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## Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

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# FM 3-81

## Maneuver Enhancement Brigade



**NOVEMBER 2021**

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**HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

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# Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

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## Preface

FM 3-81 provides maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) doctrine. The manual is linked to joint and Army doctrine to ensure that it is useful to joint and Army commanders and staffs. To comprehend the doctrine contained in this manual, readers must first understand the nature of unified land operations as described in ADP 3-0 and FM 3-0. In addition, readers must fully understand the fundamentals of the operations process contained in ADP 5-0, the principles of mission command described in ADP 6-0, the tactics contained in ADP 3-90, the protection tasks discussed in ADP 3-37, and the employment of Army forces (ARFOR) described in FM 3-94.

The principal audience for FM 3-81 is commanders and staff elements at all echelons and MEB units that are primarily tasked with conducting support area operations. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual. The other intended audience for this manual is leaders and staff sections within units that will employ a MEB or may operate under the command and control of the MEB. This manual should also be used to guide joint, interagency, and multinational higher headquarters commanders and staffs on MEB employment.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates must ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels will ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27.)

FM 3-81 uses joint terms where applicable. For joint and Army definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. Terms for which FM 3-81 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (\*) in the glossary; their definitions are boldfaced in the text. These terms and their definitions will be included in the next revision of FM 1-02.1.

FM 3-81 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of FM 3-81 is the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE). The preparing agency is the Fielded Force Integration Directorate, Doctrine Division, MSCoE. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, MSCoE, ATTN: ATZT-FFD, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929; by e-mail to [usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mpdoc@mail.mil](mailto:usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mpdoc@mail.mil); or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

# Introduction

FM 3-81 provides doctrine for the tactical employment of the MEB in support of Army operations. The manual provides the MEB with a unity of effort and a common philosophy, language, and purpose. As one of the multifunctional brigades of the Army, the MEB is designed to conduct support area operations in support of division and corps operations (also echelons above corps operations within Army, joint, and multinational structures). The MEB is a command and control headquarters with a robust multifunctional brigade staff that is optimized to conduct support area operations.

FM 3-81 discusses how MEBs enable commanders to achieve their objectives in support of unified land operations. A MEB is a combined arms organization that is task-organized based on mission requirements. The MEB is not a maneuver brigade, although it can be assigned an area of operations (AO) (normally the support area) and control terrain.

This revision is based on the successful training and employment of MEB units. This manual builds on the collective knowledge and wisdom that was gained through recent operations, lessons learned, doctrine revisions, and the analysis of the requirements for divisions and corps to control support areas. This doctrine has been adjusted to accommodate new technologies and organizational changes.

There are changes to the force structure of the MEB that have affected the MEB. The MEBs brigade support battalion (BSB) is being replaced with a headquarters support company (HSC). These modifications have an impact on dependencies and require additional mission analysis for the MEB when determining an area support concept requirement by sustainment assets of the supporting sustainment command.

FM 3-81 describes how MEB commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders plan, prepare, execute, and assess MEB operations in support of ARFOR that are conducting unified land operations within the framework of joint operations. It removes the maneuver support, stability, and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as the primary task for the MEB. The subordinate tasks that were aligned under maneuver support and stability are now aligned under tasks for the conduct of support area operations. FM 3-81 increases the emphasis on the MEB primary task of conducting support area operations while supporting the corps or division commander during decisive action—offensive, defensive, stability, or DSCA tasks. FM 3-81 includes significant changes. It—

- Establishes support area operations as the MEB primary mission and removes maneuver support stability and DSCA as primary MEB tasks.
- Describes how the MEB is not a force provider for enduring periods of time and how this could cause the MEB to become ineffective in its ability to conduct support area operations.
- Expounds the discussion on MEB support to Army operations.
- Discusses how crime, disorder, and the fear of crime are persistent, debilitating factors that contribute to instability throughout the support area.
- Adds organizational charts and a detailed discussion on MEB capabilities and the capabilities of units that may be task-organized to it.
- Introduces rear command post support.
- Designates the MEB role in synchronizing, integrating, and organizing protection capabilities and resources.



The following is a brief introduction by chapter and appendix:

- **Chapter 1** provides an overview of the MEB and discusses the capabilities and primary and subordinate tasks of the MEB headquarters. It also discusses the employment of the MEB and the supported commands and their relationships.
- **Chapter 2** identifies and discusses the capabilities of MEB organic units and units that may be task-organized to the MEB based on mission requirements.
- **Chapter 3** discusses the operational necessity of a support area, the framework, and the fundamental principles that are common to all support areas at the corps and division echelon.
- **Chapter 4** highlights support area responsibilities that include terrain management, information collection, integration, synchronization, civil affairs (CA) operations, movement control, clearance of fires, security, personnel recovery, airspace management, minimum-essential stability operations, and mobility and countermobility.
- **Chapter 5** describes the integrated sustainment effort required to support MEB operations.
- **Appendix A** describes how support area commanders synchronize, integrate, and organize protection capabilities and resources to protect the force, preserve combat power, reduce risk, and mitigate identified vulnerabilities throughout the support area.
- **Appendix B** discusses MEB support to DSCA.
- **Appendix C** describes how the forward movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel from the echelon (corps and division) support areas is vital to the support of decisive action and to the protection of ground supply routes, waterways, rail lines, and pipelines. It also describes how power generation and distribution capabilities are used to support operations across the range of military operations.
- **Appendix D** provides an overview of support area tenant units and their capabilities.
- **Appendix E** identifies how every unit in the support area is responsible for its own defense; however, units establish assembly areas (AAs), base camps, and base clusters throughout the support area to build on the concept of integrating mutual support into a viable defense. This appendix also provides a sample base camp defense plan.

The MEB doctrine that is provided in this manual, together with related maneuver; fires; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN); engineer; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); military intelligence; CA; military police; and Army Health System (AHS) doctrine will support the actions and decisions of commanders at all levels. This manual is not meant to be a substitute for thought and initiative among MEB leaders and Soldiers. No matter how robust the doctrine or how advanced the MEB capabilities and systems, it is the MEB units and Soldiers who must understand the operational environment, recognize shortfalls, and use their professional judgment to adapt to the situation on the ground.

Based on current doctrinal changes, certain terms for which FM 3-81 is the proponent have been modified for the purposes of this manual (see introductory table-1). The glossary contains acronyms and defined terms.

**Introductory table-1. Modified Army terms**

<i>Term</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Maneuver support operations	Rescinded
Movement corridor	Proponent changed from FM 3-81 to ADP 3-37

# Chapter 1

## Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

Understanding how ARFOR conduct operations as part of an interdependent joint force supports mission success and lays the framework for the roles and mission of the MEB. This chapter provides an overview of the MEB capabilities to provide command and control for units, key functions, and tasks required to conduct its primary task of support area operations. Support area capabilities focus on enabling close operations, supporting deep operations, and creating windows of opportunity that formations can exploit.


### MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE OVERVIEW

1-1. The MEB is a multifunctional brigade headquarters designed to command and control forces from multiple branches, but especially organizations that conduct tasks enabling support area operations. The MEB employs these organizations to support the conduct of decisive action in support of Army divisions; echelons above division; and joint, interagency, or multinational headquarters. Normally each division and/or corps headquarters receives and assigns a MEB to their support area. More than one MEB may be assigned to a division or corps based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

1-2. Each MEB headquarters begins with the same basic organization structure, staffing, and capabilities. Task organization is based on mission requirements for the echelon being supported. The headquarters is staffed and optimized to conduct combined arms operations integrating a wide range of functional branches and combat forces. The staff is optimized to provide for the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of key tasks associated with protection (see ADP 3-37 and appendix A), security, support to mobility, and stability. It uses units that are attached or under operational control (OPCON) to conduct the MEB primary task throughout its AO and within the broader AO of the organization (division, corps) it supports.

1-3. The MEB has limited organic structure and depends on the task organization of units for capabilities to conduct support area operations. The MEB staff must conduct detailed mission analysis and running estimates to identify these requirements. This is mission-critical when submitting for MEB subordinate functional unit requirements. Examples of MEB dependencies include fire support (counterfire radar and target acquisition assets), engineers, military police, CBRN, CA, EOD, air defense artillery (ADA), tactical combat force (TCF), sustainment, Role 2 medical support AHS (except role 1 treatment), medical evacuation (via air and ground), signal, and information collection capability (unmanned aircraft system and military intelligence units). The MEB also depends on the higher headquarters for legal, financial management, personnel, and administrative services.

1-4. The MEB may be placed in support of Army, joint, interagency, or multinational headquarters. The MEB may include a mix of CBRN, CA, engineer, EOD, military police and, potentially, air missile defense (AMD) and a TCF (see figure 1-1, page 1-2). A *tactical combat force* is a rapidly deployable, air-ground mobile combat unit with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets assigned to, and capable of defeating Level III threats, including combined arms (JP 3-10). See table 1-1, page 1-2, for discussion on the levels of threats. Table 1-1 is a guide, not a definitive categorization, and attention must be given to enemy capabilities and activities. Size is not the sole determinant of a threat level.



**Figure 1-1. Notional MEB task organization**

**Table 1-1. Levels of threat**

<i>Threat Level</i>	<i>Examples</i>
Level I	Squad size unit of enemy forces, agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, terrorists, civil disturbances, criminals
Level II	Small tactical units, enemy special operations teams, long-range reconnaissance units, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, partially attrited small combat units, and irregular forces; may include significant stand-off weapons threats
Level III	Large tactical force operations, including airborne, heliborne, amphibious, infiltration, and major air operations

1-5. The number and type of organizations placed under a MEB depend on the mission, threat, and number and type of battalions or companies that require command and control. Peacetime task organization may vary due to stationing and the type of units that are collocated under the MEB for command and control. The MEB is optimized to provide staff planning for and command and control of the units conducting support area operations.

*Note.* Force structure changes will remove the BSB from all MEBs by fiscal year (FY) 21. The headquarters and headquarters company will be converted to an HSC. The current implementation plan converts all Army National Guard MEBs in FY 21 and United States Army Reserve MEBs in FY 24-25. This change will have an impact on MEB capabilities and dependencies and create changes in the sustainment operational concept of support for the MEB. The MEB will become more dependent on supporting sustainment and medical brigades. The coordination and execution of sustainment support, previously performed by the BSB support operations (SPO) officer, are retained in the HSC in the SPO section while the brigade logistics staff officer (S-4) is the primary planner of sustainment.

1-6. Corps and division commanders assign responsibility for the support area to a MEB headquarters. The MEB commander designates AAs, base camps, and base clusters for all units operating within the support area. Within that support area, division or corps commanders should delegate tactical control (TACON) of all friendly forces for protection, defense, and security to the MEB commander. The higher headquarters will designate base camp/base cluster commanders.

- *Assembly area* is an area a unit occupies to prepare for an operation (FM 3-90-1).
- *Base camp* is an evolving military facility that supports that military operations of a deployed unit and provides the necessary support and services for sustained operations (ATP 3-37.10).
- *Base cluster* in base defense operations, a collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control (JP 3-10).

1-7. The MEB capability to conduct support area operations provides added security and defense for other units located in the support area and enhances freedom of action for the supported echelon. The MEB is only capable of limited offensive maneuver by employing its TCF to counter or defeat a threat. The MEB can provide command and control for assigned forces to defeat Level I, II, and III threats within an assigned AO. The MEB requires a TCF built around a combat arms battalion headquarters with its associated tactical air control party to defeat a Level III threat.

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*Note.* The MEB can support specific missions outside its AO or provide forces to complement or reinforce other organizations conducting select missions or tasks that support the main effort. However, specific or select missions do not imply long-term task organization. If the MEB becomes a force provider for an enduring period of time, it could become ineffective in its ability to conduct support area operations.

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1-8. Force-tailored MEB capabilities can provide critical capabilities to support offense, defense, and stability operations. They have the added staff to perform the tasks that are needed to manage an AO, including conducting select combat operations within that AO. Many of the units not staffed to control terrain become tenants within the assigned MEB AO (especially if the AO is the echelon support area). The AO provides an economy of force capability so that brigade combat teams (BCTs) or maneuver units can focus on combat operations.

1-9. The MEB characteristics are—

- **Tailorable**—can be task-organized based on the factors of METT-TC.
- **Modular**—attaches/detaches subordinate units.
- **Expeditionary**—can be deployed in modules.
- **Networked**—has an organic signal company and liaison officers to link with other headquarters/forces.
- **Joint-interdependent**—uses and contributes to other Service capabilities.
- **Agile**—can reinforce other brigades with subordinate capabilities for specific or select missions.

## PRIMARY AND SUBORDINATE TASKS

1-10. The MEB primary task of support area operations includes—

- Conducting terrain management.
- Conducting information collection, integration, and synchronization.
- Conducting civil-military operations.
- Controlling movement.
- Conducting clearance of fires.
- Enabling security.
- Conducting personnel recovery.
- Conducting airspace management.
- Conducting minimum-essential stability tasks.
- Conducting mobility and countermobility support.
- Support to rear command post operations.

1-11. DSCA is not a primary task of the MEB; however, the MEB is a very capable force (when properly task-organized) to conduct DSCA operations. Appendix B provides MEB planners general guidance for conducting DSCA operations as part of their decisive action mission in stability operations or for humanitarian support or support of homeland civil authorities.

## **HIGHER HEADQUARTERS**

1-12. Echelons above brigade (EAB) consist of divisions, corps, and theater Army headquarters. The division is optimized for the TACON of brigades during combat operations. The corps provides a headquarters that specializes in operations as a joint force land component command headquarters or that may be employed as an intermediate tactical headquarters. The theater Army headquarters serves as the Army Service component command, providing administrative control over ARFOR and some theater-wide planning and controlling support to joint forces. The Army Service component commander focuses on geographic combatant command level land power employment and support to joint, interagency, and multinational forces. All three headquarters are modular entities designed to employ expeditionary forces tailored to meet the requirements of specified joint operations.

### **Division**

1-13. A division force package may include a mix of armored BCTs, infantry BCTs, and Stryker BCTs. In addition to BCTs, each division controls a tailored array of multifunctional and functional brigades. The division may control functional groups, battalions, or separate companies; however, these are normally task-organized to a brigade.

1-14. The division uses BCTs to fight in battles and engagements. It uses support brigades primarily for shaping and sustaining operations and to complement or support BCTs. The MEB is normally assigned the division support area. The division support area may contain all or part of a sustainment brigade (other units or headquarters positioned in support of the division). The MEB conducts support area operations when given this role by the division.


### **Echelons Above Division**

1-15. The corps is optimized to serve as an intermediate tactical headquarters for land operations. The corps may serve as an Army force headquarters or, with augmentation, as a joint task force headquarters or a joint force land component headquarters. A corps can deploy to any AO to exercise command and control for Army, joint, and multinational forces. The corps force is likely to include a MEB. Figure 1-2 is an example of a Corps as an intermediate land force headquarters.

1-16. The AO is a fundamental control measure, and the commander assigns subordinate areas of operations based on METT-TC. It empowers subordinate initiative and provides a limit for decentralized execution. The first priority for allocation of terrain is to the divisions. The division AO should allow the division commander full use of division BCTs and supporting brigades. When serving as a joint task force headquarters or a joint force land component commander, the corps also assigns areas of operations to Marine Corps combat units, multinational divisions and brigades controlled by the corps, and MEBs attached to the corps.

1-17. The corps establishes a support area when required. The support area requires a controlling headquarters (a division, a BCT, or a MEB). For major operations, considerably greater capabilities may be required. This may include a division, regional support groups, a second MEB, or a rear command post to control operations throughout the support area and rear area.

1-18. A joint force commander may place a MEB in support of another Service or multinational forces, such as a Marine air ground task force, to provide command and control to Army units and capabilities that are assigned, attached, or made available to those forces during operations. As such, the MEB commander would serve as the senior Army commander and advisor responsible to the Marine commander and remain responsible to the Army force commander for internal Army issues.



**Figure 1-2. Example of corps as an intermediate land force headquarters**

1-19. When designated as a joint force land component, the corps exercises command over Marine Corps forces as required by the joint force commander. The corps functions as an operational-level headquarters. If the joint force commander elects to establish a joint security area (JSA) within the joint operations area, the joint force commander normally determines its structure and controlling headquarters. The options for the JSA depend on the threat and mission variables, particularly forces available. If the threat to the JSA is low to moderate, the theater army commander may tailor ARFOR with a MEB specifically for controlling the JSA. The MEB may include additional military police and intelligence assets. If the threat to theater bases and lines of communications is significant, the theater army may tailor ARFOR with an additional BCT to control that AO. A third option, in the case of very high threat levels, is to assign the mission to an Army division with BCTs.

1-20. When assigned the mission of supporting echelons above division, joint, or multinational forces, the MEB could be task-organized with other Service or national units and integrated staff augmentation to provide command and control for a variety of elements necessary to support those forces. The MEB may be assigned its own AO in such a role. When assigned to a joint command, the MEB may provide command and control of the JSA. In this case, the MEB commander may be designated as the joint security coordinator by a joint force commander. The MEB may be required to establish or support a theater level joint security coordination center. (See JP 3-10 for additional information on a MEB serving as a joint security coordination center for a JSA.) The MEB can also support functional component commands, a joint force, or another Service.

### Other Brigade Support

1-21. The MEB could be tasked to provide support to other divisional units, to include BCTs, functional brigades, or other support brigades. The division may task the MEB to conduct certain operations in general support to the division with selected tasks that require direct support to the main effort, such as protecting critical capabilities, assets, and activities. When providing general support, other brigades in the division coordinate their requirements with the division staff and the MEB. Based on the division commander's intent,

the MEB recommends priorities, provides task organization, and provides directed support, refining specific details through collaboration with BCTs and other support brigades to accomplish missions.

1-22. MEBs can support BCT operations in a variety of ways. In general, the division may task-organize parts of the MEB to BCTs for a specific mission, or the MEB may complement or reinforce the BCT with forces under MEB control that are performing selected missions or tasks within the BCT AO. Examples include—


- Assisting in BCT initial detainee collection point construction.
- Assisting in defensive-position construction.
- Building a bridge over a gap.
- Performing decontamination at a site within a BCT AO.
- Performing other tasks that are temporary and specific in nature.

1-23. Elements out of the MEB may also provide specific CBRN or engineer reconnaissance capability to a BCT. Military police may secure a sensitive site within a BCT AO. CBRN, engineer, EOD, and military police forces may provide a wide range of support to the BCT or to other brigades within a division AO. However, specific missions does not imply long-term. If the MEB becomes a force provider for an enduring period of time, it could become ineffective in its ability to conduct support area operations.

1-24. The MEB may also support reorganization or reconstruction operations where a BCT rests, reorganizes, and receives large quantities of supplies. This may occur when the MEB is assigned an AO within which the reorganization or reconstruction operations occur or when it is assigned an AO within which the MEB provides mobility support.

**EMPLOYMENT**

1-25. Figure 1-3 is an example of a division task organization that contains a single MEB. This particular example does not provide the division with any functional brigades. Units that might be found in functional CBRN, engineer, military police, or other brigades would likely be task-organized to the MEB. Support that might be drawn from a functional brigade would likely come from the MEB if the necessary assets have been task-organized to the MEB.



**Figure 1-3. Example division organization**

1-26. The effectiveness and success of the MEB depend on the synergy that is leveraged from integrating and synchronizing subordinate and supporting units. Depending on the METT-TC factors, MEBs can task-organize assigned units into combined arms task forces and company teams. These combined arms elements can then perform multifunctional tasks more effectively and efficiently. The military intelligence unit would be task-organized to the MEB when the METT-TC factors associated with a particular AO require this augmentation of the MEB, similar to the organic military intelligence companies that are found in all BCTs. The TCF shown in figure 1-1, page 1-2, could be made up of a variety of maneuver forces, and its actual size and composition would be based on the Level III threat that it would be focused against.

1-27. Functional brigades and the MEB provide different capabilities to the supported headquarters, and sometimes both units are required. A functional brigade is needed with large and complex functional tasks that require three or more functional battalions of the same type. Additional MEBs are required if span of control is exceeded.

1-28. The MEB bridges a capability gap between the limited functional units (CBRN, engineer, and military police) of the BCTs and the more capable functional brigades. This headquarters provides a more functional staff capability than BCTs, but usually less than a functional brigade. The key difference between the MEB and the functional brigades is the breadth and depth of the MEB multifunctional staff. The MEB provides complementary and reinforcing capabilities. Based on its task organization and mission, the MEB can detach functional modular units or combined arms elements (task forces or company teams) to support the BCTs for specific tasks and, potentially, other multifunctional brigades, providing functional and combined arms support across the higher headquarters AO.

1-29. The MEB can provide command and control for units in transition as they arrive in the division AO or when they are in between task organizations and then detach those units to provide added support to BCTs or functional brigades when needed. The MEB capability to support onward movement and integration enables the modular Army to employ assets when and where they are required.

1-30. The MEB may control the terrain where other support or functional brigades are located. They synchronize their operations with other tenant support brigades. The MEB may require capabilities in a command or support relationship from the other support brigades. The MEB should have some command and control authority over the organizations positioned within the MEB AO to conduct security and defense; this may be TACON for security and defense. The MEB should also receive liaisons to coordinate and synchronize operations between specific command structures to foster positive relationships.

1-31. The MEB may support other functional brigades or BCTs. For example, the MEB can be expected to coordinate or provide protection of designated sustainment packages or convoys transiting through the MEB AO. The MEB is also dependent on the other support brigades to fill capability gaps that were identified during mission planning.

## OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

1-32. The operational framework provides Army leaders with basic conceptual options for arraying forces and visualizing and describing operations. An *operational framework* is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). The operational framework provides an organizing construct for visualizing and describing operations by echelon in time and space within the context of an AO, area of influence, and area of interest. It provides a logical architecture for determining the responsibilities, permissions, and restrictions for subordinate echelons, and by doing so enables freedom of action and unity of effort. When used in conjunction with effective operational graphics, it provides commanders the ability to provide intent, develop shared visualization, and ultimately create the shared understanding necessary for the exercise of initiative at every echelon.

1-33. The operational framework has four components. First, commanders are assigned an AO for the conduct of operations, from which, in turn, they assign AOs to subordinate units based on their visualization of the operation. Units should be assigned AOs commensurate with their ability to influence what happens within them. Second, within their assigned AO, commanders designate deep, close, support, and rear areas to describe the physical arrangement of forces in time, space, and purpose. Third, commanders establish decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to further articulate an operation in terms of purpose. Finally, commanders designate the main and supporting efforts to designate the shifting and prioritization of resources. See ADP 3-0, FM 3-0, and FM 3-94 for additional information on the operational framework.



1-34. Commanders designate close, support, deep, and rear areas as required. They designate a deep area and rear area as required. The MEB primarily conducts operations in support of decisive action in the commander’s designated support area. Figure 1-4 depicts MEB support to a corps AO (organized into deep, close, support, and rear areas) within a theater of operations.

- The *close area* is the portion of a commander’s area of operations where the majority of subordinate maneuver forces conduct close combat (ADP 3-0).
- The *support area* is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations (ADP 3-0).
- A *deep area* is where the commander sets conditions for future success in close combat (ADP 3-0).
- The rear area is that area within a unit AO that extends forward from its rear boundary to the rear boundary of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. It is an area of operations in which most forces and assets are located that supports and sustains forces in the close area.




Figure 1-4. Notional MEB support to a corps

1-35. There are fundamental principles that are common to all support areas. Support areas may be designated by any Army echelon or by operational necessity, but they are usually associated with organizations that are capable of synchronizing and integrating continuing activities necessary to control terrain. A joint force would designate a JSA. Support area operations are conducted by the assigned area owner and tenants to prevent or minimize interference with command and control and SPO and to provide unimpeded movement of friendly forces; protection; operations to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces or defeat threats; and area damage control. Corps and divisions may have one or multiple support areas, located as required to best support the force. These areas may be noncontiguous.

1-36. When a corps or division support area is designated, the MEB, in most cases, is given responsibility for it. The MEB is normally task-organized units that support movement, protection, area security, and defense tasks throughout the support area. These organizations also provide area security (base/base camp defense, critical asset security, response force, area damage control, lines of communication, supply routes, and convoy security) as the predominant method of protecting support areas and areas that are necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control forces. If conditions in the support area degrade, it is detrimental to the success of operations. A degraded support area inhibits the ability to shape the deep area for the BCTs involved in close operations. Therefore, the protection of support areas requires planning considerations equal to those in the close areas.

1-37. Corps and division commanders may establish a rear area, particularly in the offense as the friendly force gains territory, to exploit tactical success while enabling freedom of action for forces operating in other areas. A rear area has all the characteristics of a close area, with the purpose to consolidate gains through decisive action once large-scale combat has largely ended in that particular AO.

1-38. The division rear area grows as BCTs in close operations advance. When division boundaries shift, as is likely during the offense, the corps rear area grows and the balance of security and stability tasks may shift toward a stability focus, as conditions allow. The unit responsible for the corps rear area conducts consolidation of gains activities designed to set conditions for the handover of terrain to host-nation forces or legitimate civilian authorities.

## SUPPORT TO DECISIVE ACTION


1-39. Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or DSCA tasks. ARFOR conduct decisive action. Commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible. Operations conducted outside the United States and its territories simultaneously combine three elements of decisive action—offense, defense, and stability. Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines elements of DSCA and, as required, offense and defense to support homeland defense.

1-40. Decisive action begins with the commander's intent and concept of operations. Decisive action provides direction for an entire operation. Commanders and staffs refine the concept of operations during planning and determine the proper allocation of resources and tasks. Throughout the operation, they may adjust the allocation of resources and tasks as conditions change.

1-41. The simultaneity of decisive action varies by echelon and span of control. Higher echelons generally have a broader focus than lower echelons when assigning responsibilities to subordinates. The higher the echelon, the greater the possibility that all elements of decisive action occur simultaneously within its AO. At lower echelons, an assigned task may require all the echelons' combat power to execute a specific task. For example, in some form a higher echelon, such as a corps, always performs offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA operations simultaneously. Subordinate brigades perform some combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, but they generally are more focused by their immediate priorities on a specific element, particularly during large-scale combat operations.

1-42. Unified land operations addresses combat with armed opponents amid populations. This requires ARFOR to shape civil conditions. Winning battles and engagements is important, but it is not always the most significant task in a specific strategic context. Shaping civil conditions with unified action partners is generally important to the success of all campaigns, and thus it is a critical component of all operations.

1-43. Unified land operations encompass both competition and entirety of the conflict continuum. They are conducted in support of all four Army strategic roles. The relative emphasis on the various elements of decisive action varies with the purpose and context of the operations being conducted. See figure 1-5, page 1-10.



**Figure 1-5. Elements of decisive action**

## OFFENSE

1-44. An *offensive operation* is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers (ADP 3-0). Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain physical advantages and achieve definitive results is the essence of the offense. Offensive operations seek to throw enemy forces off balance, overwhelm their capabilities, disrupt their defenses, and ensure their defeat or destruction by maneuver. An offense ends when the force achieves the purpose of the operation, reaches a limit of advancement, or approaches culmination. ARFOR conclude an offensive operation by consolidating gains through security and stability tasks, resuming the attack, shifting over to the defense, or preparing for future operations. ARFOR conduct four types of offensive operations—movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. See ADP 3-90 for additional information on the conduct of offensive tasks.

1-45. The MEB ability to conduct offensive operations is limited. During offensive operations, the focus of the MEB is typically on the protection and security of the support area, to include actions required to secure and protect lines of communication (see appendix C). The MEB may also conduct or provide support to a movement corridor in support of troop movement and logistics preparations in support of offensive operations in the close area or rear area. The MEB is not structured to conduct offensive tasks as a brigade but it may plan, conduct, and provide command and control for offensive tasks performed by assigned maneuver units and a TCF as part of security for the support area.

1-46. The MEB can form task forces or company teams to support the offensive operations of its supported headquarters. These organizations may be attached or placed OPCON to BCTs or employed by the MEB to complement or reinforce maneuver forces across the AO of higher headquarters for a specific or select mission or tasks that support the main effort. However, specific or select missions does not imply long-term task organization. If the MEB becomes a force provider for an enduring period of time, it could become ineffective in its ability to conduct support area operations.

## DEFENSE

1-47. A *defensive operation* is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). The defense alone normally cannot achieve a decision. However, it can create conditions for a counteroffensive operation that allows ARFOR to regain the initiative. Defensive tasks can establish a shield behind which stability tasks can progress. Defensive tasks counter enemy offensive tasks. They defeat attacks, destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. They preserve control over land, resources, and populations. Defensive tasks

retain terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks. They can be used to gain time and economize forces so that offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere.

1-48. Defending forces anticipate the enemy attacks and counter them. Waiting for attacks is not a passive activity. Commanders conduct aggressive surveillance, reconnaissance, and security operations to seek out enemy forces and deny them information. They engage them with Army and joint fires and maneuver to weaken them before close combat. Commanders use combined arms and joint capabilities to attack enemy vulnerabilities and seize the initiative. There are three types of tactical operations associated with defense: mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde defense. ADP 3-90 provides details on the conduct of defensive operations.

1-49. During defensive operations, the initial focus of the MEB is typically on security and protection of the support area. The MEB may conduct reconnaissance operations to support the defense. The MEB prepares to execute area damage control. Depending on the situation, the MEB continually improves defensive positions within its AO or relocates some or all of its activities if required by the higher headquarters defensive plans. The MEB continually assesses its effort to support the defensive efforts of its supported division or corps, including—

- The commitment of the MEB assigned TCF.
- The balance of effort between support to mobility, protection, and sustainment.
- The balance of effort between self-defense and mission support.

1-50. If the MEB is supporting a division level defense, MEB focus is on defensive operations within its AO. It is also prepared to provide task-organized assets to support BCTs for specific missions in their defensive tasks. These organizations may be attached or placed OPCON to BCTs or employed by the MEB to complement or reinforce maneuver forces across the AO of higher headquarters for a specific or select mission or tasks that support the main effort. However, specific or select missions does not imply long-term task organization. If the MEB becomes a force provider for an enduring period of time, it could become ineffective in its ability to conduct support area operations.

## STABILITY

1-51. A *stability operation* is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0). These operations support governance by a host nation, an interim government, or a military government. Stability involves coercive and constructive action. Stability assists in building relationships among unified action partners and promoting U.S. security interests. It can help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions in an area while supporting the transition of responsibility to a legitimate authority. Commanders are legally required to conduct minimum-essential stability tasks when controlling populated areas of operations. These include security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. See ADP 3-07 for a detailed discussion of stability.

1-52. Stability tasks are tasks that are conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. When properly task-organized, the MEB can conduct or support stability operations.

## DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

1-53. *Defense support of civil authorities* is support provided by United States Federal military forces, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events (DODD 3025.18). DSCA is a task executed in the homeland and U.S. territories. It is conducted in support of another primary agency, lead federal agency, or local authority. National Guard forces—Title 32 or state active forces under the command and control of the governor and the adjutant general—are usually the first forces to respond on behalf of state authorities. When federal

military forces are employed for DSCA activities, they remain under federal military command and control at all times. (See ADP 3-28, DODD 3025.18, and JP 3-28 for a detailed discussion of DSCA.). When properly task-organized, the MEB can conduct or support DSCA. See chapter 2 for additional discussion on MEB support to stability operations. See appendix B for additional information on MEB support to DSCA tasks.

## OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES

1-54. Operational and mission variables complement each other and support the common purpose of describing the operational environment. The operational variables include political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure that collectively create the joint memory aid of PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [operational variables]). The Army adds two more operational variables physical environment and time [PT]) to this joint construct to create the memory aid of PMESII-PT with a total of eight operational variables.

1-55. The six mission variables are grouped into the time-tested memory aid of METT-TC, which captures the six variables of METT-TC. Each variable affects how ARFOR combine, sequence, and conduct military operations. Commanders tailor and task-organize forces, employ diverse capabilities, and support different missions to accomplish military objectives.

## OPERATIONAL VARIABLES

1-56. Army planners describe conditions of an operational environment in terms of operational variables. Operational variables are those aspects of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational environment, but also the population's influence on it. Using Army design methodology, planners analyze an operational environment in terms of the eight interrelated operational variables PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time). As soon as a commander and staff have an indication of where their unit will conduct operations, they begin analyzing the operational variables associated with that location. They continue to refine and update that analysis throughout the course of operations.

1-57. The variables provide a broad view of the operational environment that emphasizes its human aspects. Because land forces always operate among populations, understanding the human variables is crucial. They describe each operation's context for commanders and other leaders. Understanding them helps commanders appreciate how the military instrument complements other instruments of national power. Comprehensive analysis of the variables occurs at the joint level; Army commanders use the comprehensive joint analysis of the variables to shape their understanding of the situation.

1-58. The eight Army operational variables discussed below highlight potential implications for the support area. The examples are not meant to be all-inclusive concerns. For more information on the variables, see FM 6-0.

- **Political.** The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—the formally constituted authorities, as well as informal political powers. The political variable includes influential political groups and the collective attitude of the population toward the United States. The support area operations may have challenges associated with political circumstances permitting or denying access to key ports of entry or critical sustainment facilities. Opportunities in the form of alternative access routes might be added. The political variable (which is always important) takes on a more prominent role during stability and civil SPO.
- **Military.** The military variable explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given operational environment. This includes nonmilitary armed and unarmed combatants, as well as insurgent forces, guerrilla forces, and criminal organizations.

- **Economic.** The economic variable encompasses individual behaviors and aggregate phenomena related to the production, distribution, and consumption of resources. The support area may include challenges associated with the production or availability of key materials and resources.
- **Social.** The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members. Societies are comprised of structured and overlapping groups and institutions, each with relative statuses and roles that support, enable, and provide opportunity to achieve personal or community expectations. Important characteristics of a social system include population demographics, migration trends, and diversity of religious and ethnic groups. Understanding these complex interrelationships in a society is vitally important for successful military missions.
- **Information.** The information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. Information involves the access, use, manipulation, distribution, and reliance on information technology systems, both civilian and military, by an entity (state or nonstate). Understanding existing communication infrastructure in an operational environment ultimately controls the flow of information to the population and military and/or paramilitary forces and influences local and international audiences. Communication availability can act as a leveling function with regard to mitigating military technical advantages to a surprising extent. Military units must understand and engage in the information environment to achieve their objectives.
- **Infrastructure.** Infrastructure comprises the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society. The support area may have challenges associated with specific deficiencies in the basic infrastructure. Opportunities in the form of improvements to existing infrastructure and specific new projects might be added. Units in the support area provide a detailed understanding of infrastructure by subcategories in the context of combat operations and stability. The degradation or destruction of infrastructure impacts the entire operational environment. This variable also reflects the infrastructure sophistication of an operational environment.
- **Physical environment.** The defining factors are complex terrain and urban settings (super-surface, surface, and subsurface features), weather, topography, hydrology, and environmental conditions. Operations in the support area may have challenges due to natural and man-made obstacles. Insights into environmental considerations are also a concern (see ATP 3-34.5). Opportunities in the form of existing routes, installations, and resources might be added. A broad understanding of the physical environment can be accomplished through geospatial engineering, which is discussed in detail in ATP 3-34.80 and JP 2-03.
- **Time.** The variable of time influences military operations within an operational environment in terms of the decision—cycles, operating tempo, and planning horizons. Support area operations might have challenges associated with completing required CA-related plan missions in the time allotted because of the impact on perceptions of civilians during stability tasks. Opportunities in the form of potential to accelerate priority projects might be added for the positive effect it would have on civil considerations and the perception of mission success.

## MISSION VARIABLES

1-59. Analysis of the operational environment in terms of the operational variables provides the relevant information that commanders can use to frame operational problems. While such analysis improves situational understanding at all levels, land operations require more specific information. When commanders receive a mission, they require a more detailed mission analysis focused on their specific situation.

1-60. Similar to the analysis of the operational environment using the operational variables, commanders at the tactical level use the mission variables to seek shared common understanding. Additionally, commanders use these variables to assist in hazard identification during deliberate planning and real-time application. The identified hazards are then mitigated. (See ATP 5-19.) The support area commander is expected to exercise prudence and ensure that residual risk is accepted at the appropriate level. The following are examples for each mission variable:

- **Mission.** The support area commander analyzes the mission in terms of specified tasks, implied tasks, and the commander's intent (two echelons up) to determine the essential tasks. Early identification of the essential tasks for support area operations enables the commander to ensure that they have the required capabilities for mission success (or, in selected cases, to designate other assets to perform those roles) early in the planning process.
- **Enemy.** The support area commander's view of the enemy concentrates on enemy tactics, equipment, and capabilities that could threaten friendly operations in the support area and along the ground line of communications (LOC). This may include an analysis of other factors within the AO or the area of interest that could have an impact on mission success.
- **Terrain and weather.** The support area commander and staff analyze terrain (man-made and natural) to determine the effects on friendly and enemy operations. The staff uses the five military aspects of terrain (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment). The support area commander and staff also use geospatial products to help determine how certain aspects of the terrain aids the enemy, promotes crime and criminality, and impacts traffic and dislocated civilians on main supply routes (MSRs) or alternate supply routes (ASRs).
- **Troops and support available.** The support area commander considers the number, type, and capabilities required (joint, multinational, and interagency forces) for mission success. The number and type of organizations placed in the support area depend on the mission, threat, and number and type of units to conduct support area operations.
- **Time available.** The support area commander must understand the time needed for planning support area operations and the importance of collaborative and parallel planning. The commander must also realize the time needed for positioning critical assets and the time associated with setting conditions for performing support area tasks or projects.
- **Civil considerations.** *Civil considerations* are the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations (ADP 6-0). Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE—areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

## THREAT

1-61. The term threat includes any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm U.S. forces, U.S. national interests, or the homeland. Threats include nation-states, organizations, people, groups, or conditions that can damage or destroy life, vital resources, or institutions. The various actors in an AO can qualify as a threat, an enemy, an adversary, or a neutral or friendly. A peer threat is an adversary or enemy with the capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple domains worldwide or in a specific region where it enjoys a position of relative advantage. Peer threats possess roughly equal combat power to U.S. forces in geographical proximity to a conflict area. Enemy and friendly unexploded ordnance pose a significant threat during large-scale combat operations. See FM 3-0 for additional information on peer threats.

1-62. A *hybrid threat* is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (TC 7-100). Hybrid threats combine traditional forces governed by law, military tradition, and custom with unregulated forces that act without constraints on the use of violence. These may involve nation-states using proxy forces or nonstate actors, such as criminal and terrorist organizations, that employ sophisticated capabilities traditionally associated with states. Hybrid threats are most effective when they exploit friendly constraints, capability gaps, and a lack of situational awareness (see ADP 3-0). Land operations often prove complex because actors intermix,

often with no easy means to distinguish one from another. Civilians could interfere with military operations. Civilians are considered noncombatants or combatants under the Law of Land Warfare. Civilians are afforded noncombatant status unless they engage in a hostile act. They may be the most difficult to counter because they are not normally part of an established enemy agent network and their actions may be less predictable.

1-63. Many urban environments include vast, densely packed areas with populations that exceed a million people. In urban environments, threats can be difficult to identify due to the often complex nature of the forces and environment. These threats may operate independently or together. Individuals may be active members of one or more groups. Potential urban adversaries share many characteristics. In urban terrain, friendly forces may encounter a variety of potential threats, such as conventional military forces, paramilitary forces, insurgents or guerilla forces, terrorists, criminals and organized crime, drug traffickers, warlords, or street gangs. Individual criminals or small gangs do not normally have the capability to adversely affect legitimate political, military, and judicial organizations. However, large-scale criminal organizations can challenge governmental authority with capabilities and characteristics similar to a paramilitary force.

1-64. Threats in a support area are categorized by the three levels of defense required to counter them. Any or all threat levels may exist simultaneously in the support area. Emphasis on base defense and security measures may depend on the anticipated threat level. A Level I threat is a small enemy force that can be defeated by those units normally operating in the echelon support area. A Level I threat generally consists of a squad size unit or smaller groups of enemy soldiers, agents, criminals, or terrorists. Typical objectives for a Level I threat include supplying themselves from friendly supply stocks, disrupting friendly missions command nodes and logistics facilities, and interdicting friendly LOC.

1-65. A Level II threat is an enemy force or activities beyond the defense capability of both the base camps and base clusters and any local reserve or response force. Level II threats consist of enemy special operations teams, long-range reconnaissance, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, and attrited small combat units. Typical objectives for Level II threats include the interdiction of friendly LOC, as well as the disruption or destruction of friendly command and control nodes and logistics and commercial facilities, the collection of information on friendly forces, and the interdiction of friendly LOC. Typically, MEB military police assets can neutralize Level II threats.

1-66. A Level III threat is an enemy force or activities beyond the defense capability of both the base camps and base clusters and any local reserve or response force. It consists of mobile enemy combat forces. Possible objectives for a Level III threat include seizing key terrain, interfering with the movement and commitment of reserves and artillery, and destroying friendly combat forces. Its objectives could also include destroying friendly sustainment facilities, supply points, command post facilities, airfields, aviation AAs, and arming and refueling points; gathering information on friendly forces; and interdicting LOC and major supply routes. The most appropriate response to a Level III threat in the support area is a TCF.

1-67. The nexus between criminal and irregular threats has grown closer and stronger. Most criminal activities in the operational environment occur in densely populated urban areas where disorder, crime, and the fear of crime harm civilian populations, weaken developing security forces, destabilize governments, and threaten military operations. Irregular and criminal threats continue to attack, manipulate, exploit, and intimidate vulnerable and frustrated populations as ways to discredit governments, gain power and influence, drive disorder and instability, and generate illicit profits. Crime, disorder, and the fear of crime continue to be persistent, debilitating factors that contribute to instability across the operational environment, especially in densely populated urban areas and in weak, failing, and failed states. Despite the potential threat, the support area will likely include urban areas, and MEBs will often establish base camps or base clusters in them to take advantage of existing facilities (airports, warehouses, ports).

## **SUPPORT TO ARMY OPERATIONS**

1-68. The Army defeats enemies by using a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations and supports civil authorities through DSCA. The effort accorded to each task is proportional to the mission and varies with the situation. The MEB supports Army operations through the integration of MEB capabilities to synchronize, integrate, and organize all organic and task-organized capabilities and resources throughout operations to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale combat, and consolidate gains. The MEB primary task of support area operations in support of operations enables the



unrestricted movement of resources to allow greater freedom of action of forces in the close area and units shaping the deep area.

## **ARMY OPERATIONS**

1-69. The United States Army exists to provide dominant landpower for the joint force and the nation. Landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people (see ADP 3-0). To maintain dominant landpower for the joint force, ARFOR conduct multidomain operations. During multidomain operations, ARFOR (as part of a joint and multinational team) employ multidomain capabilities throughout the extended battlefield to enable joint freedom of action, create and exploit the positions of relative advantage necessary for defeating enemy forces, and consolidate gains to enable enduring strategic outcomes.

1-70. Successful operations require ARFOR to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative by forcing an enemy to respond to friendly action. By presenting multiple dilemmas to an enemy, commanders force the enemy to react continuously until the enemy is finally driven into untenable positions. Seizing the initiative pressures enemy commanders into abandoning their preferred options and making mistakes. Enemy mistakes allow friendly forces to seize opportunities and create new avenues for exploitation. Throughout operations, commanders focus combat power to defeat enemy forces, protect populations and infrastructure, and consolidate gains to retain the initiative within the overall purpose of an operation.

1-71. Operations to shape consist of various long-term military engagements; security cooperation; and deterrence missions, tasks, and actions intended to assure friends, build partner capacity and capability, and promote regional stability. Operations to shape typically occur in support of the geographic combatant commander's theater campaign plan or the theater security cooperation plan. These operations help counter actions by adversaries that challenge the stability of a nation or region contrary to U.S. interests. Shaping activities are continuous within an area of responsibility. MEB commanders and staffs must perform detailed mission analysis to identify the mission requirements and specific capabilities needed to accomplish MEB missions. The MEB must synchronize, integrate, and organize all organic and task-organized capabilities and resources throughout operations to shape and protect U.S. interests and to build partner capacity and partnerships.

1-72. Operations to shape include unit home station activities, including maintaining operational readiness, training, and contingency planning. Combined exercises and training, military exchange programs, and foreign military member attendance at Army schools are examples of home-station shaping activities. At home stations, the MEB participates in mission readiness exercises that enable commanders to generate, project, and preserve combat power during training and deployment tasks that are associated with readiness requirements.

1-73. The purpose of operations is to prevent and deter adversary actions contrary to U.S. interests. They are typically conducted in response to activities that threaten partners and allies and require the deployment or repositioning of credible forces in a theater to demonstrate the willingness to fight if deterrence fails. These operations are characterized by actions to protect friendly forces, critical capabilities, assets, and activities and indicate the intent to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation.

1-74. Army operations in large-scale combat converge capabilities from all domains to generate effects on land. These operations include airborne and air assault operations, AMD, fires, aviation, cyberspace electromagnetic activities, information operations, space operations, military deception, and information collection. Large-scale combat operations such as these entail significant operational risk, synchronization, capabilities convergence, and high operating tempo.

1-75. During large-scale combat operations, ARFOR focus on the defeat and destruction of enemy ground forces as part of the joint team. ARFOR close with and destroy enemy forces in any terrain, exploit success, and break their opponent's will to resist. ARFOR attack, defend, conduct stability tasks, and consolidate gains to attain national objectives. Divisions and corps are the formations central to the conduct of large-scale combat operations and are organized, trained, and equipped to enable subordinate organizations.

1-76. In large-scale combat operations against regional peer enemies, commanders conduct decisive action to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. This involves the orchestration of many simultaneous unit actions in the most demanding of operational environments. Large-scale combat operations introduce levels of complexity, lethality, ambiguity, and speed to military activities not common in other operations. Large-scale combat operations require the execution of multiple tasks synchronized and converged across multiple domains to create opportunities to destroy, dislocate, and disintegrate enemy forces and isolate enemy forces from positions of relative advantage. During large-scale combat, the MEB controls terrain and provides security, movement control, mobility support, and clearance of fires in the echelon (corps or division) support area to facilitate operations, freedom of action, and sustainment. See FM 3-0 for additional information on multidomain operations and large-scale combat operations.

1-77. *Consolidate gains* are the activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Consolidation of gains is not separate nor isolated from large-scale combat operations; consolidation of gains activities are a form of exploitation inherent to large-scale combat operations. ARFOR conduct consolidation of gains throughout the range of military operations. The MEB, when properly task-organized, supports the consolidation of gains and focuses their priorities toward the performance of the initial response tasks of the six primary stability tasks as the security situation stabilizes. See FM 3-0 for additional information on the consolidation of gains.

