocates immediately used this launch as an example of the increasing threat. Weldon, for example, argued that the "CIA … [wasn't] even aware the North Koreans had a capability for a three-stage rocket." Gen Hughes rebuffed these claims: "It's not true [that the intelligence community was unaware.] The details, technical details of some parts of the Taepo Dong flight were perhaps a surprise, but the basic configuration of the Taepo Dong missile and its basic capabilities were certainly well assessed by [the IC]."[410] Others in the intelligence community, like Pentagon spokesperson Maj. Bryan Salas, also argued that the test was not a shock, saying "we were not surprised by the launching." National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, Robert Walpole, also explained that while it was not included in the key conclusions of the 1995 NIE, the estimate did include the potential for North Korean test flights of highly capable ballistic missiles by as early as 1996.[411] Not long after the test, Donald

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[409] "Missile Controversies," *Air and Space Forces Magazine*, January 1, 1999.

[410] *Missile Wars*, directed by Sherry Jones2002).

[411] John Liang, "Suggests Declassifying Portions of Threat Estimates: Cia Official Says Intel Community Assessments Need Be More Explicit," *Inside the Pentagon* 15, no. 17 (1999).

Rumsfeld, in a speech at the National Defense University, referenced the potential political capital of the flight test: "God Bless you, Kim Jong."[412]

In May of 1998, before the release of the Rumsfeld Commission's findings, missile defense advocates made another push for the assured deployment of a national missile defense. However, advocates in the Senate were unable to overcome a filibuster effort led by Senator Levin and were never able to vote on the act. Less than two weeks after the Taepo Dong I flight test, missile defense advocates once again pushed for deployment based on strategic myths. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) made domino-adjacent arguments by referencing important allies that we were unable to protect and the thousands of Americans in Japan and Guam. Senator Frank Murkowski (R-AK) made arguments in line with offensive advantage and paper tiger myths by claiming that "the threat of an attack on the United States is increasingly real, and *we must act now* to make certain that it is the policy [of the US to construct an NMD system] with the capability of intercepting *and deterring an aggressive strike*" (emphasis added). Senator Spence (R-SC), who would win the CSP's Keeper of the Flame award in 2000, also referenced the need to act first by declaring that the "first warning of a heart attack is a heart attack." Senator Domenici made paper tiger self-contradictory assessments of rogue states in general, noting that "any nation hostile to the U.S. would not only have to achieve long-range capability, but they would also have to be sophisticated enough in their delivery system to defeat a defensive shield," which he argued was a "substantial deterrent."[413] Richard Garwin, member of the Rumsfeld Commission, explained in an article published that year why the Commission's

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[412] Jones, , Fred Kaplan, *Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power* (John Wiley & Sons, 2008)., Melissa L. Rossi, *What Every American Should Know About Who's Really Running the World: The People, Corporations, and Organizations That Control Our Future*, Illustrated ed. (Penguin, 2005).

[413] *American Missile Protection Act of 1998--Motion to Proceed*, 105 Cong., 2 sess., Vol. 144, pt. 118 (Congresisonal Record: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1998).

report should not be used as justification for a national missile defense system: "a nation capable of producing an nuclear warhead and an ICBM could easily add countermeasures that would defeat a missile defense system."[414] Despite this post-Rumsfeld Commission push for missile defense, advocates were once again unable to bypass a Levin filibuster effort and get a vote to the floor.

While the Rumsfeld Commission report itself was not enough to immediately push through an assured deployment of national missile defense, the Commission's impact was only beginning to be felt. On September 17, 1998, CIA intelligence officer Robert Walpole made its impact clear by stating that the "Commission made a number of excellent recommendations for how we can improve our collection and analysis on foreign missile developments."[415] One of the recommendations that would be baked into future analysis was incorporating defense contractor views of intelligence, as "private-sector contractors will be asked to postulate missile threats that apply varying degrees of increased foreign assistance."[416] Noting these hypothesized varying degrees of foreign assistance was vital because it essentially allowed hypotheticals to be formed that are not limited by the real-world political or economic constraints of a developing state.

The Rumsfeld Commission was granted access not just to private contractors but to public intelligence analysts. As part of this access, the Commission, as requested by Speaker Gingrich, HPSCI Chair Goss, SSCI Chair Shelby, and DCI Tenet, made recommendations on how the intelligence process could be improved in the future. On October 15, 1998, the

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[414] Garwin.

[415] Michael C Sirak, "Senior Intelligence Official Says...: 1999 Missile Threat Update Will Incorporate Rumsfeld Recommendations," *Inside Missile Defense* 4, no. 20 (1998).

[416] Senate, *Ballistic Missile Defense Programs*, by Committee on Armed Services, 105 Cong., Second sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Publishing Office, 1998).

Commission sent a classified "intelligence side letter" to Congress and high-ranking intelligence officials recommending changes in the methodological techniques of the IC. They specifically recommended "employing the technique of alternative hypotheses." They argued that "by hypothesizing alternative scenarios, a more adequate set of indicators and collection priorities can be established," which allowed for "moving from the *highly ambiguous absence of evidence* to the collection of specific evidence of absence." They noted that this shift in methodology "can be as important as finding the actual evidence." The Commission also argued that beyond classroom training for analysts, full training should include time "spent with US national laboratories and industries."[417] When Commission members were invited to meet with DCI Tenet and intelligence staff on January 6, 1999, they were informed not only of analytic changes and the involvement of multiple private contractors and outside experts in the analysis process but also of the adoption of the competitive analysis/alternative scenario methodology encouraged by the Commission and the involvement of former members of the Commission in future annual analyses of the ballistic missile threat, including the NIE to be released later that year.[418]

Two weeks after this meeting, the formative impact of the Rumsfeld Commission was clear. Secretary of Defense Cohen announced that "there is a threat that is growing and that we expect … will pose a danger," and that the threat "criterion will soon be met and technological readiness will be the primary remaining criterion [when considering NMD deployment]."[419] In response to this announcement, Rumsfeld said that he found it "certainly reassuring" and

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[417] Rumsfeld Commission, "Intelligence Side Letter to the Rumsfeld Commission Report," last modified March 18, accessed. https://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/sideletter.htm.

[418] Ibid.

[419] Craig Cerniello, "Cohen Announces Nmd Restructuring, Funding Boost," Arms Control Association, accessed 2018. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999-01/press-releases/cohen-announces-nmd-restructuring-funding-boost.

"encouraging."[420] While the Rumsfeld Commission's impact was clearly felt on the matter of

threat perception, the technological ability of missile defense remained a sticking point. Cohen's

announcement included a two-year delay in the 3+3 program—the administration would still

make a deployment decision in 2000, but it would not be realistic to expect the system to be

deployable until five years after that. This technological caution resulted from the report of

another panel, the Welch Panel, released just months before the Rumsfeld Commission. Chaired

by former Air Force General Larry Welch and appointed by the BMDO to analyze the risks in

programs of "hit-to-kill" missile defense systems, the Panel released the first of three reports in

the spring of 1998 and suggested that hit-to-kill systems pose "a difficult technical challenge"

because the technology was not at a "state of maturity needed for operational systems." The

panel suggested that missile defense programs were more concerned with deployment than

technological success, arguing that they suffered from a "rush to failure" and would benefit from

the "earliest possible restructuring."[421] The panel suggested that the National Missile Defense

program was hindered by a "fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of developmental

testing."[422] A particularly damning section of the report discussed "random" failures of the

program:

> The study group heard repeated references to "random" failures. However, few, if any, of
> these failures were "random"–a statistical matter. They were caused by poor design, test
> planning, and preflight testing deficiencies; poor fabrication; poor management; and a
> lack of rigorous government oversight. The tendency of the government and program

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[420] Michael C Sirak, "Chairman Calls Policy Shift'reassuring': Rumsfeld Panelists Hail Pentagon's New Assessment of Missile Threat," *Inside the Pentagon* 15, no. 4 (1999).

[421] Craig Cerniello, "Panel Criticizes U.S. 'Rush' to Deploy Missile Defense Systems," Arms Control Association, last modified March, accessed 2018. https://armscontrol.org/act/1998-03/arms-control-today/panel-criticizes-us-rush-deploy-missile-defense-systems.

[422] Thomas Duffy, "Bmdo to Recall Welch Panel to Review Nmd Contractor Testing," *Inside Missile Defense* 4, no. 7 (1998).

managers to trivialize the causes of the costly failures, combined with the aggressive schedule discussed [above], has led to a 'rush to failure.'[423]

These concerns of a time crunch seemed to be echoed by those within the BMDO and among defense contractors (they all argued, however, that it was the timeline that was the problem and not an issue with the concept). Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, the director of the BMDO, argued in a statement made on the same day as Cohen's announcement that missile defense and hit-to-kill development was a difficult task and that BMDO was "doing things we don't do for normal programs"— "you will find no programs at all that have the limited amount of testing and the aggressive schedule that we've embarked upon." In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Boeing VP and NMD program manager John Peller argued that "the risk is not that you fail; the risk is that you do not get done on schedule." Peller noted that he had "zero doubt that we will succeed in the long run" but that he did "not necessarily share the same confidence" for the flight tests on schedule. In both instances, the BMDO and Boeing executives followed conventional organization theory expectations by attempting to mitigate external influence and oversight by tempering expectations for immediate success while maintaining confidence in achieving long-term goals.[424]

On May 20, 1999, the House passed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. All House Republicans voted yes on the bill's final version except Representative Vernon Ehlers (R-MI). Ehlers was concerned about missile defense countermeasures, arguing that "the question is, are we really able to build [a missile defense] that will deal with all of the various countermeasures that are likely to be employed by any intelligent enemy? I am not convinced that we can." Ehlers

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[423] Ibid.

[424] Michael C Sirak, "Revamped Nmd Program Allows Schedule'tolerance': Peller Tells Lawmakers Nmd Risk Is in Schedule, Not Viability of System," *Inside Missile Defense* 5, no. 5 (1999).

was also concerned about the lack of successful testing, stating that he had difficulty approving a bill that would make it policy to deploy a national missile defense that was not proven to work and was "an incredible blank check in a sense."[425] That spring, the *Wall Street Journal* published an editorial suggesting that Ehlers and Representative Connie Morella (R-MD), who voted no on a previous version of the bill, were "volunteering their constituents as Russian hostages."[426] Ehlers, a Ph.D. in nuclear physics from the University of California, Berkeley, was also concerned that attention was focused on ballistic missiles when there were more accessible and more likely methods of attacking the United States with a WMD.

Those in the network addressed these concerns about countermeasures in various ways. Boeing's Peller suggested in paper tiger arguments that it could take years for rogue states to develop countermeasures, despite the implied assertion that they were able to develop ICBM technology. Peller, however, also suggested to journalists that debates concerning countermeasures "ought to be classified and not in public."[427] William Graham, a member of the Rumsfeld Commission, said regarding countermeasures that "Churchill said something like, there are no final victories, no ultimate defeats. It is a game that we are going to have to play forever." While it is accurate to suggest that there are no final victories in the battle against countermeasures, as new and better ones can be developed, it is inaccurate to suggest that there are no ultimate defeats when discussing nuclear weapons.

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[425] Michael C Sirak, "Rep. Ehlers Is Lone Gop'no'vote on Nmd Bill: Lawmaker Questions Ability of Nmd Technology to Defeat Countermeasures," *Inside Missile Defense* 5, no. 11 (1999).

[426] "Hostage Volunteers," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 29, 1999, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB922487338174205994.

[427] Michael C Sirak, "Dod, Industry: Nmd Countermeasures Getting Attention," *Inside Missile Defense* 5, no. 10 (1999).

President Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act into law in July of 1999, requiring the US to deploy a national missile defense as soon as technologically possible. However, the White House made clear that they did not view this as a substantial departure from previous positions, noting that they would still be evaluating the technological readiness of the system during the scheduled deployment readiness review in 2000. Missile defense advocates, however, viewed the passage of the Act as a significant achievement and a deployment guarantee. Senator Cochran argued that the NMD Act was clear: "It provides that it is the policy of the United States, upon enactment of this law, to deploy a national missile defense as soon as technologically possible. That is unequivocal."[428]

The impact of the Rumsfeld Commission in shaping the NMD Act and the strategic myths surrounding it was also seen in the new National Intelligence Estimate released in September 1999. It incorporated techniques encouraged by the Rumsfeld Commission, including scenarios that "could happen." Although the estimate does acknowledge scenarios that are "more likely" than others, by incorporating unlikely scenarios into the main text, the estimate frames them as being on nearly equal footing, or at least similar enough to deserve similar consideration. This kind of language is found, for example, in the following passage concerning Iraq:

> Iraq *could* test a North Korean-type ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred-kilogram payload to the United States in the last half of the next decade depending on the level of foreign assistance. Although less likely, most analysts believe it *could test* an ICBM that could deliver a lighter payload to the United States in a few years based on its failed SLV or the Taepo Dong-1, if it began development now. (Emphasis in original)[429]

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[428] Daniel G Dupont, "Nmd Act Made Law; Controversy over Interpretation Hasn't Abated," *Inside Missile Defense* 5, no. 15 (1999).

[429] Council.

The new NIE referenced in its preface that it incorporated the recommendations of the Rumsfeld Commission as well as external network experts, including "missile contractors to help postulate potential ICBM configurations that rogue states could pursue." However, the assessment noted that "countries developing missiles also will respond to [US national missile defense] by deploying larger forces, penetration aids, and countermeasures." The assessment also acknowledged "other means to deliver WMD" that are "more reliable than ICBMs," such as forward-based attacks. However, the expanded perspective of the NIE meant that it could not be used to refute arguments about threats. Less than a month after the release of the 1999 NIE, the Clinton White House signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for FY-00. The Act included "important funding for both theater and national missile defense" and was announced as "the start of the first long-term, sustained increase in military spending in fifteen years."

Ultimately, the Clinton administration still had the issue of deployment to consider. The system had three planned tests between that October and the following year's election. The administration stated that it wanted two successful tests before confirming, though the administration backtracked on this, arguing that this was "depending on the type of failure." However, after two of the three tests were failures, political and technical factors added to Clinton's decision.[430] Roughly a week after the third test, Democratic leadership in Congress, buoyed by two successive failed tests, urged Clinton to kick the can down the round and allow his successor to decide on deployment, requesting a need to have more information before any decision is finalized. However, it was after a not yet publicly available internal assessment of the

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[430] More on these tests in the next chapter.

system, which Clinton received late that summer, that likely confirmed his decision to allow the next president to make the decision.[431]

The missile defense advocacy effort illustrates how network incentives can result in organizations contributing to shifting perceptions of threats. In the context of a consolidating defense industry, marked by mergers that resulted in a few core power players, influential entities like the Center for Security Policy (CSP) and the Heritage Foundation played critical roles in shifting perceptions. These organizations, receiving funding from the dominant forces in the defense industry, adeptly inflated the perception of imminent threats, effectively shaping the operational environment to justify the need for missile defense. This deliberate construction of a threat narrative serves as a stark example of how organizations can create demand for specific solutions, thereby acquiring necessary resources and political backing in a complex, interdependent network. This effort was marked by the intentional and selective use of information, explicit instructions regarding strategy passing through the network, and a calculated effort to shift perception by forming an alternative intelligence panel.

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[431] This internal report will also be discussed in the next chapter.

V: Cultivating the False Perception of a Viable Policy Solution - Decreasing Uncertainty and Manipulating the Perception of Missile Defense

Introduction

This chapter examines the multifaceted dynamics of the missile defense policy network during a critical period in US history—the George W. Bush administration, allowing for some temporal flexibility to include pivotal events from his campaign year that sowed the seeds for subsequent defense policy. Central to this analysis is how the network members (in and out of the administration), including policymakers, financially benefiting organizations, and self-interested individuals, constructed a narrative to portray missile defense as a viable technology and policy solution. This effort to craft a beneficial perception around missile defense utilized strategic myths (illogical arguments of security through aggression), inappropriate lessons from the past, and techno-optimism to justify developing and deploying strategic missile defense.

Emphasis is placed on the effort to create the perception of missile defense as an essential and viable security policy despite substantial evidence to the contrary. It examines how organizations, policymakers, and various actors aimed to promote missile defense as a credible technology and policy option despite reservations from unbiased experts. The administration's efforts notably included transforming the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) into the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), a maneuver designed to boost the agency's stature and control, impacting resource dynamics. Organization theory explains the drive for increased operational control, while resource dependence theory highlights the quest for government support to preserve autonomy and influence. Through an orchestrated campaign, missile defense

moved from a conceptual shield to a tangible entity, with physical infrastructure established and the system's role enshrined within the national defense strategy.

This chapter explores how network actors, particularly those in the administration, advocated for missile defense while managing the public's perception of its viability. It reveals the contradiction between the administration's portrayal of the technology's readiness and the actual operational capabilities. By tracing the network's strategic positioning, we see a deliberate attempt to shape public understanding and policy direction through the strategic control of information and the use of propagandizing strategic myths. This chapter is predicated on the idea that organizations requiring specific necessary resources from their external environment are incentivized to act in ways to ensure the acquisition of those resources, resulting in the creation of networks with linkages made of mutual dependencies and engaging in behaviors designed to protect autonomy as much as possible.

While the network's influence on shifting perceptions around diplomacy, arms control, and a deeper analysis of the threat inflation that contributed to the perceived "demand" for missile defense is reserved for the subsequent chapter, this chapter's discussion provides critical insight into the Bush administration's foregrounding of missile defense in America's security apparatus.

Organization theory provides critical insights into the behaviors of network actors, including government bodies, advocacy think tanks, and policymakers, depicting how organizations strive to maintain and grow their autonomy by influencing policy. Simultaneously, resource dependence theory illustrates how these entities seek to secure necessary external resources, like government funding. This understanding illuminates the complex relationship between internal drives and external constraints that incentivize network actors to manipulate the

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demands placed upon them by external actors possessing needed resources or to create an illusion of satisfaction. Such motivations result in behavior like favoring tests that do not recreate "real-world" scenarios, even after the system is deployed, indicating a preference to mitigate uncertainty and accommodate stakeholder influences.

The chapter further investigates how missile defense became ingrained in national security strategy, reflecting arguments made by advocacy think tanks and marked by significant movement of personnel between these tanks and government roles. These revolving door relationships, which substantially influence policy-making to such advocacy, can be understood through a resource dependence-based understanding of Organization Theory. The incentives to embed strategic defenses into the nation's long-term strategy also have clear rationales that are made evident from this project's theoretical lens.

Finally, this examination considers the tangible deployment of missile defense infrastructure and the significant consequences this holds for policy change. Organization theory and resource dependence theories are used in this analysis to highlight how entrenched interests and autonomy are defended through physical implementation, even as policy directions evolve.

This comprehensive examination aims to unravel the entwined organizational behaviors, resource dependencies, and strategic intents that have shaped the policy landscape for missile defense. In doing so, the chapter adds depth to our understanding of the forces driving missile defense policy and deployment during a time of notable change in US security strategy.

Shaping Perceptions of Missile Defense Viability

This section examines the strategic behaviors of policy network actors advocating for missile defense, which often stand in stark contrast to those of disinterested, unbiased experts. Employing organization theory and resource dependence theory, which both rest on a

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foundational logic that organizations seek to maintain autonomy and secure necessary resources, the analysis interprets the tactics employed by these advocates to shape the perception of missile defense's effectiveness, including the use of flawed testing methodologies that eschew real-world conditions, a lack of performance criteria for external evaluators, the advancement of convenient assumptions about adversaries that conflict with expert analyses yet fortify the argument for future missile defense success, and the proposition that missile defense does not require high effectiveness, or even functionality, to serve its purpose. Further strategies include heightened secrecy and increased classification levels around missile defense programs, the use of techno-optimistic rhetoric that unjustifiably compares missile defense to other technologies with different development trajectories, the framing of test failures as constructive learning opportunities, and rhetorical strategies that amalgamate various forms of missile defense, thereby masking the shortcomings of the advocated systems by associating them with more limited but less fundamentally flawed versions. These maneuvers reveal a calculated effort to promote a specific agenda, illuminating the divergent practices between network actors and independent policymakers and experts.

Testing Hit-to-Kill in the Run-Up to the Bush Administration

On October 2, 1999, Integrated Flight Test-3 (IFT-3), the first intercept test of the developing NMD system, successfully occurred. It received praise from all corners of the missile defense network, including the BMDO, congressional members associated with missile defense advocacy organizations, and industry executives. BMDO spokesperson Sheryl Irwin said, "It was a successful intercept. It did everything it was supposed to do, and it did it perfectly," fellow BMDO spokesperson Lt. Col. Richard Lehner added that the target was "totally pulverized" and

"the flash from the impact was spectacular."[432] The defense contractor community echoed similar

sentiments. Daniel Burnham, chairman and CEO of Raytheon, lauded the test as a 'historical

accomplishment,' extolling it as a "spectacular technological achievement" and indicative of the

National Missile Defense contractor team's technological prowess. Al Smith, Lockheed Martin

EVP, said it was a "tremendous success" for the "critical national initiative." Jim Albaugh, then-

president of Boeing Space & Communications, characterized the event as 'a tremendous

milestone for the program,' underscoring the collective sentiment of achievement despite

emerging critiques.[433]

Beyond touting IFT-3 as a success, network members praised the quality of the test and

argued that it provided significant evidence that the system would be successful. Rep. Curt

Weldon declared that "we've accomplished the so-called impossible" and that the intercept

"clearly demonstrates that we possess the capability to provide a national missile defense for

American families."[434] After the test, John Peller, Boeing's NMD Lead System Integrator (LSI)

program manager, said he was "a firm believer that the technology works and can support this

effort."[435] Before the test, Peller argued that "the target suite (used for IFT-3) was equal to, if not

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[432] The Associated Press, "Missile Defense Passes Critical Test," *The Cincinnati Post*, October 5, 1999.

[433] *Boeing Leads Team to Successful National Missile Defense Integrated Flight Test* (boeing.mediaroom.com: 2002). Albaugh would later be honored by the National Defense Industrial Association with the James Forrestal Industry Leadership Award (formerly known as the Defense Industry Leadership Award), with criteria for the award including a demonstration of strategic leadership and impact for the industry at the national level, and leadership in defining and addressing issues of the industrial base, see: NDIA, "James Forrestal Industry Leadership Award," accessed. https://www.ndia.org/about/awards/james-forrestal-industry-leadership-award.

[434] Michael C Sirak, "Despite Last Week's Successful Intercept ...: Bmdo Has No Plans to Accelerate Next National Missile Defense Test," *Inside the Pentagon* 15, no. 40 (1999), accessed 2023/07/22/, http://www.jstor.org.uoregon.idm.oclc.org/stable/43995966.

[435] Boeing.

more challenging than, the current projected rogue threat."[436] This claim was echoed by NMD JPO Program Manager Brigadier General William Nance, who declared earlier in the year that they were using in the tests "a more complex target array than we would expect from a rogue state."[437]

IFT-3 followed two previous "fly-by" tests (IFT-1a and 2) that the joint program office viewed not as actual tests but as experiments conducted for information-gathering purposes.[438] IFT-1 and IFT-2 used a target suite of 8 decoys involving various-sized balloons and cones of varying infrared signatures. Despite assurances from Nance that "many balloons" from the fly-by experiments would be involved in IFT-3, only one of these decoys was used: the largest balloon, with the brightest infrared signature (six times that of the target mock warhead).[439] Internal assessments from the Pentagon acknowledged that having a single large and bright decoy easily distinguishable from the target warhead allowed the EKV an increased ability to spot the target complex compared to a scenario with no decoy.[440] Investigative reporting and whistleblower accounts revealed that other factors tilted the test toward success in addition to the test beyond its use of just one lone, large, bright decoy. Specifically, the ICBM was launched outward from the

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[436] "Nmd Kill Vehicle Performed 'Very Well' in Flight Test, Officials Say," *Inside Missile Defense*, October 20, 1999., Fetter et al.

[437] Michael C Sirak, "In Nmd Test, Beacon Will Help Position Ekv until Booster Release," *Inside Missile Defense* 5, no. 9 (1999), accessed 2023/07/22/, http://www.jstor.org.uoregon.idm.oclc.org/stable/43970524.

[438] IFT-1a was a test of the EKV built by Boeing. This EKV was not selected as the kill vehicle for the NMD system, with Raytheon's EKV being selected and flown in IFT-2. However, Boeing was contracted to be the backup EKV builder for several years.

[439] Sirak, "In Nmd Test, Beacon Will Help Position Ekv until Booster Release.", Victoria Samson, *Flight Tests for Ground-Based Midcourse Missile Defense* (Center for Defense Information, 2006).

[440] Jeffrey St. Clair and Alexander Cockburn, "How the Pentagon Fixed the Star Wars Test," last modified January 9, accessed. https://www.counterpunch.org/2000/01/09/how-the-pentagon-fixed-the-star-wars-test/.

United States (naturally, an attack would be the opposite scenario), allowing radar a much higher probability of identifying the target. Furthermore, the target was equipped with a homing beacon and GPS, later referred to by OT&E Director Christie as "targeting aids," which he would argue keeps the test from being "credible."[441] In addition to the simple (and helpful) target complex, the beneficial flight direction, and the inclusion of targeting aids on board the re-entry vehicle, the targeting ICBM had a much slower closing velocity and a much higher apogee (the highest point in a flight), than would have been the case if launched in any actual world attack. The higher apogee affords the missile defense system a longer reaction time and makes tracking easier.

This target configuration (a single, large, bright balloon decoy) was used again four months later, on January 19, for the second hit-to-kill test, after considerations for a more complex target suite were dropped to simplify the test. The test, IFT-4, was a failure, with the EKV's cooling system malfunctioning, resulting in the kill vehicle's infrared sensors failing.[442] Less than a month after the failed test, Rep. Weldon argued at a hearing for the HASC that IFT-4 was "more challenging and, in many ways, more successful than the earlier one (IFT-3) and it demonstrated substantial technical progress." Weldon argued that, in addition to IFT-3, the two previous THAAD and three previous PAC-3 tests were successes, and "by my simple arithmetic, that is six out of the last seven (successful tests of hit-to-kill systems) and one near miss," which he deemed was "conclusive evidence that hit-to-kill technology can, will, and does work."

[441] United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2004: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, on S. 1050, to Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2004 for Military Activities of the Department of Defense, for Military Construction, and for Defense Activities of the Department of Energy, to Prescribe Personnel Strengths for Such Fiscal Year for the Armed Forces, and for Other Purposes* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004).

[442] Missile Defense Agency, *Ballistic Missile Defense Intercept Flight Test Record* (Fort Belvoir, VA: Missile Defense Agency, 2019).

Weldon did not include in his argument that THAAD and the PAC-3 systems fundamentally differed from the NMD system due to the exoatmospheric nature of ICBM intercepts and the speed at which they were conducted (among other reasons). Weldon, making a power shift argument in support of deployment, stated that the US had crossed the "threat threshold" and needed to deploy missile defenses as "rapidly and efficiently as we can" because of threats from North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and "other Middle Eastern nations." At that same hearing, Director Kadish noted that he took exception to the "characterization" of the test as a failure and instead termed it a "very valuable test event."[443]

That summer, former countermeasure designers, missile testers, government officials, and defense contractor scientists no longer involved in the missile defense network made public statements criticizing the testing process and implying it is an intentionally misleading "wicked game." Bob Dietz, a former decoy designer, questioned the pullback from eight decoys to one when it was time to do more than just fly-by tests, saying, "They did a good foxtrot for the first couple of tests and then slowed down to a crawl… you have to ask why they don't build better decoys. They've always said they'd better." The sentiment was echoed by a former Lockheed contractor, Michael Munn, who argued that "the only way to make it work is to dumb it down. There's no other way to do it. Discrimination has always been the no. 1 problem, and it will always remain that way," noting the issue is only magnified by the uncertainty that comes from countermeasures you aren't prepared for, saying "discrimination looks easy when you do it on paper… but you get up there and you never see what you expect – the data never agree with the

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[443] *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001*, Second ed., *Armed Services* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2000).

predictions."[444] A government official that the New York Times confirmed examined the missile

defense testing plan stated under the condition of anonymity that "none of the [missile defense]

tests address the reasonable range of countermeasures."[445]

On July 8, 2000, one month after the anonymous official was quoted in the New York

Times, the 3rd HTK test (IFT-5) failed.[446] The EKV did not separate from the booster used in the

test, and the giant decoy balloon (used in all previous tests in the IFT series) failed to inflate

properly.[447] Like IFT-3 and IFT-4, there was only one decoy target for IFT-5. One month later,

the Coyle Report, a deployment readiness review prepared by OT&E Director Philip Coyle, was

made available to President Clinton and informed his decision not to approve National Missile

Defense deployment that September and instead kick the can to his successor. In the report,

Coyle deemed the system as "too immature to assess in terms of predicting a realistic

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[444] William J Broad, "Antimissile Testing Is Rigged to Hide a Flaw, Critics Say," *New York Times*, June 9, 2000, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/national/science/060900sci-missile-defense.html., William J Broad, "The Nuclear Shield: Repelling an Attack; a Missile Defense with Limits: The Abc's of the Clinton Plan," *The New York Times*, June 30, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/30/world/nuclear-shield-repelling-attack-missile-defense-with-limits-abc-s-clinton-plan.html.

[445] Broad, "Antimissile Testing Is Rigged to Hide a Flaw, Critics Say."

[446] It should be noted that there are mixed accounts of the official date of this test, with reputable accounts disagreeing on the date of the test being considered July 7 (such as CSIS publications, see: Anthony H Cordesman, *Defending America: Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense: A New Us Strategy for Counter-Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare* (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001)., Union of Concerned Scientists, see: Grego, Lewis, and Wright., and the Heritage Foundation during congressional testimony, see: Veterans Affairs United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, *National Missile Defense: Test Failures and Technology Development : Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, September 8, 2000* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001).) while others use July 8 as the date (such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, see: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Missile Defense a "Humiliating Failure"," Carnegieendowment.org, last modified July 17, accessed. https://carnegieendowment.org/2000/07/17/missile-defense-humiliating-failure-pub-9219. and the MDA, see: Agency.).

[447] Grego, Lewis, and Wright., Agency.

deployment date" and noted the significant delays in the program, causing it to fall behind at a rate of 20 months every three years.

Coyle emphasized the failings of the testing program, determining that tests were not functionally representative of real-world situations, failing to "test basic elements of the system, such as countermeasures or multiple engagements, which are expected to be the norm."[448] Coyle argued that the technology and equipment that was necessary to simulate tests were also "immature," "inadequate," and provided only a "limited functional representation of the objective system" because the elements of the tests (both in terms of the test structure as well as the physical aspects being tested) were "unrealistic" and not representative of what an actual real-world situation would be. In part, the tests were deemed unrealistic because they were conducted at too low an altitude and too slow a velocity (changes that made targets more easily detected, tracked, and intercepted than in real-world situations). The tests also were nowhere near adequate when it came to addressing the "most challenging" task: that of discrimination. The system's tests relied on unsophisticated decoys and an insufficient number of them. In addition to the tests being conducted in unrealistic conditions with unrealistic decoys, the Coyle report also emphasized the fact that the tests were "rehearsed engagements with *a priori* knowledge of target complex, target trajectory, and time of launch," all of which are factors that "need to be discontinued." This factor made the failures that much more disappointing, as the tests were not structured in such a way to inform on or test real-world capabilities against real-world scenarios, even if they were successful. As the Bush Administration took the White House, the strategic missile defense had failed two of its three HTK tests despite the tests being constructed in a way

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[448] Coyle also had other concerns, such as disagreeing that the sea-based theater defenses could be quickly and easily modified to be effective against strategic ballistic missile attacks, as missile defense advocates have claimed.

that significantly improved their chance of success. The lead missile defense evaluator

determined that the tests were so inadequate that "no analyst can conclude presently that the

system will work."[449]

The New Administration and The Conflation of Systems, and a Push for Legitimacy
Enter Rumsfeld

Upon assuming the presidency, George W. Bush inherited a set of expectations from

advocates of missile defense who were eager to see decisive steps taken toward the United

States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the deployment of a national missile defense

system. This anticipation was amplified when Bush appointed Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of

Defense, a decision that proponents of missile defense widely interpreted as a signal of the new

administration's commitment to advancing the missile defense agenda.[450]

Donald Rumsfeld was not the first choice for Secretary of Defense; however, former

Senator Dan Coats was. Coats was eventually removed from consideration for two reasons:

demeanor and policy. Vice President Cheney reportedly doubted Coats' capacity to assertively

counter Secretary of State Colin Powell's influence on the President.[451] Crucially, however, was

the fact that Coats was "insufficiently enthusiastic" about missile defense and did not "consider it

a priority."[452] Cheney, who played a vital role in all appointments except for that of Powell,

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[449] Philip E Coyle, *The Coyle Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 2001), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=454081.

[450] Michael T Klare, "Rumsfeld: Star Warrior Returns," *Nation* 272, no. 4 (2001).

[451] According to Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Cheney and Powell "loathed each other." See: Mary Kay Linge, "How Dick Cheney and Colin Powell Went from Bosom Buddies to Bitter Foes," *New York Post*, January 11, 2020, https://nypost.com/2020/01/11/how-dick-cheney-and-colin-powell-went-from-bosom-buddies-to-bitter-foes/. For more on the development of the personal feud between Cheney and Powell, see: James Mann, *The Great Rift: Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, and the Broken Friendship That Defined an Era* (Henry Holt and Company, 2020).

[452] Fred Kaplan, "The Man without a Plan," Slate, last modified July 1, accessed. https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/07/donald-rumsfeld-obituary-iraq.html., Craig Unger, "How Cheney Took Control of Bush's Foreign Policy," Salon, last modified November 9, accessed. https://www.salon.com/2007/11/09/house_of_bush_3/.

wanted someone who both had the temperament to rebuff Powell and to be a staunch supporter of missile defense and thus selected Rumsfeld, his long-time colleague. Cheney actively believed in the philosophy of "personnel is policy." This belief serves as shorthand for multiple arguments of organization theory and resource dependence theory, specifically the use of appointments and personnel linkages to mitigate the uncertainty that could be caused by an external organization (which a Powell-led state department can be viewed as, from a missile defense network perspective). Cheney strategically positioned allies within the State Department, colloquially known as 'Cheney's spies,' to subtly influence policy direction, gather intelligence, and integrate the department's activities with broader administration goals; concurrently, Rumsfeld's appointment as Secretary of Defense stood as a beacon of legitimacy and a strategy for reducing uncertainty within the defense policy network.[453]

Organizations may employ a variety of strategies to construct and maintain a perception of success, even in the absence of concrete results. This may include recalibrating success metrics, disseminating selectively positive information via public relations campaigns, and receiving the endorsement of experts predisposed to support the organization's agenda. Specific tactics can involve presenting test outcomes that avoid the complexities of real-world scenarios, recasting setbacks as valuable learning experiences, drawing analogies with other technologies to rationalize underperformance, and advancing the notion that the mere existence of a system, irrespective of its operational effectiveness, constitutes success. These efforts indicate an organization's motivation to project an image of achievement and competence, essential for maintaining access to resources and negotiating within interdependent policy networks.

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[453] Through an organization theory lens, Cheney's approach to embedding aligned personnel within key departments exemplified a tactic to ensure resource alignment and policy consistency, solidifying a unified administration stance on missile defense within the interagency network.

In January 2001, Rumsfeld received advice from experienced individuals regarding staffing key positions. Rumsfeld met with outgoing Secretary Cohen, where he was told, regarding the subject of missile defense, that "Larry Welch and Gen. Kadish are pluses."[454] Rumsfeld also received input from a colleague during the Ford Administration who would go on to become an adviser to him, former Secretary of the Army Martin Hoffmann.[455] Hoffmann addressed the issue of staffing the "really key positions" and, like Cohen, noted that some individuals from the previous administration could be helpful. He also suggested Rumsfeld look into both military members that had recently retired and "the various self-styled experts in Washington in whom you have particular confidence," noting specifically that individuals from think tanks (and adjacent organizations) "may have material already 'in the can' which could be helpful."[456] Hoffmann's advice to consider a range of candidates, including those with ties to think tanks and previous administrations, underscores the presence of a network that extends beyond formal government structures, influencing the trajectory of missile defense policy through strategic appointments.

Upon taking office, the first opportunity for a rapid push in the direction of deployment was a small window to begin construction on a new radar station in Alaska on Shemya Island. Due to the short season available for construction on the Aleutian Islands, this decision must be approved in March. Otherwise, winter weather would push construction to the following

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[454] Rumsfeld was also informed in the meeting that boost-phase defenses were a "no" until "2012-2015", and that the Department of Defense "can't complete books so that they can be audited," see: Donald Rumsfeld, *Meeting with Secretary Bill Cohen and Don Rumsfeld; January (?) 2001* (The Rumsfeld Archives, 2001).

