Cognitive and Behavioral Variations within the Collectivistic Cultural Sphere: Comparing Japanese and Koreans' Self/Other Views and the Influence on Emotion Processing

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Abstract

Cross-cultural psychology research often incorporates a division of East and West, contrasting people in East-Asian collectivistic and Western individualistic cultures. However, the extent of such trait should differ within the individualistic or collectivistic group, and looking into behavioral variations occurring within the individual or collectivistic cultural sphere is also very important for the cross-cultural research. To contribute to this purpose, this article compares people from Japan and South Korea based on literature review to reveal how culture influence people's views on themselves and others, as well as communication styles. Further, the article discusses how those views and communication styles form Japanese and Korean's emotional experiences. First, the article starts from contrasting two countries in terms of geography, history, language, and belief, to outline how these factors have shaped the two cultures. Second, the Japanese and Korean views of self and others are described, and the communication styles of the two cultures are compared. Third, emotional experiences of collectivistic individuals, including Japanese and Korean, are contrasted with those of individualistic people, mainly westerners. Finally, the cultural differences between Japanese and Korean are described.

Part I. Japanese and Koreans' Self/Other Views and Communication Styles

Cross-cultural psychology research often incorporates a division of East and West, contrasting people in East-Asian collectivistic and Western individualistic cultures (Kitayama et al., 2009; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Mesquita, 2001). The tendency towards individualism or collectivism is typically seen as a type of social pattern that relates to how individuals view themselves and interact with others. The individualistic society is a unit of loosely linked individuals who view themselves as independent and unique. According to Triandis (1995), those individuals are primarily motivated by their own preferences, needs, and rights, and prioritize their personal goals over the goals of others. They also tend to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of their interpersonal relationship pragmatically. This contrasts with the collectivistic society, which is a unit of closely linked individuals who understand themselves as parts of a collective (family, co-workers, tribe, nation). Collectivistic individuals are primarily motivated by group norms and collectivistic duties. They are willing to prioritize group goals over their own personal goals (Triandis, 1995).

In the last several decades, numerous cross-cultural studies compared these two groups and revealed contrasting behavioral tendencies among people in the world. Importantly, much research has focused on groups of people belonging to either of the individualism/collectivism categorical divisions, meaning that targeted countries are often geographically separated significantly, such as Japan and the US. In comparison, however, it is still relatively rare to find research comparing people within the collectivistic or individualistic group, in other words, comparing people who live relatively close to each other. The levels and characteristics of individualism/collectivism should still differ among the countries that are categorized as either (e.g., Latin American collectivism and Asian collectivism are different, as in Smith et al., 2023), and this variation, as well as other cultural factors, such as language, history, and religious belief in each country, would create distinct behaviors within the nation (also see the following articles for criticisms for the West-individualism/Asia-collectivism dichotomy, Oyserman et al., 2002; Takano & Osaka, 1999; Vignoles et al., 2016). In order to be the example of a study comparing two cultures in a collectivistic cultural sphere, this article contrasts people from Japan and South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea/Korean) based on a literature review. The article attempted to attribute the behavioral differences of the two groups of people not only to established cultural dimensions such as individualism/collectivism but also to other cultural factors such as history and geography. This attempt is, however, challenging because empirical research directly comparing Japan and Korea is scarce. Thus, this review includes numerous unverified hypotheses on a quantitative basis to take an exploratory approach, hoping that the contents encourage many researchers to conduct empirical research in the future.

Focusing on within-group variations enables researchers to compare cultures while controlling certain factors. For example, people's ethnicity, general lifestyles, as well as the countries' political structures are very similar between Japan and Korea. So, researchers

can attribute behavioral variations to other cultural factors, such as history and religion, for example. Such examinations help reveal how the measurable aspects of culture (often using cultural dimensions) manifest. Distant countries tend to differ in the extent of cultural dimensions, but other aspects of culture, such as language and belief, also tend to differ greatly, therefore, it is difficult to pinpoint how the dimensional differences emerged. By reducing the distance and examining neighboring countries with several objective similarities the source of such dimensional differences may be easier to find.

Comparing close countries enhances the applicability of the research findings to people's lives. What is revealed in cross-cultural psychology research is especially useful for people who move or travel to other cultures. People are more likely to move to relatively close countries than more distant lands. Indeed, in the case of Japan, the largest number of immigrants come from China, Vietnam, and Korea (Statistics Bureau of Japan, n.d.). In real life, a significantly greater number of cross-cultural contacts occur within the collectivistic/individualistic sphere than across. An article like this can inform culturally specific behaviors of people in close neighbourhoods to aid immigrants/migrants adjusting to their new cultures.

This article has two parts. The first part focuses on how Japanese and Koreans view themselves and others, and how they communicate with each other. The second part discusses how those views and communication styles influence Japanese and Korean's emotional experiences. The article starts by contrasting the two countries in terms of geography, history, language, and beliefs to outline how these factors have shaped the two cultures. Next, the Japanese and Korean views of self and others are described, and the communication styles of the two cultures are compared. In the second part, the emotional experiences of collectivistic individuals, including Japanese and Koreans, are contrasted with those of individualistic people, mainly Westerners. Then, the cultural differences between Japanese and Koreans are described.

This article aims to describe the general tendencies of the two groups of people, and none of the studies introduced here focused on the individual-level trait differences between Japanese and Koreans.

Contrasting Japan and Korea in Terms of Geography, History, Language, and Belief

Geography and History

Figure 1 summarizes various statistics from Japan and Korea. Japan is an island country stretching approximately 3,500 km from north to south, occupying about 378,000 square kilometers. As of 2022, the Japanese population is approximately 125 million (Statistics Bureau of Japan, n.d.). The Korean peninsula borders China and Russia in the north, with the Sea of Japan (East Sea) to the east, the Korea Strait to the south, and the Yellow Sea to the west. It stretches 1,000 km from north to south, with the entire territory being 100,200 square kilometers. Japan and the southern tip of the Korean peninsula are approximately 50 kilometers apart at their closest points. The peninsula is divided into North and South

Figure 1.
Statistics of Japan and Korea
Sources: [1]Statistics Bureau of Japan, [2]Korean Statical Information Service, [3]Agency for Cultural Affairs (Japan), [4]Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, [5]Traiding Economics

	Japan	Korea
Area[1,2]	378,000 km[2]	100,200 km[2]
Population[1,2]	125 million	51.8 million
Capital	Tokyo	Seoul
Language	Japanese	Korean
Religion[2,3]	Buddhism 30% Shinto 3% Christianity 1% Non-religious 62%	Christianity 30% Buddhism 15.5% Non-religious 56.1%
Immigrants at 2021[4]	410,000 Koreans	41,238 Japanese
GDP[5] (2022)	4231.14 billion US dollars	1665.25 billion US dollars
Export share with each other[5] (2022)	7.3% of export and 3.7% of import are shared with Korea	4.7% of export and 9% of import are shared with Japan

Korea near the 38th parallel north, with South Korea being about 45% of the whole, around one-quarter the size of Japan (Song, 2005). The population of South Korea is around 51.8 million (Korean Statical Information Service, n.d.).

The close proximity of both nations to each other and to the major regional power of China has had huge influences on interactions, both peaceful and hostile. Korea's peninsula location has made it vulnerable from land and sea, and it has suffered foreign incursions an estimated 960 times in the past 2000 years, nearly always by China or Japan. Between 1910 and 1945, the entire peninsula was annexed by Imperial Japan. Chinese dynasties had varying relations with Korea, from cooperative to belligerent, and Korea was subjugated on several occasions, notably by the Mongol Yuan dynasty, while the People's Republic of China was heavily involved in the Korean War (1950-1953) and supported the northern regime. In contrast, the island country of Japan has experienced many fewer foreign invasions than Korea, with only the two attempted Mongol invasions in the 13th century and the Allied occupation following World War II being of any real importance.

