

AN ANSWER TO THE "EUROPEAN WAR."<sup>1</sup>

BY M. JOURDAIN.

ONE of the leading characteristics of *The Open Court* is that it is really open to discussion, and it is in keeping with the very liberal views of Dr. Paul Carus, a German by birth and sympathies, that I am allowed to discuss and dissent from his views upon the European war published in the October number of *The Open Court*, and with other articles in the same number. Dr. Carus's article (pp. 596-646) deals by sections with questions that have arisen in connection with the war; and following his arrangement, I propose to summarize his arguments and, so far as they seem to me misleading, to question them. The first section is:

## PANSLAVISM.

After a summary of the characteristics of the Slav races and the well-known disunion of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Editor turns to the incident of the assassination of the heir-apparent to the throne of Austria and his wife at Sarajevo, on June 23, 1914. There was, he says, no public sympathy throughout Europe for the crime; and yet we read: "No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in many measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices."<sup>2</sup>

The opinion of the Russian, French, and German governments

<sup>1</sup> We publish this article from England as the most comprehensive reply to the editorial position that we have received.—ED.

<sup>2</sup> Throughout this article I have used for convenience's sake the cheap reprint of the English White Paper (which also includes Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3, and other matter) entitled *Great Britain and the European Crisis*, London, 1914. I shall refer to this as *G. B. and the E. C.* Here the reference is to the introductory narrative of events, p. iii.

was that the Servian government was not to blame for the crime, but that Serbia must investigate and put an end to the propaganda which had apparently led to it. Sir Edward Grey advised Serbia to show herself moderate and conciliatory.<sup>3</sup> Unless it were proved that the Servian government had connived at or incited to the crime; or unless the Servian government were to conduct an investigation in such a way as to screen the conspiracy, there was no reason for declaration of war, or a punitive expedition against Serbia. A declaration of war on Austria's part on the ground that she "did not trust the Servians to be impartial"<sup>4</sup> is absurd.

The first open step on Austria's part was an ultimatum delivered at Belgrade, requiring an answer in forty-eight hours. The ten demands involved the suppression of anti-Austrian newspapers, literature and propaganda, the suppression of nationalist societies such as the Narodna Odbrana; the dismissal of officers and functionaries "guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the royal government" (of Serbia), participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Serbia, the arrest of two individuals compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo; the prevention of illicit traffic in arms across the frontier, an explanation of anti-Austrian utterances by high Servian officials, and finally the immediate notification of the enforcement of these measures. In addition, a prescribed statement was to be published by the Servian government in the official journal, condemning anti-Austrian propaganda and regretting the participation of Servian officers and functionaries therein.<sup>5</sup> A summary of the secret trial at Sarajevo was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings, with no corroborative evidence.

As Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir Maurice de Bunsen,<sup>6</sup> he had "never before seen one state address to another independent state a document of so formidable a character." The demand for the participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Serbia was "hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with the right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia."

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. iv.

<sup>4</sup> *Open Court* for October, 1914, p. 599. In future the letters *O. C.* will denote that issue of *The Open Court*.

<sup>5</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, pp. 3-9.

<sup>6</sup> British ambassador at Vienna.

The Editor admits that this "sounds very fair."<sup>7</sup> It is, in fact, unanswerable; and no other line of action would be possible even in the imaginary case he adduces, "if the Prince of Wales had been assassinated and some little nationality on the moral level of Servia were for good reasons suspected of having helped in the deed, plotting renewals of the crime so as to endanger the British government and its royal family." I do not think that an Englishman would have his sense of justice warped by national considerations.

Before the expiration of the time-limit of the ultimatum, Servia returned to Austria a reply amounting to an acceptance of all the demands,<sup>8</sup> subject on certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her constitution, and subject to Austria-Hungary's explanation as to her wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. "The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principles of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations."<sup>9</sup>

This reply went beyond anything which any power—Germany not excepted—thought probable.<sup>10</sup> This was the more remarkable as the time-limit of the ultimatum was as unnecessary as insolent. The impression left upon the mind of Sir Maurice de Bunsen was that the note was "so drawn up as to make war inevitable." "This country," he writes, "has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment."<sup>11</sup> In this temporary blindness of a people, the Austrian ministers were borne along on a wave of violent enthusiasm, in which they said themselves that they would be dislodged from power if they did not accede to the popular demand for the punishment of Servia.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *O. C.*, p. 599.

<sup>8</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, pp. 22-27.

<sup>9</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 25. Servia concluded by proposing, in case the Austro-Hungarian government were not satisfied with the reply, "to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the international tribunal of the Hague, or to the great powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian government on March 31, 1909."

<sup>10</sup> "German secretary of state has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept." *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 29.

<sup>11</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 27.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. vii.

As Servia consented to dismiss and prosecute those officers who could be clearly proved to be guilty and had already arrested the officer referred to in the Austro-Hungarian note, it is not correct to speak of "Russia's protection of assassins."<sup>13</sup>

Equally incorrect is the statement by the Editor: "That England rushed at once to the support of the methods of Panslavism is incomprehensible except on the assumption that England favored the plan of a most stupendous war in which Germany's prosperity, her manhood, her civilization, would be buried under the armies of the invading Russ."<sup>14</sup>

The British government's attitude was that she had no interest in the Balkans except the consolidation and progressive government of the Balkan states. Sir Edward Grey's concern in the Austro-Hungarian note and the reply of Servia was "simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's government."<sup>15</sup> Sir George Buchanan, British ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed (on July 24) that "direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion."<sup>16</sup> British intervention in the European crisis only followed Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality on August 3. As the Austro-Hungarian note was presented to Servia on July 23, and war was declared by England on Germany on August 4, England's intervention cannot be described as hurried or determined by the action of Russia.

The Editor proceeds to praise the German emperor as the prince of peace. "The Kaiser," he writes, "is a peaceful man. If any one deserves the Nobel peace prize it is he. Since his ascent to the throne he has preserved the peace of Europe, often under the most difficult conditions. The bellicose party of Germany has often been disgusted with the Kaiser's policy and called him William the Pacific."<sup>17</sup> It is perhaps premature to assume that the German emperor is the sole cause of Germany's attitude;<sup>18</sup> but turning to his acts and utterances, *is* it peace that he proclaimed so loudly in the days before the war? Was the author of those won-

<sup>13</sup> *O. C.*, p. 599.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 9.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>17</sup> *O. C.*, p. 600.

