EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the face of Africa's multiple security threats, integration and regionalisation endeavours are increasingly seen as providing opportunities for establishing sustainable economic growth, peace and stability, and securing democratic consolidation. Thus, regional integration and co-operation groupings such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are emerging as conflict managers in their respective regions. In response to regional conflict dynamics, some have come up with regional early warning and early response apparatus, such as the ECOWAS Early Warning Mechanism and the IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism, CEWARN. Projects such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the UN Millennium Declaration, and the newly launched African Union (AU) have emphasised the role of regional economic communities in responding to Africa's challenges.

The one-day International Conference on *Linking Peace, Security and Regional Integration in Africa*, held at the University of Bradford, U.K., focused international attention and facilitated constructive dialogue with the policy community on the links between peace, security, conflict, development and regional integration in Africa. It generated both academic and policy-relevant debate that could potentially lead to the mainstreaming and institutionalisation of peace and security issues as an integral component of economic integration and co-operation in Africa. Jointly organized by the Africa Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies within the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, and the UNU/CRIS, based at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium, the conference had two broad objectives:

1. To bring together academics, researchers and staff of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to share ideas on how to build policy-relevant knowledge and conceptual understanding that could enhance the capacity of African regional organizations to respond to conflicts.
2. To stimulate academic and policy debate on the link between peace, security, and regionalism in contemporary Africa.

The conference was attended by 40 participants, including academics and researchers, and senior officials of RECs in Africa.

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HIGHLIGHTS AND KEY RECCOMENDATIONS

Prof. Grace Alderson, the Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Bradford, officially opened the conference, and Dr. Shaun Gregory, Head of the Peace Studies Department, offered welcoming remarks. This was followed by an introductory plenary on 'Mainstreaming Peace, Security and Regional Integration in Africa: Discourses, Issues and Emerging Analyses', that helped to lay the ground for the analysis of regional integration, peace and security in Africa. Speakers in the plenary were Prof. Luk van Langenhove, Director, UNU/CRIS, college of Europe, Bruges, Belgium; Prof. Björn Hettne, Department of Peace and Development Research, Göteborg University, Sweden; and Dr. David Francis, Director, Africa Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. The opening plenary was followed by three other thematic panels, namely 1) Peace, Security and West Africa and Horn of Africa Regionalism, 2) Peace, Security and Regionalisation in Southern Africa and 3) Mainstreaming Peace, Security and Regional Integration: International Policy Options and Challenges. Speakers in the three panels included Dr. Sunday Ochoche, Director-General, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, Nigeria; Dr. Marcel Leroy, EU Advisor to IGAD, IGAD Conflict Prevention and Peace Support Programme, Djibouti; Mr Brian Chigawa, Legal Affairs Officer and Coordinator, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Peace and Security Programme, Lusaka, Zambia; Dr. Kojo Asiedu, Senior Advisor UNDP – ZMM-GT, Lusaka, Zambia; Dr. Wafula Okumu, Political Analyst, Conflict Management Centre, African Union (AU), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and Ms Ameena Dennis, Africa Programme Coordinator, University for Peace, Geneva Office. Presentations in each panel were followed by lively discussions. Summaries of most of the presentations and the subsequent plenary discussions are presented in the body of this report.

KEY RECCOMENDATIONS

The following are the key recommendations of the conference.

1. **Compilation of the conference papers into an edited book**
2. **Creation of a knowledge base on regional integration** involving the documentation and analysis of experiences of regional integration, its successes and failures. Systematic analyses would stress the added value of integration projects.

3. **Multi-level capacity building:** The need for capacity building featured prominently throughout the presentations and discussions at the conference. Human resource development through training and exchange of experiences and financial capacities was identified as a key area of need. In particular, there was concern for building proper understanding of needs between donors, such as the EU, and the regional organizations.

4. **Workshop on capacity needs of regional organizations:** A workshop would establish priority thematic areas for capacity building, enable discussion of flexible learning techniques – such as CD-ROMs – to accommodate the time constraints of officers, and provide a networking forum for RECs. The workshop could also propose a schedule of training activities. It was suggested that a capacity needs assessment be carried out prior to the workshop.

5. **Policy relevant research:** A number of research issues were suggested. These included:

   a) Development of a methodological framework for analysing the foci of regional integration and rigorous theorizing around integration projects.

   b) War economies, including resource extraction in conflict areas and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and how these relate to regional integration projects.

   c) The workings of, constraints on and capacities for early warning and response need to be researched.

I. INTRODUCTION

Most African countries are challenged by a variety of complex socio-economic, political and development problems. These are accompanied – and exacerbated – by multiple security threats. The most devastating have been intra-state wars and armed conflicts, with considerable regional consequences due to their spread across borders and regionalisation. The multiplicity of war and armed conflicts have clearly highlighted Africa's lack of sustained capacity and inadequate expertise for conflict prevention, management, resolution and peacebuilding.

Africa's integration and regionalisation endeavours are increasingly seen as providing opportunities for establishing sustainable economic growth, peace and stability, and securing democratic consolidation. Thus, on the one hand, regional integration and co-operation groupings, such as ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD, are emerging as conflict managers in their respective regions. The regional conflict dynamics and consequences, and the imperative for conflict prevention, have led to the establishment of regional early warning and early response apparatus, such as the ECOWAS Early Warning Mechanism and the IGAD CEWARN. However, ECOWAS peacekeeping in West Africa and SADC intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have all been based on ad hoc improvisations, rather than long-term policy prescription and commitment on the part of the regional intergovernmental organizations. On the other hand, projects such as NEPAD, the UN Millennium Declaration and the newly launched AU have placed emphasis on the role of regional economic communities in responding to Africa's challenges.

