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The Open Court.

A WEEKLY JOU[RNAL]

Devoted to the Work of Conciliating Religion with Science.

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

The Data of experience are perceptions.

Reality is the sum total of all that is.

Truth is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

Science is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

Knowledge is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

Monism is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

Religion is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of The Open Court, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word God by the more comprehensive word The All). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

Morals are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

Ethics is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

RECENT CONTENTS OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF MICRO-ORGANISMS.

[Mr. George John Romanes replies, in this contribution, to the criticisms advanced by M. Alfred Binet in the preface of his work "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms," recently published by The Open Court Publishing Company. The discussion from a psychological point of view, is extremely interesting and instructive. (No. 98.)]

PROOF OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN HYSTERICAL INDIVIDUALS.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO CONSCIOUSNESSES OF HYSTERICAL INDIVIDUALS.

THE HYSTERICAL EYE.

[A series of original investigations, with new and unpublished experiments, by the French psychologist, M. Alfred Binet, upon the psychology of hysteria; including an examination of double consciousness, "automatic writing," and the various forms of anæsthesia. (Nos. 100, 101, and 102.)]

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MAN AS A MICROCOSM.*

BY CARUS STERNE.

The sages of ancient India, the priests of Egypt, and the astrologers of Chaldea long ago pondered upon the interdependence of all existing things. They held that the harmony of the universe was so complete that nothing in it could be thought of that did not depend upon the rest; and in the more particular application of this principle they believed, that living creatures at their birth received the impress of the attendant constellation of the heavenly bodies, and that they ever afterwards remained subject to its influence.

On a *bas-relief* found by the noted French Ægyptologist Champollion, in 1827, upon the ceiling of the tomb of Ramses IV, there is represented the figure of a man, upon the different parts and members of whose body were drawn the stars and planets by which the parts were supposed to be influenced. Thus, upon the heart, the eyes, the ears, and the arms, were marked the stars that during the second half of the month of Tobi slowly rise at night from beneath the horizon, and under whose ascendency those members were believed to stand.

These ideas of antiquity met with a cordial reception among Saracenic scholars, who for a long time were the intermedium for the transmission of ancient philosophy to the peoples of modern times. In the tenth century of our era, the somewhat fantastically finished cosmic conception of this Oriental people was reduced to a system by the so-called Brothers of Purity or Sincerity. This system exhibits an evolutionary tendency. For according to its principles the creative power manifested itself by radiation into higher forms: thus it first produced minerals; then mineral-plants; then plants proper; later on, animal-plants and plant-animals, the lower and higher species, until, passing through man and angel, it reverted to divinity. Accordingly, said they, the forces of nature are all gathered together in man; all the elements of the mineral kingdom are represented in his body; to the nine spheres of the universe correspond the nine successive layers of his body, namely, marrow, bones, sinews, veins, blood, flesh, skin, nails, and hair; all the physical and psychical attributes of plants and animals unite in him; the heavenly bodies, particularly the planets, influenced his creation and continued to dominate the members of the body: the sun, the heart; the moon, the lungs; Mercury, the brain; Jupiter, the liver; Mars, the gall; and Venus, the abdomen.

Then, again, each member was redivided into separate regions, and they in their turn were supposed to be subject to the influence of the various heavenly bodies. In the art of chiromancy, or palmistry, which two hundred years ago was taught at almost all the universities, the masters, proceeding from the analogous principles of astrology, divided the palm of the hand into different sections, which were supposed to be subject to the sun, the moon, and the planets then known; and from the disposition of the lines of the moon and sun, from the configuration of the mountains of Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and Mercury, and from the cestus of Venus, they read the future fate of the individuals in question; just as the astrologists in casting the horoscope of a man's life consulted the constellations of the stars and planets that were in the ascendant at the moment of his birth. Of the interaction and intercurrence of all parts of the universe upon and with each other, they were thoroughly convinced.

They fancied, accordingly, that they could, without any difficulty whatever, liken the conditions of man, the microcosm, or little world, to those of the macrocosm, or the great universe; and wonderful things, of course, resulted from this notion. The absurdities that this parallelism of human and cosmic life led them into, is perhaps best seen in a book published towards the close of the sixteenth century by Dr. Oswald Croll, court-physician to the Prince of Anhalt. In his "Treatise upon the Symbols of the Great and Little Universe," he attempted to prove the coincidence of the microcosm and macrocosm by the following oppositions:

MICROCOSM.	MACROCOSM.
Physiognomy, or face.	Aspect of heaven.
Chiromancy, or hand.	Minerals.
Pulse.	Movement of the heavens.
Chill.	Earthquake.
Flux.	Rain.
Stomach-aches.	Peals of thunder and hurricanes.
Kidney-troubles, etc.	Lightning in summer-time.
Leanness of the body.	Drought.
Dropsy.	Floods.
Epilepsy.	Tempest.

Of course, among men of greater intelligence these

*Translated from the German by μκρκ.

notions of the coincidence of human and cosmic life assumed a less superficial shape. The intellects of Greece and Rome, in their day, had also reflected upon this relation : how that man, as the being in which the universe first came to individual consciousness, must himself be the content of the All—a microcosm, in which every force and every element were represented, in which all chords vibrated and all the ends of creation must necessarily be realized. This notion is in reality nothing but the ultimate conclusion of an anthropocentric conception of the world which regarded man as the central point of the universe, as the actual, original reason of all creation, and the consummation of creation's work. Among the early teachers of the Christian Church we find the same idea developed. John of Damascus calls the first man, as he came from the hands of God, a "second little world within the great one," a being intermediate between earth and heaven, lowly and exalted, of the flesh and of the spirit, of earth and of heaven, temporal and eternal—in which the gifts of God had united with the attributes of earth." As servitor of heaven, he reigned supreme in the world that was created for him. For him alone did the stars shine, the earth bear fruit, the beasts give flesh, the flowers fill the air with fragrance and array themselves in glorious colors; and on the day of judgment, when all mankind were to meet their doom, all these wonders would share the common fate.

It is not our purpose here to take exception to the assertions of those abstruse philosophers who believe that this idea is the acme of human wisdom ; who say that without the observing eye of a rational creature the genesis of the world could not be conceived of, and that thus the animals of primeval periods did not really exist until man had discovered their remains and shaped them anew, and that with the last of rational beings the world will sink again into the nothingness from which with man it originally arose. All this is but an apotheosis of the representative faculty wherein the latter instead of recognizing its true function here to be merely that of reproduction, would fain awaken and exorcise a world from nothingness—idle trickeries and self-delusions, to avoid the sorely felt limitations set to the faculty of direct cognition, and to hide the helplessness of philosophy as a constructive science.

Yet, withal, man could with justice regard himself the *heart* of that world which Plato has represented in his Philebos as a great organism, a sort of living animal, and whose throat and respiratory cavity the Middle Ages sought in the abyss of the Maelstrom. None could dispute that he was the highest expression, the culminating point of animal life ; and with this fact was early associated the idea that in him the germinal elements of all existence must have been united to form a final and highest expression. "All forms of creation, organic as well as inorganic, are repeated in the organization of man," teaches the Talmud * in various passages; and adds that the dust of his body is come from all the quarters of the world, to the end that he may accomodate himself to the climates of all regions. In latter days it is Paracelsus particularly who has never wearied of giving reiterated expression in his books to these ideas.† "As the world was created from out of Limbus (primitive chaos) and as of all creatures man was created the last, so there is nothing in the world that is not comprised in him. Man has therefore the knowledge of the angels and the spirits, and comes by every art that other creatures possess, *for he has inherited it from them.*"

In his book upon the Plague he particularly emphasizes the theory that man bears in his body the likeness and attributes of all creatures created before him ; and our author incidentally estimates the number of these creatures to be in round numbers MMCC. In his treatise upon the "Origin of Human Knowledge and the Human Arts," he remarks that the reason of man is also nothing but the collective reason of all animals, and that therefore man was the highest animal, for the animals individually did not possess the entire animal nature. Although every species of animal was contained in man, yet in the individual case only one of these attained pre-eminence of development; thus one man exhibited the temper of a dog; another, the voracity of a wolf ; a third, the cunning of a fox ; and so on. The magnitude of the influence that these ideas exerted, is hardly definable in a short essay. It was not alone that, in a book upon physiognomics,‡ the Neapolitan Baptista Porta taught a method of determining human character from the prominence of resemblances to certain animals;—an idea which the Danish painter Schack § a few years ago again made the subject of an extensive work. Here commence, moreover, the speculations concerning the gradation of created things that was supposed to begin with minerals and proceeding through plant, animal, and man, to extend to the highest Being—speculations which were especially favored by Leibnitz and his school and closely associated with his theory of monads.

