Inside the Migration State:
The Quest for Democratic Legitimacy

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
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TO JULINA

Contents

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[1]   This chapter is partly based on Lutz (2019b).

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[2] This chapter is partly based on Lutz (2019a).

[3] This chapter is partly based on Armingeon and Lutz (2019a).

[4] This chapter is partly based on Armingeon and Lutz (2019b).

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List of abbreviations

BDP	Conservative Democratic Party
CHES	Chapel Hill Expert Survey
CMP	Comparative Manifesto Project
CPDS	Comparative Political Data Set
CVP	Christian Democratic Party
DEMIG	Determinants of International Migration
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
FDP	Free Democrats Party
IMPIC	Immigration Policies in Comparison
MEI	Initiative against mass immigration
NZZ	Neue Zürcher Zeitung
RRPP	Radical-right populist party
SP	Social Democratic Party
SVP	Swiss People's Party
TSCS	Time-Series Cross-Section

Part I

Intro

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 The problem

"If an architect gives me a design that would result in the house falling down if I follow it, I can't carry out the job according to the plan"[1], diagnosed Philipp Müller, a leading Swiss politicians, after voters approved an anti-immigration initiative that conflicts with international agreements and as he believes would harm Switzerland's economic prosperity in the case of an implementation. The politician expressed his decision dilemma between the imperative of the popular will and the imperative of responsible decision-making to preserve the common welfare of citizens. This dilemma is part of a wider problematique in the migration policy-making of liberal democracies that guides this thesis.

Over the course of the last three decades, liberal democracies across the Western world became more strongly embedded into regional and global markets accompanied with international political institutions and legal obligations. This international interdependence makes countries structurally dependent on their continuous openness to immigration. The deeper economic integration and the growth of immigrant populations has affected mass politics of liberal democracies. Migration has become the most visible consequence of economic globalisation and at the same time the main reason for a political backlash against a more global world. While the international interdependence of states requires the transnational flow of goods, capital and labour, sovereign nation states traditionally strive to preserve sovereign control of their borders and perceive immigration a threat to

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[1] `http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/mass-immigration-initiative_how-an-issue-of-immigration-turned-into-one-of-unemployment/42756246`, retrieved 3.4.2019.

national identity and social cohesion. Accordingly, scholars have theorised that migration policies of liberal democracies face unavoidable tensions between inclusionary and exclusionary dynamics that are difficult to reconcile (Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001; Boswell, 2007; Joppke, 1998; Hampshire, 2013; Massey, 1999). The need of liberal democracies to be open and closed to immigration at the same time presents a 'liberal paradox' (Hollifield, 1992). This tension is inherent in liberal democracies due to its structural embeddedness into their institutional set-up. The capitalist economy demands the free flow of people across borders. Economic globalisation and political internationalisation have created mutual interdependence between states that reduces the policy space of national governments. According to Hollifield (2004, 903), Western democracies have become 'migration states' whose important state functions such as economic prosperity, power and stability are dependent on their willingness to accept migration. Economic globalisation and the increasing diversity of European societies made immigration to one of the most controversial political issues of our times. It is the representative democracy that provide the opportunities to mobilise anti-immigration sentiments and creates strong demands for electoral responsiveness to address the political challenges related to immigration. While powerful economic forces pressure states to accept immigration and constrain their policy choices, powerful political forces push for closure towards immigration and demand electoral responsiveness of governments. The dependency on unwanted immigration leaves a limited room to manoeuvre for discretionary policy choices. The conflicting policy imperatives of macro-structural needs and popular demands make it difficult for governments to ensure the democratic legitimacy of migration policies by being responsive to voters while following the requirements of international integration. The quest of national governments for democratic legitimacy in migration policy is the underlying problematique of this thesis.

1.2 Research question

The migration policies of liberal democracies are confronted with inherent contradictions and conflicting policy imperatives requiring them to be open and closed at the same time. The goal of this research is to examine the constrained migration policy choices and the government strategies to reconcile these competing pressures. The increasing interdependence of states brings about two

important implications for the democratic legitimacy of liberal democracies. While governments have a more limited room to manoeuvre due to macro-structural constraints, the domestic political conflict over the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants has intensified and increased voters' policy demands towards their governments. Mass politics on immigration is therefore characterised by increasing responsiveness demands and increasing responsibility needs. While the politicisation of immigration has increased demands for electoral responsiveness, immigration has been increasing over the last three decades and migration policies have become more liberal. Given the central role of responsiveness to democratic politics, this development seems puzzling. How did governing elites in Western Europe manage to continuously liberalise immigration against the increasing mobilisation of anti-immigration sentiments and domestic conflict? Despite that the idea of a 'liberal paradox' in migration policy became a common wisdom, we know surprisingly little about how governments deal with opposing policy imperatives in order to maintain their democratic legitimacy.

In a generic form, the study seeks to examine the political consequences of the trade-off constitutive for representative democracies: the tension between electoral responsiveness and government responsibility (Mair, 2009, 2013). The 'liberal paradox' pits responsive government against responsible government. How do governments shape migration policies in their aim to maintain democratic legitimacy? This thesis tackles this question with an analysis of the political choices of national governments in migration policy. The specific research question reads as follows: *How do liberal democracies respond to the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy between responsiveness demands and responsibility needs?* The research question focus on one particular response to the legitimacy challenge of representative democracy: the policy choices of national governments. Is it possible for government to pursue a migration policy that simultaneously promotes economic prosperity and gains popular support? Or is the liberal paradox a trap where the conflicting policy imperatives unavoidably undermine the democratic legitimacy of liberal democracies? The research question contains both a descriptive and an analytic part. The descriptive aspect is to establish the pattern of migration policy-making. The analytic aspect is to establish theoretical explanations of policy choices based on responsiveness demands and responsibility needs.

1.3 Outline of the argument

The main argument of this thesis provides a novel theoretical explanation of how national governments reconcile the tension between responsiveness and responsibility in migration policy.[2] The argument builds on a theory of democratic legitimacy. The point of departure for my argument is the assumption that governments must be responsive to voters and deliver effective policies in voters' interest in order to fulfil the conditions of democratic legitimacy (e.g. Mair, 2009; Scharpf, 1999). Governments aim to maintain their democratic legitimacy because they care strongly about staying in office by re-election. The premise of my argument is therefore that governments strive for the joint fulfilment of responsiveness and responsibility.

Given the fundamental tension between responsiveness and responsibility in migration policy as discussed above, I expect government's policy choices on migration to be strongly motivated by their aim to maintain democratic legitimacy. I argue that the policy choices of cross-pressured governments depends on the available room to manoeuvre in policy-making. I expect governments to resolve the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy with different policy-making modes in the external and internal dimension of migration policy. Migration policies are multi-faceted with the most established distinction between immigration and integration policy (Hammar, 1985; Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Money, 1999). The external policy of immigration has different policy attributes than the internal policy of integration. The structural dependence of modern migration state on immigration severely constrains governments in the external dimension and leaves them little choice than to accept immigration. The internal dimension on immigrant integration offers as a domestic policy area a larger policy space. The variation in the room to manoeuvre allows governments to provide for responsibility needs in immigration policy and address responsiveness demands in integration policy. This strategic combination allows governments to reconcile to resolve the conflict between responsiveness and responsibility, thereby maintaining their democratic legitimacy.

The argument of *external responsibility* and *internal responsiveness* understands governments as strategic actors that make policy choices that take external constraints into account while engaging in partisan politics. Governments prioritise responsibility in the external dimension and they prioritise responsiveness in the internal dimension. The argument rests on two different modes

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[2] In Chapter 3.2, I elaborate further on the argument and contrast it with the existing literature.

of policy-making: a logic of responsibility in immigration policy and a logic of responsiveness in integration policy. In a dynamic perspective, an increase in the tension between responsive and responsible government should result in increasingly different modes of policy-making in immigration and integration policy. Throughout the thesis, I demonstrate how this argument helps to understand the migration policy choices of national governments in Western Europe.

1.4 Relevance and contribution

This section outlines the broader relevance of the thesis and its contribution to the existing scholarship. I aim to introduce a series of innovations to the literature on migration politics and the research on policy trade-offs in times of globalisation. On a theoretical level, the thesis develops an integrative framework and offers a systematising of existing explanations of how governments attempt to escape the liberal paradox. I apply the ubiquitous idea of conflicting policy imperatives in migration policy to the analysis of government's policy choices on immigration and integration. My argument briefly introduced in the previous section borrows from and contributes to the scholarship on migration policies as well as the comparative politics literature on globalisation and democratic legitimacy. On an empirical level, the thesis conducts a comprehensive analysis of different explanations of trade-off choices in migration policy. For that purpose, I collect various original data such as a cabinet-based dataset of migration policy output, a population survey and media content database. Methodologically, the thesis makes a case for the use of cabinet-units for the analysis of government policies and introduces a dynamic perspective into the analysis of migration politics. A mixed method design tests the empirical implications of the thesis argument in a cross-country study and in a crucial case analysis.

This thesis contributes to the scholarship on migration policies that has surged over recent times. Scholars are continuously puzzled by the migration policies of Western democracies. While most voters clearly reject the idea of more immigration, it has become easier to immigrate and immigration populations have continuously grown. Various theoretical perspectives have sought to explain the contradictions of migration policies and why states accept unwanted immigration. A political-economy approach seeks to explain migration policies by the capacity to organise different

socio-economic interests (Freeman, 1995; Freeman and Kessler, 2008), an institutionalist approach sees migration policies being shaped by political institutions such as courts and international regimes (Guiraudon, 2000b; Joppke, 1998; Soysal, 1994). An approach of domestic politics explains policies as the result of partisan conflict and electoral competition (Bale, 2008; Schain, 2008). These different perspectives are valuable to shed light on selective aspects of migration policy-making but their particularistic focus on either interests, institutions or ideology does not offer an encompassing perspective on how states deal with trade-off choices and handle conflicting policy imperatives. Despite the ubiquitous idea that liberal democracies face conflicting pressures in migration policy-making, there exists scarce theoretical approaches that help to understand *how* governments manage trade-offs in their migration policy choices. This thesis aims to fill this gap with an integrative approach embedded in the perspective of democratic legitimacy. Instead of isolating specific explanatory factors of migration policy choices, I ask how governments reconcile conflicting political pressures in their policy-making. While comparative studies on migration policies surged in recent years, they are mostly static in nature and focus on one country or one specific policy. This thesis conducts a comprehensive analysis of migration policy-making by taking the multi-faceted nature of migration policies into account and applying a dynamic perspective on migration policy-making.

The literature on globalisation and its effect on mass politics is another strand of literature where this thesis aims to make a contribution. This literature provides important insights into how mass politics in liberal democracies is affected by constraints resulting from international interdependence of countries (Ezrow and Hellwig, 2014; Hellwig, 2014; Le Gall, 2017). It has however focused primarily on the dimensions of trade and welfare policies and neglected the issue of international migration (Peters, 2015). Moreover, globalisation scholars often consider immigration to be a domestic policy issue (e.g. Hellwig, 2014). The influential contributions linking globalisation constraints to migration policy do not analyse the policy-making itself but focus on states' capacity to control migration (e.g. Bhagwati, 1998; Sassen, 1996). The issue of migration is a case in point for the more general trade-off between international integration and democratic sovereignty the globalisation literature speaks to (e.g. Rodrik, 2011). International migration as an important dimension of globalisation can enhance our understanding how globalisation affects mass politics. In particular because the trans-border flows of people touch on the core of state sovereignty and the concept

of national identity. The thesis contributes to the scholarship on how globalisation affects mass politics by analysing policy-making in an area that faces both strong international integration and intense political conflict. Migration policy with its international and domestic dimension provides an ideal study object to assess the globalisation effects on the policy-making of national governments.

As a third dimension, the thesis relates to the scholarship on democratic legitimacy. Political scientists have become increasingly concerned with the 'crisis of democracy' in times of globalisation and populism. Some scholars fear a deepening of the democracy crisis because governments are increasingly constrained by international obligations and thereby unable to respond to the demands of voters (Mair, 2009, 2013). Others, see the raise of populism as a healthy corrective that restructures democratic representation (Kriesi, 2014). Previous studies address the issue of democratic legitimacy either in general terms or focus on socio-economic policies and the role of fiscal constraints (e.g. Bardi et al., 2014). I contribute to this literature by studying immigration as a paradigmatic case of contemporary challenges to democratic legitimacy. Various scholars have argued that migration policy is a policy field that suffers from a systematic democratic deficit (e.g. Freeman et al., 2013). Migration policies do not only often miss their objectives (Hollifield et al., 2014) but also do not represent the preferences of voters (Beck and Camarota, 2003). In other words, migration policies do often not fulfil the expectations of the democratic public. The divergence of migration policies and public opinion reduces citizens' satisfaction with democracy (McLaren, 2017; Stecker and Tausendpfund, 2016). Migration is therefore a most likely case for a legitimacy conflict in times of globalisation. The broader significance of the problem at hand is the risk to undermine the normative foundation of liberal democracies. The thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of policy-making on the issue of immigration in times of globalisation. At the same time, migration policy serves as a window for exploring how governments deal with legitimacy trade-offs in their policy-making.

1.5   Plan of the thesis

Following this introduction, I present in Part II the conceptual and theoretical framework to explain migration policy choices of national governments in West European democracies. Chapter 2 outlines the conceptual framework of the thesis. First, I discuss the fundamental tension between responsive governance and responsible governance as the two sources of democratic legitimacy (Section 2.1). I then apply this framework to migration policy choices in liberal democracies (Section 2.2). The framework of democratic legitimacy conceptualises migration policy choices as the result of competing policy imperatives.

The theoretical part builds upon the conceptual framework in order to theorise about government's trade-off choices in migration policy. Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework of the thesis. The Chapter begins with a discussion of existing theoretical approaches to trade-off choices in migration policy (Section 3.1). I systematise the literature into three types of explanation of government strategies to reconcile responsiveness and responsibility. I then elaborate on the shortcomings of these approaches and introduce my novel argument that governments make trade-off choices in migration policy by combining external responsibility and internal responsiveness (Section 3.2). Chapter 4 develops a series of theoretical expectations based on observable implications of thesis argument. These guiding hypotheses structure the empirical part of the thesis.

The empirical part of the thesis is based on a research design that combines a variable-oriented approach of a large-N comparative study and case-oriented approach on a crucial case of a legitimacy trade-off. Each part of the analysis tests empirical implications of the main argument. The strategy of maximising the number of empirical implications of the argument helps to increase confidence into the evidence. Each empirical chapter is furthermore accompanied with a section on robustness tests and the assessment of alternative explanations.

Part III of the thesis examines the migration policy choices of national governments in 18 West European countries between 1980 and 2014. The analysis is based on a novel dataset of policy changes on immigration and integration. The empirical part starts with a chapter on the research design followed by four empirical chapters. Chapter 5 discusses the conceptualisation of migration policy choices as the phenomenon of interest. There, I also introduce the corresponding operational-

isation and present descriptive statistics based on the policy dataset. The chapter concludes with an outline of the methodological approach. Chapter 6 analyses the determinants of governments' migration policy choices. I explain the variation of policy activity and directional change across cabinets with regard to responsibility needs and responsiveness demands. Chapter 7 assesses the temporal dynamics of migration policy choices and how the role of partisanship evolved over time. In this chapter, I examine how the transformations of globalisation and politicisation shape government's migration policy choices. Chapter 8 examines the policy success of radical-right populist parties that advocate for more restrictive migration policies. I analyse the direct and indirect influence of these parties on migration policies in order to further examine how responsiveness demands shape governments' policy choices. Chapter 9 explores the link between parties' electoral manifestos and their policy outputs as governors. With this analysis I directly assess the responsiveness of governments and test the mechanism behind the empirical pattern revealed in the preceding chapters.

Part IV conducts a case study on the implementation of the popular initiative 'against mass immigration' in Switzerland from 2014 to 2017. This is a crucial case where responsiveness and responsibility created a decision dilemma for the political elite of the country. The case study allows for the detailed assessment of the argument on the level of political actors. Finally, the effectiveness of the government strategy in maintaining democratic legitimacy is evaluated by the response of citizens towards non-responsiveness in immigration policy. The analysis is based on an original media content dataset as well as various population surveys.

The thesis concludes in Part V with a synthesis of the various results (Chapter 13) and the discussion of the empirical findings in the context of the research question (Chapter 14). Finally, I draw a series of conclusions in Chapter 15 based on theoretical and practical implications of this study.

Part II

Theory

Chapter 2

Conceptual framework

2.1 Democratic legitimacy as responsiveness and responsibility

The conceptual framework of this thesis is a perspective of democratic legitimacy on policy choices in liberal democracies.[1] A main purpose of democratic polities is to achieve legitimacy for political rule. Democratic legitimacy generally describes the compatibility of political actions and practices with public expectations and preferences (cf. Boswell, 2007, 88). As such, legitimacy is understood as a prerequisite for the functioning of democratic governments. Following the influential conceptualisation of Birch (1964), I follow the premise that a legitimate democratic government combines two essential functions: responsiveness and responsibility.[2] A government is responsive if it responds to the demands of its citizens and implements policies that reflect the preferences of its voters. A government is responsible when it adopts policies that it believes will provide effective solutions to common problems and will be in the general interest of its citizens.

Representative democracy is the constant quest for legitimacy, and it requires political elites that are both responsive to voters and responsible for government affairs (Birch, 1964; Mair, 2009; Offe, 1984; Scharpf, 1999). Citizen participation and effective policy-making are in constant tension and are central themes in the literature on representative democracy (see Bardi et al., 2014, for a more recent overview). According to Dahl (1994, 21), the dilemma of democracy is 'the ability of citizens to exercise democratic control over the decisions of the polity versus the capacity of the

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[1] The legitimacy of migration policy is understood in terms of the democratic process (input and output) and in reference to the democratic constituents and not as a purely normative consideration, such as whether states should or should not restrict immigration.

[2] In the original, Birch (1964) uses the terminology of representative government instead of responsive government.

system to respond satisfactorily to the collective preferences of its citizens'. Representing popular preferences and exercising of government responsibility in the general interest of citizens is also the *raison d'être* for political parties (Dalton et al., 2011; Sartori, 1976, 28). Political parties function so as to aggregate, voice and bundle voter preferences and they take binding political decisions to solve problems (cf. Mair, 2009; Scharpf, 1999). Governments and political parties therefore have a double nature in a representative democracy: they are representatives and governors at the same time. They express and represent the demands of the citizens and they compete in elections to hold government office. It is possible to assess the legitimacy of their political choices from two different perspectives: the process of democratic input and the quality of the outputs that they produce.

Different concepts and definitions describe this double function of representative democracy and the two-sided condition for democratic legitimacy. For that reason, I will elaborate on the thesis' definition of responsiveness and responsibility. The function of responsiveness can be identified as the tendency of political parties and governments to listen to citizens and respond sympathetically to their (short-term) demands (Bardi et al., 2014, 237). Parties act as representatives that give voice to citizens by making their preferences and perspectives present in the policy making process (Pitkin, 1967, 8). Scholars differentiate between a static and dynamic conceptualisation of responsiveness and whether it refers to the electorate as a whole or only to party supporters (Karremans, 2017). Sartori (1976) and Mair (2009) apply responsiveness to the degree to which a party represents its specific constituents, therefore only a part of the citizenry. Fritz Scharpf (1999)'s concept of input legitimacy refers to the citizenry as a whole. Their common idea of responsiveness is the degree to which political parties act as the democratic representatives of voters and their demands. In the perspective of responsiveness, governments are the delegates of voters that provide parties the mandate to govern based on their political programme (Caramani, 2017). While the normative theory of representative democracy considers it desirable that governments are responsive to the public, governing parties have a self-interest in pursuing policies that are in accordance with the demands of citizens: Taking unpopular decisions contains the substantial risk of losing electoral support. The main motivation for responsiveness stems from the democratic accountability of

governing parties that strive for re-election (Arnold and Franklin, 2012; Birch, 1964; Mark, 2010; Downs, 1957; Miller and Stokes, 1963).[3]

The function of responsibility denotes the necessity for political parties and governments to take various government responsibilities into account, such as the long-term interests of their citizens, demands from external constituents such as international markets or international organisations, and the lasting commitments of previous governments (Bardi et al., 2014, 237). Political parties provide office holders and take the responsibility of governing (Mair, 2009). The political choices of responsible governments are legitimate by producing political outputs that promote the common welfare of the citizenry (Scharpf, 1999, 6). In Scharpf's view, common welfare includes important state functions, such as ensuring economic prosperity and security and preserving institutional norms and international credibility. Economic growth, the availability of jobs, proper standards of living and economic security are valence issues that every government aims for (Butler and Jokes, 1969). The concept of acting in the interest of the common good portrays governments as the trustees of citizens who are tasked with providing policy solutions that they think best serve citizens' common interests (Caramani, 2017; Pitkin, 1967). This sense of responsible government is associated with political leadership. According to the 'ethics of responsibility' by Max Weber (1980), political leadership means acting in an instrumentally rational manner and considering the consequences of policies and governors' constrained capacities. Governments face a series of constraints to their policy-making, even when they fully control the policy levers. The institutional and socio-economic context determines and limits the options in the policy-making process (Hall, 1986; Müller and Strom, 2000). Governments' capacity is conditioned by policy-specific constraints and by political institutions. When responsible governments make policy choices, they take constitutional and other legal constraints into account as well as the practical feasibility of new policies and the country's economic vulnerability due to international interdependence (e.g. Armingeon, 2013; Schmidt, 1996). A responsible government ensures democratic legitimacy through effective policy-making in the perceived common interest of citizens given the available options and constraints. Responsible policy choices are both realistic and collectively desirable. Acting responsibly is in the self-interest of governments that seek re-election since voters engage in retrospective voting and evaluate governments

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[3] A series of softer and non-instrumental factors motivating responsiveness are discussed in the literature such as the benefit of receiving citizen approval in the policy-making process or utilities associated with politicians' compliance with democratic norms and their satisfaction of being a good representative (Dovi, 2006).

based on their competence and performance (Caramani, 2017). Therefore, I expect governments in representative democracies to strive for democratic responsibility and to enact policies that they believe will further the common good of their citizens.

The premise of the thesis' conceptual framework is that the concepts of responsiveness and responsibility are the two necessary sources of democratic legitimacy and serve as policy imperatives for governments. Voters hold their representatives accountable for whether or not they are responsive to their demands and produce policy outcomes that are in their interest. Political parties in government want to be re-elected and they must therefore be responsive to voters' preferences and govern responsibly in the general interest. In the words of Pitkin's classical definition of political representation governments should act 'in the interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them' (Pitkin, 1967, 209). Governments face legitimacy problems 'unless parties can represent as well as govern' (Katz and Mair, 2009, 760). Representation without governing is reduced to opinion polls, governing without representation is reduced to a technocratic rule (Sartori, 1976, 28). Unconditional responsiveness represents a populist style of government and unconditional responsibility represents a technocratic style of government (Caramani, 2017). For party governments neither option is feasible. The legitimacy of a party government rests on its joint fulfilment of both the representative and the governing function. Therefore, democratic governments are expected to strive for policy choices that combine responsiveness and responsibility and that allows them to maintain legitimacy by satisfying public expectations.[4]

While the early literature claims that there is harmony between responsiveness and responsibility (Birch, 1964), newer literature increasingly stresses the tension between the two (Mair, 2009, 2011). Preserving citizens' long-term interests may conflict with the short-term demands of voters. External constraints increase responsibility needs that may reduce the ability of governments to be responsive to voters and to implement their preferred policies. Most prominently, Peter Mair (2009, 2011, 2013) has argued that the tension between responsiveness and responsibility has grown in intensity over recent decades and has become potentially unbridgeable. This increasing tension largely stems from processes such as globalisation and Europeanisation – which make national governments

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[4] This is independent of whether we conceptualise parties as vote-seeking, office-seeking or policy-seeking (Strom and Müller, 1999). When governing parties are not responsible, they are not only likely to lose votes, but in consequence also the political influence to enter government office as well as policy-making capacities.

accountable to a growing number of external principles and mounting policy legacies, which reduce their opportunities for discretionary policies (e.g. Rodrik, 2011; Streeck and Schäfer, 2013). This means that once the process of deepening economic and political integration begins, the trade-off between responsiveness and responsibility increases. Peter Mair's ideas highlight the potential incompatibilities between (long-term) national interests and (short-term) democratic demands. In this perspective, governments may have greater difficulty reconciling the two dimensions of democratic legitimacy, and the gap between electoral responsiveness and government responsibility may widen. This resonates with Scharpf (1999), who argues that under the conditions of international economic integration governments can only justify their policies in terms of what they deliver and not in terms of what has been demanded by voters. Papadopoulos (2013) argues that international interdependence leads to increasing separation between the sphere of policy-making (in which governmental responsibility is important) and the sphere of politics (in which public responsiveness is valued). Contemporary democracies face challenges to their democratic legitimacy due to their struggle to combine responsiveness demands and responsibility needs.

The framework of democratic legitimacy outlined in this chapter serves as an analytical perspective on the contemporary challenges of liberal democracies with regard to international migration. It is built on the premise that government strive for both responsiveness and responsibility. Viewing migration policies through the perspective of democratic legitimacy yields important advantages. First, migration policy offers a study object that has pronounced tensions between these two legitimacy imperatives. Moreover, the concrete policy choices of governments are essentially the locus where the two functions of responsiveness and responsibility meet each other. Second, viewing migration policies in this perspective presents a concise framework for arranging a series of explanatory factors and their joint effects on government policies. Theoretical approaches that solely focus on interests, institutions or ideology risk obscuring strategic policy trade-offs, thereby neglecting how these factors interact with each other. The legitimacy framework allows for an inclusive perspective on how governments shape policies in response to conflicting political pressures. The democratic legitimacy framework directs the analytical attention to the main roles of parties and governments in representative democracy. For these reasons, the theoretical paradigm outlined in this chapter offers a comprehensive framework that sketches the challenges that international migration presents

to the foundational principles of representative democracy. This thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of legitimacy trade-offs in contemporary democracies in general and in policy-making on migration in particular.

2.2 The legitimacy trade-off in migration policy

This section applies the theoretical paradigm of democratic legitimacy to the area of migration policy. Over the last few decades, the regulation of migration has become a core task of governments and has grown its importance for the well-being of modern states (Castles et al., 2014; Hollifield, 2004). Controlling who enters under what conditions the national territory is a foundational prerogative of modern nation states and an important manifestation of state sovereignty. Immigration therefore touches one of the primary functions of nation states: defining who is a member of their societies and controlling entry and exit from their territories (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009). Defining the terms of membership and controlling the trans-border movements of people is strongly interwoven with the legitimacy of nation states. Migration is also a policy area where scholars have identified pronounced deficits in democratic legitimacy. One such deficit concerns the systematic gap between stated policy objectives and actual policy outcomes and therefore relates to the output-legitimacy of policies (Hollifield et al., 2014). The second deficit is based on the systematic gap between restrictive public opinion and liberal government policies and therefore concerns the input-legitimacy of policies (Beck and Camarota, 2003; Bonjour, 2011). Some scholars conclude that migration policies in liberal democracies are characterised by a permanent democratic deficit (Freeman et al., 2013, 2). These considerations reveal that migration policy is a case in point of a policy where governments experience difficulties maintaining democratic legitimacy and where the tension between responsibility and responsiveness is very likely to occur.

Following the framework of democratic legitimacy outlined above, governments face two policy imperatives: responding to citizens' preferences and demands and delivering policies that provide effective solutions that are in citizens' long-term interest. In the following, I apply this framework to the democratic legitimacy of migration policies and discuss the tension between responsive and responsible governance in migration policy-making.

The concept of responsiveness is generally identified with the role of representation and the input legitimacy of democracy. Governments are responsive if they respond to voter demands and the public's preferences. Opinion polls consistently show that European citizens are critical to immigration and tend to prefer more restrictive policies (see Ivarsflaten, 2005; McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Sides and Citrin, 2007a). Facchini and Mayda (2009, 8) conclude that "the existing cross-country evidence on migration preferences suggests that individuals are on average remarkably averse to more open migration policies". Rosenblum and Cornelius (2012, 246) state that "if there is a universal truth about immigration policy, it is that residents of industrialised states would prefer to see lower levels of immigration". Citizens express attitudes that are systematically more critical towards migration than those of political elites (Beck and Camarota, 2003; Teney and Helbling, 2014). The median voters in European democracies prefers less immigration over more immigration.

For a long time, migration policy theories believed that public opinion played a minor role in policy-making and that migration politics first and foremost took place behind closed doors, without public debate or electoral competition (Guiraudon, 1997; Guiraudon, 2000a; Messina, 1989, 10). Political parties built silent coalitions on migration policies to avoid politicisation (Perlmutter, 1996; Triadafilopoulous and Zaslove, 2006). This has changed over the last three decades as immigration issues have become an important part of party competition and public discourses more generally (Kriesi et al., 2008; Schain, 2008; van der Brug et al., 2015). The issue of immigration has become salient for both left-wing and right-wing parties across Western Europe (Alonso and da Fonseca, 2011). Radical-right populist parties that advocate for more restrictive migration policies successfully mobilise anti-immigration sentiments and have established themselves as a permanent feature of West European party systems (Mudde, 2013). The politicisation of immigration has ended elite consensus and the tacit implementation of migration policies. Migration has taken centre stage in political competition across Western Europe.

The process of politicisation signals a demand for policy change (Birkland, 1997). The higher salience of migration, in the sense of more intense public debates of the issue, the more difficult it is for governments to ignore the restrictive preferences of the median voter. As a result, liberalising migration policies may become a bigger electoral risk (Morales et al., 2015). Governments have more incentives to be responsive to public opinion when an issue is salient due to greater information about public preferences and larger electoral costs for shirking the public will (Burstein, 2003,

295; Page and Shapiro, 1983). The electoral success of radical-right populist parties pushes main-stream parties to take more restrictive stances on immigration (Davis, 2012). As a consequence, anti-immigration pressures have become a powerful motivator for governments across Western Europe (e.g. Schain, 2006; Howard, 2010). This pressure affects both left-wing and centre-right parties (Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018; Lahav, 2004b). The politicisation of the issue of immigration divides voters and parties along an emerging socio-cultural cleavage around globalisation and the openness to immigration (Kriesi et al., 2008, 2012). While the restrictive preferences of the median voter gained increasing weight in policy-making, the political conflict has been increasingly structured by polarised stances between the openness and closure of nation states. Empirical studies confirm that voters demand more responsiveness in migration policy with the intensification of globalisation (Hellwig, 2014, 90) and as a result of this increasing salience, governments are pressured to enact more restrictive migration policies (Givens and Luedtke, 2005). Demands for responsiveness stem from citizens' preferences and how they are mobilised politically. The structural transformation of political cleavages with its increasing politicisation of immigration has increased these demands.

The concept of responsibility is generally associated with the role of governing and the output legitimacy of democracy. It requires governments to preserve their capacity to govern and to deliver policies that are in the general interest of citizens. Responsible governments face constraints to their migration policy-making as a result of liberal democratic institutions and international obligations, as well as the requirements of the capitalist economy and international interdependence.

Neo-institutionalist theories highlight the role institutions play in shaping and constraining the policy choices of actors (Hall et al., 1996). This approach received considerable attention in the migration policy literature, particularly regarding the role of institutions that create 'liberal constraints' for migration policy-making (Hollifield, 1992, 94). Liberal-democratic institutions such as constitutional provisions, international treaties and human rights norms constrain the implementation of restrictive migration policies (Soysal, 1994; Joppke, 1998; Hollifield et al., 2014). Joppke (1998, 18) argues that courts are not only shielded from political pressures, they are also obliged to follow the rule of law and its principles of non-discrimination and universalism. In a similar vein, Guiraudon (2000b) argues that courts and bureaucracies have expanded immigrant' rights through the inclusionary logic of the law and the principles of the welfare state. National constitutions and

the international law guarantee the right to asylum and the right to family, which constitute two main channels of immigration. Liberal states have to be attentive to such civil and human rights. By violating these rights, liberal democracies risk undermining their institutional legitimacy (Hollifield, 1999). Therefore, liberal institutions are assumed to resist the restrictive tendencies of migration politics. The international interdependence of economies and societies goes hand-in-hand with political internationalisation and increasing international obligations. When governments sign treaties or enact policies, they create path dependencies that constrain future policy-making through their stickiness to change (Hansen, 2002, 279). At the international level, the European Union is an important source of 'liberal constraints' through the European Commission and the European Court (Bonjour et al., 2018).[5] EU member states are subject to treaty obligations such as free movement rights, which delegated migration regulation to labour markets and made transnational mobility a constitutive right of European citizens (Recchi, 2015). These 'liberal constraints' constitute an important source of responsibility needs, and they are liberal in two respects: First, they result from institutions and logics that are constitutive for liberal democracies, and second, they tend to protect migrants' rights and therefore support liberal migration policies.

The second set of factors that is relevant for responsibility needs in migration policy are those related to the economic effects of immigration. Political scientist have long acknowledged the dominant economic dimension of migration in terms of both its causes and effects (Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005; Freeman, 2002). Migration tends to create powerful economic interests that constrain the policy choices of governments. Modern nation states are advanced capitalist systems with economies that are transnationally interdependent. Over the last decades, the liberalisation of international trade and capital flows, as well as the growing importance of foreign investments and multinational corporations have caused European countries to become progressively more integrated into regional and world markets (Dreher et al., 2008). Global markets require the international flow of goods, services, capital and people. The overall rise in immigration over the last decades is therefore largely seen as a function of market forces and social networks, both reflecting increased economic interdependence between states. In this perspective. restrictive immigration regulations are potential barriers to the inflow of foreign capital and transnational economic activities. Empirical analysis

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[5] There are also some scholars that suggest that the European Union can actually help to circumvent liberal constraints on the national level and contribute to more restrictive policies by strategic venue-shopping (Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001). However, this argument was applied to immigration control policies rather than policies regulating the admission and integration of immigrants.

shows that the integration of markets for goods, services and capital often goes hand in hand with increased migration flows (Akkoyunlu and Siliverstovs, 2009; Peters, 2015). Consequently, if governments want to promote wealth through the freer flow of goods, services and capital across borders, they must also be willing to risk increased levels of migration (Bhagwati, 1998; Hollifield, 2004).[6] Scholars argue that European economies are structurally dependent on sustained immigration to fill skill shortages and to attract human capital (Freeman, 1979; Menz, 2009; Messina, 2007, 3). Their transformation into knowledge-based economies and the internationalisation of labour markets has resulted in an increasingly fierce competition for highly-skilled workers (Chiswick, 2011; Cerna, 2014; Menz, 2009). However, European economies have also have a continuous demand for lower skilled migrants in sectors such as agriculture, construction, catering and domestic care work (Castles et al., 2014). European countries with their large service sectors, highly-specialised economies and ageing populations therefore have a structural bi-modal demand for immigrant labour that is largely decoupled from business cycles.

Economists have demonstrated that states can reap enormous economic benefits from migration because it creates new sources of human capital and manpower and because it is conducive to growth and competitiveness (e.g. Clemens, 2011). These benefits of migration tend to be concentrated among business interests and employer organisations that exert political pressure on governments for the liberalisation of immigration (Freeman, 1995; Caviedes, 2010; Menz, 2009; Wright, 2015). Organised interest groups have shown to overwhelmingly prefer more liberal migration policies (Freeman, 2004). In addition to pressure from interest groups that benefit from migration, governments risk being penalised by voters if they fail to provide economic growth and common welfare. The economic interdependence between countries increase the stakes in two ways. On the one, countries are often increasingly interested in each other's migration policy since it affects their citizens' rights and prosperity. At the same time, countries themselves are more dependent on international migration to their country for maintaining economic prosperity. The more a country is integrated into global labour markets and structurally dependent on the recruitment of foreign labour, the higher the adverse economic consequences of restrictive migration policies (Joppke, 2002; Czaika and Neumayer, 2017). Migration tends to create powerful economic interests that militate

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[6] Although some scholars have argued that states have lost control over migration (Bhagwati, 1998; Sassen, 1996), state regulation remains a crucial factor in determining whether migration takes place, under what conditions and with what outcome.

in favour of more liberal migration policies (Favell and Hansen, 2002; Freeman, 1995; Hampshire, 2013; Hollifield, 2004). As a result, national policies on migration often take shape in the context of changes in the economic environment. A responsible government is expected to respond to macro-economic needs so as to secure the growth and stability of the national economy.

Powerful economic interests and institutional constraints represent responsibility needs in the migration policy-making of West European governments. By neglecting them, governments risk undermining their output legitimacy. Liberal institutions constrain national governments and reduce the space for restrictive policy changes while economic dependencies create powerful pressures on governments for liberal policy changes. The structural transformation of globalisation with stronger international interdependence has increased the need for government responsibility over time.

The outline of responsiveness demands and responsibility needs in migration policy illustrates that there is a likely tension between these two sources of democratic legitimacy. Their nature create competing policy imperatives. Several scholars theorise this tension as a constitutive feature of migration policy in liberal democracies. Hollifield (1992) coins the term, a 'liberal paradox', to describe the conflict that modern states have to be both open and closed to immigration for different reasons at the same time. This idea resonates with Hampshire (2013) who argues that different facets of liberal democracies cause tension between the need for openness and demands for closure. Others conceptualise this tension as a contradiction between a market logic and a political logic (Hollifield, 2004; Entzinger et al., 2004). These views share the conclusion that migration policy choices are made within deep tensions that result from the contradicting policy imperatives of liberal democracies.

This legitimacy trade-off in migration policy serves as the analytical framework of this thesis and provides a novel theoretical perspective for the analysis of migration policies. Migration policy is a field where governments struggle to maintain their democratic legitimacy. They will therefore be less motivated to consider interests and demands that do not contribute to the maintenance of democratic legitimacy. The influence of organised interests, institutions and ideology on government policy choices should therefore stem from how they resonate with the imperative to meet the preconditions for democratic legitimacy. This framework provides a comprehensive approach to explaining migration policy choices and helps to elucidate contradictions, complex causalities and the causes of an alleged democratic deficit in migration policy-making.

Chapter 3

Theoretical framework

3.1 Explaining trade-off choices

This chapter discusses the theoretical approaches to trade-off choices in migration policy. Based on the conceptual framework of a democratic legitimacy trade-off outlined in the previous chapter, I systematise different arguments for how governments respond to the trade-off between the growing demand for responsiveness and the growing need for responsibility. Governments' policy choices are where responsiveness and responsibility meet (Immergut et al., 2015, 247; Ford et al., 2015). When these sources of democratic legitimacy collide, politicians face a dilemma: Should they be responsive to the demands of voters or should they enact policies that they believe will further the common interests of citizens? The choice implies a risk of being punished for ignoring the will of voters and a risk of being punished for delivering policy outputs that negatively affect the interests of their constituents. So far, we only know little about how governments respond to these trade-offs in their migration policy choices.[1] Based on existing literature, I derive a series of arguments on how cross-pressured governments may respond to the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy. I identify three types of such response strategies: muddling-through, signalling responsiveness and selective openness. Governments either choose to balance responsiveness and

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[1] My framework framework provides a novel perspective on migration policies hitherto not gained attention in the literature. Notable exceptions are, however, Boswell (2007) who reflects upon how migration policies contribute to the legitimacy liberal states, and Ford et al. (2015) who analyses British immigration policy from a perspective of democratic legitimacy. The contribution of Boswell focus on functional imperatives of states regarding effective governance (fairness, accumulation, security, institutional legitimacy). My framework has similar building blocks, but expands the imperatives for policy-making to the input-legitimacy of democracy. The only existing contribution that conceptualises migration policy as a tension between responsiveness and responsibility is to my knowledge the study by Ford et al. (2015). These authors argue that the British governments increasingly struggles to respond to popular demands due to growing constraints. My framework elaborates on this idea and systematises its theoretical implications for the migration policy choices of governments.

responsibility (muddling-through) or they opt for separate response strategies towards responsiveness demands and responsibility needs (signalling responsiveness, selective openness). The separate response strategies in the existing scholarship can be distinguished by whether responsive policy-making affects a country's openness to immigration (selective openness) or is reduced to symbolic policy-making (signalling responsiveness).[2]

The first strategy is *muddling-through*, and it assumes that governments enact migration policies incrementally in order to maintain their democratic legitimacy in the short-term. When responsiveness and responsibility collide, it becomes difficult for governments to produce major policy changes. Policy changes are therefore likely to be path-dependent and influenced by the policy status quo. Governments enact small and incremental changes to 'muddle-through' complex policy environment (Hampshire, 2013, 2; Lindblom, 1959). This implies that there is limited strategic reasoning involved and that policy-making follows the short-term requirements of democratic legitimacy. This resonates with the idea of 'intentional fudging' or 'deliberate malintegration' from the institutionalist literature, which proposes that governments accept policy inconsistencies to balance conflicting demands (Boswell and Geddes, 2011, 47-48, Ford et al., 2015). When governments face unrealistic demands or trade-off, any action is better than none and accepting policy inconsistencies can be a rational approach. Muddling-through assumes that governments shape policies depending on what source of legitimacy weighs more. When demands for responsiveness are relatively strong, governments are expected to enact more responsive policies. When the need for responsibility is relatively strong, governments are expected to enact more responsible policies. These considerations suggest that governments make short-term policy choices based on where there is more pressure that risks undermining their legitimacy. The muddling-through strategy suggests that governments respond to the legitimacy trade-off with incremental policy-making that maintain an equilibrium between responsiveness and responsibility.

The second strategy that explains trade-off choices is *signalling responsiveness*. Governments may choose signals instead of material policy change to respond to demands for responsiveness. Besides

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[2] I do not take into account considerations that governments give absolute priority to either responsiveness or responsibility since party governments cannot ignore one of these preconditions for democratic legitimacy.

changing the status quo, policy changes have the function to send signals to constituents that their interests and demands are taken seriously (Timmer and Williams, 1998, 741). This idea resembles the distinction between the expressive and the instrumental function of political parties (Mair, 2009). On the one hand, parties express preferences and translate them into policy demands. On the other hand, parties are instrumental in enacting material policy changes. When it is untenable to make responsive policy choices that include changing the status quo due to pressing needs for responsibility, governments can use other means to signal responsiveness. These signals can serve as an instrument to avoid undermining legitimacy due to non-responsiveness. There are two versions of how to substitute material policy changes with responsiveness signals: justification and deception.

A first strategy provides constituents with plausible justifications for responsible policy choices in order to maintain their support (Grose et al., 2015; Mansbridge, 2003). Politicians can explain their policy choices, communicate the need for responsibility and aim to convey the message that popular demands are unrealistic or that they run against the long-term interest of citizens. Showing efforts to be responsive and providing justifications for policy choices can lead to learning effects where citizens adapt their preferences and policy demands (Hellwig, 2008; Karremans, 2017; Rose, 2014). Some scholars argue that if governments make plausible that policies are the result of external constraints and not of their non-responsiveness, voters will not punish them for non-responsive policies (Jurado et al., 2018). In this way, governments can shift the blame for non-responsiveness to other actors or to external circumstances that limit the policy space (Armingeon and Lutz, 2019a). When governments experience pressure to pursue responsible policies that run against popular demands such as immigration liberalisations, the strategy of blame avoidance seems to be a rational response for governments. Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) describe how politicians use 'crafted talk' to demonstrate responsiveness when the implementation of their preferred policy runs against the preferences of voters. The justification strategy suggests that governments combine responsible policies with political action that provides justification for policy choices, thereby signalling responsiveness.

A second strategy for signalling responsiveness is for governments to distort the public's perception of their policies (cf. Boswell, 2007; Wright, 2014). Responsive governance essentially requires that voters notice what the governments do and have information about their policies (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010). For this reason, governments may try to influence public perceptions about their policy agendas.

