

THE TYPES OF RELIGION

BY HOMER H. DUBS, PH.D.

THE PURPOSE of this essay is to present a classification of religions based on a study of the historic religions and to indicate the characteristics of each type. It has been widely held that religions cannot be classified; our thesis is that the difficulties in the classification of religions are due to the sort of classification attempted. That there are no mutually exclusive classes of religions we admit; what we propose to do is to suggest certain fundamental conceptions that mark off *types* rather than classes of religions, while at the same time indicating that historic religions usually belong to more than one type. An analogy may clarify our conception of "types." The various concepts and figures dealt with in geometry, the straight line, the circle, triangle, square, etc., are nowhere found exactly in nature; yet the figures actually found in nature partake more or less of these geometrical figures. For instance, a cubical box with rounded corners (what box does not have its corners more or less rounded?) partakes of the figures of both a cube and a sphere, although it shows more of the characteristics of one than another. So understood, such geometrical figures are examples of what we mean by "types," by which we mean groups of characteristics that usually come together, but do not necessarily exclude other types. It is our thesis that there are only five fundamental types of religion. We shall herein attempt to state the characteristics of each type, and to derive each type and its characteristics from a single conception. According to the stage of culture, there are primitive, national, and advanced religions; advanced religions are furthermore of three types: deontological, soteriological, and philosophic. All historic religions can be classified as one or a combination of two or more of these five types. All the important features of each religion will furthermore be found to be derived from one or more of these five types.

Before we classify religions, we must define our subject-matter. A study of comparative religion shows that most of the historic definitions of religion are faulty. For example: religion is not primarily a set of beliefs—primitive religion lays no stress upon belief; alternative myths about the same being or event, such as the alterna-

tive myths of creation in Polynesian religion, show that belief is free in primitive religion, only practice is important. Religion does not necessarily include the conception of any deity or god—primitive Buddhism was atheistic. Nor is religion necessarily a "force that makes for righteousness"; in India it is taken for granted that religion and ethics have nothing to do with each other. Religion is furthermore not mere emotion (mysticism) or a feeling of dependence; intellect is sometimes highly important. Stoicism appealed chiefly to philosophers. The Stoic world-view was central, the Stoic emotional attitude was a consequence. Against the conception of religion as a purely social phenomenon we may put Whitehead's definition of religion as what man does in his solitariness. As a definition of religion we suggest the following: Religion is the attitude that man takes to what he considers to be most important in the universe. In this definition, the term, "attitude" is used with the meaning given it in psychology, to include (1) tendencies to action, (2) their causative factors, such as beliefs, desires, interests, attention, etc., and (3) their consequences, such as actions, emotions, feelings, perceptions.

In accordance with this definition of religion, we must include as religions, not only the so-called 'positive' religions, but also many of the philosophies, such as Stoicism, Epicureanism, Cynicism, Vedanta, Yoga, etc., whenever the fundamental feature of that philosophy is a certain way of living or a certain tendency to action, rather than merely a certain intellectual belief. Careful students have recognized the religious nature of these philosophies. Lucretius himself calls Epicurus a "savior." Bolshevism, which is being recognized today as possessing the trappings of a religion, is also included by our definition as a religion, inasmuch as it makes the bringing about of the Bolshevistic society the most important thing in the universe. Our definition also accepts the popular view that, to some people, the gathering of wealth is a religion. We shall show that the characteristics of the various types of religion may be deduced from this conception.

PRIMITIVE RELIGION

The fundamental conception of primitive religion is that the purpose of religion (i.e., the most important thing in the universe) is the satisfying of man's *immediate* wants, such as food, clothing, shelter,

property, protection from disease, foes, or other injurious beings, etc. Primitive people find that the most important features of the universe are these immediate wants—there is no single “most” important feature for primitive mentality. Primitive religion consequently attempts to achieve many of the same goals that today are accomplished for civilized man by science. Primitive religion is furthermore not confined to primitive people; even highly civilized men are not always unified personalities; in some moods they still want the same immediate goods that primitive peoples concern themselves with; they still seek to attain these goods in the same way that primitive peoples use. Advanced peoples call such persisting religious elements “superstition” or “magic” or “animism.”

By the aid of our knowledge of primitive mentality, we can deduce from the foregoing fundamental conception of primitive religion the important characteristics of these religions. We shall state these characteristics baldly and leave the reader to illustrate them from his knowledge of primitive religions. (A) Men worship the nearer and smaller powers or spirits. (1) Anything conceived to have power may be worshipped, even tools or animals. (2) The divinities worshipped are not necessarily very powerful, since the needs to be satisfied by this sort of religion are not in themselves of a sort to demand very great beings for their achievement. Primitive religion has therefore no great gods. There is no single or central object of worship. In primitive culture men’s minds have not yet reached the point at which one or a few needs or objects are all-important. (3) The divinities are not incomprehensible or irresistible; man is often a match or more than a match for them. (4) There is no distinction between the divine and the human; human beings may be quite as divine as any divinities. This follows from the fact that, to primitive man, “divine” means fundamentally merely “powerful,” and some human beings, e.g., the chief or the medicine man, are obviously powerful. (5) Man may often control many or all the divinities. (6) The divinities are treated as human beings of that sort would be treated—they may be cajoled, beaten, eaten, or even killed, as well as praised and exalted, paid gifts, or taxes, glorified by ceremonies, or treated in any other sort of way that seems to be successful in achieving the desired result.

(B) In primitive religion, the divinities are not necessarily moral, because man’s wants are not all moral. Sometimes the divinities are moral, sometimes they are not so. (1) The divinities are

usually capricious, just as undeveloped human beings are capricious. When a tribe develops greater and more unified personalities among its members, and they become prominent in the tribe, the next higher sort of religion appears, a national religion. (2) Religion and morality are conjoined only spasmodically. There are some ordeals that test moral acts, some fetishes that protect moral laws, but there are quite as many non-moral or even anti-moral ordeals and fetishes. Some tabus concern themselves with moral acts; others with unmoral or immoral acts. (3) There is no distinction between religion and "magic" in the stage of primitive religion; the two may be fundamentally the same in spirit. "Magic" is only distinguished from religion, in the national or advanced stage of religious development. The Arunta *intichimua* ceremonies are thoroughly "magical" in their nature; yet they are just as much a part of the Arunta religion as any other performance. "Magic" is the term used to denominate the automatic side of primitive religion when considered from the viewpoint of a national or advanced religion. (4) There is no distinction between "religious" acts and "secular" acts in primitive religion; the distinction has not yet arisen; religion may concern itself with any part of human life whatsoever, since the important needs with which religion concerns itself may be found in any phase of life.

(C) The immediate wants with which religion is concerned are thought to be achieved in two important ways: (1) automatically, or (2) by the aid of spirits. Hence there may be a non-animistic as well as an animistic religion; more usually, actual primitive religions are a combination of both. The conception of "spirits" is so convenient that, in the present conditions of primitive development, it is found among all peoples; nevertheless many evidences point to an earlier stage in which this conception was lacking among some peoples, for example, among the Ainu. The conceptions of mana, tabu, and those practices later called "magical" are mostly automatic, although sometimes spirits are thought to produce these effects; shamanism, fetishism, totemism, and the like, are on the other hand usually animistic, although they may sometimes (rarely) be conceived as automatic occurrences. The unclearness and fluidity of primitive thought prevents a rigid classification of primitive religious performances as either automatic or animistic; we can only say that either or both may be present.

(D) What is done is all-important in primitive religion; what is thought about the divinities has little or no importance. This characteristic follows from the nature of primitive mentality—religion is conceived as a means of getting some particular things done, rather than primarily as a matter of the inner life. Hence practice precedes belief; myths are merely interesting stories, not revelations of unchangeable truth. There may be alternative myths about the same event, such as the creation of the world; myths are indeed hardly a part of primitive religion, any more than fairy stories belong to our religion today; nevertheless myths cannot be excluded from primitive religion, inasmuch as religion penetrates into every phase of primitive life. They simply are not important. Primitive ceremonies are often created on the principle of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*: what seems to have brought the desired result once may become a permanent ceremony. This feature is in harmony with the pseudo-scientific nature of primitive religion. Sometimes primitive ceremonies are created on the basis of the humanly natural ways of thinking that later become the fundamental conceptions of "magic": imitation (that like produces like) and sympathy (that action to a like object produces the same effects on the desired object). Or the personal prestige of some individual may lead the group to accept whatever ceremony he chances to hit upon. Hence in different regions there may be different ceremonies for the same purpose, or in unrelated regions there may be similar ceremonies for the same or for different purposes, due to the fundamental similarities of human nature. The social character of primitive religion is merely the outcome of the social nature of primitive life; in those aspects in which primitive life is not social, as in the use of fetishes to protect private possessions, primitive religion is not social.

Primitive religious elements in advanced ages and among even civilized peoples today are many. The most prominent is ancestor worship. Belief in guardian angels, charms, amulets, etc. belongs to primitive religion. Whenever a god or object is asked or expected to do something for some individual that the god does not do for others under the same circumstances, the resulting religion shows as many of the characteristics of primitive religion as the individuals having that religion possess primitive traits of mentality. Any religious practice that promises to give individuals (not groups) special privileges that are not extended to other individuals on the

same conditions is fundamentally of the same sort as primitive religions and so deserves to be called primitive. "Magical" ceremonies are typical examples. The religions of special privilege, inasmuch as, like primitive religions, they seek to satisfy no one all-important want, are primitive religions.