Jointly organized by the Africa Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies within the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, and the UNU/CRIS based at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium, the one-day International Conference on *Linking Peace, Security and Regional Integration in Africa* was an attempt to focus international attention and facilitate constructive dialogue with the policy community on the link between peace, security, conflict, development and regional integration in Africa. It was intended to generate both academic and policy-relevant debate that would potentially lead to the mainstreaming and institutionalisation of peace and security issues as an integral component of economic integration and co-operation in Africa. The conference had two broad objectives:

1. To bring together academics, researchers and senior officers of the RECs to share ideas on how to build policy-relevant knowledge and conceptual understanding that could enhance the capacity of African regional organizations to respond to conflicts within the context of regional integration.

2. To stimulate academic and policy-debate on the link between peace, security, and regionalism in contemporary Africa.

The conference was attended by 40 participants, drawn from among academics and researchers, and representatives of RECs in Africa. This report presents a summary of the highlights of the conference, including most of the papers presented and an outline of participants' comments and discussions. It concludes with the key recommendations and suggestions for the way forward.

II. OFFICIAL OPENING

The Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Bradford, Prof. Grace Alderson, officially opened the conference, and Dr. Shaun Gregory, Head of the Peace Studies Department, offered welcoming remarks. Prof. Alderson said the university was pleased to host such an auspicious conference and she apologised for not being able to participate fully, due to administrative commitments.   Dr. Gregory also said it was an honour for the Department of Peace Studies to be hosting such an historic conference on Africa. He highlighted the various specialised centres that operate within Peace Studies, indicating that they are central to the work and life of the department. These centres include the Africa Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, the Centre for Conflict Resolution, the Centre for International Cooperation and Security, Bradford Disarmament Research Centre, and the International Centre for Participation Studies. Dr. Gregory concluded by wishing the participants fruitful discussions.

III. THEMATIC SESSIONS

1. MAINSTREAMING PEACE, SECURITY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: DISCOURSES, ISSUES AND EMERGING ANALYSES

This panel included Dr. David Francis (Director of the Africa Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford), Prof. Luk van

Langenhove (Director, UNU/CRIS, College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium), and Prof. Björn Hettne of the Department of Peace and Development Research, Göteborg University, Sweden. The chair was Prof. Malcom Chalmers of the Department of Peace Studies and Associate Dean of the School of Social and International Studies, University of Bradford.

Dr. Francis' paper was titled **'Mapping the Regional Integration Terrain in Africa: Contemporary Discourses, Emerging Research Issues and Policy Challenges'**. He began by presenting an overview of interpretations of contemporary regional integration in Africa. There are those who argue that regional integration is the result of the 'integrative habit' going back to the pre-colonial kingdoms and empires. Others attribute it to the establishment of common services for the benefit of the British, French and Portuguese colonialists, with a number of common services being extended into the post-colonial era. Yet others point to the European integration model, which became attractive to leaders in Africa. UN programmes such as the Latin American Economic Commission and the Economic Commission for Africa are also recognised as having played a leading role in promoting regional integration. Finally, there are those who point to the dissatisfaction with the modernization concept of development and the emergence of the alternative development paradigm advocated by dependency theorists. The African dependency theorists argued that the only way to get out of underdevelopment created by incorporation into the global capitalist system was to develop an alternative development strategy based on collective self-reliance through regional integration and co-operation.

Dr. Francis then moved on to consider the discourses and interpretations used to explain regionalism and the motivations for the creation of regionalist projects. These discourses revolve around economic and developmental interpretations, politics of South-South co-operation and African unity and identity. Security is another dominant discourse, though mostly approached from the perspective of military security. Other discourses interpret regional integration from a normative perspective, viewing it as an end in itself, due to its potential for bringing about welfare, peace, development, security and democratic consolidation in Africa.

On contemporary scenarios of integration in Africa, Dr. Francis identified what he called a shift from 'old' to 'new' regionalism. The 'old' regionalism of the 1960s and 70s was formal, state-centric, institutional-based, elite-driven and focused on official trade flow. 'New' regionalism represents a departure from the purely state-led integration to a preoccupation with the interactions and transactions of the state, market, civil society,

and external actors, all of whom are involved in a complex formal and informal process of regionalisation.

Another feature of contemporary regionalism in Africa is the expansion into the security domain. Due to the challenges of armed conflict in Africa, the regionalisation projects have been forced to take on regional security responsibilities. Thus, ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD have been involved in peacemaking and mediation interventions in their respective regions. Both ECOWAS and IGAD have established a conflict early warning and response mechanism. The involvement in peace and security matters has in turn highlighted the emergence and role of regional hegemons, notably Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC.