3.1. EXPLAINING TRADE-OFF CHOICES

When politicians are under political pressure to deliver they tend to prefer higher-profile symbolic measures instead of vague long-term measures (Edelman, 2001). Guiraudon and Joppke (2001, 12-13) argue that in regard to migration policy, governments prefer highly visible policy measures, such as tighter border controls, in order to retain the 'appearance of control' and to serve a symbolic purpose.[3] Slaven and Boswell (2018) find that policy-makers in the UK adopted symbolic immigration control policies that were not aimed at changing the status quo but were instead directed at public opinion and the perception of voters. Wright (2014) examines Australian labour migration policy and shows that the government combined the liberalisation of migration with signals of tough immigration control. This reveals that liberal reforms are more likely when the public is assured that the government is in control of immigration. Scholars have argued that politicians use tough rhetoric on immigration as a strategy to create an 'appearance of control' (Massey et al., 1998, 288). The deception strategy combines responsible policies with symbolic policy measures and political activism that demonstrate responsiveness but do not alter the formal openness of the country to immigration. The signalling strategies of justification and deception aim to reassure voters that their demands are being taken seriously. This takes place either through responsive communication or by symbolic measures, and serve to limit the political costs of prioritising responsible policies.

The third strategy, *selective openness*, assumes that governments seek to maintain their legitimacy by accepting some forms of immigration while rejecting other forms of immigration. This strategy capitalises on the fact that policies are typically a mixed bag of various elements and instruments. In terms of migration policies, this could mean restricting some categories of immigrants while liberalising others. Several scholars have theorised that governments that face trade-offs between openness and closure will opt for a greater selectivity in their migration policies with the liberalisation of policies towards more desired immigrants and the restriction of policies towards less desired immigrants (Boswell, 2007; De Haas et al., 2018; Wright, 2014). We may expect that governments are more motivated to restrict undesired immigrants rather than more preferred immigrants, such as high-skilled individuals. In such a case, we would see a greater selectivity of migration policies instead of uni-directional changes. Selective restrictions of migration policy can serve as strategic tool

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[3] Control policies aim to enforce existing immigration policies and therefore do not affect the formal openness of a country. However, such control policies do have material consequences and can reduce the *de facto* openness of a country. In this thesis, I'm examining the policy output that determines the formal openness and not immigration enforcement.

for minimising voters' discontent about an overall liberal migration policy. Afonso (2014) argues that right-wing parties combine the economic pressure for liberalisation and the political pressure for restriction with a restrictive stance on selective aspects of immigration policy, such as asylum or access to citizenship, while keeping liberal policies for labour immigration. Ruhs (2013) proposes another version of selective openness as the combination of liberal admission with restrictive post-immigration rights (or vice versa). The recurring idea behind such selective openness strategies is that governments respond to the legitimacy trade-off through a strategic combination of liberal and restrictive policies on different aspects of immigration.

These three strategies provide theoretical arguments on governments' strategic responses to the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy. The strategies are not mutually exclusive and can occur in combination with each other. Systematising such policy strategies provides an overview that allows for methodical comparison. These existing approaches present plausible arguments for trade-off policy choices and bear distinct implications for policy outputs that can be tested empirically. The muddling-through strategy expects incremental policy change in the direction of the stronger political pressure. The signalling strategy expects symbolic policy change without change in the formal openness towards immigration. The selective openness strategy expects a strategic combination of restrictive and liberal policy changes targeting different immigrant categories. These three explanations contribute to the understanding of trade-off choices in migration policy. They have, however, mostly been discussed in isolation and have never been theorised nor tested in a comparative manner. I build upon these explanations and go beyond them with a novel argument on trade-off choices in migration policy. The argument aims to address three main shortcomings of the strategies proposed in the existing literature. These shortcomings include the neglect of government agency, the contrast to the continuous liberalisation of actual policies and the limited capacity to reconcile responsiveness and responsibility.

All three strategies ail to provide an adequate theory of agency when explaining trade-off choices in migration policy. The muddling-through strategy has been criticised for its limited role of government agency and its conceptualisation as a passive broker between different political interests and demands (Boswell, 2007). The strategies of signalling responsiveness and selective openness place somewhat more weight on government agency. Nevertheless, they equally assume that gov-

ernments respond in the same manner and follow the same policy pattern of symbolic policy-making or increasing selectivity. In their perspective, responsive governance would mean following the restrictive demands of the median voter. Consequently, these strategies do not allow for variation across parties and the idea that governments use their agency to mobilise constituents along partisan lines. However, the very nature of political parties is their agency for representing different political demands of their constituents. The existing explanations cannot sufficiently explain why political parties take very different migration policy stances and increasingly compete on the issue of immigration despite growing constraints that limit the policy options that governing parties can credibly offer their voters. All three strategies assume that governments respond to external demands and constraints in a uniform manner and therefore do not provide a theoretical account of government agency in shaping policy choices.

The second shortcoming is that the three strategies face difficulties to explain actual policy development with immigration policies that become increasingly liberal and immigrant rights that are continuously expanding (De Haas et al., 2018; Helbling and Kalkum, 2017). Why is there a continuous trend of liberalisation during a time of increasing politicisation and anti-immigration backlash? This empirical pattern contradicts the balancing argument of the muddle-through strategy that expects policies to become more restrictive with stronger mobilisation of public opposition towards immigration. The expectation of the selective openness strategy of separate policy responses towards different groups of immigrants seems to be contradicted by the empirical observation that immigration policies towards different migrant categories were found to be largely uni-dimensional and that liberalisation took place across different migrant groups (De Haas et al., 2018; Helbling and Kalkum, 2017; Schmid and Helbling, 2016).[4] This means that the actual evolution of migration policy-making remains puzzling observation that existing theories of trade-off choices have difficulties to explain.

A third shortcomings of the three approaches identified in the literature is their marginal contribution to the reconciliation of responsiveness and responsibility that makes it difficult to further the aim of governments to maintain democratic legitimacy. The strategy of muddling-through is inherently unstable and provides very limited leeway for reconciling demands for responsiveness and

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[4] De Haas et al. (2018) suggest that there is growing selectivity in migration policies. However, only towards irregular immigrants the authors find an overall restriction. These are the immigrants that are not admitted to the country in the first place and therefore the policies towards this group of immigrants do not change the formal openness of a country to immigration. For all other migrant groups the authors find more liberalisations than restrictions over the last decades.

needs for responsibility. The signalling strategy with tough rhetoric and symbolic policies may work in the short-term, however, there is a substantial risk of a backlash that might further undermine the legitimacy of migration policies by creating unrealistic expectations about immigration control. This is the case when governments adopt a rhetoric that meets the expectations of the public despite their awareness of their limited ability to steer immigration dynamics. The dissonance between public narratives and policy reality is likely to foster the feeling that immigration is out of control. The strong public expectations of strict immigration control also make it unlikely that justifying responsible policy choices can maintain support and that public opinion aligns with the economic imperatives and moral norms of the liberal state in favour of liberal migration policies (see Slaven and Boswell, 2018, 5). The selective openness strategy proposed enacting separate policies in order to address responsiveness demands and responsibility needs. However, this idea depends on the capacity of states to steer migration effectively that allows to select desired immigrants while deterring undesired ones. Given the systematic failure to achieve such policy objectives (Czaika and De Haas, 2013; Hollifield et al., 2014), also this strategy faces obstacles to effectively reconcile responsiveness with responsibility. All three strategies proposed in the literature provide valuable arguments for strategic policy responses to trade-offs on immigration but have limited potential to maintain democratic legitimacy.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that we require a new theoretical reasoning of how governments strive to maintain their democratic legitimacy when facing trade-offs between responsiveness and responsibility. In the next section, I introduce a novel argument explaining the migration policy choices of cross-pressured governments. I believe that this new theoretical perspective addresses the shortcomings of previous explanations and may help to understand the complexities of migration politics in contemporary democracies.

3.2 The argument

This section develops the main argument of the thesis. I build upon the previous section that outlines the existing strategies for explaining trade-off choices in the literature. My argument goes beyond these explanations by arguing that governments' migration policy choices are primarily motivated by the aim maintain democratic legitimacy. I expect governments to make strategic policy choices based on their room to manoeuvre. Responsibility needs provide countries with little choice other than to accept immigration. Therefore, governments address responsiveness demands in the internal policy dimension of integration where there is more room for discretionary policy choices. I expect governments to employ a strategic combination of responsible immigration policy and responsive integration policy. The expected outcome is that governments combine external openness to immigration (responsibility) with partisan policies in domestic integration policies (responsiveness).

The premise of the argument is that governments are strategic actors who strive for democratic legitimacy in order to ensure their re-election. Governments can neither ignore the democratic input of voter preferences and demands nor can they neglect the democratic output of effective governance in the common interest (cf. Mair, 2009; Scharpf, 1999). Therefore, they are motivated to make migration policy choices as responsive representatives as well as responsible governors. This is particularly the case of migration policy-making in liberal democracies where governments are under constant pressure from conflicting policy imperatives.

Public policies are often a mixed bag with various dimensions. This provides governments with the option of combining policy choices across different policy dimensions and matching them with different demands and interests (Akkerman, 2015, 54). With respect to the migration policy literature, I distinguish between two main policy dimensions: an external dimension of immigrant admission, which defines the rules of the entry and stay of immigrants, and an internal dimension of immigrant integration, which defines the rules of the settlement and membership of immigrants (Hammar, 1985, 7-9; Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Money, 1999). Immigration rules represent the international dimension of migration policy and integration rules represent the domestic dimension of migration policy. These two dimensions go along with policy attributes that provide governments with different opportunities and constraints for making policy choices. This distinction of two different policy dimensions follows the view of public policy scholars that 'policy determines politics'

and that each policy area provides different political conditions for policy-making (Freeman, 2006; Lowi, 1972). Most importantly, the two policy dimensions differ in the available room to manoeuvre and the available space for making discretionary policy choices. It is the policy context and political parties' strategic options that determine governments' room to manoeuvre (Strom and Müller, 1999). The external dimension of immigrant admission is highly constrained by markets and rights (see Section 2.2). Liberal democracies have become migration states that depend on openness to immigration to fulfil essential state functions. As a result, governments have little room for discretionary choices in the admission of immigrants. The internal dimension of immigrant integration, however, provides substantially more room for policy discretion and for partisan politics. In short, the macro-structural constraints that require responsible governance are higher in immigration policy and the opportunities for responsive governance are higher in integration policy. Consequently, I expect governments to solve the legitimacy trade-off by acting responsible in external immigration policies and by acting responsive in internal integration policies.

Immigration policy includes all the measures and regulations to regulate who is admitted into the country and under what conditions. Although the admission of immigrants is perceived as a prerogative of sovereign nation states, liberal democracies are often heavily constrained in their policy options. Right-based politics is enshrined in the liberal institutions of European democracies, and it protects free movement rights, the right to family and the right to asylum. In the remaining discretionary space countries increasingly compete to attract labour migrants in order to ensure their competitiveness and economic stability. Helbling (2014, 28) argues that immigrant admission is the dimension of migration policy that most directly affects tangible macro-economic interests such as prosperity and labour market stability. Fitzgerald et al. (2014, 408) add that admission rules are much more affected by international agreements and human rights norms than other areas of migration policy. Restricting right-based immigration would undermine the institutional legitimacy of democratic states. Restricting discretionary labour migration would run against the macro-economic interests of countries. At the same time, immigration policy is also constrained by public opinion since no major party openly advocates for more immigration due to the unpopularity of such a stance (Lahav, 1997, 382; Schain, 2008, 32). External constraints limit the options of governments for immigration restrictions and electoral constraints limit the options for governments for immigration liberalisations. In short, responsible governments of liberal democracies are constrained

in regard to immigration restrictions and responsive governments are constrained in regard to immigration liberalisations. Consequently, the external dimension of immigrant admission has high needs for responsibility and little room for responsiveness. I therefore expect immigration policies to be dominated by a logic of responsibility and to be determined by macro-structural factors.

Integration policy, on the other hand, is a domestic policy where countries define the post-entry rights of immigrants. These policies regulate the terms of immigrants' incorporation into the host society and tend to follow national models shaped by distinct understandings of the national community (Brubaker, 1992; Koopmans et al., 2012). This policy dimension includes domestic issues where economic interests and obligations due to international interdependence are less of a constraint, and governments enjoy a larger room to manoeuvre. Although it has been argued that integration policies also face certain liberal constraints (e.g. Howard, 2010), this policy dimension largely follows national models and offers a large range of policy options (Brubaker, 1992; Fitzgerald et al., 2014). Compared to immigration policies, the dimension of integration is less shaped by economic interests but more by cultural concerns and values. Helbling (2014, 28-29) argues that the integration policies are dominated by cultural aspects because the major economic aspects and related conflicts were already settled with the admission of immigrants. Integration policy therefore does not face the major structural constraints that result from international interdependence as in immigration policy. In other words, the need for responsibility is substantially lower.

Previous scholarship provides reasons for assuming that integration policy is particularly accessible to partisan politics. The issue of integration divides political parties along the left-right axis with the left favouring more liberal policies than the right (Akkerman, 2015). For the left, pursuing liberal integration policies can be a successful electoral strategy for gaining immigrant votes and the support of socio-liberals that favour inclusion and equality. Immigrants themselves also tend to care much more about post-entry rights than about openness at the border since they are more affected by the former than the latter. Left-wing parties can mobilise immigrants as workers and can thereby integrate the immigration issue into a larger conflict between capital and labour. Empirical research shows that immigrants are more likely than natives to vote for left parties (Messina, 2007). For right-wing parties, pursuing a restrictive integration policy can be a successful electoral strategy for mobilising culturally conservative voters. The right can link integration policy with concerns for national identity and law-and-order issues. The integration of immigrants is therefore an omnibus

issue through which political parties can funnel varies socio-economic and socio-cultural concerns. The integration of immigrants can be used to achieve partisan leverage by drawing a connection between immigrant integration and those issues where a party has a strategic advantage and that are in line with their ideology. Scholars of party competition suggest that political parties try to subsume cross-cutting issues into the dominant dimension of political conflict (Lacewell, 2017; Rovny, 2015). In short, the dimension of integration policy provides opportunities for partisan politics in terms of a political conflict about the modes of settlement and membership and about how to regulate the domestic consequences of migration. Integration policy is characterised by few responsibility needs and considerable room for responsiveness. Responsive policies do not necessarily imply restrictive policies since governments are strategic actors that selectively respond to demands and mobilise based on them. Left-wing parties may gain for mobilising in favour of more liberal integration policies. I therefore expect the area of immigrant integration to be dominated by a logic of responsiveness and to be determined by domestic politics.

Taken together, the two dimensions of migration policy offer governments a different set of opportunities and constraints in response to the legitimacy trade-off between responsiveness and responsibility. While immigration policy is more conducive to responsible policy-making, integration policy is more conducive to responsive policy-making. When governments face a legitimacy trade-off, they can pursue separate modes of policy-making in the two policy dimensions. External openness to immigration that is required by responsibility needs is combined with partisan politics on immigrant integration following responsiveness demands. This strategic combination implies that there are different 'reasons to act' for governments. In immigration policy, I expect the logic of responsibility to be the dominant mode of policy-making that is motivated by output-legitimacy. In integration policy, I expect the logic of responsiveness to be the dominant mode of policy-making that is motivated by input-legitimacy. In other words, responsible governments of modern migration states have little choice other than to be open to immigration in order to fulfil essential state functions. However, they can act responsively in domestic policies to regulate the consequences of migration and define the modes of immigrant settlement. Table 3.1 displays the theoretical claims of my argument.

Table 3.1: External responsibility and internal responsiveness

	Immigration	**Integration**
Policy attributes		
Object of regulation	entry and stay	settlement and membership
Consequences	socio-economic	socio-cultural
Location of intervention	external	internal
Room to manoeuvre	small	large
Policy choices		
Reason to act	output legitimacy	input legitimacy
Mode of policy-making	responsible	responsive
Policy outcome	international openness	domestic politicisation

The strategic differentiation of these two policy dimensions resonates with relevant literature on globalisation. Scholars studying the effect of globalisation on mass politics also suggest that the increased interdependence of states reduces governments' capacity to be responsive and limits the policy space for partisan competition (Beramendi et al., 2015; Ezrow and Hellwig, 2014; Hellwig, 2014; Rose, 2014). A prominent argument in this literature is that international economic integration that causes disruption within societies leads to domestic adaptation and compensation (Garrett and Mitchell, 2001). Due to international integration partisan politics increasingly focuses on domestic policy areas that are less affected by international constraints (Hellwig, 2014). My argument borrows from these theories and applies them to the area of migration. As in the globalisation literature, I assume that economic integration reduces the space for partisan politics. I argue that the responsiveness in domestic integration policies compensates for the non-responsiveness in external immigration policy due to external constraints. Internal policies offer governments to adapt their policies to the challenges resulting from international integration and to compensate for the limited room to manoeuvre in external policies. In this 'constrained partisanship' model, governments take migration policy choices under constrained conditions that reduce partisan politics to the domestic policy dimension. This strategy allows cross-pressured governments to simultaneously address the need for responsibility and the demand for responsiveness.

3.2. THE ARGUMENT

My argument addresses the shortcomings of the existing explanations (see Section 3.1). The first shortcoming is the lack of an adequate account of government agency. My argument pursues an integrative approach that builds upon both structure-based and agency-based considerations. Structure is represented by responsible governments (macro-structural needs) and agency is represented by responsive governments (domestic politics). I argue that governments are not just passive brokers between competing political pressures. They mobilise partisan support and structure political competition in the internal dimension of migration policy while respecting the external constraints in immigration policy. Also the second shortcoming of existing explanations is addressed by the new argument. The continuous liberalisation trend of migration policies despite the domestic politicisation of immigration is a puzzle that requires a convincing theoretical explanation. My argument suggests that this policy development is explained by macro-structural factors that keep countries open to immigration and that politicisation leads to partisan polarisation on domestic policies instead of an overall restrictive turn. The third shortcoming of the approaches proposed in the literature is their difficulty to effectively reconcile responsibility and responsiveness. My argument of external responsibility and internal responsiveness suggests that governments exploit the varying room to manoeuvre to address both the need for responsibility and the demand for responsiveness in their policy choices. This strategic combination offers governments a strategy to deliver on the public expectations and to preserve democratic legitimacy despite conflicting political pressures.

The novel argument differs from existing explanations in several regards. While muddling-through expect governments to balance conflicting pressures based on the relative strength, I suggest that they address them by separate policy choices. The strategy of signalling responsiveness expects governments to enact symbolic policies to distort public perceptions. My argument suggests instead that governments address responsiveness demands with material policy changes that do affect countries' openness to immigration. The strategy of selective openness expects governments combine liberal policies in one area with restrictive policies in another area. I argue instead that governments combine responsive and responsible policies based on the constraints and opportunities in policy-making. Responsiveness does thereby not necessarily imply more restrictions, but is dependt on the government's partisan orientation. These distinctions from previous strategies allow me to derive observable implications to test my argument against them.

Chapter 4

Hypotheses

This chapter introduces the main hypotheses of the thesis. These hypotheses formulate theoretical expectations that I derive from the main argument outlined in the preceding chapter. I argue that governments address the tension between responsiveness and responsibility in migration policy with responsible policies in the external dimension of immigration and responsive policies in the internal dimension of integration. This argument of strategic policy choices that are motivated by governments' desire to maintain democratic legitimacy bears various observable implications that are tested in the two following empirical Part III and IV.

The first empirical part consists of a comparative analysis of migration policies in Western Europe (Part III). Chapter 6 addresses the question: What drives the migration policy choices of national government? If my argument holds that immigration policies are dominated by a logic of responsibility, we should find that policy choices in this policy dimension are primarily driven by macro-structural factors that are associated with the need for responsible policy-making:

Hypothesis 1: *Immigration policies are determined by responsibility needs.*

For the internal dimension of integration policy, the argument postulates that policy-making is dominated by a logic of responsiveness. We should therefore find that integration policy choices are primarily driven by domestic politics, which is associated with the demand for responsiveness:

Hypothesis 2: *Integration policies are determined by responsiveness demands.*

In Chapter 7, I analyse how migration policy choices evolved with the advance of globalisation and politicisation. Globalisation is the main cause of increasing responsibility needs. Politicisation is the main cause of increasing responsiveness demands. The argument that there are different modes of policy-making in the external and internal dimension of migration policy also applies to policy dynamics. We should observe that immigration policies become more open and reduce the role of domestic politics over time (logic of globalisation). Integration policies should become less open and increase the role of domestic politics over time (logic of politicisation). If my argument is right, we would expect different dynamics between immigration and integration policy in response to these structural changes.

Hypothesis 3: *The policy dynamics of immigration is determined by the advance of globalisation*

Hypothesis 4: *The policy dynamics of integration is determined by the advance of politicisation*

Chapter 8 studies how radical-right populist parties (RRPPs) influence the migration policy choices of national governments. RRPPs are anti-immigration parties. Nativism is their definitional trait and their preference for more restrictive migration policies is their most salient issue preference. RRPPs have gained significant electoral support over the last three decades and have been instrumental in the politicisation of immigration and the mobilisation of anti-immigration sentiments. If my argument correctly predicts that governments primarily enact responsive policies in integration policy, the radical-right should be more successful in influencing policies on integration than on immigration.

Hypothesis 5: *Radical-right populist parties are more successful in influencing integration policies than immigration policies.*

Chapter 9 analyses the link between the policy preferences of governing parties and their policy choices. Their successful election to office provides parties with a mandate to govern based on the programme they offered to their voters. The very idea of a party-government it is to transmit the preferences that a party represented during elections into public policies once the party is elected into office. To what degree do governing parties deliver on their electoral mandate in migration policy? I argue that integration policy offers more room for governments to manoeuvre in their policy choices than immigration policy. Consequently, governments should have greater difficulty

translating their immigration policy preferences into government policies than their preferences on integration policies.

Hypothesis 6: *Governments are more likely to enact their preferred policies in integration policy than in immigration policy.*

The second empirical part consists of a case study on the Swiss initiative 'against mass immigration' (MEI), which Swiss voters narrowly approved in 2014 (Part IV). This popular demand for restricting immigration conflicts with Switzerland's international obligations and threatens the access to the internal market of the European Union. This case therefore exemplifies the tension between responsiveness and responsibility. The Swiss government faced a true legitimacy dilemma when it had to decide whether to be responsive to the expressed will of voters or to do what it considers to be a responsible policy choice in the common interest of their citizens. In Chapter 11, I analyse the policy response of the Swiss political elite that faced the decision dilemma between being responsible and responsive. Following the main argument of this thesis, I expect that the government resolved the dilemma with responsible governance in the external dimension of immigration and responsive governance in the internal dimension of integration.

Hypothesis 7: *The Swiss government responded to the legitimacy dilemma by combining responsible immigration policy with responsive integration policy*

My argument proposes that the migration policy choices of governments are motivated by the desire to maintain democratic legitimacy. The degree to which governments succeed in manoeuvring between responsiveness demands and responsibility needs without undermining democratic legitimacy depends on how citizens perceive government policies and how they respond to them. Chapter 12 analyses the response of Swiss voters to the non-implementation of their demand for immigration restrictions.

Hypothesis 8: *The combination of a responsible immigration policy with a responsive integration policy allowed the Swiss government to maintain their democratic legitimacy.*

These eight hypotheses derived from the thesis argument represent the guiding theoretical expectations for the empirical chapters 6 to 12. In addition, each chapter contains a more detailed theoretical elaboration and adds more specific sub-hypotheses regarding governments' migration policy choices.

Part III

Comparative analysis of migration policy choices in Western Europe

Chapter 5

The study of migration policy choices

5.1 Concept definition

This thesis focuses on the question how liberal democracies regulate migration and more specifically on the migration policy choices taken by national governments when facing conflicting policy imperatives (see Section 2.2). Governments enact policies in order to change the status quo and to send signals to their constituents (Timmer and Williams, 1998, 741). Both functions are important to meet public expectations and to maintain democratic legitimacy. Responsive governments enact policies to signal to voters that their preferences and demands are being taken seriously. Responsible governments enact policies that change the status quo in order to solve public problems in the general interest. Policy choices are therefore the locus of where demands for responsiveness and needs for responsibility meet. Policies are the main instrument for governments to meet the conditions of democratic legitimacy. Analysing governments' policy outputs allows me to assess how governments respond to the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy.

As a general definition, policies can be described as "government statements of what it intends to do or not to do, including laws, regulations, decisions or orders" (Knill and Tosun, 2012, 347). Migration policies are accordingly all laws, regulations, decisions and orders by national governments

in regards to "the selection, admission, settlement and deportation of foreign citizens residing in the country" (Bjerre et al., 2015, 559).[1]

As broadly acknowledged, migration policies are a multi-faceted policy area with different dimensions (see Rosenblum and Cornelius, 2012). This versatility contributes to the broad variety of migration policy concepts in the literature that often overlap and are not clearly delineated (see Bjerre et al., 2015; De Haas et al., 2015; Helbling et al., 2017, for an overview). It is necessary to differentiate between different policy dimensions of migration policies because different dimensions follow different empirical patterns and political logics. In the theoretical part I have argued that the external (or international) dimension of immigration and the internal (or domestic) dimension of integration have different policy attributes that are likely to shape the policy choices of governments in response to the legitimacy trade-off (see Section 3.2). This distinction reflects the two modes of social closure that exist in nation-states: one at the territorial border and one inside of it (Brubaker, 1992; Brubaker, 2010, 64-65; Weber, 1946, 78). This conceptual difference further resonates with Hammar (1990, 15) who differentiates between three gates at the entrance to states: entry, settlement and citizenship. While entry represents the gate at a state's border, the gates of settlement and citizenship represent the process of incorporating immigrants into society and the nation. The openness of nation states can therefore be distinguished between the openness of the state (immigrant admission) as the external dimension of migration policy and the openness of the nation (immigrant integration) as internal dimension of migration policy.

The empirical part is subsequently based on the distinction between immigration and integration as two distinct dimensions of migration policy (see also Givens and Luedtke, 2004; Hammar, 1985; Ireland, 2004; Money, 1999). These two dimensions exclude certain regulations on migration, such as control policies that regulate the enforcement of immigration rules and emigration and diaspora policies that primarily regulate the migration of a country's own citizens. These policies do not directly affect the formal openness of a country in terms of admission and integration and are therefore excluded. *Immigration policies* contain all regulations on the rights of migrants regarding their entry and stay. This policy is concerned with people crossing national borders and the regulation of who is granted admission to the country and under what conditions. Immigration policies are

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[1] Migration policy often defines migration in a limited way in that only the migration of non-citizens/foreign citizens falls under the scope and definition of migration. This common definition is also applied in this thesis that focus on countries that are primarily countries of immigration. Policies related to emigration are excluded.

therefore directed towards the outside of a country and are the international dimension of migration policy. *Integration policies* encompass all measures and regulations that define the rights and freedoms of immigrants after their arrival. Integration policies address the settlement and membership of immigrants. They are directed at the inside of a country and are the domestic dimension of migration policy.

The definition of migration policy outlined above applies a narrow definition of policies in the sense of government outputs - in contrast to policy outcomes. According to Easton (1965), policy outputs are "the binding decisions, their implementing actions and [...] certain associated kinds of behaviour" while outcomes are "all the consequences that flow from [...] the outputs of the system" (Easton, 1965, 351). Legal regulations on migration are thus policy outputs while immigration rates are policy outcomes. Policy outputs relate to the level of policy formulation, whereas policy outcomes are at least in part the result of a subsequent implementation of a policy (Hollifield, 1986, 114-115). Policy outcomes are not only the result of government action, they are strongly influenced by external factors outside of the control of governments. Policy outputs and outcomes are often combined or not properly distinguished (see Helbling, 2013, 558). The openness of a migration policy does not necessarily correspond with the numbers of immigrants a country receives. To avoid such a conflation, policy outputs should be delineated from policy outcomes when analysing migration policies. With that in mind, I define migration policy outputs as the laws and policies regarding immigration and integration that are legislated or ordered by government entities. The following analyses is confined to policy outputs given that they are the policy element that governments are directly responsible for.

Policy outputs represent policy choices of governments that decide whether and how to change the policy status quo. Policy outputs can therefore be conceptualised as the extent of change or the direction of change. The extent of change refers to the cumulative amount of policy changes a government enacts. This concept assesses governments' policy choices in the sense of how active a government is in a given policy area. For the direction of change in migration policy, scholars typically apply the degree of policy restrictiveness (openness) that is conceptualised as the extent to which a regulation limits (or expands) the rights and freedoms of immigrants (De Haas et al. 2015, 12, Givens and Luedtke 2005, 4). Restricting migration policy means that there are fewer rights and freedoms for immigrants and liberalising migration policy means that there are more rights and

freedoms for immigrants. In immigration policy, directional change refers to the restrictiveness in regards to entry and stay regulations. In integration policy, directional change refers to the degree to which a policy tends towards a restrictive-assimilationist model or a liberal-multicultural model (Koopmans et al., 2006; Lutz, 2017).

5.2 Measuring policy output

This section presents the data and operationalisation of the dependent variable that is used in the comparative analysis: the migration policy choices of national governments measured by their policy output. Only in the last few years have scholars started to systematically measure migration policies across time and space by building policy indices. There are now several available datasets that differ in their spatio-temporal coverage, conceptualisation of policies and measurement strategies (Bjerre et al., 2015; Ellerman, 2013; Helbling et al., 2017).

To build the dataset of migration policy output, I use the data from the 'Determinants of International Migration' Project (DEMIG), which provides a comprehensive migration policy dataset compiled by De Haas et al. (2015). Compared to similar project quantifying migration policies, this dataset not only covers a long time span, but it also offers a direct measurement of policy output with the attributes necessary for the purpose of this study. The DEMIG dataset contains a total of 6505 policy reforms between 1945 and 2014 across 45 countries (for more details see De Haas et al., 2015).[2] This extensive coverage allows for a quantitative comparative analysis.

The measurement unit is a single policy measure. This means that a large comprehensive reform is recorded as multiple entries and thereby avoiding a biased measurement due to the preference of some governments to enact many small reforms instead of one large. For each policy change, the dataset measures the direction of change: Did the policy become more liberal or more restrictive?[3] This information allows me to measure the quantity of the policy output in terms of policy activity

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[2] The DEMIG Policy dataset contains entries dating back to 1721. However, the systematic recording of policy reforms only starts in 1945.

[3] I apply the following coding: '-1' when immigrant rights are expanded, '0' when there is no change in openness and 1 if immigrant rights are restricted. Overall, 78 % of all policy changes are coded as a change in policy restrictiveness. Reforms that fall into the category of 'non applicable' or those that do not contain a change in policy restrictiveness are excluded from the analysis since they do not affect the restrictiveness of migration policies.

(number of reforms) and the quality of policy output in terms of directional change (change in restrictiveness).

I further differentiate the migration policy output by policy dimension, policy target group, policy effect and level of change. The DEMIG Policy dataset distinguishes between four policy sub-fields (entry and stay, integration, border and land control, and exit regulations). The sub-fields of which entry and stay (immigration) and integration correspond to the two policy dimensions of interest in this study. The two remaining categories of control and exit regulations do not affect the formal openness of the country to immigrants and primarily represent enforcement policies.). Regarding policy target groups, I differentiate between economic migrants such as labour migrants or investors and non-economic migrants such as family migrants or asylum seekers.[4] Another differentiation is between symbolic and material policy changes. Symbolic policy changes are those that do not change the restrictiveness of migration rules, whereas material policy changes are those that do affect the restrictiveness of migration rules.[5] I also take the level of policy change into account and separate minor and major policy changes.[6] I use these different measurements of migration policy outputs as dependent variables throughout the analyses in Chapter 6 to 9.

5.3 Case selection

The next step in the research design is the selection of cases and the unit of analysis. The comparative analysis of migration policy choices covers 18 West European countries from 1980 to 2014. These countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and

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[4] The category of economic immigrants consists of skilled/highly-skilled workers, investors, entrepreneurs and business people, international students and low-skilled workers. The category of non-economic immigrants consists of family members, refugees, asylum seekers and other vulnerable people, including irregular migrants.

[5] As symbolic policy changes, I include the non-directional reforms in immigration and integration policy as well as control policies that are concerned with the enforcement of immigration regulations.

[6] I classify minor policy change as reforms categorised as 'Fine-tuning' and 'Minor change'. I classify major policy change as reforms categorised as 'Mid-level change' and 'Major change'. The DEMIG Policy dataset (De Haas et al., 2015) measures each reform for its magnitude of policy change. Fine-tuning changes are measures that only affect part of a migrant category and only alter an existing policy instrument. Minor changes are measures that affect an entire migrant category, and only alter an existing policy instrument. Mid-level changes are measures that only affect part of a migrant category, but introduce or remove a new policy instrument. Major changes are measures that affect an entire migrant category and introduce or remove a new policy instrument.

the United Kingdom.[7] This case selection offers several advantages. First, West European countries share a sufficiently uniform political context. They are all liberal democracies with advanced capitalist economies and high levels of international integration. While all countries have experienced increasing immigration since 1980, the sample covers both long-standing and new immigration countries. Second, there is substantial variation in regard to both the dependent variable of policies and the independent variables of responsiveness demands and responsibility needs (see Section 5.4 and Figure A.3 in the Appendix). This variation provides meaningful differences that are necessary for testing explanations and drawing conclusions in a comparative research design. The time frame covers a period during which both responsiveness demands and responsibility needs in migration policy have substantially increased. By the 1980s, most West European countries had converged on a 'zero-immigration' policy orientation and an elite consensus to not politicise immigration (Cornelius et al., 1994). Over the next three decades, immigration has become an important issue of partisan conflict in electoral competition in many European countries, and it has had substantial variation in its level of politicisation across Western Europe. Radical-right populist parties that mobilise anti-immigration sentiments have been continuously present in Western Europe since the 1980s and have gained momentum over time (Mudde, 2013). Simultaneously, we observe increasing economic globalisation and political internationalisation that have increased countries' interdependence. West European countries have similar political regimes and similar trajectories of growing immigrant populations and growing policy constraints. Despite these similarities, the exposure to the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy varies across time and space that is exploited for testing the argument of this thesis.

I choose government cabinets as the unit of analysis. While the measurement unit is policy change, as outlined in the previous section, there are theoretical and methodological considerations that motivate the aggregation of policy changes by government cabinets for the purpose of the comparative analysis. These considerations are based on the theoretical concept of interest: the policy choices of national governments. This concept excludes the use of policy change as the unit of anal-

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[7] Eastern European countries are not included for several reasons. First, these countries only became liberal democracies during the 1990s, which does not allow them to be compared over the whole time period. Also, in Eastern Europe countries have mostly been emigration countries for the majority time periods covered in the analysis and the phenomenon of interest is therefore far less present in this region. Nativist mobilisation in Eastern Europe is unlike that of Western Europe as it is often based on the exclusion of ethnic minorities rather than on the issue of immigration (see Minkenberg, 2017).

ysis since it would only capture the occasions of policy change and would ignore the (deliberate) inaction of governments (see Bachrach and Baratz, 1963).[8] Hence, this unit of analysis would not allow for the measurement of the extent of policy change (policy activity), and it would provide limited information about the policy agenda of governments. The aggregation of policy changes on a country-year basis, as is common in comparative political analysis, is most suitable for variables that change on an annual basis. This is not the case for my dependent variable: policy change by national governments does not take place per se on an annual basis and governments also do not change in year-intervals. Two principal reasons guide the choice of cabinet periodisation. First, the natural reference point for both parties and voters are elections and cabinet terms. A policy agenda is only expected to become effective over the course of the cabinet's whole office term. Second, during the same one year more than one cabinet can hold office and be responsible for policies. The use of cabinet units therefore allows for a more accurate attribution of policy outputs to the political parties in government. This brings the methodological advantage that estimates for determinants that change on the base of cabinet terms such as government ideology can be estimated more reliably (Döring and Schwander, 2015; Schmitt, 2016).[9] Both the dependent and important independent variables of the analysis advocate for the use of cabinet-units.[10] The more surprising, that the comparative analyses based on cabinet-units is rare in the study of migration policy (for an exception see Akkerman and De Lange (2012); Röth et al. (2018)). Their use allows for the closest match between the unit of analysis and the theoretical aim of the comparison. Additionally, using cabinet units reflects the recommendation by Bartolini (1993, 148) to choose legislative terms as temporal units to study the quantity and quality of policies in a specific field. Nevertheless, there are also disadvantages to using cabinet-units. First, information is lost through the aggregation of the variables that are measured on an annual basis. This loss primarily concerns the control variables, whereas the main variables of interest, such as policy output or government ideology, vary at the level of cabinets. Second, countries receive different weights in the models because the number

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[8] Although the dependent variable measures policy change, it is not a change-variable in the sense that it measures the differences between different levels of a policy. When a cabinet does not enact any policy changes, it does not imply that there is no change in the policy output from the output of the previous cabinet. This distinction is relevant for the measurement of the independent variables and the later model design.

[9] The common use of year-country-units would not only lead to the erroneous attribution of responsibility, but it would also increase the number of observations without adding substantial variance to the variables that change by electoral and cabinet terms and would risk underestimating their explanatory power.

[10] Variables that are commonly measured on an annual basis, such as economic indicators, are measured this way mostly out of convention. The use of cabinet units reduces the information of these variables, but it does not represent a less accurate periodisation.

of cabinets varies across countries.[11] This imbalance is partly corrected by excluding short-term cabinets that did not have enough time to develop their own legislative agenda.[12] Overall, cabinet units are the most suitable unit for testing the thesis argument in a comparative manner.

For the purpose of this analysis, I define a cabinet as a government with the same party composition and the same head of government. Any general election, change in party composition of the cabinet or head of government results in a new cabinet (Budge and Keman, 1993, 10).[13] I exclude short-term cabinets of less than three months (mostly in the role of care-takers) from the dataset.

The use of cabinet-units requires that I measure all variables in that unit. In order to obtain a cabinet-aggregated policy output, I assign each policy change to the government cabinet in charge at the time. Around one third of all reforms were enacted in a year where at least two governments were in office. I assign these reforms to government cabinets following the classification of Armingeon et al. (2017b) (for more details see Appendix A.2). This assignment is based on the final political decision, e.g. approval by parliament. In 98 % of cases, it was possible to assign policy changes to the government in charge. The clear assignment of responsibility failed in the case of only 30 reforms. For each cabinet, I calculate the overall change in policy restrictiveness as the number of restrictions minus the number of liberalisations. I measure the policy activity of a cabinet by the total number of reforms a cabinet enacted during its term in office. The DEMIG Policy Government Extension provides a comprehensive cabinet-based dataset of migration policy outputs.

I calculate this aggregated variable of governments' policy output separately for immigration and integration policy. Since this aggregated measure conceals the actual number of liberalisations and restrictions, an alternative operationalisation of policy outputs separately counts the number of liberalisations and restrictions that a cabinet enacted. Furthermore, I also measure policy separately by the level of change (minor vs. major reforms), the directional change (material vs. symbolic) and the policy target group (economic vs. non-economic immigrants) as discussed above. These different measurements of migration policy output by government cabinets allow for the testing of

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[11] Because the errors of the cases (governments from a given country) are uncorrelated, it is not problematic for the model estimates that some countries contribute more cases (governments) than others.

[12] Since the main variables are available for the complete time frame, no specific adjustments need to be taken for problems related to unbalanced panels.

[13] I codes the Swiss cabinets as 4-year cabinets following electoral terms despite the annual change in the formal head of government. In the consociational democracy of Switzerland the head of government does not hold an equivalent power as in the other European countries. Instead, the head of government is a *primus inter pares* in a seven-member 'grand coalition' cabinet and therefore has no substantial capacity to alter the migration policy agenda (Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008, 75-76).

various implications of my argument as well as the alternative explanations explaining trade-off choices. I also aggregate the independent variables for government cabinets (see Section 5.5). For the variables that are measured on an annual basis, I calculate their means over the cabinet term.[14] For the variables that change on the basis of elections, such as vote shares, I use the values from the last election before a cabinet took office.

The resulting dataset contains 237 cabinets that enacted a total of 2282 policy changes that either liberalised or restricted migration policy.[15] The variables for policy activity span a range from 0 to 15 for immigration policy and from 0 to 12 for integration policy. The variables of directional policy change span a range from -10 to +5 in the case of immigration policies and from -12 to +8 for integration policies. A positive value represents a net restriction and a negative value represents a net liberalisation of migration policy.[16]

5.4 Descriptive analysis of policy output

This section provides a descriptive overview of migration policy changes in 18 West European countries between 1980 and 2014 based on the cabinet-based dataset of migration policy output introduced in the previous section. First, I look at the policy activity of governments. The bar plots in Figure 5.1 show how the extent of policy change is distributed across the sample. The highest number of cabinets falls into the category of one to five reforms, followed by those that do not enact any migration policy changes. Around 76 % of cabinets (N = 182) enacted at least one migration policy change. There is a similar pattern when I separate the two policy dimensions of immigration and integration. The policy activity between the two policy dimensions is strongly correlated (r = 0.60). When I take the varying cabinet duration into account, the correlation is reduced to a moderate level of r = 0.45. Cabinets that show higher policy activity on immigration, also tend to show a higher policy activity on integration (and vice versa) independent of cabinet duration.

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[14] The years for the aggregation are selected based on 'years of influence'. The year of investiture is considered as the first year of influence. When a cabinet was in office before July of every consecutive year, the year is calculated as year of influence.

[15] Additional 353 reforms fall into the category of 'non applicable'. For 171 reforms, the change in restrictiveness cannot be assessed, and 81 reforms contain no change in restrictiveness. I exclude these reforms from the analysis.

[16] A value of '2' means that a cabinet enacted two more policy liberalisations than policy restrictions. For the purpose of the descriptive analysis, the policy scores are standardised by cabinet duration, allowing an interpretation of the scores as the policy change for a cabinet of a duration of 924 days (empirical median).

Figure 5.1: Distribution of policy activity

Note: The bar plot represents the policy activity of governments measured as the number of reforms they enacted.

Second, I examine the distribution of policy changes in terms of policy direction. Did governments enact more restrictions or more liberalisation? Figure 5.2 visualises the distribution of the directional change by government cabinets. The distribution follows a very similar pattern in immigration and integration policy with a median score of 0 and with 50 % of observations that are either 0 or -1. Therefore, the centre of gravity tends towards liberalisation in both policy areas. The bi-variate distribution shown in the bag plot confirms this conclusion. The pyramid plots in the Appendix (see Figure A.1 and A.2) contain more detailed information on the distribution of liberalisations and restrictions across cabinets and countries.

Immigration and integration policy changes are positively correlated ($r = 0.32$ and $r = 0.25$ when accounting for cabinet duration). In other words, governments that enact liberal (restrictive) immigration policies also tend to enact liberal (restrictive) integration policies. The correlation between the two dimensions is, however, weak and substantially lower than the correlation between cabinet's policy activity. These descriptive statistics are a first indicator that the policy choices of governments differ between the two dimensions of migration policy. The comparative analysis seeks to exploit variation across time and space in order to explain the migration policy choices of national governments (see Figure A.3 in the Appendix for the display of panel heterogeneity).

Figure 5.2: Distribution of directional policy output

Note: The left plot shows violin plots for the distribution of immigration and integration policy changes of government cabinets. The plot is a combination of a box plot (median and inter-quartile range) and the probability density of the data (coloured area). Positive values represent net restriction, and negative values represent net liberalisation. The bag plot on the right is a two-dimensional box plot with a central point (the Tukey median). The inner bag that represents the smallest depth region containing at least 50 % of the total number of observations and the outer bag contains approximately 99 % of all observations.