NATIONAL RELIGIONS

The fundamental characteristic of national religion that distinguishes it from primitive religion is the emergence of one or more great gods. It is not always easy to distinguish between a great god and a mere divinity, such as a primitive spirit or a power. The ghosts and spirits are often as powerful in their own sphere as a god is. The difference is in intellectual and moral character, and in the degree of anthropomorphization. A great god is a supernatural being with a distinct anthropomorphic personality, a well-defined character, with a proper name or distinctive title, who is supposed to exercise authority over a certain land or people or a department of nature or a class of phenomena, who dwells in some locality, either a sanctuary on earth, in the sky, or in the other world, and who is in general sympathetic with men. Such a being is a magnified human being; he acts like a human being except for his vastly greater power. He is the product of a larger imagination than the ghosts or ancestors, and comes into being as the consequence of a growth in human conceptions of the divine. Great gods are found fully developed only among civilized people—national religions are characteristic of the early civilizations. For national religion, the most important things in the universe are these great gods. The characteristics of national religion are a consequence of this conception and also of the characteristics of human mentality at the stage of development found in early civilization. We list five groups of characteristics:

(A) As to the great gods themselves: (1) These gods become personalities, that is, they are humanized. We need only think of Marduk, Varuna, Amon-Ra, Jupiter, Apollo, etc. (2) The gods are given individual names, not generic names. Sin, Shamash, and Baal originally meant moon, sun, and lord; now they become personal names, not common nouns. (3) The myths that are told about the gods help to personalize and characterize the gods. These myths are not essential in a national religion, in that it is not necessary for

anyone to believe them. Nevertheless people find them intensely interesting, and, when they become current, they often influence the religion profoundly. (4) Since the gods are more human than the spirits and ghosts, they are also more moral. Primitive powers and spirits are not human, hence they are usually non-moral. The morality of the gods is, however, that of their age—a morality that is only partly moral in our (advanced) sense of the word. Although the Homeric gods were quite as moral as the best people of the age in which the account of them was written down, later generations found them immoral. Even this partial morality is, however, a great advance over the generally non-moral divinities of primitive religion. (5) The gods take over the sanctions of the moral code. The sanction of morality in primitive life is the uniform practice of the community; with the coming of civilization this uniform practice disappears, and yet it remains highly important for the perpetuation of society that morality be supported. The gods, because of their "moral" character, are able to undertake this task successfully. Hammurabi is pictured as receiving his code of laws from Shamash. (6) Because of the imperfectly moral character of the gods, they sanction many non-moral acts—in national religion the moral and the non-moral are inextricably mixed. In fact, the sins considered to be the greatest ones are purely ritual sins, such as sacrilege, since these are more directly offences against the gods than merely moral matters. A gentile found in the Jewish Temple was guilty of a sin considered even worse than mere murder. In this way people's conception of right and wrong was confused, so that moral matters were not considered the most important of all.

(7) Usually there are many gods, a polytheism. In some early communities, such as the early Semitic civilized communities, there seems to have originally been only one great god, not because of any monotheistic tendency, but merely because of the poverty of the people's imagination. Then, as various cities conquered the same region, the god of each conquering city, being thereby proved to be stronger than the god of the vanquished, came to be worshipped by the conquered communities along with their own great god, and so a polytheism sprang up. This sort of growth can be traced in Babylonia and Egypt. In other cases the vivid poetical imagination of the myth-makers characterized the gods so well that many gods sprang into being out of the varied conceptions of the human imagination. Sometimes the gods are systematized, formed into a pan-

theon, conceived as a family in Greece or as a kingdom in Babylonia; sometimes no arrangement is arrived at. (8) As the gods become older, they become greater and take on more and more functions, with the result that the minor spirits and powers become "aspects" or "forms" of the great gods. Apollo becomes Apollo Smitheus and keeps away the mice in addition to his early function of guiding the wanderer. The result is that the great gods cease to be specialists, like the minor divinities. They become jacks-of-all-trades, with the result that they become more and more alike. Myth and poetry tend to prevent this tendency, by characterizing the gods more exactly; among less imaginative people, however, the gods finally come to be distinguished chiefly in name and locality only. With the growth of reflection, as the world is seen more and more to be a unity, some keen individual, such as Iknaton, may consequently come to think that there is only one god, or that all the gods are one, as in ancient India. Such a development leads however to an advanced religion.

(B) In national religion, the relations between the gods and men are conceived on the analogy of ruler and subject—the gods are ideal great men. Consequently, (1) in dealing with the gods, belief is not required, cult alone is important. Just as in an imperial audience, conformity to the proper form is essential, while the individual's thoughts are his own private concern, so in religion, correct form alone is important. Hence outward worship is all-important. Piety consists in honoring the gods in the manner sanctioned by custom and usage. The customary morality is part of piety, since the gods are the guardians of the customary morality, but it is only a part, and not usually the most important part. The center of religion is worship. The things done are all-important, not the results they produce, for the gods demand these things. For example, attendance on religious services is all-important for those required to attend, not because of the effect of the services on those individuals, but because the gods demand that attendance.

(2) The concept most characteristic of national religion is *do ut des*. To these religions, sacrifice is voluntarily giving up something because it will please or help the gods and so secure their help in return. Just as a visit to a chieftain or king is not made without offering him a gift, so the gods demand gifts. Thus it is said in the book of Exodus (34:20), "None shall appear before me empty-handed." There are also vows, *dabo ut des*, and the plaction

of angry deities, *do ut abess*. Since *abire* is a form of *dare*, the fundamental conception in the relation of man and gods here is the same. Sacrifice rightly offered influences the gods mightily; after the flood, in the Babylonian story, the sacrifice offered by the survivors brought the angry gods, who had wanted to destroy mankind, into a kindly frame of mind again.

(3) Men do not merely need the gods' help, the gods need men's gifts. The Babylonian story tells how the gods were so hungry, after the flood had interrupted their sacrifices, that they gathered around the sacrifice "like flies." Hence it is to the interest of the gods to care for men—that is their business. The Hebrew prophetic conception of a God who would even reject his own people is utterly alien to a national religion. A national god can, in a fit of anger, injure his people; he may send a pestilence to decimate them, but he would never reject them utterly. That would be cutting off his own source of supplies.

(4) National religion, because it personalizes the gods so highly, marks off the sacred from the secular. Certain things and places concern the gods, others do not. The worship of the gods is just one function among all the functions of life. In this respect national religion shows a tendency different from both primitive and deontological religions. Primitive religions are too ill-organized to distinguish systematically any parts of life as alone sacred. The primitive religion of farmers included the ploughing of the very fields that were to produce the grain as part of the religious practice itself; in national religion, the god's care of the grain is secured by worship at some special place, a temple or altar, and, if ploughing is still part of that worship, it occurs in a special sacred field; the ordinary secular ploughing is not the religious ploughing. The primitive conception of tabu is not the same as the national conception of the "sacred," although the two conceptions often function similarly. A thing is tabu because it is intrinsically dangerous or has itself acquired some dangerous property; a thing is sacred because it is different from ordinary things since it is associated with or belongs to the god. It may be dangerous, but its danger comes from the great god, not from any other characteristics.

(5) Because of the importance of worship, there is developed for this function a group of specialists, the priests. They are the ones who know the proper formalities and matters of politeness and the idiosyncracies necessary to approach the gods. In early times

the ceremonies of worship may have been simple, but intricate ceremonies prove more impressive upon the beholders and hence are held to be more impressive to the gods too, so that, as time goes on, the ceremonies are developed in impressiveness and in beauty, until they become so intricate that no one but the specialists can know them exactly. The professional pride and self-advantage of the priests aid greatly in this process. The petrifying power of tradition, however, keeps the ceremonies unchanged in their fundamentals, susceptible to improvement only in details. The priests may be periodically chosen by the state or the people, as in Greece, or they may be chosen by other priests or by the guild of priests, as in Egypt, or the priesthood may become hereditary, as in Persia. The political possibilities of such a priestly organization are evident and conspicuous in history. One need only mention the priests of Amon in Egypt or the Brahmans in India to recall the power of a religious group who claim to monopolize the traffic between men and gods. Not only do they secure political power; they also, because of professional advantage, tend to prevent religious progress. Ikhnaton's monotheism perished because of the opposition of the Egyptian priests; the Hebrew prophets found in the Hebrew priests their bitterest enemies. Next to the fixation of ideals by writing, the priesthood is the greatest obstacle to religious development.

(C) The gods are treated like human beings in another important respect: they are located in space. (1) The temple is primarily a house for the god to live in. The Greek temple was typical of the temples in national religions. In it a small room, like the bedroom of a Greek house, in which room the god was thought to live, was the essential portion of the temple. The temple building was not a large structure for the people to congregate in, as in advanced religion, but primarily a house for the god's convenience. The people gathered in the surrounding courtyard. What have been called 'temples' in Babylonia are properly the courtyards and accessory structures; the temple proper was the tiny house on top of the ziggurat. In Vedic worship, a new temple was made each time the gods were worshipped: they were invited to come and sit on rushes carefully placed for them at the sacrifice—a form of worship suitable to a wandering people, but not different in principle from the temple worship.

