



PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF GLOCALIZATION

ODYSSEUS MAKRIDIS
Fairleigh Dickinson University (USA)
makridis@fdu.edu

Abstract: Within the bosom of the humanities philosophy reposes and, as an academic field, it is ever so often criticized for its aloofness. In a recent book, Roudometof and Dessì (2022: 9-10) politely quip that philosophy's engagement with the "glocal" has been "resilient", transacted mostly "without encroaching on other fields". Philosophy's ostensible remoteness stems in part from its institutional affiliation with, cultivation and deployment of often forbiddingly technical tools of logical analysis. Although the academic field comprises a manifold of specialties, with resentment often arising against prohibitively technical branches, I narrow my focus to an understanding of "philosophy" as an activity engrossed in logical analysis, and I will plead as defense of this avowed postulation that by so doing, operationally as it were, I can argue that philosophy can make critical and salutary contributions to the burgeoning field of glocalization studies, which is so ably canvassed in the book edited by Roudometof and Dessì (2022). Notwithstanding the promissory note offered above, and since my definition of philosophy may seem unduly restrictive, it is incumbent on me to disambiguate across related notions and to make an initial case as to both the plausibility and arguable pay-offs from taking philosophy in the way I just adumbrated. This is a substantive issue as it relates to a case I will be making as to what philosophy may have to offer to the study of glocalization.

Keywords: glocalization, humanities, philosophy, logical analysis, global imperatives.

ISSN 2283-7949
GLOCALISM: JOURNAL OF CULTURE, POLITICS AND INNOVATION
DOI: 10.54103/gjcpi.2024.23140



Some rights reserved

HOW PHILOSOPHY IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD, IN RELATION TO STUDYING GLOCALIZATION PHENOMENA, AND WHY

In the important volume edited by Roudometof and Dessì (2022) on study of and variations on the concept “glocalization”, a lone contribution that takes up the subject of philosophy is by Janz (2022: 61-75), who adumbrates a potential role for philosophy in making generative contributions to broadly global studies, beyond its characteristic near-monopoly in summoning and implementing tools of critical analysis. According to the author, in addition to its systematic analysis of concepts, philosophy can also contribute toward creating instrumentally apt concepts for the study of phenomena of globalization, and glocalization (he does not put it so, and I assume responsibility for substituting my phrasing, hopefully without altering the meanings). We can wholeheartedly agree with this article that philosophy can harness long and indeed systematic and formal experience and accumulated resources for carrying out demanding critical analysis. A slew of traditional philosophical problems is broached up in the article, with a view to showing that the conceptual storage, critical flexibility and characteristic methodological aptitude of students of philosophy, accrued over eons of honing the proper faculties, so to speak, come handy. It seems quite right, even from a perfunctory and commonsensical standpoint, to laud the philosophic discipline for its cultivation and deft management of the relevant “modalities of engagement” (Janz 2022: 63) as “philosophy” is broadly understood to be preoccupied precisely with those types of puzzles and challenges that rally critical thinking and problem-solving capacities even to the breaking point. At the same time, Janz (2022: 62) complains that a notion like that of the “glocal”, which has not accrued from within philosophy’s own coined lexicon and ruminations, is bound to be ignored. As it is put succinctly, “philosophy has theorized place, but rarely has done so with its own place” (Janz 2022: 62). Casey (1998) too has taken up the charge that philosophy tends to forget its own place even as it theorizes “place”, which, as a theme, more broadly resonates with a characteristic meta-critique of philosophy, archetypal in the work



of Friedrich Nietzsche, which can be summed up as pointing accusatively to “philosophy’s own blind spots” (Janz 2022: 69).

Let the preceding serve as summary of an attempted apologia, and diagnosis of underlying reasons, for philosophy’s aloofness. Often exhortations and accusations directed at philosophy are predicated on views that prime philosophy as a heuristic discipline, in this way ignoring or at least downplaying the foundational association of philosophy – as I would characterize it – with logical and analytical methodology. As our following sample of discussions and brief canvassing of subjects will show, the role of philosophy in application can be profitably understood by analogy to a critical-thinking and analytical or logical “hygiene” that is both preparatory and continuously needed for any systematic intellectual activity. We will also see how related errors about how logic itself works confound the landscape further charging philosophy itself with imaginary flaws and, in so doing, undercut philosophy’s role and potential contributions. I will not pursue this demanding theme further here but, to assist imagination and roughly locate on a taxonomical map that may appeal to some, we can think of the distinction between how “continental” philosophy is juxtaposed to “analytical” philosophy (and kindred schools like empiricism and logical positivism). I would reject the distinction, if only by arraying prominent “continental” figures in logical analysis (like Gottlob Frege, one of the founders of modern logic, to say nothing of Aristotle, who is possibly the founder of logic as such). Be that as it may, the distinction drawn above can be used, roughly, to locate the exclusionary view of philosophy as thinking of philosophy as “analytical” while the various – ill-conceived – criticisms of philosophy originate in (and sometimes, ironically, caricature) the “continental” waves with their logically untethered flights into speculation and grandiose generalizations. Now, if we are to split the difference, so to speak, we can say that the contributions that philosophy stands to make through applying its systematic logical tools may be seen as “analytical” while the correction of characteristic errors that otherwise impede philosophic engagement are errors originating within the “continental” schools.



Seminal contributions of philosophy are in evidence across a spectrum of applied areas; in fact, this is putting it rather feebly as, to mention one resounding example, the broad and urgent multi-disciplinary field of studies we can identify as “artificial intelligence” not only claims philosophy in a place of pride but, as some have put it, artificial intelligence is philosophy (Dennett 1979: 60-64; see also Dennett 1998). There is hyperbole in this, as well as susceptibility to outright criticism, but it is instructive to trace the reasons for such exuberance. Not only does artificial intelligence implement formal systems of logic in its design to solve constitutive problems (a pioneering work is McCarthy, Hayes 1969), but the vital issues surrounding AI, its provenance and potential as well as out intertwined collective destiny, have to do with the nature of cognitive intelligence and consciousness. Prospects of “cyborgization” of the human brain reawaken puzzling reflections on the philosophical problem known as personal identity – not as a psychological subject but understood as a matter of accounting for criteria for continuity and persistence of what is to be taken as the “self”.

Nevertheless, if we transit to the domain of social sciences, we are met with assaults on philosophy – with philosophy understood in a certain way, often without systematic or precise account given of what philosophy is or does. The views strike us as normative ab initio: catapulting us straight into what the author thinks philosophy, or perhaps any discipline, should be doing. One can find instances, which can serve as locus classicus, in specimens of Marxist analysis, either in the enshrined classics or in derivative works over long ages. There are inexorable echoes of such disguised prescriptivism in contemporary accounts, even offered by workers in the field of philosophy itself. Of course, it is nonsensical to demand that x should be y insofar as x is, analytically or by definition, not- y . Charitably, however, this line of criticism can be taken to be picking out alleged defects that do or have accrued to philosophy itself either because of its proper characterization and allotted tasks or as arising in philosophy’s attempted applications. Such damning handicaps can then be claimed to be related to philosophy’s impertinent neglect of material-economic, structural, historic, institutional or



other constraints, which, again, are denounced as tantamount to philosophy's "forgetting its place" (Casey 1998), or its failing to detect its "own blind spots" (Janz 2022: 69).

There is, of course, that nowadays ubiquitous haunting suspicion that some taint of "western" progeny sticks to philosophy as it is conceived and practiced by many. If the stigma inheres to philosophy as such, this could outright restrict any daring aspirations that philosophy can have to contribute to the study of global phenomena. But I think that it is possible to dispel this line of thinking without treading on sensitivities and a fascinating case study, to follow, can serve not only to assuage the fears, and rectify the misconceptions, but also as a template for how philosophy's privileged position to undertake analysis of meaning makes possible perspicuous and deep study of thinking across different localized contexts – and even spanning historical eons. Since I cannot concede that the business of philosophy is analysis of the logical structure of meaning, it may be seen that it easily follows from all this – assuming that my position is granted – that the role of philosophy is foundational (without prejudging or prejudicing this potentially treacherous word, "foundational", and simply letting it serve as semantically expanding on something like "deep analysis"). Of course, the objection can again be leveled that we are tied up in knots since the critics precisely assail the claim that "analysis of meaning" can be undertaken in abstraction from the study of "material", structural, institutional, cultural or any context-specific conditions that one school or another may favor.

Suffice it to say, in preliminary fashion, that an anciently known riposte to such objections can be raised. Addressing some imaginary interlocutor, we can offer a riposte like the following: unless you have settled on the rules for understanding your favorite approach's pronouncements and methods, you cannot claim to have precise, potentially completed or consistent understanding at all. Now think of philosophy, as I suggest that it is to be defined (for good reason), as delving and fathoming, assiduously, into the mechanics that sustain this precondition for understanding, which you do not see in the way that you cannot see your eyes or observe how



your eyes function (if I may indulge in a facile metaphor). It is changing the subject to raise objections, then, about what the content of your study is when I have been harping on the preconditions that are presupposed as being met for your study to be meaningful – or at least free of logically debilitating error. Based on the preceding, we would expect misplaced criticisms of philosophy to originate from misunderstanding the “essentially” logical character of the philosophical enterprise, the subject matter of logic itself. The case of Schiller, briefly examined below, will showcase such pathologies at play.

A related burden, which can also be brought into a presumed organic connection with the “western” inheritance, is to be found in philosophy’s alleged universalistic biases. As a generalization, this ought to fall flat from start since philosophic debates and schools of thought – a whole gamut of animadversions – include already critiques, as well as support, of what may be loosely taken as “universalist”. But even as it comes to the nitty gritty of philosophy’s possible and effective applications, we can dispel conceits about some alleged intrinsic resistance to “localized” thinking in favor of seeking regularities or uniform and universal patterns. The characterization of philosophy I have been defending will be found, in a case study below, to accommodate understanding and continuously addressing views and debates taking place across disparately separate historical and cultural contexts. The case study addresses versions of a Hindu teaching about “the four corners of truth”, a patently philosophical subject (that stands out and cannot be rightly taken as falling under the purview of theology, anthropology, history or whatever area), and how this teaching is to be analyzed with tools of logical analysis.

Bigoted, colonialist or neo-colonialist, hegemonic and related dispositions would denounce the Indian teaching as “irrational”. Ironically, this is the sordid heritage of other disciplines (Oxford dons writhing in the face of heathen encounters, or the example of Lévy-Bruhl 1923 – but retracted 1975: 48 –, to be taken up again later, castigating the “contradictory” primitive mind as irrational). To be sure, within philosophy such denunciations abound; however, on



the basis of how I have suggested that philosophy is to be understood, it can be said that philosophy is compelled to examine all views about the logical structure of meaning – and, indeed, such debates are unmistakably philosophical while the denunciatory and other acrimonious residue can be debited to rhetorical excess. As a concrete historical detail, Aristotelian logic dominated “western” studies and training and was oddly pronounced closed off and regarded as completed; this, however, can be easily seen as an error within the realm of what are properly philosophical investigations. In contrast, the attitude of denouncing the “contradictory” primitive mind as “irrational” can only be understood as rigidified prejudicial conceit whose subject matter falls outside the realm of (in our example) Lévy-Bruhl’s disciplinary competences. The point is not that parochial practices of philosophy are innocent of prejudice; the point, rather, is that a proper demarcation of disciplinary tasks and competences is needed to make precise philosophy’s role. Adding to the mix a logical-philosophical view known as “logical pluralism” may explain how the “universal” element applies to the tools that are to be wielded by systematic critical analysis while the normative force of the “local” logical schematizations that are at play is recognized and integrated in the analysis. Thus, do universal and local come together without running into daunting reefs – often not discerned even though invoked – that should be shipwrecking any pretense to comprehension! But the details pertaining to the promised case study are postponed until later.