In conclusion, Dr. Francis highlighted some emerging research issues and policy challenges. First, given the numerous civil wars and their negative consequences on economic integration, more serious attention needs to be given to policy and research into the inextricable link between peace, security and regional integration in Africa. Secondly, to transform these regional groupings from ad hoc improvisers into conflict managers, a more constructive and long-term regional intergovernmental collective security policy (and even research into the implications of humanitarian intervention in complex political emergencies) is required. Lastly, the multi-dimensional nature of regionalism in Africa calls for a multi-disciplinary research agenda that can offer alternative theoretical perspectives. Such a research agenda would need to move beyond the rationalist and reflectivist perspectives that have dominated the mainstream interpretations of regionalism, to focus, for example, on the anthropological, sociological, psychological, and linguistic interpretations of regionalisms in Africa.

Prof. Björn Hettne's paper was on **'The regional factor in conflict management: Research issues and policy challenges'.** He proposed a framework for the analysis of external involvement in conflict management, in the form of a 'conflict circle', which views a conflict as proceeding through six crucial elements. He noted, however, that even though the framework is a useful analytical tool, it should not be assumed that there is a 'natural history of conflict', that each conflict faithfully follows the six elements. Rather, each 'stage' in the circle is a potential exit point. Briefly, the first element in the circle is 'provention'. Introduced by Burton (1990), provention suggests that violent conflict can be avoided through the proactive implementation of policies that respond to or address potential sources of conflict. This first 'stage' precedes the 'conflict', even in its latent form, and represents the normative position that conflict should be addressed at the earliest possible stage by dealing with structural root causes. Prof. Hettne suggested

that developmental regionalism could be viewed as a means by which conflict-generating development processes can be eliminated at an early stage.

'Prevention' is the next stage in the circle, and, in itself, indicates the failure of provention. Here we encounter the language of 'preventive diplomacy' and 'conflict prevention'. Conflict prevention is confined to the period (or stage of the conflict cycle) after it has become manifest, but before it has turned violent. The idea of prevention gained particular interest following the publication of Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* (UN, 1992), which called or early warning systems, fact-finding missions and confidence-building measures.

Failure of prevention and the eventual escalation of conflict ushers in the 'intervention' stage. Although intervention mostly means military action to end conflict, it is important to keep in mind that intervention can also be in the form of civil involvement. In this regard, provention and prevention are early forms of civil intervention. Prof. Hettne distinguished between various forms of intervention, namely unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral, regional and multi-lateral, indicating that, at present, multi-lateralism remains the only legal, UN-backed intervention mechanism. However, there is a distinction in international parlance and practice between 'legal' and 'legitimate' interventions.

Intervention is followed by 'settlement' and then 'resolution'. Settlement indicates the formal end of conflict, and can be in the form of a treaty, a victory, or exhaustion. Resolution refers to post-conflict outcomes and could involve a new constitutional order that accommodates all, partitioning of the territory, regional integration, etc. This then paves the way to the 'reconstruction' stage or nation building. Reconstruction is not simply a physical exercise, but one that aims to create a new equilibrium by restoring the moral and social substance of society. It is also a 'second chance' at provention. And so the cycle starts all over again. Development regionalism is a way to break vicious circles, and contains an important proventive factor by which conflict generating processes can be 'prevented' before they occur.

On the future of conflict management, Prof. Hettne saw the continued domination of neo-functionalist approaches in which regional bodies such as ASEAN in South-East Asia and ECOWAS in West Africa continue to play leading roles. For this reason, there is the need for a comprehensive institutionalisation of regional conflict handling mechanisms. The strengthening of regional mechanisms should not compete with the role of the UN. This would amount to an artificial notion of delegation of conflict management, a role that

primarily belongs to the UN.   Rather, regional mechanisms should be seen to complement the role of the UN in the form of burden sharing.

Finally, regarding security and development, Prof. Hettne noted that there is a risk of what he called 'securitization of the development discourse', in which development concerns are subordinated to those of security, particularly since September 11. In this way, development becomes a tool for achieving security.   Prof. Hettne argued that development should remain a central goal in itself.

Prof. van Langenhove's paper was titled **'The Relevance of New Regionalism in Africa'.** He argued that there is increased recognition of the potential for regional integration to improve Africa's socio-economic situation; even though regional integration in itself is not a new thing. Because of Africa's small economies, and in the face of global competition, integration could minimize the costs of market fragmentation.   Currently some 27 African countries belong to at least one REC and 18 belong to as many as three RECs. Nevertheless, Prof. van Langenhove argued, this enthusiasm for integration has not resulted in much concrete achievement. Reasons for this poor achievement include government reluctance to cede sovereignty, structural instability due to conflicts, and poor institutional design.

In spite of these failures, regional integration in Africa remains promising. A 'second wave' of regionalisation followed the signing of the Abuja Treaty on the African Economic Community in 1991. This second wave of the 1990s goes beyond trade to encompass security and regional goods such as the management of water basins, infrastructure, energy and the environment. Beyond the state, the second wave has also involved industry and civil society. This second wave of regionalisation has been referred to as New Regionalism. Essentially, New Regionalism potentially allows small countries to have a voice, alongside larger states, and allows poor countries to integrate more easily in the world economy. It can allow developing countries to reap maximum benefits from globalisation and, at the same time, serve to protect them from the downside of globalisation.

Prof. van Langenhove noted that regional integration is a complex process that takes time and requires the underpinning of academic research. In this regard, he highlighted the role and interest in regional integration of the United Nations University (UNU). Out of UNU's and partners' work has emerged a theoretical framework named the New Regionalism Approach (NRA). NRA conceptualises integration as a multi-dimensional

and socially constructed phenomenon, where co-operation occurs across economic, political, security and environmental matters, and involves state and non-state actors.