(2) The god is nearly always located, not merely in a certain

place, but also in a certain object—the idol. It is important to recognize, what the devotees of advanced religions have often (sometimes deliberately) forgotten, that an idol is not a powerful object—that conception belongs only to primitive religion; an idol is merely the locus of a god. When the idol is broken or burned, the god is not harmed, except as he is offended by an injury done to his peculiar property. Since the idol is merely the *where* of a god, the particular form taken by an idol is unimportant. It may well be a lance, as with Mars in ancient Rome, or a stone, as in Crete and Canaan, or an animal, as in Egypt and India, as well as a human figure, as in Greece. It is not surprising that, in Athens, worship should have been paid to the ancient crude figure of Athena, while the beautiful statue of the goddess made by Phidias was admired, but not worshipped—the goddess was located in the ancient object where she had always been placed. The fantastic forms given to idols in such countries as India and Egypt are merely attempts to symbolize the god, and betray quite as much imagination as the Greek idols. The god is not the idol, he is merely in the idol. Since however he is in the idol, if you capture the idol, you may capture the god. When the Philistines defeated the Israelites at Ebenezer, they put the Ark into one of their temples, because they had captured a god. Furthermore, since the god is in the idol, the idol may be treated in the manner that the god needs to be treated—it may be given a bath or its daily toilette may be made, as was done in Egypt, not because the idol is identified with the god, but because doing these things to the idol is considered to be doing them to the god. Nevertheless the distinction between the god and the idol is very likely too fine a one for many of the god's worshippers, so that they may treat the idol as if it were the god himself, and it becomes a powerful spiritual object to them. Their religion thereupon becomes insofar a primitive religion. At the same time, to more intelligent worshippers, who distinguish between the god and the idol, the same acts of worship have a different meaning, and are part of a national religion. Thus the lack of intelligent comprehension brings about misunderstanding of important features of a religion and changes its nature.

(D) Because of the social organization of communities at the level of early civilization, in which individuals as such are unimportant, there comes to be another general characteristic of national re-

ligions—they do not concern themselves with the special interests of individuals, but only with those of the group. National religion is the religion of the *great* gods; the great gods do not concern themselves with private matters. We should not, however, be misunderstood to mean that the great gods do nothing at all for individuals; quite the contrary is true. Just as a great king, in his care of his country, so the great gods do many things for individuals. The great gods protect individuals from invasion, give individual soldiers strength in fighting for the community; they act as police officers to detect crimes, to restore stolen goods, and to punish the guilty; they act as health officers to cure sick persons or to drive away injurious demons; in the exercise of their care for their community, they even see to it that the number of citizens is maintained and increased by giving children to those desirous of them; in these and other ways the great gods deal with individuals. But these are all matters that concern primarily the community; individuals are assisted only in so far as their needs or desires are identical with the obvious needs of the community.

The consequence of this fact is (1) that religion and politics are inextricably intermixed. (a) The god is the symbol of national unity, and the whole group of citizens must worship him. When one nation conquers another, the subject nation as a nation (not as individuals) is nearly always required to worship the god or gods of the conquerors as a symbol of their loyalty. The conquered people are in addition usually convinced that the gods of the conquerors are stronger than their own gods, and so they worship the conquering gods from motives of self-interest as well as from political compulsion.

(b) The gods belong to the nation and the nation belongs to the gods. Not only do the gods need their people, but the gods make favorites of their people. They therefore do things for their own people that other gods are thought to be unable or unwilling to do, for example, they give victory in battle, protection from pestilence, etc. This belief in a special providence is characteristic of national religions, and is quite justified there; a universalistic religion can hardly believe consistently in a special providence. In a national religion, each god has his own particular circle of worshippers to whom he stands in a peculiar and exclusive religion.

(c) There is no voluntary choice of religion by the people any

more than there is a choice of citizenship. One is born into one's religion just as one is born into one's tribe. The refusal to worship the national gods constitutes treason to the state; such an act will bring the anger of the gods upon the group, and is for that reason punished with great severity, usually by outlawry or death. This requirement of worship is not a heavy one, however, since individuals are not usually themselves required to worship or believe in the gods.

(2) Since the great gods care only for the community, the worship of the gods is not a care upon individuals, but only upon the community. It is, therefore, usually conducted by the community in the person of the proper officials. Individuals may worship the gods to secure their care in matters which concern society, such as police or health protection, additions to the family, etc. Such a special appeal to the gods means giving them a special gift. There is, however, no more compulsion to make such an appeal than there is to give a special gift to the policeman on the beat when one is afraid of a robbery to one's house. Such special worship is therefore only occasional, and some individuals may, with perfect consistency, never themselves worship the national gods; only the payment of the temple tax and worship by the representatives of the group is regular and required.

(3) There is one notable exception to the fact that the great gods care only for the community; they take a different attitude to those individuals who have a special or outstanding relationship to the community or the god, such as the king or chieftain. The king represents the community, and so the gods care for him particularly. In Babylonia the king at his accession took the hands of the image of Marduk in token of this special relationship. In Egypt the king was specially favored, so that he was made a minor god by the great gods. Furthermore, the great gods, in harmony with the imperfectly moral conception of their character, may and do usually have favorites upon whom they may bestow special favors or blessings, just as even a just ruler has his favorites. The priest, especially the high-priest, because of his constant care for the god, is usually such a favorite, so that an injury to a priest is revenged by the god with especial fury. The priests are, however, regarded by the gods as servants; other individuals may be more important in the eyes of the gods, such as heroes, who, because of some outstanding characteristic, such as strength, descent, or character, are

more greatly favored, sometimes even being made divine at their death, as were Ganymede, Hercules, and Utnapishtim. In harmony with the character of the gods, the greater the god, the harder to approach him; the common people hence appeal for help, not to the greater gods, but to lesser beings.

(4) Since national religion is a function of the community, it concerns itself only with this life. National gods have a definite and restricted area in which they function—usually a definite geographical region or territory; the religion of these gods concerns itself only with what happens in that region. Many national religions have no belief in any life after death. In those religions that do have this belief, the concerns of the life after death are cared for by special gods who take that world as their territory and the cult that grows up around them is soteriological, not national. The community's gods are thus not gods of the other world, and the community's religion is not primarily a religion dealing with the other world—that is a matter for other gods and another religion.

(E) We have seen that national religions concern themselves with the community only. But people's needs are never limited entirely to community affairs; consequently there is always, in the stage of national religion, along with it another religion that cares for these other needs. This religion is nothing other than primitive religion, persisting alongside with and in addition to national religion. National gods are not exclusive of any except rival national gods of other nations, and not always of them: the national gods quite naturally tolerate primitive spirits, ghosts, and lesser deities, as long as they do not infringe upon the privileges of the national and greater gods. Hence the actual religion of a people in the stage of early civilization is a mixture of national and primitive religion, and the characteristics we have mentioned in this section do not hold for the entire religion of these peoples, but only of the worship for the great gods. For other divinities what we have said of primitive religion still holds true. In Greece, for example, the uranic cult was usually that of a national religion, while the quite different chthonic cult was nearly always that of a primitive religion. We must now consider what is the relation of the great gods to these primitive spirits.

(1) The great gods often absorb some of the primitive spirits. This fact is a natural stage in the development of the gods. Very often many tasks that benefit primarily the community are original-

ly performed by minor spirits: such tasks can be taken over by the great gods themselves, quite in harmony with the character of these gods, and to the advantage of the community, since a more powerful being now cares for these needs. The result is that the great gods absorb many of the spirits and powers and take their titles and attributes. In Babylonia the great gods in this way took over the cure of diseases—something that was originally supposed to be done by a charm or spell without the help of any spiritual agency. In Greece the great gods took over the functions of many particular deities and were worshipped under double names, as Artemis Korythale, and sometimes in the form of earlier divine animals, such as the snake, etc.

The primitive spirits are not always absorbed; they often remain and continue to be worshipped, because they do things for individuals that the great gods would not think of doing. The ancestral ghosts are specially cherished for their care of the family. In early civilization, individuals do not have many wants that are distinct and different from the wants of the community. Since the great gods take over the social duties of these spirits, there does not remain much for them to do except those things that are disliked by the people. Diseases, storms, calamities, epidemics, moments of forgetfulness, bursts of anger, crop failures, and such events, are supposed to be due to the action of spirits. The spirits, therefore, tend to become either the guardian spirits of some minor locality or some person, or else demons who are hated by the people. These demons are then worshipped with special apotropaic rites. The chthonic Greek cult is mostly such a worship. Primitive spirits need not, however, have a definite character, either good or evil; they may be purely capricious, as the English Puck. In proportion to the degree to which the individual's wants are completely absorbed in those of the community, a tendency grows up to distinguish the loved gods and the avoided demons.

The automatic phase of primitive religion becomes distinguished as magic. The working of automatic ceremonies may now be contrasted with the activity of the thoroughly anthropomorphic and personal great gods. Hence the distinction between "religion," which deals with such anthropomorphic beings, and "magic," which works automatically, comes into being. Rites that produce results by their own nature become distinguished as magic only when there is a national religion in the same community. In harmony with the dis-

inction between the loved gods and avoided demons, magic becomes likewise distinguished as white magic (helpful), and the black (injurious) art.

In early civilization the number of spirits is lessened, because the great gods absorb so many spirits; in later civilization, the wants of individuals are no longer identical with those of the community; the individual emerges with special wants of his own, and so he appeals to spirits and powers more and more for special favors. More acute observation of nature also leads to belief in larger and larger numbers of spirits to account for natural phenomena. With later civilization, therefore, the number of spirits increases, since there is more for them to do. Some of them may become greater spirits, i.e., gods. A few of them, especially those who have to do with the other world, such as Osiris and Persephone, may become the center around which grows a new sort of religion, soteriological in nature, which belongs to the group of advanced religions.