This idea of the repetition of all creation in man had a still more immediate and important result in the school of so-called Naturalistic Philosophers—now so vehemently persecuted and abused by the very ones who are most akin to them in the unintelligibility and

* Dr. Placzek, *Darwinismus und Talmud*, in the *Jüdisches Literaturblatt*, 1878, No. 1, et seqq.

† Compare Huser's edition of Paracelsus (Strassburg, 1616–18), especially Vol. I, pp. 327 and 581, and Vol. II, p. 326.

‡ Baptista Porta, *De Humana Physiognomia*, Hanoviae, 1593.

§ Sophus Schack, *Physiognomische Studien*. Jena, 1881.

grotesqueness of their view of the world. This school of philosophy moved entirely within the circle of microcosmic ideas defined by Paracelsus (and secretly cherished, even to-day, by many closet-philosophers). Their chief representative, Lorenz Oken, whose transcendent merit it is, to have first led into successful paths the long neglected study of animal evolution, writes, in 1806, in almost the very words of Paracelsus: "Man is the synthesis of all the animal principles. Animals therefore are only individual developments of these separate principles, and consequently are nothing else than the corporate impersonations of the various human organs. The organ, which is crystallized in them as it were, is their form and essence; this *single* organ constitutes the *whole* animal, while in man it constitutes but a minor part."* The various animals took various parts in the development of the different systems of organs from which later on man was supposed to issue in full perfection. Thus, some busied themselves more with perfecting the digestive system, others more with perfecting the organs of respiration, the circulatory system, the organs of locomotion; etc.

The careful observation of the preliminary and transient phases of development through which higher animals pass, and in which *one* system of organs is seen to form before another and to exhibit, throughout these phases, an unmistakable resemblance to the permanent structure of certain animals of lower classes—had prepared the way for the views of the school of Oken. As early as the year 1793, in fact, it was formulated as a universal principle by Heinrich Kielmayer, a Tübingen professor, that the embryos of higher animals had to pass, in their development, through the various structural forms of lower classes; a principle which became more and more firmly established, the more carefully the development of the young bird in the egg and the mammal in its mother's body was studied. So too, towards the close of the third decade of this century, the scientist Rathke discovered that not only frogs and other amphibia pass as tad-poles through a fish-like stage of development, but that also the higher vertebrate orders which never breathe with gills at all, show in the course of their formation *rudimentary* gills. And this last discovery seemed to confirm the correctness and truth of Oken's theory of "the embryo of man illumed throughout the animal kingdom." Whereupon the microcosmic doctrine celebrated a further deceptive triumph.

It has ever been the prerogative of philosophical systems immediately to appropriate the acquisitions of empirical research as the ripe products of their own origination; and, with Schelling in the van, their exponents now proclaimed aloud that the entire evolution of the world and its forms of life was only human genesis and a reflective act on the part of nature; that animals and all lower forms of life were nothing but stages in the onward movement of the genesis of man. Thus, Schelling could make the resultant product say of the original matrix of all:

> "I am the God within her bosom cherished,
> The Spirit that in all doth glow
> From hidden forces' primal struggle
> Till life's first streams in fulness flow."

But if man were really recognizable as the ultimate purpose of the development of life, in whose creation nature had expended every effort, and for whose presence she had long prepared; then surely man were the embodiment of nature's first and not her final thought. The animals that had to go before him, in order, agreeably to Oken's theory, to embody and develop the various systems of organs, were consequently only *means to an end;* and if, after the process of development had ceased, they still survived, they were then to be regarded as mere reproductions of primitive designs and transitional stages, as waste products of the genesis of man, the plan of whose construction lay at the foundation of all organic growth as a guiding and motive principle. In accordance with these ideas the fishes that figured in the world's history so many thousands of years before the era of man, possessed two pectoral and two ventral fins for the sole reason that they first had to show the world a rough sketch of the general form of the human body with its two arms and two legs.

In the first part of the present century, an accurate study of human miscarriages and monstrosities, made by the French naturalist Etienne Geoffroy de Saint Hilaire, led this scientist to the conviction that the animal resemblances so frequently marked in these subjects and generally characterized as harelips, ape's heads, etc., were caused by a cessation of embryonic development in some given direction, and that these subjects, accordingly, were to be looked upon as incomplete human formations. The same animal-like formations always occur, moreover, in the regular course of human development; they must be passed through by every human being coming into life; but in the normal course of development they stand for transitional stages which are generally passed over without leaving a trace of their prior existence. In the instances mentioned, accordingly, the normal course of development, having prematurely ceased at an unfinished stage, must have been arrested through some cause or other, and this fact seemed to offer a sufficient reason for giving such monstrosities the name of *arrested formations.*

*Lorenz Oken, Ueber die Entwickelung der wissenschaftlichen Systematik der Thiere in *Oken and Kiese*, Beiträge zur vergleichenden Zoologie, Anatomie und Physiologie. Bamberg und Würzburg, Heft I. (1806.)

This theory of arrested development was further elaborated by Carl Vogt in his well-known theory of microcephalous forms. The latter's conclusions were as illogical and superfluous even, as those of Geoffroy; and yet the theory was immediately adopted by many naturalists of evolutionary tendencies and extended as an explanation of the origin of the entire animal kingdom. Just as the microcephalous subject had been described as a human being whose cerebral development was arrested at a stage just anterior to that of cerebral maturity in man, corresponding, namely, to the point of development attained by the brain of the ape—so, too, apparently, the ape could be regarded as a *human* being that had failed in attaining total perfection and maturity; and so, too, the animals ranking below the ape in the order of life, could be regarded as beings who at earlier periods of development had been checked in their aspirations to human dignity and "arrested" in their too ambitious and vaulting career. Nor could the very lowest types of animal life be excluded; they must also be regarded as the primitive movements of animated nature towards the genesis of man. The main idea in this application of the theory, to explain the origin of the whole animal kingdom, was essentially contained in Oken's earliest doctrines; the name alone was new.

In this way a theory of arrested development in a broader sense originated and for a long time continued to be the guiding principle in the domain of evolutionary research. The transitory stages passed through in the evolution of the human fœtus, could be shown to agree perfectly with the permanent forms of the lower vertebrate animals that successively approximate to man, as the fishes, amphibia, and mammalia; these resemblances were shown to exist in the skeleton, the nervous and circulatory systems, the structure of the heart, the organs of generation and excretion, in fact in almost every system of the human body. The conclusion from these facts was, that the genesis of the human species had proceeded perforce through all these lower stages; and the theory that made the entire animal kingdom a collection of living models for the grandest work of art in organic creation, became more and more perfected, until many zoölogists, like B. Serres, did not hesitate to defend it with all its manifold consequences. The gradation of organic creation and the unity of its plan appeared thus to be established; for, according to this scheme, all animals were but variations of one and the same primitive type (Oken's "individual animal"), of which the lower incorporations, kept back in their development at particular stages, exhibit in each case the characteristics of a different genus, family, and class.