In order to help build policy-relevant knowledge about new forms of regional governance and co-operation, UNU set up in 2001 a new research and training programme in Bruges, Belgium, focused on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU/CRIS). The programme aims to contribute to the visioning of multi-level regional governance in Africa, capacity building within governments, industry and civil society actors, and the monitoring of implementation and impact assessment.

Finally, Prof. Van Langenhove addressed himself to the linkages between peace, security and regional integration. He acknowledged there is a debate as to whether regionalism enhances or undermines the achievement of a universal approach to global problems. More specifically, are regional organizations weakening the UN or can they be regarded as the UN's allies in dealing with supranational problems such as peace and security? Prof. Van Langenhove was of the opinion that regional organizations are not contradictory to the UN mission. The complementary relationship is indicated by the regional distribution of the 10 non-permanent seats in the Security Council. The UN Charter also gives priority to regional agencies and arrangements in the peaceful settlement of disputes. However, regional agencies and arrangements cannot take enforcement action without the authority of the Security Council. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War has had the effect of expanding the potential role regions can play as the 'first line' in peace and security matters. For this potential to be realised, divisions of labour between the UN and regional organizations need to be further developed.

Plenary Discussions

How do we frame the debate? The view was expressed that what appears to be a 'new' and 'promising' regionalism in Africa is in fact an old agenda. Rather what is needed is an 'audit' to establish what has worked, what has failed, and why. A counter-view was that whereas regionalism may not be new, as such, there is a fresh interest in it among African leaders, as well as increased recognition of the informal and civil society aspects of regional integration. Secondly, there is increased recognition of its potential to contribute to regional peace, stability, development and democratic consolidation.

Is there too much or too little funding? One perspective is that there is more than adequate external donor funding to African regional projects, with funding, for example,

for the successful reform and capacity building of the police and the military in East African countries. This view was however contested and rejected in both this and subsequent panels. Instead, the view emerged from the representatives of the RECs that there is a huge gap between what is pledged and what is paid, and another gap between what is paid and what ends up being utilized for the stated projects. This state of affairs reflects the unfavourable funding policies of the key donors.

Focus on regional or national institutions? It was suggested that regionalism could be helped by the presence of stable national institutions. As such, new regionalism ought to embrace a strategy for ensuring state-formation and development of national institutions as the building blocks for regional institutions. This calls for micro- or sub-regionalism that incorporates both formal and civil society dimensions. It was pointed out that regionalism in Africa has had the effect of both transcending sovereignty on the one hand, and strengthening it on the other. In this regard, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) would represent transcendence of sovereignty, while its insistence on the sanctity of borders represents an affirmation of it. Regionalism confronts the question of what the ideal size of a sovereign state ought to be. Regionalism and devolution of power seem to go hand in hand.

From analysis to action? A question was raised on whether the analysis of new regionalism is also concerned with analysing and acting or urging action on economic problems in Africa. In response, the presenters argued that there is a legitimate and useful role in studying and generating new ideas about regional integration and leaving advocacy or promotional roles to other sectors who can use such studies.

Regionalism and responsibility for the 'African burden': Concern was expressed about whether the new interest by the West in regionalism and role of African institutions was not in reality a convenient excuse by Western countries to relinquish the 'burden' of Africa, especially in relation to its conflicts. It was suggested that the answer to this question could only be both yes and no. There is indeed an apprehension in the West regarding intervention in Africa's problems especially after the UN and America's experiences in Somalia, and the subsequent and costly indecision concerning Rwanda. At the same time, there is a genuine concern for developing Africa's capacity to assume responsibility for peace, conflict management and economic development in Africa.

Africa's diversity: Analysis of Africa ought to recognize that Africa is very diverse, not a single entity. The colonial legacy varies according to who was the colonial power, and also among countries with the same colonial power. Analysis should therefore avoid

untenable generalizations, but could attempt to offer general categories. These considerations should be taken into account when carrying out research on peace, security and regional integration in Africa.

Environmental dimension of regionalism: The environmental dimension should be central to analysis of regional integration. For Africa, the waters of the Nile and the Zambezi hold great implications for conflict, security, integration and development.

Objectives and realities of regional integration: Regionalism embraces various objectives, including management of migrations, promotion of trade, common security and common currency. In reality, however, some of these objectives, such as migrations and trade, are rarely state-sanctioned. In addition, market-focused integration overlooks the often missing but important physical and infrastructural integration.

In concluding, Prof. Chalmers noted that the panel had raised important issues regarding the kind of research ideas that could be followed up, and the capacity needs of regional integration projects. The chair also suggested that it would be useful to address, with regard to Africa regionalism projects, the question of what has worked, what has not and why.

2. PEACE, SECURITY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION: WEST AFRICA AND HORN OF AFRICA REGIONALISM

Panelists in this session included Dr. Sunday Ochoche, Director-General, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), Nigeria, and Dr. Marcel Leroy, European Union Advisor to IGAD's Conflict Prevention and Peace Programme, Dijibouti. A third paper by Ms Florence Iheme, who could not attend the conference, was tabled. Ms Iheme is the ECOWAS Early Warning Mechanisms and Conflict Prevention Programme Manager, Abuja, Nigeria. The session chair was Dr. Mary Farrell, Senior Researcher at UNU/CRIS Bruges, Belgium.

