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Shaping Ethnoracial Identities:

State-Society Relations and Programmatic Differentiation in the Andes

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Keywords: ethnoracial identities, indigenous politics, between-group inequalities, policy preferences, programmatic differentiation, state trust, access to power, Andes.

Ethnic and racial cleavages have often served as the primary axes for structuring patterns of voter behavior and political competition in societies as varied and diverse as Benin,¹ India,² Bolivia, Ecuador,³ and the United States.⁴ These cleavages are considered essential for explaining the origins of party systems, the nature of political competition, and voter mobilization dynamics.

However, despite widespread recognition of the role that ethnoracial cleavages play in structuring politics in democratic societies across the world, disagreements remain over the conditions under which these cleavages can influence programmatic preferences in society. The comparative literature on race and ethnic politics—focused primarily on Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia—has traditionally assumed ethnic identities and, by extension, ethnic politics, to be largely devoid of systematic programmatic content. In this approach, ethnic politics generally reflect a clientelistic competition between ethnic groups for control of power and resources.⁵ In marked contrast, literature on race and ethnic politics in the United States sees the association of ethnoracial identities with programmatic preferences as a given, the product of between-group inequalities and perceptions of linked fate.⁶ A third approach, stemming from a growing literature on race and ethnic politics in Latin America, suggests that ethnoracial groups' organizational capacity largely shapes whether ethnoracial identities achieve political significance and become defined programmatically.⁷

Notwithstanding such disagreements, we currently have a limited understanding of the factors that influence ethnoracial identities' policy content and the conditions that enable programmatic differentiation across groups. Furthermore, the notable differences in the expectations of the race and ethnic politics literature remain unaccounted for.

This article examines the drivers of programmatic differentiation along ethnoracial lines. I define programmatic differentiation as the consistent and systematic adoption of substantively different policy preferences and/or priorities across ethnoracial groups. I argue that while ethnoracial groups' historical experiences with the state can provide groups with programmatic foundations, on their own, such between-group inequalities are often insufficient drivers of programmatic differentiation. Rather, access to state power dynamics—whether a recent disruption in the status quo has significantly altered the distribution of political power among ethnoracial groups—condition the extent to which ethnoracial groups become programmatically differentiated, particularly as it pertains to preferences over the role of states in society.

States play a central role in the construction of social identities and the institutionalization of ethnoracial differences.⁸ They are biased actors that often serve as a reflection of ethnoracial hierarchies and, as such, can variously include, exclude, privilege, or repress the groups that exist within them.⁹ In contexts where states reflect ethnoracial hierarchies, they systematically advantage those groups with political power through institutional arrangements and policy choices, while often disadvantaging and neglecting those that remain excluded from it.¹⁰ Such differences can provide ethnoracial cleavages with raw material for programmatic differences.¹¹

Yet systematic programmatic differentiation regarding the role of the state in society is nonetheless difficult to attain because of the inherent contradictions in the relationship between ethnoracial groups and the state: groups that have been historically-excluded by the state recognize it as a biased actor that disadvantages them. As such, they are likely to be more distrusting of that state than their counterparts while, at the same time, recognizing the state as the most significant agent for social transformation and improvement of their conditions. In other words, historically-excluded groups both need the state and distrust it, and this contradiction pulls these groups, internally, in different directions, ultimately diluting programmatic differences between them and their more advantaged counterparts.

To understand the conditions under which ethnoracial groups become programmatically differentiated on state-related dimensions, it is important to consider their patterns of access to state power. I theorize that changes in access to state power where ethnoracial groups experience meaningful gains or losses in power, relative to other ethnoracial groups, drive systematic ethnoracial programmatic differentiation. As historically-excluded groups make meaningful gains in state power, their trust in the state increases and they are more likely to support policies that attribute greater responsibilities to that state. For the historically-advantaged groups, on the other hand, a loss of power erodes both their trust in the state and support for a more involved state. The polarization that results from significant transformations in the distribution of political power in society drives a reorganization of programmatic preferences and makes systematic programmatic differentiation across ethnoracial groups more likely.

I evaluate this argument using public opinion data from the Andean region. I draw from nine pooled country surveys implemented in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) between 2008 and 2012.¹² This region offers fertile terrain for this study. On the one hand, the Andean states share demographic

similarities and deeply entrenched ethnoracial hierarchies that have historically structured state-society relations. On the other, in recent years, major transformations in ethnoracial groups' levels of access to state power in Bolivia,¹³ where historically-excluded highland indigenous populations gained control of the central government, but not in Peru or Ecuador, where indigenous populations remain powerless despite notable trends of indigenous organization and mobilization in the latter, have generated important variation that can be leveraged to evaluate this argument.

The study finds that there is marked variation across these societies in the degree of programmatic differentiation on state-related policy dimensions among ethnoracial groups. Whereas ethnoracial groups have clear and systematic differences in their programmatic demands of the state in some instances (Bolivia), in others, these differences are diluted and unsystematic (Ecuador and Peru). Such variation cannot be attributed either to differences in the strength of ethnoracial cleavages, organizational capacity, or political mobilization of indigenous groups; across the region, and in these three societies, issues of redistribution and inclusionary economic policies have been at the core of numerous indigenous mobilizations.¹⁴ Rather, the results lend support to the proposition that programmatic differentiation along state-related policy dimensions has resulted from recent shifts in ethnoracial groups' access to state power and resulting transformations in state trust.¹⁵

This study makes several contributions to the comparative literature on race and ethnic politics. First, it advances our understanding of preference formation processes and the macro-contextual mechanisms shaping these outcomes. Lieberman and McClendon showed that ethnic groups can, at least, prioritize policy issues differently.¹⁶ In line with the underlying expectations of existing scholarship, they pointed to the centrality of between-group inequalities and political salience as drivers of variation in policy priorities. The present study goes beyond policy priorities to consider whether and how ethnoracial groups become systematically differentiated in their programmatic preferences. It also advances an argument that recognizes between-group inequalities as significant, but insufficient for shaping programmatic outcomes. I introduce contemporary power relations as a central factor conditioning whether ethnoracial groups become programmatically-differentiated or not.

The study also contributes to scholarship by introducing access to state power as a variable that offers important insights into the consistency and intensity of ethnoracial preferences across contexts. This variable sheds light on why programmatic differences seem all but inevitable in some contexts but are absent in others, even when structural inequalities would lead us to expect them. I show that trust in the state is an important mechanism mediating the development of programmatic preferences among ethnoracial groups and the degree of programmatic differentiation across them. This finding is consistent with recent contributions that examine support for redistributive policies among poor sectors in high inequality settings and reveal diminished expectations of government and democratic institutions.¹⁷ Collectively, these insights help make sense of seeming contradictions between citizens' material conditions and their political preferences, and they highlight the need for closer consideration of groups' perceptions of the state.

Finally, the study adds to a growing conversation on how ethnoracial identities shape political outcomes in Latin American societies. This scholarship has focused on examining processes of politicization of ethnic and racial identities, highlighting the dynamic interplay between institutional frameworks, identities, and social organizations in shaping political behavior and representation outcomes, and evaluating the implications of this for patterns of democratic development.¹⁸ While this literature has highlighted the policy focus of ethnoracial mobilizations, the relationship between ethnoracial identities and programmatic demands nonetheless remains understudied. The present study fills this gap by providing insight into whether and how systematic programmatic differences emerge across ethnoracial groups in societies at large.