It is indeed a captivating dream for man, penetrating the secrets of creation, to trace to himself the whole of animated nature, to find his own reflection in everything that lives, and to figure not alone as the culmination but also as the purpose, the origin, and primal cause of all life! Agassiz spoke, in this spirit, of "embryonic" and "prophetic" types in the primeval world. Not only in the past have eminent zoölogists sported and reveled in these enchanting phantasies, but even nowadays pamphlets and books appear which trumpet forth this long since antiquated philosophy as a brand-new discovery: while people have become bolder and more assertive in their extension of the theory, and would fain lay claim to the entire universe as the dross and waste-material of this grand work of human genesis. The entire universe, so cry these ingenious souls, once glowed with life, even to the last atom; but in the measure that this life energized, and converged with thousand-fold intensity upon definite points (living creatures), correspondingly large masses of matter were deprived of the breath of life that originally pervaded them all alike, and were cast out from the mighty genesis!

(*To be concluded.*)

RICHARD WAGNER.

BY DR. PAUL CARUS.

Germany in the last twenty years has become dramatic. The nation of poets and thinkers has been aroused from its dreams and has taken,—what was before considered impossible,—an active and prominent part in the political affairs of the world.

At the same time the music of Germany has developed in a similar way; it has struggled for dramatic expression. After Mozart and Haydn, Beethoven had attained the highest possible summit of musical grandeur. Beethoven is a philosopher like Kant; his sonatas and symphonies are essays full of deep thought. He propounds a theme with a certain motive and then argues about the proposition from every possible standpoint, in variations connected with each other in strict logical order.

Yet Beethoven is also a lyric poet like Gœthe. His music is the expression of a deep emotion, and as he broods over some fretting pain of his heart, he reveals to his listeners his disappointment, his sorrow, and his grief; and he leads them through the labyrinth of his breast from emotion to emotion, as one psychical state of mind naturally follows another, till he finds comfort and peace in the temple of his goddess, where music restores harmony to the dissonant and jarring chords of his afflicted soul.

Music has ever been considered as the representation of human emotions. Beethoven's genius appeared to soar above the sphere of emotions, raising his art to the ethereal atmosphere of philosophical loftiness. In our time, however, music has gone a

step further and ventured upon a field which was supposed to be unattainable. Music has become dramatic; and the one who dared to lead her upon this disputed ground, who bravely fought for her right in this province and aspired after this new musical ideal, was *Richard Wagner*. Whether he has attained what he has striven for, is another question; still he was its champion in spite of malice and personal abuse.

Richard Wagner, the seventh child and the third son of the *Polizei-Actuarius* Wagner, was born in Leipsic, the 22d of May, in 1813,—the same year in which another famous poet of the Nibelungs was ushered into the world; I refer to *Friederich Hebbel* whose dramatization of *Siegfried's Tod* may be mentioned. It was at the beginning of the sanguinary war of German independence which gave birth to a free country, and was at the same time a death-knell to a usurper's tyranny, when the battle of Leipsic took place, and the roar of cannon resounded almost three days without intermission around Wagner's cradle. The many corpses of the battlefield round Leipsic produced a dangerous fever and Richard Wagner's father was one among the victims of this epidemic.

Two years afterwards, his mother, who was still young and could scarcely bring up her many children on the small pension allowed her, married Mr. Geyer, an actor of the Royal Theatre at Dresden. Mr. Geyer took good care of his step-children and did his best to give them the advantages of an excellent education. But the young Wagner lost his second father in his seventh year and reports that a day before his step-father's death he played some tunes of Weber in the adjacent room, and Mr. Geyer said in reference to his playing, "Can the boy have a talent for music?"

As a boy Wagner visited the *Kreuz-Gymnasium* at Dresden. He was enthusiastic about Weber's "*Der Freischütz*," and an acquaintance with Shakespeare's works inspired him to compose similar dramas, which of course were utter failures.

In his fifteenth year he was so deeply impressed with Beethoven's music that he decided to become a musician. The young artist composed an overture for the grand orchestra and through his acquaintance with the musical director at the Leipsic theatre, Mr. Dorn, his composition was accepted and (in spite of the remonstrance of the members of the orchestra) executed. Its success was equal to zero. The public received it with utter indifference; Mr. Dorn said in reference to this fact: "Wagner was then of a shy nature and not at all arrogant or assuming, so that he bore the failure of his virgin work with silence, laughed with the others at its fate, and seemed to believe in its justice."

Nevertheless Wagner did not lose confidence, but felt comforted by the hope of future success, and remarkable was the judgment of Dorn concerning him, who said: "I doubt, whether there was ever a young musician who was more familiar with Beethoven than Wagner was in his eighteenth year. He possessed the scores of Beethoven's overtures from the Master's own hand. He went to bed with the sonatas and arose with the quartets: the songs he sang; the quartets he whistled, for he did not get along well when he tried to play them. In short, he was a real *Furor Teutonicus*, who combined a peculiar intellectual spontaneity (*Regsamkeit*) with a higher scientific education, and he promised much."

As a youth of 17 years Wagner attended the University of Leipzig as a student of music, and at the same time he took lessons from Mr. Th. Weinling, the distinguished chanter of the Thomas School, who was famous for his thoroughness.

In 1833 Wagner went to Würzburg where one of his older brothers was theatrical manager. There he composed two operas, one *The Fairies*, and another, *Das Liebesverbot:* the latter resembles Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*. Wagner conducted for some time the theatre orchestra in Magdeburg, Königsberg, and Riga. In the first place (although circumstances were unpropitious to him) he succeeded in having (in 1836) his *Liebesverbot* presented, and it proved, as all previous works of his, a failure.

He married the talented and beautiful actress Minna Planer whose acquaintance he had made in Magdeburg, and he accepted gladly a position in Riga. From the latter place he went in 1839 to Paris, where in 1841 he completed *Rienzi* and the *Flying Dutchman*. The latter was suggested by a storm that occurred when Wagner was on his way to Paris on a sailing vessel, voyaging from Riga to Boulogne *sur mer*.

Rienzi was first produced at Dresden in 1842 and, being a great success, led to Wagner's appointment as orchestral leader in that city, where he gave his *Tannhäuser* in 1845.

In 1849 Wagner had to leave Germany as an exile for political reasons, and went to Switzerland where *Lohengrin* was finished and the Tetralogy of the *Nibelung* begun. Wagner then lived in Italy, Vienna, and in Paris, where in 1861 *Tannhäuser* met with a disastrous presentation.

In 1863 he was permitted to return to Germany. In the following year Wagner became intimate with Louis II, the young King of Bavaria, under whose zealous patronage he brought out in Munich his *Tristan* in 1865, the *Meistersinger* in 1868, *Rhinegold* in 1869, and *Walkyria* in 1870.

A special Wagner theatre was begun in 1872 at Bayreuth, where he lived the rest of his life, and his works were presented in 1876 in entire harmony with

his vast requirements. Wagner's last work, *Parsifal*, was published in 1878.

Invaluable was the favor of his royal patron, Louis II. Yet the friendship of Liszt, the father of his second wife, was of greater importance. For Liszt, the renowned musician, fully recognized his genius, became deeply interested in the ideals of Wagner, and seconded him in his aspirations with the full weight of his authority.

Wagner wrote the texts of his operas himself and also published numerous pamphlets, most of which led to acrimonious discussions.

Wagner met with many failures before he succeeded; he endured many misfortunes and was the most abused musician that ever lived. He died at the height of a dearly won renown, in 1884 at the advanced age of 71 years.