Significant cultural change came to Japan in the late 19th century with the Meiji Restoration (1868), when the last Shogun yielded power to the modernizing Emperor Meiji. Within a very short space of time, Japan went from being a pre-industrial, feudal society to a rapidly developing modern nation. This brought significant political and social change as Japan struggled to become an imperial power on the level of Russia, the USA, Britain, France, and Germany. The country readily adopted Western ideologies, technologies, military structures, and economic systems of the time. The influence of the West became even stronger after the defeat of Imperial Japan in World War II, and the country's recovery path was hugely influenced by the US.

Korea's recent history since the Japanese occupation has been extremely tumultuous. The three years of bloody war not only caused enormous despair for the citizens who lost their families but also resulted in recurring political and social divisions. South Korea's domestic political scene diverged from the democratic ideal from the 1960s, and the conflict between militaristic dictatorships and democratic movements continued until the end of the 1980s. The conflict led to several military coups and protest activities, resulting in many citizens being killed or imprisoned. A notable example is the Gwangju Massacre in 1980, in which the lives of 2,000 protesters were lost. Despite the severe oppression, Korean citizens managed to correct the unfair presidential election system in 1987 to start the path of peaceful democratization. Along with obtaining political and social stability, South Korea achieved rapid economic development to be recognized as one of the significant financial powers in the world.

The languages

There are approximately 129 million Japanese speakers and 78 million Korean speakers globally (SIL, n.d.). Linguistically, Japanese and Korean are separated into the Japonic and Koreanic language families respectively, with the level of relatedness of the two languages remaining unclear. Some linguists argue that both languages are likely part of the Altaic language family, represented by Turkic, Mongolian, and Tungusic, predominantly spoken in Central Asia, and most likely spread by migratory pastoralists four millennia ago (Shiratori, 1914; Pope, 1960, both cited in Blažek et al. 2019). While this implies that the two languages have a common origin (e.g., Unger, 2009; Vovin, 2009; Whitman, 2012), this remains a matter of debate (Kim & Kang, 2019). An alternative theory of origin sets the Altaic birthplace as southern Siberia some seven thousand years ago and sees Japanese and Korean as only very distantly related (Starostin, 2016). Other researchers argue that Japan's location on the Pacific allowed for Austronesian linguistic influences that would have been unique to Japanese and not shared by Korean (e.g., Maher, 1996; Sakiyama, 1996).

The extent of paleo linguistic relatedness of the languages of Japan and Korea remains unclear, but they indeed share a significant amount of vocabulary and syntax. Many of the words shared by the two languages tend to be loan words of Chinese origin due to the significant influence of their giant neighbor, although neither language is related to Chinese linguistically (Song, 2005).

Syntax of both languages is characterized by the subject-verb-object style, the absence of articles, conjunctions, relative pronouns, and singular-plural noun forms, as well

as the presence of modifiers before nouns. Another commonality is the use of a copula, a word or phrase that links the subject of a sentence to a subject complement at the end of each sentence (e.g., da, desu in Japanese and ida in Korean) (Song, 2005; Tujimura, 2014).

Japanese and Korean do not sound very similar, and although both languages use syllabaries (characters depicting consonant and vowel combinations), the scripts are unrelated. Korean has greater variations of vowels and consonants than Japanese. Korea uses Hangul, which was created by a Korean monarch and has been used since 1446. Japanese also uses its own characters called Kana, dated to the 9th century, and supplements those with Chinese characters called kanji (Song, 2005; Tujimura, 2014).

Religion

Japan has two principal religions, **Buddhism and Shintoism**. Buddhism arrived from China around the sixth century CE, and Shintoism, viewed as the indigenous Japanese religion, derived from the shamanic religions of East Asia. Japanese Buddhism developed its unique style because it was already mixed with other religious and philosophical teachings, such as Hindi and Jainism from India and Daoism in China when the concept arrived on the island (Kumoi, 1974). In Japan, about 62% identify as non-religious, of the remainder about 30% are Buddhist, 3% are Shinto. Importantly, these two are not mutually exclusive and are often practiced simultaneously. Christianity is followed by about 1% (Agency for Cultural Affairs, 2021). The religious makeup of Korea is very different. Closer to 30% of Koreans are Christian as of 2015 (Korean Statistical Information Service, n.d.), rising rapidly from just 2% at the end of World War II. Approximately 15% are Buddhist, with more than half of the country declaring no religion. Notably, Korean culture has been much more receptive to Christianity than Japan. It might relate to the practical function of churches as a place of gathering after the Korean War, providing support for people who lost their families.

Confucianism. Confucian philosophy has an immense influence on East Asian cultures. Between the modern Japanese and Korean cultures, its influence is much more evident for the latter; thus, it is one of the key aspects to differentiate the two. The authors recommend the following video for readers who are new to Confucianism. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PG-XUE0CyQk

Confucianism is the semi-religious, political philosophy proposed by the Chinese scholar Kung Fuzi (c. 551 – c. 479 BCE), Latinized as Confucius, which became the dominant socio-political philosophy in China after it was embraced by the Han dynasty of the second century BCE (Lin, 2012). Confucianism strongly contributed to the dynasty's stability by emphasizing the necessity of centralized government and diplomacy (Saso, 2009).

Confucianism has four key pillars. Ren, often translated as humaneness, encourages compassion, and can be described as taking no action against others one would not wish to have taken against oneself. Li is rites, doing things in the proper and established way. Zhong is loyalty, with the expectation of reciprocity from those to whom the loyalty is given. Xiao, filial piety, signifies respect for all social hierarchies, principally the family and the ancestors, but also in broader society. The impact of the tenets can be seen as coalescing into three main themes: education, family, and ritual (Yao & Yao, 2000).

Confucius argued that widespread education about society's needs was the only path to social stability. This was not only formal education but creating a culture in which learning was seen as helpful to the whole, not just a way for personal advancement. Having an educated and content populace would lead to both social progress and political stability (Yao & Yao, 2000).

The family is one of the most important factors in creating a stable background. Under the Confucian principle, all positions are part of a fixed hierarchy ranked towards maleness and age. Consequently, the father is the head of the family, with the wife or eldest son being next, depending on the child's age. Each person within the hierarchy has privileges and obligations, providing and receiving support. It is the parents' duty to care for their children, and in return, the child is obliged to show filial piety, the proper respect for the elders. This model not only applies to familial relationships but is extended to the state as a whole, with the monarch being the father of the nation. A monarch who behaves properly will be respected by his subjects, who will show deference accordingly (Slingerland, 2003). The Confucianism-based hierarchy creates unique reciprocal relationships among people, which is reciprocally obligatory (Yum, 1988). One being of higher status in the hierarchy must be obliged to take care of lower-status group members, and at the same time, the lower-status members are indebted to those of higher-status. Parents are obliged to look after their children no matter what, while the children are forever indebted to their parents and required to behave in accordance with their parents' wishes. Importantly, all relationships are governed by Ren (humanness); thus, such obligations do not create business-like contractual interactions. Instead, people embrace merciful and supportive connections within their social group (Yum, 1988).

Ritual is the importance of doing things in the proper and accepted way. This enabled everyone to know what was expected of them and ensured a smoothly running society. This covers multiple aspects of the culture, from commerce to interpersonal greetings and mealtime etiquette. Any infractions were clear, and punishments were known to all and recognized as just (Slingerland, 2003; Yu, 2007).

In order to secure a centralized seat of control and break away from the regional power of feudal lords, China employed a single civil service at the imperial court around the sixth century CE. Entry into the civil service was via an exam based on knowledge of Confucian writings (Bell, 2016). Due to the strong influence of China, the Korean government adopted the civil service exam around the tenth century CE (Koh, 1996). In contrast, Confucianism was not as deeply rooted in Japanese culture. One reason is the Japanese social system in the Middle Ages (Makizumi, 2016). Although Japan would embrace some of the elements of the civil service, the Shogunate's roots as a martial power necessitated maintaining an essentially feudal system of regional warlords swearing personal fealty, which would continue until the Meiji restoration in 1868. Having such a social structure, Confucian teaching could not be deeply embedded in Japanese culture, and its influence on most people was limited to some daily etiquette, such as respecting the older generation (Makizumi, 2016). The varied emphasis on Confucianism in society is one of the key factors explaining cultural differences between Japan and Korea.