Ethnoracial Identities and Programmatic Preferences

The programmatic differentiation of ethnoracial groups enables the alignment of ethnoracial identities with distinct, coherent policy agendas.¹⁹ Programmatic differentiation involves systematic patterns of preference formation that push policy differences across ethnoracial groups beyond the realm of single-issue, random, or conjunctural alignments. In such instances, group-based preferences become more consistent, gaining greater stability and predictability over time. When ethnoracial groups become programmatically-differentiated, differences in policy views also reach beyond groups' political elites and/or organized sectors to shape preference-formation dynamics in the population at large and regardless of within-group variation in economic status.²⁰ Conversely, when ethnoracial groups lack programmatic differentiation, their preferences become either undiscernible, inconsistent, or unstable. Ethnoracial groups may become associated with a particular policy position on a given issue, but such differentiation may not carry over to related policy areas. We may also observe contradictions in policy alignments, with group-based differences being incoherent with each other, reflecting, for instance, support for more state involvement in some dimensions, but opposition to similar involvement on related issues. In other instances, programmatic differentiation may be unstable, emerging at particular junctures and disappearing soon thereafter. Thus, whereas programmatic differentiation provides grounds for political competition that is consistently grounded in policy-based distinctions and that is more responsive to group-based needs, its absence can significantly increase the likelihood of non-programmatic modes of political linkage and reduce groups' ability to achieve meaningful policy gains.

Under what conditions do ethnoracial groups become programmatically differentiated? Existing scholarship on race and ethnic politics offers conflicting responses to this question. Research focused on the United States has repeatedly demonstrated a strong association between race-based identities and programmatic differentiation.²¹ In his seminal study, Dawson found that African Americans share policy attitudes on broad issues and that these preferences hold even as economic diversification within the African American population increases; the author attributes this persistence to a shared perception of linked fate within this community.²² In U.S.-based scholarship,

the effects of structural racism are thought to drive differentiated life experiences and generate between-group inequalities, in-group attachments, and out-group hostilities among ethnoracial groups that, in turn, delineate policy attitudes.²³ Empirically, the approach proposes several expectations. First, it suggests that ethnoracial groups are more likely to have differentiated programmatic preferences where racism has historically structured state-society relations. This is because “racialized social systems and societies [...] allocate differential economic, political, social, and even psychological rewards to groups along racial lines,”²⁴ and, as a result of that multidimensional differentiation, groups come to see their wellbeing as linked to their in-group. Such in-group, out-group attitudes mediate support for a more expansive welfare state.²⁵ Not only are socioeconomically-disadvantaged ethnoracial groups expected to be more supportive of an expansive welfare state due to their structural position and in-group loyalties, but also dominant ethnoracial groups are expected to have diminished support for a more interventionist state and its welfare policies because they do not want to advantage ethnoracial minorities.²⁶

The comparative literature on race and ethnic politics deviates significantly from these expectations. Scholarship focused on Latin America points to the centrality of organizational capacity and political leadership as central factors shaping differences in programmatic preferences across ethnoracial groups. Although this literature has focused primarily on explaining outcomes such as ethnic cleavage activation,²⁷ social mobilization,²⁸ political organization,²⁹ ethnic voting (rather than programmatic differentiation),³⁰ and policy implementation,³¹ it proposes several hypotheses about the relationship between ethnoracial identities and programmatic preferences. Most scholars see the emergence of salient ethnic identities across Latin America as a relatively recent and regionally-uneven phenomenon,³² but one that is nonetheless compatible with ethnoracially-differentiated programmatic demands given long histories of ethnoracial exclusion and enormous between-group inequalities.³³ This scholarship points to identity politicization dynamics to explain variation in outcomes across the region.³⁴ Whereas the successful consolidation of indigenous organizations in Bolivia and Ecuador enabled programmatically-based indigenous mobilization, the failure of efforts to politicize Peru’s ethnic cleavage ultimately hindered group-based mobilization and programmatic alignment. This emphasis on recent and uneven processes of ethnoracial politicization—and the social and political organizational outcomes—can also be found in literature on Afro-descendant politics in Latin America. Scholars point to shifting state policies to account for the growing politicization of race-based identities in Brazil and Colombia.³⁵ Collectively, these findings suggest that for historical between-group inequalities to achieve political expression, ethnoracial identities must themselves become politicized and organized through social movements and/or political parties.³⁶ Empirically, this literature expects programmatic differentiation among ethnoracial groups to be more likely where indigenous and Afro-descendent populations achieve organizational capacity. Where such organization fails, ethnoracial identities remain de-politicized and programmatic alignments remain inconsistent despite the enormous material disparities.

A final set of hypotheses derives from scholarship on ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, where ethnic identities often have great political salience but are nonetheless linked to the political arena through clientelistic ties.³⁷ This scholarship generally sees ethnic cleavages as running counter to programmatically-based differentiation.³⁸ Where ethnic cleavages are salient, politicians are thought to de-emphasize programmatic differences and mobilize voters along ethnic loyalties; voters, for their part, prioritize club goods and engage in instrumental ethnic voting, supporting co-ethnic politicians under expectations of a clientelistic exchange.³⁹ In such contexts, co-ethnicity can serve as an informational shortcut for voters, reducing the incentives and opportunities for programmatically-based political evaluations.⁴⁰

To summarize, existing approaches offer sharply contradicting hypotheses about whether and how ethnoracial groups become programmatically differentiated. Whereas studies on race and ethnic politics in the United States expect systematic differentiation where structural inequalities abound, the comparative politics literature deviates on its expectations, emphasizing the role of identity politicization and organizational capacity on programmatic differentiation in Latin America, and generally expecting no differentiation where clientelistic ties predominate.

A Theory of Access to State Power

This study explains why and how profound ethnoracial inequalities can coexist with variation in degrees of programmatic differentiation across states. I focus on a basic point: ethnoracial groups' perceptions of the state matters. Modifying existing theories to account for state-society relations generates different expectations about when state-centric preferences are likely to become differentiated systematically along ethnoracial lines.

My core argument is that programmatic differentiation across ethnoracial groups is a function of historical patterns of state-society relations and changes in access to state power. Whereas patterns of historical state-society relations provide ethnoracial identities with material and symbolic foundations for the formation of programmatic preferences, changes in groups' access to state power heighten ethnoracial programmatic differentiation. By access to state power, I refer to groups' degree of control over the central government.⁴¹ A group's access to state power may range from having exclusive control of government and its key institutions to being entirely excluded from these spaces. In between these two extremes, groups may enjoy different levels of power (and powersharing arrangements) over the central government relative to their counterparts. I propose that meaningful changes in ethnoracial groups' access to state power can enable programmatic differentiation. This is because these types of changes significantly disrupt the status quo of power arrangements. As groups experience meaningful changes in access to state power, they are forced to reassess their relationship with the state. Recognizing the transformation in state priorities, they adjust their support for state-centric policies, increasing polarization and enabling programmatic differentiation across ethnoracial groups.

Historically, states' behaviors and institutions have often reflected the power structures that organize their societies, with groups that occupy the upper echelons of a social hierarchy enjoying privileged access to the state and significant power over its key institutions. When social hierarchies are deeply-rooted in the state, the state's differentiated engagement with the groups that exist within it can produce structural and multi-dimensional inequalities among ethnoracial groups. This is particularly the case in societies where state-society relations are organized around an established ethnoracial hierarchy.⁴² In these contexts, the systematic exclusion of some ethnoracial groups and the reproduction of these hierarchies in state institutions provide the basis for structural group-based differentiation.⁴³

The resulting systemic exclusion conditions a wide range of outcomes, including educational opportunities,⁴⁴ returns to human capital endowments,⁴⁵ public goods access,⁴⁶ wages,⁴⁷ and social mobility.⁴⁸ In such instances, historically-advantaged ethnoracial groups will tend to receive better state resources, higher wages, greater political power, and state protection; they will also be "granted higher levels of social estimation [...] and, in many cases, [have] license to draw physical (segregation) as well as social (racial etiquette) boundaries between [themselves] and other[s]."⁴⁹ Such "accumulation of racially discriminatory treatment disproportionately sorts those stigmatized into the bottom strata of society even as it privileges others."⁵⁰