<sup>18</sup> In December 1910 he sent his portrait to the minister of education with the significant motto, *Si volo, sic jubeo*. The words of the minister completed the quotation. On May 4, 1891, at a Rhenish banquet, he said: "There is but one master in the country; it is I, and I will bear no other." In a speech at Königsberg, May 25, 1910, he wrote: "Considering myself as the instrument of the Lord, without heeding the views and opinions of the day I go my way"—an attitude which might lead to breaches of the peace.

derful Wardour Street phrases of "the mailed fist" and "shining armour" so pacific? In a speech of his delivered on March 1, 1900, on the completion of a fort, he said: "I christen thee Fort Haeseler. Thou wilt be called upon to defend the *conquests* of Germany over the western foes." Seven months later, in celebrating Moltke's birthday, he expressed a desire that "thy staff may lead Germany to further victories." The man who could proclaim that "nothing must be settled in this world without the intervention of Germany and the German emperor" cannot be the most pacific of European sovereigns. That the English people had some just cause for uneasiness in the past may be seen from a very courageous and temperate article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, December 29, 1911: "We shall be obliged to admit that the distrust on the other side of the English Channel is not altogether unfounded. If we had to listen to such utterances from the mouth of a foreign sovereign, we too would become restive and take thought for the strengthening of our line of defense. At present we can only ask England not to take so seriously the utterances in question, since we have long ago had the experience that great words are not followed by great deeds. We know that the Kruger telegram, the challenge to the yellow races, the speech at Damascus, the trip to Tangier, the sending of the "Panther," and so on, were only outward gestures which remained without any corresponding consequences. This is one of the weakest points of our foreign policy. We say to England again and again: 'The German nation is absolutely peaceably-minded, and wishes to live on terms of peace and friendship with England just as much as with all other nations.' This makes no impression on them, since they answer us: 'We are glad to believe that the German nation is peaceably-minded, but the German nation does not make German policy. Her policy is made in a quarter which is absolute, irresponsible, and incalculable; and for that reason we attach merely a Platonic, and never a practical, value to the national professions of peace.' What answer are we to make to that?"

"Who can believe," writes the Editor,<sup>19</sup> "that Germany wanted a war of such dimensions, that she provoked it or ventured into it for lust of fame or with an expectation of conquest? What can she gain?" The answer to this is twofold. Firstly, there has existed an aggressive war literature in Germany which has no parallel in any other country. Von Treitschke condemns perpetual peace as the "dream of weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages," while Bern-

<sup>19</sup> O. C., p. 600.

hardi, echoing Treitschke, speaks of war as "an indispensable factor of culture, in which a truly civilized nation finds the highest experience." In the latter author's works war with France and Russia simultaneously is hopefully anticipated, for "in one way or another we must square our account with France. . . . This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy. . . . France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path. A pacific agreement with England is, after all, a will-o'-the-wisp which no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must always keep the possibility of war with England before our eyes and arrange our political and military plans accordingly." As Bernhardi (who died in 1913) was a prominent German general, high up in the general staff, his aspirations have a certain degree of authority. And apart from militarist writers, every traveler in Germany has come face to face with what Sir Walter Raleigh aptly calls "the cheerful brutality of their political talk."<sup>20</sup> "I remember meeting," he adds, "with a Prussian nobleman, a well-bred and pleasant man, who was fond of expounding the Prussian creed. He was said to be a political agent, but he certainly learned nothing in conversation. . . . The error of the Germans, we were told, was always that they are too humane; their dislike of cruelty amounts to a weakness in them. They let France escape with a paltry fine, next time France must be beaten to the dust. Always with a pleasant outward courtesy, he passed on to England. England was decadent and powerless, her rule must pass to the Germans. 'But we shall treat England rather less severely than France,' said this bland apostle of Prussian culture. . . . The grossness of the whole thing was in curious contrast with the polite and quiet voice with which he uttered his insolences." It is impossible not to draw the conclusion that war with Russia and France was expected, one might say desired, by an influential party in Germany. That she did not desire a "war of such dimensions" is quite evident from the bids for English neutrality.<sup>21</sup> Yet she inevitably drew England into the war by her violation of the neutrality of Belgium; and both Austria and Germany were quite aware of the fact that the note to Servia might lead to a European war. The German White Book informs us that the Austrian government informed the German government of their "conception" of the situation and asked their opinion. The White Book comments as follows:

"With all our heart we were able to agree with our ally's esti-

<sup>20</sup> *Might is Right*. Oxford pamphlets, 1914, p. 12.

<sup>21</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 45.

mate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against the conservation of monarchy would meet with our approval.

"We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might, therefore, involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies."<sup>22</sup>

In the second place, Germany showed no wish to work for peace when the key of the situation lay with Berlin. While Russia, France and England initiated and supported peaceful measures, the German chancellor claimed that none should intervene between Austria and Servia.<sup>23</sup>

The remaining arguments of the Editor that the causes of the war are "the French lust for revenge"<sup>24</sup> and "England's determination not to allow Germany to appear on the field of commerce as her rival,"<sup>25</sup> and "the anti-German policy of the British government"<sup>26</sup> are more conveniently treated of under the sections on the "Foes of Germany" and the "English Point of View." The statement that "Germany has been cut off from the rest of the world" is hardly correct, as the German official wireless is sent out and is published daily in the English newspapers, while German newspapers can be easily obtained.

#### A BREACH OF NEUTRALITY.

The Editor claims that on the part of England Germany's breach of neutrality on Belgium was only an official pretext for the war, "not the real and ultimate motive." This certainly does not represent the attitude of England towards the neutrality of Belgium or Holland. Their independence had been for centuries considered as one of the strongest means for securing peace in Europe, as their position and conformation rendered them the natural battlefield of Northern Europe; of this their troublous history is sufficient proof.

"If it was made impossible for great powers to invade them war would become increasingly difficult and dangerous. With the growth of the idea of a fixed system of international law founded on treaties the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard to this end. As such it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the powers, and recognized by two generations of statesmen."<sup>27</sup> As Sir Walter Raleigh says, it

<sup>22</sup> German White Book, p. 4.