The conceptions inherent in national religion are highly important because they are congenial to civilized peoples, and hence are frequently carried on into and mixed with advanced religions, although they do not properly belong there. People are conservative, and hesitate long before giving up any way of doing things that has proved itself valuable, with the result that many conceptions belonging to national religion have been retained by people who profess an advanced religion but who have not thought carefully about it. Such notions as anthropomorphism, the *do ut des*, the interpenetration of religion and politics, worship and sacrifice as service to the god, and the confusion of moral and ritual sins, are often rejected by the keener leaders of advanced religions, but nevertheless find their way into the religion of the people. The influence of primitive and national religions does not stop in barbarous or early civilized ages; it has continued down to the present, and is still found in much of contemporary religion, even among the most highly civilized peoples.

ADVANCED RELIGIONS

The feature that distinguishes advanced religions from all others is the realization, on the part of intelligent people, that it is not the overt acts of man that are important, but the inner life, since overt actions are the results of the inner life. Consequently advanced re-

ligions concern themselves primarily with the inner life of men and only secondarily with their outward actions. This is a feature that is lacking in primitive and national religion. The great gods concern themselves with men's actions, not with their thoughts. This emphasis upon the inner life is the result of the development of thought, of study into the causes of actions, whereby man comes at last to see the practical importance of the inner life. The leaders of advanced religions have never tired of emphasizing the importance of man's inner life, his heart or mind or soul. Even the most crass of soteriological religions, in their most materialistic ceremonies, such as the taurobolium or the Dionysian orgy, or even in the mystery performances of the Çaktas of the left hand, believe that what is done, is not merely an outward form, but that an inner change in the nature of the believer is really brought about, whereby he inwardly becomes different from what he was before.

It must however be confessed that, while in theory the advanced religions concern themselves primarily with the inner life of mankind, in practice they have not always been thoroughgoing or consistent. They have often retained the emphasis upon outward action that belongs to national religion, and, indeed, many other features of national religion. In Jesus's reply to the Pharisees' criticism of his disciples for eating with unwashed hands, he reminded them that Judaism (an advanced religion) concerns itself properly with the inner life, whereas these Pharisees were thinking only about an overt action. We shall see how this inconsistency came to be a natural and inevitable development in certain religions. Nevertheless, the emphasis of the advanced religions upon the inner life remained an ideal, luring men on to ever-renewed reform of their religions, thereby bringing it more and more into harmony with its own nature.

The consequences of this emphasis upon the inner life are: (a) that religion becomes an individual matter, and an individual choice of religion becomes possible and natural. Religion no longer is a matter of race or nationality; conversion from one religion to another and the deliberate adoption of a different religion from the one that a person originally had, becomes possible. Religion consequently sometimes makes a division within the nation, so that people of the same nation often profess different and even mutually exclusive religions.

(b) Religious hypocrisy becomes now for the first time possible. Since hypocrisy consists in acting out a belief different from the belief one actually has, hypocrisy is not possible in national religion, for that religion does not require any inward belief. Only those professing an advanced religion can be religious hypocrites.

(c) A certain inward experience becomes the essential and characteristic feature of the religion. This inward experience is often expressed in a statement of belief, as in legalistic or philosophic religions (the Jewish Shema or the Christian ritual creeds) or in a statement of religious experience (in soteriological religions.) The Eleusinian password, "I fasted, I drank the gruel, I took from the ark, and, having tasted, I put it away in the basket, and from the basket into the ark," which refers to the outward concomitants of a very moving inward experience, corresponds to the Mohammedan Confession and the Zoroastrian profession of faith. Such a definite statement is a convenient catchword for the religion. It is not, however, always found. Philosophic religions, with their endless complexities of thought, tend to avoid such over-simple formulas. They require the acceptance of a certain world-view as the inward experience essential to their religion.

(d) The advanced religions are, in principle at least, universalistic. These religions emphasize the inner nature of man; but that inner nature is everywhere the same; consequently advanced religions do not properly make any distinction between different nations or races. In legalistic religions, the God of that religion is the God of all the earth, so that he is not limited to Jewish or Mohammedan territory; for soteriological religions, salvation depends upon being about to go through a certain inner experience, which, because it is inner, is possible to all men. To philosophic religions, religion consists in the acceptance of a certain world-view, whose acceptance is not conditioned upon anything but intelligence. Hence there is no fundamental reason for limiting advanced religions to any one group.

Nevertheless these religions, because of the influence of national religion, do often restrict their membership to certain groups. That restriction is, however, arbitrary, and not inherent in the nature of the religion, so that the religion is continually tending to overstep such restrictions. The legalistic religions are the worst offenders in this respect—they believe in a single God of the whole earth, who

is thoroughly moral, but who, nevertheless, plays favorites with one particular nation or race, such as the Jews, Mohammedans, or the "true Israelites"—the Christians! This contradiction is the result of a holdover of national ideas into an advanced religion.

As we stated in the beginning of this essay, there are three sorts of advanced religions: deontological, soteriological, and philosophic. Each one has its own distinct conception of what is the most important thing in the world, of what sorts of things religion deals with. Consequently these are three different sorts of religions, although all belong to the group of advanced religions and all possess, in addition to their peculiar characteristics, the four general characteristics of advanced religions.

DEONTOLOGICAL RELIGIONS.

The group of religions we call deontological hold that the most important thing in the universe is a Universal Moral Purpose, so that religion consists in putting oneself in harmony with that purpose. This purpose is nearly always incarnated in a single God, equal to whom there is no other, who is sufficiently personal to have a will, so that religion consists in obedience to or conformity with that will, and who is preëminently a moral being in the highest sense of the word. The predominantly deontological religions are nearly all monotheisms or henotheisms, especially Judaism, Mohammedanism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism. Even in medieval dualistic Zoroastrianism, Ahriman was of little pragmatic service in the religion of the people; he was merely a figure useful for the philosophic explanation of evil. Ormuzd was the greater of the two, since he was finally to overcome Ahriman. While Zoroastrianism was theoretically a dualism, it was pragmatically a henotheism, with only one God, equal to whom there was no other. So with other deontological religions.

The consequence of this conception of religion is that (1) ethics becomes integrally and inseparably connected with religion, and the religious life becomes identical and coterminous with the moral life. The sense of duty, the feeling that the right has an absolute claim upon me, as distinguished from the feeling that good acts are merely advisable or "better" than evil ones—the experience that Kant called the categorical imperative is, therefore, a consequence of this sort of religious conception. Hence these religions may quite cor-

rectly be called the deontological religions. In fact Kant could deduce the existence of God from his categorical imperative because that imperative could only be justified by the (logically) prior assumption of an ethical God of whose will morality is the expression.

The sort of ethics that is demanded by deontological religion may be, but is not necessarily a scientific ethic. The sort of morality demanded by a religion depends upon the sort of a God that is believed in. Only when God is conceived as completely rational, so that his Will can be discovered by the use of human reason, as in Stoicism and some forms of liberal Christianity, do the duties required by God coincide altogether with those required by a scientific ethic. Nevertheless, the ethic commanded by deontological religions rarely departs very far from the requirements of a scientific ethic, because of the high level of thinking that is necessary before a deontological religion, with its monotheism, can come into existence. Usually the ethics of deontological religions is authoritarian, and often non-moral acts, such as circumcision or baptism, are required by the Will of God quite as much as purely ethical acts are. Thus the ethic of a deontological religion may be wholly a scientific ethic, or it may be partly scientific, but mostly authoritarian in its nature.

(2) Since God is conceived as primarily moral, His Will covers the whole of moral life, i.e., all voluntary acts. Consequently, in truly deontological religion, there is no distinction such as there is in national religion between the sacred and the secular. Where deontological religions make this distinction, it is a hold-over from national religion.

Since deontological religions emphasize a single great God, just as national religions emphasize the great gods, deontological religions are likely to manifest many of the characteristics of national religions, through uncritical confusion of the two by their followers. Such a confusion is not inherent in deontological religions, and is due to conservatism and unclear thought. The greater leaders and founders of deontological religions, such as the Hebrew prophets, Zoroaster, and Jesus, rejected and opposed the features of religion peculiar to national religions: their followers however often allowed these very features to creep into their religion. In the case of Islam, Mohammed compromised with national religion in his later days, so that national features began to creep into Islam from its very beginnings. He was not a deep nor clear thinker in religious matters.

The degredation of these religions in the generations succeeding their founding may be described as the corruption of deontological religions by the introduction of national and sometimes of primitive elements.

LEGALISMS.

In addition to the belief in One God and his Purpose, which we have previously noted, a very important variety of deontological religion holds also that the Divine Will has been expressed in a historic revelation, which is not merely communicated to a certain person or persons, but is stated in a certain set of commands or doctrines, the most important of which have been written down in a certain document. These beliefs constitute the essential feature of this sort of religion, which has been called a legalism or nomism, because the Will of God is, according to it, to be discovered by a study of this authoritative historic revelation, just as the requirements of the law are to be discovered from a study of the code. The most important legalisms are Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity; there are also some others, such as Sikhism and Mormonism. Stoicism is a deontological religion without any strictly legalistic element, although, like Christianity, it is soteriological and philosophical too. The first three we mentioned also have soteriological features, but they are predominantly legalistic, at least in their classic forms. The Hebrew temple, especially in the time of the monarchy, enshrined a national religion; the great Hebrew prophets and Jesus preached a deontological religion; the great rabbis taught a legalistic religion; the apocalyptic books and such sects as the Essenes were soteriological. With all these influences working at the same time in first century Palestine, no wonder it is hard to unravel the nature of Jewish religion! It had not one nature, but many. All the important advanced historic religions have belonged at the same time to more than one of the three sorts of advanced religions.

From the above essence of legalism and from our knowledge of human nature we can derive the following six characteristics of legalisms. (1) There is a canon of sacred writings, which are the authority to be referred to for knowledge of the Will of God. With time there usually develops also an authoritative interpretation of that canon. A doctrine of inspiration about the way that the canon was received from God is also developed. We need merely recall to our

minds the Avesta and the Bundahishn, the Torah and the Talmud, the Koran and the Sunna, the Bible and the Church Fathers, to see how true of these religions this statement is.