[455] Hoffmann was also a member of the same private eating club at Princeton University that Rumsfeld was: the Cap & Gown Club. Douglas Martin, "Martin R. Hoffmann, Army Secretary in 1970s, Dies at 82," *The New York Times*, July 26, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/us/martin-hoffmann-army-secretary-in-1970s-dies-at-82.html.

[456] Martin R. Hoffmann, *Transition Opportunity/Issue: Pentagon Bureaucracy* (National Security Archive, 2001).

spring.[457] On March 7th, 2001, Rumsfeld received a letter from Senator Kyl and Representative Weldon concerning the United States' missile defense strategy. They urged Rumsfeld to avoid locking into a single plan that might "foreclose the full multitude of options for a comprehensive system architecture." The Congress members voiced their worries that beginning construction of the Shemya radar site without simultaneously announcing plans for other systems might play into the hands of critics who oppose a more expansive, "layered defense" system, arguing that it could prematurely eliminate "other promising options, including sea and space-based systems."[458]

Kyl and Weldon conveyed their concerns about the potential "political ramifications" of focusing solely on a ground-based system, arguing that it might inadvertently squander "political energy" needed for developing a "more extensive, layered architecture" including sea and space-based defenses. Their correspondence demonstrated strategic foresight, emphasizing the need for a diversified approach that ensured political traction. Their advocacy reflected a broader vision that favored an expansive strategy over the constrained system some advocates were promoting and, by extension, allowed for greater industry involvement, setting the stage for a robust missile defense system.

On March 8th, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld distributed a memo to Paul Wolfowitz, Dov Zakheim, Bill Schneider, Pete Aldridge, and Steve Cambone, enclosing the letter from Kyl and Weldon.[459] Shortly after, Rumsfeld requested a meeting with President Bush to "bring [him] up

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[457] Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Myers, "Bush Courts Key Lawmakers for Support on Defense Goals: Bush Lobbies Lawmakers for National Missile Defense Tests and Decisions, Past and Future," *The New York Times*, January 9, 2001.

[458] Jon Kyl and Curt Weldon, *Letter to Donald Rumsfeld* (National Security Archive, 2001).

[459] Donald Rumsfeld, *Announcement of Attached Letter on Missile Defense* (National Security Archive, 2001).

to date" on missile defense, suggesting a "small group of close-in advisors" for the discussion.[460]

He specifically mentioned Wolfowitz, Cambone, and Zakheim, all of whom received the letter

from Weldon and Kyl, as well as Scooter Libby, Steve Hadley, and Chris Williams as likely

participants, while noting that "Colin and the VP" (Colin Powell and Vice President Cheney)

might also be interested in joining.[461] The day after the meeting with President Bush, Rumsfeld

issued a directive to Wolfowitz. He stipulated a clear shift in policy discourse: the Department of

Defense was to abandon the categorization of missile defense into "theater" and "national,"

instead referring to all as "missile defense."[462] This decision, coming on the heels of expressed

legislative concerns and paired with the eventual decision to delay the deployment of the Shemya

radar, suggests an organizational maneuver to prevent early lock-in to a specific defense model

that might constrain the potential for broader missile defense strategies. It also indicates that the

arguments of the congress members and CSP advisors were considered.

    The deliberate change in terminology signified an organizational tactic aimed at

consolidating the missile defense policy narrative, a move designed to prevent fragmentation of

strategic goals, maintain a political coalition, and ensure the continuity of a versatile and all-

encompassing approach to missile defense.

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[460] Donald Rumsfeld, *Fax Transmission, Subject: Missile Defense* (The Rumsfeld Archive, 2001).

[461] Williams, special assistant to Rumsfeld, served in a similar capacity to Sen. Lott before joining the administration. Immediately after leaving the administration, Williams joined Johnston & Associates, a lobbying firm that added Boeing, TRW, and Northrop Grumman as clients after Williams's arrival. See: Andre Verlöy and Daniel Politi, "Advisors of Influence: Nine Members of the Defense Policy Board Have Ties to Defense Contractors," The Center for Public Integrity, last modified March 28, accessed. https://publicintegrity.org/national-security/advisors-of-influence-nine-members-of-the-defense-policy-board-have-ties-to-defense-contractors/.

[462] Donald Rumsfeld, *Nmd/Tmd* (The Rumsfeld Archive, 2001).

The day after, Rumsfeld forwarded another memo to a group of missile defense advocates, most of whom were in the previous day's meeting.[463] This memo was from a Welch Panel member whom Rumsfeld called "a friend of mine." The Panel member was requested by Rumsfeld and Cambone, at a luncheon they attended, to write back with their thoughts on NMD. While the specific date and location of the luncheon was not disclosed, based on the date of Rumsfeld's forwarding of the memo (March 9, 2001) and the phrasing by the author of "the luncheon Friday," we can reasonably infer that the luncheon in question was the previous Friday, March 2nd. This is notable because March 2nd was the swearing-in ceremony of Paul Wolfowitz. That same day, Rumsfeld sent out several memos concerning conversations and insights of retired military personnel. These conversations included General Tom Moorman, who gave an employment recommendation, and General Ron Fogelman, with whom Rumsfeld said he spoke "at lunch" regarding military numbers and arrangements.[464] While neither Fogelman nor Moorman's conversation was particularly noteworthy, both retired generals worked for defense contractors during these conversations, which presumably took place during a celebratory luncheon.[465] Based on these conversations, Rumsfeld put the wheels into motion regarding the possibility of employment for the recommendation and bringing in Fogelman to discuss his topic. This clearly indicates the utility of social gatherings, such as the various Galas held by organizations like the CSP, to open communication channels between defense contractors' employees and the defense department policymakers. It also demonstrates the utility of revolving

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[463] Steven Cambone, Paul Wolfowitz, Dov Zakheim, William Schneider, Pete Aldredge, and Chris Williams.

[464] Donald Rumsfeld, *Memo on Gen. Ron Fogelman* (National Security Archive, 2001)., Donald Rumsfeld, *Memo on Gen. Tom Moorman* (National Security Archive, 2001).

[465] Presumably, however, it was at this event where the unknown Welch Panel member was specifically requested to provide insight regarding missile defense.

door employment for the network.

In May of 2001, Rumsfeld sent a memo to Susan Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, asking her to provide him with answers to "tough" questions on missile defense, including wanting an answer to criticisms regarding missile defense only being "marginally effective." The talking points were laid out: no defense is perfect, even defenses that are "substantially less than 100% effective" could make "contributions to deterring threats and defending," and hit-to-kill technology has been "proven" and while the memo did not specifically address the Achilles heel of countermeasures.

The Coyle Report Roadblocks and Tests During the First Year of the Bush Administration

Organizations strive to minimize uncertainties, uphold their independence, and limit external influences on their decision-making processes to better ensure their access to necessary resources. In navigating environmental pressures and external attempts at influence, organizations may adopt strategies that create the appearance of fulfilling external demands, creating an illusion that the environmental need has been met.[466] A strategy deployed often entails controlling the release of information, selectively sharing data, or strategically delaying responses to inquiries, all concerted efforts to effectively assert control over environmental demands and manage external dependencies.[467]

Nine months after it was drafted and following a presidential election, Congress released the Coyle Report on June 26, 2001, overcoming the Department of Defense's sustained attempts to block its publication. Despite an existing statute mandating its delivery to Congress,

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[466] Pfeffer and Salancik.

[467] Ibid.

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Representative John Tierney's repeated requests for the report were systematically evaded by the DoD. Tierney first requested the report at a House National Security Subcommittee hearing on September 8, 2000.[468] For four months, the Department of Defense remained unresponsive to these inquiries. Following a failed subpoena attempt, a group of 55 House members, Tierney among them, contacted Secretary Rumsfeld directly.[469] On May 31, 2001, the report was finally delivered to the National Security Subcommittee, but the DoD stated that the report should be treated as if it were confidential. In providing the report, the Pentagon's legal counsel said it was doing so "as a matter of discretion for use by the committee for its oversight purposes only." The letter from the DoD legal counsel stated that the Pentagon had "not approved the release of this report to the general public."[470]

Rep. Tierney argued against this request by the DoD, claiming that the rationale for confidentiality was not clear, that there was never a claim that the report or its contents were classified, and that the substantial amount of time that had passed from the first request of its release provided a sufficient opportunity for any such claims to be made. Requests to Rumsfeld seeking justification for the Pentagon's suppression of the report were unanswered, though the DoD reiterated its preference for the report to be viewed as confidential. "Subcommittee Chair Christopher Shays, facing eight months of unexplained delays, released the report, declaring, 'If the proponents [of missile defense] fail to convince, the fault lies with us, yet the debate must proceed in the public arena.'" The Department of Defense's postponement in making the Coyle

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[468] Mary McGrory, "No Defense for the Missile Shield," *The Washington Post*, June 21, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/06/21/no-defense-for-the-missile-shield/aecd5b73-686e-4087-b34c-4e670e309aaf/.

[469] Coyle.

[470] Stewart Aly, *Letter to Dan Burton Regarding Coyle Report* (Washington, DC: Office of General Counsel, 2001).

Report public can be interpreted as an intentional effort to steer the dialogue regarding the viability of missile defense technology, ostensibly to maintain its budgetary allocations in the face of increasing legislative scrutiny.

On July 14th, 2001, speaking at a conference advocating for missile defense held by the Frontiers of Freedom, Rumsfeld was pressed on what the plans were for the program and stressed that they were only in the research, development, and testing phase. He explicitly stated that they were not planning on deployment in the near term.[471] Two days later, the United States conducted the ground-based midcourse defense's 4th intercept test (IFT-6), the first in over a year and the first of the Bush administration. During this test, the mock warhead was successfully intercepted. However, it was revealed later that this test – like others before it, was rigged in favor of the missile defense system and was in no way an accurate representation of a real-world scenario. A homing beacon transponder aided the interceptor in the warhead, which was used to identify its location and create an intercept plan for the booster and EKV. Furthermore, the Pentagon knew of the launch time and location of the mock warhead. While a decoy balloon was included in the test, it was notably different from the target, and the EKV was given *a priori* information about both the decoy balloon and the mock warhead and advanced knowledge concerning which object would be brighter.[472] The BMDO said they would "hopefully" also possess this information in a real-world scenario. Furthermore, the X-band radar could not immediately determine the intercept verification, as the radar stopped recording data

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[471] United States Department of Defense, *Secretary Rumsfeld Answers Questions at Frontiers of Freedom Conference* (2001).

[472] *Oversight of Missile Defense (Part 3): Questions for the Missile Defense Agency*, Second ed., *Subcommittee on Naitonal Security and Foreign Affairs* (Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 2008)., Wade Boese, "Missile Defense Interceptor Hits Target, but Not All Perfect in Test," *Arms Control Today* 31, no. 7 (2001), accessed 2021/11/05/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23627065.

over a minute before interception and reported the hit as a miss.[473] Such information would need

to be known immediately in a real-world scenario due to the need to launch follow-up

interceptors in case of a miss. The BMDO referred to this error as a "minor anomaly."[474]

Announcing the results of the $100 million test, BMDO Director Kadish said it was "a

successful test, in all aspects, right now."[475] Lott declared, "They hit a bullet with a bullet, and it

does work."[476] The day following the rigged intercept test, Jack Spencer of the Heritage

Foundation stated that the test proved critics were "wrong" and "we can hit a bullet with a

bullet." Spencer noted the importance of this missile test from a PR perspective, saying that "the

successful hit would have a big effect in the public relations battle by undermining the often-

heard argument that 'this technology is unfeasible.'"[477] The Heritage Foundation argued that the

missile defense test, deemed successful, could be leveraged to diminish public skepticism about

the system's core inadequacies, even though the test outcomes did not resolve these foundational

critiques. The New York Times reported that the test might give a "boost" to the Pentagon's

efforts to secure more funding for missile defense, aligning with the Heritage Foundation's

predictions of its positive public relations impact. Thomas Collina of the Union of Concerned

Scientists was seemingly also aware of the test's usefulness, publicly arguing that the test

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[473] Gronlund, Wright, and Young.

[474] Philip E Coyle, "Rhetoric or Reality? Missile Defense under Bush," Arms Control Association, last modified May, accessed. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-05/features/rhetoric-reality-missile-defense-under-bush.

[475] James Dao, "Pentagon Officials Report Hit in Latest Missile Defense Test," *The New York Times*, July 15, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/15/us/pentagon-officials-report-hit-in-latest-missile-defense-test.html.

[476] Gronlund, Wright, and Young.

[477] Paul Richter, "Test of Antimissile System Scores a Hit," *Los Angeles Times*, July 15, 2001, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-jul-15-mn-22621-story.html.

"shouldn't be seen as justification to move toward a system" and that "they're not really testing the system."[478]

Three days after the test, the House passed a resolution, H. Res. 195. In his opening remarks presenting the resolution, Representative Duncan Hunter, who would later receive the Keeper of the Flame Award, extolled the efforts of the United States military and defense contractor staff involved in the interceptor test. The resolution mentions explicitly that 35,000 Americans contributed to the interception, including members of the Air Force, Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and the BMDO team. The resolution also thanked "the contractor team consisting of thousands of American scientists, engineers, and blue-collar workers employed by the prime contractors and hundreds of small businesses."[479] Rep. Allen (D-ME) argued that the resolution "serves no purpose other than a political one. The best thing we could do for national missile defense is reduce the political and ideological motivations." Less than a week after the test, on July 20, 2001, the Heritage Foundation pushed the administration to emphasize a near-term deployment, specifically referencing Rumsfeld's comment about not being in the deployment phase, arguing that "even the hint of hesitation regarding deployment can stifle progress by emboldening the President's critics."[480]

In December, after initially being delayed from its planned December 1st date due to rain and delayed from its rescheduled December 2nd test, also due to rain, IFT-7 was a successful test. However, it had the same inherent bias toward success that IFT-6 had, with the only difference

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[478] Ibid.

[479] *Commending Military and Defense Contractor Personnel Responsible for Successful Ballistic Missile Test*, by Duncan Hunter, H. Res. 195 (2001).

[480] Jack Spencer, "Moving Forward on Missile Defense," last modified July 20, accessed. https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/moving-forward-missile-defense#pgfId=1150736.

between IFT-6 and IFT-7 being a change in the booster for the decoy rocket, a function that was not being tested. Even though the test was, for all intents and purposes, a repeat of a test that was already biased in favor of success, BMDO Director Kadish stressed the fact that it should not be viewed as "a pass-fail test," but that "success would be if we learned a lot and gained confidence," effectively pre-eliminating the possibility of failure.

However, the legitimacy of the test itself was contested by outside experts, like retired Navy Rear Adm Eugene Carroll, Deputy Director for the Center for Defense Information, arguing that the test "doesn't prove anything… proves only that a Hollywood script, carefully drawn, will create a compelling scene."[481] The day before the planned test date, the Union of Concerned Scientists released a report providing an independent evaluation of the program to that point.[482] The report critiqued the program, specifically emphasizing the use of homing beacons and countermeasures that did not provide a hurdle in target discrimination. While the criticisms of the simplicity and biased nature of the tests mounted, and the assurances that the test was not being viewed as a pass-fail test by the BMDO in advance of the test, statements released by the BMDO and invested missile defense advocates suggest that the system should be viewed as having passed a test. The BMDO released a statement after the successful interception arguing that the system "successfully demonstrated" both flight performance and as well as HTK technology and should be considered "a major step." TRW Systems president Donald Winter argued that the test exceeded performance expectations and demonstrated a "proven performance

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[481] "Us missile Defense Test will Be a Learning Experience - Pentagon," *Channel NewsAsia*, 1 December, 2001.

[482] Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright, and Stephen Young, *An Assessment of the Intercept Test Program of the Ground-Based Midcourse National Missile Defense System* (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2001), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/ift7.pdf.

record," with TRW's specific involvement demonstrating the "enormous value it brings to the

emerging national team."[483]

Enhancing Organizational Prestige and Control: Birth of the MDA

The Road to Reorganization

Organizational incentives within the Department of Defense and associated networks,

driven by a focus on resource dependence, were already shaping the missile defense strategy

before Donald Rumsfeld's tenure. This trajectory, evident in the emphasis on a capability-based

approach and more adaptable processes, highlights efforts to manage uncertainties and reduce

external oversight. The subsequent reinforcement and amplification of these strategies under

Rumsfeld further underscored an intent to consolidate control over resources and decision-

making to sustain a stable and autonomous operational environment.

This ongoing momentum for revamping missile defense strategies was evident in the

discourse prior to Rumsfeld's appointment. Major General William Nance's statements at a

Missile Defense symposium in December 2000 are a clear example. Nance revealed forthcoming

adjustments to the National Missile Defense (NMD) program, highlighting a shift in

development methodologies. His announcement, "adjustments will be made to permit design and

development through block upgrades, enabling engineers to integrate improved capabilities at

earliest possible dates," underscored a strategic shift towards incremental and adaptable

development processes.

Furthermore, Nance's announcement that the program would transition to a "capability-

based design," deviating from the earlier "threat-centric" approach, indicated a pivotal shift in

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[483] Ibid.

strategic orientation.[484] Although these remarks became public after the November election, drafts of this directive were circulating as early as October, with leaks to reporters occurring in November. This timeline indicates that the strategic pivot towards a more adaptable, capability-focused missile defense was already underway, independent of Rumsfeld's subsequent influence. While Rumsfeld's impact, including the heightened perception of threat, is undeniable, the organizational momentum to pursue a capability-based approach was pre-established. The evolution in missile defense strategy, especially the move towards a capability-based model, seems to be a reflection of a broader, pre-existing inclination within the defense network. In this context, Rumsfeld's role was reinforcing and amplifying these already established strategic directions rather than initiating them.

As for the rationalization behind the push for capabilities-based approaches, speaking at a missile defense symposium, General John Hyten, former vice chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made it clear that these changes in the acquisition approach provided a justification for development when one might not otherwise exist.

> "We went through a period from 1990 to 2000 where we were struggling with what is the threat, where is the threat? And then, in 2000, we came up with a concept called Capability-Based Development and Planning. And most people in this room are old enough to remember Capability-Based Development and Planning because that became the mantra. And it was really based on a functional analysis of requirements, and it was based because there was no identifiable threat."[485]

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[484] Chris Strohm, "Boeing Is Responsible for Executing Changes: Pentagon Adjusts Nmd Program Due to Capability, Testing Concerns," *Inside the Army* 12, no. 49 (2000), accessed 2021/08/20/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43985164.

[485] Later in that speech, Hyten suggested that every country with nuclear weapons should have been considered an adversary, stating, "Why did people have nuclear weapons still in their inventory? Because they were our friends? That doesn't make a whole lot of sense. No. They still had nuclear weapons because they were there to threaten the United States of America." See: General John E. Hyten, "Army Air and Missile Defense Hot Topic 2018," U.S. Strategic Command, last modified February 28, accessed. https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/1465217/ausa-army-air-missile-defense-hot-topic-2018/.

On an investor's call roughly a year after Rumsfeld's memo of reorganization, Ed Franklin, President of IDS Business for Raytheon, demonstrated how the transition to block upgrades in missile defense systems offered a practical illustration of Resource Dependence Theory in action. He explains, "They're going to have that initial capability, which they call Block '04. And then, every two years, they will upgrade capabilities."[486] This structured, iterative approach of introducing new capabilities every two years (as seen in Block '04 and subsequent upgrades) aligns with the tenets of Resource Dependence Theory. Each upgrade cycle represents an opportunity for defense contractors to secure new funding; as Franklin indicates: "Each of these blocks opens opportunities for us to go get business." This approach ensures a continuous flow of resources (financial, technological, and human capital) to these firms and maintains their investment and support in the missile defense network. The dynamic nature of these block upgrades, with their periodic introduction of new technologies and capabilities, aligns with the theory's emphasis on organizational adaptability and strategic positioning to maintain resource inflows.

Rumsfeld felt the organizational incentives to push back against oversight almost immediately after the Bush administration entered the White House. The first week of February, Rumsfeld sent out a memo asking for the costs of the oversight (including over missile defense) and trying to find ways that the oversight could be delayed, combined, or even "encourage" Congress to remove specific oversight requirements.[487] He was encouraged to use his office's

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[486] Ed Franklin, *Raytheon Annual Investor Conference - Final* (2003).

[487] Donald Rumsfeld, *Congressional Reporting Requirements* (Rumsfeld.com: 2001).

"bully pulpit" to push back against these restrictions.[488] Beyond the reports, Rumsfeld also

seemingly resented the number of times there were hearings regarding programs in the Pentagon,

sending a memo to Gingrich on the topic while noting "it is breathtaking to see the "interest"

[quotes in memo] Congress has in the Department."[489]

After taking office, Rumsfeld brought into the defense department what had been referred

to as a "cadre of corporate heavyweights," including former defense industry executives Gordon

England of General Dynamics and James Roche of Northrop Grumman, who were brought in to

serve as the Navy and Air Force Secretaries, respectively.[490] England and Roche, along with

former Enron executive turned Army Secretary Thomas White, Paul Wolfowitz, Ed "Pete"

Aldridge, and Rumsfeld, formed the Senior Executive Council.[491] Incorporating leaders from

prominent defense and industry sectors into pivotal roles within the Department of Defense can

be seen as a strategic move to optimize interactions and collaboration with potential partners.

This approach, which aligns with principles of resource dependence theory, can facilitate more

efficient operations and foster stronger alliances, potentially improving access to essential

resources and support.[492]

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[488] This specific suggestion was made by John Veroneau, the Assistant Secretary for Defense (Legislative Affairs), see: John Veroneau, *Congressional Reporting Requirements (Secdef Memo Dated February 5, 2001)* (Rumsfeld.com, 2001).

[489] Donald Rumsfeld, *Hearings - To: Newt Gingrich* (rumsfeld.com, 2001).

[490] Stan Crock and Richard S. Dunham, "A Hostile Takeover of the Pentagon?," *Bloomberg Businessweek*, no. 3739 (2001).

[491] Among other connections, Aldridge, the former CEO of The Aerospace Corporation and Secretary of the Air Force, worked in Rumsfeld's Department of Defense during the Ford Administration and gave an interview to the Rumsfeld Commission in 1998. A commission of which Wolfowitz was a member. See: Congress, *Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*, by The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 104 Cong. (Washington, DC, 1998).

[492] By the next year, the Missile Defense Support Group would also be formed, composed of representatives from various military branches, designed to aid the SEC. This move suggests an effort to smooth interorganizational

In July of 2001, Kadish argued before Congress that the then BMDO needed a different acquisition process than the rest of the DoD, suggesting a need to "go beyond the conventional build-to-requirements acquisition process."[493] On August 15, 2001, Kadish briefed the SEC (including Rumsfeld) on restructuring the then BMDO.[494] Pete Aldridge, defending the need to reorganize, said that Kadish has to be able to make decisions rapidly and "cannot afford all the oversight and scrutiny of every one of his programs." However, according to Aldridge, Kadish would still have the "proper level of oversight" because the SEC would be the "board of directors" that could provide "steering vectors" when a program gets closer to maturity, but until then, "he's going to operate in a much more streamlined manner."

On July 17th, 2001, speaking before the SASC, Kadish, in response to questioning from Sen. Max Cleland (D-GA), explained that the administration wants a new approach to acquisition when it comes to missile defense, without traditional procurement milestones but argued that this would not lead to oversight of the program suffering. Kadish stated, "When we refer to specific major defense procurement milestones, it is true we don't have those right now." Kadish argued that this "doesn't mean we don't have plans and developing criteria to move forward… in our development program. We do and will have those." He added that how those criteria lead to "specific procurement and deployment milestones, however, is yet to be determined."

tensions and align different military perspectives, potentially creating a more unified front in missile defense strategy and decision-making.

[493] Thomas Duffy, "Qdr Says Missile Defense Is Vital to Homeland Defense," *Inside Missile Defense* 7, no. 20 (2001), accessed 2023/11/14/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24783572.

[494] John Liang, "Bmdo Director Presents Reorganization Plan to Dod Leadership," *Inside Missile Defense* 7, no. 17 (2001), accessed 2021/07/22/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24783136.

Missile Defense Agency, Incentivized Optimism, and Organizational Maneuvering Around Oversight

On January 2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld released a memo issuing a series of changes in the direction of the missile defense program.[495] Among these shifts in institutional direction was renaming the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which marked a deliberate and strategic realignment by the Department of Defense. This rebranding was more than cosmetic; it elevated the MDA's role and increased its operational independence, thus enhancing its visibility and legitimacy within the national security structure. In practical terms, the MDA's new designation and the accompanying changes—shifting to a capability-based requirement process—consolidated its authority, securing a more stable foundation for resource acquisition across the network. Former Under Secretary of Defense Jacques Gansler, when speaking on the change from the BMDO to the MDA, argued that it provided a sense of "institutional permanence" and viewed it as "an elevation."[496]

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) underwent significant steps to enhance its standing and operational independence. The MDA was given a streamlined development process and greater freedom of control, and its books were wiped clean concerning any program requirements started by the BMDO. The program was given organizational freedom not seen since the National Reconnaissance Office.[497] By curtailing external oversight in areas such as testing protocols, budgeting, and acquisitions, the MDA has effectively fortified its position of

[495] *Reorganization of the Missile Defense Program*, *Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee* (mda.mil: Missile Defense Agency, 2002).

[496] Thomas Duffy, "Kadish's Bmdo Reorganization Plan Nearly Complete," *Inside Missile Defense* 7, no. 24 (2001), accessed 2021/07/22, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24783057.

[497] Bradley Graham, "Rumsfeld Pares Oversight of Missile Defense Agency," *Washington Post, February* 16 (2002).

power. This strategic elevation has broader implications for the network—it stabilizes the acquisition of resources for all involved actors. Network actors have incentives to reduce uncertainties related to the future procurement of essential resources. Such uncertainties can impede strategic planning and the "rational achievement of purpose."[498] Variability in the availability of these resources can limit an organization's choices, reducing its sovereignty and heightening reliance on other entities.[499] A further indication of the importance of this change is that Rumsfeld, who throughout his tenure in the DoD repeatedly pushed to streamline personnel and trim the metaphorical fat around positions in the Pentagon, authorized the MDA to be staffed at 100% of authorized levels, a non-standard authorization that Rumsfeld argued was due to the "special nature of missile defense development."[500] Rumsfeld also authorized the capabilities-based approach that had been in the works since the previous administration, a fact that outside experts were skeptical of, with Lisbeth Gronlund of the Union of Concerned Scientists suggesting it provided something of a cart blanche for contractors and invited gorging by the MDA, "Rather than first spell out what's needed, it sounds like they're just going to create something and then say this is something we need" arguing that it was essentially saying "whatever you've got, we'll take."[501]

The efforts to diminish external control and unpredictability highlight an organizational pursuit of self-sufficiency. Such autonomy is crucial not just for its own sake but to ensure uninterrupted progress toward organizational goals and long-term stability. The MDA's approach

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[498] Barry Posen, "Foreword: Military Doctrine and the Management of Uncertainty," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 2 (2016).

[499] Nienhüser.

[500] Graham, "Rumsfeld Pares Oversight of Missile Defense Agency."

[501] Ibid.

to mitigating uncertainties, especially in resource control and acquisition, reflects a strategic behavior influenced by the need to reduce dependency on external entities. The variability in resource availability can constrain an organization's options, impacting its autonomy and increasing its reliance on others. Thus, the MDA's actions to shield itself from external uncertainties and interference can be seen as a strategic endeavor to maintain a consistent and autonomous operational pathway.

The Necessary is Possible: Organizational Incentives for Necessary Optimistic Miscalculation

On March 13th, the same day as the intercept test IFT-8, Richard Perle stated, "I think technological pessimists, by and large, have been wrong over the years. The things that were thought to be difficult, impossible, at least daunting, have been done. They've been done in quite amazing ways."[502] Perle's perspective here was echoed by Gingrich two months later, who stated that when he sees people who doubt missile defense, he asks, "What century are you living in?" Arguing that he would "rather gamble on science and technology" rather than "lawyers and diplomats." Gingrich argued that "the historical record is pretty decisive."[503]

Actors in the network repeatedly argued to reframe what success meant; part of this was done by utilizing technological optimism and positioning success as an inevitable outcome if given the proper amount of time and resources.[504] One variation of this was positioning the difficulties of missile defense not as a science problem but as an "engineering problem." Many

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[502] Sherry Jones, "Interview with Richard Perle," Frontline, last modified March 27, accessed April 7, 2019. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/missile/interviews/perle.html.

[503] Sherry Jones, "Interview with Newt Gingrich," Frontline, last modified March 27, accessed 2019. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/missile/interviews/gingrich.html.

[504] Columba Peoples, *Justifying Ballistic Missile Defence: Technology, Security and Culture*, vol. 112 (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

outside experts, such as Theodore Postol, argue that strategic missile defense was an inherently flawed system with its problems (specifically problems of differentiation) rooted in "basic physics" and that "it will never be able to work." However, by reframing the issue, network actors can sidestep this criticism. For instance, on July 11, 2001, BMDO Director Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish argued before the SASC that "there are no inventions required to do it; it's a matter of very difficult engineering activities… it's an engineering challenge rather than an inventions challenge[505]." This point was reiterated a day later by Paul Wolfowitz, who stated that "today [strategic missile defense] is no longer a problem of invention, it is a challenge of engineering. It is a challenge this country is up to."

Organizational incentives have historically been found to cause miscalculated optimism, including among military planners regarding their concepts and technology.[506] This can result in individuals having a "necessary is possible" mindset, which is essentially "it will work because it has to work."[507] These incentives can lead to organizations choosing historical analogies that justify their proposals, regardless of appropriateness. It can be argued this miscalculated optimism can be found in two distinct ways regarding the missile defense network: strategic and technological optimism.[508] Strategic optimism involves a belief in both the effectiveness and utility of the system, requiring various paper tiger arguments to create an adversary that is deterred by the defense but not by destruction or an adversary with the capability and ability to

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[505] Thomas Duffy, "Kadish, Aldridge to Work out Missile Defense Acquisition Plan " *Inside Missile Defense* 7, no. 15 (2001), accessed 2021/07/22/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24783482.

[506] Lindley.

[507] Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914*.

[508] Some refer to techno-optimism as technological determinism; see: Columba Peoples, "Sputnik and 'Skill Thinking'revisited: Technological Determinism in American Responses to the Soviet Missile Threat," *Cold War History* 8, no. 1 (2008)., Peoples, *Justifying Ballistic Missile Defence: Technology, Security and Culture*.

create a nuclear able ICBM but without the ability or foresight to equip it with countermeasures. From a technological perspective, these incentives lead to analogies to previous technologies or breakthroughs, such as the space program or the Wright brothers, leading to a variation of the survivorship bias that discounts the countless amounts of times that people have failed to create technological breakthroughs.

A Battle Over Oversight

On March 15, 2002, intercept test IFT-8 was conducted, resulting in a successful intercept.[509] Unlike the previous two attempts, the target suite incorporated two additional balloons, with an official in the DoD noting that "any time you add more objects, you stress the kill vehicle." However, while this intercept test did include three balloons, making it almost by definition a more complex test than one without, there was not a legitimate increase in difficulty in terms of discrimination as the balloons were not intended to match the appearance of the warhead. Publications released before the test noted the program had come under public scrutiny for the lack of complexity in the target suite.[510]

On May 14, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) made a significant policy shift announced by its spokesperson, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Richard Lehner. Lehner stated, "For this upcoming test and all subsequent tests hereafter, it will be our policy to no longer offer specifics about the target or countermeasures used in the flight tests." This decision, as Lehner

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[509] The test was reported to have initially been planned for February, though the MDA would state publicly that there was no firm date set. It is unknown if this was a fluid timeline or another example of program slippage, see: " Mda Gears up for Interceptor Flight test next Month," *Defense Daily International*, 1 March, 2002.

[510] Ibid.

explained, was made to protect the integrity of their technology development and to safeguard national security from potentially hostile nations.[511]

This move to withhold previously disclosed details about the nature of the targets and countermeasures in flight tests served a strategic purpose. By restricting this information, the MDA effectively insulates itself from public and expert critiques that could question the program's efficacy, potentially influencing its resource allocation and stability. Lehner further clarified the extent of this informational restriction, noting that while they would continue to release the dates and outcomes of tests, "we're not going to talk about targets and countermeasures." Descriptions of decoys would be limited to vague terms like "balloons" or "plastic replicas," as he mentioned, "probably about as specific as we'll go."[512]

Senator Jack Reed, chair of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which oversaw the MDA, interpreted these actions as a deliberate attempt to dodge the usual oversight from Congress, the media, and the scientific community. He criticized this attitude: "They're attempting to avoid the usual oversight by Congress, the media, and the larger scientific community. There's an attitude of 'we know best, don't bother us.'"[513] The actions that Reed describes represent a strategy of shielding vital organizational aspects from external scrutiny, a tactic often used by organizations to maintain control over critical resources and preserve autonomy.

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[511] Kerry Gildea, "Mda Classifies Missile Defense Flight Test Target, Countermeasure Data," *Defense Daily*, May 15, 2002.

[512] Paul Richter, "Missile-Defense System Data Will Be Kept Private," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 10, 2002.

[513] Ibid.

The decision of the MDA to cloak its flight tests in secrecy, particularly at a stage where the system is far from deployment, sparked debate among experts. In an editorial for The Washington Post, Philip Coyle acknowledged that while the secrecy might seem reasonable at first glance, it was premature given the state of the program at the time.[514] He pointed out that the types of decoys used in tests were not representative of potential enemy countermeasures against missile defense, describing them as "round balloons" easily distinguishable from the target re-entry vehicle. With his experience and expertise as the former Director of Operational Test and Evaluation at the Pentagon, Coyle argued that at least "20 developmental tests (each costing about $100 million)" are necessary before advancing to realistic operational testing. He asserted that "the current test program is not giving away any secrets; nor is there any danger of that for years to come," highlighting that the MDA is classifying information previously published in The New York Times. [515]

This policy of withholding information, Coyle argued, extends even to the Pentagon's own independent review offices, potentially impeding thorough oversight. Stephen Young from the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) echoed these concerns, questioning the necessity of such secrecy, stating, "We don't think they need it."[516] Coyle warned of the potential for a retroactive classification policy, which could skew public perception by only disclosing successes while using classification to hide less favorable outcomes. He cautioned against the possibility of press releases on missile defense tests becoming unreliable, selectively revealing good news while concealing the bad under the guise of classification. According to Coyle, this

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[514] Philip Coyle, "Why the Secrecy Shield?," *The Washington Post*, June 11, 2002.

[515] Philip E Coyle, "Why the Secrecy Shield," *The Washington Post*, June 11, 2002.

[516] Richter, "Missile-Defense System Data Will Be Kept Private."

approach could damage the integrity of the oversight process and prevent a comprehensive understanding of the program's actual progress and challenges.[517]

These criticisms were rebuffed by Kadish, who argued, "The charge of excessive secrecy is wrong..."[518] He assured that essential decision-makers within the department would have "more than adequate information to act on" and emphasized that Congress would be fully informed when necessary for decision-making processes, having "all it needs when times come for decisions." Further reinforcing his stance on the need for discretion, Kadish highlighted the importance of safeguarding sensitive information from potential adversaries. He argued, "There is no responsible individual that would make that information available to our adversaries so they can learn how to defeat our system."[519] Taking Kadish at his word, this statement underscores a concern for national security and the strategic integrity of the missile defense system. By limiting the dissemination of certain technical details, Kadish suggests that the MDA is acting responsibly to protect the effectiveness of its system against potential countermeasures by hostile entities.

However, this explanation can be seen as somewhat obfuscating the fact that such secrecy also serves to shield the MDA from external scrutiny and influence. By restricting information, the MDA effectively insulates itself from public opinion and oversight that could challenge or question its funding and decision-making processes. While framed as a matter of national security, this strategy concurrently acts to maintain the agency's autonomy and control

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[517] Coyle, "Why the Secrecy Shield."

[518] Bradley Graham, "Secrecy on Missile Defense Grows," *Washington Post*, June 12, 2002, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/06/12/secrecy-on-missile-defense-grows/f09acd4e-10ac-4fcd-8142-102efa7866d9/.

[519] Matt Kelley, "Secrecy Sought on Missile Defense," *Associated Press*, June 25, 2002.

over its operational direction and resource allocation. Such a stance suggests an underlying intent to manage external pressures and sustain the agency's independence, potentially at the cost of comprehensive transparency and accountability.

