

BOOK REVIEWS

G. E. R. LLOYD, *Demystifying Mentalities* [Themes in the Social Sciences], Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press 1990. viii, 156 pp., Bibliography Index. £27.50/£10.95/\$49.50/\$14.95.

Geoffrey Lloyd belongs to that illustrious line of Cambridge classicists who have found anthropology useful for their own work and have then contributed to it. The value of this contribution has been duly recognized by anthropologists, who have asked him to give some of their most important lectures. Two of the four chapters that constitute this book were, in their original form, the 1985 Rivers lecture at Cambridge and the 1987 Frazer lecture in Oxford. Not surprisingly then, this work addresses a question of central interest to anthropologists: 'What is the validity and usefulness of the notion of mentalities?' (p. 1).

Lloyd points out that although Lévy-Bruhl's distinction between two 'mentalities' has been much criticized, in fact the idea of different mentalities has been widely adopted in many disciplines, especially in France. The problem is that there is no definition of 'mentality', and the term is used in a variety of senses. Furthermore, which criteria are to be employed in distinguishing between different mentalities is not clear, nor has the question of how mentalities change been addressed. Lloyd sets out to examine the whole question with reference to classical Greek thought, which is so often regarded as the origin of our own scientific rationality. He also attempts to place the development of the ideas within the political and economic setting of the period, so that they are rooted in a particular social context.

Lloyd starts off with two important distinctions: first, between literal and metaphorical (as classically illustrated by the argument surrounding the Nuer statement 'twins are birds'); and secondly, the general contrast between the pre-scientific and the scientific mentality. With regard to the first, he argues that where such a distinction does not exist it is distorting the actors' discourse to force it on them. In the ancient Greek context it was the creation of this distinction as a form of polemic that was the crucial factor. Equally so with the second, in which particular modes of inquiry, which we now recognize as scientific, were advanced in arguments in opposition to older 'non-scientific' ideas.

In chapter 2 Lloyd turns his attention to the contrast between magic and science, or more exactly that between *muthos*, which is unverifiable, and *logos*, which is known to be true. Once again Lloyd demonstrates how this contrast developed in the debates of Greek thinkers, and he stresses that magic, science (and religion) do not each belong to different 'mentalities', but are to be found equally mixed, not simply in the ideas of one society but in the mind of a single individual. From here he moves on to another subject, viz. proof. It is important, Lloyd claims, to distinguish between the practice of proof and 'an explicit concept corresponding to that practice, a concept that incorporates the conditions that need to be met for a proof to have been given' (p. 74). He demonstrates that it was in

Greece in the fourth century BC that the concept of proof became explicit, although the practice of proof is very much older than that.

With these three studies completed, Lloyd feels safe to embark on a little judicious comparison, and for this purpose he turns to Ancient China. He identifies a number of similarities and differences, of which perhaps the most significant are those concerning the respective economic and political environments of Greece and China that allowed for the development of particular lines of inquiry. He fully appreciates the complexity of the answers required, but feels there is evidence enough to claim that explanations are better sought 'in terms of the specificities of styles of inquiry and of interpersonal exchange' (p. 134) than in a resort to different mentalities. Indeed, Lloyd makes the telling point that 'to appeal to a distinct mentality is merely to *re-describe* the phenomena that are found puzzling or in need of explanation' (p. 5; original emphasis). Although anthropologists have in recent years avoided the use of mentalities as a form of explanation, they are not free from the type of fault referred to, as the continued allegiance to such notions as 'communitas' bears witness.

There is far more in this small book than a review can do justice to. However, the argument is made with such clarity that it requires no third-party exegesis; it should be readily accessible to anyone interested in the topic.

PETER RIVIÈRE

STANLEY JEYARAJA TAMBIAH, *Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality* [The Lewis Henry Morgan Lectures 1984], Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press 1990. xi, 187 pp., Notes, Bibliography, Index, Plates, Figure. £25.00/£9.95//\$42.50/\$13.95.

The nature of, and boundaries between, magic, science and religion have been the subject of considerable, and often polemical, debate since anthropology was established as a 'science'. Because presuppositions of rationality underlie this debate it strikes at 'the grand problem, which is at the heart of the anthropological enterprise: How do we understand and represent the modes of thought and action of other societies, other cultures?' (p. 3). In other words: how are we to achieve the translation of cultures when our perspective is a Western one? Tambiah's goal in *Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality*, then, is to assess the validity of these three concepts as 'general analytic categories in comparative studies' (p. 1). In order to achieve this he attempts to contextualize these concepts by tracing their history in the stream of Western thought and by examining the issues in the debate on rationality. The book, however, is disappointing.