<sup>21</sup> *O. C.*, p. 600.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. viii.

<sup>23</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 12.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

was a matter of common knowledge in England that one event would make it impossible for England to remain a spectator in a European war,—that event being the violation of the neutrality of Holland or Belgium.<sup>28</sup> There was never any secret about this and it was well known to many people who took no special interest in foreign politics. The stress laid upon the importance of Belgian neutrality in speeches by Lord Granville in the House of Lords (August 8, 1870) and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons (August 10, 1870) is emphasized again in Sir Edward Grey's speech in the House of Commons on August 3 last.<sup>29</sup>

The wrong done by Germany has no parallel in the instances of earlier breaches of neutrality quoted by the Editor.<sup>30</sup> The only recent instance quoted is the landing of British troops in Delagoa Bay at the beginning of the Boer war. Portugal is an old ally of England, and conceded permission to the British consul at Lorenzo Marques to search for contraband of way among goods imported there, and accorded free passage to an armed force under General Carington from Beira through Portuguese territory to Rhodesia.

"The Portuguese government exposed itself to no international difficulty through allowing a belligerent, whose final victory was certain and of necessity entailed total suppression of the conquered belligerent, to cross its colonial territory,"<sup>31</sup> and this incident cannot be compared with Germany, one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, invading Belgium when that country, conscious of its duty, was "firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means."

The earlier instances of breaches of neutrality instanced are the seizure of Capetown and the annexation of Dutch colonies. The Dutch colony of New Netherland was seized by England in time of peace, in 1664;—a discreditable action, but this and other political measures of the seventeenth century are no precedents for us to-day. Late in the eighteenth century, when the organization of the united Netherlands was abolished, and they were transformed into the Batavian republic, in close alliance with France, the Dutch participation in the wars of the Revolution naturally brought with it the enmity of England, and the seizure of all the Dutch colonies by the English.

Further, the Editor writes that there is no use discussing the atrocity of a breach of neutrality "because it is an acknowledged principle that in case of war the natural law of self-preservation

<sup>28</sup> *Might is Right*. Oxford pamphlets, 1914, p. 6.

<sup>29</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 93.

<sup>30</sup> *O. C.*, p. 601.

<sup>31</sup> *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed., Vol. XIX, s. v. "Neutrality," p. 477.



demands of every power the completion of the war that has arisen or is about to arise, with the utmost dispatch and by the easiest method. In the present case the Germans have carried the war through Luxembourg and Belgium because that was to them the straightest and safest way of attack."<sup>22</sup> It is significant to recall here that von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German imperial chancellor, in his speech to the Reichstag on August 4, while laying stress on Germany's "state of necessity," confesses openly that the invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium is "contrary to the dictates of international law," a wrong committed.

"It is true that the French government," he said, "has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for the invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the Lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protests of the Luxembourg and Belgian governments. The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can have only one thought—how he is to hack his way through."

The Imperial Chancellor, was, we see, unaware of this "acknowledged principle" of the Editor's. As Mr. Lloyd George has said, "treaties are the currency of international statesmanship," and it is obviously to the interest of each country to see that such international treaties are valid not only in peace (when nobody proposes to break them) but also in war. An apology advanced by the Editor is that Prussia and Germany had signed the neutrality treaty of Belgium, the present German empire not then existing, and Germany need not respect the treaty "under conditions so obviously changed." Prince Bismarck in 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, "confirming his verbal assurance gave in writing a declaration which he said *was superfluous in reference to the treaty in existence*—that the German confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium." Bismarck here speaks not of Prussia but of the German confederation, representing the German empire of to-day. The present conditions appear closely parallel to those of 1870, and it was for such an event as a Franco-German war that the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a safeguard. The Editor considers an important

<sup>22</sup> O. C., pp. 601-2.

change in the conditions was created by "the suspicion,"<sup>33</sup> the "probability" of a Franco-Belgian *entente*. "Suspicion" in the German mind is not sufficient to justify such a breach of international law. No serious evidence is advanced of a Franco-Belgian *entente*, while, on the other hand, we have the French government's assurance that it would respect the neutrality of Belgium in answer to Sir Edward Grey's inquiry:

"The French government is resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other power violating that neutrality, that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defense of her security, to act otherwise. The president of the republic spoke of it to the king of the Belgians, and the French minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian minister of foreign affairs to-day."<sup>34</sup> France could have no object in alienating the sympathies of England by violating Belgian neutrality, and Belgium on her side (August 1) intended to maintain her neutrality to the utmost of her power.<sup>35</sup> On August 3<sup>36</sup> she even refused the five French army corps offered her through the French military attaché for protecting her neutrality against the Germans, and did not "propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers."

In face of these facts we must discount unsupported stories such as that French officers were present prior to the declaration of war, in Liège, that "Lord Kitchener was in Belgium two weeks before the war began,"<sup>37</sup> if the letter of the staff correspondent of the *New York Evening Post* in London is to be accepted. The presence of English and French officers in Belgium before the Germans invaded that country has been officially denied by the Belgian government. Assuming that England and France planned how they would act if Germany did precisely what she has done, "to say that it was a violation of neutrality for England and France to plan an advance how, if necessary, they would perform the duties put upon them by the treaty establishing Belgian neutrality is to insult the intelligence."<sup>38</sup> A German plan of campaign against the United States of America has recently been published, which has not yet caused that country to attack Germany on suspicion of hostile intentions.

<sup>33</sup> "We do not know all the secret occurrences of European politics, but the *probability* is that the Belgians had agreed to allow the French to march through Belgium. . . . *Mere suspicion* of a Franco-Belgian *entente* is sufficient to attack France through the Belgian frontier." *O. C.*, p. 602. The italics here used for emphasis were not in the original.

<sup>34</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, pp. 93-94.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>37</sup> *O. C.*, pp. 602 and 603.

<sup>38</sup> *The Nation* (New York), October 29, 1914.

The argument that it was "preferable to the Germans to anticipate the French move and take Belgium first" errs like the German manifesto "To the Civilized World" in assuming an unproved and improbable French violation of Belgian neutrality. But even granted that this contention were true, what does it amount to? That Germany hurried to violate a law before some one else could do so; and "if anybody was going to murder Belgian neutrality she was going to be first at the job."