As an example of the kind of trouble that can arise if we misjudge philosophy’s role, let us consider another broad complaint about philosophy’s own “blind spots”. As intimated above, I think that there are different paths – not necessarily mutually exclusively – by which one can reach this bitter destination. It can be claimed that philosophy is at fault for ignoring the material modes of production of activity, or the structural constraints that shape thinking itself, or some allegations that essentially amount to claims of radical untranslatability across linguistic contexts (with the latter being a deep problem actually within philosophy itself but easily misappropriated and misunderstood for purposes of ideological posturing).



Rather inconsistently, Janz (2002) both castigates philosophy for its inherent limitations but, rightly, also extolls the analytical skills that philosophy can bring to bear on conceptual explication and analysis. The inconsistency can be seen in two-fold fashion: if the role of the local or “place” is paramount, then what would explain such anticipated wholesale applicability of philosophy’s analytical resources and skills? Or, if the conceptual analysis is itself to be finetuned so as to take the local into proper consideration, which “locale” would have to be deployed to ground inevitable analytical comparisons and syntheses of any two or more “local” philosophic traditions? There has to be a place between thought-imperialism and unwitting solipsism, but the metaphor of “place” becomes singularly misleading at this point. Think of philosophy – as the concept I will settle for in disambiguating – as the examination and assessment of plausible, and even implausible, theories of space rather than as a canvassing of “places” within a preassigned theoretical view. Rather than concepts, let’s think of theories, with the concepts meaningfully deployable holistically within theories. Ignoring this may explain the view, echoed also by the authors of the volume in their introduction, that philosophy seems to ignore concepts that have not originated from within its pallid endeavors. The problematization of philosophy’s potential contribution can be seen then to be displaced onto a different challenge: ought the logical analysis of viewpoints, worldviews, theories, normative systems, etc., to vary across different meaning-producing instrumentalities (which, at least in the post-Wittgenstein analytic tradition are taken to be languages)? Putting it so both dispels the common saw that philosophy may seek to impose a universalistic bent on anything it touches; and it can also showcase what the potential contributions philosophical analysis can make on the specific subject of glocalization. This is the line of thinking I will pursue rather than engage in polemical sable-rattling. As Janz (2022: 61-62) cogently summarizes, specific traditions in philosophy have engaged challenging problems – which are logical in the broad sense – like the relationship between the universal and the particular, what is defined as eternal and the temporal, and so on. The students of other traditions



inevitably come across such debates. If novel issues and animadversions arise, so much the better for enriching philosophy's treasures. We will follow subsequently, as a case study, what is recognized in the philosophy of logic as the subject of the logical law of non-contradiction and its apparent rejection by ancient Indian thinkers. The "local" predilections may be in evidence in the content of philosophic production across different parts of the world but, I suggest, the unmistakable tell-tale sign that the activity is philosophical lies in the, at least purported, application of logical analysis. This further displaces the problem onto what we mean by "logic" and how we study the logical structures of claims and viewpoints. Corresponding to the glocal is then the intriguing and deeply philosophical issue that emerges under the technical term "logical pluralism".

As I cannot further untangle such threads here, I will do my best at least to make a case about how "philosophy" is to be understood along the lines laid out so far. A corollary emerging from this, I think – or perhaps I harbor as aspirational hope – is that philosophy, so understood, can exercise a countervailing influence in demanding that standards of logical rigor are to be enforced (even if such turn out to be local – but this needs to be argued as well). This would be a seminal role for philosophy to play since the stretching of debates across now global arenas may tend to distract from precise and exacting logical thinking – not to mention the possibility of making excuses for sloppy thinking on the basis of some alleged local variation in the rules of reasoning. Of course, the pull of the local can also correct tendencies of hasty generalizations. But in either case the forum offered by philosophic analysis gives undergirding stability and continuity. The price, however, is to acquiesce in the kind of rigorous training in the logical discipline, which eludes the majority of scholars.

To begin with, it is not controversial that philosophy, understood even loosely across different perspectives, has always, and across local traditions, engaged in and continues to dwell in the analysis of problems, the investigation of paradoxes, and inquiries into proposed solutions to such anomalies confronting



reason, however reason is to be configured, and regardless of what specific field of studies such subjects may arise from. Collins (1998: 19) discerningly reflects on the relevance of certain paradoxes for appreciating philosophy's characteristic functions. Some such at least apparently paradoxical claims arise indeed in the course of theoretical pursuits in all areas but the systematic effort to confront them is what philosophy does. An example integrally related to our purposes appears to stem from how positing counter-universal and counter-general claims are offered themselves as generally valid claims if such claims are to be propounded at all. The author thinks that the superabundance of such problematizations as constitutive of philosophy as a discipline supports a "sociological" view of philosophy's activities. This can be made to follow – as it seems at first as a non-sequitur leap – by positing that philosophic activity is itself the dynamic expression of an ongoing relationship between opposing idea-producing groups. There are antecedents to such views, the most famous one perhaps being the Marxian dialectic view. Still, it is not convincing that something or other about the constitution of such opposing groups precedes the content of their activities: after all, a characteristic paradox reemerges in that the sociological model would itself have to be rendered meaningful by appealing to prior conceptual content. The author thinks that some grounding can be found for the group-view by identifying a constitutive conceptual charter, so to speak, for the group-activity and opines that "truth is the reigning sacred object of the [philosophic] scholarly community" and in this manner he anchors also the concept of group that is relevant for his analysis. This does not seem right, however, because the notion of truth itself, though central to a multiplicity of celebrated philosophical conundrums, is itself treated as the source of paradox and as a concept that is open to probing investigation rather than as ideological shibboleth or glue for identitarian membership or group cohesion. In the end, the author promotes a view that he calls "sociological realism", meant to be lusciously accoutered with all the handsome advantages of philosophic realism (asserting mind-independent existence of problematized notions including those of place and time), while failing to



accommodate abstruse claims about “realities beyond the human-sized world” (Collins 1998: 862). In this way, we have come full-circle back to the realization that such anomalies accrue due to the ongoing group-work of “intellectual networks”. Nevertheless, although seeming to neatly confirm a sociological reading of philosophy’s operations, there is a sleight of hand in all this: if it is accepted that the subject of philosophy is critical analysis, unto the most resistant technical crevices of reasoning, then the provenance of the anomalous inquiries is dictated by the nature of the enterprise and cannot be debited to happenstances surrounding the historical vicissitudes of groups. And, conversely, if “intellectual networks” are to be credited with the production of abstract and even aberrant inquiries, then such work can still be regarded correctly as encompassed within philosophic (rather than any other kind of) activity only if it is already granted that philosophy has as its characterizing function precisely such examinations rather than being secreted through concrete group-work.

What are philosophy’s providence and provenance, then? Let us not relinquish this subject to the fashionably slipshod disclaimer that shrugs off – “who is to decide?” – but rather let us seek to find, among “family resemblances” of activities that can pass muster as iterations of the philosophic game, some defensible markers; the defense consisting in what we can show that can be gained as intellectual benefit from applying the proposed view of philosophy across a range of effective applications – including on our present topic. I suggest that, understood in a certain way, the philosophic activity displaces the initially alluring challenge of the conceptual global-local polarity, and it does so for reasons that may interest the students of global cultural phenomena and even safeguard worthy scholarly endeavors from puzzlement about what turn out to be irrelevant or otiose pseudo-contrarities. I will try subsequently to elucidate this by using a historically inspired narrative, with a view to showcasing both how philosophy, as I would define it, functions and how it can be seen to resolve certain pertinent challenges by displacing problems that may seem to arise from global-local contrasts onto other arenas: specifically, I will trace how the debate on



the logical law of non-contradiction, which agitated Aristotle and appeared to be run roughshod over by another “group” of ancient Hindu thinkers, endures in our times both as a subject of debate and as a trove of applicable lessons. Although the Greek and Hindu did not have our modern technological privileges of physical interaction and mutually communicable missives, the continuing agitation over this ultimate subject – it is about logic or the standards of reasoning after all – serves in a sense as an enduring continuation of a philosophic activity that has the “local” merged with the “global” in ways I will take some pains to try to account for. We may notice also that this story is motivated by, and succeeds proportionately to, acquiescing to a certain view of what philosophy itself is and does. Displacements, whose existence I adumbrated above, happen here in the sense that what may seem as a culturally produced local-global alchemy of interactions turns out to be a dialectical reflection on problems of logic and language (across both axes finding plurality, which should please us a lot, as well as an overarching framework that we can readily see as fitting neatly into the discipline of philosophic analysis, as defined). A hope that arises, ringing almost strangely utopian, is that the philosophic study of such problems about the ultimate preconditions of human reasoning (not in a psychological sense) fit into a dialectical model that merges local and global, free of strife and shorn of what turn out to be spurious trade-offs (by “dialectical” we are to understand dialogue-based and not the Hegelian or Marxian notions). Certainly, this view consigns philosophy, as defined, to an aloof position, which can also accommodate and explain an initial impression that arises to such an effect. That such a discipline is available, though not to everyone’s tastes of course, is itself potentially promising – even if it is arguably undermined to some extent by this very aloofness.



A CASE STUDY: ARISTOTLE ON NON-CONTRADICTION
(ἀδυνάτον ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι) AND THE HINDU CA-
TUṢKOṬI (四句分別)

In an unprecedented, for its era, documentation of seemingly incompatible “localities”, Raju (1954) regaled his respectable philosophic audiences in the “west” with a claim he had previously presented to audiences at Harvard University: it appears that ancient philosophic documents by redoubtable Hindu thinkers repudiate the “classical” logical rules, specifically the so-called law of non-contradiction. The dissonance is as deep as possible since it is about how to reason. Staal (1962: 53) poignantly underscores the formidable character of the challenge by pointing out that “the possibility of mutual understanding would become moot” if Indian thought rejects the law of contradiction. It is important to note that the exhibit is not an anthropological curiosity, often leading to histories of abusive and prejudicial deprecations of a “primitive” or at least non-western mind, but a genuine object for conceptual and logical analysis.

Jayatilleke (1967: 69) traced this mode of reasoning originally to the Pali Nikaayas. He took it as a typical “East-West problem” in philosophy and, trying to reconcile what he might have seen as an anomaly, he pointed out that the problem has baffled both Indian as well as western scholars, and among these Indian scholars. It is not presumptive that there has to be some baffling anomaly in all this: to declare an anomaly presupposes arguments in support of one or another school in the philosophy of logic. Our point is that the work of philosophic logic and philosophy of logic is foundational as we may venture to say – notwithstanding some undesirable connotations that cling to using words like “foundational”.