In ethnoracialized systems, exclusion can therefore permeate citizens' lives and profoundly shape their interactions with the state. Ethnoracial groups may become associated with distinct sectors of the economy (e.g., formal/informal, agricultural/services), while also receiving drastically different access to state education, healthcare, and other public goods. They may also be differentially protected or criminalized by the state's security institutions.⁵¹ The resulting inequalities supply ethnoracial cleavages with material and symbolic foundations that provide the basis for ethnoracialized programmatic preferences.⁵²

My expectation, however, is that while historical state-society relations provide strong foundations for group-based preferences, they are nonetheless insufficient for generating systemic patterns of programmatic differentiation across ethnoracial groups, particularly along state-centric dimensions. This is because ethnoracial groups' preferences are not formed in a theoretical vacuum. Rather, when defining programmatic preferences that involve the state—for instance, those concerned with state intervention in the economy, welfare provision, or redistribution—ethnoracial groups consider their relationship with that state. Where ethnoracial groups suffer from systemic exclusion, they view the state as a central player shaping and reinforcing their condition. Their programmatic views are shaped by this dilemma: while excluded groups see the state as a central force for social transformation with the capacity to improve in-group conditions, they also recognize it as an exclusionary force that has historically disadvantaged them. Such awareness of the state as a biased actor generates distrust and leads groups to expect state actions to disadvantage them. In this same vein, historically-advantaged groups, having traditionally benefited from privileged access to the state, are likely to be more trusting of that state and will generally expect to benefit from state actions.

I expect perceptions of the state to mediate preferences and condition programmatic differentiation across ethnoracial groups on state-centric policies. Thus, whereas ethnoracial groups' material conditions might lead us to expect the historically-excluded sectors to support policies that increase the role of the state in the provision of welfare or economic redistribution—seeing it as a solution to systemic inequalities—their skepticism of, and distrust in, the state should dilute support for these programmatic views as groups fear that, in practice, a more powerful state will likely continue to disadvantage them. Among the historically-excluded ethnoracial groups, the tug and pull between material conditions and skepticism of the state undermine internal coherence in the demands these groups make of the state, contributing to a decrease in the degree of ethnoracial programmatic differentiation.

The issue of diluted programmatic differentiation is further exacerbated by patterns of preference formation among historically-privileged sectors, which are likely to have inflated levels of support for these policies due to higher levels of state trust.⁵³ Because these groups recognize that the state will continue to benefit their in-group, they are more likely to support programmatic policies that attribute greater responsibilities to the state, even when such policies would theoretically disadvantage their in-group. Such support comes at a low cost to them—the status quo and their position of advantage are unlikely to be disrupted—and dilutes ethnoracial programmatic differentiation on state-centric policies.

Meaningful changes in ethnoracial groups' access to state power disrupt the views, calculations, and expectations of the state among ethnoracial groups. Where changes in ethnoracial groups' access to state power are significant, they drive these groups to reassess their relationship with the state in light of their newly reconfigured power. A historically-excluded group that gains significant access to state power will now see itself represented within the state and recognize its increased leverage over state institutions. This awareness is expected to increase levels of trust in the state, leading the group to reassess its views on state-centric programmatic preferences and to become more consistently supportive of policies that expand state responsibilities. Similarly, for historically-advantaged groups, recognition of their relative loss of power is likely to lead these groups to perceive an increased threat that the state may act to disadvantage them. I expect this to be associated with an increase in these groups' reluctance to support policies involving a more expansive state.⁵⁴ The adjustment in state-society relations is likely to drive polarization of preferences, as groups adjust their policy views to the new reality. It is in such contexts of heightened polarization, brought about by shifting state-society relations, where I expect programmatic differentiation to be most pronounced.

Because a shift in perceptions is critical, changes in access to state power must necessarily be meaningful and significant. A historically-powerless group that succeeds at establishing a monopoly over the national government offers the clearest signal of a consequential transformation in state power. While changes need not entail such profound shifts, they must necessarily signal a significant redistribution of power across groups. For example, instances where historically-excluded groups win the presidency and gain legislative majorities clearly signal these groups' newly acquired and sizable power over

government. By contrast, relatively small changes in access to power are insufficient to alter groups' perceptions of the state. Examples of such changes include the placement of token politicians, small electoral wins, or even a presidential win with a legislature controlled by parties of the opposition. These types of political changes, rather than conveying meaningful transformations, signal the persistence of established structures of power and reveal limited access to effective representation. In such contexts, perceptions of the state remain unchanged and programmatic differences are thus more likely to remain diluted. Such outcomes are expected to hold even where historically-excluded ethnoracial groups experience notable increases in organizational and mobilizational capacity and hence in their ability to pressure the state. Although mobilizational capacity highlights group agency and may even heighten group awareness of the strategic utility of access to state power, it does not fundamentally alter group's relationship with the state. Consequently, such groups will have few reasons to shift their views of that state and programmatic differentiation is likely to remain inconsistent and diluted.

Meaningful changes in access to state power must also be durable. For programmatic differentiation to be sustained, a new and stable status quo—in which historically-disadvantaged ethnoracial groups experience meaningful increases in access to state power (and historically-advantaged sectors experience a relative decrease) and hold it over time—is crucial. Stability in reconfigured state-society relations allows the consolidation of preferences and programmatic differentiation across ethnoracial groups given new power dynamics. In such contexts, significant reassessments of state trust and programmatic adjustments are unlikely, lest the status quo is disrupted again. Meaningful shifts in power, however, may prove short-lived, in which case ethnoracial groups are likely to reassess their views of the state and adjust their preferences considering these shifting power relations. Where seemingly meaningful changes in access to state power ultimately prove unstable and unreliable, the consequence of this may be an overall decrease in levels of state trust and programmatic differentiation across ethnoracial groups as the various groups become aware of the unreliability of their access to the state.

To summarize, I expect that while between-group inequalities provide social and material foundations for ethnoracialized programmatic preferences, such inequalities do not inherently generate programmatic differentiation across ethnoracial groups, particularly where state-related policies are concerned. This is because ethnoracial groups' support for a more involved state is filtered through these groups' relationship with that state. Second, I expect state distrust among historically-excluded ethnoracial groups to reduce support for policies that grant the state greater responsibilities, even where such policies may be theoretically beneficial to their in-group. In contrast, the greater trust in the state among historically-privileged groups is likely to inflate their support for these same policies. These simultaneous processes dilute programmatic differentiation across ethnoracial groups. Third, I expect significant shifts in ethnoracial groups' access to state power to increase their degree of programmatic differentiation. As historically-excluded groups gain access to state power, their trust in the state is expected to increase and, with that, their programmatic coherence; a significant

loss of power among the historically-privileged should drive a reduction in support for state-centric policies. The resulting polarization enables systematic programmatic differentiation along ethnoracial lines.

Case Selection

I evaluate the proposed argument through an analysis of ethnoracial groups' access to power and programmatic differentiation along state-centric preferences in three Andean states: Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. I then focus on Bolivia—where there was a meaningful change in the distribution of power among ethnoracial groups—to assess variation in programmatic preferences and trust patterns, both over time and across groups.

These three Andean states share important similarities. First, throughout their histories, Andean states developed on the foundations of an ethnoracial hierarchy that positions indigenous populations in a lower echelon in society relative to non-indigenous white and mestizo populations. This deeply entrenched hierarchy began to consolidate during the early phases of colonial expansion, as colonial institutions became differentiated on the basis of ethnoracial boundaries. The *mit'a* system (a labor or silver tax collected from indigenous communities),⁵⁵ the legal and administrative framework of the Republic of Indians,⁵⁶ and the indigenous *reducciones*—which relocated indigenous populations in new communities to facilitate Christianization efforts and tax and labor collection—were all critical for institutionalizing ethnoracial hierarchies. Moreover, these institutions, like slavery in Brazil, the Caribbean, and the United States, set the foundations for lasting inequalities in the post-colonial era,⁵⁷ and structured patterns of state development in the aftermath.⁵⁸ Despite variation in state- and nation-building projects throughout the region's post-colonial history, the underlying ethnoracial hierarchies that structure state-society relations have largely persisted, and indigenous populations remain systematically excluded.