In June of 2002, according to an account by Rep. Kucinich, Kadish provided an oral directive to his deputies in the MDA, instructing them to classify as secret "all information relating to decoys" regardless of how general the information was or how widely it was already known. That summer, Congressional critics attempted to push back both on the restructuring of the MDA, including its acquisition, testing, and benchmark processes, as well as on the seemingly ever-increasing secrecy surrounding the program that further hindered attempts at oversight. That June, Rep. Tierney voiced concerns about the MDA withholding "records, documents, data, and other information" from Director Christie of the OT&E.[520] He argued the DoD had no authority to withhold information from OT&E, pointing out that the MDA had proposed formalizing restrictions on access to information through a Memorandum of Understanding and argued for missile defense to be held to the same level of scrutiny as any other system. Lehner clarified that OT&E's jurisdiction was primarily operational testing, not research and development testing. While on the surface valid, this distinction seems like a conceptual stretch when noting that the entire program was considered R&D. [521] Senator Reed argued the actions of the MDA were a "disturbing trend," with Levin declaring that the behavior was reminiscent of "Enron." [522] He claimed that it appeared to be the administration's "automatic

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[520] Jim Wolf, "U.S. Lawmaker Seeks Pentagon Missile-Secrecy Probe," *Reuters News*, June 12, 2002.

[521] Ibid.

[522] Christopher Marquis, "Democrats Complain About Missile Test Secrecy," *The New York Times*, June 13, 2002.

assumption" to "hold secret as much information as they can." [523] In a statement to the Senate floor, Sen. Byrd argued that the "sole reason" for classifying such "basic information" is to "squelch criticism." [524] However, such criticism still arrived, with an Op-Ed in the Boston Globe that month suggesting that "the only way [the MDA] can save its unworkable missile defense from reviews that will kill it, is to hide information from the public." [525]

Defense advocates in the network pushed back through the press with Aldridge, who, in an Op-Ed running roughly a week later, argued that suggestions of "sinister motives" were "groundless." [526] Alridge suggested organizational and network-based motivations for the criticism, arguing that criticisms came from "members of advocacy groups long opposed" to missile defense. Aldridge also suggested that the act of leaving the ABMT was justification enough to increase secrecy, asking, "What could be a more appropriate time to tighten security?" In a letter to the editor, Lehner argued that secrecy was needed because "current and potential adversaries want this information," alluding to a growing window of vulnerability. [527]

In July, regarding the organizational restructuring, Kadish was brought before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veteran Affairs, and International Relations. The hearing highlighted significant organizational incentives that motivate organizations like the MDA to limit oversight and public scrutiny. Kucinich characterized missile defense as "a solution which is unworkable and unaffordable for a problem which is undefinable and often not believable."

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[523] Thomas Duffy, "Levin Questions Missile Defense Agency's Classification Policy," *Inside Missile Defense* 8, no. 12 (2002).

[524] Kelley.

[525] Theodore A. Postol, "A Hole in Our Missile Defense System," *The Boston Globe*, June 15, 2002.

[526] Pete Aldridge, "Tight Security for Missile Defense," *USA Today*, June 26, 2002.

[527] Rick Lehner, "U.S. Must Protect Its Missile Test Data," *The Cincinatti Post*, June 27, 2002.

His critique extended to the reorganization of the MDA, which he argued was intended to speed up development but had the effect of significantly reducing Congressional oversight. Kucinich noted the "new emphasis defined all of the missile defense initiatives as one large research and development program...operational requirement documents were eliminated... timelines for development will not be established."[528]

Kucinich also raised concerns about the new acquisition strategy, stating, "In this spiral development strategy, the Pentagon will not focus on strict requirements for the program but on various capabilities that may develop...There is no way Congress can determine whether the program is over budget."[529] This approach, Kucinich argued, was a deliberate attempt by the Department of Defense to eliminate Congress's oversight role while spending billions on a program that lacked clear objectives and success metrics, saying that the program "has very few parameters by which to judge success. I think that's intentional." However, Kucinich did not believe that the goal was solely to prevent congressional oversight but to "prevent cost delays and technical flaws from garnering public scrutiny." When the subject of in-house red teams providing oversight for the MDA was broached, Kucinich said that he wanted it stated: "for the record that the General [Kadish] has testified that the red team programs are under the financial control and authority" of the MDA, even though they are "supposed to be giving an independent evaluation of whether or not these countermeasures work."[530]

Congressman John Tierney echoed these concerns, emphasizing that the reorganization under the current administration had made fundamental changes that threatened the ability to

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[528] "Missile Defense: A New Organization, Evolutionary Technologies and Unrestricted Testing."

[529] Ibid.

[530] Ibid.

have oversight. He pointed out the merging of various missile defense programs into a single system, stating, "Essentially, there are no limits, and we all ought to be concerned about that." Tierney, when questioning whether the MDA had addressed any of the concerns that Coyle made in his report, Kadish noted that the concerns were about the BMDO and, despite the string of tests continuing in the same system regarding the same technology, extending to the late 90s, Kadish argued Coyle's complaints were regarding a program that "no longer exists," resulting in Tierney pointing out that he "redefined [the MDA's] situation so as not to have to address those problems."

Political incentives create pressure on Republicans not to give deep criticism of the program. As evidence of the sort of faux-oversight these incentives can lead to, Congressman Schrock noted that he read about a Chinese missile that could hit Atlanta (despite countless public statements declaring that the system is not designed with China in mind). He also added that "freedom is not free. And nothing worthwhile is easy or cheap" to defend the costs of the system.

In defense of the lack of benchmarks and evaluation goals, Kadish argued that the system was still too early in development because they did not know which direction the system might develop in and when pushed on if the tests being deployed by the MDA were realistic, Kadish argued that "we ought to define what realistic means."[531] Just over a week after this hearing, the MDA made another policy change regarding the testing and evaluation process and announced that it would not create a single, overarching test and evaluation master plan (TEMP) for the entire national missile defense system. Instead, they chose to develop separate developmental test plans for each system component. This approach allows the MDA to manage the details of

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[531] Ibid.

each element's testing internally, potentially reducing the detailed information available to oversight bodies.[532]

By focusing on Developmental Master Test Plans (DMTPs) for individual missile defense elements, the MDA can control the flow of specific operational and technical information. This method effectively limits the scope of external scrutiny, allowing the MDA to maintain greater control and decision-making autonomy over the missile defense program. The decision to eventually produce TEMPs in collaboration with military services only when a system component is ready for service production further underscores this control.

While enhancing operational flexibility, this strategy also implies a deliberate management of external pressures, particularly from oversight bodies. By controlling the granularity of information shared, the MDA can navigate complex political and funding landscapes, potentially minimizing external influences on its strategic and operational decisions. This approach reflects an organizational tendency to safeguard autonomy and limit external intervention, especially in areas critical to national security and defense technology development.

A Ground Breaking, a Two-Year Hiatus, and Re-classifying Coyle

The deployment of the national missile defense system, marked by increasing levels of secrecy and a clear preference for speed over proof of effectiveness, underscores a push for deployment at any cost. This stance aligns with diverse interests: the organizational interests of the MDA in retaining control over the narrative and resources, the political interests of the President and the Republican party in deploying the system before the election for political leverage, and the interests of the broader defense network. A deployed system, subject to spiral

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[532] Thomas Duffy, "Mda Drawing up Individual Test Plans for Missile Defense Systems," *Inside Missile Defense* 8, no. 15 (2002), accessed 2021/11/12/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24783150.

development, can be continuously adjusted and expanded, significantly reducing the likelihood of cancellation or indefinite postponement compared to a system not yet deployed. This strategic approach reflects a complex interplay of internal and external factors influencing the decision-making process, with an overarching emphasis on maintaining momentum and control in the face of potential challenges and critiques.

During the first summer in office, while the ABM Treaty was still in effect, the administration made it clear it did not want to wait long to deploy a national missile defense. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and General Ronald Kadish conveyed that the administration would pursue a research and development (R&D) program to create a layered defense system. While no specific deployment dates or procurement decisions have been made, the MDA has prepared for "emergency capabilities," including deploying up to five interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska. Wolfowitz acknowledged the potential treaty violation implications of construction at Fort Greely, noting the legal complexities involved in determining whether such actions become illegal if they harbor the intention or plan to transform into an operational capability, relying on intentional vagueness to allow the organization to sidestep questions about complying with external demands.[533] The administration started clearing trees away from the potential construction site, claiming that the clearing did not count as construction.

Though the administration did wait until being officially out of the ABMT before breaking ground on the installation of the interceptor silos at Ft. Greely on June 16, 2002, there was still a clear urgency.[534] The planned construction of the siloes designed to contain the

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[533] Ibid

[534] "Ground Broken on Missile Interceptor Silos," *The New York Times*, June 16, 2002, https://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/16/us/ground-broken-on-missile-interceptor-silos.html.

Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) was to take more than two years. This is noteworthy because of the incentives it implies. There were no intelligence estimates available in 2002 that suggested it was at all plausible that any of the rogue states would have nuclear-capable ICBMs that would have the ability to hit the United States by 2004. What explains the urgency that would cause the United States to "push up" against the ABMT and break ground on the construction site only three days after being officially removed from the treaty? The logical assumption is the political motivations of 2004.

Two months after the groundbreaking, IFT-9, though repeatedly delayed due to malfunctions in the booster and the kill vehicle, was a successful intercept on an equivalent threat suite (though the specifics are unclear).[535] That fall, GAO investigators mandated by the SASC could not assess the MDA program as intended. The GAO had been instructed to determine if the MDA was meeting its goals, but the investigators were unable to do that because the goals had yet to be established. On December 11th, IFT-10 failed due to a malfunction during separation, the same error that thwarted IFT-5. IFT-10 would be the last test of the program for over two years, with the next test not coming until after the 2004 election and after the deployment of the system.

Less than a week after the failed IFT-10 test, Bush gave another speech on missile defense. In his speech, Bush announced that they were fielding "initial" capabilities of the missile defense system. These initial capabilities were set for deployment in 2004 and 2005, laying the groundwork for a "more advanced and expanded missile defense system."[536] This

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[535] Graham, "Secrecy on Missile Defense Grows."

[536] George W. Bush, *President Announces Progress in Missile Defense Capabilities* (georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov, 2002).

move signifies a shift away from traditional Cold War deterrence to a strategy that includes missile defense as a critical component of national security.

The timing of this deployment, coinciding with the 2004 election year, suggests a political motive behind the announcement. By scheduling the missile defense rollout in an election year, the was turning it into a political tool to showcase its commitment to national security and gain electoral advantage. The day following Bush's declaration, the MDA held a briefing concerning its kinetic-energy program. Terry Little, the program director, spoke to reporters about his priorities and claimed that sticking to the government's schedule was the most important, with affordability being near the bottom. Little clarified his stance on prioritizing organizational goals over costs, stating, "I'm not going to tell you anything about money, and I'm going to do anything I can to prevent you from finding out. We want credible programs, not people trying to fit 10 pounds in a 5-pound box."[537]

The following month, Rumsfeld, speaking to a Senate committee, defended the idea of waiving operational testing for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. Rumsfeld argued that waiting for a defense system to be perfect before deployment is unrealistic, especially in the realm of missile defense. He believed deploying the system, even if not completely tested, would allow for practical, on-the-ground development and learning through real-world application and experimentation.[538] In February 2003, the Bush administration requested such a waiver for the GMD system. Rumsfeld argued that the waiver would speed up the program and that they "need to get something out there, in the ground and at sea, in a way we

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[537] Jeremy Feiler and Thomas Duffy, "Missile Defense Agency Launches Kinetic-Energy Interceptor Program," *Inside Missile Defense* 8, no. 26 (2002), accessed 2021/07/22/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24782797.

[538] Thomas Duffy, "Dod Test Report Says Nmd System Not yet Operationally Ready," *Inside Missile Defense* 9, no. 4 (2003).

can test it, we can look at it, we can develop it, we can evolve it, and... learn from the experimentation."

Also, that month, a report from Christie on the GMD system highlighted its success in hitting simple missile targets. However, it underscored significant limitations, including a lack of production-representative test elements and infrastructure.[539] He expressed concerns about the system potentially circumventing the rigorous acquisition process, which could lead to premature deployment without fully understanding operational capabilities and limitations. Christie emphasized the need for test designs to realistically mimic threat scenarios, including various factors like infrared and radar signatures.

A few weeks later, in a briefing to the SASC, Aldridge demonstrated the "necessary is possible" thinking by estimating that the GMD system would be 90% effective against specific missile attacks from DPRK, though without detailed attack scenarios.[540] This claim was met with surprise by Levin, given the Pentagon's tendency to issue classified estimates. Meanwhile, a GAO report criticized the push to deploy the national missile defense by 2004, citing immature technology and limited testing as significant hurdles.[541] The report warned that the rush could lead to long-term risks in the missile defense effort, noting that elements like the three-stage booster hadn't been adequately tested under realistic conditions. Consequently, the testing provided limited data on the system's expected performance in real-world scenarios by 2004.

[539] Thomas Duffy, "Kadish Says Mda Will Have to Explain Timing of Testing Plan to Congress," *Inside Missile Defense* 9, no. 5 (2003).

[540] Jeremy Feiler, "Dod: Initial Gmd System Would Defeat Most North Korean Missiles," *Inside Missile Defense* 9, no. 6 (2003).

[541] Bradley Graham, "Gao Cites Risks in Missile Defense," *Washington Post* 5 (2003).

Levin and Reed responded to the GAO report with concern, highlighting the troubling state of the missile defense system's development. They pointed out that the rush to build the system, despite the absence of a viable threat or functional technology, painted a troubling picture.[542] They criticized the President's decision to deploy an untested national missile defense system, suggesting that the motivation behind this push appeared to be more politically driven than rooted in effective military strategy, suggesting that the political resources created by a deployment would be more valuable to the administration than the argued security of a functional missile defense system, with Levin stating that "Fielding such an unproven system may pick up political points with some people, but it won't contribute to the defense or security of our country." The rush of the program toward deployment was also highlighted by the GAO, stating that it was "in danger of getting off track early" because of the reliance on untested parts.[543] On the 4th of July, 2003, Reuters released a report describing how Rumsfeld, due to his connections and personality, was gaining sway within the administration and concentrating power in a handful of close advisors, including Wolfowitz and Cambone. The report quoted Loren Thompson, a defense analyst from the Lexington Institute think tank, who argued that "the expansion of Pentagon power and influence is real."[544] Part of this is based on his frequent habit of sending memos, which the article claims his critics refer to as "Rummygrams" but have been commonly called "snowflakes." These snowflakes contributed to the diffusion of ideas from individuals Rumsfeld met with to the rest of the DoD and administration.

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[542] Ibid.

[543] Matt Kelley, "Quick Deployment of Missile Defense System Increases Risks of Failure, Investigators Say," June 5, 2003.

[544] Will Dunham, *Rumsfeld's Pentagon Gains Clout in U.S. Government.* (Reuters Limited, 2003).

In addition to Rumsfeld's growing influence, Kadish was becoming more influential with the Secretary. When questioned about how he has kept his position since the Clinton administration, Kadish noted that Rumsfeld is "interested in longevity in key positions. And I think this [Missile Defense] is one area that he pays particular attention to."[545] Kadish, who Senator Reed suggested had been given "instructions to be as minimally cooperative as he can be," with oversight, was working closely with Rumsfeld to attempt to widen the scope of technological options considered in the system, as well as the organization restructuring the year prior.

On August 8, 2003, Rep. Waxman released a report titled "Politics and Science in the Bush Administration," alleging that the Bush administration manipulated scientific data to support its policies, including on missile defense.[546] The report highlighted claims by DoD officials, such as Kadish's statement about completing an Alaskan test facility by end-2004, Wolfowitz's comment on operational prototype interceptors by September 2004, and Aldridge's assertion of the system's 90% effectiveness against missiles from the Korean peninsula by year-end. These claims were contrasted with independent experts' views, including Coyle's estimation of the system being a decade from completion and the GAO's April 2003 assessment labeling the President's missile defense plan as unworkable and risky.

In January 2004, Christie from OT&E expressed significant concerns about the GMD system's testing. His report underscored the uncertainty of the system's capabilities prior to

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[545] Bradley Graham, "Pushing Technology and Fighting Skeptics; Missile Defense to Be Deployed in Election Year," *The Washington Post*, November 28, 2003.

[546] House Committee on Government Reform, *Politics and Science in the Bush Administration. Prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman* (House of Representatives, 2003), https://web.archive.org/web/20040924022245/http://democrats.reform.house.gov/features/politics_and_science/pdfs/pdf_politics_and_science_rep.pdf.

deployment, emphasizing the limited time for comprehensive demonstration and the focus on component rather than integrated system testing. He pointed out the unrealistic nature of the test targets and the discrepancies between testing conditions and actual operational scenarios. Christie's comments were echoed by Senator Reed, who criticized the rush to deploy the system as a politically motivated pursuit that might compromise its technological soundness and misallocate resources. Christie was particularly concerned about the need for testing against more realistic threats and at higher velocities. This situation reflects a broader organizational push for rapid deployment, potentially at odds with the thoroughness required for effective system validation and readiness. [547] The dangers of a rush to deploy were highlighted by an OBM report released that month, which said the system's timeline was "very ambitious" and had a "high degree of development risk."[548]

At a SASC hearing in March 2004, Admiral James Ellis acknowledged the "admittedly rudimentary" utility of the missile defense system, while Christie argued it was not clear that it could destroy a real ICBM from North Korea.[549] DoD officials leaked comments to reporters that "something is better than nothing," Senator Dayton criticized this approach as "gross negligence," questioning the logic of deploying an unproven system. Kadish from MDA emphasized the reliance on models and simulations over flight tests as primary verification tools

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[547] Wade Boese, "Missile Defense: Deploying a Work in Progress," *Arms Control Today* 34, no. 7 (2004), accessed 2021/11/02/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23627461.

[548] Wade Boese, "Top Military Brass Insists Missile Defense Ready to Be Deployed," *Arms Control Today* 34, no. 3 (2004), accessed 2021/11/04/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23626901.

[549] Ibid.

(while also making a Wright brothers analogy), a stance Christie disagreed with, arguing that the system "cannot be adequately validated at this time."[550]

Waxman and Tierney wrote to Rumsfeld that March, expressing firm objections to the DoD's move to retroactively classify the Coyle Report. A move that they only learned about from the GAO, which became barred from discussing the Coyle Report's specific recommendations in unclassified settings. They argued, "The decision to classify the 50 specific recommendations set forth by the Pentagon's chief testing officer is highly dubious. It appears to be an attempt to stymie public debate through the use of the classification system." They further noted that this action would primarily "prevent members of Congress from being able to issue thorough and thoughtful critiques… in a public forum." As they pointed out, the DoD's decision to classify the full text of the recommendations seemed to be a calculated move to control information flow and limit external oversight.[551]

In February of 2004, the GAO sent a report to Reps. Waxman and Tierney. The report criticized the MDA for pushing back against oversight and using biased results in the MD program. The MDA was noted for its incomplete response to the Coyle report's recommendations, with significant actions pending beyond September 2004.[552] The GAO stressed that the MD's effectiveness against ICBMs was based on limited and highly scripted flight-test data, not reflecting real-world conditions. This approach raised concerns about the transparency and accuracy of the MDA's portrayal of the MD's capabilities. Moreover, the

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[550] Ibid.

[551] Henry Waxman and John Tierney, *Letter to Rumsfeld 03-25-04* (Cdi.org, 2004).

[552] United States General Accounting Office, *Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed* (2004), https://web.archive.org/web/20040624094640/http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04254.pdf.

MDA's financial estimates for FY04-FY09 were lacking in critical areas like procurement and maintenance costs, indicating a possible underestimation of the program's complete financial requirements. This combination of factors painted a picture of the MDA prioritizing program advancement over rigorous, transparent testing and financial reporting.

That August, at the Space and Missile Defense Conference in Huntsville, Rumsfeld emphasized the need for missile defense, using historical examples like the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing and making window of vulnerability arguments. He also argued that a lack of testing is not a reason to delay deployment.[553] The conference, which gathers military and corporate leaders, serves as a pivotal hub for disseminating ideas and establishing connections for moving personnel between organizations. Rumsfeld also made illusions to El Dorado myths by arguing that deploying missile defense "represent[s] the triumph of hope and vision over pessimism and skepticism." [554] While at the conference, Rumsfeld announced that "by the end of this year, we expect to have a limited operational capability against incoming ballistic missiles." As of this point, the MDA had not run a GBI Hit to Kill test in two years and had never run one without feeding location data into the system.[555] Reporters pressed Rumsfeld about a comment made by Major General William Shelton at the conference, who said that October 1st was the "notional date driving work" on missile defense.[556] However, the system was not going to be ready by the 1st, resulting in Rumsfeld declaring, "I can't imagine anyone who's dumb enough to set a firm date."

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[553] Boese, "Missile Defense: Deploying a Work in Progress."

[554] Peoples, *Justifying Ballistic Missile Defence: Technology, Security and Culture*.

[555] Boese, "Missile Defense: Deploying a Work in Progress."

[556] Ibid.

During that August, the President made a campaign stop in Ridley Park, PA, at the Boeing plant south of Philadelphia. Bush made a quick El Dorado argument while pitching the need for missile defense (he noted it was Boeing engineers that helped get the GBI in the silos) against "tyrants who believe they can blackmail America and the free world."[557] It was the second time that week the President toured a Boeing plant, having visited one in Seattle where he noted he would go to the WTO to attempt to block subsidies for Airbus. This demonstrates how less tangible political resources can be leveraged by defense contractors, in this instance, by having the President support them firmly in one issue area and argue against a competitor in another, in implied exchange for access to employees.

Ending the Hiatus

After the election, the MDA finally held another test, IFT-13c, on December 15. The interceptor failed to leave the silo. New MDA director Lt. Gen. Henry (Trey) Obering said it was a "minor glitch," and Senator Kyl argued that "one bum test" doesn't change his support for the system. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker, who would go on to work as a lobbyist for Covington, argued that the system was "proving itself, notwithstanding the predictable setbacks from time to time."[558]

Three months later, on Valentine's Day 2005, the MDA launched its final test of the IFT series (it would be switching to the FTG series in roughly 18 months). The interceptor received an erroneous "abort" command just before the scheduled launch and, once again, failed to

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[557] David Halbfinger, "Bush Promotes His Plan for Misisle Defense System," August 18, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/18/us/2004-campaign-president-bush-promotes-his-plan-for-missile-defense-system.html.

[558] David Stout and John H. Cushman Jr., "Defense Missile for Us System Fails to Launch," *The New York Times*, December 16, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/16/politics/defense-missile-for-us-system-fails-to-launch.html.

launch.[559] This was the third straight failure of the system and the first full test since December 12. This would be the last test of the Bush administration in which decoys deployed during the test.[560] In light of the string of failures, actors in the network justified the system with techno-optimistic arguments; in an interview, Heritage's Baker Spring suggests that the United States "should be able to lead" in missile defense because "technology has always been our strong suit."[561] On December 14, 2005, following three straight failures, including two failures where the interceptor never left the silo, in a test that did not involve a target, the MDA successfully was able to launch the interceptor. Six days later, the MDA announced via a press release regarding the installation of the 10th GBI that "in the interest of operational security," they would no longer be announcing interceptor deployments.[562]

In March of 2006, the DoD announced it was replacing the Senior Executive Council with a Ballistic Missile Defense Executive Board but transferring much of its authority to the director of the MDA. Nine months later, on September 1, 2006, FTG-2 (Flight Test of the Ground-Based Missile Defense System) successfully scored a "hit" on its target, though no decoys were included in the test. Obering declared after the test that it was "a huge step" and provided a "validation of the confidence I have in this system."[563] The Office of Testing and Evaluation scored the test a "no-kill" because the EKV only managed a "glancing blow" on the

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[559] However, the failure of IFT-13c, was an interceptor failure.

[560] David Stout, "Rocket Fails to Launch in Test Run," *The New York Times*, February 15, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/15/politics/rocket-fails-to-launch-in-test-run.html.

[561] Peoples, *Justifying Ballistic Missile Defence: Technology, Security and Culture*.

[562] Wade Boese, "Missile Defense Goes Stealth," *Arms Control Today* 36, no. 1 (2006), accessed 2021/11/02/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23629580.

[563] David S. Cloud, "Missile Defense System Intercepts Rocket in Test," *The New York Times*, September 2, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/02/washington/missile-defense-system-intercepts-rocket-in-test.html.

target. Critics of the system claimed that the test was lacking "key elements of realism" and the purpose of it was "to allow the [MDA] to claim the program was back on track." Stephen Young of the Union of Concerned Scientists said it was "as scripted as can be." He acknowledged it was still "very complicated, technically, but it's much simpler than dealing with an actual missile launch." Obering, however, argued that the test accomplished its objectives and that the MDA was trying to "under-promise and over-deliver." When pushed on if the system could intercept an incoming missile from North Korea, Obering argued that "I think we'd have a good chance."

The next interception test (FTG-03), in May of 2007, did not run to completion as the target missile never made it far enough for the interceptor to launch.[564] The repeat test, FTG-03a, was held on September 28, 2007, and was a successful interception. However, it did not include the use of decoys or countermeasures.[565] The final intercept test of the Bush administration FTG-05, which launched on December 05, 2008, was a successful intercept, but due to an issue with the target missile's paneling, no decoys deployed.[566] The last successful intercept test during the Bush administration of the GMD system, in a test where decoys were deployed, was in October of 2002. Despite this, it was considered an "initial capability" and "the means to defend all 50 states against a possible attack."[567]

Embedding Missile Defense in National Strategy

In the last days of the Bush administration, several network members who were in the administration wrote an article examining missile defense and its path forward. Within this

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[564] Missile Defense Agency, *Ballistic Missile Defense Intercept Flight Test Record* (Missile Defense Agency: 2-16).

[565] Ibid.

[566] Union of Concerned Scientists, "Decoys Used in Missile Defense Intercept Tests, 1999-2018," (2019).

[567] JD Crouch et al., "Missile Defense and National Security: The Need to Sustain a Balanced Approach," *Comparative Strategy* 28, no. 1 (2009).

article, they specifically point out the "progress" made regarding missile defense since 2001 and address the strategy that would need to be taken to develop it further. That article demonstrates strategic intent that underlies several behaviors taken by the network. The most crucial step that they identify is "embedding missile defense in strategic concepts and operations," adding that this was done by "establishing [missile defense] as a key component of the broader national security mission."[568] Keith Payne, one of the article's authors, was also the study director for the NIPP report published in 2001, *Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control.* That document incorporated missile defenses into war-fighting strategies, acknowledging how they could "shoulder some of the burden of a counterforce strategy."[569]

It also heavily pushed for moving beyond arms control agreements formed in the Cold War. Another member of the NIPP R&R team, Steve Cambone, was heavily involved with the creation of QDR, a review designed for a 20-year time horizon intended to provide a "long-term approach to modernization and transformation." As part of the QDR's justification for making missile defense a national priority, it argues there are threats to US territory and US forces "abroad, at sea, and in space," as well as allies and friends. This reasoning provides a foundation to justify not only future missile defense systems but also an increasingly expansive system.

Capabilities-based planning, as described by the QDR, is based on the premise that "it is impossible to describe future threats with precision, although it is possible to describe certain desirable future capabilities." While factually accurate that it is both impossible to describe the future with precision and possible to establish future capabilities that are desired, what

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[568] Ibid.

[569] Keith Payne, *Rationale and Requirements for Us Nuclear Forces and Arms Control*, vol. 1 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2001).

capability-based planning does not incorporate is the strategic necessity or impact of these

desired capabilities, as you can construct a hypothetical adversary against which the desired

capabilities would be acceptable. This sort of planning grants even more power to the strategic

myths, as the biased miscalculations that inform them can be bolstered by such hypotheticals. It

would not require an irrational analysis of an adversary to view them as deterrable by a

decreased percentage of success but undeterred by assured destruction. It would only require the

desire to have the capability to deter such an adversary, provided they exist in the future.

Additionally, the documents incorporate the organizational desire to push back against

oversight and external infringements on autonomy. The Guidance document that Rumsfeld sent

out in the summer of 2001 directly framed such arguments in resource-dependence terms, stating

that the DoD would "seek support from Congress" to "reform its acquisition and financial

systems" to reduce the risks that could come from "squander[ing] scarce resources and

mismanagement." Notably, an additional rationale is provided, which states that such a

squandering of resources would result in the erosion of "public support for defense and reduce

US military capabilities." This demonstrates the desire to eliminate oversight and protect

autonomy to mitigate uncertainties surrounding resource acquisition and use, emphasizing the

need for public support and material wealth.[570]

The Defense Planning Guide itself is premised on the idea of capabilities-based planning

and development. From an organizational theory perspective, it is clear why this form of

planning would be preferred to threat-based planning. Capabilities-based planning allows the

organization more autonomy over its planning, choosing the type of capabilities it wants rather

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[570] Donald Rumsfeld, *Guidance and Terms of Reference for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review* (Department of Defense, 2001).

than being dependent on the environment. From a strategic perspective, it offers many of the

same benefits that led to traditional understandings of organization theory when applied to

militaries, arguing a bias for the offense.[571] From an acquisition and R&D perspective, the

Rumsfeld era adjustments to the missile defense community create many of the same advantages

as traditional offensive strategy conceptions. From a similar perspective, spiral development

offers organizational incentives with predictable timing cycles and does not come with a set end

date.

This chapter examined the actions of the missile defense network once it was able to get a

foothold within the executive branch. This chapter highlights instances of the missile defense

network engaging in buffering strategies, increasing secrecy, utilizing the selective use of

information, elevating the prestige of the MDA, pushing back against oversight, and establishing

practices that would provide consistent access to resources for the network. These practices

include both the strategic embedding of missile defense within security doctrine as well as

establishing acquisition procedures that allowed the network to unwed itself from the need for

inflated threat perceptions, making access to resources predictable, recurring, and open ended. It

is important to note that many of these behaviors, while enhanced and pushed forward by

specific individuals, were already in the works prior to the 2000 election, indicating that

organizational incentives contributed to the policy of overexpansion.

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[571] Arguments such as those found in: Allison., Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*.

VI: Maintaining the Perception of a Policy Problem: Altering Perceptions of Alternative Solutions, Managing Constraints, and Perpetuating a Justifying Threat

Why Are There Incentives for Network Actors to Undercut Diplomatic Agreements?

The missile defense network, built on interdependent relationships based on resource exchange, comprises actors with a primary goal of survival. These actors, including formal and informal organizations, strive to ensure survival by acquiring necessary resources (both in the present and predictable future access). While these resources are obtained via mutual dependencies, some can only be found externally (e.g., funding from the government). When there are situations in which external forces, such as laws or policies, prevent access to necessary resources (such as policies that devalue network resources), network actors have incentives to alter or eliminate these policies to ensure that the perceived need for such possessed resources exists.

Uncertainty can potentially impact the ability to acquire or inhibit long-term planning to ensure access to resources in the future. Actors are also incentivized to maintain their autonomy and avoid situations that could result in it being diminished.[572] Such infringements on autonomy include oversight from external bodies (as discussed in the previous chapter). These policies prevent certain behaviors or policies which restrict (directly or indirectly) access to specific markets. Policies that would prevent an organization from having access to a market devalue a possessed resource (e.g., by altering perception about its utility as a policy solution to a

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[572] Pfeffer and Salancik.; Andrea Liese, "Explaining Varying Degrees of Openness in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Fao)," in *Transnational Actors in Global Governance* (Springer, 2010).

perceived problem) or prevent the development of resources that would be valuable in exchange, incentivize organizations to become involved in the policy-making process.[573] The perceived threat of nuclear ICBM attacks, or accidental ICBM launches, is a perceived policy problem that can be perceived to be solved by resources possessed by the missile defense network. However, suppose there are alternative policy solutions solidified by international agreements, such as diplomatic restraint or agreements preventing the construction of the alternative policy solution of missile defense. In that case, the value of the resources possessed by the network drastically drops.

For the missile defense network, treaties that restrict the development and deployment of missile defenses are an infringement on autonomy and a source of uncertainty, and agreements serving as an alternative policy solution decrease the value of possessed resources. Actors in the network are incentivized to mitigate the uncertainty, minimize or eliminate such autonomy-infringing policies, and shift the perception of the viability of alternative policy solutions.

This chapter addresses two examples in which network actors strive to alter policy that undercut the value of network resources: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and diplomatic relations with North Korea, specifically ending the Agreed Framework. This chapter will highlight multiple instances in which actors in the missile defense network worked to alter the policy that stood in the way of the further development and deployment of strategic missile defense, thereby increasing the value of resources possessed by the network. This chapter will also examine the calculated and deliberate efforts of actors within the network to undercut diplomatic efforts that decreased the perceived need for strategic missile defense by serving as an alternative policy solution. The use of strategic myths as a source of justification for aggressive

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[573] Pfeffer and Salancik.

policy and the illogical and often self-contradictory claims used to support the undercutting of

diplomacy by those in the missile defense network will also be highlighted.

The ABM Treaty

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (known going forward as the ABM Treaty or ABMT)

was a treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, designed to prevent nationwide

missile defenses against ICBMs and remove the incentives for destabilizing behaviors (such as

arms racing and counterforce attacks) by making nuclear first strikes an implausible option. Due

to this fact, the treaty was referred to commonly by security experts for thirty years as the

cornerstone of strategic stability. Through the lens of resource dependence, those in the missile

defense network could view the ABM Treaty as a policy that prevented strategic missile defense

from being considered a viable policy option. The treaty restricted network members' behavior

(preventing the development and deployment of strategic missile defense). It decreased the value

of resources controlled by the missile defense network, as they held less utility to actors in the

external environment. The ABM Treaty also prevented the preferred policy choice of network

actors (strategic missile defense) from being perceived as a viable policy solution by

policymakers, restricting their policy choices and reorganizing their policy preferences from

what those preferences may have otherwise been without the ABM Treaty. The treaty codified

mutually assured destruction, which served as an alternative solution to the policy problems

argued by the network members and called into question the very existence of those perceived

policy problems. Viewed through a lens of resource dependence, it is clear why members of the

missile defense network would push for the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. It is also clear

why merely restructuring the ABM Treaty is not a satisfactory outcome for network members, as

the treaty in any form would still provide a significant layer of uncertainty by infringing network autonomy and creating uncertainty around the need for strategic missile defense.

From a resource dependence perspective, it was in the immediate interest of the network, as a whole, for the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Individuals and organizations within the network who may not directly benefit from the United States withdrawing from the ABM Treaty still benefited from the impact of the withdrawal on the network overall via exchange relationships that are dependent on resources external to the network or benefited from actor needs that were created by this effort to shift the policy. The remainder of this section details the actions of actors in the missile defense network that led to the United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Evidence will be highlighted that showcases that not only was staying in the ABM Treaty never considered a realistic outcome for actors in the network, but even modification of the Treaty was not viewed as a viable solution in the long run – as explained by the need to eliminate the uncertainty provided by external constraints.

Altering Perceptions of Alternative Policy Solutions: Undercutting Deterrence and Framing the ABM Treaty as a Cold War Relic

A month before the 2000 Presidential election, Secretary Albright argued for the importance of the ABM Treaty while speaking at a hearing for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. She argued that the treaty could "be adjusted [in a way] that would allow for a missile defense program to move forward." However, such an adjustment would require international support and necessitate the next administration to work closely with Russia (as well as China) to avoid disruptions to strategic stability.[574] This is useful for understanding the

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[574] *A Review of U.S. Foreign Policy at the End of the Clinton Administration*, 2 ed., *Foreign Relations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000).

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outgoing administration's belief that the ABM Treaty was a functional policy solution and could be modified in such a way as to allow the US's missile defense program to move forward while still serving as a viable policy for mitigating destabilizing behavior. Concerns about leaving the ABM Treaty and the impact that such a move would have on strategic stability existed in the outgoing administration. They were also echoed by members of Congress who were not part of the missile defense network, demonstrated by Sen. Biden in an article he authored that October. Biden argued that leaving the ABM could result in Russia "see[ing] the world's troublemakers as its only friends and proceed[ing] to undercut international non-proliferation regimes."[575]

Disinterested experts outside the missile defense network were also supportive of the ABM Treaty, concerned about the effects of withdrawing, and less concerned with ICBM attacks than other more likely attacks on the United States. They pushed for the US to stay a party to the agreement. The ABM Treaty was viewed as the cornerstone of strategic stability and a key element in avoiding arms racing (as well as the increased risk of nuclear war that comes with that). Disinterested experts viewed deterrence as the most robust and least destabilizing (and actively working) solution to the threat of nuclear exchange (excluding nuclear zero). As the incoming administration took office, disinterested experts believed that leaving the ABM would have a detrimental impact on strategic stability, that the ABM Treaty could potentially be adjusted through cooperation with Russia, that the dominant policy alternatives to a diplomatic solution were reliant on the fundamentally flawed technology, and that the policy problem itself was not a threat for the next decade, at least.