On page one Tambiah tells us that his 'itinerary' will begin with the late British Victorians, such as E. B. Tylor and James Frazer; move across the Channel

to the French *Année Sociologique* school of Durkheim and Mauss, and those, such as Lévy-Bruhl and Maurice Leenhardt, who interacted with them; then return to Britain to deal with Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, before finally moving on to the 'moderns'—Evans-Pritchard, Robin Horton, John Beattie and Ernest Gellner. This is not, in fact, the journey on which Tambiah takes us. Frazer is referred to 'as a footnote to Tylor' (p. 42); Durkheim, Mauss, Evans-Pritchard and Gellner are mentioned only in passing (how can you discuss anthropological conceptions of magic, science and religion without careful attention to Durkheim and Evans-Pritchard?); and Radcliffe-Brown and John Beattie appear only on page one. We are, however, presented with the ideas of such other people as Wittgenstein, Keith Thomas, Freud, Alasdair MacIntyre and a host of others.

Tambiah lays the historical foundations of the concepts listed in the book's title in the first two chapters. In chapter one he gives us several thumbnail sketches: the history of the concept of 'religion' in Western thought from Roman times to the Protestant Reformation; the Judaic legacy of magic as ritual action independent of the gods; the Greek origins of science; and the relationship between the scientific revolution and the Protestant reformation. The second chapter focuses on the Enlightenment and is a continuation of the first. Much of the discussion is based on Keith Thomas's *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (1971). During the Enlightenment, Puritan ethic displaced God from the immediacy of people's lives; positive science came to define an autonomous realm for itself, and religion came to be seen as an object worthy of scientific study. It is Tambiah's submission that the Victorian theorists' 'conception of "religion" as a system of beliefs, and the distinction between prayer and spell, the former being associated with "religious" behaviour and the latter with "magical" acts' (p. 19) is a Protestant legacy. These chapters are the most interesting. It would have been good to have had more.

Chapter three, 'Sir Edward Tylor versus Bronislaw Malinowski: Is Magic False Science or Meaningful Performance?', is mistitled. Malinowski is not discussed until the next chapter and Tylor occupies only about one third of the text, the remainder being devoted to Frazer and to Wittgenstein's encounter with him. Wittgenstein's rejection of Frazer is treated by Tambiah in several lengthy (i.e. full-page) quotes. For Tylor and Frazer, magic was a pseudo-science or false science. For Malinowski, whether magic was true or not was irrelevant; magic was contextually meaningful and, like religion, was sacred, whereas science was profane.

Chapter five is the pivotal chapter in the book, moving away from magic, science and religion toward a discussion of rationality. Lévy-Bruhl's distinction between 'prelogical' and 'logical' mentalities establishes the theme for this chapter: the issue of two coexisting modes of thought and action as they impinge on our understanding of science and religion. In addition to Lévy-Bruhl, Tambiah presents the ideas of Lucien Febvre, Maurice Leenhardt, Robin Horton and Sigmund Freud, among others. The chapter reads, however, like a series of book reviews united not so much by their contribution to a debate initiated by Lévy-

Bruhl but because they fit the chapter's theme. Indeed, one section looks at Carol Gillingham's *In a Different Voice* (1982), which discusses male and female modes of thought. Furthermore, Tambiah fails adequately to relate his discussion to science and religion. Science, magic and religion are simply abandoned in favour of rationality, reasonably enough, but it is an abrupt rather than a smooth transition, and we are not given a satisfactory explanation for the change.

In chapter six Tambiah grapples with four interrelated topics: the delineation and implications of rationality as a mode of reasoning and as a process of constructing knowledge; the question of relativism in regard to the psychic unity of mankind and the diversity of cultures; the translation between cultures; and the commensurability between sociocultural phenomena and concepts. His discussion leads him in the end to the paradox of relativism, that is, that the proposition that 'the truth and also justification of a society's beliefs is relative' is either itself relative, in which case it lacks universal applicability, or the proposition is an absolute in which case it is a self-contradiction. Tambiah rightly points out that many anthropologists fail to consider the implications of this philosophical problem, saying that 'if, as many anthropologists do, we are prepared to argue that on a certain issue societies or cultures A and B hold different views, and each in its context is justified, true or meaningful, we should be prepared to defend this judgment as having *absolute* validity for us, and provide the necessary proof' (p. 128). Tambiah thus sets himself a task that occupies the remainder of the chapter: overcoming relativism. His solution is to argue that moral or religious systems address certain universal existential problems but differ in their emphases, commitments, styles or preferences—an argument he defends by presenting three brief case-studies. He is unconvincing, however, in that he says that 'it is the social body that writes and enforces the rules of the game: what shall count as the relevant evidence, what constitutes proof and so on' (p. 142). In other words, any proof he presents must be considered as relative, so what reason do we have for believing him?