"A stray notice in the *North German Gazette*," "later reports," "a newspaper clipping" from a German paper, cannot be considered serious evidence. Information supplied from these doubtful sources is on its face doubtful. The statement<sup>39</sup> that large deposits of ammunition were stored by England in the fortress of Maubeuge before the continental war, is officially denied. The giving of wide publicity to absurd stories such as the "later reports" that "some Russian officers had adopted the custom of carrying on their persons the fingers of their slain enemies, both male and female" is to be deprecated. Stories of atrocities are circulated by all the combatant nations without exception; and it is impossible to accept any without a careful preliminary investigation.

The Editor quotes from the *Independent* (September 21, 1914): "On August 1 the British Ambassador was asked a second time whether England would remain neutral in case Germany respected the integrity of France and also her colonies. Here England again said she must be free to act." This correctly summarizes Sir Edward Grey's earlier communication (July 30) in which a similar proposal<sup>40</sup> is declared unacceptable. "For France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power and become subordinate to German policy."<sup>41</sup>

It is difficult to see where the Editor has gained "psychological insight into the manner in which the Russian minister induced Sir Edward Grey to join the French-Russian alliance. The English had supported Serbia in diplomacy, and the Russians hinted that after all the English would not be credited with making good by joining the fight,<sup>42</sup> and it seems that the Russian suggestion helped to bring the English into line."<sup>43</sup> The suggestion that England

<sup>39</sup> Published in *Gil Blas*, February 25, 1913.

<sup>40</sup> Except that in this case the French colonies were not safeguarded.

<sup>41</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 55.

<sup>42</sup> For the discussion of England's attitude during the Schleswig-Holstein complication (*O. C.*, p. 604) see below section on the "Foes of Germany."

<sup>43</sup> *O. C.*, p. 604.

acted from mere pique is naive and unsupported. The facts are that on July 24 and 25 M. Sazonoff, the Russian minister for foreign affairs, pressed Great Britain to make a declaration of solidarity with Russia and France, adding that "unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count on your neutrality." On July 29, Sir Edward Grey outlined to Sir F. Bertie, British ambassador at Paris, a conversation with the French ambassador in London, in which he says clearly in what circumstances England would not intervene,<sup>44</sup> i. e., not in a dispute between Austria and Servia, nor in a dispute between Russia, Servia and Austria. Even if "Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider."<sup>45</sup> We see Sir Edward Grey moved by English interests and obligations.

#### THE ENGLISH POINT OF VIEW.

There has been a commercial conflict between England and Germany,<sup>46</sup> two great manufacturing countries; just as there has been a struggle for markets between England and America. But the latter struggle has not led to war, and the relations between the two countries have never been better. Commercial rivalry is not, therefore, the only cause of our recent alienation from Germany; but, as the Editor rightly points out, "propaganda." But while he draws attention to the anti-German propaganda in England (relatively small) he omits to refer to the enormous and influential anti-English propaganda in Germany. The Editor points to an article in the *Saturday Review*, September 11, 1897,<sup>47</sup> as the first expression of anti-German policy in England, but the violently anti-English utterances of Treitschke date as early as 1874. Later, the German professor Karl Lamprecht seized upon the Boer war to demonstrate to Holland that England is the enemy; and Bernhardi is also anti-English. Now while in Germany the feeling against England has raised in the past a crop of aggressive professors, lectures and books, in England the feeling against Germany did not lead to dreams of conquest but to fear of invasion; of the "German peril." Instead of *Germany and the Next War*, we had *The Englishman's Home*. Even to-day, in the midst of war, the English press references to Germany are temperate when compared with German references to England.

<sup>44</sup> *G. B., and the E. C.*, pp. 9, 16.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>46</sup> *O. C.*, p. 607.

<sup>47</sup> Reprinted in *O. C.*, pp. 577-579. There is, however, no reason to suppose with the Editor that the article was "inspired by the British government" (*O. C.*, p. 607).

A third factor in the creation of national hostility was the matter of armaments, especially the navy. The English case for a predominant navy is England's insular position, which renders her liable to starvation directly she loses command of the sea; the immensely larger size of her mercantile marine, which needs protection; her colonies, and the fact that she maintains but a small army. In the competition in armaments it is worth noting that on the eve of the Hague conference of 1888, Mr. Goschen announced that if the other naval powers should be prepared to diminish their programs of ship-building, we should be prepared on our side to meet such a procedure by modifying ours; the German government replied, by Colonel von Schwarzhoff, their delegate at the conference, with a scornful speech. At the second Hague conference in 1907, the British proposal to consider a concerted arrest of armaments was politely shelved, the German delegate, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein refusing to discuss it. The question of total disarmament has not been raised, and we cannot tell whether she would "abolish her militarism if her neighbors, the French and the Russians, would disarm, and if the English would sell their navy as old iron,"<sup>48</sup> but she has certainly refused on several occasions the invitation to slacken competition in armaments.

#### THE GERMAN CAUSE.

There is very little to discuss in this section, in which patriotic poems are quoted. In the concluding paragraph, however, a list is given of indefensible and partly-defensible English wars,<sup>49</sup> such as the Opium war in China, and the Boer war of the Transvaal.<sup>50</sup> All nations, unfortunately, have some blots in their accounts, but especially Prussia, from the day of Frederick the Great's brazen theft of Silesia to the cold-blooded quarrel with Austria in 1866 and the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 which was contrived by Bismarck down to its precipitation by the falsified Ems telegram.<sup>51</sup>

#### THE FOES OF GERMANY.

An accusation is made against England of stirring others to

<sup>48</sup> *O. C.*, p. 608.

<sup>49</sup> *O. C.*, pp. 612-613.

<sup>50</sup> "Was the Boer War undertaken for the protection of English homes and English liberty?" asks the Editor (p. 613). Certainly it was, though the English liberty and English homes were in the Transvaal. The fact that it was a foreign government that interfered with their rights did not minimize the responsibility of England.