However, despite these arguments against other policy solutions, which noted the potential disruption to strategic stability and both the technical and logical critiques of strategic

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[575] Joseph R Biden Jr, "Finding the Right Path," *Arms Control Today* 30, no. 8 (2000).

missile defense as a viable policy solution, members of the Bush administration (as well as other

public-facing network members) worked to shift the perception of the viability of the ABM

Treaty. They also worked to change the perception of the policy problem that the treaty was

designed to solve. Strategic myths served the role of justifying both of these shifts of perception.

The network argued the ABM Treaty (and the concept of mutual deterrence) was a flawed policy

solution that no longer fit the policy problems of the era and certainly was less viable than

strategic missile defense.

During his confirmation hearing, Donald Rumsfeld argued that the ABM Treaty was

"ancient history" and was created "a long time ago… in a very different world."[576] This echoed

similar arguments from other network members, such as Thad Cochran, who stated ten days later

that the ABM "treaty has outlived its importance" and that "we're no longer in an arms race with

the Russians, and that was what that treaty was supposed to… contain and restrict."[577] In what

can be seen as a further indication of the predetermined nature of the decision to withdraw from

the ABM Treaty, regardless of the technological feasibility of strategic missile defense, during

Rumsfeld's confirmation hearing, he declared that he "know[s] a lot about threat" of ballistic

missiles, "but I've spent much less time on ways of dealing with it," before saying later in the

hearing that "there's no question… that we should deploy a missile defense system when it's

technologically possible and effective."[578] Rumsfeld demonstrated that he viewed it as a given

that there needed to be missile defense and that the ABMT was not a viable policy solution while

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[576] Donald Rumsfeld, *Public Statements of Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, 2001* (Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001).

[577] Henry Cooper, "A New "Old" Wind Blowing!!!," *The Shield*, January/February, 2001.

[578] Rumsfeld, *Public Statements of Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, 2001*.

simultaneously acknowledging he did not have expert knowledge on solutions to the nuclear

ICBM issue, including missile defense or its technological effectiveness.

Policy network actors have more power when external actors perceive that network actors

possess necessary resources that have viable alternatives. In the case of missile defense,

deterrence can be understood as an alternative solution to the policy problem of being vulnerable

to nuclear ICBM attacks. The ABM Treaty enshrined deterrence and MAD as fundamental

elements of strategic stability while simultaneously prohibiting the alternative (faulty) solution of

strategic missile defense. It was necessary for actors in the missile defense network to diminish

the concept of deterrence as a viable policy solution and to dismiss the suitability of the ABM

Treaty for the United States.

The Push to Change Deterrence and Cut Ties with the ABM: Bush's May 1st Missile Defense
Speech

George W. Bush entered the White House with expectations from supporters, including

those in the missile defense network, for swift transformation regarding the status of missile

defense and the ABM Treaty. This was caused, thanks to the GOP's continued hold on Congress

since the Contract with America, by the fact that the Republican party held the executive and

congressional branches of government. However, many Democratic leaders viewed missile

defense as a potentially valuable and energizing political issue now that they were no longer tied

to the Clinton White House missile defense plan.[579] It should be noted that Bush did not always

view missile defense as a critical issue, having never publicly spoken on it until he began

positioning himself for the White House. However, the advisers who helped him on his

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[579] Alison Mitchell, "Top Democrats Warn of Battle on Missile Plan," *The New York Times*, May 3, 2001,
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/03/world/top-democrats-warn-of-battle-on-missile-plan.html.

campaign provided him with a crash course in missile defense, including teachings from Donald Rumsfeld.[580] Condoleezza Rice, in an article for Foreign Affairs published during the campaign, argued that the ABM Treaty was no longer a viable fit for the security threat of the day, which she referred to as "the Iraqs and North Koreas of the world," allowing both states to serve as proxies for all threats and implying their existence.[581] She also used window of vulnerability arguments in support of missile defense but, oddly, acknowledged that rogue state nuclear weapons would be essentially "unusable" due to the assured destruction that would follow.

However, while a decision to go forward with the radar wouldn't put the United States in immediate violation of the ABM Treaty because concrete would not be getting poured until spring of 2002 at the earliest, however, because of the six-month notice needed before withdrawal, it would all but formally start the countdown on the United States leaving the treaty by years end.[582] Despite these desires for swift transformation, such as leaving the ABM Treaty so that work could begin on national missile defense deployment, the administration did not take quick action on this front. The President wanted Rumsfeld to evaluate all of the options at their disposal. However, even Rumsfeld appeared to get impatient about the delay, recording in a note regarding a late March meeting with the President that they had to get going on missile defense.[583]

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[580] These missile defense education sessions, led by Rumsfeld, also included Rice, Wolfowitz, Hadley and Perle, among others. See: James Mann and Jim Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (Penguin, 2004).

[581] Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign affairs* 79, no. 1 (2000), accessed 2023/11/03/, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20049613.

[582] Schmitt and Myers.

[583] Donald Rumsfeld, *3/28/01 Meeting with the President* (The Rumsfeld Archives, 2001).

On the first of May, 2001, President Bush delivered a speech to the National Defense University outlining his administration's national security vision. The speech laid out the administration's preferred perception of the policy problem and the crucial role that missile defense had within that policy vision. This policy vision went far beyond maintaining the existing security, stability, and safety from nuclear ICBM attacks that the United States had experienced since the advent of the nuclear age - it was not a status quo policy that was being pushed. The policy was not about maintaining existing security. It was not about maintaining strategic stability. As an indication of this, just before leaving the White House to deliver the speech, Bush was quoted as saying to close aides, "Well, let's go transform the world." When an aide responded jokingly to this statement, Bush reportedly replied, "No, this is really important. This is an important day."

The speech that Bush delivered that day, mainly targeting the ABM Treaty, was drafted by Robert Joseph, senior scholar at NIPP and senior director of the National Security Council. Joseph would later be awarded the Missile Defense Agency's Ronald Reagan Award for "outstanding support" of missile defense.[584] In the speech, Bush laid out the argument for the administration's interpretation of deterrence, framing traditional nuclear deterrence as a nonviable policy solution for their argued framing of the policy problem. The administration offered a change in the perception of what deterrence meant. As an alternative to traditional understandings of deterrence, the administration put forward a version incorporating missile defense. Bush argued that deterrence "can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation" and needed to be re-conceptualized to "rely on both offensive and defensive

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[584] "Amb. Robert Joseph," State Department, last modified January 20, accessed. https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/isab/83499.htm.

forces."[585] The Joseph-penned speech re-conceptualized the paper tiger strategic myth by declaring that defenses strengthen deterrence by "reducing the incentive for proliferation." The president explained that this disincentive was created because "countering missile defenses, especially defensive systems with multiple layers," creates a "difficult, time-consuming and expensive" problem for potential adversaries. This framing creates a perception of adversaries as dangerous and lethal yet easily thwarted by the preferred policy solution. Capable of engaging in the complex, time-consuming, and expensive process of developing a nuclear-capable ICBM able to strike the United States, yet simultaneously unable to equip it with modest countermeasures, and therefore easily thwarted by strategic missile defenses. The speech, justifying missile defense and the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, emphasized the myth that security could only be genuinely obtained through the aggressive policy of deploying strategic missile defense.

Bush, arguing that "we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty," took pains to position the Treaty as an ill-fitting policy solution that both "enshrines the past" and handcuffs the United States by "prevent[ing] us from addressing today's threats." Bush continued the network's re-framing of the policy problem by lumping the United States with allies and other countries that hold the US's favor, saying that the ABM Treaty prevented the US from "pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends, and our allies."[586] This framing, which placed the need to "defend ourselves, our friends, and our allies" as equivalent, shifts the preferred perception of the policy problem from one that was focused on just the

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[585] George W. Bush, *Remarks to Students and Faculty at National Defense University* (Washington, DC: White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2001).

[586] George W. Bush, "President Bush Speech on Missile Defense, May 1, 2001," *Speech by President George W. Bush, National Defense University, Washington* (2001).

vulnerability of the United States to a policy problem that also incorporated vulnerabilities to

allies (and beyond) of the United States. This policy problem shift created a scenario where the

"territory" that needed to be secured against the threat of ballistic missiles was far more

extensive than the geographically secure United States. Instead, it was replaced with a territory

constantly encircled by rivals, as its position was represented globally by proxies, all of which

are understood as vital – including not just allies but "friends" and deployed troops. This framing

was a variation of the strategic myth of falling dominoes, allowing for vulnerabilities of ally

states, or vulnerabilities of states we deemed to be a friend, to serve as justification for strategic

missile defenses in the United States. This was despite the fact that the missile defenses designed

to defend the continental United States from ICBM attacks fundamentally differ from missile

defenses that would be used to protect allies.

Bush's speech also framed the dissolution of the ABM Treaty as a positive step in the

United States' relationship with Russia, claiming that the security created by mutual deterrence

"perpetuate[d] a relationship [with Russia] based on distrust and mutual vulnerability." While

insisting the ABM Treaty is preventing what is necessary to make the United States safe, Bush

also continued the administration's tactic of avoiding committing to specifics regarding missile

defense, saying, "We will evaluate what works and what does not" while also sidestepping any

specifics on what would be considered a system that "works." This is despite Russia's solid and

stated desire to maintain the ABM Treaty.

Bush pushed a variation of the *offensive advantage* strategic myth, arguing it was a world

where non-aggressive strategies that worked in the past, such as deterrence, no longer were valid,

emphasizing this point through the use of a hypothetical Gulf War with an Iraq that possessed

nuclear weapons and engaged in nuclear blackmail. The President declared that the international

community would have "faced a very different situation" if that were the case. Bush added that Saddam Hussein was "gripped by an implacable hatred of the United States" and therefore, "deterrence is no longer enough," with the clear implication being that other rogue state leaders share that characteristic.[587] Furthermore, Bush directly argued against the ABM by saying that "no treaty… that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology" to defend the US or its friends and allies is "in the interest of world peace." This argument, again, relies on strategic myths as a source of justification for missile defense. In this case, the El Dorado myth implies that missile defense is necessary for world peace. The speech made clear that the White House was not interested in maintaining any agreements nor entertaining alternative policy solutions that stood in the way of the aggressive policy of developing and deploying missile defense systems.

The following day, there was immediate pushback against the President's arguments to leave the ABM Treaty and against the logic of strategic myths used to justify the withdrawal and the deployment of strategic defenses. This pushback came in multiple press conferences and speeches from congressional members without direct ties to the missile defense network. Sen. Biden (D-DE) noted the danger of the self-encirclement that leaving the ABM Treaty might result in calling it "a scenario where we could end up much worse off than we are today."[588] Biden added that strategic defense would incentivize China to increase the number of ICBMs it has from around 20 to "at least 200 to 250 sophisticated ICBMs" and likely "closer to 800," which would "guarantee to start an arms race."[589] Biden also expressed skepticism of the

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[587] Ibid.

[588] *Minority Leader News Conference*, (C-Span, 2001), https://www.c-span.org/video/?164034-1/minority-leader-news-conference.

[589] Ibid.

argument that rogue states would not be deterred by the assurance of "absolute annihilation," arguing that it was based on "a faulty premise" with no historical evidence to support the claim.

Sen. Kerry (D-MA) echoed the argument that strategic missile defense could motivate the behavior of adversaries, resulting in the United States being less safe, as it would create incentives for Moscow and Beijing to "develop[], and eventually sell[], new ways to overwhelm our defenses."[590] Sen. Daschle (D-SD) shared this sentiment and declared, "A missile defense system that undermines our nation politically, economically, and strategically – without providing any real security – is no defense at all."[591] Rep. Gephardt (D-MO) also agreed that the White House's approach could "have the effect of undermining our nation's security rather than enhancing it," Gephardt noted the administration's preferred policy solution was coming directly at the expense of the existing policy solution which had proven to be effective over a long sample size, stating that the administration was "jeopardizing an arms control framework that served [the United States] well for decades... [to deploy an] as yet unproven, costly, and expansive national missile defense system." Sen. Levin (D-MI) reiterated that the Intelligence and Defense communities said a missile attack against the United States was the "least likely threat to us."[592] He also noted similar concerns of self-encirclement and argued that Bush's missile defense plan "could risk a second cold war --- Cold War II, I call it."[593] Levin highlighted the fact that this issue was a potentially valuable political resource. He argued that the Bush

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[590] Wade Boese, "Congress Responds to Bush Missile Plans Along Party Lines," *Arms Control Today* 31, no. 5 (2001).

[591] Mitchell.

[592] Boese, "Congress Responds to Bush Missile Plans Along Party Lines."

[593] Mitchell.

administration's decision to leave the ABM Treaty was a unilateral one "wrapped in conciliatory rhetoric" and that democrats would "try in some way to stop the expenditure of funds for a system that would abrogate the ABM Treaty."[594]

However, Sen. Shelby (R-AL) utilized the Rumsfeld Commission as support for arguing that "there is no time to lose" in deploying missile defense because the United States would have "little or no warning" for a rogue state launching a missile.[595] Shelby argued that the threat was from "hostile nations from North Korea to Iran and Iraq," who he claimed "threaten or seek to threaten" the United States. This claim by Senator Shelby is a clear example of the strategic myths in modern usage – both of offensive advantage and power shifts – stating that the advantage goes to the aggressor, the adversaries are continually growing more potent, and there is an urgency to act now (a closing window of opportunity) before the advantage shifts to the (undeterrable) adversaries to make their move. Shelby uses rhetorical sleight of hand in stating these rogue states "threaten or seek to threaten" the United States, simultaneously implying that the danger is active now and the threat is growing by the second. Hence, the need to act is urgent. Shelby also reiterated Bush's El Dorado-esque implication that missile defense is the key to world peace. The senator, a staunch missile defense advocate, has not only received tens of thousands of dollars in funding from missile defense contractors (both directly and through his leadership PAC, the Defend America PAC), but he also has used missile defense's impact on the Alabaman economy as a political tool. This can be seen even in 2022 press releases by the

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[594] Ibid.

[595] Boese, "Congress Responds to Bush Missile Plans Along Party Lines."

Senator where he specifically argued that increased funding to the Missile Defense Agency was good for the north Alabama economy."[596]

The Attempt at International Support

Two days after the speech, Rumsfeld sent a memo to Rice outlining key talking points in favor of missile defense, emphasizing the pervasive nature of proliferation.[597] He pointed out the increased availability of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to a broad spectrum of countries, including rogue states, arguments implying an increasing window of vulnerability in an apparent attempt to shape perceptions of external threats. Rumsfeld argued that the mere threat of WMDs alters U.S. behavior, leading to a sense of vulnerability and encirclement, was a strategic maneuver to underscore the need for dedicated defense resources.

Rumsfeld also addressed criticisms of cost both strategically and financially. Rumsfeld proposed a counter-question: "What if you don't deploy missile defense?" He suggested that the absence of missile defense could lead to isolationism, acquiescence to threats, or preemptive military action. He proposed another rhetorical question, leveraging the idea of protecting major cities like Los Angeles or Atlanta against the cost of the system, echoing the argument repeatedly made by Weldon, "How much is Philadelphia worth? Or Los Angeles? Is it worth only $10 billion? Or $25 billion? Or is it worth spending whatever it takes?"[598] Rumsfeld also strategically employed the Wright brothers' analogy to advocate for perseverance in missile defense

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[596] *Shelby Secures Billions in Defense Funding for Alabama* (shelby.senate.gov: The Office of Senator Richard Shelby, 2022).

[597] Donald Rumsfeld, *Missile Defense to Rice* (Rumsfeld.com, 2001).

[598] Geoffrey Forden and Raymond Hall, "The Cbo's Missile Defense," *Air and Space Forces Magazine*, July 1, 2000., Jones,

development, recognizing failures as part of the process.[599] The implication of eventual success

despite failure was a tactic to mitigate oversight concerns. It underscored the need for steady

resource allocation amidst uncertainties, positioning challenges as necessary steps in achieving

long-term defense goals.

While the administration framed strategic missile defense as a critical element in

achieving "world peace," international opinion – both allies and adversaries – remained firmly in

support of the treaty and continued to push back against efforts by network members to force a

US withdrawal.[600] On March 14th, the director of China's Department of Arms Control in the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sha Zukang, argued that the United States was pursuing a policy of

self-encirclement, equating the development and deployment of strategic missile defense with

"drinking poison to quench thirst." The director argued that though China wanted no

confrontation, it would "not allow its legitimate means of self-defense to be weakened" and

wanted to preserve "existing mutual deterrence," adding that the United States had "over-

exaggerated" the threats that rogue states posed.[601] China viewed the development of a national

missile defense by the United States as an aggressive policy that weakened China's ability to

protect itself. The argued threats of rogue state ICBMs did not justify it.

The need to get allies on board or out of the way was made clear to Rumsfeld following a

meeting with his predecessor shortly after taking office. During the meeting, he was given the

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[599] For more on organization incentives leading to non-applicable choices for historical analogy, see: Lindley.

[600] European leaders, beyond just concerns regarding a destabilizing impact that the United States leaving the ABM Treaty might have on Russian and Chinese state behavior, also had concerns that the push to leave the ABM Treaty was an indicator of unilateralist behavior from the United States. For more on the anxieties of European leaders at this time, see: Wyn Q. Bowen, "Missile Defence and the Transatlantic Security Relationship," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 77, no. 3 (2001), accessed 2023/10/25, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3095434.

[601] Wade Boese, "Bush Administration Blunts International Opposition to Nmd," *Arms Control Today* 31, no. 3 (2001).

lay of the land on missile defense, informed explicitly about the need to "deal with the allies,"

and informed that technological exports are critical in those relationships.[602] Later that month,

international officials expressed concerns over the effort by the United States, such as French

officials who privately spoke of concerns regarding the "potential negative effects" of the pursuit

of missile defense and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who had apprehensions about

"the repercussions on Russian and China." Schroeder also publicly questioned if US missile

defense was "technologically feasible."[603]

Despite the public domestic debate following the President's May 1st missile defense

speech, the first substantial action taken by the administration immediately following the speech

was an effort to garner international support, as concerns from international actors were

becoming salient domestically. The administration sent high-level international delegations,

including Hadley, Wolfowitz, and Armitage, to visit 19 countries over nine days. The

administration had two themes to be pushed by its delegates: A) publicly state that the US

wanted to hear the views of other nations on missile defense and B) emphasize that the world

had changed since the creation of the ABM Treaty. The delegates stated that missile defense was

part of a new strategic framework. Still, when asked for specifics on this framework by

representatives from the international representatives they met with, the delegates repeatedly

rebuffed the requests.[604]

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[602] Rumsfeld was also informed in the meeting that boost phase defenses were "no" until "2012-2015", and that the department of defense "can't complete books so that they can be audited," see: Rumsfeld, "Meeting with Secretary Bill Cohen and Don Rumsfeld; January (?) 2001."

[603] Gerhard Schroeder, *Remarks Prior to Discussions with Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany and an Exchange with Reporters*, vol. 37, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* (govinfo.gov: Government Publishing Office, 2001).

[604] Wade Boese, "Missile Defense Consultations Abroad Yield Little Progress," *Arms Control Today* 31, no. 5 (2001).

As part of the traveling delegation, Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman continued the administration's effort to avoid specific technological commitments while reaffirming the claimed need for missile defense.[605] This tactic was in line with previous statements by administration representatives that while the administration did not know specifics regarding any type or technological aspect of the missile defense that was necessary or possible, they claimed that it was both essential and would necessarily violate the ABM Treaty. Grossman stated that "decisions about how, when, and how much are still decisions to come," but that the goal was to "expand people's minds." When pressed on specific threats that warranted missile defense, Grossman said that "by no means everybody agrees on every single piece of the threat" but said that he "think[s] there was a general recognition that the world has changed," while quickly reiterating "I want to be clear here, I don't say that there was any specificity."[606]

The resistance to specifics continued the following day, May 9, at a press conference at the US embassy in Paris. Wolfowitz pushed back against specifics regarding the administration's approach to the ABM Treaty, saying that "there has been no decision about how to deal with the ABM treaty," but also reiterating the refrain that the "world has changed" and the implication that the ABM Treaty was no longer suitable for the world that the United States existed in. The administration repeatedly attempted to reframe the perception around the policy problem and the

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[605] In 2005, Grossman joined the consultant organization, The Cohen Group, where he would become Vice Chairman. The Cohen group would consult and lobby for organizations such as Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, and Honeywell International.

[606] Marc Grossman, *The Future of Strategic Stability and Deterrence*, *Remarks at a Press Availability at the NATO Headquarters* (2001).

existing policy solution (for instance, claiming that the solution was nonviable because it prevented a potential policy option, which the administration refused to be specific about).[607]

In a press conference held that day with Grossman, Mogens Lykketoft, the Danish Foreign Minister, put forward that the official position of Denmark was that it was "necessary to maintain the ABM" or renegotiate if agreed to by all involved parties. Lykketoft added, "A unilateral cancellation of the [ABM] Treaty would not be a good signal." According to Lykketoft, a primary concern of Denmark and "very many Europeans" was that there should not be "a new arms race," something they feared leaving the ABM would trigger. Lykketoft noted that it was "extremely important in the long-term perspective" for the relationship between the United States and China to remain "stable" because they may become "in the next generation" the "next two superpowers of this world." At that same press conference, Grossman took the administration's lack of specificity to its next logical step, relying on the Rumsfeld-endorsed conflation of varying types of missile defense, saying, "It's important that we move beyond this question of NMD. What we talked about today… was missile defense. And that is missile defense not only for the United States but available to all of those countries that would like to have it and participate in it if the technology works."[608]

This commitment to not committing because "what we are talking about at the moment is still a concept" continued throughout the international faux-diplomacy blitz.[609] Rhetorical conflation also continued through the international trip. It was further demonstrated in the

[607] Paul Wolfowitz, *Press Conference on Deterrence*, *Remarks at a Press Availability at the U.S. Embassy* (2001-2009.state.gov: US Department of State, 2001).

[608] Marc Grossman, *Strategic Stability*, *Remarks at a Press Availability with Danish Foreign Minister Mogens Lykketoft at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (2001-2009.state.gov: US Department of State, 2001).

[609] Boese, "Missile Defense Consultations Abroad Yield Little Progress."

administration's "new concept of deterrence," conflating missile defenses with deterrence, which, as explained by Wolfowitz in Berlin that month, "combine[d] offensive forces, deployed defenses, and [policy]."[610]

During the weeks following Bush's speech, the administration pushed back on claims that China or Russia could feel threatened by developing and deploying strategic missile defense. Wolfowitz used the El Dorado myth, which frames aggression as a critical element in achieving world peace, as a defense against earlier claims made by the Chinese government. Wolfowitz stated that deploying strategic missile defense was not a "matter of gaining advantage over anyone but *is a matter of reducing vulnerability for everybody*."[611] Grossman, days later, stressed the argument that rival nations possessing nuclear capabilities could be viewed as an inherent form of blackmail but that the "purpose" of the United States missile defense system should be considered peaceful, stating that the "purpose of the defenses is not to make any country… more vulnerable. We would like to see the day when all countries can protect themselves from this kind of threat of terrorism or blackmail."[612]

At the same time that Wolfowitz was arguing that missile defense was inherently peaceful, the administration was also arguing that leaving the ABM Treaty would have no impact on China and that their behavior would be the same regardless of the treaty, with Armitage stating, "China has been embarked on a missile program for some time, and it long preceded any discussion by the United States about a limited missile defense plan. So, I don't

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[610] Paul Wolfowitz, *Press Conference on Missile Defense*, *Remarks at a Press Availability at the U.S. Embassy* (2001-2009.state.gov: US Department of State, 2001).

[611] Wolfowitz, "Press Conference on Deterrence."

[612] Marc Grossman, *Consultations on Missile Defense*, *Remarks at a Press Availability at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (2001-2009.state.gov: US Dpeartment of State, 2001).

think this is going to interfere in any way with the direction that China was going."[613] This argument seemingly pushes back against claims that developing a missile defense would deter nations from bolstering their capabilities. On May 21st, in an indication that they knew they needed to shift the public perception of Russian and Chinese criticisms of missile defense rather than change the opinions of Russia and China, Rumsfeld sent a memo to his assistant and Wolfowitz saying that they needed "some piece of paper that takes every one of the Russian objections [to missile defense] and shows what is wrong with it," and that "we also ought to have a piece for the China objections and some commentary on how they are behaving."[614]

The administration used the conflation of missile defense types to argue their benefits and frequently conflated the threats that strategic missile defense could defend against with those it could not. When presented with questions from reporters concerning skepticism by Russian politicians regarding claims of the rogue threat facing the United States, Hadley stated, "For Americans who lived through the Gulf War and saw the effect of SCUD missiles in that conflict, the threat has a certain reality and urgency that maybe is not shared."[615] This was another example of conflating the threat that could potentially justify a strategic missile defense, that of nuclear-capable ICBMs, with threats that are not what the strategic defense is even designed to counter. This conflation allows the network to frame the policy problems that a strategic missile defense would not resolve as problems that justify it. When asked if the United States could support staying in the ABM Treaty, state spokesman Richard Boucher said, "I don't think we

[613] Richard Armitage, *The New Strategic Framework*, *Press Conference Following Meeting with Prime Minister Vajpayee* (2001-2009.state.gov: US Department of State, 2001).

[614] Donald Rumsfeld, *Re: Objections to Missile Defense* (The Rumsfeld Archive, 2001).

[615] Stephen J Hadley, *Consultations in Moscow*, *Remarks at a Press Availability at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (2001-2009.state.gov: US Department of State, 2001).

have raised that possibility." Boucher added, "We have come to the conclusion that this treaty is outdated and not important or relevant to the current strategic situation."[616] The network members within the administration attempted to change their perception of the policy problem through strategic myths and conflating threats. The administration also used strategic myths and conflating missile defense technologies to push back against legitimate criticism, and the administration made it clear that leaving the ABM Treaty was a top priority and did not need a specific threat, a specific missile defense, or even a working viable strategic missile defense system to do it. In a testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee weeks later, Powell also argued that Russia should not worry about the missile defense plan as the United States would still be vulnerable to them. Powell, however, admitted that "you can't entirely do away with what has been known as mutual assured destruction."[617] Powell seemingly disagreed with the administration's position that MAD was a relic of the Cold War that should be left behind.

Bush pointed to the diplomatic blitz as evidence against criticisms that the United States wanted to leave the ABM Treaty unilaterally, saying, "Unilateralists don't come around the table to listen to others."[618] While some NATO leaders signaled support approval of the strategic missile defense effort, close allies France and Germany, among others, stood firmly against the plan and stressed the need to improve arms control rather than the further development and deployment of missile defenses. That summer, on June 21, speaking before the House Armed Services Committee, Rumsfeld reiterated the administration's desire to alter the perception of

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[616] Richard Boucher, *Daily Press Briefing* (2001-2009.state.gov: US Department of State, 2001).

[617] Wade Boese, "Bush Meets Opposition to Missile Defense While in Europe," *Arms Control Today* 31, no. 6 (2001).

[618] Ibid.

both the policy problems and policy solutions that were on the table, argued for a "new construct" concerning 21st-century threats and the need for a "portfolio of US military capabilities." Rumsfeld argued that deterrence was insufficient and that deterrence "in effect" allowed adversarial states to hold their people "hostage." This is due to the argument that deterrence relies on counter-value attacks; the threat of striking back at population centers to inflict pain should be sufficient to deter attacks. Rumsfeld, however, argued against counter-value attacks and the effectiveness of deterrence. The implication was clear: if counter-value attacks and deterrence were not the desired policy solution, missile defense-enabled counter-force attacks (nuclear first strike) were.

Vagueness, Inconsistency, and a Trend of Historical Hypotheticals

The Bush administration's approach to missile defense, characterized by strategic ambiguity and unilateral decisions, exemplifies the dynamic interplay between an organization's internal resource needs and its external environment. The shift in domestic power dynamics, as described in the following section and epitomized by Senator Jeffords' party change and the international reactions to U.S. policy, particularly concerning the ABM Treaty, underscore the administration's strategic maneuvering to fulfill its resource dependencies. This involved attempts to cultivate political support through strategic myth arguments and leveraging support from actors within their network while concurrently challenging congressional oversight whenever feasible.

While the administration attempted to gather international support for missile defense, or, at minimum, push back on the arguments that it was a signal of unilateralism by the US or could be considered threatening to Russia or China, the domestic power distribution was substantially

shifted.[619] Sen. Jim Jeffords, roughly three weeks after Bush's missile defense speech and after meeting in secret with Sen. Daschle and Reid for weeks, switched his party designation from Republican to independent and declared that he would caucus with the Democrats.[620] While other factors were in play, including education funding and a promise of chairing a committee, in his statement to voters explaining his decision, Jeffords specifically cited missile defense as a "fundamental issue" on which he disagreed with President Bush.[621]

In the summer of 2001, the network members within the administration used several strategic myths (offensive advantage, power shifts, dominoes, and paper tigers, among others) to suggest that not only was an aggressive policy of the deployment of strategic missile defense necessary for the security of the state but also that the alternative policy solutions of diplomacy and deterrence (embedded within the text of the ABM Treaty) were not being considered as viable options.

On July 12, 2001, Rumsfeld, Kyl, Weldon, Gaffney, and retired Senator Malcolm Wallop (among others) participated in a press conference hosted by the Frontiers of Freedom.[622] During the press conference, the network members made the pitch that the need for missile defense was valid and urgent, with Rumsfeld stating that "those that do not believe the threat is real simply

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[619] Tony Karon, "How Jim Jeffords Changed the World," last modified May 29, accessed. https://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,128283,00.html., The Associated Press, "Vermont Senator Announces He Will Leave G.O.P.," *The New York Times*, May 24, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/24/politics/vermont-senator-announces-he-will-leave-gop.html.

[620] Douglas Waller et al., "How Jeffords Got Away," CNN, last modified May 28, accessed. https://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/2001/06/04/jeffords.html.

[621] Jim Jeffords, *Statement on Leaving the Republican Party* (cnn.com: 2001).

[622] An organization that Wallop heads, see: Frontiers of Freedom, *Secretary Rumsfeld and Other Experts Discuss the Urgency of Missile Defense* (Frontiers of Freedom, 2001).

don't get it." Wallop, a longtime advocate of space-based missile defense, insisted that the problem facing missile defense is not flawed technology but "of political will and commitment."

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 12, 2001, Wolfowitz not only continued the framing of the ABM as a nonviable policy solution but presented the withdrawal of the ABM as a fait accompli due to "one or more aspects" of the testing program that Wolfowitz argued "w[ould] inevitably bump up against treaty restrictions." He declared such a 'bump' was "likely to occur in months, not in years." While he admitted that it was "not possible to know with certainty" if such a 'bump' would occur next year, he argued that "we are on a collision course… no one is pretending that what we are doing is consistent with that treaty. We have either got to withdraw from it or replace it." Wolfowitz's urgency to leave the ABM Treaty before a supposedly inevitable violation echoes window of opportunity arguments for the rapid deployment of missile defense. However, Wolfowitz was rebuked by members of Congress for the intentionally vague phrasing of "bump up against," which did not make it clear if they were planning to violate the treaty. Sen. Levin, newly appointed to chair of the committee thanks to Jefford's switch, opened the hearing that week by stating, "In order to meet a highly unlikely threat, if you rip up an arms control treaty and you start a new kind of arms race or Cold War with Russia and China, America could well be less secure."[623] Levin, among others, pushed back against Wolfowitz because the administration wanted funding for missile defense without having legal assurances that they would not violate the ABM Treaty, which, according to Sen. Leland (D-GA), represented a "system that has been reliable for 30 years, a combination of deterrence

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[623] John Isaacs, "Pebbles and All," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 57, no. 5 (2001).

and treaty obligations."[624] He argued that the administration was "proceeding without [having assurances that they would not violate the ABM Treaty], and you're asking us to proceed without it. And I hope we don't."[625]

According to Wolfowitz, the United States was willing to suffer the costs necessary for the deployment of missile defense because it would put the US in a better "position – much better – five or ten years from now to defend our troops, and I'm almost sure, to be able to defend our people." In an interview given one month prior, Wolfowitz dismissed concerns about self-encirclement and arms racing, placing these concerns in a tautological loop by stating missile defenses "will threaten no one. They will, however, deter those who would threaten us with a ballistic missile attack."[626] The implied argument is that there is no need to worry about creating a self-encirclement because A) only countries that already intended to threaten the United States would be concerned by missile defense and B) the paper tiger argument: irrational adversaries that assured national destruction would not deter, would certainly be deterred by a *potential* decrease in the likelihood of their successful attack. Wolfowitz pushed this argument further outward by broadly referencing El Dorado arguments, saying that "the way we define our interest, there's a sort of natural compatibility between the United States and most countries in the world." Not only would missile defenses threaten only countries already planning on

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[624] ibid. Sen. Cleland suggested the administration was claiming it was "bumping up against the treaty… but not inhaling," which was a reference to the rhetorical maneuvering used by President Clinton when describing his marijuana usage. See: Paul Richter, "Democrats Pelt Bush's Missile Shield with Verbal Attacks," *Los Angeles Times*, July 13, 2001, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-jul-13-mn-21895-story.html.

[625] "Pentagon Plans New Missile Defense Test," last modified July 12, accessed. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/military-july-dec01-missiles_07-12.

[626] Michael Gordon and Sherry Jones, "Interview with Paul Wolfowitz," Frontline, last modified June 12, accessed. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/missile/interviews/wolfowitz.html.

threatening the United States, but countries that would make such threats do not have "natural compatibility" with the rest of the world.

On July 14th, 2001, two days after Wolfowitz's comments of the "bumping up against" the ABM Treaty, Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov expressed confusion on the White House's position toward the ABM. Ivanov argued that mixed messages were coming from high-level administration members regarding whether they planned to stay a participant in the treaty or not, "some say they are withdrawing from the treaty. Others say they are not withdrawing. Still, others say the ABM Treaty will not be violated. Therefore, there is no point in reacting to such very contradictory statements."[627] The same week, Vladimir Rushailo, head of Putin's Security Council, told reporters that "Russia, as well as many other countries, believes that a unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty would lead to the destruction of strategic stability, a new powerful spiral of the arms race, particularly in space, and the development of means for overcoming the national missile defense system."[628]

Five days later, on July 19th, Philip Coyle testified in a hearing before the SASC. He was critical of Wolfowitz's attempt at a rhetorical fait accompli that posited the United States was months away from being forced to violate the ABM Treaty because of missile defense development. Coyle stated that "in the near term, the ABM Treaty hinders neither development nor testing" of missile defense. Coyle argued that because "additional test ranges can be established" under the treaty, the ABM was "not now an obstacle to proper development and testing" of a national system. Coyle's argument highlights a common inconsistency that network

[627] Patrick Tyler, "'Contradictory' U.S. Words on Abm Issue Puzzle Russia," *The New York Times*, July 14, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/14/world/contradictory-us-words-on-abm-issue-puzzle-russia.html.

[628] The Associated Press, "Pentagon to Begin Missile Defense Construction in April," *The New York Times*, July 12, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/12/politics/pentagon-to-begin-missile-defense-construction-in-april.html.

members frequently repeat: a tendency to argue that the potential need to modify diplomatic agreements justifies the dissolution of the agreement while also insisting that missile defenses should never be expected to be "perfect." He added that because of "simple technical and budgetary reasons," even a system with "limited capability" was still "a decade or more" away from development. He also emphasized that systems defending against SRBMs and IRBMs were permitted by the ABM Treaty and much more urgently needed than strategic defenses targeting ICBMs.

During the same hearing as Coyle, Clinton's former National Security Advisor, Samuel 'Sandy' Berger, argued that the administration's vagueness regarding the technologies they were attempting to develop as part of the missile defense system (including the final form that the missile defense system would take), makes any potential renegotiation of the ABM Treaty extremely unlikely. Berger argued that the objective of the administration should be to "enhance our security." Instead, he believes the "principal objective" of the administration is to "get rid of the treaty." These two experts highlighted the fact the network was directly undercutting diplomacy by A) arguing the treaty was destined to be violated in the near term, B) insisting that the treaty must be dissolved or fundamentally restructured when minor adjustments could handle anything needed for at least the next decade, and C) deliberately kneecapping potential diplomatic negotiations by refusing to specify the missile defense system the United States was pursuing. These efforts by the network, highlighted by the criticisms of Coyle and Berger (resisting attempts at external control, being vague concerning the satisfaction of external demands and ultimate architecture, and undercutting alternative products to increase the likelihood of access to necessary resources in the future) all align with behavior explained by the resource dependence-understandings of organization theory.