The last chapter, 'Modern Science and its Extensions', is, despite his disclaimer in the final paragraph, a critique of Western science. Tambiah sees science as two-dimensional, being comprised of an internal framework—the bodies of specialized knowledge, the methods of science, the technical applications, and an external context—the intervention of society in the application of science, socio-political and economic interests in science, the social construction of knowledge and the impact of history. Because science is so much a social undertaking we should not assume that Western science *ipso facto* has the right answers.

Although *Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality* is easy to read, the thread of Tambiah's argument is difficult to follow at times. The various authors' ideas are poorly integrated, standing as independent variations on a common theme rather than serving as illustrations in a sustained argument. There is thus, also, little that is new. The idea of the book, however, is an excellent one and does strike at the central issues in anthropology, but the topic is enormous and

requires considerably more space than it receives (the book contains 14 pages of plates and 3 pages of accompanying captions that not only bear little relevance to the text but also reduce the actual text to 137 pages). The subject deserves better treatment, especially from an author of Tambiah's stature.

CHRIS HOLDSWORTH

PAUL CONNERTON, *How Societies Remember* [Themes in the Social Sciences], Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press 1989. vi, 115 pp., Indexes. £25/£8.50/\$39.50/\$11.95.

This short and stimulating book makes a seemingly straightforward argument, which its author summarizes as follows: 'If there is such a thing as social memory...we are likely to find it in commemorative ceremonies; but commemorative ceremonies prove to be commemorative only in so far as they are performative; performativity cannot be thought without a concept of habit; and habit cannot be thought without a notion of bodily automatisms. In this way I shall seek to show that there is an inertia in social structures that is not adequately explained by any of the current orthodoxies of what a social structure is' (pp. 4-5).

The style in which Connerton advances his position relies on persuasion by example, rather than deductive argument. Thus, there are two dense pages on different versions of the Orestes-Electra myth to illustrate the point that myth is more variable than ritual. Although the underlying question—how do societies (or aspects of them) persist unchanged through time?—is the same as that found in another recent short book, Pascal Boyer's *Tradition as Truth and Communication* (Cambridge, 1990), the way it is tackled could not be more different. Boyer adopts the dry, scientific style of Oxford analytical philosophy, whereas Connerton's model seems to be the apparently anecdotal but actually carefully crafted rhetoric of Foucault.

Anthropologists may find some of Connerton's generalizations too much. He begins one paragraph, 'Consider the case of village life'. In constructing a before-and-after model to delineate the modern condition, he derives his picture of the premodern situation not from the works of historians or anthropologists, but on the basis of two essays: Thomas Mann's 'Freud and the Future' and Paul de Man's 'Literary History and Literary Modernity'. Connerton's favourite author, cited many more times than any other, is Proust. No attempt is made to ask why some traditions and some societies have more commemorative rituals than others, nor to ascertain whether some societies remember in different ways from others. When he discusses commemorative rituals in world religions, only Judaism, Christianity and Islam are considered. In showing how rituals need to be habitual to work, he fails to consider the point that in complex societies rituals are usually the province

of specialists, so that the most significant rituals may be far from habitual for the laity.

Despite all these qualifications, Connerton has raised important issues and his book is a useful 'think-piece', rich in historical examples. His attack on cognitivist accounts of continuity and his account of the logocentric bias of European thought are convincing. More consideration does need to be given to habits, a subject often shied away from in anthropology because of its associations with old explanations that characterized non-European peoples as 'slaves of habit' or enmeshed in a 'cake of custom'. Rather than Connerton's stress on bodily habits, I would have liked him to focus on *emotional* habits. Then, perhaps, he could have moved closer to his stated ambition, proclaimed rather than fulfilled here, of advancing a new notion of social structure.

DAVID N. GELLNER

BRENT RICHARDS WEISMANN, *Like Beads on a String: A Culture History of the Seminole Indians in North Peninsular Florida*, Tuscaloosa and London: University of Alabama Press 1989. xv, 179 pp., Bibliography, Index, Figures, Maps, Plates. \$15.95.

Although this volume is intended primarily for a readership with an interest in the historical anthropology of Florida and the southeastern United States, it also addresses a number of issues that are of concern for anthropology world-wide, notably ethnicity. Thus, the Seminole, as with so many other peoples that have been the object of twentieth-century ethnological investigation, appear actually to have emerged as a distinct ethnic group only in the later colonial period, around 1800. None the less, the author identifies clear continuities with earlier Mississippian cultures, particularly the Creek, rejecting previous analyses that had tended to suggest either that the Seminole were marginal to these groups or that their culture was a response to Euro-American contact.