Wagner is no mere musician, he is also a dramatic poet. He figures not only in the history of music but in that of art at large. And from this standpoint we must consider his works when we attempt to explain the development of his genius.

Wagner endeavored to express in music more than emotions; he tried to express ideas and thus to make ideas the basis of musical composition; he became a musician-poet and a composer of thoughts in musical sounds. His works are not operas in the old sense of the word; they are dramas in music.

Our greatest composers, such as Mozart, could easily be induced to compose the veriest nonsense. With extraordinary good-naturedness they accommodated their genius to the poorest librettos. That era is past since Wagner gave birth to a new ideal of music. The word is no longer merely accessory and almost meaningless as in the operas of old; it has become an integral part and the chief part of their musical expression. This new kind of musical drama may justly be called *word-opera*. There may be a doubt whether Wagner's method of realizing the ideal was the right and proper way. But whatever his faults, he bravely dared to create, and succeeded in creating a new department in music.

Wagner aspired to be the national composer of Germany. He dramatized those subjects which stirred the German nation for ages: the old sagas of the Flying Dutchman, Parsifal, Tristan, the Meistersinger, and above all the saga of the Nibelungs, the national epic of the Teutonic nations. The subjects of Parsifal, and Tristan and Isolt had been introduced into Germany from Brittany through France, yet the German genius had moulded them in such a way that they became entirely Germanized, the one through Gottfried von Strassburg, the other through Wolfram von Eschenbach, the profoundest of epic poets, both of whom lived in the twelfth century. Rienzi is a subject from Italian history and even that was taken from the narrative of an English novelist, Bulwer Lytton.

In the *Ring of the Nibelung*, Wagner attempted to reflect the Teutonic conception of the world in a grand drama representing the development of humanity, thus explaining the problems of man, his errors and guilt and chastisement, until through punishment and sacrifice justice is restored and atonement made. The German *Nibelungen saga* had been artistically represented and dramatized by many poets before Wagner, as many *Fausts* were written before Gœthe began the chief work of his life. And like Gœthe's *Faust* also the *Ring of the Nibelung* is a work that grapples with the profoundest problems of life and attempts to unravel the labyrinthian knots of the human soul.

Accordingly, Wagner's chief work may be classed among philosophical poetry—with Lucretius's *De rerum natura*, Dante's *Divina Comedia*, Milton's *Paradise Lost*, Klopstock's *Messiah*, and Gœthe's *Faust*.

The *Nibelungen saga* and the *Götterdämmerung* are not Wagner's inventions; like Gœthe's Faust they are old literary treasures of the German nation, although Wagner moulded them in his own way, as Gœthe did the Faust legend.

The Germans were the only nation who in their mythology presaged the end of the world and of its gods. This doctrine of a doomsday to come proves not only the depth of their religious and philosophical conceptions, but, what is more, also their veracity. It shows a moral prowess. They were accustomed to face death unflinchingly and had learned from it to countenance a sad truth.

The Teutonic tribes did not live under an azure sky, in a bright climate like that of Greece. Under unfavorable conditions, in a foggy, damp country, they never indulged in optimistic views of an enjoyable and peaceful existence of happiness. Life was earnest to them and was a constant battling, against hostile powers. The affinity of this view of life with pessimism engendered by bitter personal experiences, led Wagner to the philosophy of Schopenhauer, which was destined to exercise a decided influence on his development. Schopenhauer's philosophy may briefly be characterized by two words: *Idealism* and *Pessimism*. His Idealism is based on Kantian Critique and is akin to the nihilistic idealism of the Vedas of old India. It declares the world of real existences to be merely phenomenal. Our life is like a dream, and death is the awakening from it. Schopenhauer's *Pessimism* teaches that life is not worth its own troubles and we have to be ransomed and redeemed from the evils thereof. The source ot life is *will*, through which all that is exists. The negation of our will is the highest ethical deed man is capable of. The Nirvana of the

Hindoo (a non-existence, or as others say an incomprehensible all-being), a life of peace and quietude, an existence of absolute rest, must be our hope and comfort.

We need not enter here into a controversy with Schopenhauer about his philosophy of negation and unwholesome ethics. We reject pessimism and propose in its place the doctrine of meliorism to lead humanity onward through constant struggles and efforts to ever higher ideals. But as Schopenhauer has greatly influenced Wagner and the development of Wagner's operas, we must here briefly review his conception of art.

Schopenhauer declares art to be the representation of Platonic ideas, which are the types of the different stages of the evolution of the will. He calls them objectifications of the will. He says:

"Music stands alone, quite cut off from all the other arts; in it we do not recognize the copy or repetition of any idea of existence in the world. *Yet* it is such a great and exceedingly noble art, its effect on the inmost nature of man is so powerful, and it is so entirely and deeply understood by him in his inmost consciousness as a perfectly universal language, the distinctness of which surpasses even that of the perceptible world itself, that we certainly have more to look for in it than 'a disguised arithmetical exercise of a mind that is unconsciously counting or calculating,' as Leibnitz called it. Still, Leibnitz was perfectly right, in so far as he considered only its immediate external significance—its form. But if it were nothing more, the satisfaction which it affords would be like that which we feel when a sum in arithmetic comes out right, and could not be that intense pleasure with which we see the deepest recesses of our nature find utterance. From our standpoint, therefore, at which the æsthetic effect is the criterion, we must attribute to music a far more serious and deeper significance connected with the inmost nature of the world and our own self, and in reference to which the arithmetical proportions to which it may be reduced, are related not as the thing signified, but as the sign. That in some sense music must be related to the world as the representation to the thing represented, as the copy to the original, we may conclude from the analogy of the other arts, all of which possess this character and effect us on the whole in the same way as it does, only that the effect of music is stronger, quicker, more direct, and infallible. Further its representative relation to the world must be very deep, absolutely true, and strikingly accurate, because it is instinctively understood by every one and has the appearance of a certain infallibility, because its form may be reduced to perfectly definite rules, expressed in numbers, from which it cannot free itself without entirely ceasing to be music.

"All the arts objectify the will indirectly only, by means of the ideas; and since our world is nothing but the manifestation of the ideas in multiplicity, music, being no direct representation of the ideas proper, is entirely independent of the phenomenal world and ignores it altogether. It could to a certain extent exist if there was no world at all, which cannot be said of the other arts. Music is as direct an objectification and copy of the whole will as the world itself, nay, even as the ideas whose multiplied manifestation constitutes the world of individual things. Music is by no means like the other arts the copy of the ideas, but the *copy of the will itself*, whose objectivity the ideas are. Since, however, it is the same will which objectifies itself both in the ideas and in music, though in quite different ways, there must be, not indeed a direct likeness, but yet a parallel, an analogy between music and the ideas whose manifestation is the visible world.

"I recognize in the deepest tones of harmony, in the bass, the lowest grades of the objectification of will, unorganized nature, the mass of the planet. Further, in the whole of the complemental parts which make up the harmony between the bass and the leading voice singing the melody, I recognize the whole gradation of the ideas in which the will objectifies itself. Those nearer to the base are the lower of these grades. . . . the higher represent to me the world of plants and beasts . . . lastly in the melody, in the high-singing principal voice leading the whole and progressing with unrestrained freeedom, in the unbroken significant connection of one thought from beginning to end representing a whole, I recognize the highest grade of the objectification of will, the intellectual life and effort of man."

So far Wagner is in accordance with the pessimistic philosopher, but in another passage Schopenhauer says: "Music is not in need of the words or action of a drama; and the *vox humana* is to music nothing but some modified sound as is that of another instrument. That, in our case, this instrument is at the same time used as the organ of speech and communication of ideas, is incidental and may be employed as an accessory, an additional yet secondary help, but it must never become its chief purpose."