The “western” student of philosophical logic readily recognizes the subject matter and is reminded – “karma” after all – that Aristotle too, the austere enforcer of the law of non-contradiction, was once tempted to adopt an alternative logical system in order to solve the classic problem known as “future contingents”. Simplified



and stated in rather antiquated language, the challenge is: how can predictive statements be true or how can they be false since there are no factual “truth-makers” yet available for them? Since they are meaningful, however, their being “neither true nor false” ought to be admitted as an additional way of being “true”. Of course, this alters the meanings of true and of false, it alters the meaning of the connectives or “logic words” and, so, produces an alternative logic. Aristotle rapidly rejected such a move once he realized that treating “neither true nor false” as a truth value forfeits the logical laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction. It is not clear that he detected that an alternative logic is generated in this way or that he was injecting a third truth value. Regardless, he detected that the negation of “neither true nor false” ought to be defined also as “neither true nor false” (based on the philosophic motivation), and, so, “p and not-p” is also to be “neither true nor false” (if we opt for the output of conjunction as the minimum of the ordered truth values). But this means that “p and not-p” is not false! The law of non-contradiction has vanished into thin air. It might have been impossible for Aristotle to conceive that “alternative” logics can still be logics in any passable sense of the term. It would be like wanting to have his cake and eat it too if he had insisted that non-contradiction is a valid logical rule in any alternative logic. The rejection of the alternative logic, it can be seen, is motivated by a logical-philosophical dogma according to which certain logical rules (including the non-contradiction rule) are unexceptional. Aristotle, who thought that ultimately logical laws arise from within the “nature of things”, subordinated logic, as he did with everything else, to a levelling naturalism. Be that as it may, this famous antiquarian milestone, with related problems reoccurring in medieval times as the notion of divine omniscience, which is said to know for sure which predictions and even what counterfactuals are true, posed similar challenges. The moral of the story so far is that philosophy, through its integral connection to available or even aspired instruments of logical analysis, has both background and equipment for negotiating challenges about the most fundamental of all collisions of localities: apparent shifts of the reasoning “games” that are at play.



This fascinating skirmish brings up the subject of logical pluralism: controversial as it is, and not possibly examined in any sufficient detail, it is evident that it is one of the staple problems in philosophical logic and the philosophy of logic. Nor can it be excluded peremptorily that linguistic fragments within any language would not present similar shifts about logics that are at work. To the traditionalist student of logic, it is initially shocking that what logic applies emerges as a matter for empirical investigation and discovery. This should not lead us to make the mistake, however, that logical systems themselves, in their mathematically modelled representations for instance, are empirical products. Returning to the ancient Hindu logic, Staal (1962: 71) rightly opines: “It has been seen, however, that certain structures of language, which are available in Sanskrit, in Greek, and in other languages, are related to particular logical doctrines. The problem then becomes to see which particular linguistic structure is related to which particular logical doctrine”.

The logic that Raju (1953) drew attention to is known now as based on the principle of the *catuṣkoṭi* [四句分別], which, if irony permits, is also rendered by the Greek term *tetralemma*: this can be expressed as: “four alternatives”, “four possibilities”, “four edges”, “four corners” of truth. Plainly, the set of truth values is enlarged to contain, in addition to “true” and “false”, the truth values “neither true nor false” and “both true and false”. We may think of the added truth values as presented as ways for propositions (meanings of declarative sentences) to be meaningful. As it was explained earlier, the logic is different since the set of truth values is not the standard one ({true, false}) and the logical connectives (not, and, either or, if then, etc.) are now defined over a different set of truth values. It is now known that ancient Hindu philosophers experimented in such ways of thinking. Staal (1962: 69) was also aware that the work bequeathed to posterity under the title *Mīmāṃsā* also discards the law of non-contradiction: the author tried to offer the disclaimer that “this is because a different kind of negation is used” but this is trivial in the whole picture: certainly, the meaning of



negation is different since the set of truth values is not classical. Perhaps, the point is that the philosophic, or linguistic, motivation for the whole project originated with reflections on negation. I cannot attest to this one way or another but there has accrued, since then, voluminous literature on this subject. It is crucial to highlight a kind of mistake that has often afflicted students of philosophy (and one can only dread what may happen beyond): it may seem that critiques can now be rallied against whatever views are presented and whatever arguments are raised based on the “standard” notion of negation – or some other connective. But, as we have reiterated already, the “subject has been changed” (to cite Quine’s famous quip, Quine 1970: 82-3). We can imagine such faulty conceits arising – in one direction or another: either the locals are “irrational” as the right wing may say, or they are thinking in a way that we cannot understand as an enthusiastic (but ultimately incoherent) relativist may venture. Neither works. We have clinical access to the tools of studying the logics that are at play; we find examples of such incursions within linguistic fragments (to say nothing of motivated philosophical or even scientific viewpoints) across different languages; incentivization of taking positions on one or another side betray underlying philosophic views about logic itself. We may wonder if a good deal of writings in the social sciences can be thought of as “footnotes” to such misunderstandings.

One of the most prolific students of the family of logics within which the *catuskoṭi* fits is Graham Priest (e.g. 2006, 2008, 2010; Garfield, Priest 2003.) The logic of the “four corners of truth” is not *dialectic* (accepting contradictions as such to be ways of being true) but *paracomplete* (permitting contradictions to be ways of being true). Later sources in ancient Indian philosophy commandeer a more radical approach, which rejection all four corners of truth themselves, enthroning, as Priest (2015: 35) puts it, a “fourfold negation”. The term *catuskoṭi* itself needs disambiguation as it is sometimes taken to be referring to this latter teaching of comprehensive rejection of the four corners (Priest 2010: 35, also citing Raju 1953). This logic can be formalized (according to Priest 2010:



37), tendentiously rendering an added fifth truth value as “none of the above”, inducing a five-valued logical system.

Daya (1957: 255) tries to naturalize what may appear at first as a clash of local traditions in reasoning, by rightly pointing out examination of philosophical problems can and has often led to motivation of alternative logics. The author points out that sticking by the classical laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle actually leads to paradoxical consequences unless “[either the Humean] or [the] Buddhistic view of empirical reality” is adopted, by which objects are labeled by constants or names only insofar as such objects are taken as having invariable spatiotemporal coordinates. The author further points out how this arrangement itself also leads to paradoxical consequences if it is combined with certain famous results in modern mathematics (specifically, the Cantorian results about the continuum). We saw earlier the example of Aristotle’s problem of future contingents as another such case. Rejections of logical laws have been motivated in many ways throughout the history of thought and it is ironic that Aristotle himself is on record (with the celebrated query that is traditionally identified as “the problem of future contingents”) for considering an alternative logic which he sharply rejecting upon realizing that classical laws of logic are lost when this is done. There is no obstacle, however, in imagining Aristotle conversing with the Hindu thinkers. When analysis is brought to bear, with the travails of philosophy so understood, intercultural exchanges can go through unimpeded. We may wonder, of course, as to an apparent assumption made here – that the formulations of problems as such are in some universal language that itself operates according to the classical rules of reasoning. Interestingly, something along these lines appears to have been one of Aristotle’s, not fully hashed out, arguments in support of the law of non-contradiction. We cannot enter into such additional complications here but what is significant, for our current purposes, is that we can clearly draw the contours of such debates, and further add substantive content to the debates, even within each of the identified traditions, and that the terrain on which such meetings of minds can be transacted is laid out by philosophy.



Although the main points have been made, we may briefly satisfy appetites we might have whetted by digging a little deeper into the background of this subject. Aristotle provides both what we would call today logical and metalogical formulations of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). Aristotle (*Metaphysics* (*Τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*) Γ.4, 1006^a3-4, 14-15) defends the principle by arguing that any meaningful denial of the principle would have to presuppose validity of the principle that is denied (since the denying statement itself would have to be understood as sharply distinct from its own negation). In a rarely acrimonious polemic, Aristotle denounces anyone who would deny the PNC as “no better than some vegetative form of life”. The complete statement of the principle. *Metaphysics* (1006^a1-10) reads, in my attempted translation, as follows:

But we have taken it as it being impossible that anything both is and is not and we showed to this effect that this of all principles is the most certain. Indeed, those who demand proof of this do so because of lack of learning: because, certainly, it is lack of learning to not know of what proof should be demanded and of what it should not be so demanded. For it is impossible to have proof of everything (because such would go on to infinity, hence this would not be a way to give proof).

Metalogical formulations (ignoring the treatment of contrariety and other relationships from the square of opposition) are given as follows: 1) contradictory statements cannot be true together (*Metaphysics* Γ.6, 1011^b15ff.) [$\forall \phi \sim (\tau \Gamma \phi \neg \ \& \ \tau \Gamma \sim \phi \neg)$] – second-order logic formulation; 2) it is not possible to assert and deny the same (*Metaphysics* Γ.3, 1005^b23ff.) [$\forall F \forall x \sim (F(x) \ \& \ \sim F(x))$].

Bocheński (1951: 37) reads another formulation: “For each meaningful sentence ϕ , there is one and only one sentence that is the negation of ϕ ” (*De Interpretatione* 6.17^a31, 7.17^b38). Also: “Of any two mutually contradictory sentences, one must be true and the other false” (*De Interpretatione* 7.17^b26). “For it is a matter of necessity that each statement, whatever it may be, must be either affirmed or denied [my translation]” (*Metaphysics* Γ.7, 1011^b23ff.). “For it is necessary that of a contradiction (what is denied) one of

the two components must be true. Moreover, insofar as it is necessary that anything is either affirmed or denied, it is then impossible that both (conjuncts) are false: so, one of the two components of the contradiction is false” [my translation] (*Metaphysics* Γ.7, 1012^b10ff). Other formulations are found in *De Interpretatione* (*Περί ερμηνείας*) 9.18^a37f.; 12, 21^b1-8. Bocheński (1951: 40ff.) observes that Aristotle clearly distinguishes another fundamental logical principle of the standard logic, known as the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM; in Latin: *tertium non datur*) from the principle of non-contradiction (PNC) and at times appears to harbor doubts about the validity of PNC. According to PNC, every meaningful statement is either true or false; that they cannot be both is provided by the principle of non-contradiction. It is possible for a logical system to observe one but not the other principle but such a logic would not be the classical logic because in the latter the two laws are inter-derivable.

Turning now to the paracomplete logic of the “four corners of truth”: Priest (2010: 30ff) provides a syntactic formulation of the *catuṣkoṭi* by means of recursive definitions in the metalanguage of all four truth-predicates. The definition of the *catuṣkoṭi* can then be expressed metalinguistically by the following schema for all atomic sentential variables p : *a*) p is related to true and p is not related to false [four-cornered definition of “true”]; *b*) p is not related to true and p is related to false [four-cornered definition of “both”]; *c*) p is not related to true and p is not related to false [four-cornered definition of “neither”]; *d*) p is related to true and p is related to false [four-cornered definition of “false”]. A needed stipulation is needed: any sentential variable must take one of the four values. Another needed stipulation is that no sentential variable may take more than one of the four values. An interesting metalogical observation is noted by Priest (2010: 33): if what is known as the T-predicate (Tarski predicate of truth) is admitted for the formal system, then there is “collapse” of the corners, reverting to a two-valued system. This, however, far from establishing some kind of transcendental diagnosis of anomaly, can be simply taken to suggest that the formal system should be constructed without the T-predicate.



PHILOSOPHY'S ROLE IN STUDYING GLOCALIZATION

Studies about the global, the local, and indeed the glocal risk becoming incoherently entangled in the varieties of problems, puzzles and paradoxes whose analysis philosophy has arrogated to itself since time immemorial, and across traditions (insofar as we settle, for defensible reasons, on a definition of philosophy as I adumbrated above). Even more alarming is the nagging possibility that incoherent or redundant debates arise around conceptual, theoretical and methodological issues given that such debates have already occupied philosophical travails. The issues that have traditionally occupied philosophical investigations are foundational: they relate to the preconditions for and constraints on how to make sense of claims (not in a psychological but in the logical sense), and, underlying that, to any existing variety of modes of rationality. The subject of translatability across linguistic frameworks has also attracted broad, even if inconclusive, attention.