(2) There likewise develops a new type of religious leader, not (as in national religion) a priest whose business it is to worship the God, but a learned man who has studied the canon and is able to interpret it and state its application to concrete cases. The Jewish Rabbi or Scribe is typical of these religions. Hence true piety consists in the study and memorizing of the religious canon. Not all of these religions have gone as far as Hillel, one of the first-century Jewish rabbis, who said, "No uneducated man shuns sin, no common man is pious," implying that the common people are little better than heathen, since they do not have the time or capacity to study the Torah; but a tendency in that direction has always been present in legalisms. The cultivation of casuistry, in which a thoroughly legalistic spirit manifests itself, is the natural consequence of such a conception. Schools of interpretation, such as the Mohammedan four schools of jurisprudence, are another quite natural development of this sort of religion.

(3) A new type of worship is developed, quite different from the temple worship in national religion, in which worship is primarily for the benefit of the god. Now members of a legalistic religion meet for reading, study, and explanation of the Sacred Revelation—a sort of worship that is primarily for the benefit of the people, so that they may know better how to conform themselves to the Will of God. This sort of worship was begun in the Jewish synagog. That institution has been the historic parent of the Mohammedan mosque and the Christian church service, not only because of actual imitation, but also because of the appropriateness to that sort of religion. Zoroastrianism retained also the nationalistic worship, just as Judaism retained the Temple worship and was only deprived of that worship by a historical accident, the destruction of Jerusalem; the vital feature of Zoroastrianism (as in Judaism) lay, however, not in its ritualistic worship, but in the attempt of the people to obey the Divine Will and in the instruction given for that purpose.

(4) One curious consequence of legalism is the religious particularism that arises within it. Those who have the historic revelation of God are naturally thought to stand in a privileged relation to Him and hence are conceived to be specially favored by Him. This par-

ticularism is a quite natural development and one almost universally found in legalisms, but it is not a strictly logical consequence of the fundamental conception of the religion. It is rather an instance of the way that national conceptions tend to creep into these religions. A God of the whole earth, who is thoroughly moral in his nature, would not play favorites or direct the history of the world for the benefit of any one nation, as Judaism and many Christian sects believe: such a conception is, however, natural to peoples who have had a national religion and so have been used to think of the god as preëminently *their* God. Consequently they distinguish peoples into those whom God cares for and those whom he condemns: Jews and Gentiles, Christians and heathen, etc. Nevertheless, because legalisms are fundamentally advanced religions, and so are properly universalistic, there have been in all legalisms protests against such narrowness, such as in the book of Jonah and John 1:9.

(5) Although God is conceived as preëminently moral, yet the sort of morality actually demanded often includes many non-moral acts, matters of religious custom, that are demanded simply because God is declared to require them. The Puritan sabbath observances, the Jewish food tabus, Mohammedan prayers, fastings, and pilgrimage observances, the Parsee shirt and belt, are considered to be just as important and sometimes more important than purely moral matters. These observances are performed simply because God commands them. Here again we notice the influence of national religion: God is often conceived, not as purely moral, but as arbitrary, uncriticizable, not to be measured by merely moral standards. Just how strong this tendency is, is shown by the fact that that extraordinarily keen judge of human nature, Mohammed, was compelled to make his religion largely a matter of religious custom, chiefly because he saw that his followers, who had been trained in a national religion, expected to be required to conform to some religious customs.

(6) The greatest handicap that legalisms manifest, lies in the fact that their opportunity for progress is limited. They are tied to a historic revelation, which is written down, with the result that the amount of change possible is limited, since the historic revelation expresses the moral ideals of a past age. It is interesting to watch the gyrations of the legalisms in attempting to adapt an ancient, written revelation to conditions different from those of the age when the

revelation was written down. The Jews developed the doctrine that part of the Torah was never written, but handed down by tradition, so that the Rabbis promulgated that tradition even to the extent of abrogating the written Law, which they did in the matter of divorce; when however these very oral enunciations were written down, a new written revelation was thereby formed, which had again, with greater difficulty, to be adapted to new situations. The Mohammedans likewise developed their four schools of jurisprudence, all of which, though contradicting each other in their deliverances, were nevertheless admitted as correct! Christianity has been more flexible; the wiser sects have never enunciated God's Law in moral matters in any detail; those sects that have done so, such as the Eastern Church, have decayed when popular thought found them antiquated and out of accord with a more developed conscience. Legalistic religions, because their requirements are definite and precise, have been able to make an immediate appeal to popular acceptance, but the historic development of the public conscience, brought about by the very emphasis of these religions upon morality, has often left them behind.

The historically important deontological religions have thus been legalistic; but legalism is not inevitable for these sorts of religion; today there is a marked trend, among the more progressive adherents of all the four great legalisms, towards a deontological religion that will reject merely legalistic elements.

SOTERIOLOGICAL RELIGIONS.

The fundamental conception of soteriological religion is that the most important thing in the universe is some sort of trouble or evil, together with the cure for that evil. Trouble is perennial in human life; national and legalistic religions, however, generally take an optimistic attitude to this world—they are concerned with living in this world, not with escaping from it. In the face of trouble, however, a merely deontological religion is not adequate. When confronted with a seemingly inevitable and overwhelming trouble, there are only three things that can be done: (a) a man can give up, which means ultimately to commit suicide; (b) he can attempt to forget the difficulty, which means to day dream and leads to some form of shizophrenia or delusion; or (c) he can seek religion, whether by some form of Stoic religious attitude to face and bear

the inevitable, or by some religious hope to find help and confidence in continued living. Curiously enough, the religious way of meeting such troubles is the only one that is psychologically normal.

Even primitive religion dealt with difficulties and troubles; it is not therefore surprising that soteriological religions probably developed earliest of all advanced religions. Many primitive spirits and most national gods are usually helpful in trouble: a soteriological religion arises when man comes to think of some particular trouble as the *most* important thing in the universe, or conversely, when some god starts to specialize in helping men. There have been innumerable soteriological religions. Very likely the earliest was the cult of Osiris in ancient Egypt. Among the historically important ones are: in Greece, the mystery religions, especially the Dionysian, Orphic, and Eleusinian cults; in the Hellenic-Roman world, the oriental cults, Magna Mater, Isis, Mithra, Christianity, and the religious philosophies, Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Neoplatonism. Epicureanism proclaimed itself as anti-religious; but its opposition was directed chiefly towards the national and cruder soteriological religions. It was primarily a means of overcoming trouble, misery, and unhappiness; hence it was primarily a religion. In India there are many soteriological religions, especially Jainism, Buddhism, and the Bhakti cults, Vishnuism and Sivaism. The four important Hindu philosophies, the Vedanta, Ramanuja, Sankhya, and Yoga are also soteriological religions, inasmuch as they promise salvation. In China the philosophy of Lao Tze and the (later) Taoism were likewise soteriological religions; here the Buddhist sects preëminently satisfied the demand for a soteriological religion.

Three of the great legalisms, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Islam are to a lesser extent also soteriological religions, inasmuch as they promise to save from eternal punishment; the soteriological side is not, however, greatly developed in the orthodox forms of these religions. In some of their sects, such as the Essenes, the Cabala, and Sufism, the soteriological emphasis is dominant. The greatest world-religions, Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, are not single religions, but rather collections of religions; some of their sects belong predominantly to different types of religion from that of the parent religion. It is furthermore possible for one religion to belong to two or more types at the same time, and for people to think that two or more things are both the most important things in

the universe at the same time, when it is possible to attain two or more goals at the same time. For example, it is possible to consider God's purpose and some trouble as both of them the most important feature of the universe, when God's purpose is considered to be the removal of that trouble—a religion organized on such a conception will be both deontological and soteriological.

Since soteriological religions are man's way of meeting trouble when that trouble is for him the most important thing in the universe, there are four important questions to ask these religions: (I) From what does this religion promise salvation? (II) What must the religious man do to attain salvation? (III) Just how does salvation come to him? and (IV) What is it that he is promised as salvation?

We may sum up these religions in terms of the sorts of answers they give to these four questions. (I) The troubles from which these religions promise to save are as varied as the troubles to which the flesh is heir, with the qualification that the more important soteriological religions pick out the more important and more universal troubles. Frequently 'salvation' means relief from more than one of them; sometimes a religion will offer to cure from any and all trouble. We may group these troubles as (1) an unhappy future life: death, suffering in a future life, continued transmigration; (2) an unhappy present life: sickness, poverty, calamities, political defeat, fears, unhappiness; and (3) supposed causes of unhappiness: fate, an incurably evil world, desire, ignorance, immorality. The student of comparative religion can easily fit each of these troubles with two or three religions that promise to deal with them.

(II) As to what the religious man must do to find salvation, we find great differences. Anything unusual and extraordinary, or nothing at all, has been proposed. There are (1) severe asceticism and mortification of the flesh, such as in the Hindu fakir and the Christian flagellant; (2) moderate asceticism, as in primitive Buddhism and the monasticism of the Christian orders; (3) ritual acts of various sorts: (a) initiations, long ceremonies as in the religions of Eleusis, Isis, Mithra, Magna Mater, and Christian baptism; (b) prayer and reading of the Scriptures, as in the Tibetan prayer-wheel or the promises of salvation in the Buddhism Diamond Sutra or the Lotus to those who read or repeat these Scriptures; (c) various magical formulae, such as the repetition of the syllable

Om, or of the name of Amida in the Jodo Buddhist school; or (d) various meritorious works, such as charity, preaching or spreading the religion, certain moral deeds. In this last set of requirements, soteriological religions approach closely to the requirements of some legalisms.