<sup>51</sup> In October, 1892, Bismarck said to Harden: "It is so easy for one who has some practice, without falsification merely by omissions, to change the sense. As the Editor of the Ems despatch. . . I should know. The King sent

war and keeping out of it herself,<sup>52</sup> "making other nations carry on wars intended for her benefit."<sup>53</sup> As an illustration of the first policy the attitude of England during the Schleswig-Holstein complication is quoted as follows:

"In 1864 England encouraged Denmark to resist Prussia and Austria on account of Schleswig-Holstein, and the Danes relying on English assurances, refused any compromise, the result being that they lost their duchies. A Danish friend of mine expressed himself very vigorously in condemning British statecraft, saying that the warfare of Prussia was square and honest, but the attitude of England was unpardonable."

Though some of England's diplomacy in the past has been both weak and blundering, her action in this affair compares favorably with Germany's. The succession to the duchies received international sanction by the protocol of London (May 8, 1852), signed by the five great powers and Norway and Sweden. In 1863, Frederick, Duke of Augustenburg, son of the prince who in 1852 had renounced the succession to the duchies, next claimed his right on the ground that he had no share in the renunciation, and assumed the government under the style of Duke Frederick VIII. With "this folly," as Bismarck termed it, Austria and Prussia would have nothing to do. It was clear that they, as signatories to the 1852 protocol must uphold the succession as fixed by it, and that any action they might take in consequence of the violation of that compact by Denmark must be so "correct" as to deprive Europe of all excuse for interference. "From the beginning," Bismarck admitted later, "I kept annexation steadily before my eyes."<sup>54</sup> On December 28, a motion was introduced in the Diet by Austria and Prussia calling on the confederation to occupy Schleswig as a pledge for the observance by Denmark of the compacts of 1852. This was rejected by the Diet, and Austria and Prussia thereon decided to act in the matter as independent European powers (January, 1864). "Had<sup>55</sup> the Danes yielded to the necessities of the situation, and withdrawn from Schleswig under protest, the European powers would probably have restored Schleswig to the Danish crown, and Austria and Prussia as European powers would

it me with the order to publish it either completely, or in part. After I had summarized it by deletions, Moltke who was with me exclaimed: "*Vorhin was eine Chamade jetzt ist eine Fanfare.*" *Zukunft*, October 29, 1892, p. 204; and December 3, 1892, p. 435.

<sup>52</sup> *O. C.*, p. 604.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 613.

<sup>54</sup> *Reflections*, Vol. II., p. 10.

<sup>55</sup> I quote here the resumé of the question in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Schleswig-Holstein Question," 11th edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 329.

have no choice but to prevent any attempt upon it by the Duke of Holstein. To prevent this possibility, Bismarck made the Copenhagen government believe that Great Britain had threatened Prussia with intervention should hostilities be opened, though (he admitted) as a matter of fact England did nothing of the kind. The cynical strategem succeeded; Denmark remained defiant, and the Prussian and Austrian forces crossed the Eider." This explains the fact that Denmark is in favor of England to-day, and anti-German in its sympathies.

There is no evidence that England used Japan for the purpose of humiliating Russia.<sup>56</sup> The talk of inveterate enmity between England and Russia is by no means justified. The *entente* with Russia is an indication that English and Russian policies were not irreconcilable. As to national sympathies, England is quick to appreciate the qualities of that "profound and humane people."

The Editor describes the French as theatrical and vain, unsteady and lacking "the serious insistency of their Teutonic neighbors,"<sup>57</sup> and dominated by the idea of "revenge." "The French are blinded by their vanity, their vaingloriousness, their narrow-minded hope for revenge. Like big children they became an easy prey to the British king who ensnared them to fight the battles of Albion." The Editor's French type reminds one of the comic Frenchman of fiction. But how are we to explain the fact that the German army has moved backward from the Marne, and has vainly attempted to break through the lines of their vain, decadent and vainglorious enemy? The French idea of revenge is circulated by Germany, but little has been heard of it in France in recent years. There is evidence that French statesmen looked on war with Germany as one of the greatest evils that could befall a nation, and the events of 1905 and 1911 are a proof that she was prepared to pay a price to avert the ill-will of Germany. As French statesmen speak of the launching of five threats of war against them by Germany since 1870—the first in 1875 when Moltke wished to bleed France white, the fifth in 1911—it is hardly to be expected that the French should have adopted the point of view that "the real interest of France would naturally lie in an alliance with Germany. . . . this has often been recognized by Germans, but the French are blinded by vanity and their narrow-minded hope for revenge."<sup>58</sup>

The war has come; the French who know their history no doubt remember the war of 1870-71. Of this war in which Napoleon III was a mere puppet in Bismarck's hands, the Editor writes,

<sup>56</sup> *O. C.*, p. 613.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 613-615.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 616.

“Was not the cause of the war the unjustifiable demand that the king of Prussia should humiliate himself before the French emperor? He should beg pardon for a Hohenzollern prince of an entirely different line because the Spaniards had offered to the latter the crown of Spain.”<sup>59</sup> Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was advised by Bismarck to “abandon all scruples and accept the candidature in the interests of Germany,” and as “a red rag to the Gallic bull.” Prince Bismarck worked the German press to inflame opinions against France. On the evening of July 8, the French ambassador Benedetti reached Ems under instructions to ask King Wilhelm to secure the withdrawal of Prince Leopold. The King wrote privately to Sigmaringen; on the 10th, Prince Karl Anton, father of Prince Leopold, said it was too late to draw back, but on the 12th, Prince Leopold actually withdrew, and the news was published in the *Kölnische Zeitung*. Benedetti received orders to demand an undertaking from King Wilhelm that the candidature would never be renewed. The old king refused but added that he had no hidden designs, and had reason to hope the question was closed. The German ambassador in Paris sent to Ems for approval a draft note stating that the king of Prussia had meant no offense to France. Though irritated, the king sent an aide-de-camp to Benedetti to report that he had received the official withdrawal from Sigmaringen and approved of it. The aide-de-camp added that Benedetti might come to the station at Ems to salute His Majesty on his departure for Coblenz. As Benedetti bore witness at Ems “there was neither insulter nor insulted.” Bismarck, as is well known, falsified the telegram summarizing the conversation with Benedetti; and this “news” made public rendered the continuance of peace impossible. This was not an affair in which French diplomacy shone, but what of the Prussian?

With regard to the conditions of peace after the French defeat, the Editor writes that the surrender of Alsace and a small piece of Lorraine was demanded for rounding off the lines of Germany’s defense, and “incidentally it was remembered that the people of Alsace were Germans, that Alsace had belonged to the German empire, and its people even in the year 1871 were still speaking German,”<sup>60</sup> therefore the French should not resent this settlement.