After all, it is a trivial point to make, for any coherent study, that matters pertaining to meaning must be negotiated and settled – or at least regarded as capable of being so negotiated and settled – prior to, and as a precondition for, carrying on with any intelligible project. We may think, even if inevitably simplifying, of the negotiating task as constituting the philosophic activity. The apparent fact that philosophic controversies abound, apparently stay unsettled, tend to recur, with raging debates, may explain both why philosophy appears aloof to the other disciplines (after all, it is the settling that must first be procured and its seeming indefinite postponements can only be rankling); and also why misunderstanding or disregarding the ministrations of philosophy can be fateful and even fatal for coherence (after all, insofar as the conceptual challenges are unsettled, either they must be taken as fixed and continue to rouse controversies, or the controversies themselves re-emerge, perhaps in more simplified and imprecise disguise, and be confronted without the rigorous analytical resources and methods that philosophy has so carefully cultivated). If we consider, additionally, how the comments (should we say “meta-comments”?) ventured



above may themselves constitute semantic material that is itself already open to the same challenges that it speak about: this, however, does not show that the case is helpless (it cannot count as proof of such a claim) as it rather suggests that the philosophical tasks (be they vexing or beckoning) are inexorable. The apparent failures of philosophic analysis to solve outstanding challenges, the wide range of discordant positions, the availability of strong arguments of both sides of disputes, but also the recurrent commission of errors and claimed attributions of fallacies – all such familiar experiences to the historian of philosophical schools and debates may exacerbate a negative view of philosophy but let then such critiques also be debited to philosophy!

We may search for an example in how discussions of relativism appear in philosophical analysis. The relevance to the study of global and local phenomena is not only obvious but foundational as it pertains even to translatability of meanings. While the student of glocal phenomena cannot be detained by philosophical investigations, at least not without changing institutional but also substantive roles and activities, the ongoing philosophical attempts to deal with relevant issues of meaning generate valuable insights. Drawing on resourceful philosophical analysis can: preclude and rectify conceptual fuzziness; remedy logical lapses (relative to whatever paradigmatic framework of meaning is adopted by the student of the glocal); highlight the theoretical options and obstacles that are available in relation to the “deeper” issues (the ones that ought to be settled for whatever scholarly investigation to “make sense” even under its own lights, so to speak); and, indeed, to continue to take upon itself the burden of the ineluctable failures that accrue from the probing analytical interrogatories themselves so that the researchers in other fields can continue apace on their appointed work but with an available access to the logical hygiene, prevention and corrections that philosophical analysis has in store.

Admittedly, expectations for such synergetic labor may be utopian; the rigor of philosophy is purchased at a heavy price: as any incidental observer can attest, and frustrated interloper can document, the toil of philosophy can be prohibitively demanding, often



presupposing extensive technical training in the methods of formal logic and transacted within a long tradition of trading off elegance and accessibility for analytical rigor and attention to complex detail. The view that any taxing problem that comes within the purview of philosophy must be based on some underlying and undetected error either in logic or in linguistic usage, pioneered by the logical empiricist and analytical schools and lucidly explicated in (Carnap 1950), does not help with “public relations” with the rest of the academic universe. On the other hand, however, if such are the burdens of critical thinking at the highest level and if it is philosophy that is institutionally encumbered with such, then we may as well change the metaphor and see the ministrations of philosophical labor as the kind of emergency care for reasoning that anyone may need despite whatever limitations and constraints may weigh down the prospects of survival. It is essential that, as we saw in the case we addressed in preceding section, that this is the kind of emergency services that are in principle accessible to anyone across the global spectrum while also catering to whatever needs may be arising from local constraints on the transactions of reasoning. In our study of the case, we saw how the formal equipment of logic can be applied diagnostically, happily free of possible bias or error accruing due to encounters with what may be initially unfamiliar “rules of the game”.

Certainly, all this is controversial in spite of whatever reassurances we may provide to the contrary: indeed, habits die hard and embittered complaints about miscommunications across semantic localities, as well as the perennial revelations about what extra-semantic elements (be it history, material conditions, gaps between economic forces and legal frameworks, demographic or ascriptive essentialisms) underlie the production of meaning, have hardened over millennia. Vested interested ride on perpetual reiterations of such asseverations. More alarming, since it is cost-free in terms of analytical rigor to perpetuate paradigmatic views without caring or being equipped to dissect them critically in a rigorous and systematic fashion, something like what economic theorists call moral hazard exists in this case: reinforcing such institutional behaviors



constantly disincentivizes engagement with the tools of logical analysis and continuously raises the cost for all: old debates are rediscovered but laying in shallower waters now; poor reasoning habits become ever more entrenched; meta-questions and meta-assumptions are allowed to lead to intellectual paralysis or propagandistic smugness.

There is always more work to be done about such fundamentally constitutive matters. I have to bypass for current purposes the intriguing topic of inter-translatability for which accumulated insights from philosophical studies seem both valuable and indispensable (but see for a seminal text: Quine 1960, ch. 2, and as one example of a response Searle 1987.) The comprehensive edited volume by Roudometof and Dessì (2022) addresses this concern and showcases problems while also supplying a substantive relevant bibliography. This is a promising area for training reasoning skills and, by the same token, one in which fallacy can loom large if the tested resources of philosophical analysis are not deployed. I will, however, address briefly in the next section, what is clearly, a central issue related to our subject: claims that radically relativize meaning – what we may call “alethic relativism”. According to this view, as defined aptly by Baghranian and Carter (2022: 4.4.), what is true or false (assuming that bivalence of truth value is to be thought as invariant) is always, irreducibly and incorrigibly relative to a specified conceptual, linguistic, or cultural framework. It should not be difficult to make the case that a radical challenge of this kind ought to lurk around any theoretical study of glocalization. At a minimum, it ought to be assumed that alethic relativism is either refuted if communication of meaning is actuated, or that appropriate adjustments are made to accommodate such communication of meaning across linguistic, or other, barriers. The former assumption may seem not sensitive enough to locality of meaning – which, of course, is circular as an argument purporting to show that there must be relativization of meaning. The latter assumption necessitates the search for, and thorough exploration, of increasingly technical means to accommodate. In either case, the experience and resources of philosophic debates and endeavors is available and can



provide economies of scale, so to speak, in trying to address a subject such as this. Pondering over relativism has been a staple subject of philosophic debates, dominating the activities in the western-classic debates between Plato's Socrates and the Sophists – and we may safely wager that this can be found as a lively topic in unmistakably philosophic debates across various traditions over the millennia. A short section on the subject is warranted, also hinting at how a philosophic propaedeutic for studies of global phenomena can be formed, without, of course, presuming to be resolving the various problems involved. Nevertheless, the apparently interminable reiteration of philosophical animadversions – also in evidence in the subject of relativism – should not be taken to invalidate a need for the ministrations of philosophical labor. The other disciplines present such a phenomenon, further accentuated and undermined by logical errors and efforts to “reinvent the wheel” arising from neglect of philosophical analysis. There is a deeper view, as well, due to logical empiricism, that ostensibly irresolvable puzzles stem from logical or linguistic errors in the formulation of the putative problem: but this too is a philosophic position and can be properly understood, and its lessons applied, as part of the philosophic propaedeutic that was brought up above.

I will briefly examine three sample cases with a view both to correcting views about the methods of philosophy and to showing how the subjects and problems philosophy examines (and the analytical approach philosophy takes) make philosophical resources indispensable for a burgeoning field like that of glocalization studies. In the first case, we diagnose a characteristic error about the nature of logic; this error permeates widespread conceits about how meaning originates and how it is to be studied and, as part of its insalubrious influence, prevents potential synergies between social studies fields and philosophical analysis. The second case shows how philosophical study, and specifically the logical methods at the disposal of philosophy, can be applied to make sense of what could appear at first as unbridgeable divides across semantic (more aptly perhaps, linguistic) frameworks located in different cultural units and at different times. The analysis, albeit presented in synopsis,



pierces through what might have been disastrous confusions, renders precise representation of the issues at stake and, crucially, preempts all sorts of gratuitous, vogueishly recurrent, claims about meaning relativism. The third case takes direct aim at the subject of relativism – a foundational subject confronting the students of social and cultural phenomena. We get a sense of the complexity of the subject, the important conceptual distinctions and theoretical varieties that are at stake, and, in so doing, configure subtly the fundamentally philosophical tasks that study of global and related phenomena ought to face and manage as a matter of – as we may put it – logical hygiene. The consolations of philosophy, which has been hard bent on dissecting and discussing such matters for a long time, can be put to good use; or, confusions and undetected errors may abound – not to mention that efforts to “reinvent the wheel” can arise as students of social and cultural subjects try to face the challenges anew and without the available resources of philosophical analysis.

THE CASE OF F.C.S. SCHILLER

The strident writings of redoubtable early-20th century thinker, F.C.S. Schiller, exemplify a certain type of recurrent erroneous conceits about what logic is and what logic does. The prominence of this and derivative misunderstandings occludes access, and may even adjure against invoking, the services of logical analysis. Due to the misconceptions, the logical study of meaning can be smugly declared as passing through analysis of material, social or economic conditions of production; unfolding historic forces; psychological influences and conceits; cultural demarcations; and the list can be expanded ad libitum. The harm from such views can hardly be underestimated: based on points raised in the preceding section, we can say that the study of how a meaning-game works, which is logic, is itself not only independent but constitutively prior to any possibility of assessing the subject of study altogether. To give an example, without any prospects of entering into details here and only for



illustrative purposes, the paraconsistent character of the Hegelian, or for that matter the Marxian, dialectic, ought to be itself accepted as prior to, and as necessary for, accessing the theoretical system. Whether the contingent truths of empirical, historical, cultural or any, “reality” are engendered or produced in some specific way is not what logic studies. Think of such claims and whatever etiolog-ical or broadly causal underlying claims as “plugged” in to yield conclusions within the theory; but the internal coherence of the theory itself is indeed at stake as the subject matter of logic. So, returning to the example, it is not the claims about power or history that constitute logical meaning – such are logically indeterminate statements. It is rather the solidity of the inferential patterns within the theory that is addressed by logical analysis, and, under an assumption of logically pluralist charity, the internal logic of the system may not necessarily be “classical”. Imagine, however, if the drawing of inferences, based on whatever premises and evidence are adduced, violates the theoretical system’s own inferential rules!

One unwarranted assumption that can reinforce the confusion could be that logic is inexorably “classical”. In other words, there may be a presumption that logical study would result in imposing an absolutist and universalistic straitjacket and, so, show itself as incompatible with the luxuriating spectacle of variety across theoretical systems, historical eras, linguistic frameworks, cultural traditions or whatever context is singled out as relevant. This, however, is an error, as the analysis of the previous section ought to make clear by briefly studying a striking example of what seems at first an insuperable divide across both temporal and cultural-traditional contexts. The fact that logical heterodoxy is controversial within the philosophy of logic does not undercut the essential thrust of the preceding comments as it shows that further querying this overall subject would invite more rather than fewer philosophic excursions.

F.C.S. Schiller, a self-styled “humanist pragmatist”, avers in one of his voluminous polemics that “logic substitutes classification of empty distinctions for the study of actual thinking” (Schiller 1912: 1). The vagueness of “empty” in this assertion is mind-boggling.