Although the degree of Confucian influence differs among East Asian countries, the philosophy may, nonetheless, be a crucial factor for the unique characteristics of East Asian cultures, distinct from the West. Some researchers argued that socio-economic development enhances people's intrinsic desire for more individual freedom in every society, which consequently leads any culture to take a uniform modernization process as happened in Western countries in the modern era (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2013). Contrary to this notion, the socio-economic development influenced by the increasing focus on individual freedom seems to take different paths between East Asians and Westerners. East Asians' sense of individual freedom appears to incorporate Confucian values, and it contributes to the unique modernization process of East Asian countries (Akaliyski, 2023).

The following sections contrast Japanese and Korean psychology using the above-described geography, history, and language factors. This review posits that these factors somehow influence psychological processes and behaviors. Naturally, however, establishing causal relationships between those factors and human psychology is extremely difficult, and the position of this article is not empirically verified. Therefore, the causal inferences described in the following sections are mere suggestions.

Japanese and Korean Views on Self and Others

Japanese view

Japanese culture emphasizes living harmoniously with nature. This mentality is strongly related to Japan's two principal religions, Buddhism and Shintoism. Japanese Buddhism, which is heavily influenced by Indian philosophy, sees the circular existence of birth, suffering, and rebirth in all living things. Shinto is even more focused on nature, an animistic system of belief in which kami (spirits or minor gods) inhabit everything: animals, trees, and the land itself in rivers and mountains (Cali & Dougill, 2012). Nature can be benevolent and provide bountiful crops, but it can also be cruelly merciless, with Japan being on the earthquake-prone Pacific Ring of Fire and the ocean's typhoon-producing weather system. Japanese have accepted nature as something they can never control (Maebayashi, 2016). This mindset can be seen in the Japanese language, which has many specific words related to the uncontrollable aspects of life, for example, mujokan (the Buddhist concept of the impermanence of worldly things), akirame (acceptance of uncontrollable situations), and hakanasa (fragility of things without autonomy).

Japanese also value harmonious relationships with other people, especially those they regard as their in-group members. Japanese culture emphasizes discrimination between in-groups and out-groups and requires people to synchronize with their in-group members while caring about them (Lee, 2018). Japanese culture teaches people to prioritize group norms over individual needs and expects them to think and act in line with group values (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Also, people understand that violating such expectations has consequences, namely, experiencing shame. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture by Ruth Benedict (2005), originally published in 1945, is one of the most famous books about Japanese culture. It describes Japan as a "shame culture" in which how one is seen by others is a cause of anxiety. In a shame culture, being evaluated

by close others as right is more important than the subjective sense of right and wrong. In contrast, the West has a "guilt culture" in which negative feelings come from internal judgments. Transgressions in a guilt culture result in the individual assessing the nature of the action; in a shame culture, the individual has greater concern about how they are seen rather than the nature of the action itself (Lewis, 1971).

The shame emotion described by Benedict (2005) can be elicited when an individual fails to live up to the reputation of his/her group (Uskul et al., 2018) or when one disturbs group harmony (Leung & Cohen, 2011). These mental processes have been distinguished in recent years; the former concerns preserving honor, while the latter preserves face. Although receiving bad evaluations from in-group members is crucial for both processes, the former is strongly related to one's obligation fulfilment in a group (Uskul et al., 2018), while the latter is related to failed conformity to group norms (Bond & Smith, 1996). A large-scale study involving 24 nations by Smith et al. (2021) concludes that Japanese culture emphasizes face preservation.

The recent cultural trend in Japan is characterized by increased individualism (Ogihara, 2017). Modern Japan has been more individualistic than its neighbors of Korea and China, possibly due to the strong Western influence after World War II, but the tendency has been even more prominent since the 1990s. Japan experienced a severe economic downfall at the end of the 1980s, which resulted in the country's progress toward strong capitalism, and this might have contributed to an increased individualistic view of self among people. Due to the cultural shift, societies require people to take responsibility for themselves rather than relying on others' support. However, the traditional collectivistic value is still strong, so belonging to social groups and behaving as expected by other group members is still very important. In this complex cultural trend, many young people have failed to find a comfortable place in society (Norasakkunkit & Uchida, 2011), reflected in the growing number of youths called NEET (Not engaged in Employment, Education, or Training) and hikikomori, who show an extreme degree of social isolation.

Korean view

Korean social structure is very strongly influenced by Confucian principles, emphasizing hierarchies (Cho, 2007). In the Confucian society, individuals are required to fulfill roles and obligations within the social group and are expected to stay in rigid and fixed interpersonal relationships. This contributes to cultivating a strong sense of group identity among people, and indeed, Korean culture is characterized by a sense of "we-ness" (Park & Han, 2018).

This "we" is a conscious feeling, usually shared among relatives but extended to other in-group members (Choi, 1993). It is closer and more intimate than the general sense of communality or in-group implies, and whether or not others are included determines the qualities of the interpersonal relationship. While "we" automatically includes family, the concept can be extended to include more varied members (Park & Han, 2018). "We" are treated as if they are family, and research shows Koreans tend to feel familism more easily for non-familial relations than people in other countries (Hur et al., 2016). Some argue that Koreans' kin-centered way of thinking results from their history. Because Korea was so frequently either under some level of occupation or compelled to act as a vassal, the

country's own military did not develop into a significant power. This lack of national sovereignty is considered a major factor in Korean identity. The populace feels they cannot rely on the nation for protection, and such actions must be undertaken by the people and their families (Seo et al., 2012).

The uniquely Korean concept of chulsin, literally origin or background, is identified through people's place of birth and education and plays a major role in deciding if a particular individual should be included in "we" (Inumiya, 2017). Chulsin is not a personal connection and only indicates background; however, in Korean societies, people with the same chulsin fraternize with each other to cultivate the sense of "we". Although similar fraternizations occur in Western societies, "we" can result in comparative strangers being treated as a family because they went to the same school. It is common for an employer to treat applicants from the same chulsin favorably (Park & Han, 2018).

The sense of in-group is also important in Japan, but how Japanese and Koreans construe their in-group members noticeably differ. In other words, the Korean sense of "we" is different from the Japanese "we" (Inumiya, 2009). Such familial feelings lack in Japanese "we". It is a sense of collective community and the experience resulting from shared goals and activities. Japanese also express "in-group affection", but it is often limited in the context of joint activities based on collective norms, not in a context-free manner as in family relations.

Table 1.

Summary of Japanese and Korean Views on Close Others

	How they are united with close others	What are close others like	What is required for individuals
Japan	Through common goals and shared norms	Like nature, others can be kind and supportive but can be merciless and critical.	Flexibly adapt to others in various situations.
Korea	Familial feelings	Like family members, they are merciful and supportive regardless of context. Honest communication is possible.	Knowing own place in the familial hierarchy, being loyal to and respecting superiors

Although Korean familialism must have been a major driving force for the country's growth, it also has adverse effects. South Korea reports one of the highest suicide rates in the world (WHO, n.d.). In 2019, the suicide rate was 28.6 per 100k people, compared to around 10 to 13 per 100k in the rest of the developed world. Some argue that the high suicide rate is related to Confucian-based collectivism, emphasizing individuals' obligations in society. In the case of a family relationship, for example, parents are obliged to provide for their

children, and there is a strong demand for children to meet their parents' expectations (Cho, 2007). Due to the high expectation for role fulfilment, failure leads to intense feelings of burdensomeness or loss of their social group. Such feelings of disconnection may be a major factor in suicidal ideation (Y. Park et al., 2017). Recent economic development in Korea has created a disparity of wealth and enhanced competition for high social status and financial success (Kang, 1996). This social change may also contribute to creating vulnerable Koreans who are failing to meet others' expectations.

Comparing Japan and Korea with Cultural Dimensions

The above-mentioned cultural differences between Japan and Korea are hard to quantify, so this section contrasts the two cultures more visibly using cultural dimensions. Hofstede's (1980) pioneered the concept of cultural trait dimensions. There are six dimensions: power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence. The extent of these dimensions for major countries is easily available through a website (Insights, n.d.), which scores each dimension between 0 and 100 using computer modeling. Below describes the result of individualism and masculinity of Japan and Korea (retrieved on November 19, 2021), which showed noticeable group differences.