In his presentation on **'The nexus between peace, security and regional integration in the ECOWAS region: Policy implications',** Dr. Ochoche explained that, although formed for purposes of economic integration, ECOWAS has had to respond to the challenges of conflicts in the region. For this reason, its peacekeeping and intervention arm, ECOMOG, was incorporated as a legal mechanism within ECOWAS. Since its

inception, ECOMOG has been deployed in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire. ECOMOG peacekeeping has faced numerous challenges, but it also a model of what regional institutions could do with limited resources and capacity. Dr. Ochoche argued that, although many regional projects have articulated good conflict response mechanisms, these often failed to recognize the reality of the political environment within which they were expected to function. For this reason, many mechanisms are good on paper but weak on implementation. By far the greatest challenge to ECOWAS regionalism is the lack of political will, which is tied up with national pride and claims of sovereignty. For example, Senegal would not allow intervention in the Casamance conflict, as this would infringe on their sovereignty. Other challenges to ECOWAS include issues of nationality and migration, which are becoming increasingly thorny. The region is also very diverse: economically, climatically, demographically and linguistically, making integration more difficult. The diversity, and especially the Franco and Anglophone divide means that some countries have resisted Nigeria's role as the regional hegemon.

In conclusion, Dr. Ochoche argued that structures and mechanisms for overseeing integration needed to be carefully thought through and put in place. Secondly, regional integration should be viewed from within a larger democracy project for the region. Lastly, adequate funding is a prerequisite for the successful implementation of the goals of both ECOWAS and ECOMOG.

Dr. Marcel Leroy's presentation was titled **'Toward a division of labour in African security: African Union and the sub-regional groupings in eastern and southern Africa'.** He noted that the end of the Cold War had opened up possibilities for closer links between RECs and academia. However, the changed international environment after the Cold War had also led to a proliferation of actors in security matters and an increased potential for 'mischief'. The newly inaugurated AU is set to launch a Peace and Security Council. However, the parallel promotion of NEPAD is seen as an attempt to sell to the West 'a sexy tool' that is devoid of the problems associated with the OAU and its successor, the AU.

With regard to IGAD, Dr. Leroy noted that Ethiopia plays the role of the regional hegemon. Although IGAD has funding challenges, it has been better funded than the OAU, if one compares the budgets of the two institutions against their staffing capacities.

The IGAD region needs to develop its capacity and a culture of cooperation, through mechanisms such as joint military operations and exercises. Dr. Leroy noted that before

the war, Ethiopia and Eritorea had a Joint Border Commission. This commission broke up just before the war and no records of its work were kept. There needs to be proper coodination between regional and continental actors, among donors, and between the donors and African projects.

Plenary Discussions

A number of issues emerged in the subsequent discussions.

Role of Nigeria: Although the Anglo-Francophone divide continues to be an issue in defining Nigeria's role as the region's hegemon, it was argued that the region needs Nigeria. This is evidenced by Nigeria's dominance in the peacekeeping operations of ECOMOG, in terms of military equipment, personnel and funding.

Lack of Capacities: Regional integration and security projects suffer from poor capacity, both in terms of material and human resources. Capacity for conflict early warning remains low, though IGAD has had a successful programme of training and capacity building in early warning, known as CEWARN.

Selective Capacity building: In the name of fostering efficiency or control, there is often selective funding and capacity building within the same institution. Thus donors may shun the OAU secretariat, but fund OAU's Conflict Mechanism, contributing to tensions within the organization.

Role of civil society: There were different views about the role of civil society in issues such as early warning. One view was that in many countries civil society organizations are ahead of governments in their analysis of conflicts and tensions, and in building capacity for early warning through training. In this regard, collaboration between governments and civil society would be beneficial. A counter-view was that civil society is usually subject to the same schisms or fault lines that run across society in general and cannot, therefore, be viewed as an impartial actor.

The Chair for the session concluded by highlighting the recurrent themes of training and capacity building for regional integration and security projects as evident needs.

3. PEACE, SECURITY AND REGIONALISATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

There were two speakers in this session. Mr Brian Chigawa is the Legal Affairs Officer and Coordinator of the COMESA Peace and Security Programme. Dr. Kojo Asiedu is a Senior Advisor, UNDP – ZMM-GT. Both are based in Lusaka, Zambia. The session was chaired by Dr. Donna Pankhurst of the Peace Studies Department and Associate Dean, School of Social and International Studies, University of Bradford.

Mr Brian Chigawa presented a paper on **'Mainstreaming Peace, Security and COMESA Regionalism: Emerging Policy Challenges'**. He indicated that COMESA is a 20-member community stretching the length of the continent and involving cross-cutting membership to other bodies. Thus, about half of the member states of COMESA are members of the SADC, while all members of the IGAD are COMESA members. Furthermore, two of the members of the East African Community (EAC) are members of COMESA, as are almost all the members of the Indian Ocean Commission. COMESA has actively established formal and informal working relationships with the other sub-regional organizations to reduce duplication of programmes. To date COMESA has formal agreements with all the above-mentioned sub-regional organizations, including ECOWAS and the AU. With SADC, there is now a task force at the Secretariat which meets every three months to discuss issues of harmonisation of programmes and their joint implementation.