Establishing historical and archaeological linkages in the period prior to 1800 has been hampered by the fact that the proto-Seminole were immigrant into northern Florida from around 1600 onwards, the author identifying the cause of this dispersion as general weakening of chiefly authority across the southeast, during the period 1300-1500. In turn, this process of social fissioning was greatly enhanced by both the early deerskin trade and the later establishment of a strict 'one trader-one town' policy by the British. Accordingly, chiefly authority became further limited to the village, while both the 'nuclear family', as well as individual men and women, emerged as primary economic units.

By 1800, a distinct Seminole ethnicity had coalesced, giving rise to the observation that these economically sovereign individuals and their close kin were

politically related, via traditional matri-clan affiliations, 'like beads on a string'. Thus, countering economic forces for increasing individualization were such military and political factors as persistent Creek raiding of the more dispersed Seminole settlements, as well as the advent of U.S. administration in Florida, resulting in containment on reservations and an end to free trade.

This analysis enables the author to identify the paradox that it was not the 'clash of cultures' that led to the demise of the Seminole but the similarity of Seminole and Euro-American self-definition; both cultures stressing individual performance and competition, with the same economic resources, principally land, at stake. For such reasons, it has been difficult for earlier commentators to appreciate the authenticity of Seminole culture, it being assumed that this stress on individual competitiveness was a measure of Seminole deculturation, rather than a creative, native response to the opportunities afforded by external trade. As the author stresses, this kind of social process has been largely opaque to ethnographic analysis.

Unfortunately, however, theoretical problems concerning the relation of 'culture history' to the multiplicity of other 'histories' that might be constructed are left largely unaddressed in this volume. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the author will return to this topic in the future.

NEIL L. WHITEHEAD

ANTHONY F. AVENI, *Empires of Time: Calendars, Clocks, and Cultures*, London: Tauris 1990. ix, 358 pp., Index, Plates, Figures. £16.95.

Aveni is a professor of astronomy and anthropology at Colgate University and is also an archaeologist. He has edited and written a number of scholarly books on archaeoastronomy, particularly in reference to Central America and Peru. This book is intended to make much of this material available to a more general readership, while placing it in a world-wide cultural and historical perspective. The result is an engagingly written and reasonably up-to-date introduction to the cultural history of time, calendars and clocks.

It begins with a brief set of aptly chosen examples of adaptations to natural rhythms in animal life. These are followed by discussions of Hesiod's *Works and Days*, the book of Genesis, Hesiod's *Theogony*, a Babylonian creation myth, possible Ice Age lunar calendars and a Sumerian token system of accounting. Aveni goes on to trace the history of the Western calendar before getting, by way of the Nuer and the Trobrianders, on to the area of his own research strength, namely the Maya, Aztecs and Incas. Before his concluding chapter, he works in the Chinese, with Indonesian asides. Aveni mentions India in passing, but generally leaves out the massive early Indian development of mathematics, logic, astrology, astronomy and calendrical systems. The coverage is thus imbalanced.

However, if taken to be essentially about pre-contact Central and South American calendrical systems, then the book can be commended for its serious attempt to compare them with developments in Europe and Asia. Aveni appears to do justice to these achievements without exaggerating them. Furthermore, the comparisons often illuminate aspects of European and Asian time-systems in novel ways.

Aveni does stray sometimes in his treatment of the Asian literature. For example, he attributes a record for calendrical intricacy to the Kédang, who, he claims, have ten kinds of weekly cycles, ranging from one to ten days in length. The Kédang have no such thing. Presumably he has misremembered a description of Balinese notions by Clifford Geertz in his *Person, Time, and Conduct in Bali* (1966, p. 45). The suspicion that he is confusing Bali and the Kédang is confirmed in chapter 10, where he refers to 'Chinese and Balinese joints of time', whereas in the previous chapter on Chinese time-reckoning he had drawn on not Balinese material but my own on Kédang. (In any case, in discussing metaphors appropriate to time, I merely said that if I were to choose a metaphor from the Kédang language, it would be that of joints or *woq*. This metaphor is not, so far as I know, in overt use for that purpose in Kédang, although obviously I would not have suggested it if I did not think it got close to the way the Kédang represent events in time.)

One would have to agree with Aveni that 'time is many different concepts and ideas' (p. 10). It is interesting to learn that, according to experiments by Stephen J. Gould concerning the pattern of expansion and decline of natural species, the diversification of species *does not* take place in exactly the same way as it would if we were to 'run the clock of time in a backward direction' and that the history of life is a one-way process. Similarly, the neutral K meson, a subatomic particle, decays in an interval of time that would be different if time were reversed. This discovery contradicts a theorem in quantum mechanics that predicts that a reversal of the direction of time would not change the pattern of subatomic decay.