There is a sense in which the operations of deductive logic are “empty” in that they are not derivative from empirical content. We may think of how confused it would be to ask for empirical support for why the rules of a game, let’s say soccer, are what they are. We may trace the historic origin of the rules-constituting formation of the game, not excluding possible subsequent alterations in the rules, but the normative force exercised by the rules is not a factual matter: insofar as the game is played according to its rules (which is a trivial request), we cannot depend on canvassing opinions from those who “know” the game as to whether it is played correctly or not. Think of how it is patently nonsensical to ask a referee to decide whether S is or is not a rule of some game X (distinguished from whether S has been correctly applied.) Moreover, as the above opening salvo shows, Schiller thinks of “actual thinking” in a concrete way, which is flagrant misunderstanding again.

Pursuing further the preceding example, imagine pressing that we need to draw some distinction between what an omniscient referee of the rules of some game X “actually” thinks. Materially concrete, content-rich, psychologically inflected modes of thinking are not about logic: think of how subjective emotions can hamper application of a game’s rules (but in no way could it be claimed that the rules are not what they are after all, since they can be subverted in application). Or, if we may vary out hypothetical, see if we can make sense of some claim that separate cultures A and B can be said to be playing the same game X even though the rules are different, and the justification given for this being that any rule S can be U because S becomes U as refracted through the lens of culture B. This might be a tempting example but notice how the two games cannot be the same! (It is interesting perhaps if the two games can be matched, isomorphically as mathematicians might say, which would make them in some proper sense equivalent but not identical: game Y is for culture B what game X is for culture A. But it is open to further examination to see how this can make precise sense.)

In the same vein, Schiller inveighs logic for not dealing with reasoning as it takes place in actual life – reasoning as concentered by means of actually occurring processes – but, without sensing the



problem, he dismisses this as falling under the purview of psychology, from which he concludes (Schiller 1912: 2) that logic performs an illicit normative function in dismissing instances of reasoning as bad. He does not see of course that a critique of such “dismissals” needs can be raised only as an appeal that some alternative logic is at work (“you misunderstand what game is being played”. But can we make sense of a claim to the effect that “even though the rules of the game have been correctly applied, nevertheless the outcome must be dismissed because the rules are ‘wrong?’”).

Further, Schiller (1912: 3) demands: “if [logic’s] function is to give an account of true thinking, is it not thereby committed to lay claim to all truth and universal knowledge? Must it not profess to discern truth and to correct error in all the sciences?”. Truth and falsehood are properties of declarative statements (statements that can be correctly asserted, if true, in discourse), and it is not clear what “true thinking” is. If it is about empirically correct conjectures and assertions, this is again to misunderstand what logic does. If we think, to repeat the cliché, as logic being about drawing conclusions (and some other notions), so that “garbage in-garbage” so to speak, Schiller’s complaint is tantamount to protesting that what has come in from outside has in fact been secreted internally. Schiller dismisses the fundamental distinction between “formal” and content-rich so peremptorily that he actually thinks that this distinction, between the formal character of logic and the “material” content of statements, has itself been drawn defensively by embarrassed logicians so they can cover up their failures in discovering universal truths. A straw-man caricature can also be discerned here, not uncommonly fancying the philosopher as a researcher for meaning-of-life “universal” truths. In fact, Schiller (1912: 4-5) doubles down that this “brilliant idea occurred to logicians”, about what logic is, so that they can disavow responsibility for factual error and “sit in judgment” over the sciences themselves and “criticize all knowledge without producing any”. There is a lot about a productive character of logic (in the case of deductive logic at least, this seems unavoidable) but this complaint is, analogically speaking, like castigating grammarians for allegedly concocting an “empty”



discipline of grammatical analysis only so that they can disavow responsibility for what is being written or said. Nor does Schiller see the error of his ways as he obdurately confounds again logic with psychology in claiming proudly (Schiller 1912: 5): “for it lay in the erroneousness of his original assumption that the actual process of thought could be put aside as psychological and irrelevant to its evaluation” (Schiller 1912: 5).

Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that, inadvertently, Schiller actually discovers for himself the position of logical pluralism, but he misjudges his serendipitous insight as falling outside the scope of logic itself. It is trivially true, of course, that a logical-philosophical commitment to the “Aristotelian” classicist view is orthogonal to logical pluralism but this too helps us see how the subject fits into the philosophical discussions around logic – not to mention the correspondent motivated formalisms whose study amply showcases the travails of mathematical logic and metalogic. It is worth quoting a relevant passage from Schiller at some length; piercing through his jargon, what he takes to be the “matter” of logic, as distinguished from the “form”, is not empirically based content, although he thinks so: alternative formal systems, to which he alludes, may be motivated by specific empirically based considerations but are themselves, indeed, formally developed and thus “empty” of empirical meaning postulates. Their “meanings”, in a semantic rendering, would be developed as truth values, with a multiplicity of such truth values defined in the development of multivalent extensional logics or as values-in-context for construction of modal logics.

To advert to the standard, tricky but, for our current purposes, illustrative, analogy from geometry: an alternative, non-classical (non-Euclidean) geometrical system (like that deployed in relativity theory), cannot claim a factual or descriptive character with respect to empirical reality; it is formally developed, and the separate empirical subject of its applicability is not included in its content. If we keep in mind the above observations, the following passage could be translated into a plea for the adoption of a logical pluralist view of logic, although the author mistakes it for a repudiation of



reliance on formal logic. Form and matter could not in the end be wholly separated; certain forms were appropriate to certain matter, certain meanings were expressed more naturally in one form than in another. It could not be maintained, therefore, that the material of thought exercised no influence at all upon the form and could be disregarded by Logic altogether; it had to be admitted that the forms of thought were diversely modified according to the various matters thought about (Schiller 1912: 5).

It does not occur to him that the alternative “forms” to be applied are going to be as “empty” and treated as incorrigible on the basis of material content, once selected: he confuses what is aptly called “motivation” of a logical formalism for what the nature of formalism itself is. The “material of thought” motivates development of alternative formalism. As an apt example, that ought to be taken to heart for obvious reasons, the logic motivated by Marxist dialectic historicism, like its Hegelian predecessor, would not be observing the classical law of non-contradiction. We examined in a preceding section, and in some detail, another case that propels adoption of a non-bivalent logic. We see that logic, broadly understood and injected with a principle of pluralist tolerance, is overarching relative to cultural, linguistic, ideological, or methodological choices. Logic is presupposed for the coherence of whatever overall position is taken and applied: it may be the logic inherent to the position itself but discovering and developing this internal logic systematically and precisely is the work of philosophic logic. Letting logical analysis do the work would save us all kinds and large numbers of empty error-based disputes, supposititious but spurious discoveries, grandiose claims and alleged critiques. But let us notice how application of the proper method of logical analysis brings together, or, more appropriately put, shows us the overarching canopy that we do not notice on account of its demanding technical features. Analogies can be drawn to pseudo-problems and misunderstandings arising out of the classic colonial attitude of not bothering to study the “native’s” language or, for that matter, coming back to our topic, logic if such there is.



We have dwelled on this case because it showcases the types of misconceptions and outright erroneous views about logic, which crop up time and again to undermine what would be a salubrious synergy between philosophic analysis and investigations of global phenomena undertaken mainly by disciplines within the range of social sciences. Skodo (2014: 35-36) sums up Schiller's spirited critique to be taking "formal logic" to task for denying the relevance of a "holistic philosophy of life", for its supposed rigidity and resistance to "radical change", for its opacity to the "plasticity" of human thought, and for its lack of "human" content. The root cause is then said to stem from ignoring "non-logical" elements such as "irreducibly conflicting ideologies, values, and a variety of purposes". The catalogue of charges echoes interminably throughout iterations of ill-conceived projects and approaches that in fact make themselves vulnerable to ideological capture and indiscernible fallacy because of what is, deep down, neglect for the tools of critical thinking broadly understood. In fact, the case of Schiller is more chilling because he knew where to look but his fiery polemic misfired and yielded patently wrong assertions about the subject matter.

The inconsolable isolation of philosophy (punning on a medieval adage about the "consolations" afforded by philosophy), of which we spoke in the opening of this article, is both detrimental to the other fields as it is also the effect of a broad neglect for the instrumentalities of critical thinking: because of the ineluctable universality of logic (understood in the pluralist sense), errors, like Schiller's, that accrue from within the study of the subject are not self-correcting in the sense in which, for instance, more detailed or more precise reiteration of a historiographical analysis can be counted on to correct previous errors. The type of misunderstanding that is highlighted in Schiller's case is, characteristically, something of a "raw" datum. There is no way to apply his insights so that they can be confirmed or disconfirmed. Not only self-correction is lacking but also, it may be noted, his views present a kind of incorrigibility that is typical of logical nonsense. Compare, for example, a Marxist dialectician's possible claim that the study of the history of productive forces shows that logical analysis is "empty" or itself



generated, and, as such, it is malapropos with respect to the proper tools needed for analysis, while, at the same time, the dialectical analyst's claims must be encoded in terms of a non-standard logic (which tolerates contradictions.) If no such reliance is afforded, the project collapses into incoherence.

Skodo (2014: 36) rightly sees Schiller as claiming that "logic" eschews all "humanizing" and concretizing influences and, as such, it "is based on empirically false, historically meaningless, and practically useless assumptions, and is therefore structurally flawed as both a descriptive and normative science of thought". In taking logic to be "descriptive", one throws the game away altogether. The tools of critical thinking are not based empirically: they are "motivated", as the term of art has it, but once ensconced and apt for application they must be conceived formally: to see this, consider generally what we mean by an incoherent claim; now let us try to reason that such a claim is, after all, comprehensible and only shows us that we were wrong about what took logic to be. In that case, the claim was never incomprehensible; it only "seemed" so, but this point, pressed recursively, could be used to "show" that there are ultimately no incomprehensible claims whatsoever. This is a reduction of the initial claim to absurdity. How did we get to this point? We smuggled the assumption of an unrestricted license for following conceits about empirical reality toward "discovering" the "right" logic. Furthermore, if this were to be indeed a way for figuring out the "correct" logic, further adjustments, based on incoming empirical data, would not be permissible anymore (since the "correct" logic has been discovered), which also reduces to absurdity the claims we have been addressing about a putative empirically-based character of logic.

The protestations about rigidity and inflexibility of logic, which we have been also canvassing in Schiller's text and commentaries, reflect assumptions about a presumed universalistic character of logic. As we have already addressed this in our brief analysis of the case of the "four corners of truth", we do not need to pursue the issue further except for a few further observations. Strictly speaking, the critic already presumes that reasoning is not universal, misunderstands this



for a repudiation of logic rather than seeing it for, what it is, a reaffirmation of the fundamental role of logics – in the plural. The critic, moreover, is so making an empirical claim and, in so doing, is incurring an appropriate burden of showing this to be the case. That the discovery of what logic is at play is an empirical matter would have scandalized Aristotle (he did actually court such a case, arguably, in his exploration of what is known as the problem of “future contingents” and promptly retreated from it). Nevertheless, at this juncture, we come face to face with a surprising but well-known conjecture that was raised within the modern school of logical positivism (even adumbrated, albeit haltingly, in Quine’s famous attack on analyticity, see Quine 1951; also relevant is the delightfully unorthodox: Łukasiewicz 1971).

