

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY IN ITS DIVERGENCE FROM THE
SPIRIT OF THE CONTEMPORARY WEST (II)

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A CONSTANT feature that characterizes all the diverse philosophical systems of India resides in their approach to the tasks of metaphysical interpretation. This approach is identical with the persistent emphasis of the religious consciousness. It centers about the interrelations of the self and the world. Professor Leidecker has lent his authority to the contention that a "unifying theme that runs through all the systems is that of expressing experience in terms of the relation between the world and the self."¹ In this respect we find the contemporary philosophical situation in the West sharply different. Our behaviorisms, positivisms, naturalisms, most realisms, and speculative philosophy, however wide their departures from one another, alike manifest an objective orientation in consequence of which the relation between the world and the self is at most one of the questions that arise in the endeavor to frame a conception of reality under the lead of science, and only certain of these philosophies manifest any temptation to express experience in terms of this relation.

In raising the issue of differences between India and the contemporary West as concerns the influence of the religious consciousness upon philosophy, however, it was our intention to stress other matters—features connected with the lines of consideration mentioned in our preceding paper. First of all we would allude to a conception which is prominent in the thought of India, and enters into all its philosophic systems except the Cārvāka, but which, in the specific form in which it there occurs, is all but absent from our contemporary Western philosophies. That to which we refer is the doctrine of Karma; and that feature of this doctrine which we would here single out for attention is its unqualified synthesis of power, on the one hand, with justice or goodness, on the other. Neither of these traits would the Hindu consciousness sacrifice, even when confronted with the hard problems of human fate. Both in quality and

¹ Leidecker, Kurt F., "Indian Philosophy and Western Thought," *Journal of the International School of Vedic and Allied Research*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 18.

in intensity, the teaching goes, the vicissitudes and fortunes of life are resultants of earlier deeds—a thesis which carries with it the doctrine of previous existence. Indeed, according to Garbe, the effects of human action are held to carry far beyond the experience of the individual agents. The "subsequent effectiveness of guilt and of merit, usually called *adṛishṭa*, 'the invisible,' also often simply *karman*, 'deed, work,' not only determines the measure of happiness and suffering which falls to the lot of each individual, but also determines the origin and evolution of all things in the universe. At bottom this last thought is only a necessary consequence of the theory that every being is the architect of its own fate and fortunes into the minutest details: for whatever comes to pass in the world, some creature is inevitably affected by it and must, therefore, by the law of atonement have brought about the event by his previous acts. The operations of nature, therefore, are the effects of the good and bad actions of living beings. On these assumptions all Indian philosophy, with the exception of materialism, is founded.² This account may not meet with universal approval on the part of scholars. Yet what does seem indisputable is the basic position in Indian thought of the belief in the inseparability of power, order and justice.

We find a characteristic, even though but a relative, distinction between Indian and contemporary Western, and especially American, thought, also in the fact that the former has always manifested an exceptional preoccupation with that whole or totality within which all elements of being are felt or conceived to fall. This means, in part, that it has exhibited a pronounced tendency to monism. This tendency is as ancient even as the Rigveda. Writes Mr. Prasad: "A careful study of the Rigveda will show that while individual gods are adored and the various phenomena of nature are attributed to them, the need of finding one comprehensive unity amid all diversity and one fundamental cause for all the manifold causes and effects is constantly pressing itself upon these poet philosophers of yore, and that as a result of this we already find in the Rigveda the theistic, the pantheistic and the monistic tendencies in juxtaposition with the more usual and predominant polytheistic notions."³ The monistic strain becomes much more emphatic with the course of time, until, with the appearance of the Upanishads, it becomes indubitably ascendent. Again to quote Mr. Prasad: "For the most part there is one conception which dominates the whole of Up-

² Garbe, Richard, *The Philosophy of Ancient India*, pp. 8f.

³ Prasad, Jwala, *Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, p. 5.

anishadic thought, viz., that there is ultimately only one principle of reality and it is Brahman or the universal self. All diversity and plurality of existence is either an illusion altogether or a manifestation of this same principle in a variety of forms."⁴ Even where there is a theistic emphasis in the Upanishads there is a monistic note in the teaching that the universe, though having its source in Brahman, does not completely represent the latter but that Brahman transcends the universe.

In her philosophy India has indeed travelled upon almost all the paths of metaphysical exploration and has expounded widely varying doctrines of reality. Professor Radhakrishnan, however, has insisted, in his valuable historical studies, that Indian philosophy at its highest is monistic. Indeed, in his view, even those systems of thought that are avowedly dualistic or pluralistic have, unmistakably and inevitably, monistic implications. Now it is only fair to bear in mind that historical interpretations are easily colored by the historian's own philosophical affiliations; and Professor Radhakrishnan has been charged with having distinctly exaggerated the extent to which monism reigns in Indian philosophy. Whatever element of truth there may be in such a charge there nevertheless seems abundant evidence that, as compared with what obtains in the contemporary West, the monistic doctrine, or an underlying current thereof, uniquely prevails and has so prevailed, in the philosophy of India.

This is certainly the case when one envisages the situation from the standpoint of logical and epistemological teaching. But it is equally clear when the matter is viewed from the angle of ethics, especially in connection with the problem of evil. Generally speaking, life in the West has presented itself more in terms of struggle. Not nearly as striking as in India have been the tendencies to explain away evil or to seek escape from it through flight or disregard. Thus there has been a more widely prevalent as well as a sterner ethical dualism—a dualism often so stubborn as to carry the day both in theology and in metaphysics. The good, it has commonly been felt, is engaged either in an heroic defense against the invasions of evil or in a spirited attack upon it.

Often India's monism has been carried to extremes such as are seldom found in the classical systems of the West, and are today non-existent in America. In some instances, however, Indian thinkers have preserved the aspect of diversity, setting forth the ultimate unity, not as void of distinctions and utterly abstract, but as in-

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

clusive of, even though transcendent to, the differences which it organizes and synthesizes. Precisely as India, despite its astounding variety of climate, races, religions and civilizations, and its paradoxes and strains, is inclined to feel itself in some profound way as one, and often cherishes this unity beyond all else; and precisely as, speaking in the by and large, she, throughout the centuries antedating Western control, admitted with exemplary toleration the most varied types of religious beliefs and practices, acknowledging to all the value of bodying forth in some fashion the one eternal—just so have her philosophies, though prevailingly monistic, nevertheless at times sought to find place for all the vast choir of heaven and of earth. The point, however, which we are at present concerned to make is that in India the consciousness or realization of the ultimate or the all-embracing unity has ever seemed peculiarly clear.

The experience of himself as in essence the ultimate, or as falling within its life, or as being nought except in and through it, has been so strong and so universal as to set the typical Indian seer and philosopher quite apart from most of the thinkers of contemporary America. Religion for the former could never be identified, as it so often is by the latter, either with a certain quality of the social consciousness or with active participation in the ethical tasks of mankind. For the Hindu, it involves as an essential feature a life hidden in the absolute, a feeling of unity with the ultimate, an overpowering sense of the nothingness of man apart from God, along with an assurance that God is all in all to him. The influence of this outlook and experience we find reflected in much of India's metaphysics.

Moreover, in the latter the emphasis falls upon being and eternal reality, rather than upon becoming, transformation and progress in time. How the energetic Aryan invaders originally came to substitute the ideal of realization for that of aspiration, of possession for that of search, of being for that of striving, we need not inquire. But early indeed the shift occurred. Thereafter, pretty much throughout, India's seers and thinkers, as well as her sons and daughters generally, have been widely agreed as to the priority, alike in theory and in life, of being over becoming. Writes Professor Radhakrishnan: "Except the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, all the systems aim at the practical end of salvation. The systems mean by release (moksa) the recovery by the soul of its natural integrity, from which sin and error drive it. All the systems have for their ideal complete mental poise and freedom from the discords and uncer-

tainties, sorrows and sufferings of life, 'a repose that ever is the same,' which no doubts disturb and no rebirths break into. The conception of *jīvanmukti*, or liberation in life, is admitted in many schools."⁵ Hence it is not surprising that "all the systems protest against the scepticism of the Buddhists, and erect a standard of objective reality and truth as opposed to an eternal, unstable flux. . . . It is assumed that whatever has a beginning has an end. Everything that is made up of parts can be neither eternal nor self-subsistent. The true individual is indivisible. The real is not the universe extended in space and time; for its nature is becoming and not being. There is something deeper than this—atoms and souls, or *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, or Brahman."⁶

Entirely in harmony with the above is the typical Hindu view that even philosophy, as discursive reasoning and thought activity, cannot be the ultimate mode of human experience. To the latter philosophy can be but a pathway. Indeed much the same may be said of the ethical life. The one who knows, gets beyond reasoning processes to insight and realization; the holy man transcends the plane of moral striving where the good is a goal of effort—for him the good is an accomplished fact, an achieved experience. In an illuminating paper on "Approach to Metaphysics" which has recently appeared in *The New Era*, Professor Dasgupta has touched upon this point. In reference to metaphysical inquiry he writes: "Whether these intellectual efforts are required ultimately to point to some kind of solid experience as the ultimate result or whether the efforts themselves are sufficient to satisfy the craving of the mind in this direction, is a matter in which the Western and Indian minds are not in thorough agreement. I do not say that there is any history of open and positive disagreement and quarrel over this matter between them, but, it seems from the history of philosophy of the two countries, that European minds were always generally satisfied with the theoretical and rational enquiry, whereas, the Indian minds though they enforced strictest rational enquiry, always demanded some real experience which could verify the net results of the intellectual enquiry. With the Indian thinkers mere theoretical accuracy of thought leading logically to a certain conclusion, was not considered to be sufficient. It is curious that there were certain metaphysical results which they considered as being strictly verifiable in experience, and in which all the conflicting systems of thought, which were in hopeless quarrel over the epistemological,

⁵ Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, p. 26.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 25 f.

ontological and logical parts of the theoretical enquiry, were mostly practically in agreement."

Hindu thinkers are therefore pretty much at one as regards their ultimate objective. This consists not in an accumulation of theoretical truths or even in the construction of a temple of knowledge. Truth is indeed highly prized and the vocation of the scholar is set on a pedestal. Yet in the last analysis the value of science and philosophy is deemed to be practical^{6a} and religious. It is the function of these disciplines to serve and to satisfy the basic needs of human life. Whatever the historic origin of the belief in the saving power of knowledge,⁷ it is primarily because of such power that knowledge is sought. Of the earlier thinkers, including the author of the *Gita*, Edgerton says that, though frequently differing on other points, they all agree in their fundamental attitude towards the objectives of speculation. These "are primarily religious rather than philosophical"; "all Hindu philosophy has a practical aim. It seeks the truth, but not the truth for its own sake. It is truth as a means of human salvation that is its object. In other words, all

^{6a} Our exposition would seem to receive general confirmation in Professor Dasgupta's recent volume, *Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought*. Here it is pointed out that the speculative features of the Yoga philosophy were intended as a rational basis for the prescribed practises; their value, it is stated, is "that of a hypothesis, which, according to Yoga, enjoys the patronage of the Upanishads and serves to explain the results of the performance of Yoga practises." (p. 7.) It is but fair to add, however, that the same page from which this quotation is taken, includes also the sentence: "The Yoga . . . *unlike other systems*, (ital. mine) does not base its claims merely on the consistency of its speculative reasonings but also on a system of practises by which the speculative results at which it arrived can be directly verified." It is difficult to see how this passage can be reconciled with that which we quoted in our text from *The New Era*. True, the reference in the *Yoga Philosophy* is to a system of practises rather than to a direct experience of verification through realization, such as Professor Dasgupta said in *The New Era* that "Indian minds . . . always demanded." Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how one may logically claim, on the one hand, that Indian systems other than the Yoga base their claims *merely* on the consistency of their speculative reasonings and, on the other, that "Indian minds . . . always demanded some real experience which could *verify* (ital. mine) the net results of the intellectual inquiry." What may be said, we have allowed ourselves to claim, is that the ultimate objective of Indian philosophers has been in part to blaze a trail for thinking minds to a non-reflective yet noetic experience, while yet and also, in cases where this experience has been arrived at independently of speculative thought, to furnish logical underpinnings for it.

⁷ Professor Franklin Edgerton attributes it to primitive ideas of magic which left lingering traces even when they became transcended and transfigured. (Cf. *The Bhagavad Gita*, p. 7.) This would help to explain how it comes that in India knowledge commonly possesses a value quality that is quite unique, a quality quasi-transcendental as it were, and commanding a reverential regard akin to that often maintained toward the mysterious and the supernatural—a quality that distinguishes it from what is prevalent in the West in those circles where knowledge is construed as instrumental to needs and to practical or spiritual ends.

Hindu philosophy is religious in basis. To the Hindu mind, 'the truth shall make you free.' Otherwise there is no virtue in it. This is quite as true of the later systems as of the early and less systematic speculations. To all of them knowledge is a means to an end."⁸

The contention that Indian philosophy, while *religious* in basis, is *practical* in aim—that its esteem for scientific and metaphysical knowledge is due not to any independent value which such knowledge is supposed to have but to the practical value ascribed to it—might seem *prima facie* to bring into conjunction terms that we set into contrast in our foregoing exposition. For we referred to Indian philosophy as peculiarly dominated by certain features of the religious consciousness, and in so far we differentiated it from contemporary American culture which was said to reflect in a peculiar degree the experiences of practical, as well as of ethical, life and activity. This particular antithesis of the religious and the practical, however, in no wise prevents bracketing together the two terms in a description of the objectives of Indian philosophy. The reason for this is simple. It resides in the different meanings carried by the term "practical" in the two cases. In the earlier context, the term was given its Western connotation; now, in defining the aim of Indian philosophy, we employ it differently. In the one case, its associations are with utility, with particular ends to be attained, with the relations of objects and instruments to needs and desires, and to specific purposes realizable through courses of action; in the other, it refers to the satisfaction of a religious and spiritual yearning, to an experience of the absolute, to the attainment of a salvation that puts to rest the restless questioning of the intellect and the passionate urge of desire.

That from which knowledge is held by typical Indian thinkers to emancipate the individual is suffering^{8a} and *samsāra*, or the cycle of life. The bondage in this case is attributed to a peculiar form of ignorance, an ignorance whose nature it is to misconstrue the true character and value of things. Such ignorance is to be dispelled by traversing the paths of philosophy with the aim of securing an immediate realization of truth and reality. Salvation from *samsāra*, the supreme question of man, is found by every philosophical school of India in some special form of cognition. Yet there is a sense in which philosophy as reflective thought carries us only to the portals

⁸ Edgerton, Franklin, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

^{8a} Cf. Dasgupta, S. N., *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 87: "The practical motive of all systematic speculation in India was deliverance from suffering."

of realization. The tenets common to all the philosophical systems of India, Professor Radhakrishnan describes, almost at the outset of his discussion, in the following sentences: "Reason is subordinated to intuition. Life cannot be comprehended in its fulness by logical reason. Self-consciousness is not the ultimate category of the universe. There is something transcending the consciousness of self, to which many names are given—Intuition, Revelation, Cosmic Consciousness, and God-vision. We cannot describe it adequately, so we call it the super-consciousness. When we now and then have glimpses of this higher form, we feel that it involves a purer illumination and a wider compass. As the difference between mere consciousness and self-consciousness constitutes the wide gulf separating the animal from man, so the difference between self-consciousness and super-consciousness constitutes all the difference between man as he is and man as he ought to be. The philosophy of India takes its stand on the spirit which is above mere logic, and holds that culture based on mere logic or science may be efficient, but cannot be inspiring."⁹

Indian philosophies, thus, transcend, in many cases, the level of strictly ethical experience. Or, at any rate, they carry us beyond that which Bosanquet has aptly called "the realm of claims and counter-claims." "While virtue and vice may lead to a good or bad life within the circle of *samsāra*, we can escape from *samsāra* through the transcending of the moralistic individualism."¹⁰ Taken in conjunction with a universalistic and a cosmic perspective, this tends to make for great breadth of sympathy and good will. Mr. Chenchiah goes so far as to allege: "The essence of Hinduism is best expressed in the words of Coleridge: 'He prayeth best who loveth best, all things both great and small.' The religious mythology of India is shot through and through with this tender love for all manifestations of God. In the psalms of the Indian saints (unlike those of the Old Testament) there is never a hint of anger nor a desire for revenge."

Mr. Chenchiah's pronouncement is perhaps too exuberant. Nevertheless, in some respects, as exemplified in her reverence for and protection of the cow, Hinduism indubitably senses the oneness of all forms of life. Moreover, Hinduism has exhibited a rare hospitality to alien faiths; it has to a considerable degree included and taken up within herself various bodies of worshippers with

⁹ Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, p. 25.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

different gods and forms of cult, having been receptive, indeed, even to those for whom all gods are but subjective creations of finite mind; it has exercised a measure of religious toleration that brightens the annals of mankind. On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that humans are humans. They live not on or by creeds and insights alone. In practice, India has had and continues to have much bitter religious strife. Alike the Jains of the south and the Buddhists variously, as in Nepal and Orissa, have much to complain of regarding persecution by Hindus. Far worse still have been the sufferings inflicted by Hindus upon low caste co-religionists. Even the great philosopher Sankara quotes with approval the law books which prescribe that, if a Sudra overhears the Vedic chants, his ears are to be filled with lead; if he utters verses from the Veda, his tongue is to be cut off; and if he touches a copy of the Vedas, his body is to be dismembered. Aspiration to be a hermit subjects the Sudra to persecution. Indeed, the Ramayana reports that the god Rama beheaded Sambuka, a Sudra, because he had practiced penance, and the other gods are said to have been jubilant over what Rama had done.

In the life—and, indeed, even in the thought—of India, as elsewhere, there thus are clashing elements. But it is worth noting that Hinduism peacefully shelters within herself extremely diverse points of view in relation to gods and no-gods, as well as to worship and the cultivation of emotions. Moreover, the typical Hindu aspires to transcend the plane of narrow individualism and to attain to a cosmic perspective wherein everything finite is given place within an all-inclusive whole and is through such membership, or as an expression of the totality, vested with such reality and value, if any, as it may be deemed to have. These features operate strongly towards the expansion of sympathies and the exercise of tolerance in religion and philosophic views, as well as in the attitudes both reflected and cultivated by them.

Aristoxenus tells the story of a visit paid to Socrates by an Indian philosopher. When the immortal Greek told the latter that he devoted himself to the study of man and human affairs, he is said to have received a smile and the reply that no one could understand things human who did not understand things divine. Whether or not this story has any foundation in fact, it illustrates the profound conviction of Indian philosophers generally that there is a reality undisclosed by sense and that this reality affords the key

for such comprehension as may be possible of that which engages the thought of man.

The population of India generally has displayed an acute sense of the infinite and a reverent devotion to the unseen. It has felt that only in this perspective might one understand particular things and events, and only in this light should one direct one's life. Margaret E. Cousins, writing on "The Womanhood of India," has recently said: "Only those who have lived long and intimately amongst the women of India can appreciate the change that is flooding their lives bearing them forth to freedom, literacy, creative activity of all kinds, and all tinged, nay, sprung from the fountain of spiritual realization, for the Indian woman's source of strength is ever her sense of the Eternal." Drawing on a larger canvas, Mr. P. Chenchiah has given us the following sketch: "The pursuit of the infinite, the search of the unknown has been the main pre-occupation of India all through the ages. The pageant of India—benevolent rulers, far-famed conquerors, learned pundits, incomparable philosophers, great poets and singers; palaces, palm-shaded villages and populous towns,—all these are in the picture. But in the center are the Sadhu and the Rishi (seer), the searchers after truth. All Indian arts, crafts and sciences are born of her religion. Indian music is the praise of the gods, Indian painting their portrait gallery, Indian architecture their temples. Amidst a thousand voices, all attractive and charming, India followed the trail of the Brahman, the mystery of God as it emerges in human consciousness and history."

For our present purposes it is indifferent what may be the specific forms in which the conviction of the infinite has received philosophic expression. Some there were, for example, who held the view that being possesses a depth which is unfathomable by the instrumentalities of abstract thought. Others, again, insisted upon a type of reality which, though designated as unknown, they nevertheless ardently longed in some way to capture and to express. However varied the formulations, we find in India, to a degree unknown in the West, a sense of the infinite, and this it is which not merely permeates wide reaches of her life but likewise dominates much of her philosophy.

Now we of America too are actively engaged in the search for the unknown. Never before in our history has so much importance been attached to discovery or so much energy and resourcefulness been displayed in research. This is true of our universities and

technological institutions, and it finds exemplification also in numerous organizations which are sustained exclusively for purposes of scientific investigation. Indeed, even some of our larger industries have set up well equipped laboratories and staffed them with highly trained specialists in numerous fields not only of applied but also of the pure sciences. But in the main the unknown which is in these cases the object of the quest is equivalent essentially to the not yet known. It is continuous with that of which we possess clear knowledge. Often, indeed, it is conceived as of a piece with the perceptual order. The latter is in such cases commonly given a twofold rôle: that of setting the problems with which reason should occupy itself and that also of validating or negating the conclusions which reason proposes.

Among India's thinkers we find some who are fascinated by the natural and psychological orders of perceptual and introspective experience, and who are very fearful of any departure from the leadings of modern science. And, on the other hand, there are philosophers of contemporary America who are stressing the extent of the unknown and are insisting that, as the latter enters knowledge, much or all of what has been accepted as true will require revision; there are those who are sensitive to the limitations of that which is ever actually knowable, even though it be not in principle unknowable. Thus, India has thinkers who exemplify the dominant Western traits and America has those who in some measure embody characteristics common in India. Hence outer wings of Indian and American thought tend to meet. Yet even in these cases closer scrutiny will disclose differences arising from divergent matrices. In their central, their most characteristic and potent, features, the unknown, the infinite and the real being of which large numbers in India have always had some form of consciousness and for which they have maintained an intense longing, are very different indeed from anything that commands wide attention on the part of our intellectual explorers even in the field of philosophy.

The contrast thus alleged may receive further illumination through another which is closely related thereto and to which we now pass. From the days of the Vedas on down, we find closely associated with the consciousness of the essential mystery of things, a restless feeling of wonder. In the earliest time, this experience was aroused by physical nature, whose awesome features in India are peculiarly fitted to exercise such an influence. At a later period, the sense of mystery and the associated wonder were stimulated

more especially by subtle stirrings and forebodings within the self. Now the wonder thus aroused has a quality that not merely impels the mind beyond what is already grasped to something essentially similar thereto, as does that form of wonder which prevails in the America of today. The wonder of the Indian is one akin to that involved in the religious consciousness, one that engenders a relation to a reality genuinely, and in some very significant sense qualitatively, distinct from the physical and the psychological factors arousing it. I am not sure but what the latter rather than the former represents the experience of Kant when contemplating the starry heavens above and the moral law within. If so, those interpreters of the Koenigsberger have a point in their favour who construe his doctrine of noumena and things-in-themselves not in terms of the limits of the given, as does the Marburg School, but in a much more dualistic fashion. Or again, consider what Plato meant when he described wonder as "the mark of the genuine philosopher so that he was no bad geneologist who said that Iris is the child of wonder." Contrast this with the wonder described by Comte in a passage which declares that this is man's deepest motivation, and that no suffering can be more acute than the consternation arising from the thought that some event may happen in violation of the laws of phenomena. This wonder is that of the scientists, the positivists, and certain of the empirical philosophers. From it we must distinguish that to which Carlyle referred when he contended that "He who cannot and does not wonder (and worship) were he President of innumerable Royal Societies and possessed the epitome of Hegel's philosophy and the knowledge of all the laboratories and observatories of modern Europe within his single head, he who does not perpetually wonder is but a pair of spectacles behind which there is no eye." Now this wonder which for Plato constitutes the mark of a genuine philosopher, which was in all probability associated with the awe and reverence aroused in Kant by the starry heavens and the ethical imperative, and which, in Carlyle's phrase, distinguishes a seeing eye from glassy spectacles is, if my limited knowledge may be trusted, precisely what we find to an exceptional degree among the seers and thinkers of India's many centuries. Together with Plato and the major philosophers of medieval Europe, they powerfully strengthen the conviction of those who, despite much of unquestionable value in the thought of contemporary America, find therein limitations connected with the functioning of what William James labelled the thick-skinned mind.

The drawing of contrasts is theoretically perilous, especially when one is dealing with matters as complex as philosophy and culture. Nevertheless, it is hoped that enough will have been said to justify the affirmation that Indian philosophy diverges in significant ways from the spirit and the thought currents of the contemporary West, and to render at least plausible the thesis that the differences which present themselves arise in no small measure from the more intimate relationship which the life and the speculative thought of India have maintained with the deliverances of the religious consciousness. The chief points which we have sought to make might be summarized as follows: In respect to the feeling of wonder, the concept of practical, and the value attached to knowledge, there are significant differences between the spirit of India and that of present-day America; and in each case these differences arise from the greater prominence in the Indian mind of a sense of the infinite and of the religious note. Indian philosophy has its orientation in the relation of the self and the world; its goal is not abstract knowledge but a characteristic type of experience. Its aims are practical—practical, however, not in the sense of enhancing man's power over the material or the social environment, or of realizing ends of a purely or narrowly ethical sort, but in the sense of satisfying the more ultimate need of salvation. It thus transcends the plane of morality. In distinction from the centrifugal philosophy of an "expanding will" which, at its best, centers about the perfecting of society and its world, the philosophy of India turns to a supernature discoverable in the recesses of the human soul and suggesting the need for spiritual realization. Its emphasis is upon being rather than becoming. In opposition to doctrines of flux, it stresses an objective reality that furnishes an absolute standard of truth and of spiritual values. The individual aspires to an overpowering experience of the ultimate, and the philosopher is inclined to a metaphysical monism which looks beyond particulars to a whole or a totality within which they fall. Power and goodness are conjoined in the concept of karma. We thus have a marked divergence from the temporalism, pragmatism, and instrumentalism, and pluralism which are so prominent in the contemporary West, and from those analytic and intellectualistic strains that pervade so many of its philosophies.