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# Religiosity and Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration

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RELIGIOSITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION

by

Shiloh Deitz

B.A., Whitworth University, 2009

A Research Paper

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Master of Arts

Sociology

in the Graduate School

Southern Illinois University Carbondale

May 10, 2014

RESEARCH PAPER APPROVAL

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April 11, 2014

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

In 1965, the Immigration and Nationality Act opened the United States to a wider variety of new immigrant populations. While the previous law (created in 1924) gave priority to applicants from the British Isles and Northern or Western Europe, the new law prioritized family reunification and work visas (Hero 2010). In the years that followed the 1965 Act, waves of new immigrant populations came to the United States as refugees and as voluntary immigrants. Not accounting for illegal immigration, in the past decade (2000-2009) over 10 million new immigrants gained permanent residence in the United States with 34% from Asia and 43% from the Americas (DHS 2012: 7-15). In 2005, the percentage of Latinos/Hispanics in the U.S. (14.5%) had surpassed Blacks (12.1%) (Hero 2010: 448). Such a large number of culturally diverse new immigrants raise questions regarding integration and public policy.

Debates over immigration policy feature prominently on the public agenda. Some believe that new-immigrant minorities helped to decide the outcome of the 2012 Presidential election and the creation of immigration policy that people generally agree on will probably continue to be divisive, yet important. Zarate and Quezada (2012) suggest that “prejudice towards immigrants is now 'allowed' by the new social norms and that such prejudice produces new questions rarely addressed in the literature” (160). Discerning what factors lead natives toward positive attitudes toward immigration and immigrants is important. Not only do these attitudes influence policy but also they alter the experience of new immigrants – often shaping their ability to integrate. Native attitudes towards immigrants and immigration are often entrenched in identities with researchers pointing to a high level of demographic factors influencing attitudes.

Religious affiliation and practice are also important factors influencing attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. On one hand, religious doctrines often preach charity and good will; on the other hand, new immigrant groups can appear as a threat to the religious identity of the members of religious groups. In recent years, many prominent religious leaders have openly called for more charitable treatment of immigrants in the United States, but the effect that these statements have on their religious communities is only beginning to be understood. Despite the rich body of literature on native attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, we do not robustly understand the effect of religion on these attitudes, nor has a thorough analysis of the effect of religious fundamentalism been conducted. Perhaps, certain aspects of religiosity will negatively influence attitudes toward immigrants and immigration while others will have a positive effect.

Concretely, I expect that members of religious groups will be less likely to view immigrants negatively than the non-religious after religious fundamentalism is taken into account. I also expect that those who are only moderately active in religious activities will exhibit more prejudice than those that are highly active or not active. I also predict that those who are religiously fundamentalist will have the least positive views toward immigrants and immigration. These predictions are grounded in the literature on fundamentalism and political behavior, assumptions about the influence of the social beliefs of religious leaders, and the salience of religious practice in affecting social behavior and political action.



## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**

Overall, researchers interested in explaining respondents' attitudes towards immigration and immigrants (ATII) have had divergent empirical findings due to data set differences and conceptualization – however, they have generally agreed on theoretical concepts, especially that ATII are the result of individual characteristics or structural context. Researchers focused on the effects of individual characteristics have pointed to: socio-economic self-interest, symbolic interest, and contact theory; while those concerned with structural level factors have mostly used the group or competitive threat theory (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 317).

Socio-economic self-interest is preserved by rationalizing and legitimizing native benefits and protecting those benefits from foreigners. Researchers have found that those who are less stable socio-economically tend to have more negative ATII due to the direct economic threat that immigrants are perceived to present (Burns and Gimpel 2000). Gustin and Ziebarth (2010) found that in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, the United States, and the United Kingdom, the 2008 economic crisis increased negative feelings toward immigrants. This study suggests that the socio-economic threat perceived to be posed by immigrant populations was exacerbated by the international economic crisis. They argue that in the United States most of the negative sentiment toward immigrants has been placed on those that are illegal. However, in the U.S. there is a tendency to conflate legal immigrant with illegal immigrant.

Symbolic interest theory suggests that an individual's values or attachment to their group or individual identity has a significant effect on ATII. Those who feel a positive connection toward a group membership have been shown to display negative attitudes toward any perceived outside influence (Davidov et al. 2008). In regards to immigration, symbolic interest appears in the expression of nationalism, or religious particularism. For example, Chandler and Tsai (2001)

found that the belief that the English language is being threatened explains a significant amount of variation in ATII – with those who believe that English language is in danger holding negative views toward immigrants. In this case, nationalism is expressed through language use.

Contact theory states that contact with minority or 'other' populations may foster favorable attitudes. Escandell and Ceobanu (2009) conceptualized contact with immigrants using variables measuring close relationship, occasional encounter or acquaintanceship, and workplace contact. They found that close relationship and occasional encounter or acquaintanceship reduced negative ATII over time but workplace contact did not. They also found that perceived group threat was a stronger predictor of negative ATII when controlling for other factors.

Berg (2013) found that group threat in the form of symbolic racism is the most salient factor explaining ATII, especially in the form of limiting access to social services for immigrants. He found that negative attitudes toward immigrants were often supported and perhaps propagated by the majority group and drew on heavily stereotyped assumptions about the minority group. The clearest display of this theory is California's Proposition 187, which attempted to prohibit illegal immigrants from using health care, public education, and other social services (Golden 1994).

A few studies have analyzed the significance of these four major theories in conjunction. Yunus and Karakoc (2012) analyzed the salience of contact theory and group threat theory in the context of globalization. On an international scale, they analyzed whether increased globalization and immigration leads to a more positive views about immigration and immigrants though integration or whether it is perceived as a threat. They found that in general globalization in the form of high levels of openness to international trade and high levels of immigration leads to negative ATII.

A 2012 study conducted by Wallace and Figueroa also added globalization, among other variables, to an analysis of ATII. Using data from the United States, they found that group threat theory was supported by negative ATII in areas with sharp increases in immigrant populations and highly concentrated African-American populations. In contrast, they found that States with a high foreign-born population showed less prejudice – this finding supports contact theory, but contradicts group threat theory. Finally, the researchers analyzed cultural theory and found that cosmopolitan States with higher average educational attainment tended to have less negative views toward immigrants. These initial results led them to test their own explanatory theories for why certain states have higher ATII than others. They looked at economic competition, labor market deregulation, and globalization. In support of their economic competition hypothesis, they found that States with high economic growth tended to have lower levels of prejudice. Regarding market deregulation, they found that states with low union density, union deauthorization, and low minimum wage tended to have higher levels of prejudice toward immigrants. Finally, they found that in regards to globalization, States that had recently experienced corporate restructuring had higher levels of prejudice. The results of this work and the work already mentioned suggest that the factors contributing to negative ATII are multifaceted. The empirical findings of these studies lent themselves to the creation of control variables in this study.

#### *Role of Religion in Attitudes toward Immigrant and Immigration*

Philpott (2002) argued that the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> brought religion back into discussions of international relations. While it had been assumed that religion was not a driving factor in countries' decisions, Philpott questioned whether this could still be assumed. His line of reasoning was that September 11<sup>th</sup> had heightened United States citizens awareness of the

religious ‘otherness’ of citizens of other countries and perhaps immigrants. This perception was probably enhanced by the ‘War on Terror’ and its media portrayal. Regardless of whether or not the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> marked a revival in the strength of religion based identities, the role that religion plays in affecting attitudes toward immigration and immigrants is an important one.

McDaniel, Nooruddin and Shortle (2011) argued that religious affiliation can serve as a symbolic identity, usually attached to Christian nationalism, which leads to negative ATII. They argued that Evangelical or fundamentalist religious groups are especially prone to this view. As a majority group, Evangelical Christians may believe that Christianity is deeply tied to what it means to be American. This dates back to the early years of the United States, when America was described as a ‘city on a hill’ and it was believed that America had a special role in God’s plan.

Daniels and von der Ruhr (2005) found that different religious denominations create different forms of social capital and are prone to different perceptions of group threat by outsiders. They argue that fundamentalists encourage a very bonding form of social capital which leads to strong in-group loyalty and overall antagonism to outsiders. Moderate and liberal Protestants tend to create networks which are more loosely bonded and less prone to threat.