The level of individualism, the degree of interdependence a society maintains among its members, is 46 for Japan and 18 for Korea. As a reference, the score for the US is 98, and China 20. Japan is much more individualistic than Korea. One possible cause relates to Japan's geographical features, which are likely to have contributed to heightening individuals' distinct identities. Japan's terrain of valleys, plains, bays, and lakes separated physically by mountains and hills enhanced a sense of regional distinctiveness, a key feature of its identity, until the modern world brought in easy transportation and communication. This resulted in diverse local cultures reflecting family structures, marriage customs, and inheritance practices (Yoneyama, 1976). Japan's geography also worked to limit China's influence on the country, while Korea's terrain did not afford the same protection. Among China's influences, one related to individuality might be sharing family names. The Chinese collectivistic model values large families, resulting in the Chinese sharing a surprisingly limited number of family names, having approximately 4000 for a population of 1.3 billion (Schiavenza, 2013). In comparison, the UK has around 45,000 surnames, and the US has more than 150,000. Following the Chinese way, Koreans have only 533 family names (Korean Statical Information Service, n.d.), while Japan, with a population of 126 million, has around 100,000. This much greater diversity is thought to have stemmed from a stronger sense of family independence, cultivated from a culture that ensured the sovereignty of each family (Schiavenza, 2013).

Japan's political and social experiences after WWII have also contributed to the shift of their culture towards individualism. Japan was occupied by US forces after the war, and the forces are still present in various military bases today. This strong tie to the US continuously brings individualism influences to society (Ogihara, 2017). Korea also experiences the presence of foreign forces in the country as a multi-national United Nations peacekeeping force has been based there since the Korean War. However, the extent of

US involvement in Japan seems to have a very straightforward effect. This may be because Japan has already had more individualistic tendencies than Koreans due to geographical and historical reasons. Also, the recent increase in Japanese individualism is partly driven by their political trend to strengthen capitalism.

Masculinity refers to individual motivations, such as wanting to be top dog (masculine) or being more concerned with quality of life (feminine). Japan at 95 is more masculine than Korea 39. Korea's strong femininity stands out among East Asian countries. The high femininity of Korean culture is likely to be related to Confucianism. The disciplines that emphasize filial piety, morals, and ethics are thought to enhance empathetic attitudes among people toward their kin and peers, and such attitudes may be translated to the culturally feminine tendencies that focus on quality of life (Park & Han, 2018). As mentioned before, Korea's tumultuous history since the Korean War enhanced people's devotion to their family and "we", while feelings towards their nation fulfilling its obligations as a protector waned (J. Park et al., 2017). Therefore, it may well be the case that Koreans' affection towards their family is strong compared to neighboring countries, which explains why Korea is one of the most feminine cultures in East Asia. However, the recent economic advancement in Korea has brought inevitable financial competition in society, which may change the extent of femininity in the future.

In recent years, Hofstede's six dimensions have been revised and compacted as a two-dimensional model (Minkov, 2018) consisting of the two most reliable traits, individualism-collectivism (IDV-COLL) and flexibility-monumentalism (FLX-MON, equivalent to long/short term orientation). Minkov and Kaasa (2022) state that FLX-MON dimension relates to differences in the delay of gratification, prioritization of thrift, and consistency of self. Flexible cultures value delay of gratification and emphasize self-sufficiency, while monumental societies encourage people to be generous and interdependent. Also, monumental cultural members value consistent behaviors and self-definition across different situations, while flexible people tend to change their behaviors to adapt to shifting circumstances. When the cultural dimension scores were determined based on people's subjective culture measurements (e.g., self-reported values, beliefs, ideologies, and self-construal), Japan and Korea showed fairly similar scores for the two dimensions. However, Japan was slightly more individualistic and flexible than Korea (Minkov, 2018).

Minkov (2018) found that East Asian countries, including Japan, Korea, China, and Singapore, are the most flexible nations in the world. However, Korea is relatively less flexible than Japan, which may be due to Koreans' rigid social positions within their "we" group, resulting from the influence of Confucianism. On the contrary, the Japanese sense of "we" is more context-dependent, corresponding to their extremely high level of flexibility (the highest of the 56 countries in Minkov's study).

Minkov and Kaasa (2022) measured objective culture instead of subjective culture and revealed a two-dimensional structure corresponding to IDV-COLL and FLX-MON. Objective cultural measures are statistics of social practices, such as adolescent fertility rates, homicide rates, political freedom, gender inequality, and innovation output. These measures were clustered into two-factor components: long-term orientation (corresponding to FLX-MON) and emancipation (IDV-COLL). Again, the dimensional scores for Japan and Korea

were similar, but Japan's emancipation score was clearly higher than the Korean score, confirming that Japan is more individualistic than Korea.

Japanese and Koreans' Communication Styles

Addressing self and others

The cultural differences between Japan and Korea, as described above, significantly influence how people communicate with each other. Members of collectivistic cultures respect individuals' roles and status within a social group; thus, it is important to address others appropriately in accordance with the relationship. The use of most common honorifics, equivalent of Mr. and Miss/Mrs in English, are similar in Japanese and Korean. Honorific suffixes (e.g., san, sama, and kun in Japanese, and ssi, nim, and gun in Korean) are added after the name. In both cultures, it is also common to distinguish humble and normal nouns to address someone; the English equivalent could be father or dad/papa/pas. In Korea, this distinction is more rigid and strictly determined by the social status of the addressers and addressees rather than the two types of words being flexibly used depending on the situation, most likely reflecting the rigid Confucian-based social system. For example, younger people always address older people respectfully (Cho, 2003; Han, 2002), like a son would address his father using a respectful form of the word "father" in any situation. In contrast, Japanese address the same person differently depending on the context of the addressee's role in the conversation. A son would address his father politely when he interacts with his father directly, or the father appears in a family conversation as a topic. However, when the son talks about his father to non-family members, he would call him using a modest form of "father" (Cho, 2003) because it suggests arrogance to speak highly of family members to non-relatives. In Japanese, one of the modest forms of the word father is chichi, and the honored form is Otousan, although there are many more variations for each form. It has been suspected that Japanese honorifics were developed primarily for addressing supernatural figures or natural elements for worship (Kindaichi, 2022), and their flexible use has evolved in applying them to humans (Kikuchi, 1994; Oishi, 1972). Japan's high level of flexibility in the FLX-MON cultural dimension must be related to the language characteristics.

Family member terms, such as "sister" and "uncle", are used very flexibly in Japan and Korea. When family members call each other, their familial role is often determined based on the viewpoint of the youngest person in the family. So, if a married couple has a child, the husband and wife would call each other father and mother, and they would call their parents grandmother or grandfather. Some of those kinship terms, especially uncle or aunt, are often used to address general older people. In a close relationship involving unrelated people with age differences, Koreans have a strong tendency to address each other using family terms such as "older brother (hyeong)" and "younger sibling (dongsaeng)" instead of using names (Lim et al., 2002). It is not very common among Japanese, who prefer to use names or nicknames between friends and to use job titles in business relationships. Koreans utilize those family terms to emphasize the hierarchical structure of the relationship as well as cultivate familial feelings between unrelated individuals.

The Japanese language has many more first-person terms than Korean. At least three gender-free terms and two for each gender are commonly used. Japanese also has more varieties of second-person terms than Korean (Wu, 2010). Similar to the flexible use of honorifics, Japanese people address themselves and others flexibly depending on their relationship (Hasegawa & Hirose, 2005). In contrast, Korean has only two first-person terms: one is used when the listener is younger than the speaker, and the other for the opposite situation. The first-person terms are often omitted in both languages because the subject in a sentence is easily identifiable through contexts. However, it occurs more often in Japanese than in Korean (Jung, 2001), likely due to the high-context communication tendency of Japanese (see below).