The consequences of ethnoracialized state-society relations are visible in present-day socioeconomic structures and inequalities across these states. According to a World Bank report, there is “unambiguous evidence that indigenous peoples fare worse on most accounts, independently from other factors such as level of education, age, urban or rural location, type of work, and characteristics of the household.”⁵⁹ These inequalities are evidenced in poverty structures, job markets, public goods provision, and healthcare and education access. Collectively, they reveal some of the consequences of differentiated patterns of interaction between ethnoracial groups and the state in Andean societies and shed light on central pathways through which programmatic foundations for ethnoracial groups become established.

The three Andean states also share important similarities in their ethnic composition. Quechuas constitute a dominant indigenous group in all three states; Aymaras are present and dominant in Bolivia and Peru, and all three countries have smaller lowland or Amazonian indigenous populations. These dynamics enable me to control for ethnic composition while considering variation in access to state power across indigenous groups.⁶⁰

The final condition that makes this an effective setup for evaluating the proposed argument centers on differences in patterns of indigenous mobilization and recent changes in state power dynamics. While democratization in the 1980s brought with it greater political space for indigenous populations to organize and make demands from the state,⁶¹ social and political organizational efforts have varied within the region. Ecuador and Bolivia saw the emergence of powerful indigenous movements that were remarkably effective at mobilizing popular support, forcing the hand of the political class and, ultimately, organizing indigenous parties that have restructured these countries' political arenas and experienced significant electoral success.⁶² In Peru, by contrast, the political successes have been limited, with indigenous movements experiencing greater challenges mobilizing support, sustaining a national presence, and influencing politics.

This variation in organizational capacity among indigenous populations, however, has not automatically translated into transformed state-society relations. Despite the increased salience, organizational capacity, and political influence of indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador, only Bolivia has thus far experienced a meaningful transformation in ethnoracial groups' access to state power. In both Peru and Ecuador, by contrast, indigenous populations lack meaningful access to state power despite heightened levels of indigenous mobilization—and organizational and policy successes—in Ecuador.⁶³

In Bolivia, the key transformation in patterns of access to state power came with the electoral success of the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS-IPSP) in December 2005. The MAS-IPSP is a party with deep roots in indigenous movements and an agenda centered on deepening the incorporation of its indigenous bases, concentrated predominantly in the country's highland regions. The party's rise to power radically transformed indigenous populations' relationship with the state—particularly among Aymara and Quechua populations—and reconfigured the distribution of power across ethnoracial groups, reducing the political power of white and (white-) mestizo populations somewhat and significantly augmenting that of indigenous and (indigenous-) mestizo groups. The magnitude of the power shift is evidenced, first, in the election and appointment of officials that self-identify as indigenous at all levels of government, including the presidency. It is also highlighted by the ties that many of these elected and appointed leaders have to indigenous organizations across the country.⁶⁴ Indigenous populations' increased access to state power has not been merely descriptive. It has also entailed major political reforms, including a new constitution, approved in 2009, that redefined Bolivia as a plurinational state and reconfigured indigenous peoples' relationship with the state.

Other Andean states have not experienced similar transformations. In Ecuador, despite the tremendous organizational successes of indigenous populations since the 1990s, access to state power has remained elusive. Although the indigenous party, *Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik* (MUPP), has become an influential political player—running in an alliance with a successful presidential candidate in 2002, coming in a close third place in the 1996 and 2021 elections, and demonstrating enormous mobilization capacity time and again in recent years—increased political participation has thus far fallen short of bringing about meaningful transformations in the distribution of state power among ethnoracial groups. While the indigenous party and movement

continue to make programmatically-grounded demands of the state—and have accumulated notable successes in their pushes for social policy and constitutional reforms⁶⁵—their relationship with the state remains antagonistic and their power within formal state institutions limited. Hence, their most significant expressions of force have been sustained mobilizations that have placed existing governments in crisis and driven several presidential resignations,⁶⁶ a story much like Bolivia's prior to MAS-IPSP's victory.⁶⁷

In Peru, too, the status quo in terms of access to state power remains, with indigenous populations remaining largely powerless within the central government and state institutions. Despite persistent trends of ethnic voting, social and political organizing among indigenous populations has been comparatively limited.⁶⁸ In fact, scholars characterize Peru as a case of failed ethnic cleavage activation, often contrasted with the organizational successes of indigenous movements and parties in Bolivia and Ecuador.⁶⁹

Such variation in indigenous populations' degree of politicization, organizational capacity, and recent shifts (or not) in access to state power provides an effective context for considering the proposed argument and controlling for alternative explanations.

Empirical Strategy

I examine the empirical implications of the proposed theory in three stages. The analyses begin by exploring whether differences in indigenous groups' access to state power across countries are associated with meaningful differences in ethnoracial groups' patterns of programmatic differentiation. Towards this end, I use LAPOP's individual-level public opinion data and pool nine nationally-representative surveys conducted in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru between 2008 and 2012. This period of analysis captures key variation in ethnoracial groups' levels of access to state power and organizational capacity. Later stages of the study extend the period of analysis from 1998 to 2014 in Bolivia to consider cross-time variation in patterns of trust in the state.⁷⁰

My analysis of programmatic differentiation focuses on preferences over the role of the state in society because I expect these to be filtered through groups' perceptions of the state. I develop a *Programmatic Index* that combines four state-centric dimensions—industry, wellbeing, employment, and redistribution—included in all survey years. *Industry* reflects support for state intervention in the economy, drawing from a question about whether the state should own the most important industries. The second dimension, *Wellbeing*, captures support for the idea that the state, more than individuals themselves, is the main actor responsible for people's wellbeing. The *Employment* dimension examines support for the view that the state, more than private businesses, is the primary actor responsible for generating employment. Finally, the *Redistribution* dimension reflects support for the idea that the state should implement firm policies to reduce inequalities between the wealthy and poor. Responses to the four questions range from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7), with strongly agree indicating significant support for greater state responsibilities. The *Programmatic Index* averages responses to these four questions. It similarly ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating no support for greater state responsibility

in the provision of services and 7 indicating strongest support for state responsibility. The Appendix includes tables describing the questions used to operationalize this index, along with summary statistics. It is important to note that support for state involvement in Latin American economies has historically been very high, with positions often averaging above 5 on 1–7 scales across the entire population. The question here, then, is about the conditions that enable persistent and systematic—meaning internally coherent and statistically significant—differentiation in ethnoracial groups’ preferences given contexts defined by profound between-group inequalities.

I measure ethnoracial identities in two ways, using ethnoracial self-identification and native language. The ethnoracial self-identification category has five levels: White, Black, Mestizo, Indigenous, and Other. This question has the advantage of relying on self-reported identification with an ethnoracial community. This is key because it reflects respondents’ affinity to an ethnoracial identity and guarantees a certain level of awareness (as opposed to external classification). For the present study, I rely on this measure to assess how ethnoracial groups’ access to state power shapes programmatic differentiation across Andean societies.

While I implement all of the analyses with the two measures of ethnoracial identity, whenever the analyses require zooming into the indigenous category and/or analyzing trends over extended periods of time, I turn to the language-based variable in the main text. The language-based measure is the most stable measure of ethnoracial identity available. For the purposes of this study, it is also particularly useful for unpacking the indigenous category and examining variation across indigenous groups.⁷¹ I classify this variable into three categories—Spanish speakers, indigenous highlands (Aymaras and Quechuas), and indigenous lowlands (Amazonian and lowland ethnic communities)—to test hypotheses focused on within-country variation in indigenous groups’ access to state power.