This descriptive overview draws attention to the cross-sectional differences and temporal dynamics of migration policy changes. We see that the tendency towards liberalisation follows an almost uniform trend in all countries. There are only two exceptions. The UK possesses a restrictive mean in both policy areas, whereas the Netherlands only has a liberal mean in immigration policy but a restrictive mean in integration policy. The literature often considers the UK as a deviant case due to its strong top-down determination of migration policies (e.g. Hansen, 2000). However, scholars demonstrate that also the UK faces severe tensions between responsiveness and responsibility in its migration policies (Ford et al., 2015). The Netherlands, as a restrictive outlier in integration policy, points to the pronounced backlash against multiculturalism that scholars have discussed at length (Joppke, 2004). Overall, the data reveals an accelerating liberalisation trend in immigration policy over time. In integration policy, liberalisation increased in the 1990s and slowed down after 2000. Overall, both policy dimensions have become continuously more liberal over time. This conclusion confirms previous findings based on different datasets or methodology (De Haas et al., 2015; Helbling and Kalkum, 2017).

Figure 5.3 presents the descriptive evidence of the distribution of policy changes by target group and by level of change. The policy output with regard to the two different target groups of economic

and non-economic immigrants closely resembles each other. There are, however, substantially more major policy reforms than minor ones and the output based on major reforms tend to be more liberal than the output based on minor reforms. These descriptive plots suggest that policy-making does not vary substantially between the two policy target groups and that incremental policy-making does not dominate in migration policy.

Figure 5.3: Distribution of policy output by target group and level of change

Note: The plots display the quantity and quality of migration policy output by the policy target group and the level of change. These violin plots combine a box plot (median and inter-quartile range) and the probability density of the data (coloured area). Positive values represent net restriction, and negative values represent net liberalisation.

The descriptive analysis of migration policy choices of national governments shows that most governments get involved with migration policy. Overall, governments have enacted more liberalisations than restrictions between 1980 and 2014. This applies to both policy dimensions of immigration and integration as well as both target groups of economic and non-economic immigrants.

5.5   Measuring the drivers of migration policy choices

The main objective of this thesis is to evaluate how states respond to the trade-off between responsiveness demands and responsibility needs in migration policy. This section outlines how I operationalise these concepts. Both concepts are highly abstract and therefore intricate to measure. I derive a series of theory-driven factors that constitute the demand for responsiveness and a series of factors that determine the need for responsibility.

The first series of factors capture the varying needs for responsibility in migration policy. A government is responsible when it acts in the interest of the general public given the constraints and opportunities of governing. In the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2.2, I discuss the role of two factors that determine the needs for responsibility in migration policy: markets and rights, or in other words, the demand for foreign labour and institutional constraints. If we would observe that these factors vary systematically with governments' policy choices, we would say that governments act in an output-oriented manner and are therefore responsible governors. I consider several factors when operationalising the need for responsibility. A particular focus lies on globalisation as a structural transformation that is expected to be the main driver behind increasing responsibility needs. The more internationally integrated countries are, the more policy choices become constrained by the interdependence of countries with global markets and international regulations. The integration of countries is measured with a globalisation proxy measuring the degree of trade openness in a country in a given year. This concept represents the economic integration of countries into world markets, and can be measured as total trade (sum of import and export) as a percentage of GDP. Alternatively, I use the KOF index for economic globalisation that reflects the extent and freedom of international trade and investment and revenue flows (Dreher et al., 2008). I normalise the globalisation variables to a range from 0 to 1 to facilitate the interpretation of model coefficients.[17] To control for short-term fluctuations of labour demand, I also include the annual unemployment rate, GDP growth per capita and the net migration rate.[18] These macro-economic variables capture the structural interdependence of national economies and their demands for foreign labour.

Political institutions that constrain governments' policy space are another group of factors related to responsibility needs. According to the veto player approach of Tsebelis (2002), policy change becomes more difficult when there is a large number of actors whose consent is necessary to change the status quo. In migration policy, scholars observe that institutional veto players restrict the influence of majoritarian sentiments on policy-making (Bearce and Hart, 2016; Breunig and Luedtke, 2008). The number of veto players therefore serves as another control variable (data from Quality of Government Dataset). One could argue that European integration creates liberal constraints

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[17] As robustness check, I log-transform the variable to avoid a skewed distribution.

[18] The net migration figure is taken from the Quality of Government Dataset compiled by (Teorell et al., 2017) (absolute number of net migration divided by population size). The net migration figure for France previous to 1998 is missing. The Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS), compiled by Armingeon et al. (2017b), includes GDP growth and unemployment rate.

and reduces the discretionary policy-making of national governments (e.g. Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes, 2013). Others argue that European integration allows national governments to overcome domestic constraints by engaging in strategic venue shopping (e.g. Guiraudon, 2000a). Not all areas of migration policy have the same degree of Europeanisation. It primarily takes place in control policies, such as combating crime and illegal immigration, while countries largely preserved their sovereignty in the area of legal immigration (Geddes, 2008). To account for the potential influence of EU-membership, the models include a dummy-variable that measures whether or not a country was a member of the EU in a given year. I account for other institutional factors that are time-invariant, such as electoral systems or strength of courts, in the statistical models using country fixed effects. I account for the policy legacy from previous governments by including the absolute level of policy restrictiveness. I use policy indicators from the 'Immigration Policies in Comparison' database (IMPIC), which is available for every year from 1980 to 2010 and covers all OECD countries (Helbling et al., 2017).[19] These indicators provide a baseline level of migration policy restrictiveness across a number of policy areas. The main advantage of combining DEMIG Policy with the IMPIC is the comparable categorisation of policy sub-fields.[20] These macro-structural factors measure different aspects of government responsibility in migration policy. They show considerable variation across time and space and serve as measurements that grasp responsibility needs in the empirical analysis.

The second series of factors measure the varying demands for responsiveness in migration policy. A government is responsive when it acts upon the demands and preferences of voters. In the theoretical discussion in Section 2.2, I discuss domestics politics as the main driver of demands for responsiveness. The more policies follow responsiveness demands and the stronger their explanatory power for variation in policy output, the higher the level of responsiveness. A particular focus lies on politicisation as a structural transformation, which I expect to be the main driver behind increasing demands for responsiveness. For a series of analyses, I use a politicisation proxy that measures the degree of issue salience of migration in the electoral arena. This concept represents

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[19] Since the IMPIC dataset does not cover the most recent years, the inclusion of IMPIC variables into the models reduces the number of observations.

[20] A comparison between the DEMIG and the IMPIC datasets confirms the high measurement validity between the change and level operationalisation of migration policies (Schmid and Helbling, 2016).

the degree to which the issue of immigration is part of public debates and the electoral competition of parties. Issue salience is the basic concept of politicisation with political parties acting as the key actors (Green-Pedersen, 2012).[21] Measuring electoral issue salience takes the mobilisation of public opinion into account.[22] While public opinion on migration is highly stable over time, the degree of its salience influences party politics (Dennison and Geddes, 2019). The country fixed effects take the stable level differences between countries into account. As with previous scholarship, I focus on the issue salience for political parties (Green-Pedersen and Otjes, 2017) since civil society actors are less important to the politicisation of migration (Kriesi et al., 2012). I operationalise issue salience by observing the number of statements on migration in the election manifestos of political parties. The data stems from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), which offers the most extensive quantitative dataset of party manifestos across time and space (Volkens et al., 2017). The broad availability of party manifestos allows for an extensive coverage of time and space using a common measurement approach. The CMP dataset counts both positive and negative policy statements in parties' electoral manifestos and it places a particular emphasis on the salience of an issue in these manifestos. The CMP codes represent the share of quasi-sentences in the respective category calculated as a fraction of the overall number of allocated codes per document.[23] THE CMP does not provide pre-defined items for migration policy.[24] I therefore adopt the proposal of Alonso and da Fonseca (2011) of an aggregate measurement for migration policy by combining five items that are closely related to migration ('multiculturalism negative', 'national way of life: positive', 'law and order', 'underprivileged minority groups' and 'multiculturalism: positive'). This strategy allows me to measures parties' issue emphasis regarding migration over my analysis' complete time frame. The number of statements in each of the five items are then aggregated and weighted by the vote share of each party. I normalise the resulting politicisation variable to a range from 0 to 1 in order to facilitate the interpretation of model coefficients.

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[21] Some scholars propose measuring politicisation based on polarisation as well as salience (Hutter and Grande, 2014, 1003-5). My measure of issue salience already includes political conflict since political parties use their manifestos as a tool of partisan competition. What is more, since I am interested in politicisation as a source of responsiveness demands, the salience-dimension is more relevant than the polarisation-dimension. Issue salience increases responsiveness demands independent of party polarisation.

[22] A common way to measure responsiveness is by comparing policy output with public opinion data (e.g. Jennings, 2009). However, such data is not available for such a large number of countries going back to the 1980s.

[23] This means that the scores are adjusted for the varying sizes of manifestos.

[24] Since 2006 the dataset includes measurement of position on immigration and integration, but only for newly entered countries resulting in N = 37 observations and therefore of limited use for a quantitative analysis.

Additionally, I measure the policy position and issue emphasis of government cabinets. The literature proposes several approaches to measure the policy positions of parties, such as manifesto coding, expert and voter surveys as well as the analysis of speeches or media content. For the reasons I outline above, I also choose the CMP dataset to measure parties' position in migration policy. The CMP dataset has long featured as standard measurement of parties' policy positions. The dataset is based on quasi-sentences that mention a particular policy position. All major parties are included in the dataset. This allows for the calculation of aggregated policy scores of government cabinets.[25] Furthermore, the dataset allows for both position and salience measures of political parties. Finally, the data structure allows for a separate analysis of the importance of restrictions and liberalisations. I measure the positional score by subtracting the negative statements on migration from the positive statements on migration and dividing the resulting number by the total number of statements on migration. To calculate a position score for each government cabinet, I aggregate the positions of all of the governing parties weighted by their seat share within the government coalition:

$$CabinetPosition = \sum_{i=1}^{n}(PartyPosition_i * SeatShare_i) \qquad i = Number\ of\ governing\ parties$$

This operationalisation follows the common perspective that (multi-party) governments are coalitions of parties that agree on the mean of their ideological stance relative to the seat share of each governing party (Cusack, 2001). Previous studies show that this aggregation is a valid predictor (Warwick, 2001). Furthermore, this operationalisation allows me to directly compare the positions of parties with those of cabinets. The formula is used to calculate a cabinet's position on migration policy. The resulting variable captures the 'centre of gravity' of a cabinet's stance on immigration, meaning that positive values represent a preference for a more restrictive policies and negative values represent a preference for more liberal policies. The same procedure is applied to calculate the issue emphasis of a government cabinet. The emphasis score is calculated as the aggregated share of statements on immigration. Both the position score and the emphasis score confirm that there is significant variation between political parties (see also Alonso and da Fonseca, 2011).

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[25] The complete data for the Norwegian Solberg-cabinet and the Greek Papademos-cabinet are missing reducing the available observations to N = 235.

Some scholars question the validity of the measurement chosen by the CMP (Dinas and Gemenis, 2010; Ruedin and Morales, 2017). Their main criticism is that CMP scores conflate policy positions with issue salience and the lack of uncertainty estimates. Indeed, the emphasis of the CMP on issue salience allows only to measure positions in a broad sense of the relative importance of positive and negative statements. To address the conflation of position and salience, I correct the position score for the number of statements yielding a "pure position" score and also conduct a separate analysis of positive statements that indicate a liberal preference and negative statements that indicate restrictive preferences. To address the broader validity concerns of the CMP dataset and to assess the robustness of the analysis, I also cross-validate the estimation of the manifesto–policy association with expert survey data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) as an alternative database of parties' policy positions coded by party experts (Polk et al., 2017).[26] This empirical strategy allows me to benefit from the relative advantages of different measurements and to enhance the robustness of the results. The CHES dataset provides separate policy preferences for immigration and integration policy for 188 parties across 17 countries between 2002 and 2014.[27] The positions are coded on a zero to ten scale from 'very liberal' to 'very restrictive'.[28] The CHES data confirm the substantial variation in parties' migration policy position. The cabinet preferences in the two dimensions of migration policy are highly correlated ($r = 0.92$) and have an equal variance (see also Figure A.4 in the Appendix). Parties that prefer a liberal immigration policy also prefer a liberal integration policy (and vice versa). Governing parties align along one dimension of migration policy. I assign the policy position and issue emphasis of governing parties to the cabinets resulting from elections in that year. Previous studies have shown that the expert coding correlates strongly with alternative coding strategies of migration policy positions in party manifestos (Ruedin and Morales, 2017). The scores based on the CHES are positively correlated with the CMP-scores ($r = 0.4$): In around 80 % of cabinets, the two scores are congruent on whether the cabinet prefers a more liberal or a more restrictive policy on migration.[29] This indicates that the scores are overall a valid mea-

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[26] The expert evaluations are based on party manifestos, but take into account other sources also and are therefore based on a broader information base than the positional scores from the Comparative Manifesto Project. This offers a broader rooting of policy positions and addresses concerns that party manifestos for themselves play a minor role in elections.

[27] Data for the following countries included: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

[28] For immigration policy, the score ranges from "strongly opposing tough policy" to "strongly favouring tough policy." For integration policy, the score ranges from "strongly favours multiculturalism" to "strongly favours assimilation."

[29] The share of congruence is 80.8 % for immigration and 78.4 % for integration. Furthermore, sub-codes identifying only immigration issues were introduced in the fifth edition of the Comparative Manifesto Project in 2014 (607.2, 607.3, 608.2,and

surement of cabinets' policy position given their different strategies of operationalisation. The use of both data sources ensures the robustness of the evidence provided in the empirical section.

To complete the measurement of domestic politics, I measure the political ideology of governments using two different operationalisation: a continuous left-right score and a 4-point categorical variable. The first variable measures government ideology on the left-right-scale from 0 to 10 as weighted score of all governing parties.[30] Additionally, the ideological distance from the predecessor government serves as control variable. The larger the ideological gap between a new and an old government, the more likely it is that we can expect a policy change.[31]. I base an alternative measurement of government ideology on four categories of governments: left-wing, centre, right-wing and radical-right. This variable is based on the party classifications used by Armingeon et al. (2017a). A cabinet is left-wing when at least two thirds of the cabinet consists of left-wing parties. A cabinet is right-wing if at least two-thirds of the cabinet consists of right-wing parties. Other cabinets fall into the centre category. Cabinets with a formal or informal coalition involving radical-right populist parties (RRPPs) are coded as 'radical-right' (there is a more detailed discussion of this party family in Chapter 8).[32] The definition of the radical-right party family follows the definition of right-wing populism by Mudde (2007, 22-23.) RRPPs are anti-immigration parties that are instrumental in the politicisation of migration issues and that have the potential to exert electoral pressure on mainstream parties. For this reason, I also include the cumulative vote share of parties belonging to the party family of radical-right populist parties. I choose the RRPP vote share instead of their seat share in parliament as main variable since it is a more direct measurement of electoral success, and it is not distorted by a country's electoral system.

This section provides an overview of the main measurement strategies and data sources. I identify macro-structural factors as the drivers of responsibility needs and domestic politics factors as the drivers of responsiveness demands. These measurements are applied throughout the empirical chapters 6 to 9.

608.3). The positional score calculated on these sub-codes is strongly correlated (r = 0.77) with the positional score calculated by the main score that reach beyond the issue of immigration.

[30] Data from the ParlGov dataset by Döring and Manow (2018).

[31] It uses the variable included in the CPDS and ranges from -3 to +4 with negative values represent a shift to the right and positive values a shift to the left.

[32] Following Duverger (1980, 186) there are four types of office success: external support, junior partner, senior partner and single-party government. So far we observe junior partner and external support to be the dominant forms of office success.

5.6   Methodological approach

This section outlines the methodological approach that underlies the comparative study. The compiled dataset of migration policy output is based on cabinet-units clustered by countries as discussed in Section 5.3. The data structure is both cross-temporal (cabinet periodisation) and cross-sectional (across countries). The data therefore allows for the analysis of within (longitudinal, $T = 8\text{-}22$) and between (cross-section, $N = 18$) variation of variables (Beck and Katz, 1995; Beck, 2001, 5). Modelling time-series and cross-section data (TSCS) requires accounting for the specific data structure that violates standard assumptions ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression. There is clear evidence of panel heteroscedasticity (Breusch-Pagan test, $p < 0.05$) and the use of pooled linear models is therefore inappropriate since there is no constant variance. The further model selection is informed by a Hausman test ($p < 0.05$) that suggests to use fixed effects instead of random effects. All models therefore include country fixed effects that allow for the exploitation of multiple observations on cross-sectional units over time and the controlling of unobserved, unit-specific heterogeneity while obtaining estimates on observable, substantive variables of interest (Mummolo and Peterson, 2018). Treating the units as fixed elements eliminates the unchanging attributes of countries and rules out omitted variable bias from unobserved characteristics of countries that are time-invariant, such as political institutions and other country-idiosyncrasies like immigration history. The use of country fixed effects bears theoretical implications that the analysis focuses on within-country variation (Mummolo and Peterson, 2018). Both the theoretical interests in the temporal dimension of within-country change as well as the methodological necessity to account for unit heterogeneity recommends the use of country and fixed effects (FE). The focus on within-country variation fits my research question since I'm interested in the effect of structural changes over time and not level effects. FE models allow me to study the temporal dynamics in policy-making in response to an intensifying legitimacy trade-off. For the temporal dimension, I do not include fixed effects because an F-test of individual effect ($p > 0.05$) does not require their inclusion and since they tend to consume important variance of theoretical interest (see Plümper et al., 2005). A test for unit root also fails to show critical values. The standard errors (SE's) are clustered by countries in order to account for panel heterogeneity and cross-sectional correlation. Typically, time-series cross-sectional data requires that serial correlation is accounted for. There is however little reason to assume that the

policy changes of the previous government systematically influence the policy changes enacted by a government. The Durbin-Watson test statistic for auto-correlation indicates that the error terms of the cabinets are uncorrelated and can therefore be treated as independent observations.[33] No further adjustment is therefore needed for serial correlation.

Additional methodological considerations relate to the measurement of the dependent variable: the cabinet-aggregated policy output. Since the dependent variable captures policy change, I adjust for the absolute level of policy restrictiveness. For that purpose, I include the IMPIC-score of absolute level of the policy restrictiveness with separate scores for immigration and integration policy. This model adjustment controls for level and ceiling effects. Since governments are in charge for varying duration and therefore do not all have the same time to implement their policy agenda, I need to adjust for cabinet duration measured as the number of days a cabinet is in office.

Throughout the comparative study, I rely on the cabinet-dataset of migration policy output. Chapter 6 and 8 rely heavily on descriptive statistics and the panel data models discussed above. In Chapter 7, I introduce a dynamic perspective on policy choices. For that purpose, I also require a methodological approach that allows for an estimate of dynamic effects. I do this with a 'moving-window' approach where I estimate a series of models for sub-periods of equal length (Finseraas and Vernby, 2011; Kwon and Pontusson, 2010). Comparing the model estimates permits the tracking of gradual changes over time and is better than alternative estimation strategies that are based on non-overlapping sub-samples or simple interaction effects.[34] The choice of the window length provides a trade-off between estimation precision and accuracy of the time dimension. The periodisation of cabinet length advises not choosing too narrow windows to avoid noisy estimates. Applying a 15-year window over a period of 35 years guarantees sufficiently large sub-samples and results in 20 models to be estimated for consecutive time periods.[35] Chapter 9 tests the party mandate in migration policy. To measure mandate fulfilment, scholars mostly compare parties' electoral manifestos with their subsequent policy outputs (Klingemann et al., 1994; Royed, 1996). I apply a

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[33] Note that if my dependent variable would have been the absolute level of policy restrictiveness rather than the directional policy output, the assumption of uncorrelated errors would be almost certainly violated. However, in my case of policy changes it is not.

[34] If we interact the independent variable with one or more period dummies, it would imply that there is a structural break in an effect and would assume that we were able to identify a turning point.

[35] The number of observations vary between the sub-samples due to the periodisation based on cabinet duration and ranges from 91 to 117.

similar strategy by combining CMP/CHES data with the DEMIG Policy dataset in order to provide a substantive sample that allows for a quantitative analysis with panel data models (datasets introduced above). To test what drives the association between the electoral mandate of cabinets and their policy output, I include interaction terms between a cabinet's policy position and the potential drivers of mandate fulfilment.

Each empirical chapter contains a section with robustness tests to address model uncertainty and to assess effect stability in terms of direction and significance. Many different modelling strategies for time-series cross-sectional data have been proposed without a single model that can offer the best remedy for all of the problems involved (Wilson and Butler, 2007). For this reason, I include plausible alternative model specifications. I also conduct additional tests about whether the empirical conclusions hold when using alternative operationalisations of crucial concepts. Due to the use of macro-variables, the estimated average effects may be sensitive to case selection and classification choices (Kittel, 2006). I test whether the estimates are robust with regard to different sampling and classification choices. These various tests increase the validity of inference.

Finally, the empirical chapters test for the alternative strategies of muddling-through, signalling responsiveness and selective openness (see Section 3.1) that explain governments' policy choices. These alternative explanations are tested by comparing different dimensions of governments' policy choices and assessing whether they are in line with the theoretical expectations. The *muddling-through* strategy expects governments to respond by incremental policy-making to competing pressures. I test this hypothesis with a comparison of model estimates for major and minor reforms. If governments respond to the legitimacy trade-off by muddling-through, we should find these estimates to vary by the level of change. The increase of conflicting pressures should increase result in more minor policy changes and fewer major policy changes. This expectation is tested in various contexts throughout the comparative study. The second strategy of *signalling responsiveness* expects governments to respond to the legitimacy trade-off with symbolic policy changes that do not change the formal openness to immigration. If this prediction is correct, we should observe that responsiveness demands have a stronger influence on symbolic policy changes than on material policy changes that make policies more liberal or restrictive. I test this explanation by comparing the models explaining the two different types of policy output. The third strategy of *selective openness* expects governments to shape different policy responses towards desired economic immigrants and

undesired non-economic immigrants. I test this hypothesis by differentiating model estimates by policy target groups. If governments become more selective in response to the increasing tension between responsiveness demands and responsibility needs, I would expect them to enact different policy choices towards undesired non-economic migrants and desired economic migrants.

All three alternative explanations allow me to derive empirical implications that I systematically test throughout the comparative study. Evidence for one or more of these alternative explanations of migration policy choices does not directly undermine the main argument of the thesis since these explanations are not mutually exclusive. Testing these alternatives offers a systematic comparison of the evidence for different policy response strategies of national governments. Throughout the empirical part, I test the three existing theoretical explanations of policy choices by cross-pressured governments and evaluate their explanatory power in comparison to the novel argument of the thesis.

Chapter 6

Explaining migration policy choices

This chapter analyses the migration policy choices of West European governments between 1980 and 2014. What drives policy-making on immigration and integration? The analysis tests the first implications of the thesis argument (Section 3.2). I argue that governments prioritise responsible policy-making on immigration and responsive policy-making on integration. If this is the case, we should find different determinants of policy choices in these two dimensions. Are immigration policy and integration policies dominated by distinct modes of policy-making? This chapter is crucial to establish evidence of how migration policy-making is shaped by legitimacy concerns and lays the foundation for the subsequent empirical analyses. The remainder of this chapter starts with an analysis of what drives government to become active in migration policy, followed by an analysis what drives governments' choices to liberalise or restrict migration. The chapter concludes with a summary of these first results.

6.1 The drivers of policy activity

Governments place different emphasis on specific policies and vary in the extent of policy output across policy areas. Following the framework of democratic legitimacy, governments enact migration policy changes in order to address responsibility needs and responsiveness demands. The policy activity of governments should therefore follow the strength of these two sources of democratic legitimacy. Consequently, I expect that changes in immigration policy are motivated by responsibility

needs from macro-structural factors and changes in integration policy are motivated by responsiveness demands from domestic politics. The structural transformation of globalisation should be associated with immigration policy activity and the domestic politicisation should be associated with integration policy activity.

Hypothesis 1a: *The immigration policy activity of governments is driven by responsibility needs.*

Hypothesis 2a: *The integration policy activity of governments is driven by responsiveness demands.*

6.1.1 Results

To examine the drivers of policy-making on migration, I analyse what factors explain the overall policy activity of governments on immigration and integration issues. What motivates governments to enact policy changes? In a first assessment of my argument of external responsibility and internal responsiveness, I test to what degree the structural transformations of globalisation and politicisation drive migration policy activity of national governments. I estimate models using the number of policy changes a government enacted during its office term as the dependent variable. Figure 6.1 displays the marginal effects of the expected relationships. I find a expected positive association in both policy dimensions. The number of immigration policy changes increases significantly with higher levels of globalisation. The number of integration policy changes increases significantly with higher levels of politicisation. The globalisation effect on immigration policy output is stronger than the politicisation effect on integration policy output. The migration policy activity of governments increases with deeper international integration and more intense political competition around the issue of immigration.

Moreover, immigration policy activity does not vary systematically with domestic politicisation and integration policy activity does not follow the the level of economic globalisation (see model output in Table 6.1). Globalisation does only affect immigration policy and politicisation does only affect integration policy. These results confirm the different modes of policy-making. The additional mod-

Figure 6.1: Structural transformations and policy activity

Note: *The estimates represent predicted probabilities based on panel regression models including country fixed effects, an adjustment for cabinet duration and country-clustered standard errors. The estimates are displayed with 95 % confidence intervals.*

els with control variables included confirm the overall pattern.[1] The predicted difference between low and high levels of globalisation is an average of seven immigration policy reforms. The predicted difference between low and high levels of politicisation is an average of around three integration policy reforms. The results presented here show that these structural transformations induce policy activity in different policy dimensions of migration. While the international integration of countries is strongly associated with the number of immigration policy reforms, the level of politicisation is a strong determinant of the number of integration policy reforms. The control factors have only limited explanation power. The only significant predictors are unemployment rate, net migration and cabinet duration. In times of high unemployment, governments are less active in migration policy. The significant effect of the level of immigration suggests that migration policies are a response to immigration. Also the result that cabinets with longer office duration enact more policy changes confirms the theoretical expectation. No substantial effects are, however, found for institutional factors, government ideology or radical-right vote share.

6.1.2 Robustness test

To assess the robustness of these results, I conduct a series of tests using alternative methodological choices. First, I rerun the models using the KOF-index as an alternative operationalisation of globalisation that covers a broader measurement of international interdependence. The resulting

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[1] The models do not adjust for the absolute level of policy restrictiveness, since unlike with directional change, there is no reason to assume that it influences the likelihood of policy changes in general. This is confirmed also empirically of the IMPIC scores are included into the models.

Table 6.1: Determinants of migration policy activity

| | DV: Number of reforms | |
| | Immigration | Integration |
	(1)	(2)
Globalisation	7.817**	1.263
	(3.015)	(2.582)
Politicisation	−0.619	2.918*
	(1.342)	(1.149)
Unemployment rate	−0.168*	−0.122*
	(0.072)	(0.062)
GDP growth	−0.145	−0.101
	(0.087)	(0.074)
Net migration rate	167.863**	86.066
	(51.644)	(44.228)
Right-wing cabinet	−0.348	−0.026
	(0.214)	(0.183)
RRPP vote share	−0.001	−0.034
	(0.039)	(0.033)
EU-membership	0.640	1.213
	(0.774)	(0.663)
Number of veto players	−0.025	−0.170
	(0.224)	(0.192)
Cabinet duration	0.004***	0.003***
	(0.0004)	(0.0003)
Constant	−1.912	0.350
	(1.769)	(1.515)
Observations	228	228
Adjusted R^2	0.510	0.372

*Note: Panel regression models with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. The level of significance is as follows: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.*

effects are largely similar to the previous models: Immigration reforms become more numerous with increasing globalisation, integration reforms increase with domestic politicisation. Unlike in the previous models, there is also a significant globalisation effect in integration policy but substantially smaller than in immigration policy. To test whether the effects are affected by the distribution of the independent variable, I test whether their log-transformation yields the results. Also with this transformation, the result pattern remains unaltered. Since the institutional variables (veto players, EU-membership and policy baseline) have more variation between countries than within countries, I run models without country fixed effects to see how this changes their explanation power. Also in this alternative model specification, none of them exerts a significant effect on the directional change

of migration policies. I then test the robustness of the effects regarding sampling choices with a cross-validation test. The results are confirmed When I drop single countries from the models. This means that the estimated effects do not depend on one particularly influential countries or cabinets. Although globalisation and politicisation both increase over time they exert different effects on government's migration policy activity. To account for the time-trend, I run models including a time-trend variable. While the politicisation effect on integration reforms remains significant, the globalisation effect on immigration reforms loses its significance. This is in line with the observation that globalisation follows a more linear trend over time than politicisation that shows stronger fluctuations (see Figure 8.2). To test the robustness of the results in terms of various cabinet duration, I estimate models based on the sub-sample of cabinets that are at least one year in office. The globalisation effect increases and the politicisation effect decreases in these models, whereas the overall empirical pattern remains the same. These alternative estimates demonstrate that the results are sufficiently robust.

6.1.3 Alternative explanations

The results presented in this chapter confirm the idea that responsibility needs drive immigration policies and responsiveness demands drive integration policy. To corroborate this explanation of policy activity, I test three alternative explanations for how governments respond to the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy (see Section 3.1). The first explanation is a strategy of *muddling-through* that expects governments to balance responsiveness and responsibility with incremental policy-making. I test this hypothesis with separate models for major reforms and minor reforms (see Figure 6.2). The coefficients are of similar size and do not support the idea that governments distinguish between minor and major reforms in their policy-making. Globalisation tends to expand both type of reforms, whereas the effect of politicisation is close to zero. These results provide no empirical support for muddling-through as a government strategy.

The second explanation is a strategy of *signalling of responsiveness* by enacting symbolic policy changes that do not change the formal openness to immigration. I test this hypothesis using the number of symbolic and material reforms as dependent variables. The models do not reveal

Figure 6.2: Testing alternative explanations for migration policy activity

Note: The estimates are based on panel regression models including country fixed effects, an adjustment for cabinet duration and country-clustered standard errors. All control variables from Table 6.1 included. Estimates displayed with 95 % confidence intervals.

systematic effects (see Figures 6.2). If anything, material policy changes are more strongly associated with the levels of globalisation and politicisation. Hence, also for the idea of signalling responsiveness there is no empirical support.

The third strategy is *selective openness* towards different policy target groups. I test this idea by separating the admission of (desired) economic migrants from the admission of (undesired) non-economic migrants. Globalisation exerts a significant positive effect on the number of reforms on economic immigration, but not on non-economic immigration. The politicisation coefficient is slightly larger for non-economic immigration than for economic immigration, but does not reach significance in both models. A more pronounced difference between the two policy target groups is found for the globalisation effect. With higher levels of globalisation governments enact significantly more policies on economic immigration, whereas the coefficient for policies on non-economic immigration is negative and not significant. These results provide partial confirmation of the selective openness strategy in the sense that only policies on economic immigration are motivated by globalisation pressures.

6.2 The drivers of directional policy change

Migration policies determine the openness of a country to immigration. Migration policy changes are typically adjustments of policy restrictiveness with policies becoming more restrictive or more liberal to immigration. This section analysis the determinants of migration policy choices in terms of such directional changes. What factors explain liberalisations and restrictions in immigration and integration policy? Following the main argument of this thesis, I assume that the restrictiveness of immigration policies is primarily determined by responsibility needs and that the restrictiveness of integration policies is primarily determined by responsiveness demands. Furthermore, I expect the association to run in specific directions. In the theoretical section, I argue that international interdependence creates latent pressures for liberal migration policies. Regarding responsiveness demands, I argue that the median voter prefers less migration over more immigration. The effect of politicisation on directional policy choices is therefore most likely the restriction of policies.

Hypothesis 1b: *Directional immigration policy changes are driven by responsibility needs.*

Hypothesis 2b: *Directional integration policy changes are driven by responsiveness demands.*

6.2.1 Results

I examine the drivers of policy choices in directional terms in a similar fashion as in the previous section. I estimate the explanation power of globalisation and politicisation on directional policy changes in immigration and integration policy (see Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3: Structural transformations and directional policy change

Note: The marginal effect plots are based on panel regression models with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. The estimates are adjusted for cabinet duration and displayed with 95 % confidence intervals.

The level of globalisation is strongly associated with the liberalisation of immigration policies. The higher the international economic integration of a country, the more likely it becomes that governments liberalise immigration. I find no substantive association of globalisation with integration policy changes. The coefficient of politicisation exerts a restrictive influence on integration policies and as expected, the effect is stronger in the area of integration but does not reach statistical significance. Globalisation pressures lead to more external openness, whereas politicisation pressures does not systematically affect the directional change of migration policies.

Table 6.2: Determinants of migration policy changes (direction)

	DV: Restrictiveness of policy output	
	Immigration	Integration
	(1)	(2)
Globalisation	−8.964**	−2.770
	(3.291)	(2.783)
Politicisation	0.107	1.595
	(1.318)	(1.082)
Unemployment rate	0.074	0.003
	(0.088)	(0.071)
GDP growth	−0.034	−0.061
	(0.089)	(0.074)
Net migration rate	−35.006	−25.584
	(58.282)	(47.446)
Right-wing cabinet	0.408	0.444*
	(0.225)	(0.185)
RRPP vote share	0.022	0.010
	(0.040)	(0.033)
EU-membership	0.036	−0.856
	(0.777)	(0.636)
Number of veto players	0.067	−0.020
	(0.228)	(0.185)
Policy baseline	−2.175	−0.221
	(2.608)	(0.352)
Cabinet duration	−0.001*	−0.001***
	(0.0004)	(0.0003)
Constant	2.188	−0.404
	(2.141)	(1.582)
Observations	210	210
Adjusted R^2	0.177	0.235

*Note: Panel regression models with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. The level of significance is as follows: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.*

Table 6.2 shows the fully specified models with all factors related to responsibility needs (macro-structural factors) and responsiveness demands (domestic politics). The results for globalisation and politicisation remain in substance the same. The restrictive effect of politicisation on integration policies becomes more pronounced whereas there is no substantial effect on immigration policy. The effect of globalisation on the liberalisation of immigration policies remains strongly significant whereas no such effect is found for integration policies. The coefficients of the additional variables have rather limited explanation power. The effects of the macro-structural factors tend towards the expected direction with the exception of GDP growth. The effects of unemployment and net migration appear stronger in immigration than in integration policy. The fully specified models confirm the theoretical expectations that responsibility needs primarily drive immigration policies. However, none of the additional variables exert an influence on the directional change in immigration policy that is statistically significant. The government ideology exerts a significant effect on integration policy changes.[2] Left-wing government tend to enact more liberal policies. This result is an indicator that domestic politics does have a stronger influence in the domestic dimension of migration policy. However, the share of radical-right votes does not reveal a substantial effect in any policy dimension.[3] Finally, the cabinet duration appears as significant predictor of directional change. The longer a government is in office the more pronounced becomes the liberalisation of migration policies.

6.2.2 Robustness test

Whether these findings are stable, I test with a series of robustness checks. Using the KOF globalisation index instead of trade openness does weaken the liberalising effect of globalisation in immigration policy but does not alter the overall result pattern. Also the inclusion of a time-trend variable does not change substantially the coefficients of globalisation and politicisation. The institutional variables of veto players, EU-membership and policy baseline have more variation between countries than within countries. Their influence might be concealed by adjusting for time-invariant country-specific factors. However, all three variables do not exert a significant effect on the directional policy output also when the country fixed effects are dropped from the models. Also a cross-validation

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[2]   The effect of government ideology is analysed in more depth in Chapter 7.
[3]   The policy influence of radical-right parties is analysed in more depth in Chapter 8.

test by dropping single countries from the models confirms the results. Re-sampling suggests that the estimated effects do not depend on one particularly influential countries or cabinets.

To further investigate how consistent the effects in the analysis above are, I generate separate estimates for liberalisations and restrictions. This way, I can assess whether the effects of globalisation and politicisation on the directional policy output are rather the result of additional policy changes are of fewer policy changes. The separate model estimates show that the influence of structural transformation (globalisation and politicisation) is primarily more changes in the expected direction than the result of less changes in the opposing direction (see Figure 6.4). There is a strong effect of globalisation on immigration liberalisations and a strong effect of politicisation on integration restrictions. The effects are more pronounced than when taking all directional reforms into account (see Figure 6.3). No significant effects are found on immigration restrictions and integration liberalisations. These additional estimates are in line with the analysis of policy activity that demonstrates an increase in the number of policy changes with higher levels of globalisation and politicisation (see Section 6.1). This finding provides further evidence motivate governments to enact separate policy responses to responsibility needs and responsiveness demands.

Figure 6.4: More liberalisations, more restrictions?

(a) Immigration

(b) Integration

Note: The marginal effect plots are based on panel regression models with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. The model estimates are adjusted for cabinet duration and displayed with 95 % confidence intervals.

6.2.3 Alternative explanations

In the theoretical part above, I discuss three alternative response strategies to the legitimacy dilemma in migration policy (Section 3.1). In this section, I assess whether they provide plausible explanations for directional policy choices of governments.

The strategy of *muddling through* expects governments to enact policies that balance macro-structural needs and domestic political demands by incremental policy-making. Accordingly, we would expect similar policy determinants across both policy area. This is not the case as we have seen in the results of this chapter. To further test this hypothesis, I estimate separate models for minor and major reforms that allows me to test whether the effects of responsiveness demands and responsibility needs depend on the level of change. If the hypothesis is correct, we should see stronger effects of globalisation and politicisation on minor reforms than on major reforms. The results are presented by a coefficient plot in Figure 6.5. The coefficients in the two models are of similar size and none of them reaches statistical significance. Hence, there is no supportive evidence for the idea of muddling-through as a government strategy.

Figure 6.5: Testing alternative explanations for directional policy change

Note: *The estimates are based on panel regression models with country fixed effects and country-clustered standard errors. The models include the same control variables as the models in Table 6.1. The estimates are displayed with 95 % confidence intervals.*

The strategy of *signalling responsiveness* expects cross-pressured governments to enact more symbolic policies to address responsiveness demands. Since symbolic policy changes are in this study defined as non-directional, they also do not provide an explanation for directional policy changes. The strategy of *selective openness* suggests that governments reconcile responsiveness demands and responsibility needs by separate policies for different target groups. This strategy can be tested by re-estimating the models using policies on economic immigration and on non-economic immigration as dependent variables (results displayed in Figure 6.5). The estimated coefficients are close to zero for the politicisation effect on both target groups. They differ, however, substantially for the globalisation effect. The level of globalisation significantly reduces the restrictiveness of economic immigration policies, whereas the effect on policies towards non-economic immigration is substan-

tially smaller and not statistically significant. While responsibility needs from globalisation lead to more directional changes on economic immigration, the responsiveness demands from politicisation do not result in more directional reforms on non-economic immigration. These results provide only partial support for the idea of selective openness as a government strategy.

6.3 Summary

This first empirical chapter analyses the determinants of migration policy choices of national governments in West European countries between 1980 and 2014. I assess the driving factors of the quantity (policy activity) and the quality (change in restrictiveness) of governments' migration policy output. The analysis provides a first test of the thesis argument. Do governments prioritise responsibility in immigration policy while prioritising responsiveness in integration policy? The empirical evidence of this chapter largely confirms this theoretical expectation.

The external policy dimension of immigration is primarily determined by macro-structural factors and policy choices are driven by globalisation pressures. This hypothesis is confirmed regarding the policy activity (Hypothesis 1a) and the directional policy change (Hypothesis 1b) in the sense that globalisation is associated with more immigration reforms and stronger immigration liberalisation. In contrast, I do not find any systematic influence of domestic politics on government's immigration policy choices. The internal policy dimension of integration is determined by domestic politics and policy choices are driven by the politicisation of immigration. This hypothesis is confirmed regarding the policy activity (Hypothesis 2a) and the directional policy change (Hypothesis 2b) in the sense that politicisation is associated with more integration reforms and a more restrictive reforms on integration. In contrast, macro-structural factors play a minor role in shaping government's integration policy choices.

While the empirical analysis provides the first piece of evidence in favour of the main argument, the alternative explanations do not yield systematic support. Only the strategy of selective openness finds some support that governments respond to globalisation by the liberalisation of economic immigration rather than non-economic immigration. The results of this chapter confirm the idea different modes of policy-making across different policy dimensions. We learned that migration

policy choices in the external dimension of admission and the internal dimension of integration are driven by different factors. The empirical pattern is consistent with my argument of external responsibility and internal responsiveness. This finding lays the foundation for the next chapter that looks at the temporal dynamics of migration politics in response to an increasing tension between responsiveness and responsibility in migration policy-making.

Chapter 7

The dynamics of migration politics

7.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the evolution of governments' migration policy choices in response to an increasing tension between responsiveness demands and responsibility needs. The previous chapter 6 assessed the drivers of the quantity and quality of migration policy output. In the following, I expand on this analysis by introducing a dynamic perspective on policy-making in order to establish evidence of how the competing pressures of responsiveness and responsibility shape the policy choices of governments. How does migration politics evolve over time with a increasing legitimacy trade-off?

Policy-making is inherently dynamic and domestic politics is the constant adaptation to external constraints and opportunities in order to reach policy objectives. Scholars argue that a dynamic perspective is essential for understanding governments' policy choices because of the structural transformations that have occurred in the world economy over the past decades (Beramendi et al., 2015; Huber and Stephens, 2014). Migration politics in particular has been shaped by structural transformation of international globalisation and domestic politicisation (see Section 2.2). Hence, both responsibility needs and responsiveness demands are unlikely to be static. Over the last three decades, both the macro-structural needs of a globally integrated economy and the domestic demands for responsiveness have increased substantially. Globalisation increased the structural dependency of European countries on sustained immigration and created latent pressure for the liberalisation of immigration. Politicisation brought immigration on top of the political agenda and and mobilises political opposition against further immigration. These two developments took place

simultaneously but create opposing political pressures on policies. The analysis of the dynamics of migration policy-making allows me to assess the competing pressures from globalisation and politicisation. In the analysis, I examine the evolution of partisan effects on migration policy choices in order to assess whether they are motivated by domestic politics or by macro-structural factors. If governments act responsible in immigration policy and responsive in integration policy, as I argue in Section 3.2, we would expect different policy dynamics in these two policy dimensions. Immigration policies should primarily respond to the responsibility needs from globalisation. Integration policies should primarily respond to the responsiveness demands from domestic politicisation. The dynamic analysis provides additional evidence of how national governments respond to the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy.

The chapter continues with a discussion on the implications of the thesis argument for the evolution of policy choices on immigration and integration. Then, I test the theoretical expectations of policy dynamics with a descriptive analysis and a series of panel model estimates. The chapter concludes with robustness tests and the assessment of alternative explanations.

7.2 Migration politics between globalisation and politicisation

Migration politics in Western Europe has undergone deep structural transformations over time. In the 1980s, countries clinched to a zero-immigration policy and migration policy was largely decided behind closed doors and by elite consensus (Guiraudon, 1997, 2000a) with political parties building silent coalitions on migration policy (Perlmutter, 1996; Triadafilopoulous and Zaslove, 2006). Party systems were structured by stable cleavage structures around a domestic distributional conflict (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Nation states had substantial discretionary power on migration policies and policies follow distinct national models (Brubaker, 1992). These circumstances have changed over recent decades. On the one hand, governing constraints from economic globalisation have increased the responsibility needs in migration policy-making. On the other hand, the politicisation of immigration followed the realignment of party systems around socio-cultural issues and thereby increased responsiveness demands. In the following, I discuss in more details the competing expectations of globalisation and politicisation for migration policy-making over time.