Some soteriological religions require (4) the orgy, by which we mean the arousal of some violent emotional condition. The classic example is the orgies of Dionysos and of Cybele. There are also the dancing dervishes of Islam and the Christian Holy Rollers. Sometimes sexual acts are included, as in Dionysos, Cybele, the Civaite Çaktas of the left hand. Sometimes drugs, such as alcohol, hashish, etc. are used to produce the required emotional condition.

(5) The mystic ecstasy is an emotional condition so widely cultivated and so important that it deserves separate mention. Usually the orgy itself ends in some sort of hypnotic or semi-hypnotic condition; the mystic ecstasy may, however, be cultivated quite apart from any orgy. The Yoga, Neoplatonism, and Christian mysticism are outstanding examples of this sort of religion.

(6) Some religions demand, on the other hand, self-culture. Stoicism required the philosopher to "retreat within himself and be unmoved" by emotion. Lao Tze urged quietistic desirelessness, as did the Upanishads and primitive Buddhism.

(7) Other religions, especially some philosophic soteriological cults, find salvation by knowledge. The Sankhya found salvation by knowledge of the eternal distinction of *purusha* and *prakriti*; the Vedanta by knowledge of the "That art Thou!" and of the universal *maya*.

(8) Still other religions require faith or trust in a God: Jodo Shinshu in Japan, St. Paul and Augustine in Europe. (9) Sometimes love of the God is enjoined, as in the Hindu Bhakti religions and some forms of Christianity. (10) Other religions require merely a bare wish or thought in order to produce the desired results, as in the Shingon Buddhist school or the American Unity society. (11) Still others require nothing at all; man is saved by God's irresistible grace; man can do nothing to deserve it or predispose it. This is the doctrine of the southern Ramanuja Vishnuites and the extreme supralapsarian predestinarian Calvinism. (12) Very few find that salvation is to be found in the development of a moral character and the attempt to live a moral life; the difficulties in such a pro-

posal have discouraged most religions from adopting such means of salvation.

(III) With regard to the way that salvation is attained, there is not so much diversity. Salvation may be attained (1) automatically, or (2) by the aid of some God. (1) Automatic methods of salvation may be distinguished as (a) the use of some superhuman power, usually called magic: various formulas, powerful objects, or powerful acts. In ancient India it was believed that *tapas*, austere asceticism, if continued long and severely enough, would automatically give a person great power, sometimes even greater than that of the gods. (b) Other methods of salvation utilize natural laws. For example, Gautama the Buddha taught that the removal of desire would bring about the cessation of *karma*. It is difficult to distinguish this from the preceding variety of automatic action, since magic is merely primitive science; it is merely that some ways of action proposed by some religions have been confirmed by scientific investigations, and others have not. (2) The other mode of salvation, by the aid of a gracious and kindly God, is more common. This God (a) may be thought to possess his power by his own intrinsic nature, as in Christianity and the great legalisms, or (b) He may have acquired his power by some experience, as Osiris (and possibly Mithra) did by dying and coming to life again. In the foregoing ways religions propose to attain salvation.

(IV) Concerning the sorts of salvation promised, there are also many differences among these religions. The attainment most commonly promised is (1) some sort of heaven, meaning by that term, a happy life after death. The conceptions of heaven have varied with the character and ideals of those proposing them, from the sensual enjoyment of the Dionysos cult and the more refined enjoyment of the Eleusinian Elysian fields or the Buddhist Western Heaven to the vague conception, found in some Christian circles, of association with God. Usually there goes along with the conception of heaven the notion of a hell, a place of punishment, for the unsaved.

(2) In India, where the great evil in life is not death, but unending transmigration, salvation is to Nirvana, which can best be described as the cessation of transmigration. Buddhists, Jains, and others have debated whether Nirvana is simply annihilation or a continued blessed existence. Nirvana has meant both of these conceptions.

(3) Other religions, not seeking such other-worldly goals, have found salvation in mere contentment, quietude of spirit, freedom from disturbance of mind. The Stoic *apatheia* and the Epicurean *ataraxia* are examples of this sort of salvation. These states of mind really constitute a salvation, inasmuch as they are represented as the achievement of relief from man's besetting troubles.

(4) Mahayana Buddhism, in its nobler forms, has a different conception of salvation, namely, becoming a Bodhisattva, a miracle-working being who is able to save others—the monk saves himself to become a savior of others.

(5) The mystics have found salvation in an ineffable metaphysical union with the Godhead, as in Plotinus and the Yoga. Some, more magical religions, especially Osiris and Dionysos, have also sought identification with the God for the purpose of attaining a happy immortality—here union is a means, not the goal.

(6) There is also the notion that salvation consists in moral reformation. This conception is rare; it is found chiefly in Christianity and not always there. Other religions have put morality as a desirable feature of their religion or even have made the living of a reasonably moral life as a prerequisite to initiation, but rarely has the living of a moral life been made the goal of religion.

Some religions promise other sorts of salvation: wealth, good luck, cure of disease; these are however less important; they are additional advantages, rather than the most important things in religion.

Some religions have thought of salvation as consisting in more than one of these kinds of salvation at the same time: eternal life, in Christianity, usually means both heaven and quietude of spirit and union with God and moral reformation. Different Christian sects have differed in the stress they put upon one or the other of these components. Buddhism, more catholic even than Christianity, has, at various times and in various sects, defined salvation as each of the six great goals we have listed. Religions, competing with each other for the assent of mankind, tend, like merchants, to offer anything and everything they think men may prize.

In analyzing the characteristics of these soteriological religions, we must first notice that the soteriological religions divide into two groups: (A) the tough-minded religions, which seek first of all for the cause of human trouble and then try to remove it, and (B) the

tender-minded religions, which seek to escape trouble directly, usually by some easier way than by resolutely trying to remove its cause. Gautama the Buddha in finding the cause of trouble in human desire was taking the tough-minded attitude; Eleusis, in leading men to friendship with the powerful goddesses, Demeter and Kore, who would in friendship save the initiate, was taking the tender-minded attitude. Tender-minded religions take the easy way out of trouble: they worship a loving god or dream about a better land, so that human troubles may be neglected. The tough-minded religions work manfully and resolutely to remedy the trouble at its source, sometimes demanding of humanity more than it is ordinarily able to accomplish.

Religion has often been criticized for being an escape-mechanism; these critics have neglected the tough-minded soteriological religions. Although the larger number of soteriological religions have been tender-minded, most tender-minded religions have perished. The competition of religions has left them behind.

The tough-minded religions, in searching for the cause of trouble, are inevitably led into adopting some philosophical position, so that they become also philosophical religions. Since social science also investigates the cause of trouble, soteriological religions must undergo scientific investigation too.

There are two characteristics of soteriological religion in which they powerfully reinforce the general characteristics of advanced religions in just those respects where legalisms are deficient. (1) Soteriological religions are purely spiritual in their nature—the important thing for them is to produce a change in the inner nature of man. Even the most crass practice, the taurobolium or the orgy, has its importance, not in itself, but in the changes it brings about in the inner man—he is *renatus in aeternum* or otherwise regenerated. The legalistic religions tend to emphasize non-moral customs, such as fasting, circumcision, or church attendance, merely because God commanded them; soteriological religions bend all practices to spiritual ends, and so make them spiritual. Hence the cure of legalistic materialism lies in the infusion of soteriological influence.

(2) Soteriological religions break over national bonds. A person is not a member of a soteriological religion because he has been born a member of a certain group of nation; he needs a Second Birth, an initiation or baptism or its equivalent. Consequently any

one who can be initiated can become a member of that religion. Hence the soteriological religions are the great missionary religions of history—Orphism, Mithraism, Buddhism, Christianity, and others. This implicit universalism has brought about remarkable changes in these religions. Greek pride at first restricted initiation at Eleusis to Athenians; the nature of this religion however brought its extension to any Greek, then to anyone, male or female, slave or free, Greek or barbarian, who was free of serious crime and could understand the ritual. In India the Bhakti cults have overstepped the bonds of caste; members of the lower castes have been their saints and leaders. The universalistic soteriological religions thus remedy the deficiency of the particularistic legalisms.

Apart from the two above characteristics, there are no others peculiar to all soteriological religions and always found in them. However, state four tendencies that are likely to appear, but may not be shown because of the intermixture of a strong deontological influence.

(1) In soteriological religions, the bond between religion and morality tends to be shattered. There is, indeed, no necessary connection between morality and soteriological religion, unless the evil from which one needs to be saved is specifically moral evil itself. Salvation from any other evil, such as a miserable future life, transmigration, or an evil world, need not be by a moral means. Hence morality may not be required for salvation, and, if required, its requirement may be purely adventitious. India's soteriological religions take it for granted that religion and morality are separate. Even in religions such as primitive Buddhism and Neoplatonism, in which morality is required, it is relegated to an inferior position. Gautama required his followers to live moral lives, but salvation came not by so doing; it came only by asceticism, ridding oneself of desire, not of immorality. In Neoplatonism and the mystical movements deriving from its influence, morality is merely one of the earlier steps in the preparation for the mystic revelation; the believer must proceed *beyond* morality to the mystic vision. Religions that profess to deliver man from immorality do not show this tendency; they are however rare.