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Further evidence of network members viewing the ABM Treaty withdrawal as a foregone conclusion can be found in directions given by Secretary Rumsfeld to BMDO Director Kadish concerning the development of the missile defense system. Kadish, speaking at a missile defense conference sponsored by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, revealed that Rumsfeld gave him "two very clear directives," the first of which was to build a system that could defend the United States, allies, deployed troops, and the ever nebulous "friends." The second directive was to design the system "without regard to treaty constraints… and I believe we have done that."[629] However, at the same conference, Kadish said, "I won't talk about [system architecture] in much detail… because we haven't nailed exactly all the details down." Kadish conveyed to the audience that the details of the system would remain vague but that it was designed without regard to the ABM Treaty, effectively treating the treaty as if it was only a temporary stopgap and not only would it not prevent the deployment of a strategic defense system, but the possibility of renegotiating a treaty that could allow a modified system was not even taken into account – and was intentionally removed from consideration.

The conference, where Kadish explained that the ABM Treaty was not being considered in the calculus of missile defense architecture and that the system was intended to defend not just the United States but anyone considered a "friend," was attended by a substantial contingent of defense industry participants. Out of a reported group of around 200 participants, roughly 70 were defense companies of some variation, including Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon (all of which had elaborate displays).[630] In addition to Weldon (who gave the keynote speech)

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[629] Jeff Bennett, "Kadish Told to Pursue Missile Defense without Regard to Abm Treaty," *Inside Missile Defense* 7, no. 14 (2001), accessed 2023/10/09/, https://www-jstor-org.uoregon.idm.oclc.org/stable/24783404.

[630] Ciarrocca and Hartung.

and Kadish, also speaking at the two-day conference were Baker Spring of the Heritage

Foundation, Lee Wilbur of Boeing, and several of Weldon's fellow CSP advisors, including

Henry Cooper of High Frontier, Douglas Graham of Lockheed Martin, and Frank Gaffney.

Lowell Wood of LLNL and the Hoover Institution spoke of the potential to incorporate Brilliant

Pebbles ideas into the missile defense architecture.[631] In the lead-up to the conference, Weldon,

sandwiched by two missiles in the parking lot where the conference was held, told reporters that

strategic defense was needed because 70 nations possessed "medium and long-range missiles"

with more building them, an argument that allowed the number of countries with ICBMs capable

of hitting the United States to be conflated with the substantially higher number of countries with

medium-range ballistic missiles.[632] The conference was titled *Defending the Northeast, the*

Nation and America's Allies from Ballistic Missile Attack.

Two weeks after that conference, during a HASC hearing, Weldon argued security

through aggression by making a comparison to pre-nuclear Europe. He argued that "there were

those in Britain who wanted to make sure that Britain was properly prepared, and they were

working on one specific new, cutting-edge technology that those who wanted to appease Hitler

and Germany thought would provoke a conflict… I think there's a parallel here, and I would

hope that those who are adamantly opposed to missile defense would remember that, I think,

related story that occurred not too long ago." Beyond comparing missile defense critics to the

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[631] Baker Spring, "The Operational Missile Defense Capability: A Historic Advance Forthe Defense of the American People," Heritage Foundaiton, last modified September 22, accessed. https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-operational-missile-defense-capability-historic-advance-forthe-defense-the.

[632] The missiles were identified as "ballistic missiles" according to the Mainline Times & Suburban and as SCUD missiles by the Lincoln Institute. See: Mainline Media News, "Weldon Crusades for Missile Defense against Foreign Threats," Mainline Media News, last modified September 23, 2021, accessed 2021. https://www.mainlinemedianews.com/2001/07/02/weldon-crusades-for-missile-defense-against-foreign-threats/., Albert Paschall, "The First Guy on My Block," The Lincoln Institute, last modified July 19, accessed. https://www.lincolninstitute.org/first-guy-block/.

appeasers of Hitler, Weldon made a paper tiger argument, implying that modern threats should be viewed as potential causes of destruction on the level of the next World War and also that these Hitler-esque terrors could easily be thwarted by a simple effort, in this case, the deployment of missile defense. Of course, Weldon's argument equating missile defense critics with appeasers of Nazi Germany failed to properly account for the fact that pre-nuclear Great Britain existed in a fundamentally different security situation than the United, in no small part due to the existence of nuclear weapons (as well as other military and geographic differences).

Later that month, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith also made a historical hypothetical during a hearing of the SFRC. Feith encouraged the senators to "imagine" a rogue state "armed with ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction" with a "genocidal dictator [threatening] our allies and deployed forces" before stating that he was describing Iraq. Feith then argued the window of opportunity was closing and that they needed to build defenses because "hostile powers will soon have – or may already have – the ability to strike US and allied cities with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons."[633]

Furthermore, these historical and ahistorical analogies (such as President Bush's hypothetical nuclear Iraq in the first Gulf War) allowed network defense members to argue that existing threats and vulnerabilities are comparable to historical threats and vulnerabilities.[634]

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[633] *The Administration's Missile Defense Program and the Abm Treaty*, 1st ed., *Foreign Relations* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001).

[634] For more on the use of analogies to shape opinion, see: Dale W Griffin and Lee Ross, "Subjective Construal, Social Inference, and Human Misunderstanding," in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Elsevier, 1991)., Denise R Beike and Steven J Sherman, "Framing of Comparisons in Research and Practice," *Applied and Preventive Psychology* 7, no. 3 (1998).. For more on propagandist usage of analogy to imply attributes of a current situation beyond what exists, see: Diederik A Stapel and Russell Spears, "Guilty by Disassociation (and Innocent by Association): The Impact of Relevant and Irrelevant Analogies on Political Judgments," *Political Behavior* 18 (1996)., Keith L. Shimko, "Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making," *Political Psychology* 15, no. 4 (1994), accessed 2023/10/22/, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3791625.

These analogies were used without a specific point of comparison, allowing the hypothetical and historical threats to serve as proxies for any potential l future threat instead of directly pointing to an existing threat that the missile defense system would realistically defeat. Organizations often have motivated reasonings for selecting the historical cases that they use to build analogous-based justifications. Organizations are also effective at transmitting these perspectives through the organization. One such example was a memo written by Rumsfeld arguing that events such as England during the Blitz and the Gulf War justified the pursuit of missile defense.[635]

Senator Biden pointed out this consistent use of nonspecific threats in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on missile defense later that month when he pointed out that the administration's approach to a justifying threat "appears to be to throw out any number of menaces and hope that at least one will prove persuasive" while not giving sufficient attention to threats that the joint chiefs of staff have said are more likely than an attack by a long-range ballistic missile" or alternative policy solutions like diplomacy.[636] This strategy of multiple menaces was demonstrated in the same committee hearing by Sen. Helms, who provided two states that the missile defense system was not argued to defend against before including additional hypothetical future threats. Just sentences after declaring that the ABM Treaty "is nonexistent" due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union because "today there is a far different relationship with Russia than the United States has ever had before with the Soviet Union," the Senator also argued that "in addition to the threat from Russia and China," the US "may very well soon face a hostile tyrant wielding an intercontinental-range missile."

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[635] Donald Rumsfeld, *Anecdote on Missile Defense* (National Security Archive, 2001).

[636] *The Administration's Missile Defense Program and the Abm Treaty*, First ed., *Foreign Relations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001).

As evidence for his use of the power shift myth, Helms referenced the Rumsfeld Commission report, arguing it warned against "leaders such as Saddam Hussein [who] seek the ability to blackmail the United States." During an exchange with his protegee, John Bolton, later in the hearing, Helms also stated that the intelligence community warned that North Korea and Iran "probably will deploy ICBMs within the next few years," to which Bolton replied, "That is some estimates." It should be noted that the consensus of the NIE released two years prior disagreed that Iran "probably will deploy" ICBMs in the few years following 2001, but rather that it "could" potentially "test" an ICBM in 10-15 years. That NIE suggested that North Korea would likely test, not deploy, a two-stage Taepo Dong-2 missile, which, in theory, would be able to hit Alaska or Hawaii. However, later analysis revealed the Taepo Dong-2 as an element of the North Korean space program. [637] Furthermore, at the time of this argument, North Korea abided by a moratorium on its missile program, which began in 1999. Helms' argument also was not supported by the NIE that would be released later that year and would only go as far as to say that North Korea "may" be ready to begin flight-testing (not deploying) a multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2 but reiterated that North Korea still adhered to the self-imposed moratorium on flight-testing missiles and their longest-range ballistic weapon at the time was the No Dong, with a range of 1,300 km.[638]

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[637] Joseph Cirincione, "Assessing the Assessment: The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate of the Ballistic Missile Threat," *The Nonproliferation Review* 7, no. 1 (2000).

[638] Other assessments, such as that by Director of the DIA, Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, in February 2001, would also not go further than "could" on the capabilities of the rogue threats, stating that "North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, could field ICBMs with WMD [over the next 15 years]," see: *Global Threats and Challenges through 2015, Statement for the Record*, 1st ed., *Select Committee on Intelligence* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001). National Intelligence Council, *Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015* (National Intelligence Council Washington, DC, 2001).

At this same hearing, Helms' protégé John Bolton highlighted that the administration was not looking to modify the ABM Treaty, which could allow near-term developments while holding the core of the diplomatic agreement in place, but instead was seeking the dissolution of the agreement. It should be noted that Bolton was a staunch critic of arms control agreements and international agreements of all forms. Referencing the anarchic nature of the international arena, when questioned during an interview the following year about compliance with a treaty, Bolton argued, "If somebody violates the treaty, what are you going to do? You going to sue them?"[639] Bolton claimed that diplomatic adjustments such as "line-out amendments" were not "viable" according to the administration. He stated, "We need to accept that the treaty is fundamentally in conflict with the administration's approach toward the development of missile defenses."[640] Disregarding entirely the possibility of modifying the diplomatic agreement to incorporate space for "limited" strategic defenses (or even to allow for modification of the allowed testing arrangements in the near term) cannot be satisfactorily explained by the argued threat of rogue states or terrorists. While an outright dismissal of the possibility of modifications to the treaty cannot be justified by the threat landscape facing the United States, experts outside of the network continued to declare that nothing in the program needed to violate the treaty in the near future, with John Rhinelander, a legal advisor to ABM negotiations adding that there was "nothing" in the treaty that would've prevented "research or laboratory work on anything," The clear implication allows for two possibilities: a desire to, in the future, expand the strategic defenses beyond the "limited" system which was being sold, or a desire to eliminate the ABM

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[639] J. Peter Scoblic and Wade Boese, " Expounding Bush's Approach to U.S. Nuclear Security," *Arms Control Today*, 1 March, 2002.

[640] "The Administration's Missile Defense Program and the Abm Treaty."

Treaty as a potential diplomatic policy solution to the threat of arms racing.[641] Neither possibility

is supported by the majority of arguments made in support of strategic defenses. Offensive

realism (provided the technology was not fundamentally flawed) could explain these possibilities

as a pursuit of nuclear primacy but would trip over the strategic flaws inherent in the system. A

resource-dependence domestic explanation provides an understanding of both potential

rationales, regardless of the effectiveness of the technology.

On the international side, the Bush administration made several attempts to reach an

agreement with Russia on ending the ABM Treaty, with Rice heading to Moscow in late July

and Rumsfeld following three weeks later. When asked if Rumsfeld had convinced him of the

idea of the treaty no longer being appropriate for modern times, Russian Defense Minister Sergei

Ivanov stated, "I'm afraid not," and added that "we feel no compunction to leave one or any

other treaty or accord which we currently have signed." However, it is difficult to view these

diplomatic overtures as anything other than obfuscations of unilateral intent. This fact was made

clear a week following Rumsfeld's trip when President Bush stated, "We will withdraw from the

ABM Treaty on our timeline." Despite some public signals to the contrary or the hope for a

diplomatic agreement, the administration made clear that there was no scenario in which they,

and by extension the missile defense program, remained constrained by the Treaty.[642] A week

later, JD Crouch made a broad window of vulnerability argument, not only in support of leaving

the ABM Treaty but against the concept of formal arms control agreements as a whole, stating

that they "require so much time to negotiate" they do not "allow us to make the kinds of

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[641] "The Administration's Missile Defense Program and the Abm Treaty."

[642] Wade Boese, "U.S.-Russian Differences Remain on Missile Defenses, Abm Treaty," *Arms Control Today* 31, no. 7 (2001), accessed 2021/11/05/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23627061.

adjustments to our own forces in the time frame we need to make them."[643] Crouch, appointed

that month to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, was a CSP

Advisor.[644]

An Exogenous Source of Resource Change: The Impact of 9/11 and The Folding of Missile
Defense Resistance

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the entire landscape of U.S.

defense policy underwent a significant transformation, affecting all its facets, including missile

defense. This epochal event is a pivotal demonstration of how external shocks can radically alter

the dynamics of resource exchange and policy formulation within organizational structures. The

attacks not only heightened public and political awareness of defense issues but also shifted their

political salience and electoral relevance. Within this altered context, the missile defense network

strategically leveraged the post-9/11 vulnerabilities to advocate for a departure from Cold War

paradigms and to underscore the threats posed by non-traditional adversaries. Influenced by

organizational and network biases, this advocacy led network members to justify the need for

missile defense through arguments that, paradoxically, focused on a type of threat that missile

defense would not have prevented. This section demonstrates how the calculated dissemination

of aggression-justifying imperial myths throughout the defense policy network was instrumental

in garnering support for these sweeping policy shifts and in countering opposition to significant

changes, such as the U.S.'s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). By delving

into these multifaceted changes, the paper illuminates the complex interplay of policy-making,

resource mobilization, and strategic rhetoric, particularly in the actions and discourses of key

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[643] Catherine MacRae, "Policy Office Overhaul Divides World, Reviving Reagan-Bush Model," *Inside the Pentagon* 17, no. 35 (2001), accessed 2023/11/12/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/insipent.17.35.04.

[644] Crouch was also in between stints as faculty for Missouri State. This program is aggressive in its policy advocacy in support of defense programs and lists multiple CSP and NIPP members and defense executives among its faculty.

figures like Secretary Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice, underscoring the indispensable role of network dynamics in shaping U.S. defense strategies during a period of profound national and international upheaval.

Thanks in large part to Sen. Jim Jeffords leaving the GOP in May to give the Democrats the majority, missile defense critics in Congress were able to throw weight behind their efforts to push back against the administration's missile defense efforts.[645] By September 2001, congressional missile defense skeptics and supporters of the ABM Treaty sought to redirect funding from missile defense to other threat priorities and prevent the administration from leaving the treaty. In a deliberate move to uphold the ABM Treaty, the SASC approved the Bush administration's budget request in early September with revisions designed to protect the treaty. Specifically, it redirected $1.3 billion to other priorities, including a $600 million allocation for anti-terrorism. It explicitly restricted the use of funds for any projects that were "inconsistent" with the treaty's terms.[646] The committee added a requirement of congressional approval, within 30 days, on any use of funds that were used in ways inconsistent with the treaty but deemed necessary for national security by the executive branch.

Such stipulations prompted a response from the administration, with Senator Warner introducing a letter from Secretary Rumsfeld stating that he would recommend the president issue a veto if Congress made the cuts and put in place the stipulations on missile defense that the SASC approved.[647] During this veto threat, Rumsfeld, despite repeated claims from missile

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[645] Press, "Vermont Senator Announces He Will Leave G.O.P..", Karon,

[646] Wade Boese, "Democrats Withdraw Missile Defense Restrictions," *Arms Control Today* 31, no. 8 (2001), accessed 2021/11/08/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23627258.

[647] Thom Shanker, "Senate Committee Cuts Money from Missile Defense Plan," *The New York Times*, September 8, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/08/us/senate-committee-cuts-money-from-missile-defense-plan.html.

defense advocates that US missile defenses should not threaten Russia, used power shift arguments to state that the SASC budget changes "would send a signal to the Russians and other countries that may prefer that the US remain vulnerable to ballistic missiles that they can wait us out, while proliferation and offensive missile developments continue apace," and that "the US would fall still further behind in countering the threats of long-range missiles."[648]

The possibility that Levin would attach stipulations to the funding to ensure that testing would comply with the ABM Treaty was a possibility known to Rumsfeld for months; in private communication between Rumsfeld and Chris Williams in July, they expected this exact scenario. It also revealed that they believed they knew specific intangible resources: "some measure of stature, jurisdiction, and relevance," that he would crave in his first year as SASC chair. They determined that it should be made "clear right away that [the President] will veto" and thus put pressure on Levin to accommodate to "get a bill."[649]

On September 9, 2001, Condoleezza Rice appeared on "Meet the Press" and argued that it would be irresponsible for the President not to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles.[650] This statement was promptly countered by then-Senator Joe Biden, who highlighted the Defense Department's assessment of more likely threats, such as terrorism through bomb smuggling or anthrax attacks, rather than "somebody sending an ICBM with a return address on it." The following day, September 10, Rumsfeld penned a document, the nature of which is unclear—whether a personal note or an official memo.[651] In it, Rumsfeld articulated a strategic emphasis

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[648] Ibid.

[649] Chris Williams, *Various Items - To: Donald Rumsfeld*, memo discussing strategy if Levin uses funding to protect ABMT ed. (2001).

[650] Jeff Nussbaum, "The 9/11 Speech That Was Never Delivered," *The Atlantic*, September 10, 2023.

[651] Donald Rumsfeld, *Senator Wallop* (National Security Archives, 2001).

he wanted in advocating for missile defense, stressing the importance of future threats rather than current ones. He criticized the notion of waiting until threats became imminent, underscoring the government's responsibility to prepare for the future, stating, "We ought to start feeding into our missile defense arguments that missile defense is not about today – it is about tomorrow." In this document, Rumsfeld noted that he wanted the argument made that the critics were "flat wrong" even if they did not "have missile defense capabilities" at the moment, adding "particularly Biden." That same day, Rumsfeld requested that former Senator Malcolm Wallop, a Senior Fellow with the Heritage Foundation and the head of the Frontiers of Freedom (an organization that held a pro-Missile Defense press conference for that summer that Rumsfeld participated in), be added to "that group that comes in with Frank Gaffney from time to time," indicating a consolidation of voices in support of the missile defense agenda.[652]

That same day, September 10th, Biden gave a speech at the National Press Club asking if the United States was willing to "end four decades of arms control agreements" in order to become "a kind of bully nation, sometimes a little wrongheaded" that would "make unilateral decisions in what we perceive to be our self-interest."[653] Biden argued leaving the ABM Treaty would be saying "the hell with our treaties, our commitments, our word" to "pell-mell rush" toward an expensive system with questionable technology instead of staying with the ABM and working out a "verifiable agreement," with North Korea?[654] Biden also stressed that there were other more likely threats than an ICBM attack: "Missile defense has to be weighed carefully

[652] Ibid.

[653] Jane Perlez, "Biden Opens Wide Critique of Bush Plan for a Shield," *Thew New York Times*, September 11, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/11/world/biden-opens-wide-critique-of-bush-plan-for-a-shield.html.

[654] Ibid.

against all other spending and all other military priorities … In truth, our real security needs are much more earthbound and far less costly than missile defense."[655] Biden's argument framed the debate as a whole through a resource dependence lens, debating not just over strategy but demonstrating a fundamental disagreement over how to allocate national resources while questioning why missile defense is being pushed as an effective policy solution for an issue that has been handled by diplomacy for decades.

On the day of the attacks, Rice was scheduled to present a case for missile defense at Johns Hopkins University. Her speech was intended to articulate a dual-focused security strategy, addressing both the low-tech terrorism threats and the high-tech missile capabilities posed by rogues.[656] In the drafts of her planned address, Rice aimed to broaden the perspective on national security interests, pushing an encompassing domino argument by asserting that "our interests span every time zone."[657] She also challenged the notion that the United States was either isolationist or unilateralist before specifically arguing that those defending the ABM Treaty had failed to "recognize the tectonic plates of history really have shifted."[658]

The actual shift took place on the day of Rice's planned speech. In the post-September 11 landscape, Senator Carl Levin's political maneuvering, particularly his use of budget regulations to protect the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, encountered a significant paradigm shift. Recognizing the changed security (and political) landscape, Levin, hoping to circumvent a divisive political battle in a time of national crisis, suggested initially to try and reach a quick

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[655] Ibid.

[656] Robin Wright, "Top Focus before 9/11 Wasn't on Terrorism; Rice Speech Cited Missile Defense," *The Washington Post*, April 1, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40697-2004Mar31.html.

[657] Nussbaum.

[658] Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington* (Crown Pub, 2011).

agreement on missile defense language to either "bridge those differences or defer that debate until," a time that was less politically charged.[659] Rep. David Obey signaled the importance of these exogenous events on the impact of policy making, noting that even though 9/11 was an event that would not have been prevented by missile defense, Congress would be overwhelmed by the circumstances of the dramatically shifting political landscape and be reluctant to push back against the administration, adding that such shifts in the political landscape (and thus shifts in political resources, produce "some of the craziest results and some of the biggest mistakes."[660]

Beyond Levin, other Democratic senators realized their opposition to missile defense was losing ground. Senator Barbara A. Mikulski (D-MD) captured this sentiment, remarking, "Nobody wants to say 'I told you so,'" acknowledging the shift despite clear evidence that terrorism was a more significant threat than rogue missiles. Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Kent Conrad (D-ND) conveyed a resigned acceptance of this new reality, with Feinstein noting, "I think we probably will not argue about it now. But eventually, there will come a realization that these planes were missiles a defense shield could not defend against." Conrad added, "We've got to use our resources to defend against this sort of attack," rather than focusing on missile defense.[661]

In contrast, Republican senators reinforced their stance on the necessity of missile defense. Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) stated, "What Tuesday showed is that attacks can come in

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[659] Ibid.

[660] Adam Clymer, "The Missile Debate: Shield Plan Appears Buoyed by a New Bipartisan Mood," *The New York Times*, September 14, 2001.

[661] Adam Clymer, "After the Attacks: The Missile Debate; Shield Plan Appears Buoyed by a New Bipartisan Mood," *The New York Times*, September 14, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/14/us/after-attacks-missile-debate-shield-plan-appears-buoyed-new-bipartisan-mood.html.

many different forms," highlighting the diverse nature of threats. Senator Thad Cochran (R-MS) stressed the unpredictability of threats, noting the inability to predict enemy tactics.[662] Frank Gaffney argued that the attacks would wake up Americans from "an unwarranted sense of security to reflect upon their vulnerability… and there is no more egregious example of our vulnerability than our complete inability to stop even a single [ballistic] missile."[663] While some argued that the attacks proved the need for missile defenses and leaving the ABM Treaty, other advocates like Fred Thompson (R-TN) and White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer stressed that the events "are not connected" and in no way diminish the threat of ballistic missiles.

While some experts initially predicted that the 9/11 attacks would redirect focus away from threats like ICBMs because they would "take up so much oxygen" in national security discussions, the political landscape soon shifted in a different direction, with Tom Collina from the Union of Concerned Scientists expressing concern over the Democrats' potential retreat from their stance on missile defense funding. He noted, "There's a real danger because of the crisis that the democrats will give up this fight, which would be a real shame."[664] Jack Spencer of the Heritage Foundation echoed the idea but did not echo the sentiment, saying that the attacks would "help the American public understand the importance of national defense."[665]

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[662] Cochran, who introduced the 1999 Missile Defense Act and whose former chief of staff MDB Carlisle is a member of the CSP board of directors, gave Rumsfeld's introduction at his Keeper of the Flame Award gala for the CSP three years prior, see: "1998 Keeper of the Flame Award: Donald Rumsfeld," Center for Security Policy, last modified October 26, accessed. https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/1998-keeper-of-the-flame-award-donald-rumsfeld/.,Center for Security Policy, *2001 Annual Report: Standing Watch* (Washington, DC: Center for Security Policy, 2001).

[663] John Lancaster and Greg Schneider, "Foreign Policy Consequences Huge; Missile Shield, Mideast, Security Likely to Be Influenced," *The Washington Post*, September 13, 2001.

[664] Clymer.

[665] Philip Dine, "Mood Is High for Defense Spending, but Specifics Are Murky; Old Battle Lines over Missile Defense Remain Firm," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, September 16, 2001.

A week after the attacks, the political resources of the moment clearly favored missile defense advocates. Negotiations were underway on backtracking Levin's earlier budget cuts and restrictions between Levin, Warner, and Rumsfeld.[666] During this period, Rumsfeld sent a memo to Bush, along with the rest of the upper-level members of the administration, pushing for them to publicly release information that indicated that missile defense testing was constrained due to the ABMT.[667] These negotiations resulted in the language designed to protect the concepts of the ABM Treaty getting removed from the authorization bill, as Levin determined he did not want the Senate in a political fight.[668] After the negotiations, Levin and Warner cosponsored an amendment that restored missile defense funding but allowed the possibility for the president to shift the funding to anti-terrorism programs if he chose to.[669] Skelton and Spratt also agreed to alter their budget cuts.[670] An aide leaked to the New York Times that the Democrats felt they made a sacrifice and that it was important for the GOP to reciprocate. This hopeful perspective was shared by Reed, who suggested that while it was not the time to debate the ABMT, it would be "counterproductive" for the administration to leave the treaty.[671] Levin also argued that they did not miss their opportunity, saying that while he knew it would now be more challenging to get a bill to pass with such ABMT protective provisions, he still believed it was "very unlikely

[666] James Dao, "Democrats in Senate Budge on Missile Defense Money," *The New York Times*, September 19, 2001.
[667] Donald Rumsfeld, *Attached Memo* (Rumsfeld.com, 2001).

[668] James Dao, "Democrats in Senate Budge on Missile Defense Money," *The New York Times*, September 19, 2001.

[669] Boese, "Democrats Withdraw Missile Defense Restrictions."

[670] Ibid.

[671] Adam Clymer, "Democrats in Senate Back Down on Missile Shield Issue: Opposition to Bush on Any Defense Issue Dissipates," *The New York Times*, September 22, 2001.

that the President, under these circumstances, is going to withdraw unilaterally from this treaty."[672]

On October 12, Rumsfeld held a meeting that included former director of SDIO, Caspar Weinberger, who served as an unpaid consultant for Rumsfeld. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss concepts of homeland security and WMDs. On the 17th, Weinberger sent a follow-up memo to Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, suggesting that 9/11 allowed the opportunity for dramatic changes regarding homeland defense, including a "major public information campaign" and "large-scale education programs in…foreign hostile capabilities," though he noted that "thanks to the Rumsfeld Commission," the US has "fully embarked on the acquisition and deployment of missile defenses," but "we of course need to abandon the ABM Treaty."[673] This demonstrates that network members were motivated to leave the ABM Treaty and, crucially, that they understood the strategic opportunity for policy change that had presented itself due to the political resource redistribution caused by the attacks.

On November 8, Rumsfeld sent a memo to the president arguing that the ABM Treaty is too complex to keep around because it "encumber[s] our efforts to develop missile defenses with a complicated restraining" agreement, and also suggested that the complexity of the agreement "argues against putting [the president] in the position of having to try to negotiate these complexities, at the last minute, with President Putin," instead encouraging the Bush to inform Putin that he was going to withdrawal.[674]

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[672] Thomas Duffy, "Promises to Keep Issue Alive; Levin: Abm Language Will Be Tough to Bring up as Separate Bill," *Inside Missile Defense* 7, no. 20 (2001), accessed 2021/07/22/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24783569.

[673] Capsar Weinberger, *Briefing of October 12, 2001* (rumsfeld.com, 2001).

[674] Donald Rumsfeld, *Abm Treaty - To: George W. Bush* (Rumsfeld.com, 2001).

On December 13, President Bush announced that the United States was beginning the six-month process of leaving the ABM Treaty. Rumsfeld wrote in a memo that day, "It is a good outcome."[675]

On the 20th of December, Gaffney and David Keene, co-chairs for Americans for Missile Defense, published a letter signed by 50 conservative leaders, thanking the president for putting "that impediment behind us, once and for all."[676] However, while leaving the ABMT got Bush goodwill and credit with the missile defense network, the head of the state department was not so fortunate. On Christmas Eve, Gaffney published an article that undercut Powell for being "a determined opponent of missile defense and an advocate for preserving the ABM Treaty" and that he "continues to exhibit…bad judgment."[677]

In a personal communication to Rumsfeld, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs Powell Moore briefed him before lunch with Senator Jeff Sessions, informing Rumsfeld that their goal was to "arm him [Sessions]" with information so that he could "champion" the administration's decision to leave the ABMT and support missile defense policies in general. Moore specifically noted that Sessions would support the administration's missile defense program as "his interest is driven in large part by the key role that the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama plays in the development of our missile defense program."[678]

On June 13, 2002, six months after giving notice, the United States official withdrew from the ABM Treaty. Both CSP and the Heritage Foundation took significant credit for the

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[675] Donald Rumsfeld, *Abm Treaty* (Rumsfeld.com, 2001).

[676] "Coalition Backs Bush On abm withdrawal," *U.S. Newswire*, 20 December, 2001.

[677] Frank Gaffney, "Media Elites Drive Wedge between Bush, Powell," *Insight on the News*, December 24, 2001.

[678] Powell Moore, *Read Ahead for Secretary Rumsfeld Lunch with Senator Sessions* (2002).

withdrawal from the Treaty.[679] Heritage published an article in November of 2002 about its ability to "influenc[e] the debate on missile defense."[680] In its 2002 annual report, the CSP referred to the withdrawal from the ABMT as "years of work bear[ing] fruit" and quoted an article from The Nation which pointed out that CSP memos, including those written by CSP members who were in the administration, were heavily informing policy.[681] The goal of removing the barrier to missile defense as a viable policy was a success.

North Korea Diplomacy: Dismantling Policy Alternatives

The final section of this study looks at actors' actions within the missile defense network as they strove to undercut the potential diplomacy between the US and North Korea. It should be pointed out that while there are certainly valid arguments for why the diplomatic solutions did not work, only the actors with ties to the network fought against the possibility of diplomacy. Multiple experts in the agreement without network ties argued that diplomatic avenues still existed. However, network members did not extend the same "it does not have to be perfect" grace to diplomacy that they have to missile defense.

The Agreed Framework

A Brief History of the Agreed Framework

While the relationship between the United States and North Korea following the Korean War was at all times tense and distrustful, it was also stable and, seemingly, easy to work out a

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[679] Policy, *Precision-Guided Ideas: 2002 Annual Report*.

[680] Spring, "The Heritage Foundation: Influencing the Debate on Missile Defense."

[681] Center for Security Policy, *Preceision-Guided Ideas: 2002 Annual Report* (2002).

modus vivendi. During the Cold War, the border between North Korea and South Korea became so heavily militarized that many experts viewed it as one of the most stable stand-offs in the world. With initial help from the Soviet Union, North Korea began developing a civilian nuclear program. By the 1980s, the basics of complete indigenous capability had been developed and created, and an indigenously designed 5MW(e) reactor that used uranium mined in the state was upgraded. As their program progressed, they began the process of building 50MW(e) and 200MW(e) reactors, which could potentially lead to enough plutonium for 150 nuclear weapons, and, facing international pressure, joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. After years of negotiations, North Korea signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1992 and allowed inspections of nuclear facilities.

The IAEA found discrepancies between their inspections and NK's declared facilities and materials and asked to inspect two waste sites but were rebuked. During this time, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and years of meager agricultural crop yields, North Korea's economy faced collapse and widespread famine. This coincided with a period of power transition as Kim Il-sung died in 1994. In October of that year, the US and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework that called on Pyongyang to freeze the operation and construction of nuclear reactors in exchange for proliferation-resistant nuclear power reactors along with a supply of fuel oil until construction of these light-water reactors (LWRs) was complete. The agreement successfully froze North Korea's seemingly rapidly increasing pursuit of nuclear weapons from 1994 until the United States decided to end the Agreed Framework in 2002. Organization theory with a resource dependence perspective provides a clear understanding of actions taken by the Missile Defense network members toward North Korea, which may otherwise seem suboptimal. Viewing the possibility of a nuclear North Korea as a policy problem needing a solution, the

Agreed Framework provided such a solution. It reinforced the notion that diplomatic options and negotiated agreements are viable policies to pursue in the future regarding these issues. As demonstrated during the years of the Clinton administration, missile defense advocates have positioned North Korea as a rogue state that cannot be assumed to be deterrable. Strategic missile defense, as a policy outcome and resource, becomes more valuable if there is a perception that the United States' vulnerability to nuclear ICBMs is a policy problem growing in severity and urgency. Strategic missile defense as a policy outcome and a resource also becomes more valuable if potential policy alternatives (such as diplomatic negotiated agreements) are viewed as untenable or unsatisfactory. Through this lens, it is clear that actors who benefit from developing and deploying strategic missile defense would also benefit from the perception of the policy area being shaped to appear urgent and severe. Actors who benefit from developing and deploying strategic missile defense would also benefit from potential policy alternatives (such as diplomatic solutions) being viewed as unacceptable or unreliable.

The Perry Process

Following the Rumsfeld Commission's report and North Korea's testing of the Taepodong-1, President Clinton formed a team led by former Secretary of Defense William Perry to try to ease tensions and address the goals of the Agreed Framework. Perry pushed for a collaborative approach to problem-solving that has come to be known as the "Perry Process," involving a reduction of isolation of North Korea by the US and its allies in a "step-by-step and reciprocal fashion."[682] North Korea responded to the Perry Process by agreeing to a moratorium

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[682] Cordesman, *Strategic Threats and National Missile Defenses: Defending the Us Homeland*.

on its long-range missile testing for as long as the talks continued.[683] In explaining the logic behind the Process, Secretary Perry argued that his experiences have shown that "nations, even those with a history of conflict and competition, can cooperate to important ends under a policy of mutual trust and respect."[684] According to Perry, there were two "fundamentally different" options: one was to "make step-by-step progress to comprehensive normalization and a peace treaty" relying on allies for strength, and the other was the "traditional alternative" of coercion.[685] While the missile defense network was successful in shaping the perception of the offense-defense balance and framing North Korea as a viable, undeterrable threat, as the Clinton years drew to a close, there was still the Agreed Framework in place as well as legitimate progress being made toward reaching an arms control agreement with North Korea. Both of these elements hampered the ability to use North Korea as justification for missile defense and served as legitimate policy alternatives.

The 1990s started with a potential nuclear crisis between the United States and North Korea. However, through the Agreed Framework, the plutonium reprocessing abilities of North Korea were effectively frozen for the rest of the decade. While this was happening, the missile defense network, in need of a new viable threat to fill the void left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, argued that undeterrable "rogue states" such as North Korea were such an imminent threat. When the intelligence community's assessments disputed these claims, congress members with ties to the missile defense lobby pushed for a commission to reassess the intelligence

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[683] David E Sanger, "Clinton Is Ready to Scrap Some North Korea Sanctions," *New York Times*, September 14, 1999, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/14/world/clinton-is-ready-to-scrap-some-north-korea-sanctions.html.

[684] William Perry, "The North Korean Policy Review: What Happened in 1999," last modified August 11, accessed. http://www.wjperryproject.org/notes-from-the-brink/the-north-korean-policy-review-what-happened-in-1999.

[685] Ibid.

estimates. Congress used the findings of this commission as justification for implementing a missile defense system as soon as technologically feasible. During this time, North Korea utilized missile tests as leverage for negotiations, pushing for normalized relationships and economic relief. As the decade ended, former Secretary of Defense William Perry pushed for good-faith, step-by-step negotiations involving North Korea and US allies. These negotiations resulted in a freeze of North Korea's ICBM testing and a viable blueprint for negotiations in the future.

Reversing Course on Clinton-era Diplomacy – Powell's Backtrack

In the early weeks of the administration, there were hopes from outside of the White House, as well as by certain members of the administration without strong ties to the missile defense network, that the Bush administration would be able to pick up where the Clinton administration left off in terms of improving the United States' relationship with North Korea (such as the DPRK agreeing to freeze testing of long-range ballistic missiles). This belief was exemplified by Colin Powell, who had met with former Secretary William Perry, who "brought him up to date" on the Perry Process.[686] Powell told Perry that he planned to follow up on the Process and would attempt to, according to Perry, "bring them to a successful conclusion." At Madeleine Albright's request, Powell hosted a briefing at his house following the election. The briefing, attended and led by Ambassador Wendy Sherman (former Special Advisor to President Clinton and Policy Coordinator on North Korea) and Jack Pritchard, dealt with issues involving North Korea and the possibility of establishing a "common agenda" concerning the state.[687]

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[686] Ibid.
[687] There are disputes on the topics covered in the transition period between the administrations, with disagreement on the level of briefings that occurred concerning terrorism. Rice argued in her memoirs that North Korea was the "most pressing business" of the meetings. Rice, *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington*.