The moral of this story is that the excitement, debate, and whatever controversies surround this matter are part and parcel of the philosophy of logic. It seems impossible to flee the wide nexus of logic and its orbiting areas (metalogic, philosophy of logic). On the other hand, as we have pointed out repeatedly, how to discharge such a burden becomes very much the business of logic (and, once again, “formal” it has to be) insofar as alternative modes of thinking clamor for corresponding formalisms. The alleged “plasticity” of human thought is an empirical claim and not internal to how the devices and methods of formal logical construction work.

RELATIVISM

The presumptive founder in the United States of cultural anthropology (Boas 1940: 636) opined that knowledge and emotions are the product of the “form of social life”. Spiro (1986: 263-4), who valiantly tries to navigate through ample conceptual confusions, documents how “Boas and his followers” took normative conclusions to be following from exclusively descriptive premises – a characteristic fallacy, which the author suspects and endeavors to explicate albeit without much conviction. Apparently, Boas thought that, since the objective of rejecting western ethnocentrism



is morally laudable, it should follow that whatever descriptive premises can be used to draw the relevant normative conclusion ought to be accepted as doing the job in the argumentative entailment. There is a bestiary of logical errors thriving in samples of his writings, and it is alarmingly sobering that so many devout students of the subject cannot unpack the arguments to detect the errors while succumbing to the rhetorical allure inherent to making so valuable a case for normative ethnographic relativism. Nevertheless, not only the normative cannot be derived from descriptive but also non-trivial claims that turn out to be provable are not necessarily to be proven by any means whatsoever. The case for upholding some fuzzy overarching relativist view seems even more robust if it is also to be argued that meaning relativism of some variety (what – Spiro 1986: 263 – calls “epistemic relativism”) itself “follows from” descriptions or factual accounts that ground what may be aptly called “descriptive relativism”. The insouciance with which such leaps are undertaken is astounding. Spiro (1986: 281) is concerned that what was at the time an emergent trend of favoritism toward “ethnographic particularism” could deprive anthropology of any prospects for eking out generalizations and, thus, render the field irrelevant if not obsolete.

Although the motivating objective is itself pragmatic (and, notice again, it cannot by itself support normative or methodologically relevant conclusions), the core concern in the article is about the kind of work that philosophical investigations have been transacting with a view to preventing and rectifying foundational, and as such debilitating, confusions. It is telling perhaps that in the same article the author conflates Lockean epistemic empiricism (the “tabula rasa” fame) with epistemological relativism (Spiro 1986: 261) and tries to appeal to sociobiology (Spiro 1986: 266 and ff.) in a reserved effort to boost the prospects of respectable anthropological generalizability even though, ironically, there is a marked sociobiological alacrity for drawing normative conclusions from merely descriptive observations.

Schmidt (1955: 780) pointed out that, considering the futility of evaluating ambiguous claims, disambiguation is a necessary



condition for assessing standard relativistic claims that proliferate in classic and vaunted texts of anthropology. Citing multiple embarrassing examples of logical error, mostly of the variety of the ought-is fallacy but also of non-falsifiable appeals to the role of the unconscious in epistemic enculturation and, of course, equivocation, Schmidt (1955: 783) establishes a *reductio ad absurdum* from the enthusiastic derivation of normative conclusions from factual accounts of cultural variance: in the case of the ought-is distinction, it can be seen that substituting “is” for “ought” in the sentence “it is that p, but it ought not to be that p” results in contradiction; but, surely, this is a significant or meaningful and not a trivially false (self-contradictory) claim. This famed distinction between ought and is – whose continuing debate is itself a philosophical challenge – is characteristically collapsed across a slew of anthropological jumps from observational accounts to normative and metaethical conclusions.

It may be a promising sign that the philosophical exegesis has percolated into cultural anthropological circles in that there are more recent claims that “there has been a progressive reduction in the scope [of influences on cultural anthropology] of cultural relativism” (Brown 2008: 363). A pressing item on the emerging agenda has been the challenge of reconciling cultural relativism with human rights (given the notorious incident of rejection of the United Nations declaration of human rights document by the American Anthropological Association in 1947), but attempts at reconciling confront logical traps of their own. An attenuated commitment to the trademark relativism of the anthropological variety can be defended on grounds of methodology, considering that meaning-gaps confront the anthropological researcher into cultures (Brown 2008: 371 and ff.); as our case analysis in the preceding section presented, the contributions of philosophical methods and resources are invaluable in such respects.

Relativist dicta, often averred ambiguously as between subjectivism or some community-relative type of conventionalism, are famously raised and debated to the hapless reader’s exhaustion in the Platonic dialogues, with the legendary Protagoras often credited as



the inveterate inventor of such a view. The spectra of relativistic puzzles, apparent antinomies and even outright contradictions, and the difficulties that turn out to be inherent in settling for a cautiously precise and instructive taxonomy of variants of relativism – so that important conceptual distinctions can be drawn and understood – could reemerge to frighten the student of glocalization. If anything, it is surprising that this does not appear to be happening, unless it is already burgeoning interstitially within discussions around specific topics. It seems inevitable that, as we may say, that the wheel might be reinvented: given how central relativistic views are in the convergent disciplines that may be enthusiastic about studying globalization and related phenomena, any more penetrating analysis, delving down to the concepts themselves and seeking to monitor logical soundness, could rediscover problems and positions that have been, even if inconclusively, addressed and debated in philosophy.

Although the corpus of philosophical examination of relativism seems complex and forbidding, sometimes unduly technical, perhaps seeming pedantic, it does, however, have in its depository the conceptual analytical, theoretical, and methodological resources that are needed both to prevent theoretical studies of glocalization from digressing into arcane inquiries and, more importantly in my view, to instill requisite intellectual rigor and logical health in the discussions that are bound to arise and persist. Additionally, relativistic thrusts of the more radical variety could appear as *ab initio* obstacles to many theoretical activities – such as would presuppose the possibility of intercultural communication of meaning, inter-translatability, or higher-order criteria for adjudication of local claims. No less alarming would be the petulance of assertions about the defeat of projects as, presumably, stemming from the primacy of local semantics. Insofar as the “glocal”, if I understand the concept correctly, is, by conceptual design, dependent on the possibility of some synthesis of global and local, there seems to arise a fundamental need to have some preemptive resolution of the kind of relativistic challenges that have been mentioned. The resources of philosophical analysis are indispensable. As mentioned above, one may try to start from scratch



– it would still be doing philosophy but with a handicap in terms of training and background – and yet the copious work of philosophical laborers is available to put to work.

A related danger stems from a tendency, token of ignorance about philosophy as such, to misattribute to philosophy a systematically and preemptively anti-relativistic doctrine. This is patently in evidence in Karl Mannheim’s self-congratulatory text below, where a phantasmagoria is conjured up by not only misunderstanding the character of deductive logic (taking it as pretending to heuristic feats, like Schiller did as we saw in preceding section), but also indulging in a patent view of philosophy as reaching for absolutist and foundationalist grounds:

The main conclusion reached in *Structural Analysis* is that epistemology is not a self-contained discipline; it cannot furnish a standard by which we should be able to distinguish truth from falsehood. All it can do is to re-arrange knowledge already supposed to have been achieved and trace it back to some science which is supposedly “fundamental” in that it deals with a field in which every item of knowledge may be considered as having its origin (Mannheim 1952: 11).

He speaks of epistemology or philosophy of knowledge specifically, perhaps taking it as the relevant rival to his work arising from within philosophy, and then cavalierly misjudges the task of philosophy as always comprising some heuristic goal; he completes the imagines salvo against philosophy by means of a straw-man fallacious caricature of philosophy as always hankering for some ultimate foundation so as to stave off any relativistic incursions. This projects to philosophy a view from outside; although philosophers have often been flagrantly committed to favored views, not free of bias or doctrinaire allegiance, polemical and even fanatical, it can be said that they cannot be such *qua* philosophers; or that they are not carrying out the methodical and analytical operations that we have argued characterize philosophy when so doing. There is a long discussion of justice defended against certain views in Book I of Plato’s *Republic*, which comes to mind. There Socrates argues



against relativizations of the concept of justice to power relations and, in the course of his argument, to paraphrase, he uses the example of a cowherd: he is not a moneymaker qua being a cowherd; as such, as being what it means to be a cowherd, he has to be (trivially, by definition) devoted to the good not of himself but of the cow. We cannot analyze this case here, but the point is that once definitions are settled, we cannot evade the semantically trivial implications that follow from them. Having made a case for how philosophy is to be understood, Mannheim's portrait of the philosopher is mistaken about what philosophy does when Mannheim essentially assigns to the student of philosophy some deep-seated anti-relativistic pathos.

It is impossible to offer even a sufficiently inclusive summary of the extensive philosophical analyses of relativism here, but I will attempt to showcase briefly how philosophy draws attention to and elucidates some basic conceptual distinctions and implications from claims made in relation to the broader subject of relativism, ignoring which could wreak havoc with respect to even identifying what is being claimed! Not to mention that, were heated debates to arise around claims pro or con, coherence and cogency of what is actually presented could be compromised – a standard complaint, by the way, from the other side of the aisle, with students of philosophy so often embittered by the low standards of logical rigor in evidence in other disciplines (hence, the explanation of the characteristic aloofness of philosophy, with which we opened this text, can proceed from both directions of the divide).

Generally, any claim about relativism applied to a concept (or class of things, if taken extensionally), is a claim about treating a predicate as a two-place (binary) rather one-place (unary) predicate. For some predicate Φ (be that a truth-predicate, meaning-predicate, value-predicate, knowability-predicate, and so on), it is presented that it is a misunderstanding to consider Φ as applying to one input (as $\Phi(x)$, for instance as in $\text{True}(x)$ or $\text{Knowable}(x)$ or $\text{Obligatory}(x)$, etc.); it is rather, correctly, to be regarded as a binary predicate ($\Phi(x, y)$, where y must take values from the relevant context be that culture, means of production, historical era, theoretical



framework, etc.). Although it is not an “analytic” (logically necessary, trivial) claim that relativistic claims arise in reaction to or as presented rectifications of an initial position about the non-relativity of the predicate, it is marked that they do arise as such, often accompanied by characteristic polemical thrusts.

An initial analysis of relativistic viewpoints may suggest that they are self-contradictory and, as such, self-refuting (if the “Aristotelian” constraint of bivalence is to be observed, something we examined in preceding section.) For instance, in seeking a determination as to whether “it is morally wrong to torture animals for fun” is true or false, the relativistic principle that eschews ranking an animal-torturing culture and a culture that forbids such practices renders the claim both true and false since both cultures are presumed to be correctly furnishing value-standards. Nevertheless, the logic of relativization comes to the rescue: it is a contradiction for a proposition to be determined both true and false but it is not a contradiction (for the same bivalent view of logic) to have that $\Phi(a, b)$ is true and $\Phi(a, c)$ is false, with “a” and “c” as names for the cultural wholes or traditions that render contrasting judgments as to the value-predicate (regarding permissibility of torturing animals for fun) in our example.

We may think effectively of “relativism” as a cohort of different theories, “relativisms”, (Haack 1996: 297) which are connected by means of characteristic family resemblances, and whose characteristic feature is that they posit that something is related to something else, and Baghranian and Carter (2022) usually make, a concurrent, if not logically entailed, claim that what is so relativized cannot be coherently defined simpliciter.