Mayan cities carried sun time 'locked within their walls': 'keeping the right time was an intimate part of the Maya notion of city planning' (p. x). A Mayan correction table used in predicting the motions of Venus allowed an accuracy of within two hours in five centuries. Mayan Keplers and Newtons operated cycles that, according to inscriptions, were as long as 64 million years, and one inscription may go 500 million years into the past. Aztec and Inca time-systems were not as accomplished as the Mayan, but were nevertheless impressive.

Many of the topics are covered in easily available secondary sources, some of which Aveni refers to in the notes. This is, however, somewhat more than a secondary work, as it presents original arguments about the place of the more developed American traditions in the world history of time-reckoning. Accepting that there are limitations in the book's scope, reflecting the author's own interests, his unique combination of skills make this an unusual and very acceptable introduction to a demanding, but fascinating branch of anthropology. A complementary study dealing with Arabic and Asian time-systems would be most welcome.

R. H. BARNES

WILLIAM F. HANKS, *Referential Practice: Language and Lived Space among the Maya*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1990. xxiii, 580 pp., Index, Diagrams, Photographs. Price not given.

This book is far more than a complex and extremely detailed linguistic ethnography of Maya in Yucatán, Mexico. It discusses many important theoretical issues and sets standards both for research and for the presentation of the results of that research. I fear British publishers would no longer consider a work of this detail and size.

In his Ph.D. (Chicago, 1983) Hanks examined place and time deixis. This data is now re-examined in the light of further fieldwork that has permitted him to explore person deixis as well. He is, therefore, able to analyse the complete field of deixis, in a manner that owes much to the influence of Bourdieu and Merleau-Ponty. It is impossible in a short review to do justice to the richness of the data or to the complexity of Hanks's argument. I will confine myself to presenting some of the distinctions that form the basis of his analysis.

Hanks's definition of deixis is as follows: 'the term *deictic* in traditional grammar designates (roughly) linguistic elements which specify the identity of placement in space or time of individuated objects relative to the participants in a verbal interaction' (p. 5); to which is footnoted the following: "'Deixis" designated the *indexical denotational* function of linguistic forms whereby they contribute to the individuation of referential objects relative to indexical contexts'. Hanks's own contribution lies in the use he makes of the differing concepts of 'frame', 'framespace', 'framework' and 'field'.

Frames are 'generally defined as coherent schematization of action and experience'. They are 'schematic structures on the border between the semantic system of language and native typification of practice'. They 'function as pragmatic templates in which roles and categories are configured in standard (if not entirely fixed) ways' (p. 78). Typical examples are the participant frames of discourse in Maya (and many other societies) that are 'speaker', 'addressee' and 'referent'. Another example, more idiosyncratically Mayan, may be the frame of cardinal location with four directions and a centre, often represented (by Maya as well as by their ethnographer) as a square perimeter with a central point. This is physically realized time and again in the construction of houses, in the relation of a house to the compound in which it is located as well as in the swidden fields in the country. The process of clearing a field begins with a shamanic rite in which the altar layout anticipates the actions that follow. Two sides of the perimeter of the field are cut using aligned sticks to define two straight, perpendicular lines. The space thus defined is then cleared. The final field is rectangular and is thought of as having a central point. A detailed analysis of shamanic practice shows how the altars and prayers connect both bodily orientation (participant frame) and the different spatial frames, that of the four cardinals and centre prominent among them.

The further term 'frame space' is introduced to allow for the fact that actors act in the light of frames other than those actually in play. Such 'virtual' frames constitute 'the socioculturally defined constraints on action' but they are not reducible to pre-existing rules (p. 80). In such arguments, the influence of Bourdieu is most apparent.

Frameworks may be thought of as the actual events and interactions in which the schemata of the frames are brought into play. Reported speech is a good example. In reporting the speech of another person I project myself and my addressee(s) from the immediate frame to that of the speech event that I am reporting. Shamanic ritual is more complex again. These are frameworks in which several different frames may be instantiated with various relations to one another: 'frame work' in other words. The difference between frame and framework is summarized thus: 'social actors bring [frames] to interaction as part of their already shared knowledge of the world, whereas they produce and revise [frameworks]' in the process of interaction itself (p. 295).

We are told how Mayan people talk, not just to one another but also to both dogs and babies (neither of which can answer back). Such a level of detail and the sustained analysis of the data must be welcomed, despite the text's hard reading. Cynics will say that much laudable effort has been spent on a description of a few twigs without giving us a view of the forest. Where is the overview? How does this help us understand social structure? Focus on the minutiae of conversational interaction may not leave room for the social contexts within which that interaction occurs. Hanks is fully aware of the possibility of such criticism. He gives much more than purely linguistic data. We learn about household organization, work practices and both the theory and everyday practice of shamanism. Moreover, Hanks shows how the details of linguistic usage *reveal* social structure. For example, the man leading a work-party speaks as if everyone present shares his (physical) viewpoint even when his juniors manifestly do not. When the juniors address the leader they do not assume (presume) such symmetry. Power has many forms: its holders control not just work but also the verbal accounts of the work. The lesson I learn from this is that verbal utterances may well provide a guide to the shifting hierarchies of power within a group, in circumstances where the division of power may not be as clear-cut as that within the work-party.