Although Wagner, in the attempt at deepening the import and significance of music, followed his guide, Schopenhauer, in some respects perhaps too closely, he certainly rejected the doctrine of the indifference of the words and therewith the impossibility of dramatic music, which Schopenhauer proclaimed in the above quoted passages. But if *music* expresses *will*, and if *melody* symbolizes human aspirations, why should music not be dramatic? Indeed, from the

premises of Schopenhauer's explanation of music, it is the unavoidable consequence.

Schopenhauer would have been more consistent in saying, "If my theory is right and music signifies will in its different stages of objectification, if melody represents the aspirations and struggles of mankind, the notes of music ought to express the deeds of man; they must be dramatic."

Wagner was bold enough to realize it. He was a faithful believer in Schopenhauer and speaks in a passage of his essays about the exorbitant difficulties which a proper conception of Schopenhauer's philosophy has to face; he recommends it as the basis of all culture, both intellectual and ethical, and adds: "All our labor should be devoted to its realization in every province of life. If we succeeded in that, the beneficent and regenerative result would be immeasurable."

Wagner, indeed, has acted accordingly: all his works of art bear the stamp of Schopenhauer's influence.

One instance, where the effect of Schopenhauer's pessimism is most decided, will suffice.

According to the old Teutonic mythology as it is preserved in the Edda, the gods die fighting, and the tenacity of their strong will even in meeting their destiny is remarkable. It reminds us of the fearlessness of the Ostro-Goths, who when fighting against odds, stood in battle unflinching and sold their lives dearly.

The gods in the Edda, presaging their fate, courageously fight, until Odhin, the last of them, sinks to the ground; and the sons of Muspil, the flames, flicker round Ygdrasill, that great tree, which means the world, and devour the meaningless wrecks of the universe, that remain after doomsday, the *Götterdämmerung*, the last struggle of the gods. Such death is no renunciation, no negation of life. Wagner transforms this version of the doomsday of the gods into a pessimistic resignation. Wodan renounces life, and sick of existence, waits for the moment when the injustice done through the love of gold in the beginning of the whole drama of life, has been atoned, and then dies by suicide in the flames he has himself kindled. How feeble appears Wagner's Wodan in comparison with the heroic God of the Edda!

Wagner often compared poetry and music to man and woman, and the relation of words and melody to love. If love is more than an emotional or romantic revery, both husband and wife have to yield and give way to each other, in order to find their individualities restored in a higher and more perfect unity.

Wagner was strongly opposed to what he called absolute music, "which," he said, "uses the words as foil for a jewel. The foil has no value, the musical jewel is all." According to Wagner, words and music are to be wedded on equal rights. Such was his intent, but it may be that their marriage, as realized in Wagner's operas, is more like the whimsical eccentricity of a couple who, in spite of apparently unsurmountable hindrances, link their fates together. Wagner's music is full of abnormal combinations and accords that defy all rules of harmony; ingenious whims abound and imitators of this system would be apt to lead composition to utter ruin. But then he has exaggerated his style in such a way that none will ever be able to out-Herod him. Wagner succeeded in spite of his negligence of fundamental rules, in spite of the dangerous lack of regularity and musical law. He succeeded; the earnestness of his aspirations and the high and noble aim of his soul, compelling him to go on in his path, in spite of all opposition. His confidence is like the divine faith of a prophet, and the perseverance with which he pursues his visions, impresses his auditors with the sincerity of his ideals. If we blame the form of Wagner's works of art, we must acknowledge his genius, who conjured the phantom of a dramatic opera from the realm of the ideal, and we cannot send it away. It will haunt us until it is fully realized.

Wagner is not the end and consumation of all musical development, beyond which it is impossible to go. He is the starting-point for a new development, and the faults of which he is accused, and, may be, in many cases certainly is guilty of—his very faults indicate that there is scope for improvement and further development.

The merit of Wagner is his ideal of dramatic music; his fault is his romanticism * sicklied over with pessimistic world-renunciation. The object of art is by no means a vague phantasy of impossible fairy visions in a transcental ghost-land of miracles; its object is the representation of human ideals here on earth, in this real world of ours. Accordingly art should not lead us to a total renunciation of ourselves and of our aspirations, it should teach the resignation of egotistic desires only in order to purify our hopes and longings. The hero of a tragedy must not be the victim of his own despair but rather a sacrifice for progress on the altar of the ideal. Thus art will not be a guide to suicide but to higher existence and to a nobler life. It will not destroy but preserve.

The poet-composer of the future should unite Wagner's dramatic vigor with classic beauty. Instead of confounding the public with mystic phrases (as does Wagner in his Parsifal) he should show us the grandeur of the simplicity of truth. The dramatic action of word-operas should be a faithful image of real life, not for the sake of world-renunciation, but for elevating the hearts of the auditors, and strengthening the faith in their ideals.

* The libretto of the *Meistersinger* is perhaps the only composition which is free from the romantic and pessimistic tendencies that pervade almost all other operas of Wagner.

RETROGRESSION IN ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE LIFE.*

BY AUGUST WEISMANN.

IV.—CONCLUSION.

We spoke, in our last paper, of the loss of the instinct of wildness in animals. It is furthermore interesting to note the loss of the instinct to seek for food, occurring in many instances. The reception of food and consequently the acquisition of the same, is indispensable to life. We might regard this instinct to be the first and most primitive of all, and yet it may be entirely or partially lost. Numerous young birds no longer possess this instinct to search for their food. They stretch open their bills and cry; they swallow the food, too, that is put in their mouths; but it never occurs to them to *pick up* food that lies on the bottom of their cage. The sight of the food does not awaken in them a desire to eat. They have, at this period of their lives, actually forgotten how to eat. Nor is it strange; for birds come out of the egg in an imperfectly developed state, and are fed by their parents, who shove the food into their opened bills. It was thus not necessary for them to be incited to eat by the sight of food, but simply by feeling it in their bills. Part of the instinct thus became superfluous, and was lost. It cannot be objected here that the little creatures are as yet too undeveloped to search for their food. That they are; and for this very reason their parents were obliged to feed them, and the instinct of seeking for food became unnecessary. Many other birds, as chickens for instance, run about immediately after creeping out of the egg, hunt their food and pick it up. Here the instinct is preserved intact.

One of the most remarkable instances of the loss of this instinct is that of certain *ants*. It has been well known, ever since the beginning of the present century, that a great many species of ants hold slaves; as, for instance, the reddish ant of Alsace and Switzerland, the *Polyergus rufescens*. The ants of this species are not large but are very powerful, and are wont to take the field, from time to time, in great hordes, to fall upon and plunder the habitations of a weaker species, as the gray ant, the *Formica fusca*, for instance. Their purpose, however, is not to kill and devour their surprised victims. It is quite different. They deprive them of their young, and carry the latter to their homes, where they care for them tenderly, employing those that turn out to be working-ants, as servants, or, as they are commonly called, as slaves. These "slaves" attend to all those domestic duties which the reddish working-ants had formerly to attend to; they feed the young, build the passages and dwellings, bring food and even feed their lazy masters. This is no fiction, as formerly supposed, but a confirmed fact, which was first observed in the early part of this century by that celebrated observer of ants, Huber of Geneva, and which has been firmly established since his time by his successor and pupil, August Forel. I have convinced myself personally of its truth.

The astonishing fact, though, is this: the reddish ants in consequence of being thus fed by their slaves, have totally forgotten how to search for food. If we shut them up and give them their favorite food, honey, they will not touch it, but will starve, and die of exhaustion—if we do not take pity on them and procure them one of their gray slaves. Being put in the same compartment the slave goes to work, first partakes of the honey himself to his heart's content, and then feeds his masters, who joyfully accept this rescue from an ignominious death.