Relativism is not the same as skepticism, but confusions can arise around this issue. The skeptic denies feasibility of determining the truth value of $\Phi(x)$, for x taking values from the appropriate domain. The skeptic does not need the contextualizing maneuver noted in the preceding point to prevent contradictions from arising. On the other hand, the relativist is not a skeptic insofar as the relativist asseverates that the truth value of the relevant predicate $\Phi(x, y)$ can indeed be determined, at least in principle, for specific values



of x and y respectively from the domain of the value (per our example) and the cultural context.

Although the definition offered above can be defended as the more encompassing, other ways of defining the concept (not inconsistent with the one offered above) include: *a) negative definitions* that characterize relativism in terms of what it stands opposed to: objectivism, universalism, monistic theoretical commitments, metaphysical realism (claiming mind-independent existence of appropriate objects); *b) rectification-definitions*, which present the dependence on the appropriate context as essential and liable to be, or to have been, ignored in the study of some class of phenomena; *c) deferential definitions*: disavowing any ontological or transcendent mentalist commitments, such definitions (endeared to empiricism and logical positivism) treat all claims as meaningful only relative to a holistic theoretical framework which is to be justified on the basis of some criteria (that “it works”, or that it is practically attainable or at least more easily attainable, that it is verifiable by the internal standards of the framework, etc.) Often, deference to scientific paradigms is shown in such cases; *d) vague definitions*: notwithstanding some obvious appeal, almost in sensationalist fashion, perspectival definitions are unclear as to their relativistic credentials. Granted that, for instance, the table can be seen, in every case, only through one specific perspective, it may be asked if there is supposed to exist an authoritative method for deriving the “table” by some means of jointly treating all such perspectives.

There is an important distinction between, usually called, global and local relativisms. The definition of relativism that is presented ought to indicate under which of the two “umbrella” classes the defined concept falls. This is of further interest since there is copious literature interrogating claims that global relativism is self-refuting (going back to the charge that any claims upholding a relativist view are themselves liable to be denied from within some framework insofar as this is said to be the case of every claim: classical locus, Plato, *Theaetetus* 170^e-171^e). Arguments against the incoherence of global relativism and ways in which global relativism may be rescued from a predicament of self-refutation also can be



found (e.g. Blackburn 2007). Confusions can easily arise as to what claims are asserted under a guise of relativist thinking, and what positions are singled out to be attacked in debate; certain subtle and crucial distinctions need to be drawn within and around concepts of relativism, and the philosophic literature on the subject has seminal contributions to make to this effect. We can only sample some examples here: what Haack (1996: 298-299) called “shallow” relativism ought to be distinguished from “deep relativism”. The former is to be identified as compiling observational claims of covariance between some class of things x and a context y ; while the latter, properly credentialed as relativist way of thinking, enters some seminal contention that some class of things (or term) x can “make sense” or be meaningful only relative to (relativized to) what is to serve as independent variable y .

The cautionary, often ignored, distinction between factual or descriptive versus normative relativism is apropos to mention in this connection. David Hume noticed, some time ago, how normative conclusions are presumed derived from only non-normative (descriptive or factual assertoric premises), an inductive logical error which aptly bears the name “Humean fallacy”, also referred to often as the “ought-is fallacy” (well, debating as to whether this is indeed a logical error or not would continue to carry on with the work of philosophy). An infamous exemplar is the ungraciously labeled “anthropological fallacy” by which factual observations and descriptive accounts of varying moral rules and norms across cultures are taken as sufficient for drawing a normative or metaethical conclusion (about what ought to be done, morally, or about the nature of morality as such). The descriptive relativist is akin to the “shallow” relativist as defined above; but what the apple of contention is all about has to do with “deep” relativism, or, in the case brought up here, normative or metaethical relativism. Nagging experience, I think for many who endeavor to teach such subjects, attests to the difficulty students have in grasping that claims about “it all depends on the culture” are deeply ambiguous as between being descriptive or normative. We are not interested in this as a psychological impediment – although that is worth exploring too;



the case is about logical analysis, and if it is to be disputed and debated that too would be, excitingly, carried out within philosophy (by whatever name we may assign to it).

The crux of cultural relativism is often taken to consist in the stipulation of a universal toleration principle. Once again, the confusion is that the adduced principle is normative but is not demarcated unambiguously from the factual or descriptive relativism that is amply attested in the anthropological corpus. This is not a minor guffaw because the vast anthropological collection of facts attesting to diversity could then be taken as sufficient for supporting the normative principle itself – a move that not only commits the ought-is fallacy but now also opens the floodgate to characteristic paradoxes from application of the principle: for example, “tolerating the intolerant” seems to be instantiating an application of the principle, which presumably entails a contradiction (it requires further logical analysis to establish if this is the case). Or the normative principle of tolerance can be disguised as a methodological principle about how to study cultures, possibly from within and without tainting preconceptions: in this case different species of normativity are involved (moral rules as distinguished from rules for correct study), risking further production of fallacious arguments that jump categories in seeking to establish conclusions.

A critical distinction is to be drawn between what Hacking (1982: 49) calls “subjectivity” and a broad term of relativity. Obviously, given how relativism is defined, on any construction, the notion of “relativity” ought to be clearly understood as defined. Subjectivity here connotes that “thinking about p makes it true or false;” whereas “relativity” is about whether p is true or false only relative to the mode of reasoning that is employed. The celebrated oracular pronouncement by Shakespeare’s Hamlet, that “nothing is true but thinking makes it so”, is likely to be a statement on subjectivity as defined above (one may dread speculating as to how this is understood across endless series of lectures and admiring commentaries). Although it comes across as highfalutin, assertions about subjectivity are, at least, anti-realist and, in the worst case, trivial statements masquerading as significant: like stating that “you



cannot attribute meaning without doing so” (for a related point, Haack 1996: 302). Relativity, on the other hand, is where the significant action is. The claim is that no statement can be either true or false (or any other truth value, I would add) independently of what mode of reasoning is employed. This renders modes of reasoning themselves immune to criticism since any such critical attempt would itself be trivially (by definition) a confusion as to what is to be taken as the value of the contextual variable y . No mode of reasoning R can be criticized on the basis of some proposition p that is justified by means of deploying logical resources and rules from R .

As Hacking (1982: 57) puts it, on a well-founded relativity view, it is, and it is only, “styles of reasoning” that render meaning and determinations as to truth value possible, while “deduction and induction merely preserve [truth]”. A subtle distinction (not explicitly drawn but implied and used in Taylor 1982) can be suggested operationally – for purposes of enabling an incisive analysis – between commensurable and incommensurable practices, with incommensurability, as a binary predicate of pairs, being understood along the Wittgensteinian analogy of games that are in principle, not just de facto, constructed on the basis of mutually inconsistent sets of rules. It is not clear if this can point can be ultimately sustained without compelling an investigation of the logics that are at work in the different “games”. Assuming shared logical rules, the incommensurability would be about “contingent things” (as Taylor 1982 assays it) and the pay-off from thinking along such lines is that, for instance, pre-scientific cultural practices are not to be either condemned as irrational or elevated – via a roundabout ethnocentric scheme – as standing for different modes of rationality as such. This example, if I have represented it correctly, and regardless of what possible gaps it presents, is indicative of the kind of ingenuity, coupled with cautious and precise analytical drawing of distinctions, that is found in the tradition of philosophic scholarship.



PHILOSOPHY AND GLOBAL/GLOCAL IMPERATIVES

We may think of the fundamental task of philosophy, understood in a certain way, to consist in a second-order process of reflection that seeks to outline and assess the logical structures that are at stake, motivate and are in evidence, in conceptual and theoretical investigations. Problems that may initially seem perplexing, as they arise from inter-linguistic, inter-cultural, or inter-disciplinary interactions are to be approached by applying the impressive apparatus that philosophical and logical analysis has amassed. The need may arise, as we showcased in the study case of preceding section, to express the logical system that is at work. Examples abound, and they are the staple of debates, in philosophy of logic: for instance, in the investigation of the “language” of the scientific theory of quantum mechanics, the models can be afforded a more parsimonious presentation (pursuant to the Occam’s razor criterion) if construction is to be carried with a “non-classical” logic (in which one of the classical laws of distribution fails).

This subject is certainly controversial within philosophy itself, but the point raised here is that the formal tools and analytical sophistication that are placed at philosophy’s disposal can be deployed to benefit. Put negatively, for philosophy as it were, this is tantamount to discharging such vexing burdens of meaning-explication and systematic mapping of ways of reasoning: the social sciences lack the background institutionalized experience and tools for such tasks; engaging in this kind of labor can only sow unnecessary confusion and reap misunderstanding that can be explained, or even remedied; lead to vaunted discoveries and wild claims that may have been already found or exploded by philosophical investigations; succumb to and reinforce intrusive ideological pressures when, as we have argued, the work of reasoning, rightly understood, is fundamental and a pre-requisite to making sense of any enterprise (doesn’t this seem suddenly like a trivial point, although often missed?).

With respect to cultural analysis, ultimately linguistic-logical analysis, it may be hypothetical or arguable that different logics are at work. Some of this work may be displaced, again, onto traditional



and vexing puzzles regarding translatability. This is not a novel issue, nor is it arising out of interactions across “local” contexts of meaning: it is arguable that a plurality of “logics” is at work within the idiomatic operations of any given language. Taken up by philosophy, the study of the guideposts for reasoning that are needed to transact studies into the interaction of local and trans-local can be carried out with rigor, protecting us from lapses of reasoning (by any relative standard). It may be surprising, and even seem opprobrious, that cultivating academics’ bright faculties is not sufficient for developing some appropriate knack or requisite abilities in logical reasoning: it is a staple of any introduction or preface to a logic textbook that there is an alarming rate of failure in IQ or such tests (comparing also the LSAT for admission to Law School in the US) among highly educated and undisputably bright people. There is some evidence to support that humans are not selected evolutionarily for reasoning capacities.

This awkward subject, so sensitively related to “critical thinking” learning outcomes in education, is often parried by adducing that there are other, “racist” or generally discriminatory forces, at play. Notice, however, that if we adopt a radically relativist view of logical pluralism, as we have been presenting, the need arises for more, and not for less, study of logics as we would be dealing with many, locally embedded, logical systems. Of course, it is plain nonsensical (metatheoretically, or pretheoretically, so to speak) that there can be no system of reasoning at work, whatsoever, in some linguistic idiom or description of some set of cultural practices. A rough comparison with languages, idioms, and dialects will do: if we claim that the locals speak another idiom or dialect, then that has to be studied – and systematic it is, even as it is also organically evolving as natural languages do. We may think of the role of philosophy I have been insinuating into the broader frame to be like that of a harsh taskmaster who keeps track of what is claimed and in what language (analogized to “reasoning” of course, since, as it is known, what Wittgenstein called “logical grammar” is not perspicuously available through mere study of linguistic rules).



In a sense, the work of philosophy may seem like humdrum drudgery to many, although it is surely appealing to the students of philosophy and logic. There is a remaining cornucopia of variegated landscapes to explore and map and it is these that come within the vision of researchers: moral norms, aesthetic values, transactional rules, foundational sagas, and so on. The apparently impressive cultural diversity, calmly encountered by Herodotus but regarded as *prima facie* impressive by anthropological researchers spanning out from out from within the British colonial imperium, can then be seen to have exercised an over-sized influence on academic minds. The deeper question of meaning-generation can be found, rightly approached, to combine the local and the global in a way that can be studied rigorously as I have argued. The subject is dispassionate, as are the methods. Perhaps this is one explanation as to how our era's lightning globalization has been possible at all in the sense that such divergent specimens of humanity arising from an inveterately adversarial history of the species, have been able, rather unceremoniously, to come together and "understand" the "other" within this suddenly available global forum of internet connectivity. Now, it may be noted that if one were to challenge the notion that there is "understanding" indeed, there should be no presumptive objection to raising such challenges, but the question then is: how is "understanding" to be studied? Surely, there can be interest in, let's say, psychological operations but, as we may say, the generation of meaning – as it arises in a "language game" – is not to be taken in the psychological sense but in a broadly normative sense: "I may subjectively think that I understand this sentence, but I am mistaken by the rules that are objectively at work!" We cannot repeat here such gems as Wittgenstein's brilliant proof that there can be no private language.