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## Chapter 2

# Organic and Task-Organized Structure

The MEB is a multifunctional command and control headquarters that is organized to perform support area operations for Army divisions and corps. The MEB may include a mix of maneuver, engineer, military police, CBRN, CA, EOD, and other capabilities. The number and type of organizations that are task-organized to a MEB are driven by mission requirements. Peacetime task organization may vary due to stationing and the types of units that are collocated under the MEB for command and control. This chapter discusses the capabilities of units that are organic to the MEB and the capabilities of organizations that are task-organized based on mission requirements.

### SECTION I – ORGANIC STRUCTURE

2-1. The MEB is designed to perform support area operations in support of the JSA, division, or corps support area. The brigade can also conduct combat operations up to the level of a maneuver battalion when task-organized with maneuver forces. The MEB is an economy of force command and control headquarters designed to provide command and control of forces from multiple branches. The MEB requires tailoring or task organization for every mission that it performs. When assigned or attached in support of a theater-specific operation, operation order (OPORD), operation plan (OPLAN), or concept plan, the supported headquarters (combatant command, JTF, theater Army corps or division) and MEB staff will conduct a mission analysis to determine capabilities, recommend task organization, and command and support the relationships that are necessary to accomplish the mission. The MEB span of control should not exceed seven battalions for an extended period of time.

2-2. Beyond its two organic units (HSC and brigade signal company), the MEB has no fixed structure (see figure 2-1). It is only a headquarters element. The MEB must have battalions/companies/teams attached, OPCON, or TACON. Capability requirements should be identified early in the planning process and constantly reevaluated to ensure that the MEB is able to perform all of the specified and implied tasks that are necessary to achieve mission success.




Figure 2-1. MEB organic structure

2-3. The planning and coordination of sustainment support, previously performed by the BSB SPO officer, will fall to the MEB S-4. The MEB staff is unique in its capabilities. No other brigade-level organization has such a large and complete organic staff with the capabilities that are required to conduct support area operations and DSCA. The MEB staff may need to be augmented with additional personnel from CA when CA units are task-organized under the MEB for command and control.

2-4. It will be a challenge for the MEB to integrate task-organized units and employ them as cohesive tactical formations the same way that units with organic subunits, leaders, and Soldiers can do. The trust and teamwork that are required to conduct close combat with combined arms formations (technical, functional, and maneuver) are difficult to develop quickly. The Army force generation collective-training events and continuous in-theater training will be essential to prepare the unit, develop trust and teamwork, and certify leaders.

## HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT COMPANY

2-5. The primary mission is to provide command and control capabilities and unit-level administrative support and sustainment support for all task-organized units enabling the MEB to support Army operations across the range of military operations. This is accomplished by core staff from the MEB HSC and their associated signal support (see figure 2-2). The brigade headquarters operates as a tactical and administrative headquarters within a specified and assigned AO. The brigade has the capability to deploy both a main command post and a tactical command post within its AO.




Figure 2-2. HSC

2-6. The tactical command post contains a tailored portion of the MEB headquarters to control current operations. The tactical command post is established when the commander must be positioned away from the main command post location for an extended time period, when METT-TC factors do not permit the

commander access to the main command post, and when the main command post is moving. The tactical command post focuses on assisting the commander with the command and control of current operations. The tactical command post is commander-focused and execution-centric. The MEB brigade operations staff officer (S-3) is responsible for the tactical command post, according to the commander's guidance.

2-7. The main command post contains the portion of the MEB headquarters in which the majority of the planning, analysis, and coordination occurs. The main command post is the commander's primary command and control facility. The MEB executive officer normally supervises the main command post staff activities and functions. The main command post operates from a relatively secure location and moves as required to maintain command and control of the operation. The main command post integrates and synchronizes MEB operations and staff mission functions.

## **COMMAND GROUP**

2-8. The command section contains the commander and deputy commanding officer and provides continuous command presence at one location or the ability to provide command and control for split-based operations. The command sergeant major and enlisted members complete the command group.

2-9. The command group provides staffing and command and control for all task-organized units. It coordinates CBRN, engineer, military police, TCF, and other missions according to the commander's concept of operation.

## **COMPANY HEADQUARTERS**

2-10. The headquarters company contains the company commander, the first sergeant, and other personnel (a food management team, supply personnel, an equipment repair parts noncommissioned officer). The HSC provides limited local security and unit command and control functions for the HSC. The HSC provides administrative and logistical support for all task-organized units.

## **MAINTENANCE SUPPORT PLATOON**

2-11. The maintenance support platoon headquarters provides leadership, supervision, and technical guidance to the maintenance and support platoon conducting distribution and field-level maintenance operations and maintenance management. The maintenance support platoon consists of the—

- **Distribution Section.** Conducts limited logistics package operations, tactical distribution, and retail Class III capabilities for organic units and, to a limited extent, for team, section, and platoon size organizations task-organized to the MEB. The distribution section provides the receipt, storage, and issue of supplies and equipment (except Class VIII) to supported units and conducts quality control and testing of fuels being distributed by the section.
- **Field Maintenance Section.** Provides base shop and on-site field maintenance on wheel vehicles; on-site field maintenance on power generation and quartermaster and utilities equipment; and base shop field maintenance on small arms for the MEB. The field maintenance section has the ability to provide required support to company size organizations task-organized to the MEB.
- **Service and Recovery Section.** Provides recovery and maintenance evacuation of organic equipment. The service and recovery section provides augmented recovery support and support of maintenance evacuation to task-organized units when those units exceed their organic capabilities.

## **S-1 SECTION**

2-12. The S-1 section provides personnel and administrative support for the MEB and task-organized units, to include personnel actions, mail distribution, publications, forms, awards, and decorations. It also performs personnel-related planning support to the MEB staff through the production of staff estimates and related documents and products required for OPLAN/OPORD development and assists the S-3 with OPLAN/OPORD and related products reproduction requirements, as needed.

## S-2 SECTION

2-13. The brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) section provides intelligence support to the commander and the current operations staff. It collects, receives, identifies, and analyzes intelligence documents, reports, and related information; prepares intelligence summaries; and maintains enemy order-of-battle information. This section advises and provides updates to the commander and staff on enemy and battlefield situations; performs planning functions for the brigade to SPO; and develops immediate, intermediate, and long-range plans for the brigade and subordinate units. The S-2 section also provides the consolidated and coordinated staff estimates and related products required for the development of OPLANs/OPORDs within the command.

## S-3 SECTION

2-14. The S-3 section provides staff oversight for all matters concerning training, operations, and plans. With the commander's approval, it prepares unit training guidance, develops the brigade mission-essential task list, determines and allocates training resources and land requirements, and obtains and allocates resources and personnel for both internal and external schools. It develops scenarios for forward training requirements and disseminates future operations and execution information to higher, lower, adjacent, supported, and supporting units. It develops standard operating procedures and OPORDs and writes fragmentary orders for both short-range and mid-range planning horizons. It provides command and control capabilities by establishing the tactical operations center and coordinating efforts of the staff and subordinate units. It also provides the commander and staff different courses of action (COAs) in critical functional areas through the advice of subject matter experts. The main command post operations airspace management section includes airspace control, electronic warfare system operator staff, and tactical airspace integration system operator staff to provide the MEB the ability to control Army airspace within its assigned AO. The S-3 section consists of the—

- **S-3 operations section.** The S-3 operations section provides knowledge management capabilities to the commander and staff. It determines the commander's critical information requirements and maintains operational information and force status. It assesses the operational situation, prepares plans and orders (including the integration of special technical operations into plans and operations), and establishes or revises standard operating procedures.
- **AMD cell.** The AMD cell provides planning, integration, and synchronization of aerial operations and the ability to conduct airspace management within its assigned AO throughout the range of military operations. It serves as the principal advisory body on aerial operations to the commander and current operations staff, focusing on integrating and synchronizing air missions to support the commander's intent and scheme of maneuver. It is responsible for the planning, integration, and synchronization of airspace command and control information, AMD and Army aviation augmentation, intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) information, the use and integration of sensors, and clearance of fires with the fire support element. As required, it provides staff estimates and related documents used in the development of OPLANs/OPORDs.
- **Area operations cell.** The area operations cell provides specialized planning, integration, and synchronization of tactical activities within the MEB assigned AO. Within the assigned AO, the focus of operations is normally on civilian-military operations, area security, terrain management, movement control, clearance of fires, and employment of the TCF. The area operations section provides the MEB commander specialized planning, coordination, and integration recommendations for all units assigned to, attached to, or transiting the brigade AO. The area operations section supports staffing of the tactical command post as directed by the commander.
- **Liaison office cell.** The liaison office cell provides personnel to represent the MEB commander at the headquarters of other commands, allied force headquarters, host-nation governments, or other U.S. government agencies as directed to coordinate and promote cooperation between two or more organizations. It assists in the development and refinement of OPLANs/OPORDs and staff estimates as required to effectively represent the commander's intent and plan of actions. It can task-organize to provide multiple liaison teams. Teams may be required to perform liaison missions with allied, coalition, host-nation, or other governmental and nongovernmental agencies as necessary and directed by the appropriate authority.

- **CBRN cell.** The CBRN cell provides the commander planning, integration, and synchronization of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) operations throughout the range of military operations to support the commander's intent and scheme of maneuver. It serves as the principal CBRNE advisory body to the commander and staff and is responsible for the planning and execution of all CBRNE operations and functions. It provides staff estimates and OPLAN/OPORD documents and related support as required.
- **Engineer cell.** The engineer cell provides the commander planning, integration, tracking, and synchronization of engineer operations. It serves as the principal engineer advisory body to the commander and staff. It is responsible for the planning and execution of all engineer functional operations. It provides staff estimates and OPLAN/OPORD documents and support as required.
- **Military police cell.** The military police cell provides the commander planning, integration, and synchronization of military police operations, focusing on integrating and synchronizing military police support to support the commander's intent and scheme of sustainment. It serves as the principal military police advisor commander and staff. It is responsible for the planning and execution of all military police operations and provides staff estimates and interaction in the development of OPLANs/OPORDs and related planning documents.
- **Fires cell.** The fires cell provides the commander planning, integration, and synchronization of fire support to achieve the commander's intent. It is responsible for the planning and execution of all fires support and functions and provides staff estimates and related planning documents as required in the development of OPLANs/OPORDs.
- **Cyber electromagnetic activities cell.** The cyber electromagnetic activities cell coordinates and synchronizes cyberspace and electronic warfare operations for effective collaboration across the staff elements. This section includes the electronic warfare officer (who has additional responsibility as the cyberspace planner), the spectrum manager, the electronic warfare technician, and electronic warfare noncommissioned officers. The cyberspace electromagnetic activities section is key to the collaboration of cyberspace and electronic warfare operations. The cyberspace planner understands the operations and missions of the unit and the commander's intent. The cyberspace electromagnetic activities section participates in the planning and targeting process and leads the cyberspace electromagnetic activities working group to support the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). The cyberspace planner requests effects provided by nonorganic resources.

#### S-4 SECTION

2-15. The S-4 section provides supervision and coordination of logistics support, operational contract support, field feeding, supply, distribution, transportation, and maintenance support for the MEB and subordinate units. It coordinates support of the assigned and attached organizations within the MEB and provides staff estimates and products in the development of OPLANs/OPORDs as required. General engineering is primarily supervised and coordinated by the S-3 section in the MEB. The S-4 section consists of the—

- **Logistics management section.** The logistics management section provides supervision and coordination of logistics, supply, and maintenance support for the MEB and subordinate units. It coordinates equipment recovery and evacuation operations and manages Class IX requirements for the MEB. It also provides staff estimates and products in the development of OPLANs and OPORDs as required.
- **Property book office.** The property book office coordinates and executes property book responsibilities for the MEB and for assigned and attached units.
- **Mobility section.** The mobility section provides supervision, support, and coordination of transportation for the MEB and task-organized units. The mobility section provides staff estimates and products in the development of OPLANs and OPORDs as required.
- **Food operations section.** The food operations section provides supervision, support, and coordination of field feeding for the MEB and subordinate units. The food operations section provides staff estimates and products in the development of OPLANs and OPORDs as required.



- **SPO section.** The SPO section coordinates and manages the movements of the MEB and the deployment and redeployment of rotating personnel and equipment. The SPO section receives the MEB equipment at the seaport of debarkation and aerial port of debarkation and manages mortuary affairs for the MEB.
- **Sustainment automation support management office.** The sustainment automation support management office provides technical assistance and support to sustain the Standard Army Management Information Systems.

### S-5 SECTION

2-16. The brigade plans staff officer (S-5) section provides planning functions for mid- to long-range operations. It provides the consolidated and coordinated staff estimates and related products required for the development of OPLANs/OPORDs within the command.

### S-6 SECTION

2-17. The brigade signal staff officer (S-6) section provides communications planning within the brigade and supporting commands. It directs all activities relative to the operation and maintenance of communications and related equipment and supports and coordinates signal support within organic means. It conducts the planning, configuring, implementation, and analysis of information system(s) requirements. It manages intratheater information systems, programs, and initiatives in support of tactical military police/detention activities and coordinates the integration of commercial off-the-shelf communications and information systems. It operates the net control station; establishes operation policies; enforces guidance on communications security matters; and provides training on communications security materials and management and accountability procedures. It provides oversight of the certification and accreditation process for brigade units under the DOD information technology security certification and accreditation process. It manages the brigade portion of the Army knowledge management program to enable the brigade to be a network-centric and knowledge-based force. It also provides S-6 staff input in the development of OPLANs/OPORDs as required.

### RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SECTION

2-18. The resource management section uses published financial management guidance, policies, and fiscal law to plan and execute financial management operations. Resource management, as a critical member of the brigade principal staff, ensures that the commander's operational requirements are properly resourced. Resource management is in constant synchronization with the fiscal triad and other staff to project funding requirements and oversee the tactical execution of spending. Resource management also ensures that the commander is aware of existing funding implications to make resource-informed decisions and that requirements are properly validated and applied efficiently and effectively. It provides the brigade funds management capability to conduct efficient, autonomous financial management operations.

### S-9 SECTION

2-19. The MEB civil affairs operations staff officer (S-9) is the principal staff officer responsible for all matters concerning CA. The S-9 evaluates civil considerations during mission analysis and prepares the groundwork for transitioning AOs from military to civilian control. The S-9 advises the commander on the military effect on civilians in the AOs, relative to the complex relationship of these people with the terrain and institutions over time. The S-9 is responsible for enhancing the relationship between ARFOR and the civil authorities and people in the AOs.

### STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION

2-20. The staff judge advocate section provides legal expertise to the commander and staff pertaining to military, domestic, and international law. It provides advice on laws of armed conflict and interprets rules of engagement. It determines the legality of targets and plans, supervises the administration of military justice, and monitors the treatment of captured and detained persons and refugees. It also provides staff estimates and the related documents and support necessary in the development of OPLANs/OPORDs as required.

## SURGEON

2-21. The MEB surgeon is the principal advisor to the commander on the health of the brigade and advises the commander and staff on medical capabilities and all AHS support requirements necessary to support plans. The MEB surgeon and staff interface with all elements of the brigade staff to coordinate AHS SPO across the warfighting functions, to include the S-3 for SPO and issues related to force health protection (FHP); S-1 for casualty operations (casualty estimates, tracking, and personnel replacements); S-2 for medical intelligence support and information related to the health threat; S-4 for sustainment (health service support [HSS]-related issues) and logistics support; SJA; and others. The MEB surgeon and staff coordinate with the supporting medical brigade (support) for EAB medical support and ensure that HSS and FHP requirements are integrated into the commander's ground tactical plan. The MEB surgeon is also responsible for providing technical supervision of all organic medical support personnel and activities within the brigade.

2-22. The MEB also has a medical section that provides Role 1 medical care and behavioral health to the Soldiers of the MEB and support to assigned units as required. It provides immediate troop medical care for MEB Soldiers, operates a troop medical facility, trains subordinates in the provision of troop medical services, and determines patient evacuation requirements for medical conditions. It advises the MEB commander on medical treatment conditions that affect the health and welfare of assigned/attached forces and detainees/refugees. It contains one (4-member) evacuation squad to evacuate patients. See FM 4-02 for additional information on AHS support.

## UNIT MINISTRY TEAM

2-23. The unit ministry team (UMT) consists of a chaplain and a religious affairs specialist. The chaplain serves as a personnel staff officer with direct access to the commander. The MEB UMT provides religious support to all assigned or attached service members, family members, and authorized civilians. It provides religious, moral, and ethical advisement to the command as it impacts both individuals and the organization's mission. It coordinates with higher, subordinate, and adjacent UMTs and chaplain sections for area and denominational coverage requirements. See ATP 1-05.01 and FM 1-05.

## BRIGADE SIGNAL COMPANY

2-24. The brigade signal company establishes organic communications (see figure 2-3, page 2-8) for the MEB and provides the following communication capabilities:

- Combat net radio retransmission of voice using a—
  - Single-channel ground and airborne radio system.
  - Improved high-frequency radio.
  - Single-channel tactical satellite for command and control.
- A multichannel tactical satellite to extend the MEB communications services range.
- MEB command and control network management.
- The establishment of primary command post voice and video MEB capabilities.

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*Note.* The brigade signal company works in tandem with the S-6 on matters that concern MEB signal operations, automation, management, and information security.

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


Figure 2-3. Brigade signal company

## SECTION II – TASK-ORGANIZED STRUCTURE

2-25. The MEB has no fixed structure. It requires tailoring or task-organization for every mission it performs. When assigned or attached in support of a theater-specific operation, OPOD, OPLAN, or concept plan, the supported headquarters (combatant command, JTF, theater Army corps, or division) and MEB staff will conduct a mission analysis to determine capabilities, recommend task-organization, and command and support the relationships that are necessary to accomplish the mission. The MEB can receive a mix of modular units (engineer, military police, psychological operations, CBRN, CA, EOD, intelligence, AMD, and a TCF), from detachments to battalions. Figure 2-4 depicts possible units that are task-organized to the MEB for a specific mission. In many cases, the broad geographic responsibilities and extensive functional capabilities that the MEB represents require a variety of subordinate, functionally based formations that are task-organized based on the mission.




Figure 2-4. Notional task-organized structure for the MEB

## ENGINEER

2-26. Engineers are organized in a scalable, adaptable manner to support combat, general, and geospatial engineering requirements. Army engineer forces operate as integral members of the combined arms team

during peace and war to provide a full range of engineering capabilities. These technical capabilities are grouped together into three engineer disciplines—combat, general, and geospatial engineering—

- *Combat engineering* is the engineering capabilities and activities that directly support the maneuver of land combat forces that require close and integrated support (JP 3-34). This engineer discipline focuses on affecting terrain while in close support to maneuver. Combat engineering is integral to the ability of combined arms units to maneuver.
- *General engineering* is those engineering capabilities and activities, other than combat engineering, that provide infrastructure and modify, maintain, or protect the physical environment (JP 3-34). This engineer discipline is primarily focused on providing construction support. It is the most diverse of the three engineer disciplines and is typically the largest percentage of engineer support that is provided to an operation, except in offensive and defensive operations at the tactical level when combat engineering is typically be predominant.
- *Geospatial engineering* is those engineering capabilities and activities that contribute to a clear understanding of the physical environment by providing geospatial information and services to commanders and staffs (JP 3-34). Geospatial engineers generate geospatial products and provide services to enable informed running estimates and decision making. It is the art and science of applying geospatial information to enable an understanding of the physical environment as it affects terrain for military operations.

2-27. Table 2-1 provides an overview of engineer capabilities at the battalion level and below that may be task-organized to the MEB. For additional information on engineer operations, see FM 3-34.

**Table 2-1. Engineer mission planning and capabilities**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Mission Planning</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>
Engineer battalion	1 per 2-5 engineer companies (various combinations)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides command, control, planning, and supervision for 2-5 engineer companies and one FSC.</li> <li>• Provides coordination of engineer support, unit allocation, and resource management.</li> <li>• Plans and supports construction of obstacles, defensive positions, fixed and floating bridge construction, and river crossing operations.</li> <li>• Plans and supervises the collection of engineer-related information and the development of engineer intelligence.</li> <li>• Provides technical advice, assistance, and training in mine warfare, field fortifications, camouflage, demolitions, and engineer reconnaissance techniques.</li> <li>• Plans, supervises, and coordinates survey and design teams or explosive hazard teams when augmented by the engineer brigade for construction and/or clearance missions.</li> <li>• Coordinates with the medical brigade (support) to provide for site preparation, construction, or modification of waste disposal areas for hospitals/ Role 3 medical treatment facilities.</li> </ul>
HHC, prime power battalion	1 per Army headquarters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides technical advice to commanders and senior engineers on all aspects of electrical power systems.</li> <li>• Provides specialized Class IV, VII, and IX support to subordinate units.</li> <li>• Provides electrical engineer support, to include a limited design and analysis capability.</li> <li>• Manages and coordinates worldwide prime power requirements.</li> </ul>

Table 2-1. Engineer mission planning and capabilities (continued)

Organization	Mission Planning	Capabilities
Engineer prime power company	3 per prime power battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides technical advice to commanders and staffs on power-related issues.</li> <li>• Provides electrical power production up to 12 megawatts (each platoon can provide approximately three megawatts of electrical power with organic generators) in support of command and control sites, hospitals, weapons systems, logistic support areas, and relief for tactical generators at fixed sites and critical facilities.</li> <li>• Conducts repair and maintenance of organic power production and distribution equipment. Each platoon can also inspect/repair commercial power production systems, assess/repair electrical infrastructure, and maintain/repair substations.</li> <li>• Provides electrical-related contracting officer representative assistance.</li> <li>• Conducts maintenance and minor repairs to other power production equipment, including host-nation fixed plants.</li> <li>• Provides management and coordination of prime power requirements.</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides electric power transformation, distribution facilities, and services.</li> <li>• Conducts field level maintenance on organic prime power equipment.</li> <li>• Connects to commercial distribution networks.</li> <li>• Conducts damage assessment of power-generation and distribution systems.</li> <li>• Provides limited repair and maintenance of industrial electric systems and controls.</li> <li>• Operates and maintains nonstandard distribution systems and equipment.</li> <li>• Provides electric power transformation, distribution facilities, and services.</li> <li>• Conducts field level maintenance on organic prime power equipment.</li> <li>• Connects to commercial distribution networks.</li> <li>• Conducts damage assessment of power-generation and distribution systems.</li> <li>• Provides limited repair and maintenance of industrial electric systems and controls.</li> <li>• Operates and maintains nonstandard distribution systems and equipment.</li> </ul>

Table 2-1. Engineer mission planning and capabilities (continued)

Organization	Mission Planning	Capabilities
Power line company	1 per prime power battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides technical advice to commanders and staffs on power-related issues.</li> <li>• Provides repair and maintenance of distribution equipment.</li> <li>• Provides electrical-related contracting officer representative assistance.</li> <li>• Provides operation, maintenance, and minor repairs to other power production equipment, including host-nation fixed plants.</li> <li>• Provides management and coordination of power line requirements worldwide.</li> <li>• Provides management, coordination, and production of power requirements.</li> <li>• Provides electric power transformation, distribution facilities, and services.</li> <li>• Provides field level maintenance on all organic vehicles.</li> <li>• Establishes connections to commercial distribution networks.</li> <li>• Conducts damage assessment of power-generation and distribution systems.</li> <li>• Conducts limited repair and maintenance of industrial electric systems and controls.</li> <li>• Provides operation and maintenance of nonstandard distribution systems and equipment.</li> <li>• Conducts placement of overhead or ground-laid power lines and maintenance of up to 60 miles of high-voltage power line.</li> <li>• Stores fuel to operate power generation systems.</li> </ul>
Clearance company	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per division headquarters (minimum)</li> <li>• 1 per 120 km (72 miles) per day of two-way routes requiring clearance in division and corps areas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Company HQ provides command, control, and oversight of three route clearance platoons, one equipment platoon, and one field maintenance team.</li> <li>• Provides advice to the maneuver or formation commander on engineer capabilities and required augmentation for engineer efforts to shape the AOs.</li> <li>• Conducts identification, neutralization, clearing, and marking of explosive hazards along routes.</li> </ul>

Table 2-1. Engineer mission planning and capabilities (continued)

Organization	Mission Planning	Capabilities
Clearance company (continued)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conducts removal of rubble, debris, berms, holes, trenches, vegetation, and trash from the medians and shoulders of routes to eliminate concealment of explosive hazards and aid in visual and sensory detection.</li> </ul>
Engineer construction company	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per 765 horizontal construction hours per day and</li> <li>• 1 per 280 vertical or horizontal construction hours per day or</li> <li>• 1 per 90 miles of MSR</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Company HQ provides command, control, and oversight of two horizontal construction platoons, one vertical construction platoon, and a field maintenance team able to operate on a 24-hour basis.</li> <li>• Conducts surveys for construction projects.</li> <li>• Provides horizontal platoons focused on shaping, upgrading and repairing foundations for facilities, air field, roads, survivability/force protection, and river crossings.</li> <li>• Provides clearing, grubbing, and borrow pit and dust suppression for projects sites.</li> <li>• Provides earthmoving with haul, grade, shape, compact, cut, fill, and drainage capability.</li> <li>• Provides vertical platoon focused on building, assembly, repair, or upgrade of vertical structures (to include basements) through skills of masons, carpenters, plumbers, interior electricians, and other laborers.</li> <li>• Provides construction, upgrades, and maintenance of wood-frame, steel-frame, concrete, and preengineered structures.</li> <li>• Provides installation, repair, and maintenance of plumbing, water, and sewage distribution systems.</li> <li>• Provides interior electrical design, layout, installation, and maintenance inspections of facilities and host-nation electrical systems.</li> </ul>
Engineer vertical construction company	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per 560 vertical construction hours per day or</li> <li>• 1 per 560 general construction hours per day and</li> <li>• 1 per 375 horizontal construction hours per day</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Company HQ provides command, control, and oversight of two vertical construction platoons, one equipment support platoon, and a field maintenance team able to operate on a 24-hour basis.</li> <li>• Conducts surveys for construction projects.</li> <li>• Provides vertical platoons focused on the building, assembly, repair, or upgrade of vertical structures (including basements) through the skills of masons, carpenters, plumbers, interior electricians, and other laborers.</li> <li>• Provides construction, upgrades, and maintenance of wood-frame, steel-frame, concrete, and preengineered structures.</li> <li>• Provides installation, repair, and maintenance of plumbing, water, and sewage distribution systems.</li> <li>• Provides interior electrical design, layout, installation, and maintenance inspections of facilities and host-nation electrical systems.</li> </ul>

Table 2-1. Engineer mission planning and capabilities (continued)

Organization	Mission Planning	Capabilities
Engineer vertical construction company (continued)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides equipment support platoon focused on shaping, upgrading, and repairing foundations for facilities, air field, roads, survivability/force protection, and river crossings.</li> <li>• Provides clearing, grubbing, borrow pit, and dust suppression for project sites.</li> <li>• Provides earthmoving with haul, grade, shape, compact, cut, fill, and drainage capability.</li> </ul>
Engineer support company	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per 605 horizontal construction hours per day and</li> <li>• 1 per 280 vertical or horizontal construction hours per day or</li> <li>• 1 per 280 general construction hours per day</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Company HQ provides command, control, and oversight of two rapidly deployable earthmoving (RDE) platoons, one vertical construction platoon, and a field maintenance team able to operate on a 24-hour basis.</li> <li>• Conducts surveys for construction projects.</li> <li>• Provides RDE platoons focused on rapid airfield repair, military facilities, aircraft platforms, roads, and survivability/force protection.</li> <li>• Provides clearing, grubbing, borrow pit, and dust suppression for project sites.</li> <li>• Provides hauling, grading, shaping, compacting, cutting, filling, emplacing culverts, and earthmoving.</li> <li>• Provides vertical platoon focused on the building, assembly, repair, or upgrade of vertical structures (to include basements) through the skills of masons, carpenters, plumbers, interior electricians, and other laborers.</li> <li>• Provides construction, upgrade, and maintenance of wood-frame, steel-frame, concrete, and preengineered structures.</li> <li>• Provides installation, repair, and maintenance of plumbing, and sewage distribution systems.</li> <li>• Provides interior electrical design, layout, installation, and maintenance inspections of facilities and host-nation electrical systems.</li> <li>• Provides field maintenance and vehicle recovery.</li> </ul>
Multirole bridge company	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per four 40-meter gap crossings or eight 20-meter gaps</li> <li>• 1 per wet gap crossing span of 107-213 meters</li> <li>• 1 per two wet gap crossing spans less than 106 meters each</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides technical advice and assistance to commanders in the emplacement/construction of standard and nonstandard United States Army bridging systems.</li> <li>• Conducts and prepares reconnaissance reports for road, route, tunnel, bridge, and ford sites.</li> <li>• Provides float bridging operations with a maximum span of 213 meters up to Class 75 (tank) and/or Class 96 (wheel) or 1 six rafts of Class 75 (tank) and/or Class 96 (wheel) based on stream velocity of 0 to 3 feet per second.</li> <li>• Provides four heavy dry support bridges, spanning 40 meters, with a capacity up to Class 70 (tank) and/or 96 (wheel) or combination of single or double-story bridge.</li> </ul>



Table 2-1. Engineer mission planning and capabilities (continued)

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Mission Planning</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>
Engineer utilities detachment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per regional support group or</li> <li>• 1 per base camp population of 6,000</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides facilities engineering support in the areas of carpentry, masonry, electrical, plumbing, and road maintenance and repair.</li> </ul>
Engineer firefighting team–fire truck	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per petroleum pipeline and terminal operating company</li> <li>• 1 per petroleum support company</li> <li>• 1 per army aviation brigade</li> <li>• 1 per (div/corps) sustainment brigade</li> <li>• 1 per base camp population of 3,000 without airfield operations</li> <li>• 2 per base camp population of greater than 6,000 without airfield operations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides one 12-hour shift in support of wide-body aircraft (C-130 or larger) operations. The team must be augmented by another team to complete 24-hour operations.</li> <li>• Provides crash/rescue support for MEDEVAC and normal flight or maintenance standbys.</li> <li>• Conducts fire-prevention inspections on an installation or airfield.</li> <li>• Provides command and control of the nonfirefighting assets used to support wildland firefighting operations (heavy equipment, personnel).</li> <li>• Conducts fire-fighting operations (structural, crash/rescue, and wildland) on an installation/in an AO.</li> <li>• Provides emergency assistance to victims, to include emergency medical assistance.</li> <li>• Conducts initial response to HAZMAT incidents.</li> <li>• Provides training of unit level fire brigades.</li> <li>• Assists with medical resources during MASCAL incidents.</li> <li>• Assists in host-nation support as required.</li> </ul>
Engineer facility detachment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per base camp population of 18K (Includes U.S. military, DA civilian, contractor, supported HN forces) or</li> <li>• 1 per corps or senior Army HQ</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Designs small projects.</li> <li>• Prepares project documentation.</li> <li>• Conducts environmental assessments and reporting.</li> <li>• Supports operations and maintenance training.</li> <li>• Performs energy conservation surveys.</li> <li>• Conducts utilization studies.</li> <li>• Writes service contracts.</li> <li>• Establishes short- and long-range facility work plans.</li> </ul>
Well drilling team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per corps or senior Army HQ</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is capable of drilling and casting two complete water well holes of 5 7/8 inches in diameter. Truck mounted rigs can reach depths of 2,000 feet.</li> <li>• Installs casings, screens, and pumps and develops wells to provide water at the well head.</li> <li>• Provides transportation of up to 2,500 gallons of potable water.</li> <li>• Provides personnel and equipment to sustain two 24-hour shift operations.</li> </ul>

Table 2-1. Engineer mission planning and capabilities (continued)

<b>Legend:</b>	
DA	Department of the Army
FFTG	firefighting team
FSC	forward support company
HAZMAT	hazardous material
HN	host nation
HQ	headquarters
KM	kilometer
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
U.S.	United States

*Note.* The considerations presented in the mission planning and capabilities tables primarily describe potential employment and capabilities of the described organization. These notional considerations do not relieve planners of the requirement to perform detailed mission analysis to support the identification and employment of the specific capabilities required to accomplish MEB missions.

## MILITARY POLICE

2-28. Military police units are manned, equipped, and trained to operate across the range of military operations. Military police organize for purpose and provide technical capabilities that enhance the MEB ability to control terrain, protect populations, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains. Military police do this through the three military police disciplines of police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support. Military police headquarters cannot generally conduct all three military police disciplines at the same level of priority; therefore, commanders must anticipate, prioritize, and synchronize the employment of military police assets.

2-29. The military police disciplines are interdependent areas of expertise formed by military police technical capabilities and tactical tasks. Each discipline is focused on capabilities that support or are supported by the other disciplines. Military police operations are viewed through a policing or corrections lens that focuses efforts on civil order maintenance, threat mitigation, and personnel and asset protection. The execution of military police operations—and the manner in which they are conducted—are policing in nature. *Policing* is the application of control measures within an area of operation to maintain law and order, safety, and other matters affecting the general welfare of the population (FM 3-39). Military police operate in support of commanders to establish and maintain an orderly environment in which commanders and their forces can operate with minimal threat interference. This is true whether conducting operations at home or abroad.

- Police operations is identified as the lead discipline for military police operations and a primary protection warfighting function task. It provides the foundation for military police technical and tactical operations and provides the policing lens through which all military police operations are viewed. Police operations, fused with police intelligence operations, encompass two major subordinate tasks: policing and law enforcement.
- Detention operations is also a primary protection warfighting function task conducted by military police to shelter, sustain, guard, protect, and account for populations (detainees or U.S. military prisoners) as a result of military or civil conflict or to facilitate criminal prosecution. A U.S. military prisoner is a person sentenced to confinement or death during a court-martial and ordered into confinement by a competent authority, whether or not the convening authority has approved the sentence. (See FM 3-39). The Secretary of the Army is the DOD executive agent for detainee operations and for the long-term confinement of U.S. military prisoners.
- Security and mobility support provides support to the movement and maneuver warfighting function and the protection warfighting function. The security and mobility support discipline focuses on the technical capability and tactical tasks that support—
  - Mobility operations (with a focus on movement over maneuver).
  - Security operations (with a focus on area and local security that includes the significant task of antiterrorism [AT] and physical security).
  - Populace and resources control operations (with a focus on the control and security of dislocated civilians and infrastructure).

2-30. Table 2-2 provides an overview of military police capabilities at the battalion level and below that may be task-organized to the MEB. For additional information on military police operations, see FM 3-39.

**Table 2-2. Military police mission planning and capabilities**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Mission Planning</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>
Military police battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per 2–5 military police company</li> <li>• 1 per two DC camps under United States Army control or 10,000 DC</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conducts the command and control of battalion operations for 2–5 military police companies and other assigned or attached elements to execute police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support.</li> <li>• Coordinates with the headquarters and headquarters detachment, military police brigade, host-nation military organizations, and the civil police authorities concerning host-nation support.</li> <li>• Conducts vulnerability assessments of critical facilities.</li> <li>• Supervises the staff for collection and evacuation of detainees and/or dislocated civilians.</li> <li>• Prepares the command and control of subordinate elements that support counterdrug operations pursuant to controlling law and within the provisions of DOD policy.</li> <li>• Supervises the selection, organization, training, equipment, and employment of host-nation military and paramilitary police units.</li> <li>• Provides military police investigative support within the battalion AOs.</li> <li>• Provides protective service details for designated high-risk personnel when they are properly trained or supervised by a CID special agent.</li> </ul>
Military police detention battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per TDF (4,000 detainees)</li> <li>• 1 per strategic detention facility</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conducts command and control of operations for assigned and attached units.</li> <li>• Provides administrative, field feeding, clothing, religious, and recreational support to detainees. When organized to support U.S. military prisoners or detainees, field feeding is limited to the procurement or distribution of food rations, equipment, and supervision of U.S. military prisoners or detainees in the preparation of meals.</li> <li>• Coordinates and supervises work projects for detainees or U.S. military prisoners.</li> <li>• Provides limited HSS and FHP services during detainee operations and supervising qualified personnel providing medical care and operational public health.</li> <li>• Screens/inspects incoming and outgoing detainee mail for contraband items.</li> <li>• Maintains organic equipment in the headquarters and headquarters company and assigned military police detention companies and detention camp liaison detachments.</li> </ul>

Table 2-2. Military police mission planning and capabilities (continued)

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Mission Planning</i>	<i>Capabilities</i>
Military police detention battalion (continued)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operates and maintains battalion internal radio and wire communication nets.</li> <li>• Provides organic personnel to maintain detention facilities and utilities, heat, lights, and water.</li> <li>• Consolidates supply and HR support to U.S. Soldiers assigned to subordinate units.</li> </ul>
Military police company	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per committed BCT (minimum)</li> <li>• 1 per APOD</li> <li>• 1 per intratheater Army airfield</li> <li>• 1 per SPOD plus 2 additional military police platoons</li> <li>• 1 per DC facility under United States Army control (5,000 DC)</li> <li>• 1 per 80 km of MSR/ASR</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conducts security and mobility support through the establishment of required traffic control posts, route reconnaissance patrols, surveillance patrols, and holding areas to ensure the uninterrupted flow of units, supplies, equipment, and personnel.</li> <li>• Preserves the freedom of movement over main and ASRs by conducting straggler control and dislocated-civilian control.</li> <li>• Secures critical sites, facilities, or storage facilities.</li> <li>• Supports security force assistance.</li> <li>• Provides route security and convoy escort.</li> <li>• Supports dislocated-civilian operations.</li> <li>• Serves as external mobile security for theater major subordinate commands, as required.</li> <li>• Provides external security for inter- and intra-aerial ports of departure.</li> <li>• Serves as external mobile security for the division headquarters or division major subordinate commands, as required.</li> <li>• Serves as a quick-reaction force or response force.</li> <li>• Protects high-risk personnel.</li> <li>• Provides security for deep-water ports.</li> <li>• Provides support to armor, infantry, and Stryker BCTs.</li> <li>• Provides security to rail terminals and yards.</li> <li>• Escorts detainees during transportation.</li> <li>• Operates a detainee collection point at the BCT echelon.</li> <li>• Operates a detainee holding area at division and corps echelons.</li> <li>• Provides temporary detention operations for detained individuals.</li> <li>• Provides police operations and incident response to maintain order and enable the rule of law.</li> </ul>

Table 2-2. Military police mission planning and capabilities (continued)

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Mission Planning</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>
Military police company (continued)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per detainee holding area plus two platoons</li> <li>• 2 per strategic detention facility</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrates police intelligence through operations to enhance situational understanding, protection, civil control, and law enforcement efforts.</li> <li>• Conducts host-nation policing training and support.</li> </ul>
Military police detention company	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per HHD military police detention BN</li> <li>• 1 per strategic detention facility</li> <li>• 1 per 300 high-risk detainees</li> <li>• 1 per confinement facility U.S. military prisoners (300 prisoners)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conducts detention operations to shelter, sustain, guard, protect, and account for detainee and U.S. military prisoner populations.</li> <li>• Operates a maximum-security compound, when directed.</li> <li>• Operates a standalone facility for 300 U.S. military prisoners or 100 high-risk detainees, when directed.</li> <li>• Operates one compound within a theater detention facility.</li> <li>• Conducts host-nation corrections training and support.</li> </ul>
Military police law enforcement detachment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per division and senior Army headquarters</li> <li>• 1 per 20,000 United States Army personnel in a BCT, division, and corps area</li> <li>• 1 per 12,500 United States Army personnel in a JSA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Planning, supervision, coordination, personnel administration, and logistical support to organic and attached elements.</li> <li>• Evidence identification, processing, and preservation critical to successful criminal investigations. Provides primary control point for all law enforcement related incidents.</li> <li>• Initial entry point for receipt of complaints and maintenance of complaint records. Dispatching of traffic management and collision (TMC) investigation and military police investigation (MPI) teams. Maintains control of offenders and criminal suspects. Manages the status of investigations, prepares reports, and provides criminal data for analysis.</li> <li>• Conducts vulnerability assessments, identifies and prioritizes critical facilities and key terrain according to the guidance provided by the military police BDE within the AO. Dispatches Force Protection teams to identify mission-essential activities that are vulnerable to criminal acts or disruptive activities.</li> <li>• Assists base/base cluster commanders with the development of internal defense plans.</li> <li>• Staffs and operates a field military police station.</li> <li>• When at home station, provides personnel support the provost marshal's office and dedicated technical police expertise to support United States Army installations.</li> </ul>

Table 2-2. Military police mission planning and capabilities (continued)

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Mission Planning</i>	<i>Capabilities</i>
Military working dog headquarters team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per 1–4 MWD squads and/or PDDD–tracking team</li> <li>• 1 per senior Army headquarters (to fill MWD program manager positions)</li> <li>• 1 per military police BN (Military Police BN and military police detention BN)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Military Working Dog program management at the theater/command/brigade level.</li> <li>• Supervision for task-organized MWD squads and teams.</li> <li>• Certification of MWD handler/dog pairs in accordance with standards for detection and location of known substance training aids for explosives, munitions, narcotics, or other substances; certification for locating personnel; certification for tracking personnel; or certification for patrol-dog procedures.</li> </ul>
Military working dog squad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per military police BN (military police BN and military police detention BN)</li> <li>• 1 per APOD and SPOD plus three additional MWD teams ( 9 MWD)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Six handler/dog pairs capable of providing patrol/explosive detection support for up to two 24-hour operations with (two handler/dog pairs per 8 hour shift), or six concurrent short duration missions each requiring one handler/dog pair.</li> <li>• PEDD are trained to patrol and to detect the odor of explosives. The primary mission of a patrol explosive detection dog team is to support commanders by providing a patrol capability and conducting tactical search operations against hostile threats by detecting firearms, ammunition, and explosives. The PEDD are trained to passively respond to explosive material and components. The PEDD normally works in close proximity to the handler and is usually on a leash. The handler/dog teams conduct searches during all levels of combat and noncombat operations. Military police MWDs can be used to maintain order and the discipline of U.S. Soldiers, third-country nationals, and contractors. Patrol explosive detection dog teams can also provide patrol capabilities to assist with security pertaining to enemy combatants and other personnel involved in theater-wide operations.</li> </ul>

Table 2-2. Military police mission planning and capabilities (continued)

Organization	Mission Planning	Capabilities																																
Military working dog patrol drug detection team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per military police BN (military police BN and military police detention BN)</li> <li>• 2 per APOD and SPOD</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Three handler/dog pairs to provide patrol/drug detection support for up to one 24-hour operation (one handler/dog pair per 8 hour shift) with a single handler/dog pair or three concurrent short duration missions, each requiring a one handler/dog pair. A military working dog can work 7 days a week, providing the dog is allowed adequate rest in a 24-hour period.</li> <li>• PDDD detect the presence of drugs, the odor of drugs, and the residual odors of drugs. This specialized ability to detect drugs makes patrol drug detection dog teams valuable assets to commanders and other government agencies. The primary mission of a patrol drug detection dog team is to support commanders by providing a patrol capability and conducting drug search operations. The PDDD are trained to passively respond to the presence of drugs, the odor of drugs, and the residual odors of drugs. Patrol drug detection dog teams can also provide patrol capabilities to assist with security pertaining to enemy combatants and other personnel involved in theater-wide operations.</li> </ul>																																
<p><b>Legend:</b></p> <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr><td style="width: 15%;">AO</td><td>area of operations</td></tr> <tr><td>APOD</td><td>aerial port of debarkation</td></tr> <tr><td>ASR</td><td>alternate supply route</td></tr> <tr><td>BCT</td><td>brigade combat team</td></tr> <tr><td>BN</td><td>battalion</td></tr> <tr><td>CID</td><td>criminal investigations division</td></tr> <tr><td>DC</td><td>dislocated civilian</td></tr> <tr><td>DOD</td><td>Department of Defense</td></tr> <tr><td>Km</td><td>kilometer</td></tr> <tr><td>MSR</td><td>main supply route</td></tr> <tr><td>MWD</td><td>military working dog</td></tr> <tr><td>PDDD</td><td>patrol drug detection dog</td></tr> <tr><td>PEDD</td><td>patrol explosive detection dog</td></tr> <tr><td>SPOD</td><td>seaport of debarkation</td></tr> <tr><td>TDF</td><td>theater detention facility</td></tr> <tr><td>U.S.</td><td>United States</td></tr> </table>			AO	area of operations	APOD	aerial port of debarkation	ASR	alternate supply route	BCT	brigade combat team	BN	battalion	CID	criminal investigations division	DC	dislocated civilian	DOD	Department of Defense	Km	kilometer	MSR	main supply route	MWD	military working dog	PDDD	patrol drug detection dog	PEDD	patrol explosive detection dog	SPOD	seaport of debarkation	TDF	theater detention facility	U.S.	United States
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*Note.* The considerations presented in the mission planning and capabilities tables primarily describe potential employment and capabilities of the described organization. These notional considerations do not relieve planners of the requirement to perform detailed mission analysis to support the identification and employment of specific capabilities required to accomplish MEB missions.

## CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

2-31. CBRN elements, battalion and below, are task-organized to the MEB to conduct CBRN operations based on the tactical situation. *Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations* include the employment of capabilities that assess, protect against, and mitigate the entire range of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents to enable freedom of action (FM 3-11). CBRN capabilities span across the range of military operations by assessing CBRN threats and hazards, providing protection against CBRN hazards, mitigating CBRN incidents, and providing hazard awareness and understanding. The CBRN functions of assess, protect, and mitigate share a common fundamental purpose that fits within the protection warfighting function to achieve or contribute to national objectives.

- **Assess.** Through information collection and dissemination, effective warning and reporting, modeling, and hazard awareness and understanding, CBRN and select medical staffs and units possess the ability to estimate the potential for (or the existence of) CBRN threats and hazards. Assessing hazards allows proactive decision making and encompasses all of the capabilities to evaluate the potential for CBRN threats and hazards in the operational environment, detect and model CBRN hazards, and determine the characteristics and parameters of hazards throughout the operational environment that bear on operational and tactical decisions.
- **Protect.** CBRN and medical staffs and units provide the Army capabilities for protection against CBRN incidents. *Protection* is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0). It encompasses the execution of physical defenses to negate the effects of CBRN hazards on personnel and material. Protection conserves the force by providing individual and collective protection postures and capabilities. Protecting the force from CBRN incidents includes hardening systems and facilities, preventing or reducing individual and collective exposures, or applying medical prophylaxes through FHP.
- **Mitigate.** CBRN units and medical staffs provide the Army the ability to mitigate CBRN incidents by responding with the personnel, subject matter expertise, medical response/treatment, and equipment to reduce the impact of, or neutralize, the hazard. *Contamination mitigation* is described as the planning and actions taken to prepare for, respond to, and recover from contamination associated with all chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards to continue military operations (JP 3-11). The mitigate function includes capabilities to negate hazards, such as the decontamination task.