The *globalisation hypothesis* expects migration politics to evolve in line with increasing macro-structural requirements of a globally integrated economy. National governments are constrained in their policy-making due to international interdependence resulting from the economic integration into world markets (Sassen, 1996) and the growing political internationalisation (Soysal, 1994).[1] Scholars argue that these constraints leave national governments no other choice than to accept immigration in order to preserve the institutional legitimacy of the liberal state and guarantee economic competitiveness (Hampshire, 2013; Hollifield, 2004). It is argued that migration policies in Western Europe are primarily driven by economic labour needs (Freeman, 1979; Hammar, 1985; Messina, 2007). The deepening of international integration further shrinks the policy space. Although it is contentious how much room for partisan politics there effectively is, there is broad consensus that the requirements of government responsibility have grown over time (e.g. Ford et al., 2015). The structural necessity of openness to immigration reduces the capability of governments to shape discretionary policies following their preferences. Responding to short-term demands from voters and the realisation of partisan goals becomes more difficult. As a result, we expect governing parties to enact increasingly similar policies with higher levels of globalisation.

Hypothesis 3a: *Partisan effects in migration policy decrease with higher levels of globalisation.*

Globalisation does create latent pressures for more liberal and market-friendly policies (Mair, 2013; Scharpf, 1999). The more countries are dependent on immigration, the more leverage do business interests have to demand liberal migration policies. The expansive dynamic of capitalism and the right-expanding logic of liberal institutions create latent pressure for immigration liberalisations. The growing economic and political interdependence of countries increases the liberalisation pressure in migration policy.[2] The second implication of the globalisation hypothesis is therefore that governments increasingly liberalise migration policies with deeper international integration.

Hypothesis 3b: *Migration policies become more liberal with higher levels of globalisation.*

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[1] Migration scholars argue as well that domestic constraints from liberal constitutionalism constrains the policy options of governments (e.g. Joppke, 1998). However, constitutions do not change dramatically over time and are therefore left out.

[2] One might argue that the liberalisation of immigration contributes to increasing interdependence. This direction of causality is, however, unlikely because the immigration liberalisation is clearly the laggard when it comes to the liberalisation of trans-border flows. Countries continue to insist on their national sovereignty to control immigration. Furthermore, migration flows are primarily determined by structural factors rather than the migration policies of a country (Hollifield et al., 2014).

The *politicisation hypothesis* expects migration politics to evolve in line with the growing importance of issue politics around migration. The last three decades have brought an important transformation of migration policy-making by an increasing politicisation of international migration in almost all West European countries (van der Brug et al., 2015). I define politicisation as the structural transformation of political conflict where the issue of immigration bears increasing weight in electoral competition. Although there are various understandings of the term, issue salience is commonly understood as the basic concept of politicisation (Green-Pedersen, 2012).[3] Migration has not only became a salient political issue but also catalysed the emergence of a new political divide that is structuring West European party systems. The emergence of a new socio-cultural cleavage between transnational integration and national demarcation has made immigration a central issue of party competition and has institutionalised the electoral conflict around immigration (Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2008). For both, left-wing and right-wing parties the issue if immigration has gained considerably in salience (Alonso and da Fonseca, 2011). This politicisation bears implications for the dynamics of migration politics. The first implication of the politicisation hypothesis is that political parties develop more distinct policy positions on immigration. The realignment of parties around the issue of immigration suggests that the ideology of a party becomes more clearly linked with its migration policy preference. De Vries et al. (2013) demonstrate that voters' left-right self-placement became more aligned with attitudes towards immigration (and less with socio-economic attitudes). The higher visibility and importance of the migration issue implies that voters are better able to locate their migration policy preferences and vote accordingly. As a result, we expect the sorting of voters to parties by migration policy preferences to become more important. According to the spatial theory of party competition do diverging views on an issue represent an essential element of politicisation (Downs, 1972). Right-wing parties increasingly mobilise voters that feel left behind from globalisation and share authoritarian values that renders their constituents increasingly critical to immigration. The electoral raise of radical-right populist parties pressures mainstream-right parties to take a more restrictive stance on immigration. As a result, we expect right-wing parties to realign around a more restrictive position on migration. Left-wing parties increasingly obtain electoral support from cosmopolitan and highly-educated constituencies and less from working-class voters, making it increasingly likely that they adopt liberal positions on migration (Han, 2015).

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[3] For a detailed discussion of the concept of politicisation, see Chapter 5.

Furthermore, the share of immigrants and immigrant voters has grown over time, making it more attractive for left-wing parties to appeal to immigrant voters by pursuing a liberal migration policy. Left-wing parties are therefore expected to realign around a more liberal position on migration. While right-wing parties have electoral incentives to harden their position on migration, changes in their electorates encourage left-wing parties to become more liberal over time (Schain, 2008). Politicisation should therefore put an end to the elite consensus on immigration and increase the partisan divide through an intensified political conflict. Consequently, governing parties should become increasingly responsive to their supporters and their migration policy preferences. The restructuring of West European party systems around a new cleavage between the openness and closure of nation states suggests that governing parties will enact increasingly distinct policies on the issue of migration.[4]

Hypothesis 4a: *Partisan effects in migration policy increase with higher levels of politicisation.*

A second implication of the politicisation hypotheses is the increased role of the median voter preference on public policies. The higher salience of migration, in the sense of more intense public debates on the issue, increases voters' demand for responsiveness and makes it more difficult for governments to ignore the preferences of the median voter (Wlezien, 1995). As Culpepper (2010) convincingly demonstrates in the case of corporate governance reforms, business interests tend to prevail when issues are of low salience or highly technical. When issues become politically salient, however, governing parties are spurred to pay more attention to the preferences of the median voter, and they may be less willing to favour business interests if their chances of re-election are at stake. Public opinion research has repeatedly shown that European citizens overwhelmingly prefer a reduced level of immigration (Sides and Citrin, 2007a). The literature suggests that the emergence of strong anti-immigration parties over the last three decades has further pressured mainstream parties to take more restrictive stances on immigration (Bale et al., 2010). The past decades have shown that the socio-structural determinants of voting behaviour have declined and issue voting has increased (Green-Pedersen, 2007), placing more weight on the issues parties compete about. The structural

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[4] One might argue that the policy choices of governments contribute themselves to the politicisation of immigration. And indeed, political parties most likely do both contribute and react to the evolution of political conflicts. However, it is the opportunity structure of social cleavages and institutionalisation of party systems that drive electoral strategies of parties and their subsequent policy choices (Häusermann et al., 2013).

transformation of politicisation should make particularistic competition around immigration more likely and should increase policy responsiveness to the electorate as a whole. Politicisation should therefore motivate governments to enact more restrictive migration policies following the preference of the median voter.

Hypothesis 4b: *Migration policies become more restrictive with higher levels of politicisation.*

The structural transformation of globalisation and politicisation create opposing theoretical expectations about the dynamics of migration politics. Politicisation is expected to create dynamics of increased partisan polarisation and more restrictive migration policies, whereas globalisation is expected to create dynamics of partisan convergence and more liberal migration policies. The thesis argument outlined in Section 3.2 suggests that responsibility needs shape immigration policies and responsiveness demands shape integration policy. By implication, the globalisation hypothesis (H3) should find confirmation in immigration policy and the politicisation hypothesis (H4) should find confirmation in integration policy. We should therefore see increasingly different modes of policy-making in the two dimensions of migration policy as response to an intensifying tension between responsiveness and responsibility.

7.3 Policy dynamics in immigration and integration

First, I conduct a descriptive analysis of how migration policy changes evolved over time. I compare the quantity and quality of policy output in the time period from 1980 to 1995 with the period from 1996 to 2014.[5] The bar plots in Figure 7.1 and 7.2 show the means of quantitative and qualitative policy output by policy dimension (immigration/integration) and government ideology (left/right).[6]

The comparison across the two policy dimensions reveals a higher policy activity of governments in immigration policy than in integration policy. This is the case for both left-wing and right-wing

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[5] The cut-off point is necessarily arbitrary. However, for methodological and theoretical reasons the year 1995 seems appropriate. To split the dataset in the middle allows for similarly large sub-samples. Moreover, the largest change both in economic globalisation and politicisation of immigration took place in the 1990s.

[6] Classification of cabinets as 'left' and 'right' based on the normalised left-right variable. All cabinets below a value of 0.4 are classified as 'left' and all cabinets above 0.6 are classified as 'right'. The two groups are of similar size.

Figure 7.1: Migration policy activity by government ideology

Note: The bars represent the group means of the number of policy changes and include the standard deviation. The comparison of the error bar does not allow to determine whether the difference is statistically significant.

cabinets. Over the whole period from 1980 to 2014, right-wing governments enact slightly more policy changes than left-wing governments. More revealing is the split of the sample into the two time periods that shows the development over time. There is a clear pattern of increasing policy activity independent of government ideology and policy dimension. Regarding partisan dynamics, there is a pronounced catch-up effect of left-wing cabinets. While in the time period before 1995, left-wing cabinets enacted only around half as many reforms as right-wing cabinets, they exceed right-wing cabinets in their average number of policy reforms after 1995. These results suggest that government's migration policy activity increased over time and that partisan differences in terms of the quantity of policy output decreased over time.

To assess the quality of policy output, I employ the same comparison with the directional change of migration policies (see Figure 7.2). The observation that all bars have negative values reveals that on average cabinets liberalised both immigration and integration policies independent of their ideology. Left-wing and right-wing cabinets have a largely similar liberalisation record in immigration policy, whereas left-wing cabinets liberalise more than twice as much as right-wing cabinets in integration policy. The comparison of left-wing and right-wing cabinets over the whole time period shows that partisan differences are more pronounced in integration than in immigration policy. The split of the

Figure 7.2: Change in policy restrictiveness by government ideology

Note: The bars represent the group means of the directional policy output (policy restrictiveness) and include the standard deviation. The comparison of the error bar does not allow to determine whether the difference is statistically significant.

sample allows me to assess the partisan dynamics over time. In immigration policy, governments increased their liberalisation efforts independent of their ideology. In integration policies, we observe a polarisation with the left becoming more liberal and the right becoming more restrictive. In the period before 1995 it was the political right that was more liberal, whereas after 1995 it was the political left that has a more pronounced liberalisation record. These results are in line with the idea of a realignment around the issue of migration with the left becoming more associated with pro-immigration positions and the right with anti-immigration positions. The analysis of directional policy changes confirms that partisan influence on policy choices has increased primarily in integration policy. The globalisation dynamics in immigration policy is confirmed regarding the liberalisation trend but not in terms of decreasing partisan effects. The politicisation dynamics in integration policy is confirmed regarding the increase in partisan polarisation but not in terms of more restrictive policies.

In the next step, I analyse partisan effects with a series of panel regression models (see the results in Table 7.1). Over the whole period from 1980 to 2014 partisan effects are larger in integration than immigration policy. Left-wing governments enact more liberal migration policies than right-wing governments. In substantial terms, the most right-wing government enacts two to three more restrictive integration policy reforms than the most left-wing government. When control vari-

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ables are included, the partisan effect in immigration policy become larger and the partisan effect in integration policy become smaller. Nevertheless, the main result that significant partisan effects appear only in integration policy but not in immigration policy remains unaltered.

Table 7.1: Partisan effects in migration policy

| | *DV: Restrictiveness of policy output* | | | |
| | Immigration | | Integration | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Government ideology	1.350	2.121	3.124***	2.452*
(0 = left; 1 = right)	(0.970)	(1.194)	(0.808)	(0.968)
Constant	0.051	−0.220	−1.869*	−1.083
	(0.902)	(1.933)	(0.751)	(1.331)
Controls	no	yes	no	yes
Observations	237	210	237	210
Adjusted R^2	0.125	0.150	0.207	0.232

Note: The table displays the result of panel regression models with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. The variable 'government ideology' measures the left-right-orientation of a government normalised to a range from zero to one. The level of statistical significance is as follows: $^*p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$. The complete model outputs are displayed in Table A.4 in the Appendix.

To understand the partisan dynamics over time, I estimate time-varying partisan effect with a 'moving window' approach. This method allows me to assess the fine-grained temporal evolution of partisan effects instead of a structural break or linear evolution. The plots in Figure 7.3 show how the estimated coefficients of government ideology (left/right) changes when choosing different time frames for underlying samples. In both policy dimensions, I observe that partisan effects increase over time. While partisan effects seem largely non-existent and fairly stable in the 1980s, they increase substantially over the course of the 1990s. Left-wing governments enact increasingly liberal policies in comparison with right-wing governments. The trend of partisan dynamics is similar across the two policy dimensions. Nevertheless, the dynamic perspective confirms the difference between immigration and integration policy, as significant partisan effects only occur in integration policy. This main pattern remains unaltered when conditioning the estimates on the control variables. The results largely confirm the pattern from the descriptive analysis above.

Figure 7.3: Time-varying partisan effects

Note: The plots present the coefficient of government ideology (0 = left, 1 = right) of twenty consecutive regression models based on a moving window of 15 years. The models include country FE's and country-clustered SE's. The coloured areas represent the 95 % confidence intervals.

The evidence suggests particular trends in the evolution of partisanship in migration policy. However, the temporal pattern does not reveal the drivers behind this evolution of partisan effects. Therefore, I test in the next step the theoretical arguments that the structural transformations of globalisation and politicisation are responsible for time-varying partisan effects. If the politicisation of immigration is indeed responsible for increasing partisan effects, I would expect government ideology to interact with the level of politicisation. I test this hypothesis empirically with interaction models (results presented in Figure 7.4 and Table A.5 in the Appendix). Politicisation does not moderate the partisan effect on immigration policy outputs. In integration policy, however, higher levels of politicisation explain the growing divide between left-wing and right-wing cabinets. No significant moderation effect is found for globalisation.[7]

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[7] Since there are no decreasing partisan effects, I do not report models estimating the moderation effect of globalisation. These models do as expected not yield any significant effects.

Figure 7.4: Drivers of partisan dynamics

(a) Immigration   (b) Integration

Note: The plots show how politicisation moderates the partisan effects in migration policy based on panel regression models with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. The models are adjusted for cabinet duration. The estimates are displayed with 95 % confidence intervals.

7.4 Robustness tests

Also this chapter tests the effect stability with a series of robustness checks. Do the revealed empirical pattern hold when using alternative operationalisation and estimation strategies? I re-estimate the models using the KOF-index as globalisation proxy. The estimates yield the same pattern. I then test whether the pattern of partisan effects depends on the radical-right that position itself strongly anti-immigration. Also when I include an RRPP-dummy (government participation) the partisan effects remain largely unaltered. This result suggests that the evolution of partisan effects is a general pattern and not dependent on the radical-right. The structural transformation of politicisation is correlated with time (see Figure 8.2). Are the effects therefore primarily the result of this correlation? I test this by including a time-trend variable into the models. The effect is only slightly weaker with a time-trend included.

I then run models on sub-samples to test the sensitivity of the estimates to sampling choices. Separate models are run for countries where politicisation of migration is low (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Iceland) an where politicisation of migration is high (Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, France, UK). A strong and significant partisan divide and partisan polarisation over time appears only in the models for the politicised countries but not for the non-politicised countries. This result is consistent with the the theoretical expectation. The different robustness checks suggest that the revealed empirical pattern of partisan dynamics appears consistently across different measurement and modelling choices.

7.5 Alternative explanations

In this section, I assess the evidence for alternative explanations of how governments deal with the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy. The first such explanation is a strategy of *muddling-through* where governments are expected to balance out responsiveness demands and responsibility needs with incremental policy-making. If this is the case, partisan effects should appear primarily on minor reforms than on major reforms. I test this with re-estimating the moving-window models separated for minor and major reforms (see Figure 7.5). The results suggest that major reforms are more partisan than minor reforms. This result suggests that governments deliver substantive policy changes based on their partisan ideology instead of choosing a strategy of incremental policy-making. The hypothesis of muddling-through is not confirmed.

The strategy of *signalling responsiveness* can also be tested in the dynamic perspective. In this perspective, governments address responsiveness demands with symbolic policies that do not affect the formal openness to immigrants. Assuming that the tension between responsiveness and responsibility has increased over time, governments become more likely to choose this option. I test this expectation with moving-window models using the number of symbolic reforms as dependent variable. The association between politicisation and symbolic policies shows no clear time trend. Moreover, the plot for the number of material reforms shows a similar pattern of temporal variation and no significant effect of politicisation. I find no supporting evidence for the strategy of signalling responsiveness.

The strategy of *selective openness* assumes that governments enact different policies towards different policy target groups. As in the previous chapter, I conduct a comparison of immigration policies on economic migration and immigration policies on non-economic migration. The moving-window estimates reveal a stronger increase of partisan difference towards non-economic immigrants as expected. The partisan effect is, however not significant for most estimates of non-economic immigration policy. While there is a pattern slightly supportive of the selective openness hypothesis, I do not find clearly opposing trends across the two policy dimensions and the effect size is rather small. Therefore, there is only limited support for the strategy of selective openness.

Figure 7.5: Testing alternative explanations for migration policy dynamics

Note: Each plot represents twenty consecutive panel regression models based on a moving window of 15 years. All models with country FE's, country-clustered SE's and adjustment for cabinet duration. The dependent variables are mentioned in the sub-titles of the plots. The band around the estimated effect line represents the 95% confidence interval. The alternative hypotheses expect stronger effects in the plots on the right side than the plots on the left side.

7.6 Summary

This chapter analyses migration policy dynamics over time. How did policy-making evolve in response to an increasing tension between responsiveness and responsibility? These two competing forces have opposing expectations regarding the role of partisanship on migration policies over time. Responsibility needs from globalisation expect a partisan convergence towards more liberalisation. The responsiveness demands from politicisation expect an overall restrictive dynamics and increasing

partisan differences. The empirical results provide partial support for both theoretical expectations. Over time, governments have become more active policy-makers on migration issues with left-wing cabinets catching up to right-wing cabinets. Governments have become generally more involved in migration policies over time. Regarding the directional policy change, the results confirm that structural transformations over the last decades have shaped the evolution of migration policies. The globalisation hypothesis finds confirmation in the sense that immigration has been increasingly liberalised independent of government ideology (Hypothesis 3a). However, against the theoretical expectation of a partisan convergence, the data suggest a slight trend towards more partisan policies (Hypothesis 3b). The politicisation hypothesis is confirmed as there is partisan polarisation over time, in particular in integration policies (Hypothesis 4a). However, beyond the growing partisan divide there is no overall trend towards more restrictive migration policies (Hypothesis 4b). Globalisation tends to influence the direction of policy change, whereas politicisation affects the partisan influence on policy choices. The results reveal that migration politics is not static, but evolves over time in response to political and economic transformations. The politicisation of migration ended the previous elite consensus and resulted in the polarisation of of integration policies between left-wing and right-wing governments. Progressing globalisation has increased the liberalisation efforts of governments in immigration policy. The external openness appears as a structural necessity, whereas the internal openness appears to be a partisan choice.

These findings confirm the expectation of the thesis argument that responsible policy-making is prevalent in immigration policy and responsive policy-making is prevalent in integration policy. The globalisation-induced immigration liberalisation suggest that the external dimension of migration policy follows the needs of international interdependence. The politicisation-induced polarisation of integration policies suggest that the internal dimension of migration policy follows the demands from domestic politics.

Chapter 8

The policy influence of the radical-right[1]

8.1 Introduction

This chapter studies how the political success of radical-right populist parties (RRPPs) influences the migration policy choices of governments. The mobilisation of anti-immigration sentiments and the politicisation of immigration in electoral competition by RRPPs is an important source of responsiveness demands in migration policy. The analysis of how RRPPs influence policy choices allows me to provide further evidence of how national governments adjust their policy choices when they face increased demands for democratic responsiveness. Over the last three decades, radical-right populist parties have established themselves as a permanent feature of party systems in West European countries. They share nativism as ideological core and take a strongly anti-immigration position (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 2007). RRPPs create with their policy agenda pressure on mainstream-parties to adopt more restrictive migration policies. The radical-right is therefore an important driver behind the politicisation of migration (Grande et al., 2018). With RRPPs gaining votes in elections and seats in parliaments and governments, we can expect the demands for responsiveness in migration policy to increase. The political pressure from the radical-right intensifies the legitimacy trade-off between responsiveness and responsibility (see Section 2.1). How do national governments respond to the political pressure from the radical-right for more restrictive migration policies?

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[1] This chapter is partly based on Lutz (2019b).

In the theoretical part, I argue that governments respond to the legitimacy trade-off between responsiveness and responsibility with a responsible immigration policy and a responsive integration policy (see Chapter 3.2). If this is the case, we would expect the increased political pressure from RRPPs to be responded in integration policy but not in immigration policy. Consequently, I expect mainstream parties to co-opt the radical-right in the internal dimension of integration but not in the external dimension of immigration. This chapter is crucial to establish evidence of how migration policy choices respond to electoral mobilisation that create political pressure on governments. The analysis adds to the findings of the previous chapter that domestic politics affects primarily the internal dimension of migration policy. I begin with demonstrating how RRPPs have established themselves in West European party systems and how they have increased the demands for democratic responsiveness on migration issues. I further elaborate on the migration policy influence of RRPPs and derive a series of sub-hypotheses. I then present the empirical findings and conclude with robustness checks and the assessment of alternative explanations.

8.2 The radical-right and the demand for responsiveness

Over the last three decades, immigration has emerged as an important issue of political conflict across Western Europe (van der Brug et al., 2015). The growing presence and electoral breakthrough of RRPPs was instrumental to place immigration on the political agenda (Mudde, 2013). This party family started its electoral success in the 1980s, accelerated it throughout the 1990s and have since then established themselves as a permanent feature of party politics (see Figure 8.1). Across the 18 West European democracies analysed in this thesis, the average vote share of RRPPs has grown substantively over the last decades. While RRPPs have hardly gained any votes in the early 1980s, they increased their average vote share to around 5 % in the middle of the 1990s, and experienced a second increase after 2005 to almost 10 % on average.

The radical-right not only gained more votes over time, in several countries it has also entered coalition governments as a junior partner of mainstream-right parties (De Lange, 2012; Mudde, 2013). The first such cabinet where RRPPs gained direct policy-shaping capacity was the Italian cabinet of Silvio Berlusconi in 1994. Since then, such coalitions were investitured also in Austria,

Figure 8.1: RRPP vote share across 18 West European democracies

Note: *The line graph displays the average vote share of radical-right populist parties across 18 West European countries between 1980 and 2014. Calculated based on data from the Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS) by* Armingeon et al. (2017b).

Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands and Norway.[2]   Table 8.1 presents an overview of RRPP-supported cabinets including both formal and informal coalitions.

Table 8.1: List of cabinets with support from RRPPs

Country	Cabinet	Coalition	Period
Government Coalition			
Austria	Schüssel I	ÖVP, **FPÖ**	2000 - 2003
	Schüssel II	ÖVP, **FPÖ**/**BZÖ**	2003 - 2007
Italy	Berlusconi I	FI, **LN**, **AN**, UDC, CCD	1994 - 1995
	Berlusconi II	FI, **AN**, **LN**, CCD	2001 - 2005
	Berlusconi III	FI, **AN**, **LN**, CCD, NPSI, PRI	2005 - 2006
	Berlusconi IV	PDL, **LN**, DCpA	2008 - 2011
Netherlands	Balkenende I	CDA, VVD, **LPF**	2002 - 2003
Norway	Solberg I	H, **FrP**	2013 - 2017
Switzerland	Ogi II	**SVP**, SP, FDP, CVP	1999 - 2003
	Deiss I	**SVP**, SP, FDP, CVP	2003 - 2007
	Couchepin II	**SVP**, SP, FDP, CVP	2007 - 2011
	Widmer-Schlumpf I	**SVP**, SP, FDP, CVP, BDP	2011 - 2015
External support			
Denmark	Fogh Rasmussen I	LIB, KF (**DF**)	2001 - 2005
	Fogh Rasmussen II	LIB, KF (**DF**)	2005 - 2007
	Fogh Rasmussen III	LIB, KF (**DF**)	2007 - 2009
	Løkke Rasmussen I	LIB, KF (**DF**)	2009 - 2011
Netherlands	Rutte I	VVD, CDA (**PVV**)	2010 - 2012
Norway	Bondevik II	KrF, H, V (**FRP**)	2001 - 2005

Note: *The parties are listed in the order of their seat shares. The parties that are printed in bold letters represent RRPPs and the parties in brackets represent RRPPs that provide external support for a minority government. The selection of cabinets follows largely the selection of* Akkerman (2012) *and* De Lange (2012). *Switzerland is a special case with itst government based on the 'magic formula' resulting from consocational style of government. Following* Röth et al. (2018) *all cabinets from 1999 are coded as RRPP-supported.*

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[2]   In Switzerland, the SVP has been in government for decades but was prior to the 1990s not classified as a RRPP.

The radical-right party family has evolved from the fringes to the mainstream in West European party systems. The opposition to immigration and multicultural societies is at the heart of RRPP's electoral success (Mudde, 2013). They articulate a coherent anti-immigration ideology with restrictive positions on the issue of immigrant admission and immigrant integration (Akkerman, 2015; Zaslove, 2004; Lehmann and Zobel, 2018). This position corresponds well with the median voter that prefers less immigration and more restrictive migration policies (Sides and Citrin, 2007a). This endows RRPPs with a considerable agenda-setting power and the leverage to pressure mainstream parties and governments towards a more restrictive stance on immigration and integration. Grande et al. (2018) demonstrate that the issue-entrepreneurship of RRPPs is crucial to explain variation in the level of politicisation of immigration. Others argue that also mainstream parties have incentives to place immigration on the political agenda (Meyer and Rosenberger, 2015; van der Brug et al., 2015). Nevertheless, scholars consider RRPPs as important catalysts for the migration issue taking centre stage in electoral competition (Mudde, 2013). Figure 8.2 displays the level of electoral issue salience of migration over time. Migration was least politicised in the 1980s, reached new heights in the beginning of the 1990s when Europe received a record number of refugees, and the highest levels just before the financial crisis in 2008. Overall, politicisation has significantly increased between 1980 and 2014, alongside the electoral breakthrough of RRPPs as anti-immigration parties.

Figure 8.2: Politicisation of migration over time

Note: The plot displays a smooth line (smoothing parameter: 0.2) of the average level of politicisation across 18 West European democracies between 1980 and 2014. Index based on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), for the operationalisation see Section 5.5.

The policy influence of a party is defined as a preferred policy change that would not have occurred without the party's existence (Carvalho, 2013; Williams, 2006).[3] This change can relate to both the quantity and the quality of policy output. In terms of quantity, I expect the influence of RRPPs to be expansive due to their strong emphasis on migration issues. In terms of quality, I expect the influence to be restrictive due to RRPP's opposition to immigration. There are two distinct pathways that enable RRPPs to influence government's policy output: an indirect influence by shifting the policy agenda of mainstream parties as an electoral competitor, and a direct influence by gaining policy-making capacity as a governor (Schain, 2006).

The indirect pathway of policy influence results from parties' capacity to influence party competition and its direction. RRPPs particularly influence electoral competition by broaching immigration as a salient political issue and mobilising anti-immigration sentiments (Davis, 2012). RRPPs mobilise popular demands for policy change and put considerable pressure on governments to take a more restrictive stance on immigration. The electoral success of RRPP's makes it more difficult for mainstream parties to ignore the restrictive preference of the median voter, and therefore, liberal migration policies become a bigger electoral risk to them (Bale, 2003; Bale et al., 2010; van Spanje, 2010). The co-optation of the radical-right may therefore be seen as a strategy for mainstream parties to prevent voter defection. As a result, I expect mainstream parties to shift towards migration policies that are more restrictive.

Hypothesis 5a: *The electoral success of RRPPs leads to more restrictive migration policies.*

A party can also exert direct influence on policy choices by gaining government office. Since the radical-right has only entered coalition governments, the policy choices are therefore necessarily the result of a bargaining interaction with their mainstream-right coalition partner. Only when the mainstream-right party co-opts the more restrictive position of the radical-right party we can expect a policy effect. Shifting their policy positions is electorally risky for parties. Such changes may alienate party voters, create internal divisions, and undermine credibility in the public's per-

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[3] Some might argue for the possibility of reverse causality between policy success and electoral/office success. Potential feedback loops between success in office and electoral outcomes can work in both direction, either enhance or wreck RRPPs potential for future electoral success (Akkerman and De Lange, 2012; De Lange, 2012). Since parties tend to lose votes due to governing costs, reverse causality is at least unlikely. I nevertheless take these concerns into account in the research design with the measurement of electoral/office success preceding the measurement of policy success. This takes the logical temporal order into account.

ception. Policy inertia is therefore the default option for parties. The electoral success of RRPPs provides, however, also the strategic opportunity for mainstream-right parties to gain government office by extending the overall size of the right-wing block (Bale, 2003). The coalition potential can be increased by ideological proximity that mitigates the policy concessions that governing parties would expect from each other. It is plausible that mainstream-right parties co-opt more restrictive migration policies in order to gain government office as the senior partner of a right-wing coalition.

Hypothesis 5b: *The government participation of RRPPs leads to more restrictive migration policies.*

A restrictive influence on migration policies can be the result of RRPP's capacity to enact policy restrictions (preferable change) and/or its capacity to prevent policy liberalisations (undesirable change) compared to the direction the policy would have taken in their absence. Endowed with government power, RRPPs have electoral incentives to demonstrate to their voters that they are capable of providing effective governance and are able to deliver promised policies, in particular when it comes to their core issue of immigration. The office success brings policy-making capacity that endows RRPPs with additional leverage to pass their preferred policy agenda. As a result, I expect governments with RRPP participation to enact more migration policy output and the directional policy influence to lead to more restrictive policy output. As argued above, politicisation signals demands for policy change and is therefore more likely to motivate governments to pass additional policy reforms rather than impede their policy activity. Alternatively, one could argue that RRPPs constitute a veto-player that may prevent mainstream parties to enact their favoured (more liberal) policies. I have argued that governments are motivate to enact policy changes that demonstrate responsiveness in order to maintain democratic legitimacy. Sticking to the status quo does neither allow governments to demonstrate effective governance nor democratic responsiveness. Taking these considerations together, I expect co-optation of the radical-right to take place primarily by additional restrictions than the fewer liberalisations.

Hypothesis 5c: *The policy influence of RRPPs is rather change-enabling than change-constraining.*

The election and office success of RRPPs increases demands for policy change and responsive policy-making. The thesis argument expects government to fulfil such responsiveness demands in internal integration policies while prioritising responsibility needs in external immigration policies. Consequently, I expect RRPP's policy influence to be more likely in integration than in immigration policy across all three sub-hypotheses.

8.3 The migration policy success of the radical-right

In the following, I assess if and how the radical-right influences migration policy choices of West European governments.[4] As in the previous chapters, I use panel regression models to estimate the determinants of government's migration policy output across space and time. The vote share of RRPPs at the last election serves as a factor to estimate the indirect policy effect. The direct policy effect, I estimate by comparing the policy output of radical-right cabinets with the policy output of mainstream-right cabinets. The controlled comparison of mainstream-right with radical-right cabinets tests whether the (restrictive) policy output is the result of the radical-right or rather stems from mainstream-right parties instead. Separate analyses are conducted for the effects on the quantity and quality of policy output.

First, I analyse the influence of RRPPs on the quantity of policy output. The higher emphasis that RRPPs place on migration issues in comparison to mainstream parties should result in a higher polic activity of governments. Figure 8.3 compares the number of policy reforms enacted by mainstream-right cabinets with those by radical-right cabinets. We see that governments with RRPP support enact more policy changes both in immigration and integration policy. In substantive terms, the radical-right cabinets enact on average approximately two more reforms in each policy dimension. However, there is large variations between the different cabinets indicated by the large standard deviations. I further assess the expansive effect of RRPPs on governments' policy activity with a series of panel regression models. Figure 8.4 plots the estimated effect of radical-right vote share (indirect effect) and government participation (direct effect) on the number of policy reforms. The

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[4] Since RRPPs have become an important political actor only in the 1990s, the sample used for the following analysis is reduced to the time period between 1990 and 2014. Repeating the same analysis with the total sample does, however, yield substantially the same results.

Figure 8.3: Average number of policy changes by government ideology

Note: The bar plots compare the policy activity of mainstream-right and radical-right cabinets (mean number of reforms with standard deviation). I include only cabinets with a duration of more than one year. The graph is based on N = 15 radical-right cabinets and N = 32 mainstream right cabinets.

coefficients confirm the descriptive evidence that RRPP-supported cabinets enact more policy reforms than comparable mainstream-right cabinets. The effect is of similar size in immigration and integration policy. Governments with radical-right support enact between one and two more reforms compared with mainstream-right cabinets. The effects are, however, not statistically significant. I find no evidence for an indirect effect as the coefficient of RRPP vote share is around zero. From these models we learn that the direct effect tends to be more pronounced than the indirect effect. However, none of the estimates reaches statistical significance and suggests a limited influence of the radical-right on the migration policy activity of governments.

Figure 8.4: RRPP influence on the numbers of reforms

Note: The coefficients result from the fully specified models with country FE's and clustered SE's as well as control variables (complete model output in Table A.6 in the Appendix). The dependent variable is the number of policy reforms by policy dimension. The plot shows the coefficients of RRPP-government participation (mainstream-right governments as reference category) and the RRPP vote share (normalised to a range from zero to one). Estimates displayed with 95 % confidence intervals.

I then estimate the directional effect of RRPPs on migration policy choices. Do governments enact more restrictive policies as a result of the radical-right's influence? This is estimated as well with panel regression models using the directional policy output as dependent variable (results in Table 8.2). Model (1) and (2) on immigration policy detect no significant effect neither for the direct nor the indirect influence. The government participation of RRPPs slightly increases policy restrictiveness in the base model, but becomes negative when I include control variables. In comparison with mainstream-right cabinets, the governments with radical-right support do not enact significantly more restrictive immigration policies. The indirect effect of RRPPs as an electoral competitor appears to reduce policy restrictiveness against the theoretical expectation. However, also these coefficients clearly miss statistical significance. The estimates suggest that the electoral success of RRPPs does neither directly nor indirectly influence government's immigration policies in any significant way.

Table 8.2: Estimates of the radical-right policy success

| | *DV: Restrictiveness of policy output* | | | |
| | Immigration | | Integration | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
RRPP government participation	0.085	−0.449	2.305*	2.254*
	(1.170)	(1.215)	(0.917)	(0.999)
RRPP vote share	−1.460	−1.738	−1.280	−1.390
	(1.738)	(1.703)	(1.359)	(1.399)
Cabinet duration	−0.001*	−0.001	−0.001**	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Constant	4.076	2.550	0.624	−0.143
	(2.613)	(3.436)	(1.463)	(2.501)
Controls	no	yes	no	yes
Observations	138	134	138	134
Adjusted R^2	0.191	0.241	0.362	0.328

Note: Panel regression models with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. All models are adjusted for cabinet duration. The coefficients of RRPP-government participation uses mainstream-right government as reference category and the variable of RRPP vote share is normalised to a range from zero to one. For legibility reasons, the coefficients of the controls and the country dummies were left out (complete model output in Table A.7 in the Appendix). The level of significance is as follows: $^*p{<}0.05$; $^{**}p{<}0.01$; $^{***}p{<}0.001$.

I then estimate the same models for integration policies. Model (3) and (4) reveal that the government participation of RRPPs significantly increase the policy restrictiveness. Compared with mainstream-right cabinets, the policy output of RRPP-supported cabinets is on average more than

two reforms more restrictive. The coefficients are statistically significant and are not affected by the inclusion of control variables into the model. For the indirect policy influence the coefficients resembles the ones found for immigration policy: Both models show a weak negative effect against the theoretical expectation. These findings suggest that the policy success of RRPPs indeed varies across the two dimensions of migration policy. A substantial policy effect is found only in integration policy but not in immigration policy.

The influence of RRPPs on the direction of migration policy choices can be change-enabling (more restrictions) and/or change-constraining (less liberalisations).[5] The previous models are not able to assess in which way RRPPs exert their influence. The aggregated measure for the restrictiveness of government's policy output may conceal the actual number of liberalisations and restrictions since the balance out each other. Therefore, I estimate separate models for liberalisations and restrictions to shed more light on how RRPPs influence migration policies (see Figure 8.5 and Table A.8 in the Appendix). Does the political influence of RRPPs prevent liberalisations and/or lead to more restrictions?

Figure 8.5: RRPP effect: change-enabling or change-constraining?

Note: Estimates from the fully specified models with country FE's and clustered SE's for the direct effect (government participation) and the indirect effect (vote share) of RRPPs on the directional policy output. Mainstream-right governments serve as reference category for the direct effect. RRPP vote share normalised to a range from zero to one. Positive value represent a liberal effect and negative values represent a restrictive effect. 95 % confidence intervals displayed.

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[5] For a similar analysis, see also Section 6.2.

The model results displayed in Figure 8.5 do not find any significant effect of the RRPP vote share and thereby confirming the null effects in the previous models. All coefficients are positive and estimate contrary to the theoretical expectation a liberal effect of RRPP's electoral success on the migration policy output. The separation of change-enabling and change-restricting effects confirms the previous result that RRPPs do not exert a significant influence on migration policies as an opposition party. For the direct influence of RRPPs as governors, the models reveal a clear pattern. RRPPs are more likely to increase the number of restrictions than decrease the number of liberalisations across both policy dimensions. The coefficients confirms the tendency that RRPP-supported cabinets enact more reforms (compared to mainstream-right cabinets) and that the directional effect on immigration policy is not significant. For integration policy, the models show that the significant restrictive effect of RRPP government participation found in the previous model above is almost exclusively the result of more restrictions and not the result of fewer liberalisations.

8.4 Robustness tests

I test the reliability of these findings with a series of robustness tests. First, I rerun the models using alternative operationalisations of crucial variables. Instead of the electoral share of RRPPs, I use the seat share in parliament and the change in vote share compared to the previous election.[6] Furthermore, we would expect that it may makes a difference whether radical-right parties just gained votes and seats in one election or have established themselves as a permanent feature of a party system. Therefore, I run an additional model with a variable measuring for how many continuous years RRPPs won more than five percent of the votes in parliamentary elections. All three alternative model specifications yield no different results and confirm the null-finding for an indirect policy effect of RRPPs.

A second issue is the case selection. The limited number of radical-right cabinets is likely to make the estimates sensitive to classification and sampling choices (Kittel, 2006). I assess the stability of my estimates with alternative sampling choices. The inclusion of cabinets back to 1980 and thereby gaining more observations and years with few successful RRPPs does not substantially alter the main results. When I reduce the sample to cabinets with a duration of at least one year,

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[6] The variable is measured as current vote share minus vote share from previous election.

the result pattern is largely similar (cf. Lutz, 2019b). Additionally, I conduct cross-validation tests by excluding single countries and governments from the sample. The Danish cabinets are the most influential observations. But even when leaving them out, radical-right government participation still leads to a significant increase of integration policy restrictions and no effect on immigration policies. The results suggest that the main effects do not depend on a few influential observations or the specific case selection. Despite the small number of 18 governments with RRPP-support, the pattern of policy influence is robust to classification or sampling choices. I then conduct separate estimations of policy effects for formal and informal coalitions. The RRPP influence is stronger in the case of informal coalitions compared to formal coalitions both regarding the quantity and regarding the direction of policy output. While this suggests that providing support to mainstream right governments is sufficient to exert policy influence, this conclusion is tentative due to the low number of six informal coalitions the estimates are based on. The cumulative results of these re-sampling tests confirm the finding that mainstream-right parties selectively co-opt the radical-right in integration policy when they form a government coalition.

Another issue could be a spurious relation with time. The significant effect of RRPP-supported governments on migration policy could be the result of these governments occurring simultaneously with the realignment of party systems around immigration that takes place independent of the far-right's success (see e.g. Money, 1999). The realignment of political conflicts would therefore be a third variable explaining both increasing partisan divide and RRPP success. I test this hypothesis with the inclusion of a time-trend variable into the model. The effects remain unaltered in substance. Therefore, we can conclude that the direct effect of RRPPs on integration policy is unrelated to potential time-trend effects. One could argue that the spatial competition of political parties conceals the indirect policy influence. Scholar argue that left-wing parties tend to become more liberal and right-wing parties tend to become more restrictive when faced with electoral competition from the radical-right (e.g. Schain, 2008). Indirect effect of RRPPs should therefore take into account their interaction with the ideology of governing parties. I do, however, not find a significant moderation effect of government ideology on the indirect influence of RRPPs on migration policies. The additional tests confirm the robustness of the non-finding for an indirect policy effect as well as the finding of a direct policy effect in integration policy but not in immigration policy.

8.5 Alternative explanations

In this section, I present additional analyses to assess the explanatory power of the three alternative explanations for trade-off choices in migration policy (see Section 3.1). Do the strategies of muddling-through, signalling responsiveness or selective openness help to explaining the policy choices of governments in response to the political pressure from the radical-right? Furthermore, I analyse parties' policy positions on immigration and integration to test whether the selective co-optation of the radical-right could be the result of ideological proximity rather than the room to manoeuvre as I argue.

The strategy of *muddling-through* expects governments to enact more incremental reforms when they face conflicting political pressures. I test this hypothesis by estimating separate models for minor and major policy changes (see Figure 8.6). As in the analysis above, the indirect effect of RRPPs is negative and the direct effect is positive. The coefficients for the indirect effects both point in the opposite direction than expected by the argument. The coefficients for the direct effect are the same size for minor and major reforms. Furthermore, none of the coefficients is statistically significant. These results provide no support for the idea that governments use minor policy reforms to address responsiveness demands from the radical-right.

According to the strategy of *signalling responsiveness*, governments respond with symbolic policy changes to conflicting pressures. I test this hypothesis with separate models for symbolic and material policy changes. The estimates in Figure 8.6 do not provide any empirical support. The indirect policy effect is slightly stronger for symbolic reforms, whereas the direct policy effect is stronger for material reforms. None is different from zero. The strength of the radical-right does therefore also not lead to a systematic increase in symbolic policy-making.

The strategy of *selective openness* implies that governments respond to conflicting policy imperatives by an increased selectivity of immigration policies. The policy influence of RRPPs should therefore depend on the policy target group. I test this hypothesis with separate models for immigration policies on economic immigrants and on non-economic immigrants (see Figure 8.6). The coefficients for economic immigration policies suggest a liberal effect of RRPPs and the coefficients for non-economic immigration policies suggest a restrictive effect of RRPP strength. However, also in these models non of the effects is statistically significant. While there is a consistent pattern

Figure 8.6: Policy influence of RRPPs: Testing alternative explanations

Note: *The coefficient plot is based on panel regression models with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. The models are adjusted for cabinet duration and include the same control variables as in Table 8.2 above. The coefficients estimate the indirect effect (RRPP vote share) and the direct effect (RRPP government participation) of the radical-right on the change in migration policy restrictiveness and in the case of signalling responsiveness on the number of reforms. The variable of RRPP government participation (direct effect) uses mainstream-right cabinets as reference category and the RRPP vote share (indirect effect) is normalised to a range from zero to one. Positive coefficients represent a restrictive effect on policy output. All effects are displayed with 95 % confidence intervals.*

of selective openness, the effects are not particularly substantial and are not significantly different from zero. The assessment of alternative explanations provides no systematic empirical support and confirms that the only substantial co-optation of the radical-right takes place in integration policy. I argue that this pattern is the result of the limited room to manoeuvre in immigration policy that motivates governments to enact responsive policies in the domestic area of integration. There is, however, an alternative explanation for this selective co-optation of the radical-right. The different policy effects in immigration and integration policy could be the result of a different ideological nature of the two policy dimensions.[7] Is co-optation more pronounced in integration policy because mainstream-right and radical-right parties are ideologically closer to each other in this dimension than in immigration policy? I test this hypothesis with data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) by comparing the policy positions of mainstream-right parties with the positions of RRPPs (see Figure 8.7). Both party groups position themselves on the restrictive side of the policy scale meaning that they prefer more restrictive policies both on immigration and integration.

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[7]   See Chapter 9 for a deeper elaboration of this argument and a more comprehensive empirical assessment.