As with young birds, so in this case, the instinct of searching for food and the ability to recognize it by sight, has degenerated, and, plainly, because it is no longer needed. From the fact that in these ant-communities there always were great numbers of slaves and that the latter always fed their masters, the instinct to search for food became unnecessary, was neglected by the selective power of nature, and gradually passed away.

Other instincts, too, in these reddish ants, have wholly or partially disappeared; and for the very same reason. The reddish ants seem to have forgotten how to build their dwellings, and, in a great measure, to care for their young. Other ants bestow upon their young the greatest possible care, carry them from time to time to better parts of their houses, take them out into the open air and out into the sun, and feed their larvæ with unremitting assiduity. But we find none of these duties performed by the reddish slave holders. They would be incapable of raising their young, and the species would become extinct, if they were suddenly deprived of their gray slaves. Not only among men does there rest a curse upon slave-holding; even animals grow debased and degenerate under its influences.

There are still other species of slave-holding ants, whose habits have been carefully studied, where the degeneration of the masters is even more complete, having affected their physical strength. But there is yet much light to be shed upon this subject and I would therefore prefer not to consider it fully here, however remarkable the phenomena so far observed appear. All the instances cited are an additional confirmation of the correctness of our theory explaining processes of retrogression from non-use; for all these cases of degenerated instincts are found among the working-ants, that is among those *that have no offspring*. The disappearance of these instincts, therefore, cannot have been effected in the way before suggested, namely, that the individual became accustomed, for

* Translated from the German by μκρκ.

example, to no longer seeking his food himself, and that this habit was transmitted to his descendants.

In the instances given, the degeneration of the instinct to eat has been partial and not complete. Thus, only the instinct to search for food and the faculty to recognize it, have been lost. There is no lack of cases, however, where the instinct of nourishment, generally, has degenerated, where hunger is not felt and where no sort of food is taken. This sounds strange, but is explained by the fact that enough food was deposited in the bodies of these animals from the earlier periods of their existence, to last them throughout their lives. Many night-butterflies, and dayflies (ephemera), possess more or less degenerated mouths, and none of them take food. The male wheel-animals do not possess a vestige of an alimentary canal; they have neither mouth, stomach, nor intestines; their life has only to last as long as the food which they brought with them from the egg, holds out. Nature is never extravagant. No instinct, no organ of the body has permanency unless absolutely requisite to the preservation of the species. *Panmixy*, or, if you will, the remission of natural selection, brings it about that the superfluous is reduced to the absolutely necessary.

It is true that these retrogressions, if our explanation be accepted as the correct one, can only be effected very gradually. Generation after generation must elapse before that which is unnecessary vanishes; and we must expect still to find at times vestiges of organs and mechanisms which were once important but which are now fast approaching total elimination. We have seen this in the examples cited. The so-called "rudimentary" organs are found in myriads of cases and among the most different species of animals; and they are evidence to us of the radical transmutations the different species have undergone. Here belong the hidden eyes of the eel-salamander (*Proteus anguinus*), of the golden mole, of the blind-grub, and the latter's degenerated mechanism of hearing; here belong the remnants of the Kiwi's wings, the wing-stumps of many female night-butterflies whose male companions possess fully developed wings; here belong the slight projections about the mouth-aperture of dayflies, which are nothing else than jaw-bones that have not yet completely disappeared; and thousands of other instances.

In this category belong, above all, those many cases of retrogression, in which an organ possessed by the progenitor is wanting entirely in the adult descendants and yet is present in a rudimentary form in the young. The working-ants, as above explained, possess no wings, but in the larva the rudiment of a wing is found in the shape of a small disc beneath the skin; later on this disappears.

The larvæ of bees, too, have lost their feet; they do not need them to creep about, for they live in an enclosed wax-cell directly in contact with their food. Although having from non-use of their feet become footless larvæ, yet they acquire a pair during their development in the egg such as their sawfly-like ancestors must have had.

We see from such cases that an organ that has retrograded from non-use, first disappears in the fully developed condition, and not until long after, in the embryonic, rudimentary form. The latter may be preserved for generations, even though in the fully developed condition the organ has long since disappeared from the organization of the animal.

Such rudimentary remnants, not advancing in development, have been discovered in great multitudes by evolutionists. They plainly point to the previous history of the species, and would form in themselves a competent proof of how numerous and various the ancestors of the now existing species must have been, and of how intricate and crooked the path is, that the development of the organic world has followed. At times it was forwards, at times backwards; at times it affected only a part, at times the whole organism. All that nature in the course of countless generations has constructed,—for example, the highly organized organs of locomotion, limbs of definite strength, of complicated articulation and great elasticity, of accurately balanced muscular-power, adapted to movement upon the earth, or wings so wonderfully designed for overcoming weight and for rising into the air, or those organs that give animals knowledge of the outer world, those eyes of incredibly delicate construction, those mechanisms of hearing and smelling, into the intricacies of whose fitness only the continued and united labor of our keenest investigators has been able to penetrate—they are all at once relinquished and given over to a slow process of disorganization from the very moment they become unnecessary to the persistence of the species.

It certainly seems as if development in this direction could not possibly be termed a progression. As regards the particular organ, it is certainly a retrogression; but as regards the whole animal, the matter is quite different. When we speak of "purpose" and "aim" in relation to living creatures, the "aim" can only mean existence. The form and complexity of structure, the *absolute* potentiality of an organism are not determining factors. The question solely is how may the species continue fit for existence; it cannot remain *below* the standard of fitness, for, then it would perish; it cannot go *above* it, for it has no means of rising higher than the point at which its fitness for existence is fixed. The ultra-pessimistic doctrine of Schopenhauer, that the world is as bad as it possibly

could be, and that, were it a little worse, it would perish, is as true, and just about as significant, as the opposite optimistic theory, that the world is as perfect as it was possible to make it from the forces given, that it is not conceivable how it could have been turned out one jot more perfect than it is.

The world of organisms proves to us that this is so. We see every living species shaping itself in conformity to its purpose in every detail, and adapting itself to the particular conditions of existence in which it is placed. But it adapts itself only in so far as is unavoidably necessary to ensure its existence, and not one iota more. The eye of the frog is a highly imperfect mechanism compared with the eye of the hawk or that of man, but it is perfect enough to see a crawling fly or a wriggling worm, and thus ensures the species sufficient nourishment. From a strictly optical standpoint, even the eye of the hawk is not an absolutely perfect visual organ, but it is perfect enough to discover its prey with accuracy from high altitudes ; this is all that is required for the existence of the species, and the attainment of further visual excellence, through natural selection, is precluded.

The object of all transformations—the species's fitness for existence—is not always attained by the progressive improvement of the whole or of a part ; new organic additions are not being continually made. On the contrary old organic parts become in time unnecessary and must be removed. This does not take place with ideal completeness, nor suddenly as if by magic, but slowly and in conformity with the forces involved, and for many generations, therefore, imperfectly. But in the end the organ which is no longer indispensable to life, is entirely removed, and a complete equilibrium is again established between the structure of the body and the work it has to perform. In this aspect, retrogression is a part of progression.

A SWISS SCENE.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

How SWEET it is to linger all alone
Beside the shore, while summer skies are bright,
And watch the little boats with steady flight
Follow the wind toward the setting sun.

Their pointed sails the last ray falls upon
Spread wing-and-wing, and, wonderfully white,
Seem really wings of birds about to light
Upon the water when their day is done.

They come to me out of the distant haze
A scattered fleet before a gentle wind,
Laden with precious thoughts of other days ;

And just as when I watched them from behind
At starting, when they took their different ways
New-painted on my nursery window-blind.