Another actor who hoped that the incoming administration would be able to improve relations with North Korea was the President of South Korea, Kim Dae-jung. During a telephone conversation held between Kim and Bush (as part of a series of calls to international leaders from the incoming president), Kim stressed to Bush the need to engage with North Korea. In response, Bush reportedly covered the mouthpiece of the White House phone with his hand and said to members of his team, "Who is this guy? I can't believe how naïve he is!"[688] Within weeks of taking office, the incoming President stated that the suggestion of diplomacy with North Korea was "naïve."

Roughly six weeks after the inauguration, on March 6, 2001, Powell made his goals regarding North Korea public when he said that the administration "plan[ned] to engage with [DPRK] to pick up where President Clinton left off." Powell said the administration wanted to make sure US policy toward North Korea was "totally synchronized" with South Korean policy but assured that "some promising elements were left on the table and [the Bush administration] will be examining those elements."[689] Powell noted that the promising elements he mentioned could also benefit North Korea, stating that the US had "a lot to offer that regime if they will act in ways that we think are constructive."[690] These remarks aligned with Wendy Sherman's views in an op-ed released the next day in the New York Times. Sherman noted that the Clinton

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[688] Charles L Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb* (Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

[689] Colin L Powell, *Press Availability with Her Excellency Anna Lindh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden* (2001).

[690] Rice would later say that the story was "overwritten" by the press, who stretched the quotes into a full story, see: Rice, *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington*.

administration was "tantalizingly close" to a deal with North Korea but that they ran out of time "before [the administration] could nail down the final details."[691]

While Powell was optimistic about finishing what the Clinton administration had started, his predecessor, Madeleine Albright, believed the prior administration could not close the deal themselves due partly to the hostile political environment pushing back against an agreement. This hostility, Albright argued, was because "many in Congress and within the punditocracy opposed a [Clinton-Kim Jong Il] summit because they feared a deal with North Korea would weaken the case for national missile defense."[692] Multiple experienced, high-ranking members of the previous administration, the President of South Korea (with a clear interest in finding a viable and peaceful outcome), and the incoming Secretary of State all made it clear that they viewed diplomacy with North Korea as not just a preferred solution to the situation, but a realistic and viable solution.

That same day, the Director of the DIA, Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, in a closed hearing with the SASC, gave a statement for the record (a copy of which Rumsfeld received on March 1st) concerning threats to the US over the next 15 years. In his statement, Wilson stated that North Korea "could field small numbers of [ICBMs]" within the next 15 years. Still, he stressed that North Korea pledged and reaffirmed a pledge not to test long-range missiles in September of 1999, as well as June and October of 2000, stating it was "a pledge it has lived up to so far." Crucially, Wilson also noted the "relaxation of tensions on the [Korean] peninsula, and the real potential for further improvements," though acknowledged the "potential" for things

[691] Wendy R. Sherman, "Talking to the North Koreans," *The New York Times*, March 7, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/07/opinion/talking-to-the-north-koreans.html.

[692] Madeleine Albright, "At the Door to the Hermit Kingdom," *Vanity Fair*, September, 2003.

to change rapidly.[693] In a bullet point summary provided to Rumsfeld on February 27th, Wilson specifically noted that "Pyongyang's bold diplomatic outreach to the international community and engagement with South Korea reflect a significant change in strategy."[694]

On March 7, 2001, the day after Powell made his statements on the "promising elements" available for negotiation and agreement between the US and the DPRK, he was forced to backtrack his comments in what he later called "an embarrassing way."[695] In a hallway scrum that reporters would later describe as awkward and humiliating, Powell said, "There was some suggestion that imminent negotiations are about to begin… that is not the case."[696] Powell stated that there was "no hurry" to engage with North Korea and that the administration would "in due course, decide at what pace and when we engage." Weeks later, when discussing the incident, Powell told reporters, "Sometimes you get a little too far forward in your skis."[697] The same day as Powell's backtracking, Kyl and Weldon sent Rumsfeld a letter stating that "missile defense opponents [could] use a favorable change in the status of North Korea's missile programs to argue that the threat of ballistic missile attack has been vastly diminished," adding that "the effects of such arguments could be devastating."[698] It is not clear if the letter had anything to do with Powell's reversal; however, it does serve as an indication that members of the missile

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[693] Thomas R. Wilson, *Global Threats and Challenges through 2015* (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2001), https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/osd/snowflakes/11-F-0559%20(Rumsfeld)%20Second%20Release%20Bates%20913-2966.pdf.

[694] Donald Rumsfeld, *Threat Analysis* (theblackvault.com, 2001).

[695] Mike Chinoy, *Meltdown: The inside Story of the North Korean Crisis* (St. Martin's Press, 2010).

[696] Alan Sipress and Steven Mufson, "Powell Takes the Middle Ground," *The Washington Post*, August 26, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/08/26/powell-takes-the-middle-ground/8999cf69-6d90-413e-8850-18bbc49f42c2/?utm_term=.34386fb08cac.

[697] Ibid.

[698] Kyl and Weldon.

defense network were aware of the value that the threat of North Korea held for them and the "devastating" effects that it could have on the deployment of missile defense if that threat were diminished.

That same day, the administration's attitude regarding diplomacy with North Korea became clear and starkly contrasted with Powell's initial optimism of the previous day. In a meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, President Bush made clear that optimism on the topic, both by Powell and South Korea, should be cooled. Kim was hoping to receive Bush's blessing of the South Korean "sunshine policy" of engagement with the North, and he had explained to Washington officials his belief that a small window of opportunity existed to take advantage of recent indications of diplomatic receptiveness from North Korea.[699] Instead, in an experience that President Kim referred to as one which "humiliated" him, President Bush expressed apparent skepticism of the South Korean policy and decisively ended any possibility of a United States-North Korean summit occurring any time in the near future. Bush said many difficulties stood in the way of the two states even having a "dialogue."[700] In explaining his skepticism of North Korea, Bush stated that "we're not certain as to whether or not they're [DPRK] keeping all terms of [the Agreed Framework]."[701] Rice would later say that while "no one wanted to embarrass the South Korean," the administration wanted to make it clear that "we [the administration] would not pursue the Agreed Framework."[702] After Bush's statement, Torkel

[699] Bradley Graham, *Hit to Kill: The New Battle over Shielding America from Missile Attack* (PublicAffairs, 2003).

[700] Steven Mufson, "Bush Casts a Shadow on Korea Missile Talks," *The Washington Post*, March 8, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/03/08/bush-casts-a-shadow-on-korea-missile-talks/2edabd42-2c97-4154-b604-0f28bdf5639b/?utm_term=.dbace6e44c47.

[701] David E Sanger, "South Korean President and Bush at Odds on North Korea," *New York Times*, March 7, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/07/world/south-korean-president-and-bush-at-odds-on-north-korea.html.

[702] Rice, *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington*.

Patterson, the Senior Director for Asia at the National Security Council, was pushed for clarification by reporters regarding Bush's claim questioning North Korea holding to terms of the Agreed Framework. Patterson admitted that there was no evidence that North Korea violated any terms of the Agreed Framework.[703]

The next day, March 8th, Powell continued to reverse course from his earlier public optimism regarding North Korean negotiations from the previous administration during testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While his remarks to the press earlier in the week noted the "promising elements" that were left over from the Clinton administration negotiations and implied that diplomacy was a viable and realistic option that he hoped to continue, the rebuked Powell pointed out "what was missing in what had been done" during the Clinton administration. Powell noted the lack of "any kind of monitoring or verification regime" and that "the North Koreans had not engaged on that in any serious way in the period of the Clinton administration." Powell also stressed a crucial difference in approach between the administration's negotiation strategies, beyond just an emphasis on verification – the Bush administration wanted to incorporate issues beyond ballistic missiles into the negotiations, including the conventional military concerns on the Korean peninsula.[704] This indicates that despite the claims from the administration that the nuclear ballistic missile capabilities of rogue states served as an existential threat, the administration did not treat it that way in its diplomatic relations. This framing positioned attempts at diplomacy not as a direct and viable policy alternative to strategic missile defenses but implied that they should only be considered

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[703] Chinoy.

[704] Alex Wagner, "Bush Puts N. Korea Negotiations on Hold, Stresses Verification," *Arms Control Today* 31, no. 3 (2001).

successful if they also address a wide range of other policy issues (including those that seem to be competing interests).

External critics of the administration's approach noted the contradiction between the perception of the North Korea threat pushed by the administration and its approach to negotiations with North Korea, as well as the convenient justification for missile defense. A justification that was maintained by preventing improved relations with North Korea. On the day that Powell backtracked on his optimism, the president of the Council for a Livable World, John Isaacs, was quoted in the Chicago Tribute noting that "an adversarial relationship with North Korea makes it easier to sell national missile defense to the American people and the Congress." Isaacs said the recurring strategy of using Russia, China, and North Korea "as threats rather than negotiate."[705] At a press conference on the topic held two weeks later, Spurgeon Keeney Jr, the president of the Arms Control Association, referred to Bush's "handling of this affair" as "one of the most serious diplomatic blunders of the post-Cold War era" and a "fail[ure] to pursue a major opportunity to improve US security." Keeney noted that "rejecting [the] diplomatic track in favor of building a national missile defense… is a very poor trade-off" and that the administration's strategy toward North Korea will "certainly be widely perceived in this country and throughout the world as a cynical effort… to maintain North Korea as a clear and present danger to the United States and thus a rationale for pursuing a national missile defense."

Morton Halperin noted that the threat of North Korea having a nuclear-capable ICBM, as emphasized in the Rumsfeld Commission report, "led the Clinton administration to move toward deployment of a national missile defense." Halperin also noted that even advocates of missile

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[705] Naftali Bendavid and John Diamond, "Bush Talks Tough on N. Korea," *Chicago Tribune*, March 08, 2001, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2001-03-08-0103080271-story.html.

defense must know that the world would be safer if the threat that justified missile defense did not exist, rather than just defending against it, saying, "whatever one thinks about national missile defense, it seems clear that the North Koreans are much less likely to fire an ICBM at the [US] if they do not have one, and that it must be in our interest to try and reach an agreement which prevents them from building such an ICBM." Robert Gallucci, the lead negotiator for the Agreed Framework, encouraged missile defense advocates to place national security concerns ahead of parochial interests, saying that while every administration will have individuals with different ideas and perceptions, "if anybody's thinking it is a good idea to preserve the threat of North Korean ballistic missiles, I would think that is an idea that was not consistent with American national security interests, and I would hope that they would put it aside."[706]

Less than a week after the Bush White House pushed back against diplomatic relations with North Korea because the administration was "not certain" if North Korea was "keeping all terms of all agreements" despite the National Security Council's Senior Director for Asia stating that there was no evidence of any violation, missile defense advocates Senator Mike DeWine (R-OH), Bob Smith (R-NH), and Bolton's mentor, and arms treaty adversary, SFRC Chair Jesse Helms (R-NC), sent a letter to President Bush requesting that the US abandon its Agreed Framework obligations of providing an LWR. The senators instead pushed for coal-reliant power plants to handle North Korea's energy demands.[707] Helms also sent a letter to Powell requesting that the United States reject the CTBT and the ABM Treaty. The following day, in a speech to

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[706] Arms Control Association, "Bush's Deferral of Missile Negotiations with North Korea: A Missed Opportunity," *Arms Control Today* (March 23 2001).

[707] Philipp C Bleek, "Helms Asks Administration to Reject Arms Control Treaties," *Arms Control Today* 31, no. 3 (2001).

AEI, Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL), a missile defense advocate, echoed the request to abandon Agreed Framework obligations of providing LWRs and instead pushed for coal-fired power plants.

March 15, one week after Powell's diplomatic efforts were backtracked (and the day after Helms requested the White House for the US to abandon its Agreed Framework obligations), the DPRK canceled scheduled talks with South Korea to further reconciliation efforts.[708] North Korea issued additional statements that week about the "hostile" policies of the United States and its "black-hearted intention to torpedo the dialogue between" North and South Korea.[709] In a statement made through the Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang stated it was "fully prepared for both dialogue and war" but threatened to "take thousand fold revenge" on the United States. Two weeks later, noting the seeming incongruence of the White House stance of not continuing the "bargaining framework" left by the prior administration while simultaneously warning of North Korea's threat posed to the nation, Sen. John Kerry wrote in an op-ed for the Washington Post. Kerry pointed out the dissonance between the White House's identification of the policy problem and their dismissal of a viable policy solution, saying, "We have no hope of reducing the missile threat… unless we constructively engage North Korea."[710] Kerry argued that the White House "points to the North Korean missile threat as a major reason why we need to proceed" with missile defense and that this framing makes its hesitation to enter discussions

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[708] Don Kirk, "North Korea Abruptly Cancels Meetings with South," *New York Times*, March 13, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/13/world/north-korea-abruptly-cancels-meetings-with-south.html.

[709] B Dan Wood, *Presidential Saber Rattling: Causes and Consequences* (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[710] John Kerry, "Engage North Korea," *The Washington Post*, March 30, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2001/03/30/engage-north-korea/320da687-8fe0-4085-8152-34a26b680348/.

with North Korea "all the more puzzling. If we can reduce or eliminate the threat posed by North Korea's missile program, why wouldn't we push ahead?"

The following day, North Korea pledged to voluntarily extend the self-moratorium on its missile testing, which it previously threatened in March to end, until 2003.[711] Kim Jong Il made the pledge to a visiting envoy of European Union (EU) delegates. The fact that the EU sent its own delegates rather than deferring to US leadership on the matter, as it had done in the past, was viewed by some as an indication of international concern with US policy on the matter.[712] Though the connection was not directly specified, 2003 was also the same date as the "target date" for the completed construction of LWR in North Korea, as negotiated in the Agreed Framework. This extended the voluntary moratorium that began in 1999, following indications of a plan by the US to ease sanctions, which was reaffirmed the following year in a commitment to Madeleine Albright. The day after this voluntary extension, EU Secretary-General Javier Solana stated at a press conference that Kim has reaffirmed his continued demand to receive compensation for giving up the export of missiles, with Kim stating they "are part of trade." Solana quoted Kim, saying the North Korean leader stated, "I need money. I'm able to produce this, and I will sell it."[713]

On the last day of March, Rumsfeld sent a memo to Wolfowitz requesting that he "find out what Gaffney's article on CTBT is about and give me a briefing." Gaffney's article was predictably about the need to "terminate" any potential implementation of the agreement. Crucially, however, this incident served as an example of network members (in this case,

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[711] Alex Wagner, "Dprk Extends Missile Pledge as Us Readies to Resume Talks," *Arms Control Today* 31, no. 5 (2001).

[712] Graham, *Hit to Kill: The New Battle over Shielding America from Missile Attack*.

[713] Wagner, "Dprk Extends Missile Pledge as Us Readies to Resume Talks."

Gaffney) being able to provide input into administration policy even without direct in-person communication, though Gaffney certainly had that. The incident also served as an example of Rumsfeld deliberately seeking that input.

Preliminary Hurdles

On June 6th, 2001, a month after his May 1st pro-Missile Defense speech discussed earlier in this chapter, President Bush announced that the policy review concerning North Korea was completed and discussions with the state could resume. Bush declared his desire to have negotiations take place "in the context of a comprehensive approach" and cover a "broad agenda." Bush stated that in addition to negotiations concerning the Agreed Framework, its implementation, and verification, he directed his team to include topics unrelated to the crux of the original agreements in negotiations. These additional topics included North Korea's conventional military and the American desire for them to have a "less threatening conventional military posture."[714] This position by the United States essentially served as putting forth a non-starter for substantive negotiations, effectively making the requirements for initial negotiations unreasonably high by including components that work against each other. Frank Jannuzi, the then Policy Director of East Asian and Public Affairs for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, explained that "the two goals (of denuclearization and a reduction of conventional–military) are incompatible," in that if you ask them to get rid of both avenues of security, they are left with nothing.[715] This effectively positioned a diplomatic solution as a nonviable policy alternative to missile defense in addressing the threat of a nuclear ICBM from North Korea.

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[714] George W. Bush, *Statement by the President* (georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov: Office of the Press Secretary, 2001).

[715] Chinoy.

Instead, it reframed it as needing to handle multiple, varying policy problems to be viewed as a viable solution. It also simultaneously decreased the chances of good-faith diplomacy from taking place.

In August of 2001, North Korea publicly, once again, reaffirmed its self-imposed suspension of ballistic missile tests for another two years.[716] This was made as part of a joint statement with Russian President Vladimir Putin wherein the states stressed the importance of the ABM Treaty. Less than two weeks later, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld released a statement claiming that "North Korea possessed enough plutonium to produce two to three, maybe even four to five nuclear warheads."[717] At the time, this was the largest public estimate by a government official of the "possible" number of North Korean nuclear weapons. During that same period, Rumsfeld doubled down on the prior findings of his 1998 Commission that served as a critical justification for missile defense and influenced later NIEs. During a meeting with Russian journalists, Rumsfeld argued that the Commission's report regarding the threat of ICBMs from rogue states would "prove to be exactly accurate."[718] During this same day, there were accounts by South Korean journalists of Rumsfeld declaring that "the completion of [North Korea's] ICBM development by 2003 is certain."[719]

[716] Ian Traynor, "Bush Shield Unites Putin and Kim," *The Guardian*, August 5, 2001, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/aug/06/russia.northkorea.

[717] Larry A Niksch, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program," (March 17 2003), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk24.pdf; Kim Jin, "North Possesses Nuclear Weapons, Rumsfeld Says," *Korea JoongAng Daily*, Sept 18, 2002, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=1908697.

[718] Donald Rumsfeld, *Media Availability with Russian Journalists at the Grand Marriott Hotel* (2001).

[719] Nuclear Threat Initiative, "North Korea Missile Chronology," last modified 2012, accessed. http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/north_korea_missile_4.pdf?_=1363987296. North Korea did not successfully complete an ICBM test before 2017, over 20 years after NIE 95-19, which the Rumsfeld Commission disputed. Zachary Cohen, Ryan Browne, and Nicole Gaouette, "New Missile Test Shows North Korea Capable of Hitting All

By December 2001, the National Intelligence Council had revised its position on North

Korea's nuclear arsenal to a position that more closely aligned with Rumsfeld's claims from

earlier in the year, officially stating that "North Korea has produced one, possibly two, nuclear

weapons."[720] This unclassified estimate declared that the Intelligence Community believed in the

"mid-1990s" North Korea had at least one nuclear weapon. This statement contradicts multiple

NIEs composed by the intelligence community published in the 1990s, which do not make such

declarations. Instead, those multiple estimates state that North Korea likely produced the material

for one to two nuclear weapons through its pre-Agreed Framework nuclear program. Despite this

curious case of the IC seemingly reaffirming Rumsfeld's statements by retroactively

reinterpreting intelligence estimates from the previous decade, a report prepared by the

Intelligence Community in January of 2003, after what was essentially the collapse of the

Framework, once again reverted to the claim that while North Korea likely had enough material

for one to two nuclear weapons, it did not claim the state had the nuclear weapons.[721]

Bolton on the "offensive"

The following month, the September 11th terrorist attacks occurred, leading many to

believe that the focus would shift from concerns regarding rogue states and ballistic missiles

toward terrorist attacks and boots-on-the-ground conflicts, as the nation's focus shifted from

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of Us Mainland," last modified November 30, accessed. https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/28/politics/north-korea-missile-launch/index.html.

[720] Niksch.

[721] David E Sanger, "North Korea Opens Unofficial Channel for U.S. Talks," *The New York Times*, January 10, 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/10/international/asia/north-korea-opens-unofficial-channel-for-us-talks.html. For more information on the fluctuating intelligence estimates regarding North Korea from this time period, see: Jonathan D Pollack, "The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework," *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 3 (2003).

argued vulnerabilities against nuclear ICBM attacks to vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks. Chris Madison of the Council for a Livable World's National Missile Defense Project argued that because of the attacks, attention would shift away from argued threats, such as North Korea, that were previously used to justify the pursuit of NMD and towards the War on Terror. Madison argued that the terrorism concerns were "going to take up so much oxygen, that whole discussion of how this happened and what we do about it. North Korea is irrelevant, frankly, in that discussion."[722]

Bolton would later acknowledge that the September 11th attacks "pushed North Korea to the side," but that this was only temporary, saying that "by year's end, I was able to move onto the offensive toward dismantling the failed Agreed Framework and [KEDO]."[723] Bolton's usage of "the offensive" as a phrase, in this instance, implies that the dismantling of the Agreed Framework was not a necessary measure of last resort but that it was a specific and predetermined goal that he strove to achieve. As noted by Bolton, while initially, the September 11th attacks seemed to sideline the North Korea issue, the administration quickly pivoted to using the attacks as a stalking horse for justifying various defense policies, attempting to shape the perception of many policy issues so that the terrorist attack could be used as an indicator that the administration's preferred policy choice (such as the development and deployment of strategic defense) was correct.

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[722] Thomas Duffy and Adam J Hebert, "Chairman Calls Terrorism 'Our No. 1 Threat' Levin Says Senate Debate on Missile Defense Could Be Postponed," *Inside Missile Defense* 7, no. 19 (September 19 2001), https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/24783265.

[723] John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations* (Simon and Schuster, 2008).

In early November of 2001, North Korea signed onto two international conventions against terrorism.[724] Less than three weeks later, Bolton spoke at a conference on biological weapons and argued that North Korea and a handful of other countries, including Iraq and Iran, were pursuing biological weapons.[725] Bolton wanted to "name names" to "put the international spotlight on them."[726] Bolton argued this while noting that the US opposed the verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention, saying that "the time for 'better than nothing' protocols is over." This argument, by Bolton, highlights the inconsistent nature of the position of the executive branch that the deployment of a missile defense system that is fundamentally flawed is still better than no missile defense system, but an imperfect international agreement is unacceptable.

Days after Bolton's comments regarding North Korea, Bush made further comments that suggested broad links between North Korea and the threat of terrorism that had been emphasized since September 11. While noting that the war in Afghanistan was "just the beginning" of the war on terror, Bush made clear implications, arguing that states developing WMDs "used to terrorize nations" will be considered terrorists and "held accountable."[727] Bush also reiterated an insistence that North Korea open itself to weapon inspectors. Despite signing two international conventions against terrorism following the September 11th attacks, the Bush administration still pushed to shape the perception of the terrorism threat to include North Korea, thus helping to

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[724] The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the 1979 International Convention Against The Taking of Hostages, see: Associated Press, *North Korea Will Sign Anti-Terrorism Treaty* (2001).

[725] Steven Mufson, "U.S. Says Iraq, Others Pursue Germ Warfare," *The Washington Post*, November 20, 2001.

[726] David E Sanger, "After the Taliban, Who? Don't Forget North Korea.," *The New York Times*, November 25, 2001.

[727] Ibid.

justify the development and deployment of missile defense. Furthermore, despite the

administration arguing on numerous occasions that any missile defense is better than no missile

defense, it also pushed back against international agreements that could serve as policy

alternatives to missile defense and mitigate their justifying threats by arguing "the time for

'better than nothing' protocols is over."[728]

In speeches given in January of 2002, Rumsfeld took the September 11 attacks and used

them as an argument against nuclear deterrence, saying that the "terrorists who struck us… were

clearly not deterred from doing so by the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal." Rumsfeld was also able

to lump the terrorist attacks in with other vague threats, stating that "defending against terrorism

and other emerging 21st-century threats requires that we take the war to the enemy."[729] Rumsfeld

echoed these sentiments in a Foreign Affairs article he authored later that summer.[730] Not only is

this an instance of Rumsfeld using a variation of the Offensive Advantage myth, with the

implication that security can be achieved via "tak[ing] the war to the enemy," but it was clear

that the terrorist attacks were being positioned to justify the preferred policies of the

administration. This included not only pushing back against policy alternatives (arguing that the

situation required "tak[ing] the war to the enemy" as opposed to any form of diplomatic solution

as well as indicating that deterrence and any international agreement that codified deterrence

would be insufficient) but also using the attacks as a means of altering the perception around

policy problems. This perception-shifting would better justify the preferred policy of an

executive branch filled with members of the missile defense network in high-ranking positions.

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[728] Mufson, "U.S. Says Iraq, Others Pursue Germ Warfare."

[729] Mann and Mann.

[730] Donald Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," *Foreign Aff.* 81 (2002).

This includes rhetorical attempts at binding the threat of terrorism with the argued threat of a nuclear ICBM capable of North Korea, thus serving as a justification for keeping the perception of North Korea as a threat alive while implying the insufficiency of diplomacy.

Axis of Evil and Not Certifying Compliance

In his January 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush further pushed this effort to maximize the utility of the September 11 attacks by conceptually linking terrorism with rogue states. Bush argued that "some" rogue states have been quiet post-September 11, "but we know their true nature," before immediately stating that North Korea was "arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction while starving its citizens." Bush then further made clear that the White House was linking North Korea and terrorism into a single nebulous threat by arguing that "states like [North Korea, Iran, and Iraq] …and their terrorist allies, constitute an Axis of Evil." Bush claimed that the Axis was "arming to threaten the peace of the world." Bush then alluded to the Power Shift imperial myth by declaring that "time is not on our side," that "dangers gather," "peril draws closer and closer," and the regimes are a "grave and growing danger."[731] Bush did not mention in his speech that North Korea had signed onto multiple anti-terrorism conventions since September 11 and, earlier in the year, unilaterally extended its 1999 moratorium on missile launches. Six sentences after he argued that states such as North Korea were part of an Axis of Evil, President Bush said that the United States would "develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack." In real-time, during the State of the Union speech, it took President Bush less than two minutes and fifteen seconds to coin the Axis of Evil, name the states that constitute it, connect the Axis with

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[731] George W. Bush, *The President's State of the Union Address* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, 2002).

the September 11th attacks, and highlight the deployment of missile defenses as needed to "protect America."

According to Condoleezza Rice, this was part of a concerted effort by Cheney and Rumsfeld to push back against Powell's diplomatic efforts and undercut negotiations. She noted, "One can hardly negotiate successfully with a regime if one is publicly committed to its destruction."[732] Cooperation with North Korea was in question, but many people – including those in the administration without direct connections to the missile defense lobby - thought it was very possible. There was a clear divide in the Executive Branch among those hoping for a diplomatic resolution and those not. Bolton said that he was "convinced… to take a harder line" on North Korea due to both the State of the Union speech and "also the reaction to it the next morning at the State Department staff meeting."[733] According to later accounts, careerists in the State Department "recoiled" at the Axis of Evil segment of the SOTU. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Jim Kelly, declared his department would make it clear to the press that the SOTU was not an indicator of a policy change toward North Korea. The next day, at a staff meeting, Powell informed those in the State Department who disagreed with the speech that no one in State was to criticize it.[734] Bolton later suggested that Powell did not want reporters to write stories about "daylight" between Bush and himself. However, despite Powell's efforts, Bolton still argued that those in the State Department were using "covert measures" to

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[732] Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honour* (Simon and Schuster, 2011).

[733] Bolton.

[734] David Frum, *The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush* (Random House, 2003).

undercut the message of the President's speech and keep pathways for diplomatic solutions alive.[735]

Roughly a week after the State of the Union in which North Korea was declared part of the Axis of Evil, the Director of National Intelligence, George Tenet testified before Congress that North Korea was in compliance with the "terms of the Agreed Framework that are directly related to the freeze on its reactor." Tenet also acknowledged that North Korea threatened to walk away if it determined the United States "was not living up to its end of the deal."[736] However, Bolton said the State of the Union meant "there was no way, even in State [Department] weasel words, we could now urge Bush to certify DPRK 'compliance' with the Agreed Framework." In his memoir, Bolton argued that the Department of Defense wanted to end the Agreed Framework "immediately." While he agreed with the position, he believed more groundwork needed to be laid. This is one of many admissions made by Bolton indicating that diplomacy with North Korea was not only not a preferred option but was something to be avoided and that the Agreed Framework's dissolution was the goal not only of Bolton but also of Rumsfeld's Defense Department.

In his speech at the National Defense University on January 31, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld highlighted the escalating nature of terrorist threats and advocated for missile defense as a critical component of U.S. defense strategy. He emphasized the potential for more deadly attacks, advocating for a proactive, offensive defense approach, encapsulated in his

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[735] Bolton.

[736] George Tenet, "Tenet's Testimony before Senate Committee," *The New York Times*, February 6, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/06/international/tenets-testimony-before-senate-committee.html.

statement, "The best, and in some cases, the only defense is a good offense."[737] Rumsfeld's reference to a 'nexus' of global threats underscored a strategic narrative linking various threats to justify broad, aggressive defense policies, including missile defense. This narrative aligns with organizational incentives to create a unified threat perception, leveraging the strategic myth of 'bandwagoning' with rogue states and the 'window of vulnerability' arguments to influence public opinion towards supporting broad defense strategies in a complex global security scenario.

The State of the Union successfully generated concern regarding the rogue states. A week following the address, a group of House lawmakers wrote to the president "in light of [his] strong statement… regarding North Korea." They argued that due to his strong statements, they "suspect that facts do not support" the US certifying NK compliance with the Agreed Framework. They also said that plans for the United States to adhere to the Agreed Framework and deliver 2 LWRs "need to be re-evaluated in light of the threats" mentioned in the speech.[738] The same day, Powell, in a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that the White House was willing to restart talks with North Korea "any time, any place, or anywhere without any preconditions," despite other statements by the administration to the contrary.[739] Powell also noted that the administration believes that North Korea was still "comply[ing] with the [missile flight test] moratorium they placed upon themselves and [they] stay within the KEDO agreement."[740] When questioned further for clarity on North Korea's compliance with the

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[737] Brian Whitaker, "Rumsfeld Warns of Even Deadlier Attacks on Us," last modified January 31, accessed. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/01/afghanistan.brianwhitaker.

[738] Keith J. Costa, "In a Letter from House Lawmakers Bush Asked to Reconsider Providing Nuclear Reactors to North Korea," *Inside Missile Defense* 8, no. 4 (2002), accessed 2022/02/16/, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24783310.

[739] *Foreign Policy Overview and the President's Fiscal Year 2003 Foreign Affairs Budget Request*, Second ed., *Foreign Relations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2002).

[740] The KEDO Agreement is an alternate name for the Agreed Framework

Agreed Framework, Powell acknowledged that the administration has not certified compliance but noted that "the IAEA believes that the DPRK has been complying with the freeze provisions of the Agreed Framework." He added that North Korea must come into full compliance with IAEA safeguards by the time a "significant portion of the light water reactor project is completed."

In March of 2002, a version of the US Nuclear Posture Review (completed in December) was leaked to the public. Within the NPR, there were plans detailing a scenario of a potential nuclear first strike against North Korea (as well as against six other states).[741] The leaked posture review further inflamed the tensions between the two states, which were brought to a boil during the State of the Union. The first strike scenarios against North Korea that were included in the posture review raised flags in Pyongyang, as it could be argued that this violated the spirit of the Agreed Framework in which the US stated it would "provide formal assurances to [North Korea], against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S." North Korea state media reported, on March 15, that if the United States "tries to use nuclear weapons" against the state, it would be forced to "examine all the agreements" held with the United States, and "if the U.S. inflicts nuclear holocaust upon [North Korea], the [United States'] mainland will not be safe either." That same day, when questioned about the NPR, Rumsfeld called it "a very fine piece of work" but criticized the individuals who leaked the findings.

However, this wasn't the only debate concerning what was considered a violation of the Agreed Framework. John Bolton argued that North Korea "failed to make a complete and

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[741] David Wastell, "Us Plans for First-Strike Nuclear Attacks against Seven Countries," *Telegraph*, March 10, 2002, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1387333/US-plans-for-first-strike-nuclear-attacks-against-seven-countries.html.

accurate declaration of its nuclear activities" in addition to refusing to allow inspection of its nuclear facilities. By the end of March 2002, the administration notified Congress that North Korea was not in compliance with the agreement.[742] This was despite Director of National Intelligence Tenet's testimony just one month earlier stating the opposite and Powell stating before Congress that North Korea was "staying within" the agreement.

On April 1, 2002, Bush issued a memo claiming that he would not confirm the compliance of North Korea with the Agreed Framework but that the United States would continue its financial obligations to KEDO anyway, granting a waiver to ensure the agreed payments were not impacted.[743] The claims of Bolton that North Korea was not in compliance rested on very shaky ground at this point, as North Korea was obligated to come into full compliance (including the accuracy and completeness of its declaration on its nuclear program) only after a "significant portion of the LWR [light water reactor] project is completed.[744] When the President issued his memo no work on the light water reactor project had even begun. Bolton argued "breaking the chain of compliance certifications" was "laying a basis to say in the future that North Korea's manifest noncompliance required us to tank the Agreed Framework once and for all."[745]

Powell's Bold Approach and the Battle vs Bolton

In June of 2002, during a graduation speech at West Point, the President further pushed back on negotiations with North Korea, claiming that the United States "cannot put our faith in the word

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[742] Rice, *No Higher Honour*.

[743] Ibid.

[744] *Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994*, by International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/457 (1994).

[745] Bolton.

of tyrants" and warned that "if we wait for threats to fully materialize we will have waited too long," before adding the kicker to his speech that missile defense was an "essential priorit[y] for America."[746] Less than two weeks after this speech, Deputy Secretary of Defense (and Keeper of the Flame award winner) Paul Wolfowitz stated in an interview that without missile defense, nuclear weapons would "give freedom of action to international bullies … like North Korea."[747] During this time, Powell, still attempting a diplomatic resolution, was trying to convince the President that to help the people of North Korea, they needed to engage in a "bold approach" of diplomatic maneuvers, a tit-for-tat series of moves to completely reconstruct the relationship between North Korea and the United States (echoing the Perry Process implemented during the end of the Clinton administration).[748] On June 10th, during a speech at the Asia Society Annual Dinner, Powell pushed for future talks involving North Korea to "help… move its relations with the US toward normalcy." He laid out a four-point agenda involving ICBMs, human rights, conventional military concerns, and nuclear proliferation; however, while these issues did expand far beyond the nuclear issue, and while they do involve competing desires of conventional and nuclear capabilities, they were not positioned as preliminary hurdles that must be cleared in advance.[749]

Bolton's Hammer

The following month, in July of 2002, John Bolton found what he would later refer to as "the hammer [he] had been looking for to smash the Agreed Framework," when it was

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[746] George W. Bush, "Text of Bush's Speech at West Point," *The New York Times*, June 1, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/01/international/text-of-bushs-speech-at-west-point.html.

[747] Gordon and Jones,

[748] Chinoy.

[749] Colin L Powell, *Remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner* (2002).

determined by the CIA that in 2001, North Korea "began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities," and obtained "equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems."[750] A reporter from NPR almost immediately revealed that a "source" had leaked information about this intelligence to her. Powell suspected Bolton or Rumsfeld's Pentagon of leaking the information in an attempt to kill the Agreed Framework.[751] Despite Bolton's claims that this presented a clear violation of the Agreed Framework, some analyses claim that the intelligence assessment blurred the lines between weapons-grade enrichment and lower-level enrichment and North Korea was not producing uranium that was "suitable for nuclear weapons."[752] Pritchard, who worked on negotiations, noted that the enrichment violated a prior agreement cited by the Agreed Framework, though technically, it was never implemented. [753]

Although Powell wanted to push for the approach, he was sided against by Rumsfeld, Cheney, and ultimately Rice.[754] The administration canceled the planned talk, citing a naval incident that happened around the same time and scheduling issues. [755] It was effectively the end of the Bold Approach before it ever began.

On July 23, 2002, John Bolton delivered a memo to Colin Powell indicating the demise of the Agreed Framework with North Korea. Later, further tensions surfaced in a meeting that

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[750] Jeffrey Lewis, "Revisiting the Agreed Framework," 38north.org, last modified May 15, accessed. https://www.38north.org/2015/05/jlewis051415/; Jonathan D Pollack, *No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security* (Routledge, 2017).

[751] John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations* (2007); Rice, *No Higher Honour*.

[752] Selig S. Harrison, "Did North Korea Cheat?," last modified February 2005, accessed. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2005-01-01/did-north-korea-cheat.

[753] Pritchard.

[754] John Newhouse, "Sidelined by the State-Defense Split," *The Washington Post*, October 5, 2003.