Figure 8.7: Migration policy positions of the mainstream-right and the radical-right

Note: Data of policy positions from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015). The sample contains N = 171 party positions (with N = 39 classified as radical-right). The following party families are counted as mainstream-right: 'conservative', 'confessional', 'christian-democratic', 'liberal', 'agrarian/centre'. The scale of policy preferences ranges from 0 = most liberal to 10 = most restrictive. For a more detailed display of policy positions by party family see Figure 9.2.

Figure 8.8: Distribution of policy positions within radical-right cabinets

Note: Data of policy positions from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015). Each party position is marked with the abbreviation of the party name. Full names of parties: FI = Forza Italia; LN = Lega Nord; CDA = Christen-Democratisch Appèl; VVD = Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie; PVV = Partij voor de Vrijheid; H = Høyre; FrP = Fremskrittspartiet; V = Venstre; KF = Konservative Folkeparti; DF = Dansk Folkeparti. The Swiss cabinets are excluded due to their distinct coalition-forming process in the country, which includes all major parties.

RRPPs position themselves as expected substantially more to the restrictive extreme than the mainstream-right parties. Most importantly, this pattern is found in both policy dimensions. The ideological distance between the radical-right and the mainstream-right does not vary between immigration and integration. This is further corroborated by the comparison of RRPPs with mainstream-right parties within coalition governments. Figure 8.8 shows six RRPP-supported cabinets and how the different governing parties position themselves on immigration and integration. The pattern

of an equal ideological distance finds confirmation in all those cabinets. Different ideological proximity in immigration and integration can therefore not account for the selective co-optation of the radical-right by mainstream-right parties.

8.6 Summary

This chapter analyses how migration policy choices of governments are shaped by the political influence of radical-right populist parties. These parties are an important source of responsiveness demands in migration policy and allow me to test how governments respond to the tension between responsiveness and responsibility. Due to external constraints in immigration policy, responsive policies should be more likely in integration policy, as I argue throughout this thesis. The results of this chapter reveal that the policy influence of RRPPs is limited to a direct effect on integration policies where they are able to enact more restrictive reforms when they hold government office. The empirical evidence in this chapter provides support for a direct effect of the radical-right on migration policies as a governor (Hypothesis 8a) but not for an indirect effect as an electoral competitor (Hypothesis 8b). The mere electoral success of RRPPs does not result in significant policy effects despite the electoral competition with mainstream parties. Furthermore, the results confirm the theoretical expectation that when RRPPs influence the policy choices of governments, their effect is primarily change-enabling and not change-constraining (Hypothesis 8c). The overall policy success of RRPPs is rather limited. The only occurrence of restrictive effects, I find when the radical-right gains policy-shaping capacity as a junior partner in a coalition government. There, RRPPs use their bargaining power inside government coalitions to enact more restrictions on integration policy. This chapter provides robust evidence for the thesis argument by demonstrating that the anti-immigration parties in Western Europe affect the internal dimension of migration policies, but not the external dimension.

Chapter 9

The electoral mandate on immigration[1]

9.1 Introduction

This chapter tests to what degree governing parties deliver on their publicly stated migration policy positions. I expect responsive governments to enact the policies that they pledged to implement in the last elections. Citizens vote for political parties and thereby provide them with the mandate to implement their policy agenda. Policies are responsive when they respond to the demand of voters by the election of particular parties into government office rather than others. Programmatic differences between parties should therefore be translated into different policy outputs. The fulfilment of the electoral mandate by governing parties provides information on how responsive governments are in migration policy. The analysis of the mandate fulfilment allows me to test important implications of the thesis argument on when governments are responsive in their migration policy-making. This chapter assesses governments' responsiveness directly as the match between what people want and what they receive. The previous chapters demonstrated that there are different policy-making modes in the two dimensions of migration policy. In this chapter, I test whether it is the case that governments vary in their responsiveness across policy dimensions and examine the drivers behind the manifesto-policy association of governing parties.

For a long time scholars observe that migration policies in liberal democracies are characterised by a divergence between the mostly restrictive preferences of voters and the mostly liberal policies and

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[1] This chapter is partly based on Lutz (2019a).

increasing immigrant populations (Czaika and De Haas, 2013; Freeman et al., 2013; Hollifield et al., 2014). This 'gap-hypothesis' suggests that governments deliver tough talk but weak action and that policies on immigration are biased in a liberal direction.[2] Freeman et al. (2013, 2) interprets this phenomenon as a permanent democratic deficit of migration policies. However, more recent contributions cast doubts on whether and to what extent migration policies are detached from public opinion (Jennings, 2009; Lahav, 2004a; Morales et al., 2015). The thesis argument offers a new perspective on this old academic debate. The legitimacy trade-off in migration policy as discussed in Section 2.2 makes it more difficult for governments to fulfil their electoral mandate. While electoral platforms are a tool to mobilise voters and gain votes, the implementation of these platforms hinges on the available policy space of governments. I argue that whether governments are responsive in migration policy depends on their room to manoeuvre. My argument of external responsibility and internal responsiveness assumes that governments prioritise responsibility in immigration policy and responsiveness in integration policy (see Section 3.2). A gap between democratic input and democratic output in migration policy is more likely in the external immigration policy where governments face strong constraints than in the internal integration policy where they enjoy a larger policy space. Consequently, I expect governments to deliver on their electoral promises primarily in the internal dimension of integration policy and less in the external dimension of immigration policy. The analysis of the party mandate model in migration policy provides additional evidence of how national governments respond to the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, I elaborate on the empirical implications of the thesis argument for the fulfilment of the electoral mandate in migration policy and derive a series of sub-hypotheses. I then present the empirical analysis that assesses the prediction of the party mandate model in the case of migration policy. A second empirical section tests for different drivers of the association between manifesto positions and policy outputs. Finally, I conduct a series of robustness checks and evaluate alternative explanations for trade-off choices in migration policy.

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[2] Despite a large literature referring to the gap-hypothesis, the concept remains surprisingly vague and is referring to different types of gaps within the policy process (Boswell, 2007; Czaika and De Haas, 2013; Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006). Different conceptualisations have often not been clearly distinguished in the literature (Bonjour, 2011, 91). Moreover, they neglect the link between parties policy positions as electoral competitor and their corresponding policy output as governors.

9.2 The legitimacy trade-off and the party mandate

The idea that elections provide the input-legitimacy for the policy-making of governing parties was prominently conceptualised by the party mandate model (APSA, 1950).[3] In this perspective, parties offer competing policy platforms to voters and the party which attracts the most votes on this basis then forms the next government. The governing parties are then bound (both morally and by fears of retribution at the next election) to carry through the program on which on which they were elected (Budge and Hofferbert, 1990, 111). Keeping electoral promises is important in the normative theory of democracy, but is also rational for parties that aim for re-election. The fulfilment of the electoral mandate by governing parties provides a mechanism by which citizens can exercise control over public policy, thereby establishing issue congruence (Downs, 1957; Thomassen, 1994). The election of political parties are the means by which voters delegate political authority and keep their representative accountable. Thus, the party mandate is a mechanism through which voters are connected with the policy choices of party governments. Political parties that compete for votes need to implement those policies that satisfy their voters once they control decision making (Downs, 1957). This allows them to demonstrate that they are effective governors but also credible representatives of their voters. Governments deliver public policies in exchange for political support by voters. Since parties are assumed to seek re-election, they are expected to enact their policy agenda when they gain government office. Both policy-seeking and vote-seeking motivations create incentives to parties to deliver on their electoral pledges (Strom and Müller, 1999). In consequence, we may expect that governing parties follow the policy agenda they outlined in their electoral manifesto. By implication, we should find an empirical association between the parties' electoral programmes and government policies.

According to Klingemann et al. (1994), the party mandate consists of two approaches. A position-based party mandate and a emphasis-based mandate.[4] When political parties compete for votes in elections, they do this based on their policy positions and based on the emphasis they place on different policy issues. When parties enter government office they are expected to deliver

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[3] The APSA-report uses the term 'responsible party system'. Its idea of responsibility refers to parties' programmatic differences that connect voters with policies. To avoid conflating this idea with the concept of responsibility in my framework of democratic legitimacy, I use the more common term of the 'party mandate model'.

[4] The literature discusses the position-based party mandate often under the term of 'electoral pledges' (Thomson et al., 2017). I use the more general term of policy positions since pledges refer to specific promises rather than the overall policy direction.

on their policy positions and their policy emphasis. The first aspect of the party mandate relates to parties' policy positions. Parties represent different constituencies based on distinct ideological backgrounds. As such they should strive to deliver policies that represent their distinct party ideology in order to gain re-election. This means that different policy choices in representative democracies should be attributable to the party composition of governments. Parties with a restrictive stance on immigration should enact more restrictive migration policies. Parties with a liberal stance on immigration should enact more liberal migration policies. This position-based party mandate in migration policy results in the following sub-hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6a: *The more restrictive (liberal) parties position themselves in their electoral manifestos, the more restrictive (liberal) the migration policy outputs they enact as governors.*

The second aspect of the party mandate is related to the issue emphasis of parties. Political parties compete for votes by selectively emphasising certain policy issues while ignoring others. We expect parties to stress those issues where they are perceived to be competent and credible by voters. In consequence, we assume that parties are in particular motivated to deliver in those core issues when they gain government office. This salience approach to the party mandate argues that mandate fulfilment is about parties policy priorities. Governing parties are expected to deliver on those policy issues that they emphasised in their electoral manifestos (Budge, 2001; Klingemann et al., 1994). The emphasis a party places on an issue signals to voters in which policy areas a party can be expected to become active as a policy-maker when elected into government office. By implication, we should find an empirical association between parties' issue emphasis in their manifestos and their policy activity as governors.[5] Parties with a greater emphasis on migration issues in their manifestos should enact more migration policy changes as governors than parties that de-emphasise the issue as stated in the following sub-hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6b: *The more governing parties emphasise the issue of immigration in their electoral manifesto, the more migration policy changes they enact as governors.*

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[5] The classic approach of emphasis-based party mandate focuses on government spending. Spending figures are, however, not very useful for measuring regulatory policies such as migration policy. Instead, I use the number of policy changes as a measure of government's policy activity.

The theoretical expectations of the party mandate model outlined so far are based on a static view of mandate fulfilment. According to the thesis argument, however, responsive policy-making depends on responsiveness demands and responsibility needs. Similar as in Chapter 7, we may expect the structural transformations of globalisation and politicisation to moderate the fulfilment of government's electoral mandate. While I generally assume that governing parties have incentives to deliver on their policy promises, the pressure to do so is likely to vary by the salience of an issue in the electoral competition. Higher levels of politicisation is likely to increase the electoral punishment of parties for the non-fulfilment of their electoral mandate and the rewards for its fulfilment. When a policy issue is not salient in the electoral competition, voters are less likely to perceive it as important for their evaluation of government performance. Politicisation signals demand for policy change and thereby increases the demand for responsiveness. For these reasons, I expect a stronger mandate fulfilment with higher levels of politicisation as expressed in this sub-hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6c: *The politicisation of migration issues strengthens the fulfilment of the party mandate in migration policy*

Mandate fulfilment should further depend on governing constraints that influence the capacity of parties to implement their preferred policies. The higher the demands for responsibility, the more limited the options of discretionary policy choices. I argue that in migration policy, governments are constrained by the international interdependence of countries that limits their room to manoeuvre (see Section 2.2). With higher levels of globalisation, governing parties should have greater difficulty to fulfil their electoral mandate. Furthermore, political institutions facilitate or constrain policy choices (Breunig and Luedtke, 2008). According to the veto-player theory by Tsebelis (2002), a high number of actors whose consent is necessary in passing policy reforms places constraints on governing parties and the implementation of their policy agenda. Abou-Chadi (2016) demonstrates that left-wing parties liberalise policies following their preference for more openness towards immigration only when they don't face strong veto players. This argument implies that the winset of a cabinet is smaller with a higher number of parties in the government. In larger government coalitions the policy-shaping capacity is shared among more parties and therefore a single governing party has greater difficulty to translate its manifesto pledges into policies (Thomson et al.,

2017). The number of veto players and the coalition size are institutional factors that may moderate the manifesto-policy association. Responsibility demands from international interdependence and institutional constraints should reduce the capability of governments to deliver on their electoral manifestos.

Hypothesis 6d: *Governing constraints weaken the the fulfilment of the electoral mandate in migration policy*

The party mandate model assumes that governments are responsive to the expressed will of their voters. However, governments often face a tension between responsiveness as input legitimacy and responsibility as output legitimacy (see Section 2.1). When gaining government office, parties have incentives to deliver but also face governing constraints and have to balance responsiveness demands with responsibility needs. Delivering their promises is more likely in those policy areas where the responsibility needs are lower. In Section 3.2, I argue that cross-pressured governments prioritise responsibility in external immigration policies and prioritise responsiveness in internal integration policies. As a result, I expect governments to be more likely to deliver on their electoral manifestos in the domestic area of integration policy than on immigration policy where governments face strong constraints. This applies to both the position-based and the emphasis-based party mandate. Politicisation increases the demand for responsiveness and should strengthen the fulfilment of the party mandate also primarily in integration policy. Globalisation as an important source of responsibility needs should weaken the mandate fulfilment primarily in immigration policy, whereas institutional constraints should apply in an equal manner to the two policy dimensions. These considerations lead to the following sub-hypothesis that applies the thesis argument to the party mandate model:

Hypothesis 6e: *The fulfillment of the electoral mandate is more likely in integration than in immigration policy*

9.3 Electoral promises and migration policy outputs

To assess the fulfilment of the party mandate in migration policy, I compare parties' electoral manifestos with their migration policy output. Parties compete in elections based on their programmatic offers laid down in party manifestos. The party manifesto consists of the collected stances of a party that outline its policy agenda to voters and is published before each election. Since party manifestos are the result of internal debates prior to elections, we may assume that they are accurate representations of the policy positions a party takes as an organisation. The party mandate theory claims that there is a meaningful connection between the electoral programmes laid out in parties' manifestos and their enacted policies as governors.

Figure 9.1: Migration policy positions of parties and cabinets

Note: The CMP-scores range from -1 (only positive statements) to +1 (only negative statements) and covers 18 countries from 1980 to 2014. The CHES-scores range from -5 to +5 with negative values representing a preference for more liberal policies and positive values representing a preference for more restrictive policies. The CHES-data covers 17 countries between 2002 and 2014. The upper group of histograms represents the party scores and the lower group of histograms represents the aggregated and seat-weighted positional scores of cabinets. Each histogram is structured by 10 bins of equal length.

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I first conduct a descriptive comparison of the migration policy positions of governing parties with those of cabinets. The histograms in Figure 9.1 show the distribution of policy positions measured with two datasets: the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). There is considerable variation across governing parties as well as across government cabinets. This fulfills a crucial requirement of the party mandate model. In substantive terms, a majority of parties and cabinets in both datasets prefers policies that are more restrictive. This restrictive tendency is even more pronounced on the level of cabinets. This means that there is no pronounced liberal bias on the level of electoral mandates. Most voters vote for political parties that take a restrictive stance on immigration.

Do the policy preferences of parties differ between the external and the internal dimension of migration policy? Figure 9.2 displays the average policy positions across party families based on the CHES dataset. The ideological patterns of immigration and integration strongly resemble each other. The most liberal in both dimensions are left-wing parties, the most restrictive in both dimensions are radical-right parties. The various centre-right parties position themselves in between. This evidence suggests that the different policy dynamics in immigration and integration policy do not relate to differences in party ideology.[6] Political parties align in one migration policy dimension with left-wing parties taking a more liberal stance and right-wing parties taking a more restrictive stance.

Figure 9.2: Comparing policy positions on immigration and integration

Note: Data of policy positions from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015). Position scale from 0 = more liberal policy to 10 = more restrictive policy. The total sample size is N = 155. I exclude parties that do not belong a specific party family.

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[6] I make a similar point in Chapter 8.

Next, I compare the policy positions of government cabinets with their policy output. For that purpose, I classify the policy positions and policy outputs of cabinets into directional dummy variables of either restriction or liberalisation. The resulting position dummy indicates whether a cabinet prefers more restrictive or more liberal policies. A corresponding output dummy measures whether a cabinet enacts more restrictions or more liberalisations. I expect cabinets that prefer more restrictive policies to enact more restrictions than liberalisations (and vice versa). Table 9.1 displays the results of the cross-tabulation of manifesto positions and the directional policy output.

Table 9.1: Cross-tabulation of policy positions and policy output

Immigration policy (CMP)

		Output	
		liberal	*restrictive*
Position	*liberal*	20	10
	restrictive	86	25

$$\chi^2 = 1.48 \ (p = 0.23)$$

Integration policy (CMP)

		Output	
		liberal	*restrictive*
Position	*liberal*	28	4
	restrictive	78	29

$$\chi^2 = 2..90 \ (p = 0.10)$$

Immigration policy (CHES)

		Output	
		liberal	*restrictive*
Position	*liberal*	8	0
	restrictive	26	9

$$\chi^2 = 2.60 \ (p = 0.16)$$

Integration policy (CHES)

		Output	
		liberal	*restrictive*
Position	*liberal*	10	2
	restrictive	13	14

$$\chi^2 = 4.25 \ (p = 0.07)$$

Note: The cross-tabulation is based on dummy variables of cabinet's policy position and their policy output. Each cabinet is classified as either 'liberal' or 'restrictive' on both dimensions. White fields are matches and grey fields are mismatches. The Chi-Squared-tests (χ^2) assess the statistical association between the policy positions and the policy output.

From the tables above we learn that the mismatches outnumber the matches, except for integration policy measured with the CHES-scores. The comparison reveals that migration policy positions are often not translated into corresponding policy output. Instead, there is a strong liberal bias with governments implementing liberal policies despite the restrictive preferences in their party manifestos. In other words, liberal preferences of political parties are more likely to be translated into policy output than restrictive preferences. The Chi-Squared tests (χ^2) demonstrate that there is no systematic manifesto-policy association in terms of statistical significance. In comparison, the correlation and significance are stronger in integration policy than in immigration policy. Overall,

there is a systematic liberal bias across both policy areas, but a stronger correspondence of manifesto positions with policy outputs in integration policy than in immigration policy. This pattern of a systematic bias towards more liberal policies does not necessarily imply that parties' programmatic positions do not matter for policy outputs. In order to further test whether variations in a cabinet's policy position may explain variations in policy output, I run a series of panel regressions to model this relationship (see Figure 9.3; and Table A.9 in the Appendix). The result shows that the aggregated policy position is significantly associated with policy output in integration but not in immigration policy. The statistical association is stronger when distinguishing the estimates by the policy direction. The association between negative statements and restrictions is slightly larger than between positive statements and liberalisations. These models confirm the substantial difference in manifesto-policy association between the two policy dimensions. In substantive terms, the cabinet with the most liberal position enacts between two to three integration policy reforms in a more liberal direction than the most restrictive cabinet. For immigration policy this effect is around zero in the overall position score and around one policy reform in the respective direction when when positive and negative statements are separated. The estimates provide empirical support for the emphasis-based mandate. Governing parties enact more policy output when they emphasis migration issues in their manifestos. The effects are comparable across the policy dimensions of immigration and integration. Whether parties emphasis migration in their manifestos or not translated in an estimated difference of three to four policy reforms in policy output. Although migration policies are characterised by a liberal bias, they still vary with the electoral mandate of governing parties.

9.4 The drivers of mandate fulfilment

The previous section demonstrates that migration policy choices of national government are often a poor representation of the policy positions laid down in their electoral manifestos. In a next step, I analyse the driving factors behind the manifesto-policy association and the different degree of responsiveness among government cabinets. While demands for responsiveness incentivise parties to act upon their electoral mandate, the needs for responsibility constrain their capacity to enact

Figure 9.3: Manifesto-policy association across migration policy (CMP)

Note: The estimates are based on panel regression models with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. Models are adjusted for cabinet duration. The independent variables are normalised to a range from zero to one in order to facilitate comparison and interpretation. Larger coefficients represent a stronger manifesto-policy association. Models are adjusted for cabinet duration. Estimates with 95 % confidence intervals.

their preferred policies. Does the fulfilment of the electoral mandate depend on electoral incentives and governing constraints?

First, I test whether the responsiveness demands from politicisation have the expected positive effect on the party mandate fulfilment. Figure 9.4 displays the moderation effect of politicisation on the manifesto-policy association (see also Table A.10 in the Appendix). Across both policy dimensions the level of politicisation tends to increase the mandate fulfilment, but only in integration policy there is a substantial and statistically significant effect. The more parties compete on the issue of migration, the more governing parties deliver on their manifesto positions on immigrant integration. These model estimates corroborate the idea that the degree of mandate fulfilment is primarily determined by the policy dimension. Governments react to stronger responsiveness demands with a better fulfilment of their electoral mandate in internal integration policies. The detachment of electoral manifestos and policy output in external immigration policies, however, remains largely unaffected by electoral incentives from the politicisation of immigration.

The second series of factors that may moderate the manifesto-policy association are responsibility needs that constrain governments in their policy choices. While electoral incentives should affect the willingness of parties to deliver on their manifesto pledges, structural constraints should affect their

Figure 9.4: Manifesto-policy association and electoral incentives

(a) Immigration

(b) Integration

Note: The marginal effect plots are based on panel regression models with an interaction term between the policy position of a cabinet (preferred restrictiveness) and the level of politicisation. The interaction effect represents the degree to what politicisation moderates the manifesto-policy association. The plots display the 95 % confidence intervals.

capacity to enact policies based on their electoral mandate. I test the influence of responsibility needs with a moderation effect of governing constraints on the manifesto-policy association. Figure 9.5 reveals that the level of globalisation, the number of veto players and the coalition size do not exert a significant moderation effect on the party mandate fulfilment (see also Table A.11 in the Appendix). Only the number of veto players points in the expected direction of a lower manifesto-policy association, but the estimated effect size is close to zero. Globalisation and coalition size do also not show the expected effects. These results are confirmed, when I separate immigration and integration policy. Governing constraints do not exert any significant effect on the fulfilment of the electoral mandate by governments. Since these variables vary strongly between countries more than within countries, I also run the model without country fixed effects. This specification choice does, however, not alter the results. The strength of governing constraints does therefore not affect the likelihood of governing parties implementing the policy positions in their party manifestos.

Figure 9.5: Manifesto-policy association and governing constraints

(a) International interdependence

(b) Coalition size

(c) Institutional constraints

Note: The marginal effect plots are based on panel regression models with interaction terms of the policy position of governments (preferred restrictiveness) with the respective variable. The interaction effect represents the degree to what a variable moderates the association between the manifesto position of a government coalition and its policy output.

9.5 Robustness tests

I assess the stability of the results presented in this chapter with the inclusion of potential confounders into the models. I select control variables that could impede the translation of manifesto positions into government policies. These are the vote share of radical-right parties that may pressure government towards more restrictive policies than they would have implemented otherwise; the net migration rate as an operationalisation of problem pressure; the unemployment rate and GDP growth as measurements of the macro-economic context; the absolute level of policy restrictiveness and EU-membership that either facilitates or constrains policy changes. The models with these controls included show that the manifesto-policy association becomes weaker as a result, but the overall pattern remains in substance the same (see Figure 9.6; and Table A.12 in the Appendix). Both the position score and the emphasis score of cabinets continue to be positively associated with integration policy output although with lower levels of statistical significance.[7] In immigration policy, the models confirm the zero coefficient of the position score while the emphasis score becomes slightly negative. These adjusted models suggest that the general pattern of better mandate fulfilment in integration policy applies also to the emphasis-based party mandate.

Figure 9.6: Manifesto-policy association (adjusted for confounding factors)

Note: The coefficient plot is based on panel regression models with country fixed effects and country-clustered standard errors. The models are adjusted for cabinet duration. The independent variables are normalised to a range from zero to one. Larger coefficients represent a stronger manifesto-policy association. Estimates with 95 % confidence intervals

The control variables have limited explanation power. There is a significant effect of cabinet duration in both models. With more time in office, cabinets enact more policy output and have a more pronounced liberalisation record. The significant effect of the net migration rate in both policy

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[7]   While the position score is still significant, the emphasis score looses its significance. This result corresponds to the previous models showing higher levels of uncertainty in the emphasis-based mandate fulfilment than the position-based mandate fulfilment.

dimensions suggests that migration policies are in parts a response to migration flows. The more immigration a country experiences, the more active the government becomes in migration policy. To further test the robustness of the main results, I run models with an alternative measurement for cabinet positions. I use the CHES dataset that offers fewer observations but separate position scores for immigration and integration policy. If the policy dimension conditions the manifesto-policy association as suggested by the models presented above, we should find the same pattern with separate measurement for the two policy dimensions. The results in Figure (Figure 9.7 confirm this expectation (see also the complete model output in Table A.13 and A.14 in the Appendix). Both coefficients are positively associated with policy output, but only in integration policy results a significant effect.[8] The strength of the association is similar to the estimates with CMP-data and therefore confirms the robustness of the evidence that mandate fulfilment varies by policy dimension. I then estimate separate models for restrictions and liberalisations. I find that manifesto-policy association is stronger for restrictive reforms than for liberal reforms. Governments are more responsive in their restrictive reforms than in their liberal reforms. This finding is in line with the results of Chapter 8. The additional tests provide confirmation of the main findings and suggest that the results are sufficiently robust.

Figure 9.7: Manifesto-policy association across migration policy (CHES)

Note: The estimates are based on panel regression models with country-clustered SE's. The independent variable is the preferred policy restrictiveness on a scale from zero to one. The independent variable is the directional policy change (all reforms) and the number of liberalisation and restrictions. Larger coefficients represent a stronger manifesto-policy association. Positive effects mean more restrictions, negative effects mean more liberalisations. The models are adjusted for cabinet duration. The estimates are displayed with 95 % confidence intervals.

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[8] The same result pattern occurs when I include additional country fixed effects. The manifesto-policy association remains significant in integration policy while no significant association in immigration policy is found.

9.6 Alternative explanations

As in the previous chapters, the result section is followed by an assessment of alternative explanations for how cross-pressured governments make migration policy choices (see Section 3.1). Do the strategies of muddling-through, signalling responsiveness and selective openness help to explain the variation in government's fulfilment of the electoral mandate in migration policy? The strategy of *muddling-through* expects governments to enact more incremental policy changes in order to balance competing pressures of responsiveness and responsibility. Consequently, we would observe that the manifesto-policy association is stronger for minor policy changes than for major policy changes. The results in Figure 9.8 show, however, that the association is almost identical across the different level of policy change. Both coefficients are positive but not statistically significant. The muddling-through strategy does therefore not find empirical confirmation.

Figure 9.8: Coefficient plot for alternative explanations of mandate fulfillment

Note: The coefficient plot is based on panel regression models with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. The models are adjusted for cabinet duration. The independent variables are normalised to a range from zero to one. Larger coefficients represent a stronger manifesto-policy association. The estimates are displayed with the 95 % confidence intervals.

The strategy of *signalling responsiveness* assumes that governments are responsive by delivering symbolic policies that do not affect the formal openness of the country. Consequently, we would expect the manifesto-policy association to be stronger for symbolic policy changes than for material reforms that affect the restrictiveness of migration policies. Since symbolic policies are defined as

non-directional, I test this hypothesis with the emphasis-based mandate fulfilment. Do parties that emphasise migration issues in their manifestos deliver more symbolic policy changes than parties that de-emphasise migration issues? The coefficients in Figure 9.8 reveal a significant positive manifesto-policy association for both types of reforms, whereas the mandate fulfilment is slightly stronger in the model with material reforms.[9] This pattern does not confirm the idea that governments prioritise symbolic reforms for responsive policy-making on immigration.

The strategy of *selective openness* expects governments to enact responsive policies on less desired immigrant groups and responsible policies on more desired immigrant groups. According to this reasoning, we should find a stronger manifesto-policy association for policies targeting non-economic immigrants than for policies targeting economic immigrants. I test this expectation with separate models for these two dimensions of immigration policy. I find a positive association for non-economic immigration and a negative association for economic immigration (see Figure 9.8). The fulfilment of the electoral mandate is stronger for the target group of non-economic immigrants as expected. However, the effect size is relatively small and the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. Therefore, also for the selective openness strategy the estimates provide only limited support.

9.7 Summary

This chapter provides a comprehensive assessment of the party mandate model in migration policy. When governing parties deliver on their policy positions they offered to voters during the electoral competition, then they fulfil the mandate that was given to them by the voters and then they act as responsive governors. Therefore, the test of the fulfilment of the electoral mandate allows me to shed more light on where and when governments enact responsive migration policies. The argument of the thesis suggests that governments give more weights to democratic input in the area of integration policy compared with immigration policy where governments prioritise responsibility needs.

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[9] The position-based mandate can not be calculated since symbolic policies are defined as non-directional.

The results of this chapter reveal meaningful patterns of how the fulfilment of the electoral mandate in migration policy varies across different contexts. Both the position-based mandate (Hypothesis 6a) and the emphasis-based (Hypothesis 6b) are confirmed. The positions and emphasis of parties in their electoral manifestos are positively associated with their policy output. Government policies are, however, systematically more liberal than what we could expect from their electoral manifestos. Whether political parties deliver on their manifesto promises as governors depends primarily on responsiveness demands measured by electoral incentives (Hypothesis 6c) and not on responsibility needs measured as governing constraints (Hypothesis 6d). Most importantly, the thesis arguments finds systematic confirmation in the finding that there is a significant manifesto-policy association in integration but not in immigration policy (Hypothesis 6e). Moreover, I find that electoral incentives from politicisation increase the mandate fulfilment only in integration policy. Not only are governments responsive in integration policy, but they become increasingly responsive when responsiveness demands increase. Immigration policy on the other hand is is largely detached from party manifestos and mandate fulfilment is not dependent on the strength of responsiveness demands. The three alternative explanations for the policy choices of cross-pressured governments find no systematic empirical support. Once more, the different modes of policy-making in immigration and integration policy are confirmed. In this chapter we have learned that this difference between the two policy dimensions is not the result of different structures of party positions but the result of how preferences of parties are translated into policy output. Governments concentrate their responsive policy-making on internal integration policies rather than external immigration policies.

Part IV

Swiss case study: The initiative against mass immigration

Chapter 10

The case

In the second empirical part of this thesis, I conduct a case study analysis on the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy in Switzerland. This part complements the comparative analysis and tests the thesis' argument on an exemplary case of the tension between government responsiveness to voters and the responsibility of government affairs: the implementation of a popular vote demanding the restriction of immigration. Swiss voters narrowly approved the so-called 'initiative against mass immigration' (original: "Masseneinwanderungsinitiative", hereafter MEI) in February 2014, thereby tasking the Swiss political elite to implement a new regime of immigration restrictions. This is a crucial case where the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy (Section 2.2) became manifest and provided a decision dilemma for elected representatives. Large parts of the political elite opposed the MEI because it is in conflict with international agreements with the European Union, which it considered to be of utmost importance to the country. The approval of this initiative meant that the political elite had to choose between a responsive policy of restricting immigration and its preferred responsible policy of preserving international obligations in the general interest of their voters. The analysis of how the Swiss political elite implemented the MEI allows me to assess the argument I outline in Section 3.2. How did Swiss politicians respond to the decision dilemma? Did they opt for a combination of external responsibility and internal responsiveness as I argue? Did elected representatives succeed in reconciling responsiveness and responsibility, thereby maintaining democratic legitimacy? The following case study aims to answer these questions and to provide an additional micro-foundational analysis of governments' policy choices when facing a legitimacy trade-off in migration policy.

The Swiss case is particularly informative for testing my argument because of Switzerland's globally integrated economy, the high issue salience of immigration and the regular direct-democratic referendums on migration issues. These factors make Switzerland a most likely case for observing the postulated tension between responsiveness and responsibility. Freeman (2011, 1554-1555) argues that Switzerland is not an outlier in terms of its citizens' immigration views, however, its direct-democratic institutions facilitate the expression of anti-immigrant attitudes. Switzerland not only has one of the highest immigration rates among Western democracies, but it is also one of the most globally integrated economies (Dreher et al., 2008), and its immigration policy itself is highly internationalised (Linder, 2014, 226). In 2014, non-Swiss citizens constituted 24.3 % of the permanent population and contributed to around one third of all working hours in Switzerland.[1]

The economic and political integration reduces the room of manoeuvre in migration policy, as a look at recent migration statistics is able to demonstrate. In 2014, 152'206 people immigrated to Switzerland, of which the largest categories were EU/EFTA citizens enjoying free movement rights (45.3 %) and family migration (30.1 %).[2] The remaining immigration channels consist of educational migration, humanitarian migration and labour migration. The free movement rights of EU/EFTA citizens are laid down in international agreements that are linked with the preferential access of Switzerland to the European single market. The right to family and the right to apply for asylum are constitutional rights guaranteed by the Swiss constitution and the European Convention for Human Rights. This means that in large parts, legal obligations from constitutional rights and international obligations determine immigration to Switzerland, and it is therefore mostly not a discretionary choice of the government. Revoking the free movement rights of EU/EFTA citizens would most likely disrupt Switzerland's economic and political relationship with the European Union and question its preferential access to the European single market. Revoking the constitutional right to asylum or family runs against the core of liberal democracy and could undermine Switzerland's institutional legitimacy. The remaining discretionary space for restricting immigration mainly includes the immigration of third-country nationals for the purpose of work and education

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[1] Statistics on foreigners in Switzerland provided by the Federal Office for Statistics, `https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/aktuell/neue-veroeffentlichungen.gnpdetail.2015-0057.html`, retrieved 25.03.2019. Data on working hours, see report by Handelszeitung, `https://www.handelszeitung.ch/unternehmen/so-viel-arbeitet-die-schweiz-786706#`, retrieved 25.03.2019.

[2] State Secretary for Migration (2015) Statistik Zuwanderung: Ausländerinnen und Ausländer in der Schweiz - Jahr 2014 [immigration statistics 2014], report published on 22.April 2015, `https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/publiservice/statistik/auslaenderstatistik/monitor/2014/statistik-zuwanderung-2014-12-d.pdf`, retrieved 04.03.2019.

in Switzerland. However, this type of immigration faces little public scrutiny or opposition and is strongly favoured by economic interest organisations strongly that advocate for the recruitment of highly-skilled individuals from non-EU/EFTA countries. This brief overview demonstrates that Switzerland represents a typical migration state that is structurally dependent on its openness towards immigration and that is bound by series of constraints that severely limit its discretionary policy space on immigration.

On the other hand, public opinion in Switzerland is critical to immigration and tends to favour less immigration at a level that is comparable to other European countries (Armingeon and Engler, 2015; Sciarini et al., 2015). The political elite prefers more liberal migration policies than the average citizen (Herrmann, 2016). In this context, direct-democratic instruments have, at least since the 1960s, repeatedly been used in order to place anti-immigration policies on the political agenda (see Skenderovic, 2007). Shortly before the 2011 national elections, the right-wing populist Swiss People's Party (original 'Schweizerische Volkspartei', hereafter SVP) launched its initiative 'against mass immigration' (MEI), which demanded a substantial reduction of immigration.[3] Both the government and the parliament recommended rejecting the initiative. Nevertheless, a narrow majority of voters (50.3 %) approved the initiative on the ballot box on 9 February 2014 and the constitution was amended to require the restriction of immigration. For the first time, Swiss voters approved an anti-immigration initiative against the will of the government and the large majority of the parliament, whereas previous proposals with similar demands had been rejected.[4] As a popular vote is binding, the approval of the initiative meant that the Swiss constitution was amended as proposed by the SVP. The MEI demanded controlling immigration by a quota rule and prioritising the hiring of Swiss nationals in the labour market (for the exact wording, see Appendix B.1).[5] As a result, the goal of reducing immigration, and the way for doing so became part of the new constitutional rule. The material content of the constitutional amendment, including the immigration quota and the discrimination of EU citizens in the Swiss labour market, directly contradicts the bilateral agreement between Switzerland and the European Union on the free movement of persons. Rather than defining a general political goal, the new constitutional article demands the introduction of

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[3] The SVP runs on an anti-immigration and Eurosceptic platform and is considered to be one of the most successful radical-right populist parties in Western Europe (Kriesi et al., 2005).

[4] Swiss voters approved the free movement of persons agreement in 2000 (introduction) as well as in 2005 and 2009 (expansion to new EU member states).

[5] Additionally, the initiative includes the recommendation of restricting permanent settlement, family migration and access to welfare benefits. However, these amendments would not require lawmakers to adapt any existing policies.

specific policy instruments that primarily serve to control and reduce immigration. Therefore, politicians hardly had any room to interpret or bargain about the content of the vote. The initiative includes a transitional provision that provides the government with a period of three years to renegotiate international agreements that are in conflict with the new amendment and for the parliament to enact an implementation law. Swiss politicians faced a strong popular demand to restrict immigration, which, in the view of most of them, would run against the common welfare of Switzerland. How did they respond to this manifest dilemma of democratic legitimacy?

The case selection of Switzerland and the MEI-implementation is guided by the theoretical concept of the legitimacy trade-off between responsiveness and responsibility. The selection follows the reasoning of a crucial case design for choosing a case that closely fit the theoretical argument (George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007). The main advantage of examining this case is that it not only represents a latent tension between responsiveness and responsibility, but it comes the closest to a true dilemma of democratic legitimacy - with a choice between the two unsatisfactory alternatives of unresponsiveness and irresponsibility. The case study uses various data sources and methods. An original dataset of immigration claims in Swiss newspapers serves as the main data source for analysing the responses of the political elite to the implementation dilemma. The analysis of voters' responses uses original and secondary survey data of Swiss citizens. The case study allows for a comprehensive analysis of how mass domestic politics responds to the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy.

First, I discuss in greater detail how the MEI represents a decision dilemma between responsiveness and responsibility for the political elite. Two empirical chapters then analyse how political elites and voters responded to the trade-off choice in migration policy. The chapter on the response of the political elite analyses the discourse and policy choices of Swiss politicians in the implementation process. The analysis tests the overall argument of the thesis as well as the alternative explanations outlined in Section 3.1. The analysis of voters' responses tests how citizens reacted to the non-responsiveness of political elites, as demonstrated by the non-implementation of immigration restrictions. This analysis sheds more light on the implications of constrained choices on the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy and whether the Swiss government succeeded in reconciling responsiveness with responsibility in order to maintain democratic legitimacy.

Chapter 11

Elite response[1]

11.1 The decision dilemma of democratic legitimacy

This chapter analyses the response of the Swiss political elite to the legitimacy trade-off in the case of the initiative 'against mass immigration' (MEI). First, I elaborate on the strategic dilemma between responsiveness and responsibility faced by Swiss politicians. Then, I derive theoretical expectations about the implementation strategies of Swiss politicians based on the thesis argument. The following section on the research design introduces the data and method of the empirical analysis. The results section contains an analysis of elite discourses over the course of the implementation period as well as an assessment of the policy choices made by Swiss politicians to implement the popular vote. The empirical part concludes with an evaluation of the three alternative explanations for trade-off choices and a summary of the findings.

A popular vote is a strong event of politicisation and the approval of an initiative against the recommendation of the political elite signals a notable demand for policy change. An intense political campaign preceded the MEI vote, which led to a considerable voter mobilisation and an above-average turnout of 56 %. After its approval by a majority of voters, Swiss politicians faced the task of implementing the new constitutional article that demanded the restriction of immigration. The Swiss political culture of direct democracy places particular importance on respecting popular vote outcomes ('vox populi, vox dei'), and the norms of direct democracy require that politicians accept and follow the decision of a popular vote. It is uncontested that sovereignty rests with

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[1] This chapter is partly based on Armingeon and Lutz (2019a).

the people, as they have the final legal authority over constitutional changes (Vatter, 2014, 45 et passim). Therefore, politicians are expected to do whatever the people decide in a vote, even if they opposed the ballot proposal. Any non-implementation of the popular may be accused of betraying the people. The MEI therefore constituted a strong popular demand as a binding constitutional amendment. In other words, its approval created strong responsiveness demands.

With the exception of the SVP, the major political parties opposed the initiative because they believed that it opposed important economic and political interest of the country. Specifically, the MEI conflicts with the agreement with the European Union on the free movement of persons. This agreement is part of the 'Bilateral Agreements I', a sector-based series of agreements that provide Switzerland with preferential access to the European single market.[2] The EU and Switzerland are highly integrated both economically and politically. The European Union defends the integrity of its internal market and clearly stated that despite the MEI approval the free movement is not negotiable. Given the interdependence and power imbalance, the EU can apply legal coercion to confront the Swiss government with unwanted consequences if it would implement the referendum result (Rose, 2019). The strong interdependence of Switzerland with the much larger European Union creates strong responsibility needs.

For the Swiss political elite, the conflicting responsiveness demands and responsibility needs constitute a dilemma of democratic legitimacy. If they would choose to be responsive to the popular demand and implement immigration restrictions, they would deliberately enact a policy that they considered to be harmful to their voters and the country at large. If they prioritise responsibility and preserve free movement, they would violate democratic norms and risk being accused of betraying the will of the people. As a result, either choice, irresponsibility or non-responsiveness, would undermine democratic legitimacy.

How did the Swiss political elite respond to this decision dilemma? I argue that governments aim to be both responsive and responsible as they are the two necessary conditions for democratic legitimacy (see Section 2.1). In the context of the MEI dilemma, this means that politicians can neither ignore the popular demand for immigration restrictions nor international obligations and the macro-

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[2] In addition to the free movement of persons, these market access agreements also cover technical barriers to trade, public procurement markets, agriculture, overland transport, civil aviation and research.

economic interests of Switzerland. My argument suggests that governments prioritise responsibility in immigration policy and responsiveness in integration policy (see Section 3.2). I would therefore expect that the implementation of the MEI would be based on policy choices that would allow for continuous openness in immigration policy and responsive policy measures in domestic integration policy.

11.2 Data and method

To assess the elite response to the implementation dilemma, I rely on a series of data sources, such as opinion surveys, political claims in mass media and official communication by political parties. The methods applied include systematic media content analysis, survey analysis and the examination of textual evidence on politicians' claims. The case selection is based on the Swiss political elites who have policy-shaping capacity and who are also representatives of their voters. The implementation of new constitutional rules is the shared responsibility of the Swiss government and parliament. The Swiss consociational government shares government responsibility among the main parties in parliament (Kriesi et al., 2008). The cabinet consists of a grand coalition that includes about 80 % of all seats in the lower house. The government and the governing coalition are therefore distinct from governments in purely representative democracies. There is no dichotomy of government and opposition, and there is no prime minister. As a collegial body, the Swiss government takes responsibility for its decisions as a unitary actor. Policy-making is based on negotiations and amicable agreements between the government and the major parties. In this context, the actors of interest in this thesis are the four major governing parties that constitute the grand coalition government.[3] These parties are the Swiss People's party (SVP), who initiated the popular vote, the Liberal Party (FDP), the Christian-Democratic Party (CVP) and the Social-Democratic Party (SP), who opposed the initiative. I base the empirical analysis on the Swiss government as a unitary actor as well as the governing parties and their representatives.

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[3] Although the BDP had one member in the government coalition until the end of 2015, it is largely an artefact as a SVP breakaway party. The BDP governor, Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf, was elected as a SVP member but then expelled from the party. Once she left the government, she was replaced by an SVP member.

The main data source is an original dataset of political claims made by Swiss politicians in the mass media on the issue of immigration. The dataset covers the period from the day after the popular vote, which took place on the 9 February 2014, to the day the final parliamentary decision on the implementation law was made, on 16 December 2016. I select four large newspapers from which I obtain information for the database: the 'Neue Zürcher Zeitung' (NZZ) and 'Blick' in the German-speaking region and 'Le Temps' and 'Le Matin' in the French-speaking region. These newspapers cover Switzerland's two main linguistic regions. The selection includes the two leading quality papers (NZZ, Le Temps) and the two tabloids with the highest circulation (Blick, Le Matin). I select periods of two weeks (and a longer period of one and a half month immediately following the popular vote in February 2014) separated by about two months.[4] This selection results in 14 periods that are equally distributed over the 32 months between February 2014 and December 2016 (see Figure 11.1).