My main independent variable, access to state power, is operationalized using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset.⁷² This dataset classifies power relations between politically-relevant ethnic groups on a yearly basis—starting in 1946 and going through 2020—based on expert assessments of political participation and ethnic exclusion. Power relations are classified every year based on each ethnic group’s access to executive power, defined as “control over the presidency, the cabinet, and senior posts in the administration, including the army” through their political representatives.⁷³ They identify eight categories. For the ethnoracial groups in the three Andean countries analyzed here, four categories are relevant: powerless, junior partner, senior partner, and dominant. Powerless groups are fully excluded from political power, meaning that their elite representatives “hold no political power at either the national or the regional level without being explicitly discriminated against.”⁷⁴ Junior and senior partners participate in power-sharing regimes and are classified as one or the other depending on their position within the government. Dominant groups hold power in the executive but include “token” members of other groups.

EPR bundles ethnoracial groups into categories that vary somewhat across countries. For Bolivia, it organizes groups into four categories: Aymara, Quechua, Guaraní and other eastern indigenous groups, and Whites/*Mestizos*. According to the data, in 2006, Aymaras and Quechuas transition from powerless to senior and junior partner status, respectively.

Guaranís and other eastern indigenous groups remain powerless both before and after the rise of MAS-IPSP. Whites and *Mestizos*, for their part, experience a decline in state power in 2006, moving from dominant until 2005 to junior. In Ecuador, the EPR dataset divides ethnoracial groups into Afro-Ecuadorians, Indigenous highland peoples (Kichwa), indigenous lowland peoples (Shuar, Achuar, etc), and Whites/*Mestizos*. The first three groups are classified as powerless and Whites/*Mestizos* as dominant for the period of interest. The same holds for ethnoracial groups in Peru, which are divided into Afro-Peruvians, Indigenous peoples of the Amazon, Indigenous peoples of the Andes, and Whites/*Mestizos*, with the first three remaining powerless and the last one classified as dominant during this period.

These classifications in access to state power provide crucial variation for this study: (1) across countries during the 2008–2012 period (with Bolivia’s indigenous classified as junior/senior partners and Ecuador and Peru’s as powerless), (2) over time in Bolivia (pre- versus post-2006 power arrangements), and (3) across ethnoracial groups within Bolivia (with Quechuas and Aymaras increasing their access to power in 2006, Guaranís and lowland indigenous groups remaining powerless during the transition, and Whites/*Mestizos* moving from dominant to junior partners). I exploit these three levels of variation in the analyses that follow.

I also include a number of controls in multivariate models, including measures for economic class, urban-rural residence, gender, and education, variables that scholars often associate with programmatic differentiation. I operationalize economic class using a composite measure of individuals’ declared assets that ranges from 0 to 100, increasing with greater assets.⁷⁵ This operationalization has the advantage of providing a consistent measure that can be implemented across all survey years and countries and that is not as vulnerable to misreporting.⁷⁶ The urban-rural variable takes on five different values: rural area, small city, medium city, large city, and national capital (reference category). The education variable is numeric and ranges from 0 to 18, increasing with respondents’ years of education. I also implement additional robustness checks that include government approval as a control.

For all analyses, I implement generalized linear models, weighted to the appropriate complex survey design. Analyses at the regional level include country- and year-fixed effects. Those that focus on individual countries include only year-fixed effects. Throughout, I implement three main models: a bivariate analysis (Model 1), a multivariate analysis including controls (Model 2), and a multivariate analysis including controls and government approval (Model 3). In the main text, I include results for Model 2. Results for Models 1 and 3 can be found in the Appendix, where I also include additional robustness checks. All results include robust standard errors.


Results

Ethnoracialized Programmatic Preferences I first consider the relationship between ethnoracial identities and the *Programmatic Index* within each country. This helps assess observable implications associated with the competing hypotheses. My expectation is

that, given ethnoracial groups' patterns of access to state power, we should observe systematic programmatic differentiation across ethnoracial groups in Bolivia, where the indigenous had state power at the time, but not in Peru and Ecuador, where indigenous groups remained powerless.

Figure 1 presents the results of the multivariate analyses in each Andean country, visualizing coefficients for white and *mestizo* populations, with indigenous as the reference category. The results are consistent with the access to state power hypothesis: programmatic differentiation between indigenous populations and their white and *mestizo* counterparts is significant in Bolivia, but not in Peru and Ecuador. The direction of the relationship is also consistent with expectations. Indigenous populations in Bolivia are more likely to support greater state involvement in social policies than their non-indigenous counterparts. In Peru and Ecuador, the association loses statistical significance and even displays opposing tendencies. Whereas in Peru, indigenous populations lean towards greater state involvement relative to their non-indigenous counterparts, in Ecuador, the coefficients are slightly positive. This is a surprising pattern given the high levels of political organization among indigenous populations in Ecuador and the prevalence of state-centric demands among these organized groups, which have persistently led protests in support of more redistributive policies. This finding suggests that, contrary to what the Latin American scholarship on ethnoracial politics posits, the social mobilization and political organization of ethnoracial groups is insufficient for driving programmatic differentiation across groups in society at large. The results also challenge expectations by other race and ethnic politics scholarship which cannot account for differences in patterns of programmatic differentiation across societies.

Figure 1 Ethnoracial Identities and the *Programmatic Index* in the Andes




Note: The figure plots ethnoracial self-identification coefficient estimates for the *Programmatic Index* (with indigenous as reference category and RSE). Bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure A1 in the Appendix probes these dynamics further by disaggregating the *Programmatic Index* and evaluating the association between ethnoracial identities and individual issue dimensions. Results are consistent with those observed here and reveal significant differences in the size and direction of programmatic differences along issue dimensions.

Access to State Power My central theoretical expectation is that meaningful changes in ethnoracial groups’ access to state power—that increase access to state power among the historically-excluded and reduce it among historically-privileged groups—should be associated with increased programmatic differentiation across ethnoracial groups. One empirical implication of this argument is that as ethnoracial groups’ access to state power increases, their support for greater state involvement should increase as well. To evaluate this, I employ the *Access to State Power* variable and assess its relationship with the *Programmatic Index*. The model implemented uses respondents’ ethnoracial self-identification and includes standard controls.

Figure 2 displays the predicted effects of *Access to State Power* on the *Programmatic Index* as ethnoracial groups move from being powerless (0) to becoming junior

Figure 2 Predicted Effects: Access to State Power and Programmatic Index



Note: The figure plots predicted effects of *Access to State Power* on the *Programmatic Index*. Bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

partners (1), senior partners (2), and dominant (3). The results are consistent with expectations: as ethnoracial groups' access to state power increases from powerless to dominant, their support for greater state involvement in social policies increases significantly, with other variables held at their (weighted) means. Given a context in which a historically-excluded group becomes dominant and a historically-advantaged group becomes powerless, I estimate a 0.7 shift along the *Programmatic Index*. The magnitude of this shift comes into focus when we consider that, on average, support for state involvement is notably high in Andean countries (and elsewhere in Latin America) and average support for these policy preferences is around 5.3 in the three countries. In this context, a difference of 0.7 between ethnoracial groups will significantly deepen ethnoracial polarization and increase programmatic differentiation across groups.


Another way to assess how ethnoracial groups' access to power conditions programmatic preferences and differentiation is to examine more closely the variation in preferences across ethnoracial groups within Bolivia. Bolivia offers important within-country variation in ethnoracial groups' access to state power: whereas Quechuas and Aymaras (highland indigenous) gained access to power through the rise of the MAS-IPSP, white/*mestizo* populations experienced a small decline in power (to junior partner), and Guaraní and eastern lowland indigenous groups remained powerless. Given this variation, I expect highland indigenous groups to be significantly more supportive of increased state involvement than both non-indigenous and lowland indigenous populations.

To evaluate this expectation, I employ the native-language variable and assess whether there are meaningful differences in group preferences. The multivariate model uses highland indigenous populations as the reference category. These analyses are tentative due to limitations in the survey sample of lowland indigenous populations, which tend to be undercounted and excluded from country surveys. Consequently, their sample size across survey cycles is small: ranging from twenty-four in 2012 to forty-five in 2010. Nonetheless, the data allow us to do the exercise, while recognizing the limited representativeness and large margins of error of this sample.