This account avoids the cruelty of the annexation of these provinces by Germany. Though largely German in speech and race their inhabitants were for the most part passionately attached to France. In accordance with the Treaty of Frankfort the in-

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 615.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 616.



habitants were allowed to choose between French and German nationality, but all who chose the former had to leave their country. Some 50,000 did so before October 1872 and settled in France. Even after this exodus, when in 1874 the provinces were enabled to elect members for the Reichstag, they sent fifteen deputies who delivered a formal protest against the annexation and retired from the House, they formed no party and took little part in the proceedings except on important occasions to vote against the government. Gortchakoff gave warning that the annexation would leave a wound that would long be a menace to Europe, while Bismarck is reported to have said "one does not mutilate with impunity. To take Metz and a part of Lorraine was the worst of political blunders." It will be seen from this account of the feelings of the two provinces, that the cases imagined by the Editor, of England clamoring for revenge because the United States were once English colonies, and Spain clamoring to regain Gibraltar, are not parallel.

It is difficult to see why the English alliance with Japan (which has for some time been recognized by the powers as a civilized power), is condemned<sup>61</sup> by the Editor, while Germany's alliance with the oriental and unspeakable Turk is welcomed with enthusiasm at Berlin. To the German mind Japanese intervention is cowardly, the Turkish glorious.

#### JAPAN.

The action of Japan has been so correct that no reasonable American paper shows a trace of Mr. Randolph William Hearst's notorious scare on this subject<sup>62</sup> in the *Chicago American*. The conclusion is so grotesque that it needs no comment or refutation. "The attitude of Japan and her procedure against Germany is a warning. Might we (i. e., America) not overnight have a war on hand on account of the secret treaties between Japan, England and Russia in which Mexico and the South American republics would join just for the fun?"

#### ANTI-MACCHIAVELLI.

The Editor quotes a few clauses from the testament of Peter the Great, who ruled from 1689 to 1725, "to show our readers what it means to support Russia and how little any one can rely on Russian faith."<sup>63</sup> The dates alone make this contention pre-

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 618.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 618-619.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 620.

carious; one could as soon attribute to M. Poincaré the ruling ideas of Louis XIV, or to King George V the methods and aims of James II. To counterbalance Peter the Great's "testament" the Editor draws attention to Frederick the Great's *Anti-Macchiavelli*,<sup>64</sup> issued by Voltaire at the Hague in 1740, and containing not Frederick's own ideas but a reflection of the generous French philosophy of the eighteenth century respecting the duty of sovereigns, which may be summed up in the sentence: "The prince is not the absolute master but only the first servant of the people." It is however worthy of note that the great Frederick who joined in the partition of Poland was no believer in honesty in politics. Of statecraft popularly called Macchiavellian I have found the most remarkable expressions in German authors such as Bernhardt, who in speaking of Germany's future<sup>65</sup> war with France, says "As soon as we are ready to fight, our statesmen must so shuffle the cards that France shall appear to be the aggressor,"<sup>66</sup>—a sentence that might have been written by the ingenious author of *Il Principe*.

#### MODERN WARFARE.

This section attempts the defense of the German army by stating: (1) that German "atrocities" in Belgium did not take place; (2) that the Belgians committed atrocities against Germans. With regard to the first contention it may be pointed out that the only official inquiry, the Belgian, produces a vast mass of evidence from sufferers and eye-witnesses; while the round robin of the five American reporters<sup>67</sup> only comes to this, that these five gentlemen, after spending two weeks with, and accompanying the troops upward of one hundred miles, were "unable to report a single instance unprovoked." This is quite possible with regard to the districts seen by them, but obviously does not cover the whole country of Belgium. The German official statement that "the only means of preventing surprise attacks from the civil population has been to interfere with unrelenting severity, and to create examples which by their frightfulness would be a warning to the whole country" seems by its wording to allow for atrocious treatment of the civil population.

The destruction of Louvain, whether the civil population fired upon the Germans or no, has shocked all neutral countries. The Editor gives the German official report<sup>68</sup> (published in Berlin,

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 621.

<sup>65</sup> *Germany and the Next War*, published in 1911.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 280.

<sup>67</sup> Quoted in O. C., p. 620.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 632-633.

August 20), as disposing of "all the Belgian fables," while he describes the Belgian account as improbable and lacking verification.<sup>69</sup> The utmost that could be said is that the two accounts are inconsistent; and neither side gives "verification." It cannot be said that the German version disposes of the Belgian, any more than that the Belgian disposes of the German, as far as evidence is concerned, though one may have a clear idea as to which story is the more probable. It is not correct to say that "to reproach the Germans for burning Louvain is the more unfair as under the same circumstances every other army would have done the same";<sup>70</sup> as the English, French and Italian press has repudiated such measures. The execution of a certain number of Indian rebels as a definite punishment of the guilty cannot be compared with the German treatment of Louvain, Termonde and Aerschot, in which many innocent civilians, women and children perished. In the suggestion that Belgians have been guilty of "the most heinous crimes of battle-hyenas," and that many people have been captured who found a pastime in torturing German soldiers,<sup>71</sup> no proof is adduced; and as far as the evidence of hospitals is available the *Vorwärts*, investigating this question, found there was absolutely no foundation for these imaginary "atrocities."

The final "atrocities" charge made by the German emperor<sup>72</sup> to President Wilson, is that French and English troops make use of dum-dum bullets. Such accusations are easy to make, and no verification is attempted on the German side; that is, the German emperor merely states that "after the capture of the French fort of Longwy my troops found in that place thousands of dum-dum bullets which had been manufactured in special works by the French government. Such bullets were found not only on French killed and wounded soldiers but also on English troops." The German case was that the government supplied large quantities of these bullets, and the German legation in Berne invited all and sundry to go and see the dum-dum bullets in their possession which had, it was said, been taken from French and British soldiers. The *Journal de Genève* sent Herr Meyer von Stadelhofen, the well-known Swiss rifle champion, who also carefully scrutinized these bullets in the German legation. He reported:

"I noticed first that the transformation had been effected with the help of rudimentary tools, such as a file, a saw, or a

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 628. The Belgian account was issued to the British press on September 15 by the Press Bureau.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 628.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 634.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 634.

puncheon; secondly, that of these five bullets no two were cut in the same place, the mark of the instrument having been sometimes made nearer and sometimes farther from the nose of the bullet; thirdly, that the scooping-out was not done in the middle of the bullet; fourthly, that the metal had been recently worked, for the lead was still very bright."