(2) The soteriological religions exhibit a tendency to obscure the concept of God; some of them even lack that concept. Their emphasis is upon man and man's salvation; God, if present, is sub-

subsidiary to man's salvation. Hence the God of a soteriological religion need not be the greatest being in the universe. He may be a being who has died and lives again, who shares in human weaknesses, such as Osiris-Separis, Dionysos, Attis, or Siva; he need only be kindly disposed to his followers and powerful enough to give them what they want. Indeed, these religions may do without any God at all, since salvation may come by some automatic process. Hence the Sankhya, Jainism, and primitive Buddhism are atheistic.

(3) The soteriological religions show a decided tendency to be tolerant of other religions, and often allow their followers to belong to other religions at the same time, for they do not concern themselves with the whole of life, as do the deontological religions, but only with one phase, that from which salvation is sought. Hence other gods may be worshipped for other purposes. In Athens it was the common practice to worship the national gods and the primitive spirits, and, at the same time, to be initiated into the rites of Eleusis. Sometimes the same person joined a number of soteriological cults, much as one joins fraternal organizations today—if one cult fails to save, another may succeed! As long as a religion subserves only one among the many purposes of life, if that purpose is not inclusive of all other purposes, that religion can consistently be tolerant of other religions.

(4) These religions also show a tendency towards otherworldliness. They seek to escape from this life. Even Stoicism, which believed in no other world, nevertheless disparaged this world; the true Stoic retreats into himself, where he can be undisturbed, and cares not how things happen in the outer world. Hence soteriological religions tend to fail to consider the needs and interests of human society, and often sacrifice this world for the sake of another. Sometimes such a religion encourages positive immorality, as in the orgies, especially the Çakta sects of the left hand.

A more usual result is some form of asceticism, which may be laid at the door of soteriological religion. For Neoplatonism and most Christian ascetics, asceticism is to free the soul from matter; for Buddhism it is to free the mind from any other effort than that of eliminating desire. The result is a depreciation of morality among ordinary people.

Much milder is the requirement of an emotional "conversion" experience, from which there is more often than not an undesir-

able psychological reaction. This tendency likewise leads frequently to a one-sided spirituality.

The soteriological religions are not only the most numerous of all types of religion, but also perhaps the most varied of all. In many ways their tendencies balance the tendencies of deontological religions. Indeed, the defects of soteriological religions lie in their one-sidedness; the complete union of soteriological and deontological religion would remedy most of these one-sided tendencies. The tough-minded soteriological religions are, moreover, also philosophies.

PHILOSOPHIC RELIGIONS.

The essence of philosophic religion is that the most important thing in the universe is the explanation of that universe, in so far as that explanation relates to (directly or remotely, but nevertheless necessarily) what is thought to be most important in practical life. When we ask philosophy to be the guide of life, we make of it a religion.

Most of the great philosophies have been philosophic religions. In the classic world, Pythagoreanism set the model for a philosophic religion; there were also Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Neoplatonism; in India, the Vedanta, Yoga, Sankhya, and Ramanuja are philosophic religions; in China, the philosophies of Lao Tze, Mohtze, Confucius, and the neo-Confucians are philosophic religions. So are also the theologies of the higher religions, such as the idealism of Mahayana Buddhism, Mutazilite Mohammedanism, Jewish philosophy, and Christian theologies. Perhaps the most imposing is the system of St. Thomas Aquinas. There are also eighteenth-century Deism and the Protestant theologies. The greatest inadequacy of Protestant Modernism is its lack of an adequate philosophic development. Most of the great modern European philosophic systems have at least a religious side, in so far as they deal with fundamental problems of human life, and are, therefore, philosophic religions—Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, for example. Spinozism is today more and more manifesting its religious nature by attracting devotees. The conflict between the "positive religions" and philosophy has been motivated by this religious rivalry. The world's important philosophies and theologies have been philosophic religions and hence must be judged by the criteria of religion.

In stating the characteristics of philosophic religions, we note

that in three respects they especially stress characteristics that properly belong to all advanced religions. (1) They emphasize the importance of belief—the acceptance of certain conceptions of life and of the universe. This fact is an outgrowth of the circumstance that advanced religions deal primarily with the inner life—in this case it is interpreted in accordance with the nature of philosophic religion.

The emphasis upon a developed creed, meaning by that term a detailed statement of belief, is characteristic, not always of a purely philosophic religion, but of a religion that combines philosophic with legalistic characteristics. The Jewish Shema and Mohammedan Profession of Faith are not developed creeds, but convenient catchwords. A developed creed is exemplified by the creed of Maimonides or that of al-Ashari, both of whom were philosophers as well as adherents of a legalism. Christianity, after its impregnation by Greek philosophy, developed many creeds.

(2) Philosophic religions, more than any other, are individually chosen. For acceptance they appeal only to the reason of the individual. Often they do not even have any initiation ceremonies; an acceptance of a set of beliefs is alone necessary to join.

(3) These religions are truly universalistic—they transcend political boundaries. Philosophic thought is, by its own nature, supranational. Confucianism, an apparent exception, spread little outside of China because of difficulties of communication; it, however, profoundly affected Japan and Indo-China, to which regions it could go.

In addition to the three foregoing ways in which philosophic religions exemplify the general characteristics of advanced religions, there are also five special characteristics or tendencies of these religions: (1) They are the product of a great deal of reflection. All religions, especially advanced religions, are the product of some reflection; only the philosophic religions, however, carry this tendency to its logical conclusion in making religion throughout a matter of reflection. With other religions, reflection is only partial—they include many non-reflective concepts, such as rituals and magic, which is primitive, unreflective science. Philosophic religions are therefore highly theoretical, emphasizing metaphysics and theology.

(2) They consequently appeal only to the educated, satisfying the "intellect" as a statement of truth rather than the "emotions"

as comforting or helpful. Hence their appeal is limited in its range—only to those who seek for intellectual satisfaction. Since such people are usually the leaders of civilized communities, the influence of the philosophic religions has, however, been far greater than the number of their adherents would suggest, even percolating, in the course of centuries, down to the lower classes of society, as did Confucianism in China.

(3) Because of their emphasis upon the explanation of the universe, philosophic religions lack many practices that other religions find advantageous. They need no temples or meeting-houses; they need no particular organization and no ritual. They are thus purely spiritual in nature. There may be some sort of a gathering, just as there are scientific meetings; there may be an organization, just as there are scientific associations; and there may be an initiation, just as there is sometimes a formal admission of new members into a scientific society; but such forms are not at all necessary, and are frequently dispensed with. It is incorrect, however, to say that philosophic religions are literally unemotional. Emotion enters into them, just as it enters into scientific pursuits (cf. scientific controversies), but, since reason usually moderates emotion, philosophic religions nearly always exclude the violent emotions, and hence are said to be 'emotionless.' Some of these religions have indeed encouraged the mystic ecstasy, which is a very intense (though not violent) emotional experience. Even the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity is properly emotional in nature. Refined spirituality is quite consistent with emotion.

(4) Because reflection plays so large a role in these religions, the natural tendency of a one-sided philosophic religion is towards over-refinement, absorption in purely theoretical problems, to the exclusion of the practical side of life. This tendency is exemplified in Plotinus and in the Neoplatonic current in Christianity—"practical" problems fade into the background before the *contemplatio Dei*. Philosophic religions tend to become absorbed in metaphysics, theodicies, free-will controversies, and similar problems.

In particular, the importance of morality for life tends to be neglected. The Hindu philosophic religions show this characteristic; due to their influence, India has generally accepted the notion that religion and morality are properly separate—before the overwhelming *maya*, morality ceases to be significant; when the *purusha* is seen

to be separate from the *prakriti*, the *purusha* is alone real, and morality, which belongs to the *prakriti*, ceases to be important. To maintain the emphasis of religion upon morality, some deontological influence is essential in religion.

(5) Just as morality tends to disappear in one-sided philosophic religions, so the concept of God, the most valuable concept in religion, is likely to disappear in a mist of abstractions. In the Vedanta, in Plotinus and the "negative theology," in Lao Tze, the concept of God is in great danger of disappearing. Some philosophic religions are frankly atheistic, as the Sankhya, the Vedanta, Epicurus, Gautama the Buddha. Even when a God is admitted, He is rarely conceived in such fashion that He can come into practical relationships with the believer, so that prayer, except as self-communion, is impossible. Narrowness and one-sidedness is possible to philosophers just as much as to ignorant people.

In spite of these one-sided tendencies, philosophy is a permanent element in religion. Man is a reasoning being, and insofar philosophy is inevitable. Religion should, however, be more than mere philosophy, since man wants more than merely an explanation of the universe; religion must be as broad as life if it is to be really valuable. The ideal religion, meaning thereby the most valuable religion, would seem to be an advanced religion that rejects all purely primitive and national elements and stresses to an equal degree, deontological, soteriological, and philosophical elements. The foregoing classification of religions may thus be made into a means of comparing and evaluating religions.

We have seen that the classification of religions is possible if we do not require our classes to be mutually exclusive, but rather types that are exemplified in actuality as coherent groups of tendencies, while each actual religion is usually the result of a mixture of different types. We have been able to deduce these types from the general definition of religion by considering the different possible sorts of things that may be considered most important in life. Primitive religions take immediate wants, national religions, one or more anthropomorphic great gods, and advanced religions, the needs of the inner life as most important. The first of these important inner needs is a purpose for life that is also the purpose of the universe, leading to the conception of a single personal moral God, a deontological religion, and to the conception that this God's will is stated

in an authoritative revelation, thereby producing a legalistic religion. The inner need may also be for salvation from some sort of trouble or evil, producing a soteriological religion or it may be for an explanation of the universe, producing a philosophic religion. All actual religions may be classified as belonging in different degrees to one or more of these five types of religion, and the important characteristics of actual religions may each be classified as derived from some one of these types. In this way there is offered objective basis of comparison among religions, so that comparative religion may become a real science.