Figure 3 presents the coefficients of interest from the multivariate regression analyzing the association between ethnoracial groups and the *Programmatic Index*. The results are consistent with expectations: both Spanish and lowland indigenous populations tend to be less supportive of state involvement than highland indigenous populations that have access to power during the period under examination. While the confidence intervals for lowland indigenous populations are very large, the difference between this group and their highland counterparts nonetheless achieves statistical significance. This result reveals programmatic differentiation within the indigenous category in Bolivia, in line with expectations regarding the role of access to state power in shaping programmatic outcomes.

Given indigenous groups' differentiated histories of interaction with the state, it could be that these differences in programmatic preferences are due to variation in indigenous groups' demands on the state. Across the region, the political agenda of lowland movements has been characterized by the advancement of demands for increased autonomy and environmental protections. This contrasts significantly with the types of demands often advanced by highland indigenous populations. While the latter also incorporate demands

Figure 3 Ethnoracial Groups and the Programmatic Index in Bolivia




Note: The figure plots ethnoracial identity coefficient estimates for the *Programmatic Index* in Bolivia (with RSE). Bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

for autonomy and environmental issues, they have tended to mobilize along issues related to industry nationalization, increased access to public goods, and an expansion of the definition of the nation, among other issues related to state-building. Without denying these fundamental differences in the content of these groups’ policy demands, it is nonetheless possible to tentatively consider how different levels of access to state power would shape the content of lowland indigenous’ populations programmatic preferences.

To examine this, I build a predictive plot of the regression path of lowland indigenous populations in Bolivia given increasing levels of access to state power. Figure 4 presents the results, which indicate that increasing lowland indigenous populations’ access to power—even when we consider that these groups’ tend to be apprehensive to policy solutions that run through the state—would increase their position on the *Programmatic Index* from an estimated 5.0 to a 5.3 value. Although the data available do not allow us to reach firm conclusions, it does seem that lowland indigenous groups’ more limited support for greater state involvement derives, at least in part, from their limited access to, and thus leverage over, that state.

Trust in the State In this final section, I turn to the central mechanism that I argue drives the relationship between access to state power and programmatic differentiation: state trust. I propose that meaningful changes in access to state power matter for programmatic differentiation because they transform ethnoracial groups’ levels of trust in the state and, in so doing, facilitate programmatic differentiation across groups. As historically-excluded groups gain access to state power, their trust in the state increases, and they become more willing to favor state-centric policy solutions to their issues. In contrast, for the historically-advantaged, a loss of power erodes trust in that state.

Figure 4 Predicted Effects: Access to Power and Programmatic Index for Lowland Indigenous in Bolivia




Note: The figure plots predicted effects of *Access to State Power* on *Programmatic Index* among lowland indigenous in Bolivia. Shaded area represents 95 percent confidence intervals.

Recognizing that the state is now less likely to act on their behalf, they become more apprehensive of greater state involvement and policies that would benefit out-groups.

Focusing on trust, I examine whether 2006—the year that the MAS-IPSP rose to power in Bolivia—represented a juncture in ethnoracial groups’ trust in the state. My expectation is that the shift in state-society relations was accompanied by a transformation in ethnoracial groups’ perceptions of, and trust in, the state. For indigenous populations that found themselves in power for the first time, 2006 and the subsequent years of MAS-IPSP governance represented nothing short of a seismic change. This victory involved not only unprecedented descriptive representation, but also the promise of substantive representation, of having an ally that they could trust, rather than an antagonist, in the state. The experience was different for the non-indigenous, who viewed the rise of the MAS-IPSP with skepticism and, even though they remained junior partners, could no longer trust the state to act in their interest. These dynamics, I posit, should be associated with a transformation in trust levels across ethnoracial groups.

To evaluate this, I analyze ethnoracial groups’ trust in state institutions directly tasked with representing interests and devising social policies. I create a composite variable, *State Institutions*, averaging responses to a question about level of trust (“to what extent do you trust [...]”) in the legislature and the president. Responses range from not at all (1) to very much (7). Since these data are available for all survey cycles between 1998 and 2014 for Bolivia, I can consider variation in trust in representative state institutions both before and after the rise of MAS-IPSP.

Figure 5 Ethnoracial Groups and Trust in Representative State Institutions



Note: The figure plots indigenous coefficient estimates for trust in state institutions in Bolivia by year (with RSE). Bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 5 presents the results. The graph plots the coefficient of interest—highland indigenous—from a multivariate analysis assessing trust in state institutions by ethnoracial group for each survey year. The dashed line marks the 2006 shift in state-society relations in Bolivia. The analyses illustrate the significant transformation in ethnoracial groups’ trust in the state. Whereas between 1998 and 2006, indigenous populations’ trust in state institutions was significantly lower than their non-indigenous counterparts, after 2006 this relationship flipped and indigenous populations became more trusting of that state both relative to their non-indigenous counterparts and their pre-2006 views. This dynamic is reflected in the coefficient plot, which illustrates the shift from statistically significant negative trust coefficients to positive ones after indigenous populations gained access to state power. Gaining access to state power fundamentally transformed ethnoracial groups’ perceptions of, and trust in, the Bolivian state. In so doing, it enabled groups to adjust their views on programmatic preferences that run through the state. Differences between the in-group and out-group came into sharper focus and enabled ethnoracialized programmatic differentiation.

Conclusion

This study shows that meaningful changes in ethnoracial groups’ access to state power drive programmatic differentiation on state-centric policies across groups. Gaining or losing access to state power fundamentally disrupts calculations by altering groups’ trust in the state and increasing or decreasing their willingness to support greater state

involvement in social policies. As groups adjust their preferences to the new context, ethnoracialized programmatic differentiation becomes more likely. By contrast, where patterns of access to state power remain stable, systematic programmatic differentiation across ethnoracial groups is less likely, regardless of whether or not these societies are characterized by sharp between-group inequalities, salient ethnoracial identities, or significant organizational capacity among excluded sectors.

This argument offers a framework for understanding the link between ethnoracial identities and policy preferences across a wide range of contexts, from Latin America to the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa. Scholarship on race and ethnic politics has tended to develop within regional vacuums, often generating contradicting results and expectations, leading subfields to work under different assumptions and pursue fundamentally different questions. By sharpening the focus on the state as a central *loci* of identity formation and group differentiation, and bringing attention to the understudied role that state perceptions play in shaping political behavior, this study offers a promising foundation for finding a common thread that can account for cross-regional variation. This study's findings suggest, for instance, that the significant levels of programmatic differentiation across ethnoracial groups in the United States may be explained not just by pervasive between-group inequalities, but also by historical moments where meaningful changes in ethnoracial groups' access to state power have enabled increased programmatic coherence and polarization.⁷⁷ Similarly, limited levels of ethnoracialized programmatic differentiation in African states may be due, at least in part, to group-based perceptions of the state that limit state trust among disadvantaged groups. The significant differences in ethnic and racial groups' experiences with the state across the globe offer opportunities for expanding and deepening our understanding of ethnoracialized political behavior.

The findings of this study also reveal insights for a growing body of scholarship on state trust and welfare policy preferences. Recent scholarship has found support for redistributive policies to be conditional on citizens' expectations of the state; where poor citizens have diminished expectations of state capacity or willingness to redistribute, their support for redistributive policies decreases.⁷⁸ The mechanism proposed in the present study similarly highlights how perceptions of the state condition attitudinal outcomes. The findings suggest that meaningful changes in access to state power may provide a potential pathway out of the puzzle of diminished expectations. Meaningful increases in access to state power may drive groups to reassess their relationship to the state and update policy preferences accordingly. Greater programmatic differentiation among socioeconomic groups in Latin America and elsewhere may indeed increase with redistributions of state power.