High and low context

Communication styles vary across cultures. In the 1970s, anthropologist Edward Hall proposed dividing communication styles between high and low contexts. Low context requires information to be expressly stated, while high context relies on the context of the circumstances, shared understandings, tone, and gestures (Hall, 1976). Real-world communication is not cleanly divided between the two categories, with some elements of both being found in most cultures, but generally, a culture will tend towards one or the other. Areas speaking a Germanic language, including the English-speaking world, are the major examples where the low context styles are used. Higher context styles are found in areas speaking Chinese, the Romance languages, Indian languages, Arabic, Korean, and Japanese. Importantly, Korea is considered to be lower context than Japan.

Generally, the higher-lower communication style spectrum corresponds well with the collectivism-individualism dimension, with more collectivistic cultures having a higher context. As such, Korea, having a lower context style than Japan, stands out as Japan is the more individualistic of the two. Some researchers question the definition of high- and low-context communication (Yum, 1988), while others suspect that the type of investigated communication (e.g., for business or casual interaction) influences the outcome (Thomas, 1998). Although further investigation is necessary, the strong familialism of Korean culture may be associated with the relatively low-context communication style. A low-context style is more direct, straightforward, and open than high-context, and the former should be more prominent in conversations among closely tied people, such as family. Since Koreans expand their family-like relations to unrelated others more easily than Japanese (Hur et al., 2016), their general interaction style tends to be lower context.

It has been observed that Japanese conversation involves a high level of nodding, and this reliance on non-verbal cues is seen in other high-context communication styles. Japanese use nodding extensively rather than verbal signals to show their understanding to the speakers (Kita & Ide, 2007), and those who nod a lot are perceived as good listeners (Inumiya, 2017). Also, the variation of nods is more diverse for Japanese than for Koreans (Park, 2004), suggesting that they have developed a more nuanced style of nodding to enrich their communication (Kurosaki, 1987).

Self-disclosure

Self-disclosure is any information about himself/herself that one person communicates verbally to another person (Cozby, 1973). It is more common among individualists than collectivists (Chen, 1995). However, Koreans seem to self-disclose more frequently than Japanese and are more likely to do so at the first meeting with others, while Japanese prefer to do so later (Jeon, 2011). Koreans believe sharing personal information is the key to building a good relationship with a new acquaintance. Knowing others at the first meeting is, therefore, crucial to establishing an appropriate hierarchy between people. In Korea, those involved in the relationship should be allocated a designated social position (Confucian-based social order) so that everyone can address each other appropriately. Also, information about one's birthplace and educational background is regarded as chulsin, a crucial factor for forming a "we" group. For this, sharing their age, educational background, and other personal issues at the earliest opportunity is essential. In contrast, Japanese generally believe that being overly open about self is egotistical and being nosy about others' private issues is rude (Midooka, 1990).

The Japanese way of building a new relationship is much more gradual compared to the Korean way. Not disturbing their counterparts is the priority, so they try to maintain an appropriate distance from others (Midooka, 1990). The Japanese honne (true feelings, desires, and opinions) and tatemae (socially desirable quality for display) are utilized to adjust distances with others (Cho, 2001).

Table 2.

Summary of Japanese and Korean Communication Styles

	Communication styles	**Keys for Relationships with Others**
Japan	• Flexible use of honorifics and self/other addressing terms • Higher context • Reserved	• Adapting to others in varieties of circumstances • Overt linguistic expressions can be interpreted as rude sometimes • Keeping appropriate social distance from others
Korea	• Less flexible use of honorifics and self/other addressing terms • Lower context • Open	• One's social position is fixed, and the language is used accordingly • Honest and straightforward expressions are welcomed in familial relationships

Part I Conclusions

Although both Japan and Korea are included in the collectivistic cultural sphere, their unique culture was formed based on their geography, history, language, and beliefs, which are related to their distinctive views on self and others and their communication styles. The next part of this article focuses on emotional experiences and how they are influenced by Japanese and Korean views of self and others.

Part II. Japanese and Koreans' Emotion Experiences

Cross-cultural psychology research comparing the East and West became popular in the 1980s. Since the early stage of this trend, Japan has been frequently chosen as a typical example of a collectivist culture (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett et al., 2001). In the 1980s, Japan was already one of the largest global economies, and most people had wealth and lifestyles equivalent to those in major Western countries. This allowed for balanced psychological comparisons between Japan and other leading Western countries. The focus on Korean culture came later. Although the inclusion of Korean culture was encouraged as early as a 1990 international psychology conference, a collaboration between the Korean Psychological Association and the International Association of Cross-Cultural Psychology (Han, 2002), cross-cultural comparisons involving Korea are still notably rare compared to Japan.

In order to address this deficit, at least in part, this section reviews emotion research targeting Japanese and Korean individuals, highlighting their similarities and differences. First, it introduces some recent cross-cultural research comparing Japan or Korea with Western countries. Second, culturally specific emotions in the two countries are introduced and explained. Finally, various emotion-related behaviors shown by Japanese and Korean individuals are contrasted.

Emotional Experiences of East and West

This section reviews recent research comparing Japan and Korea with Western countries, most commonly the US. In this line of research, Japan and Korea are often regarded as representatives of collectivistic cultures. They revealed that individualism-collectivism cultural tendencies affect various emotional experiences, such as frequently experienced emotions, manner of expressions and appraisals, and well-being.

Emotional events have themes. Kitayama et al. (2006) describes that those themes can be classified into two types: socially disengaging (i.e., internal) themes and socially engaging (i.e., social) themes. Events with internal themes signify the presence of an independent, autonomous self, such as the theme of personal achievement and encountering obstacles for such achievement. Social themes represent an interdependent and relationally embedded nature of self. Examples of socially themed events would be the experience of successful teamwork or disturbing group harmony. Emotions elicited by those events are internal and social emotions. An example of internal emotion is pride, and that of

social emotion is embarrassment. Those from individualistic cultures like America frequently experience internal emotions, whereas collectivists like Japanese more frequently experience social ones (Boiger et al., 2013; Kitayama et al., 2006). Experiencing positive internal emotions is more likely to enhance subjective well-being of the individualists, while positive social emotions do so for the collectivists (Kitayama et al., 2000). For the individualists, success leads to positive internal emotions (e.g., being proud of themselves), and failure is more likely to be associated with social emotions (e.g., being angry with someone). In contrast, success is likely to lead to positive social emotions (e.g., feeling closeness for someone supportive), while failure leads to internal emotions (e.g., frustration with themselves) for the collectivists (Imada & Ellsworth, 2011)

Cultural influence on emotional expressions has been well researched. Emotion display rules refer to culturally determined covert guidelines on how and when people should express certain emotions (Matsumoto, 1990). For example, East Asians believe that leaders should present positive emotions modestly (e.g., smiling with a mouth closed), whereas Westerners prefer leaders to express positive emotions in a highly aroused way (Tsai et al., 2016). Collectivistic cultural members have a strong tendency to suppress emotional expressions in public, especially negative ones (Matsumoto et al., 2008).

Facial displays of emotions also vary across cultures. Although many facial expressions are often considered culturally invariant (Matsumoto & Willingham, 2009), some subtle differences exist (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003). Recently, Cordaro et al. (2018) examined spontaneous facial and bodily displays of 22 emotions in China, India, Japan, Korea, and the US and observed cultural accents for all of them. Such variations in emotion encoding style are paired with culturally specific emotion decoding styles. People in the same cultural group, therefore, not only share knowledge on emotional expressions but also on where to look to read others. There is evidence that East Asians focus on eye regions to decode emotion from a face, while Westerners pick information from the mouth regions as well (Jack et al., 2009). The culturally specific encoding/decoding style is likely underlying the phenomenon of in-group advantage, whereby emotion recognition is most accurate when the expressor and receiver belong to the same cultural group (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002, 2003).

Individualistic/collectivistic cultural values also alter how often people experience mixed or complex emotions. Collectivistic cultures are high in dialectic belief, the tendency to avoid favoring one characteristic and instead seek the middle ground (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). It is reported that people with high dialectic beliefs tend to feel mixed emotions more often and evaluate a single emotion more complexly than people without that belief (Miyamoto & Ma, 2011; Miyamoto et al., 2014). Indeed, Miyamoto et al. (2010) found that their Japanese participants reported more co-occurrences of positive and negative affect in pleasant situations than Americans. Japanese also tend to see some negativity in happiness due to its fleeting nature (Uchida & Kitayama, 2009; Uchida et al., 2004).