PROFESSOR WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD, *President of the New Orient Society of America, died June 7, 1934 in Berlin, Germany. His remains will be returned to New York for burial late in September.*

Books Relating to Oriental Subjects

FAR EAST

JAPAN

- W. G. ASHTON—Shinto, the Ancient Religion of Japan. Cloth, 60c.
FREDERICK STARR—The Ainu Group at the Saint Louis Exposition.
Boards, 75c.

INDIA


- WM. NORMAN BROWN—Indian and Christian Miracles of Walking
on the Water. Cloth, \$2.00.
PAUL CARUS—The Gospel of Buddha. Paper, 75c., Cloth, \$1.25,
De Luxe, \$5.00.
PAUL CARUS—Karma, a Story of Buddhist Ethics. Paper, 15c.
PAUL CARUS—Nirvana, a Story of Buddhist Psychology. Cloth, 60c.
PAUL CARUS—Portfolio of Buddhist Art. 50c.
S. N. DASGUPTA—Hindu Mysticism. Cloth, \$2.00.
ALBERT J. EDMUNDS—Hymns of the Faith (Dhammapada).
Cloth, \$1.00.
RICHARD GARBE—Akbar, Emperor of India. Paper, 50c.
RICHARD GARBE—The Philosophy of Ancient India. Paper, 30c.

CHINA

- PAUL CARUS—Canon of Reason and Virtue (Lao-Tze's Tao Teh
King). Cloth, \$1.00. Paper, 50c.
PAUL CARUS—K'ung Fu Tze. Boards, 50c.
PAUL CARUS—Tai-Shang Kan-Ying P'ien. Boards, 75c.
PAUL CARUS—Yin Chih Wen. Boards, 25c.
H. G. CREEL—Sinism: A Study of the Evolutoin of the Chinese
World-View. Cloth, \$2.00.
FREDERICK GOODRICH HENKE—The Philosophy of Wang Yang-
Ming. Cloth, \$2.50.

NEAR EAST

- LAWRENCE H. MILLS—Zarathushtra, Philo, the Achaemenids and
Israel. Cloth, \$4.00.
LAWRENCE H. MILLS—Avesta Eschatology. Boards, 75c.
LAWRENCE H. MILLS—The Yasna of the Avesta. Price, \$5.00.
LAWRENCE H. MILLS—Our Own Religion in Ancient Persia.
Cloth, \$2.00.
HUGO RADAU—Bel, the Christ of Ancient Times. Boards, 75c.
A Series of Monographs on Oriental Culture



BOOK NOTES

The Meaning and Truth of Religion. By Eugene William Lyman. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1933. Pp. xvi + 468.

An important book which interprets the function of religion as the source of meaning, purpose, and hope in our modern life and which finds the fullest development of religion in the synthesis of its various elements.

The Plain Man Seeks for God. By Henry P. Van Dusen. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1933. Pp. xvi + 213.

Written in a clear and interesting manner for the man who is willing to think through the philosophical and religious problems underlying the convictions which influence so much of his life and thought.

The Quest Of Solitude. Written and illustrated by Peter F. Anson. New York E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1933. Pp. xviii + 277.

A sympathetic description of the solitary life and its message to mankind as lived by those who seek in solitude, not refuge, but something positive—the Finding of God.

The Aesthetics of William Hazlitt. A Study of the Philosophical Basis of His Criticism. Philadelphia. The University of Pennsylvania Press. 1933. Pp. viii + 200.

From various, scattered essays are here brought together the philosophical and aesthetic thoughts of William Hazlitt making accessible in easy form a basis for a more thorough understanding of his criticism.

The Life of Cardinal Mercier. By John Gade. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1934. Pp. ix + 312.

A sympathetic account of Cardinal Mercier, Archbishop of Malines during the stormy period of the world war.

BOOK NOTES

Epochs in the Life of Simon Peter. By A. T. Robertson. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1933. Pp. xvi + 342.

Dr. Robertson follows the development of Simon the fisherman of Galilee to Peter, the "Prince of the Apostles," sorting out as much as possible the legendary accounts that have grown up about the character of Simon Peter.

The Gate of Remembrance. The Story of the Psychological Experiment which resulted in the discovery of the Edgar Chapel at Glastonbury with a record of the finding of the Loretto Chapel in 1919. By Frederick Bligh Bond.

The story of the discovery of the lost chapels with the help of psychic writings. New York. E. P. Dutton & Co. 1934. Pp. xvi + 214.

Reflections on the End of an Era. By Reinhold Niebuhr. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1934. Pp. xii + 302.

An examination of the present crisis in Europe and America on the basis of which Dr. Niebuhr condemns modern liberalism as being unable to give adequate guidance through such a period of confusion; his solution would be through a more radical political orientation and more conservative religious convictions.

Prayers For Services. A Manual for Leaders of Worship. Compiled and edited by Morgan Phelps Noyes. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1934. Pp. xvi + 296.

A valuable collection of liturgical material, gathered from ancient and contemporary sources, which should prove valuable for ministers and others who are called upon to lead public worship.

The Pageant of Chinese History. By Elizabeth Seegar. New York. Longmans, Green & Co. 1934. Pp. xvi + 386.

An introduction to the history of a great people, written for twelve-year-old children as a consecutive narrative. This manner of handling the history of so vast and complicated an empire by its very nature must have many shortcomings; but the simple story of Chinese history cannot help fascinate the young reader where a more detailed account would but confuse him. Knowing about those strange countries that are so different from ours in their social life, their art, and their philosophy is an enriching experience. We are happy that this book has been made available.

AN ACCOUNT OF PSYCHOSIS
AND RELIGION

A LETTER TO A FRIEND

ANONYMOUS

An authentic description of the experiences of
a college student facing insanity as well as an
unusual chapter in religious experience.

Price \$1.00

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY
149 East Huron Street Chicago, Illinois

A NEW BOOK ON PHILOSOPHY—
FILLING A REAL NEED

The Categories of Charles Peirce

By

EUGENE FREEMAN

A compact and sympathetic guide to the major
articulations of a very rich and complex phi-
losophy.

Paper Edition.

Price: \$1.00

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY
149 E. HURON STREET CHICAGO

ART AND ARCHAEOLOGY

Washington, D.C.

Forty-eight de luxe pages and cover, costing One Dollar the copy, makes this the most expensive magazine in America.

It issues the 20th of every second month.

If you subscribe for a year, and are an Open Court reader, tear this out, enclose \$3.50 with it, and get a year's subscription at a substantial discount. See for yourself why ART AND ARCHAEOLOGY is worth its price!

Among the features of the May-June issue are a remarkable Minoan gold treasure now on exhibit at the World's Fair, and an interesting survey of the ancient ruined cities of Lycia, Asia Minor.

Don't miss the lavishly illustrated twenty pages given to the Gellatly Art Collection, now open to the public in the United States National Gallery, Washington, D.C.

Try a year's subscription. Learn why and how such a magazine can be so original, so beautiful, and so interesting.

Address

SUBSCRIPTION DEPARTMENT

ART AND ARCHAEOLOGY — 701 Southern Building
Washington, D.C.

The New Humanist



A Bi-Monthly Journal

reflecting the development of thought related to human values in all phases of social and individual life. It recognizes the need for serious discussion of basic problems in an atmosphere of freedom and impartiality.

Creative contemporary thought gravitates very largely about the Humanist position. Accordingly THE NEW HUMANIST is especially interested in the humanist movement. At the same time the journal is inter-liberal in scope and is tied to no sect or cult.

The drift of culture and religions the world over is followed as objectively, yet sympathetically, as possible.

AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS:

Harry E. Barnes, John H. Dietrich, O. W. Firkins, H. Gordon Hayes, A. Eustace Haydon, Walter M. Horton, Robert J. Hutcheon, Cassius J. Keyser, William M. Leiserson, Douglas C. Macintosh, Max C. Otto, John Hermann Randall, Jr., Curtis W. Reese, Oliver L. Reiser, Roy Wood Sellars, Maynard Shipley, Martin Sprengling, Radislav A. Tasanoff, Henry Nelson Wieman.

Contributed verse and articles given careful consideration

Subscription: One Dollar Per Year. Single Copies, Twenty Cents.

THE NEW HUMANIST

14 West First Street

Dayton, Ohio

THE NEW ORIENT SOCIETY OF AMERICA
MONOGRAPH SERIES ARE NOW
AVAILABLE IN BOOK FORM

THE NEW ORIENT

Volume I

THE NEAR EAST

With an Introduction by
JAMES HENRY BREASTED

Editors:

A. E. Haydon, Halford Hoskins,
A. H. Lybyer, A. T. Olmstead,
Martin Sprengling

Contents:

The Heritage of Eastern Asia,
Heritage of Western Asia,
Modern Turkey, Egypt, Syria,
Palestine, and Arabia

Cloth. Pages 473. Illustrations 130.
Price \$3.50

Volume II

THE FAR EAST

With an Introduction by
BERTHOLD LAUFER

Editors:

Arthur Upham Pope, Berthold Laufer,
Quincy Wright, Walter E. Clark

Contents:

Persia,
Central and Russian Asia,
Japan, India, China,
North Africa

Cloth. Pages 400. Illustrations 65.
Price \$3.50

ORDER BLANK

NEW ORIENT SOCIETY OF AMERICA,
149 East Huron St., Chicago, Ill.

Dear Sirs:

Inclosed please find \$.....for which please send
.....of THE NEW ORIENT. Vol. I, Vol. II.

Name.....

Address.....