It has also been shown that those in minority religious groups (Jews, Mormons, and other non-Christian groups) are more likely to have positive ATII than mainstream groups (Knoll 2009). Knoll called this the ‘minority marginalization’ hypothesis and suggested that the reason for this might be that members of minority religions feel a sense of shared experience with other marginalized groups.

Contact theory would suggest that religious groups with greater numbers of immigrants in attendance (e.g. Catholics) might show less negative ATII. As mentioned above, Escandell

and Ceobanu (2009) found that close relationships and occasional encounter between natives and immigrants reduced animosity between the groups. An extension of this finding might be that in churches with diverse immigrant populations, native members would exhibit positive ATII. However, this theory has not been applied to religious communities. McDaniel et al. (2011) believe that positive ATII would not be seen in religious groups with more immigrant members because issues of religious identity are more salient.

However, McDaniel et al. (2011) recognize that symbolic identity could be altered by church leadership. In the past decade many prominent religious leaders have made public statements articulating their beliefs about immigration and immigrants. These statements are important because they often communicate the role that they believe people affiliated with their religious group should take regarding immigrants and immigration. They have the potential to shape the meaning of religious identities. If the religious followers of these highly visible individuals are taking their messages to heart, ATII should have a significant relationship with religious affiliation. Among the prominent groups that have made positive public statements regarding immigrants and immigration are: Catholics, Baptists, other sectarian Christians, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Lutherans, Methodists, Mormons, and Jews (Knoll 2009; Nteta and Wallsten 2012). The statements of these leaders often draw on the belief that the Bible encourages compassion and some have gone so far as claiming that resisting unjust laws is a moral imperative. However, at the same time, some leaders (usually Evangelicals) have made statements that emphasize the need to follow national laws and thus condemn immigrants and hope to deport those who have come illegally (McDaniel et al. 2011). These groups argue that the Bible supports the protection of national borders and the enforcement of national laws. In this

sense immigration, as Knoll (2009) argues, may be becoming a 'moral' issue for Christian communities.

Nteta and Wallsten (2012) found that those that did hear messages in support of positive ATII at their local church were more likely to have a positive ATII. With this in mind religious participation is an important variable to include when analyzing the impact of religious affiliation on ATII. If a person attends religious activities more often, they may be more prone to hear the messages of their leaders which advocate extending charity to immigrants in the United States. Scheepers, Gijbberds, and Hello (2002) found that religious practice has a curvilinear relationship with prejudice - those with low or no church attendance and those with a high level of church attendance were found to be less prejudiced than those in the middle. Layman (1997) has gone further to argue that the distinction between more or less religious behavior and practice is just as important as denomination for understanding political behavior. Others have found that those who attend religious activities more often have deeper religious convictions and are more prone to follow the directives of their leaders (Lee 2002). Thus, a robust measure of religious practice is important to an analysis of religion and ATII.

As stated above, I am particularly interested in the under-studied effect of religiosity on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. With prominent religious leaders from a variety of religious groups making public statements in support of caring for immigrants, I would expect that the members of religious groups are more open to immigration and hold more positive views about immigrants than the non-religious. Further, I predict that those that frequently participate in religious activities (attend services and other activities) and those that never or almost never participate in religious activities are most likely to have a positive attitude towards immigrants. Finally, I predict that Christian fundamentalists will not have a positive attitude towards

immigrants and immigration - this might be explained by religious particularism and the subsequent feeling that other groups hurt the U.S and their religion by introducing new ideas. I predict that religious fundamentalism will have a greater effect on ATII than religious affiliation. With religious fundamentalism in the model, I predict that no religious group will be significantly more or less likely than the non-religious to have negative ATII. Overall, my predictions align with Scheepers et al's (2002) view that there are some aspects of religiosity that negatively affect ATII and some that positively affect it. I have written my hypotheses below:

H<sub>1</sub>: Members of religious groups will be less likely to negatively view immigrants and immigration than those with no religious affiliation after accounting for religious fundamentalism and other factors.

H<sub>2</sub>: Those who participate in religious activities and services very often or seldom to not at all will be more likely to support immigration and think positively about immigrants, controlling for other factors.

H<sub>3</sub>: Respondents who are religiously fundamentalist (believe the Bible is the word of God) will be less likely to think positively about immigrants or favor more immigration, controlling for other factors.

## CHAPTER THREE

### METHODS

I have used the 2010 General Social Survey (GSS) merged data for these analyses. The GSS is a nationally representative survey, conducted every two-years by the National Opinion Research Center in the United States. The survey has been conducted since 1972 and gathers data on social indicators. In 2006, the GSS switched from a repeating cross-section design, to a combined repeating cross-section and panel-component design. This particular data set includes all cases and variables from the 2010 GSS, including the variables and cases re-interviewed from previous years (N=4901). I will use this data set to run two analyses – one analysis with the first dependent variable measuring attitudes toward immigration (N=2679), and one analysis with the limited sample for the second dependent variable which measures attitudes toward immigrants (N=1310).

#### *Dependent Variables*

The first dependent variable that I used measures the respondent's attitudes toward immigration. The question elicited their response to the following question: "Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be...increased a lot (1), increased a little (2), remain the same as it is (3), reduced a little (4), reduced a lot (5), can't choose (8), or no answer (9)?" Due to frequency distributions and to simplify my analyses I collapsed categories so that my final variable separates only those who think immigration should increase (1, 2), those who think immigration should stay the same or don't have a strong opinion (3, 8), and those who think immigration should decrease (4, 5). I set the "no answer" category to missing. With this variable a high value indicates a more negative view about immigration.

To operationalize attitudes toward immigrants I created a rounded composite score using three variables. The three variables asked for the respondents' level of agreement with the



following statements: “Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in America,” “Immigrants are generally good for America's economy,” and “Immigrants increase crime rates.” Respondents could choose their answer from the following list: “agree strongly” (1), “agree” (2), “neither agree nor disagree” (3), “disagree” (4), “disagree strongly” (5), and “can’t choose” (8). I set all respondents who did not answer to missing. I then collapsed “neither agree nor disagree” responses with “can’t choose” because these seem to be expressing the same thing – the respondent does not have a strong feeling either way. I then reverse coded responses to “immigrants increase crime rates” and “immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in America.” I did this because I want a negative sentiment towards immigrants to be expressed by a high numeric value. In the regression analyses I collapsed the categories to be agree (1, 2), neither agree nor disagree (3, 8), and disagree (4, 5).

### *Independent Variables*

The GSS asked three questions that measure religious affiliation. First, respondents were asked “What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?” If the respondent chose “Protestant” or “other,” they were then asked “What specific denomination is that, if any?” In the data set the first variable had a limited amount of response choices, whereas the second and third had a wide variety of specific denominational categories. I used these three variables to create a new variable which includes a more detailed and diverse selection of religious affiliations. This follows Sherkat’s (2001) claim that religious denominations structure religious life in the US and there are distinct and observable differences between them. The new variable includes: liberal Protestants (Presbyterians, United Church of Christ) (1), mainline Protestants (Episcopalians and Lutherans) (2), moderate Protestants (Methodists, Disciples of Christ, Brethren, Reformed) (3), Baptists (4), other Sectarian groups

(Assembly of God, Nazarene, Churches of Christ, Pentecostal Holiness, etc.) (5), minority religions (Jews, Mormons, and other non-Christian religions) (6), other Protestants (7), Catholics (8), and people with no religious identification (9). These categories were used as a dummy set in regression with the non-religious as the reference category.

In order to measure religious fundamentalism, I used a variable that elicits the respondent's views about the Bible. I have done this because fundamentalism is not necessary a primary identity and many people would not self-identify as fundamentalist because the label holds negative connotations. Hood, Hill, and Williamson (2005) describe fundamentalism as an 'intratextual' belief-system meaning that a specific text is used by religious fundamentalists as a tool or rule book from which to interpret and evaluate all of life (e.g. Bible for Christians and Qu'ran for Muslims). For this reason, the respondent's beliefs about the Bible are a good measure of Christian fundamentalism. The GSS asked: "which of these statements comes closest to describing your views about the Bible? – the Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word (1); the Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word (2); the Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by men (3)." There is also an option for "other" (4), which was not offered as a choice but volunteered by the respondent and "don't know" – the total number of "other" and "don't know" answers is very small. I collapsed both the "other" and "don't know" categories with the belief that the Bible is a book of fables. I did this because I am most concerned with those that believe the Bible is the literal word of God (religious fundamentalists) and those that believe that it is the inspired word of God (religious moderates), as compared to those that are more liberal. I set the 'no answer' values to missing and created dummy variables for those that believe the Bible is the word of God, those that believe that it is the inspired word

of God, and those that think it is a book of fables or something else. Those that believe that the Bible is a book of fables or something else were set as the reference category in regression.