Recent studies comparing Korea and the US focused on dimorphous expressions (Song et al., 2021) and moral attributions (An et al., 2016; An & Trafimow, 2014). When the level of positivity or negativity of facial expression does not match that of the situation (e.g., expressing sadness in a positive situation), the expression is dimorphous (Aragón et al.,

2015; Larsen et al., 2001). Song et al. (2021) established that both Koreans and Americans use dimorphous expressions, but Koreans share a lesser degree of consensus about the interpretations of those expressions compared to Americans. It may be because East Asians are more accepting of mixed and complex emotions (Miyamoto & Ma, 2011; Miyamoto et al., 2014) due to their dialectic beliefs (Peng & Nisbett, 1999).

We feel moral emotion when someone commits a transgression and judge the person's disposition accordingly. An et al. (2016; 2014) investigated how such wrongdoing is viewed differently by Koreans and Americans. According to An et al. (2014), a moral violation can occur in two ways: doing bad things or not doing good things. It is often the case that a bad action significantly impacts someone's moral status more than the absence of a good action. An et al. (2014) accordingly observed that American participants were more likely to connect the bad action and the personality, while the inaction was disregarded. However, this was not the case for their Korean participants, who judged the bad action and inaction equally with regard to the actor's personality. An et al. (2016) also found that Koreans were not likely to judge the bad action as negatively as Americans, while no group difference was observed regarding the inaction. They argue that Koreans were reluctant to judge others based on limited information and suggest this is because of a difference in Koreans' information processing style.

Information processing refers to how people gather information from their surroundings, how that is identified, classified, grouped together or separated out, and how we know what is what. This processing is often broken down into analytic and holistic styles (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). The analytic style leads evaluators to interpret information as overt, discreet items. The holistic style is likely to lead to the information being shaped by contexts, circumstances, and existing knowledge (Choi & Nisbett, 2000; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Nisbett et al., 2001). Those from individualistic cultures tend towards an analytic cognition style, while collectivistic cultures lean toward a holistic one. An et al. (2016) argue that this is why collectivistic, holistic Koreans might have had difficulties evaluating other people based solely on the bad actions described in the study. Importantly, these information processing styles alter how moral emotion is elicited and how people interpret the situation or person as a source of the emotion.

In conclusion, Japan and Korea have been regarded as similar representatives of collectivistic cultures and contributed to revealing how individualism-collectivism influences emotion processing. The following part compares the emotional experiences of Japanese and Koreans.

Culturally Specific Emotions

This section introduces some culturally specific emotion concepts signifying unique and significant emotional processes for Japanese and Koreans. The described concepts exist only in either of the two languages or exist in both languages but are defined or used differently. It is debatable whether conceptually different emotions can be distinguishable in terms of subjective experiences involving cognition and physiological reactions. Some researchers suggest that linguistic knowledge of emotion at least partly governs individuals'

emotional experiences (e.g., Barrett, 2006). If so, culturally specific emotions can only be experienced by individuals possessing the relevant concepts. However, empirically confirming this notion is out of scope for this review. Instead, this section summarizes theories and research conducted from an indigenous psychology perspective, which describes some emotion words and observable behaviors related to them.

Japanese Amae

Amae refers to one's expectation of receiving favors from others, and it is often identified as a unique Japanese emotion (Doi, 1971). The parent-child relationship is the best example of amae materialization, and people tend to seek this kind of relationship with non-family members as well (Johnson, 1993; Rothbaum et al., 2000). Two motivations drive amae: affective and manipulative (Yamaguchi & Ariizumi, 2006). The affective motivation is to obtain a sense of security, positiveness, and acceptance. The amae protagonist expects to receive special treatment from others, and if it is denied, they are likely to feel dissatisfaction, rejection, and vulnerability. The manipulative motivation is to control others by stretching the limit of the amae-driven behaviors, and children will often test their parents' patience with amae-driven behaviors and feel a great deal of acceptance when the parents become more lenient (Yamaguchi & Ariizumi, 2006).

Amae is an integral part of interpersonal relationships among the Japanese because it is a sign of intimacy and trust in the relationship and works to enhance group harmony (Takamatsu & Takai, 2018). Therefore, it is totally acceptable for anyone to have this emotion in a close relationship, regardless of their age, gender, or social status. This emotion is significant not only for the one who feels amae but also for the person who is expected to give the favors. Since Amae is frequently present in interpersonal relationships, anyone can be expected to give favors to others. So, Japanese people are well prepared to react to someone's amae effectively, in other words, providing appropriate favors by anticipating others' needs correctly (Behrens, 2004). Amae is a crucial emotion for the Japanese to cultivate interdependent relationships that contribute to a sense of connectedness and group unity, which are essential to achieving collective goals. Amae-based relationships also impact individuals' self-concept (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). For Japanese, a part of self that lacks autonomy plays a significant role in defining and understanding the self.

Some researchers argue that Japanese people's dedication and obedience to authority may be related to amae. In the amae-based interdependent relationship, the person who gives the favors becomes an authority figure, and those feeling amae towards him/her would follow obediently (Niiya et al., 2006). Such amae-driven dedication to authority might have been the driving force behind the extremely speedy modernization of the country in the 19th and 20th centuries (Shang & Taninaka, 2007).

It is important to note that the experience of amae has been reported in countries other than Japan (Takamatsu & Takai, 2018). For example, Niiya et al. (2006) observed Americans behaving similarly to Japanese in an amae situation. It is not too surprising that relations with levels of reciprocity similar to amae exist outside of Japanese culture, but most Western languages do not seem to have the equivalent word or concept. Interestingly, Korean has the equivalent word, but people expect to have an amae-based relationship only

with someone already very close, namely the "we" group members. As mentioned before, Koreans are willing to establish a "we" group quickly with newly met people through smooth self-disclosures and finding common grounds such as chulsin. Thus, amae-based interaction can be expected for relatively new relationships but is limited to the "we" group (Yi, 1982). On the contrary, Japanese apply the concept to more general interpersonal relationships. In the ultimate case, Japanese may feel amae towards someone they have never met. For example, someone with a physical disability may think he/she can be late for a meeting with a new person, expecting generosity from the meeting partner.

Japanese Sumanai.

Sumanai (or sumimasen in a polite form) is, in a strict sense, an apologetic and appreciative feeling towards others (Iio, 2017; Kimura, 1994), but it is most commonly used to call out to others like "Excuse me" in English. The emotion of Sumanai stems from the experiencers' feeling of being indebted to someone either because they have caused trouble to them or received favors from them. Therefore, sumimasen is often used instead of saying "thank you" or "I'm sorry" (Kimura, 1994). Contrasting to "Thank you", which primarily describes one's internal state of being grateful, sumimasen solely expresses one's humbleness to others as "I owe you" in English (Kumatoridani, 1999). In Japan, many deliberately use "I owe you" to emphasize their gratitude to others in situations where "thank you" is perfectly sufficient.

Sumanai is used in a wide range of situations in which speakers need to make sincere apologies (negative situations) to those in which they show their gratitude (positive situations). This means that the word (or emotion) is ambiguous in terms of its level of positivity. The ambiguous nature of the term makes it versatile and ubiquitous in Japanese conversations. The Japanese employ the high-context communication style that relies on interpreting context for accurate comprehension (Hall, 1976). This communication style may allow the Japanese to use ambiguous words without misunderstanding. Generally, high-context communication is associated with collectivistic cultures, and low-context communication is more common in individualistic cultures (Hall, 1976). Interestingly, Iio (2017) reports that the use of "thank you" instead of sumanai is increasing among young Japanese. It may reflect Japan's recent increase in individualistic cultural tendencies (Ogihara, 2017).

Korean Han

Han is the most well-known culturally specific Korean emotion, often translated as resentment. Han is a very complex emotion, representing helplessness, ego lamentation, and grief caused by frustrating events or loss. This emotion also represents positivity, such as hope for future enjoyment and divine light. It distinguishes han from general resentment, with the latter being more closely associated with a sense of bitterness and motivation for revenge (Chon, 1993).