[755] Pritchard.

included Bush, Rice, Powell, and Kelly. Kelly relayed to Rice that NPR had received information from "defense sources" about a new weapons program in North Korea, a leak Powell perceived as a Pentagon strategy to undermine the Agreed Framework further and constrain President Bush's policy options.[756]

The complexity of these internal dynamics was further exposed on July 26 during a private meeting between Powell and Bolton. Powell, probing the foundations of Bolton's stance on North Korea, questioned whether Bolton would have advocated for the termination of the Agreed Framework even without the uranium intelligence. Bolton's response was unambiguous; he had been "waiting for the North to do something so unambiguous that no one could in good conscience defend what [he] viewed as a policy of pure appeasement." This statement, frank and revealing, sheds light on the deep-seated divisions within the State Department. These divisions were likely deliberately influenced (via Cheney's deliberate placement of Bolton into the State Department) by external forces seeking to steer U.S. foreign policy in a new direction.

However, while there was substantial pressure within much of the administration pushing against the Agreed Framework, individuals within the executive branch still fought to preserve a diplomatic relationship with North Korea. On July 31[st,] Secretary of State Powell had gone to great lengths to "choreograph a semi-spontaneous session" between himself and Paek Nam-sun, the North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Brunei, hoping to establish future talks.[757] Powell also authorized Charles "Jack" Pritchard to attend the concrete pouring ceremony for the Light Water Reactors that were to be part of the Agreed Framework and that North Korea had

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[756] Bolton, *Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations*.

[757] Todd S. Purdum and Don Kirk, "Powell Meets with North Korea Counterpart in Brunei," *The New York Times*, July 31, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/31/world/powell-meets-with-north-korea-counterpart-in-brunei.html.

been waiting nearly eight years for. According to Pritchard, there was much reluctance from the administration to include him in the event, and he received Powell's permission just one hour before his flight. Pritchard claimed that "the decision to allow me to attend was made by Powell, without consultation with the [White House].[758]

While some, like Bolton, viewed the intelligence regarding North Korea's uranium program as essentially a smoking gun, there were disputes regarding the conclusiveness of the evidence. Some analysts questioned what the intelligence said, arguing that the uranium enrichment was at a lower level than weapons-grade.[759] Others were skeptical if the evidence used to make the determination of enrichment actually proved that such enrichment was taking place, a claim of uncertainty that seemingly was supported five years later when a longtime intelligence official claimed at a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, to have only "mid-confidence" that the uranium program was even in existence.[760] Furthermore, even if the intelligence proved what Bolton believed it did, multiple experts with intimate knowledge of the agreement believe this did not constitute a clear violation of the Agreed Framework, echoing Pritchard's belief. Robert Carlin, who served as an advisor to the US negotiators who worked on the Agreed Framework, claimed that those in the negotiations viewed the specific declaration that Bolton argued North Korea violated as an "afterthought" and one that "no one really

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[758] Pritchard.

[759] Harrison,

[760] "Mid-confidence" as defined by the intelligence community means that the "information is interpreted in various ways, we have alternative views," or it is not "fully corroborated" David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "U.S. Had Doubts on North Korean Uranium Drive," *New York Times*, March 1, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/01/washington/01korea.html. ibid.; Glenn Kessler, "New Doubts on Nuclear Efforts by North Korea," *The Washington Post*, March 1, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/28/AR2007022801977.html.

believed [that aspect] would… constitute one of the core [North Korea] obligations."[761] The specific element of the Agreed Framework that Bolton believed was in violation was a reference to a previous agreement between the North and the South, as the Agreed Framework was designed to be an effort to halt North Korea's plutonium production capabilities. Robert Gallucci, the chief negotiator working on the agreement, echoed Carlin's sentiments, claiming that the Agreed Framework had "hard and soft portions to the deal" and that the hard elements were the agreement's focus. The hard portions were that "[North Korea] needed to have [its plutonium] program frozen and under inspection, and they needed to re-can the spent fuel so it wasn't reprocessed. That was done."[762]

In his August 29 speech, John Bolton cast a critical eye on North Korea's missile and weapons programs, emphasizing the severe implications for international security and the Agreed Framework. He stressed, "North Korea is the world's foremost peddler of ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise," highlighting their dealings with countries like Syria, Libya, and Iran. Bolton reinforced the gravity of these actions by aligning with President Bush's designation of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the "Axis of evil," a term he deemed "factually correct." He underscored the dire need for North Korea to shift its operational approach both domestically and internationally, stating, "If North Korea wants to have a brighter future, it needs to fundamentally shift the way it operates at home and abroad." His remarks implied a stark choice for North Korea: alter its path or face the demise of the Agreed Framework.

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[761] Robert Carlin and John W Lewis, *Negotiating with North Korea: 1992-2007* (Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), 2008).

[762] Robert Gallucci, interview by Martin Smith, April 10, 2003, 2003, Kim's Nuclear Gamble, Frontline.

North Korea's response to Bolton's speech was swift and marked by visible anger. On August 31, they indicated a conditional willingness for dialogue, stating, "If the U.S. has a will to drop its hostile policy toward the DPRK, it will have dialogue…the ball is in the court of the U.S. side."[763] This statement came as a direct reaction to Bolton's criticism of their missile, nuclear, and biological weapons programs, reflecting the heightened tensions and the precarious state of U.S.-DPRK relations. North Korea's response highlighted the delicate balance in diplomatic negotiations, with the future of the Agreed Framework hanging in the balance, heavily influenced by the rhetoric and policies of crucial U.S. figures like Bolton.

In the fall of 2002, the United States sent an envoy to North Korea – in September, Rumsfeld sent out a memo advising against this but said that if anyone was to go, it should be either Joseph or Bolton as they were "preferred (and trusted)."[764] Ultimately, James Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, was selected to attend. When Bolton learned that the choice had been made to send Kelly, Bolton instructed his aide to "do whatever you legally can to stop the Kelly trip."[765] After push-back from Kelly, he was sent but was not sent alone. Kelly was sent on strict orders from Cheney and Bolton not to negotiate. According to John Merrill,[766] Kelly had "absolutely no room to explore the issue," an idea that Pritchard seconded, who argued that Cheney and Bolton wanted just enough information to get the US out of the Agreed Framework, and echoed by Rice, who viewed this strategy as "so constraining [that] Jim couldn't fully explore what might have been an opening to put the

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[763] John Bolton, *Speech to Korean-American Association* (2002).

[764] Pritchard.

[765] Chinoy.

[766] The chief of the Northeast Asia division of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department.

[nuclear] program on the table."[767] It went so far that a daily script was prepared for Kelly that he was to read exactly while on the trip. The transcript has North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju stating, "We are entitled to have a nuclear program." When pushed for clarity on what that meant, Kang responded, "It's up to you to think about this. We will not take the trouble to interpret this for you."[768] On September 10, the National Security Council concluded that the Agreed Framework with North Korea was essentially nullified. This shift in policy prompted Bolton, in a phone call to Robert Joseph, to inquire specifically about Kelly and Moriarity's reactions. Joseph said Kelly looked "sick," which Bolton later said told him everything he needed to know about the success of his goal.[769] Kelly's account of the meeting, which he sent back to Washington, was leaked to the press soon after. According to Secretary Rice, it was "clear" that this leak was intentionally done by the administration's Cheney/Rumsfeld/Bolton sect "to snuff out any hope of further negotiations."[770] Bolton viewed this as a massive success in his strategy to "go straight for the Agreed Framework's jugular," reaching a "decisive conclusion that the Agreed Framework was dead."[771]

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[767] Rice, *No Higher Honour*.

[768] It should be noted that there were disputed elements concerning the translations that took place during the envoy's meeting with NK representatives. Pritchard admits there was "no precise, irrefutable statement" and no "smoking gun," but the envoy agreed on what they "understood him to mean." However, Stanford professor John Lewis noted that after examining the transcript, there could be muddiness (maybe intentionally) on what was conveyed by the NK representatives. NTI, "Translation Issues Muddy U.S. Assertion That North Korea Confessed to Uranium Enrichment Program," last modified January 23, accessed. http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/translation-issues-muddy-us-assertion-that-north-korea-confessed-to-uranium-enrichment-program/.

[769] Bolton, *Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations*.

[770] Rice, *No Higher Honour*.

[771] Bolton, *Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations*.

There was Never a Real Chance

It should be noted that finding out about the enriched uranium did not have to mean an end to the Agreed Framework. There was still an opportunity to engage in a version of the "Perry Process" again, dealing with the knowledge of the uranium enrichment in a negotiated process that would complement the plutonium program freeze already in effect, thanks to the Agreed Framework. A similar idea was even suggested by Charles Pritchard and James Kelly, noting that if the Framework was terminated, the North could return to reprocessing plutonium only to be overruled by Bolton, who claimed that "wouldn't make the slightest difference."[772] That the solution to North Korea violating a murky aspect of the Agreed Framework (if that is what happened) is to terminate the Agreed Framework does raise some eyebrows when one considers that the aspects of the Agreed Framework that focused on freezing Pyongyang's reprocessing of plutonium (which was a core goal of the Agreed Framework) appeared to have functioned successfully. However, that is what happened in November 2002, when the Executive Board of KEDO (at the urging of the Bush administration) suspended the heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea in December of that year. Within a month of this suspension, North Korea expelled the inspectors from the IAEA that were monitoring the Yongbyon facility that had been frozen during the Agreed Framework and announced its withdrawal from the NPT.[773] The following day, North Korea threatened to end its ballistic missile test moratorium.[774]

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[772] Ibid.

[773] KEDO, "About Us: Our History," KEDO, accessed. http://www.kedo.org/au_history.asp.

[774] Peter S. Goodman and Philip P. Pan, "N. Korea Threatens to Resume Missile Tests," *The Washington Post*, January 12, 2003.

In a phone call to investors two months after North Korea left the NPT, Raytheon executive Ed Franklin noted that "for the first time, I think, in the missile defense history, there is a concurrence - a bipartisan concurrence that missile defense is a necessity" adding that "from our perspective… this is a program that's going to go and it's going to go for some time…There is also concurrence that there, indeed, are major threats out there."[775]

Fall Out from Ending the Agreed Framework

Leaving the NPT and the Bold Approach

The North Korean Ambassador to China, Choe Jin Sun, defended this stance by advocating the right of impoverished states to possess defensive capabilities against nuclear threats while accusing the US of hostility. Concurrently, North Korea's Deputy Ambassador to the UN, Han Song Ryol, sought dialogue with the Bush administration through New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson. However, no engagement occurred with the US-UN Mission. As pointed out by State Department spokesperson Nancy Beck, these developments were perceived as escalatory actions by the international community, following North Korea's earlier steps of expelling inspectors from Yongbyon.[776]

A little over a month after North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, Powell, on a diplomatic trip to East Asia, suggested the possibility of U.S. assistance to North Korea, conditional upon ending its nuclear program. He proposed a "bold approach," requiring nuclear issues to be "resolved and behind us" before any aid. Emphasizing a multilateral forum for dialogue, Powell stated, "If more nations in the region and the international community were

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[775] Franklin.

[776] "U.S. Dismisses N Korean Assurances," BBC News, last modified January 11, accessed. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2649549.stm.

involved, then the obligations on North Korea would be stronger," adding that "it's not out of the realm of the possible."[777]

In July 2003, North Korea's state newspaper, Rodong Sinmun Daily, responded to U.S. criticism of its missile exports, labeling such critiques as illegitimate interference in its state commerce and a "dangerous attempt" by imperialist forces to control the DPRK.[778] The newspaper defended these sales as "legal commerce," addressing the security needs of other countries. Mid-July reports indicated North Korea claimed to have sufficient plutonium to produce six nuclear weapons, a direct challenge to U.S. President Bush's stance against a nuclear North Korea.[779] These claims, made during a meeting with U.S. diplomat Jack Pritchard, suggested the completion of plutonium reprocessing by June 30th, with interpretations varying from North Korean frustration over the U.S.'s refusal of bilateral talks to a strategy of normalizing its nuclear status.

In July and August 2003, the U.S. approach to North Korea's nuclear program highlighted internal debates and the push for aggression by individuals with connections to the administration. Former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry warned of the escalating dangers posed by North Korea's nuclear program, criticizing President Bush's reluctance to enter genuine talks due to his personal views on Kim Jong Il.[780] Perry's remarks indicated a belief that the U.S. was on a path toward war.

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[777] Reuters, "Threats and Responses: Nuclear Standoff; Powell Links Aid to North Korean Concessions," *The New York Times*, February 22, 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/22/world/threats-responses-nuclear-standoff-powell-links-aid-north-korean-concessions.html.

[778] Paul Eckert, *N.Korea Asserts Right to Make and Sell Missiles.* (Reuters Limited, 2003).

[779] David E Sanger, "North Korea Says It Has Made Fuel for Atom Bombs," *The New York Times*, July 15, 2003.

[780] Thomas E Ricks and Glenn Kessler, "U.S., N. Korea Drifting toward War, Perry Warns; Former Defense Secretary Says Standoff Increases Risk of Terrorists Obtaining Nuclear Device," *The Washington Post*, July 15, 2003.

Tensions within the administration were evident in the discourse around North Korea. In a speech on July 31, John Bolton referred to North Korea as a "hellish nightmare," exacerbating the situation. This was followed by Senator Jon Kyl's letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell on August 20, criticizing Charles 'Jack' Pritchard for allegedly conveying mixed messages regarding Bolton's speech, telling North Korean representatives it was just Bolton's opinion. [781]

The resignation of Pritchard, an advocate for negotiations with North Korea, just before the six-party talks in Beijing, underscored these internal conflicts. [782] The State Department, through spokesperson Philip Reeker, denied any policy-related reasons for Pritchard's departure, despite reports of his disagreement with hardliner stances within the Bush administration. If Kyl were interested in maintaining North Korea as a viable source of justification for missile defense, removing Pritchard from the equation would be a sound step.

During the six-party talks in Beijing, North Korea threatened to test a nuclear weapon but expressed willingness to dismantle its program if the U.S. changed its policies and aided its energy needs. [783] Despite this threat, diplomats agreed to continue talks, and the White House described the session as a "positive session."

In October 2003, Powell hinted at a potential agreement with North Korea, noting his staff was exploring various security agreements in response to North Korea's altered stance on

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[781] Arshad Mohammed, "U.S. Envoy to N. Korea out as Talks Near," *The Washington Post*, August 26, 2003, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/08/26/us-envoy-to-n-korea-out-as-talks-near/ce18c431-d470-4f9e-9c6f-0d4b5567bfb6/.

[782] Ibid.

[783] Peter Slevin and John Pomfret, "N. Korea Threatens Nuclear Arms Test; Delegate to Talks Cites U.S. Hostility," *The Washington Post*, August 29, 2003.

nonaggression pacts. [784] About a week later, Bush expressed willingness to offer a written

guarantee not to attack North Korea in exchange for its nuclear disarmament. Still, he firmly

ruled out a formal treaty - a key North Korean demand.[785] Instead, Bush proposed a security

declaration within a joint agreement involving China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea, explicitly

excluding a bilateral treaty.

Powell, appearing on CNN, suggested there were potential agreements that could

potentially work with both North Korea and the United States. [786] Gaffney was also on cable

news, repeatedly pushing back against any kind of diplomacy with North Korea. In an interview

with Weldon on Fox News, Gaffney stressed that the US should not provide North Korea

financial incentives to move away from nuclear weapons. On CNBC later that spring, Gaffney

said that the administration was "a little slow to my taste" but "has begun putting missile

defenses which could help defeat that kind of threat from North Korea."[787]

Over the next few years, after Powell left the administration and after North Korea first

tested the bomb, it seemed unclear if any agreement could be reached to stabilize relations.

However, as Rice describes in her memoir, through repeated meetings during the six-party talks,

diplomacy with North Korea was "produc[ing] some results."[788] North Korea had readmitted

inspectors and was dismantling its nuclear infrastructure. However, they wanted to be removed

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[784] Mike Allen and Glenn Kessler, "Bush Says Pact with N. Korea Possible; Security Guarantee Linked to Steps on Nuclear Programs," *The Washington Post*, October 20, 2003.

[785] Ibid.

[786] Ibid.

[787] Larry Kudlow, *Interview: Frank Gaffney of the Center for Security Policy Discusses North Korea's Nuclear Threat to the United States*, *CNBC: Kudlow & Company* (CNBC, Inc., 2005).

[788] Rice, *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington*.

from the terrorist watch list. A request that Rice acknowledged should have been granted "much earlier." However, Cheney vehemently disagreed.[789] A back-and-forth debate in the administration went on regarding the need to have North Korea sign a detailed agreement, resulting in, ultimately, the chance for diplomacy unraveling and North Korea remaining a nuclear power. North Korea remained a justifying threat.

This chapter examined two instances of members of the missile defense network pushing to undercut international agreements, the ABM Treaty and the Agreed Framework. In both instances experts without close ties to the network, including individuals who had worked on the agreements previously, believed that there were ways to solve the issues raised with the agreements without discarding them completely. Missile defense advocates who repeatedly argued for lenience regarding missile defense flaws did not offer the same flexibility to agreements that worked against their vested interests. In both cases network members made it clear, in personal writings and private communications, that they were interested only in finding rationales to end the agreements. In both instances experts from outside of the network viewed these behaviors as being motivated by missile defense advocacy. This chapter provides two cases of network actors (organizations and individuals that represent them), working deliberately and strategically to manipulate the environment to improve the ability of the network to obtain necessary resources. Both treaties served as alternative policy solutions, containing the argued threat of North Korea and legitimizing the power of nuclear deterrence. In the case of the ABM Treaty, it also served as a measure of autonomy infringement, as it prevented the network from having full control over its capabilities. This chapter also highlighted the importance of the incorporation of exogenous events in a resource dependence based understanding of

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[789] Richard B Cheney and Liz Cheney, *In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir* (Simon and Schuster, 2011).

overexpansion, particularly in the case of the ABM Treaty, as the shift in political resources following the attacks of September 11 effectively ended the last legitimate resistance to missile defense. In both cases, it was the deliberate, intentional and strategic action of network actors that undercut these agreements.

VII: Conclusions

Research Problem and Objectives

The central research problem addressed in this dissertation is rooted in the counterintuitive resurgence of strategic missile defense as a critical component of US Defense Policy. This resurgence is perplexing because, for economic, diplomatic, strategic, and technological reasons, strategic missile defense is a system where the costs rapidly outpace the benefits. Strategic missile defense is costly as a system, historically costing over $400 billion, with exorbitant costs projected into the future. It also has high diplomatic costs as it is a stumbling point in arms control agreements. Strategic costs are also high, as strategic missile defense systems create incentives for arms racing, thus triggering even more extreme downstream economic costs. The system also dangerously incentivizes first-strike posture, hair-trigger alerts, and various technological and strategic countermeasures, including MIRVing ICBMs. Combined with the fact that such a technology is both strategically and technologically flawed in insurmountable ways, it is clear that strategic missile defense is not a system that has been championed for legitimate national security reasons, as it makes us less safe and creates harmful incentives for all parties. Furthermore, at the time of the resurgence, the Intelligence Community came together to declare that there were no viable threats that would legitimately justify a missile defense system for another 15 years. This dissertation sought to explain why and how strategic missile defense was reborn despite high economic, strategic, and diplomatic costs, a fundamentally flawed technology, and no legitimate threat to justify it.

Due to the hypothetical ability to project influence without consequence that an effective missile defense could provide (as it would be the key that unlocks nuclear superiority) and the multiple ways in which the costs of missile defense drastically outpace the benefits, this

dissertation argues that strategic missile defense is a variant of overexpansion, a self-defeating policy of aggression. However, even the exceptional work on overexpansion conducted by Jack Snyder and his theory of Coalition logrolling cannot fully explain the case. Snyder's Theory, though valuable and incredibly insightful, has a difficult time explaining the timing of the case (in various respects); the participation of actors who receive no direct benefit from the policy of overexpansion yet still contribute to the overall push for it, and why the standard checks of democracy have not been successful in thwarting this varietal of overexpansion. Ultimately, this project builds off the work of Snyder and, using historical process tracing, determines that the resurgence of missile defense can best be understood as being driven by an informal network of actors connected by resource dependencies, including financial linkages, information exchanges, and personnel, and behaving in ways that can be explained using an organization theory perspective emphasizing resource dependencies and network behaviors.

Summary of Key Findings

This network and its actors require resources from their organizational environment. These actors behave strategically, leveraging resource exchanges to achieve their primary goal of survival. This strategic behavior includes mitigating uncertainty, resisting infringements on autonomy when possible, and acquiring access to necessary resources. This includes leveraging resource dependencies to enact policy change when needed.

This framing allows us to explain the timing of events better than a logrolling coalition explanation would be able to, as it incorporates the changing distribution of resources (including financial and political resources) in the wake of exogenous events. This dissertation argues that the network actors, behaving in ways understandable through organization theory, worked to shape the environment in ways that were beneficial for the network. These actors acted

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strategically and deliberately, with clear examples of strategy and tactics being passed through the network from various actors. They worked toward goals that did not immediately benefit them directly but benefited the network as a whole. The project tracked the behavior of network actors as they worked to manage uncertainties and manipulate the organizational environment, shifting perceptions to create demand for the resources provided by the network. It also tracked the behavior of the network as it worked to buffer itself from environmental fluctuations by resisting oversight, utilizing strategic secrecy and information dispersal, and establishing practices for perpetual network resource acquisition. Additionally, network behavior that directly contributed to undermining international agreements in ways that benefited the network (while being resisted by actors without strong network ties) was tracked.

The rest of this section will briefly cover the cases of this study. Each case in question identifies behaviors best understood by viewing the network as an organization. Organization theory also explains the use of biased "Strategic Myths," propaganda arguments that can be understood via motivated biases and "necessary created from organizational incentives.

Generating A Threat

The first case explores the rebirth of missile defense after it had been declared dead in the wake of the Cold War. In behavior entirely explainable by resource-dependence logic, facing projections of a dwindling defense budget/ resource pool, the defense industry consolidated in a series of mergers, acquisitions, and departures, increasing the relative power of the remaining contractors. Advocacy think tanks that received funding from the defense industry, such as CSP, worked to strategically add a missile defense plank to the Contract with America, turning missile defense advocacy into a valuable political resource. However, a low threat perception and high costs prevented immediate change. Strategic pushes for defense continued, such as those

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advocated by Rep. Weldon (also in the CSP), who encouraged labor unions to apply political pressure on their representatives and informed them that he would assist them with strategy. He also warned that they would lose the argument if they relied on facts and logic.[790]

CSP and other advocacy groups that received defense funding worked to alter the perception of threat to create an urgent need to act. Network connected actors, wanting to take advantage of the political strength the Contract with America created, pressured Rep. Jack Kemp to convince Heritage Foundation president Ed Feulner to make a Team B to analyze the threat.[791] Henry Cooper, one of the actors who applied the pressure, stated after the fact that it was part of a plan for missile defense. Team B consisted of members of various advocacy organizations pooling their personnel. Team B, led by Cooper, argued for the need for multiple types of missile defense and suggested a strategy for making it happen – including the withdrawal from the ABMT.

Unclear threats and high costs resulted in a compromise bill that encouraged R&D. However, Dole, in an attempt to accumulate political resources for a run at the White House, immediately reversed course on the compromise – consolidating GOP support around MD. Soon after, a coalition of missile defense advocates quickly formed against potential POTUS candidate Colin Powell, forcing him from the race. Soon after a follow-up Team B report was published and a Dole letter to Thurmond urging the GOP to rally around the cause, the GOP switched to a pro-deployment stance.

The 1995 NIE regarding the ballistic missile threat was released and argued the perceived

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[790] While we do not know the exact time, we do know that the CSP would hold "tiger team" meetings on the hill in order to educate and strategize with congress members on how to sell the policy.

[791] Potentially coincidental but Feulner was appointed to the Kemp Commission later that year.

threat was overstated and no new country would likely threaten the US with nuclear ICBMs in the next 15 years. Weldon of the CSP argued that intelligence was politicized. While this happened, network members worked to maintain the coalition by resisting attempts to formalize the distinction between theater and national defenses in the ABMT. A military oversight council suggested funding for missile defense would be better spent elsewhere, resulting in pushback from network members who argued that organizational pressures restrained the council.

In response to the NIE and the Clinton WH's 3+3 plan, the network pushed to alter the perception of threat created by the NIE, using congressional hearings to amplify the criticisms, hearing testimony from network members, and pushing for another Team B style analysis but government-sponsored. Congressmembers with parochial incentives also pushed for missile defense.

Disinterested government analysis determined that there was no politicization of the NIE and that it was consistent with previous NIEs. Two new panels were created in response to this failure to undercut the NIE. The Gates panel, designed to evaluate if the NIE was politicized, found that there was no politicization and that the NIE could've been even more firm in the lack of threat. However, groups like CSP pushed the idea that intelligence was being manipulated. Meanwhile, defense contractors were pooling resources and forming alliances, working together on missile defense.

As part of the process, the Rumsfeld panel was designed to reevaluate the threat itself. The Rumsfeld Commission used a "hypothesis-based analysis" or "worst case" style, focusing on what was conceivable rather than probable. This 'hypothesis-based' style of analysis is coherent with organization theory as this allows the network to have greater control over the needed technology and is less dependent on determining political or personality factors that

could differentiate a threat from not a threat. In this instance, it also helps justify defense to

maximize threat Wallops. The commission collaborated with defense contractors frequently

when determining its analysis. The commission greatly inflated the threat, arguing that NK could

have an ICBM that could hit the US within five years with little warning time. As a result of the

political momentum, the network succeeded in shifting the perception of the threat, incorporating

their methodology into future NIEs. Rumsfeld, indicating the usefulness of a threat and his

interest in missile defense, declared God Bless Kim Jong after an NK missile test in 1998. The

House passed the NMD Act of 1999 with all but one GOP member in support, Vernon Ehlers, a

Ph.D. in nuclear physics. The US was committed to deploying missile defense, though the

Clinton Admin would kick the can to the next person in office.

The reinvigoration of missile defense in the aftermath of the Cold War can be interpreted

as a strategic initiative by various actors to acquire vital resources, including financial backing

and political support. By influencing policy, shifting threat perception, and shaping public

opinion, these actors ensured a commitment by the United States to deploy a missile defense

system, demonstrating the influential role of resource dependence in orchestrating organizational

and political dynamics.

Cultivating the False Perception of a Viable Policy Solution

The second case study within this framework presents a nuanced analysis of the

organizational dynamics at play in developing and advocating missile defense systems. It reveals

a concerted effort to cultivate and safeguard the perception of missile defense as an effective

policy response to inflated threats. This effort is characterized by reliance on strategic myths,

selective historical analogies, and an unwavering belief in technological progress, often at the

expense of acknowledging the system's evident flaws. Furthermore, the study underscores the

quest for institutional permanence, as exemplified by the renaming and organizational elevation of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), indicative of a broader drive for enhanced control and resource acquisition within the defense network.

In contrasting the rhetoric and actions of missile defense proponents with those of disinterested experts, the study highlights the strategic organizational decision to appoint Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense over Dan Coats. This appointment, influenced by Dick Cheney's doctrine that personnel is policy, served to mitigate uncertainties and counterbalance the influence of Colin Powell. The decision to consolidate various missile defense categories into a singular framework reflects a strategic objective to avoid goal fragmentation and maintain organizational autonomy, further influenced by network actors such as Center for Strategic and Policy Studies (CSP) advisory board members.

Additionally, the study examines the organizational incentives that drive the MDA towards protecting its autonomy and minimizing oversight. This is manifested in the agency's heightened secrecy and controlled release of information, both strategies to manage external pressures and influences. The MDA's adoption of streamlined acquisition processes, capabilities-based planning, and a spiral development system, as advocated for by General Ronald Kadish, resonates with organizational theory. These concepts gave the MDA greater control over the planning process, allowing for flexibility and continuous opportunities for defense contractors within the network.

The chapter also delves into the organizational psychology behind missile defense development, particularly the "necessary is possible" mindset that shapes the creation of hypothetical threats and predictions about the system's feasibility. As political momentum for the physical deployment of missile defense grew, the MDA increased secrecy around the system and

temporarily halted testing, aligning with a strategic pause until after the subsequent election. While criticized for potentially misrepresenting the system's readiness, the agency's deviation from standard testing and evaluation protocols aligns with a broader narrative of maintaining organizational autonomy and control over the missile defense agenda.

The second case reflects organizational dynamics, demonstrating a deliberate effort to create and protect the perception of missile defense as a viable policy solution to the problem that threat inflation created. This effort relied on strategic myths, inappropriate historical lessons, and techno-optimism and largely ignored and obfuscated evident problems with the system. It also highlights attempts at institutional permanence, including the organizational elevation of the newly renamed MDA, reflecting a drive for increased control and support.

The chapter compares the rhetoric and behavior of missile defense advocates within the network to disinterested experts. It highlights the simplistic tests used by the MDA's testing program and the contradictory claims used to justify it. The chapter highlights the strategic organizational decision to appoint Rumsfeld instead of Dan Coats as Secretary of Defense. As argued through Cheney's belief in personnel equals policy, placing aligned individuals at key positions eliminates a lot of uncertainties and pushes back on the uncertainty of Powell's appointment.

The decision to categorize all missile defenses together and eliminate the theater distinction demonstrates a strategic desire to avoid the fragmentation of goals and protect autonomy by avoiding being "locked in" to a set framework. It also reflects network members' influence as a letter from CSP members Kyl and Weldon could be argued to have directly led to policy change in their favor. Similarly, the incident of retired Generals that Rumsfeld interacted with at the Wolfowitz luncheon quickly getting the muscle of the DoD behind their pet projects

demonstrates the impact that social events (like the fundraisers hosted by organizations like CSP) can have on getting policy ideas dispersed through the network.

The case also highlights organizational incentives to protect autonomy and avoid oversight when possible, including increased levels of secrecy and the selective and controlled release of information to manage external influences. Furthermore, the chapter points out that many of the changes that took place have been coming for organizational reasons, not just due to the appointment of Rumsfeld.

Kadish pushed for a streamlined acquisition process and capabilities-based planning and acquisition, as well as a spiral development system. From an organization theory perspective, these concepts make sense as they allow the organization to have greater control over the planning process, not just tied to potential threats (similar to hypotheses-based threat analysis) – and spiral development, without a set end goal in mind, allows an open-ended project with frequent opportunities for contractors to take a second bite at the apple.

This chapter also discusses how organizational incentives can lead to individuals adopting a "necessary is possible" mindset when constructing missile defense hypotheticals or predicting if the technology will ever work. As political momentum to get missile defense physically deployed, the MDA heightened secrecy around the system and also halted testing around the system for two years until after the next election. The MDA also eliminated the testing and evaluation systems that all other programs adhere to. Missile defense was also embedded into the US defense strategy, incorporating ideas from network members that came into the administration from think tanks with ideas already "in the bag."

Maintaining the Perception of a Policy Problem

The final section analyzes the undercutting of two diplomatic agreements to clear the way

for missile defense and to continue to justify its existence. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. defense policy experienced a significant transformation, illustrating the impact of exogenous events and resource distributions, including intangible resources. The attacks heightened public and political focus on defense issues, shifting their political salience and electoral relevance. Within this context, the missile defense network, driven by the primary goal of survival and characterized by interdependent relationships based on resource exchange, strategically leveraged post-9/11 vulnerabilities. These actors, including formal and informal organizations, sought to advocate for a shift away from Cold War defense paradigms, emphasizing the emerging threats posed by non-traditional adversaries. This advocacy, rooted in organizational and network biases, led to justifications for missile defense that paradoxically focused on a type of threat missile defense would not have prevented, demonstrating how calculated dissemination of aggression-justifying imperial myths was instrumental in garnering support for these policy shifts.

Domestically, the altered political landscape following 9/11 resulted in a shift in power towards the administration, removing some of the strength that the missile defense critics acquired with the party shifting of Jim Jeffords earlier that year. Network members, even before the attacks, strategized on exactly how they would handle Levin, and their strategy worked, especially after he became resistant to the idea of not supporting the White House post-attack. Also highlighted are strategic attempts at building arguments and documentation of spreading arguments among congress members to garner their support on missile defense.

This case demonstrates organizational behavior by highlighting attempts to mitigate uncertainty and avoid the constraints of congressional oversight and international treaties. It

demonstrates the impact of a resource-redistributing event on this effort to push for aggressive policy.

This study's concluding section critically examines actors' role within the missile defense network, particularly in their efforts to undermine potential diplomatic relations between the U.S. and North Korea. From an organizational theory perspective, these actions are revealing, especially when viewed through the lens of resource dependence theory. The actors linked to the missile defense network consistently opposed diplomatic solutions, favoring missile defense, a stance not shared by experts without such ties. This behavior can be understood as aligning with organizational interests, where strategic missile defense is valued as a policy outcome and resource. The Agreed Framework is pivotal in this context. It represented a diplomatic solution to the perceived policy problem of a nuclear North Korea, opposing the narrative that strategic missile defense was the only viable response. During the Clinton administration, despite progress in diplomacy and the Agreed Framework, the missile defense network argued that North Korea was an undeterrable rogue state, elevating the perceived need for missile defense.

The shift in U.S. policy during the Bush administration further exemplifies the influence of the missile defense network. Initial optimism for continued diplomacy under Colin Powell quickly dissolved under pressure from network actors, revealing a preference for a hardline stance over negotiated agreements. This shift was notably marked by Powell's public backtrack on engagement with North Korea. The administration's actions and rhetoric increasingly portrayed North Korea as an imminent threat, justifying the development of missile defense systems. Critics argued that this adversarial stance towards North Korea was strategically used to bolster the case for national missile defense. The administration's approach contrasted with the

intelligence assessments and diplomatic efforts, suggesting that engagement with North Korea was feasible and productive.

The unraveling of the Agreed Framework and the subsequent developments underscored the administration's preference for military solutions over diplomacy. Despite evidence of North Korea's willingness to engage in dialogue and extend moratoriums on missile testing, the Bush administration, influenced by actors within the missile defense network, pursued policies that effectively nullified diplomatic achievements. The termination of the Agreed Framework exacerbated tensions and served the interests of those advocating for missile defense, as it reinstated North Korea as a significant threat in public perception. Through the lens of organization theory and resource dependence theory, this case study illustrates how institutional and network ties can shape foreign policy decisions, often at the cost of viable diplomatic solutions.

Discussion of Research Significance

I contend that this work is a genuine contribution to understanding defense policy, particularly missile defense policy, and a significant addition to the literature on overexpansion. My dissertation delves into the complex interplay between domestic political interests and international defense policy, challenging the conventional wisdom that security imperatives primarily drive the pursuit of a national missile defense system in the United States. Instead, I argue that this pursuit is significantly influenced by domestic political dynamics, where political actors, defense contractors, and other interest groups play a pivotal role. This perspective is vital for comprehending how domestic politics can shape a nation's foreign and defense policy, often leading to strategies not necessarily aligned with the country's security needs or technological capabilities.

Furthermore, my work introduces a novel theoretical framework by conceptualizing strategic missile defense as a form of 'overexpansion,' a concept traditionally not applied in defense policy analysis. This approach provides a critical lens to examine how domestic interest groups and political coalitions can push a nation towards expansive and potentially strategically unsound policies. I uniquely employ organization theory and resource dependence to explain why certain groups consistently advocate for missile defense systems. By using organization theory, I explore how the internal goals of these groups shape their push for missile defense. Resource dependence theory further helps us understand how these groups, including political figures and defense contractors, use their influence to sway defense policy in their favor. This approach sheds light on these groups' underlying motivations and tactics to promote missile defense, even when its strategic value is debatable. This approach also allows for the cohesive incorporation of exogenous events. This explanation offers insights into how defense policies are often driven by the interests of powerful groups, a valuable perspective for academics and policymakers.

Reflection on the Research Methodology

In my research, I confronted the inherent challenge of conclusively demonstrating the intricate dynamics influencing missile defense policy. Recognizing the improbability of uncovering a definitive 'smoking gun' moment, I eschewed methods such as large-N statistical approaches, which, while potentially revealing incremental changes in specific variables, might not fully capture the subtleties and complexities of the case at hand. Instead, I opted for a methodology focused on accumulating a preponderance of evidence, even if largely circumstantial, to construct a more comprehensive understanding of the unfolding events. Snyder's use of historical process tracing inspired this methodological choice. This technique

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meticulously tracks the sequence of events and decisions to unveil the underlying causal mechanisms leading to a particular outcome. While acknowledging the absence of absolute certainties, this approach allows for a nuanced exploration of the causal pathways and influences that shaped missile defense policy, providing a rich and layered understanding of the subject.

To further enhance this methodology, incorporating additional analytical tools such as comparative historical analysis or integrating elements of network theory could offer new perspectives and strengthen the robustness of the findings. These refinements would broaden the scope of analysis and deepen our grasp of the complex interplay between policy, politics, and organizational behavior in defense policy-making.