A state-centric approach to studies of ethnoracial political behavior also opens important avenues for future research that examines the mechanisms at play driving ethnoracial programmatic differentiation for issue dimensions that vary in levels of state-centricity. The findings of this study suggest that a lack of programmatic differentiation need not imply the absence of ethnoracialized programmatic preferences in society, but rather the filtering of preferences through views of the state. Future studies

can incorporate perceptions of the state as a mediating mechanism shaping preferences and extend these insights to consider their implications for political behavior.

Finally, the insights of this study may prove particularly relevant for examining preferences in contexts where between-group inequalities among ethnoracial groups have historically structured state-society relations. They may be less applicable to those settings where ethnoracial identities have been tangential to processes of state- and nation-building—where the material foundations for programmatic differentiation along ethnoracial lines are likely absent—or where ethnoracial groups are pushing for autonomy or independence. Groups have to recognize themselves as part of the state to be willing to find policy solutions that run through that state, rather than outside of it.

NOTES

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71. Both measures have advantages and disadvantages. Questions about self-identification vary in their availability and wording across surveys and countries. This generates some uncertainty in the interpretation of results, since responses to these questions are sensitive to question wording, response choice, and policy

changes (see Telles). This categorization also tends to bundle all indigenous groups into a single category, limiting analyses aimed at differentiating between the experiences of distinct ethnic groups. Moreover, self-identification includes the *mestizo* category which, given the region's history of nation-building based on *mestizaje*, can significantly confound responses. The historical tendency has been for respondents to identify as *mestizo* regardless of whether they identify with an ethnic community (see Marisol de la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919–1991* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000)).

The language variable, for its part, is limited in that it provides an imprecise measure of ethnoracial identities. In this categorization, the many who identify as belonging to an indigenous group but that do not speak an indigenous language get classified as native Spanish-speakers and excluded from the “indigenous” category.

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76. Assets include items like television, cell phone, refrigerator, running water, and motorcycle. I identified items included across all survey years and constructed a composite measure that weighs more heavily those assets that are rarer.

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APPENDIX

Table A1 LAPOP Survey Data: Observations Available by Country and Year

Country	2008	2010	2012
Bolivia	3003	3018	3029
Ecuador	3000	2999	1500
Peru	1500	1500	1500

Table A2 LAPOP Survey Data: Observations by Country, Year, and Question

	Survey Year	Country	Industry	Wellbeing	Jobs	Redistribution
1	2008	Bolivia	2825	2910	2923	2911
2	2008	Ecuador	2863	2900	2918	2899
3	2008	Peru	1454	1472	1470	1454
4	2010	Bolivia	2901	2941	2945	2919
5	2010	Ecuador	2886	2962	2966	2951
6	2010	Peru	1456	1471	1476	1470
7	2012	Bolivia	2882	2963	2972	2935
8	2012	Ecuador	1438	1466	1482	1458
9	2012	Peru	1454	1478	1482	1478

Table A3 Programmatic Index: LAPOP Survey Questions

Variable	Question	Scale
Industry	The state, instead of the private sector, should be the owner of the most important industries in the country. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this phrase? (<i>ros1</i>)	1-7, strongly disagree to strongly agree
Wellbeing	The state, more than individuals, should be the primary responsible for ensuring the wellbeing of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this phrase? (<i>ros2</i>)	1-7, strongly disagree to strongly agree
Employment	The state, more than private enterprise, should be the main actor responsible for generating employment. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this phrase? (<i>ros3</i>)	1-7, strongly disagree to strongly agree
Redistribution	The state should implement firm policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this phrase? (<i>ros4</i>)	1-7, strongly disagree to strongly agree

Table A4 Programmatic Preferences: Survey Means by Country

	Bolivia	Peru	Ecuador
Programmatic Index	5.29	5.31	5.24
Industry	4.62	4.55	4.08
Wellbeing	5.46	5.41	5.55
Employment	5.65	5.61	5.72
Redistribution	5.44	5.66	5.60

Table A5 Ethnoracial Identity and Preferences for Programmatic Index

	Model 1A	Model 1B	Model 2A	Model 2B	Model 3A	Model 3B
Black	-0.212** (0.068)		-0.167* (0.069)		-0.118 (0.069)	
Mestizo	-0.218*** (0.035)		-0.171*** (0.036)		-0.134*** (0.036)	
Other (Self-ID)	-0.242 (0.141)		-0.217 (0.141)		-0.184 (0.141)	
White	-0.312*** (0.048)		-0.243*** (0.049)		-0.199*** (0.049)	
Other (native 1.)		-0.357* (0.177)		-0.332 (0.176)		-0.289 (0.173)
Spanish		-0.219*** (0.030)		-0.164*** (0.032)		-0.146*** (0.032)
Assets			-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Education			0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Male			0.043* (0.020)	0.046* (0.021)	0.032 (0.020)	0.036 (0.021)
Large City			0.044 (0.031)	0.023 (0.033)	0.062* (0.031)	0.042 (0.033)
Medium City			0.017 (0.030)	-0.024 (0.031)	0.036 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.031)
Rural Area			0.093** (0.029)	0.088** (0.030)	0.097*** (0.029)	0.092** (0.030)
Small City			0.028 (0.037)	0.038 (0.038)	0.029 (0.037)	0.039 (0.038)
Govt. Approval					0.179*** (0.015)	0.171*** (0.016)
Constant	5.506*** (0.034)	5.571*** (0.031)	5.430*** (0.046)	5.506*** (0.045)	5.376*** (0.047)	5.470*** (0.045)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	19219	16861	19177	16821	19004	16663

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

Table A6 Ethnoracial Identity and Preferences for Programmatic Index in Bolivia

	Model 1A	Model 1B	Model 2A	Model 2B	Model 3A	Model 3B
Black	-0.438* (0.209)		-0.311 (0.216)		-0.194 (0.205)	
Mestizo	-0.299*** (0.039)		-0.201*** (0.041)		-0.119** (0.041)	
Other (Self-ID)	-0.569** (0.179)		-0.457* (0.178)		-0.366* (0.175)	
White	-0.515*** (0.068)		-0.353*** (0.070)		-0.215** (0.071)	
Other (native l.)		-0.455* (0.189)		-0.387* (0.187)		-0.256 (0.184)
Spanish		-0.363*** (0.033)		-0.271*** (0.036)		-0.183*** (0.036)
Assets			-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Education			0.005 (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.009* (0.004)
Male			0.071* (0.030)	0.066* (0.029)	0.052 (0.029)	0.049 (0.029)
Large City			0.149* (0.066)	0.101 (0.065)	0.192** (0.065)	0.157* (0.064)
Medium City			-0.079 (0.042)	-0.079 (0.042)	-0.028 (0.042)	-0.030 (0.041)
Rural Area			0.221*** (0.041)	0.205*** (0.041)	0.216*** (0.041)	0.204*** (0.040)
Small City			-0.016 (0.050)	0.016 (0.049)	0.001 (0.049)	0.027 (0.047)
Govt. Approval					0.316*** (0.022)	0.308*** (0.022)
Constant	5.708*** (0.039)	5.718*** (0.034)	5.586*** (0.060)	5.591*** (0.057)	5.405*** (0.061)	5.424*** (0.058)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	8092	8343	8073	8325	8002	8250