In sum, this book represents a substantial contribution to both Mayan anthropology and to anthropological theory. It provides a refreshingly empirical antidote to post-modern ethnography. Hanks appears as a conversant in many of the examples, his mistakes are corrected and the reader is able to learn with him. He spares us, however, a detailed account of his feelings, rightly judging that we are more interested in learning about Maya than about another American academic. The book should be in every library, if not on the shelves of every working anthropologist.

DAVID ZEITLYN

EDWARD SAPIR, *American Indian Languages, Part 1*, Vol. V of *The Collected Works of Edward Sapir* (ed. William Bright), Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter 1990. 538 pp. Appendix, Phonetic Key References. DM220/\$99.00.

Volumes V and VI of the collected works of Edward Sapir are intended to bring together his shorter papers on American Indian languages. Whereas Volume VI, to be edited by Victor Golla, contains articles on Athapaskan, Na-Dene, Penutian, Wakashan, and Salishan families, the present one is devoted to Hokan and Uto-Aztecan languages and the relationship between Algonkin and the remotely situated Californian languages Wiyot and Yurok. The papers are all strictly linguistic in character, and many of them (reviews, encyclopedia articles, linguistic maps, and so on) are of primarily historical interest because of their influence on subsequent linguistic work.

The anthropological interest of this publication lies primarily in the record it preserves of Sapir's attempts to improve the linguistic sophistication of North American ethnography and descriptive linguistics, in Sapir's then radical proposals to reorder the classification of native American languages, and in a single paper of 1923 on the Algonkin affinity of Yurok and Wiyot kinship terms.

One of Sapir's more radical departures was his attempt to demonstrate, through lexical, morphological, and phonological evidence, that the Yurok and Wiyot languages belonged to the Algonkin family. At the time, Truman Michelson attacked this hypothesis, although it was substantiated after Sapir's death. The various papers in the debate between Sapir and Michelson are reproduced here.

Anthropologists, as well as linguists, may also still find interest in Sapir's essay on the linguistic publications of the Bureau of American Ethnology [BAE], the quality of which, he decided, ran 'a very long gamut indeed', from the amateurish to work of 'as high a standard of phonetic finish and morphological insight as one could hope to find anywhere in descriptive linguistic literature' (p. 65). As someone who has used the BAE's publications on the Omaha in my work, I am gratified to see that Sapir thought that the Revd. J. O. Dorsey's publication on *The Cegiha Language* (1890) was one of three BAE works that represent the 'high-water mark' for the series in phonetic quality and that Dorsey's text material 'can more than hold its own in comparison with much that followed' (pp. 65, 67). It is important, however, to remember that this review was published in 1917, and that in work republished here Sapir had a strong influence on improving the phonetic standards and phonemic practices of the BAE and other contributions to American Indian linguistics.

There are thirty-five papers by Sapir in this volume, with two more by Kroeber and two by Michelson in the appendix. The editor has divided the papers of the main text into five sections, each provided with an introduction. There is a photographic frontispiece of Sapir in 1915 or so, a note to the reader, a preface and an introduction to Volumes V and VI. The appendix ends with a phonetic key to Sapir's publications. Publications containing typographic complexities have been photographically reproduced, while the rest have been newly typeset. One

consequence of this procedure is that some printing errors in the original publications have been retained.

Most readers will find this a work to be dipped into for a variety of highly specific reasons. Every university ought to have the entire series in one of its libraries accessible to anthropologists, ethnohistorians, psychologists and linguists.

R. H. BARNES

ANN FIENUP-RIORDAN, *Eskimo Essays: Yup'ik Lives and How We See Them*, New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press 1990. xxii, 269 pp. Bibliography, Index, Illustrations, Maps. No price given.

The Yupiit are Eskimos of southwestern Alaska, an environment very different from the more northern Arctic shores, the lands of the Inuit. This book's task is two-fold, as indicated in the subtitle: to represent Yup'ik life and thought accurately and to articulate, or identify, the images transposed upon 'Eskimos' by the Western imagination. The result is a dynamic encounter between 'Yup'ik and Western thought and cultural representations'; indeed this encounter is 'the central theme' (p. xiii), and the dynamic is maintained throughout the text, as each essay, from different vantage points, or on different topics (ranging from ecology to warfare), poses a question about 'Yup'ik lives and how we see them'.