Highlighting COMESA's successes, Mr Chigawa noted that it is the first economic bloc in Africa to attain a Free Trade Area, involving 9 of the 20 members. Increased intra-COMESA trade and inflow of Foreign Direct Investment in the COMESA region have led to the creation of regional jobs. Sadly, these gains have been eroded by the estimated $13 billion in lost economic opportunities as a result of armed conflicts in the region.

In its objectives, COMESA envisages a clear linkage between peace, security and sustainable development. Although member states of COMESA have recorded significant gains in their economic integration and movement towards sustainable economic development, it is clear that more progress could have been made if some member states were not hindered by wars and insecurity. Examples of member states experiencing conflict include Burundi, the Comoros, the DRC and Rwanda. Mr Chigawa argued that during the last ten years almost half the member states of COMESA have been involved in armed conflicts. Somalia, a member of COMESA's predecessor, the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), failed to make it through the transition as a result of the continuing armed conflict in the country.

Mr Chigawa emphasised that COMESA member states are keenly aware that peace and security are fundamental pre-requisites to sustainable economic development. For this reason, the Heads of State and Government Summit in 1999 mandated their foreign affairs ministers to meet at least once a year to consider modalities of addressing issues of peace and security. Before this decision, COMESA had made attempts to address issues of peace and security on an *ad hoc* basis using its staff at the Secretariat. Such efforts included, among others, mediation in the conflicts between Sudan and Uganda, and between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Little was achieved by such initiatives, either because of their late timing or lack of a framework or mechanism for dealing with the conflicts between member states. Efforts were also hindered by a lack of capacity in conflict handling skills within the regional body.

COMESA now has a framework for addressing issues of peace, security and conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy. A unique feature of this framework is the inclusion of non-governmental and civil society actors. The setting up of the framework was preceded by a programme of capacity building among public representatives, such as members of parliament and senators. In 2002, through this capacity development initiative, COMESA trained about 70 members of parliament from the region in conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy. COMESA also has a Court of Justice which, besides its core mandate of deciding on trade disputes, can be used to address conflicts between member states mainly through its arbitration powers.

In conclusion, Mr Chigawa argued that even though the core role of COMESA, like other RECs, is to promote economic development, it cannot ignore social and political issues that affect the well-being of the people, especially armed conflicts and insecurity. Involvement in issues of conflict and insecurity stresses the need for the RECs to build their capacities in this area.

Dr. Kojo Asiedu's paper was titled **'Potential Peace and Security Dividends From Micro-Regionalism: The Case of the Zambia-Malawi-Mozambique Growth Triangle'.** It focused on 'Growth Triangles' (GTs) and their effect on the domestic and external security interests and objectives of participating states. Dr. Asiedu defined GTs as 'trans-national economic zones spread over geographically neighbouring areas, in which differences in factor endowments of three or more countries are exploited to promote external trade and direct investment for the mutual benefit of the participating countries.' GTs can be viewed as part of 'informal regionalism mechanisms' which include GTs, Development Corridors and Economic Areas. These can be contrasted with the more formal approaches such as Free Trade Areas, Customs Unions, and Common Markets.

Dr. Asiedu argued that whereas formal mechanisms adopt common rules and a 'top-down' approach to accelerating trade and investment, informal mechanisms try to avoid the slow pace this entails by adopting instead, more pragmatic, 'bottom-up' approaches. GTs are normally market- and private sector-driven.

Dr. Asiedu's paper focused on the ZMM-GT. Started in 1999, the ZMM-GT follows the model and experience of more than 10 Asian GTs. The ZMM-GT shares the objective of strengthening integration with other regional initatives, such as SADC and COMESA. It, however, emphasises collaboration between contiguous districts or regions of participating countries with substantial similarities, such as socio-economic development, economic structure, and sometimes even a common cultural heritage.

With regard to the relationship between GTs and peace and security, Dr. Asiedu argued that the GTs in South East Asia have had both security-enhancing as well as security-diminishing implications. Firstly, the Asian GTs have brought together former enemies and countries with different political and economic ideologies in fruitful collaboration. Economic collaboration has also led to confidence building among the countries, making the possibility of inter-state conflicts quite remote. This is despite the fact that several East Asian countries have a number of unresolved territorial disputes with one another. Secondly, because of the fostering of rapid growth, the GTs have contributed to the 'performance legitimacy' of the governments of the region, ensuring domestic and regional stability. The downside of the GTs is that they usually target particular regions of countries rather than the entire country. As a result, they have the potential to accentuate cleavages along political, ethnic or religious lines. Perceptions of unequal gains by the participating countries can also be a source of discontent. Dr. Asiedu observed that most conflicts in Asia and Africa occur along marginalized border areas. The GTs are, by definition, intended to function along such areas. This sometimes raises questions of diversion of resources to these areas. These factors diminish, rather than enhance, peace and security.

Dr. Asiedu concluded that, for progress to be made, the pursuit of economic integration must go hand in hand with that of political stability at the national level and political cooperation at the sub-regional level. The ZMM-GT can enhance its complementary role in sub-regional integration by incorporating in its work issues on the causes of conclict.

Plenary Discussions

The key issues in the discussions that followed included:

Private Sector's role in GTs: given that the private sector is driven only by profit, is the ZMM-GTs' vision of 'bottom-up' integration realistic? It was argued that the GTs may not deliver growth as intended. The private sector is different from the grass roots.