His conclusions, therefore, are that obviously these bullets were not altered by mechanical means, and that they were not altered at the time or under the conditions referred to in the German note handed to him. To put it plainly, the statements of this note are not borne out by the examination of the bullets with which it was accompanied, while, to put it still more plainly, the famous dumdum bullets were made in Germany, or, at any rate turned into dumdum bullets there. Herr Meyer von Stadelhofen then asked whether the secretary of the Berlin foreign office had sent the German legation in Berne any medical evidence testifying to the use of dumdum ammunition, to which the answer was "No," an explanation being added, about which an army surgeon's opinion would be highly interesting, that "German doctors consider that it is virtually almost impossible to know whether a wound is or is not due to a dumdum bullet, owing to the fact that modern bullets have such a rotary movement that they often cause wounds similar to those produced by dumdum bullets, especially when they do not strike quite direct, as is frequently the case."<sup>73</sup>

Corroborative testimony directly controverting the use of dumdum bullets by the allies is that of Dr. Häberlin, a member of the Zürich medical association, who acted as a volunteer surgeon in various military hospitals in Arlen (Grand Duchy of Baden) and Ludwigsburg, and reported he never heard anything of a dumdum bullet wound. I have given prominence to these reports of neutrals, but the memorandum issued from the War Office, dated October 7, denies the use of dumdum bullets by English troops. There is, the report runs, clear evidence that Germany has not confined herself solely to the use of unobjectionable ammunition. Her troops both in Togoland and in France have been proved to have used bullets with a soft core and hard thin envelope, not entirely covering the core, which type of bullet is expanding and therefore expressly prohibited by The Hague Convention. Such bullets of no less than three types were found on the bodies of dead native soldiers serving with the German armed forces against British troops in Togoland in August, and on the persons of German European

<sup>73</sup> Quoted in the *Morning Post*, October 30, 1914.

and native armed troops captured by us in that colony. All the British wounded treated in the British hospitals during the operations in Togoland were wounded by soft-nosed bullets of large calibre, and the injuries which these projectiles inflicted, in marked contrast to those treated by the British medical staff amongst the German wounded, were extremely severe, bones being shattered and the tissue so extensively damaged that amputation had to be performed. The use of those bullets was the object of a written protest by the general officer commanding the British troops in Nigeria to the German acting governor of Togoland. Again, at Gundelu, in France, on September 19, 1914, soft-nosed bullets (i. e., those in which the lead core is exposed and protrudes at the nose) were found on the dead bodies of German soldiers of the *Landwehr*, and on the persons of soldiers of the *Landwehr* made prisoners of war by the British troops.

One of these bullets has reached the War Office. It is undoubtedly expanding, and directly prohibited by the Hague Convention.

#### MILITARISM.

In this section the Editor makes a useful distinction between two uses of the word militarism.<sup>74</sup> With the training of a large proportion of the citizens of military age for military service, which is the practice of nearly every country in Europe, few English critics find fault; though hitherto England, standing outside the European system, has contented herself with a small professional army. The French are also "the French nation in arms."<sup>75</sup> The militarism that is condemned by England and France is not only "the disease of militarism contracted by some members of the officers' corps at Zabern,"<sup>76</sup> but the political condition characterized by the predominance of the military class and its armed doctrine. It was against this subordination to armed doctrine that Theodor Mommsen warned his constituents at Halle: "Have a care, gentlemen, lest in this state which has been at once a power in arms and

<sup>74</sup> *O. C.*, p. 636. Militarism, according to the *New English Dictionary*, is "the spirit and tendencies characteristic of the professional soldier, . . . the political condition characterized by the predominance of the military class in government and administration; the tendency to regard military efficiency as the paramount interest of the state."

<sup>75</sup> Before the war the French army, with 84 per cent of competent men called up, was even more "a nation in arms" than the German army with only 53 per cent of such men called up.

<sup>76</sup> *O. C.*, p. 636. It is hardly correct that militarism in this sense "has never been worse in Germany than in other countries."

a power in intelligence, the intelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure military state should remain."

#### GROWING MILITARISM.

Whether a peace party will make an end of armaments<sup>77</sup> in the future or whether militarists, the men who believe with Moltke that universal peace is "a dream and not a pleasant dream," is an academic question suitable for a debating society, and from its nature insoluble at the present moment. Other contentions in this section are that Germany has been converted from a friendly to an inimical nation, which has been dealt with already, and that in Germany warfare has developed into a science.<sup>78</sup> "The German army is a school in which German youths are training to be good soldiers and the German staff is also a school in which officers are instructed in strategy. There is not a Moltke to lead them, but Moltke's spirit guides them all. Should one of them die to-day, even if he occupy the highest rank, there are dozens who can take up his work." Strategy is not the monopoly of the German general staff; and the German operations on both fronts have hitherto shown small signs of serious strategy. In the west there was the occupation of Belgium and, while the way to Calais and Dunkirk lay open, the rush to Paris. Then the retreat from Paris, a defeat on the Marne; and—Calais is now the objective! In the east, an advance toward Warsaw and a strategic retreat with heavy losses. Some of the army's defects in war were foreseen by a critic of the manœuvres in 1911 when the military expert of the *Times*<sup>79</sup> gave warning that "the German army has seen less of modern war than any other which stands in the front rank. The contempt which it displays for the effects of modern fire, and professes to hold for armies of naval states with which it may come in conflict can only be set down to ignorance." But the end tries all, and it is not wise, as the Editor points out, to discredit the enemy.<sup>80</sup>

#### ILLUSTRATIONS.

At the close of my examination of the Editor's statement of

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 639-640.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 642.

<sup>79</sup> "There is nothing in the higher leading at the manœuvres of a distinguished character, and mistakes were committed which tended to shake the confidence of foreign spectators in the reputation of the command. . . . The German army, apart from its numbers, confidence in itself and high state of organization, does not present any signs of superiority over the best foreign models and in some ways does not rise above the second rate." *Times*, October 28, 1911.