The author—respected for scholarship within both the Yup'ik nation and academic circles—manages well the task of interpreting this on-going encounter. The study thus becomes as much about 'Western' as about 'Eskimo' modes of life and thought, reference being made to certain presuppositions that underlie 'Western' culture, particularly to notions of possessive individuality.

Richly varied yet unified, the book includes a chapter (surprisingly) titled 'Robert Redford, Apanuupak, and the Invention of Tradition', that describes the creation of a film, or cinematographic saga, based on Yup'ik tales, in which the creative process involves: (a) Yup'ik stories about Apanuupak, an Achilles-like figure; (b) their selective presentation by a storyteller to a film maker; (c) the latter's interpretation of them; (d) their further interpretation by the production company headed by Redford, who would play the leading role; and finally (e) the film's eventual presentation to the Yupiit youth, for whom this medium is replacing their elders' oral tradition, hence the 'invention of tradition'.

This book would, therefore, be of interest to ethnographic and other film makers, as well as to readers interested in traditional Yup'ik social organization, subsistence ideology, and cosmology; as well as those interested in modern Yup'ik religions (Eastern Orthodoxy and Moravian Christianity), contemporary political organization, known as the Yupiit Nation, and native views, in contrast to those of the state, concerning land management.

The material is readable, an accomplishment in itself, as the author has translated the details of scholarly anthropological, ethnohistorical, and even theological knowledge into well-written prose that maintains a propelling vitality from beginning to end. The book should therefore appeal to the general reader also, whose imagination could thereby be stimulated toward more accurate images regarding the Eskimos. A practical 'objective' of the author has thus, in fact, been achieved: 'to bridge the separation between informed scholarship and popular concepts' (p. xiii).

S. A. MOUSALIMAS

NORA MARKS DAUENHAUER and RICHARD DAUENHAUER (eds.), *Haa Tuwunáagu Yís: For Healing Our Spirit—Tlingit Oratory*, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press/Juneau, AK: Sealaska Heritage Foundation 1990. xxxv, 569 pp., Illustrations, Map, Bibliography. No price given.

Tlingit oratory—from southeast Alaska: the Pacific Northwest Coast of North America—is given particular expression during memorials: hence, part of the meaning intrinsic to the book's title, *For Healing Our Spirit*. And the memorials remain very much at the heart of modern Tlingit life, as the dates of these selections attest; for most of the speeches date from 1968 to 1988, with two older examples recorded on wax cylinders in 1899.

The memorials, themselves comprised of traditional patterns of reciprocity between social moieties and clans, are described by the editors in a comprehensive, (153-page) introduction. The editors criticize the extension of the term 'potlatch' from literature about other Pacific Northwest Coast cultures and articulate 'a new and different understanding' (p. xi) by focusing on the healing aspects of these Tlingit memorials, for example, the 'talking of grief' through oratory. To place the speeches within their proper cultural setting, the editors further explain in detail Tlingit social structure and clan crests, the vocabulary of the Tlingit spirit world, and the treatment of spirits during the speeches.

The oratory itself is analysed as literature, with reference to its general structure, its use of simile and metaphor and its 'levels of meditation'. Each of the speeches is presented with numbered verses and with a transcription of the original Tlingit facing a page of English translation.

The editors are themselves Tlingit, one by birth and upbringing, the other by intermarriage and tribal adoption; and both are published poets in their own right. Is it necessary to highlight the value of this oratory and its explanation and translation by Tlingit poets? They explain the culturally specific elements of the memorials within Tlingit life and indicate the universality of meaning contained within the poetic speeches.

This book is the second in the series *Classics of Tlingit Oral Literature*. The first volume, *Haa Shuká: Our Ancestors* (1987), presents Tlingit oral narratives in the same manner.

S. A. MOUSALIMAS

MALCOLM CHAPMAN and HELEN MACBETH (eds.), *Food for Humanity: Cross-Disciplinary Readings*, Oxford: Centre for the Sciences of Food and Nutrition, Oxford Polytechnic, for the International Commission on the Anthropology of Food and Food Problems 1990. 164 pp. (For price see below.)

The study of food is such a potentially broad topic that all too often the investigation of its different aspects is fragmented into a host of separate sub-disciplines, only some of which are in any form of contact with one another. Yet the practitioners of these different academic specializations could benefit greatly from learning what their kith in other departments are up to. All the more reason, then, to cheer the publication of this compact collection of papers.

Disciplinary variety is the keynote of this edition: there are papers by social anthropologists, biological anthropologists, an aid worker, a developmental psychologist, an environmental biologist, a nutritionist, a geneticist, and an economist, as well as one by two students at Oxford Polytechnic who worked together with Oxfam on the formula for a high-energy biscuit to be used as part of famine-relief operations. The geographical scope of the contributions is similarly wide: from south Wales to sub-Saharan Africa, from India to Ethiopia, from Nepal to New Guinea, and so on.