2-32. Table 2-3, page 2-22, provides an overview of CBRN units, planning requirements, and capabilities at the battalion level and below that may be task-organized to the MEB. For additional information on CBRN operations, see FM 3-11.



Table 2-3. CBRN mission planning and capabilities

Organization	Mission Planning	Capabilities
CBRN battalion	One per 2-6 CBRN/ CBRNE Companies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Command and control and supervision of personnel assigned to the CBRN battalion and up to six CBRN/ CBRNE companies.</li> <li>• Operation of a battalion main command post.</li> <li>• Staff planning and sustainment coordination with the CBRN staff within the brigade, division, Corps, or Theater Army sector.</li> <li>• Assessment of task-organized unit capabilities, utilization, and impacts on plans and operations to the brigade, division, corps, and Theater Army AO.</li> </ul>
CBRN company (hazard response)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per BCT</li> <li>• 1 per division</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Company HQ: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Command and control and supervision of personnel assigned to the company.</li> <li>▪ Staff planning, sustainment coordination and assessment of task-organized unit. Capabilities, utilization, and impacts on plans and operations with CBRN staff within brigade, division, corps, or theater Army sector.</li> <li>▪ Allocation of task-organized units and resources in support of CBRN reconnaissance, surveillance, decontamination and WMD elimination operations throughout the theater of operations.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 per BCT</li> <li>• 1 per division</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reconnaissance and Surveillance Platoon: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Detects and identifies CBRN hazards.</li> <li>▪ Provides early warning of contamination for supported units.</li> <li>▪ Ability to locate, identify, marks and report contaminated areas and identify bypass routes.</li> <li>▪ Collection and coordination for evacuation of CBRN environmental samples.</li> <li>▪ Assesses hazards in support of site exploitation or CBRN response.</li> <li>▪ Limited conventional reconnaissance when not in a CBRN contaminated environment.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Hazard Assessment Platoon X2: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Detects and identifies CBRN hazards.</li> <li>▪ Ability to locate, identify, mark and report contaminated areas.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Assess sites to confirm/deny presence of CBRN material.</li> <li>• Equipment and personnel decontamination.</li> </ul>

Table 2-3. CBRN mission planning and capabilities (continued)

Organization	Mission Planning	Capabilities
CBRNE company (technical)	One per 2-4 CBRN response missions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ground and air technical escort of hazardous chemical, biological and radiological material.</li> <li>• Render safe procedures for chemical, biological, radiological, and explosive devices.</li> <li>• Consequence management and emergency response support to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Federal, State, and Local law enforcement organizations.</li> <li>• Support of weapons of mass destruction sensitive site exploitation. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Isolation Phase:</b> Locate and assess the site by conducting presumptive identification to confirm or deny the presence of CBRN agents and materials.</li> <li>▪ <b>Exploitation Phase:</b> Preserve, characterize, exploit and disable/neutralize WMD targets.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Destruction Phase: Destroy, dismantle, remove, transfer, dispose, and consolidate WMD targets.</li> </ul>
CBRN company (area support)	1 per RSOI, SPODs, and APODs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Command and control, staff planning and supervision of personnel.</li> <li>• Staff planning, sustainment coordination and assessment of task-organized unit capabilities, utilization, and impacts on plans and operations with CBRN staff within brigade, division, corps, or theater Army sector.</li> <li>• Maintenance for organic equipment, vehicle recovery operations, and POL distribution.</li> <li>• Supply, signal and unit administration support.</li> <li>• Detects and identifies CBRN hazards.</li> <li>• Ability to locate, identify, mark and report contaminated areas.</li> <li>• Assess sites to confirm/deny presence of CBRN material.</li> <li>• Collects CBRN samples as required in the overall sample management plan and coordinates for sample evacuation.</li> <li>• Performs technical decon of team members.</li> <li>• Assesses hazards in support of site exploitation or CBRN response.</li> <li>• Has the ability to mitigate small CBRN hazards.</li> <li>• Equipment and personnel decontamination, quantity of personnel and equipment decontamination is dependent on availability and type of equipment, temperature and geographic location.</li> <li>• Area decontamination and support MASCAL decontamination, and patient decontamination</li> <li>• Detection and identification of biological agents throughout the theater of operations.</li> </ul>

Table 2-3. CBRN mission planning and capabilities (continued)

Organization	Mission Planning	Capabilities
CBRN company (area support) (continued)	1 per RSOI, SPODs, and APODs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Collection and transfer of known or suspected samples of biological agents; limited chemical detection capabilities; twenty-four hour operations under all weather.</li> </ul>
CBRN company (biological)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2-5 per CBRN BN</li> <li>During large-scale combat:</li> <li>1 per Senior Army HQ</li> <li>1 per DIV HQ</li> <li>As required in support of stability tasks and Special operations forces</li> <li>As required during stability tasks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Command, control, and supervision of personnel assigned to the company.</li> <li>Staff planning, sustainment coordination and assessment of task-organized unit capabilities, utilization, and impacts on plans and operations with CBRN staff within brigade, division, corps, or theater Army sector.</li> <li>Allocation of task-organized units and resources in support of biological surveillance throughout the theater of operations.</li> <li>Monitor, sample, detect, identify and report biological agents.</li> <li>Collection, packaging and transfer of known or suspected samples of biological agents; limited chemical detection capabilities; twenty-four hour operations under all weather conditions.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Legend:</b></p> <p>AO area of operations  APOD aerial port of debarkation  BCT brigade combat team  BN battalion  CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear  CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives  Decon decontamination  DIV division  HQ headquarters  MASCAL mass casualty  POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants  RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration  SPOD seaport of debarkation  WMD weapons of mass destruction</p>		

*Note.* The considerations presented in the mission planning and capabilities tables primarily describe potential employment and capabilities of the described organization. These notional considerations do not relieve planners of the requirement to perform detailed mission analysis to support the identification and employment of the specific capabilities required to accomplish MEB missions.

## CIVIL AFFAIRS

2-33. CA forces execute CA core competencies and functions. The CA branch provides three core competencies nested within CA operations – CA activities, military government operations and CA supported activities. CA functions are structured under each competency, organizing tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) into executable capabilities to achieve the desired effects. CA core competencies form the basis for training, organizing, equipping, and employing CA forces. The core competencies nest within the commander’s overall responsibility for planning and executing civil-military operations. CA operations core competencies and their nested functions:

- **CA activities.** *Civil affairs activities* are activities specifically planned, executed, and assessed by Civil Affairs forces that support the commander in order to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate indigenous populations and institutions, unified action partners, and interagency (FM 3-57). CA activities provide unique capabilities to the commander. CA activities consist of the following functions:
  - Civil reconnaissance.
  - Civil engagement.
  - Civil information management.
  - Civil-military operations center.
  - CA operations staff support.
- **Military government operations.** *Military government operations* are operations executed by Civil Affairs to provide expertise in the civil sector functions in order to establish transitional military authority or conduct support to civil administration (FM 3-57). While the Department of State has the lead for stabilization and reconstruction, the DOD has a requirement to support that. DODD 5100.01 directs the Army to establish military government when occupying enemy territory, and DODD 2000.13 identifies military government as a directed requirement under CA operations. Although CA forces enable military government by conducting Military government operations, there is currently no overarching concept or doctrine within DOD or the Army for how to establish a transitional military authority. CA forces provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of civilian authorities in order to establish local government capability or to enhance its capacity. This core competency is normally executed in support of Department of State operations or when directed in the absence of other United States Government capabilities. Military government operations include the following functions:
  - Transitional military authority.
  - Support to civil administration.
- **CA supported activities.** *Civil affairs supported activities* are activities in which Civil Affairs plays a key planning, coordinating or synchronizing role, but for which they are not the proponent or primary executor (FM 3-57). CA supported activities are comprised of the following functions:
  - Foreign assistance.
  - Foreign humanitarian assistance.
  - Populace and resources control.
  - Civil-military engagement.

2-34. Table 2-4 provides an overview of CA units, planning requirements, and capabilities at the company level that may be task-organized to the MEB. For additional information on CA operations see FM 3-57.

**Table 2-4. CA mission planning and capabilities**

Organization	Mission Planning	Capabilities
CA company (general purpose force)	1 per MEB	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Command and control of assigned or attached Civil-Military Operation Center and CA teams.</li> <li>• Tactical-level planning, management, coordination, and synchronization of CA operations within the supported commander's AO.</li> <li>• Assessment of the civil component of the supported command's AO facilitating integration of civil input into the supported command's common operational picture.</li> <li>• A standing Civil-Military Operation Center that is the focal point for civil-military coordination, collaboration, and communication for the supported unit headquarters.</li> <li>• Collation, analysis, and fusion of civil information for input to the supported command's common operational picture.</li> <li>• Assistance in coordinating indigenous populations and institutions, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government as part of civil-military operations.</li> <li>• Emphasis on local indigenous population and institutions issues.</li> <li>• CA teams directed through tactical mission tasks (civil reconnaissance, civil engagement).</li> <li>• Trained in cultural and regional expertise.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Legend:</b></p> <p>AO                    area of operations            CA                    civil affairs            MEB                 maneuver enhancement brigade            U.S.                  United States</p>		

*Note.* The considerations presented in the mission planning and capabilities tables primarily describe potential employment and capabilities of the described organization. These notional considerations do not relieve planners of the requirement to perform detailed mission analysis to support the identification and employment of specific capabilities required to accomplish MEB missions

## EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

2-35. Due to the likelihood of encountering explosive hazards, EOD teams may be integrated into all operations regardless of type. EOD supports the MEB commander by detecting, identifying, evaluating, rendering safe, and performing final disposition of all explosive ordnance. This includes improvised explosive devices, unexploded ordnance, and weapons of mass destruction. EOD has four functional areas:

- **Render safe.** The application of special EOD methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions, or separation of essential components of unexploded ordnance, to prevent an unacceptable detonation.
- **Technical intelligence.** Collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign ordnance and improvised explosive devices.

- **Protection.** Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure.
- **Disposal.** Final disposition of explosive ordnance and components, which may include detonation or a controlled burn.

2-36. Table 2-5 provides an overview of EOD units, planning requirements, and capabilities at the company level that may be task-organized to the MEB. For additional information on EOD operations see ATP 4-32.3 and FM 4-30.

**Table 2-5. EOD mission planning and capabilities**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Mission Planning</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>
EOD company	1 per MEB	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct EOD support to designated brigade or area EOD general support to designated multifunctional brigade.</li> <li>• Planning and execution cell in addition to providing company level oversight and execution of administrative and logistics support for up to five EOD platoons.</li> <li>• Neutralize hazards resulting from domestic or foreign conventional, nuclear, chemical biological ordnance, and improvised explosive devices.</li> </ul>
EOD platoon	1-3 per explosive ordnance company	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Command and control for activities conducted by response teams.</li> <li>• Receipt, prioritization, and dispatch of EOD response teams.</li> <li>• Teams organized to neutralize hazards resulting from domestic or foreign conventional, nuclear, chemical biological ordnance, and improvised explosive devices.</li> <li>• Limited ability to augment battalion level headquarters with special staff expertise associated with EOD hazards.</li> <li>• Support to the United States Secret Service in the protection of the President, Vice President, and other dignitaries as directed.</li> <li>• Removal of stuck rounds and downloading of misfired munitions.</li> </ul>
<b>Legend:</b> EOD                    explosive ordnance disposal MEB                    maneuver enhancement brigade		

*Note.* The considerations presented in the mission planning and capabilities tables primarily describe potential employment and capabilities of the described organization. These notional considerations do not relieve planners of the requirement to perform detailed mission analysis to support the identification and employment of specific capabilities required to accomplish the MEB’s missions

## MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY

2-37. All-source intelligence support at the MEB level is very basic and focuses on ground operations. A task organized military intelligence company provides collection and additional analysis capability to the MEB. The MEB commander and staff task-organize the military intelligence company based on the mission variables (METT-TC). To offset capability shortfalls, the MEB intelligence staff integrates elements of the military intelligence company into its staff operations. For operational considerations, such as weighting the main effort, the MEB may task-organize intelligence support teams from the military intelligence company, counter intelligence teams, human intelligence teams, or signals intelligence teams to support a battalion.

2-38. A military intelligence company is employed to meet the MEB commander’s information collection tasks (see FM 3-55). The MEB staff develops a scheme of information collection that employs collection assets based on the MEB’s mission, priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), concept of operations, the commander’s intent, and requirements tasked from higher. This scheme integrates intelligence operations with the MEB’s overall operation. The military intelligence company positions military intelligence collection assets to—

- Satisfy specific information requirements.
- Expose threat vulnerabilities.
- Detect targets.
- Collect information for assessment of lethal and nonlethal effects.
- Identify opportunities as they arise.
- Monitor key locations.

2-39. Table 2-6 provides an overview of the military intelligence planning requirements and capabilities at the company level that may be task-organized to the MEB. For additional information on military intelligence operations see FM 3-22.

**Table 2-6. Military intelligence mission planning and capabilities**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Mission Planning</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>
Military intelligence company	1 per MEB	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Intelligence analysis and support and coordination and execution of tactical intelligence operations.</li> <li>● Threat analysis, situation development, target development, and combat assessment in support of the brigade.</li> <li>● Collection management, human intelligence collection planning, and multisensor visualization (through the tactical ground station) for the brigade commander and staff.</li> <li>● Execution of human intelligence operations to include planning and deconflicting missions, initial Military Source Operations screening and referrals, collection and document and media exploitation in support of the commander’s information requirements in the brigade AO.</li> <li>● Limited signals intelligence support to include radio direction finding and mapping of the electronic battlefield, along with receipt, dissemination, and integration of SIGINT-derived products into Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance analysis and reporting.</li> <li>● Coordinates with the electronic warfare platoon to integrate signals intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities to target adversary electronic capabilities in support the friendly scheme of maneuver.</li> </ul>

Table 2-6. Military intelligence mission planning and capabilities (continued)

Military Intelligence Company (continued)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reconnaissance and surveillance analysis from data collected and provided by the Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System Platoon.</li> <li>• Provides intelligence support to the commanders as required to support combat operations.</li> <li>• Conduct Intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination.</li> </ul>
<b>Legend:</b> AO area of operations MEB maneuver enhancement brigade SIGINT signals intelligence		

*Note.* The considerations presented in the mission planning and capabilities tables primarily describe potential employment and capabilities of the described organization. These notional considerations do not relieve planners of the requirement to perform detailed mission analysis to support the identification and employment of specific capabilities required to accomplish the MEB's missions

## AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY

2-40. *Air and missile defense* is the direct (active and passive) defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and assets (JP 3-01). More precisely, ADA is the dedicated Army systems, personnel, and forces that provide active, land-based defense against air and missile attacks. ADA forces execute AMD operations under the joint counterair operational framework based on the integration of offensive and defensive counterair operations. *Offensive counterair* are offensive operations to destroy or neutralize enemy aircraft, missile launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and after launch, and as close to their source as possible (JP 3-01). *Defensive counterair* are all defensive measures designed to neutralize or destroy enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace (JP 3-01). Defensive counterair consists of two operational elements:

- **Active AMD operations.** Direct defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. Active AMD includes *air defense* (defensive measures designed to destroy attacking aircraft or aerodynamic missiles, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack [JP 3-01]) and ballistic *missile defense* (defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy missiles, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack [JP 3-01]).
- **Passive AMD operations.** All measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and critical assets. These measures include detection, warning, camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, hardening, and the use of protective construction.

2-41. During support area operations the designated support area land owner may be tasked-organized an ADA element (short-range air defense [SHORAD]) to counter low-altitude unmanned aircraft systems, high-speed fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition assets. Table 2-7 provides an overview of the ADA battalion (Avenger) capabilities that may be a tenant unit of the corps or division support area. For additional information on ADA battalions (SHORAD) see FM 3-01.



Table 2-7. ADA mission planning and capabilities

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Mission Planning</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>
ADA battalion (SHORAD)	1 per MEB	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Air defense against low altitude hostile aircraft.</li> <li>• Air defense airspace management coordination elements to supporting high and medium ADA battalions.</li> <li>• Early warning information and air defense command and control information to supported units.</li> <li>• Unit administration; religious support; field feeding; and communications-electronics support for units of the battalion.</li> </ul>
<b>Legend:</b> ADA                    air defense artillery MEB                    maneuver enhancement brigade SHORAD                short-range air defense		

*Note.* The considerations presented in the mission planning and capabilities tables primarily describe potential employment and capabilities of the described organization. These notional considerations do not relieve planners of the requirement to perform detailed mission analysis to support the identification and employment of specific capabilities required to accomplish the MEB's missions.

## TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE

2-42. The TCF is task-organized to the MEB when it is required to defeat Level III threats throughout its AO. An infantry battalion, Stryker battalion, combined arms battalion or a combination infantry, Stryker, and armor companies can be assigned as the TCF for the MEB's AO. The TCF size, composition, and response time is based on mission requirements. The TCF may be on call or a unit's only mission. At a minimum, the TCF must—

- Be positioned so that it can respond within the required time.
- Be mounted (generally), but can be foot-mobile when transported by helicopters or conditions warrant.
- Have sufficient ammunition and supplies to accomplish the mission to include engineer support as required.
- Be able to communicate with the supported base defense operations center (BDOC) to include monitoring the center's command net if required.
- Understand and rehearse the requisite parts of the supported base defense plan.

2-43. TCF assigned missions can include the following:

- Reinforce engaged units outside the perimeter.
- Conduct reconnaissance and security operations.
- Respond to threats on critical assets, infrastructure, or high-risk personnel.
- Conduct security checks and patrols within the base camp perimeter.

2-44. Table 2-8 provides an overview of the TCF planning requirements and capabilities of different battalions that may be task-organized to the MEB as a TCF. For additional information on a TCF, see JP 3-10 and ATP 3-21.20.

Table 2-8. TCF mission planning and capabilities

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Mission Planning</i>	<i>Types of Companies</i>	<i>Support Requirements</i>	<i>Unique Capabilities</i>
Infantry Battalion	1 per MEB (when a tactical combat force is required) or	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rifle Company 1 LMTV, 1 HMMWV 3 Rifle Platoons</li> <li>Weapons Company 4 Assault Platoons 4 HMMWVs with M2 or MK-19 and ITAS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No organic troop transportation</li> <li>Smallest sustainment requirement (Class I and V)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Large number of personnel per platoon and company — designed to operate in complex terrain</li> </ul>
Combined Arms Battalion	1 per MEB (when a tactical combat force is required) or	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mechanized Infantry Company 14 Bradley Fighting Vehicles</li> <li>Tank Company 14 M1 Abrams Main Battle Tanks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Heavy sustainment requirement (maintenance and Class III/V/IX)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Designed to defeat enemy armor threats</li> <li>Large tactical range</li> </ul>
Stryker infantry Battalion	1 per MEB (when a tactical combat force is required)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stryker Infantry Rifle Company 14 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Strykers 2 Mortar Carrier Vehicles Strykers 3 Rifle Platoons</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Medium sustainment requirement (maintenance and Class III/IX)</li> <li>Similar Class V requirements as a IBCT battalion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tactical mobility organic at the platoon and company level</li> <li>Able to dismount same number of personnel as light infantry battalion</li> </ul>
Legend:	HMMWV highly mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle IBCT infantry brigade combat team ITAS improved target acquisition system LMTV light medium tactical vehicle MEB maneuver enhancement brigade			

*Note.* The considerations presented in the mission planning and capabilities tables primarily describe potential employment and capabilities of the described organization. These notional considerations do not relieve planners of the requirement to perform detailed mission analysis to support the identification and employment of specific capabilities required to accomplish the MEB's missions.

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## Chapter 3

# Support Area Operations

The support area represents a key AO in support of Army operations. Operations are not successful solely based on support area operations, but Army operations could be lost in the support area. If conditions in the support area degrade, it is detrimental to the success of operations. Therefore, the protection of support areas requires planning considerations equal to those of the close areas.

### SUPPORT AREA OVERVIEW

3-1. There are fundamental principles that are common to all support areas, whether they are established in a contiguous AO or a noncontiguous AO during large-scale combat operations or contingency operations. Support areas may be designated by any Army echelon or by operational necessity, but they are usually associated with and assigned to units that are capable of controlling an AO and executing the AO responsibilities as described in ADP 3-0.

3-2. Commanders assign a support area as a subordinate AO to protect the force, preserve combat power, reduce risk, and mitigate vulnerabilities throughout corps and division support areas. The support area may provide critical infrastructure and secondary command and control nodes. This is where most of the echelon sustaining operations occur. Support area operations as discussed in this manual do not include the mission SPO conducted by tenants within the support area. Considerations for establishing a support area include—

- The location (size required and proximity to LOC).
- Command and support relationships between units in the support area.
- Transportation networks (including road, rail, inland waterways, and air) into and out of the area.
- Survivability of critical assets and personnel.
- Terrain management.
- Security responsibilities.
- The dispersion of units to increase survivability against indirect-fire and air attacks.
- Displacement considerations to sustain tempo and shorten LOC.
- Movement control into, through, and out of the support area by units enabling combat operations.
- Security and defense capabilities.
- The congestion of organic, supporting, and unassigned airspace users over the AO.
- A plan for transitions (boundary shifts, commander's priorities, mission).

3-3. The higher headquarters assesses and assumes risk in the support area to maximize combat power in other AOs. During planning, the higher headquarters and assigned support area commander conduct their initial assessments and adjust resources as the situation changes. Based on METT-TC, any unit assigned the support area will normally require augmentation to successfully complete the mission. Within a division support area, a designated unit such as a BCT or MEB is identified as the support area land owner and conducts support area operations. Within a corps support area, the corps designates a division, BCT, or MEB as the designated land owner. The MEB is the primary Army unit for conducting division and corps support area operations (see FM 3-0). Key functions performed by the support area commander include terrain management, movement control, protection, security, and defense.


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*Note.* Assigning the support area to functional or multifunctional brigades without the capability to conduct AO responsibilities will increase operational risk.

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## CONTIGUOUS AREA OF OPERATIONS

3-4. In most operations, corps and divisions employ contiguous areas of operations. *Contiguous area of operations* is where all of a commander's subordinate forces' areas of operations share one or more common boundaries (FM 3-90.1). This allows the command and control for the majority of the AO by using subordinate organizations while avoiding gaps and seams in responsibility. Contiguous areas of operations may provide additional security for maneuver units, headquarters, and support areas by limiting the gaps between units. Figure 3-1 provides an example of a contiguous corps AO with established support areas that include ground LOC.




**Figure 3-1. Corps contiguous AO**

## NONCONTIGUOUS AREA OF OPERATIONS

3-5. A *noncontiguous area of operations* is where one or more of the commander's subordinate force's areas of operation do not share a common boundary (FM 3-90.1). The reasons for using a noncontiguous area vary but begin with geographical separation of important terrain from the remainder of the areas of operations. The commander's decision to deploy the force into a noncontiguous AO, regardless of command echelon, is derived from the mission variables of METT-TC analysis. In particular, the commander evaluates the threat and ability of the enemy to mass combat power sufficient to threaten friendly forces in noncontiguous AOs. Second, the commander evaluates the enemy's ability to sever ground LOCs between noncontiguous AOs.

3-6. When conducting operations in a noncontiguous AO, commanders should take a holistic approach to countering threats. Commanders and staffs must expect the enemy to operate between the noncontiguous AOs using sophisticated surveillance devices, improvised explosive devices, mortars, rockets, missiles, unmanned aircraft systems, space and cyberspace operations, and information warfare, making support areas increasingly vulnerable. Area security may be the predominant method of protecting support areas that are

necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control forces. Area security operations are often emphasized in noncontiguous AOs to compensate for the lack of protection integrity that large or distant, unoccupied areas often create. Forces conducting area security operations can saturate an area or position on key terrain to provide protection through early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance and guard against unexpected enemy attack with an active response. Ground LOC located in noncontiguous areas present unique challenges based on the location, distance between supporting base camps and base clusters, and the security environment. Figure 3-2 provides an example of a noncontiguous corps AO with established support areas.



**Figure 3-2. Corps noncontiguous AO**

## SUPPORT AREA OPERATIONS

3-7. Support area operations are conducted by the MEB and tenants to prevent or minimize interference with command and control and SPO and to provide unimpeded movement of friendly forces; protection; operations to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces or defeat threats; and area damage control. The support area may provide secondary command and control nodes. Support area operations, as discussed in this chapter, do not include the mission SPO conducted by tenants within the support area. See appendix D for additional information on support area tenant units and their capabilities.

3-8. Support area operations are often conducted as economy-of-force operations. Within a division or corps support area, the MEB conducts support area operations (area security, terrain management, movement control, mobility support, clearance of fires, airspace management, TCFs for security, mobility and countermobility support, rear command post support).

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**Note.** A theater sustainment command, expeditionary sustainment command, or sustainment brigade headquarters should not be assigned support area responsibility because these headquarters lack the capability to execute the AO responsibilities and would require significant augmentation of personnel and mission command systems.

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3-9. The MEB also has the capabilities to provide command and control for units, key functions, and tasks required to conduct support area operations. Support areas achieve the economy-of-force by having properly staffed headquarters control terrain so that combat forces can conduct combat operations. The MEB conducts engagements to defeat threats throughout the support area. Due to the MEB having limited organic capabilities, the higher headquarters provides resources for the MEB or assists them in defeating threats that are expected in the support area. This is most appropriately done by task-organizing the MEB with military police and a TCF if Level III threats are present and no other TCF has been task-designated by the division or corps. Table 3-1 identifies MEB support area responsibilities and supporting tasks.

**Table 3-1. Support area responsibilities and supporting tasks**

<b><i>Support Area Responsibilities</i></b>	<b><i>Supporting Tasks</i></b>
Conduct terrain management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Positioning and design of base camps</li> <li>• Placement of units and facilities within the support area</li> <li>• Establishing areas of operation and other control measures</li> <li>• Grouping units into base camps and designated base clusters</li> <li>• Coordinate air corridors</li> <li>• Identify environmental considerations</li> </ul>
Conduct information collection, integration, and synchronization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Plan information requirements and assess collection</li> <li>• Task and direct information collection</li> <li>• Execute information collection</li> </ul>
Conduct civil-military operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Engage and influence indigenous populations and institutions</li> <li>• Conduct military government operations</li> <li>• Provide civil considerations expertise</li> <li>• Enable stability operations</li> </ul>
Control movement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regulate movement according to priorities</li> <li>• Synchronize routes</li> <li>• Designate, maintain, secure, and control movement along the routes located in the support area</li> <li>• Provide guidance on the roles and responsibilities for movement, protection, and defense of forces moving through the support area</li> </ul>
Conduct clearance of fires	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct fire support planning and coordination</li> <li>• Identify surface targets</li> <li>• Integrate fires with security and defense plans</li> </ul>
Enable security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct area security <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Provide node protection</li> <li>▪ High risk personnel security</li> <li>▪ Conduct lines of communication security</li> <li>▪ Convoy security</li> <li>▪ Support to base camp and base cluster defense</li> <li>▪ Conduct area damage control</li> <li>▪ Critical asset security</li> <li>▪ Conduct response force operations</li> <li>▪ Establish checkpoints and combat outpost</li> <li>▪ Establish movement corridors as required</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Conduct local security</li> </ul>

Table 3-1. Support area responsibilities and supporting tasks (continued)

<i>Support Area Responsibilities</i>	<i>Supporting Tasks</i>
Enable security (continued)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Group units into assembly areas, base camps and base clusters</li> <li>• Direct the employment and maneuver of the tactical combat force</li> <li>• Synchronize, integrate, and organize protection capabilities</li> <li>• Harden critical infrastructure and command and control nodes</li> </ul>
Conduct personnel recovery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Report</li> <li>• Locate</li> <li>• Support</li> <li>• Recover</li> <li>• Post isolation screening</li> <li>• Reintegrate</li> </ul>
Conduct airspace management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synchronize use of airspace</li> <li>• Identify, coordinate, and integrate airspace users</li> <li>• Adhere to airspace control procedures and maintain contact with the appropriate airspace control element responsible for the volume of airspace above the brigade area of operations</li> </ul>
Conduct minimum-essential stability tasks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish civil security</li> <li>• Conduct security cooperation</li> <li>• Support to civil control</li> <li>• Restore essential services</li> <li>• Support to governance</li> <li>• Support to economic and infrastructure development</li> </ul>
Conduct mobility and countermobility support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct clearing (areas and routes)</li> <li>• Improve line of communications roads and bridges</li> <li>• Construct and maintain combat roads and trails</li> <li>• Construct and maintain forward airfields and landing zones</li> <li>• Conduct traffic management and enforcement</li> <li>• Plan, prepare, and execute obstacles</li> <li>• Construct, emplace, or detonate obstacles</li> <li>• Mark, report, and record obstacles</li> <li>• Maintain obstacle integration and overwatch</li> </ul>
Rear command post integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide signal connectivity</li> <li>• Provide sustainment support</li> <li>• Provide workspace</li> <li>• Provide security</li> </ul>



## SUPPORT AREA CONSIDERATIONS

3-10. Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations. The activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. Planning starts an iteration of the operations process. Upon completion of the initial order, planning continues as leaders revise the plan based on changing circumstances. Preparing begins during planning and continues through execution. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage. Assessing is continuous and influences the other three activities. This section uses the operations process activities (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) to discuss considerations that are important to conducting support area operations. The primary considerations of commanders and their staff are the positioning, employment, and protection of assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations.

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*Note.* The MEB is an integral part of corps and division ability to command and control in support areas. The mobilization and deployment of the MEB must be prioritized in planning and operations to ensure that it arrives as early as possible. Depending on the situation, corps and division commanders may consider deploying their assigned MEB ahead of their divisional combat power.

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### PLAN

3-11. Corps and division planners must analyze METT-TC to determine what capabilities and units the MEB needs to successfully accomplish the support area mission. A troop-to-task analysis must be done during mission analysis to determine the required capabilities. The corps or division commander must then assess the level of risk and allocate resources to MEB. In some tactical situations, the corps or division commander may accept risk in the support area, but then plan to apportion additional combat power to the support area to improve the tactical situation throughout the AO.

3-12. The placement of support areas is influenced by enemy threats. To increase their survivability, support areas are generally placed out of range of the majority of the enemy's indirect-fire systems to increase their survivability when possible. However, security considerations must be balanced with maintaining responsiveness units conducting close and deep operations. Figure 3-3 provides a notional example of depths and frontages of the operational area. Below are general considerations for minimum distances for establishing corps and division support areas behind the forward line of troops:

- The division support area extends from 29 to 36 kilometers behind the forward line of troops.
- The corps support area extends from 70 to 90 kilometers behind the forward line of troops, or 40 to 60 kilometers behind the division support areas.

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*Note.* Corps and division planners must ensure that supporting sustainment units (especially fuel, water, and ammunition) are positioned no further than 90 kilometers from the support area during operations demanding high operating tempo and movement. This can be extremely critical when conducting offensive operations and maintaining combat power against the enemy. Poor terrain or weather conditions may reduce the distance.

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


Figure 3-3. Doctrinal template of notional depths and frontages

3-13. The corps and division operational areas are normally subdivided and assigned as subordinate unit AOs, corps AOs to divisions and brigades, and division AOs to brigades (see FM 3-0). At corps and division levels, METT-TC analysis may not support an option to assign the echelon support area to a single unit. The area retained by the echelon may be easy to secure and control so that it can all be assigned as the echelon support area to a MEB with minor augmentation. As the operation progresses and the situation changes, the size of the echelon support area may change.

3-14. The MEB commander plans for support area operations within an assigned support area. The AO responsibilities require the MEB to plan decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations within the AO. Securing host-nation populations and critical infrastructure must also be planned for during support area operations. The MEB commander and staff must synchronize and integrate numerous units and headquarters' elements to conduct support area operations.

3-15. When the operational environment or particular missions in the support area require a high degree of certainty and order, compliance, or centralization, the MEB commander may adjust the degree of control. Examples are in terrain management with the positioning and design of base camps. This is often needed for base-inherent defensibility, clustering of base camps for mutual support, the employment of base camps and base cluster response forces, and the TCF assigned to the support area. Some units that are tenants within the support area will not have the staff to conduct detailed IPB and defense planning and preparation needed to execute a decentralized command and control operation. This requires the MEB commander to conduct operations in a level of detail not normally done by other brigades.

3-16. The MEB higher headquarters order should establish command and support relationships within the support area and give the MEB commander clear authority to request or negotiate with units for their compliance or support for security and defense. The MEB commander must integrate the actions of tenant units, to include base camps and base cluster commanders. Responsibilities may include protection, information collection, security, defense, movement control, fires, air support, AMD, incident response, and area damage control. The MEB commander coordinates decentralized execution by assigned units, base camps, and base cluster commanders. The MEB commander's staff may also need to coordinate area damage control support to functional brigades, the sustainment brigade, or the sustainment command throughout the support area. The staff reviews and coordinates the supporting base camp and base cluster defense plans; develops plans to employ the TCF and fires; and coordinates for host-nation, joint, interagency, and multinational assets. See appendix D for additional information on base camps and base clusters.

3-17. The MEB staff coordinates with the higher headquarters to establish priorities, develop plans, and decide when and where to accept risk in the support area. The MEB staff can use several levels of vulnerability, threat, and criticality assessments and the risk management process discussed in ADP 3-37 and ATP 5-19.

3-18. Based on vulnerability and risk assessment, the higher headquarters may provide the MEB commander with additional capabilities, to include information collection support, additional security forces, or additional fires and other forces. The increased span of control might be excessive for the MEB commander and require the higher headquarters to manage areas not assigned to subordinates within its larger AO, commit another unit (MEB or BCT) that is capable of providing command and control for another portion of those unassigned areas if that is feasible, or accept risk.

3-19. The MEB will command one of the base camps within the support area and may designate an assigned battalion size unit as the base camp defense commander. The MEB commander may assign subordinate unit boundaries within the AO.

3-20. The MEB may use several boards or working groups during support area planning and execution. For example, multifunctional members of the protection working group may be used to ensure that all aspects of protection are considered, assessed, and incorporated.

3-21. While CA activities are a significant part of support area operations, the division and corps information operations also integrates and synchronizes information-related capabilities actions to support protection and other warfighting functions. These information-related capabilities actions include tactical deception and support to joint military deception; support to mobility and countermobility, protection, intel, and fires; crowd sourcing; and coordination for multispectral decoy emplacements. Other staff elements at division and corps, including cyberspace electromagnetic activities, provide secondary jamming against enemy bypassed regular

forces, irregular forces, and hybrid threats. In addition, signal procedures should include electromagnetic spectrum terrain masking and directional antenna use.

3-22. The MEB is also responsible for stability operations within the support area. Commanders use civil-military operations to enable these stability operations. The planning and coordination of these operations, from corps to brigade, are the responsibility of the assistant chief of staff, CA operations (G-9)/S-9. See FM 3-57 for more information on G-9/S-9 responsibilities.

3-23. The MEB designated with AO responsibilities may not be designed as a maneuver headquarters, but some of its subunits must be capable of maneuver and enabled with capabilities to enhance freedom of movement when required. The MEB should be assigned a maneuver unit as a TCF (designed to combat Level III threats, ideally at least a battalion headquarters to provide effective command and control) or may potentially form a response force short of a TCF from other attached or OPCON units such as military police. The MEB would control the maneuver of the TCF or response force as they employ maneuver and fires to defeat threats throughout the support area. The MEB will initially fight any size threat operating in the support area and must plan to employ all fire support assets, to include indirect fires, Army aviation, and close air support. The MEB commander is responsible for and plans where to locate and use attached, OPCON, or TACON radars to actively acquire enemy indirect-fire and engage with the best available fire support asset.

3-24. The MEB headquarters must tailor their operations process to the mission and operational environment. Staff planning requires details that are unique to the support area mission and size of the operational area, to include terrain management and airspace considerations.

## **PREPARE**

3-25. During initial entry, the MEB commander directs designated base camp commanders to prepare their individual base camps according to standards directed by its higher headquarters. If the support area is established in an initially secure area, contractors alone or assisted by military units may construct the base camps. A technique may be to have the designated support area land owner or functional units construct base camps within their AO that are readily available for use. These camps would be planned, designed, sited, constructed, and able to secure against Level II or III threats as required. There may be situations in which the MEB commander takes control of support area base camps and facilities that are not constructed to acceptable standards and must be upgraded.

3-26. The MEB can conduct tasks to support the support area defensive plan and prepare for area damage control. This includes mobility, countermobility, and survivability; obstacles; structures; and AT. The MEB commander will direct reconnaissance and surveillance assets to conduct initial reconnaissance of their AO throughout the support area to verify and refine IPB. The proper location selection, design, establishment, construction, and manning of base camps and base clusters can help to reduce the need for a TCF.

3-27. The MEB commander will establish standing operating procedures throughout the support area to ensure protection, security, defense, and the ability to perform area damage control. The MEB commander will ensure that base camp security and defense forces are trained, rehearsed, and ready. Important rehearsals include commitment of base camp response forces, commitment of cluster response forces, commitment of the support area TCF, battle handover, and fire plan rehearsals.

## **EXECUTE**

3-28. The MEB commander conducts support area operations within the assigned support AO. The MEB staff will ensure close, continuous coordination with higher headquarters staff, AO tenants, and transient units to ensure security, protection, movement, continuous support, and defense. The MEB will execute detection, early warning, and rapid response to threats and coordinate responsive area damage control to minimize effects.

3-29. The MEB staff will synchronize security operations, conduct information collection, and develop the threat and common operational picture and share it with all units in the support area. The staff will coordinate the collective defense within the AO. The MEB commander may direct and employ transiting combat forces with the approval of higher headquarters. The support area TCF will defeat Level III threats or conduct battle handover to other combat forces.

3-30. The MEB must integrate airspace user requirements with the theater airspace control system. A division may execute the joint air ground integration tactics techniques and procedures and request a volume of airspace to control all airspace users entering, exiting, and operating in their operational area. The MEB air defense airspace management cell coordinates with the airspace control element responsible for airspace control over their assigned AO.

## **ASSESS**

3-31. The MEB staff must fuse the assessments from the commander, staff, subordinates, supporting units, and tenant units to monitor and evaluate the current situation and progress. The staff conducts base camp threat and vulnerability assessments. Key areas the staff assesses include security, base camp defense preparations, and area damage control preparations. The MEB commander and staff share their assessment with their higher headquarters commander and staff. Based on the assessments, they share responsibility to adjust tasks, resources, or risks. This is a dynamic process that will need to be redone as the conditions and risk change. The staff can use measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) to help it develop security measures for the assigned support area and required detailed tasks.

## **SUPPORT AREAS BY ECHELON**

3-32. Corps and division commanders establish a support area to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and support tactical operations. The echelon commander assigns the support area as an AO to a subordinate unit. The location and size of the support area varies according to METT-TC. The echelon support area commander establishes the support area into one or more base camps, and assigns security responsibilities to units located within the base camps. Possible tenants of the support area include (but are not limited to)—

- Sustainment (see FM 4-0 for additional information on sustainment operations in a support area).
- Field artillery operations (see FM 3-09 for additional information on field artillery operations).
- Military police (see FM 3-39 for additional information on military police operations in a support area).
- Engineers (see FM 3-34 for additional information on engineer operations in a support area).
- CBRN assets (see FM 3-11 for additional information on CBRN operations in a support area).
- Aviation (see FM 3-04 for additional information on aviation operations in a support area).
- CA (see FM 3-57 for additional information on CA operations in a support area).
- Nongovernmental organizations.
- Host-nation entities.
- Medical treatment facilities (see FM 4-02 for additional information on medical support to a support area).
- Signal support to operations (see FM 6-02).

## **CORPS**

3-33. The corps establishes a support area to concentrate sustainment, protection, available aviation, and support capabilities required to sustain, enable, and control tactical operations. The corps support area is based on geographical advantages for sustaining the force and protecting these assets. When the corps establishes a support area, it assigns it as an AO with responsibility to a subordinate unit such as a division, BCT, or MEB. However, in a corps contingency force operation, ill-defined or nonexistent boundaries and areas of operations can occur.

3-34. The corps commander can direct maneuver forces to reinforce the support area security mission as a TCF. If there is a Level III threat in the corps support area that needs more than a single battalion size TCF to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level, then the corps commander should allocate a BCT to this mission. The United States Air Force tactical airspace control personnel joint terminal attack controllers are essential to the ground commander's ability to employ close air support mission aircraft in the support area.

## **DIVISION**

3-35. The division support area is the area in which the majority of the division's sustainment functions occur. The division support area also facilitates the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and support divisional forces.

3-36. The division OPORD establishes area security responsibilities for the division support area. The support area commander will have TACON of all ground forces within or transiting that area for security and defense. The order specifies the commander's broader TACON authority for the protection, security, defense, movement control, and terrain management.

3-37. When assigned to the MEB, the division support area becomes the MEB AO. To accomplish all of the doctrinal responsibilities associated with controlling an AO, the MEB requires augmentation consisting of Army and Air Force airspace control personnel. Units located within or transiting the division support area are responsible for self-protection against Level I threats. They must coordinate with the MEB for maneuver, troop movements, and indirect fires outside of the established perimeter of any base camp to which they are assigned.

3-38. In the absence of a MEB, the division commander assigns the mission to a BCT commander. If the division commander assigns the support area to a functional brigade, significant augmentation is required for the functional brigade to accomplish all of the doctrinal responsibilities associated with controlling an AO, such as augmenting personnel and key systems to control fires and airspace. The division commander remains responsible for all unassigned areas within their AO that are not assigned to a subordinate unit, such as BCTs or the MEB.

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## Chapter 4

# Support Area Responsibilities

Command and control is fundamental to the art and science of warfare. No single specialized military function, either by itself or combined with others, has a purpose without it. Through command and control, commanders provide purpose and direction to integrate all military activities toward a common goal—mission accomplishment. Commanders assign support areas to subordinate commanders to conduct support area responsibilities. This chapter describes the MEB role in conducting terrain management, controlling movement, protection, security, and defense functions.

### TERRAIN MANAGEMENT

4-1. *Terrain management* is the process of allocating terrain by establishing areas of operations, designating AAs, and specifying locations for units and activities to deconflict activities that might interfere with each other (ADP 3-90). Throughout the operations process, commanders assigned an AO manage terrain within their boundaries. Through terrain management, commanders identify and locate units in the area. The operations officer, with support from others in the staff, can then deconflict operations, control movements, and deter fratricide as units get in position to execute planned missions. Commanders also consider unified action and host-nation partners located in their AO and coordinate with them for use of the terrain.

4-2. The higher headquarters may position a number of other support brigades; functional brigades; smaller units; various higher headquarters; contractors; and joint, interagency, and multinational organizations within the support area. Regardless of the size of units, the MEB commander has some command and control responsibilities over those in their AO. Units assigned to operate within the support area are typically TACON to the MEB commander for defense and force protection. The MEB commander has approval authority for the exact placement of units and facilities within the support area, unless placement is directed by the MEB commander's higher headquarters. In instances where there is disagreement, the higher headquarters retains final authority. The commander must deconflict operations, control movement, and prevent fratricide.


4-3. Terrain management involves allocating terrain by establishing AOs and other control measures, by specifying unit locations, and by deconflicting activities that may interfere with operations. Indirect fires and air corridors must be planned congruently to ensure deconfliction in time and space. Control trigger, elevation, and azimuths should be considered when planning airspace deconfliction and should be synchronized with division or corps and adjacent unit plans. During large-scale combat operations, the MEB commander may designate AAs where the tenants of the support area occupy an area and provide temporary functional support until support area base camps and base clusters can be established or until a relocation of the support area is required due to transitions. *Occupy* is a tactical mission task that involves moving a friendly force into an area so that it can control that area. Both the force's movement to and occupation of the area occur without enemy opposition (FM 3-90-1). While in the AA, each unit is responsible for its own protection activities, such as local ground security. An *assembly area* is an area a unit occupies to prepare for an operation (FM 3-90-1). Ideally, an AA provides—

- Concealment from air and ground observation.
- Adequate entrances, exits, and internal routes.
- Space for dispersion; each AA is separated by enough distance from other AAs to preclude mutual interference.
- Cover from direct fire.
- Good drainage and soil conditions that can sustain unit vehicles and individual Soldier movements.



- Terrain masking of electromagnetic signatures.
- Terrain allowing observation of ground and air avenues into the AA.
- Sanctuary from enemy medium-range artillery fires.

4-4. Establishing a support area includes grouping units into base camps and designating base clusters as necessary for common defense. Terrain management should facilitate current and future operations. Poor terrain management can result in congestion, interruption of tactical traffic patterns, and degradation of SPO. The failure to follow basic rules of coordination can cause disruption and create combat identification hazards. Good terrain management enhances operations. Figure 4-1 provides an example of an established support area with multiple base camps.



**Figure 4-1. Example of an established division support area**

4-5. Having an assigned AO assigned and facilitates the movement of units and the use of fires. It restricts units that are not assigned responsibility for the AO from moving through the AO without coordination. It also restricts outside units from firing into or allowing the effects of its fires to affect the AO. Both of these restrictions can be relaxed through coordination with the owning unit. It facilitates the movement and fires of the unit assigned responsibility for, or owning, the AO. In selected situations, subordinate AOs may be created to facilitate the movement of sustainment convoys or maneuver forces through the support AO.

4-6. Within the support area, the MEB commander conducts the tactical coordination and integration of land and air units while employing firepower and maneuvering forces for positional advantage in relation to

the enemy. Beyond the inherent responsibilities for adjacent unit coordination, the MEB commander deconflicts terrain coordination issues by collaborating with adjacent, passing, and supported units to reduce the likelihood of combat identification errors and trafficability problems and to enhance situational understanding, security, and defense. The MEB plans, coordinates, and monitors airspace throughout the support area. Fires integration and coordination is conducted by the designated land owner (support area) fire support element through the targeting process. The MEB also coordinates AMD for critical assets and activities through protection prioritization. Effects are assessed against the supporting mission requirements.

4-7. The S-3 functions as the overall terrain manager and assigns and reassigns AOs based on mission requirements to subordinate units throughout the support area. The MEB is responsible for any terrain in the support area not assigned to a subordinate unit. The S-3 is responsible for overall support area surveillance and reconnaissance plans and integrates subordinate unit and base camp plans. The S-3 will engage the entire staff, particularly the S-2, the engineer, military police, brigade surgeon, CBRN operations, fires, and AMD staff, when analyzing factors essential to assigning territory and locating base camps and facilities within the support area. These factors include—

- Coordinating with the supporting medical treatment facility and other medical assets to ensure proper site selection and accessibility for evacuation of patients.
- Locating base camps on the best defensible terrain. The S-2, S-3, terrain analysis team, engineer, and maneuver commander (if a TCF is assigned) collaborate on this effort. This will significantly reduce the resources needed to effectively defend them.
- Locating the sustainment brigade (if in the AO) with access to transportation infrastructure.
- Constructing a base camp defense, which can be viewed as constructing a strong point (360-degree defense).