In order to measure religious participation I created a rounded composite variable using two measures of religious participation: religious service attendance and participation in other activities. The first question asked “how often do you attend religious services?” Respondents could choose: “never” (0), “less than once a year” (1), “about once or twice a year” (2), “several times a year” (3), “about once a month” (4), “2-3 times a month” (5), “nearly every week” (6), “every week” (7), or “several times a week” (8). The second question asked, “how often do you take part in the activities and organizations of a church or place of worship other than attending services?” Responses were similarly classified into: “never” (1), “less than once a year” (2), “about once or twice a year” (3), “several times a year” (4), “about once a month” (5), “2-3 times a month” (6), “nearly every week” (7), “every week” (8), “several times a week” (9), “once a day” (10), or “several times a day” (11). For both of these variables I set “don’t know” and “no answer” to missing. I then recoded the second question so that the scale is similar to the first. I started by reducing responses to the question of participation in religious activities, so that “never” was a value of 0 and “every week” a value of 7. I then collapsed responses 9-11 into a more general “several times a week” (8). After creating the mean composite variable, which ranges from 0-8, I created a dummy set including: never religiously active (0), about yearly religiously active (1-3), about monthly religiously active (4-5), and weekly religiously active (6-8). In regression, I set the never religiously active category as the reference. I did this because of Scheepers et al.’s (2002) prediction that religious activity is curvilinear, as well as Ceobanu and Escandell’s (2010) assertions about the importance of understanding religious activity in models of religiosity.

### *Control Variables*

Immigration is not only a question of policy or identity; it is also a racially charged issue. Thus, it is important to control for race. For these analyses, I created a dummy variable set from a self-reported race question in the GSS. This includes white, Black, and other. There are two limitations with this choice: first, it does not catch the different experience or opinions of Asians or Latinos (two of the largest immigrant populations) and second, there are some issues with self-reporting. However, due to sample size limitations this is the best variable for understanding racial differences.

Immigration status is also an important control for understanding attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. To measure immigration status I used three variables. The first asked “were you born in this country?” The response categories are “yes” (1), “no” (2), and “don’t know” (8). I created a dummy variable with “yes” and “don’t know” (0), and “no” (1). I did this because I am interested in those who were not born in the United States and if someone does not know, this means that immigration status is not a salient identity for them. The second question asked, “were both your parents born in this country?” Respondents’ answers are categorized as follows: “both born in US” (0), “mother yes, father no” (1), “mother no, father yes” (2), “mother yes, father don’t know” (3), “mother no, father don’t know” (4), “mother don’t know, father yes” (5), “mother don’t know, father no” (6), “mother don’t know, father don’t know” (7), and “neither born in US” (8). Since I am interested in persons who know whether their parents were immigrants, I created a dummy variable for those with one or more parents born outside the U.S. (1, 2, 4, 6, 8) and compared them to those with either all parents born in the U.S. or who didn’t know about the birthplace of their parents (0, 3, 5, 7). The third question asked, “how many of your grandparents were born outside the US?” Respondents could choose

“none” (0), “one” (1), “two” (2), “three” (3), “four” (4), or “don’t know” (8). I created a dummy variable for those who knew their grandparents were immigrants by combining those with one or more (1,2,3,4) grandparents who were born outside the U.S. and comparing them to those with none or who didn’t know.

A variable measuring income is an important control for this model because of the competitive threat hypothesis mentioned above. I used the GSS variable that measures income in 2006 dollar ranges. I did not alter this variable - it begins at “under \$1,000” (1) and goes up to “\$150,000 or over” (25). I also included a control variable for education which measures total education in years – starting at first grade (1) and ending at eight years beyond high school (20). Epenshade and Calhoun (1993), along with a number of other scholars have shown that an increase in education decreases prejudice. Other scholars have also shown that younger people are less prejudiced (Wilson 1996), and that women tend to be less prejudiced (Hughes and Tuch 2003). Thus, I also included a variable that asked “how old are you?” and is measured in years, as well as a variable that measures sex. I dichotomized the variable measuring sex, so that male (1) and female (0).

Immigration is a very political issue, and so political affiliation is an important control variable. In the GSS survey respondents were given this prompt: “We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I’m going to show you a seven point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal (1) to extremely conservative (7). Where would you place yourself on this scale?” This scale places moderates, or people who consider themselves “middle of the road” (4) politically, in the middle. Thus values 1-3 are liberal persons and values 5-7 are conservatives. Since political affiliation is an important control for my model but not the focus of the analysis I collapsed all liberals together (1-3),

moderates (4), and conservatives (5-8). I set “don’t know” and “no answer” values to missing. I then created a dummy set with these three groups.

Regional differences are important to take into account when looking at religious differences, prejudice, and immigration policy. The GSS categorized respondents into detailed regional categories including: “New England” (1), “Middle Atlantic” (2), “East North Central” (3), “West North Central” (4), “South Atlantic” (5), “East South Central” (6), “West South Central” (7), “Mountain” (8), and “Pacific” (9). I used census classifications to collapse these groups into West, South, Northeast, and Midwest. However, the only major difference was between those in the South and everyone else, so I have only retained the Southern region as a dummy variable which includes “South Atlantic”, “East South Central” and “West South Central.”

To measure the effect of rural residence I used a variable that classified respondent’s place of residence by size and type. This variable included ten different sizes and types of location from a “city with a population greater than 250,000” (1) to “the open country” (10). I collapsed “smaller areas” (9) and “open country” to express rural location. I originally created a dummy set with all ten categories but the greatest differences were between people in the latter two rural categories and everyone else, thus I only used the single dummy variable.

Past researchers have found marital status to be an important control in studies about prejudice or immigration so I have included it in this model (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). In the GSS respondents were asked “are you currently...married (1), widowed (2), divorced (3), separated (4), or never married (5).” I created a dummy variable comparing those married (1) to everyone else (0), because this is what previous studies have found to be important (ibid).

*Statistical Procedures*

In my model I created two composite variables: one that measures attitudes toward immigrants and one that measures religious practice. To make sure that these were good measures I ran factor analysis and reliability tests for the first composite variable and correlations for the second using the full sample for the first dependent variable (N=2679). In order to do this I turned all potential variables into standardized measures (z-score variables). Using factor analysis, I examined the correlation between the following variables: the perceived effect of immigrants on crime, on jobs, and on the economy. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy for this test was .67 and initial communalities for each item showed the proportion of variance explained by the factor to be above .5. The lowest of these was the perceived effect of immigrants on the economy, 57% of the variance in this item was explained by the factor. These variables all load strongly onto one factor with an Eigen value of 1.84 and this factor accounts for 61% of the total variance. In the reliability analysis for this factor, the Cronbach's Alpha was .69 and this value would decrease if any single item were deleted from the factor (range of Chronbach's Alpha's if one item deleted: .52-.63). The corrected item-total correlation was highest for the variable measuring attitudes about immigrants and jobs (.55), followed by immigrants and crime (.48), and immigrants and the economy (.47). This analysis led me to create a composite variable measuring attitudes toward immigrants rather than a factor, so that I could talk about the results in a less abstract way. The second analysis examined the correlation between two standardized variables that measure the frequency of religious practice, these are: frequency of participation in religious activities and frequency of religious service attendance. In bivariate analysis these two variables were highly correlated ( $r=.66$ ;  $p<.001$ ).