Figure 11.1: Timeline of the implementation process

I extract all articles with the key words 'migration' or 'free movement' (with their respective translations in German and French) within the selected periods.[5] The unit of measurement is a political actor making a policy statement in a given newspaper article.[6] The dataset consists of two types of variables: meta-variables on the newspaper article and the political actor and variables on the politicians' political claims (see Appendix B.3 for the code-book). I record the article's date and newspaper. I also record each actor's party affiliation and political function. The second part of the dataset consists of variables that code the political claims of political actors on immigration control and the MEI-implementation. A first variable codes if the stated immigration policy preference supports a more restrictive policy (closure) or is against more restrictions and hence for maintaining the status quo of free movement (openness).[7] A second variable contains statements on the strategic

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[4] I only focused on selected periods due to the extensive workload of manually coding newspaper reports for the whole period.

[5] I use the following search terms: "Personenfreizügigkeit", "Einwanderung", "Freier Personenverkehr", "Migration", "Zuwanderung" and "Auswanderung". In French these words are "libre circulation", "immigration", "migration" and "emigration".

[6] An actor can make policy statements in three dimensions (immigration control, strategic evaluation of options/constraints and domestic policy measures). Each actor only receives one entry per article.

[7] I also include political claims in favour of a more open immigration policy in the category of 'openness'.

evaluation of the MEI-implementation process, and I also code it as a dummy variable: Switzerland is either unconstrained in its policy options and able to combine immigration restrictions with the Bilateral Agreements (options) or Switzerland has limited policy options and has to accept the trade-off between immigration restrictions and the Bilateral Agreements (constraints). These two variables allow me to classify the communication of political elites as either 'responsive discourse' or as 'responsible discourse'. A responsive discourse that is committed to implementing the popular vote is represented by political claims that immigration should be restricted (closure) and that the initiative can be implemented as voters expect (options). A responsible discourse that is committed to preserving the Bilateral Agreements is represented by political claims that immigration should not be restricted (openness) and that there is a trade-off between immigration restrictions and the Bilateral Agreements (constraints). A third variable measures statements on domestic migration policies. A statement in favour of a domestic policy measure is only coded in combination with an immigration policy preference and/or a strategic evaluation of the MEI-implementation. A domestic policy measure is any measure related to migration that does not affect the external openness of the country.[8]

The coding process begins with an initial assessment of whether or not an article is relevant based on whether it contains a political actor that is making a political statement on its immigration policy preference or on the strategic evaluation of the MEI-implementation. The coding follows an inductive process. When a new actor or a new domestic policy measure appears, I add a new category to the code-book. If an actor proposes a combination of domestic policy measures, the combination receives its own category that allows for its later aggregation across categories. This procedure guarantees the exclusiveness and exhaustiveness of categories. Inter-coder-reliability (Cohen's Kappa) is above 0.8, indicating a high agreement between coders.[9] The media content dataset is the basis for a quantitative media content analysis that tracks the discourse of the political elite on immigration control and the MEI-implementation.

The analysis of media content is combined with secondary survey data and official party communication to test the main argument and the alternative explanations for trade-off choices. To

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[8] This variable includes mostly integration policy measures but also some measures outside of migration policy as a result of inductive coding. For a detailed list of domestic policy measures see the code-book in Appendix B.3.

[9] Inter-Coder-Reliability measured by Cohen's Kappa with a value of 0.841 for the policy variable (openness/closure) and 0.814 for strategy (options/constraints).

measure the policy preferences of the political elite, I rely on data from the voting advice application Smart Vote from the 2015 national election. Smart Vote is an candidate survey that asks candidates about a range of policy issues (details in Appendix B.4). Most importantly, it includes a question on their preference regarding the free movement of persons. The dataset covers 3801 candidates, 1820 of which belong to governing parties. The response rate was 84 % of all candidates and 94 % of the candidates that were elected. Moreover, I use official press releases from government institutions and political parties as an additional data source of political claims (documents listed in Appendix B.2). Throughout the empirical section, I refer to these documents using their number in the list. This additional text evidence complements the media content database in order to provide a more detailed picture of elite positions and communication strategies.

11.3 Results

This section provides empirical evidence on how the Swiss political elite implemented the MEI. First, I analyse party elites' positions on the ballot proposal before and after the vote. Then, I track their policy discourse over the course of the implementation process. Finally, I assess the policy choices made in response to the popular vote in light of the theoretical expectations.

The MEI was not the first popular vote on free movement of persons with the European Union. Its introduction was supported by a broad political coalition from the centre-right to the centre-left (Afonso, 2010). The main opposition to opening the Swiss labour market came from the radical-right SVP. These political camps also led the campaigns on the MEI. The government recommended that voters reject the SVP's initiative and toured the country to convince voters of that position. In the official message to the parliament, the government acknowledged the popular concerns regarding immigration, but it also warned of the detrimental effects for the Swiss economy and the country's international relations (Document 1). The government acknowledged that the high level of immigration in the previous years had created pressure in various realms, such as integration, the housing market, infrastructure and education. The government's main arguments were that the approval of the initiative would endanger the reliable relationship with the EU and would harm the Swiss economy. It also expressed its belief that the EU would not accept the discrimination of their

citizens on the Swiss labour market given that free movement of persons is a crucial pillar of the European single market. This official communication by the Swiss government contains clear references to responsiveness and responsibility and indicates that the government aimed to fulfil them both. The government demonstrated responsiveness by taking the initiative's concerns seriously and by pledging to address them using political measures other than the MEI. The government demonstrated responsibility by stating that the initiative would run against important national interests and would therefore, in the government's perspective, not be a good solution for addressing concerns surrounding immigration. The parliament agreed with this position, and it recommended rejecting the MEI on the 27 September 2013 with a count of 140 to 54 in the first chamber and of 37 to 5 in the second chamber.[10] While the SVP representatives (who had proposed the initiative) approved it in the parliament, all other major parties rejected it. In the official information to voters ahead of the vote, the government repeated its arguments and emphasised that Switzerland is dependent on immigrant workers and that the initiative would harm the national economy (Document 2). Despite broad opposition by the political elite, the MEI was narrowly approved by 50.3 % of voters.

How did the political elite respond to this new situation that confronted the policy demands of the constitution with their beliefs that this policy would run against the common interest of citizens? The Swiss government acknowledged the approval of the initiative and began the process of implementing the new constitutional article. At the press conference on the day of the vote, the government pledged that Switzerland would introduce immigration quotas to replace the free movement of persons and that the popular vote would constitute a regime change in Swiss immigration policy (Document 3). At the same time, the government reiterated that the implementation would require the re-negotiation of existing treaties with the EU and that the result of such negotiations would remain unclear.

Political parties provided different interpretations of the popular vote, but they agreed that the popular will had to be implemented. The SVP welcomed the approval of its proposal and pressured the government to start the implementation process as soon as possible (Document 13). The FDP believed that the country would be in a difficult position after the vote, but it pledged to find the best possible negotiation result with the EU in order to implement the initiative (Document 17). In

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[10] BBl 2013 7351.

its first press release after the vote, the CVP stressed that the popular will had to be implemented while the Bilateral Agreements should be preserved (Document 20). The SP stated its disappointment that the path of opening had grinded to a halt and considered the approval of the MEI as an open-ended experiment (Document 22). These press releases demonstrate that the political elite had little option other than to commit themselves to the implementation of the new constitutional article. Although some political parties issued statements showing their disappointment, they all committed to contributing to the implementation of the vote. How did the aftermath of the vote affect the policy positions of Swiss politicians? To answer this question, I analyse the publicly stated positions of party elites based on the Smart Vote database. Candidates answered questions regarding their support for the free movement agreement for three national elections (2007, 2011, 2015). The survey results are displayed in Figure 11.2.

Figure 11.2: Elite support for free movement of persons over time

Note: Data from three waves of the Smart Vote survey among all candidates ahead of the national parliamentary elections in 2015. For the detailed wording see Appendix B.4. Sample sizes are as follows: 2007 (N = 3087); 2011 (N = 2917); 2015 (N = 3205).

In the year 2007, the extension of the free movement agreement to Romania and Bulgaria was a contentious issue with as many as 40 % of candidates opposing it. In 2011, candidates were asked about their general views on the free movement agreement and a large majority of around 80 %

expressed their support for it. In 2015, around one year after the MEI vote, there was a similar level of support in favour of the Bilateral Agreements and against immigration restrictions as demanded by the MEI. This means that a large majority of the political elite expressed continuous support for the free movement of persons, even after the popular vote that demanded its end.

By separating the preferences of the candidates by party affiliation, we can see how the different political parties positioned themselves in the implementation trade-off (see Figure 11.3). The trade-off preferences strongly resonate with parties' support for the initiative before the popular vote. The SVP overwhelmingly preferred immigration restrictions to the Bilateral Agreements, while the other main parties overwhelmingly favoured the Bilateral Agreements over immigration restrictions. None of the social-democratic candidates opted for immigration restrictions. There are a few deviations in the centre-right parties (CVP and FDP). The pattern looks largely the same when we only examine the candidates that were elected into the parliament in 2015. Despite the popular vote and politicians' commitment to implement the initiative, the policy positions that political parties conveyed to their voters remained the same.

Figure 11.3: Trade-off preferences for MEI implementation (party elite)

Note: The graph is based on the Smart Vote candidate survey from summer 2015, which asked whether candidates for the national election preferred immigration restrictions or the Bilateral Agreements with the EU. Party abbreviation as follows: SVP = Swiss People's Party; FDP = Liberal Party; CVP = Christian-Democratic Party; SP = Social-Democratic Party. For detailed wording see Appendix B.4. Number of observations N = 960 (candidates); N = 154 (elected representatives).

These different policy positions taken by parties suggest that the SVP has a different view than the other governing parties of what constitutes a responsible immigration policy. Do these trade-off preferences therefore stem from different evaluations of the benefits of immigration and the Bilat-

eral Agreements? To assess this question, I analyse data from the Selects survey from the 2015 national election.[11] This survey is anonymous and is therefore more likely to reflect politicians' true perceptions. Candidates were asked whether or not they agree with the statement that immigration is good for the economy. Apart from the SVP, the majority of party elites perceive immigration as an economic benefit to the country. The same pattern appears when I reduce the sample to incumbents.[12] The trade-off preferences regarding the MEI-implementation are congruent with politicians' perception of the economic benefits of immigration. The parties that perceive immigration as an economic benefit favour the Bilateral Agreements, and those that do not perceive immigration as an economic benefit favour immigration restrictions. Additionally, in contrast to the FDP, CVP and SP, during the implementation process the SVP stated that it did not consider the Bilateral Agreements to be of crucial importance for the Swiss economy (Document 16). In this perspective, immigration restrictions do not seem an irresponsible policy. Only the other three governing parties face a legitimacy trade-off between responsiveness and responsibility. The evidence shows that the policy positions of the political elite after the vote are consistent with those before the vote. Politicians did not change their views about what policy is in the interest of the country nor on how they position themselves to the voters in terms of their immigration policy preference.

Most politicians clearly prefer to preserve the Bilateral Agreements with the EU, which they consider to be the responsible policy choice in the interest of the country. However, the popular demand for immigration restrictions cannot be blatantly ignored without violating democratic norms and taking the risk of high electoral costs. I present two types of evidence to assess how the Swiss political elite responded to this decision dilemma during the MEI-implementation. For the first type of evidence, I conduct an analysis of the political process and politicians' discourse regarding the implementation of the new constitutional amendment. How did political elites position themselves and how did they communicate the implementation dilemma to the public over the course of the implementation period? Did they opt for a responsive discourse or a responsible discourse? The second type of evidence is the analysis of the resulting policy choices. In what sense did the final implementation choice represent responsive and responsible policy-making?

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[11] For more details on the survey and the question wording see Appendix B.4.

[12] There are N = 41 incumbent member of parliament from the four governing parties.

Figure 11.4: Elite views on the benefits of immigration

'Immigrants are good for the Swiss Economy'

Note: The graph is based on the Selects candidate survey (2015), more details on the survey and the exact wording of the question in Appendix B.4. Party abbreviation as follows: SVP = Swiss People's Party; FDP = Liberal Party; CVP = Christian-Democratic Party; SP = Social-Democratic Party. The number of observations is N = 901.

The Swiss government began its efforts to implement the initiative right after the vote. Just a few months later, in June 2014, the government presented its first implementation concept to the public (Document 4). It underscored the government's commitment to restrict immigration and thereby demonstrated responsiveness. The proposal was based on three pillars. First, domestic immigration laws needed to be revised to specify the new immigration restrictions. Second, the free movement agreement with the EU was to be amended. Third, the government proposed complementary domestic measures to tackle labour shortages and to improve labour market regulations. At the same time, the document listed a series of constraints that limited the government's capacity to restrict immigration. Once more, the government spelled out the responsibility needs resulting from international obligations and macro-economic needs. In February 2015, one year after the vote, the Swiss government presented a revised immigration law with new immigration restrictions and issued a mandate for re-negotiating the free movement agreement with the EU (Document 6). The introduction of immigration restrictions for EU citizens was made dependent on successful negotiation with the EU. The SVP increasingly turned against the official implementation strategy and accused the government of betraying the will of the people (Document 15). The other governing parties, the FDP, CVP and SP, held their position that the popular demand for immigration restrictions had to be implemented while preserving the Bilateral Agreements (Document 18, 21 & 23). While

the SVP insists on immigration restrictions, the other governing parties combine their pledge to implement the popular vote with the aim to preserve the Bilateral Agreements.

The re-negotiation of the free movement agreement between Switzerland and the EU became a crucial element of the implementation efforts. From the beginning, the EU made it clear that it did not plan on entering such re-negotiations. It did not change its position thereafter, and it insisted on the indivisibility of the four freedoms of the single market (Document 24). The EU Commission insisted that the free movement of persons is a cornerstone of the bilateral relationship and would therefore not be negotiable. The Commission further stated that the implementation of the initiative would threaten other bilateral agreements that regulate the access to the single market and the Swiss participation in the Schengen/Dublin area. In December 2015, the Swiss government took a new attempt and presented the idea of a safeguard clause similar to the temporary transition measures in the free movement agreements (Document 8). However, despite repeated efforts by the Swiss government to change the Commission's mind using exploratory talks and high-level diplomatic exchanges, the EU did not alter its stance. What is more, in November 2015, the Swiss Federal Court ruled that the new constitutional article could not be applied as long as the free movement agreement was in force (Document 12). Therefore, there was no plausible solution for solving the dilemma between the MEI and the Bilateral Agreements. They only path for implementing immigration restrictions would be to terminate of the free movement agreement with the EU and thereby lose the preferential market access guaranteed by the Bilateral Agreements.

How did this development affect the political discourse? Based on the media content dataset (see Section 11.2), I assess whether politicians communicated a responsive or a responsible position regarding the MEI-implementation. Statements that the popular will (immigration restrictions and preserving the Bilateral Agreements) can and should be implemented represent a responsive discourse. Statements that the popular will cannot be implemented due to external constraints, and that the Bilateral Agreements should be prioritised represent a responsible discourse. Figure 11.5 displays the frequencies of the discourses by the governing parties FDP, CVP and SP.[13] Although they strongly preferred the Bilateral Agreements, the parties delivered a substantial amount of responsive discourse where they pledged to restrict immigration.

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[13] The SVP does not face a decision dilemma and is therefore left out.

Figure 11.5: Policy discourses of mainstream governing parties

Policy position

closure

Note: This mosaic plot is a visual representation of the contingency table of claims on immigration policy position (openness/closure) and on the strategic evaluation (constraints/options). It is based on the political actors from the FDP, CVP and SP. The sample size is N = 134.

Next, I analyse the how the discourse evolved over the three-year implementation period. Did politicians increasingly recognise the trade-off situation and move from a responsive discourse towards a responsible discourse as it became increasingly unlikely that the EU would accept re-negotiations? Figure 11.6 shows the result.

Political claims in favour of immigration restrictions (closure) and statements that this demand could not be reconciled with the Bilateral Agreements (options) dominated the initial discourse following the popular vote. Despite having rejected these views prior to the popular vote, the public statements made by most politicians' follow this responsive discourse. Over periods two to four, this discourse further dominates with around 80 % of all statements. Despite failing to open negotiations with the EU, there was no shift in the public discourse. The discourse only switches to the responsible side at the end of the three-year implementation period. Politicians stuck to the responsive discourse as long as possible although it ran against their preferred policy. This discourse evolution applies to both members of the government and the parliament. We might, however, expect differences between the governing parties. The SVP who prioritised immigration restrictions had no incentive to switch their discourse unlike the mainstream parties of the FDP, CVP

Figure 11.6: Implementation discourse over time: from responsive to responsible

Note: *The graph represents the shares of a responsive discourse (opening - constraints) compared with a responsible discourse (closure - options) over time. The periods are unequal in length and cover between four and seven weeks (see Appendix). I extract the statements from NZZ, Blick, Le Temps and Le Matin. Statements by all political actors considered. The sample size is N = 1198 for position statements and N = 456 for statements on the strategic evaluation.*

and SP who prioritised the Bilateral Agreements. The data confirms this expectation. While the SVP did not change its discourse over time, the mainstream parties shifted from a 65 % responsive discourse in periods one to five to an 81 % responsible discourse in period six.[14]

As long as governing parties were not forced to make policy choices, a responsive discourse dominated. However, when time was running out and decisions had to be taken, the discourse switched and politicians acknowledged the trade-off between immigration restrictions and the Bilateral Agreements. Only then did they take a position against immigration restrictions. The signalling of responsiveness withered in the moment when politicians had to take responsibility for their policy choices. The policy discourse of Swiss politicians demonstrates that they aim to be both responsive and responsible in order to avoid undermining democratic legitimacy.

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[14] For a more detailed analysis of the role of parties in shifting the discourse, see Armingeon and Lutz (2019a).

The second type of evidence of elite response is the analysis of policy choices. How can the chosen implementation be assessed in the perspective of democratic legitimacy? Do the policy choices provide evidence favouring the argument of external responsibility and internal responsiveness? Towards the end of the three-year implementation period, a political coalition between the left-wing and centre-right parties adopted an implementation law based on measures to strengthen the public service of employment assistance and without violating of the free movement rights of EU citizens. The implementation of the MEI, therefore, did not restrict immigration and did not discriminate against EU citizens on the Swiss labour market. Most politicians argued that this 'implementation light' is the maximum possible way to implement the popular vote. Lawmakers expected that the new policy would reduce immigration pressures by increasing the employment of domestic labour (Document 19). The employment measure may contribute to fulfilling the substantial goals of reducing immigration, so the expectation of the responsible politicians. In the context of near full employment, it is, however, unlikely that this indirect immigration control would have substantial effects. The implementation law is therefore mainly symbolic since it contains no measures to restrict immigration to Switzerland.[15] The non-implementation of the immigration quota was a deliberate choice made to prioritise responsibility and to avoid terminating or violating the free movement agreement. Furthermore, during the implementation period, the Swiss government decided to expand free movement to Croatia after the government initially declared that it conflicted with the new constitutional article (Document 9). Instead of restricting free movement, the government has expanded it. In the external dimension, the policy of openness remains largely unaltered by the popular vote in favour of immigration restrictions. This confirms the first element of my hypothesis: Governments favour responsible policy-making on immigration policy.

The second element of the argument expects that politicians opt for responsive policy-making in the domestic area. During the campaign prior to the vote, the Swiss government acknowledged that there were a series of challenges due to high levels of immigration and suggested addressing them by using domestic measures (Document 1 & 2). How did this look like after a vote that had a majority of voters favouring immigration restrictions? According to my argument, the parties that face a legitimacy trade-off should turn to domestic policies for responsive policies.

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[15] Constitutional scholars have debated whether the implementation respects or violates the constitution (`http://eumigratio nlawblog.eu/eu-swiss-free-movement-and-stop-mass-immigration-much-ado-about-nothing/`, retrieved 25.03.2019.). It remains clear, however, that the demand for immigration control by the means of a quota rule and a national preference in the labour market was not fulfilled and rights of EU citizens in Switzerland remained unaltered.

First, I assess the existence of such a domestic strategy using parties official press releases after the popular vote. The SVP demanded that the Swiss government to take immediate steps to implement the initiative and to bring immigration numbers down (Document 13). No specific references were made to domestic measures such as integration policy demands. The FDP combined its commitment to implementing the initiative using every available option to restrict immigration with a call for a large-scale domestic liberalisation agenda to strengthen the national economy (Document 17). In its first press release after the popular vote, the CVP called for negotiations with the EU in order to preserve the Bilateral Agreements (Document 20). At the same time, the party demanded that the government enact domestic measures to fight against the abuse of welfare benefits by immigrants and to take stronger measures to protect Swiss labour standards. The media statement by the SP focused on domestic policy measures so as to address the concerns of voters around the issue of immigration (Document 22). These measures proposed by the social-democrats concerned the labour market, the housing market and also education and land use policy. These responses from the governing parties show that the parties that rejected the initiative formulated various domestic political demands that did not directly relate to the main demand of the initiative, the restriction of immigration. These measures covered various issues and were not confined to integration policy. They were strategically chosen issues that aligned with each party's ideology. While the liberal FDP called for a more liberal labour market in response to the vote, the left-wing SP called for more labour market protectionism. The politicisation of such domestic policy issues allowed parties to talk about those the issues that were most favourable to them and that were not constrained by the Bilateral Agreements.

Using the media content database, I assess whether politicians combined their public statements on immigration policy and the MEI-implementation with a call for domestic measures.[16] The mainstream governing parties of the FDP, CVP and SP make 80 such statements. This is a substantial number given the 134 statements on the MEI-implementation (see Figure 11.5). The most common domestic policy measures proposed by these parties were to increase domestic employment (N = 43) and to protect Swiss labour standards (N = 18). While only the left-wing SP mentions labour market protectionism, all three parties call for a better use of the domestic labour potential. Increasing

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[16] I only coded statements on domestic measures if an actor made a statement on his/her immigration policy preference or a strategic evaluation of the trade-off of the MEI-implementation with the Bilateral Agreements. The inductive coding resulted in 21 types of domestic measures. For more details see code-book in Appendix B.3

domestic employment acts as a valence issue that all parties could support. Increasing domestic employment is therefore the only domestic policy measure that found broad support across all governing parties that preferred the Bilateral Agreements to restricting immigration. This analysis shows that governing parties systematically called for domestic policy responses when discussing the MEI-implementation. The implementation law consisted of a domestic policy measure aimed at increasing the employment of domestic labour. Politicians demonstrated responsiveness in both their discourse and their policy choices when and where they do not face strong responsibility needs. This evidence corroborates the second element of my argument: Governments resolve the legitimacy trade-off by turning to domestic issues for responsive policy-making.

11.4 Alternative explanations

Following the results section that tests the thesis argument, I assess the explanatory power of alternative explanations for the policy choices of cross-pressured governments (see Section 3.1). The case study design allows for a more in depth analysis on whether the strategies of muddling-through, signalling responsiveness or selective openness are consistent with the way the Swiss political elite has implemented the MEI.

According to the *muddling-through* strategy, the political elite balances conflicting pressures with incremental policy-making. In the case of the MEI-implementation, the room for this strategy is severely limited since politicians face a clear decision dilemma that does not provide room for bargaining or small step incremental reforms: Either the free movement of persons remains or immigration quota are introduced. Were there nevertheless policy choices during the implementation process that could classify as muddling-through? In December 2014, the Swiss government decided to reduce the immigration quota for third-country nationals, and it justified this decision by referencing the MEI approval (Document 5). Labour migration from non-EU countries is one of the few discretionary channels of immigrant admission. The government opted to use this available instrument to demonstrate responsiveness. This decision did not sit well with business interest groups and their political advocates. The SVP also opposed this decision and stated that that

these highly-skilled immigrants were not the immigration problem that the MEI aimed to address (Document 14). In response to the political pressure, the government increased the quota in 2016 by half of the previous reduction (Document 7). The official justification for this decision was that it struck a balance between important economic needs and the popular vote on the MEI. After the implementation period, the government increased the quota to 2014 levels citing the continuous economic demand for foreign workers (Document 11). The policy choices regarding on third-country nationals fulfils the criteria of muddling-through because they represent an incremental change responding to the stronger political pressure. Muddling-through is therefore a viable option when governments have the discretionary power to influence immigrant numbers. However, this measure was not capable of significantly influencing immigration numbers since the potential reduction of 2000 quota permits would only correspond to just 1.3% of total immigration.[17] More importantly, the measure did not offer a solution to the implementation dilemma surrounding the restriction of EU immigration.

The government adopted another immigration policy in May 2017: the activation of the safeguard clause for immigration from Bulgaria and Romania. This instrument of the free movement agreement allows for the temporary re-introduction of a quota if immigration exceeds a certain threshold. Although this measure was enacted after the MEI-implementation period, the government justified it by emphasising its political aim to control immigration in the context of the MEI (Document 10). This measure also failed to substantially reduce immigration since it affected a very limited share of immigrants, and it was a transitional measure that was only available for a limited time. These two policy choices demonstrate that the Swiss government used its small discretionary policy space to enact minor incremental immigration restrictions for responsive policy-making. This limited strategy of muddling-through did not, however, address the decision dilemma between immigration restrictions and the free movement agreement.

Signalling responsiveness is an explanation that expects politicians to send responsive signals to the public instead of making material policy changes that affect policy restrictiveness. In the first version of this strategy politicians provide justifications to citizens by explaining their non-responsive policy-making. The discourse analysis in the previous section has demonstrates that all parties com-

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[17] Total number of immigrants to Switzerland in 2016: 153,627 (Eurostat, online data code: $migr_imm8$).

mitted themselves to responsive policy-making. The political elite avoided confronting voters with the trade-off as long as possible. The government made intensive efforts to establish negotiations with the EU on the free movement issue, and it developed specific policy proposals with immigration restrictions. These efforts demonstrated their responsiveness before any policy choices were made. These efforts may have helped to establish the perception that the failure to implement immigration restrictions did not result from the ignorance of Swiss politicians but rather from their impaired capacity due to external constraints. The 2016 Brexit decision in particular opened a strategic window of opportunity for shifting the discourse and externalising the blame for non-responsiveness to an external event (Armingeon and Lutz, 2019a). The second version of signalling responsiveness expects governments to create distortions between policies and the public's perception of them. Did the Swiss government enact symbolic policy measures to demonstrate responsiveness? The implementation law, which did not contain any new immigration restrictions, was sold to the public as the implementation of the MEI, although its material demands were not fulfilled. Lawmakers promised that the new employment measure would work as an indirect form of immigration control by reducing the demand for foreign workers on the Swiss labour market (Document 19). There are, however, strong doubts that this law had any effect on net immigration given the high level of employment and the structural dependence of the Swiss economy on immigrant labour. Therefore, the implementation law has a symbolic element that signals responsiveness. The same applies to the safeguard decision of the government to temporarily restrict free movement rights of certain EU citizens. It allowed the government to send a signal that showed immigration control to voters, but it had no substantial influence on actual immigration.[18] Nevertheless, both policy measures brought material policy change. While many government actions and policy choices contain signals of responsiveness, neither did Swiss politicians resolve their decision dilemma by their failed re-negotiation efforts nor by taking purely symbolic actions without material policy change.

The third strategy of *selective openness* expects government to combine liberal policies towards some (desirable) immigrants and restrictive policies towards other less desirable immigrants. As mentioned above, the minor immigration policy measures that the Swiss government implemented

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[18] Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 10.05.2017, "Symbolpolitik mit der Ventilklausel" (https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/rumaenien-und-bulgarien-symbolpolitik-mit-der-ventilklausel-ld.1292158?reduced=true, retrieved 22.03.2019).

in response to the popular vote targeted labour immigrants from non-EU countries and EU free movers from new EU member states that tend to be high-skilled individuals. The rationale behind these policies was therefore not about the desirability of these groups but rather that they were the only available discretionary policy instrument through which the government could demonstrate responsiveness (cf. Ford et al., 2015). Since in particular high-skilled workers are the most-desired immigrants, these measures do not follow the expectation of the selective openness strategy.

The three alternative strategies explaining trade-off choices of governments provide an additional theoretical perspective on the decision dilemma for the Swiss political elite. The results of this section suggest that the Swiss political elite did combine different response strategies in their efforts to resolve the decision dilemma surrounding the MEI-implementation. They enacted some incremental policy changes in immigration policy and showed efforts to signal responsiveness to voters. There is, however, no evidence that any of these alternative explanations allowed the Swiss government to resolve the decision dilemma since their implementation law was a domestic policy measure that is not consistent with the explanations discussed in this section.

11.5 Summary

This chapter analyses how the Swiss political elite responded to the legitimacy trade-off after the popular vote in favour of immigration restrictions. The results show that the political elite did not implement new immigration restrictions but instead opted to continue free movement of persons with the European Union. They justified this choice due to external constraints: the EU did rejected the Swiss demand for a re-negotiation of the existing agreement and the termination of the Bilateral Agreements would harm the Swiss economy. This non-responsiveness in immigration policy was compensated with a domestic implementation of the popular vote. The parliament adopted an 'implementation light' based on an strengthened employment service that was expected to increase domestic employment and thereby reduce the demand for immigrant labour. The Swiss government therefore chose a mixed strategy. It sent responsiveness signals with their public discourse and through its various efforts to implement the initiative. However, the final way out of the dilemma

was a strategy of domestic implementation that preserved the free movement agreement with the EU. The MEI-implementation confirms the main argument of the thesis: The Swiss government could not ignore the demands for responsiveness nor the needs for responsibility. It resolved the dilemma of democratic legitimacy with a combination of external responsibility and internal responsiveness.

Chapter 12

Voter response[1]

12.1 The response to non-responsiveness

The previous empirical chapters analyse the migration policy choices of national governments in response to competing pressures from responsiveness demands and responsibility needs. This chapter concludes the empirical part of the thesis by examining how voters perceived the legitimacy trade-off and how they responded to governments' policy choices. The responses of voters determine whether or not the trade-off between responsiveness and responsibility undermines democratic legitimacy. Are constrained policy choices in migration policy able to garner popular support or do they lead to voter dissatisfaction?

The initiative 'against mass immigration' (MEI) exemplifies the collision between responsiveness and responsibility (see Section 5.3). I show that the Swiss government resolved the dilemma of democratic legitimacy by combining external responsibility with internal responsiveness (see Section 11.3). While voters demanded immigration restrictions, they got a domestic implementation law with a focus on employment measures instead. How did Swiss voters respond to the non-implementation of immigration restrictions? To answer this question, I analyse the perceptions and attitudes of voters regarding the MEI-implementation and how voters reacted to the policy choices of their elected representatives. First, I elaborate on voters' reaction to the non-responsiveness of their political representatives and how this may affect the democratic legitimacy of policies. I then introduce the data and method applied in this chapter. The result section begins with descriptive

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[1] This chapter is partly based on Armingeon and Lutz (2019b).

evidence of voters' perceptions and attitudes on the MEI and its subsequent implementation. I then use multi-variate survey modelling to estimate the determinants of these attitudes. Finally, I assess whether the Swiss political elite succeeded in maintaining the democratic legitimacy of their policy choices in the context of the MEI-implementation.

With the approval of the MEI, Swiss voters expressed a clear demand for restricting immigration to the country. At the same time, voters repeatedly voted in favour of the Bilateral Agreements with the EU, including the agreement on the free movement of persons, which conflicts with their demand to restrict immigration.[2] Do voters perceive a trade-off in their policy preferences? Previous research shows that many Swiss voters are cross-pressured between immigration restrictions and the benefits of economic openness for the country (Emmenegger et al., 2018). Furthermore, survey evidence suggests that Swiss voters expected that immigration restrictions could be reconciled with the Bilateral Agreements (Milic, 2015; Sciarini et al., 2015). Many Swiss voters assumed that the EU would agree to change the existing agreement in favour of Swiss demands and compromise on one of its fundamental pillars. Despite repeated efforts by the Swiss government, the EU did not change its initial position that free movement is a non-negotiable pillar of the common market and of the Bilateral Agreements with Switzerland.

In opting to implement a domestic measure thereby prioritising the Bilateral Agreements over the demand for immigration restrictions, the popular vote's main policy demand was not fulfilled. Did this implementation choice of the government lead to dissatisfaction among voters, thereby undermining democratic legitimacy? Or did the government succeed in maintaining is democratic legitimacy through its combination of external responsibility and internal responsiveness? So far we have limited knowledge of how voters respond to the non-responsiveness of their elected representatives (see Esaiasson and Wlezien (2017) for an overview). The existing literature mostly addresses voters' general attitudes towards democracy and not their responses to specific policy choices. Moreover, existing studies do not assess policy choices based on a direct-democratic vote that creates a strong implementation mandate. In this chapter, I argue that the consequences of

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[2] The Swiss voters approved the agreement on the free movement of persons in previous votes in the year 2000 (introduction) as well as in 2005 and 2009 (expansion to new EU member states).

non-responsiveness to a popular vote depend on how voters interpret the policy choices of their repre-sentatives. In the Swiss case, there were two competing interpretations of the MEI-implementation. The Swiss government and the mainstream governing parties argued that they did the maximum possible to implement the initiative, but that due to the responsibility needs created by the external constraint of the Bilateral Agreements, the free movement of persons had to continue. The SVP perceived the non-implementation of immigration restrictions as a betrayal of the popular will and was convinced that more would have been possible if the government would have negotiated more forcefully. In its view, the government failed and could not be trusted. Thus, different political actors hold opposing interpretations of the same event. Which interpretation did voters follow? Depending on their interpretation, voters may have reacted differently to the policy choices of the Swiss government.

In one version of voter response, voters follow the government's interpretation and accept the trade-off that immigration restrictions are not an available option as long as the country is not willing to terminate the Bilateral Agreements. They acknowledge that external constraints limit the govern-ment's policy space and that the EU is not willing to re-negotiate the free movement agreement. When a government fails to implement its promises due to external constraints, voters may become more aware of the limited capacity of the national government and adapt their preferences and ex-pectations (Rose, 2014). Hellwig (2014) shows that voters are capable of realistically assessing the constraints on policy-making and shifting their political demands to policy areas where governments have more room to manoeuvre.[3] We may therefore expect voters to adapt their policy expectations and revise their policy demands accordingly. Moreover, if governments act responsively in some ar-eas, this can create good will for responsible actions in other areas and allow governments to enact policies that are not in accordance with the short-term demands of voters (Linde and Peters, 2018). In a similar vein, Esaiasson et al. (2017) found that demonstrating the will to be responsive can ensure citizen's acceptance of policy choices that do not follow the majority opinion. The strategy of external responsibility and internal responsiveness may therefore provide an effective solution to the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy: responsive action in domestic policies creates goodwill that

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[3] Hellwig considers migration policy to be a domestic policy area where voters demand more responsiveness from governments. However, this perspective neglects the fact that migration creates a strong interdependence between countries and that migration policies have an important external dimension.

allows for the acceptance of non-responsive action in the external policy dimension of immigration rules. According to this argument, we would expect voters to approve the government's responsible policy choice on immigration and to maintain their support and trust in it because they are satisfied with the domestic policies that were implemented based on their demand.

Hypothesis 8a: *Voters adapt their policy assumptions and support the government's policy choice.*

In another version of voter response, voters follow the SVP's interpretation and perceive the government as unresponsive to the popular will. Voters do not adapt their expectations that the demand for immigration restrictions can be reconciled with the Bilateral Agreements. As a result, they are dissatisfied with the government and withdraw support for it and the mainstream parties that failed to implement the will of the people. Mair (2013) formulates this expectation more generally by suggesting that governments that are increasingly pressured to prioritise responsibility over responsiveness will deepen the crisis of democracy and undermine its legitimacy. In a similar vein, Rose (2014) argues that international interdependence that prevents government responsiveness may lead to dissatisfied voters that punish their representatives at the next election. In the context of the Euro crisis, external constraints due to membership in the Euro zone have undermined the legitimacy of national democracy and have detached voters from their democratic political systems (Armingeon et al., 2016). Studies examining migration policies specifically show that the divergence of migration policies and public opinion reduces citizens' satisfaction with democracy (McLaren, 2017; Stecker and Tausendpfund, 2016). According to these considerations, failing to implement a popular vote because of external constraints leads to a withdrawal of trust. As a result, voters blame their representatives for ignoring their vote and punish them in the next election.

Hypothesis 8b: *Voters do not adapt their policy assumptions and are dissatisfied with the government's policy choice.*

I will now develop theoretical expectations regarding voters' reaction to policy choices that prioritise responsibility over responsiveness, such as in the Swiss case of the non-implementation of immigration restrictions. Why did some voters support the government's responsible policy-choice

to continue free movement of persons and why did others continue to support the MEI despite the failed re-negotiation with the EU? I identify three explanations: rational policy preference, political ideology and economic interests.

The first explanations is that immigration restrictions are voters' rational policy preference. This may be the case when voters prefer immigration restrictions over the Bilateral Agreements and would be willing to accept the latter's termination. In this case, voters consider that continuing free movement is more costly than losing preferential access to the European single market. Another rational policy preference is that voters do not perceive a trade-off between immigration restrictions and the Bilateral Agreements. In this case, voters perceive the continuation of the free movement agreement as a failure of an unresponsive government. In these two situations, continuously supporting the MEI is consistent with voters' policy preferences.

Hypothesis 8c: *Voters continue to support the MEI as a result of rational policy preferences.*

The second explanation is based on voters' political ideology. Citizens may support the MEI because it reflects their political orientation and values. Citizens who possess a strong national identity and anti-immigration values are likely to consider immigration restrictions as a favourable policy. This group of citizens that holds persistent anti-immigration views is most likely composed of those individuals who identifying as right-wing and who value national sovereignty over international integration. Extensive literature suggests that deep-rooted values and attitudes are often resistant to facts (see Sides and Citrin (2007b) for how this applies to attitudes towards immigration). These citizens may therefore support the MEI as an expression of their political predispositions, which are unaffected by the real-world failure to implement the popular demand.

Hypothesis 8d: *Voters continue to support the MEI as a result of their political ideology.*

A third explanation relates to citizens' socio-economic interests. According to the literature on the losers of globalisation, certain social groups have more to fear more from globalisation than others (Kriesi et al., 2008, 2012). This particularly applies to citizens with low levels of education and workers with low levels of skills who may suffer from competition with immigrant workers. This social group is more likely to favour immigration restrictions since they assume that the international

opening of the labour market worsens its economic situation. In this perspective, voters support the MEI despite the failure of implementation because it represents their socio-economic interests.

Hypothesis 8e: *Voters continue to support the MEI as a result of their socio-economic interests.*

12.2   Data and method

To analyse voters' reaction to the implementation dilemma, I rely on original and secondary survey data. The combination of different surveys allows me to analyse the perceptions and preferences of Swiss citizens regarding immigration policy and the MEI-implementation. The detailed wording and information on the method and sample of the surveys is provided in Table B.4 in the Appendix.

For the analysis of the motivations behind people's vote choice, I use the post-vote survey VOX that was fielded just after the MEI-vote in February 2014. The survey asks voters about their vote choice and whether they agree or disagree with the main arguments of the vote campaign.[4] The survey contains four arguments in favour and four arguments against the initiative. The arguments in favour ask whether the voters agree with the SVP's problem analysis that immigration causes problems and Switzerland needs to regain control over it. The arguments against the initiative ask whether voters agree with the government and parliament that the initiative conflicts with the Bilateral Agreements and would harm to the Swiss economy. Furthermore, the survey asks voters an open question about their motivations for approving or rejecting the initiative. I use these questions to analyse the vote choice motivations and the role that the trade-off between immigration restrictions and the Bilateral Agreements played. To analyse the survey responses, I present descriptive statistics and model the explanatory power of different arguments for the vote choice.[5] I estimate both a linear probability model (LPM) and a logistic regression model to account for the binary outcome variable (Mood, 2010). The LPM offers a more intuitive interpretation of the model coefficients and is in most cases an equal fit as the logistic model that I report as a robustness test. I complement the analysis of the VOX survey with additional survey questions

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[4]   To facilitate the interpretation of the model coefficients, I normalised the 4-category Likert-scale (strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree) to a range from 0 to 1.

[5]   The VOX survey does allow to control for socio-demographic factors of voters. The analysis is based on weighted observations (by language region and vote choice, gew1143) to ensure the representativeness of the sample.

from Selects (2011) and MOSAiCH (2013, 2015) in order to provide evidence of how citizens' views evolved over time.

To capture voters' responses to the non-implementation of the immigration restriction, I rely on original survey data fielded in 2017, immediately following the three-year implementation period.[6] The first part of the survey consists of face-to-face interviews with a sample size of $N = 1066$ (including $N = 877$ Swiss citizens). The face-to-face survey was followed by a written questionnaire that was returned by $N = 646$ respondents. The questionnaire devotes a series of questions to the MEI (see Appendix B.4 for the detailed wording). It asks respondents how they voted in 2014 and how they would vote today. It also asks them about their trade-off policy preferences, whether or not they prefer the MEI to the Bilateral Agreements and whether they prefer the termination of the agreement on the free movement of persons or domestic reforms that address immigration challenges. Furthermore, the survey contains specific questions regarding the MEI-implementation. Did citizens believe that the government took the maximum possible steps to implement the initiative or that it did not negotiate forcefully enough? Did they think that the Switzerland could pressure the EU to re-negotiate on free movement? Did citizens consider that the popular will was fulfilled by the domestic implementation of the initiative? And, do citizens trust the government regarding EU matters? These questions allow me to assess how Swiss citizens perceive and interpret the non-implementation of immigration restrictions and to test different explanations.

I conduct a descriptive analysis of the survey responses and build two types of models. The first models analyse the reaction of voters by estimating why many of them continued to the MEI despite the failure of its implementation. The independent variables measure the three different explanations outlined in the theoretical section above: rational policy preferences, political ideology and socio-economic interests. I capture rational policy preferences by the trade-off preference between the MEI and the Bilateral Agreements and the perception of whether the government did the maximum possible to implement the initiative. For the explanation on political ideology, I use citizens' left-right self-placement ($0 = $ left; $10 = $ right) and their preference regarding the openness/closure of the country ($0 = $ openness; $10 = $ closure). I measure socio-economic interests by household income

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[6] The questionnaire has been developed by Klaus Armingeon and myself and was part of the MOSAiCH-survey 2017 administered by the Swiss National Data Archive in Lausanne (FORS). More details on the survey are provided in the Appendix B.4.

and level of education (low, middle, high).[7] Finally, I include sex, age and political knowledge as control variables. The knowledge variable that captures the cognitive resources of a person consists of an aggregated index based on four items. These items relate to migration policy and political institutions and cover both Swiss and European politics (see Appendix B.4). I estimate the effects of these determinants on support for the MEI that serves as the binary dependent variable. I run a series of logistic regression models based on the sample containing only Swiss citizens. First, I estimate separate models for each of the three explanations. Finally, I build a model with all of the variables included in order to estimate the relative explanatory power of the three explanations. All models apply post-stratification weights so as to address the under-representation of MEI-supporters in the survey.[8] A series of robustness tests based on alternative operationalisation choices assess the stability of the effects.

The second group of models assesses why the failure to implement the MEI did not cause a political backlash of dissatisfied voters. To answer this question, I analyse the determinants of voters' distrust regarding how the Swiss government handles EU matters.[9] As the main independent variable, I use voters' trade-off preference between the termination of the agreement on the free movement of persons and domestic policy measures that address immigration challenges. If the strategy of a domestic implementation is successful, voters should not withdraw their trust because they are satisfied with the domestic implementation. Additionally, I include citizens' preferences between the MEI and the Bilateral Agreements and a variable that reflects whether or not voters consider that the domestic implementation represents the will of the people. Voters that prefer the Bilateral Agreements and those that consider that the popular will can be implemented by domestic measures should show lower levels of distrust. All models contain sex, age and political knowledge as controls and are completed with additional robustness tests.