NEAR GENEVA, 1877.

CORRESPONDENCE.

CHEAPEN LAND BY TAXING IT.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

IN THE OPEN COURT, No. 107, Mr. J. G. Malcolm wraps up a conundrum in a very comical paradox, and then hurls it at me. Presuming that Mr. Malcolm is not jesting with me but inquiring in good faith, I will answer him. He calls upon me to "explain why it is that to tax anything else but land makes it higher-priced ; but to tax land makes it cheaper, and the higher it is taxed the cheaper it becomes ?" The fallacy here is concealed in the assumption that the tax is a burthen in one case, and a benefit in the other. The truth is that the tax is a burthen in both cases, the manner of its mischief being differently shown.

A tax upon land operates as a blight in proportion to the severity of the tax. It cheapens land as Canada thistles cheapen it, by making it less valuable, and harder to enjoy. Ten years ago a plague of locusts fell upon Northwestern Iowa. In despair the farmers of that region sold their farms for a trifle and fled from the plague. The locusts were a blessing because they cheapened land. The single-tax plague would cheapen land just as the grasshoppers did. It is a mistake that we can benefit the general community by tormenting land with any form of barrenness, tax, or blight.

Another fallacy concealed in the conundrum is that land and personal effects, as merchandise, have the same character, as for instance, cloth and land, when the true comparison is between the product of the loom and the product of the land. We may make land less desirable or "cheaper" by taxing it, but the man who cultivates it must add his extra taxes to the price of wheat and pork, or he must perish. Unless he can get his taxes back by the sale of his produce, he must abandon the land, and if we make the single-tax high enough, we can make the land so cheap as to be worth nothing. We may levy the single-tax on sheep, and the effect will be to make sheep-raising so precarious as to cheapen sheep, but the sheep-raiser must lay his tax-burthen on to the wool he sells, and the weaver who pays it in the higher price of wool must lay it on to cloth ; and so on until it falls at last upon the man who buys a coat, the final product of the sheep and of the loom. Either that, or it will tax all sheep-owning out of existence, as Mr. George and his disciples propose to tax land-owning out of the world.

What matters it, whether land is cheap or dear if men are not permitted to own it ? In Mr. George's Utopia men are forbidden to own land, and consequently can have no object in buying it. The single-tax artifice is used by Mr. Malcolm, although he ought to know by this time that it has no place in Mr. George's theory, except as a means by which to confiscate all the lands in the country. Mr. George says the end he seeks is the abolition of private property in land ; the single-tax contrivance he declares is only the means to that end. The substance of the plan is confiscation, the single-tax the form. WHEELBARROW.

THE MORE OWNERS THE BETTER.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

"*To increase production I desire to increase the number of land-owners altogether.*"—Wheelbarrow in THE OPEN COURT, No 108.

To increase production I desire to increase the number of land-users. Wheelbarrow and I are getting together very rapidly. In fact, since his letter on convict labor, the only difference I can see, is largely a theoretical one. He desires greater facilities for the performance of productive labor, so do I. He desires that the laborer shall receive the full value of the amount produced. So do I. He proposes as a remedy a wider distribution of land. So do I.

Perceiving that the concentration of land in the hands of the few is destructive of the opportunity to use, he would have many owners instead. In place of ten men owning all the land of a state he would have ten thousand owners. So would I. But I would go further. I would have *all* share in this beneficent thing, ownership of land, that Wheelbarrow considers such a necessity to civilization. If it is better that a hundred should own instead of one, surely a thousand owners would be better and to have *all* share in the ownership would be the best of all.

But how? Wheelbarrow does not tell us. He has as yet advanced no remedy except objections to other people's remedies, or, if the quotation at the head of this article is to be considered a remedy, he has given us no pharmaceutical directions as to its preparation, nor has he advised us how it is to be administered.

Surely, if in prescribing for my typhoid-fever patient, I neither gave name of medicine, dose, nor time of taking, my patient could justly distrust my abilities. If, in fact, I simply contented myself with telling him he had typhoid-fever, he would be justified in discharging me and calling on some one who had a remedy and was prepared to administer it.

We have agreed, then, that the concentration of land in the hands of the few *is* an evil.

How Wheelbarrow proposes to remedy matters he never tells us

I would do it by making it unprofitable to *hold land and not use it*. I would not divide up the land. I would not prescribe state-ownership. I would not have the land worked in common. But I would, by a tax levied upon the value of land exclusive of improvements, take for the benefit of the whole people the rental value of the bare land and leave to the holder the entire value of the labor and improvements he placed upon that farm. Thus making, in effect, all share in the benefits to be derived from this good thing ownership, that Wheelbarrow praises.

In so doing I would leave the holder secure in his possession and use, and the better the use the better it would be for him. It would only be non users that would get hurt. Wheelbarrow would like to get rid of these latter by increasing the number of owners on the principle that the smaller the holding the more likely the holder is to be a user.

I would appeal to the pocketbook by a tax that would make it unprofitable to own any amount of land, large or small, without making the best use of it possible. Wm. C. Wood.

LAND-OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL FOR USE.

To the Editor of The Open Court :—

I do not think that the arguments of Wheelbarrow, in your issue of August 29th, were "robust" enough to give much weight to his direct compliment. They seem to me to be characterized, as usual, by a certain "smart" way of putting things, and by inability, or unwillingness to see distinctions between things which are somewhat similar but not alike.

The red savages, he says, denied the right of appropriating land for peaceable occupation, saying that the Great Spirit gave it as the common property of all. But we must not accept as authoritative even what the savages say about the Great Spirit. The prejudice of the red man against peace in general, and his ignorance of the ways of other races of men, probably kept him from seeing that in denying the right of peaceable occupation, he denied also a man's right to a wide range of choice in employing himself. There is plenty of room in this country, both for nomads and town-dwellers.

Wheelbarrow, however, does not agree with the savages, but says: "The highest security for the right of peaceable occupation for use is ownership." Plainly, my analysis of the existing custom of ownership was lost on him. I tried to show (and he did not deny it) that our custom of ownership, because it includes more privilege than any mortal can rightfully claim, stands condemned of injustice. It certainly gives a very high form of security—for the "owner."

Similarly, if a sufficient fleet of gunboats should patrol George's banks and prevent all but American crews from fishing there, that would give a very "high" security of occupation for the Americans. But, in both cases, special privilege for some would necessarily mean slavery for the rest—that is, denial of equal rights. To say that in order to secure the privilege of using land, one must be privileged to control land which he is not using at all, is like saying that in order to secure a man's right to self-control, he must needs be privileged to control some one else, for the privilege of controlling idle land is worthless, unless some one else wants to use it. And yet, Wheelbarrow wants us to take his word for it, that the whole theory and practice of agriculture depends on protecting the land-owners in their control of land which they are not using, as well as that which they are using, thereby enabling them to trade in the necessities of the rest. 'Tis a startling statement—I should like to see him try to prove it. It seems to me that if Scully's Illinois tenants did not have to pay him two-thirds of their crops as rent, and if the Dakota wheat growers did not have to pay speculators for the privilege of using virgin soil, they might be more successful farmers than they are now.

Again, I am rightly quoted, thus:—"It is true that every man has a right to as much control over land as is needful for his use and enjoyment of it, and for the security of the fruits of his labor," and then Wheelbarrow innocently says:—"Very well;— what is this right of control but ownership?"

Methinks a man who can't distinguish between these two privileges should think more and publish less. For the distinction is perfectly plain. Ownership of land includes, of course, all that I have approved in the above quotation; if it stopped there, it would be just. But it don't stop there. It gives the protection of the State's clubs and threats as completely to the man who never even saw the vacant land he "owns," as to the man who lives on his land and uses it constantly.