Moreover, if the caveat is raised that the "local" reasserts itself within the global concatenation of interactive experiences, this too does not pose an objection to what has been argued but, rather, further draws attention to the kind of logical inquiry that has been proposed: what allows local meaning to interact "meaningfully", as it were, with other meaning-generating games; and what are the



preconditions for the possibility of studying such interactions? (there is an interesting complication, which I will have to bypass here. Having mentioned Wittgenstein several times, many students of the subject are well aware how Wittgenstein famously “kicks the ladder” claiming that in the end the subjects of the higher-order inquiry I have been referring to “can be shown” but not be talked about. At least, this is one way of reading his oracular pronouncements. This, however, does not affect, arguably, the “applied” side – how logical investigations can be carried out regardless of what puzzles arise if we were to try a higher level of discourse).

In addition to the meaning-managerial tasks of philosophy, there is also a broad array of philosophical challenges, some of them reaching to hoary antiquities and across different traditions, which become more pronounced and urgent in the current globalized environment. Let us take, as an example, the potential existential threat posed by the rapidly evolving capacities of artificial intelligence: this is a subject of global urgency, to which “local” insights can be inputted for general benefit; but the debate requires analytic rigor and systematic approaches mostly arising out of computer science and neuroscience, physics and mathematics, and with the inexorable presence of philosophy hovering in place (there is even a plausible claim that AI is itself about “philosophy” insofar as AI is fundamentally about construction and application of guided reasoning systems). The higher-order examination that is called for is of the kind of “pale” and abstract investigation into logical structures in which philosophy engages. Analysis of the notion of and prospects of an AI+ “singularity” emerging (see, e.g. Chalmers 2010) are underway and accelerating; the study of a prospect that confronts humanity anywhere on the planet inevitably draws from the trough of what is loosely classified as “philosophy of mind”: there are old “Cartesian” dualist views (with substance, predicate, and property dualism versions) as well as spirited critiques; unexpected reinforcements of dualistic thrusts (arising out of “knowledge arguments” and the recently notorious “philosophic zombie” argument); then there is the gamut of the physicalist theories from the apparently discredited behaviorist views to the



“identity theory” and to eliminativist materialism, and, crucially, to versions of functionalism, whose “multiple realizability” thesis is a boon for the exotic claim that, in principle, “machines can think” as Turing (1950) put it. This kind of issue is raised here to underscore how the arsenal, methods and instruments of philosophic study are in ubiquitous display and application globally: if local contributions can add further enlightenment, nuance, exception or innovative thinking, we may ask: how are such contributions to be mediated, integrated, made sense of and explicated, advanced and brought into the mix of debates? In a way, any attempt to do this ends up being “philosophy”, by default and this seems to be the case even on the basis of some minimalistic understanding of what “philosophy” is and does.

There is a tried but true cliché about how philosophy counteracts the parochialism that has often hampered and derailed intellectual endeavors in many fields. This is not to deny that practicing philosophers have been myopic or that philosophic support has been forthcoming and abundant in the service of all sorts of prejudiced, intolerant, opinionated ideological taskmasters. The point rather is how the methods and tools of philosophy – like surgical scalpels that work the same, and salubriously, on everyone and everywhere – are clinical and ready to apply. As an abject example of misconceived and “chauvinistic” folly we may consider how Lévy-Bruhl (1923) opined that the “primitive mind” is radically different from the advanced mind not only by its characteristic subscription to “mystical” beliefs, but, fundamentally through a characteristic failure to observe the logical law of non-contradiction – on which a lot was presented in an earlier section. Surely some philosopher or other could have made the point but it could be said in that case – as it cannot be said “categorially” of Lévy-Bruhl – that such a philosopher would be failing in a most basic (even if oft ignored) professional virtue of philosophy: the exercise of “logical charity”.

Even more importantly perhaps, such a student of philosophy, engaging in ad hominem characterization, would be failing to apply the characteristic methods of philosophy. Even if it comes across as nonsense, a claim is to be subjected to analysis. In the classical



Greek tradition, the dialogues of Plato serve as enduring examples of debating and dissecting claims. Even if not “getting it right”, and even while committing errors of reasoning in the analysis itself, the task is ongoing and consists in thinking through all the way to the rudiments and mechanics of reasoning. Lévy-Bruhl could have thought of applying logical charity too – in fact, he ought to have been motivated in that way, based on what is arguably the proper method for anthropological investigation – but he would lack the methods and tools to carry out the project. In the hands of lurking, possibly undetected, prejudice (including of the intellectual variety), scholarship itself is, as it has been proven time and again to be, dangerous if not tempered by the techniques and practices of philosophy.

REFERENCES

- M. Baghramian, J. Carter (2022), *Relativism*, in *Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*, plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/#toc.
- S. Blackburn (2007), *Truth: a guide* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- F. Boas (1940), *Race, language, and culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- I.M. Bocheński (1951), *Ancient formal logic* (Amsterdam: North-Holland).
- M.F. Brown (2008), *Cultural relativism 2.0*, in “Current Anthropology”, 49, 3, pp. 363-383.
- R. Carnap (1950), *Empiricism, semantics, and ontology*, in “Revue Internationale de Philosophie”, 4.
- E. Casey (1997), *The fate of place: a philosophical history* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).
- D. Chalmers (2010), *The singularity: a philosophical analysis*, in “The Journal of Consciousness Studies”, 17, pp. 7-65.
- B.K. Choudhary, D. Gangopadhyay (eds.) (2022), *Prolegomena to intercultural dialogue*, vol. I (Bihar: Nava Nilanda Mahavihara).
- R. Collins (1998), *The sociology of philosophies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- K. Daya (1957), *Law of contradiction and empirical reality*, in “Mind”, 66, 262, pp. 250-257.
- Y. Deguchi, J. Garfield, G. Priest (2008), *The way of the dialetheist: contradictions in buddhism*, in “Philosophy East and West”, 58, pp. 395-402.
- D. Dennett (1979), *Artificial intelligence as philosophy and as psychology*, in M. Ringle (ed.), *Philosophical perspectives in artificial intelligence* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press), pp. 57-80.
- D. Dennett (1994), *The practical requirements for making a conscious robot*, in “Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London”, 349, pp. 133-146.

ISSN 2283-7949

GLOCALISM: JOURNAL OF CULTURE, POLITICS AND INNOVATION

DOI: 10.54103/gjpci.2024.23140



Some rights reserved

- M. Dummett (1976), *Truth and other enigmas* (London: Duckworth).
- P. Feyerabend (1978), *Science in a free society* (London: New Left Books).
- J. Garfield, G. Priest (2003), *Nāgārjuna and the limits of thought*, in "Philosophy East and West", 58, pp. 395-402.
- S. Haack (1996), *Reflections on relativism: from momentous tautology to seductive contradiction*, in "Philosophical Perspectives", 10, pp. 297-315.
- I. Hacking (1982), *Language, truth and reason*, in M. Hollis, S. Lukes (eds.), *Rationality and relativity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 48-66.
- P. Hayes (1994), *Nāgārjuna's appeal*, in "Journal of Indian Philosophy", 22, 4, pp. 299-378.
- B. Janz (2022), *The universal and the individual, the global and the local: philosophy's diverse debts and duties*, in V.N. Roudometof, U. Dessì (eds.), *Handbook of culture and globalization* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar), pp. 61-75.
- K.N. Jayatilleke (1950), *Some problems of translation and interpretation II*, in "University of Ceylon Review", 3, 1, pp. 45-55.
- K.N. Jayatilleke (1963), *Early Buddhist theory of knowledge* (London: Allen & Unwind).
- K.N. Jayatilleke (1967), *The logic of four alternatives*, in "Philosophy East and West", 17, 1-4, pp. 69-83.
- L. Lévy-Bruhl (1923), *Primitive mentality* (London: Allen & Unwin).
- L. Lévy-Bruhl (1975), *The notebooks on primitive mentality* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- J. Łukasiewicz (1909), *Über den Satz des Widerspruchs bei Aristoteles*, in "Bulletin Internationale de l' Académie des Sciences de Cracovie".
- K. Mannheim (1952), *Essays on the sociology of knowledge*, ed. by P. Kecskemeti (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
- J. McCarthy, P.J. Hayes (1969), *Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence*, in B. Meltzer, D. Michie (eds.), *Machine intelligence 4* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), pp. 463-502.
- G. Priest (2006), *In contradiction: the study of the transconsistent* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- G. Priest (2008), *Introduction to non-classical logic* (2nd ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- G. Priest (2010), *The logic of the catuskoti*, in "Comparative Philosophy", 1, 2, pp. 24-54.
- W.V.O. Quine (1951), *Two dogmas of empiricism*, in "The Philosophical Review", 60, 1, pp. 20-43.
- W.V.O. Quine (1960), *Word and object* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- P. Raju (1953), *The principle of four-cornered negation in Indian philosophy*, in "Review of Metaphysics", 7, pp. 694-713.
- R. Robertson (1992), *Globalization: social theory and global culture* (London: Sage).
- R. Robertson (1995), *Glocalization: time-space and homogeneity-heterogeneity*, in M. Featherstone, R. Robertson (eds.), *Global modernities* (London: Sage), pp. 25-44.
- R. Rorty (1991), *Objectivity, relativism, and truth: philosophical papers* (vol. 1) (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).
- V.N. Roudometof (2019), *Recovering the local: from globalization to localization*, in "Current Sociology", 67, 6, pp. 801-817.
- V.N. Roudometof, U. Dessì (2022), *Handbook of culture and globalization* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing).
- F.C. Schiller (1912), *Formal logic: a scientific and social problem* (London: Macmillan & Co.).
- M. Schlick (1936), *Meaning and verification*, in "The Philosophical Review", 46, 4, pp. 339-369.



- P.F. Schmidt (1955), *Some criticisms of cultural relativism*, in "The Journal of Philosophy", 52, 25, pp. 780-791.
- J. Searle (1987), *Indeterminacy, empiricism and the first person*, in "The Journal of Philosophy", 84, 3, pp. 123-146.
- A. Skodo (2014), *The self, ideology, and logic: F.C.S. Schiller's pragmatist critique and formalist alternative to formal logic*, in A. Skodo (ed.), *Other logics: alternatives to formal logic in the history of thought and contemporary philosophy* (Leiden: Brill), pp. 32-50.
- M.E. Spiro (1986), *Cultural relativism and the future of anthropology*, in "Cultural Anthropology", 1, 3, pp. 259-286.
- J.F. Staal (1962), *Negation and the law of contradiction in Indian thought: a comparative study*, in "Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies", 25, 1/3, pp. 52-71.
- C. Taylor (1982), *Rationality*, in M. Hollis, S. Lukes (eds.), *Rationality and relativism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 87-105.
- A. Turing (1950), *Computing machinery and intelligence*, in "Mind", 49, pp. 433-460.