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[7] The education classification is based on ISCED-categories. Low education includes those that only completed compulsory school. High education includes individuals with a tertiary level education. The middle category includes all educational levels in between.

[8] Weights provided by FORS (Lausanne).

[9] To facilitate the interpretation of the model coefficients, I normalise the 5-category Likert-scale to a range from 0 to 1. I treat the variable as quasi-metric and model it using a linear regression. An ordered logistic model serves as robustness test.

12.3 Results

This section analyses the preferences and perceptions of Swiss voters regarding the implementation dilemma of the MEI. I provide evidence of how voters reacted to the policy choices of their political representatives in their attempt to implement the initiative. First, I examine citizens' motivation to approve immigration restrictions in the popular vote. Then, I analyse whether voters perceived a trade-off between the implementation of immigration restrictions and the preservation of the Bilateral Agreements. The empirical section concludes with an analysis of how voters reacted to the non-implementation of immigration restrictions and its consequences for the democratic legitimacy of the MEI-implementation. Did the Swiss political elite succeed in maintaining legitimacy with a combination of external responsibility and internal responsiveness?

Only around 20,0000 votes made the difference at the ballot box in February 2014. Swiss voters approved the initiative against mass immigration with 50.3 %. While this vote expressed the demand for immigration restrictions, voters had also previously approved the Bilateral Agreements with the EU including the agreement on the free movement of persons. Nevertheless, the outcome of the vote seems less surprising in light of various surveys in the years before the vote. In the 2011 election year when the SVP launched the MEI and started to collect signatures, a survey among Swiss citizens showed that 63 % of voters agreed with the proposal to re-negotiate the free movement agreement with the EU in order to reduce immigration.[10] In 2013, a relative majority of Swiss citizens held the view that the free movement of persons was harming Switzerland more than benefiting it.[11] Many Swiss citizens felt uncomfortable with the level of immigration and identified the free movement rights of EU citizens as a policy that was harming the country. A voter survey taken immediately following the 2014 vote reflects the MEI vote was a vote about reducing immigration: 89 % of all respondents could identify that immigration restrictions were part of the initiative and 47.9 % referenced the specific policy tool, such as an immigration quota or the adaptation of the free movement agreement.[12] However, only 6.5 % of respondents mentioned that addressing the domestic challenges of immigration, such as labour market disruptions or crime,

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[10] Data from the 2011 Swiss Electoral Study (Selects) [f15804]. 31.3 % of respondents totally agree with the policy proposal and the same percentage rather agrees. For more details of the survey see Appendix B.4.

[11] Survey question from MOSAiCH 2013 [CH16new]. More details on the question wording in the Appendix B.4.

[12] VOX survey 2014 [a32c], for details see Appendix B.4.

had been part of the vote content.[13] Hence, voters were well informed about the content of the initiative and voted on a policy proposal that, in their view, would restrict immigration rather than addressing the domestic challenges regarding immigration. Their vote choice was an expression of their preference on immigration policy.

It is possible to obtain a more detailed picture of voters' motivations from the campaign arguments. What were the most influential arguments of the campaign? Based on the VOX survey, I estimate the explanatory power of four arguments in favour and four arguments against the initiative (see Figure 12.1). The strongest predictor for the vote choice is the argument that Switzerland should regain political control over immigration (in favour), followed by the argument that the free movement of persons is important for the success of the Swiss economy (against) and the argument that immigration is a threat (in favour).[14] However, the arguments that the initiative is in conflict with the Bilateral Agreements (against) or that immigration creates domestic problems (in favour) have no significant predicting power for the vote choice.

Figure 12.1: Explanatory power of arguments for the MEI vote choice

Note: The coefficients are from a linear probability model (LPM) that allows for a more intuitive interpretation. I weight the observations by language region and vote choice (gew1143). Blue coefficients represent the arguments in favour of the initiative, while orange coefficients represent arguments against it. The plot displays the coefficients sorted by effect size. Positive (negative) coefficients represent a positive (negative) effect of an argument on the approval of the MEI. A coefficient of 0.2 means that the likelihood of approving the MEI is 20 percentage points higher when citizens agree with the argument compared to when citizens disagree with it. The sample size is N = 732 and the adjusted R2 = 0.65. There is no problematic multi-collinearity between the argument variables (VIF < 2.6). The complete model output is in Table B.1 in the Appendix.

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[13] Those in favour of the initiative and those against it do not substantially differ in their knowledge about the content of the initiative. An exception is their reference to the specific policy tool, where 61 % of those opposing the initiative make such a reference, but only 47 % of supporters do. However, both groups describe the content of the initiative as immigration restriction with around 92 % of voters in each group.

[14] These results remain largely unaltered when controlling for sex, age and the left-right orientation of respondents.

To take the binary structure of the outcome variable into account, I also estimate a logistic regression. Figure 12.2 displays the predicted probabilities derived from this model for the arguments on immigration control and the Bilateral Agreements. The visualisation confirms that the argument of immigration control has a strong and substantive effect, whereas the perceived conflict with the Bilateral Agreements is of minor importance for the vote choice. Also, when voters were asked about their vote motivations in an open-ended question, the most mentioned argument (by 55 % of voters) was that immigration should be reduced.[15] Hence, the approval of the MEI was a vote on immigration control, whereas the relationship with the European Union and the domestic challenges regarding immigration played a minor role in the vote choice.

Figure 12.2: Predicted vote choice based on main arguments

Note: The conditional effect plots are based on the predictions of a logistic regression model with eight campaign arguments (VOX survey). The observations are weighted by language region and vote choice [gew1143]. The sample size is N = 732 and the adjusted R2 = 0.65. No critical values for multi-collinearity in the model (VIF < 2.6). Table B.1 in the Appendix shows the complete model output.

Next, I assess how voters perceived the trade-off between immigration restrictions and the Bilateral Agreements. The analysis above suggests that the vote choice was motivated by immigration preferences rather than considerations regarding the relationship with the EU and the fate of the Bilateral Agreements. In Figure A.1 displays how voters agree or disagree with the main arguments presented in the vote campaign. Among the MEI-supporters, the majority (61 %) did not perceive a conflict between the initiative and the Bilateral Agreements (Argument 2). However, many voters that agreed with the argument of a conflict still voted in favour of the MEI. This can be explained

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[15] VOX survey 2014 [a43/a53], for details see Appendix B.4.

by the fact that the large majority (88.7 %) of MEI-supporters accepted the risk of the termination of the Bilateral Agreements (Argument 3). Among the voters that voted against the MEI, 38.6 % nevertheless agreed with the argument that Switzerland should regain control over immigration (Argument 1). The relatively high agreement with the arguments of the pro-campaign suggests that many no-voters shared the SVP's analysis of the problem. They did, however, perceive a conflict with the Bilateral Agreements (84.5 %, Argument 2) and were not willing to risk them (55.7 %, Argument 3). However, only 28 % of no-voters argued that the relationship with the EU and the Bilateral Agreements was relevant to the vote choice.[16]

Figure 12.3: Voters' agreement with campaign arguments

Note: The two pyramid plots represent the complementary shares of agreement/dis-agreement with eight arguments on the MEI-vote. The data from the post-vote VOX survey was fielded immediately following the vote in February 2014. See Appendix B.4 for details on the survey and the exact question wording. The orange colour indicates that responses are in line with the campaign in favour of the initiative. The blue colour indicates that responses are in line with the campaign against the initiative. Sample size: N = 536 NO-voters and N = 476 YES-voters.

Does this mean that voters were ambivalent in their vote choice? Around a third of voters (32.1 %) show attitudinal ambivalence on the trade-off between immigration restriction and Bilateral Agreements.[17] This means that a substantive share of voters agree that Switzerland should regain control over immigration, but they also perceive a conflict between this demand and the Bilateral Agreements. Among those that want more political control over immigration, a slight majority (50.9 %) disagrees with the argument that the MEI conflicts with the Bilateral Agreements and 81 % agree that the risk of terminating the Bilateral Agreements should be accepted. Most citizens that voted

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[16] VOX survey 2014 [a43/a53], for details see Appendix B.4.

[17] Overall, two thirds of respondents are ambivalent in the sense that they agree with at least one argument in favour and one argument against the initiative.

in favour of the MEI did not perceive a trade-off between immigration restrictions and the Bilateral Agreements and most were willing to risk disrupting the relationship with the EU (see Figure 12.3). If people are ambivalent, their vote choice should depend on whether or not they are willing to risk the termination of the Bilateral Agreements in order to restrict immigration. This rationale is confirmed with a three-way interaction model for the vote choice (see Figure 12.4). The willingness to risk disrupting the relationship with the EU moderates the effect of the immigration preference on the vote choice. The probability of voting 'yes' was more than three times higher (lower) when voters were (not) willing to risk the Bilateral Agreements.[18] There were very few voters who supported stricter immigration control but who did not want to risk the Bilateral Agreements despite being aware of the trade-off. As expected, this moderation effect only occurs with voters that perceive a trade-off between the MEI and the Bilateral Agreements.[19] This means that some voters were indeed torn between the MEI and the Bilateral Agreements. However, most MEI supporters wanted fewer immigrants and did not perceive a conflict with the Bilateral Agreements.

Figure 12.4: Ambivalent vote choice: MEI and/or Bilateral Agreements?

Note: The plot shows the predicted probability of vote shares in favour of the MEI based on a linear probability model with a three-way interaction effect between whether or not a voter agrees with the argument that immigration should be restricted [arguc1], the argument whether there is a conflict with the Bilateral Agreements [arguc2] and whether a termination of these agreements should be risked [arguc3]. I weigh the observations by language region and vote choice [gew1143].

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[18] When estimating a logistic regression model, there is a highly significant interaction between the trade-off perceptions of voters and whether the willingness to risk the Bilateral Agreements affects their vote choice.

[19] The trade-off perception does not moderate the influence of immigration preference on the vote choice.

MEI-supporters were either not aware of the trade-off with the Bilateral Agreements or were willing to take the risk of their termination (applies to 92.3 %). However, this does not necessarily mean that they were willing to terminate the Bilateral Agreements in favour of the MEI. How would Swiss voters decide if they had to choose between immigration restrictions and the Bilateral Agreements? A few months after the vote, only one third (34 %) of voters expressed a preference for the MEI over the Bilateral Agreements, whereas the clear majority (59 %) prioritised the Bilateral Agreements (Sciarini et al., 2015, 10). A substantial share of MEI-supporters (30 %) would prioritise the Bilateral Agreements if they were forced to choose. The evidence suggests that the Bilateral Agreements enjoy more support overall than the MEI. If Swiss voters would be forced to decide between the two, two thirds would opt for the Bilateral Agreements. The approval of the MEI was therefore based on the assumption of having it both ways.

In the following, I analyse the reaction of voters to the non-implementation of immigration restrictions. The parliament adopted an implementation law in December 2016 with an strengthened public employment service but a continuation of the free movement of persons. However, as the analysis above demonstrates, the MEI approval was motivated by the demand for fewer immigrants and not by the better tackling of domestic challenges related to immigration. How did citizens interpret the non-implementation of immigration restriction? Did they accept the government's justification that it took a responsible choice to save the Bilateral Agreements or did they follow the SVP's interpretation that the government was non-responsive and to blame for disregarding the will of the people?

The 2017 MOSAiCH survey provides a series of survey questions that allow for an assessment of how voters interpreted the (non-)implementation of the MEI. I assess these interpretations based on five dimensions. First, whether or not voters considered the implementation law as an actual implementation of the popular vote. Second, whether voters thought that the priority given to the Bilateral Agreements was the right or wrong choice. Third, whether or not the government could be trusted in matters of EU policies. Fourth, whether or not Switzerland could pressure the EU to re-negotiate on free movement. Fifth, whether or not the Swiss government did the maximum it could to negotiate with the EU. These five dimensions allow me to represent the two competing interpretations of the MEI-implementation. The Swiss government has argued that the

Bilateral Agreements should be prioritised over immigration restrictions, that it did the maximum to approach the EU and that re-negotiating free movement was not an option. Therefore, the government considered that it implemented the popular will and that it remained deserving of the people's trust. The SVP has argued that immigration restrictions should have priority over the Bilateral Agreements, that the Swiss government did not try hard enough to negotiate with the EU and that the government could have put more pressure on the EU. The SVP believed that the popular will was not implemented and that people should therefore not trust the government. The government justified their responsible policy choice, and the SVP criticised its non-responsiveness. Which interpretation did Swiss voters follow? I present the results in Figure 12.5. Overall, voters approved the decision to prioritise the Bilateral Agreements and expressed high levels of trust in the government on EU matters. Voters were split regarding whether or not the implementation law should be considered as an actual implementation of the popular vote. Moreover, most voters did not perceive that the government did everything possible to implement the initiative and thinks that the EU would have made concessions if the government would had tried harder.

Figure 12.5: Interpretation of the MEI-implementation by voters

Note: These pyramid plots show the percentages of voters who agree/disagree with survey questions on the MEI-implementation. Data from MOSAiCH 2017 [CHS4, CH27, CH28a, CHS17bp, CHS18p], details on the survey and the exact wording in the Appendix B.4. All questions are coded as dummy variables. Question 1 is original a dummy. Question 2 and 5 are based on a 4-category Likert-scale that were collapsed into two categories of agreement/disagreement. For question 3 and 4 with a 5-category Likert-scale, the response 'neither-nor' is coded as missing. N = 877 (YES-voters N = 202; NO-voters N = 376).

Since the yes-voters have different preferences and perceptions than the no-voters (see results above), the interpretation may depend on how citizens have voted on the MEI. The split of voters into the two groups in Figure 12.5 confirms this expectation. Those that voted 'yes' are substantially more likely to share the SVP's interpretation in all five dimensions. The clear majorities of yes-voters

are in line with the SVP's interpretation except that most of them consider the government to be trustworthy on EU matters. The no-voters clearly share the government's interpretation in all five dimensions. The most contentious aspect that divides the no-voters is whether the EU could have been pressured to renegotiate free movement agreement. MEI opponents are largely satisfied with the government's responsible policy choice. The yes-voters believe that the government is non-responsive to their demand but, nevertheless, they do not withdraw their trust.

The yes-voters did hold the same assumption as three years earlier. Many did not perceive a trade-off between immigration restrictions and the Bilateral Agreements. Survey data also reveals no substantial shift in public support for the MEI (Armingeon and Lutz, 2019a). In the remainder of this section, I conduct an analysis of why voters stick to a policy that has failed in its implementation. In the theoretical section, I discuss three possible explanations. First, voters continued to support the MEI because it represents their rational policy preference. Second, continuous support could be the result of political ideology. And third, voter support for the MEI could be based on voters' socio-economic interests. I test for these different determinants in a series of logistic regression models (results presented in Table 12.1). I run three separate models for the three different explanations. All coefficients are significant and point in the expected direction, with the exception of education. In the complete model (4), I test the explanatory power of the different approaches against each other. Two factors clearly appear as the strongest predictors. The first is whether voters prioritise the MEI or the Bilateral Agreements and the second is the general right-left ideology. If voters prioritise immigration restrictions they are significantly more likely to be continuously supportive of the MEI. The second major predictor is that voters with a right-wing political orientation are significantly more likely to support the MEI. Also, a significant positive effect is found for the distrust in the government in EU matters and the preference for closure. Income and education, however, are not systematically associated with MEI-support. The control variables of sex, age and political knowledge also do not exert any substantial influence. These findings suggest that rational policy preferences indeed explain a part of the continuous support for the MEI. However, it is political ideology that explains an equal share of the variance. Less support is found for the idea that the economic losers of globalisation have particularly high support for the MEI.

Table 12.1: Determinants of voter support for the MEI

	DV: Would vote in favour of the MEI again			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MEI-priority	1.234***			0.657***
	(0.132)			(0.183)
Distrust in government	0.426***			0.343*
	(0.124)			(0.168)
Right-wing orientation		0.433***		0.308***
		(0.059)		(0.081)
Closure of the country		0.415***		0.243*
		(0.069)		(0.100)
Household income			−0.119**	−0.081
			(0.045)	(0.058)
Middle education			0.372	0.502
			(0.384)	(0.508)
High education			−0.403	−0.043
			(0.436)	(0.573)
Sex (female)	−0.067	0.349	−0.297	0.021
	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.217)	(0.272)
Age	0.002	−0.004	−0.006	−0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Political knowledge	−0.078	−0.082	−0.052	0.096
	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.088)	(0.112)
Constant	−4.317***	−4.185***	0.437	−5.110***
	(0.477)	(0.472)	(0.560)	(0.957)
Observations	691	691	485	441
Akaike Inf. Crit.	733.727	750.736	600.918	435.723

Note: These are logistic regression models with post-stratification weights. Low education acts as reference category. The level of significance is: $^*p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$.

To assess the stability of these effects, I conduct a series of robustness checks. The use of alternative operationalisations demonstrates how sensitive the estimates are to measurement choices. I use an alternative calculation of MEI-support by adding the respondents that answered 'would not vote' (coded as $0 =$ no MEI-support). The results do not change significantly. Afterwards, I replace government distrust with a variable on whether voters perceive a trade-off between the MEI and the Bilateral Agreements. This alternative question is a precise measurement for the rational policy preference, however, it provides fewer observations as the question is part of the paper questionnaire. The coefficient is not statistically significant, while the other effects are in substance the same. To account for elite cues, I run a model with SVP-sympathy and general trust in the government. Both coefficients are positive and significantly associated with MEI-support. The other effects are not

altered in substance. Finally, I test for whether or not political knowledge moderates the effect of political ideology. Cognitive resources could increase the effect of political ideology. The data shows that this is not the case. These alternative specifications confirm the stability of the effects. The continuous support for the MEI despite its failed implementation can be explained by voters' rational policy preferences and their views on immigration.

These results demonstrate that many voters maintain their support for a failed policy due to their ideological predisposition for a restrictive immigration policy. Most MEI-supporters also did not agree with the government that immigration restrictions could not be implemented due to external constraints. If most supporters of the initiative do not follow the government's interpretation, does it mean that the government's strategy to reconcile responsiveness demands with responsibility needs failed? This would mean that voters would have punished the parties that supported a responsible policy choice and rewarded those that blamed the government for its non-responsiveness. If we examine the electoral development, we observe no evidence of an electoral backlash for the parties responsible for the non-implementation of immigration restrictions. In the four cantonal elections that took place in spring 2017, following the MEI-implementation, the SVP *lost* seats in all elections while the centre-right FDP gained seats in two of the elections (Seitz, 2017). Moreover, MEI-supporters tend to trust the government in EU matters despite the failed implementation, as the analysis above shows. These observations contradict the expectation of an electoral backlash against an unresponsive political elite.

Did the domestic implementation of the popular demand allow the government to maintain its democratic legitimacy despite the non-implementation of immigration restrictions? A poll among Swiss citizens in 2017 suggested that a broad majority supported the domestic implementation of the MEI and only 35 % would vote against it in a referendum vote.[20] This is despite the fact that most voters did not consider the domestic employment measure to be a proper implementation of the initiative (see analysis above). In hindsight, it is clear that voters perceived immigration quota as the main content of the initiative (64.8 %) rather than domestic employment measures (3.5 %).[21]

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[20] `https://www.gfsbern.ch/de-ch/Detail/pragmatische-umsetzung-der-initiative-gegen-masseneinwanderung-ist-mehrheitsfaehig`, retrieved 25.03.2019.

[21] These response items are part of a knowledge question about the content of the MEI [CHS19p]. The two other categories were more asylum restrictions and the protection of wages.

When asked about their choice between the termination of the free movement agreement or the implementation of additional domestic measures to address immigration challenges, a large majority of voters (79 %) preferred the domestic measures.[22] Even among the MEI-supporters, there is no majority that prefers termination, only 36.4 % choose this policy option. Already in the year 2015, 83 % of voters responded to the same question that they preferred domestic measures to the termination of the free movement agreement. Hence, support for a domestic policy response for immigration concerns preceded the implementation law introduced in 2016. This suggests that the domestic implementation of the initiative finds broad support among voters despite their preference for immigration restrictions. Does voter satisfaction with the domestic implementation explain why voters did not withdraw their trust in the government? In Table 12.2, I estimate the effect of voters' preference for a domestic implementation on distrusting the government on EU matters. The models also include voters support for the MEI, a variable on whether or not the voter considered the initiative to have been implemented as well as the previous control variables sex, age and political knowledge. As expected, voters that preferred a domestic implementation have significantly lower levels of distrust in the government than those that prefer the termination of the free movement agreement. Distrust is also significantly lower when a person voted against the MEI and when a person considered the initiative to have been implemented. These coefficients are even stronger in model (2) on the sub-sample of MEI-supporters.[23]

While Swiss voters have overall high trust in their government, distrust on EU matters increases to more than 60 % among MEI-supporters that are dissatisfied with the domestic implementation.[24] However, among the MEI-supporters that are satisfied with the domestic implementation, two thirds trust the government in EU matters. These findings suggest that the Swiss government could maintain its democratic legitimacy in the implementation dilemma by making a responsible policy choice

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[22] Another poll in spring 2017 asked about the voting intentions regarding the SVP initiative to terminate the free movement of persons where 34 % stated they were in favour of this policy proposal (`https://www.gfsbern.ch/de-ch/Detail/pragmatische-umsetzung-der-initiative-gegen-masseneinwanderung-ist-mehrheitsfaehig`, retrieved 25.03.2019).

[23] The additional inclusion of the factors related to political ideology and economic interests (see Table 12.1) make the effect of the preference for the a domestic implementation even larger with a higher level of statistical significance. As robustness test, I also include a variable of general trust in the government and sympathy for the SVP to account for elite cues and whether trust in EU matters is simply an expression of general trust. Also then the the preference for a domestic implementation remains a strongly significant predictor. The substantial results also remain unaltered when estimating an ordered logistic model instead of a linear regression.

[24] The value is the predicted probability of distrust for voters that consider the MEI not properly implemented and want the free movement agreement to be terminated.

Table 12.2: Determinants of government distrust

	DV: Distrust in the government	
	(1)	(2)
	All voters	MEI-supporters
Support of domestic implementation	−0.108***	−0.176***
	(0.020)	(0.039)
Popular will has been implemented	−0.076***	−0.105**
	(0.016)	(0.039)
Voted in favour of the MEI	0.093***	
	(0.017)	
Constant	0.466***	0.615***
	(0.031)	(0.068)
Observations	634	179
Adjusted R^2	0.178	0.186

*Note: Coefficients of linear regression models, control variables (sex, age, political knowledge) not shown. The dependent variable is normalised to a range from zero to one. The independent variables variables are coded as dummies. Level of significance: *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$.*

on immigration policy in combination with domestic policy measures that address immigration concerns of voters. Although most MEI-supporters did not share the government's policy preferences nor their views on external constraints, they nevertheless placed trust in the government and were satisfied with its policy choices.

12.4   Summary

In this empirical chapter, I analysed how voters reacted to the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy. The context of the Swiss popular vote against mass immigration (MEI) in 2014 provides an exemplary case for such an analysis. Switzerland's economic and political integration with the European Union prevented the Swiss political elite from implementing the people's will of immigration restrictions. The re-negotiation of the free movement agreement with the EU failed and the government opted for a domestic implementation of the popular vote without restricting immigration. Did this strategy of external responsibility and internal responsiveness succeed in maintaining democratic legitimacy? This crucially depends on how voters reacted to the fact that they did not get what they wanted.

The evidence in this chapter demonstrates that voters approved the ballot proposal because they wanted fewer immigrants in the country. Although they did not get any immigration restrictions, there was no political backlash of dissatisfied voters. Most citizens that voted in favour of the initiative continued to trust the government and were satisfied with the domestic implementation of the initiative. The SVP, who launched the popular initiative and blamed the government for betraying the will of the people, could not obtain any electoral benefits from the failed implementation of immigration restrictions. The analysis demonstrates that this outcome is not the result of voters adapting their initial assumptions about the EU's willingness to make concessions to Switzerland or their policy preferences, but rather because they were satisfied with the political elite's domestic responsiveness. This suggests that the policy choice of the Swiss political elite was successful in reconciling responsiveness demands and responsibility needs and it thereby succeeded in maintaining democratic legitimacy.

Part V

Conclusion

Chapter 13

Synthesis of results

This thesis conducts a comprehensive analysis of migration policy choices in liberal democracies. How do national governments reconcile the conflicting pressures of electoral responsiveness and government responsibility on the issues of immigration? Do governments succeed to be responsive to their voters while providing for the requirements of their globally integrated economies? This chapter summarises the various empirical results and provides a synthesis of the findings of all empirical chapters. The empirical analysis is divided into two parts: an analysis of migration policy choices of national governments across 18 West European democracies (Chapter 5 to 9) and a case study on the implementation of an anti-immigration vote in Switzerland (Chapter 10 to 12). These two parts are complementary in their assessment of empirical implications of the thesis argument. The comparative study allows for the generalisation of the proposed argument across time and space, while the case study allows for the micro-foundation of the theoretical claims.

The cumulative evidence spans over six empirical chapters and allows for a conclusive assessment of the evidence regarding the thesis argument as well as alternative explanations of how governments manoeuvre the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy. The argument I put forward in this thesis suggests that the policy choices of cross-pressured governments are determined by the room to manoeuvre. I argue that the external dimension of immigration policy with severe constraints follows a logic of responsibility and the internal dimension of integration with a larger policy space follows a logic of responsiveness. Throughout the empirical part, I reveal evidence of different modes of policy-making in the two dimensions of migration policy.

Immigration policy choices are primarily drive by macro-structural factors (Hypothesis 1) and their evolution over time follows international economic integration (Hypothesis 3). The admission of immigrants have become more liberal independent of a government's political orientation. Furthermore, immigration policies remain largely unaffected by domestic politicisation and the political success of the radical-right (Hypothesis 5). Immigration policy choices do not correspond in a meaningful way to what governing parties pledged in their electoral manifestos (Hypothesis 6). The immigration policy choices are the result of structural needs. These findings provide support for the idea that immigration policy-making is primarily shaped by responsibility needs.

Integration policy choices are primarily drive by domestic politics (Hypothesis 2) and their evolution over time follows a pattern of electoral competition between political parties (Hypothesis 4). Integration policies have been increasingly shaped by partisan differences as a result of politicisation. Furthermore, government have adopted more restrictive integration policies when they enter coalitions with radical-right parties ((Hypothesis 5). Finally, governing parties tend to deliver on their manifesto promises in integration policy (Hypothesis 6). The integration policy choices of governments are largely a partisan choice. These findings provide support for the idea that integration policy-making is primarily shaped by responsiveness demands.

The main argument of the thesis finds systematic empirical support. The migration policy choices of government are shaped by their aim to reconcile electoral responsiveness and government responsibility. The highly constrained area of immigration policy makes governments to prioritise responsibility, whereas governments employ responsive policy-making in the less constrained domestic area of integration policy. Responsibility needs have motivated governments to enact immigration reforms and responsiveness demands have motivated governments to enact integration reforms. As expected, the pressure from macro-structural factors leads to more immigration liberalisations (see Chapter 6 and 7) and the pressure from domestic politics leads to more integration restrictions (see Chapter 8 and 9).

Throughout the empirical chapters, I tested alternative explanations for how governments reconcile responsiveness and responsibility in their policy choices (see Section 3.1). I found no systematic

evidence of a muddling-through strategy.[1] Governments do not systematically respond with incremental policy-making to conflicting responsiveness demands and responsibility needs. Instead, I reveal different modes of policy-making in the external and the internal dimension of migration policy. Governments do not muddle-through, but choose separate policy strategies in their quest to maintain democratic legitimacy. Another strategy of government would be the signalling of responsiveness. I find no substantive evidence that governments enact symbolic policies as a response to conflicting legitimacy imperatives. The evidence rather suggests that countries enact considerable amounts of material policy changes in response to responsiveness demands and responsibility needs.[2] The strategy of selective openness finds the more consistent support in the empirical analysis. Policy choices tend to vary by the immigrant target group. While there is a systematic pattern that policies on economic immigration tend to follow responsibility needs, policies on non-economic immigration tend more towards responsive policy-making. However, the effects are not of substantial size and miss statistical significance in most cases. Hence, the empirical evidence provides only limited for a strategy of selective openness.

The Swiss case study analyses the implications of the cross-pressure from responsibility needs and responsiveness demands on government's policy choices and their consequences for the democratic legitimacy of migration policies. The Swiss political elite escaped the implementation dilemma after an immigration vote with continuous openness in external immigration policy in combination with a domestic policy measure to address popular concerns around immigration (Hypothesis 7). The evidence further suggests that the Swiss citizens did not align with responsible policy choices in favour of openness and continued to support immigration restrictions. However, the strategy of responsive policy-making in domestic policy areas could prevent an electoral backlash and maintain democratic legitimacy (Hypothesis 8). Overall, there is compelling evidence for the argument of the thesis not only regarding the expected policy choices but also regarding the driving mechanism and the implications for democratic legitimacy.

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[1] Only in the Swiss case study, the quota decisions on third-country nationals qualifies as muddling-through strategy. This is however, not a policy change but a continuous decree of the Swiss government to define the exact quota for the upcoming year. Also it did not avert the decision dilemma the Swiss government found itself after the approval of the initiative against mass immigration.

[2] I test the argument in a limited fashion by focusing on policy choices. It is obvious that all politics and policies contain symbolic aspects. This thesis focuses on a specific group of policy choices based on a minimalist definition of symbolic policies as those reforms that do not affect a country's formal openness to immigration.

Chapter 14

Discussion

In this Chapter, I discuss the empirical findings in the light of the initial research puzzle (see Section 1.1) and elaborate on their contributions to the existing literature as well as the thesis' limitations that raises new questions for future research. The various findings of the empirical analysis on government's trade-off choices in migration policy contribute to different strands of literature. First and foremost, my findings are relevant for the literature studying migration policies. A bedrock of this scholarship is the idea that liberal democracies face conflicting pressures that require them to be open and closed at the same time, and are thereby difficult to reconcile (e.g. Hampshire, 2013; Hollifield, 2004). Viewing migration policy-making in the perspective of democratic legitimacy provides a theoretical framework for such trade-offs and allows for a systematic explanation of policy choices as I demonstrate. Migration politics has evolved over time and policy-making is shaped by the structural transformations of international integration and changing patterns of domestic political conflict. I derive four implications of my findings for the literature on migration policies.

First, migration politics should be viewed as dynamic rather than static. Not only do structural changes contribute to the evolution of policies over time, but also the salience of the issue in the domestic arena is highly influential for policy outputs. International migration is an important dimension of deeper international integration of countries and it is an important issue of political conflict in many European democracies. Therefore, scholars should not only ask how immigration affects mass politics but also how structural transformations in liberal democracies affects the way states deal with the issue of immigration.

Second, an integrative theoretical framework can advance our understanding of migration policies. Instead of assessing the role of interests, institutions and ideas in isolated perspectives, We should study how they interact and jointly shape migration policy-making. In a similar vein, we should assess how economic and cultural consequences of immigration jointly shape policy outcomes instead of asking whether it is economic or culture that drives migration politics. One central finding of this thesis is that immigration is intertwined with both cultural and economic consequences that cannot be ignored by politics. This multi-dimensionality should be taken seriously and understood as the complex nature of immigration (politics) rather than be seen as just competing explanations for political outcomes.

Third, the results of this thesis may help to disentangle mixed an inconsistent findings in the existing literature. In particular, previous studies on the effect of politicisation and radical-right parties on migration policies produce no conclusive evidence but many contradictory findings (cf. Bale et al., 2010; Breunig and Luedtke, 2008; Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Mudde, 2013; Schain, 2008). The evidence provided in this thesis suggests that the role of political parties in migration policy-making has not only changed over time, but also depends crucially on the policy dimension and the available policy space. Furthermore, the findings on the party mandate fulfilment in migration policy recommends to distinguish between the positions parties take for the purpose of electoral competition and the subsequent policies they implement as governors. These distinctions may help to get a better understanding how party governments make strategic policy choices that shape the partisan politics of immigration.

Fourth, my argument sheds new light on some established concepts in the literature. The results confirm the differences in policy-making between immigration and integration (cf. Ireland, 2004; Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Money, 1999). They demonstrate, however, that the difference between the two policy dimensions is not the result of varying ideological nature of the two policy dimension as previous scholarship suggested, but that the distinction is the result of a different room to manoeuvre for governments. As a result of the multi-dimensionality of migration policy, we observe two different modes of policy-making that allow governments to reconcile electoral responsiveness and government responsibility. My findings also offer a new perspective on the prominent idea of a 'numbers versus rights' trade-off proposed by Ruhs (2013). I find that some governments indeed combine liberal admission (numbers) with integration restrictions (rights). I suggest, however, that

this pattern is not the result of a trade-off choices between numbers and rights, but rather the result of two conflicting legitimacy imperatives. The policies on numbers follows structural needs and the policies on rights follows partisan choices. A prominent concept in the migration policy literature is further the 'gap-hypothesis' that government policies are systematically more liberal than voters would prefer (Czaika and De Haas, 2013). I confirm this general idea but provide new evidence of what mechanism drives this divergence. My results reveal that the liberal bias of migration policies is not the result of a gap in representation but rather a manifesto-policy gap due to responsibility needs that pressure governments to accept unwanted immigration. I hope my thesis sparks new attention to these fascinating research puzzles on the politics of immigration.

My findings also talk to the literature on globalisation and its effects on mass politics. I apply the argument proposed by Hellwig (2014) that the room to manoeuvre shapes national policy-making to the area of migration policy. The issue of migration has either been neglected in the globalisation literature and considered as domestic issue. Conceptualising migration policy as two-dimensional with an external and an internal dimension helps to disentangle the effects of globalisation on migration policy-making. The results of this thesis confirm the idea that globalisation pressures governments to enact liberal policies that favour international integration and open markets. A considerable amount of studies demonstrate declining partisan effects over time due to economic globalisation (see Huber and Stephens, 2014, for an overview). My findings, however, demonstrate that when it comes to migration policy partisan effects have increased over time, primarily in the domestic policy area where governments enjoy greater room to manoeuvre. This thesis suggests that migration policies deserve the attention of globalisation scholars that aim to understand how international integration interacts with domestic politics.

Another contribution of this thesis is to the debates around democratic legitimacy in times of global integration. While 'pessimists' expect the external constraints due to international integration to lead to a 'party-less democracy' where national governments lack the capacity to respond to voter demands (Mair, 2009, 2013). There are also 'optimists' that expect the evolving conflict around the openness and closure of nation states to result in re-enforced representation through a realignment of party systems (Green-Pedersen, 2007; Kriesi, 2014). My findings suggest a middle way between

these two scenarios. Unlike pessimists that expect a wholesale decline of parties, I find that parties have become increasingly important in shaping migration policies. At the same time, external constraints limit the policy space of governments and pressures countries to accept immigration even if this is unpopular with voters. The strategy of external responsibility and internal responsiveness allows governments to avoid a populist backlash and maintain democratic legitimacy despite conflicting pressures. National governments enact strategic policy choices that allow them to continue partisan politics and responsive policy-making in times of growing constraints. Instead of either responsibility or responsiveness, we should ask how these imperatives of democratic legitimacy interact within a constrained room to manoevre for governments (cf. Bardi et al., 2014). Scholars also pay particular attention to the role of radical-right parties in undermining liberal democracies (e.g. Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013). The finding that RRPPs use their government power to restrict the rights of already admitted immigrants corroborates the common expectations that RRPPs are a threat to minority rights in liberal democracies and the freedoms of those who are not considered part of the 'people'. The radical-right is, however, not particularly influential and even if they gain government office, the policies do not deviate significantly from previous ones.[1] The micro-level analysis of the Swiss case study shows that the underlying tension between responsiveness and responsibility cannot be easily resolved even when governments find successful strategies to maintain democratic legitimacy. It is for future research to enhance our understanding of how government's manoeuvre legitimacy trade-offs more generally.

As with every piece of academic work, there remains a number of open questions and empirical limitations. The perspective of democratic legitimacy to migration policy-making introduces a new conceptual and analytical framework for the analysis of migration policy choices and raises new research questions.

The focus of the empirical analysis throughout this thesis is on how migration policy choices change over time. By focusing on within-country variation, I have largely left out the role of national institutions that are time invariant. The Swiss case study takes place in a very specific institutional context. The Swiss anti-immigration vote provides an exemplary case of a legitimacy trade-off in migration policy. One might, however, argue that the Swiss case is very particular due

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[1] We don't know how migration policies would be like when the radical-right would form a one-party government.

to its direct-democratic system with a consociational government.[2] The comparative analysis does adjust for time-invariant country-specific factors but does not assess in depth the role of political institutions.[3] While this research design offered various benefits, it may be worthwhile to assess the role of institutional contexts for the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy in future research.

I demonstrate that governments enact responsive policies primarily in internal policies on integration rather than in external policies on immigration. However, democratic responsiveness as a motivation for policy-making can imply different policy aims. Integration policies can serve as another mean of regulating immigration itself or as a policy to address the domestic consequences of immigration. Do integration policies serve as immigration control in disguise that should discourage potential immigrants? Or are integration policies seen primarily as a mean to address domestic challenges related to immigration and cultural diversity? The thesis leaves this question open and it therefore deserves further scholarly attention.

The phenomenon of immigration affects both important economic interests as well as cultural values. This characteristic makes migration issues such an intricate object for policy-makers and for scholars alike. Although the legitimacy trade-off is essentially a tension between economic implications of immigration and cultural implications of immigration, I have left many questions unanswered in this regard. I argue that immigration policy has primarily socio-economic consequences while integration policy has primarily socio-cultural consequences. The extensive literature on immigration attitudes suggest that they are primarily rooted in cultural anxieties (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Whether this facilitates the acceptance of responsive policy-making confined to integration policy remains an open question. Future research should aim to btter disentangle voters' concerns about the admission of immigrants and the integration of immigrants.

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[2] For a more detailed discussion of the Swiss institutional context see Armingeon and Lutz (2019b).
[3] Political institutions are only taken into account as within-country change over time, whereas the fixed effects models adjust for time-invariant country differences.

Chapter 15

Conclusions

This thesis tackles an intractable puzzle of migration politics in liberal democracies. Contemporary European democracies have become migration states with globally integrated economies that are dependent on openness to immigration for preserving their economic prosperity and institutional legitimacy. But immigration is often unpopular with voters and has sparked attitudinal polarisation and partisan conflict that pressures governments to be responsive to voters' demands. Against this background, I pursue the research question of how national governments respond in their migration policy choices to cross-pressures that threatens to undermine their democratic legitimacy. I begin with the conceptualisation of migration policy choices in the perspective of democratic legitimacy. This allows me to derive two competing policy imperatives: input legitimacy based on responsive policy-making and output legitimacy based on responsible policy-making. Party governments in liberal democracies cannot ignore these two necessary conditions for democratic legitimacy without undermining their re-election prospects. I use this framework to systematise existing explanations for trade-off choices in migration policy. I then develop an novel argument based on government's room to manoeuvre that addresses the shortcomings of the existing explanations. I argue that governments reconcile the demands for responsiveness and the needs for responsibility with a combination of responsible immigration policy and responsive integration policy. While the external dimension of immigration is highly constrained and leaves governments limited policy options, the internal dimension of integration policy offers a considerable policy space for discretionary policy choices based on partisan preferences.

The empirical part of the thesis combines a large-N cross-sectional study with a case study design to analyse how liberal democracies deal with the legitimacy trade-off on the issue of immigration. The comparative study covering 18 West European countries from 1980 to 2014 reveals in details how immigration and integration policies are characterised by different modes of policy-making. Immigration policy choices are motivated by responsibility needs, integration policies are motivated by responsiveness demands. External openness is a structural necessity and follows a logic of output legitimacy. Internal openness is a partisan choice and follows a logic of input legitimacy. These findings confirm the idea that government's are motivated to reconcile responsiveness and responsibility in their migration policy choices. I demonstrate how migration policies evolved since the 1980s when there was a partisan consensus for a zero-immigration policy. Liberal democracies have since then become increasingly permissive to immigration and accept immigration to provide for the needs of international interdependence. Despite the vivid political conflict about the benefits and harms of immigration, governments of all colour have continuously liberalised immigration rules. On the other hand, immigration has evolved from a non-politicised issue to a polarising issue in the center of partisan competition. Political parties play an increasingly important role in shaping migration policies. The politicisation of immigration across Western Europe resulted in a stronger partisan divide in government policies with left-wing parties enacting increasingly more liberal policies than right-wing parties. Migration policies in times of globalisation is characterised by openness to immigration and partisan polarisation in domestic integration policies. The Swiss case study demonstrate on an exemplary case of a legitimacy dilemma how politicians compensated external openness due to responsibility needs with internal policy measures to address responsiveness demands. This strategy allowed the Swiss political elite to avoid a populist backlash and to maintain their democratic legitimacy.

The main contribution of this thesis is in my view the systematic approach to the question how governments make trade-off choices in migration policy. The 'liberal paradox' has puzzled scholars for a long time and the idea of competing pressures is ubiquitous in the migration policy literature. I contribute to this scholarship by linking the trade-off idea with government's policy choices embedded in a novel theoretical framework of democratic legitimacy. The complementary weakness is that the focus on policy choices and their evolution over time necessarily leaves out other aspects. The specific mechanism linking the policy imperatives from democratic legitimacy and the

policy output is only briefly assessed in the Swiss case study. The comparative research design does not allow for an assessment of the underlying mechanism and leaves out direct measurement of governments' motivations and public opinion. The strong focus of the analysis on change over time and the specific case of a popular vote in Switzerland largely leaves out potential context-dependency. While I demonstrate a general pattern, there might be important variation across countries in their degree that they face the legitimacy trade-off in migration policy and the country-specific policy-making process. The study may therefore under-estimate the context-dependency of migration policy-making.

What are the broader implications for the democratic legitimacy of migration policies? The findings show that the migration policy trade-offs do not need necessarily undermine democratic legitimacy. However, the fundamental tension between the needs of international integration and domestic politicisation is likely to continuously provide difficult policy choices for governments. Immigration to Western Europe is set to further increase first and foremost because of demographic labour shortages. The question analysed in this thesis is therefore likely to remain important and rather to intensify than to abate in the near future. The coming decades will pose interesting dilemmas for policy-makers to reconcile the maintenance of international integration with the domestic conflict about the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants.

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Appendix

Appendix A

Comparative Study

A.1   DEMIG Policy Government Extension

A.1.1   About DEMIG Policy

The dataset DEMIG POLICY was compiled between 2010 and 2014 as part of the DEMIG project (Determinants of International Migration: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of Policy, Origin and Destination Effects). It tracks 6,500 migration policy changes in 45 countries, most of them enacted in the period of 1945 to 2013. The dataset assesses for each policy measure whether it represents a change towards more restrictiveness (coded +1) or less restrictiveness (coded -1) within the existing legal system. Besides this main assessment of change in restrictiveness, every policy change is also coded according to the policy area (border control, legal entry, integration, exit), policy tool (recruitment agreements, work permit, expulsion, quota, regularisation, resettlement, carrier sanctions, etc.), migrant group (low- and high-skilled workers, family members, refugees, irregular migrants, students etc.) and migrant origin (all foreign nationalities, EU citizens, specific nationalities etc.) targeted.

Dataset and documentation available on the DEMIG-Project-Website.