<sup>80</sup> The cheerful brutality of Mr. Winston Churchill's speech at a recruiting meeting at Liverpool in which he used the following words: "If the German

Germany's case I wish to draw attention to some of the illustrations in the October number of *The Open Court*. As a pendant to the serious damage to Rheims cathedral the Editor gives a photograph of the Castle of Heidelberg, and the same juxtaposition of the two buildings has occurred to German purveyors of picture postcards. No one defends the ravage of the Palatinate in 1688, but as I have pointed out we do not draw our precedents from the reign of Louis XIV. With reference to the three views of Nuremberg, the Editor writes: "It is almost forgotten that according to newspaper reports, the first bombs were not dropped over Antwerp or France or England, but from French aeroplanes on this city of old German art." "Newspaper reports" (exclusively in German papers, by the way) are not sufficient evidence for this statement. It is inconsistent with the attitude of the French government, which withdrew the French army six miles from the frontier to prevent a collision before the outbreak of war<sup>81</sup> and later protested against German bomb-dropping upon and bombardment of unfortified towns.

#### ENGLAND'S BLOOD-GUILT IN THE WORLD WAR.

The Editor's contribution to the discussion of Germany's case is by far the largest and most considerable of the papers in the October number. But there remain two papers to be considered. That by Professor Burgess<sup>82</sup> reproduced from the *Springfield Republican* brings forward no point of importance, and its value may be gathered from the fact that he gives up a whole page to an account of a dinner at Wilhelmshöhe with the Emperor, including a list of the guests. Haeckel's contribution, "England's Blood Guilt in the World War," like the German appeal "To the Civilized World," is interesting as showing that German savants have not realized that assertion is not proof. We read:

"The parliament and press of the hostile Triple Entente, the English, French and Russian newspapers are endeavoring. . . to throw the whole blame upon Germany. . . . Emperor William II has, in the twenty-six years of his reign, done everything within his power to preserve for the German people the blessings of peace. . . . Similarly, the other two members of the Triple Alliance, Austria-Hungary and Italy, have ever endeavored to preserve the precious

navy does not come out and fight, they will be brought out like rats in a hole" (Quoted in *O. C.*, p. 641) is also to be deprecated.

<sup>81</sup> "The French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilometers, so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany." *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 69.

<sup>82</sup> *O. C.*, pp. 587-595.

blessing of peace and avoid European complications. *Rather does the whole responsibility for the outbreak of this world war fall on that mighty triple coalition the entente cordiale. . . .*

"In the splendid speech from the throne with which Emperor William II opened the German Reichstag on August 4 he *showed* the real causes that drove the enemies of our German empire to their insidious attack, envy of the prosperity of the dear fatherland," etc.<sup>83</sup>

The method is that of a Free Kirk minister dealing with the difficulties of belief in the existence of John the Baptist: He began: "Some people say John the Baptist did not exist. (Very solemnly) He *did!* Having disposed of that difficulty. . . ."

It is the spirit of the German appeal to the civilized world<sup>84</sup> with its many national trumpet-peals, each beginning "It is not true," sheer denial with no attempt at adducing evidence for the denial. The appeal might have originated in the Wolff bureau, not in the minds of savants. As the *Nation*<sup>85</sup> points out, "Nowhere is there any evidence of a desire to undertake an unbiased investigation of facts, logic is thrown to the winds, and we are treated to a flood of rhetoric and of unsupported statements. . . . It really seems as if some of the professors who have rushed into print to defend Germany's cause are doing it quite as much harm as the enemy." The appeal to the cultured world has destroyed the myth of German culture.

The rest of Haeckel's paper is notable only for a few misstatements—such as that "Russia in the beginning of August declared war on Germany and Austria,"<sup>86</sup> whereas Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia on July 31,<sup>87</sup> at a time when negotiations were still proceeding between Russia and Austria,<sup>88</sup> and that England aims at a world empire, "the annihilation of the independent German empire, the destruction of German life and works, the subjection of the German people to British domination,"<sup>89</sup> a dream worthy of a German mind. The conclusion has a very unlucky prophecy, also

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 581.

<sup>84</sup> This appeal was published by ninety-three German savants and artists. Among the signatures are Eucken, Haeckel, Freda, Humperdinck, Sudermann, Hauptmann, Lamprecht, Kaulbach, Dörpfeld.

<sup>85</sup> *The Nation* (New York), October 29, 1914.

<sup>86</sup> *O. C.*, p. 584.

<sup>87</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 66.

<sup>88</sup> On July 31, "the Austro-Hungarian ambassador declared the readiness of his government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia." *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>89</sup> *O. C.*, p. 585.



an outcome of German subjectivity, that Germany would find powerful allies among the nations that already bear England's unbearable yoke—Canada, India, Australia, Egypt and South Africa. Prophecy is of all controversial weapons the most dangerous.

#### TWELVE POINTS ASSURED.

The only important controversial points in the Editor's December article, "Lessons of the War," are summed up in the section "Twelve Points Assured," pp. 758-760. The Editor regards certain points as assured. Could he give any evidence that Russia "officially" supports a policy of assassination in Serbia (p. 758)? In the fourth paragraph he assumes that the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia is the result of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. We now know, thanks to Signor Giolitti's revelations to the Italian parliament, that the murder of the archduke and the indictment of Serbia's complicity, which figured so largely in the Austrian ultimatum, had little to do with the settled purpose of Austrian policy. In the middle of 1913 Signor Giolitti, then Italian prime minister, was informed by the Austro-Hungarian government that it contemplated immediate action against Serbia and reckoned on the support of Italy under the terms of the Triple Alliance. The Italian government replied that it could not regard the action indicated as constituting a *casus foederis*, which would never arise out of an aggressive act. This reply induced Austria-Hungary to postpone action. As the Austro-Hungarian policy was already set in 1913, it is absurd to speak of it as conditioned by the Sarajevo assassination in 1914. I have already dealt with further points such as the Belgian neutrality and Russian mobilization. In the case of Germany's "positive evidence that the Belgians had broken neutrality long before a German soldier set foot on Belgian soil," the English case is strengthened by Herr Dernburg's publication of the military convention between England and Belgium. The proposed help from England, it is definitely stated in this document, was only to be given *after Belgian neutrality had been violated*.