Bivariate relationships between my dependent variables and most of the independent variables were examined with cross-tabular analysis. I conducted Pearson correlation tests with three of the independent variables and the dependent variables because three of the variables are ordinal with more than five response categories. The variable measuring participation in religious activities did not have a significant Chi-square value in either of the bivariate relationships with the dependent variables. For this reason I proceeded to test whether there was a significant difference between the mean responses to attitudes about immigrants and immigration in this variable using one-way ANOVA. In the ANOVA tests for both dependent variables, the Levene statistic was not significant so I accepted the null hypothesis of equal variances and proceeded to check the F-test statistic. The F-test statistic was also not significant. This suggests that there is not a significant difference in mean scores to questions about immigrants and immigration across religious practice categories; nonetheless, I left the variable in the model for theoretical reasons.

Before running logistic regression, I checked my model for multicollinearity using ordinal least squares regression. None of the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were substantially greater than 2.5 in the collinearity statistics for the first regression (N=2679). I also checked for collinearity in the second model (N=1310) and had similar findings.

I estimated an ordinal regression using PLUM. Two multivariate models were analyzed: attitudes toward immigration (model 1) and attitudes toward immigrants (model 2). For each model, I entered the variables in steps. The first step includes the dependent variable and control variables only (race, immigration status, education, income, age, sex, political views, Southern residence, rural residence, and marital status). In the second step, I added religious affiliation dummy variables. In the third step, I added religious practice and in the final step I added belief



about the Bible<sup>1</sup>. In all four steps for model one, the model fit Chi-square values were significant and goodness of fit statistics were not significant, indicating a good fit. The test of parallel lines was violated in step one ( $p < .05$ ) but not in any of the subsequent steps. For the second model, the model fit Chi-square values were also all significant and the goodness of fit values were all not significant. The parallel lines assumption was not violated in any of the steps. Again, this leads me to believe that these data fit the model.

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<sup>1</sup> These steps will be referred to as M1.a, M1.b, M1.c, M1.d for model one and M2.a...M2.d for model two.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### RESULTS

#### Univariate Statistics

As mentioned earlier, the entire sample was not asked all of the questions that are of interest to these analyses. The questions that comprise my composite variable measuring attitudes toward immigrants had a smaller sample size (N=1310) compared to the variable measuring attitudes toward immigration (N=2679). I ran regression with the full sample for each dependent variable and then I ran a second regression measuring attitudes toward immigration and immigrants using the restricted sample for both variables (N=841). I present the univariate statistics for both samples below-starting with the full sample for attitudes toward immigration (model 1; N=2679), and proceeding to describe the second sample for attitudes toward immigrants (model 2; N=1310). The results of the limited sample for both variables (N=841) can be viewed in Table 1.

**\*\*Table 1 Here\*\***

For model 1, the mean response to the question of whether immigration should be increased (1), decreased (3) or stay the same is 2.36 (SD=.7). This means that on average responses fell somewhere between hoping immigration would stay the same (2) or decrease (3). Regarding religious practice, 18% of the sample never participates in religious activities, 16% does so about yearly, 10% participate about monthly, and 9% participate weekly in religious activities. Thirty-two percent of the sample believes the Bible is the word of God, while 46% believe it is the inspired word of God, and 23% believe it is a book of fables or something else. Finally, 4% are liberal Protestants (Presbyterian, United Church of Christ, Unitarian), 6% are other mainline Protestants (Episcopalian and Lutheran), 9% are moderate Protestants

(Methodists, Disciples of Christ, Brethren, and Reformed groups), 17% are Baptists, 7% are from other sectarian Protestant groups (Assembly of God, Nazarene, Church of Christ, Pentecostal Holiness, etc.), 11% are from other Protestant groups not already mentioned, 23% are Catholic, 6% are part of a minority religion, and 18% have no religion.

Demographically 14% of the sample is African-American, 78% is white, and 8% is of another race. Eleven-percent of the sample was not born in the U.S., 18% have one or more parents that were not born in the U.S., and 38% have one or more grandparents who was not born in the U.S. The average number of years of education completed is 13.74 (SD=2.96). The average income is somewhere between 30,000 and 39,999<sup>2</sup> (M=16.97; SD=5.62). Forty-five percent of the sample is male and the average age is 48.59 (SD=16.73). Politically, 30% are liberal, 36% are moderate, and 34% are conservative. Twenty-two percent of the sample lives in the South and 12% live in a rural area. Lastly, 47% are married.

The sample used to test the dependent variable measuring attitudes toward immigrants is smaller (N=1310) than the one used for testing attitudes toward immigration (N=2679). The univariate statistics for this second sample were remarkably similar to the first sample; this can be observed in Table 1.

### Bivariate Statistics

I ran cross-tabular analyses to test the bivariate relationship between the dependent variables (measuring attitudes toward immigrants and immigration) and independent variables measuring: religious affiliation, religious practice, religious fundamentalism, race, immigration generation questions, political views, Southern residence, rural residence, and marital status. I

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<sup>2</sup> A score of 16 means that income is between 30,000 and 34,999 and a score of 17 means that the income is between 35,000 and 39,999 in U.S. dollars.

ran a correlation with educational attainment, income, and age. These are all two tailed tests with the null hypothesis stating that the variables are independent of one another. Cross-tabular analysis using the dependent variable measuring the respondents' beliefs about the rate of immigration did not result in a significant Pearson Chi-Square test for the variable measuring religious activity and the correlation between the dependent variable and income was not significant. The bivariate relationship between the second dependent variable (attitudes toward immigrants) was not significant for the level of religious activity and age. All other tests had significant results.

Religious affiliation can result in conservative or liberal political and social beliefs, depending on the strength of commitment and the doctrines that are taught. This is an important variable for understanding attitudes toward immigrants and immigration because some prominent religious leaders have made public statements regarding the issue – usually supporting positive ATII. However, religious groups that are more conservative and do not have a strong social justice agenda may show a stronger preference for a decrease in immigration and hold negative views about immigrants. Bivariate analysis of the dependent variable measuring attitudes toward immigration and religious affiliation was statistically significant ( $X^2=90.36$ ; 16df;  $p<.001$ ). The relationship between the second dependent variable measuring attitudes toward immigrants and religious affiliation was also statistically significant ( $X^2=86.28$ ; 16df;  $p<.001$ ). The detailed results are presented in Table 2 and Table 3.


**\*\*Table 2 Here\*\***

**\*\*Table 3 Here\*\***


Correspondingly, the relationship between religious fundamentalism and attitudes about the rate of immigration ( $X^2=29.02$ ; 4df;  $p<.001$ ) and immigrants ( $X^2=55.50$ ; 4df;  $p<.001$ ) was

significant. Religious liberals were more likely to believe immigration should increase and more likely to have a positive view about immigrants than moderates and conservatives. Twelve percent of religious fundamentalists, 11% of moderates ( $AR=-2.8$ ), and 17% of liberals ( $AR=3.7$ ) believe that immigration should increase. On the other hand, 51% of religious fundamentalists believe that the rate of immigration should decrease compared to 51% of moderates and 40% of liberals ( $AR=-4.8$ ). Fundamentalists were significantly less likely to have a positive view toward immigrants. Twenty-three percent of religious fundamentalists have a positive attitude about immigrants ( $AR=-5.5$ ) compared to 34% of moderates and 48% of religious liberals ( $AR=5.7$ ). On the other hand, 32% of religious fundamentalists have a negative view about immigrants ( $AR=4.9$ ) compared to 21% of religious moderates and 16% of liberals ( $AR=-3.3$ ). In both cases (attitudes toward immigrants and immigration) liberals were significantly less likely to have a negative view towards immigrants or believe immigration should decrease. These results suggest, fitting with my hypothesis, that fundamentalists are more likely to have a negative view about immigrants than those that are not fundamentalist.

**Figure 1. Christian Fundamentalism and Attitude about Immigration**



**Figure 2. Christian Fundamentalism and Attitudes about Immigrants**



Although immigration is often discussed in an abstract way it is a racial issue. This bivariate analysis confirmed that race and attitudes about immigration were significantly related

( $X^2=91.87$ ; 4df;  $p<.001$ ) and race and attitudes toward immigrants were significantly related ( $X^2=28.84$ ; 4df;  $p<.001$ ). I imagined that a higher number of whites would support a decrease in immigration than Blacks or people of another race, and this was supported by the bivariate analysis. African-Americans were more likely to think that immigration should increase and less likely to believe it should decrease; however, regarding attitudes toward immigrants, Blacks were more likely than whites to have a neutral attitude and less likely to have a positive one.