Illegal trade and conflict: illegal trade in arms and resources such as minerals and oil plays a major role in sustaining conflict and its spread across borders. COMESA recognizes this problem and is working on a programme on small arms.

Funding Challenge: it was emphasised that there is usually a great mismatch between the pledge or reported funding, and the actual amounts that are finally availed to the regional bodies. This creates an unfair impression that the bodies have resources but are not delivering on their mandates.

4. MAINSTREAMING PEACE, SECURITY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION: INTERNATIONAL POLICY OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES

Panelists in this session included Dr. Wafula Okumu, Political Analyst, Conflict Management Centre, AU, and Ms Ameena Dennis, Africa Programme Coordinator, University for Peace, Geneva Office. The session was chaired by Prof. Luk van Langenhove.

In her paper titled **'Mainstreaming Education for Peace into Regional Integration Programmes',** Ms Dennis noted that, given the dreary picture of the reality of conflict, regional peace and security is increasingly recognized as an indispensable pre-requisite for the realization of economic integration and development objectives in Africa. Reversing the trends and culture of violence, and inculcating values of peace can only be brought about through long-term education for peace. Ms Dennis noted that any type of education is a life-long process, aimed at expanding the knowledge base of individuals so that they are able to make wise and informed decisions on issues which have a bearing on their lives. Education for Peace aims to empower people to understand the complex, dynamic, and inter-connected world in which we live. Education for peace

needs to combine both formal and informal strategies and wave together intellectual and experiential aspects.

Ms Dennis argued that education for peace faces the challenge of organizing and developing sufficient capacity to alter the course of violence and secure lasting and meaningful peace. Civil society organizations (CSOs) have an enormous potential within Africa for fostering a culture of peace and sustainable development, but are severely limited in terms of capacity building and resources. CSOs can work in close collaboration with academic institutions in the provision of short-term courses and training programmes in peace and conflict studies.

To achieve the goals of an encompassing education for peace programme, Ms Dennis suggested that a range of activities should be undertaken. These include academic teaching and training, raising awareness and mobilizing society for peace and research-backed policy development. Academic teaching and training is needed to generate skilled human resources, and could make use of alternative pedagogical tools such as e-learning, distance education and mixed modes of learning. Community-based peace education could aid awareness creation through innovative, informal and culturally appropriate modes of education such as radio, theatre, music, and the performing arts. In its turn, rigorous and policy-oriented research would not only inform academic teaching and training, but also influence national and international policy processes. Also, research could highlight the lessons learnt from undocumented Africa-led peace processes such as those of CSOs, regional groupings like IGAD, and UN Secretary General's special representatives.

Ms Dennis also highlighted the role of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in promoting human resource and capacity development, and knowledge sharing. Two main components have been identified as relevant for the harnessing of ICT and acceleration of education for peace in Africa. These are the diversification of sources of knowledge, and acceleration of information exchange. Key themes under the diversification of sources of knowledge include the development by African academics of Africa-specific materials and their dissemination via DVD/CD-ROM and/or the Internet; exploration of technology-enhanced flexible learning and mixed modes of delivery; working with the media in raising popular awareness, especially among those without formal education; use of traditional African media and cultural expressions; supporting the retrieval, management and preservation of valuable archives and historical documents. Key themes under the acceleration of information exchange include making use of ICT to connect researchers, practitioners and policy makers within and outside

Africa; exploring and encouraging the sharing of lessons learned and case study material through ICT as a way of overcoming publishing barriers which stop African academics from publishing their research; supporting the development of regional and sub-regional early warning mechanisms, and the training and equipment to develop databases and monitoring systems; sharing lessons learned; facilitating the development and sharing of curricula within Africa and other regions to promote South/South cooperation.

Finally, Ms Dennis noted that, for regional organizations to fully fulfil their mandates in the field of peace and security, there is a requirement to build the capacity and expertise within the regional organizations, to fully appreciate the interfaces between poverty, conflict, development, security and regional integration. In this regard, the University for Peace proposed a capacity-building workshop for officials of African regional organizations. Such a workshop would aim to identify the existing capacity of staff in the regional organizations to understand the linkages between peace, security, and regional integration, and establish priority thematic areas for capacity-building training programmes.

Plenary Discussions

Discussion after the presentations revolved around the role of the AU and the practicalities of education for peace.

The nexus between AU, NEPAD, mineral wealth and conflict management: A question was raised regarding how AU's handling of conflicts in Africa interfaces with the new approach to Africa's development, as advocated through the NEPAD initiative. The particular case of conflict in the DRC was brought up, where mineral wealth is said to be driving the involvement of neighbouring countries. It is a major embarrassment and a test to the vision of NEPAD that millions have died in the DRC even as NEPAD tries to present a new resolve to address Africa's problems.

'War economies' and research: Conflicts in countries such as Angola, Liberia, the DRC and Sierra Leone raise the issue of *war economies*, where resources such as oil, timber and diamonds have become the 'silent agents' for the prolongation and fuelling of conflict. Researching the causal links between mineral wealth and war, and exposing the actors involved is a risky undertaking and researchers would need special protection.