A.1.2   Government Extension

The Government Extension Dataset provides additional data to the DEMIG POLICY dataset. The extension assigns policy changes with particular governments. The dataset covers all reforms that were enacted in West European countries over the last 35 years. Scholars interested in explaining these migration policy reforms are required to assign reforms to particular political actors, in particular the government that are responsible for enacting the reforms. Government cabinets constitute the common reference point for both political parties and voters. The assignment requires data collection for those reforms enacted in years that saw at least two different governments in office. The chosen classification of government units allows to combine the dataset with the CPDS Extension on government composition (Armingeon et al., 2017a) containing an extensive range of political variables of cabinets. The declared objective of the DEMIG Policy dataset it is to study of migration policy effectiveness and therefore is interested in migration policy as an independent variable. The Government Extension increases the value of the DEMIG Policy dataset to scholars interested in migration policy reforms as independent variable since they can now link each reform to the political actors responsible for it.

A.1.3 Coverage

- Countries (N = 18): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

- Years (N = 35): 1980 - 2014

- Reforms: In total 2'282 reforms were coded, with 807 reforms (35 %) out of them that were enacted in years with at least two different governments in power. These reforms were researched in order to assign them to one specific cabinet. A clear assignment failed only 30 reforms (1.3 %).

A.1.4 Codebook

- *cabinet*: name of the cabinet and main party in brackets - following the cabinet classifications of the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al., 2017a). If a reform could not be assigned to a particular government, then its coded 'unknown'.

- *source*: specify the date of reform and the source of the information. When the description of the country files (provided by DEMIG Policy) contains a specific time indication, then this information is coded, if not, additional references of the data source are provided.

Figure A.1: Pyramid plot on immigration policy

Note: The pyramid plot multiples display the number of liberalisations and restrictions by government cabinets. Each country is represented by a separate plot and cabinets are ordered chronologically.

Figure A.2: Pyramid plot on integration policy

Note: The pyramid plot multiples display the number of liberalisations and restrictions by government cabinets. Each country is represented by a separate plot and cabinets are ordered chronologically.

Figure A.3: Heterogeneity of policy changes across space and time

Note: The graph represents the mean values by country and year of investiture based on the standardised policy change scores for a cabinet duration of 924 days (median). A 95 % confidence interval surrounds the means. Country abbreviations are as follows: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FI = Finland, FR = France, DE = Germany, GR = Greece, IS = Iceland, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, LU = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, PT = Portugal, ES = Spain, SE = Sweden, CH = Switzerland, UK = United Kingdom.

A.2 List of cabinets

An important choice of research design is the selection of government cabinets. Here, I present in details the selection rationale and details to the specific cabinets in the sample. Specific definition of cabinet, with the consequence that what others count as two cabinets are here counted as one cabinet. Only cabinets with a length of more than three months are included. This excludes mostly caretaker cabinets of very short duration. Full technocratic governments are excluded since they do not allow to calculate essential variables such as government ideology. Technocrat-led but partisan government are included in the sample. In Table A.1 all cabinets of the sample are listed, and Table A.2 lists all cabinets excluded from the sample. Cabinet names are in most cases based on (Armingeon et al., 2017a) using the name of the prime minister and the abbreviation of his or her party. The Swiss cabinets have no prime minister but rotate their presidency annually. Therefore, the name 'Bundesrat' (federal council) is used for Swiss cabinets in combination with the year of their investiture.

Table A.1: List of Cabinets

Cabinet (N = 237)	Investiture	Ideology
Austria (N = 12)		
Sinowatz I (SPÖ)	1983 - 1986	center
Vranitzky I (SPÖ)	1986 - 1987	center
Vranitzky II (SPÖ)	1987 - 1990	center
Vranitzky III (SPÖ)	1990 - 1994	center
Vranitzky IV (SPÖ)	1994 - 1996	center
Vranitzky V (SPÖ)	1996 - 1997	center
Klima I (SPÖ)	1997 - 2000	center
Schüssel I (ÖVP)	2000 - 2003	RRPP
Schüssel II (ÖVP)	2003 - 2007	RRPP
Gusenbauer I (SPÖ)	2007 - 2008	center
Faymann I (SPÖ)	2008 - 2013	center
Faymann II (SPÖ)	2013 - 2014	center
Belgium (N = 16)		
Martens II (CVP)	1980 - 1980	center
Martens III (CVP)	1980 - 1980	center
Martens IV (CVP)	1980 - 1981	center
Eyskens I (CVP)	1981 - 1981	center
Martens V (CVP)	1981 - 1985	center
Martens VI/VII (CVP)	1985 - 1988	center
Martens VIII (CVP)	1988 - 1991	center
Martens IX (CVP)	1991 - 1992	center
Dehaene I (CVP)	1992 - 1995	center
Dehaene II (CVP)	1995 - 1999	center
Verhofstadt I (VLD)	1999 - 2003	center

Verhofstadt II (VLD)	2003 - 2007	center
Leterme I (CD&V)	2008 - 2008	center
Van Rompuy I (CD&V)	2008 - 2009	center
Leterme II (CD&V)	2009 - 2011	center
Di Rupo I (PS)	2011 - 2014	center
Denmark (N = 15)		
Jorgensen VI (SD)	1981 - 1982	left
Schlüter I (KF)	1982 - 1984	right
Schlüter II (KF)	1984 - 1987	right
Schlüter III (KF)	1987 - 1988	right
Schlüter IV (KF)	1988 - 1990	right
Schlüter V (KF)	1990 - 1993	right
Nyrup Rasmussen I (SD)	1993 - 1994	center
Nyrup Rasmussen II (SD)	1994 - 1996	center
Nyrup Rasmussen III (SD)	1996 - 1998	center
Nyrup Rasmussen IV (SD)	1998 - 2001	center
Fogh Rasmussen I (LIB)	2001 - 2005	RRPP
Fogh Rasmussen II (LIB)	2005 - 2007	RRPP
Fogh Rasmussen III (LIB)	2007 - 2009	RRPP
Lokke Rasmussen I (LIB)	2009 - 2011	RRPP
Thorning-Schmidt I (SD)	2011 - 2014	center
Finland (N = 14)		
Sorsa IV (SDP)	1982 - 1982	center
Sorsa V (SDP)	1982 - 1983	center
Sorsa VI (SDP)	1983 - 1987	center
Holkeri I (KOK)	1987 - 1990	center
Holkeri II (KOK)	1990 - 1991	center
Aho I (KESK)	1991 - 1994	center
Aho II (KESK)	1994 - 1995	center
Lipponen I (SDP)	1995 - 1999	center
Lipponen II (SDP)	1999 - 2002	center
Lipponen III (SDP)	2002 - 2003	center
Vanhanen I (KESK)	2003 - 2007	center
Vanhanen II (KESK)	2007 - 2010	center
Kiviniemi I (KESK)	2010 - 2011	center
Katainen I (KOK)	2011 - 2014	center
France (N = 14)		
Mauroy II/III (PS)	1981 - 1984	left
Fabius I (PS)	1984 - 1986	left
Chirac II (RPR)	1986 - 1988	center
Rocard II (PS)	1988 - 1991	left
Cresson I (PS)	1991 - 1992	left
Beregovoy I (PS)	1992 - 1993	left
Balladur I (RPR)	1993 - 1995	center
Juppe I/II (RPR)	1995 - 1997	center
Jospin I (PS)	1997 - 2002	left
Raffarin II/III (UMP)	2002 - 2005	right
Villepin I (UMP)	2005 -2007	right
Fillon II (UMP)	2007 - 2010	right
Fillon III (UMP)	2010 - 2012	right
Ayrault II (PS)	2012 - 2014	left
Germany (N = 11)		
Schmidt III (SPD)	1980 - 1982	center
Kohl I (CDU)	1982 - 1983	center
Kohl II (CDU)	1983 - 1987	center
Kohl III (CDU)	1987 - 1991	center
Kohl IV (CDU)	1991 - 1994	center
Kohl V (CDU)	1994 - 1998	center
Schröder I (SPD)	1998 - 2002	left
Schröder II (SPD)	2002 - 2005	left
Merkel I (CDU)	2005 - 2009	center
Merkel II (CDU)	2009 - 2013	center
Merkel III (CDU)	2013 - 2014	center
Greece (N = 15)		
Rallis I (ND)	1980 - 1981	right
Papandreou A I (PASOK)	1981 - 1985	left
Papandreou A II (PASOK)	1985 - 1989	left
Tzannetakis I (ND)	1989 - 1989	center
Mitsotakis I (ND)	1990 - 1993	right
Papandreou A III (PASOK)	1993 - 1996	left
Simitis I (PASOK)	1996 - 1996	left
Simitis II (PASOK)	1996 - 2000	left
Simitis III (PASOK)	2000 - 2004	left
Karamanlis I (ND)	2004 -2007	right
Karamanlis II (ND)	2007 - 2009	right
Papandreou G I (PASOK)	2009 - 2011	left
Papademos I (Ind.)	2011 - 2012	left
Samaras I (ND)	2012 - 2013	center
Samaras II (ND)	2013 - 2014	center
Iceland (N = 15)		
Thoroddsen I (IP)	1980 - 1983	center
Hermannsson I (PP)	1983 - 1987	center
Palsson I (IP)	1987 - 1988	center
Hermannsson II (PP)	1988 - 1989	left
Hermannsson III (PP)	1989 - 1991	center
Oddsson I (IP)	1991 - 1995	center
Oddsson II (IP)	1995 - 1999	center
Oddsson III (IP)	1999 - 2003	center
Oddsson IV (IP)	2003 - 2004	center

Ãsgrimsson I (PP)	2004 - 2006	center
Haarde I (IP)	2006 - 2007	center
Haarde II (IP)	2007 - 2009	center
Sigurdardottir I (SDA)	2009 - 2009	left
Sigurdardottir II (SDA)	2009 - 2013	left
Gunnlaugsson I (PP)	2013 - 2014	center

Ireland (N = 14)

Fitzgerald I (FG)	1981 - 1982	center
Haughey II (FF)	1982 - 1982	right
Fitzgerald II (FG)	1982 - 1987	center
Haughey III (FF)	1987 - 1989	right
Haughey IV (FF)	1989 - 1992	right
Reynolds I (FF)	1992 - 1993	right
Reynolds II (FF)	1993 - 1994	center
Bruton I (FG)	1994 - 1997	center
Ahern I (FF)	1997 - 2002	right
Ahern II (FF)	2002 - 2007	right
Ahern III (FF)	2007 - 2008	center
Cowen I (FF)	2008 - 2009	center
Cowen II (FF)	2009 - 2011	center
Kenny I (FG)	2011 - 2014	center

Italy (N = 22)

Cossiga II (DC)	1980 - 1980	center
Forlani I (DC)	1980 - 1981	center
Spadolini I/II (PRI)	1981 - 1982	center
Fanfani V (DC)	1982 - 1983	center
Craxi I/II (PSI)	1983 - 1987	center
Fanfani VI (DC)	1987 - 1987	center
Goria I (DC)	1987 - 1988	center
De Mita I (DC)	1988 - 1989	center
Andreotti VI (DC)	1989 - 1991	center
Andreotti VII/VIII (DC)	1991 - 1992	center
Amato I (PSI)	1992 - 1993	center
Ciampi I (Ind.)	1993 - 1994	center
Berlusconi I (FI)	1994 - 1995	RRPP
Prodi I (PPI)	1996 - 1998	center
D'Alema I (DS)	1998 - 1999	center
D'Alema II (DS)	1999 - 2000	center
Amato II (Ind.)	2000 - 2001	center
Berlusconi II (FI)	2001 - 2005	RRPP
Berlusconi III (FI)	2005 - 2006	RRPP
Prodi II (ULIVO)	2006 - 2008	left
Berlusconi IV (FI)	2008 - 2011	RRPP
Letta I (PD)	2013 - 2014	center

Luxembourg (N = 8)

Santer I (CSP)	1984 - 1989	center
Santer II (CSP)	1989 - 1994	center
Santer III (CSP)	1994 - 1995	center
Juncker I (CSP)	1995 - 1999	center
Juncker II (CSP)	1999 - 2004	center
Juncker III (CSP)	2004 - 2009	center
Juncker IV (CSP)	2009 - 2013	center
Bettel I (DP)	2013 - 2014	center

Netherlands (N = 14)

van Agt II (CDA)	1981 - 1982	center
van Agt III (CDA)	1982 - 1982	center
Lubbers I (CDA)	1982 - 1986	center
Lubbers II (CDA)	1986 - 1989	center
Lubbers III (CDA)	1989 - 1994	center
Kok I (PvdA)	1994 - 1998	center
Kok II/III (PvdA)	1998 - 2002	center
Balkenende II (CDA)	2002 - 2003	center
Balkenende III (CDA)	2003 - 2006	center
Balkenende IV (CDA)	2006 - 2007	center
Balkenende V (CDA)	2007 - 2010	center
Balkenende VI (CDA)	2010 - 2010	center
Rutte I (VVD)	2010 - 2012	RRPP
Rutte II (VVD)	2012 - 2014	center

Norway (N = 15)

Harlem Brundtland I (DNA)	1981 - 1981	left
Willoch I (H)	1981 - 1983	right
Willoch II (H)	1983 - 1985	right
Willoch III (H)	1985 - 1986	center
Harlem Brundtland II (DNA)	1986 - 1989	left
Syse I (H)	1989 - 1990	center
Harlem Brundtland III (DNA)	1990 - 1993	left
Harlem Brundtland IV (DNA)	1993 - 1996	left
Jagland I (DNA)	1996 - 1997	left
Bondevik I (KRF)	1997 - 2000	center
Stoltenberg I (DNA)	2000 - 2001	left
Bondevik II (KRF)	2001 - 2005	RRPP
Stoltenberg II (DNA)	2005 - 2009	left
Stoltenberg III (DNA)	2009 - 2013	left
Solberg I (H)	2013 - 2014	RRPP

Portugal (N = 13)

Sa Carneiro I (PPD)	1980 - 1981	right
Pinto Balsemao I/II (PPD)	1981 - 1983	right
Soares III (PS)	1983 - 1985	center
Cavaco Silva I (PPD)	1985 - 1987	right

Cavaco Silva II (PPD)	1987 - 1991	right
Cavaco Silva III (PPD)	1991 - 1995	right
Guterres I (PS)	1995 - 1999	left
Guterres II (PS)	1999 - 2002	center
Barosso I (PPD)	2002 - 2004	right
Santana Lopes I (PPD)	2004 - 2005	right
Socrates I (PS)	2005 - 2009	center
Socrates II (PS)	2009 - 2011	center
Passos Coelho I (PSD)	2011 - 2014	right
Spain (N = 10)		
Calvo-Sotelo I (UCD)	1981 - 1982	center
Gonzalez I (PSOE)	1982 - 1986	left
Gonzalez II (PSOE)	1986 - 1989	left
Gonzalez III (PSOE)	1989 - 1993	left
Gonzalez IV (PSOE)	1993 - 1996	left
Aznar I (PP)	1996 - 2000	center
Aznar II (PP)	2000 - 2004	center
Zapatero I (PSOE)	2004 - 2008	left
Zapatero II (PSOE)	2008 - 2011	left
Rajoy I (PP)	2011 - 2014	center
Sweden (N = 12)		
Fälldin III (C)	1981 - 1982	center
Palme IV (S)	1982 - 1985	left
Palme V (S)	1985 - 1986	left
Carlsson I (S)	1986 - 1988	left
Carlsson II/III (S)	1988 - 1991	left
Bildt I (M)	1991 - 1994	center
Carlsson IV (S)	1994 - 1996	left
Persson I (S)	1996 - 1998	left
Persson II (S)	1998 - 2002	left
Persson III (S)	2002 - 2006	left
Reinfeldt I (M)	2006 - 2010	right
Reinfeldt II (M)	2010 - 2014	right
Switzerland (N = 8)		
Bundesrat 1983	1983 - 1987	center
Bundesrat 1987	1987 - 1991	center
Bundesrat 1991	1991 - 1995	center
Bundesrat 1995	1995 - 1999	center
Bundesrat 1999	1999 - 2003	RRPP
Bundesrat 2003	2003 - 2007	RRPP
Bundesrat 2007	2007 - 2011	RRPP
Bundesrat 2011	2011 - 2014	RRPP
United Kingdom (N = 9)		
Thatcher II (CON)	1983 - 1987	right
Thatcher III (CON)	1987 - 1990	right
Major I (CON)	1990 - 1992	right
Major II (CON)	1992 - 1997	right
Blair I (LAB)	1997 - 2001	left
Blair II (LAB)	2001 - 2005	left
Blair III (LAB)	2005 - 2007	left
Brown I (LAB)	2007 - 2010	left
Cameron I (CON)	2010 - 2014	right

Table A.2: Cabinets excluded from the sample

Reason for exclusion	Cabinet name	Country
Short-term cabinets	Verhofstadt III	Belgium
(less than three months)	Jäätteenmäki I	Finland
	Mauroy I, Raffarin I, Fillon I, Ayrault I, Valls I	France
	Schmidt IV	Germany
	Grivas I, Zolotos I, Zolotos II, Pikramenos I	Greece
	Cowen III	Ireland
	Balkenende I	Netherlands
Technocratic governments	Dini I, Monti I	Italy
(non-partisan)	Pikramenos I	Greece

List of adaptation regarding the CPDS cabinet list

- Switzerland, cabinet, 4-year cabinets instead of one-year

- Sweden: Carlsson III merged with Carlson II

- Portugal: Pinto Balsemão II merged with Pinto Balsemão I

- Norway: add Harlem IV because Harlem II listed twice

- Netherlands: Kok III (PvdA) merged to Kok II (PvdA)

- Italy: D'Alema II (DS) merged with D'Alema I (DS)
  Craxi II (PSI) merged with Craxi I (PSI)
  Spadolini II (PRI) merged with Spadolini I (PRI)

- Germany: Kohl IV zu Kohl III (CDU)

- France: Raffarin III (UMP) merged with Raffarin II (UMP)
  Juppé II (RPR) merged with Juppé I (RPR)
  Mauroy III (PS) merged with Mauroy II (PS)

- Belgium: Martens VII (CVP) merged with Martens VI (CVP)

A.3 Descriptive statistics of variables

Table A.3: Summary statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Directional policy output							
Immigration	237	−1.008	2.444	−10	−2	0	5
Integration	237	−0.857	2.138	−12	−2	0	8
Minor reforms	237	−0.346	1.827	−7	−1	0	10
Major reforms	237	−1.519	2.701	−15	−3	0	6
Immigration (economic)	237	−0.781	1.750	−8	−1	0	3
Immigration (non-economic)	237	−0.224	1.313	−5	−1	0	4
Policy activity							
Immigration	237	3.143	3.420	0	0	5	15
Integration	237	2.114	2.602	0	0	3	12
Minor reforms	237	1.030	1.427	0	0	2	7
Major reforms	237	2.114	2.518	0	0	3	12
Symbolic reforms	237	3.603	4.035	0	0	6	21
Material reforms	237	5.257	5.400	0	1	8	27
Immigration (economic)	237	1.831	2.377	0	0	3	11
Immigration (non-economic)	237	2.118	2.522	0	0	3	12
Independent variables							
Globalisation	237	0.315	0.191	0.000	0.183	0.454	1.000
KOF-Index	237	78.237	7.904	56.704	73.245	84.395	89.801
Unemployment	237	7.520	4.169	0.767	4.533	9.233	27.000
GDP growth	237	1.992	2.272	−9.179	0.746	3.325	9.261
Net migration rate	228	0.002	0.004	−0.015	0.0004	0.004	0.020
EU-membership	237	0.755	0.431	0	1	1	1
Veto player	237	4.450	1.333	2.000	3.333	5.000	11.333
Coalition size	237	2.464	1.274	1	1	3	6
Politicisation	237	0.241	0.172	0.000	0.120	0.313	1.000
Left-Right position	237	2.950	0.935	0.356	2.382	3.599	5.614
RRPP vote share	237	4.723	7.368	0	0	6.8	29
Δ cabinet ideology	237	−0.012	0.658	−2.000	−0.200	0.000	2.000
IMPIC immigration	219	0.430	0.105	0.307	0.359	0.464	0.700
IMPIC integration	219	1.109	0.698	0.050	0.650	1.569	3.000
Cabinet duration	237	928.443	508.144	98	436	1,442	1,847
CHES immigration	53	0.595	0.691	−0.553	0.034	1.087	1.910
CHES integration	53	0.497	0.724	−1.067	−0.042	0.881	2.095
CMP migration	235	0.588	0.195	0.000	0.462	0.746	1.000
CMP positive	235	0.255	0.228	0.000	0.072	0.391	1.000
CMP negative	235	0.208	0.184	0.000	0.075	0.293	1.000
CMP emphasis	235	0.236	0.167	0.000	0.121	0.320	1.000

Figure A.4: Parties' migration policy preferences by political ideology

Note: The scatterplots are based on N = 186 party positions for each policy area. The grey dots represent single parties and the black line is a smoothed trend line. Pearson's correlation coefficient reported. The dotted line represents the 95 % confidence interval. Data: Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2006 - 2014.

A.4 Additional model specifications

This section contains the detailed model outputs of the comparative analysis in Chapter 6 to Chapter 9.

Table A.4: Partisan effects in migration policy

| | *DV: Restrictiveness of policy output* | | | |
| | Immigration | | Integration | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Government ideology	1.350	2.121	3.124***	2.452*
	(0.970)	(1.194)	(0.808)	(0.968)
Policy baseline		−2.048		−0.157
		(2.650)		(0.341)
RRPP vote share		−0.007		0.023
		(0.036)		(0.030)
Net migration rate		−68.995		−28.119
		(57.895)		(46.856)
Unemployment rate		0.092		−0.013
		(0.088)		(0.070)
GDP growth		0.036		−0.059
		(0.086)		(0.071)
Number of veto players		0.172		−0.002
		(0.229)		(0.184)
EU-membership		−0.756		−0.934
		(0.734)		(0.596)
Cabinet duration	−0.001***	−0.001**	−0.001***	−0.001***
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Constant	0.051	−0.220	−1.869*	−1.083
	(0.902)	(1.933)	(0.751)	(1.331)
Observations	237	210	237	210
Adjusted R^2	0.125	0.150	0.207	0.232

Note: The table displays the result of panel regression models with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. The variable 'government ideology' measures the left-right-orientation of a government normalised to a range from zero to one. Levels of statistical significance: *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$.

Table A.5: Structural drivers of partisan dynamics

	DV: Change in policy restrictiveness			
	Immigration	Integration	Immigration	Integration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Right-wing cabinet	1.682	0.562	0.783	4.704**
	(1.847)	(1.528)	(1.816)	(1.540)
Politicisation	−0.498	−4.361		
	(3.200)	(2.646)		
Right-wing cabinet*Politicisation	−1.381	10.683*		
	(6.550)	(5.417)		
Globalisation			−7.755*	3.879
			(3.858)	(3.271)
Right-wing cabinet*Globalisation			2.726	−6.635
			(6.459)	(5.476)
Cabinet duration	−0.001***	−0.001***	−0.001***	−0.001***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Constant	0.175	−0.909	2.420	−2.819*
	(1.151)	(0.952)	(1.344)	(1.140)
Observations	237	237	237	237
Adjusted R^2	0.122	0.216	0.154	0.206

Note: Estimates based on panel regressions with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. The models are adjusted for cabinet duration. The level of significance is as follows: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table A.6: RRPP influence on migration policy activity

| | DV: Number of policy changes | |
| | Immigration | Integration |
	(1)	(2)
Left-wing cabinet	0.530	0.353
	(0.842)	(0.742)
Centre cabinet	−0.008	0.225
	(0.875)	(0.770)
RRPP cabinet	1.220	1.666
	(1.163)	(1.025)
RRPP vote share	0.282	−0.135
	(1.434)	(1.263)
Net migration rate	72.824	47.658
	(62.513)	(55.075)
Unemployment rate	−0.166	−0.181[*]
	(0.094)	(0.083)
Number of veto players	−0.276	−0.223
	(0.357)	(0.315)
EU-membership	−1.214	0.604
	(1.435)	(1.265)
Cabinet duration	0.004[***]	0.003[***]
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)
Constant	1.522	1.484
	(2.769)	(2.440)
Observations	152	152
Adjusted R^2	0.515	0.355

Note: Estimates based on panel regressions with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. Positive coefficients represent an increase of policy activity. The models are adjusted for cabinet duration and include the main control variables. The level of significance as follows: $^*p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$.

Table A.7: Effect of RRPPs on migration policy output

| | *DV: Restrictiveness of policy output* | | | |
| | Immigration | | Integration | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Left-wing cabinet	−1.073	−1.109	−1.154	−0.960
	(0.832)	(0.975)	(0.649)	(0.802)
Centre cabinet	−0.844	−1.406	−0.047	−0.150
	(0.873)	(0.928)	(0.681)	(0.762)
RRPP cabinet	0.085	−0.449	2.305*	2.254*
	(1.170)	(1.215)	(0.917)	(0.999)
RRPP vote share	−1.460	−1.738	−1.280	−1.390
	(1.738)	(1.703)	(1.359)	(1.399)
Δ cabinet ideology		−0.656		−0.197
		(0.459)		(0.377)
Net migration rate		32.855		−5.601
		(77.547)		(63.799)
Unemployment rate		0.271*		0.049
		(0.131)		(0.109)
Number of veto players		0.278		0.146
		(0.390)		(0.328)
EU-membership		0.280		0.204
		(1.445)		(1.186)
Policy baseline	−3.246	−4.966	−0.934	−1.071*
	(4.470)	(4.523)	(0.489)	(0.543)
Cabinet duration	−0.001*	−0.001	−0.001**	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Constant	4.076	2.550	0.624	−0.143
	(2.613)	(3.436)	(1.463)	(2.501)
Observations	138	134	138	134
Adjusted R^2	0.191	0.241	0.362	0.328

Note: Panel regression models with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. All models are adjusted for cabinet duration. The coefficients of government ideology uses mainstream-right government as reference category and the variable of RRPP vote share is normalised to a range from zero to one. For legibility reasons, the country dummies were left out. Level of significance as follows: $^*p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$.

Table A.8: RRPP influence on the direction of reforms

	Immigration		Integration	
	Liberalisation	Restriction	Liberalisation	Restrictions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Left-wing cabinet	0.668	0.441	0.841	0.119
	(0.817)	(0.538)	(0.696)	(0.464)
Centre cabinet	0.637	0.769	0.111	0.038
	(0.777)	(0.512)	(0.662)	(0.441)
RRPP cabinet	0.798	−0.349	−0.333	−1.922***
	(1.017)	(0.670)	(0.867)	(0.578)
RRPP vote share	1.507	0.231	0.676	0.714
	(1.427)	(0.940)	(1.214)	(0.810)
Δ cabinet ideology	0.232	0.423	−0.225	0.422
	(0.385)	(0.254)	(0.327)	(0.218)
Net migration rate	45.861	−78.708	48.685	−43.055
	(64.950)	(42.800)	(55.354)	(36.925)
Unemployment rate	−0.190	−0.081	−0.095	0.047
	(0.110)	(0.072)	(0.094)	(0.063)
Number of veto players	−0.242	−0.036	−0.217	0.071
	(0.327)	(0.215)	(0.284)	(0.190)
EU-membership	−0.733	0.453	0.292	−0.495
	(1.211)	(0.798)	(1.029)	(0.687)
Policy baseline	−0.108	5.072*	0.656	0.415
	(3.789)	(2.497)	(0.471)	(0.314)
Cabinet duration	0.003***	−0.002***	0.002***	−0.001***
	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0002)
Constant	−0.012	−2.539	0.887	−0.744
	(2.878)	(1.897)	(2.170)	(1.448)
Observations	134	134	134	134
Adjusted R^2	0.466	0.332	0.374	0.337

Note: Estimates based on panel regressions with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. Positive coefficients represent a liberal effect and negative coefficients represent a restrictive effect. The coefficients of government ideology uses mainstream-right governments as reference category and the variable of RRPP vote share is normalised to a range from zero to one. The level of significance as follows: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table A.9: Model output manifesto-policy association - CMP

Dependent Variable:	Change in restrictiveness		Liberalisations		Restrictions		Number of reforms	
Policy dimension:	Immigration	Integration	Immigration	Integration	Immigration	Integration	Immigration	Integration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Position score	−0.453	2.592***						
	(0.936)	(0.783)						
Positive statements			0.960	1.887**				
			(0.758)	(0.610)				
Negative statements					1.211*	2.633***		
					(0.515)	(0.433)		
Emphasis score							2.827*	2.879**
							(1.191)	(0.981)
Cabinet duration	−0.001***	−0.001***	0.003***	0.002***	0.001***	0.001***	0.004***	0.003***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)
Constant	1.076	−1.875*	−1.075	−0.122	−0.391	−0.577	−1.667	−0.434
	(0.957)	(0.801)	(0.694)	(0.558)	(0.424)	(0.356)	(0.881)	(0.726)
Observations	235	235	235	235	235	235	235	235
Adjusted R^2	0.118	0.193	0.327	0.310	0.287	0.249	0.422	0.322

Note: All models are panel regressions with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. The coefficients represent the change in policy output when the manifesto score of cabinets changes from 0 to 1. All estimates are adjusted for cabinet duration. Data from CMP, CPDS and DEMIG Policy. Level of significance as follows: $^*p{<}0.05$; $^{**}p{<}0.01$; $^{***}p{<}0.001$.

Table A.10: Model output manifesto-policy association and electoral incentives

| | DV: Change in restrictiveness | |
| | Immigration | Integration |
	(1)	(2)
Position score	−1.650	−1.273
	(1.610)	(1.314)
Politicisation	−4.574	−10.085***
	(3.751)	(3.061)
Position score * Politicisation	5.337	16.681***
	(5.678)	(4.633)
Cabinet duration	−0.001***	−0.001***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Constant	2.034	0.202
	(1.233)	(1.006)
Observations	235	235
Adjusted R^2	0.119	0.233

*Note: Estimates based on panel regressions with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. The dependent variable includes immigration and integration reforms. Positive coefficients represent a stronger manifesto-policy association. Models adjusted for cabinet duration. Level of significance: *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$.*

Table A.11: Model output manifesto-policy association and governing constraints

	DV: Change in restrictiveness (migration policy)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Position score	0.448	3.162	−2.923
	(2.959)	(4.331)	(2.305)
Number of governing parties	−0.305		
	(0.614)		
Position score*Number of governing parties	0.612		
	(0.953)		
Number of veto players		0.385	
		(0.489)	
Position score*Number of veto players		−0.184	
		(0.892)	
Politicisation			−14.659**
			(5.369)
Position score*Politicisation			22.018**
			(8.126)
Cabinet duration	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.003***
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Constant	0.155	−2.707	2.236
	(2.197)	(2.724)	(1.765)
Observations	235	235	235
Adjusted R^2	0.198	0.203	0.224

Note: Estimates based on panel regressions with country FE's and country-clustered SE's. The dependent variable includes immigration and integration reforms. Positive coefficients represent a stronger manifesto-policy association. Models adjusted for cabinet duration. Level of significance: $^*p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$.

Table A.12: Model output manifesto-policy association - CMP with controls

	Change in restrictiveness		Number of reforms	
	Immigration	Integration	Immigration	Integration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Position score	−0.104	2.054*		
	(1.174)	(0.940)		
Emphasis score			−0.823	1.540
			(1.363)	(1.182)
Unemployment rate	0.089	−0.035	−0.099	−0.082
	(0.089)	(0.071)	(0.092)	(0.078)
GDP growth	0.041	−0.057	−0.271**	−0.170*
	(0.087)	(0.072)	(0.091)	(0.080)
Net migration rate	−53.700	−10.652	289.038***	142.463**
	(57.757)	(46.525)	(60.060)	(51.956)
Radical-right vote share	−0.009	0.001	0.044	−0.002
	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.036)
Number of veto players	0.189	0.022	−0.007	−0.145
	(0.231)	(0.185)	(0.237)	(0.204)
EU-membership	−0.726	−1.085	1.230	1.486*
	(0.748)	(0.605)	(0.770)	(0.669)
Policy baseline	−1.234	−0.058	−3.223	−0.117
	(2.659)	(0.338)	(2.714)	(0.374)
Cabinet duration	−0.001*	−0.001***	0.004***	0.003***
	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)
Constant	0.538	−0.765	−0.074	0.446
	(1.934)	(1.313)	(1.964)	(1.398)
Observations	210	210	210	210
Adjusted R^2	0.136	0.226	0.534	0.387

Note: Panel regressions with country fixed effects and country-clustered standard errors. Level of significance as follows: $^*p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$.

Table A.13: Regression results manifesto-policy association - CHES immigration

	All reforms	Liberalisations	Restrictions
Position score	1.240	−0.194	1.046
	(1.645)	(1.341)	(0.819)
Cabinet duration	−0.002*	0.004***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Constant	−0.280	−0.581	−0.861
	(1.370)	(1.117)	(0.682)
Observations	53	53	53
Adjusted R^2	0.052	0.307	0.233

*Note: Estimates based on panel regression models with country-clustered SE's. Effects remain unaltered when country fixed effects included. Larger coefficients represent a stronger manifesto-policy association. Positive values represent a restrictive effect, negative values represent a liberal effect. Models adjusted for cabinet duration. Level of significance: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.*

Table A.14: Regression results manifesto-policy association - CHES integration

	DV: migration policy output		
	All reforms	Liberalisations	Restrictions
Position score	3.946**	−1.668	2.277**
	(1.344)	(1.207)	(0.780)
Cabinet duration	−0.002*	0.002***	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Constant	−0.929	0.134	−0.795
	(0.980)	(0.880)	(0.569)
Observations	53	53	53
Adjusted R^2	0.193	0.247	0.182

*Note: Estimates based on panel regression models with country-clustered SE's. Effects remain unaltered when country fixed effects included. Larger coefficients represent a stronger manifesto-policy association. Positive values represent a restrictive effect, negative values represent a liberal effect. Models adjusted for cabinet duration. Level of significance: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.*

Appendix B

Swiss Case Study

B.1 Initiative against mass immigration

The wording of the initiative in the original that became constitutional law on February 9th 2014:

```
I
Die Bundesverfassung wird wie folgt geändert:

Art. 121 Sachüberschrift (neu)
Gesetzgebung im Ausländer- und Asylbereich

Art. 121a (neu) Steuerung der Zuwanderung

1 Die Schweiz steuert die Zuwanderung von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern eigenständig.

2 Die Zahl der Bewilligungen für den Aufenthalt von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern in der
Schweiz wird durch jährliche Höchstzahlen und Kontingente begrenzt. Die Höchstzahlen
gelten für sämtliche Bewilligungen des Ausländerrechts unter Einbezug des Asylwesens.
Der Anspruch auf dauerhaften Aufenthalt, auf Familiennachzug und auf Sozialleistungen
kann beschränkt werden.

3 Die jährlichen Höchstzahlen und Kontingente für erwerbstätige Ausländerinnen und Ausländer
sind auf die gesamtwirtschaftlichen Interessen der Schweiz unter Berücksichtigung eines
Vorranges für Schweizerinnen und Schweizer auszurichten; die Grenzgängerinnen und Grenzgänger
sind einzubeziehen. Massgebende Kriterien für die Erteilung von Aufenthaltsbewilligungen sind
insbesondere das Gesuch eines Arbeitgebers, die Integrationsfähigkeit und eine ausreichende,
eigenständige Existenzgrundlage.

4 Es dürfen keine völkerrechtlichen Verträge abgeschlossen werden, die gegen diesen Artikel
verstossen.

5 Das Gesetz regelt die Einzelheiten.

II
Die Übergangsbestimmungen der Bundesverfassung werden wie folgt geändert:

Art. 197 Ziff. 9 (neu)
9. Übergangsbestimmung zu Art. 121a (Steuerung der Zuwanderung)

1 Völkerrechtliche Verträge, die Artikel 121a widersprechen, sind innerhalb von drei Jahren
nach dessen Annahme durch Volk und Stände neu zu verhandeln und anzupassen.
```

2 Ist die Ausführungsgesetzgebung zu Artikel 121a drei Jahre nach dessen Annahme durch Volk und Stände noch nicht in Kraft getreten, so erlässt der Bundesrat auf diesen Zeitpunkt hin die Ausführungsbestimmungen vorübergehend auf dem Verordnungsweg.

B.2 List of official documents

The press releases from government institutions and political parties listed below serve as data source for Chapter 11 on the elite response in the Swiss case study. Throughout the empirical analysis they are referenced following their number.

Bundesrat (Swiss government)

1. "Botschaft zur Volksinitiative «Gegen Masseneinwanderung»", Geschäft 12.098, 07.12.2012 (`https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2013/291.pdf`)

2. "Volksabstimmung vom 9. Februar 2014: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates", Abstimmungsbüchlein, herausgegeben von der Bundeskanzlei, 25.11.2013 (`https://www.bk.admin.ch/dam/bk/de/dokumente/Abstimmungsbuechlein/erlaeuterungen_desbundesrates09022014.pdf.download.pdf/erlaeuterungen_desbundesrates09022014.pdf`)

3. "Systemwechsel bei der Zuwanderung: Ja zur Volksinitiative "Gegen Masseneinwanderung", press release from 09.02.2014 (`https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-51948.html`)

4. "Art. 121a BV (Steuerung der Zuwanderung): Umsetzungskonzept", by the Federal Department of Justice and Police, 20.06.2014 (`https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/eu/fza/personenfreizuegigkeit/umsetz-mei/konzept-umsetz-d.pdf`)

5. "Bundesrat kürzt Kontingente für Fachkräfte aus Drittstaaten", press release from 28.11.2014 (`https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/de/home/aktuell/news/2014/2014-11-283.html`)

6. "Steuerung der Zuwanderung: Bundesrat verabschiedet Gesetzesentwurf und Verhandlungsmandat", press release from 11.02.2015 (`https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-56194.html`)

7. "Kontingente für Erwerbstätige aus Drittstaaten für 2017 festgelegt", press release from 12.10.2016 (`https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/aktuell/news/2016/ref_2016-10-125.html`)

8. "Steuerung der Zuwanderung: Bundesrat entscheidet sich für Schutzklausel", press release from 4.12.2015 (`https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/de/home/aktuell/news/2015/2015-12-042.html`)

9. "Schweiz ratifiziert Kroatien-Protokoll", presse release from 16.12.2016 (`https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/aktuell/news/2016/ref_2016-12-16.html`)

10. "Bundesrat ruft Ventilklausel an für Erwerbstätige aus Bulgarien und Rumänien", press release from 10.05.2017 (`https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/de/home/aktuell/news/2017/2017-05-100.html`)

11. "Erhöhung der Kontingente 2018 für Erwerbstätige aus Drittstaaten und Dienstleistungser- bringer aus der EU/EFTA", press release from 29.09.2017 (`https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ej pd/de/home/aktuell/news/2017/2017-09-290.html`)

Federal Court

12. "Urteil vom 26.November 2015 (2C 716/2014): Keine Änderung bei Auslegung des Freizügigkeits- abkommens", press release from the 26.11.2015 (`https://www.bger.ch/files/live/sites/b ger/files/pdf/de/2C_716_2014_yyyy_mm_dd_T_d_17_10_04.pdf`)

SVP

13. "Stimmbürger sagen JA zur eigenständigen Steuerung der Zuwanderung - Bundesrat hat jetzt rasch umzusetzen", press release from 09.02.2014 (`https://www.masseneinwanderung.ch/co ntent/aktuell/medienmitteilungen/ja`)

14. "Ein Tropfen auf den heissen Stein", press release from 28.11.2014 (`https://www.svp.ch/n ews/artikel/medienmitteilungen/ein-tropfen-auf-den-heissen-stein/`)

15. "Abstimmen, bis es Brüssel passt - Ganz in EU-Manier", by Adrian Amstutz (president of the SVP group in the national parliament), article in the official news outlet of the SVP from March 2015 (`https://www.svp.ch/partei/publikationen/extrablatt/extrablatt- maerz-2015/abstimmen-bis-es-bruessel-passt-ganz-in-eu-manier/`)

16. "Bilaterale Ja, aber nicht um jeden Preis", by Thomas Matter (member of parliament), article in the official news outlet of the SVP from September 2015 (`https://www.svp.ch/partei/pu blikationen/extrablatt/extrablatt-september-2015/bilaterale-ja-aber-nicht-um-je den-preis/`)

FDP

17. "Masseneinwanderung: Zusammen gut Lösung mit Brüssel verhandeln" press release from 09.02.2014 (`https://www.fdp.ch/aktuell/medienmitteilungen/medienmitteilung-detail /news/masseneinwanderung-zusammen-gute-loesung-mit-bruessel-verhandeln/`)

18. "Volksentscheid umsetzen - Bilaterale erhalten", press release from 12.08.2015 (`https://www. fdp.ch/aktuell/medienmitteilungen/medienmitteilung-detail/news/volksentscheid-um setzen-bilaterale-erhalten/`)

19. "Inländervorrang respektiert den Volkswillen - gleich doppelt", press release from 10.09.2016 (`https://www.fdp.ch/aktuell/medienmitteilungen/medienmitteilung-detail/news/inla endervorrang-respektiert-den-volkswillen-gleich-doppelt/`)

CVP

20. "Masseneinwanderungsinitiative: Verhandlungsspielraum wahren - keine unüberlegten Schnell- schüsse" press release from 20.03.2014 (`www.cvp.ch/de/news/2014-03-20/masseneinwande rungsinitiative-verhandlungsspielraum-wahren-keine-unueberlegten`)

21. "Mutloser Bundesrat", press release from 11.02.2015 (`https://www.cvp.ch/de/news/2015- 02-11/mutloser-bundesrat`)

SP

22. "Handeln statt jammern" press release from 09.02.2014 (`https://www.sp-ps.ch/de/publi kationen/medienmitteilungen/handeln-statt-jammern`)

23. "MEI-Umsetzung: Reihenfolge richtig – innenpolitische Reformen verpasst", presse release from 11.02.2015 (`https://www.sp-ps.ch/de/publikationen/medienmitteilungen/mei-um setzung-reihenfolge-richtig-innenpolitische-reformen-verpasst`)

European Commission

24. "Developments following the Swiss referendum on 9th February", statement by European Commissioner László Andor on behalf of European Commission to European Parliament plenary session from 26.02.2014 (`http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-32_en.htm`)

B.3   Codebook media content database

The media data covers four Swiss newspapers (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Blick, Le Temps and Le Matin. The time frame is defined by the implementation period of the Swiss initiative 'against mass immigration' adopted on February 9, 2014 and the subsequent implementation law in December 2016). The unit of measurement is an actor making a positional statement on immigration policy and the MEI-implementation. The dataset contains statements by all public figures, not just by the political elite as analysed in chapter 11. The codebook and dataset is stored with FORS, Lausanne.

```
ID (Identification number for each article)

newspaper (Name of the newspaper an article was published)

1 Neue Zürcher Zeitung
2 Blick
3 Le Temps
4 Le Matin

date (Date of publication of the article, YEAR/MONTH/DAY - e.g. 140209)

relevance (Does the article contain a statement of a political actor with regard to the free
movement of persons?)

0 = not relevant
1 = relevant

actor (Identification number of the political actor making the statement in the form of
'Surname, Name'. A political actor is defined as a person of public interest in media, politics,
economy, civil society or science. Excluded are anecdotal opinions of individuals with no formal
function. Individual actors start with the number 0001, collective actors with the number 0500)

0001 Sommaruga, Simonetta
0002 Maurer, Ueli
0003 Schneider-Ammann, Johann
0004 Rossier, Yves
0005 Lampart, Daniel
```

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0006 Müller, Philipp
0007 Levrat, Christian
0008 Blocher, Christoph
0009 Savary, Géraldine
0010 Keller-Sutter, Karin
0011 Brunner, Toni
0012 Matter, Thomas
0013 Piccand, Roger
0014 Rickenbacher, Iwan
0015 Burkhalter, Didier
0016 Nordmann, Roger
0017 Derder, Fathi
0018 Schwarz, Gerhard
0019 Longchamp, Francois
0020 Darbellay, