Political attitudes in post-Brexit Conservative turmoil in Britain : reading British Election Study 2014-2019 Internet Panel data

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1 Introduction

In the 2010 general election, the Conservative Party returned to power, albeit in the imperfect form of a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, after a period of stagnation from the end of the 20th century to the zero years. Since then, until now (January 2024), it has held the prime ministership even when it has not won a single majority of seats, but in the last 13 years and a little more than half a year, it has had five prime ministers – David Cameron, Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak. The list includes five people. Of these, Cameron is the only one who has won two general elections and six years in office, but Johnson is the only other to have held and won a general election. And including those that did not hold a vote of the entire Conservative party membership, there have been one fewer party leadership elections than the number of the prime ministers. It is particularly well known that Truss had the shortest tenure in British constitutional history, with only 46 days in office. This paper seeks to examine changes in UK voters' political attitudes over this period using the British Election Study 2014-2023 Internet Panel Combined Waves 1-25 (conducted in May 2023), the latest data available as of January 2024, conducted after 2022, when two prime ministerial changes and Conservative party leadership contests were carried out.

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2 Data used in this article

The data used in this paper is from the British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1-25[1]. The waves of this panel data that are actually used are: wave 15 of the post-2017 election period (May 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May); wave 17 of the EU withdrawal negotiations difficult and pre-2019 general election period (November 2019, Prime Minister Boris Johnson); wave 19 of the post-2019 general election period (December 2019) wave 21 (May 2021), post-completion of EU withdrawal and Covid-19 pandemic period wave 21 (May 2021), pre-Johnson resignation wave 23 (May 2022), six months after Prime Minister Sunak took office wave 25 (May 22). And, in order to keep the presentation of the charts and tables below, the parties are basically abbreviated as follows. Conservative = C, Labour = L, Liberal Democrat = LD, Scottish National Party = S or SN, UK Independence Party = U, Brexit Party (later Reform UK) = Bx/Rf, Other = O, No party support = N.

3 Changes in voting intention

In the British Election Study data, in Wave before and after the general election (for "Is there a party you would like to vote for in the election?)" Which party is that?"; after a general election"Which party did you vote for?"; and when a general election is not near, "And if there were a UK General Election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?" The answers to these questions are used as the 'party you (intend) to vote for', and the changes in these responses are examined. The 19th wave of the BES 2014-2023 Internet Panel Survey is the post-election survey for the 2019 general election. Table.3.1 shows the frequency table for which parties were voted for in

(1) Fieldhouse, E., J. Green, G. Evans, J. Mellon & C. Prosser, J. Bailey, R. de Geus, H. Schmitt and C. van der Eijk (2023) British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1-25. DOI: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-8810-1.

the 2019 general election in the 19th wave of data. The official statistics are 43.63% Conservative（365 seats）, 32.08% Labour（202 seats）, 11.55% Liberal Democrat（11 seats）and 3.88% SNP（48 seats）, so there are slight differences from the BES data figures, but it is fair to say that they are generally correct.（Uberoi et al. 2020）.

Table.3.1 shows the distribution of votes in the 2019 general election.

Table 3.1: How voted in Dec 2019 General Election

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
C	12,872	11.531	44.538
L	8,426	7.548	29.155
LD	3,640	3.261	12.595
SN	1,269	1.137	4.391
O	1,651	1.479	5.713
U	32	0.029	0.111
Bx/Rf	747	0.669	2.585
DK	264	0.236	0.913
NA's	82,731	74.110	NA
Total	111,632	100.000	100.000

Table.3.2 then shows the answers to the voting intention "If there was a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?" at the 25th wave stage.

Table 3.2: If Tomorrow is the General Elction May 2023

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
DK	7,918	7.093	26.408
C	6,039	5.410	20.141
L	9,135	8.183	30.467
LD	2,415	2.163	8.055
SN	775	0.694	2.585
O	2,264	2.028	7.551
Br/Rf	1,437	1.287	4.793
NA's	81,649	73.141	NA
Total	111,632	100.000	100.000

However, frequency distribution table prepared from the most up-to-date data currently available shows a significant change in voting intentions

(Table.3.2). It should be noted that the combined percentage of 'don't vote' and 'don't know' is 26.4%, with the governing Conservative Party falling far behind at 20.14% and Labour behind at 30.47%. Smaller parties are not much different, but Reform UK has doubled its support. Assuming that all 'don't vote's and 'don't know's don't vote (I know it seems unlikely), the turnout for the two main parties is 27.36% to 41.39%, probably an overwhelming Labour's win; Labour in the 2019 general election was not the worst in terms of turnout, but its 202 seats won were the worst since 1935. This was probably due to the loss of seats in the former industrial areas of North West England. This would be 41.39%, with close to roughly 40% in 2001 and 2017, with 412 and 262 seats respectively. Depending on the Conservative Party's turnout, this is a turnout that could range from a landslide victory to a narrow defeat. The Conservative Party took 31.5% of the vote (165 seats) even in the 1997 general election, and given that it has not had a figure under 30% since the turn of the 20th century, the figures are predictably devastating, even if they are not likely to continue to be so until 2025.

Fig.3.1 is a mosaic plot to look at the change from voting in the 2019 general election (wave 19) to voting intention in May 2023 (wave 25). Nearly half of those who said they voted for the Conservative Party at the last election have drifted to other parties or no vote. Half of those who drifted away from the Conservative Party, with the most common breakdown being 27.9% of those who said they did not vote or did not know. 7.3% went to Labour, 3.5% to the Liberal Democrats and 9.7% to Reform UK.

Assuming that 'don't vote' and 'don't know' don't vote in their entirety, the turnout for the two main parties is 27.36% to 41.39%, probably an overwhelming Labour win; Labour in the 2019 general election was not the worst in terms of turnout, but its 202 seats won were the worst since 1935. This was probably due to the loss of seats in the former industrial areas of

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North West England. This would be 41.39, with close to 40% in 2001 and roughly 40% in 2017, with 412 and 262 seats respectively. Depending on the Conservative Party's turnout, this is a turnout that could range from a land-slide victory to a narrow defeat. The Conservatives took 31.5% of the vote in the 1997 general election（165 seats）, and given that they have not had a figure in the 20% range since the turn of the 20th century, these figures are predictive of devastating results, even if they do not continue to be so until 2025. It is possible that the largest categories 'don't go' and 'don't know' will go to the polls and choose the Conservatives, and as far as the smaller par-ties are concerned, this may be somewhat better, as they may be tactical voters for fear of a dead vote in the event of an actual election, but it still predicts an uphill battle for the Conservatives in the next election. The results of the election were not good enough for the Conservatives. Of course, it is easy to speculate that the Conservative Party's internal mess in mid-2022 will be the first to be cited as the cause of these changes, and some detailed reporting on the facts has already been done. The following section will look at the BES data to see what changes have occurred in the electorate（Narihiro et al. 2023）.


Figure 3.1: mosaicplot-w19w25

Of the change from the 2019 general election to the 2023 voting intention, the breakdown of transition from the Conservative Party is as follows. More than half of the outflows are drifted from the Conservative Party.

DK	C	L	LD	SN	O	Br/Rf
0.279	0.483	0.073	0.035	0.001	0.031	0.097

The percentage of Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats and 'don't vote' or 'don't know' is plotted on a line graph for the nine waves from wave 17 (pre-19 general election) to wave 25. Wave 19 is the post-19 general election data, so voting participation is likely to be exaggerated and simple comparisons cannot be made. Even without that, the Conservatives have lost momentum after their general election victory and the completion of EU withdrawal. The three lines will cross around 23rd wave. This wave was collected in May 2010, when Prime Minister Johnson's position was winding down after a series of ministerial resignations due to 'partygate'. His de facto resignation and the start of the election campaign for a successor Conservative leader was in early July. Finally, the variation in voting intention described above is summarised in a line graph (Fig.3.2).


Figure 3.2: line graph of variation in voting intention

4 Variation in the Most Important Issue for respondents

The next section looks at changes in the issues that respondents consider most important. Here presented are frequency tables for the small_mii_cat variable in waves 17, 21, 23 and 25 of the BES2014-2023 IP. These are, respectively, the period of Brexit negotiations cul-de-sac and pre-2019 general election (November 2019), the period after Brexit completion and Covid-19 pandemic (May 21), before Johnson's resignation (May 22) and just over six months after Sunak's inauguration (May 22).

4.1 November 2019, when negotiations to leave the EU were stalled. and pre-2019 general election (17th wave)

Table.4.1 shows the most important issues for respondents in November 2019 (Wave 17). Firstly, 64% of the respondents naturally cited 'Europe' for this period. No other issue was mentioned by more than 10%, followed by 'environment' (6.1) and 'healthcare' (5.7). However, the specific meaning of this interest in 'Europe' is not clear. Looking at Table.4.2, party support among respondents who mentioned 'Europe', 34.32% of those who mentioned 'Europe' did so, compared to 28.72% of Conservative Party identifiers among all respondents. Again, among Conservative Party supporters, 72.98% also cited 'Europe'. The proportion of Labour Party supporters who mentioned 'Europe' was also 55.45%, so interest in 'Europe' was high, even if not as high as among Conservative Party supporters or Brexit supporters (70.97%).

Table 4.1: Most Important Issues in Nov 2019

item	count	percent	cum_count	cum_percent
Europe	20,082	0.640	20,082	0.640
Environment	1,919	0.061	22,001	0.701
Health	1,787	0.057	23,788	0.758
Negativity	1,729	0.055	25,517	0.813
Other	1,056	0.034	26,573	0.847
Immigration	1,047	0.033	27,620	0.880

item	count	percent	cum_count	cum_percent
Inequality	1,018	0.032	28,638	0.913
Other lib-auth	988	0.031	29,626	0.944
Economy	982	0.031	30,608	0.976
Austerity/spending	560	0.018	31,168	0.993
Terrorism	136	0.004	31,304	0.998
Other left-right	71	0.002	31,375	1.000

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round(prop.table(table(panel$pidW17)),4)
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C	L	LD	SN	O	U	N	Br/Rf	DK
0.2873	0.2380	0.0757	0.0249	0.0425	0.0070	0.2206	0.0346	0.0693

Table 4.2: pid and importance of Europe

item	count	percent	cum_count	cum_percent
C	6,892	0.3432	6,892	0.3432
L	4,211	0.2097	11,103	0.5529
N	4,168	0.2075	15,271	0.7604
LD	1,678	0.0836	16,949	0.8440
DK	1,109	0.0552	18,058	0.8992
Br/Rf	797	0.0397	18,855	0.9389
O	582	0.0290	19,437	0.9679
SN	528	0.0263	19,965	0.9942
U	117	0.0058	20,082	1.0000

Table 4.3a: regression dpiW17 on pid

term	estimate	std.error	statistic	p.value
(Intercept)	4.227	0.024	178.934	0.000
pidW17L	−1.093	0.036	−30.739	0.000
pidW17LD	−1.349	0.054	−25.162	0.000
pidW17SN	−1.454	0.088	−16.534	0.000
pidW17O	−1.422	0.069	−20.525	0.000
pidW17U	0.333	0.152	2.191	0.028
pidW17N	−0.562	0.037	−15.055	0.000
pidW17Br/Rf	0.442	0.072	6.173	0.000
pidW17DK	−0.492	0.064	−7.671	0.000

Table.4.3a regresses the dependent variable dealPrioritImmig (the priority given to immigration issues in EU withdrawal negotiations) on party identification with each party. As pidW17 is a categorical variable, this

regression analysis is the same as comparing means of dealPriorityImmi-gration in each party support. With the baseline as Conservative party sup-port, negative coefficients indicate a lower priority by that much, and posi-tive coefficients the opposite. The next table.4.3b is a multiple comparison of the mean of the dealPriorityImmig with Bonferroni adjustment between identitying parties. It shows combinations with statistically different means. In any case, given the high average, an important reason for support for leaving the EU is that it is perceived at this point to guarantee control of immigration, or more overtly written, the autonomy to keep migrants out.

Table 4.3b: Pairwise comparisons using t tests with pooled SD
data: panel\$dPIW17 and panel\$pidW17

	C	L	LD	SN	O	U	N	Br/Rf
L	< 2e−16	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
LD	< 2e−16	0.00012	–	–	–	–	–	–
SN	< 2e−16	0.00179	1.00000	–	–	–	–	–
O	< 2e−16	0.00011	1.00000	1.00000	–	–	–	–
U	1.00000	< 2e−16	< 2e−16	< 2e−16	< 2e−16	–	–	–
N	< 2e−16	< 2e−16	< 2e−16	< 2e−16	< 2e−16	1.8e−07	–	–
Br/Rf	2.5e−08	< 2e−16	< 2e−16	< 2e−16	< 2e−16	1.00000	< 2e−16	–
DK	6.9e−13	< 2e−16	< 2e−16	< 2e−16	< 2e−16	1.2e−05	1.00000	< 2e−16

P value adjustment method: bonferroni

4.2 Post−completion of Brexit and Covid−19 pandemic phase（May 2021, 21st wave）

This was followed by the legal withdrawal from the EU at the end of January 2020（but remaining in Single Market and Customs Unio in a tran-sition period during 2020）, followed by the expansion of Covid−19, which is when the economic damage about to grow. In this case（Table.4.4）, 'Europe' is no longer considered to be the most important at the earliest opportunity, and this also naturally leads to 'Healthcare' taking the dominant position with 64.70% of the total. In the detailed breakdown variables, Coronavirus

has 59.70%. It would mean the same thing. The only other variable mentioned by more than 10% is 'Economy' with 11.53%.

Table 4.4: Most Important Issues in Nov 2021

item	count	percent	cum_count	cum_percent
Health	17,835	0.647	17,835	0.647
Economy	3,177	0.115	21,012	0.762
Environment	1,593	0.058	22,605	0.820
Negativity	1,109	0.040	23,714	0.860
Immigration	868	0.031	24,582	0.892
Inequality	853	0.031	25,435	0.923
Other lib-auth	837	0.030	26,272	0.953
Europe	693	0.025	26,965	0.978
Other	276	0.010	27,241	0.988
Austerity/spending	226	0.008	27,467	0.996
Other left-right	71	0.003	27,538	0.999
Terrorism	26	0.001	27,564	1.000

Among those who listed 'health care' as the most important issue, a slightly higher proportion supported the Conservative Party (31.34% overall vs. 35.31%), but the proportion of supporters of the other parties was almost the same as the overall proportion. With regard to the situation of the Covid-19 pandeic, the average rating at this point is close to 'Getting a little better'. In terms of voting intention, with 36.43% Conservative and 22.32% Labour, the high level of interest in the corona problem does not mean that the Conservatives are rated low in terms of their handling of it: of those who said that the Covid-19 situation is 'worsening badly' or 'getting worse', those referring to the UK Government as being responsible for it were only 371 in the sample, compared with 371 overall. The sample size of 371 is a small number in the aggregate.

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4.3 December 2022, the Conservatives in confusion (23rd wave 23).

And in November 22, the month after Sunak was elected leader and prime minister of the Conservative Party. The greatest interest has shifted to the

cost of living（41.66）.'economy-general'（13.54）and inflation（7.34）follow, presumably with the same implications; items exceeding 5% are 'immigration'（5.10）and 'war'（5.05）. At this point, more than six months have passed since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, but interest in the war is not very high. The question here will be what impact the worsening economic situation has had（Table.4.5）.

The mean for 'economic change'（5-point scale, 1 = very much worse off）averaged 1.576, a deterioration from 2.27 in wave 22. Other worsening can be seen for 'personal economic prosperity'（econPersonalProsp）and 'general economic prosperity'（econGenProsp）from wave 21 to wave 23 respectively（wave 22 does not include this question item）.

Table 4.5: Small Most Important Issues in Nov 2022

item	count	percent	cum_count	cum_percent
Economy	17,837	0.632	17,837	0.632
Other lib-auth	2,764	0.098	20,601	0.730
Negativity	1,575	0.056	22,176	0.785
Environment	1,478	0.052	23,654	0.838
Immigration	1,466	0.052	25,120	0.890
Inequality	1,042	0.037	26,162	0.927
Health	994	0.035	27,156	0.962
Europe	613	0.022	27,769	0.983
Other	249	0.009	28,018	0.992
Austerity/spending	153	0.005	28,171	0.998
Other left-right	39	0.001	28,210	0.999
Terrorism	26	0.001	28,236	1.000

Comparing wave 22（November 2021）and wave 23 for voting intention, a reversal has occurred between Conservative and Labour, although it is not yet a significant difference. Between wave 22 and wave 23, there is an exodus of around 10% from Conservative support to 'not voting' or 'don't know' and around 2% to Labour, although this is not a clear difference judging by the adjusted standardised residuals in the contingency table. When a logistic regression is conducted using a dummy variable with movement from

Conservative Party support to other parties as the dependent variable, with a rating of economic change (5 points) and a rating of NHS change (5 points) as explanatory variables, the coefficient on the rating of NHS change is significant at the 0.1% level, indicating that as the rating gets worse, the probability of outflow from the Conservative Party The probability increases. The effect of ratings on changes in the economy is not statistically significant: the number of data entered into the logistic regression is tantalising because, as noted above, changes in one-wave statements do not show significant variation, albeit reversals between the two main parties. When a logistic regression analysis is run with the period in view and the dependent variable changed from actual voting at the previous general election (wave 19) to the change in voting intention in wave 23, the coefficients are statistically significant for both a worse economy and a worse NHS, and since both coefficients are negative, both figures are larger (economy, better NHS conditions) leads to an increase in the probability of shifting the vote to a party other than the Conservatives (Fig.4.1).

　　The cross table below the mosaic plot shows a residual analysis, where

Figure 4.1: change in voting intention from W22 to W23

asresid represents adjusted standardized residuals, and an absolute value above 1.96 indicates a cell whose realised value is significantly more（or less）than expected at the 5% level. The following table shows the adjusted standardised residuals.

Cell Contents
Count
Column Percent
Adj Std Resid

panel$gEVW23	panel$gEVW22							
	DK	C	L	LD	SN	O	Bx/Rf	Total
DK	3,783	579	248	66	23	204	116	5,019
	69.5%	10.7%	5.1%	6.0%	3.5%	14.0%	15.0%	
	87.659	−29.211	−37.604	−15.236	−13.217	−10.499	−6.783	
C	465	4,495	43	15	1	61	124	5,204
	8.5%	83.2%	0.9%	1.4%	0.2%	4.2%	16.1%	
	−35.139	111.159	−46.558	−19.376	−15.593	−20.041	−6.641	
L	556	124	4,195	103	23	189	25	5,215
	10.2%	2.3%	86.2%	9.4%	3.5%	12.9%	3.2%	
	−31.938	−47.268	108.842	−13.212	−13.644	−12.190	−14.916	
LD	324	105	240	881	6	95	14	1,665
	6.0%	1.9%	4.9%	80.2%	0.9%	6.5%	1.8%	
	−7.781	−20.180	−10.174	87.997	−7.100	−2.785	−6.758	
SN	19	2	13	1	598	9	1	643
	0.3%	0.0%	0.3%	0.1%	90.3%	0.6%	0.1%	
	−14.221	−15.664	−13.559	−6.089	128.240	−5.920	−4.997	
O	228	58	121	29	11	878	37	1,362
	4.2%	1.1%	2.5%	2.6%	1.7%	60.1%	4.8%	
	−9.306	−19.856	−14.030	−5.744	−5.419	83.272	−2.362	
Bx/Rf	65	37	6	3	0	25	454	590
	1.2%	0.7%	0.1%	0.3%	0.0%	1.7%	58.9%	
	−9.157	−11.689	−13.544	−5.445	−4.599	−2.993	92.878	
Total	5440	5400	4866	1,098	662	1,461	771	19,698
	27.6%	27.4%	24.7%	5.6%	3.4%	7.4%	3.9%	

mean（panel$cEW23［panel$gEVW22=="C" & panel$gEVW23!="C"],na.rm = T）

［1］1.645455

mean（panel$cEW23［panel$gEVW22=="C" & panel$gEVW23=="C"],na.rm = T）

［1］1.95662

The average rating on change in economic conditions for those who drifted out of the Conservative Party between 2022 and 2023 was 1.65 on a five-point scale, more severe than 1.96 for those who continued to support the Conservative Party.

Of those who moved from Labour to Conservative between the 2017 and 2019 general elections, 21.5% remained Conservative Party supporters at the 25th wave stage. 27.9% returned to support Labour and 35.6% said they did not vote or were unsure.

Not so many moved from Labour to Conservative between the 2017 and 2019 general elections and back to Labour support in 2023, with 59.3% considering 'Europe' as the most important issue at the 2019 stage, with 'healthcare' as the next most important issue. However, in 2023, they have little interest in 'Europe' and 'healthcare' at the earliest stage, and 76.5% of them consider 'economy' to be the most important issue. Labour lost votes and seats on the Brexit issue and regained them to some extent through post-Brexit changes.

```
round(prop.table(table(panel$gEVW19[panel$gEVW13=="L"])),3)
C     L     LD    SN    O     U     Bx/Rf  DK
0.120 0.696 0.085 0.016 0.055 0.001 0.020  0.007
DK C L LD SN O Br/Rf 0.304 0.104 0.373 0.088 0.017 0.074 0.039
```

Those who voted Labour in the 2017 election but drifted out of it in 2019 cited 'Europe' as their 'most important issue' 31.5% in 2017, which rises to 50.72% in 2019 years. Looking at voting intentions expressed in May 2023 (wave 25), .373 returned to Labour and .304 were 'unsure',

The most important issue for respondents who voted Conservative in the 2019 election but intend to vote Labour in May 2023 was 'Europe' at 58.67% in 2019, but 'Europe' is less than 1% in 2023, with 'economy' at 71.86%. 'Europe' perhaps was driven by interest in Brexit, which prompted a move

from Labour to the Conservatives, but the disappearance of the 'Leave' issue with the completion of EU withdrawal and the emergence of economic issues such as rising living costs has reversed this trend.

4.4　May 2023, latest data（25th wave）.

May 2011, which is currently the latest data available, is six months after Prime Minister Sunak took office. The rapid deterioration of the economic situation, which was the basis for the loss of the trousseau, has been corrected to some extent, but people's biggest concern is still the cost of living （33.72）. The same can be said for the 'economy in general'（17.13）and 'inflation'（7.52）. 'Migration'（11.26）, health care（5.8）and 'environment' （5.55）are gaining weight. The Sunak has struggled with this, promising to curb the number of migrants（Table.4.6）.

Considering that 42.48% of respondents in W19 and 35.28% in the same question item in W21（omitted）had named the Conservative Party as the party most capable of handling its most important issues, it is（Tab.4.7） clear that the ruling Conservative Party is rapidly losing credibility. It seems clear, but even the next largest party, Labour, is only just over 20%, and with as many as 30% of respondents saying they would not trust any party, it seems that distrust of political parties is progressing.

Table 4.6: Most Important Issues in May 2023

	Freq	% Valid	% Valid Cum.	% Total	% Total Cum.
Europe	604	2.177	2.177	0.541	0.541
Immigration	3,243	11.688	13.865	2.905	3.446
Economy	16,467	59.347	73.212	14.751	18.197
Health	1,654	5.961	79.173	1.482	19.679
Terrorism	23	0.083	79.255	0.021	19.700
Inequality	1,142	4.116	83.371	1.023	20.723
Environment	1,549	5.583	88.954	1.388	22.110
Austerity/spending	303	1.092	90.046	0.271	22.382
Negativity	1,289	4.646	94.691	1.155	23.536

	Freq	% Valid	% Valid Cum.	% Total	% Total Cum.
Other lib-auth	1,272	4.584	99.276	1.139	24.676
Other left-right	77	0.278	99.553	0.069	24.745
Other	124	0.447	100.000	0.111	24.856
	83,885	NA	NA	75.144	100.000
Total	111,632	100.000	100.000	100.000	100.000

Table 4.7: Best party to handle MII, W25

item	count	percent	cum_count	cum_percent
No party is best able to handle this issue	8,320	0.298	8,320	0.298
Labour	6,303	0.226	14,623	0.524
Don't know	5,369	0.192	19,992	0.716
Conservative	3,948	0.141	23,940	0.857
Green Party	1,223	0.044	25,163	0.901
Brexit Party/Reform UK	1,138	0.041	26,301	0.942
Liberal Democrat	789	0.028	27,090	0.970
Other party	417	0.015	27,507	0.985
Scottish National Party（SNP）	362	0.013	27,869	0.998
Plaid Cymru	50	0.002	27,919	1.000

To look at changes in party support, we compare the 'party I would vote for if there was an election tomorrow' between the two time points: party support at W17 and W25 is crossed in the Fig.4.2 mosaicplot and cross table.

```
descr: : crosstab(panel$gEVW25, panel$gEVW17, prop.c = T, asresid = T, style = 'SPSS')
```


Figure 4.2: from voting in 2019 general election to voting intention in May 2023

Cell Contents

| |
| Count |
| Column Percent |
| Adj Std Resid |

panel\$gEVW25	panel\$gEVW17 DK	C	L	LD	SN	O	U	Bx/Rf	Total
DK	1,747	1,241	274	312	60	98	26	333	4,091
	61.9%	25.3%	10.2%	15.0%	14.0%	16.5%	38.2%	28.4%	
	45.104	−4.624	−22.407	−14.036	−6.433	−6.266	1.938	0.557	
C	157	2,635	29	137	4	20	8	188	3,178
	5.6%	53.8%	1.1%	6.6%	0.9%	3.4%	11.8%	16.1%	
	−22.958	67.133	−28.500	−17.932	−10.526	−11.014	−1.967	−4.765	
L	594	354	2,073	788	43	141	12	192	4,197
	21.1%	7.2%	77.3%	37.8%	10.0%	23.7%	17.6%	16.4%	
	−9.686	−40.317	61.970	10.232	−8.566	−2.626	−1.980	−9.533	
LD	110	177	63	682	11	39	5	32	1,119
	3.9%	3.6%	2.3%	32.7%	2.6%	6.6%	7.4%	2.7%	
	−8.225	−12.863	−11.326	46.786	−3.978	−0.971	−0.073	−6.538	
SN	18	1	15	14	276	6	0	3	333
	0.6%	0.0%	0.6%	0.7%	64.5%	1.0%	0.0%	0.3%	
	−6.440	−12.903	−6.546	−5.257	87.947	−2.094	−1.256	−4.805	
O	137	148	217	136	33	280	8	60	1,019
	4.9%	3.0%	8.1%	6.5%	7.7%	47.1%	11.8%	5.1%	
	−4.780	−13.138	2.669	−0.738	0.663	39.421	1.583	−2.510	
Bx/Rf	58	345	11	14	1	11	9	363	812
	2.1%	7.0%	0.4%	0.7%	0.2%	1.8%	13.2%	31.0%	
	−8.932	5.762	−12.790	−10.436	−4.853	−3.992	2.801	39.863	
Total	2,821	4,901	2,682	2,083	428	595	68	1,171	14,749
	19.1%	33.2%	18.2%	14.1%	2.9%	4.0%	0.5%	7.9%	

Table 4.8: logistic regression of vote change form W19 to W25

term	estimate	std.error	statistic	p.value
（Intercept）	−0.161	0.252	−0.637	0.524
cEW25	−0.142	0.040	−3.539	0.000
cNHSW25	−0.251	0.040	−6.261	0.000
cCLW25	0.031	0.032	0.966	0.334
lConW25	−0.029	0.017	−1.684	0.092
lLabW25	−0.136	0.017	−7.823	0.000
cIW25	0.123	0.034	3.608	0.000
lTrussFW25	0.024	0.012	2.060	0.039
lSunakW25	−0.065	0.015	−4.410	0.000

term	estimate	std.error	statistic	p.value
lStarmerW25	0.048	0.017	2.830	0.005
pidCW25	−0.314	0.076	−4.118	0.000
iSW25	−0.038	0.017	−2.263	0.024
iCSW25	0.131	0.011	12.297	0.000
bEIW25	0.009	0.001	7.853	0.000
uGEIW25	−0.004	0.001	−2.690	0.007
ePPW25	−0.099	0.039	−2.573	0.010
eGPW25	0.005	0.038	0.136	0.892
cTFNW25	−0.089	0.028	−3.189	0.001

```
car: : vif(fit4)
      cEW25      cNHSW25      cCLW25      lConW25      lLabW25      cIW25
   2.126381     1.245567    1.220850     4.454064     3.740458   1.509917
 lTrussFW25    lSunakW25  lStarmerW25     pidCW25        iSW25     iCSW25
   1.425485     2.713237    3.445132     2.075727     2.841223   2.465633
     bEIW25      uGEIW25      ePPW25       eGPW25     cTFNW25
   1.553793     1.673428    1.781936     2.494286    1.357722
glance(fit4)
# A tibble: 1×8
  null.deviance   df.null   logLik      AIC      BIC   deviance   df.residual     nobs
          <dbl>     <int>    <dbl>    <dbl>    <dbl>      <dbl>         <int>    <int>
1        10,620.   10,826    −4558.   9,152.   9,283.     9,116.        10,809   10,827
fmsb: : NagelkerkeR2(fit4)

$N
[1]  10,827

$R2
[1]  0.2075473
performance: : r2_mcfadden(fit4)

# R2 for Generalized Linear Regression
      R2:  0.538
  adj. R2:  0.538
blorr: : blr_rsq_cox_snell(fit4)

[1]  0.09074916
```

To understand the factors that led to the shift from Conservative to Labour from the 2019 general election to mid-23, logistic regression analysis was conducted with a binary variable with move (or stay) as the dependent variable. The variables included 'change in economy' (5-point scale),

'change in NHS' (5-point scale), 'change in cost of living' (5-point scale), 'change in immigration' (5-point scale) Conservative Party likes and dislikes (11-point scale), Labour Party likes and dislikes (11-point scale), former Prime Minister Truss and Conservative Party leader likes and dislikes (11-point scale), current Prime Minister Sunak like/dislike (11-point scale), Labour Party leader Starmer like/dislike (11-point scale), Conservative Party identification or not, difference between Conservative Party and confidence on the right number of immigrants (20-point scale), change in economic situation due to Brexit (101-point scale), The following are statistically significant at the 5% level: change in economic situation due to government economic policy (101-point scale), change in own economic environment (5-point scale), change in general economic situation in society (5-point scale), except for 'change in cost of living' and 'like/dislike of Conservative Party' and 'change in general economic situation in society'. 'Dislike Sunak' and 'like Truss', 'the economy has got worse', 'the NHS has got worse' and 'immigration is increasing', and 'like Labour' and 'no Conservative party identification', 'there is a gap between what they and the Conservatives think immigration should be', 'personal economic situation is getting worse' 'I don't like Labour', 'I don't have a party identity', 'there is a gap between myself and what the Conservatives think the number of immigrants should be' and 'my personal economic situation has worsened', leading to more votes for non-conservatives or 'not voting' (above, Tab.4.8). The results of the logistic regression analysis with 'change in living costs' as the only independent variable, with the same dependent variable, show the predicted direction, i.e. a sign direction (positive) in the direction that an increase in living costs increases the probability of voting for a party other than the Conservative Party or 'don't vote' or 'don't know', and a sign direction (negative) in the direction of an increase in 'don't vote' or 'don't know'

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at the .1% level. statistically significant at the .1% level (omitted), but the effect disappears when other explanatory variables are introduced, as in Tab.4.8 above. Apart from this, the results show that the theoretical expected direction of the sign influences the vote for the Conservative Party. The pseudo-R^2 is .087 for Cox & Snell, .51 for McFadden's and .210 for Negelkerk, although the sample size is not very large and is only a rough guide.

Table.4.9 shows the results of a logistic regression analysis where the dependent variable is a binary variable of Conservative Party 1 otherwise 0 in voting intention at W25. Due to the difference in the dependent variable, the number of samples included is larger than in the analysis of Tab.4.8 Variance Inflation Factor.

```
car: : vif(fit5)
      cEW25     cNHSW25      cCLW25      lConW25      lLabW25       cIW25
   1.772446    1.315534    1.160828    1.421372    2.462791    1.457469
 lTrussFW25   lSunakW25  lStarmerW25     pidCW25       iSW25      iCSW25
   1.240537    1.365332     2.47703    1.185363     2.45968    2.144197
     bEIW25     uGEIW25      ePPW25      eGPW25
   1.277258    1.168139    1.652865    2.011631
```

Table 4.9: logistic regression of conservative vote

term	estimate	std.error	statistic	p.value
(Intercept)	−5.953	0.249	−23.942	0.000
cEW25	0.098	0.038	2.583	0.010
cNHSW25	0.173	0.037	4.718	0.000
cCLW25	−0.058	0.032	−1.806	0.071
lConW25	0.568	0.020	28.088	0.000
lLabW25	−0.129	0.018	−7.125	0.000
cIW25	−0.121	0.035	−3.435	0.001
lTrussFW25	−0.046	0.012	−3.847	0.000
lSunakW25	0.235	0.016	14.523	0.000
lStarmerW25	−0.130	0.017	−7.552	0.000
pidCW25	1.243	0.066	18.869	0.000
iSW25	−0.035	0.017	−2.045	0.041

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term	estimate	std.error	statistic	p.value
iCSW25	-0.034	0.014	-2.403	0.016
bEIW25	0.000	0.001	-0.194	0.846
uGEIW25	0.012	0.002	7.572	0.000
ePPW25	0.031	0.041	0.753	0.452
eGPW25	0.179	0.038	4.747	0.000

Table 4.10: stata18による多項ロジスティック回帰

. tabulate pidW25, generate(pidW25)

pidW25	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
C	8,337	27.42	27.42
L	7,703	25.33	52.75
LD	2,179	7.17	59.92
SN	694	2.28	62.20
O	1,761	5.79	67.99
N	7,386	24.29	92.28
Br/Rf	627	2.06	94.34
DK	1,720	5.66	100.00
Total	30,407	100.00	

.
. mlogit gEVW25c4 cEW25 cNHSW25 cCLW25 lConW25 lLabW25 cIW25 lTrussFW25 lSunak
> W25 StarmerW25 pidW251 pidW252 pidW253 pidW256 iSW25 iCSW25 bEIW25 uGEI
> W25 ePPW25 eGPW25, baseoutcome(2)

Iteration 0: Log likelihood = -20,490.748
Iteration 1: Log likelihood = -12,305.004
Iteration 2: Log likelihood = -10,815.821
Iteration 3: Log likelihood = -9,762.213
Iteration 4: Log likelihood = -9,586.6161
Iteration 5: Log likelihood = -9,582.1793
Iteration 6: Log likelihood = -9,582.1754
Iteration 7: Log likelihood = -9,582.1754

Multinomial logistic regression

Number of obs = 15,802
LR chi2(57) = 21,817.15
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log likelihood = -9582.1754

Pseudo R2 = 0.5324

gEVW25c4	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P > |z|	[95% conf. interval]	
1						
cEW25	−.1413887	.0443619	−3.19	0.001	−.2283365	−.054441
cNHSW25	−.1889562	.0436222	−4.33	0.000	−.2744541	−.1034583
cCLW25	.1009988	.0380046	2.66	0.008	.0265112	.1754865
lConW25	−.5572295	.0236173	−23.59	0.000	−.6035186	−.5109404
lLabW25	.1364158	.0211377	6.45	0.000	.0949867	.177845
cIW25	.0727086	.0399354	1.82	0.069	−.0055633	.1509806
lTrussFW25	−.0253526	.0142246	−1.78	0.075	−.0532324	.0025272
lSunakW25	−.1917408	.0187711	−10.21	0.000	−.2285314	−.1549502
lStarmerW25	.0808083	.0192626	4.20	0.000	.0430543	.1185623
pidW251	−1.429675	.1581688	−9.04	0.000	−1.73968	−1.11967
pidW252	−1.004511	.2062768	−4.87	0.000	−1.408806	−.6002159
pidW253	−.5811343	.2279647	−2.55	0.011	−1.027937	−.1343317
pidW256	−.6845034	.1692847	−4.04	0.000	−1.016295	−.3527114
iSW25	.0082839	.0198523	0.42	0.676	−.0306258	.0471936
iCSW25	.0053533	.0163412	0.33	0.743	−.0266749	.0373814
bEIW25	−.0013864	.0014682	−0.94	0.345	−.004264	.0014911
uGEIW25	−.0098693	.0017692	−5.58	0.000	−.013337	−.0064017
ePPW25	−.0627616	.0473431	−1.33	0.185	−.1555524	.0300292
eGPW25	−.149891	.0432043	−3.47	0.001	−.2345699	−.0652122
_cons	6.336757	.3282849	19.30	0.000	5.69333	6.980183
2	(base outcome)					
3						
cEW25	−.1609907	.0597891	−2.69	0.007	−.2781752	−.0438063
cNHSW25	−.1001716	.05657	−1.77	0.077	−.2110468	.0107036
cCLW25	.0161362	.0460765	0.35	0.726	−.074172	.1064445
lConW25	−.7501621	.0285679	−26.26	0.000	−.8061542	−.6941701
lLabW25	.6686295	.0277015	24.14	0.000	.6143355	.7229236
cIW25	−.0330942	.0482289	−0.69	0.493	−.127621	.0614326
lTrussFW25	−.0760258	.0199884	−3.80	0.000	−.1152023	−.0368492
lSunakW25	−.3257282	.0236564	−13.77	0.000	−.3720939	−.2793624
lStarmerW25	.3562135	.0241656	14.74	0.000	.3088499	.4035772
pidW251	−1.077406	.1925902	−5.59	0.000	−1.454876	−.6999359
pidW252	.3218876	.2192964	1.47	0.142	−.1079254	.7517007
pidW253	.0312253	.2430893	0.13	0.898	−.445221	.5076716
pidW256	−.5244857	.1923458	−2.73	0.006	−.9014766	−.1474948
iSW25	.0509573	.0249181	2.04	0.041	.0021186	.0997959
iCSW25	−.0143506	.0196705	−0.73	0.466	−.052904	.0242028
bEIW25	−.0041058	.0019079	−2.15	0.031	−.0078452	−.0003664

gEVW25c4	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]	
uGEIW25	-.01127	.0021889	-5.15	0.000	-.0155602	-.0069798
ePPW25	-.1100231	.0578741	-1.90	0.057	-.2234543	.003408
eGPW25	-.1445931	.0556067	-2.60	0.009	-.2535803	-.0356059
_cons	4.095722	.3752069	10.92	0.000	3.36033	4.831114
4						
cEW25	-.1988874	.0637052	-3.12	0.002	-.3237474	-.0740274
cNHSW25	-.0602568	.0609292	-0.99	0.323	-.1796758	.0591621
cCLW25	.0202232	.0486361	0.42	0.678	-.0751018	.1155483
lConW25	-.693464	.0301292	-23.02	0.000	-.7525161	-.6344119
lLabW25	.1869441	.0284426	6.57	0.000	.1311977	.2426905
cIW25	.0565478	.0510078	1.11	0.268	-.0434256	.1565211
lTrussFW25	-.0814574	.0218098	-3.73	0.000	-.1242039	-.038711
lSunakW25	-.2208696	.025009	-8.83	0.000	-.2698862	-.1718529
lStarmerW25	.2972802	.0258962	11.48	0.000	.2465245	.3480359
pidW251	-1.146084	.2034878	-5.63	0.000	-1.544913	-.7472551
pidW252	-.7843205	.2362529	-3.32	0.001	-1.247368	-.3212733
pidW253	2.033886	.2436239	8.35	0.000	1.556392	2.51138
pidW256	-.6378802	.2028745	-3.14	0.002	-1.035507	-.2402534
iSW25	.1165345	.0269188	4.33	0.000	.0637746	.1692945
iCSW25	-.0034161	.0207776	-0.16	0.869	-.0441396	.0373073
bEIW25	-.0105818	.0020548	-5.15	0.000	-.0146093	-.0065544
uGEIW25	-.0081788	.0023396	-3.50	0.000	-.0127643	-.0035934
ePPW25	.0149169	.0609121	0.24	0.807	-.1044686	.1343024
eGPW25	-.1703678	.0588288	-2.90	0.004	-.2856701	-.0550656
_cons	4.651048	.3979961	11.69	0.000	3.87099	5.431106

Table.4.10 with 4-category voting intention as the dependent variable（vote for Labour, Liberal Democrats, "don't go/don't know", baseline is Conservative）and a multinomial logistic regression with the same variables as above as independent variables. For multinomial logistic regression, the mlogit command of StataSE 18.0 through RStata was used, as no package could be found that could successfully control the output number table in R.

Firstly, for 'don't vote' and 'don't know', statistically significant and negative effects（i.e. lower probability of 'don't vote' and 'don't know' for voting for the Conservative Party）include thinking 'economy is getting better',

'NHS is getting better', 'cost of living is lower' is getting better', 'I like the Conservatives', 'I like Sunak', 'party identification with the Conservatives', 'party identification with Labour', 'party identification with the Liberal Democrats', 'economic impact positive by the government', 'economic general is prospering'. These seem counter-intuitive. The increased probability of "I like Labour" and "I like Starmer" may be due to abstention rather than voting Conservative. It is difficult to explain why 'no party identification' would result in a decrease in probability.

Next, the factors that have a statistically significant and negative impact on voting intention for Labour (i.e. the probability of choosing 'Labour' is reduced versus voting for the Conservative Party) are: 'The economy is improving', 'I like the Conservative Party', 'I like former leader Truss', 'I like Sunak', 'Party identification with the Conservative Party Identification', 'No party identification', 'Economic impact of Brexit' is positive, 'Economic impact of government is positive', 'General economy is prospering' Conversely, positive voting intentions for Labour are. 'I like Starmer's leadership', and 'desirable number of immigrants for me', increase in. It is somewhat puzzling that 'Labour party identification' does not reach statistical significance, but overall the results are considered not to be counter-intuitive.

The variable mii asks what the respondent considers to be the most important issue, and if there is some issue, it is answered in an open format. The mii_cat and small_mii_cat variables group these by category. The bestOnMII variable then asks respondents to name the party that can best address the issues they consider most important. Based on these items, it is possible to examine the policy categories that voters expect from the respective parties. For political parties, this indicates issue ownership.

When asked which party they thought would be best able to deal with the economy, which was of greatest concern to respondents at the 25th wave,

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Labour and the Conservatives were at .257 and .156 respectively, with a significant drop in trust in the Conservative Party, with 30% of respondents not trusting any of the parties. Twenty per cent of respondents were 'don't know'. Together, around half of voters have no expectations of the parties on policies they consider important. These figures are not much different from those in the 24th wave.

'If there was an election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?', 30.5% Labour, 20.1% Conservative and 8.1% Liberal Democrat, with Green and Reform UK at around 5%. There is no prospect of Brexit-affiliated parties winning seats under an electoral system with a relative majority, and the European Parliament elections that have been the biggest bridgehead for Brexit-affiliated parties so far as a result of leaving the EU no longer exist.

Concluding remarks

This paper uses BES Internet Panel Data to look at changes in political attitudes in the UK over medium-term period. During this period, people's interests have shifted sharply towards Europe (Brexit), Covid-19 and economic issues, and party support has fluctuated accordingly. It seems that such changes rarely occur in such a short span of time. This was the author's first attempt to create a so-called reproducible document using rmarkdown, so it was also a training exercise for the author. The unexpected effort required, particularly with regard to the output of the figures and tables, meant that more elaborate analysis had to be postponed. Nevertheless, the change in attitude to the changes created by austerity policies and Brexit, which has been going on for some time, is a step forward for now in assessing Conservative politics since 2010, which may soon be drawing to a close.

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