Role of regional hegemons in the AU: The role that regional hegemons can play in regional peace and security was revisited, with the argument that regional hegemons,

such as Nigeria in West Africa, are indispensable. These hegemons are particularly important to the proposed Peace and Security Council of the AU. It was, however, pointed out that regional hegemons, besides their military might, also need to be exemplary in terms of democratic practice in order to take up regional responsibilities.

A people-centred AU: There was the view that the OAU, and now the AU, has been a club of secretariat bureaucrats and politicians. The AU needs to take advantage of the transition from the OAU to truly transform itself into a people-centred political community.

OAU's successes and lessons: Assessments of the OAU are often too harsh. Even as the AU seeks to transform itself, the lessons and successes of the OAU should be built upon, not discarded. Such lessons include the OAU's role in the liberation struggles and the handling of inter-state disputes arising from national boundaries.

The paradox of successful conflict prevention and resolution: Successes in conflict prevention and resolution are never publicised, while the conflicts are visible and publicised. This creates the impression that no conflict prevention or resolution initiatives have worked.

Value addition and impact: In the face of the various ongoing peace programmes in Africa, the University for Peace needs to think carefully about what values it wants to add. Education cannot easily be quantified and its impact can certainly not be realized in a short period of time. It therefore needs to be thought of as a long-term engagement.

The place of 'traditional mechanisms': These need to be highlighted and promoted. However, 'traditional mechanisms' should not be taken to refer only to what worked in the past. There are examples of traditional mechanisms that are operating today, e.g. the *gacaca* system in Rwanda.

Information sharing and knowledge base: There are various ongoing initiatives that could offer lessons for others. For example, COMESA has been working with traditional, faith-based and trade union conflict resolution mechanisms. Sharing of such initiatives should be encouraged.

What kind of education? Investment in education should address the question of what kind of education is on offer. Having educated people in a country does not guarantee peace, as evidenced by Sierra Leone which has some of the most educated people in Africa.

IV. CLOSING PLENARY

CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD

The closing plenary was jointly facilitated by Prof. Van Langenhove, Ms Dennis and Dr. Francis. The following general conclusions and suggestions for the way forward emerged at the end of the conference.

1. Production of an edited book

It was agreed that the papers presented at the conference, along with additional ones to be solicited, would be published as an edited book. The publication of the papers would serve to outline the emerging discourses, research issues and policy challenges on the link between peace, security and regional integration in Africa. The published book would additionally encourage continuation of the academic and policy debate on the subject.

2. Creation of a knowledge base on regional integration

The creation of a knowledge base calls for the documentation and analysis of experiences of regional integration, highlighting both the successes and the failures. Systematic analyses would stress the added value of integration projects.

3. Multi-level capacity building

The need for capacity building featured prominently throughout the presentations and discussions at the conference. Human resource development through training and exchange of experiences and financial capacities were identified as key areas of need. In particular, there was concern for building proper understanding of needs between donors, such as the EU, and the regional organizations.

4. Cultivation of a broad base of society support for RECs

RECs need to work closely with civil society institutions and politicians in order to gain the necessary support from society. RECs have largely remained the exclusive domain of politicians and policy makers.

5. Division of labour

A clear division of labour between regional, continental and UN bodies is needed in order to avoid the appearance or perception of duplication and confusion. Such a division of responsibilities would best be achieved through a multilateral approach.

6. Policy relevant research

The following were suggested as possible areas of research:

a) The state regional integration and its dynamics in Africa

b) Development of a methodological framework for analysing the foci of regional integration and rigorous multidisciplinary theorizing of integration projects

c) The role and workings of war economies, including such issues as resource extraction in conflict areas and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and how these relate to regional integration projects

d) The workings of, constraints and capacities for conflict early warning and early response mechanisms

e) To what extent are regional integration projects embedded in the aspirations of the citizens?

7. Workshop on capacity building for regional organizations

A proposal to organize a workshop on the capacity building needs of regional organizations was made and discussed. Such a workshop would establish priority thematic areas for capacity building, enable discussion of flexible learning techniques – such as CD-ROMs – to accommodate the time constraints of officers, and provide a networking forum for RECs. The workshop could also propose a schedule of training activities.

The participants endorsed the proposed workshop and made the following points:

a) COMESA Secretariat fully supports the idea of a workshop and would work with the Africa Centre and UNU/CRIS towards its organization. An earlier workshop for COMESA Members of Parliament clearly demonstrated specific capacity building needs for COMESA countries.

b) It was suggested that a capacity needs assessment be carried out prior to the workshop. The report of the needs assessment could then be fed into the workshop. UNU/CRIS offered to follow up on the needs assessment study and suggested asking the Jordan-based UNU Leadership Academy to carry out the pre-workshop study.

c) For the workshop to succeed, it would be important that it is not seen to duplicate efforts and programmes. In this regard, it would be helpful if it was also seen to be in harmony and dovetail with the AU's peace and security agenda. Indeed, this might be central for the securing of the AU's endorsement of the workshop and its training activities.

CLOSING REMARKS

Dr. David Francis closed the conference with a vote of thanks. On behalf of the Africa Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, he thanked all those who had played a role in the success of the conference. These included the participants, speakers, session moderators and the co-organizers, UNU/CRIS. He particularly expressed his appreciation to the representatives of the RECs for finding time to attend and speak at the conference. Finally he thanked colleagues at the University of Bradford for their support, and the Research Assistants at the Centre for their hard work in the preparations for the conference.

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