The editors introduce and place each paper in its appropriate academic context. In this way, even those unfamiliar with, say, the intricacies of nutritional analysis or neurophysiology will still be able to learn something from each contribution. For this reason, this collection will be an invaluable addition to the reading list of any interdisciplinary course on the human sciences. It is available (for £8.95 plus £1 postage and packing) from the Centre for the Sciences of Food and Nutrition, Oxford Polytechnic, Gypsy Lane, Headington, Oxford, OX3 0BP.

JEREMY MACCLANCY

DAVID LEVINSON, *Family Violence in Cross-Cultural Perspective* [Frontiers of Anthropology, 1; ser. ed. H. Russell Bernard], Newbury Park etc.: Sage Publications 1989. 108 pp., Appendixes, References, Indexes, Tables, Figures. £12.95.

The one unarguable description one could apply to this book is 'ambitious'. It sets out, no less, to 'address the worldwide reality of family violence' by means of a comparative study based on data held in a massive archive of ethnographic material, the Human Relations Area Files in New Haven, Connecticut. Levinson, who is vice-president of the company that created the files, uses a sample of ninety societies, ranging from Bushmen and small South American Indian tribes to Greeks and Malays, to test major theories about the causes of family violence and to suggest means by which it might be prevented or controlled.

The weaknesses of comparative studies of this nature are well known. The data are often unreliable or incomplete, huge differences in the cultural meaning of apparently similar practices are lost from view, and societies that may exhibit wide internal variations in behaviour have to be classified as though homogeneous. Thus decisions have to be made on whether, for example, 'wife-beating occurs in 49% or less of households', or on whether the mother or the father is the 'principal disciplinarian' in bringing up children, when the source of information may be an ethnographer without knowledge of the language or any particular interest in family relationships, and when perceptions of what is meant by wife-beating or discipline inevitably vary. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the enterprise is in vain. Cautiously as any finding has to be treated, the results are fascinating and, perhaps most importantly, suggest many areas for future researchers to explore in more depth in individual societies.

It is apparent, first of all, that while human beings have devised an impressive range of ways of inflicting pain and humiliation upon their families, from gang-rape of girls and the binding of body parts to the killing of wives and forced suicide of the aged, by far the most common form of family violence is wife-beating—be it as a result of sexual jealousy, as punishment, or simply at will. This is the phenomenon to which Levinson pays most attention, and he makes a significant contribution to the dauntingly complex debate about its causes; the sections on the physical punishment of children and other forms of violence are of marginal interest by comparison.

While not producing a fully integrated theory of wife-beating, the author puts forward what he calls a 'sexual inequality conflict model' of the phenomenon, reflecting his findings that its presence is predicted most strongly by four factors: sexual economic inequality, violence as a common means of conflict resolution throughout the society, male domestic authority, and restrictions on divorce for women. When all four are present, he claims, there is a strong likelihood that wife-beating will occur in a majority of households in the society.

The above is particularly interesting when read in conjunction with his analysis of 'wife-beating interventions'—i.e. the informal mechanisms used by each society to control or mitigate wife-beating, which may include, for example, immediate

intervention by neighbours, public censure of husbands and the possibility of divorce. The main conclusion is that, while outside assistance for the wife is the most effective, the availability of such assistance is less likely in societies with the economic and power relations that promote wife-beating in the first place. In other words, strategies to reduce violence by strengthening external intervention will have only limited effectiveness unless they are combined with fundamental changes in the underlying power structures. Feminists could hardly ask for a stronger endorsement of their fundamental argument that economic and social inequality between the sexes lies at the heart of violence against women.

One of the other interesting conclusions to emerge is that family violence is significantly correlated with the frequent use of violence as a means of conflict resolution in the wider society. The implication is that a general culture of violence develops in some societies, expressing itself in a variety of contexts. Conversely, Levinson identifies sixteen societies among his sample of ninety in which family violence of any kind is rare, noting that most of these also exhibit less violence in other social relationships. He gives as an example the Central Thai people, who apparently value individualism but at the same time generally behave in a 'polite, gentle and non-aggressive' manner with each other. Other striking features of the society are equitable divisions of labour and property holding between men and women. The costs include a high divorce rate, a surfeit of gossip and relatively frequent suicide attempts.

Ultimately, it has to be recognized, many of the conclusions depend upon shaky evidence, and the book is replete with crude generalizations about the nature of societies and the behaviour of their members. Even so, the enterprise is eminently worthwhile, both as a spur to further research and as a contribution in its own right to a most important debate.

MIKE MAGUIRE