Wheelbarrow seems to think that there can be only one kind of control over land, namely, the cast-iron, trespassers-will-be-prosecuted kind, which the warranty deed conveys.

But there may be many degrees of control. Where the use is but a simple robbery of nature, like gravel-digging, surface-quarrying, felling trees, grazing cattle, hunting or fishing, the control needs to be only slight and temporary, because, as a rule, the user is not storing anything in or upon the soil for future use. On the other hand, the farmer, the store-keeper, the manufacturer, and others like them, need to enjoy much more complete control; but even then it needs not always to be wholly exclusive of others, for a common footpath, or cart-road, or drain may run across it without injury to it.

The uses for land are numberless; control should be sufficient for the use, and no more, and where there is no use, there should be no control.

Wheelbarrow says that in denying that a man's rights exist after his death, I occupy a weak position, both in morals and in politics. He does not venture to discuss the moral side of the question, however, but contents himself with misrepresenting my statement, and asking me questions which derive all their force from the misrepresentation. I said nothing about a man's right to property. My right to use land exists because I exist. My right to property exists either because I have produced the property from the soil, or have gotten it fairly from some one who did. The two are essentially different. Land is opportunity; property is the reward of exertion. If Wheelbarrow had known the difference between the two, he would not have asked his three irrelevant questions.

A man's right to use land springs from the necessary relation

between him and land. Death destroys this necessary relation, and with it the right. The right is a condition of life, and is unlimited, save by the equal rights of others. Necessarily, therefore, it is not transferable.

Now, as to the withdrawal of goverment protection. Government has done, and is doing, many things which it ought to "dishonor," and the sooner the better. Wheelbarrow thinks that evidence of land-title must exist on paper somewhere, before any man can safely enjoy the right of occupying land for use.

This indicates, I think, a superstitious faith in officialism. How about other natural rights—the right to live, for instance? Can a man safely enjoy that, if he has no official certificate of birth? And if a man's presence is proof enough that he has a right to live, should not the fact that he is using land be proof enough of his right to use it?

Perhaps he thinks it impracticable to hold land without paper-titles. But it is done, all about us. In the older states, at least, if the holder of a title-deed neglects to assert his legal privileges, twenty years' possession of the land gives any other man a perfect title, despite the deed. Title to some of the best land in Boston was gained thus by a "squatter" within the present century. At Nahant, close by here, many titles have been gained thus, within fifty years, and there are men there now who, when they buy land, omit to record the deed, preferring to get a title by simple occupation. Wheelbarrow doubtless knows well that in the West, the first improvement made,—a well dug, or a shanty built, for example,—has often settled the question of title. And in Dakota, within ten years, even in the stress of land-hunger which our laws produce, a frame made of three pieces of timber nailed together and set up has often sufficed to hold title for thirty days, while the settler was getting his lumber.

Such customs have sprung from the good sense of the people. If it had not been for the usurpations of legal authority, the same good sense would, doubtless, long ago have made occupation and use the sole and necessary condition of land-tenure. As to settling disputes by violence, no law or custom can wholly prevent that, but if all the vacant land in the country were free, as it should be, such disputes would probably be rare, and confined mostly to people with a taste for violence. For the stake in such a quarrel would not be what it is under present conditions—the loaded die of a land-gambler, or a private-taxing privilege. It would be simply a chance to work in a community where such chances would be so plenty that the population could not use one-tenth of them.

I note briefly the other points. Title to improvements could be conveyed by bill of sale, as well as by deed. But I did not propose to abolish the record of all deeds, but only of the *warranty* deed, because it assumes to convey privileges which no man ever had or can have. Very likely Wheelbarrow never heard of quit-claim deeds, but lack of space compels me to assume that my readers know some things

My proposition would not declare men incapable of making contracts; it would only decline to enforce one kind of contract—a very different thing.

Again, a mortgage on improvements, or a note, might be recognized by law although a land-mortgage should be ignored.

* * *

To conclude—I think that our primary monopolies—land, money, tariff, and patent monopolies, from which spring a whole brood of lesser ones—have sprung from government restriction, and are supported directly by it. Therefore I believe that the natural way to destroy monopolies is to lessen the power of the ruling class, by leaving a larger number of acts outside the control of the legislator, the judge, and the sheriff.

THEODORE P. PERKINS.

LYNN, Mass.

BOOK NOTICES.

Brentano's will publish in the latter part of September a story called "Puritan and Priest," expected to have a large circulation in church-circles—evidently antidotal in tendencies.

The *Revue de Belgique*, for August, contains an instructive essay, *Les Sources du Pentateuque*, by M. J. Küntziger, written in review of Alexandre Westphal's work, *Les Sources du Pentateuque: Etude de critique et d'histoire* (Paris, Fischbacher).

The author of "The Reveries of a Bachelor," Mr. Donald D. Mitchell, who has so seldom written of late, will contribute to the October *Scribner's* the end-paper, entitled, "A Scattering Shot at Some Ruralities," upon the decay of "New England Farm and Village Life."

It is announced that Prof George P. Fisher, of Yale, will contribute during the coming year, to *the Century*, a series of papers on the Nature and Method of Revelation. Prof. Fisher will touch upon various interesting points in Christianity. We are curious to know its purpose and tendency.

To the *Atlantic Monthly* for October, Mr. Joseph Henry Thayer contributes a paper on "President Woolsey." Although taking "little interest in ecclesiastical peculiarities or denominational proselytism," says Mr. Thayer, yet to President Woolsey "Christianity was consummate rationality."

Publishers, Newsdealers, and Journalists will find *Caspar's Directory of the American Book, News, and Stationary Trade* a most valuable working adjunct. It is a painstaking and careful compilation, numbering some 1434 pages. The arrangement of indices and classification of topics are excellent.

The opening article of the *Popular Science Monthly* for October is "Pensions for All," by Gen. M. M Trumbull. Apart from its political and financial significance, there is a moral element involved in the question; and Gen. Trumbull broaches an ethical lesson, bearing forcibly upon our national character, that all will do well to heed.

With regard to the long-announced appearance of Mr. M C. O'Byrne's novel, "Upon this Rock," we learn, upon inquiry, that the author is unable definitely to speak The book has long since been ready for the press, and it is to be regretted that a work promising to deal with so many current vital questions should make such an inauspicious beginning.

"Swedenborg's Lehren und die Metaphysische oder Geistige Heilungsphilosophie," is the title of a little pamphlet of twenty pages, written in German, by Adolph J Bartels, "Preacher of the New Church and Doctor of the Metaphysical Science of Healing." The title in English would probably read: Swedenborg's Teachings and the Metaphysical or Spiritual Philosophy of Healing. We are unable to give an impartial criticism of Preacher Bartels's upholdings. *Ab initio* we are prejudiced, and mentally incompetent to receive them; the very words of the preface, *viz.*, "the healing of diseases by *supernatural* means," precludes us. Preacher Bartels's "Spiritual Metaphysic," which includes all such inferior forms as the Faith Cure, the Prayer-Cure, the Thought-Cure, and Christian Science, may contain latent germs of truth; but can we use them in their unclassified shape, and their supernatural guise?

NOTES.

Dr. Paul Carus arrived, from Europe, on Friday of last week.

Dr. Gould, of Philadelphia, will contribute to our next number a paper, called "A Dream of Alchemy," relative to the Brown-Séquard 'Elixir of Life.'

The Open Court Clubbing Rates.

The following rates are offered to all who wish to subscribe for THE OPEN COURT and any one of the magazines in the list subjoined. If more than one he desired, they may be obtained through our office at the price stated in the first column, allowing a discount of 10 per cent on all orders amounting to $10.00 and over. Each periodical sent with THE OPEN COURT for the price stated in the second column. Money must accompany all orders.

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