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

Table A7 Ethnoracial Identity and Preferences for Programmatic Index in Peru

	Model 1A	Model 1B	Model 2A	Model 2B	Model 3A	Model 3B
Black	-0.152 (0.127)		-0.144 (0.128)		-0.145 (0.129)	
Mestizo	-0.069 (0.085)		-0.057 (0.085)		-0.057 (0.086)	
Other (Self-ID)	-0.113 (0.228)		-0.078 (0.231)		-0.077 (0.231)	
White	-0.198* (0.100)		-0.163 (0.101)		-0.161 (0.102)	
Spanish		-0.028 (0.057)		-0.017 (0.060)		-0.012 (0.060)
Assets			-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Education			0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.0002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.005)
Male			0.038 (0.037)	0.048 (0.037)	0.038 (0.038)	0.049 (0.037)
Large City			-0.033 (0.051)	-0.019 (0.051)	-0.034 (0.052)	-0.020 (0.051)
Medium City			0.021 (0.057)	0.019 (0.056)	0.021 (0.057)	0.021 (0.056)
Rural Area			-0.129* (0.055)	-0.117* (0.055)	-0.122* (0.056)	-0.112* (0.056)
Small City			-0.004 (0.070)	0.016 (0.068)	0.004 (0.070)	0.023 (0.069)
Govt. Approval					-0.057 (0.031)	-0.062* (0.031)
Constant	5.458*** (0.086)	5.399*** (0.061)	5.541*** (0.109)	5.460*** (0.088)	5.532*** (0.110)	5.443*** (0.089)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4168	4276	4167	4274	4112	4216

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

Table A8 Ethnoracial Identity and Preferences for Programmatic Index in Ecuador

	Model 1A	Model 1B	Model 2A	Model 2B	Model 3A	Model 3B
Black	0.076 (0.130)		0.092 (0.132)		0.100 (0.131)	
Mestizo	0.005 (0.107)		0.036 (0.108)		0.028 (0.107)	
Other (Self-ID)	0.435 (0.444)		0.420 (0.437)		0.407 (0.448)	
White	0.021 (0.120)		0.050 (0.122)		0.043 (0.121)	
Assets			-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Education			0.010* (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	0.010* (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)
Male			0.027 (0.035)	0.016 (0.042)	0.017 (0.034)	0.008 (0.041)
Large City			0.114* (0.054)	0.089 (0.065)	0.126* (0.053)	0.095 (0.065)
Medium City			0.169** (0.064)	0.128 (0.081)	0.189** (0.064)	0.147 (0.080)
Rural Area			0.168** (0.058)	0.215** (0.070)	0.156** (0.058)	0.194** (0.069)
Small City			0.170* (0.078)	0.213* (0.100)	0.151* (0.077)	0.192 (0.098)
Govt. Approval					0.241*** (0.027)	0.232*** (0.033)
Other (native l.)		-0.058 (0.329)		-0.077 (0.349)		0.048 (0.291)
Spanish		0.092 (0.206)		0.165 (0.210)		0.139 (0.211)
Constant	5.081*** (0.107)	5.282*** (0.204)	4.914*** (0.123)	5.120*** (0.219)	4.831*** (0.123)	5.061*** (0.220)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	6959	4242	6937	4222	6890	4197

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

Table A9 Ethnoracial Identity and Programmatic Index in Bolivia

	Model 1B	Model 2B	Model 3B
Lowland Indigenous	-0.455 [*] (0.189)	-0.387 [*] (0.187)	-0.256 (0.184)
Spanish	-0.363 ^{***} (0.033)	-0.271 ^{***} (0.036)	-0.183 ^{***} (0.036)
Assets		-0.004 ^{***} (0.001)	-0.003 ^{**} (0.001)
Education		0.008 [*] (0.004)	0.009 [*] (0.004)
Male		0.066 [*] (0.029)	0.049 (0.029)
Large City		0.101 (0.065)	0.157 [*] (0.064)
Medium City		-0.079 (0.042)	-0.030 (0.041)
Rural Area		0.205 ^{***} (0.041)	0.204 ^{***} (0.040)
Small City		0.016 (0.049)	0.027 (0.047)
Govt. Approval			0.308 ^{***} (0.022)
Constant	5.718 ^{***} (0.034)	5.591 ^{***} (0.057)	5.424 ^{***} (0.058)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	8343	8325	8250

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

Table A10 Ethnoracial Identities and Trust in Representative Institutions in Bolivia, 1998–2014

	1998	2000	2002	Trust in Representative Institutions					
				2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
High. Indigenous	-0.443*** (0.060)	-0.383*** (0.068)	-0.373*** (0.068)	-0.224** (0.088)	0.042 (0.071)	0.562*** (0.085)	0.504*** (0.077)	0.385*** (0.084)	0.183** (0.075)
Assets	0.005** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.003** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.004*** (0.001)
Urban	-0.381*** (0.067)	-0.236*** (0.073)	-0.384*** (0.076)	-0.121 (0.081)	-0.165** (0.069)	-0.074 (0.082)	-0.127* (0.068)	-0.290*** (0.074)	-0.397*** (0.070)
Education	-0.012* (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.0002 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.032*** (0.008)	-0.027*** (0.008)
Male	0.306*** (0.058)	0.140** (0.062)	0.126** (0.063)	0.033 (0.065)	-0.003 (0.059)	0.117* (0.066)	0.144** (0.063)	0.125* (0.064)	0.089 (0.060)
Constant	3.669*** (0.083)	3.157*** (0.096)	3.916*** (0.096)	3.733*** (0.114)	4.547*** (0.094)	4.234*** (0.104)	4.711*** (0.098)	4.233*** (0.100)	4.769*** (0.106)
Observations	3,122	2,731	2,827	2,891	2,686	2,678	2,735	2,636	2,879

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

1 Disaggregating the Programmatic Index


Figure 1A probes the association between ethnoracial identities and disaggregated programmatic preferences by country. This helps consider whether the strong association between these variables in Bolivia, and/or their weak association in Peru and Ecuador, are driven by a particular issue dimension. The figure presents the results of the analyses disaggregating the *Programmatic Index* into its four issue dimensions—Industry, Well-being, Employment, and Redistribution—to evaluate individual preferences for state involvement in these four key areas. As with the analyses included in the main text, I implement these regressions at the country level with year-fixed effects. Figure 1A displays coefficients for white and *mestizo* populations, with indigenous as the reference category. For the three countries, the results are largely consistent with those observed in Figure 1 in the manuscript.

Looking first at Bolivia, indigenous populations consistently support greater state involvement than their white and *mestizo* counterparts. This association is statistically significant across three of the four dimensions—industry, employment, and redistribution—and, interestingly, holds for both white and *mestizo* populations, despite the ill-defined boundaries between indigenous and *mestizo* categories in Andean societies.

Turning to Ecuador, we observe that the association between ethnoracial identity and programmatic preferences is weak and does not achieve statistical significance along any of the four dimensions. Interestingly, the direction of the association varies across dimensions and across ethnoracial groups within some dimensions. Whereas in the Industry dimension, indigenous populations lean towards being more supportive of state involvement than their counterparts, in two other dimensions—Wellbeing and Employment—indigenous population seem to lean towards being less supportive of greater state involvement than *mestizos* and whites. On the redistribution dimension, also curiously, the indigenous seem to be positioned somewhere in between the white and *mestizo* groups, with a negative (though again not statistically significant) coefficient for white populations and a positive one for *mestizos*.

Like in Ecuador, in Peru, the relationship between ethnoracial identities and programmatic preferences fails to achieve statistical significance across all four dimensions and for both whites and *mestizos* across these dimensions. However, there are some interesting differences between the two countries. First, ethnoracial preferences, while not achieving statistical significance, nonetheless seem more solidly defined along the Industry and Redistribution dimensions. In both of these, coefficients are negative and come close to reaching statistical significance particularly vis-à-vis white populations. Second, along the Wellbeing and Employment dimensions, the association points in different directions for the two ethnoracial groups, with coefficients leaning negative for white populations and positive for *mestizo* ones.

Figure A1 Ethnoracial Identities and Disaggregated Programmatic Preferences in the Andes



The figure plots ethnoracial identity coefficient estimates (using self-identification measures) based on a multivariate analysis using a generalized linear model with year-fixed effects and appropriate survey weights to assess preferences on the sub-dimensions of the Programmatic Index. The figure includes robust standard errors. Bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.