Interpretations of the effect of race on attitudes toward immigrants may correspond slightly with immigration history. First generation immigrants were more likely to support an increase in immigration than natives ( $X^2=108.80$ ; 2df;  $p<.001$ ). Those with at least one immigrant parent were more likely to support an increase in immigration than those with native parents ( $X^2=93.39$ ; 2df;  $p<.001$ ). Lastly, respondents with at least one immigrant grandparent were more likely to support an increase in immigration rate than those with native grandparents ( $X^2=28.48$ ; 2df;  $p<.001$ ). Similarly, 1<sup>st</sup> generation immigrants were more likely to have a positive view of immigrants than natives ( $X^2=31.98$ ; 2df;  $p<.001$ ). Respondents with at least one immigrant parent were more likely to positively view immigrants than those with native parents ( $X^2=53.52$ ; 2df;  $p<.001$ ) and those with at least one immigrant grandparent were more likely to have a positive attitude about immigrants than those with all native grandparents ( $X^2=24.81$ ; 2df;  $p<.001$ ). Overall, respondents that are first generation immigrants, have at least one parent that was an immigrant, or have at least one grandparent that was an immigrant were much more likely to favor an increase in immigration and to think positively about immigrants than those who are native born, have native born parents, or have native born grandparents.

The respondents' level of education was significantly correlated with their attitudes about immigration and immigrants - an increase in education leads to a decrease in the belief that

immigration should decrease and a decrease in negative views toward immigrants. A relatively equal number of men and women think immigration should increase and have a positive view of immigrants. Age was correlated with attitudes about immigration ( $r=.06$ ;  $p<.005$ ) but not attitudes about immigrants. Immigration is a politicized issue and attitudes toward immigration and immigrants were significantly correlated with political affiliation. Political liberals tend to favor an increase in immigration and tend to view immigrants positively, while political conservatives tend to favor a decrease in immigration and view immigrants negatively. People living in the South and in rural areas tend to favor a decrease in immigration and hold a negative view about immigrants. People who are married were significantly less likely to believe that immigration should increase, yet they were more likely to have a positive view toward immigrants. Finally, the respondents' income is not correlated with attitudes toward immigration and has a negative relationship with attitudes toward immigrants. As income increases, negative views about immigrants decrease.

### Multivariate Statistics

#### *Model 1 (DVI with full sample [N=2679])*

PLUM ordinal regression using the first dependent variable (whether or not the number of immigrants to the U.S. should increase, stay the same, or decrease), all independent variables and all control variables had a significant Chi-square value ( $X^2=327.92$ ;  $p<.001$ ). As mentioned previously, the goodness-of-fit statistics (Pearson and Deviance) and test of parallel lines were not significant – further suggesting a good fit. I conducted this test in four steps which I will later refer to as 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d. The first step included all control variables, the second step added religious affiliation, the third step added religious participation, and the fourth step added religious fundamentalism.



\*\*\*Table 4 Here\*\*\*

In this model, there was a significant relationship between several variables and the dependent variable. In the first step (1a), African-Americans and persons of another race were significantly less likely than whites to hold a negative view about immigration ( $p < .001$ ;  $p < .05$ , respectively). First generation immigrants and those with at least one immigrant parent were also significantly less likely to hold the aforementioned belief, compared to those who were born in the U.S. or those with native parents ( $p < .001$ ;  $p < .05$ , respectively). A one unit increase in education corresponds with a decrease in scores for the dependent variable ( $p < .001$ ) and politically liberal respondents were significantly less likely than conservatives to have a negative view about immigration ( $p < .001$ ). Compared to those that live in non-Southern or non-rural areas, Southerners and rural people were significantly more likely to hope to restrict immigration ( $p < .05$ ).

When religious affiliation variables were added (1b), the level of significance of the control variables was not altered. Compared to the non-religious, mainline Protestants, moderate Protestants, Baptists, Catholics, and other Protestant groups were significantly more likely to hold a negative view about immigration. In step three (1c), religious activity variables were not significant and the addition of these variables did not alter the coefficients of any of the variables already in the model.

On the fourth step, when variables measuring the respondent's level of religious fundamentalism were added, many of the coefficients changed. The variables measuring the respondents' belief about the Bible were not significant on their own. Compared to those that believe the Bible is a book of fables or something else, the belief that the Bible is the inspired word of God approaches standard significance levels in increasing the odds of having a negative

view about immigration. The belief that the Bible is the word of God did not have a significant relationship with the dependent variable. Particularly, the addition of these variables in model 1d affected the coefficients of many of the religious affiliation groups. For example, in model 1c being Catholic rather than non-religious increased the odds of having a negative view about immigration by 32% ( $p < .05$ ), in model 1d the coefficient for Catholics was insignificant. Compared to the non-religious, mainline Protestants, moderate Protestants, Baptists, and other Protestants were still significantly more likely in model 1d to hold a negative view about immigration but their coefficients decreased slightly. In model 1c, being part of a mainline Protestant group increased the odds of having a negative view about immigration by 58% ( $p < .05$ ), while in model 1d it increased the odds by 48% ( $p < .05$ ). Being moderate Protestant in model 1c increased the odds of having a negative view about immigration by 90% ( $p < .001$ ), whereas in model 1d it increased the odds by 79% ( $p < .001$ ). Being Baptist in model 1c increased the odds of having a negative view about immigration by 114% ( $p < .001$ ), and in model 1d these odds were increased by 103% ( $p < .001$ ). Lastly, in model 1c being in another Protestant group increased the odds of having a negative view about immigration by 49% ( $p < .05$ ), and in model 1d it increased these odds by 39% ( $p < .05$ ). The control variables were not significantly affected by the addition of any of the religiosity variables – their significance and the direction of their coefficients remained the same as it was in model 1a.

*Model 2 (DV2 with full sample [N=1310])*

I next ran a PLUM analysis with the second dependent variable (a composite measure of attitudes toward immigrants), all independent variables, and all control variables. The model fit Chi-square value was significant ( $X^2=222.6$ ;  $p < .001$ ) and the Pearson and Deviance values were

not significant meaning the model fit the data. The test of parallel lines also produced a Chi-square value that wasn't significant; meaning the assumption of parallel lines was not violated.

**\*\*Table 5 Here\*\***

I followed the same procedure with this dependent variable, adding the independent variables in four steps. In step one (2a), having an immigrant parent, having higher educational attainment, being politically liberal, not living in the South, living in a non-rural place, and being married all significantly lowered the probability that the respondent held a negative view about immigrants – all of these control variables except rural residence retained their significance throughout all four steps. In the second step, compared to the non-religious, being moderate Protestant, Baptist, and Catholic all increased the odds of having a negative view about immigrants. The coefficients of these religious affiliation variables were nearly unaltered by the addition of religious practice in step three (2c).

In the fourth step (model 2d), the dummy set measuring beliefs about the Bible altered the coefficients for religious groups. Compared to the belief that the Bible is a book of fables, believing that the Bible is the word of God increases the odds of having a negative view about immigrants by 58% ( $p < .05$ ). In the final model moderate Protestants and Baptists were significantly more likely than the non-religious to have a negative view about immigrants. In model 2c being a moderate Protestant increased the odds of having a negative view of immigrants by 97% ( $p < .05$ ) and in model 2d these odds were increased by only 63% ( $p < .05$ ). Being Baptist in model 2c increased the odds of having a negative view towards immigrants by 164% ( $p < .001$ ), and in model 2d the odds were increased by 114% ( $p < .001$ ). While being Catholic approaches standard significance levels in increasing the odds of having a negative view about immigrants (39%;  $p < .1$ ) in model 2c, in model 2d Catholic affiliation did not have a

significant relationship with attitudes about immigrants. Finally, although the coefficient for rural residence was significant in model 2a, 2b, and 2c, it was no longer significant in the final model.