Limitations

I acknowledge certain limitations inherent in the study. Firstly, while rich in detail, the focus on historical process tracing may not capture the entire spectrum of variables influencing missile defense policy, potentially omitting broader systemic factors. Secondly, the reliance on available historical records and data means that some aspects of the decision-making process, particularly those not well-documented or publicly disclosed, remain outside the scope of this analysis. Finally, the study's concentration on the U.S. context might limit its generalizability to other countries or systems, restricting its applicability in different geopolitical environments. However, I argue that detailed historical process tracing is able to provide an accumulation of evidence that highlights the utility of the network linkages and the deliberate nature of the actions of the actors in ways that other approaches fall short.

Recommendations for Future Research

Areas for future research in this area naturally present themselves. A longer analysis incorporating the changing network as it extends through the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations would provide a much greater context to the arguments, including how much power the network has after it is firmly entrenched within the strategic foundation of defense policy. Second, integrating quantitative methods, such as network analysis or statistical modeling, could complement the qualitative findings of this dissertation, offering a more holistic view of the interplay between political, economic, and technological factors in defense policy. Third, a deeper exploration into international institutions' role and influence on national missile defense strategies could shed light on the broader implications of such policies within the global security architecture. Additionally, an analysis examining how the pursuit of missile defense eventually resulted in the creation of the Space Force (or, at least, that's my current hypothesis) would be very compelling.

Appendix: A Brief Look at the Network

The missile defense network reflects the interplay of organizational interests and the influence of individuals driven by specific goals, fitting into the broader concepts of organization theory and resource dependence theory. While not a formalized group, this network represents a complex web of advocacy think tanks, corporations, and influential figures advocating missile defense system policies.[792] Key to this network is interdependent (and indirectly interdependent) relationships among organizations and individuals who move between private and public sectors, gaining power and prestige. For example, many individuals from top missile defense contractors were appointed to crucial defense positions in the Bush administration. Think tanks like the Center for Security Policy (CSP), Project for the New American Century (PNAC), and the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) have extensive overlaps in membership with defense contractors and government bodies. This situation illustrates how interconnected networks, based on resource-dependence logic, influence policy decisions, a phenomenon analyzed through organization theory emphasizing resource dependence.

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[792] Vital journalistic research at the time has helped lay the foundation for further study and application of theory. The contributions of individuals such as William Hartung, Michelle Ciarrocca, and others cannot be overstated. This project would not exist without the foundation this initial research has provided. See: William D Hartung, "Reagan Redux: The Enduring Myth of Star Wars," *World Policy Journal* 15, no. 3 (1998); William D Hartung and Michelle Ciarrocca, "Star Wars 2: Here We Go Again," The Nation, last modified June 1, 2000, accessed 2018. https://www.thenation.com/article/star-wars-ii-here-we-go-again/; Michelle Ciarrocca and William Hartung, "Star Wars: The Next Generation," last modified January 31, accessed. https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2001/01/star-wars-next-generation/; Rex Wingerter, "What Drives the Development of Us Missile Defense and Space-Based Weapons? The Role of Us Domestic Interest Groups," *Asian Perspective* 35, no. 4 (2011); Erik K Pratt, "Missile Defense Sponsors: Shifting Political Support for Strategic Defense after Reagan," *Asian Perspective* (2001).

Advocacy Organizations

CSP

Multiple advocacy think tanks have played an essential function in the missile defense lobby over the period discussed in this paper. The Center for Security Policy (CSP) refers to itself both as a "clearinghouse for information and recommendations" as well as "a hub and 'back office' of a network of over 100" experts and officials.[793] Similarly, it has been referred to by some analysts as the "nerve center" of the lobby and played a vital role in the rebirth of missile defense, with Frank Gaffney and Bob Livingston being critical drivers in missile defense's inclusion in the Contract with America (and Gingrich a Keeper of the Flame Award Winner). The organization was also vital in the creation of the Rumsfeld Commission, which solidified a rationale for the further development and deployment of the technology, as members were key drivers in the creation of and contributors to the Heritage Foundation's Team B, as well as vocal critics of the NIE 95-19 and staunch advocates for the creation of the Rumsfeld Commission itself.[794] Personal, private communication showed Rumsfeld telling Cheney, regarding the CSP, "It is a good outfit, and they have been consistently helpful to us. I hope you can give them a hand!"[795] In a speech at the 2002 Keeper of the Flame gala, Doug Feith argued that two of the crucial differences between the DoD and the CSP were that 1) the DOD uses

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[793] Policy, *2001 Annual Report: Standing Watch*., Policy, *Precision-Guided Ideas: 2002 Annual Report*., Center for Security Policy, *Promoting Peace through Strength: Center for Security Policy Annual Report 2003-04* (2004)., Center for Security Policy, *Peace through Strength: Activity Report 2005 -2006* (2006).

[794] Helen Caldicott, *The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush's Military-Industrial Complex* (The New Press, 2004). Reuben Steff, *Strategic Thinking, Deterrence and the Us Ballistic Missile Defense Project: From Truman to Obama* (Routledge, 2016). Ciarrocca and Hartung.

[795] Donald Rumsfeld, *Keeper of the Flame - To: Richard Cheney* (2004).

"precision strike[s] with JDAMs, while the Center opts for carpet bombing with those damn faxes," and 2) "the center is good at strategic influence."[796]

Frank Gaffney founded the Center, a protégé of Richard Perle and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during the Reagan administration.[797] Gaffney was a missile defense proponent known for his prolific ability to churn out a "constant stream" of reports in his post-Reagan years arguing that the gravest threats facing the United States were from China and "rogue states" with developing ICBM programs.[798]

In the ten years leading up to the release of the Rumsfeld Commission's 1998 report, the CSP received millions in corporate donations, with 25-35% of its funding coming from such sources.[799] Over half of the corporate contributions it received came directly from defense contractors, with every significant missile defense corporation contributing financially.[800] It was during this decade that Gaffney stated that "intensifying debate about the deployment of ballistic missile defenses" was to be a "goal" and "a priority for [the CSP] and its Board [of Advisors]."[801] The advocacy group's Board of Advisors, later known as the CSP's National Security Advisory Council, is described on the CSP website as "a key instrument for the

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[796] Donald Rumsfeld, *Remarks for Gen. Myers Event* (Rumsfeld.com, 2002).

[797] Gary Dorrien, *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana* (Routledge, 2013).

[798] Jason Vest, "The Men from Jinsa and Csp," *The Nation* 2 (2002).

[799] Leslie Wayne, "After High-Pressure Years, Contractors Tone Down Missile Defense Lobbying," *The New York Times*, June 13, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/13/world/after-high-pressure-years-contractors-tone-down-missile-defense-lobbying.html; Hartung et al.

[800] William D Hartung and Michelle Ciarrocca, "The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex: Corporate Think Tanks and the Doctrine of Aggressive Militarism," *Multinational Monitor* 24, no. 1/2 (2003). Donald E Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter?: Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes* (McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 2018).

[801] Jr. Edward Ericson, "The Star Wars Lobby," *The Hartford Advocate*, June 28-July 4, 2001, http://www.pepeace.org/current_reprints/03/Star_Wars_Inc.htm.

networking, information sharing, paper production, and recommendation dissemination" for the

CSP.[802] This advisory board served as a veritable who's who of individuals associated with the

missile defense lobby, a fact showcased during the first term of the Bush administration when the

CSP publicly boasted on its website about the twenty-two active members of the advisory board

who were taking a leave of absence to "take top government posts."[803]

Between the release of the Rumsfeld Commission's report in 1998 and the first year of

the Bush administration, the CSP received roughly another million dollars from missile defense

contractors and corporations.[804] Two months after the report's publication, Secretary Rumsfeld

received the Center's Keeper of the Flame award. During the Center's most significant annual

fundraiser banquet, this honor has been bestowed over the years on many ardent missile defense

supporters. In receiving this honor, Secretary Rumsfeld joined the ranks of Rep. Newt Gingrich,

Rep. Chris Cox, Sen. Jon Kyl, and President Ronald Reagan as missile defense supporters who

had won previously.[805] The honor would later go on to be awarded by CSP to missile defense

supporters such as Vice President Dick Cheney, Sen. Ted Cruz, Sen. James Inhofe, and Deputy

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[802] Policy, *2001 Annual Report: Standing Watch*; Policy, *Precision-Guided Ideas: 2002 Annual Report*; Policy, *Promoting Peace through Strength: Center for Security Policy Annual Report 2003-04*. Policy, *Peace through Strength: Activity Report 2005 -2006*.

[803] Center for Security Policy, "Members of National Security Advisory Council Take Top Government Posts," last modified April 27, accessed.
https://web.archive.org/web/20020427200455/http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=static&page=nsac-gvtsvc.

[804] ProPublica, "Tax Data for Center for Security Policy," Propublica.org, accessed.
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521601976. Ciarrocca and Hartung.

[805] Cox, a member of the Center for Security Policy's Advisory Council, has a history of using unsupported "classified" evidence to inflate the perceived threat of China, a practice he has called "suggest[ing] the possible scope of the problem." In a report, he suggested that China operated 3,000 front companies in the US even though the State Department could only identify two. Experts on such activities put the number between 100-250x less than Cox suggested. MW Lynch and JA Taylor, "Cox Reports," *REASON* 31, no. 4 (1999); Chalmers Johnson, "In Search of a New Cold War," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 55, no. 5 (1999).

Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.[806] Over the years, the advisory board for the Center for Security Policy has included not only members of the Bush administration, such as Robert Joseph and Vice President Richard Cheney, but also members of Congress who pushed for policy favoring missile defense, like Rep. Curt and Sen. Jon Kyl.

The CSP utilizes what it refers to as "force multipliers," which are essentially "working groups" and regularly scheduled meetings designed to allow members and critical actors to interact. The CSP had working groups dedicated to "National Security," and at least one such group was explicitly devoted to missile defense.[807] The NSWG refers to itself as a biweekly meeting in the CSP DC headquarters, allowing for "an opportunity for information exchanges, briefings and… joint action" between members of the military community and "think tanks, defense industries, and legislative and executive branch officials."[808] The MDWG similarly describes its role as "enabling some of Washington's most knowledgeable and influential actors … to exchange information, receive briefings and… map strategy," including "leaders of think tanks, information services, industry representatives and government agencies."[809] The Missile Defense Coalition "builds upon the years of Center-led networking, public education and advocacy and other policy support that culminated" in the decision to leave the ABMT. As part

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[806] Center for Security Policy, "Keeper of the Flame Award," accessed. https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/about-us/events/keeper-of-the-flame-award/.

[807] I say at least one because the CSP tends to rebrand its concepts often. However, the concept stays the same (such as the Advisory Board and the National Security Advisory Council). For this reason, it is unclear if the Missile Defense Working Group and the Missile Defense Coalition are independent groups or a rebranding. From the evidence I have examined the only distinction in description is that the MDWG is said to meet biweekly while the MDC is said to meet on "roughly a monthly basis." See:Policy, *Precision-Guided Ideas: 2002 Annual Report*; Policy, *Promoting Peace through Strength: Center for Security Policy Annual Report 2003-04*.

[808] Policy, *Precision-Guided Ideas: 2002 Annual Report*.

[809] Policy, *Promoting Peace through Strength: Center for Security Policy Annual Report 2003-04*.

of the CSP's strategy, they utilize "tiger teams" in Congress to "equip members of Congress and their leadership to address the missile defense issue" in DC and their districts. There were at least five tiger team meetings with varying members of Congress and six similar meetings with some or all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CSP not only spreads its information on the topics it advocates for, but it further pushes the issue of missile defense by spreading "work by the Heritage Foundation, High Frontier, and other like-minded US Groups… to influential" audiences.[810] While a complete tally of members or advisors is difficult to obtain as the Center often redesigns its website entirely, and annual reports are only available to members of the Center. I have used internet archival work to get several years of annual reports. I have compiled a list of confirmed advisory board /NSAC members and other key individuals who provide vital linkages and avenues of information dispersal between these organizations (see Table 1 at the end of this Appendix).

PNAC

In September of 2000, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), an organization that called for a return to "a Reaganite policy of military strength," released a policy document explaining what the organization determined should be the goals going forward for the U.S. military, as well as how to achieve those goals.[811] In the report entitled *Rebuilding America's Defenses*, PNAC argued that it was imperative for the military to "develop and deploy… missile defenses" and that "failure to build missile defenses will… compromise the exercise of American power abroad."[812] The report argued for America's need to have a

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[810] Policy, *Peace through Strength: Activity Report 2005 -2006*.

[811] Ken Silverstein, "How to Make Millions by Selling War," *Vice*, September 17, 2015.

[812] Donald Kagan and Gary James Schmitt, *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century* (2000).

"layered system of land, sea, air, and space-based" missile defenses and that such a "robust" missile defense system "remain[ed] a long-term project."[813] While the report noted that such a system would be necessary for defensive protections, it argued that "ballistic missile defenses will be the central element in the exercise of American power and the projection of U.S. military forces abroad."[814]

There was extensive crossover participation between PNAC, other advocacy think tanks, and the Bush administration. PNAC's leadership included a CSP's Board of Advisors member, Bruce Jackson, who had also served as the VP of Strategy and Planning, Corporate Strategic Development for Lockheed Martin. PNAC also had Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs John Bolton as a Director.[815] The PNAC "Statement of Principles" was signed by, among others, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, and CSP's Frank Gaffney.

NIPP

Another influential advocacy think tank involved in the missile defense debate, the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), was founded by Keith Payne, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy in the Bush administration, who went on leave from the NIPP when he took his post in the administration.[816] Before the formation of the NIPP, Payne was the co-author of the much-debated essay "Victory is Possible," detailing how the United

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[813] Ibid.

[814] Ibid.

[815] Ciarrocca and Hartung.

[816] State Department, "Dr. Keith B. Payne," US Department of State, accessed. https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/isab/68276.htm.

States could conceivably "win" a nuclear war.[817] Another member of NIPP, Charles Kupperman, was a former VP for Strategic Integration and Operations/Missile Defense Systems at Boeing Corp. and a VP for Space and Strategic Missile Sectors at Lockheed Martin. Kupperman was a member of CSP's board of advisors and also served the same role for NIPP.[818] A report co-authored by Robert Joseph (later Special Assistant to President Bush), along with fellow NIPP members Steven Hadley (later Bush's Deputy National Security Advisor), Steven Cambone (later senior aide to Sec. Rumsfeld and his Chief of Staff on the Rumsfeld Commission), and William Schneider (later Bush's Defense Science Advisor) titled *Rationale and Requirements*. This document was "adapted virtually wholesale" into the Bush administration's 2002 Nuclear Posture Review.[819]

Corporations

The funding from missile defense contractors supported the advocacy think tanks pushing for missile defense development and deployment. In addition to supporting the think tanks, the missile defense contractors regularly use their wealth to influence political outcomes. In the four years from 1997-2000, the top four missile defense contractors, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and TRW (later acquired by Northrop Grumman), spent over $74 million on lobbying expenditures alone, which does not account for contributions they made to candidates, parties, or PACs.[820] This pales in comparison to the return on their investment; however, from 2001-2004,

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[817] Gray and Payne.

[818] "Dr. Charles M. Kupperman," Global Impact Inc., accessed. http://www.globalimpact-inc.com/charles-m-kupperman/.

[819] Peoples, *Justifying Ballistic Missile Defence: Technology, Security and Culture*.

[820] Maria Ryan, "Inventing the 'Axis of Evil': The Myth and Reality of Us Intelligence and Policy-Making after 9/11," *Intelligence and National Security* 17, no. 4 (2002).

Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman received nearly $15 billion in missile defense contracts.[821] From 2000 to 2002, these four contractors received over 65% of the yearly missile defense contracts. Before being acquired by Northrop Grumman, TRW Inc. doubled its valuation during the first two years of the Bush administration.[822]

Further showcasing the close ties between the missile defense contractors and the policymakers within the Bush administration is that at least 32 of the appointees in the administration in key positions related to defense issues were "former executives, consultants, or major shareholders" of the top missile defense contractors.[823] This revolving door of employment also allowed individuals in the administration to find comfortable employment working for missile defense contractors, like Pete Aldridge, who moved from the Pentagon to Lockheed Martin after public service.

It is essential to highlight some of the individuals who played a role in helping to cultivate and maintain the threat of North Korea and clarify some of their connections with missile defense. Describing some of these influential actors' parochial interests can help explain their behavior.

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[821] William Hartung and Frida Berrigan, "Missile Defense Program Wasteful and Unncessary," Foreign Policy in Focus, last modified July 14, accessed. http://fpif.org/missile_defense_program_wasteful_and_unnecessary/.

[822] William D Hartung and Michelle Ciarrocca, "The Ties That Bind: Arms Industry Influence in the Bush Administration and Beyond," *World Policy Institute* (2004).

[823] Michelle Ciarrocca, "Missile Defense All over Again," Foreign Policy In Focus, last modified September 30, accessed. http://fpif.org/missile_defense_all_over_again/.

Key Individuals

John Bolton

John Bolton is a noted super-hawk who has, over the past 25 years, established a reputation as an individual who has played vital roles in the dismantling of multiple arms control and nonproliferation international agreements (including the ABM Treaty, the Agreed Framework, the JCPOA, and his current efforts on the INF Treaty).[824] He served as the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security in the Bush administration, even though he was known to have a strong distaste for any international agreement that could potentially constrain the United States. Bolton has been described by his critics as "ruthless,"[825] by his admirers as a "bulldog,"[826] and by those who knew him personally as "a masterful bureaucratic tactician" who was "relentlessly effective in implementing – or stymying – policy."[827] While Bolton has served as an advocate of missile defense over the years, he can be best understood as an appointee fulfilling Cheney's adage of "personnel is policy." He was placed in the State Department, many argue to counter Powell's diplomatic efforts. Bolton would later admit that he had occasionally undermined Powell, and they were both aware of it, saying,

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[824] Colin Dwyer, "Bolton Affirms Us Intent to Pull out of Arms Treaty with Russia," last modified October 23, accessed. https://www.npr.org/2018/10/23/659911920/bolton-affirms-u-s-intent-to-pull-out-of-arms-treaty-with-russia; John Bolton, "John Bolton: The Iran Deal Was Betrayed by Its Own Abysmal Record," *Washington Post*, May 9, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/john-bolton-the-iran-deal-was-betrayed-by-its-own-abysmal-record/2018/05/09/c8f6bc9a-53bf-11e8-9c91-7dab596e8252_story.html?utm_term=.034c1d2a175a; Matthew Gault, "Nuclear War Experts: 'John Bolton Is an Asshole'," *Motherboard*, March 26, 2018.

[825] Maureen Dowd, "U.N.Leash Woolly Bully Bolton," *New York Times*, April 27, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/27/opinion/unleash-woolly-bully-bolton.html.

[826] Adam Shaw, "Trump's Pick of Bolton for National Security Adviser Brings a Bulldog to the White House," last modified March 23, accessed. http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/03/23/trumps-pick-bolton-for-nsa-chief-brings-bulldog-to-white-house.html.

[827] Matthew Waxman, "The John Bolton I Knew," last modified March 23, accessed. https://www.lawfareblog.com/john-bolton-i-knew.

"I knew it, and he knew that I knew it."[828] During Bolton's confirmation hearing, Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) listed his concerns with the nomination, noting that Bolton was "highly critical" of the Agreed Framework and that Bolton felt the United States would "[suffer] no downside if [it] never normalize[d] relations with North Korea." Dorgan argued that the appointment was a signal of the administration's intentions to abandon or "ignore" agreements that would stand in the way of US efforts to build a "destabilizing national missile defense system" and "abandon talks with North Korea."[829] In his memoir, Bolton admitted that he had the goal of destroying the Agreed Framework and was looking for a way to justify doing so.[830]

Bolton began his career as the protegee of missile defense advocate and international agreement critic Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC). Bolton has battled accusations during his career when claims were made that he engaged in "pay for play" in his advocacy of policies. In 1994-5, while Bolton was actively testifying before Congress encouraging the US to support Taiwan as a full member of the United Nations, Bolton was also receiving payments totaling $30,000 from Taiwan's government for writing supportive reports; he claimed these were "completely separate transactions."[831] Helms conveyed the type of actions that were expected of Bolton when it came to international agreements that could stand in the way of missile defense. Helms informed Bolton at his senate confirmation hearing that he wanted him to "take that ABM treaty and dump

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[828] Bolton, *Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations*.

[829] United States Senate, *Nomination of John Robert Bolton of Maryland to Be under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security* (Washington, D.C.: Government Publishing Office, 2001).

[830] Bolton, *Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations*.

[831] Walter Pincus, "Taiwan Paid State Nominee for Papers on U.N. Reentry," *The Washington Post*, April 9, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/04/09/taiwan-paid-state-nominee-for-papers-on-un-reentry/338304d4-dbd1-4356-9dfc-f3142a1e0860/?utm_term=.bc8d19d9c7a6.

it… on the ash heap of history" because of the constraints it placed on the US to develop a missile defense system.[832]

Robert Joseph

Robert Joseph served as the senior director of the National Security Council during the first years of the Bush administration. He would succeed John Bolton as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and like Bolton, was viewed by some former administration members as one of Vice President Cheney's "spies."[833] Cheney brought him into the administration from the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) after serving as an advisor with CSP. He was described by Secretary of State Powell's Chief of Staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, as an individual who "really hated the Agreed Framework."[834] According to Wilkerson, Joseph's first objective was to "kill the Agreed Framework and to make sure that nothing like it ever got created again."[835] Joseph also was a member of CSP's advisory council and would later receive the Ronald Reagan Award from the Missile Defense Agency, an award given out by the government organization honoring individuals who display "outstanding support, innovation, and engineering or scientific achievement associated with technologies designed to defend against ballistic missile attack."[836] In the announcement of his award, the agency credits Joseph with "more than two decades" of being a "driving force" in the "development of… United States

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[832] Caldicott; Elizabeth Becker and Eric Schmitt, "G.O.P. Senators Tell Clinton They Oppose Him on Abm Treaty and Defense System," *New York Times*, April 22, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/22/world/gop-senators-tell-clinton-they-oppose-him-on-abm-treaty-and-defense-system.html.

[833] Robert Dreyfuss, "Vice Squad," *The American Prospect*, no. April 17 (April 17 2006), http://prospect.org/article/vice-squad-0.

[834] Chinoy.

[835] Ibid.

[836] Missile Defense Agency, "Awards," accessed. https://www.mda.mil/about/awards.html.

policies and strategies to defend the nation… from threats of ballistic missiles."[837] In the press

release, the agency credited Joseph with "play[ing] a key role" in the decision to remove the US

from a treaty that hampered missile defense development, the ABM Treaty. On October 20, a

few weeks before the election of George W. Bush, Joseph published an article in the Journal of

Homeland Security entitled "The Case for National Missile Defense."[838] Joseph has gone on

record that he believes it is time to "reassess the role of missile defenses" regarding China and

Russia and that it is time to move "beyond protection against accidental and unauthorized

launch" from those states. He encourages pushing for new missile defense technology and

development (and funding) to counter the threat of those states.[839]

Dick Cheney

Vice President Cheney has a long history with the missile defense lobby, including being

an early board member of the CSP when he was not in public office.[840] Cheney had also been a

longstanding ally of Donald Rumsfeld since Rumsfeld hired him as an aide during the Nixon

administration. Cheney would serve as Rumsfeld's Deputy when Rumsfeld was Chief of Staff in

the Ford White House before eventually succeeding him in that post. He would become the

Secretary of Defense for George H.W. Bush. Cheney and Rumsfeld have been described by

Colin Powell's former Chief of Staff as a "symbiotic pair," saying that they operate like a

"cabal" to bypass traditional policy-making processes to push their agenda sometimes.[841] During

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[837] Missile Defense Agency, *Missile Defense Agency Presents Ronald W. Reagan Award to the Honorable Robert G. Joseph* (2005).

[838] Robert Joseph, "The Case for National Missile Defense," *Journal of Homeland Defense* (October 20 2000).

[839] *Prepared Statement of Dr. Robert G. Joseph*, *House Committee on Armed Services* (Washington DC: 2014).

[840] Policy, *2001 Annual Report: Standing Watch*; Ciarrocca and Hartung.

[841] Lawrence Wilkerson, *Interview Lawrence Wilkerson*, ed. Michael Kirk, *The Dark Side* (PBS: 2005).

their time in the Ford administration, Cheney was said to have aided Rumsfeld's political manipulations in getting the Team B intelligence experiment approved. The pair pushed for the "analysis" because, according to a former CIA analyst, they "wanted to toughen up the agency's estimates."[842]

A key to understanding how Cheney influenced policy is to understand that Cheney adhered to the slogan "personnel is policy."[843] From his previous experiences in the executive branch, he understood that one of the most significant ways you can impact policy change is through who you appoint to specific posts.[844] This understanding sheds light on the argument from Secretary Powell's former Chief of Staff, Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, who argued that Under Secretary John Bolton was an inside man in the State Department for the Vice President.[845] This sentiment was echoed by others in the administration who described Bolton and Robert Joseph, among others, as "Cheney's spies."[846]

Beyond being a former CSP board member and an original PNAC member, Cheney also had some financial ties with the missile defense industry. The Inauguration Committee for the administration took nearly half a million dollars from Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon. His wife, Lynne, served on the board of directors for Lockheed Martin from 1994 until January

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[842] Greg Grandin, *Kissinger's Shadow: The Long Reach of America's Most Controversial Statesman* (Macmillan, 2015).

[843] Barton Gellman, *Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency* (Penguin, 2008).

[844] Ibid.

[845] Wilkerson.

[846] Stephen J Sneigoski, *The Transparent Cabal: The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel* (IHS Press, 2008); Muhammad Idrees Ahmad, *Road to Iraq: The Making of a Neoconservative War* (Edinburgh University Press, 2014).

2001, when the Vice President took office, bringing in over $100,000 a year for "attending quarterly meetings."[847] Even the Vice President's son-in-law, Philip Perry, was a registered lobbyist for Lockheed Martin. He would be nominated to serve as general counsel to the Department of Homeland Security while the law firm he was working at represented Lockheed in their dealings with the Department of Homeland Security.[848]

Donald Rumsfeld

Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense under Ford, was a member of PNAC and referred to by the Center for Security Policy as a "special friend."[849] Rumsfeld was on the board of directors for the engineering firm ABB (ASEA Brown Boveri) when they landed the $200 million contract to "provide the design and key components for the [LWR]" that North Korea was promised as part of the Agreed Framework. While his spokesperson claimed that Rumsfeld "does not recall it being brought before the board," former directors vehemently disagreed, and the former president of the nuclear division that oversaw the project said, "I'm sure [the board was] aware."[850] While Rumsfeld has referred to North Korea as a "terrorist regime," he was also on the board of directors for ABB when they opened an office in Pyongyang. Rumsfeld served on the board of directors for the pro-missile defense think tank RAND. Secretary Rumsfeld was on the board for various pharmaceutical corporations and banking and investment operations, arguably demonstrating that his professional allegiances are seemingly less aligned to any

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[847] Ciarrocca and Hartung.

[848] John Mintz, "President Nominates Cheney's Son-in-Law," *Washington Post*, April 1, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16318-2005Mar31.html.

[849] William D Hartung and Michelle Ciarrocca, "Star Wars Revisted: Still Dangerous and Costly," *Foreign Policy In Focus* Septemer (September 1 1999), http://fpif.org/star_wars_revisited_still_dangerous_costly/.

[850] Richard Behar and Brenda Cherry, "Rummy's North Korea Connection," *Fortune*, May 12, 2003.

specific ideology other than amassing money and power.[851] While some could make the

argument that Rumsfeld has had connections with the missile defense industry because he has a

deep-seated ideological belief in offensive realism and the freedom of action that an effective

missile defense would theoretically bring, those who have had the chance to know Rumsfeld

personally dispute the suggestion, with claims that "Rumsfeld doesn't strike me as an ideological

guy," and "I never viewed him as an ideologue."[852]

 While Rumsfeld was in the Ford administration, it was his behind-the-scenes political

machinations that persuaded President Ford to allow for the alternative intelligence analysis that

would later be known as Team B.[853] Rumsfeld would eventually go on to chair the Commission

to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. This commission was intentionally

modeled on the success of the earlier Team B exercise. He undertook this "Blue Ribbon" review

of the intelligence assessment along with several CSP members as Commission members.

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[851] Andrew Lindenauer, "The Rumsfeld Resume," last modified December 28, accessed.
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/05/12/342316/index.htm.

[852] *Rumsfeld's War*, directed by Michael Kirk (PBS, 2004),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/themes/whois.html.

[853] Cahn, *Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the Cia*.

Table 1 – Center for Security Policy Current and Former Advisory Board Members and Related Personnel

Name	Various Associations	Name	Various Associations
Abrams, Elliot *	L, O, B, F	Decter, Midge *	Γ, F
Abrams, Rachel *		DeGraffenreid, Ken * ~	A
Albrecht, Mark *	M	Denman, Diana *	
Aldridge, Pete +	A	Dobriansky, Paula *	B, N, F
Armitage, Richard	A, T	Duncan, John *	A,
Amitay, Morris J. *	Q	Ebner, Stanley *	T
Andrews, Robert * +	A, G	Ellis, Andrew *	Q
Ball III, William L. *	G	Elkes, Terry ~	β
Bailey, Kathleen *	S, K	Englund, Jon *	
Barker, Robert *	A	Fairbanks, Charles *	B
Barnett, Frank *		Falcoff, Mark *	H
Bennett, William *	J, F, I	Feith, Douglass * +	A
Billingslea, Marshall +	A	Ferrell, Brig. Gen. Stephen +	M
Blue, Linden *	T	Feulner, Edwin *	J
Bolton, John +	B, H	Fishbein, Rand *	Q
Britt, J. Stephen *	P	Forbes, Malcolm "Steve" ^	F
Brooks, Charles *	Q	Galbraith, Evan * +	A, X
Brown, Robert +	E	Gaffney Cross, Devon *	Ω
Brudzinski, Jason *	Q	Gaffney, Frank * ~	A, F
Bryen, Stephen D.	A, T	Gingrich, Newt ^	
Byron, Beverly B. *	H	Glynn, Patrick *	H
Cambone, Stephen +	T R	Goble, Paul *	B
Carlisle, Margo * ~	A, Q	Gormley, Dennis +	Δ
Cebrowski, Vice Adm. Art +	T	Goure, Daniel *	A
Cheney, Richard *	F, A	Graham, Douglass *	A
Chu, David +	A	Graham, Margaret *	Θ
Clancy, Tom *		Gray, Colin *	K
Clinton, Bruce ~		Grayson, E.C. *	G
Cohen, Eliot +	F	Hackett, James *	S
Comstock, Barbara *	V	Hamilton, Charles *	A
Cooper, Henry *	E, H, K	Hefti, Martlin * ~	A
Courter, Jim *	D	Hoeber, Amoretta *	A
Cox, Christopher *^	H	Holly, Maj. Gen. John +	E
Crouch, J.D. * +	A, X	Hoppe, John David *	Q
Dailey, Brian *	M	Horner, Charles *	O
Daniels, Mitchell *	Y, Z	Houser, William *	G

Table 1 (Continued)

Name	Various Associations	Name	Various Associations
Hutchinson, Kay Bailey *	C	Miller, Lt. Gen. Thomas *	G
Hyde, Henry *	H	Monetta, Dominic * ~	P , β
Ikle, Fred *	A, S, F	Moore, Thomas *	Q
Inhofe, James *	C	Mylroie, Laurie *	Θ
Jindal, Bobby *	H	Nalapat, Monu +	
Jones, Ge. James ^		O'Connell, Thomas +	A
Joseph, Robert * +	L, B, X, F	Obering, Gen. Henry "Trey" +	E
Judge, Clark *	L	Paige, Kathleen +	E
Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ron +	E, T	Pardo-Maurer, Roger +	A
Kaminsky, Phyllis *	N	Patron, Robert *	β
Kasparov, Garry * ^		Payne, Keith *	A, K
Keyes, Alan *	X	Perle, Richard *	Ω, A
Kirkpatrick, Jeane *	X, I	Piotrowski, Gen. John *	M
Kraemer, Sven *	A	Podhoretz, Norman	F
Krauthammer, Charles ^		Popp, Robert +	π
Kupperman, Charles * ~	T	Prentice, E. Miles ~	
Kyl, Jon * + ^	C	Reich, Otto +	X
Laird, Burgess +	A	Reilly, Robert * +	A
Lay, Christopher *	A	Rumsfeld, Donald ^	A, F, I, R
Lehman, John *	G	Robinson, Roger * ~	Ξ
Leitner, Peter *	A	Roche, James *	G
Lenczowski, John *	N	Rood, John +	M, A
Libby, Lewis	F	Rowny, Lt. Gen. Edward*	L, B
Livingston, Bob *	H, β	Rubin, Michael *	H
Longley, James *	H	Santoli, Albert *	Ψ
Lord, Carnes *	L	Schlesinger, James ^	A
Luti, William +	A	Schneider, William L. *	B, R
Macdonald, Jennifer *	Q	Schriever, Gen. Bernard *	
Malkin, Michelle +		Schroeder, Wayne *	A
Martin, J. David +	E	Shadegg, John *	H
McCallum, Taffy Gould *	β	Sherr, James *	Θ
McCoy, Tidal *	G	Smith, Carl *	Q
McCrery, James *	O	Snyder, Rob +	E
McKee, Adm. Kinnaird *	G	Sorzano, Jose *	Θ, L
Merrill, Philip *	X	Spence, Floyd ^	H, Q
Middendorf III, J.W. *	G	Steinmann, David ~	μ

Table 1 (Continued)

Name	Various Associations	Name	Various Associations
Stenbitt, John +	A	Webb Jr., James *	G
Taylor, Allen ~	μ	Weber, Vin	F, β, I
Teicher, Howard *	N	Weinberger, Caspar ^	A
Vallely, Maj. Gen. Paul +		Weldon, Curt *	H
Van Cleave, Michelle *	A	Whittlesey, Faith *	X
Stenbitt, John +	A	Wilcox, Christopher +	A
Taylor, Allen ~	μ	Wilson, Pete *	Z
Teicher, Howard *	N	Winsor, Curtin *	X
Vallely, Maj. Gen. Paul +		Wolfowitz, Paul	A, F, R
Van Cleave, Michelle *	A	Worden, Brig. Gen Pete +	O
Wade, Troy *	P	Woolsey, James *	O, T, R
Waldron, Arthur *	Ξ	Younger, Stephen +	λ
Wallop, Malcolm ^	J	Zakheim, Dov * +	A, T
Legend:			
Symbol	**Organization**	**Symbol**	**Organization**
*	Confirmed current or former member of CSP's NSAC/Advisory Board	F	PNAC original statement of principles signatory
+	Confirmed Speaker at NSWG, MDWG, or MDC	G	Service Secretary / Deputy Serv. Sec. / Asst. Serv. Sec. / Vice Chief / Director
^	Winner of Keeper of the Flame or Mightier Pen	H	AEI
~	CSP Board of Directors	I	Empower America
A	Department of Defense	J	Heritage Foundation
B	State Department	K	National Institute for Public Policy
C	Senate	L	Assistant or Special Assistant to POTUS or VPOTUS
D	Representative	M	National Space Council, Nat. Sec. Space Architect, US Space Command
E	SDIO/BMDO/MDA	N	National Security Council

Table 1 (Continued and Concluded)[854]

Symbol	Organization	Symbol	Organization
O	DCI / USIA / Defense Intelligence Officer / OSI	β	Lobbying/Law/Consulting Firm/Consultant
P	Department of Energy	Γ	Committee for the Free World
Q	Assistant or Chief of Staff to a Congressmember	Δ	RAND
R	Participant or Staff for Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States aka Rumsfeld Commission	Θ	Associated Education Institute (e.g. Southwest Missouri, Washington Institute, University of the Americas)
S	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	λ	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
T	Defense Contractor Executive	μ	Financial Organization
U	Office of Force Transformation	Ξ	US-China Security Review Commission
V	Department of Justice	Ψ	American Foreign Policy Council
W	High Frontier	Ω	Defense Policy Board
X	Ambassador / UN / NATO / Assistants	π	DARPA
Y	OMB		
Z	Governor		

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[854] Information on CSP advisors obtained from CSP annuals: Policy, *2001 Annual Report: Standing Watch.*, Policy, *Precision-Guided Ideas: 2002 Annual Report.*, Policy, *Promoting Peace through Strength: Center for Security Policy Annual Report 2003-04.*, and Policy, *Peace through Strength: Activity Report 2005 -2006.*

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