It has been argued that han stems from a history of frequent threats of foreign invasions. Kim (1982) suggests that han represents the angst of an oppressed people unable to show their resentment to their occupiers directly. According to Ko (1980), han is a

pain internalized to a national level. Thus, it is passed on to new generations who have never experienced wars. Many Korean folklore and traditional children's plays work to pass on the essence of han. The complexity of han is attributed to Korea's political and psychological tendency to look inward rather than searching for solutions outside. Despite a history of numerous external threats, Korea had never succeeded in developing sufficient military power to deter aggressors. Instead, their focus became internal and philosophical to dissipate the damage they experienced (Park & Han, 2018). The process of realizing the pain and finding the resolution is parallel to the materialization and transformation of han. The starting point of han is resentment generated from dissatisfaction and frustration. However, the emotion becomes more complex because resentment further generates secondary emotions related to consciousness of the damage (e.g., helplessness and grief) and future hopes (Lee, 1983). Many cultural activities in Korea, such as singing and dancing in festivals, expressing feelings in arts, and worshipping spiritual powers, are attempts at psychological sublimation, which changes the painful aspects of han to positive outcomes (Kim, 1982).

The ambivalent nature of han (having both positive and negative valence) might reflect the ambivalent political/militaristic strategies often observed in "peninsula culture", such as Korea and Italy (Kudo, 2018). Peninsula culture features superficially glorified militant patriotism, coerced upon people to compensate for weakness and failures of the nation's actual political and militaristic strategies. Such cultural contradictions are likely to enhance people's ambivalent feelings towards the nation. The Korean han captures such feelings with its sense of anger, helplessness, and hope.

The Chinese character for Han is commonly used in China, thus Chinese people also grasp a similar concept (K. T. Lee, 1983). However, han's conceptual definition does not have a perfect correspondence between the two cultures. Korean han is strongly related to their historical paths, especially to frequent foreign invasions, and this aspect is, of course, not reflected in Chinese han.

Han is a very complex emotion, and it is difficult for non-Koreans to grasp. The following video introduces pop culture examples, such as TV series and films, that express han very well. The readers may be able to experience this emotion through pop culture. https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1524085315934

Korean Shimchoeng

Shimchoeng ("the state of mind" in Korean) is another crucial Korean indigenous emotional term. Shimchoeng is defined as a general state of emotional arousal or an affectionate state regarding the actions of someone in the "we" group (Choi et al., 2007; Park, 2015). In a close relationship with established trusts, people expect each other to behave in a certain way. Shimcheong works like an alarm that indicates the others' behavior is somewhat unexpected. If the behaviors of others violate the expectations, shimcheong occurs like a ripple on a calm lake. Shimcheong then elicits further processing of the situation, leading the person to experience more specific emotions such as disappointment or sadness. Those outcomes are termed as "disappointed shimcheong", "rejected shimcheong", or "unfairly treated shimcheong" (Choi, 1997; Choi & Kim, 1999). The valence of shimcheong can also

be positive when others' behaviors violate one's expectations in a positive way (Choi & Han, 2008).

One sometimes expects others to give him/her favors, which makes the shimcheong similar to amae, the Japanese emotion to expect favors from others in a close relationship. Amae can lead to experiences of negative feelings when others are reluctant to give favors. It is very similar to the experience of negative Shimcheong, which features feelings of dissatisfaction and vulnerability (Choi & Kim, 1999). However, the two emotions are distinct. Amae represents unbalanced interdependency because one will always give favors, and the other will always receive them. These roles do not change within the relationship. On the contrary, shimcheong is an emotional alert system for unexpected behaviors of others, and it is constantly operating in any Korean's mind. It is also notable that there are varieties of shimcheong, from positive to negative. The expressiveness of amae and shimcheong is also different. Amae is often expressed covertly (e.g., nonverbally) because people are good at picking up others' amae needs without the emotion being emphasized. In fact, Japanese tend to express any emotions in a relatively reserved manner because they believe that emotion is their internal experience rather than something to communicate with others (Yamada, 2009). On the contrary, Korean shimcheong is readily communicated. The experiencers often choose to explain how their expectations are violated, which enhances communication among the "we" group members. In this way, Koreans are generally very communicative about their emotions (Cho, 2001; Choi et al., 2007).

Comparing Japanese and Koreans for Emotional Experiences

Emotional experiences and expression styles

Frequently experienced emotions are different between Japanese and Koreans. Furukawa et al. (2012) compared the propensity to experience shame, guilt, and pride among Japanese, Korean, and US children aged between 8 and 11 and found that shame was most experienced by the Japanese, guilt was most experienced by the Koreans, and pride was most experienced by the Americans. This result fits Benedict's (2005) description of Japan as a shame culture, in which people psychologically focus on how the social group observes them. However, it is puzzling why Koreans, who are more collectivistic than Japanese, are less likely to feel shame. It may be because the sense of group unity differs between the two cultures. Korean "we" is somewhat familial, while Japanese "we" emphasizes shared goals and group achievements. Within Korean "we" groups, someone's failure experience may be seen as something to be forgiven, following the Confucian concept of Ren (humanness), while it may be seen as something to be frowned upon in Japanese "we" groups.

Importantly, the characteristic of the flexible culture in the FLX-MON dimension is described as 'Children are taught to "be like those who know more" and be ashamed in cases of failure' (Minkov & Kaasa, 2021, p. 244). This statement signifies how deeply shame is integrated into Japanese culture, which is one of the most flexible in the world,

The manner of expressing emotions differs between the two cultures. Cordaro et al. (2018) compared people's facial and body expressions in China, India, Japan, Korea, and the US. They found the following three features were present among Japanese but not

among Koreans: a chest expansion in pride expressions, leaning forward in amusement expressions, and head-scratching motions in confusion expressions. It is unclear why those are present only for Japanese, but it can be said that these features are frequently used in Japanese cartoons to show characters' emotions, and cartoons have been significant parts of Japanese culture in the last few decades.

Differences in emotion display rules between Japan and Korea have also been reported. Generally, Japanese display rules are more suppressive than Korean's. Lee and Matsumoto (2011) report that the difference is particularly noticeable for sadness and anger expressions, such that Japanese strongly suppress these emotions in social situations. As discussed in the section on self-disclosure, Japanese often hide their true self to keep an appropriate distance from others because being honest can be perceived as rude, while Koreans tend to value honest expressions even when they lead to disagreements or arguments because they believe communication in such a situation cultivates understanding and sympathy among group members (Choi, 2000; Takatsuki, 2008). Interestingly, however, Chou, Takahashi, and Daibo (2007) argue that facial expression intensity would unlikely differ between the two cultures when there is no situational constraint. In other words, it is not the case that Korean expressions are generally more exaggerated than Japanese. Koreans can be more suppressed than Japanese, depending on the social status of the surrounding people.

Chou et al. (2007) observed the influence of cultural display rules on happiness and anger expressions. In their study, participants displayed emotions in their faces and were photographed. Comparing the expression images of the Japanese and Korean participants, they found that the eye regions of Korean people were less expressive than those of Japanese for happiness expression, giving a less intensely emotional look. Chou et al. (2007) suggested that it was because an older experimenter was with the participants when they were forming the facial expressions. Korean participants, sensitive to social order by age, might have suppressed their expressions to be polite. Japanese, less sensitive to such social order, were not affected by the experimenter's presence, resulting in expressing their emotions more naturally. Alternative to this account, their result can be interpreted that Koreans' happy expressions were natural and Japanese expressions were exaggerated. Ekman (1972) states that Japanese are strongly context-sensitive about their facial expressions, meaning they are willing to express emotions as the context requires. The Japanese participants in Chou et al.'s study (2007) might have been more sensitive to the experiment instructions than the Korean participants. Conducting a similar experiment including another country to serve as a control condition may reveal which account is underlying the expression intensity between Japanese and Koreans. Interestingly, though, the difference in intensity was found only in happy faces.