4-8. These factors also include an assessment of—

- Drop zones or landing zone availability that is protected from the observation and fire of the enemy, which is a main consideration in selecting and organizing the location.
- Geographical boundaries.
- A concept of the operation.
- Theater basing plan.
- Mission requirements.
- The mission priority.
- Tactical maneuver plans.
- Likely enemy avenues of approach.
- Direct- and indirect-fire weapons capabilities.
- Deconfliction of fires (via scheme of fires and fire support coordination measures) and integration of airspace users (via the unit airspace plan and airspace coordinating measures).
- Airspace above the AO.
- Equipment density.
- Incident response.
- Accessibility for sustainment.
- Storage space for supply units.
- Indigenous civil considerations.
- Trafficability (ideally level, well-drained, firm ground).
- Access to the MSR, roads, and transportation infrastructure.
- Available facilities.
- Environmental threat and endemic disease considerations.
- Room for dispersion.
- Natural obstacles and canalized areas.
- Cover, concealment, and camouflage (natural or man-made structures).
- Security and mutual support.
- Ease of evacuation.

- Key facilities.
- Weapons of mass destruction research, production, and storage sites.
- Toxic industrial material hazard sites and areas.
- Decontamination sites.

4-9. The MEB S-2 performs a detailed IPB for the support area and shares it with all tenants. A detailed IPB is critical for identification of threats present within the operational environment, to include health threats prevalent in the area to prevent or reduce individual and collective exposure. The detailed terrain analysis is key to terrain management. The designated unit must consider the defensibility of the terrain and primary unit missions when constructing new base camps and assigning units to existing base camps.

## **INFORMATION COLLECTION**

4-10. *Information collection* is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). This activity implies a function, mission, or action and identifies the organization that performs it. Information collection activities are a synergistic whole analysis effort focused with emphasis on synchronizing and integrating all components and systems. Information collection integrates the intelligence and operations staff functions focused on answering commander's critical information requirements. Joint doctrine refers to information collection combined with the operations process and the intelligence process as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. See FM 3-55 for additional information on information collection.

4-11. Information collection is the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements. This includes the following:

- Plan requirements and assess collection.
- Task and direct collection.
- Execute collection.

4-12. Commanders integrate information collection to form an information collection plan that capitalizes on different capabilities. Information collection assets provide data and information. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity that results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity. See JP 2-0.

4-13. Intelligence staff inform commanders and staffs where and when to look. Reconnaissance, security, intelligence operations, and surveillance are the ways—with the means ranging from national and joint collection capabilities to individual Soldier observations and reports. The end is intelligence that supports the commander's decision making. The result is successful execution and assessment of operations. This result depends on effective synchronization and integration of the information collection effort.

4-14. The intelligence and operations staffs work together to collect, process, and analyze information about the enemy, other adversaries, climate, weather, terrain, population, and other civil considerations that affect operations throughout the support area. Intelligence relies on reconnaissance, security, intelligence operations, and surveillance for its data and information. Conversely, without intelligence, commanders and staffs do not know where or when to conduct reconnaissance, security, intelligence operations, or surveillance. The usefulness of the data collected depends on the processing and exploitation common to these activities.

4-15. The MEB commander supports information collection requirements during the conduct of support area operations that may contribute to the commander's critical information requirements; inform intelligence-led, time-sensitive operations; or shape support area operations. The conduct of information collection activities supports the commander's understanding and visualization of the operations by identifying gaps in information, aligning assets and resources against them, and assessing the collected information and intelligence to inform the commander's decisions. They also support the staff's integrating processes during planning and execution. The direct result of the information collection effort is a coordinated plan that supports the operation.

4-16. The MEB commander tasks units (engineer, military police, CA, intelligence, CBRN, military intelligence, and TCF) that it has a command or support relationship with within the support area to conduct reconnaissance, security, intelligence operations, and surveillance. (See table 4-1 for unit capabilities.) If the support area designated land owner is not task-organized with adequate information collection assets, it requests information collection support from the higher headquarters. This support could be provided through counterintelligence, human intelligence, signals intelligence, unmanned aircraft systems, or ground surveillance systems.

**Table 4-1. MEB information collection capabilities**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Capability</b>
CBRN	Provide additional information collected during conduct of primary missions.
	Detects, locates, marks CBRN and toxic industrial materials that restrict freedom of maneuver.
	Capable of assessment/characterization/exploitation of WMD targets. Also capable of performing general reconnaissance, security, and tactical enabling tasks, such as route reconnaissance and the forward passage of lines.
Engineer	Monitor terrestrial areas of interest through information collection assets to help reveal the enemy location and disposition and route, area, zone, and force reconnaissance.
	Assists commanders in determining the feasibility of areas for use based on the aspects of the terrain.
	Provides a detailed understanding of infrastructure, such as sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, safety, and other considerations.
Stryker battalion (TCF) Infantry battalion (TCF) Combined arms battalion (TCF)	Conduct Soldier sensor missions, as needed, to satisfy requirements, including tactical questioning.
	Provide scout platoon capability for real-time detection, recognition, and identification of distant target locations.
Military intelligence company	Conduct intelligence operations, such as military source operations. Document exploitation, interrogation and debriefing, and counterintelligence operations.
	Support development of brigade common operations picture, targeting, IPB, analysis of information reported across all the warfighting functions, and development of intelligence products.
	Receive, process, and display near real time information from nonorganic sensors.
Military police	Conduct information collection through reconnaissance and surveillance and the integration of police intelligence operations throughout all military police tasks to seek out the enemy, monitor likely high-speed avenues of approach and potential landing zones and drop zones.
	Provide additional information through police operations and security and mobility support in towns and other populated areas, and along ridgelines, wooded areas, and critical terrain features from which the enemy can influence movements along road networks throughout the support area.
	Collect police information during military police operations concerning crime, disorder, criminal activity, and criminal threats throughout the AO.
	Collect information during the conduct of detainee operations.

Table 4-1. Information collection capabilities (continued)

Organization	Capability
CA	Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to identify, assess, verify, or refute information on targeted ASCOPE.
	Develop civil component of the operational environment to provide input to the common operational picture, targeting process, IPB, and integration of civil knowledge.
<b>Legend:</b> AO area of operations ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events CA civil affairs CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace TCF chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear tactical combat force WMD weapons of mass destruction	

4-17. MEB commanders must know enemy capabilities and intentions throughout the support area. They must anticipate, receive, and provide early warning of emerging threats in the AO. This requires access to all-source intelligence. Based on intelligence in the support area, the commander locates facilities and units and applies combat power to defeat threats early in the AO and, if required, relocates units at risk.

4-18. MEB and base camp commanders use observation posts and patrols to collect information and improve security. Base camp and base cluster commanders have an inherent responsibility to gather information and share intelligence with the support area designated land owner. Surveillance is inherent and continuous in all security operations.

4-19. Counterreconnaissance is also inherent in all security operations. It is the sum of all actions taken to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. The focus is to deny the enemy information and destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance elements. Security forces operate offensively or defensively when executing counterreconnaissance.

4-20. *Counterintelligence* is information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities (JP 1-02.2). Counterintelligence includes all actions taken to detect, identify, track, exploit, and neutralize the multidiscipline intelligence activities of adversaries. It is a key intelligence community contributor to protect U.S. interests and equities. The MEB S-2 coordinates all counterintelligence measures and operations with the counterintelligence coordinating authority of the higher headquarters.

## CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

4-21. Civil-military operations are a joint operational construct and the inherent responsibility of all commanders. Within this construct, contact between U.S. military forces and the civil component of the operational environment is considered civil-military operations. Commanders at all levels must realize that Soldiers' actions—when dealing with the indigenous populations and institutions, unified action partners, and interagencies—impact the overall civil-military operations situation. Predeployment training of all Soldiers regarding the culture and customs of the factions of the indigenous populace they may encounter enhances the effectiveness of the overall civil-military operations objectives.

4-22. Every U.S. military organization has some capability to support the execution of civil-military operations. Typically, CA units form the nucleus of civil-military operations planning efforts. Others—such as special forces, psychological operations, engineers, medical, transportation, military police, and security forces—support this effort. Commanders and staffs should not consider civil-military operations something performed only by CA forces.

## CONTROL MOVEMENT

4-23. The MEB controls all movement throughout the support area. Units may not move through ground or air LOCs without clearance from the MEB. The MEB ensures that movement within the support area does not interfere with the corps or division commander's maneuver or fires execution.

4-24. The echelon that designates the support area must provide clear guidance on the roles and responsibilities for controlling movement. The support area commander designates, maintains, and secures movement along the routes within the AO unless the higher headquarters directs otherwise. When a unit wants to move within the designated support area, it coordinates with the BDOC or base cluster operations center (BCOC). The BDOC or BCOC will coordinate with the MEB commander to obtain movement support throughout the support area: intelligence updates, additional security, fires, and final approval. See ATP 4-16 for additional information on movement control.

## CLEARANCE OF FIRES

4-25. The MEB commander has the authority to determine surface targets and perform clearance of fires within the support area. The MEB integrates fires with security and defense plans (see appendix C) and rehearses their employment. Within the support area, the MEB commander may employ any direct- or indirect-fire system without further clearance. ADP 3-90 lists three exceptions: munitions effects extend beyond the AO, restricted munitions, and restrictive fire support coordination measures. Detailed coordination is required of fire support planning and measures to apply fire support to and from adjacent division or corps systems according to their targeting and fires priorities. Cross boundary fires should be strictly coordinated and, if time allows, thoroughly rehearsed.

4-26. The MEB must conduct detailed fires planning to allocate resources to be used down to the company level while integrating and coordinating fires within the support area. This includes the integration of fire support planning and targeting. The MEB commander's staff will coordinate fires with the higher headquarters, base camp, and base cluster staffs. The MEB commander could provide fires if the TCF is task-organized with artillery or mortar systems. Much of the time, the support area designated land owner will receive fire support from a field artillery battalion. The MEB commander must develop targeting and counterfire standing operating procedures (see ATP 3-09.12).

## SECURITY

4-27. Security is an essential part of support area operations. Security operations are performed by commanders to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the forces being protected time and maneuver space in which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their protected forces. The ultimate goal of security is to protect the force from surprise and reduce the unknowns. The MEB commander must provide security forces to prevent surprise and provide time for units within the support area to effectively respond. The MEB commander must inform tenants and transients of support area security plans and capabilities. See FM 3-90-2.

4-28. If properly task-organized, the MEB may perform any required security task within the support area. Area security is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specified area. The support area commander is responsible for the security of all units operating with the support area. Each unit commander retains responsibility for their unit local security. See ADP 3-37 and FM 3-90-2.

4-29. The MEB conducts security tasks and coordinates, synchronizes, and integrates protection capabilities (see annex A) to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specified area. The MEB provides time and maneuver space in which to react to the enemy and develop the situation. Successful security operations depend on properly applying five fundamentals:

- Provide early and accurate warning.
- Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
- Orient on the force, area, or facility.
- Perform continuous reconnaissance.
- Maintain enemy contact.

**AREA SECURITY**

4-30. *Area security* is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, and activities within a specific area (ADP 3-90). Forces engaged in area security protect the force, installation, route, area, or asset. Although vital to the success of military operations, area security is normally an economy-of-force mission, often designed to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations and to support decisive and shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power.

4-31. Area security may be the predominant method of protecting the support areas that are necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control forces. Forces engaged in area security can saturate an area or position on key terrain to provide protection through early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance and to guard against unexpected enemy or adversary attack with an active response. This early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance may come from ground- and space-based sensors. Area security may focus on named areas of interest in an effort to answer commander's critical information requirements, aiding in tactical decision making and confirming or denying threat intentions.

4-32. The MEB should be task-organized in a manner that emphasizes the mobility, lethality, and communications capabilities required to conduct area security tasks throughout the support area. The support area designated land owner conducts area security to preserve the commander's freedom to move reserves, position fire support means, provide for command and control, conduct sustaining operations, and contribute to other support area activities. Area security often entails route security, convoy security, and checkpoint operations. The MEB units conducting area security take advantage of the local security measures performed by all units in the support area.

**Base Camp Defense**

4-33. *Base defense* consists of the local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base, to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to United States forces (JP 3-10). The MEB will conduct base camp and base cluster security and defense when it is necessary to defend in all directions, when it must hold critical terrain in areas where the defense is not tied in with adjacent units, or when it has been bypassed and isolated by the enemy and must defend in place. Within a support area, the support area designated land owner normally must defend in all directions and prepares perimeter base camp security and defense (see appendix E).

4-34. The MEB commander is responsible for area security, base camp and base cluster security, and defense within the support area. The designated base camp commanders within the support area should be in support of the MEB commander for security and defense. The elements operating within the individual base camps should be in support of the base camp commander for security and defense. The MEB commander tasks units within the support area to conduct collective information collection, security, and defense operations. See ATP 3-37.10 for details on base camp security and defense.

4-35. The MEB integrates the base camp and base cluster security and self-defensive plans. The MEB commander designates tenant commanders as base camp commanders. The base camp commanders perform this additional responsibility under the oversight of the support area commander. The MEB can mass forces, capabilities, or systems from several base camps or base clusters to integrate, synchronize, and mass combat power at a decisive point where the threat exceeds a single base camp's security or defensive capabilities.

**Outer Security Area**

4-36. Typically, each base camp or base cluster has a boundary established beyond their perimeter to at least direct fire range (3–5 kilometers) to execute their fire plans within their ability to control; this is their security area. The MEB is responsible for the security of the area not assigned to a subordinate unit within the support area. This security area should be wide enough to preclude enemy use of mortars and allow adequate time to detect enemy threats and engage with direct-fire weapons. MEB commanders clearly define their intent for outer security areas and their expectations for actions to counter threats. OPORDs state the tasks of the security force(s) in terms of the time required or expected to maintain security.

4-37. Early warnings of pending enemy actions ensure that the commander has time to react to any threat. The intelligence staff analyzes likely routes and methods the enemy could use to conduct reconnaissance. They template likely locations and activities of enemy observation posts, patrols (mounted and dismounted), and other reconnaissance assets. Named areas of interest are established at these locations to focus counterreconnaissance activities. Security forces use observation posts, combat outposts, patrols, sensors, target acquisition radars, and aerial surveillance to locate high-potential targets and to confirm or deny the commander's critical information requirements.

### ***Defense in Depth***

4-38. The depth extends from the range of the threat's indirect weapons to the individual Soldier's response to threats inside the perimeter. The support area commander can mass combat power at any of the base camps or direct the response forces, reserve, or TCF to fight from one of the base camps. MEB commanders plan fires throughout the support area up to the maximum planning range of available weapons. They may place portable obstacles around critical locations within the AO or base camp perimeters during periods of reduced visibility to disrupt the enemy plan based on visual reconnaissance and to add depth to the defense. See ATP 3-37.34 for additional information on establishing perimeters.

4-39. The base camps formed into base clusters provide mutual support to each other. The MEB can coordinate mutual support between base camps and between base clusters. This provides a series of integrated defensive positions that add to defense in depth.

### ***Strong Point***

4-40. In hostile fire areas, most base camps are planned, prepared, and executed as modified strong points because their focus is not primarily antiarmor. Normally, the modified strong point must defeat personnel, car or truck bombs, and indirect fires. If the base camp is designated a strong point, then the support area designated land owner has sited and planned it based on a detailed analysis of the terrain to best use its defensive potential.

### ***Penetrations***

4-41. The MEB must develop plans to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces in the support area. This is accomplished throughout the support area and in the outer security area or within the base camps when there is a penetration. Each base camp commander or unit assigned an AO is responsible for identifying enemy forces. Enemy threats may originate within the support area or be a larger element that penetrates the support area or base camp perimeter.

4-42. If a base camp is threatened with a penetration, the MEB commander may take the following actions in order of priority:

- Allocate immediate priority of all available indirect fires, including attack aviation or close air support, or coordinate for reinforcing fires from higher or adjacent commands to support of the threatened unit. This is the most rapid and responsive means of increasing the combat power of the threatened unit.
- Direct and reposition adjacent units to engage enemy forces that are attacking the threatened unit. This may not be possible if adjacent units are already decisively engaged.
- Commit the TCF (if available) to defeat the Level III threat.
- Commit the reserve to reinforce the threatened unit.
- Commit the reserve to block, contain, or destroy the penetrating enemy force.



4-43. The support area or base camp commander can use the following guidance to counter a penetration:

- **Maintain contact with the penetrating enemy force.** Forces may be able to delay the penetrating force by maintaining contact. The commander seeks to determine the size, composition, direction of attack, and rate of movement of the penetrating enemy force. Forces in contact must also sustain fires and close air support against the enemy to disrupt, delay, or divert their attack.
- **Take immediate actions to hold the advance or expansion of the penetration.** This may require changing task organization, adjusting adjacent boundaries and tasks, executing situational or reserve obstacles, or shifting priority of fires.
- **Move threatened units.** Based on the direction of enemy attack, units may need to move away from the penetration. These movements must be controlled to ensure that they do not interfere with counterattack plans or movements of combat forces.
- **Determine where and how to engage the penetrating enemy force.** Based on the size, composition, and direction of enemy attack, the commander selects the best location at which to engage the enemy. The reserve may counterattack into the flank of the enemy, or it may establish a defensive position in depth to defeat or block the enemy. The staff establishes control measures for the attack of the reserve. The reserve can use an engagement area or objective to orient itself to a specific location to engage the enemy. A battle position can be used to position the reserve along defensible terrain. The commander and staff develop a concept of fires and consider required adjustments to fire support coordination measures. They also decide on the commitment of directed, reserve, or situational obstacles to support the action. Traffic control is especially critical. Sufficient routes must be designated for the reserve to use, and provisions such as the use of military police and combat engineers must be taken to ensure that those routes remain clear.
- **Plan effectively.** A simple, well thought-out plan, developed during the initial planning process, greatly improves the ability of subordinates to react effectively.

4-44. MEB commanders must keep their higher headquarters informed of any enemy penetrations, and the base camp commanders must keep the MEB commander informed. The higher headquarters or MEB commander might reinforce the base camp commander with additional fires, attack aviation, security forces, or maneuver forces. Normally, in the case of a base camp penetration, the commander positions the response force or reserve according to the priority of the counterattack.

### *Counterattack*

4-45. MEB and base camp commanders use counterattacks to destroy an enemy within the support area or base camp perimeter. The units seek to slow the rate of penetration; weaken the enemy; and reduce maneuver options, momentum, and initiative and then counterattack with all available force. Timing is critical to a counterattack. Assuring the mobility of the counterattacking force is critical.

4-46. Ideally, the response force or reserve must be given warning time to prepare and maneuver. A quick verbal warning order or monitoring the command net can give the response force or reserve some warning and allow them to begin immediate movement toward their attack position to begin a counterattack. The response force or reserve issues situation reports and oral fragmentary orders on the move. Planning and preparation to a battle drill standard are needed. Within the support area, a successful defense is the defeat of enemy forces within the security area or the main battle area, if designated.

### *Fires*

4-47. The MEB must plan for Army and joint fires: indirect fires, attack aviation, and close air support throughout the support area. The commander must consider the risk and advantages of observed and unobserved fires and then incorporate this into the attack guidance and target selection standards of the concept of fires and targeting criteria.

## Critical Asset Security

4-48. *Critical asset security* is the protection and security of personnel and physical assets or information that is analyzed and deemed essential to the operation and success of the mission and to resources required for protection (ADP 3-37). Critical assets can be people, property, equipment, activities, operations, information, facilities, or materials. For example, important communications facilities and utilities, analyzed through criticality assessments, provide information to prioritize resources while reducing the potential application of resources on lower-priority assets. Stationary weapons systems might be identified as critical to the execution of military operations and, therefore, receive additional protection. The lack of a replacement may cause a critical asset to become a top priority for protection.

4-49. The MEB staff must use criticality, threat vulnerability, and threat probability to prioritize identified critical assets. Once the staff determines which assets are critical for mission success, it recommends protection priorities and establishes a protection prioritization list for the support area (see annex A). The protection prioritization list helps the MEB commander identify or assess assets that require protection prioritization within the support area. Not all assets listed on the protection prioritization list receive continuous protection. Some critical assets only receive protection assets based on available resources. It is the responsibility of the MEB staff to provide the assessment and recommended prioritization list to the commander for approval. The corps and division information operations elements are responsible for integrating and synchronizing information-related capabilities that support and complement critical asset protection against bypassed regular forces, irregular forces, and hybrid threats in the support area. The electronic warfare operations is responsible for synchronizing electronic attack against Level II and Level III threats. Coordination between the information operations/operations security (OPSEC) officers and the signal officer emphasizes electromagnetic signature masking through terrain and directional antenna usage. The protection prioritization list is continuously assessed and revised throughout each phase, transition, or major activity of an operation. See ADP 3-37 for additional information on critical assets and the protection prioritization list.

## Node Protection

4-50. Command posts and operations centers are often protected through area security techniques that involve the employment of protection and security assets in a layered, integrated, and redundant manner. This can often keep hostile threats at a distance by maximizing the standoff distance from explosive effects, while keeping the protected asset outside the range of enemy or adversary direct-fire weapons and observation. CBRN sensors may be emplaced around critical nodes to provide early warning to friendly forces of incoming enemy CBRN strikes, particularly at static sustainment areas and command and control nodes.

## High-Risk Personnel Security

4-51. *High-risk personnel* are personnel who, by their grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation, are likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets (JP 3-26). When units identify a significant risk based on a verified threat from an intelligence source to selected personnel, the local commander has the ability to organize security details from internal resources. Special precautions are taken to ensure the safety and security of these individuals and their family members. Commanders must ensure that any security details are properly trained and equipped and may request additional protective detail support if needed. See ATP 3-39.35 and DODI O-2000.22.

## Movement Corridor

4-52. A *movement corridor* is a designated area established to protect and enable ground movement along a route (ADP 3-37). Units establish a movement corridor to set the conditions to protect and enable movement of traffic along a designated surface route. Units conduct synchronized operations within the movement corridor, such as reconnaissance, security, mobility, and information collection for forces that require additional command and control, protection, and support to enable their movement. See ADP 3-37 for additional information on the establishment of a movement corridor.

## Response Force Operations

4-53. Response force operations expediently reinforce unit organic protection capabilities or complement that protection with maneuver capabilities based on the threat. Response force operations include planning for the defeat of Level I and II threats and the shaping of Level III threats until a designated TCF arrives for decisive operations. A response force with appropriate fire support (usually designated by the area commander) is tasked to deal with Level I or II threats located in the support area. The response force delays a Level III threat until a TCF arrives. Each threat level or any combination of levels may exist throughout the operational environment. See JP 3-10 for additional information on the levels of threat.

4-54. Each designated base camp commander is responsible for organizing and preparing a quick reaction force. The quick reaction force can be from assigned, attached, or OPCON units or supporting or reinforcing combat forces directed to conduct combat operations in support of the unit. These forces operate under control of the BDOC to defeat Level I and some Level II threats and delay Level III threats until the support area designated land owner responds with their response force or a TCF.

4-55. When needed, the base camp quick reaction force assembles and counterattacks by fire and maneuver to eliminate the threat. The base camp commander commits the quick reaction force, reconstitutes the quick reaction force, and notifies the base cluster commander, if assigned, or the support area commander. This notification becomes the warning order for the base cluster or support area reserve.

4-56. The commitment of a quick reaction force becomes a significant command and control and potential fratricide problem that rehearsals and standing operating procedures can mitigate. Since the two friendly forces may converge, typically the higher commander assumes command and control of the engagement.

### *Reserve*

4-57. When assigned the support area, the MEB commander should dedicate a reserve. The reserve is a dedicated force withheld from action and committed at a decisive moment. The reserve provides the commander flexibility to exploit success or deal with a tactical setback. The force is not committed to perform any other task.

4-58. The reserve is positioned to respond quickly to unanticipated missions. A reserve maintains protection from enemy fires and detection by maximizing covered and concealed positions, wide dispersion, and frequent repositioning.

4-59. When resources (or METT-TC) permit, the MEB may begin defensive operations with a company reserve and allocate additional forces to the reserve as operations progress. In other cases, the MEB initial reserve force might be as small as a platoon.

4-60. A reserve is usually assigned an AA or base camp. Maintaining and positioning a reserve is a key requirement for achieving depth within the defense. The MEB commander and staff determine the size and position of the reserve based on the accuracy of knowledge about the enemy and the ability of the terrain to accommodate multiple enemy COAs. When the MEB commander has intelligence about the enemy and the maneuver options of the enemy are limited, the MEB can maintain a smaller reserve. If knowledge of the enemy is limited and the terrain allows the enemy multiple COAs, then the MEB needs a larger reserve. This gives the MEB commander the required combat power and reaction time to commit the reserve effectively in the support area. To employ the reserve, the MEB commander must be able to track the threat, assess information, and employ and control fires.

### *Tactical Combat Force*

4-61. The MEB defeats Level I, II, and III (if assigned a TCF) threats within the support area. Tenant units defeat Level I and some Level II threats within their assigned base camps. The support area commander employs a response force (military police units if task-organized to the support area designated land owner) within their AO to assist tenants or convoy commanders to defeat Level II threats and delay Level III threats when they are not capable of doing it themselves. The MEB commander employs a TCF to defeat Level III threats in the support area.

## Lines of Communications Security

4-62. The security and protection of LOCs and supply routes are critical to military operations because most support traffic moves along these routes. The security of LOCs and supply routes (rail, pipeline, highway, and waterway) presents one of the greatest security challenges in the support area. Route security operations are defensive in nature and are terrain-oriented. A route security force may prevent an enemy or adversary force from impeding, harassing, or destroying traffic along a route or portions of a route by establishing a movement corridor. Organizations task-organized to the designated support area land owner (engineer, CBRN, military police, EOD) are capable of providing security and protection of LOC and supply routes that are identified as critical to military operations. Units conduct synchronized operations (mobility and information collection) within the movement corridor. A movement corridor may be established in a high-risk area to facilitate the movement of a single element or to accommodate an enduring operation. See appendix B for additional information on LOC.

## Checkpoints and Combat Outposts

4-63. It is often necessary to control the freedom of movement in an AO for a specific period of time or as a long-term operation. This may be accomplished by placing checkpoints and combat outposts along designated avenues and roadways or on key terrain identified through METT-TC. Checkpoints are used for controlling, regulating, and verifying movement; combat outposts are used for sanctuary, support, information collection, or area denial. See ATP 3-90.4 for more information on combat outposts.

### *Checkpoints*

4-64. Checkpoints monitor and control the movement of personnel and vehicles, inspect cargo, enforce laws and regulations, and provide information. They may be used simply to coordinate movement and surveillance activities. Establishing checkpoints is a critical measure in a commander's overall security efforts. A commander designates checkpoints along a movement route to assist marching units in complying with the timetable. The movement overlay identifies critical points along the route where interference with movement might occur. Commanders position traffic control posts along the route to prevent congestion and confusion. They may be manned by military police or other unit personnel. These Soldiers report to the appropriate area movement control organization when each convoy, march column, and march serial arrives and completes passage of their location. Checkpoints may indicate critical terrain features, help to coordinate air-ground integration, and enable effective civil control.

### *Combat Outpost*

4-65. A combat outpost is a reinforced observation post that is capable of conducting limited combat operations. While the factors of METT-TC determine the size, location, and number of combat outposts established by a unit, a reinforced platoon typically occupies a combat outpost. Mounted and dismounted forces can employ combat outposts. Combat outposts are usually located far enough in front of the protected force to preclude enemy ground reconnaissance elements from observing the actions of the protected force. Considerations for employing combat outposts—

- Allow security forces to be employed in restrictive terrain that precludes mounted security forces from covering the area.
- Can be used when smaller observation posts are in danger of being overrun by enemy forces infiltrating into and through the security area.
- Enable a commander to extend the depth of their security area.
- Should not seriously deplete the strength of the main body.

4-66. Forces manning combat outposts can conduct aggressive patrolling, engage and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements, and engage the enemy main body before their extraction. The commander should plan to extract their forces from the combat outpost before the enemy has the opportunity to overrun them.

## Convoy Security

4-67. A convoy security operation is a specialized type of area security operation conducted to protect convoys. The MEB conducts convoy security operations when there are insufficient friendly forces to continuously secure routes in the support area and there is a significant danger of enemy or adversary ground action directed against the convoy. The MEB commander may also conduct convoy security in conjunction with route security operations. Planning includes designating units for convoy security; providing guidance on tactics, techniques, and procedures for units to provide for their own security during convoys; or establishing protection and security requirements for convoys carrying critical assets. Local or theater policy typically dictates when and which convoys receive security and protection and the configuration of the convoy. See ATP 4-01.45 for more information on convoy security training requirements and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

## Port Area and Pier Security

4-68. The MEB may provide area security for port and pier areas. The joint force commander and subordinate joint force commanders ensure that port security plans and responsibilities are clearly delineated and assigned. If MEB commanders are assigned a port area as part of the support area, they must develop and organize plans to ensure that forces are trained, led, and equipped to concentrate the necessary combat power at the decisive time and place to protect or secure port areas and cargo, as necessary. The patrol of harbors and anchorages is generally the mission of a dedicated port security unit and may include waterfront security operations. See JP 3-10 for additional information on port security units.

## Area Damage Control

4-69. The MEB performs area damage control before, during, or after incidents within the assigned support area or in support of a corps or division specific mission (see JP 3-10). Area damage control is performed to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects. To help minimize its effects, area damage control includes actions to recover immediately, resume operations, and maintain and restore order. Area damage control involves centralized planning and decentralized execution. Commanders assess their ability to withstand hostile action and man-made or natural disasters and then allocate area damage control resources to mitigate the hazards in consonance with their importance to the mission.

4-70. Following an enemy attack, the MEB or base camp commander may need to reorganize while transitioning from defensive to routine operations. *Reorganization* is all measures taken by the commander to maintain unit combat effectiveness or return it to a specific level of combat capability (FM 3-90-1).

4-71. Incident management plans and area damage control are key components to a successful protection plan. The area damage control plan includes subordinate and support area or base camp tenant responsibilities that include the specific actions to be taken before, during, and after incidents. The area damage control plan is synchronized and coordinated with the defensive and protection plans (including survivability and AT plans). The IPB process and safety techniques are used to identify and assess hazards and make recommendations to prevent or mitigate the effects of those hazards. Training and rehearsals assist in the ability to respond immediately to damage. Assessment teams advise the commander on the extent of damage and estimated time for recovery.

4-72. Incident management plans should also include the contingency of CBRN contamination mitigation, including clean and dirty route management, equipment and personnel decontamination points, decontamination logistical replenishment planning, and a prioritized list of capabilities that must be decontaminated first. The goal should be to limit the impact of CBRN attacks on normal operations, preventing cross-contamination while protecting personnel and rapidly reconstituting combat power.

4-73. Area damage control is a tiered response. As a part of area security operations, all commanders conduct area damage control to prevent, respond, and recover from the negative effects of enemy or adversary action that can diminish combat power with local assets and resources. The base camp is the next level of area damage control response with their capabilities. Each base camp defense plan includes an area damage control plan. The designated support area land owner coordinates area damage control within the support area according to the area damage control plan, additional support from higher headquarters, or specialized

units. Within an assigned AO, the designated support area land owner may keep centralized control of some area damage control assets to permit allocation at the critical point and time.

4-74. Area damage control may include such measures as—

- Establishing fire breaks and lanes.
- Hardening structures.
- Dispersing key capabilities and resources.
- Coordinating with higher headquarters and CA to use host-nation support for area damage control.
- Locating, isolating, and containing the incident.
- Isolating danger or hazard areas.
- Mitigating personnel and material losses.
- Reestablishing security.
- Assessing the situation and damage.
- Supporting decontamination operations.
- Searching and rescuing entrapped personnel.
- Eliminating pockets of enemy resistance.
- Providing civil control.
- Removing and exposing of explosive ordnance.
- Clearing rubble.
- Clearing down trees.
- Providing electrical power services.
- Providing fire protection services.
- Controlling flood damage.
- Determining contaminated areas.
- Reorganizing or reconstituting a response force or reserve.
- Repairing facilities.
- Improving security or defenses.
- Integrating and assisting with mass casualty incident plans.
- Replacing or shifting information collection assets and observers.
- Recovering and repairing damaged equipment.
- Repairing critical facilities, routes, or LOCs within the AO.

## LOCAL SECURITY

4-75. *Local security* is low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy (ADP 3-90). Local security provides immediate protection to friendly forces and is typically performed by a unit for self-protection, but it may also be provided by another unit when the security requirements are greater than the unit security capabilities. Local security may include countermobility and survivability activities. Area security activities take advantage of the local security measures performed by all units (regardless of their location) in an AO, and all local security activities should be linked to the broader area security activities.

4-76. Local security includes any local measure taken by units that protect against enemy actions. It involves avoiding enemy detection or deceiving the enemy about friendly positions and intentions. Local security prevents a unit from being surprised, and it is an important part of maintaining the initiative. The requirement for maintaining local security is an inherent part of all operations. Units use active and passive measures to provide local security.

4-77. Active local security measures include but are not limited to—

- Observation posts.
- Patrols.
- Unmanned aerial systems.

- The establishment of specific levels of alert within the unit. The commander adjusts those levels based on the factors of METT-TC.
  - The establishment of stand-to times. The unit standard operating procedure details the unit activities during the conduct of stand-to.
- 4-78. Passive local security measures include but are not limited to—
- Camouflage and concealment.
  - Movement control.
  - Noise and light discipline.
  - Proper communications procedures.
  - The employment of available ground sensors.
  - The use of night vision devices and daylight sights to maintain surveillance over the area immediately around the unit.
  - The incorporation of emission control to prevent the enemy from detecting, identifying, and locating friendly forces.

### TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE

4-79. A *tactical combat force* is a rapidly deployable, air-ground mobile combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets assigned to and capable of defeating Level III threats including combined arms (JP 3-10). The TCF is task-organized to the MEB commander when it is required to defeat Level III threats throughout the support area. An infantry battalion, Stryker battalion, or a combined arms battalion can be assigned as the TCF for the support area commander's AO. The TCF size, composition, and response time is based on mission requirements.

### PERSONNEL RECOVERY

4-80. *Army personnel recovery* refers to the military efforts taken to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel (FM 3-50). Personnel recovery is the overarching term for operations that focus on recovering isolated personnel before captivity. Isolation refers to a tactical situation that requires isolated personnel to evade or operate in captivity as an extension of the battlefield. Every unit must have procedures in place to recover personnel.

4-81. Commanders must integrate personnel recovery throughout operations. This requires an understanding of the complex, dynamic relationships between friendly forces, the enemy, and the operational environment. This understanding helps commanders visualize and describe their intent for personnel recovery and assists them in developing focused isolated Soldier guidance. Personnel recovery guidance is contained in various parts of the order, including the base order, appropriate annexes, appendixes, tabs, and exhibits. For additional information on personnel recovery, see FM 3-50.

### AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT

4-82. The MEB is staffed with an air defense airspace management cell that is responsible for planning, coordinating, integrating, and controlling air defense and airspace management to integrate brigade airspace, including AMD. The MEB staff coordinates with the division joint air ground integration center as required to deconflict and integrate the airspace within the support area. See FM 3-52 and JP 3-52.

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**Note.** The air defense airspace management cell capabilities resident in a MEB does not have the full brigade aviation element or United States Air Force Tactical Air Control Party found in maneuver brigades.

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4-83. The air defense airspace management cell has digital connectivity to theater level with the tactical airspace integration system. Fires and airspace use is deconflicted in the fires cell and air defense airspace management cell. The MEB commander can request airspace coordinating measures, such as unmanned aircraft system holding areas and base camp defense zones, to manage airspace. Key tasks may include coordinating manned and unmanned Army aviation support.

4-84. The air defense airspace management cell continuously plans for and coordinates airspace requirements and monitors operations of all airspace users to support operations and those transiting through the support areas airspace. This continuous situational understanding is critical to ensure that the brigade can react to any situation requiring immediate use of airspace, such as offensive and defensive fires, unplanned unmanned aircraft system launches, or a diversion of aviation assets in real time.

## STABILITY

4-85. Ultimately, stability is the set of conditions in which a local populace regards its governance institutions as legitimate and its living situation as acceptable and predictable. Actions to maintain or reestablish stability first aim to lessen the level of violence. These actions also aim to enable the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions. Lastly, these actions encourage the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior. A *stability operation* is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0).

4-86. The MEB may be required to conduct some minimum essential stability tasks for its supported echelon within an assigned support area while concurrent, large-scale combat is occurring in the larger AO of the headquarters they are supporting. The MEB would effectively perform in an economy-of-force role in one area with the relative weight of their effort on stability tasks as other units focus the relative weight of their effort in offensive or defensive tasks in another area. The MEB may be required to conduct minimum essential stability tasks simultaneously with support area operations. See ADP 3-0 and ADP 3-07 for additional information on stability tasks.

4-87. Stability operations are conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Primary Army stability tasks include the following:

- Establish civil security.
- Conduct security cooperation.
- Provide support to establish civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Provide support to governance.
- Provide support to economic and infrastructure development.

4-88. When properly task-organized, the MEB can conduct or support stability operations; however, they have little capability to conduct the primary Army stability task of support to governance and economic development. These tasks are conducted in a complementary, reinforcing, and concurrent manner with other agencies or multinational forces. While the stability tasks are essential for success, without complementary inform and influence efforts that explain these actions to the population, success may be unattainable.

## MOBILITY AND COUNTERMOBILITY

4-89. *Mobility* is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (JP 3-36). As described in FM 3-90-1, mobility is the key to successful operations. Its major focus is to enable friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield or an AO.



4-90. *Mobility tasks* are those combined arms activities that mitigate the effects of obstacles to enable freedom of movement and maneuver (ATP 3-90.4). Mobility includes the following primary tasks:

- Conduct breaching.
- Conduct clearing (areas and routes).
- Conduct gap crossing.
- Construct and maintain combat roads and trails.
- Construct and maintain forward airfields and landing zones.
- Conduct traffic management and control.

4-91. When properly task-organized, the MEB staff can plan, direct, integrate, and control engineer, military police, and CBRN capabilities and request EOD capabilities necessary to clear an area, location, or line for communication of obstacles or impediments. The support area designated land owner conducts this operation throughout the support area to support movement corridors, rapid runway repairs, and horizontal construction. See ATP 3-90.4 for additional information on mobility.

4-92. Countermobility operations are those combined arms activities that use or enhance the effects of natural or man-made obstacles to deny enemy freedom of movement and maneuver. When properly task-organized, the MEB commander's staff can plan direct, integrate, and control the capabilities necessary to alter the mobility of adversaries. The MEB may conduct this operation in the support area as part of security and defense while ensuring that these countermobility actions do not impair future friendly force freedom of movement. Key countermobility tasks may include (see ATP 3-90.8)—

- Site obstacles.
- Construct, emplace, or detonate obstacles.
- Mark, report, and record obstacles.
- Obstacle integration.

## **REAR COMMAND POST**

4-93. The rear command post provides echelon (corps and division) oversight, planning, synchronization, direction and/or coordination of sustainment activities, terrain management, protection, stability tasks, boundary and operational transition management, host-nation coordination and support, and integration (reception, staging, and onward movement) of arriving forces throughout rear areas.

4-94. When established, the rear command post is the command post that deconflicts, prioritizes, coordinates, and synchronizes rear area operations for the supported echelon (corps/division) and should not duplicate the tasks assigned to the MEB, BCT, or sustainment brigade. It has similar responsibilities to the tactical command post, and in certain cases may take the fight from the main command post. The rear command post enables the corps or division commander by unifying the efforts of combat, functional, and multifunctional units that operate in the support area and, when applicable, the rear area to ensure uninterrupted support to the main effort. When synchronized, these efforts enable the corps or division to maintain tempo and operational reach.

4-95. The rear command post echelon headquarters task-organizes units for network connectivity, life support, transportation, medical support, and security for the rear command post. Corps and division commanders may use the rear command post to provide command supervision and general officer oversight for—

- Performing terrain management and movement control.
- Defeating threats.
- Enabling sustainment operations.
- Coordinating and synchronizing protection.
- Enabling stability operations.
- Enabling transitions.

## Chapter 5

# Sustainment

*Sustainment* is the provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion. (ADP 4-0). Sustainment provides freedom of action, extends operational reach, and prolongs endurance to unified land operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. Sustainment provides the support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment. MEB commanders use their assets to maintain the momentum of operations and enhance the capabilities of their forces. This chapter discusses sustainment of the MEB.

### PLANNING

5-1. The sustainment warfighting function is defined as the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (see ADP 3-0). Sustainment encompasses the elements of logistics, personnel services, financial management, and HSS required for mission accomplishment. Logistics is planning and executing the movement and support of forces. The elements of logistics include maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution, operational contract support, and general engineering. The Army HSS is support and services performed, provided, and arranged by the Army Medicine to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the behavioral and physical well-being of personnel by providing direct patient care that includes medical treatment (organic and area support) and hospitalization, medical evacuation (to include medical regulating), and medical logistics (to include blood management). Personnel services include human resources (HR) support, legal support, religious support, and band support. Financial management encompasses finance operations and resource management.

5-2. This chapter discusses how the MEB sustains itself. The MEB is a unique organization that can expand to employ a wide range of capabilities, each with their own sustainment needs. Operational planners must ensure that MEB sustainment planning is conducted as early as possible and continue to monitor as the mission changes to effectively sustain the MEB throughout the operation. Because the MEB no longer has a BSB, the MEB S-4 must work with the higher echelon headquarters and the sustainment command headquarters to conduct METT-TC analysis to ensure that the MEB has the required sustainment support to ensure mission success.

5-3. The MEB staff synchronizes operations across all six warfighting functions to generate and maintain combat power. It plans tactical logistics. The MEB S-4, S-1, brigade surgeon, and chaplain are the principal sustainment planners for the MEB. The S-4 is the principal sustainment executor. Logistics synchronization for the brigade is done between the primary staff sections and S-4. The MEB commander designates who will oversee logistics synchronization for the brigade. The MEB commander may elect to use the deputy commanding officers, the XO, or the brigade S-4 to oversee logistics synchronization for the brigade. The MEB obtains the logistics preparation of the theater information and products from the supporting sustainment brigade and the higher echelon headquarters concept of operations and integrates this with their IPB. The S-4 and S-1 maintain a continuous sustainment estimate during all operations. They use the logistics estimate to determine sustainment capabilities, anticipate support requirements, identify and resolve shortfalls, and develop support plans. They integrate into all planning what is needed to develop and synchronize sustainment with maneuver and fire plans. Sustainment commanders and planners must thoroughly understand the mission, tactical plans, and the MEB commander's intent.

5-4. The MEB must know the—

- Mission, task organization, and concept of operations for all subordinate battalions and attachments under MEB control.
- Higher headquarters sustainment plans.
- Known and anticipated branch plans and sequels.
- Density of personnel and equipment of each subordinate unit.
- Known and anticipated enemy situation and capabilities.
- Capabilities and limitations of subordinate units.
- Host-nation support and contract capabilities.
- Size and capabilities of local population civil infrastructure.
- Capacity and capability of local government and nongovernmental agencies.
- Cultural considerations in the MEB AO.

5-5. The MEB does not necessarily need to establish a brigade support area. Given the MEB mission, it will typically be collocated with a support battalion providing general support to the MEB and other units in the support area. MEB operations may require split-based sustainment operations. The S-4 may conduct replenishment operations within the MEB support AO or within the AO of a unit that the MEB is supporting.

5-6. Logistics planners must understand the MEB current and projected sustainment capabilities. They use information collected from personnel and logistics reports and operational reports to determine the personnel, equipment, and supply status of each unit within the MEB. They consider the disposition and condition of all supporting sustainment units and individual unit-level capabilities. They analyze this data and the current situation to determine the MEB logistical capabilities and limitations.

5-7. Sustainment planners must anticipate and understand support requirements of a tactical plan or COA. Running estimates are a critical tool for achieving shared understanding. The S-1, surgeon, and S-4 analyze all COAs and modifications to current plans. They assess their sustainment feasibility, identify support requirements, and determine requirements for synchronization. The S-1 and S-4, like the commander, must visualize how the operation will unfold to determine critical requirements for each sustainment element. They consider the requirements for each sustainment element during all phases of an operation. They analyze each COA and consider the—

- Type and duration of the operation.
- Task organization, tasks, and sustainment requirements of subordinate forces.
- Medical and maintenance profile of units to be assigned or attached.
- Ramifications of tactical operations such as gap (river) crossings, tactical pauses, long movements, preparatory fires, or defenses.
- Need for special equipment, supplies, or service.
- Requirements to separate, disassemble, configure, uncrate, or trans-load supplies above normal requirements.
- Requirements for reconstitution.
- Required varieties and quantities of all classes of supplies (especially Class III, V, VIII, and IX).
- Requirements for support of reconnaissance forces, security operations, or deception efforts.
- Need for Class IV/V obstacle material.
- Positioning of combat trains and other supporting logistics elements.
- Casualty numbers and likely locations.
- Large-scale decontamination operations in support of BCTs or consequence management decontamination operations.
- Area damage control preparations and response.
- Minimal essential stability tasks to support the operation.

5-8. The S-4's analysis also includes estimated attrition based on likely outcomes of subordinate missions. Analysis of estimated attrition primarily focuses on critical systems. The S-1, in coordination with the surgeon, assists by projecting potential personnel losses (through development of the casualty estimate). To perform this analysis, current unit personnel and equipment densities, standard planning factors, operations logistics software, and historical data are used in conjunction with the operations logistics plan. When analyzing COAs, this projection helps the commander understand the potential losses and associated risks of each COA.

5-9. To understand the MEB capabilities and determine support requirements, logistics planners apply a METT-TC analysis to the operation. Table 5-1 gives an example of general sustainment considerations for tactical operations.

**Table 5-1. Logistics considerations for tactical operations**

<b>Mission</b>	MEB mission and commander's intent.
	Concept of operations.
	Higher headquarters mission and concept of operations.
	Higher headquarter concept of support.
	Type and duration of operation.
	Required supply rate.
	Controlled supply rate.
<b>Enemy</b>	Enemy capabilities and tactics that could threaten sustainment operations.
	Enemy unconventional tactics that could threaten sustainment operations.
	Anticipated amount of detainees.
<b>Troops</b>	MEB task organization to include supporting logistics units.
	Location and condition of all units, including sustainment units.
	Current and projected status of personnel, equipment, and classes of supply.
	Availability and status of services.
	Unit level sustainment capabilities.
<b>Terrain and Weather</b>	Effects of weather and terrain on sustainment operations.
	Additional sustainment requirements of the MEB due to weather and terrain.
	Condition of infrastructure such as roads and bridges.
<b>Time Available</b>	Impact on the ability to build-up supplies and replenish units.
	Planning and preparation time for sustainment units.
	Impacts of time on support requirements and distribution methods.
<b>Civil Considerations</b>	Host nation support and contract services.
	Impact of civilian and refugee movements.
	Potential for hostile reactions by civilians against sustainment operations.
	Potential detainee or resettlement requirements.
	Provision of minimum essential stability tasks.
<b>Legend:</b>	
MEB	maneuver enhancement brigade

5-10. The S-4, in coordination with the surgeon, S-1, and all elements of the MEB staff, must balance support requirements and priorities with available sustainment capabilities. They consider existing stockage, anticipated receipts, capacities, and capabilities. They must assess the status of all sustainment functions (logistics, personnel services, financial management, and HSS) required to support the MEB and compare them to available capabilities. They identify potential shortfalls then take or recommend actions to eliminate or reduce their effect on the operation.