When I ran ordinal regression with the restricted sample for both dependent variables (N=841) the results were largely the same as the results described above. Being moderate Protestant, being Baptist, believing the Bible is the inspired word of God, being Black, being of another race, being a 1<sup>st</sup> generation immigrant, and educational attainment all had a significant relationship with attitudes about immigration. However, being mainline Protestant, part of another Protestant group, and having at least one immigrant parent were no longer significantly related to attitudes about immigration in the restricted sample. Compared to model 2 being Baptist, a Christian fundamentalist, a 1<sup>st</sup> generation immigrant, having at least one immigrant parent, and educational attainment were still significantly related to attitudes about immigrants in the restricted sample. However, being a moderate Protestant was no longer significantly related to attitudes about immigrants in the smaller model. Taking these results and the sample description statistics into account suggests that the samples were not drastically different in the three models.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **DISCUSSION**

Understanding the relationships between personal characteristics, religiosity, and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in the United States is important. As the U.S. becomes increasingly diverse new policies are needed to accommodate new residents and these new policies will need to have the support of the general public to be successful. In this study I have investigated the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. I predicted that some religious groups, perhaps those with prominent leaders publicly asserting the importance of extending charity to immigrants, would be more likely to have positive views toward immigrants than those who are not religiously affiliated. I also predicted that religious activity would have a significant curvilinear relationship with attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. I believed that those who attended religious activities the most and those who attended the least would hold more favorable views about immigrants than those in the middle. Finally, I predicted that those who were religious fundamentalists would be significantly less likely than non-fundamentalists to have positive attitudes about immigrants and immigration.

My first hypothesis was that members of religious groups would be significantly less prejudiced than people without a religious affiliation, after adding religious fundamentalism to the model. I drew from previous literature to make this hypothesis. Knoll (2009) argued that those in minority religious groups are less prejudiced and hold less negative views toward immigrants than the non-religious or other religious groups. Nteta and Wallsten (2012) found that those exposed to positive messages about immigrants in a religious setting were less likely to be prejudiced than those who had not been. Finally, McDaniel et al. (2011) argued that those in majority religious groups, such as Evangelicals, might have more negative views toward

immigrants due to the confluence of their religious and national identities. I believed that McDaniel et al.'s findings could be accounted for by fundamentalism not affiliation per se.

I did not find support for this hypothesis. Unexpectedly, some religious groups were more likely than the non-religious to have a negative view about immigrants and immigration even after accounting for religious fundamentalism. Specifically, I did not find support for Knoll's 'minority hypothesis.' While persons in a minority religious group are less likely than the non-religious to have negative views about immigrants and immigration, these are not significant results. Compared to the non-religious, I did not find that any religious group was significantly less likely than the non-religious to hold negative views toward immigrants and immigration. Nteta and Wallsten (2012) were able to more directly compare those who had heard messages in their local church that supported positive views toward immigrants and immigration and those that had not. This measurement difference may explain my divergent results. I did find that mainline Protestants, moderate Protestants, Baptists, and other Protestants were more likely to favor a decrease in immigration than the non-religious. I also found that moderate Protestants and Baptists were significantly more likely than the non-religious to have a negative view about immigrants. This fits with McDaniel et al.'s (2011) claim that those in majority religious groups may have negative views toward immigrants and immigration because they are trying to protect their symbolic identity. However, other majority groups, such as liberal Protestants, were not significantly more likely than the non-religious to hold negative views toward immigrants and immigration. These results suggest that there is something about religious affiliation, other than fundamentalism and rate of participation, which leads some to negatively view immigrants and immigration.

My second hypothesis was that the respondent's level of religious activity would be significant. I believed that, as Scheeper et al. (2002) found, the relationship would be curvilinear, with the highest level of prejudice coming from those moderately religiously active. The results of this analysis do not support this hypothesis. Religious activity was not a significant predictor of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration and it did not have a noticeable effect on the coefficients of the religious affiliation variables. This may be because this is not an issue of prejudice as I originally thought. Scheepers et al. (2002) were looking at the relationship between religious activity and prejudice. Layman (1997) made the more general claim that religious behavior or activity is as important as denomination for understanding political behavior. In these analyses, that did not seem to be the case. However, perhaps I did not include sufficient religious controls or my composite measure was not strong.

My last hypothesis was that being fundamentalist would significantly increase the odds of having negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration and decrease the effect of any religious affiliation measures. This hypothesis drew from the findings of McDaniel et al. (2011) who argued that fundamentalist Christians are especially prone to hold Christian nationalist views which lead to negative attitudes toward immigrants. The addition of the variables measuring the respondent's views about the Bible significantly altered many of the coefficients for religious affiliation. Regarding attitudes toward immigration, many of the religious affiliation coefficients dropped and the coefficient for Catholic affiliation was not significant after this addition. Even though these variables had an effect on the other variables in the model, they were not themselves significant. Belief that the Bible is the inspired word of God approaches standard significance levels in regards to attitudes about immigration, whereas belief that the Bible is the word of God does not. The addition of variables measuring fundamentalism to the model for the

second dependent variable also caused the coefficients of the religious affiliation variables to decrease. In this case, belief that the Bible is the word of God is also significant on its own ( $p < .05$ ). These findings suggest that a measure of religious fundamentalism is an important addition to any study of the effects of religion, but does not explain all of the variation between religious groups.

Finally, previous research has argued that economic factors (Burns and Gimpel 2000), age (Wilson 1996), and gender (Hughes and Tuch 2003) were significantly related to prejudice. In this analysis these variables were consistently not significant. This may again be the result of immigration not being a direct issue of prejudice.

These findings could be more robustly analyzed with a larger sample that was asked more questions directly related to immigration and religion. For example, Gustin and Ziebarth (2010) claim that much of the negative sentiment toward immigrants in the United States has been due to the conflation of legal immigrant with illegal immigrant. The questions available in the GSS do not differentiate in the interview between legal and illegal immigrants. In addition, many studies have included a control variable for Border States which I was not able to include. Furthermore, both the measure of religious practice and attitudes toward immigrants are limited and perhaps inaccurate. For example, it could be argued that the measure that I have used for attitudes toward immigrants actually only measures the perceived effect of immigrants on the United States – this may be a different measure altogether. Also, some religious communities may not emphasize religious activities other than religious services. Thus, a person might attend services once a week or more (8) but never participate in religious activities (0), this would make it appear as if they are moderately religiously active when in fact they are very active. Additionally, the variable measuring the respondent's views about the Bible restricts the measure



to Christian fundamentalists and does not include fundamentalists from other religious groups. Lastly, the variation of participants within religious groups can be quite large. For example, there are extremely liberal Catholics and extremely conservative ones, and religious affiliation may be too broad a measure to catch the diversity within religious groups.

The interactions between various religious groups and fundamentalism needs more detailed analyses than what I did in this study. It would be helpful to not only suggest that Christian fundamentalism has an effect but to also understand more concretely why it has an effect on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. This question began to be addressed by McDaniel et al. (2011) but could be explored further. Also, the interactions between various religious groups and basic demographic characteristics should be analyzed in more depth. Furthermore, the reasons why some religious categories remain significant after fundamentalism and religious activity are added to the model, remains a mystery. Research often assumes that groups like Baptists are prejudiced because the members are politically conservative or religiously fundamentalist, but both of these factors have been accounted for in this model. This important question may need to be addressed with qualitative exploratory research, followed by better informed quantitative work.