The study found a noticeable difference between the two cultures in how anger is expressed, although the intensity was similar. Japanese used vertical motion by moving their chin up and down or keeping the head still and moving their gaze up and down. For Koreans, the left and right motion of the head was prominent in anger expressions. The Japanese expression style might have reflected their general tendency to suppress negative emotional expressions in public (Matsumoto et al., 2008), resulting in some hesitation

manifested as occasionally looking downward (Chou et al., 2007).

The structure of emotion concept for Japanese and Koreans: Multi-dimensional approach. The human emotional experience is, obviously, highly complex and varied, and emotions have been categorized as anger, fear, love, etc. since humans have the capacity to articulate such things. This categorization can be further divided or grouped together by similarity. By identifying a limited number of characteristics or dimensions, this naturalistic process has been ordered into the multi-dimensional model of emotion concepts. This model proposes that emotional characteristics vary along identifiable dimensions, such as positivity and activeness, and that each emotion can be mapped onto a multi-dimensional space based on the extent of the relevant characteristics (Fontaine et al., 2007). Those dimensions are identified by research in which people classify a number of emotion words based on semantic similarity. Multiple research projects in different cultures have found that people are very attentive to the positivity of each emotion and readily use the evaluation for emotion classification. The extent of positivity is often referred to as a dimension of valence. The second most important characteristic to distinguish for an emotion is how active, alert, or prepared the emotion experiencer is, called an arousal dimension. These two are the most prominent characteristics in many cultures (Jackson et al., 2019; Russell et al., 1989; Västfjäll et al., 2002; Yik & Russell, 2003). People also use other characteristics, such as whether the emotion is indicating an attentive or rejective attitude of the expressor (Schlosberg, 1954), whether the emotion is controllable or impulsive (Osgood, 1966), and whether the emotion is socially engaging or not (Kgantsi et al., 2015). The use of those dimensions, which are less important than the valence and arousal, might be culturally variable (Kuppens et al., 2006).

The valence/arousal two-dimensional structure has been identified for Japanese (Honma, 2014) and Korean emotions (Yik et al., 2003), but other dimensions have also been found. For example, a three-dimensional structure with energy, tension, and hedonic tone was found for Japanese (Joh, 2009). For Koreans, a dimension of relaxation-tension (Kang & Han, 1994) and self-other focused attention (Rhee et al., 2008) have been found in the place of the third dimension.

Recently, E. J. Park and colleagues (2022) compared the multi-dimensional structure of emotion concepts between Japanese and Korean individuals and identified the social engagement dimension along with the valence and arousal for both cultures. The authors interpreted that socially engaging emotions (e.g., happiness and sadness) heighten the experiencer's interdependent sense of self, while socially disengaging emotions (e.g., anger and pride) heighten the independent sense of self. This dimension may be especially salient for members of collectivistic cultures who need to alter their behaviors depending on whether they are with others or not (Uskul & Kikutani, 2014). Interestingly, while the Japanese prioritized the social engagement dimension over the arousal to distinguish emotions, Koreans prioritized the arousal over the social engagement. It might be because the Korean indigenous emotion of shimchoeng, which is very important for Korean individuals, is arousal-based. The variations in emotional experiences within the collectivistic cultural group can be reflected in the multi-dimensional structure of emotion concepts.

Conclusions

Japan and Korea are thought to have a similar collectivistic culture, and it is a fair assumption considering their geographical proximity as well as linguistic and ethnic similarity. However, each country has distinct histories, social structures, foreign affairs, and economic status. These factors create unique cultural norms for Japan and Korea, and the norms strongly influence how people define themselves, evaluate others, and communicate with each other. As part two of this review describes, those factors are also strongly related to individuals' emotional experiences. The causal relationship between cultural factors and psychology is hard to establish, and their interactive effect can be expected. Culturally unique emotion processing styles may give feedback to people's communication styles and self-concepts to make cultural differences more recognizable.

This article has attributed various behavioral differences between Japanese and Koreans to the differences in cultural dimensions, such as high-low context. However, our argument is mostly based on the studies comparing only Japan and Korea, and such two-country comparison research is likely to have methodological limitations. Comparing just two countries is often insufficient to determine whether the difference in cultural dimension levels causes behavioral variations. Therefore, it is recommended to include three or more cultures with varying levels of the relevant dimension (low, middle, and high) and see whether the behavioral difference corresponds to that order (see the consilience approach in Leung & van de Vijver, 2008). Such multicultural comparison studies involving Japan, Korea, and a third country are rare, so we could not base our arguments on them, but it is a notable limitation of the current research.

Another limitation of the current research is the vague definition of "difference". The introduced studies comparing Japanese and Koreans with various behaviors showed statistically significant "differences" between those people for the measured behaviors, but it is not clear whether such differences are experienceable in real life. In other words, it is unclear whether those differences apparent in the experimental results and the findings of correlational and observational investigations are transferable to people's real-life actions. Also, the historical and linguistic differences between Japan and Korea described in this article cannot be quantified. However, the authors speculate that such differences are noticed when Japanese and Koreans communicate with each other. Osaki (2006) asked Japanese and Korean workers who often experience Japan-Korea intercultural communication to report their concerns and showed that many answers reflected differences in communication styles. For example, on the one hand, some Japanese mentioned that Koreans state their opinions much more clearly than the Japanese, which can be interpreted as being rude in the Japanese environment. On the other hand, many Korean workers reported their frustration with Japanese employees' avoidance of making clear responses (e.g., avoiding giving a yes/no answer). This finding demonstrates that the "differences" expressed in statistical effect sizes in psychological experiments are experienceable and relevant to real communications. As mentioned before, research comparing the two countries (favorably including a third country) is still rare, but once the number reaches a

sufficient level, performing a meta-analysis on the findings should reveal the "difference" logically and structurally.

Geographically close countries have frequent human interactions, as with Japan and Korea, and the research focusing on the within individualistic/collectivistic group variations can inform those people who are living in other cultures what to expect and how to communicate with the natives. This type of research also contributes to the investigations on cultural trait dimensions. Geographically close countries tend to share numerous cultural features, such as people's ethnicity, general lifestyles, and the countries' political structure. So, if the compared cultures differ in dimensional scale, researchers can attribute the difference to something that is not shared. In the case of Japan and Korea, the varying degree of Confucian influence seems to be contributing to their level of FLX-MON dimension. Looking into such within-group variations is, therefore, extremely valuable for emotion research as well as any cross-cultural research.

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Reading Materials for Further Engagement

Japanese Emotions

Matsumoto, D. (1996). *Unmasking Japan: Myths and realities about the emotions of the Japanese.* Stanford University Press.

Korean History

Seth, M. J. (2020). *Korea: A very short introduction.* Oxford University Press.

High-low Context Communication

Nakano, S., Tanaka, T., & Mikushi, K. (2022). Cross-cultural social skills instruction and indirect expressions: Psychoeducation in Japan's high-context culture. *IAFOR Journal of Psychology and the Behavioral Sciences, 8*(2), 19-37.

Application of Cross-Cultural Emotion Research

Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J. and Minkov, M. (2010). *Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind: Intercultural cooperation and its importance for survival* (2nd ed). McGraw-Hill.

Tanaka, T. (2012). Minor study : A cross-cultural psycho-educational program for cross-cultural social skills learning to international students in Japan :Focusing on the AUC-GS learning model. *Japanese Journal of Applied Psychology, 38*, 76-82.

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Questions for Discussion

1. Discuss the effective methods to compare the emotion processing of people from different cultures.

2. Find culturally specific emotions in your culture and describe them. Consider cultural aspects (e.g., religion, history, and language) that might have influenced the emergence of those emotions.

3. What is the role of culturally specific emotions? Consider three levels of uniqueness in human mental programming: human nature-culture-personality (see Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010).

4. Consider people from your neighboring countries. Do they have culturally specific behaviors? If so, discuss why they behave differently from people from your culture.

5. What can be the benefit of researching the emotion processing of neighboring countries such as Japan and Korea?

6. What roles do emotions play in the communication among people in your culture? Discuss whether the role differs across cultures.

7. What can cause problems or conflicts in emotional communications between different cultures?

8. Discuss how to reduce problems or conflicts in cross-cultural communications. Should the strategy be different for cross-cultural communications among people from neighbouring countreis and for those among people from distant countries?

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