5-11. When a sustainment shortfall is identified, the sustainment planners take every available action to eliminate or reduce its effect. They must understand its potential impact on the force, the risk it presents to mission accomplishment, its duration, and which requirement exceeded the unit capabilities. They analyze the shortfall to determine its cause, such as battle losses, supply availability, resource availability (equipment, man-hours), or distribution shortfall. They consider the following actions to resolve a shortfall:

- Shifting supplies or assets by phase of the operation.
- Requesting support or additional assets from higher headquarters.
- Using alternative distribution methods.
- Considering the use of host-nation support.
- Considering pre-positioning supplies or attaching additional sustainment capabilities to subordinate forces.
- Modifying the COA or plan.

5-12. Based on the logistics estimate, the sustainment planners develop support plans. The overall sustainment plan is briefly described in the concept of support. The concept of support provides all commanders and staffs a general understanding of the commander's priorities and how the operation will be logistically supported. Detailed sustainment plans are outlined in Annex F (Sustainment) to the MEB OPORD or as part of a fragmentary order. The S-4 and executive officer closely monitor the implementation of the sustainment plan. They adjust sustainment operations or shift resources to account for changing situations or changes in priorities (such as shifting the main effort) or to replace lost sustainment capabilities.

5-13. The MEB staff plans for the sustainment of a frequently changing task organization with augmentation from other unified action partners. Attachments to the MEB should arrive with their appropriate sustainment capability. When a company, team, or detachment is attached to the MEB, the S-4 integrates their sustainment into the MEB support system. The attachment orders must clearly state who will provide medical, maintenance, and recovery services and provide support for Class III, V, and IX supplies. When receiving attachments, sustainment planners require some basic information from the sending unit S-4 to anticipate how to develop a synchronized concept of support. When the unit is detached, the MEB assists forwarding any on-hand supplies or equipment to the gaining unit. Some considerations include the following:

- The number and type of vehicles, personnel by specialty, and weapons systems and their current status.
- Organic medical and maintenance capabilities.
- When the attachment is effective and for how long.
- What support assets are coming with each attachment to the MEB.
- When and where linkup will occur, and who is responsible for linkup.

## **LOGISTICS ELEMENTS**

5-14. Logistics is primarily the responsibility of the MEB S-4 and is provided primarily by the MEB organic HSC or requested through the support battalion providing sustainment to the support area. Logistics elements include maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution, operational contract support, and general engineering. General engineering is primarily planned by the S-3 staff and is not discussed in this chapter. Field services will be discussed further and include mortuary affairs, shower and laundry capabilities, field feeding, and water purification. Operational contract support is discussed in greater detail because much of this information is new or emerging doctrine.

### **Maintenance**

5-15. How maintenance is accomplished in the MEB is dependent on the individual unit capabilities. Most units, either organic or attached to the MEB, have some organic field maintenance capabilities. The HSC maintenance support platoon provides field maintenance for organic MEB units and supplemental field maintenance support to other units attached as required. If the echelon of maintenance required is outside the MEB capability, the MEB S-4 section will coordinate with the echelon sustainment brigade for support.

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*Note.* Planners need to coordinate for TCF maintenance support to accompany the unit when assigned to a MEB. The MEB does not have maintainers with the proper skills or tools to support main weapons systems (tanks, armored personnel carriers, or Stryker vehicles).

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## Transportation

5-16. The MEB HSC and signal company have 100 percent mobility of their TOE equipment and supplies in a single lift using organic equipment. If MEB assigned and attached units require additional lift support, they will request it through channels to the MEB S-4.

## Supply

5-17. Supply is the process by which required materials and equipment are made available to supported units to help them accomplish the mission. This process includes all classes of supply, to include Class VIII. MEB resupply to subordinate elements is coordinated through the S-4 sections. Supplies are provided through the distribution processes established below.

## Field Services

5-18. Field services maintain combat strength of the force by providing for its basic needs and promoting its health, welfare, morale, and endurance. Field services provide life support functions. ATP 4-42 has additional information on field services. Field services include—

- **Shower and laundry.** There is no organic laundry or shower capability in the MEB. Support must be coordinated by S-4 with the sustainment brigade in general support of the MEB.
- **Field feeding.** With the exception of a TCF, units typically assigned to a MEB do not have organic field feeding support. The MEB S-4 will need to coordinate field feeding support and Class I supplies with the supporting sustainment command.
- **Water.** The MEB has limited organic capability to produce, store, and transport purified water to meet the MEB support requirements. The MEB S-4 will coordinate with the support sustainment brigade or command for water support requirements.
- **Mortuary affairs.** The MEB is dependent on its supported command for processing and evacuating remains. Internal to the MEB, handling teams are predesignated at the unit level. It is the unit responsibility to evacuate remains to the mortuary affairs collection point.
- **Medical.** The MEB is dependent on the Medical Brigade (Support) for all AHS support above Role 1 medical treatment.

## Distribution

5-19. Distribution is the primary means to prolong endurance. *Distribution* is the operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistic system to deliver the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right time” to support the geographic combatant commander (JP 4-0). The MEB is typically co-located with the division sustainment brigade or division sustainment support battalion. The MEB S-4 will coordinate with the supporting sustainment unit for Class I, II, III, IIIP, IV, V, VII, and IX supplies and with the Medical Brigade for Class VIII supplies.

5-20. There are two standard methods of supply conducted in an operational environment: supply point distribution and unit distribution. The MEB can use either method when supplying subordinate units.

- **Supply point distribution.** Supply point distribution requires the supported unit to move to a supply point to pick up supplies. The supply point issues materiel to the supported unit that transports their supplies back to the unit with organic transportation. Supply points include supply support activities for all supply classes.
- **Unit distribution.** When unit distribution is used, the supported unit receives supplies in its area. The logistics release point, established by the supported unit, may be any place on the ground where unit vehicles pickup supplies and then take them forward to their unit.

5-21. Normally the MEB uses the supply point distribution method from the supporting sustainment brigade or a combat sustainment support battalion. If the MEB S-4 determines that the unit distribution method is required, it coordinates with the supporting sustainment unit to distribute among all the bases in the base cluster, METT-TC-dependent, or those MEB subordinate units would travel to an established supply distribution point to pick up supplies. The MEB would not establish supply points for its subordinate units unless a high degree of control was required. See ATP 4-42 for additional information on the two methods of supply for an operational environment.

### Operational Contract Support

5-22. The Army has consolidated its theater support contracting capabilities into separate table of organization and equipment units. These units include the contracting support brigades and contracting battalions. Operational contract support is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of combatant commander-directed operations. The contracting support brigade and its subordinate unit primary missions include—

- Providing theater support contracting capabilities to deployed ARFOR and to other military forces, governmental agencies, and/or nongovernmental agencies, as directed.
- Assisting theater Army and ARFOR staffs in developing operational contract support plans (annex W of the OPLAN). These plans will include mission-specific contracting and contractor-specific integration, synchronization, and management information.
- Coordinating the execution of planned theater support contracts and coordination with the supporting Army field support battalion.

5-23. The contracting support brigades are regionally aligned to a specific theater Army. When deployed, the contracting support brigade has a direct support relationship with the ARFOR commander in the operational area and executes its contracting mission under the direction and contracting authority of the Army contracting command. The ARFOR commander may further delegate this direct support relationship per METT-TC factors. Theater support contracting actions in support to the MEB will be executed in a general support manner.

5-24. Contracting is a key source of support for deployed armed forces in unified land operations. Because of the importance and unique challenges of operational contract support, the MEB commander and staff need to fully understand their role in planning and managing contracted support in the AO. Current doctrine describes three broad types of contracted support—**theater support**, **external support**, and **systems support**.

- **Theater support contracts.** Theater support contracts are contracts awarded by contingency contracting officers deployed to the operational area. They provide the ability to rapidly contract for logistics support within a theater of operations. Theater-support contractors acquire goods, services, and minor construction support, usually from local commercial sources, to meet the immediate needs of operational commanders. Theater support contracts are the type of contract typically associated with contingency contracting. MEBs often require activity for theater support contract support actions related to both internal and external missions. Theater support contracts in support of MEB missions are normally executed on a regionally aligned basis.
- **External support contracts.** External support contracts provide a variety of mission support to deployed forces. External support contracts may be prearranged contracts or contracts awarded during the contingency itself to support the mission and may include a mix of U.S. citizens, third country nationals, and local national subcontractor employees. The largest and most commonly used external support contract is logistics civil augmentation program. This Army program is commonly used to provide life support, transportation support, and other supporting functions to deployed ARFOR and other elements of the joint force. In most operations, the MEB is a supported unit, but not the requiring activity when it comes to logistics civil augmentation program support.
- **Systems support contracts.** Systems support contracts are prearranged contracts awarded by and funded by acquisition program executive officers and project/product management officers. These contracts provide technical support, maintenance support and, in some cases, Class IX support for a variety of nontype classified and selected other Army weapon and support systems. System contractors, made up of U.S. citizens, provide support in garrison, and may deploy with the force

to both training and real-world operations. They may provide either temporary support during the initial fielding of a system, called interim contracted support, or long-term support for selected materiel systems, often referred to as contractor logistic support. The MEB does not normally play a significant role in planning or coordinating system support contracts, other than coordinating and executing support of system-support-contract-related personnel.

5-25. For the MEB, the major challenge is ensuring that operational contract support actions are properly incorporated and synchronized with the overall MEB support effort. The MEB S-4 and resource management staff will be trained on their roles in the operational contract support planning and execution process as described below:

- **Contract management.** The MEB will nominate a contracting officer representative (sometimes referred to as contract officer technical representative) for every service contract, and a receiving official for all supply contracts. Quality contracting officer representative (approved by the supporting contracting office) and receiving official support is key to ensuring that contractors provide the service or item according to the contract. The MEB must also manage funding for each contract and request funds in advance of the depletion of current funds, or all contract work will stop until adequate funds are available.
- **Contract close out.** The MEB is responsible for completing receiving reports, certifying that contracted goods or services were received by the Army, and submitting the receiving report to the contracting officer so the contract can be closed out and the contractor paid. For more information on operational contract support, see ATP 4-10.

## PERSONNEL SERVICES

5-26. Personnel services complement logistics by planning for and coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel. Personnel services are an integral part of unit readiness. The MEB S-1 is the staff officer responsible for personnel services. MEB capabilities include HR support, financial management, legal support, and religious support.

### Human Resources Support Section

5-27. HR support is an important component of sustainment. The MEB S-1 is responsible for providing or coordinating the operational and tactical level HR support that sustains the combat potential of the force and the morale and welfare of Soldiers. HR support is also found at the sustainment brigade level on a general support or an area basis. They provide HR companies, which can provide planning and coordination for HR operations, and liaison and technical support to their customers and supported units.

5-28. The MEB S-1 section serves as a conduit between subordinate units and the higher echelon HR organization. Because of distances and communications capabilities, all reports are submitted through the MEB S-1 for forwarding to the appropriate agency. Initial personnel data is submitted by subordinate and attached units of the MEB by using digital technology. The MEB S-1 also provides information to subordinate units on the status of evacuated/hospitalized personnel and adjusts personnel requirements accordingly.

5-29. HR support includes personnel accountability, strength reporting, personnel information management, personnel readiness management, casualty operations management, essential personnel services, personnel support, postal operations, and morale welfare and recreation and community support.

#### *Personnel Accountability*

5-30. The brigade S-1 is responsible for coordinating and managing personnel accountability in the MEB. Personnel accountability is the process for recording by-name data on Soldiers when they arrive at, and depart from, the command.

#### *Strength Reporting*

5-31. Replacement companies under command and control of replacement battalions at theater or corps level receive, support, and process replacements. They coordinate movement with the appropriate movement



control element. The division replacement section coordinates with the assistant chief of staff, logistics and higher headquarters transportation officer for movement to the brigade support area. The MEB S-1 processes and assigns replacements to battalions. The battalion S-1 further assigns replacements to the company level.

### ***Personnel Information Management***

5-32. Personnel information management encompasses the collection, processing, storage, display, and dissemination of information about Soldiers, units, and civilians. Personnel information management is controlled by the brigade S-1 through the battalion S-1s within the command.

### ***Personnel Readiness Management***

5-33. The purpose of the personnel readiness management system is to distribute Soldiers to units based on documented requirements or authorizations to maximize mission preparedness and provide the manpower needed. Personnel accounting is the system for recording by-name data on Soldiers when they arrive at, and depart from, units when their duty status changes (such as from duty to hospital) and when their grade changes. Strength reporting is a numerical end product of the accounting process. It starts with strength-related transactions submitted at unit level and ends with a database update through all echelons to the Total Army Personnel Database. Personnel readiness managers, casualty managers, and replacement managers utilize a personnel information database when performing their missions.

### ***Casualty Operations Management***

5-34. The casualty reporting system is a by-name personnel accounting system that begins at unit level with the person who knows that a casualty has occurred. DA Form 1156, *Casualty Feeder Card*, is forwarded as soon as possible. Reports are prepared using the Army Casualty Information Processing System–Light and are sent directly to Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA), with copies furnished to other higher headquarters, as appropriate. The medical section or the medical support company (area support) provides the disposition log daily to the MEB S-1.

### ***Essential Personnel Services***

5-35. Essential personnel operations are coordinated with subordinate commands and higher command assistant chief of staff, personnel (G-1). This includes providing the MEB with timely and accurate personnel services that efficiently update Soldier status, readiness, and quality of life. This allows commanders to effectively manage the force, including actions supporting individual career advancement and development, proper identification documents for security and benefits entitlements, and recognition of achievements and service (see FM 4-0).

### ***Personnel Support***

5-36. *Personnel support* encompasses command interest/human interest programs, and retention functions. Personnel support also includes substance abuse and prevention programs, enhances unit cohesion, and sustains the morale of the force (FM 4-0).

### ***Postal Operations***

5-37. The brigade S-1 is responsible for coordinating and providing postal operations support with subordinate units of the brigade. The MEB has no dedicated postal support capability and must perform this function with on-hand assets. The Military Postal Service serves as an extension of the United States Postal Service; therefore, services are regulated by public law and federal regulation. Postal operation requires significant logistics and planning for transportation and mail handling (see FM 4-0).

### ***Morale, Welfare, and Recreation***

5-38. The brigade S-1 coordinates morale, welfare, and recreation support with subordinate commands in the MEB. This includes providing Soldiers and other authorized personnel with recreation and fitness activities, goods, and services.

## Financial Management

5-39. The MEB has no special financial management capability. The MEB S-3 coordinates for support from mobile financial management teams. Financial management organizations provide support to MEB units and individual Soldiers on an area basis. During deployments, mobile teams from corps-level financial management organizations provide support to forward units. Financial management support units are also found at the sustainment brigade level on a general support or an area basis. They provide financial management services, to include paying and preparing certified vouchers, receiving collections, establishing financial management control processes, tracking commitments and obligations, providing vendor support and accounting, and establishing disbursing station numbers and a local depository.

## Legal Support

5-40. The brigade legal section provides and supervises legal support to MEB leaders. The brigade legal section provides and coordinates all legal support for the MEB. Paralegal Soldiers in the MEB and subordinate battalions provide paraprofessional and ministerial support for legal actions. The United States Army Trial Judiciary and United States Army Trial Defense Service are independent organizations that provide military judge and trial defense services to the MEB.

## Religious Support

5-41. The MEB chaplain is the personnel staff officer responsible for implementing the commander's religious support program. The religious support mission is to assist commanders in the responsibility to provide for the free exercise of religion and to provide religious, moral, and ethical leadership to sustain a ready force of resilient and ethical Soldiers and leaders. UMTs and chaplain sections, comprised of at least one chaplain and one religious affairs specialist, possess three core competencies: nurture the living, care for the wounded, and honor the dead. The religious support mission is executed through two required capabilities—providing support and advising the command. For additional information on religious support, see ATP 1-05.3, ATP 1-05.4, and FM 1-05.

## HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT SECTION

5-42. HSS encompasses all support and services performed, provided, and arranged by the AHS to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the behavioral and physical well-being of Army personnel and, as directed, unified action partners. HSS includes the following—

- Medical treatment (organic and area support).
- Hospitalization.
- Medical evacuation (including medical regulating).
- Medical logistics (including blood management).

5-43. The MEB surgeon's duties and responsibilities for HSS and FHP may include—

- Advising the commander on the health of the MEB units.
- Planning and coordinating for health services support and FHP for MEB units (including but not limited to medical treatment, medical logistics, medical evacuation, hospitalization, veterinary services, dental services, combat and operational stress control, operational public health, and laboratory services).
- Developing and coordinating the AHS OPLANs to support the MEB commander's decisions, planning guidance, and intent in support of unified land operations.
- Recommending task organization of medical units/elements in support to MEB units to satisfy all medical mission requirements.
- Monitoring troop strength of medical personnel and their utilization.
- Evaluating and interpreting medical statistical data.
- Monitoring medical logistics and blood management operations in the theater.
- Monitoring medical regulating and patient tracking operations for MEB personnel.

- Determining MEB training requirements for first aid and for maintaining wellness of the command.
- Recommending disposition instructions for captured enemy medical supplies and equipment.
- Submitting to the supporting medical brigade (support) and higher headquarters surgeon.
- Coordinating and synchronizing—
  - Health education and combat lifesaver training for the MEB.
  - The mass casualty plan developed by the S-3.
  - Medical care of detainees and civilians in the MEB operations area.
  - The treatment of sick, injured, or wounded Soldiers.
- Performing medical evacuation, including the use of both of the Army's dedicated medical evacuation platforms (air and ground).
- Coordinating medical logistics, including Class VIII resupply, blood management, and medical maintenance.
- Creating health-related reports and battlefield statistics.
- Collecting and analyzing operational data for on-the-spot adjustments in the medical support structure and for use in post operations combat and materiel development studies.

### ***Brigade Surgeon Section***

5-44. The brigade surgeon section assists the surgeon with the responsibilities listed above. The brigade surgeon section monitors and tracks operations with medical communications for combat casualty care for applicable automated systems and provides updated information to the surgeon and the SPO chief for building HSS and FHP capabilities to meet the MEB medical requirements identified by the surgeon. Other functions include—

- Planning for the AHS support for the MEB units.
- Identifying and coordinating through the division surgeon section and as authorized directly with medical brigade elements to support the requirements of the MEB.
- Coordinating and managing medical evacuation and treatment capabilities.
- Coordinating and managing Class VIII resupply capabilities and ensuring that medical support is integrated and synchronized with the MEB operational support plan.

5-45. The brigade surgeon section is normally staffed with medical operations officers and a medical operations noncommissioned officer. The primary function of this brigade surgeon section is medical planning to ensure that adequate AHS support is available and provided in a timely and efficient manner for the MEB and its attached units. This brigade surgeon section coordinates with the division surgeon section and, as authorized, with the medical brigade for the placement and support requirements of medical units and elements located in the MEB operations area.

5-46. The medical treatment team is assigned to the brigade surgeon section and supports the MEB headquarters. The team provides Role 1 AHS support for MEB headquarters personnel. The medical treatment leader is a physician assistant and works under the supervision of the MEB surgeon.

### ***Medical Evacuation***

5-47. Medical evacuation provides en route care and emergency medical care. En route medical care enhances the Soldier's prognosis, reduces long-term disability, and provides a vital linkage between the roles of care necessary to sustain the patient during transport. Most units assigned/attached to the MEB have organic ground evacuation capability. The MEB sustainment medical operations officer should coordinate medical evacuation for those units assigned or attached to the MEB that does not have an organic evacuation capability.

### *Medical Logistics*

5-48. The MEB surgeon coordinates medical logistics support with both the supported higher echelon surgeon and the EAB medical brigade providing general support to the AO. This includes planning and executing all Class VIII supply support, contract support, medical hazardous waste disposal, and distribution of medical gases.

### **Force Health Protection**

5-49. The MEB surgeon's duties and responsibilities for FHP may include—

- Identifying potential medical-related commander's critical information requirements (PIR and friendly force information requirements) as they pertain to the health threat, ensuring that they are incorporated into the command's intelligence requirements.
- Coordinating for veterinary support for food safety, animal care, and veterinary services, to include zoonotic diseases transmissible to man.
- Planning for and implementing FHP operations to counter health threats.
- Planning for and accomplishing redeployment and post deployment health assessments.
- Establishing and executing a medical surveillance program.
- Establishing and executing an occupational and environmental health surveillance program.
- Recommending combat and operational stress control, behavioral health, and substance abuse control programs.
- Ensuring that general threat, health threat, and medical intelligence considerations are integrated into AHS support OPLANs and orders.
- Advising MEB commanders on FHP CBRN defensive actions, such as immunizations, use of chemoprophylaxis, pretreatments, and barrier creams.
- Maintaining situational understanding by coordinating for current FHP information with surgeon staffs of the next higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters.
- Coordinating and synchronizing:
  - Combat and operational stress control programs with the division surgeon section and supporting medical brigade.
  - Operational public health services, to include identification of health threats.
  - Preventive dentistry support programs for the prevention of cavities and gum disease.
  - Support of area medical laboratories, to include the identification of biological and chemical environmental hazards, as required.

5-50. Preventive medicine personnel provide operational public health support for the identification of endemic and emerging diseases and for employment of the countermeasures required to address health threats in the brigade area. Effective and timely FHP measures are essential for sustaining combat power during continuous operations. The MEB first line of protection is the use of operational public health measures and unit field sanitation teams to protect against food, water, and vector-borne diseases and environmental injuries. Coordination with supporting veterinary teams is also required for food safety and quality assurance surveillance and for assisting in foodborne and zoonotic disease surveillance and control. For additional support, MEB subordinate units coordinate through their medical treatment team or the brigade surgeon section for operational public health preventive medicine. Personnel from the medical brigade (support) provide operational public health provide advice and consultation in the areas of disease and nonbattle injury, environmental sanitation, epidemiology, entomology, medical surveillance, limited sanitary engineering services, and pest management.

5-51. The mental health section provides training and advice in the control of stressors and the promotion of positive combat and operational stress behaviors. The mental health element provides early identification, handling, and management of misconduct stress behavior. The section also assists and counsels personnel with personal, behavioral, or psychological problems and may refer suspected neuropsychiatric cases for evaluation. These programs are designed to maximize the return-to-duty rate by identifying combat stress reactions and providing rest/restoration within or near the Soldier's unit area. See FM 4-02 for additional information.

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## Appendix A

# Synchronize and Coordinate Protection

The support area commander synchronizes, integrates, and organizes protection capabilities and resources to protect the force, preserve combat power, reduce risk, and mitigate identified vulnerabilities throughout the support area. Criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability are some of the most significant considerations in determining protection priorities. Although all military assets are important and all resources have value, the capabilities they represent are not equal in their contribution to overall mission accomplishment. Determining and directing protection priorities may involve the most important decisions the support area commander makes and their staffs support.

## PROTECTION

A-1. *Protection* is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0). Protection serves as a warfighting function and as a continuous and enduring activity. It integrates all protection capabilities to secure routes, prevent casualties, and protect forces.

A-2. Protection is not linear—planning, preparing, executing, and assessing protection is continuous and enduring. Protection preserves capability, momentum, and tempo. Protection is an important contributor to operational reach and closely relates to endurance and momentum. It also contributes to the commander's ability to extend operations in time and space. Commanders and staffs synchronize, integrate, and organize capabilities and resources throughout the operations process to preserve combat power, enable freedom of action, and prevent or mitigate the effects of threats and hazards.

A-3. The principles of protection provide Army leaders and staffs with a context for implementing protection efforts, developing schemes of protection, and allocating resources (see ADP 3-37 for additional information on the protection principles):

- Comprehensive.
- Integrated.
- Layered.
- Redundant.
- Enduring.

## PROTECTION WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

A-4. The *protection warfighting function* refers to the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP 3-0). Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants), systems, and physical assets of the United States and unified action partners. The protection warfighting function enables commanders to preserve force integrity and combat power by integrating protection capabilities to safeguard friendly forces, civilians, and infrastructure. Commanders incorporate protection when they understand and visualize capabilities available for protection. Some of these actions or effects may be generated through the combined integration of the eight elements of combat power, resulting in an increasingly effective and efficient scheme of protection.

A-5. Military operations are inherently complex. Commanders must deliberately plan and integrate the ethical application of military force against an enemy while protecting the force and preserving combat power. Commanders develop protection strategies for each phase or transition of an operation. They integrate and synchronize protection tasks and systems to reduce risk, mitigate identified vulnerabilities, and act on opportunity.

## PROTECTION TASKS

A-6. Army operations and missions are executed through tactical tasks. The support area commander and staff incorporate protection tasks when they understand and visualize available protection capabilities. Protection tasks enable the designated support area land owner to preserve the force, safeguard bases/base camps, and secure routes throughout the support area. When properly integrated and synchronized, the tasks and systems that comprise the protection warfighting function increase the probability of mission success.

A-7. The support area commander and their staff must consider all protection tasks and systems and apply them as appropriate. Each task and its associated system are typically associated with a staff or staff proponent that performs specific duties. The protection warfighting function tasks—

- **Conduct survivability operations.** *Survivability* is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (ATP 3-37.34). Survivability operations enhance the ability to avoid or withstand hostile actions by altering the physical environment (see ATP 3-37.34 for additional information on survivability). They accomplish this by providing or improving camouflage, cover, and concealment via the following four tasks:
  - Constructing fighting positions.
  - Constructing protective positions.
  - Hardening facilities.
  - Employing camouflage, cover, concealment, and movement.
- **Provide FHP.** The Army FHP consists of measures that promote, improve, or conserve the behavioral and physical well-being of Soldiers comprised of preventive and treatment aspects of medical functions that include: combat and operational stress control, dental services, veterinary services, operational public health, and laboratory services. This enables a healthy and fit force, prevents injury and illness, and protects the force from health hazards. Its mission is under the protection warfighting function. Successful FHP measures require deliberate and consistent analysis and communication of health threats to inform commanders and individuals; they also require the implementation and enforcement of unit and individual countermeasures (to include exposure controls, chemoprophylaxis, and immunizations against diseases both endemic and those used as warfare agents) needed to reduce associated health risks. Commanders and unit leaders must remain informed and proactively engaged to ensure the health of the force; reduce health threats, stressors, and risks; and promote all available countermeasures. See FM 4-02 for additional information on FHP.
- **Conduct CBRN operations.** CBRN operations include the employment of tactical capabilities that anticipate and counter the entire range of CBRN threats and hazards (see FM 3-11 for additional information). The activities to implement protection include the following:
  - Understand the environment.
  - Conduct CBRN information collection through reconnaissance and surveillance.
  - Conduct CBRN defense.
  - Cooperate with and support partners.
  - Establish CBRN response efforts to minimize the effects of a CBRN incident.
- **Provide EOD and force protection support.** EOD is a key asset in the protection of military and civilian personnel, critical assets, infrastructure, and public safety. EOD units provide support through the supporting EOD headquarters across the range of military operations by detecting, locating, identifying, diagnosing, rendering safe, exploiting, and disposing of all explosive ordnance, improvised explosive devices, and weapons of mass destruction. See ATP 4-32.1 and ATP 4-32.3 for additional information on EOD.

- **Coordinate AMD.** AMD protects the force from manned and unmanned aerial attacks and enemy aerial surveillance. Coordinating AMD support protects friendly forces from the effects of threatening ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned aircraft systems. It enables the freedom of action commanders to require synchronized maneuver and protects critical capabilities from interdiction. See FM 3-01 for additional information on AMD.
- **Conduct personnel recovery.** *Army personnel recovery* refers to the military efforts taken to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel (FM 3-50). Personnel recovery is the overarching term for operations that focus on recovering isolated personnel before captivity. See FM 3-50 for additional information on personnel recovery.
- **Conduct detention operations.** Detention involves the detainment of a population or group that poses some level of threat to military operations. Detention operations are conducted by military police to shelter, sustain, guard, protect, and account for populations (detainees or U.S. military prisoners [U.S. military personnel ordered to confinement]) as a result of military or civil conflict or to facilitate criminal prosecution. Detention operations are essential to setting the conditions for consolidation of gains during large-scale combat. They lessen enemy capability to prolong a conflict through protracted resistance by irregular forces. See FM 3-63 for additional information on detention operations.
- **Conduct risk management.** *Risk management* is the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). The Army uses risk management to help maintain combat power while ensuring mission accomplishment during current and future operations. It is the Army process for helping organizations and individuals make informed decisions to reduce or offset risk. Risk management applies to operations and to nonoperational activities. Using this process increases operational effectiveness and the probability of mission accomplishment. It is a systematic way of identifying hazards, assessing them, and managing the associated risks. Commanders, staffs, Army leaders, Soldiers, and DA Civilians integrate risk management into planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. See ATP 5-19 for additional information on risk management.
- **Implement physical security procedures.** Physical security consists of physical measures that are designed to safeguard personnel and to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents and safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, theft, and terrorism. The Army employs physical security measures in depth to protect personnel, information, and critical resources in all locations and situations against various threats through effective security policies and procedures. See ATP 3-39.32 for additional information on physical security.
- **Apply AT measures.** AT consists of proactive defensive measures used to deter, detect, delay, deny, and defend individuals and property against terrorist acts. These measures include limited response and containment by security forces. AT measures are required to be incorporated into all military operations. See ATP 3-37.2 for additional information on AT.
- **Conduct police operations.** Police operations encompass policing and the associated law enforcement activities to control and protect populations and resources and to facilitate the existence of a lawful and orderly environment. Police operations and the associated skills and capabilities inherent in that function provide the fundamental basis on which all other military police disciplines are framed and conducted. See ATP 3-39.10 for additional information on police operations.
- **Conduct populace and resources control.** The function of populace and resources control is conducted in conjunction with, and as an integral part of, all military operations. Populace and resources control functions consist of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. These controls are normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. Combatant commanders define and enforce these controls during large-scale combat, consolidation of gains, and times of civil or military emergency. See ATP 3-39.30 and ATP 3-57.10 for additional information on populace and resources control.



- **Area security.** *Area security* is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area (ADP 3-90). Area security may be the predominant method of protecting the support areas that are necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control forces. Area security often focuses on the following activities:
  - Tactical AA security.
  - Base/base camp defense.
  - Critical asset security.
  - Node protection.
  - High-risk personnel security.
  - Movement corridors.
  - Response force operations.
  - LOC security.
  - Checkpoints and combat outposts.
  - Convoy security.
  - Port area and pier security.
  - Area damage control.
- **Conduct cyberspace and security defense.** The Army secures and defends the network through a defense-in-depth approach, incorporating layered security and defenses. The tasks to secure and defend cyberspace are perform cybersecurity activities and conduct defensive cyberspace operations—internal defensive measures. See FM 3-12 for more information for cyberspace planning considerations.
- **Conduct electromagnetic protection actions.** Many Army capabilities, including communications, cyberspace operations, information collection, space capabilities, target detection, and precision guided munitions, depend on assured access to the electromagnetic spectrum. The tasks to protect Army access to the electromagnetic spectrum are conduct electronic protection actions, conduct defensive electronic attack, and conduct electromagnetic spectrum management.
- **Conduct OPSEC.** *Operations security* is a capability that identifies and controls critical information, indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations, and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities (JP 3-13.3). Effective and disciplined OPSEC is employed during decisive action. Units routinely employ OPSEC measures to reduce, eliminate, and conceal essential elements of friendly information. Units use directional antennas and terrain masking to conceal tactical communication signatures and reduce detection by enemy direction-finding capabilities. This helps to prevent enemy or adversary reconnaissance and other information collection capabilities from gaining an advantage because the threat has knowledge of identifiable or observable unit-specific information. For additional information on OPSEC for division and below, see ATP 3-13.3.

## PROTECTION SUPPORT TO ARMY OPERATIONS

A-8. Protection emphasizes the importance of planning and expanding protection priorities, to include protecting mission partners, civilian populations, equipment, resources, infrastructure, and cultural landmarks across the range of military operations. The synchronization, integration, and organization of protection capabilities and resources to preserve combat power from the effects of threats and hazards are essential. When properly integrated and synchronized, the tasks and systems that relate to protection effectively protect the force, preserve combat power, and increase the probability of mission success.

A-9. Operations to shape include unit home station activities, including maintaining operational readiness, training, and contingency planning. Combined exercises and training, military exchange programs, and foreign military member attendance at Army schools are examples of home station shaping activities. At home stations, protection tasks maintain safe and secure environments that enable commanders to generate

and preserve combat power during training and deployment tasks that are associated with Army sustainable readiness requirements that are in support of unified land operations.

A-10. Army protection capabilities support operations to prevent or deter interference during mobilization and prevent or mitigate attacks during the transit of ARFOR and cargo, along movement routes, and at initial staging areas and subsequent AAs where uncertain threat conditions require a delicate balance between protection and building combat power.

A-11. At the division level and higher, the integration of the protection warfighting function and tasks is conducted by a designated protection cell and the chief of protection. At brigade level and below, the integration occurs more informally with the designation of a protection coordinator from the brigade staff or as an integrating staff function assigned to a senior leader. The protection coordinators participate in various forums to facilitate the continuous integration of protection tasks into the operations process. This occurs through protection working groups, staff planning teams, and staffs conducting integrating processes.

A-12. During large-scale combat, commanders and staffs deliberately plan and integrate protection capabilities to protect the force, preserve combat power, reduce risk, mitigate identified vulnerabilities, and act on opportunity. Figure A-1 shows the integration and synchronization of protection tasks in support of a gap crossing, movement corridor, and support area. Commanders also develop a scheme of protection for the transition of each phase of an operation or major activity. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting protection priorities between offensive, defensive, and stability tasks also involves a transition. Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution so that a force can maintain the momentum and tempo of operations. A force is vulnerable during transitions. Commanders and staffs also identify potential threats and hazards during planning and identify protection priorities during the transition and follow-on operations.




Figure A-1. Protection in support of large-scale combat operations

Legend:	
AMD	air missile defense
BSA	brigade support area
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CIV	civilian
CSC	convoy support center
DET	detention
DSA	division support area
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EW	electronic warfare
FHP	force health protection
OPSEC	operations security
PL	phase line
PRC	populace and resources control
SUST	sustainment
TCP	traffic control post

**Figure A-1. Protection in support of large-scale combat operations (continued)**

A-13. As ARFOR transition from large-scale combat to the consolidation of gains, the focus transitions to area security and stability tasks. Army operations to consolidate gains correspond with stabilize and enable civil authority phases of a joint operation. Commanders continuously consider the synchronization, integration, and organization of protection capabilities necessary to consolidate gains and achieve the desired end state. Consolidate gains activities include the relocation of displaced civilians, detainee operations, the reestablishment of law and order, providing humanitarian assistance, and the restoration and protection of critical infrastructure

## ASSESSMENTS

A-14. Initial protection planning requires various assessments to establish protection priorities. Assessments include threats, hazards, vulnerability, and criticality. These assessments are used to determine which assets can be protected given no constraints, and which assets can be protected with available resources. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide all assets the same level of protection. For this reason, the support area commander makes decisions on acceptable risks and provides guidance to the staff so that they can employ protection capabilities based on the protection priorities.

A-15. Protection planning is a continuous process that must include an understanding of the threats and hazards that may impact operations from the deep area back to the strategic support area. Protection capabilities are aligned to protect critical assets and mitigate effects from threats and hazards. The protection cell and protection working group must prioritize the protection of critical assets during operations to shape, operations to prevent, large-scale combat, and during the consolidation of gains that best supports the commander's end state.

A-16. An important aspect of protection planning involves the support area. If conditions in the support area degrade, it is detrimental to the success of operations. A degraded support area also inhibits the ability to shape the deep area for the BCTs involved in close operations. Therefore, the protection of support areas requires planning considerations equal to those in the close areas.

## THREAT AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT

A-17. Personnel from all staff sections and warfighting functions help conduct threat and hazard analysis. This analysis comprises a thorough, in-depth compilation and examination of information and intelligence that address potential threats and hazards in the AO. The integrating processes (IPB, targeting, and risk management) provide an avenue to obtain the threats and hazards that are reviewed and refined. Threat and hazard assessments are continuously reviewed and updated as the operational environment changes.

A-18. Considerations for the threat and hazard assessment include—

- Enemy and adversary threats.
  - Operational capabilities.
  - Intentions.
  - Activities.

- Foreign intelligence entities (see ATP 2-22.2-1 and ATP 2-22.2-2).
- Criminal activities.
- Civil disturbances.
- Health and safety hazards.
- CBRN toxic industrial materials.
- Cyberspace threats.
- Other relevant aspects of the operational environment.
- Urban environments.
- Incident reporting and feedback points of contact.

A-19. The threat and hazard assessment results in a comprehensive list of threats and hazards and determines the likelihood or probability of occurrence of each threat and hazard. Table 1-1, page 1-2, shows examples of potential threats and hazards in an AO. In the context of assessing risk, the higher the probability or likelihood of a threat or hazard occurring, the higher the risk of asset loss.

### CRITICALITY ASSESSMENT

A-20. A criticality assessment identifies key assets that are required to accomplish a mission. It addresses the impact of a temporary or permanent loss of key assets or the unit ability to conduct a mission. A criticality assessment should also include high-population facilities (recreational centers, theaters, sports venues) that may not be mission-essential. It examines the costs of recovery and reconstitution, including time, expense, capability, and infrastructure support. The staff gauges how quickly a lost capability can be replaced before providing an accurate status to the commander. The general sequence for a criticality assessment is—

- **Step 1.** List the key assets and capabilities.
- **Step 2.** Determine if critical functions or combat power can be substantially duplicated with other elements of the command or an external resource.
- **Step 3.** Determine the time required to substantially duplicate key assets and capabilities in the event of temporary or permanent loss.
- **Step 4.** Set priorities for the response to threats toward personnel, physical assets, and information.

A-21. The protection cell staff and working group continuously update criticality assessments during the operations process. As the staff develops or modifies a friendly COA, information collection efforts confirm or deny information requirements. As the mission or threat changes, initial criticality assessments may also change, increasing or decreasing the subsequent force vulnerability. The protection cell members monitor and evaluate these changes and begin coordination among the staff to implement modifications to the protection concept or recommend new protection priorities. PIR, running estimates, MOEs, and MOPs are continually updated and adjusted to reflect the current and anticipated risks associated with the operational environment.

### VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

A-22. A vulnerability assessment is an evaluation (assessment) to determine the magnitude of a threat or hazards effect on an installation, personnel, a unit, an exercise, a port, a ship, a residence, a facility, or other site. It identifies the areas of improvement required to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or terrorism or attacks against threats. The staff addresses who or what is vulnerable and how it is vulnerable against threats. The vulnerability assessment identifies physical characteristics or procedures that render critical assets, areas, infrastructures, or special events vulnerable to known or potential threats and hazards. The general sequence of a vulnerability assessment is—

- **Step 1.** List assets and capabilities and the threats against them.
- **Step 2.** Determine the common criteria for assessing vulnerabilities.
- **Step 3.** Evaluate the vulnerability of assets and capabilities.

A-23. Vulnerability evaluation criteria may include the degree to which an asset may be disrupted, quantity of the asset available (if replacement is required due to loss), dispersion (geographic proximity), and key physical characteristics.

A-24. DOD has created several decision support tools to perform criticality assessments in support of the vulnerability assessment process, including mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability, population, and proximity (MSHARPP) and criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER) (see ATP 3-37.2 for more information on MSHARPP and CARVER)—

- **MSHARPP.** The purpose of the MSHARPP tool is to analyze likely terrorist targets and assess their vulnerabilities from the inside out, with focus on the U.S. military mission. Consideration is given to local threats, the probable means of attacks, and variables that affect dispositions of potential targets. After developing a list of potential targets, MSHARPP selection factors are used to assist in further refining the assessment by associating a weapon or tactic with a potential target to determine the efficiency, effectiveness, and plausibility of the attack method and to identify vulnerabilities related to the target. When the MSHARPP values for each target or component are assigned, the sum of the values indicates the highest-value target (for a particular mode of attack) within the limits of enemy known capabilities. See ATP 3-37.2 for additional information on the MSHARPP tool.
- **CARVER.** The CARVER matrix is a valuable tool in determining criticality and vulnerability. For criticality purposes, CARVER helps assessment teams and commanders (and the assets that they are responsible for) determine assets that are more critical to the success of the mission. This also helps determine which resources should be allocated to protect critical assets (personnel, infrastructure, and information). The CARVER matrix assesses a potential target from a terrorist perspective to identify what the enemy might perceive as a good (soft or valuable) target.

## ESTABLISH PROTECTION PRIORITIES

A-25. Criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability are some of the most significant considerations in determining protection priorities that become the subject of support area commanders' guidance and the focus of area security operations. The scheme of protection is based on the mission variables and should include protection priorities by area, unit, activity, or resource.

A-26. Although all military assets are important and all resources have value, the capabilities they represent are not equal in their contribution to decisive operations or overall mission accomplishment. Determining and directing protection priorities may involve the most important decisions that commanders make and their staffs support. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide the same level of protection to all assets.

A-27. Most prioritization methodologies assist in differentiating what is important from what is urgent. In protection planning, the challenge is to differentiate between critical assets and important assets and to further determine what protection is possible with available protection capabilities. Event-driven operations may be short in duration, enabling a formidable protection posture for a short time; condition-driven operations may be open-ended and long-term, requiring an enduring and sustainable scheme of protection. In either situation, the support area commander provides guidance on prioritizing protection capabilities and categorizing important assets.

## PROTECTION PRIORITIZATION LIST

A-28. Protection prioritization lists are organized through the proper alignment of critical assets. The commander's priorities and intent and the impacts on mission planning determine critical assets. A *critical asset* is a specific entity that is of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of a nation to continue to function effectively (JP 3-26). Critical assets can be people, property, equipment, activities, operations, information, facilities, or materials. For example, important communications facilities and utilities, analyzed through criticality assessments, provide information to prioritize resources while reducing the potential application of resources on lower-priority assets. Stationary weapons systems might be identified as critical to the execution of military operations and, therefore, receive additional protection. The lack of a replacement may cause a critical asset to become a top priority for protection.

A-29. The protection cell and working group use information derived from the support area commander's guidance, the IPB, targeting, risk management, warning orders, the critical asset list and defended asset list,

and the mission analysis to identify critical assets. Critical assets at each command echelon must be determined and prioritized.

A-30. Protection cells and working groups can develop criticality, vulnerability, and threat probability values to help prioritize critical assets. Figure A-2 provides an example of how criticality, vulnerability, and threat probability values can help determine risk. Table A-1 provides an example of a protection risk analysis table.




Figure A-2. Example criticality, vulnerability, and threat probability values

Table A-1. Example protection risk analysis table

Asset	C (1-4)	V (1-3)	T (1-5)	Risk Analysis Total C x V x T
Command post	4	2	4	32
Signal nodes	3	2	4	24
Movement corridor	2	2	4	16
Population center	2	3	2	12
<b>Legend:</b> C                   criticality T                   threat V                   vulnerability				

A-31. The protection prioritization list is a key protection product developed during initial assessments. The protection cell and working group must use criticality, threat vulnerability, and threat probability to prioritize identified critical assets. Once the protection working group determines which assets are critical for mission success, it recommends protection priorities and establishes a protection prioritization list. It is continuously assessed and revised throughout each phase or major activity of an operation:

- Criticality is the degree to which an asset is essential to accomplish the mission. It is determined by assessing the impact that damage to, or destruction of, the asset will have on the success of the operation. Damage to an asset may prevent, significantly delay, or have no impact on the success of the plan.
  - **Catastrophic.** Complete mission failure or the inability to accomplish the mission, death or total disability, the loss of major or mission-critical systems or equipment, major property or facility damage, mission-critical security failure, or unacceptable collateral damage.
  - **Critical.** Severely degraded mission capability or unit readiness, total disability, partial disability, temporary disability, extensive damage to equipment or systems, significant damage environment, security failure, or significant collateral damage.
  - **Marginal.** Degraded mission capability or unit readiness; minor damage to equipment or systems, property, or the environment; lost days due to injury or illness; or minor damage to property or the environment.

- **Negligible.** Little or no adverse impact on mission capability, first aid or minor medical treatment, slight equipment or systems damage (remaining fully functional or serviceable), or little or no property or environmental damage.
- Threat vulnerability measures the ability of a threat to damage the target (asset) using available systems (people and material). Asset vulnerability is greater if a lower-level threat (Level I) can create damage or destruction that would result in mission failure or severely degrade its mission capability. If an asset can withstand a Level I or Level II threat, its vulnerability ability is less and may not require additional protection assets, depending on asset criticality. The following mitigating factors must be considered when assessing the vulnerability of a target: survivability (the ability of the critical asset to avoid or withstand hostile actions by using camouflage, cover [hardening], concealment, and deception), the ability to adequately defend against threats and hazards, mobility and dispersion, and recoverability (which measures the time required for the asset to be restored, considering the availability of resources, parts, expertise, manpower, and redundancies).
  - **Level I threat.** Agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, terrorists, civil disturbances.
  - **Level II threat.** Small tactical units. Irregular forces may include significant standoff weapons threats.
  - **Level III threat.** Large tactical force operations, including airborne, heliborne, amphibious, infiltration, and major air operations.
- Threat probability assesses the probability that an asset will be targeted for surveillance or attack by a credible/capable threat. Determinations of the intent and capability of the threat are key in assessing the probability of attack.
  - **Frequent.** Occurs very often, known to happen regularly. Examples are surveillance, criminal activities, cyberspace attacks, indirect fire, and small-arms fire.
  - **Likely.** Occurs several times, a common occurrence. Examples are explosive booby traps/improvised explosive devices, ambushes, and bombings.
  - **Occasional.** Occurs sporadically, but is not uncommon. Examples are air-to-surface attacks or insider threats, which may result in injury or death.
  - **Seldom.** Remotely possible, could occur at some time. Examples are the release of CBRN hazards or the employment of weapons of mass destruction.
  - **Unlikely.** Presumably, the action will not occur, but it is not impossible. Examples are the detonation of containerized ammunition during transport or the use of a dirty bomb.