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## **APPENDICES**

**APPENDIX A**  
**SAMPLE DESCRIPTION TABLE**

**Table 1. Sample Description**

<u>Dependent Variables</u>	(N=1310)	(N=2679)	(N=841)
Attitudes Toward Immigration (1-3)	---	2.36 (.70)	2.37 (.67)
Attitudes Toward Immigrants (1-3)	1.90 (.75)	---	1.94 (.75)
<u>Independent Variables</u>			
Religious Affiliation			
<i>Liberal Protestant</i>	.04 (.19)	.04 (.20)	.04 (.20)
<i>Mainline Protestants</i>	.06 (.24)	.06 (.23)	.05 (.23)
<i>Moderate Protestant</i>	.11 (.31)	.09 (.29)	.12 (.32)
<i>Baptist</i>	.16 (.37)	.17 (.37)	.16 (.37)
<i>Other Sectarian Group</i>	.07 (.26)	.07 (.26)	.07 (.26)
<i>Catholic</i>	.22 (.41)	.23 (.42)	.22 (.41)
<i>Other Protestant Group</i>	.10 (.30)	.11 (.31)	.10 (.30)
<i>Minority Religious Group</i>	.07 (.25)	.06 (.23)	.07 (.26)
<i>No Religious Identification</i>	.17 (.37)	.18 (.38)	.17 (.37)
Christian Fundamentalism			
<i>Word of God</i>	.31 (.46)	.32 (.47)	.31 (.46)
<i>Inspired Word of God</i>	.48 (.50)	.46 (.50)	.48 (.50)
<i>Book of Fables</i>	.21 (.41)	.23 (.42)	.21 (.41)
Religious Participation			
<i>Never</i>	.19 (.39)	.18 (.39)	.19 (.39)
<i>Yearly</i>	.13 (.34)	.16 (.36)	.14 (.35)
<i>Monthly</i>	.12 (.32)	.10 (.30)	.12 (.32)
<i>Weekly</i>	.09 (.29)	.09 (.28)	.09 (.29)
<u>Control Variables</u>			
Race			
<i>Black</i>	.14 (.34)	.14 (.35)	.14 (.35)
<i>White</i>	.78 (.41)	.78 (.42)	.79 (.41)
<i>Other</i>	.08 (.27)	.08 (.27)	.07 (.25)
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Immigrant	.11 (.31)	.11 (.31)	.10 (.30)
Immigrant Parent	.18 (.38)	.18 (.39)	.16 (.37)



**Table 1. Continued**

Immigrant Grandparent	.36 (.48)	.38 (.48)	.36 (.48)
Educational Attainment (0-20)	13.73 (2.91)	13.74 (2.96)	13.75 (2.81)
Age	48.90 (16.56)	48.59 (16.73)	48.78 (16.47)
Male	.47 (.50)	.45 (.50)	.48 (.50)
Income	17.23 (5.40)	16.97 (5.62)	17.20 (5.37)
Political Views			
<i>Conservative</i>	.35 (.48)	.34 (.47)	.33 (.47)
<i>Moderate</i>	.36 (.48)	.36 (.48)	.36 (.48)
<i>Liberal</i>	.29 (.46)	.30 (.46)	.32 (.47)
Southern Region	.22 (.41)	.22 (.41)	.24 (.42)
Rural Area	.12 (.33)	.12 (.32)	.14 (.34)
Married	.50 (.50)	.47 (.50)	.49 (.50)

*Note.* Mean scores are reported with standard deviation in parentheses

**APPENDIX B**  
**CROSS-TABULATION TABLES**

**Table 2. Cross-Tabulation: Attitudes toward Immigration and Religious Affiliation**

		Liberal Protestant	Mainline Protestant	Moderate Protestant	Baptist	Other Sectarian	Minority Religion	Other Protestant	Catholic	No Religion
	Count	18	11	19	35	31	31	32	80	82
Increased (1) <sup>a</sup>	% within RA <sup>b</sup>	15.80%	7.20%	7.90%	7.90%	15.90%	19.90%	11.10%	13.10%	17.20%
	AR <sup>c</sup>	1	<b>-2.1</b>	<b>-2.4</b>	<b>-3.3</b>	1.4	<b>2.8</b>	-0.8	0.4	<b>3.3</b>
	Count	52	57	85	137	72	68	105	250	211
Stay the Same (2)	% within RA	45.60%	37.50%	35.10%	30.90%	36.90%	43.60%	36.50%	40.80%	44.20%
	AR	1.5	-0.3	-1.2	<b>-3.7</b>	-0.5	1.3	-0.8	1.2	<b>2.7</b>
	Count	44	84	138	271	92	57	151	282	184
Decreased (3)	% within RA	38.60%	55.30%	57.00%	61.20%	47.20%	36.50%	52.40%	46.10%	38.60%
	AR	<b>-2.2</b>	1.7	<b>2.7</b>	<b>5.8</b>	-0.4	<b>-3.1</b>	1.4	-1.4	<b>-4.9</b>
	Count	114	152	242	443	195	156	288	612	477
Total	% within RA	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Note. Pearson Chi-Square: 86.28; 16df; p<.001

<sup>a</sup>Immigration should be: increased, decreased, or stay the same.

<sup>b</sup>RA refers to religious affiliation

<sup>c</sup>AR refers to adjusted residual

**Table 3. Cross-Tabulation: Attitudes toward Immigrants and Religious Affiliation**

		Liberal Protestant	Mainline Protestant	Moderate Protestant	Baptist	Other Sectarian	Minority Religion	Other Protestant	Catholic	No Religion
Positive (1) <sup>a</sup>	Count	25	34	38	32	31	40	44	96	96
	% within RA <sup>a</sup>	49.00%	41.00%	26.40%	15.20%	32.60%	46.00%	33.60%	33.20%	43.60%
	AR	<b>2.4</b>	1.5	-1.9	<b>-6.1</b>	-0.1	<b>2.6</b>	0.1	0	<b>3.6</b>
Neutral (2)	Count	18	33	59	93	41	39	55	137	90
	% within RA	35.30%	39.80%	41.00%	44.30%	43.20%	44.80%	42.00%	47.40%	40.90%
	AR	-1.2	-0.6	-0.6	0.4	0	0.3	-0.3	1.7	-0.7
Negative (3)	Count	8	16	47	85	23	8	32	56	34
	% within RA	15.70%	19.30%	32.60%	40.50%	24.20%	9.20%	24.40%	19.40%	15.50%
	AR	-1.4	-1	<b>2.7</b>	<b>6.3</b>	0.1	<b>-3.3</b>	0.2	-1.9	<b>-3.1</b>
Total	Count	51	83	144	210	95	87	131	289	220
	% within RA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Note. Pearson Chi-Square: 90.36; 16df; p<.001

<sup>a</sup> Respondent's view about immigrants in the U.S.

**APPENDIX C**  
**ORDINAL REGRESSION TABLES**

**Table 4. Ordinal Regression of Attitudes about Immigration (N=2679)**

	M1.a	M1.b	M1.c	M1.d
<b>Religious Affiliation</b>				
<i>Liberal Protestant</i>		-.16 (.20)	-.17 (.21)	-.26 (.21)
<i>Mainline Protestant</i>		<b>.47 (.19)**</b>	<b>.46 (.19)**</b>	<b>.39 (.20)**</b>
<i>Moderate Protestant</i>		<b>.65 (.16)***</b>	<b>.64 (.16)***</b>	<b>.58 (.17)***</b>
<i>Baptist</i>		<b>.77 (.14)***</b>	<b>.76 (.14)***</b>	<b>.71 (.15)***</b>
<i>Other Sectarian Group</i>		.15 (.15)	.13 (.17)	.08 (.18)
<i>Catholic</i>		<b>.30 (.12)**</b>	<b>.28 (.12)**</b>	.21 (.13)
<i>Other Protestant Group</i>		<b>.41 (.15)**</b>	<b>.40 (.15)**</b>	<b>.33 (.16)**</b>
<i>Minority Religious Group</i>		-.05 (.18)	-.06 (.18)	-.10 (.18)
<b>Christian Fundamentalism</b>				
<i>Word of God</i>	---	---	---	.04 (.13)
<i>Inspired</i>	---	---	---	<b>.19 (.11)*</b>
<b>Religious Participation</b>				
<i>Yearly</i>	---	---	.15 (.11)	.15 (.11)
<i>Monthly</i>	---	---	.20 (.13)	.20 (.13)
<i>Weekly</i>	---	---	.14 (.14)	.15 (.13)
<b>Race</b>				
<i>Black</i>	<b>-.66 (.11)***</b>	<b>-.81 (.12)***</b>	<b>-.82 (.12)***</b>	<b>-.80 (.12)***</b>
<i>Other</i>	<b>-.44 (.16)**</b>	<b>-.43 (.16)**</b>	<b>-.43 (.16)**</b>	<b>-.42 (.16)**</b>
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Immigrant	<b>-.86 (.17)***</b>	<b>-.84 (.17)***</b>	<b>-.84 (.17)***</b>	<b>.84 (.17)***</b>
Immigrant Parent	<b>-.36 (.15)**</b>	<b>-.35 (.15)**</b>	<b>-.35 (.15)**</b>	<b>-.36 (.15)**</b>
Immigrant Grandparent	.08 (.10)	.15 (.10)	.14 (.10)	.15 (.10)
Educational Attainment (0-20)	<b>-.09 (.01)***</b>	<b>-.08 (.02)***</b>	<b>-.08 (.02)***</b>	<b>-.08 (.02)***</b>
Age	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
Male	-.03 (.08)	.00 (.08)	.00 (.08)	.00 (.08)
Income	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)
<b>Political Views</b>				

**Table 4. Continued**

<i>Moderate</i>	-.03 (.09)	.01 (.09)	.01 (.09)	.00 (.10)
<i>Liberal</i>	<b>-.48 (.10)***</b>	<b>-.39 (.10)***</b>	<b>-.40 (.10)***</b>	<b>-.40 (.10)***</b>
Southern Region	<b>.29 (.10)**</b>	<b>.22 (.10)**</b>	<b>.22 (.10)**</b>	<b>.22 (.10)**</b>
Rural Area	<b>.39 (.13)**</b>	<b>.35 (.13)**</b>	<b>.36 (.13)**</b>	<b>.37 (.13)**</b>
Married	.02 (.09)	-.01 (.09)	-.01 (.09)	-.02 (.09)
<b>X<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>269.68***</b>	<b>319.63***</b>	<b>323.84***</b>	<b>327.92***</b>

*Note.* Regression coefficients are presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p<.001.

Reference variables are: religious affiliation - 'no religious identification; Bible - 'the Bible is a book of fables'; religious activity - 'never religiously active'; race - 'white'; political views - 'political conservative'.

**Table 5. Ordinal Regression of Attitudes about Immigrants (N=1310)**

	M1.a	M1.b	M1.c	M1.d
<b>Religious Affiliation</b>				
<i>Liberal Protestant</i>	---	-.20 (.31)	-.22 (.31)	-.38 (.42)
<i>Mainline Protestant</i>	---	.05 (.26)	.03 (.26)	-.12 (.27)
<i>Moderate Protestant</i>	---	<b>.68 (.22)**</b>	<b>.68 (.22)**</b>	<b>.49 (.24)**</b>
<i>Baptist</i>	---	<b>.96 (.20)***</b>	<b>.97 (.21)***</b>	<b>.76 (.23)***</b>
<i>Other Sectarian Group</i>	---	.10 (.25)	.08 (.25)	-.13 (.27)
<i>Catholic</i>	---	<b>.34 (.18)*</b>	<b>.33 (.18)*</b>	.20 (.20)
<i>Other Protestant Group</i>	---	.27 (.22)	.29 (.22)	.11 (.24)
<i>Minority Religious Group</i>	---	-.11 (.25)	-.12 (.25)	-.20 (.26)
<b>Christian Fundamentalism</b>				
<i>Word of God</i>	---	---	---	<b>.46 (.20)**</b>
<i>Inspired</i>	---	---	---	.23 (.17)
<b>Religious Participation</b>				
<i>Yearly</i>	---	---	.23 (.16)	.26 (.16)
<i>Monthly</i>	---	---	.23 (.17)	.20 (.17)
<i>Weekly</i>	---	---	.13 (.19)	.09 (.19)
<b>Race</b>				
<i>Black</i>	.16 (.16)	-.02 (.17)	-.03 (.17)	-.09 (.17)
<i>Other</i>	-.32 (.23)	-.33 (.23)	-.34 (.23)	-.36 (.23)
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Immigrant	<b>-.41 (.24)*</b>	-.39 (.24)	-.39 (.24)	<b>-.40 (.24)*</b>
Immigrant Parent	<b>-.79 (.21)***</b>	<b>-.81 (.21)***</b>	<b>-.80 (.22)***</b>	<b>-.81 (.22)***</b>
Immigrant Grandparent	.03 (.14)	.12 (.14)	.12 (.14)	.14 (.14)
Educational Attainment (0-20)	<b>-.15 (.02)***</b>	<b>-.13 (.02)***</b>	<b>-.13 (.02)***</b>	<b>-.13 (.02)***</b>
Age	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
Male	-.08 (.11)	-.07 (.11)	-.08 (.11)	-.04 (.11)
Income	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)
<b>Political Views</b>				



**Table 5. Continued**

<i>Moderate</i>	-.09 (.13)	-.07 (.13)	-.28 (.17)	-.07 (.13)
<i>Liberal</i>	<b>-.50 (.14)***</b>	<b>-.39 (.14)**</b>	<b>-.39 (.14)**</b>	<b>-.34 (.14)**</b>
Southern Region	.11 (.13)	-.00 (.13)	-.00 (.13)	.01 (.13)
Rural Area	<b>.40 (.16)**</b>	<b>.35 (.17)**</b>	<b>.36 (.17)**</b>	<b>.31 (.21)*</b>
Married	<b>-.27 (.12)**</b>	<b>-.42 (.14)**</b>	<b>-.27 (.12)**</b>	<b>-.29 (.12)**</b>
<b>X<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>173.07***</b>	<b>213.50***</b>	<b>216.90***</b>	<b>222.60***</b>

*Note.* Regression coefficients presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p<.001.

Reference variables are: religious affiliation - 'no religious identification; Bible - 'the Bible is a book of fables'; religious activity - 'never religiously active'; race - 'white'; political views - 'political conservative'

**Table 6. Ordinal Regression of Attitudes about Immigration and Immigrants (N=841)<sup>a</sup>**

	Attitudes about Immigration	Attitudes about Immigrants
Religious Affiliation		
<i>Liberal Protestant</i>	-.36 (.40)	-.32 (.40)
<i>Mainline Protestant</i>	-.18 (.36)	-.11 (.36)
<i>Moderate Protestant</i>	<b>.54 (.31)*</b>	.39 (.29)
<i>Baptist</i>	<b>.53 (.29)*</b>	<b>.68 (.28)**</b>
<i>Other Sectarian Group</i>	-.23 (.34)	-.22 (.33)
<i>Catholic</i>	.21 (.26)	.34 (.25)
<i>Other Protestant Group</i>	.27 (.31)	.24 (.30)
<i>Minority Religious Group</i>	.04 (.31)	-.29 (.32)
Christian Fundamentalism		
<i>Word of God</i>	.26 (.25)	<b>.50 (.25)**</b>
<i>Inspired</i>	<b>.43 (.22)**</b>	.32 (.21)
Religious Participation		
<i>Yearly</i>	.12 (.21)	.23 (.20)
<i>Monthly</i>	<b>.39 (.23)*</b>	.28 (.22)
<i>Weekly</i>	.39 (.26)	.14 (.25)
Race		
<i>Black</i>	<b>-.78 (.22)***</b>	-.20 (.22)
<i>Other</i>	<b>-.53 (.31)*</b>	-.49 (.32)
<i>1<sup>st</sup> Generation Immigrant</i>	<b>-1.11 (.31)***</b>	<b>-.53 (.32)*</b>
<i>Immigrant Parent</i>	-.45 (.29)	<b>-.51 (.28)*</b>
<i>Immigrant Grandparent</i>	.27 (.19)	-.00 (.18)
<i>Educational Attainment (0-20)</i>	<b>-.10 (.03)***</b>	<b>-.14 (.03)***</b>
<i>Age</i>	.00 (.01)	.00 (.00)
<i>Male</i>	-.09 (.14)	-.07 (.14)
<i>Income</i>	.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)
Political Views		
<i>Moderate</i>	-.03 (.18)	<b>-.27 (.17)*</b>

**Table 6. Continued**

<i>Liberal</i>	<b>-.33 (.18)*</b>	<b>-.34 (.18)*</b>
Southern Region	-.04 (.17)	.06 (.17)
Rural Area	<b>.50 (.23)**</b>	.29 (.21)
Married	-.21 (.16)	<b>-.37 (.15)**</b>
<b>X<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>131.09***</b>	<b>149.59***</b>

*Note.* Regression coefficients presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p<.001.

Reference variables are: religious affiliation - 'no religious identification; Bible - 'the Bible is a book of fables'; religious activity - 'never religiously active'; race - 'white'; political views - 'political conservative'

<sup>a</sup>Limited sample for both variables

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