A-32. The protection prioritization list helps Army commanders to identify or assess assets that require protection prioritization within their assigned areas. Not all assets listed on the protection prioritization list receive continuous protection. Some critical assets only receive protection assets based on available resources. It is the responsibility of the protection working group to provide the assessment and recommended protection prioritization list to the commander for approval (see table A-2).

Table A-2. Example protection prioritization list

Rec Priority	Asset	Location	Notes	Requirement	Threat	Mitigation	Unit Tasks
1	DIVARTY Q53 (Radar)	PL Bobcat	Critical for Counterfire missions, 4x	1 x MP CO	ENY Air, IDF(G-6, 9A51, 9A52, 2S19), SPF, EW Jamming	Survivability Position; Passive Air Defense; CAV SQDN & MP CO securing	SPF, A, 3-265 1-172 CAV 233 MP CO
2	DIVARTY Q36 (Radar)	PL Bobcat	Critical for Counterfire missions, 3x	1 x MP CO	ENY Air, IDF(G-6, 9A51, 9A52, 2S19), SPF, EW Jamming	Survivability Position; Passive Air Defense; CAV SQDN & MP CO securing	A, 3-265 1-172 CAV 233 MP CO
3	DIVARTY Q37 (Radar)	PL Bobcat	Critical for Counterfire missions, 3x	1 x MP CO	ENY Air, IDF(G-6, 9A51, 9A52, 2S19), SPF, EW Jamming	Survivability Position; Passive Air Defense; CAV SQDN & MP CO securing	A, 3-265 1-172 CAV 233 MP CO
4	3-197 MLRS	PL Bobcat	BN assigned to DIVARTY, 16x	1 x Avenger PLT	IDF(G-6, 9A51, 9A52, 2S19), Chemical Attack	Survivability Position; Passive Air Defense; CAV SQDN & MP CO securing	A, 3-265 1-172 CAV 233 MP CO
5	2-18 HIMARS	OBJ Viking	BN assigned to DIVARTY, 16x	1 x Avenger PLT	IDF(G-6, 9A51, 9A52, 2S19), Chemical Attack	Survivability Position; Passive Air Defense; CAV SQDN & MP CO securing	A, 3-265 1-172 CAV 233 MP CO
6	814-206, 957-206 MRBC	In place on river	Maintain LOCs	1 x Avenger PLT; Secure by ABCTs	SPF, IDF(G-6, 9A51, 9A52, 2S19)	Passive Air Defense; defended in echelon	B, 3-265(-)
7	Division Support Area	With 404MEB	Open additional LOC	1 x Avenger PLT; Secure by MEB	SPF, IDF(G-6, 9A51, 9A52, 2S19)	Passive Air Defense; defended in echelon	B, 3-265(-)
8	C/3-4 Patriot	With DMAIN	Corps Asset	1 x MP PLT	SPF, IDF(G-6, 9A51, 9A52, 2S19), Chemical Attack	1 x MP PLT Organic Avenger System	3/333 MP CO(-)
9	1-201FA BN	PL Bobcat	Fires support DIVARTY, M109A6 BTYS	1 x Avenger PLT	Enemy Air, IDF(G-6, 9A51, 9A52, 2S19)	Passive Air Defense	A, 3-265 1-172 CAV 233 MP CO
10	1-82FA BN, 1-7FA BN	With organic BDE	Fires support to Maneuver Units, M109A6 BTYS	3 x Avenger PLTs	Enemy Air, IDF(G-6, 9A51, 9A52, 2S19)	Passive Air Defense	B, 3-265(-) C, 3-265(-)
11	CL III, V, & VII Re-supply Missions	Ganja-PL Giants	TACON for Convoy Security	2 x MP CO	SPF, IDF(G-6, 9A51, 9A52, 2S19)	MP Convoy Security	252 MP CO 253 MP CO
12	265 ADA BN (Avengers)	Various	Necessary for Protection Plan of other PPL	1 x PLT per Battery (3 x PLT total)	Chemical Attack, SPF		Secure by supported units

Defended Asset List (DAL) – those critical assets with air defense units assigned for AMD.

Critical assets with units designated to provide additional security beyond self-secure.

**Legend:**


- ABCT armored brigade combat team
- ADA air defense artillery
- AMD air missile defense
- BDE brigade
- BN battalion
- BTYS battery
- CAV cavalry
- CO company
- CL class
- DIV division
- DIVARTY division artillery
- DMAIN division main command post
- FA field artillery
- ENY enemy
- EW electronic warfare
- HIMARS high mobility artillery rocket system
- IDF indigenous forces
- IBCT infantry brigade combat team



**Table A-2. Example protection prioritization list (continued)**

<b>Legend:</b>	
LOC	lines of communication
MEB	maneuver enhancement brigade
MLRS	multiple launch rocket system
MP	military police
MRBC	multi-role bridge company
PL	phase line
PLT	platoon
PPL	protection prioritization list
SEAD	suppression of enemy air defense
SOF	special operations forces
SQDN	squadron
TACON	tactical control

A-33. Changes to protection prioritization should be anticipated and assets reassessed as transitions occur throughout operations or with changes to the commander’s priorities (see figure A-3).



**Figure A-3. Example of protection prioritization during transitions**

## SCHEME OF PROTECTION DEVELOPMENT

A-34. The scheme of protection describes how protection tasks support the commander’s intent and concept of operations. It uses the commander’s guidance to establish the priorities of support to units for each phase of the operation. A commander’s initial protection guidance may include protection priorities, civil considerations, protection task considerations, potential protection decisive points, high-risk considerations, and prudent risk. Figure A-4 provides an example of a scheme of protection.

(U) References: Refer to base OPORD.	
(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU	
1. (U) Situation. Refer to base OPORD.	
2. (U) Mission. Refer to base OPORD.	
3. (U) Execution.	
<p>(1) (U) Scheme of Protection. During division operations priority of protection support is focused on the protection prioritization list: Division Level - division fires, division support area, bridging assets, division mission command nodes and lines of communication. Air missile defense assets will be arrayed to support division artillery and protect critical assets throughout division's area of operations. Priority for military police forces is to conduct area security throughout the division support area, main supply route security and traffic control in support of gap-crossing, provide convoy security for high value convoys in support of sustainment, and establish a division holding area to conduct detainee operations. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) forces will provide CBRN defense, establish CBRN response, and conduct information collection to identify chemical warehouses/plants, hydrocarbon/oil pipelines, and contaminated areas throughout the divisional area of operations. Key risks to mission throughout this phase include CBRN attacks focused on obstacles and key terrain such as WILSON gap-crossing (wet) efforts and terrain that naturally canalizes maneuver efforts. Engineer's priority of effort will focus on survivability efforts to avoid and withstand hostile actions by constructing protective positions and hardening facilities. Engineers will provide support to explosive ordnance assets during route clearance activities. All division units will - incorporate survivability tasks; apply antiterrorism measures; implement physical security procedures; plan for the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel; establish force health protection measures to enable a healthy, fit force and prevent injury and illness; and incorporate risk management throughout all operations. Additional risks include enemy Special Forces efforts to disrupt sustainment in the division support area.</p>	
<b>Legend:</b>	
OPORD	operations order
ZULU	time zone indicator for Universal Time

**Figure A-4. Scheme of protection example**

A-35. Planners receive guidance as commanders describe their visualization of the operational concept and intent. This guidance generally focuses on the COA development by identifying decisive and supporting efforts, massing effects, and stating priorities. Effective planning guidance provides a broad perspective of the commander's visualization, with the latitude to explore additional options.

A-36. The protection working group develops the scheme of protection after receiving guidance and considering the principles of protection in relation to the mission variables, the incorporation of efforts, and the protection required. The scheme of protection is based on the mission variables, thus it includes protection priorities by area, unit, activity, or resource. It addresses how protection is applied and derived during all phases of an operation. For example, the security for routes, bases/base camps, and critical infrastructure is accomplished by applying protection assets in dedicated, fixed, or local security roles; or it may be derived from economy-of-force protection measures, such as area security techniques. It also identifies areas and conditions where forces may become fixed or static and unable to derive protection from their ability to maneuver. These conditions, areas, or situations are anticipated and the associated risks are mitigated by describing and planning for the use of response forces.

A-37. The protection working group considers the following items, at a minimum, as it develops the scheme of protection:

- Protection priorities.
- Work priorities for survivability assets.
- AMD positioning guidance.
- Specific terrain and weather factors.
- Information focus and limitations for security efforts.
- Areas or events where risk is acceptable.
- Protected targets and areas.
- Civilians and noncombatants in the AO.

- Vehicle and equipment safety or security constraints.
- Personnel recovery actions and control measures.
- Force protection condition status.
- FHP measures.
- Mission-oriented protective posture guidance.
- Environmental guidance.
- Information environment guidance.
- Explosive ordnance and hazard guidance.
- Ordnance order of battle.
- OPSEC risk tolerance.
- Fratricide avoidance measures.
- Rules of engagement, standing rules for the use of force, and rules of interaction.
- Escalation of force and nonlethal weapons guidance.
- Operational scheme of maneuver.
- Military deception.
- Obscuration.
- Radiation exposure status.
- Contractors in the AO.

A-38. While each protection task and system has its own operational consideration, each must be synchronized and integrated within the scheme of protection to ensure synergistic protection efforts. For example, AMD without survivability is less effective. Area security without AT, OPSEC, and physical security is also less effective. To ensure this synergy, the protection working group develops a scheme of protection around which MOPs and MOEs can be monitored and evaluated. See FM 6-0 for additional information on MOPs and MOEs.

A-39. Individuals are protected at the lowest level by awareness, personal protective equipment, an understanding of the rules of engagement, and fratricide avoidance measures. By implementing additional protection measures in the area surrounding an individual (fighting positions, vehicles, collective protection, and FHP measures taken against accidents and disease), the force then provides a layering of protection. Enhancing survivability measures, applying active and passive defense operations, and implementing AT and physical security measures add to the next layer of a comprehensive, integrated, layered scheme of protection. Implementing protection tasks and utilizing protection systems in a comprehensive, layered scheme of protection preserve the protected priorities throughout the range of military operations in any operational environment.

## PROTECTION COORDINATOR

A-40. The protection coordinator works with the protection working group to integrate and synchronize protection tasks and systems for each phase of an operation or major activity. The MEB commander designates a senior staff officer to serve as the protection coordinator and to lead the protection working group. The protection working group at a minimum should consist of (see ADP 3-37): CBRN personnel, engineer personnel; personnel recovery; brigade surgeon; and provost marshal. The protection working group coordinates with the signal staff section to further facilitate the information protection task.


A-41. While the planning cell develops plans, the protection working group attempts to minimize vulnerability based on the developing COAs. The intent is to identify and recommend refinements to the COAs that are necessary to reduce vulnerability and ensure mission success. The protection working group provides vulnerability mitigation measures to help reduce risks associated with particular COAs and conducts planning and oversight. Representatives from the protection working group may provide input to plans and future operations, depending on the operational environment and the commander's preference.

A-42. The protection working group membership does not require representatives from every functional element of protection. However, dedicated members should coordinate with other personnel and special staff elements as required. Primary members of the protection working group typically include the chief of

protection coordinator, an ADA officer, a personnel recovery officer, a military police officer, a CBRN officer, an EOD officer, an engineer officer, and an AT officer.

## TASKS AND SYSTEMS INTEGRATION

A-43. Protection tasks integration throughout the operations process helps establish control measures against potential threats and hazards (see figure A-5). The layering of protection tasks (some redundant) ensures a comprehensive scheme of protection. The layered approach of protection provides strength and depth. Units use their available capabilities to defend the protection priorities, and a layering of capabilities reduces the destructive effect of threats and hazards.



**Figure A-5. Integration of protection throughout the operations process**

A-44. The protection working group ensures the integration of protection equities throughout the operations process via integrating processes, continuing activities, the MDMP, working groups, planning sessions, and coordination between warfighting functions. This develops and refines a scheme of protection and a protection plan that are comprehensive, integrated, layered, redundant, and enduring. All members of the protection working group provide input and conduct actions that have beneficial output, which develops the scheme of protection and enhances the overall protection plan. The agenda, frequency, composition, input, and expected output for the working group are determined by the lead protection working group officer based on mission variables and MDMP integration.

## INTEGRATING PROCESSES

A-45. The integrating processes of IPB, targeting, and risk management are essential in providing assessments or key information to assessments. They are a vital part of integrating protection within the other warfighting functions and throughout the operations process.

A-46. IPB is a systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of threat, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest to determine their effects on operations. By conducting the IPB, commanders gain the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points in time and space.

A-47. The targeting process integrates commander guidance and priorities to determine which targets to engage and how, when, and where to engage them to assign friendly capabilities to create the desired effect. The staff then assigns friendly capabilities that are best suited to produce the desired effect on each target. An important part of targeting is identifying possibilities for fratricide and collateral damage. Commanders establish control measures, including the consideration for restraint, which are necessary to minimize the chance of these events. The protection priorities must be integrated within the targeting process to achieve the desired objectives while ensuring the preservation of combat power.

A-48. Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks that arise from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Threat, hazard, capability, vulnerability, and criticality assessments are utilized to evaluate the risk to the force, determine the critical assets, ascertain available resources, and apply security or defensive measures to achieve protection. Risk management helps commanders preserve lives and resources, avoid or mitigate unnecessary risk, identify and implement feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist, and develop valid COAs. Risk management integration during operations process activities is the primary responsibility of the unit protection officer or operations officer.

## MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

A-49. The *military decisionmaking process* is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). The MDMP integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and unified action partners to understand the situation and mission; develop and compare COAs; decide on a COA that best accomplishes the mission; and produce an OPLAN or order for execution. The MDMP helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. This process helps commanders, staffs, and others think critically and creatively while planning. The MDMP results in an improved understanding of the situation and in a plan or order that guides the force through preparation and execution.

A-50. Effective protection integration during operations depends on full integration into the MDMP and the overall operations process. The protection working group provides input to the commander's MDMP by integrating the threat and hazard assessment with the commander's essential elements of friendly information and the protection prioritization list. See table A-3 for protection integration to MDMP.

Table A-3. Protection integration to MDMP

<i>Key Input</i>	<i>Steps</i>	<i>Protection Actions</i>	<i>Protection Output</i>	<i>Key Output</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Higher HQ plan or order</li> <li>New mission anticipated by the commander</li> </ul>	<p>Step 1: Receipt of Mission</p> <p>Warning Order</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consolidate protection-related running estimates from staffs</li> <li>Review consolidated protection array of assets</li> <li>Determine protection working group members</li> <li>Ensure protection planner integration within the unit planning team</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Protection working group</li> <li>Warning and reporting systems</li> <li>Protection running estimate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commander's initial guidance</li> <li>Initial allocation of time</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Higher HQ plan or order</li> <li>Higher HQ knowledge and intelligence products</li> <li>Knowledge products from other organizations</li> <li>Design concept (if developed)</li> </ul>	<p>Step 2: Mission Analysis</p> <p>Warning Order</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide input on critical networks or nodes that can be influenced</li> <li>Identify requests for information</li> <li>Determine available assets</li> <li>Conduct and consolidate initial assessments</li> <li>Conduct protection working group</li> <li>Recommend and coordinate information collection assets for protection</li> <li>Identify EEFI, and establish how long it should be protected (Condition of key units and weapons systems)</li> <li>Determine OPSEC indicators</li> <li>Develop essential survivability and other engineering tasks</li> <li>Identify available information on routes and key facilities</li> <li>Analyze protection considerations of civilians in the AOs</li> <li>Determine available unified action partner capabilities</li> <li>Determine funding sources, as required</li> <li>Determine availability of construction and other engineering materials</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consolidated HVT list</li> <li>RFIs</li> <li>Initial assessments</li> <li>Recommended PPL</li> <li>Recommended EEFI</li> <li>Initial protection priorities</li> <li>Input into information collection plan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Problem statement</li> <li>Mission statement</li> <li>Initial commander's intent</li> <li>Initial planning guidance</li> <li>Initial CCIRs and EEFIs</li> <li>Initial OPSEC planning guidance</li> <li>Updated IPB and running estimates</li> <li>Assumptions</li> </ul>

**Table A-3. Protection integration to MDMP (continued)**

<i>Key Input</i>	<i>Steps</i>	<i>Protection Actions</i>	<i>Protection Output</i>	<i>Key Output</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mission statement</li> <li>• Initial commander's intent, planning guidance, CCIRs, and EEFI</li> <li>• Updated IPB and running estimates</li> <li>• Assumptions</li> </ul>	Step 3: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COA Development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Determine array of protection assets</li> <li>• Integrate protection tasks into COA</li> <li>• Determine initial scheme of protection</li> <li>• Coordinate health support requirements</li> <li>• Ensure that link architecture meets requirements and has been allocated from respective agents</li> <li>• Recommend appropriate level of survivability effort for each COA based on the expected threat</li> <li>• Determine alternate construction location, methods, means, materials, and timelines to give the commander options</li> <li>• Determine real-property and real estate requirements</li> <li>• Identify indicators and vulnerabilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Recommended updates to PPL</li> <li>• Recommended updates to EEFI</li> <li>• Determine residual risk</li> <li>• Develop initial OPSEC measure and countermeasures</li> <li>• Initial scheme of protection</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COA statements and sketches</li> <li>• Tentative task organization</li> <li>• Broad concept of operations</li> <li>• Revised planning guidance</li> <li>• Updated assumptions</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Updated running estimates</li> <li>• Revised planning guidance</li> <li>• COA statements and sketches</li> <li>• Updated assumptions</li> </ul>	Step 4: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COA Analysis (War Game)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify limitations and shortfalls of protection tasks for each COA</li> <li>• Determine branches, sequels, decision points, unintended consequences, and second- and third-order effects</li> <li>• Develop risk management and decision points for risk tolerance</li> <li>• Develop MOE and MOP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Initial DAL</li> <li>• Refined EEFI</li> <li>• Refined information collection plan</li> <li>• Refine OPSEC measures and countermeasures</li> <li>• Initial risk management and risk tolerance decision point matrix</li> <li>• Refined scheme of protection</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refined COAs</li> <li>• Potential decision points</li> <li>• War-game results</li> <li>• Initial assessment measures</li> <li>• Updated assumptions</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Updated running estimates</li> <li>• Refined COAs</li> <li>• Evaluation criteria</li> <li>• War-game results</li> <li>• Updated assumptions</li> </ul>	Step 5: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COA Comparison</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Compare economy-of-force and risk reduction measures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refined protection priorities</li> <li>• Refined PPL</li> <li>• Refined EEFI</li> <li>• Refined scheme of protection</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluated COAs</li> <li>• Recommended COAs</li> <li>• Updated running estimates</li> <li>• Updated assumptions</li> </ul>

Table A-3. Protection integration to MDMP (continued)

Key Output	Steps	Protection Actions	Protection Output	Key Output
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updated running estimates</li> <li>Evaluated COAs</li> <li>Recommended COA</li> <li>Updated assumptions</li> </ul>	Step 6: COA Approval <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Warning Order</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Brief scheme of protection</li> <li>Brief protection task specifics, as required</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refined protection priorities</li> <li>Refined EEFI</li> <li>Refined</li> <li>Refined scheme of protection</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commander-selected COA and modifications</li> <li>Refined commander's intent, CCIRs, and EEFIs</li> <li>Updated assumptions</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commander-selected COA with any modifications</li> <li>Refined commander's intent, CCIRs, and EEFIs</li> <li>Updated assumptions</li> </ul>	Step 7: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refine and develop protection annex and supporting appendixes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Protection annex and supporting appendixes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Approved OPLAN or OPORD</li> <li>Subordinate understanding of plan or order</li> <li>Update EEFIs as needed</li> </ul>
<b>Legend:</b> AO area of operations CCIR commander's critical COA course of action DAL defended asset list EEFI essential element of friendly information HQ headquarters HVT high-value target IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace MOE measure of effectiveness MOP measure of performance OPSEC operations security PPL protection priority list RFI request for information				

## PROTECTION WORKING GROUP

A-51. Working groups address various subjects depending on the situation and echelon. A *working group* is a grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to provide analysis, coordinate, and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function (FM 6-0). Their cross-functional design enables working groups to synchronize contributions from multiple command post cells and staff sections. For example, the protection working group brings together representatives of all staff elements concerned with protection. It synchronizes the contributions of all staff elements with the work of the protection working group. It also synchronizes protection with future operations and current operations integration cells.

A-52. The protection working group forms the core membership of the protection working group, which includes other agencies, as required. Protection working group members differ in that additional staff officers are brought into the working group. These additional staff officers meet operational requirements for threat assessments, vulnerability assessments, and protection priority recommendations. The protection working group calls upon existing resources from the staff and are incorporated into the unit battle rhythm as needed. Working groups may convene daily, weekly, monthly, or intermittently depending on the subject, situation, and echelon.

A-53. Protection working group meetings have the same purpose, regardless of the echelon. Protection functions at different echelons of command differ mostly in the size of the AO and the number of available protection capabilities. The protection working group—

- Determines likely threats and hazards from updated enemy tactics, the environment, and accidents.
- Determines vulnerabilities as assessed by the vulnerability assessment team.
- Establishes and recommends protection priorities, such as the critical asset list.
- Provides recommendations for the critical asset list and defended asset list.



- Reviews and coordinates unit protection measures.
- Recommends force protection conditions and random AT measures.
- Determines required resources and makes recommendations for funding and equipment fielding.
- Provides input and recommendations on protection-related training.
- Makes recommendations to commanders on protection issues that require a decision.
- Performs tasks required for a force protection working group and a threat protection working group according to DODI 2000.16.
- Accesses assets and infrastructure that are designated as critical by higher headquarters.
- Recommends the mode and frequency of survivability movements.

A-54. Commanders augment the team with other unit specialties and unified action partners, depending on the operational environment and unit mission. The chief of protection determines the working group agenda, meeting frequency, composition, input, and expected output. Table A-4 shows a sample purpose, agenda, and composition of a protection working group with staff inputs and outputs.

**Table A-4. Example protection working group activities**

<b><i>Purpose and Frequency</i></b>	<p><b>Purpose:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Determines likely threats and hazards</li> <li>● Determines vulnerabilities</li> <li>● Establishes and recommends protection priorities</li> <li>● Provides recommendations for the CAL and DAL</li> <li>● Reviews and coordinates unit protection measures</li> <li>● Recommends FPCONs and random AT measures</li> <li>● Makes recommendations to commanders on protection issues that require a decision</li> <li>● Performs tasks required for a force protection working group and a threat protection working group</li> <li>● Assesses assets and infrastructure that are designated as critical by higher headquarters.</li> <li>● Analyzes and provides recommendations for the protection of civilians in the AO</li> <li>● Develops and refines the protection running estimate</li> <li>● Develops a scheme of protection, ensuring that it nests with the operational concept</li> <li>● Develops isolated Soldier guidance.</li> <li>● Provides input and recommendations for cyberspace network protection.</li> <li>● Identifies risks to the mission</li> <li>● Integrates PR requirements into plans, orders, SOPs and staff products.</li> </ul> <p><b>Frequency:</b> Every other day</p>	
<b><i>Composition</i></b>	<p><b>Chair:</b> Chief of protection</p> <p><b>Attendees:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● ADA officer</li> <li>● AT officer</li> <li>● CBRN officer</li> <li>● Engineer officer</li> <li>● Electronic warfare element representative</li> <li>● EOD officer</li> <li>● Fire support representative</li> <li>● OPSEC planner</li> <li>● Provost marshal</li> <li>● Safety officer</li> <li>● Intelligence representative</li> <li>● CA officer</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Public affairs officer.</li> <li>● Staff judge advocate.</li> <li>● Chaplain.</li> <li>● Surgeon.</li> <li>● Medical representative.</li> <li>● Veterinary representative</li> <li>● Subordinate unit LNOs</li> <li>● Operations representative</li> <li>● An area contracting officer</li> <li>● Cyberspace representative</li> <li>● Information officer</li> <li>● Logisticians</li> <li>● Personnel recovery officer</li> </ul>

Table A-4. Example protection working group activities (continued)

<b>Inputs and outputs</b>	<b>Inputs:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commanders guidance and intent</li> <li>• Operations and warning orders</li> <li>• Current scheme of protection</li> <li>• Threat and hazard assessment</li> <li>• Vulnerability assessment</li> <li>• Criticality assessment</li> <li>• Risk management</li> <li>• CAL</li> <li>• DAL</li> </ul>	<b>Outputs:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Update protection assessment</li> <li>• Scheme of protection</li> <li>• Protection Running estimate</li> <li>• Protection prioritization list</li> <li>• Recommended FPCON</li> <li>• Recommended protection guidance and mitigation measures</li> <li>• Recommended changes to EEFI</li> <li>• Recommended changes to CAL and prioritization of DAL</li> </ul>
<b>Agenda</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Roll Call</li> <li>• Operations/intelligence update (G-3/G-2)</li> <li>• Protection prioritization list assessment / update (Chief of Protection)</li> <li>• New vulnerabilities—next 72 hours (Chief of Protection)</li> <li>• Mitigation measures (Chief of Protection)</li> <li>• Recommendations—security posture adjustments, information engagement, resource allocation, required training (Chief of Protection)</li> <li>• Guidance (G-3)</li> <li>• Conclusion (Chief of Protection)</li> </ul>	
<b>Legend:</b> ADA                    air defense artillery AO                     area of operations AT                     antiterrorism CA                     civil affairs CAL                    critical asset list CBRN                 chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear DAL                    defended asset list EEFI                  essential elements of friendly information EOD                   explosive ordnance disposal FPCON                force protection condition G-2                    assistant chief of staff, intelligence G-3                    assistant chief of staff, operations LNO                    liaison officer OPSEC                operations security PR                     personnel recovery SOP                    standard operating procedure		

## RUNNING ESTIMATE

A-55. A *running estimate* is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). Failure to maintain accurate running estimates may lead to errors or omissions that result in flawed plans or bad decisions during execution. Running estimates include recommendations for anticipated decisions. During planning, commanders use these recommendations to select feasible, acceptable, and suitable COAs for further analysis. During preparation and execution, commanders use recommendations from running estimates in decision making. See ADP 5-0 for additional information on running estimates.

A-56. The protection working group develops and refines the protection running estimate (see figure A-6, page A-22). The protection estimate provides a picture to the command on the protection continuing activity. It is developed from information (including the facts, assumptions, constraints, limitations, risks, and issues) pertaining to the protection mission and the scheme of protection. It includes the essential tasks from a higher order. Integrating process data and continuing activities (assets available, civil considerations, threat and hazard assessments, criticality assessments, vulnerability assessments, capability assessments, MOEs, MOPs, essential elements of friendly information, protection priorities, risk decision points, supporting tasks) feed updates to the running estimate.

Past 24 hours	Protection common operational picture			PPL
Next 48 to 72 hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PPL</li> <li>• Threats/hazards</li> <li>• Incidents</li> <li>• Asset locations</li> </ul>			Asset task organization
Issues/risk decision points				Provost marshal officer
Protection priorities				Engineer
Essential elements of friendly information	FPCON INFOCON	AMD ADW WCS	CBRN and EOD MOPP OEG Explosive hazards	Safety
Security banner				
<b>Legend:</b> ADW                    air defense warning AMD                    air missile defense CBRN                    chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear EOD                    explosive ordnance disposal FPCON                    force protection condition INFOCON                    information operations condition MOPP                    mission-oriented protective posture OEG                    operation exposure guide PPL                    protection prioritization list WCS                    weapons control status				

Figure A-6. Example protection running estimate

## CONTINUOUS ASSESSMENT

A-57. *Assessment* is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Commanders typically base assessments on their situational understanding, which is generally a composite of several informational sources and intuition. Assessments help commanders determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It also involves continuously monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to determine what changes might affect the conduct of operations.

A-58. Throughout the operations process, commanders integrate their assessments with those of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other unified action partners. The primary tools for assessing the progress of the operation include the OPORD, the common operational picture, personal observations, running estimates, and the assessment plan. Staff members develop running estimates that illustrate the significant aspects of a particular activity or function over time. These estimates are used by commanders to maintain situational understanding and direct adjustments. Significant changes or variances among or within running estimates can signal a threat or an opportunity, alerting commanders to take action.

A-59. The assessment plan is enabled by monitoring and evaluating criteria derived from the warfighting function protection tasks. The criteria used to monitor and evaluate the situation or operation may be represented as an MOE or MOP. These measures are discrete, relevant, and responsive benchmarks that are useful in all operations. They may contain the commander’s critical information requirements and the essential elements of friendly information and may generate information requirements. MOEs and MOPs can be significant decision support tools and may drive transition periods, resource allocations, and other critical decisions.

A-60. During preparation, operations to shape, and operations to prevent, the protection working group focuses on threats and hazards that can influence preparatory activities, including monitoring new Soldier integration programs and movement schedules and evaluating live-fire requirements for precombat checks and inspections. The protection working group may evaluate training and rehearsals or provide coordination and liaison to facilitate effectiveness in high-risk or complex preparatory activities, such as movement and sustainment preparation.

A-61. The protection working group monitors and evaluates the progress of current operations to validate assumptions made in planning and to continually update changes to the situation. The protection working group continually meets to monitor threats to protection priorities, and they recommend changes to the protection plan, as required. They also monitor the conduct of operations, looking for variances from the OPORD that affects their areas of expertise. When variances exceed a threshold value developed or directed in planning, the protection working group may recommend an adjustment to counter an unforecasted threat or hazard or to mitigate a developing vulnerability. It also tracks the status of protection assets and evaluates the effectiveness of the protection systems as they are employed. Additionally, the protection working group monitors the actions of other staff sections by periodically reviewing plans, orders, and risk assessments to determine if those areas require a change in protection priorities, posture, or resource allocation.

A-62. The protection working group monitors and evaluates—

- Changes to threat and hazard assessments.
- Changes in force vulnerabilities.
- Changes to unit capabilities.
- The relevancy of facts.
- The validity of assumptions.
- Reasons that new conditions affect the operation.
- Running estimates.
- Protection tasks.
- System failures.
- Resource allocations.
- Increased risks.
- Supporting efforts.
- Force protection implementation measures, including site-specific AT measures.

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## Appendix B

# Defense Support of Civil Authorities

ARFOR demonstrate the Army's core competencies by combining offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks. The continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks is known as decisive action. In DSCA, decisive action refers to how ARFOR combine DSCA tasks to support homeland security and, if required, DSCA tasks with offensive and defensive tasks to support homeland defense. The MEB is well suited to provide support to civil authorities because it has the most complete multifunctional staff of any Army brigade. The MEB also has the skills needed to provide command and control for units that are frequently needed by civil authorities. This appendix discusses the MEB support to DSCA.

## DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES CORE TASK

B-1. ARFOR conduct four core tasks (figure B-1 illustrates the DSCA core tasks with examples) in support of DSCA and the overall homeland security enterprise:

- Provide support for domestic disasters.
- Provide support for domestic CBRN incidents.
- Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies.
- Provide other designated domestic support plan.




Figure B-1. DSCA core tasks with examples

B-2. These DSCA tasks can overlap. For example, providing Army support of civil law enforcement agencies can occur during disaster response or its aftermath. In most cases, a MEB may provide support for the first three tasks. The MEB may provide assistance as a unit or as part of a joint task force in support of lead civil authorities for DSCA (see JP 3-28). The U.S. laws carefully limit the actions that military forces conduct within the United States, its territories, and its possessions (see ADP 3-28 for information on laws). The MEB complies with these laws while assisting affected citizens.

B-3. Doctrine on CBRN consequence management is contained in JP 3-0 and JP 3-41. This chapter uses the task *Respond to CBRN Incident* for DSCA and area damage control. Tactical-level doctrine on CBRN consequence management operations is contained in ATP 3-11.41.

B-4. The MEB is designed to integrate many of the types of units that have the greatest applicability in support to DSCA (CBRN, engineer, EOD, and military police). The MEB has the broadest multifunctional capability and training for DSCA tasks of any brigade. The MEB may be the ideal brigade to respond to certain incidents because of its capability to provide command and control, be assigned an AO, and perform other related requirements. The brigade is trained to manage airspace and conduct interface with others that control airspace. This is particularly important in large-scale disasters requiring DOD aviation support. The MEB can conduct or support most DSCA tasks depending on the nature of the incident and its task organization. The MEB may be called upon to function as the on-site DOD or Army headquarters or to complement or support another headquarters (such as a joint task force or the CBRNE operational headquarters to respond to specific missions). The MEB can provide area damage control as part of support area or in support of its higher headquarters and assigned units.

B-5. The MEBs in the Army National Guard could be among the first military forces to respond on behalf of state authorities. Planning DSCA tasks is similar to planning stability tasks; they both interact with the populace and civil authorities to provide essential services. The MEB tasks are similar, but the environment is different (domestic versus foreign). The specialized capabilities of the MEB to conduct stability tasks apply to DSCA, primarily for Tasks 1 and 3. However, the MEB supports the lead civil authority for DSCA. A civil authority is in the lead for DSCA, while the task force or joint task force (hence MEB) supports the lead civil authority. See ADP 3-28 for additional information on DSCA.

## **PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DOMESTIC DISASTERS**

B-6. Natural and man-made disasters occur throughout the United States and its territories. Most domestic disasters require no federal military support. State and federal emergency management entities receive most military support from the National Guard in state active duty or Title 32, United States Code (USC) status. In a catastrophic event, the demand for resources may exceed National Guard capacity, even with assistance from other states. In such situations, federal ARFOR provide requested support, through either United States Pacific Command or United States Northern Command.

B-7. DOD defines a *complex catastrophe* as any natural or man-made incident, including cyberspace attack, power grid failure, and terrorism, which results in cascading failures of multiple, interdependent, critical, life-sustaining infrastructure sectors and causes extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage or disruption severely affecting the population, environment, economy, public health, national morale, response efforts, and/or government functions (JP 3-28).

B-8. There are two distinguishing characteristics of a complex catastrophe: 1) the extremely large scale of damage and casualties, and 2) the cascading effects of the failure of critical infrastructure. These cascading effects impact both the types and quantity of response required in support of the affected populace as well as the environmental conditions in which the response must occur. Some of the effects include widespread and long-term power grid failure, degraded or inoperable communications, and severe impacts to the transportation infrastructure. The cascading effects from these failures could cause numerous problems beyond the immediate affected area and increase the severity of the situation including, but not limited to, widespread scarcity of food and water, lack of medical services at fixed sites within the impacted area, and potentially the breakdown of governance and rule of law.

B-9. DOD installations and activities may receive requests directly from local civil authorities and will respond, within their capability, under their own immediate response authority in accordance with DODD 3025.18, and mutual aid agreements in accordance with DODI 6055.06.

## PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DOMESTIC CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, OR NUCLEAR INCIDENTS

B-10. A *chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident* is any occurrence, resulting from the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and devices; the emergence of secondary hazards arising from friendly actions; or the release of toxic industrial materials or biological organisms and substances into the environment, involving the emergence of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards (JP 3-11). The National Response Force integrates governmental jurisdictions, incident management and emergency response disciplines, and private sector entities into a coordinated CBRN incident response.

B-11. Military forces conduct domestic CBRN incident support under appropriate laws, regulations, and policies. These include the hazardous waste operations and emergency response standard (Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standard Number 1910.120) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (Sections 9601 to 9675 of Title 42 USC). Responders at every level plan and operate in accordance with these laws. These and other laws define—

- Response authorities for public and private agencies.
- Hazardous substances, emergency planning, and community right to know.
- Cleanup requirements.
- Required protective measures and training for responders within the United States.

B-12. Department of Homeland Security uses the National Fire Protection Association Standard 472, Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents, to establish the qualifications for personnel conducting domestic CBRN incident response. (See National Fire Protection Standard 472). During domestic CBRN incident response operations, national laws subordinate military doctrine and military authority outside DOD installations. Command structures are based on the National Response Framework and the National Incident Management System, with DOD as a supporting partner. DOD is not the lead unless an incident occurs on a DOD installation.

## PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DOMESTIC CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

B-13. Providing support for domestic civilian law enforcement applies to the restricted use of military assets to support civilian law enforcement personnel within the United States and its territories. These operations are significantly different from operations outside the United States. ARFOR support domestic civilian law enforcement agencies under constitutional and statutory restrictions, as prescribed by corresponding directives and regulations. For additional information, see DODI 3025.21.

B-14. Except as expressly authorized by the Constitution of the United States or by another act of congress, the *Posse Comitatus Act of 1878* (18 USC 1385) prohibits the use of active Army and Air Force as enforcement officials to execute state or federal law and perform direct law enforcement functions. Likewise, United States Navy regulations prohibit the use of the Marine Corps and Navy for performing direct state and federal law enforcement functions. However, the *Posse Comitatus Act* does not apply to state National Guard forces in state active duty status and Title 32, USC status. Nor does the *Posse Comitatus Act* restrict the Coast Guard, even when under the OPCON of the Navy, since the Coast Guard has inherent law enforcement powers under Title 14 USC.

B-15. Domestic law enforcement missions differ substantially from similar stability tasks associated with civil security and civil control. The rights of civilians take precedence during domestic law enforcement support except in extreme emergencies.

B-16. Law enforcement support falls into two broad categories: direct and indirect. Direct support involves enforcing the law and engaging in physical contact with offenders. Indirect support consists of aid to civilian law enforcement agencies but does not include enforcement of the law or direct contact with offenders. Federal laws, presidential directives, and DOD policy prohibit federal military forces from enforcing laws and providing security except on military installations. These laws, policies, and directives specify limited exceptions to the restrictions. When authorized by the Secretary of Defense, federal military forces may provide indirect support to civilian law enforcement agencies, but support is limited to logistic, transportation, and training assistance except in life threatening emergencies. State and territorial governors can use state



National Guard forces for direct support of civilian law enforcement as a temporary expedient in accordance with state laws.

## PROVIDE OTHER DESIGNATED DOMESTIC SUPPORT

B-17. Providing other designated domestic support encompasses preplanned, routine, and periodic support not related to disasters or emergencies. Often, this is support to major public events and consists of participatory support, special transportation, and additional security. Examples are national special security events such as Olympics, inaugurations, or state funerals. Some missions may involve designated support requested by a federal or state agency to augment its capabilities due to labor shortages or a sudden increase in demands. Such support may extend to augmentation of critical government services by Soldiers, as authorized by the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense. For example, skilled Soldiers replaced striking air controllers in the Federal Aviation Administration until newly hired civilians completed training. Soldiers have moved coal during strikes or even operated key commercial enterprises when national security considerations justified such extreme action.

## DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES CONSIDERATIONS

B-18. Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations. The activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. Planning starts an iteration of the operations process. Upon completion of the initial order, planning continues as leaders revise the plan based on changing circumstances. Preparing begins during planning and continues through execution. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage. Assessing is continuous and influences the other three activities. This section uses the operations process activities (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) to discuss considerations that are important to the MEB in conducting DSCA.

## PLAN

B-19. The MEB uses Army planning procedures for DSCA, but must be able to participate and integrate its planning with federal, state, tribal, or local levels as discussed in the following section. Soldiers receive their orders in an Army format, but these orders must be consistent with the overall shared objectives for the response. These orders are aligned with the specific guidance that other on-the-ground responders from other civilian and military organizations are receiving. Soldiers exercise individual initiative to establish and maintain communication at all levels. Based on the type of support provided, MEB leaders, staffs, and Soldiers need to be familiar (to varying degrees) with the terminology, doctrine, and procedures that are used by first responders to ensure the effective integration of Army personnel and equipment. This ensures that citizens who are affected by the disaster receive the best care and service possible.

B-20. When the MEB conducts DSCA tasks, a lead federal or state government agency has the overall responsibility depending on the MEB status as a 10 USC or 32 USC Title 10 or Title 32 organizations. The MEB status as a state or federal asset will determine which documents it should use as legal authorities when conducting operations. If the MEB is a state asset, it reports to the state National Guard chain of command. If the MEB is a 10 USC asset (Regular Army), it reports to its federal chain of command.

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*Note.* The military chain of command is not violated while the MEB supports the lead federal agency to assist citizens who are affected by a disaster.

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B-21. The MEB leaders and staff may help support the emergency preparedness planning that is conducted at the national, state, or local level. The MEB may conduct contingency, crisis response, or deliberate planning. The MEB leaders and staffs must understand the following documents from the Department of Homeland Security:

- National-level civil disaster and emergency response doctrine contained within the National Incident Management System.
- National Response Framework documents.

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*Note.* The MEB leaders must understand the doctrine in JP 3-28.

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B-22. The National Response Framework organizational structure includes emergency support function annexes. There are currently fifteen emergency support function annexes. The emergency support functions are used to help identify who has what type of resources to provide as part of a disaster response. Possible considerations for MEB support to DSCA planning include—

- Assisting with interorganizational planning.
- Assisting with initial needs assessments.
- Providing logistics support for civil authorities.
- Providing sustainment in a damaged austere environment.
- Assisting the lead civil agency to define and share COAs.
- Soliciting agency understanding of roles.
- Developing measurable objectives.
- Assisting in the coordination of actions with other agencies to avoid duplicating effort.
- Planning to hand over to the operation civilian agencies as soon as feasible. The end state and transition are based on the—
  - Ability of civilian organizations to carry out their responsibilities without military assistance.
  - Need to commit ARFOR to other operations or the preparation for other operations.
  - Ability to provide essential support to the largest possible number of people.
  - Knowledge of the legal restrictions and rules for the use of force.
  - Establishment of funding and document expenditures (see National Incident Management System procedures).
- Identifying and overcoming obstacles, including—
  - Planning media operations and coordinating with local officials.
  - Maintaining information assurance.
  - Establishing liaison with the lead federal agency.

## **PREPARE**

B-23. Commanders should prepare for DSCA by understanding the appropriate laws, policies, and directives that govern the military during response and by planning and preparing with the agencies and organizations they will support before an incident. There may be little or no time to prepare for a specific DSCA mission. When possible, the commander helps develop contingency plans and standing operating procedures for potential natural and man-made disasters. The MEB may plan, receive units, and deploy within hours. It is possible that the MEB will link up with units on-site during execution as they arrive from across a state or region.

B-24. Based on METT-TC factors, training before deployment for DSCA aids in preparing for and executing the necessary tasks. Many stability tasks correlate with DSCA tasks. When possible, the MEB leaders and staff train with civil authorities.

B-25. The notification for DSCA employment usually requires rapid reaction to an emergency, but sometimes may allow for deliberate preparation. After notification, the MEB commander and staff leverage the command and control system to coordinate and synchronize their operations with civilian authorities.

B-26. The deployment may be within a state or anywhere within the United States or its territories. The MEB should develop standing operating procedures for the various methods and locations of deployment. Based on METT-TC, the MEB task-organizes to conduct DSCA. The MEB may deploy an advanced party with additional staff augmentation as an early-entry command post to provide on-site assessment and an immediate command and control presence. Deployment is affected whether the DSCA mission warrants the entire MEB or one or more task forces from the MEB. The MEB task organization may change periodically as the need for particular services and support changes. A MEB involved in DSCA operations normally will be task-organized with CBRN, engineer, medical, military police, public affairs and, potentially, units from other Services. Throughout the coordination effort, it is important for the commander and staff to understand and inform interagency personnel of the MEB capabilities and limitations.

B-27. Due to nonhabitual supporting relationships and dissimilar equipment, the MEB and the lead governmental organization must ensure that there is close coordination in all areas. The MEB may co-locate its headquarters with the lead agency to improve coordination. The MEB headquarters may be established in tactical equipment or fixed facilities. By using liaison teams, the commander and staff work closely with interagency and other military elements.

B-28. A defense coordinating officer and assigned staff may not suffice for a complex disaster. When required, the MEB headquarters can control capabilities that the lead authority requires from the DOD. Depending on the complexity of the operation, some staff augmentation may be required. The previously existing task organization of the MEB may require reinforcement with additional functional units to accomplish assigned missions. The MEB commander task-organizes available assets for the mission and requests reinforcement as necessary.

B-29. The MEB leaders must understand the complex environment in which the brigade conducts its mission. The MEB must integrate its activities into the planning effort of the supported civilian agency, understand support requirements, and be aware of the supported agency's capabilities and limitations. This leader understanding creates an atmosphere that permits shared communications and forges a unified effort between elements. Integrating the MEB command and control system into the command and control systems of the lead governmental agency and local first responders may be a challenge. The extent to which the MEB command and control system is able to integrate into the supported agency command and control system depends on the communications/network compatibility/capability of the supported agency.

B-30. Oftentimes, an agency possesses data that, in its original form, creates compatibility issues with the MEB format and the common operational picture. It is incumbent upon the MEB to facilitate the exchange of information with the lead agency. During planning and execution, the MEB can deploy liaison officers to the lead agency. The network-centric environment of the MEB serves as the conduit for rapidly communicating information, while stationary or while moving en route to the geographical site for support operations.

B-31. When the MEB works closely with an agency, the problem sets can be complex and diverse. The MEB and the agency must leverage their skill sets and resources to better inform leaders and maximize their greatest potential when preparing to conduct a DSCA operation. By eliminating redundancies and identifying shortfalls in corresponding capabilities, the MEB creates the conditions for a unified effort. The MEB must always protect its information, leverage its information collection capabilities and the communications network to enhance situational awareness, and verify the lead governmental agencies capability to fuse data.

## **EXECUTE**

B-32. The MEB will do what is required to accomplish its mission when conducting DSCA, even though task organizations may need to be changed. The MEB may not be assigned an AO. The MEB may conduct the below tasks for DSCA.

### **Respond to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Incidents**

B-33. Depending on the nature of the incident and initial assessment, the task organization of the MEB may need to be changed frequently. The controlling headquarters may also change the command or support relationship of the MEB as additional units or organizations respond to the incident. Key response tasks may include assessing a CBRN hazard, conducting risk management, responding to a CBRN hazard, planning

and preparing for CBRN consequence management support, and providing mass casualty decontamination support. CBRN response addresses the short-term, direct effects of a CBRN incident. Major functions performed are safeguarding lives, preserving health and safety, securing and eliminating the hazard, protecting property, preventing further damage to the environment, and maintaining the public's confidence in the government's ability to respond to a CBRN incident.

### **Provide Support to Law Enforcement**

B-34. The MEB conducts this task in domestic and foreign locations and is governed by applicable laws and policies (see ADP 3-28). The efforts are similar to the stability tasks: establish civil security and establish civil control. Key law enforcement tasks may include conducting law and order operations, providing guidance on military police operations, planning police operations, and providing operational law support.

### **Conduct Postincident Response**

B-35. The MEB organic staff has many of the skills required to conduct most postincident response tasks. MEB requirements could include many of the tasks from stability and DSCA, to include tasks from support area operations. Some DSCA would require the MEB to conduct airspace management, unmanned aircraft system employment, debris removal, medical care, and the employment of specialized search and rescue teams. The MEB can provide command and control for most search and rescue tasks on land but may require augmentation and task-organized capabilities depending on the mission. In a domestic incident, United States Northern Command and United States Pacific Command have a capability area of protection that includes search and rescue. The United States Army Corps of Engineers provides organic and contracted land-based search and rescue capabilities.

B-36. Executing DSCA must occur within the guidelines laid out by the lead civil agency. When requested and within the legal limits of federal and state law, the MEB may leverage attached/OPCON information collection assets and networks by positioning sensors, robotics, or forces in a manner that provides rapid and accurate data flow to lead governmental agencies, which enables them to assess the situation and the status of objectives. The civil agency may require an adjustment to the plan, and the MEB must be ready to modify its ongoing operations. The information processes the MEB has in place, because of its communication network, will allow for rapid dissemination of potential issues to the lead agency for resolution.

B-37. When executing DSCA, MEB leaders and staff must—

- Be familiar with the incident command system and be able to follow unified command system procedures for the integration and implementation of each system.
- Know how the systems integrate and support the incident.
- Be familiar with the overall operation of the two command systems and be able to assist in implementing the unified command system if needed.
- Know how to develop an Incident Action Plan and identify assets available for controlling weapons of mass destruction and hazardous material events.
- Coordinate these activities with the on-scene incident commander.
- Be familiar with steps to take to assist in planning operational goals and objectives that are to be followed on site in cooperation with the on-scene incident commander.
- Know how to interface with and integrate requisite emergency support services and resources among the emergency operations center management and the incident or unified command on-scene incident management team.
- Be familiar with the coordination functions and procedures that are to be conducted by and with the emergency operation center in support of on-scene emergency response activities.

B-38. The tasks of Soldiers are similar to many of the tasks in stability tasks. In most cases, they do not need to have as much knowledge of the incident command system.

B-39. While DSCA operations vary greatly in every mission, the MEB can expect events to follow a pattern of planning, preparation, response, and recovery. Military support for DSCA will be provided through Commander, United States Northern Command; Commander, United States Southern Command; or Commander, United States Pacific Command depending upon the location of the incident.

B-40. The Joint Director of Military Support in the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) serves as the action agent for the Assistant Secretary of Defense–Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs who has the executive agent responsibility delegated by the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Director of Military Support plans for and coordinates the DOD civil support mission and is the primary DOD contact for all federal departments and agencies during DOD involvement in most domestic operations.

B-41. If DSCA is provided concurrently with homeland defense, the MEB must be prepared to transition to support the offensive and defensive operations of other military forces.

### **Preparation**

B-42. The MEB preparation for disaster response depends on the priority of other missions. If the MEB is a 10 USC unit, mission priorities may dictate minimal planning and preparation for DSCA operations. On the other hand, a 22 USC MEB may have enough time to plan and prepare for DSCA with other civil and military organizations.

B-43. Preparation implements approved plans and relevant agreements to increase readiness through a variety of tasks. Such tasks may include, but are not limited to—

- Developing standing operating procedures and tactics, techniques, and procedures with expected supported and supporting elements.
- Task-organizing to fill gaps in duties and responsibilities.
- Training personnel and leaders on nonmilitary terminology and procedures used for DSCA (such as the incident command system).
- Obtaining (through training) the proper credentials for key personnel.
- Exercising and refining plans with military and civilian counterparts.
- Obtaining the proper equipment to provide the required capability.
- Developing, requesting, and maintaining logistics packages for follow-on resupply and maintenance of all classes of supplies in support of extended operations.
- Preparing and maintaining Soldier readiness for all personnel to ensure that they are up to date.
- Ensuring that communications equipment, communications security, and controlled cryptographic items are serviceable and ready to deploy.

### **Response**

B-44. As part of a response, the MEB subordinate units and/or liaison teams enter the affected area and make contact with relief organizations. They relay pertinent information about the effort of these organizations up through their military chain of command. The military chain of command relays this information to the lead civil authority. Planning for the operation, staging command post into the area, establishing security, deploying MEB subordinate units, and initiating contact with supported activities and other parts of the relief force occur during this phase of operations.

B-45. The commander considers leading with liaison teams and urgent relief assets, such as debris clearance, law enforcement, search and rescue, food, and water. The command and control system of the lead unit gives the MEB units robust early ability to communicate and coordinate with each other and that organization with which the command and control information systems are compatible. Further, the ability to reconnoiter and gather information makes MEB units useful in the initial efforts by civil and other authorities to establish situational awareness, control the area, and oversee critical actions.

### **Recovery**

B-46. Once DSCA is underway, recovery begins. With initial working relationships between all organizations in place, the MEB maintains steady progress in relieving the situation throughout this phase of operations. The MEB work includes coordination with its higher headquarters, supported groups, and other relief forces and the daily allocation of its own assets to recovery tasks.

B-47. The MEB task organization is likely to change periodically as the need for particular services and support changes. Security, maintenance, the effective employment of resources, and Soldier support all need

continuing attention. The brigade surgeon advises and assists the MEB commander in counteracting the psychological effects of disaster relief work and exposure to human suffering on MEB Soldiers throughout the operation.

## Restoration

B-48. Restoration is the return of normality to the area. In most cases, the MEB disengages before restoration begins. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is in charge of restoration operations for DSCA.

B-49. The DSCA ends in different ways. Crises may be resolved or the MEB may hand off a continuing DSCA to a replacement unit, a relief agency, a police force, or other civil authority. Missions of short duration or narrow scope may end with completion of the assigned task.

## ASSESS

B-50. The MEB command and control system is essential to support the interagency overall assessment. The MEB network-centric environment provides for a robust exchange of information. A common problem that the MEB or a nonmilitary agency may encounter is information overload or a different perception on how an operation is progressing. Commanders share the common operational picture (their interpretation of the situation) with their civil agency counterpart to ensure a unified effort. Liaison should occur to demonstrate this capability and to verify the method in which information sharing will occur.

B-51. MEB commanders gauge unit readiness for DSCA missions by assessing proficiency in the tasks of command and control, sustainment, protection, support area operations, and emergency/incident response or the specified tasks assigned to an Army National Guard unit for planning. The requirement to deploy into a domestic operational environment—often with little warning—and to operate requires command and control that can adapt systems and procedures for a noncombat, civilian-led structure.

B-52. The MEB leverages its command and control system capabilities and supports a degraded or destroyed civilian command and control/communications system. The MEB brings its mobile network and augments and/or replaces a devastated civil infrastructure. Most first responder communications are wireless, using tower-based repeating which is powered by the grid. The MEB augments local law enforcement (and emergency medical services, fire services, and other first responder communications) with the command and control network to restore vital services to the AO.

## EMPLOYMENT

B-53. An example of a MEB conducting DSCA is a plane that has crashed into a major industrial site and resulted in mass casualties. A CBRN incident has occurred, with downwind prediction that affects a built-up area and state Highway 5, and there is an environmental hazard of runoff into the river that provides water to a built-up area downstream.

B-54. The local officials responded but were overwhelmed. The state governor declared a state of emergency; directed the state emergency management agency to take over incident command, management, and response; and requested support from a neighboring state. That state has an Army National Guard MEB ready to respond to the mission based on an existing support agreement.

B-55. The Army National Guard MEB immediately deploys the deputy commanding officer with an early-entry command post to collocate with the state emergency management agency on-site command post, while the rest of the MEB mobilizes and moves to the incident site. The MEB is task-organized with one engineer battalion, two military police battalions, a CA battalion, two CBRN battalions, and one mechanized infantry battalion. The state emergency management agency also put their state medical battalion, rotary-wing squadron, local and state search and rescue teams, and a volunteer local construction company OPCON to the MEB. The state emergency management agency assigned the MEB an area to control, in which they will conduct the operations. The key tasks include conducting risk management, responding to a CBRN incident, providing support to law enforcement, conducting postincident response, improving movement, and supporting area security in and around the industrial site. Finally, they are to conduct sustainment support operations (general engineering to construct a berm to control surface runoff) and other critical requirements that may be identified.

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## Appendix C

# Lines of Communication Considerations

The forward movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel from the echelon (corps and division) support areas is vital to the support of decisive action. The protection of ground supply routes, waterways, rail lines, pipelines, and power generation and distribution capabilities is used to support operations across the range of military operations. LOC security is especially challenging during large-scale combat operations and the consolidation of gains. One of the greatest risks to Army operations can be threats along MSRs.

## LINES OF COMMUNICATION OVERVIEW

C-1. The security, maintenance, and movement control of LOCs is critical to military operations. *Line of communications* are a route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move (JP 2-01.3). During large-scale combat operations, the support area commander's primary focus is the security and maintenance of LOC (rail, pipeline, highway, waterway[canal or river]) throughout the support area and provides forward movement of personnel and the distribution of equipment and materiel from the echelon (corps and division) support areas to units forward.

C-2. LOC security is an operation, not a sustainment function, and Level II and Level III threat conditions require a dedicated security force. Most units conducting operations throughout the support area can defend against and defeat Level I threats; however, various types of security forces are normally required to patrol and respond to incidents on LOCs to defeat Level II and III threats. These security forces include a dedicated LOC response force and TCF. A response force (normally military police) is a highly mobile, dedicated security force with the capability to defeat Level I and II threats and delay Level III attacking support area LOCs.

C-3. Although all LOCs throughout the support area are important, the capabilities they represent are not equal in their contributions to support area operations and overall mission accomplishment. Determining and directing protection and maintenance priorities for ground LOCs throughout the support area may involve the most important decisions that the commander will make. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide the same level of protection to all ground LOCs. See ADP 3-37 for establishing protection priorities.

C-4. General engineering assets possess the capabilities to develop infrastructure to support mobility, force protection, logistics, base camps, and force beddown facilities. Infrastructure support includes the construction, rehabilitation, repair, maintenance, and modifications of landing strips, airfields, check points, MSRs, LOCs, supply installations, building structures, and bridges. General engineering units (in support of infrastructure development) can also provide capabilities to repair (and limited reconstruction of) railroads or water and waste facilities. The basic capabilities of general engineer units can be expanded by augmenting them with additional personnel, equipment, and training from specialized engineer units. See ATP 3-34.40 for additional information on general engineering support.

C-5. Movement control is a significant component to the control of LOCs, routes, and area security, but it is focused on control rather than security of the movement. *Movement control* is the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications (JP 4-01.5). Movement control activities also interface with information operations, CA, psychological operations, public affairs, crowd sourcing, and tactical deception. Security considerations should always be a part of movement control. Mobility considerations are also critical to providing security.



## LINES OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY

C-6. *Security operations* are those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their protected forces (ADP 3-90). Security operations encompass five primary tasks—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security. While the first three tasks are linked to the movement and maneuver warfighting function, the last two are linked to the protection warfighting function. These last two security tasks are focused on providing protection, although they may also enhance the movement and maneuver of the force. The focus of security operations may be either on a force (such as convoy operations), facility (base camp, dislocated civilian camp, detention site), or LOC for which they are providing security. See ADP 3-37, ADP 3-90, and chapter 2 for additional information on area and local security.

C-7. Security forces operating in the support area (normally military police [see FM 3-39] or a TCF) may also conduct counterreconnaissance in the performance of area and local security in support of LOC security. *Counterreconnaissance* is a tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a commander to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct mission, but a component of all forms of security operations (FM 3-90-1).

## ROUTE SECURITY

C-8. Route security is a specialized area security task conducted to protect LOCs or MSRs and friendly forces moving along them. Enemy attempts to interdict LOCs may have little immediate impact on the corps or division ongoing decisive and shaping operations because of subordinate unit basic loads. However, the security of those routes over which the corps and division sustaining operations flow are critical to sustained land operations.

C-9. The security of the support area LOCs and supply routes, whether rail, pipeline, highway, or waterway, presents one of the greatest security problems in the support area. Route security operations are defensive in nature and are terrain-oriented. A route security force prevents an enemy force from impeding, harassing, or destroying traffic along the route or portions of the route itself. The establishment of base camps and base clusters along that route permits the concentration of security resources. Route security requires dedicated resources at almost an infinite number of points or reaction forces to counter possible enemy action. Units performing missions that require the habitual use of LOCs and supply routes, such as military police, maintenance, transportation, supply, and field service units, can perform route security operations with their primary activities. The support area commander can employ the following techniques to provide route security:

- Active and passive security.
- Route reconnaissance.
- Cordon security.
- Movement corridor.

C-10. While the scope of these operations depends on the mission variables of METT-TC, route security operations tend to require the commitment of significant resources. A combination of passive and route reconnaissance is the most common pattern used over secured routes, such as a division MSR.

### Active and Passive Security

C-11. Active and passive security is a technique to provide route security without a significant expenditure of labor or resources. It includes—

- Camouflage.
- Convoy formation and march control to present the least lucrative target possible under prevailing conditions.

- Proper selection of routes.
- Capitalizing on security offered by related activities taking place without regard to route security requirements. These activities include aircraft traversing over all or portions of the route, maintenance activities taking place along the route, training exercise or troop movement adjacent to or along the route, military and host-nation police traffic control activities, and the activities of the civilian population.

C-12. The support area commander employs passive security for all conditions or situations and as an adjunct to any other technique of route security employed. They are the products of a long-term and continually improved program for an integrated security system.

### Route Reconnaissance

C-13. Route reconnaissance addresses not only the route itself, but also all terrain along the route from which the enemy could influence the movement of forces. Route reconnaissance takes place at irregular intervals to avoid developing a regular pattern that an enemy could exploit. See FM 3-90-1 for additional information on route reconnaissance.

### Cordon Security

C-14. It is normally not feasible to secure all points along a route by physically allocating resources to all the points of the route. *Cordon security* is the security provided between two combat outposts positioned to provide mutual support. (ATP 3-91) The support area commander can assign any available air assault, mechanized, Stryker, or military police unit to combat outposts established at critical locations along the route. The commander locates these combat outposts within supporting distance of each other when possible. Units assigned to these combat outposts provide response forces in the event of enemy activity along the route within their subordinate areas of operations. Forces based at these combat outposts conduct reconnaissance patrols and offensive actions between their base combat outpost and adjacent combat outposts designed to counter enemy activities between these two points on a frequent but irregular schedule.

C-15. Normally, each combat outpost contains at least a platoon size element and is equipped with automatic weapons, communications, and sensors and is supported by those fire support assets available to the support area commander. The outpost commander rotates personnel between duty at the combat outpost and duty on patrol. The higher commander of each combat outpost makes frequent contact with each deployed combat outpost to check its status.

C-16. The establishment of cordon security does little to eliminate those threat forces that require the adoption of this technique. A commander directing the establishment of cordon security should also direct a series of parallel corrective actions, including—

- Searching for a new route to bypass an enemy attack/ambush locations.
- Conducting vigorous search and attack operations to destroy the enemy within the support area.
- Rigorously enforcing circulation control measures in coordination with the host nation over the civilian population.
- Removing cover from areas offering concealment to an enemy.
- Constructing new routes to bypass dangerous areas.
- Mass-evacuating the civilian population from towns and villages along the route. (This is an extreme measure and requires consultation with host-nation authorities and adherence to the laws of land warfare.)

### Convoy Security

C-17. Convoy security is a specialized area security task conducted to protect convoys. Units conduct convoy security when there are not enough friendly forces to continuously secure LOCs in an AO and there is a significant danger of enemy ground action directed against the convoy. The commander may also conduct them with route security operations. Convoy operations are generally conducted at the battalion level or below, with brigade oversight. The support area commander is responsible for convoy security in the support area (which is usually the MEB commander). Likewise, responsibility for the security of convoys transiting

BCT areas of operations is the responsibility of the appropriate BCT commander. Security of convoys transiting previously unassigned areas within the division AO will typically be the responsibility of the commander assigned responsibility for the temporary movement corridor designated by the echelon headquarters to support that convoy. Planning considerations for the division include—

- Ensuring proper allocation of combat power to the task.
- Coordinating combat enablers (fires, attack aviation, electronic warfare assets) for supported units.
- Allocating information collection assets.


### **Movement Corridor**

C-18. A movement corridor may be established to facilitate the movement of a single element or be established for a longer period of time to facilitate the movement of a number of elements along a given route. The support area commander may establish a movement corridor within the support area along an established MSR or a route designated for unit movement. All airspace requirements above the movement corridor, such as airspace for aerial recon and fires, must be included in the unit airspace plan to allow the establishing unit to conduct effective operations.

C-19. The unit commander or convoy commander is responsible for a base level of security during movement. Most support brigades and functional units have a need for more security that they can organically provide during their movement and receive little support from maneuver units to provide additional required security. Units owning an AO may provide additional security support to units moving through or that are present in their AOs, to include the ability to provide fires. Several tasks and tactics, techniques, and procedures can be integrated within an AO to set conditions to help secure individual unit movement, to include—

- Supporting situational understanding.
- Conducting tactical maneuver (performed by the AO owner or assigned maneuver unit).
- Conducting route and convoy security operations.
- Conducting mobility operations.
- Conducting AT activities.
- Conducting CBRN operations.
- Conducting survivability operations.
- Handing off security responsibility when crossing AO borders or at the nearest secure area/facility/base.
- Integrating fires.
- Coordinating logistics support.
- Conducting tactical troop movement.
- Employing combat patrols.
- Conducting counterambush actions.
- Employing obscurants.
- Providing tactical overwatch.

C-20. The support area commander task-organizes the enablers required to establish a movement corridor and has the staff necessary to establish integrated operations within it. Military police, engineer, logistics, EOD, aviation, CBRN, and other forces may establish a combined arms approach to establish a movement corridor to provide secure movement of military traffic through vulnerable areas (see figure C-1). Based on published movement tables, the combined movement corridor forces will open and maintain a safe passage route through uncontrolled terrain. The opening of the route requires a synchronized effort, with each branch providing unique movement and mobility skills to the route. The sequence may include engineer route clearance and maintenance activities that are integrated with area security implementation along the corridor.



**Figure C-1. Example movement corridor**

C-21. Engineer and military police forces conduct route reconnaissance missions to determine problems along the route. Sustainment forces may then establish temporary holding, maintenance, or rest areas along the corridor as the tactical situation dictates. With the establishment of military police traffic control posts and convoy escorts of critical commodities of supplies and with aviation convoy security in place, the convoys move along the protected route to their final destination. The movement corridor opens and closes for specified periods of time to meet movement table requirements.

C-22. This paragraph discusses support to movement beyond the support area commander’s assigned support area by using the technique of movement corridors. There are several techniques that the support area commander may use to support movement beyond its assigned support area. Where an MSR passes from the support area AO through a division-controlled area directly into a BCT AO, the division could designate an AO around the MSR and assign it to the support area commander as part of the support area. The support area commander could create a movement corridor from the support area boundary to the BCT AO. In this case, the support area commander would be responsible for all actions within the movement corridor. The division would provide the required information collection and fires support. The support area commander would coordinate with higher headquarters and the units conducting the movement to provide the required capabilities to support ongoing operations. The support area commander would transfer responsibility for units moving along the corridor to the BCT at their boundary. The BCT could extend the movement corridor within their AO to their brigade support area or to their other boundary if the MSR passes through the AO. The support area commander’s support to movement that does not move on an MSR could also be provided within a movement corridor. A movement corridor that does not use an established MSR may require additional information collection and other forces to set conditions.

## RAILWAY AND RAILHEAD SECURITY

C-23. Support area commanders support the security of railheads, terminals, and railways that run through the support area and are critical to the forward movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel from the echelon (corps and division) support areas. As with air and sea ports and terminals, railheads and terminals may be collocated with a base camp located in the support area.

C-24. Security forces operating in the support area support Army rail operations through local and area security. As with planning to support other intermodal operations, the support area commander and security forces need to understand the basics of those operations. (See ATP 4-14 for more information on Army rail operations.) It is important to understand the critical assets associated with rail operations (tracks, locomotives and rolling stock, switching modes, tunnels and bridges, marshalling yards) and the items (materiel and personnel) that are being transported. The basics associated with route security apply to the tracks, while those associated with local security apply to the protection of sites and specific points within the rail system. Military police may also be involved in providing security as part of the security force on the rolling stock itself (to include armored trains and cars), and many of the basics associated with convoy security will apply. See ATP 3-39.30 and FM 3-39 for additional information on military police support to the security of critical sites.

C-25. Security forces support to rail security operations is to prevent the theft, damage, and interference of rail operations during the transport phase. Therefore, security forces support of rail security focuses on high-value or sensitive military equipment. The overall rail security is the responsibility of the train commander or shipper; however, security forces are integrated into rail security if a viable threat has been identified or the sensitivity of the cargo requires additional trained security personnel.

C-26. When planning for security forces support in rail security operations, security forces need to consider host-nation security regulations and close coordination with host-nation law enforcement agencies or other regulatory agencies. Planning considerations for security forces rail security activities include—

- Developing a security plan for rail transport, including establishing preventive security assumptions/measures to ensure that transport is undisturbed.
- Establishing initial security rules before the rail operations begin; for example, military working dog teams or security forces conduct security checks of rail wagons and/or stocks and supplies.
- Obtaining a detailed threat assessment of the route before movement to identify likely threats and, based on the threat assessment, applying the correct level of security measures for rail operations.
- Conducting route/railway reconnaissance, if necessary.
- Coordinating and liaising with host-nation law enforcement activities and host-nation security forces before movement to minimize vulnerable points. When feasible, a detailed movement plan should be given to allied forces.
- Defining where security monitoring/patrolling are required.
- Determining host-nation and other national border-crossing requirements to ensure undisturbed transport via crossing points.

## PIPELINE SECURITY

C-27. Pipelines assist in maintaining storage levels to meet daily demand and required stock objectives for the distribution of petroleum. Pipelines reduce the number of convoys and personnel required in distributing the product. The support area commander tasks security forces to provide pipeline security through local and area security tasks to protect pipelines. Security forces (normally military police) conduct mobile security patrols and employ sensors and unmanned aircraft systems to detect and defeat Level I and Level II enemy threats disrupting pipeline distribution.

## TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL

C-28. Traffic management and control are conducted to enable the unencumbered movement of personnel and resources along road networks in the most efficient manner possible. Although focused on supporting movement, traffic management can also be selectively applied to enable maneuver. Traffic management and control also contributes to the commander's protection efforts. Reconnaissance is an essential component of effective traffic management and control.

C-29. Traffic management and control is the direction, control, supervision, and execution of the activities required to enable freedom of movement for persons, vehicles, and resources. Traffic management holistically involves transportation, military police, engineer, and other technical capabilities. The four primary components of traffic management and control are—

- Movement control (a transportation task under sustainment).
- Traffic management and enforcement (performed by military police as part of their military police disciplines).
- MSR and ASR regulation and enforcement (performed by military police as part of security and mobility support discipline).
- Engineering support focused on traffic engineering.

## MOVEMENT CONTROL

C-30. Regulating movements entails the additional actions to synchronize the flow of movement over LOCs which includes, but is not limited to, planning and executing route synchronization and distribution network designs, managing convoys at distribution hubs/convoy support centers/border crossings/entry control points, and diverting the movement of a convoy or single shipment when necessary.

C-31. A key aspect of regulating movements is route synchronization. Route synchronization is the planning, routing, and scheduling of movement on ground supply routes and is a control measure that regulates the flow of movement supporting military operations. Route synchronization is executed by commanders with the responsibility to provide order, prevent congestion, and enforce movement priorities for the ground supply routes in their operational area.

C-32. The support area commander regulates movement throughout the support area. If the movement is conducted on MSRs or ASRs designated by higher headquarters, the support area commander regulates movement in coordination with the division transportation office/movement control battalion/movement control teams. Units may not move through ground LOCs within the support area without clearance from the AO responsible unit. The support area commander designates, maintains, secures, and controls movement along the routes within the support area unless the higher headquarters directs otherwise. Most routine movement on MSRs/ASRs is handled by the unit conducting the movement or the supporting headquarters. The support area commander must assert control when security conditions require it and stop, reroute, or delay movement even if coordinated or approved by others.

C-33. The higher headquarters must provide clear guidance on the roles and responsibilities for movement control, protection, and defense of forces moving through the support area or originating in the support area AO that move into other AOs. Active participation by the SA commander and tenant units with higher headquarters planners will help to ensure proper guidance. The support area commander has responsibility for movement control, protection, and defense within the support area. The higher headquarters, through its movement control battalion and movement control teams, has primary responsibility for movement control within the AO. The convoy commander has primary responsibility for convoy protection, security, and defense. The support area commander may be assigned TACON for force protection in certain circumstances. When a unit wants to move within the support area, it coordinates with the BDOC or BCOC. The BDOC or BCOC will coordinate with the support area commander to obtain movement support: intelligence updates, additional security, fires, and final approval. When the unit plans to leave the support area, the support area commander will coordinate with the supporting movement control team as required to obtain movement clearance for use of the MSRs and ASRs. The base camp or base cluster commander adjusts perimeter security after a unit loads out for movement or integrates a new unit into existing plans to ensure a comprehensive security posture. When a unit moves through the support area, it coordinates with the supporting movement control team.

C-34. Sustainment headquarters pushing convoys into a support area and the sustainment headquarters receiving the convoy coordinate with the support area BCOC or BDOC to ensure that the convoys do not conflict with movement and maneuver, protection, or fires warfighting functions. This is especially important for major unit moves supported by transportation units. The support area owner S-3 is ultimately responsible for controlling all movement through the support area. If possible, the support area owner may place a liaison officer at the higher headquarters to assist in controlling sustainment movements.

C-35. The support area commander's staff plans and conducts the required operations to support movement. The CBRN officer determines likely areas for enemy use of CBRN, and designates decontamination sites for restoring contaminated units. The CBRN officer also coordinates with task-organized CBRN assets to position CBRN detection sensors and to establish the corresponding process for receiving, validating, and disseminating CBRN alerts, precautions, and downwind messages to subordinate, adjacent, and higher units. The engineer coordinates mobility support, monitoring route status and directing required route maintenance. The EOD staff, in coordination with the engineer and intelligence staff, monitors and conducts trend analysis within the support area. The military police coordinates traffic control and directs required military police security. The S-6 ensures that the required codes, loads, administrative data, and procedures for accessing dedicated communication nets or networked systems are current, available, operational, and packaged for dissemination by the operations section to organic, tenant, or passing units. They coordinate with subordinate electronic warfare officers to ensure that electronic countermeasure devices and equipment are properly installed, tested, and deconflicted with noncomplementary devices of similar purpose within the support area.

## **TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND ENFORCEMENT**

C-36. Traffic management and enforcement and MSR and ASR regulation and enforcement collectively include active and passive measures used to control traffic circulation, enforce traffic regulations, investigate traffic collisions, and enable safe movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Traffic management and enforcement focuses on mitigating traffic disruptions created by threats, dislocated civilians, and congestion due to breakdowns, weather, and degradation of road surfaces. Traffic control elements coordinate with movement control teams to update and share information on MSR interdiction, traffic congestion, or other situations influencing movement in the AO. Military police provide temporary traffic control through manned traffic control posts and emplace temporary traffic control devices (signs, roadblocks, traffic cones, warning devices, other traffic control measures). Traffic management and enforcement and MSR and ASR regulation and enforcement conducted by military police may include—

- Supporting movement associated with tactical missions, such as traffic control in support of breaching and gap crossing (traffic control posts, defiles, temporary route signing).
- Supporting movement control priorities through execution of published traffic control plans and enforcing highway regulations.
- Supporting passage of lines (forward or rearward) mobility support through traffic control (to include management of dislocated civilians, stragglers, and detainees) for stationary and passing units.
- Enforcing traffic laws and building host-nation police capacity to perform traffic control and enforcement tasks consistent with the rule of law.

C-37. Military police trained as traffic management and collision investigators can conduct traffic surveys to assess traffic problems on specific existing road structures. Based on these assessments, they can provide recommendations for implementation of traffic control measures to mitigate acute traffic flow problems. (See ATP 3-39.10.) Traffic flow problems that require major construction or cover large road networks (such as those found within large cities) require comprehensive traffic studies and expertise from traffic engineers supported by transportation, military police, and other technical specialties.

**LINES OF COMMUNICATION MAINTENANCE**

C-38. Engineering support to traffic management and control can include repairing and clearing roads, improving trafficability and facilitating movement to major construction projects, and designing and building highways. In support of traffic studies, engineers also provide technical expertise on the design and installation of permanent traffic control devices into the road network. See ATP 3-34.40 for additional information on general engineering support.



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## Appendix D

# Support Area Tenant Units

Many of the units not staffed to control terrain become tenants within the support area. Support area operations are conducted by the assigned area owner. Support area operations do not include the mission support operations conducted by tenants within the support area. The support area commander will synchronize their operations with tenant units in the support area to prevent or minimize interference with command and control and support operations and to provide unimpeded movement of friendly forces; protection; operations to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces or defeat threats; and area damage control. The support area commander will have some command and control authority over the tenant and transient organizations within the support area for security and defense; this may be TACON for security and defense. This chapter provides an overview of support area tenant units and their capabilities.

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*Note:* See chapter 2, Section II, for an overview of possible MEB task-organized units and their capabilities.

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## ENGINEER

D-1. Engineers not assigned to BCTs are organized in capability-based units of multidiscipline combat, general, and geospatial capabilities. Army engineer forces operate as integral members of the combined arms teams and echelons above the BCT during peace and war to provide a full range of engineering capabilities. These capabilities are generally provided by three engineer disciplines—combat, general, and geospatial engineering. Table D-1 provides an overview of engineer capabilities at the brigade and battalion level that may be a tenant unit of the support area. For additional information on engineer operations, see FM 3-34.

**Table D-1. Engineer mission planning and capabilities**

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Capabilities</i>
Engineer Brigade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide command and control, plan, integrate, and employ engineer capabilities (combat, general, and geospatial engineering) in support of division, corps and theater areas of operations.</li> <li>• Oversee contract construction, labor, and indigenous personnel.</li> <li>• Plan and supervise terrain analysis and topographic operations.</li> <li>• Decoy emplacements (if necessary field expedient decoys/on-site fabrication).</li> </ul>
Engineer Battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide command and control, plan, integrate, and employ up to 5 task organized companies, one forward support company.</li> <li>• Coordinate engineer support, subunit task organization, and resource management.</li> <li>• Plan and support mobility, countermobility, and survivability operations.</li> <li>• Plan and supervise the collection of engineer related information and development of engineer information.</li> </ul>

**Table D-1. Engineer mission planning and capabilities (continued)**

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Capabilities</i>
Engineer Battalion (continued)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide technical advice, assistance, and training in mine warfare, field fortifications, camouflage, demolitions, and engineer reconnaissance techniques.</li> <li>• Plan, supervise, and coordinate survey and design teams when augmented by engineer brigade for construction or clearance missions.</li> <li>• Coordinate with medical brigade to provide for site preparation, construction or modification of waste disposal areas for combat support hospitals.</li> <li>• Emplace division managed multi-spectral decoys, construct decoy positions, and support decoy pattern of life.</li> </ul>

**MILITARY POLICE**

D-2. Military police units are manned, equipped, and trained to operate across the range of military operations. Military police organize for purpose and provide technical capabilities that enhance the support area commander’s ability to control terrain, protect populations, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains. Military police do this through their three military police disciplines of police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support. Military police headquarters cannot generally conduct all three military police disciplines at the same level of priority; therefore, commanders must anticipate, prioritize, and synchronize the employment of military police assets. Table D-2 provides an overview of military police capabilities at the battalion level and below that may be a tenant unit of the corps or division support area. For additional information on military police operations, see FM 3-39.

**Table D-2. Military police capabilities**

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Capabilities</i>
Military police brigade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides command and control for the operation of the brigade and for all task organized units.</li> <li>• Provides staff planning, coordination, and supervision required for all task organized and attached units, including unit allocation and resource management.</li> <li>• Coordinates with CA operations staff officer for planning and execution of civil-military operations, appropriate Army, joint, interagency, and multinational headquarters, host-nation civil authorities, nongovernmental organizations, and private volunteer organizations.</li> <li>• Provides logistical and administrative support to the headquarters and task organized units.</li> <li>• Integrates police intelligence operations and vulnerability assessments into the common operational picture.</li> <li>• Provides management of detainee operations.</li> <li>• Provides MWD program management, and coordinating MWD employment and sustainment within the brigade AO.</li> <li>• Coordinates and supervises protective service operations for designated personnel.</li> <li>• Brigade commander serves as Commander of Detainee Operations when required.</li> <li>• Provides staff planning, coordination, and supervision required for all task organized and attached units.</li> <li>• Coordinates and supervises protective service operations for designated personnel.</li> </ul>

Table D-2. Military police capabilities (continued)

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>														
Military police battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conducts the command and control of battalion operations for 2 to 5 military police companies and other assigned or attached elements.</li> <li>• Provides staff planning, coordination, and supervision required for all task organized and attached units executing police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support.</li> <li>• Coordinates with the headquarters and headquarters detachment, military police brigade, host-nation military organizations, and the civil police authorities concerning host-nation support.</li> <li>• Conducts vulnerability assessments of critical facilities.</li> <li>• Provides management of detainee operations and supervises the staff for collection and evacuation of detainees and/or dislocated civilians.</li> <li>• Prepares the command and control of subordinate elements that support counterdrug operations pursuant to controlling law and within the provisions of DOD policy.</li> <li>• Integrates Police Intelligence Operations and vulnerability assessments into the common operational picture</li> <li>• Supervises the selection, organization, training, equipment, and employment of host-nation military and paramilitary police units.</li> <li>• Provides military police investigative support within the battalion AOs.</li> <li>• Provides protective service details for designated high-risk personnel when they are properly trained or supervised by a CID special agent.</li> </ul>														
Military police detention battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conducts command and control of operations for assigned and attached units.</li> <li>• Provides administrative, field feeding, clothing, religious, and recreational support to detainees. When organized to support U.S. military prisoners or detainees, field feeding provided is limited to the procurement/distribution of rations, menus, and field kitchen equipment and the supervision of qualified U.S. military prisoners or detainees in the preparation of meals. Complete field-feeding services are provided to high-risk detainees.</li> <li>• Coordinates and supervises work projects for detainees or U.S. military prisoners.</li> <li>• Provides limited health support services and operations public health services during detainee operations and escorts qualified personnel providing medical care and operations public health services.</li> <li>• Screens/inspects incoming and outgoing detainee mail for contraband items.</li> <li>• Maintains organic equipment in the headquarters and headquarters company and assigned military police detention companies and detention camp liaison detachments.</li> <li>• Operates and maintains battalion internal radio and wire communication nets.</li> <li>• Provides organic personnel to maintain detention facilities and utilities, heat, lights, and water.</li> <li>• Consolidates supply and HR support to U.S. Soldiers assigned to subordinate units.</li> </ul>														
<p><b>Legend:</b></p> <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 15%;">AO</td> <td>area of operations</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CA</td> <td>civil affairs</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CID</td> <td>criminal investigations division</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DOD</td> <td>Department of Defense</td> </tr> <tr> <td>HR</td> <td>human resources</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MWD</td> <td>military working dog</td> </tr> <tr> <td>U.S.</td> <td>United States</td> </tr> </table>		AO	area of operations	CA	civil affairs	CID	criminal investigations division	DOD	Department of Defense	HR	human resources	MWD	military working dog	U.S.	United States
AO	area of operations														
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## CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

D-3. *Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations* include the employment of capabilities that assess, protect against, and mitigate the entire range of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents to enable freedom of action (FM 3-11). CBRN capabilities support operations across the range of military operations by assessing CBRN threats and hazards, providing protection against CBRN hazards, mitigating CBRN incidents, and providing hazard awareness and understanding. The CBRN functions of assess, protect, and mitigate share a common fundamental purpose that fits within the protection warfighting function to achieve or contribute to support area operations. Table D-3 provides an overview of CBRN units, planning requirements, and capabilities at the battalion level and below that may be task-organized to the support area designated land owner or a tenant unit of the corps or division support area. For additional information on CBRN operations, see FM 3-11.

**Table D-3. CBRN mission planning and capabilities**

Organization	Capabilities
CBRN brigade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide command and control for the operation of the brigade and up to five CBRN battalions.</li> <li>• Provide staff planning and sustainment coordination with the CBRN staff within division, corps, or theater Army sector.</li> <li>• Operate a tactical command post and a main command post.</li> <li>• Allocate units and resources in support of CBRN reconnaissance, detection, decontamination, and chemical weapons of mass destruction operations throughout the theater of operation.</li> </ul>
CBRN battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Command and control and supervision of personnel assigned to the CBRN battalion and up to six CBRN/ CBRNE companies.</li> <li>• Operate a battalion main command post.</li> <li>• Conduct staff planning and sustainment coordination with the CBRN staff within the brigade, division, corps, or theater army sector.</li> <li>• Allocate task organized units and resources in support of CBRN reconnaissance, surveillance, decontamination, biological detection, and CWMD operations to the theater army area, corps, division, and brigade areas of operation.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Legend:</b></p> <p>CBRN                    chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</p> <p>CBRNE                chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives</p> <p>CWMD                 countering weapons of mass destruction</p>	

## CIVIL AFFAIRS

D-4. CA forces execute CA core competencies and functions. The CA branch provides three core competencies nested within CA operations—CA activities, military government operations, and CA supported activities. CA functions are structured under each competency, organizing tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) into executable capabilities to create the desired effects. CA core competencies form the basis for training, organizing, equipping, and employing CA forces. The core competencies nest within the commander’s overall responsibility for planning and executing civil-military operations. The following are CA operations core competencies and their nested functions:

- **CA activities.** *Civil affairs activities* are activities specifically planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that support the commander in order to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate indigenous populations and institutions, unified action partners, and interagency (FM 3-57). CA activities provide unique capabilities to the commander. CA activities consist of the following functions:
  - Civil reconnaissance.
  - Civil engagement.
  - Civil information management.

- Civil-military operations center.
- CA operations staff support.
- **Military government operations.** *Military government operations* are operations executed by civil affairs to provide expertise in the civil sector functions in order to establish transitional military authority or conduct support to civil administration (FM 3-57). While the Department of State has the lead for stabilization and reconstruction, the DOD has a requirement to support that. DODD 5100.01 directs the Army to establish military government when occupying enemy territory, and DODD 2000.13 identifies military government as a directed requirement under CA operations. Although CA forces enable military government by conducting military government operations, there is currently no overarching concept or doctrine within DOD or the Army on how to establish a transitional military authority. CA forces provide expertise in civilian sector functions that are typically the responsibility of civilian authorities to establish local government capability or to enhance its capacity. This core competency is normally executed in support of Department of State operations or when directed in the absence of other U.S. government capabilities. Military government operations include the following functions:
  - Transitional military authority.
  - Support to civil administration.
- **CA supported activities.** *Civil affairs supported activities* are activities in which civil affairs plays a key planning, coordinating or synchronizing role, but for which they are not the proponent or primary executor (FM 3-57). CA supported activities are comprised of the following functions:
  - Foreign assistance.
  - Foreign humanitarian assistance.
  - Populace and resources control.
  - Civil-military engagement.

D-5. Table D-4 provides an overview of CA units, planning requirements, and capabilities for units that may be task-organized to the support area designated land owner or tenant unit of the corps or division support area. For additional information on the capabilities of CA units, see ATP 3-57.70 and FM 3-57.

**Table D-4. CA mission planning and capabilities**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>
CA Brigade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Plan, enable, shape, and manage civil-military operations.</li> <li>• Develop and maintain a civil common operational picture for the corps' AOs.</li> <li>• Plan, assess, and manage CA operations in support of unified land operations.</li> <li>• Plan, assess, and support military government operations (Subnational).</li> <li>• Support stabilization, reconstruction, and development.</li> <li>• Enable indigenous populations and institutions, interagency, and interorganizational coordination to achieve unified action.</li> <li>• Enable command and control.</li> <li>• Enable transitions to consolidate gains.</li> </ul>

**Table D-4. CA mission planning and capabilities (continued)**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>
CA Battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Plan, enable, shape, and manage civil-military operations</li> <li>• Develop and maintain a civil common operational for the division's AOs.</li> <li>• Plan, assess, and execute CA operations in support of unified land operations.</li> <li>• Plan and assess stability activities</li> <li>• Enable indigenous populations and institutions, interagency, and interorganizational coordination to achieve unified action.</li> <li>• Enable mission command.</li> <li>• Enable transitions to consolidate gains.</li> </ul>
<b>Legend:</b> AO                      area of operations CA                      civil affairs	

## AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

D-6. *Air and missile defense* is the direct (active and passive) defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and assets (JP 3-01). More precisely, ADA is the dedicated Army systems, personnel, and forces that provide active, land-based defense against air and missile attacks. ADA forces execute AMD operations under the joint counterair operational framework based on the integration of offensive and defensive counterair operations. *Offensive counterair* are offensive operations to destroy or neutralize enemy aircraft, missile launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and after launch, and as close to their source as possible (JP 3-01). *Defensive counterair* are all defensive measures designed to neutralize or destroy enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace (JP 3-01).

D-7. During support area operations, the designated support area land owner may be task-organized an ADA element (SHORAD) to counter low-altitude unmanned aircraft systems, high-speed fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, reconnaissance, intelligence, and surveillance and target acquisition assets. Table D-5 provides an overview of the ADA battalion capabilities that may be a tenant unit of the corps or division support area. For additional information on ADA battalions (SHORAD), see FM 3-01.

**Table D-5. ADA mission planning and capabilities**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>
ADA Battalion (SHORAD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Air defense against low altitude hostile aircraft</li> <li>• Air defense airspace management coordination elements to supporting high and medium ADA battalions</li> <li>• Early warning information and air defense command and control information to supported units</li> <li>• Unit administration; religious support; field feeding; and communications-electronics support for units of the battalion</li> <li>• A force protection element to conduct coordinated defense of the unit's area or installation, unit movements, and other missions</li> </ul>
<b>Legend:</b> ADA                      air defense artillery SHORAD                short-range air defense	

## AVIATION BRIGADE

D-8. Army aviation formations are organized, trained, and equipped to support the combined arms team at the tactical and operational levels. Army aviation operations in the support area typically include air movement, aeromedical evacuation, and command and control support, but they may also include

reconnaissance, attacks, and security operations if there is a threat to the support area. When conducting attacks, reconnaissance, and security operations, Army aviation typically operates as a combined arms team with the ground unit designated with the security mission for the support area. The aviation brigade and theater-aviation EAB require large AAs usually located inside the division support area. An aviation brigade may need as much as 145,000 square meters to park aircraft and equipment. The space is required because of the minimum space required around helicopters during takeoff and landing in unimproved areas.

D-9. Table D-6 provides an overview of Army aviation formations capabilities that may be a tenant unit of the corps or division support area. For additional information on Army Aviation formations, see FM 3-04.

**Table D-6. Aviation brigade capabilities**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>
Combat Aviation Brigade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct command and control of helicopters and equipment to enhance command, control, communications, and intelligence.</li> <li>• Provide attack/recon helicopters for rapid employment as a part of the combined arms team to destroy enemy forces.</li> <li>• Provide utility and cargo helicopters for air assault and air movement, aerial mine warfare, downed aircraft recovery team, casualty evacuation, and intermediate and deliberate search and rescue operations in support of the division.</li> <li>• Provide air ambulance helicopters to evacuate critically wounded or other patients consistent with evacuation priorities and operational considerations, from points as far forward as possible, to appropriate role of care.</li> <li>• Conduct air reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations in support of the division.</li> <li>• Provide air traffic services for division and transit aircraft.</li> <li>• Provide unmanned aircraft systems for tactical reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition and manned unmanned teaming to increase the commander's situational understanding and operational reach.</li> </ul>
Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct command and control of helicopters and equipment to enhance command, control, communications, and intelligence.</li> <li>• Provide utility and cargo helicopters for air assault and air movement, aerial mine warfare, Downed Aircraft Recovery Team, casualty evacuation, and intermediate and deliberate search and rescue operations in support of the Division/Corps.</li> <li>• Provide air ambulance helicopters to evacuate critically wounded or other patients consistent with evacuation priorities and operational considerations, from points as far forward as possible, to appropriate role of care.</li> <li>• Conduct Air Traffic Services for Division/Corps and transit aircraft.</li> </ul>

## LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES

D-10. Logistics include maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution, operational contract support, and general engineering. Field services maintain the force by providing life, morale, and welfare support. Field services include shower and laundry, field feeding, water production and distribution, clothing and light textile repair, aerial delivery, and mortuary affairs. Table D-7, page D-8, provides an overview of sustainment capabilities that may be a tenant unit of the corps or division support area. For additional information on sustainment, see FM 4-0.



**Table D-7. Sustainment capabilities**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>
Expeditionary Sustainment Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide sustainment support which includes logistics support, conduct human resources support, conduct financial and comptroller support, and provide health service support.</li> <li>• Plan, integrate, synchronize and assess Army common and special operations forces sustainment requirements.</li> <li>• Rapidly deploy to conduct theater opening, distribution management and reception, staging and onward movement of forces.</li> </ul>
Division sustainment brigade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide responsibility for the integration, synchronization, and execution of sustainment operations for a division.</li> <li>• Command and control of up to seven battalions.</li> <li>• Coordinate and synchronize tactical-level sustainment operations to meet current and future operations.</li> <li>• Provide general support to units assigned or attached to the division and operating in the division areas of operations.</li> </ul>

**ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM**

D-11. The *Army Health System* is a component of the Military Health System that is responsible for operational management of the HSS and FHP missions for training, pre-deployment, deployment, and postdeployment operations. Army Health System includes all mission support services performed, provided, or arranged by the Army Medicine to support health service support and force health protection mission requirements for the Army and as directed, for joint, intergovernmental agencies, coalition, and multinational forces (FM 4-02). The AHS is a complex system of systems, divided into ten medical functions and aligned with medical disciplines. These systems are interrelated and interdependent and must be continuously and meticulously synchronized. The AHS uses medical command and control organizations to manage the subordinate units providing AHS and FHP (see table D-8).

**Table D-8. Medical capabilities**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>
MEDCOM (DS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Command and control of theater medical units providing AHS support within the AO.</li> <li>• Management, coordination, and patient tracking procedures with the theater patient movement center staff section.</li> <li>• Synchronization of intratheater evacuation plans with the intertheater evacuation plan to ensure a seamless transition between tactical and strategic evacuation systems.</li> <li>• Coordination and orchestration of medical logistic operations to include Class VIII supply, distribution, medical maintenance and repair support, optical fabrication, and blood management.</li> <li>• Veterinary technical supervision for animal medical care, food protection, and veterinary public health support.</li> <li>• Operations public health support for medical and (OEH surveillance, potable water inspection, pest management, food facility inspection, and control of medical and nonmedical waste.</li> <li>• Assistance with coordination and integration of strategic capabilities from the sustaining base to units in the AO.</li> <li>• Staff planning, supervision of operations, and administration of assigned and attached medical units.</li> </ul>

Table D-8. Medical capabilities (continued)

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>														
Medical Brigade (Support)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Command and control of subordinate and attached units.</li> <li>• Advises commanders on medical aspects of their operations.</li> <li>• Medical staff planning, operational and technical supervision, and administrative assistance for subordinate or attached units and hospitals operating in the division or corps AO.</li> <li>• Coordination with the supporting theater patient movement requirements center for medical regulating and medical evacuation from medical battalion (multifunctional) and hospitals to support theater Army unit's MTFs.</li> <li>• Medical consultation service and technical advice in Operations public health, behavioral health, dental services, medical laboratory support, nutrition, and veterinary support.</li> <li>• Control and supervision of Class VIII supply and resupply to include blood management. Serves as the single integrated medical logistics manager when designated by the geographical combatant commander.</li> <li>• Joint capable C2 capability when augmented with appropriate joint assets.</li> </ul>														
Medical Battalion (Multifunctional)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Medical command and control, staff planning, supervision of operations, medical and general logistics support as required, and administration of activities of subordinates in accomplishing the AHS mission.</li> <li>• Task organization of EAB health care assets to meet the projected patient workload.</li> <li>• Planning and coordination of Role 1 and Role 2 medical treatment, to include staff advice on a support basis for EAB units without organic health assets.</li> <li>• Monitoring and supervision of medical logistics operations, to include Class VIII supply or resupply, medical equipment maintenance and repair support, optical fabrication and repair support, and blood management.</li> <li>• Consultation, planning, and coordinating air and ground medical evacuation within the battalion AO. Coordinating aeromedical evacuation support requirements with the supporting aviation unit, and synchronizing the air evacuation plan into the overall medical evacuation plan.</li> <li>• Coordination of medical regulating and patient movement with the medical brigade (support) patient movement branch or the MEDCOM (DS) theater patient movement center, as required within the AO.</li> <li>• Consultation and technical advice on operations public health (disease vectors and pest management, medical and OEH surveillance, food facility inspection, waste and water management, operational hearing services), combat operational stress control and behavioral health, medical records administration, veterinary services, nursing practices and procedures, dental services, and automated medical information systems to supported units.</li> </ul>														
<p><b>Legend:</b></p> <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 150px;">AHS</td> <td>Army Health System</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AO</td> <td>area of operations</td> </tr> <tr> <td>C2</td> <td>command and control</td> </tr> <tr> <td>EAB</td> <td>echelons above brigade</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MTF</td> <td>medical treatment facility</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MEDCOM (DS)</td> <td>medical command, deployment support</td> </tr> <tr> <td>OEH</td> <td>occupational and environmental health</td> </tr> </table>		AHS	Army Health System	AO	area of operations	C2	command and control	EAB	echelons above brigade	MTF	medical treatment facility	MEDCOM (DS)	medical command, deployment support	OEH	occupational and environmental health
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## REGIONAL SUPPORT GROUP

D-12. The regional support group mission enables a commander to support personnel. The regional support group is a deployable headquarters that manages base camps or base clusters with a population of 6,000 or more personnel and requires services beyond basic life support (see ATP 3-90.20). The regional support group headquarters is designed to relieve the burden of base camp management and operations from the combatant commander.

D-13. A regional support group provides the command, control, and administrative support structure for operating a base camp or base cluster with a population of 6,000 or more personnel. The population consists of military forces, DA Civilians, other government agency personnel, nongovernmental organization personnel, government contractors, and transients. Usually a regional support group falls under a general officer command during contingency operations. This mission set includes—

- Commanding assigned or attached units.
- Supporting units and personnel as directed.
- Providing contract requirements definition and oversight assistance.
- Determining base camp support requirements.
- Operating and manning a 24/7 BDOC.
- Commanding smaller contingency bases within the general officer command's operational area.
- Overseeing base camp management and operations.

## Appendix E

# Base Camp and Base Cluster Security and Defense

Support areas are subject to both conventional and unconventional threats. These threats will attempt to disrupt support area operations by attacking sustainment operations and command and control nodes, disabling AMD systems, and seizing key terrain. Every unit in the support area is responsible for its own defense. The establishment of base camps and base clusters throughout the support area builds on the concept of integrating mutual support into a viable defense.

### BASE CAMP AND BASE CLUSTER OVERVIEW

E-1. A *base camp* is an evolving military facility that supports the military operations of a deployed unit and provides the necessary support and services for sustained operations (ATP 3-37.10). Establishing base camps is a complex task that balances mission, protection, sustainment, and construction requirements. This task is further complicated by changes in missions; fluctuating troop levels; threat factors; and the complexity, lethality, and speed of military operations. Added to this are time and resource constraints, theater entry conditions, mission duration, access to resources, competing requirements, and environmental considerations.

E-2. The use of base camps for sustainment and related activities are unavoidable during the conduct of large-scale combat operations. Commanders must be able to establish base camps and enable access for onward movement and sustainment of forces. Base camps, due to their size and immobility, are difficult to conceal and are generally considered high-value targets for enemy attacks due to the concentration of friendly forces and materiel. Securing and protecting base camps and infrastructure is essential to the force ability to compete and win. Base camps are highly contested and difficult to sustain forward on the battlefield. All activities forward on the battlefield, including LOCs, critical infrastructure, and hasty base camps or AAs, must be resilient and mobile.

E-3. The base camp is the focal point for base defense planning and is responsible for defending itself against Level I threats. The base camp engages Level II and Level III threats and delays them until reinforcing military police or a TCF arrives to assist in defeating the threat. Each base establishes a BDOC to plan, coordinate, and supervise base camp defense operations.

E-4. Base camps are nonpermanent by design and are geographically small, defensible areas with defined perimeters and established access controls. Base camps should be situated and designed to take advantage of natural and man-made terrain features. The area may vary from high ground with good observation and fields of fire to highly congested areas, obscuring observation and limiting fields of fire.

E-5. Lethality and the speed of operations may require the establishment of AAs, hasty base camps, and base clusters using physical terrain features and dispersion to support the protection of forces. The designated base camp commander assigns areas to tenant units and requires them to tie in fires and observation with adjacent units. The BDOC is normally located near the center of the base camp. Unit locations in the base camp are assigned areas based on their future mission, their combat power, and the presence of enemy avenues of approach within their AO. The base camp commander ensures that observation posts are established at key points around the entire perimeter along the most likely enemy avenues of approach. When possible, hasty base camps should provide—

- Concealment from air and ground observation.
- Adequate entrances, exits, and internal routes.

- Space for dispersion.
- Cover from direct fire.
- Good drainage and soil conditions that can sustain unit vehicles and individual Soldier movements.
- Terrain masking electromagnetic signatures.
- Sanctuary from enemy artillery fires.
- Sufficient space for basecamp specific purposes.

E-6. Base camps may have a specific purpose, or they may be multifunctional. While base camps are not permanent bases or installations, the longer they exist, the more they exhibit many of the same characteristics in terms of the support and services that are provided and the types of facilities that are developed

E-7. A base camp can contain one or more units from one or more Services and typically support U.S. and multinational forces and other unified action partners operating anywhere along the range of military operations. (See JP 3-10.) A base camp has a defined perimeter and established access controls. The perimeter encircles the base camp site and employs crew served-weapons, fighting positions, and observation posts.

E-8. Base camps provide a protected location from which to project and sustain combat power. Commanders apply operational art to decide when, where, and for what purpose to operate from base camps. The arrangement and location of base camps (often in austere, rapidly-emplaced configurations) throughout the support area complement the ability of U.S. forces to conduct sustained, continuous operations, enabling commanders to apply combat power in support of large-scale combat operations.

E-9. Base camps throughout the support area may be developed for specific purposes. A base camp can serve as an AA or a sustainment base; support onward movement, integration, or detention operations; or perform multiple functions. The designated purpose and operational requirements of tenant units serve as the primary guides for designing a base camp.

E-10. The support area commander designates an area or facility as a base camp and designates the senior officer as the base camp commander responsible for protection, terrain management, and day-to-day operations of the base camp. This allows other units in the base camp to focus on their primary functions. Units located within the base camp are under the TACON of the base camp commander for security and defense.

E-11. Construction standards for a base camp in support of large-scale combat operations normally fall within the initial construction standards. An initial construction standard is characterized by facilities with minimum capabilities, requiring minimal engineer effort and simplifying material transport and availability. Organic construction is a subset of the initial construction standard. It is intended for immediate use by units upon arrival in theater for up to 90 days; however, it may be used for up to 6 months. Units use their organic/table of organization and equipment capabilities to the fullest extent possible to construct base camps. Organic capabilities may vary based on the type of unit, training, experience, and equipment available. They typically provide for initial force presence and maneuver activities until force flow supports the arrival of engineer resources. See ATP 3-37.10 for additional information on base camp construction standards.

E-12. Base camps may be grouped together into a cluster. Within the support area, the support area commander may designate base clusters for the mutual protection and accomplishment of mission objectives. A base cluster has no defined perimeter. However, each base camp within the base cluster does. The senior commander within the base cluster is the base cluster commander. The base cluster commander operates the BCOC and is responsible for the base cluster defense plan.

E-13. A number of base clusters may exist within the echelon support area, but there will only be limited assets to assist in their defense. The support area commander will determine which base camps or base clusters have protection priority and submit the unit protection prioritization list to the appropriate echelon for consideration of additional protection assets. See appendix A for additional information on developing a protection prioritization list.

## BASE CAMP PRINCIPLES

E-14. The base camp commander and staff use the base camp principles as a guide for analytical thinking. These principles are not a set of rigid rules, nor do they apply in every situation (see ATP 3-37.10 for additional information on base camp master planning principles). They should be applied with creativity, insight, and boldness. These principles are—

- **Survivability.** A primary purpose of base camps is providing a protected location from which to project and sustain combat power. Base camps depend on the application of effective protection strategies, generally achieved by developing a comprehensive protection plan consistent with the principles of protection discussed in ADP 3-37.
- **Scalability.** Scalability is the ability to tolerate population fluctuations and incorporate changes in the base camp mission, level of services, or force protection level without the need for redesign.
- **Sustainability.** Sustainability is the ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of sustainment/logistics support to achieve military objectives. This means that base camps must achieve and maintain effectiveness within the means of available resources (materials, labor, energy, and funds) without placing any unnecessary strain on existing sustainment systems.
- **Standardization.** The standardization of base camp policies, Service standards, guidance, system solutions, standard designs, and construction provides consistent expectations for commanders and drives the repetitive use of proven best practices and tactics, techniques, and procedures. It helps achieve a higher degree of sustainability, reliability, and efficiency.

## BASE CAMP ACTIVITIES

E-15. Base camp activities are interrelated and interdependent; each activity provides an action that mutually supports the others. The foundation of all activities is master planning. The base camp activities are—

- **Master planning.** Master planning is an integrated strategy for the design, construction, and maintenance of required facilities and infrastructure that integrates base camp improvements for protection, quality of life for residents, and efficiencies and effectiveness.
- **Operations and maintenance.** This activity includes all of the tasks needed for constructing, maintaining, operating, and repairing base camp facilities and infrastructure.
- **Protection.** Base camp protection includes the consideration of all of the protection tasks within the protection warfighting function articulated in ADP 3-37 (see appendix A for more information on protection).
- **Sustainment.** Sustainment activities provide support in two major areas: sustainment/logistics and field services.

## SITE SELECTION AND LAYOUT

E-16. Numerous competing demands and considerations influence a base camp site selection and layout, such as tactical and operational objectives, mission concerns, military constraints, environmental factors, division or corps directives, and commander guidance. A site selection and layout assessment assists in identifying the potential benefits, vulnerabilities, and protection requirements associated with a base camp.

E-17. In all situations, a site selection and layout assessment aids in estimating base camp characteristics and the suitability of the site to meet protection requirements. It is important to recognize that some problems are inherent, such as high ground and snipers overlooking the entire base camp interior, or a location where floods occur while other problems can be mitigated. Knowledge regarding base camp protection measures improves throughout the process, from initial selection and layout to design and establishment of the base camp. Protection considerations deliberately integrated from inception into the site selection, layout, design, and establishment process greatly reduces the resource requirements (materials, time, and labor) needed to protect personnel and assets.

## SITE SELECTION CONSIDERATIONS

E-18. Many factors influence site selection, including the tactical situation, access to transportation and infrastructure, proximity to the civilian population, terrain, weather, protection considerations, and effects of selecting an alternate location. Site selection can be crucial to effective operations. The primary concern during site selection is mission accomplishment. However, protection considerations cannot be ignored. A poorly located base camp may be difficult to secure and could hinder rather than enable the mission. Early identification of protection and security requirements reduces construction requirements and manpower demands and helps ensure adequate protection of personnel and assets commensurate with the threat. See ATP 3-37.10 for additional information on site selection.

## DESIGN AND LAYOUT CONSIDERATIONS

E-19. Planners responsible for the base camp layout and design should consider many variables, such as operational and functional issues, infrastructure requirements, protection and security measures, health and safety, and emergency response. Each base camp should be prepared to defend against the effects of hostile actions, nonhostile or unintended events (such as fire), and environmental conditions such as flooding or other man-made or natural disasters. Many of the base camp layout considerations are similar to site selection criteria. However, layout concerns and constraints are typically base camp-specific. Throughout the design process, planners should recognize conflicts, establish priorities, and focus on the most favorable solutions. The base camp layout should—

- Facilitate current and future operations.
- Maintain a layered, defense-in-depth security approach.
- Include entry control points that maintain security and control vehicle and personnel access.
- Protect critical assets and provide accessible protective shelters (bunkers) throughout the base camp.
- Allow for the dispersion of units and structures and maintain interior LOCs to support rapid incident response.
- Maximize protection of high-occupancy structures using measures such as overhead and sidewall protection designs.
- Maximize utilization of existing buildings and other infrastructure.

E-20. Protection measures that reduce vulnerability and diminish potential threats and hazards to personnel and critical assets should be addressed during base camp design. These measures include the establishment of standoff and facilities separation distances, perimeter security, vehicle barriers, entry control points, access control, intrusion detection, and mass warning.

## SECURITY AND DEFENSE

E-21. All commanders are responsible for the protection of forces on base camps within their AOs. The base camp and base cluster commanders integrate the appropriate protection tasks as part of mission planning and throughout the operations process. The framework for base camp protection consists of three primary areas: an outer security area, a perimeter zone, and an inner security area. These are shown conceptually in figure E-1. The base camp commander implements protection measures for tenant units on the base camp, and the base cluster commander coordinates, synchronizes, and integrates protection capabilities to safeguard base camps, secure routes, and protect forces within the base cluster. Protection and defensive measures are applied within and beyond the confines of the base camp to safeguard personnel, physical assets, and information. Protecting and defending base camps include consideration of all of the protection principles

within the protection warfighting function in ADP 3-37 and the associated defensive tasks detailed in FM 3-90-1, including—

- **Comprehensive.** Base camp and base cluster protection is an all-inclusive utilization of complementary and reinforcing protection tasks and systems available to base camp commanders to preserve the force.
- **Integrated.** Base camp and base cluster protection is integrated with other activities, systems, efforts, and capabilities associated with base camp missions to provide strength and structure to the overall effort. Integration must occur vertically and horizontally throughout the process.
- **Layered.** Base camp and base cluster protection capabilities are arranged using a layered approach to provide strength and depth. Layering reduces the destructive effect of a threat or hazard.
- **Redundant.** Base camp and base cluster protection efforts are often redundant anywhere that a vulnerability or point of failure is identified. Redundancy ensures that specific activities, systems, efforts, and capabilities that are critical for the success of overall base camp protection have a secondary or auxiliary effort of equal or greater quality.
- **Enduring.** Ongoing base camp and base cluster protection activities maintain the objectives of preserving combat power, populations, partners, essential equipment, resources, and critical infrastructure throughout the base camp life cycle.




Figure E-1. Framework for base camp security and defense

E-22. Base camp and base cluster security and defense capabilities are employed using a layered approach to provide strength and depth. Layering reduces the destructive effect from any single attack or hazard through the dissipation of energy or the defeat of the attacking force. A layered defense slows threat attacks and provides time for friendly defensive forces to assess, decide, and respond. Obstacles, such as barbed wire fences, jersey barriers, T-walls, berms and ditches, bastion barriers, networked munitions, and direct-fire positions and elements are deployed in depth, in a concentric fashion, to provide maximum protection.



E-23. These obstacles, direct-fire positions, and active deterrents can be in the form of—

- Wire, concrete, or other barriers used to reinforce the perimeter.
- Entry control points and associated obstacle/countermobility plans used to canalize and control incoming personnel or vehicles.
- Barriers employed to block high-speed avenues of approach, externally on approaches to the perimeter and internally to protect high-risk targets.
- Perimeter guard towers and observation posts.
- Ditches, berms, or other earthen obstacles.
- Mobile security patrols.
- Communications signal/electromagnetic signature masking.

## BASE CAMP AND BASE CLUSTER SECURITY

E-24. Base camps provide a protected location to project and sustain combat power. While some base camps, especially smaller base camps built in high-threat areas, may be required to focus on defense rather than just security, the primary focus for most base camps is not on conducting defense, except in rare instances. In these cases, normal mission operations on the base camp cease and the focus of all available assets is shifted to defense until the threat is eliminated or repelled. Once the threat is defeated, the base camp and its tenant or transient units return their focus to their primary missions.

E-25. *Security operations* are those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the forces being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their protected forces (ADP 3-90). The five fundamentals of security are—

- **Provide early and accurate warnings.** Early and accurate warnings of an enemy approach are essential to successful base camp and base cluster protection/force protection. The base camp and base cluster commanders need information to shift and concentrate forces to meet and defeat the enemy. The use of OPs, patrols, security forces, and sensors provide long-range observation; observe enemy movement; and report the enemy's size, location, and activity.
- **Provide reaction time and maneuver space.** Base camp and base cluster security assets—forces, sensors, and patrols—should work at a sufficient distance to allow the base camp and base cluster commanders time to review rapidly reported information. This timely review gives the base camp and base cluster commanders the reaction time necessary to order indirect fire to slow the enemy's rate of advance; maneuver direct-fire elements into place to engage, exploit, and defeat the enemy; and initiate coordination for a response force or TCF if required, based on the threat level.
- **Orient on the force, area, or facility to be protected.** Base camp and base cluster organic, security, and reinforcement forces must be aware of any enemy movement and must reposition their elements accordingly to maintain their position relative to any threats. The force must understand the base camp and base cluster commander's scheme of protection, including where the security force is in relation to enemy movement.
- **Perform continuous area security operations.** Base camp and base cluster personnel conduct continuous area security operations to gain as much information as possible about the AO and any threats. This can be accomplished through OPs, mounted and dismounted patrols, and remote sensors, such as unmanned aircraft systems deployed to observe dead space.
- **Maintain threat contact.** Once enemy forces are detected, base camp forces must continuously collect information on the enemy's activities and disposition to assist the base camp or base cluster commander in determining the potential and actual enemy COA and deny the enemy the element of surprise. This requires security forces to maintain continuous visual contact to be able to use direct and indirect fires to influence enemy actions and gain time for the base camp and base cluster commander. Once the base camp security forces make enemy contact, they do not break contact unless the base camp or base cluster commander or a designated security force commander specifically directs it.

E-26. Although not a fundamental of security operations, the use of dispersion is an important technique that commanders should consider. Dispersing units, command posts, equipment, and personnel reduces vulnerability against enemy direct- and indirect-fire threats and CBRN attacks. However, units should be close enough to provide mutual support against enemy ground attacks. Commanders must determine where risk is acceptable.

E-27. Base camps and base clusters typically protect their personnel and assets through the application of security activities. Some essential security activities include communications security, cybersecurity, information security, OPSEC, personnel security, and physical security. Of the five security tasks listed in ADP 3-90—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security—only area security and local security typically apply to base camps and base clusters. Area security preserves the base camp and base cluster commander's freedom to move reserves, position fire support means, provide for mission control, conduct sustaining activities, and coordinate for reinforcing forces (see chapter 2). Local security provides immediate protection to base camp forces and assets. See ADP 3-37 and ADP 3-90 for additional information on area and local security.

## **BASE CAMP DEFENSE**

E-28. *Defensive operations* are operations to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). *Base defense* refers to the local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to United States forces (JP 3-10). Successful base camp and base cluster defenses share the following characteristics: disruption; flexibility; maneuver; massing effects; and operations in depth, preparation, and security. The basic defensive tasks are applicable to the area and perimeter of the base camp. See ADP 3-90 for a discussion of these characteristics.

### **Area Defense**

E-29. Conducting area defense is a defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to a base camp, base cluster, or surrounding terrain. The focus of the area defense is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually supporting, prepared positions. Units maintain their positions and control the terrain between these positions. An area defense capitalizes on the strength inherent in a closely integrated base camp defense. The higher commander may assign subordinate units or tenant organizations the task of conducting an area defense as part of their mission. Subordinate echelons defend within their assigned AOs as part of the larger-echelon operation. See FM 3-90-1 for more information on area defense.

### **Perimeter Defense**

E-30. The commander can employ perimeter defense as an option when conducting an area defense or in the conduct of base camp and base cluster defense in the echelon support. A perimeter defense is oriented in all directions. The prerequisites for a successful perimeter defense are aggressive patrolling and security operations outside the perimeter. The unit within the perimeter can perform these activities; or another force, such as the territorial defense forces of a host nation, can perform them. The unit can organize a perimeter defense to accomplish a specific mission, such as protecting a fire base. A unit may also form a perimeter when it is located in the friendly echelon support area within the confines of a base camp or base cluster.

E-31. A major characteristic of a perimeter defense is a secure inner area, with most of the combat power located on the perimeter. Another characteristic is the ease of access for resupply operations. The commander coordinates direct- and indirect-fire plans to prevent accidentally engaging neighboring friendly units and noncombatants. Normally, the reserve centrally locates to react to a penetration of the perimeter at any point. See FM 3-90-1 for more information on perimeter defense.

## BASE DEFENSE OPERATIONS CENTER

E-32. A *base defense operations center* is a command and control facility established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense (JP 3-10). Other contingency locations may also establish BDOCs as the situation requires. A base camp's commander provides and exercises base camp defense through a BDOC. Through the BDOC, the base camp commander plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base camp defense efforts (see ATP 3-90.20).

E-33. The BDOC resembles a typical command post. A *command post* is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities (FM 6-0). Personnel and equipment are arranged to facilitate coordination, the exchange of information, and timely decision making. Well-designed BDOCs integrate command and staff efforts by matching personnel, equipment, information systems, and procedures against their internal layout. (See ADP 6-0 or FM 6-0 for more information on command posts.) The protection functions of a BDOC include the following:

- Plan and execute force protection, AT, and physical security operations according to published guidance.
- Conduct a protection working group and threat working group.
- Ensure that all units within the perimeter conduct active and passive security measures.
- Monitor and direct security forces.

E-34. The composition of the BDOC depends on the combination of forces involved and may include other Services and multinational, host-nation, and other U.S. agency personnel, depending on the combination of forces located at each base camp. Multi-Service, other agency, host-nation, and multinational representation should be part of the BDOC when elements of their armed forces, police, or paramilitary forces are directly involved in the overall base defense effort, or when they are a major tenant organization. The BDOC normally consists of three primary sections: command, intelligence, and operations. There may be additional sections designated as deemed necessary (see ATP 2-22.2-1).

E-35. Similar to a BDOC, the BCOC is a command and control facility that serves as the base cluster commander's focal point for defense and security of the base cluster (see JP 3-10). The BCOC is established to control several subordinate base camps that may be grouped together in a cluster for mutual support for protection. The base and base cluster commanders also coordinate and integrate security operations with the BCOC as appropriate. Other contingency locations may also need to coordinate with BCOCs as the situation requires. Such coordination normally involves TACON over forces assigned or attached to the base primarily for the purpose of base defense and security. The base commander may also exercise TACON over other forces (such as medical or emergency services) residing on the base for primary purposes other than base defense. For example, when these forces perform functions related to base defense or local security missions as part of the overall base defense plan, they typically fall under TACON of the base commander (see ATP 3-90.20). This TACON relationship may not exist at other contingency locations; the echelon (corps or division) commander should provide guidance in those situations. The BDOC typically conducts 24-hour operations. Basic BDOC functions include the following:

- Provide organization for coordinated base camp security.
- Prepare plans to implement the commander's base camp defense guidance.
- Monitor assigned, attached, and tenant-unit forces and resources and provide the commander information to aid, allocate, and move forces and materiel to meet base defense requirements.
- Inform the base commander of security concerns.
- Develop and execute a reconnaissance and surveillance plan to ensure proper security from standoff threats within base camp boundaries, and coordinate with the base camp and base cluster commanders for the area outside the base camp boundary.
- Coordinate with the base camp commander or tenant commander to deconflict security activities from combat and stability operations.
- Identify and share emergency response and area damage control capabilities, to include medical support, engineering, EOD, and firefighting, as required.

- Evaluate actions to identify operational deficiencies, lessons learned, and best practices.
- Develop methods to improve combined operational effectiveness, to include coordinating training and exercising security measures.

### **Base Defense Planning**

E-36. Base camp defense planning is a methodical process that combines site selection considerations, mission objectives, mitigation strategies, identified security requirements, and protection operations. Early identification of protection requirements is essential to base camp defense planning. Requirements established before construction reduce construction and manpower costs. Security measures established in the planning process are more easily applied than after construction.

E-37. The base camp defense plan is necessary for the development and implementation of a comprehensive protection program. The base camp defense plan should focus efforts and resources toward cohesive defense operations. A sample plan template is provided in appendix D. The base defense plan should—

- Convey the base camp commander's intent.
- Provide a clear, concise mission statement.
- Provide tasks and activities, constraints, and coordinating instructions.
- Permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans.
- Focus on subordinate activities.
- Promote initiative.
- Include annexes containing subordinate information not included in the main defense plan.

E-38. Base camp defense planning should be conducted using a team approach. Essential members include the base commander, tenant-unit commanders, and the protection team.

### **Base Camp Commander**

E-39. Base camp commanders are responsible for protection planning and operations and should use all available assets to establish required security levels. Base camp commanders normally exercise TACON for the purpose of base defense over forces assigned or attached to the base. The commander may also exercise TACON over other forces residing in the base for primary purposes other than local base defense when these forces are called on to perform functions related to base camp defense or local security missions as part of the overall base camp defense plan.

E-40. Base camp commanders also have direct interest in the security of the area surrounding the base. As such, the commander coordinates base defense efforts with the TCF or host-nation forces providing exterior security, if available. Base camp commanders establish a BDOC to serve as the focal point for protection, security, and defense within the base camp boundary. Through the BDOC, the commander plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base camp defense efforts.

E-41. Critical to the success of the protection mission is the need for coordination and cooperation among assigned or attached units. These units should build operational relationships based on mutual support. For example, tenant-unit communications equipment may not be compatible with host-unit equipment. In this case, tenant-unit commanders should coordinate with the base commander to ensure compatibility.

## Tenant-Unit Commanders

E-42. Tenant-unit commanders actively participate in base camp defense planning. Tenant units normally provide for their own security and contribute personnel to the protection mission. These assigned or attached forces fall under the base camp commander's TACON. This relationship may not necessarily exist at all contingency locations. Regardless, tenant-unit commanders should ensure that provided personnel are properly equipped and trained. Key tenant-unit concerns include training, rehearsals, coordination, and competing requirements between security and operational tasks. Tenant-unit commander responsibilities include—

- Participating in the preparation and execution of base camp defense plans.
- Providing for unit internal security.
- Conducting individual and unit training to ensure readiness for assigned defense tasks.
- Providing an appropriate share of facilities, equipment, and personnel for the BDOC.
- Advising the base camp commander on operational concerns specific to their units.
- Sustaining and administering unit forces.
- Providing unit requirements for common-user communications systems to the base camp commander's communications element.

## Protection Working Group

E-43. A working group approach should be used to develop the base defense plan and protection measures and to manage protection operations. To interact efficiently, team members should understand the concepts, roles, and capabilities of other members. A working-group approach facilitates protection plan development, intelligence sharing, and coordination between tenant units.

## BASE CAMP THREATS

E-44. In most cases, base camps are located where the risk of Level III threats have been eliminated or effectively mitigated by the designated AO commander. During large-scale combat operations, base camps often become focal points for bypassed or reconsolidated Level III threats. The support area commander must be prepared to conduct defensive and offensive tasks by deploying the TCF to repel a Level III attack when the threat assessment indicates the possibility of a Level III threat in the support area, regardless of whether the element of decisive action/simultaneous activities is currently dominant. Preparations may involve significant increases in area denial measures; offensive actions; hardening, dispersal, and other protection measures; and immediate reaction to hostile actions.

E-45. On initial occupation of the base camp site, friendly forces take offensive actions to identify levels of enemy presence and eliminate enemy threats in the immediate area, if required. Once the area is cleared and the necessary elements of the base camp defense have been established, the base camp commander continues managing area security tasks to provide an early warning and to mitigate the risks of threat elements operating within the base camp AO. The base camp commander and staff identify gaps in security and requirements for additional support or assets. The base camp commander, supported by the staff, coordinates with the AO commander to fill identified capability gaps.

E-46. Base camps are purposely designed and constructed to be resistant to enemy attack and to recover quickly so that they can continue to operate. The ability to quickly recover from an enemy attack is enhanced through detailed planning and rehearsals of procedures. Base camps must be prepared to defend in any direction through flexible base camp defense plans that include the use of dedicated initial-response forces positioned to respond to the widest possible range of contingencies.

E-47. The two principal types of attacks that a base camp commander and their staff focus on are categorized as penetrating attacks or standoff attacks. Infiltrated attacks from inside the base camp are likely to occur as well. Screening and vetting local workers are paramount to disrupting the threat's potential to gain access as a base camp worker or visitor. Hybrid threats will use the difficulties of positive identification of threat actors as threat actors to their advantage, and often these actors will provide signatures similar to friendly or neutral actors, gaining them access to the base camps.

### **PENETRATING ATTACKS**

E-48. Defending against penetrating attacks relies on a strong perimeter defense that incorporates obstacles and integrated fires from well-protected firing positions. When applying defensive elements to a base camp perimeter, the type and extent of barrier and fires integration may be restricted based on mission and operational variables. Base camps within complex terrain, especially in support of stability tasks, will likely be restricted in the amount and types of obstacles and corresponding fires allowed in the outer security area; this is especially true for indirect fires.

E-49. Security forces must be capable of disrupting and delaying the penetration of the base camp perimeter until reinforced by a response force or TCF. Base camp defenders should have tactical mobility with as much personal protection as possible. Security forces must be equipped with reliable and multiple means of communication. They should also have the necessary sensors and devices to execute reconnaissance and surveillance to the limits of the security area. This helps provide adequate detection and early warnings during periods of limited visibility.

E-50. Joint fires may be employed to augment the organic direct- and indirect-fire capabilities of the base camp or base cluster. Security force personnel (augmentation and selectively armed personnel) may be directed to secure key facilities within the base camp, such as command posts, ammunition storage areas, and aircraft revetments. They may also support finding, fixing, containing, and defeating any attacks that may penetrate the perimeter. Adequate fire-control measures must be employed to prevent fratricide.

### **STANDOFF ATTACKS**

E-51. Standoff attackers are typically elusive targets. Level I and Level II threats may rely on blending in with the legitimate populace, only revealing themselves as combatants when they engage in a hostile act. Standoff attacks are mitigated by conducting area security tasks within and beyond the base camp AO to—

- Deny hiding places to the enemy.
- Disrupt enemy planning, reconnaissance, and organization.
- Detect the enemy as it moves into position and posture forces to quickly neutralize detected forces.
- Deny enemy anonymity through identity activities.

E-52. These preemptive actions rely on timely, accurate, relevant, and predictable intelligence, including human intelligence, within the base camp outer security area and beyond. For imminent threats that originate outside the base AO for which the AO commander is unable to assist, the base camp commander must use organic base camp combat power to counter the threat or, with the permission of the support area commander, assume the risk of enemy standoff attacks.

## BASE CAMP SECURITY FORCES

E-53. Within a support area, various types of security forces are assigned to secure the security area and LOCs. These include dedicated base camp and base cluster security forces, LOC security forces, and TCFs. A response force (normally military police) is a highly mobile, dedicated security force with the capability to defeat Level I and II threats and delay Level III threats within a support area. All base camp and base cluster units and/or detachments must maintain a readiness posture. Important rehearsals include commitment of base camp response forces, commitment of cluster response forces, commitment of the support area TCF, battle handover, and fire plan rehearsals.

E-54. A base camp may or may not have a force dedicated to its security and defense. Therefore, it is important for base camp commanders to be aware of the assets available for base camp security and defense. When there is not a dedicated security force, the base camp commander requires TACON of tenant-unit personnel to augment security and defense of the base camp. Base camp security and defense is an economy-of-force mission, so it is imperative that all organic, tenant, and transient forces residing on the base camp provide assistance to the base camp commander to fulfill these requirements as necessary. See ATP 3-37.10 for additional information on security forces.

## BASE CAMP DEFENSE PLAN

E-55. The base camp commander plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base camp defense efforts. The commander also coordinates and integrates security operations with the BCOG as appropriate. Such coordination normally involves TACON over forces assigned or attached to the base primarily for the purpose of local base camp defense. The base commander may also exercise TACON over other forces residing on the base for primary purposes other than local base camp defense (such as medical). For example, when these forces perform functions related to base defense or local security missions as part of the overall base camp defense plan, they fall under TACON of the base camp commander. TACON may be authorized at the first common higher headquarters. Figure E-2 provides a sample format for a base camp defense plan.

**[CLASSIFICATION]**

*Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the OPLAN or OPORD. Place the classification marking Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential in parentheses at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions.*

**Note.** Omit areas that do not apply.

**Copy ## of ## copies**  
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*The first line of the heading is the copy number that is assigned by the issuing headquarters. Maintain a log of specific copies issued to addressees. The second line is the official designation of the issuing headquarters (for example, 1st Infantry Division). The third line is the place of issue. It may be a code name, postal designation, or geographic location. The fourth line is the date or date-time group that the plan or order was signed or issued and becomes effective unless specified otherwise in the coordinating instructions. The fifth line is a headquarters internal control number assigned to all plans and orders according to unit SOPs.*

**OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)] [(classification of title)]**

*Number plans and orders consecutively by calendar year. Include code name, if any.*

**References:** List documents (JP 3-10 and ATP 3-37.10) that are essential to understanding the OPLAN or OPORD. List references concerning a specific function in the appropriate attachments.

(a) List maps and charts first. Map entries include the series number, country, sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale.

(b) List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.

**Note.** Doctrinal references for this attachment include JP 3-10, ADP 3-37, FM 3-81, FM 3-90-1, and ATP 3-90.20.

**Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD:** State the time zone used in the AOs during execution. When the OPLAN or OPORD applies to units in different time zones, use ZULU time.

**Task Organization:** Describe the organization of forces available to the issuing headquarters and their command and support relationships. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) if long or complicated.

The organization for defense should clearly specify the base units providing the forces for each defense element. Attached or transient units and the names of commanders should be included. The defense requirements of U.S., HNs, TCNs, and other civilian organizations quartered on the base also should be identified. Their capabilities to assist in the defense are determined and integrated into the base defense plan.)

**1. Situation.** The situation paragraph describes the conditions of the operational environment that impact operations in the following subparagraphs (Under the following headings, describe the environment in which defense of the base will be conducted, in sufficient detail for subordinate commanders to grasp the way in which their tasks support the larger mission):

a. Area of Interest. Describe the area of interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

**[page number]**  
**[CLASSIFICATION]**

Figure E-2. Example format for a base camp defense plan



**[CLASSIFICATION]**

b. Area of Operations. Describe the AO. Refer to the appropriate map by its subparagraph under references; for example, "Map, reference (b)." Refer to appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations) as required.

(1) Terrain. Describe the aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

(2) Weather. Describe the aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

(Place the classification and title of the OPLAN or OPORD and the issuing headquarters at the top of the second and any subsequent pages of the base plan or order.)

c. Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence). (Describe the threat to the base, to include the composition, disposition, location, movements, estimated strengths, including terrorist organizations and reconnaissance elements.)

d. Friendly Forces. Refer to base order, Annex A (Task Organization), and Annex C (Operations). (List information on friendly forces not covered by this OPORD, to include the mission of the next higher headquarters and adjacent bases as well as units not under base command whose actions will affect or assist the defense of the base. These units may include security forces, fire support, special operations forces, cyberspace operations forces, engineers, CBRN units, military police, EOD, HN military or police organizations, and government and nongovernmental organizations of both the U.S. and HN.)

e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may impact physical security or the implementation of physical security procedures.

f. Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact base defense. Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required. View civil considerations through a base defense perspective by using operation and mission variables.

g. Attachments and Detachments. If pertinent, list the units or assets that are attached to or are detached from the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the base order. Do not repeat information that is already listed in Annex A (Task Organization).

h. Assumptions. List the assumptions that are specific to base defense which support the OPORD development.

**2. Mission**. Provide a clear concise statement of the base commander's defense mission.

**3. Execution**.

a. Commander's Intent. (The commander discusses how the development of the defense is envisioned and establishes overall command priorities. This subparagraph should provide subordinates sufficient guidance to act upon if contact is lost or disrupted.)

b. Concept of Operation. (Briefly describe how the commander believes the overall operation should progress. Define the areas, buildings, and other facilities considered critical, and establish priorities for their protection.)

(1) Phasing. (Set forth, if necessary, the phases of the operation as they are anticipated by the commander.)

(2) Scheme of Maneuver. (Describe the organization of the ground security forces, the assignment of elements to counter standoff and penetrating attacks to include the base boundary patrol concept of operation and establishment of a defense with primary, alternate, and supplementary defensive positions, as well as reaction force responsibilities. Describe the purpose of counterattacks and set work priorities.)

(3) Scheme of Fires. (State plans for employing AMD and supporting fires, such as mortars and other indirect-fire assets, smoke, and aviation support.)

c. Tasks for Subordinate Elements. (If not previously described, this and succeeding subparagraphs should set forth the specific tasks for each subordinate defense element listed in the Task Organization.)

d. Reserve. (The next-to-last subparagraph of paragraph 3 contains instructions to the base's mobile reserve.)

**Figure E-2. Example format for a base camp defense plan (continued)**

[CLASSIFICATION]

e. Coordinating Instructions. (Always the last subparagraph of paragraph 3. Contains those instructions applicable to two or more elements or to the command as a whole.)

(1) Control Measures. (Define and establish restrictions on access to and movement into critical areas. These restrictions can be categorized as personnel, materiel, and vehicles. Security measures also may be outlined here.)

(a) Base Boundary. (Define and establish the base boundary as coordinated with the area commander. Include a description of plans to cope with enemy standoff attacks.)

(b) Personnel Access. (Establish control pertinent to each area or structure.)

1. Authority. (Give authority for access.)

2. Criteria. (Give access criteria for unit contractor personnel and local police and armed forces.)

3. Identification and Control

a. (Describe the system to be used in each area. If a badge system is used, give a complete description to disseminate requirements for identification and control of personnel who conduct business on the base, if applicable.)

b. (Describe how the system applies to unit personnel, visitors to restricted or administrative areas, vendors, contractor personnel, and maintenance and support personnel – if applicable.)

(c) Materiel Control Procedures.

1. Incoming.

a. (List requirements for admission of materiel and supplies.)

b. (List special controls on delivery of supplies to restricted areas.)

2. Outgoing.

a. (List required documentation.)

b. (List special controls on delivery of supplies from restricted areas.)

c. (List classified shipments.)

(d) Vehicle Control

1. (State policy on registration of vehicles.)

2. (State policy on search of vehicles.)

3. (State policy on parking.)

4. (State policy on abandoned vehicles.)

5. (List controls for entering restricted areas.)

(e) Train Control

1. (State policy on search of railcars.)

2. (State policy on securing railcars.)

3. (State policy on entry and exit of trains.)

(2) Security Aids. (Indicate the manner in which the following security aids will be implemented on the base.)

(a) Protective Barriers

1. Definition.

2. Clear Zones.

a. Criteria.

b. Maintenance.

3. Signs.

a. Types.

b. Posting.

Figure E-2. Example format for a base camp defense plan (continued)

**[CLASSIFICATION]**

- 4. Gates.
  - a. Hours of operation
  - b. Security requirements
  - c. Lock security.
  - d. Protective lighting system. (Use and control, inspection, direction, actions during power failures, emergency lighting.)
- (b) Intrusion Detection System
  - 1. Types and locations.
  - 2. Security classifications.
  - 3. Maintenance.
  - 4. Operation.
  - 5. Probability of Detection.
    - a. Limitations.
    - b. Compensating measures.
    - c. Redundant capabilities.
- (c) Protection of Classified Information
  - 1. Security containers.
  - 2. Personnel access to areas containing classified material.
  - 3. Vetting and verification of clearance.
  - 4. Classified material handling procedures.
  - 5. Emergency destruction plan.
- (3) Interior Guard Procedures. (Include general instructions that apply to all interior guard personnel, fixed and mobile. Attach detailed instructions such as special orders and standing operating procedures as annexes. Ensure that procedures include randomness.)
  - (a) Composition and organization. (**Note:** During security and support operations, the interior guard may be a contracted civilian security force.)
  - (b) Tour of duty.
  - (c) Essential posts and routes.
  - (d) Weapons and equipment.
  - (e) Training.
  - (f) Military working dogs.
  - (g) Method of challenge.
  - (h) Mobile security force.
    - 1. Composition.
    - 2. Mission.
    - 3. Weapons and equipment.
    - 4. Location.
    - 5. Deployment concept.
- (4) Rules of engagement. (Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.)

[page number]

**[CLASSIFICATION]**

Figure E-2. Example format for a base camp defense plan (continued)

**[CLASSIFICATION]**

(5) Contingency Plans. (Indicate actions in response to various emergency situations. List as annexes any detailed plans, such as combating terrorism, responding to bomb threats, active shooter response, hostage situations, emergency destruction of classified information, natural disasters, and firefighting.)

- (a) Individual actions.
- (b) MSF actions.

(6) Security Alert Status.

(7) Air Surveillance.

(8) Noncombatant Evacuation OPLANs.

(9) Coordination with HN or Adjacent Base Plans.

(10) Measures for Coordination with Response Force and Tactical Combat.

(11) Procedures for Update of This OPORD. (If the OPORD is not effective upon receipt, indicate when it will become effective.)

**4. Sustainment.** Identify priorities of sustainment for physical security key tasks, and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

**5. Command and Signal.**

- a. Command.
  - (1) Location of the Commander. State the locations of the provost marshal and military police commanders within the AO.
  - (2) Liaison Requirements. State the physical security liaison requirements that are not covered in SOPs.
- b. Control.
  - (1) Command Posts. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of each command post and its time of opening and closing.
  - (2) Reports. List police operations-specific reports that are not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.
- c. Signal. Address police operations-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required.

**ACKNOWLEDGE:** Include only if the attachment is distributed separately from the base order.

[Commander's last name]  
[Commander's rank]

The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of the attachment. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarter files.

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**[page number]**

**[CLASSIFICATION]**

<b>Legend:</b>			
AMD	air missile defense	JP	joint publication
AO	area of operations	MSF	mobile security force
AR	Army regulation	OPLAN	operation plan
ATP	Army techniques publication	OPORD	operation order
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear	SOP	standard operating procedure
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal	TCN	third country nationals
FM	field manual	U.S.	United States
HN	host nation	ZULU	time zone indicator for Universal Time

Figure E-2. Example format for a base camp defense plan (continued)

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# Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definitions.

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AA</b>	assembly area
<b>ADA</b>	air defense artillery
<b>ADP</b>	Army doctrine publication
<b>AHS</b>	Army Health System
<b>AO</b>	area of operations
<b>AMD</b>	air missile defense
<b>AR</b>	Army regulation
<b>ARFOR</b>	Army forces
<b>ASCOPE</b>	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
<b>ASR</b>	alternate supply route
<b>AT</b>	antiterrorism
<b>ATP</b>	Army techniques publication
<b>attn</b>	attention
<b>BCT</b>	brigade combat team
<b>BCOC</b>	base cluster operations center
<b>BDOC</b>	base defense operations center
<b>BSB</b>	brigade support battalion
<b>CA</b>	civil affairs
<b>CARVER</b>	criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability
<b>CBRN</b>	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
<b>CBRNE</b>	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives
<b>CERCLA</b>	Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
<b>COA</b>	course of action
<b>DA</b>	Department of the Army
<b>DC</b>	dislocated civilian
<b>DOD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DODD</b>	Department of Defense directive
<b>DODI</b>	Department of Defense instruction
<b>DSCA</b>	defense support of civil authorities
<b>EAB</b>	echelons above brigade
<b>EOD</b>	explosive ordnance disposal
<b>F&amp;Es</b>	Fire and Emergency Services

<b>FHP</b>	force health protection
<b>FM</b>	field manual
<b>FY</b>	fiscal year
<b>G-1</b>	assistant chief of staff, personnel
<b>G-9</b>	assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
<b>HR</b>	human resources
<b>HSC</b>	headquarters support company
<b>HSS</b>	health service support
<b>IPB</b>	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
<b>J-3</b>	operations directorate of a joint staff
<b>JP</b>	joint publication
<b>JSA</b>	joint security area
<b>LOC</b>	line of communications
<b>MDMP</b>	military decisionmaking process
<b>MEB</b>	maneuver enhancement brigade
<b>METT-TC</b>	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations
<b>MO</b>	Missouri
<b>MOE</b>	measure of effectiveness
<b>MOP</b>	measure of performance
<b>MSCoE</b>	Maneuver Support Center of Excellence
<b>MSHARPP</b>	mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability, population, and proximity
<b>MSR</b>	main supply route
<b>NO.</b>	number
<b>OPCON</b>	operational control
<b>OPORD</b>	operation order
<b>OPLAN</b>	operation plan
<b>OPSEC</b>	operations security
<b>PMESII-PT</b>	political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (operational variables)
<b>PIR</b>	priority intelligence requirement
<b>S-1</b>	battalion or brigade manpower and personnel staff officer
<b>S-2</b>	battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
<b>S-3</b>	battalion or brigade operations staff officer
<b>S-4</b>	battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
<b>S-5</b>	battalion or brigade plans staff officer
<b>S-6</b>	battalion or brigade signal staff officer
<b>S-9</b>	battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
<b>SHORAD</b>	short-range air defense
<b>SPO</b>	support operations
<b>TACON</b>	tactical control

<b>TC</b>	training circular
<b>TCF</b>	tactical combat force
<b>UMT</b>	unit ministry team
<b>U.S.</b>	United States
<b>USC</b>	United States Code

## **SECTION II – TERMS**

This section contains no entries.



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**09 November 2021**

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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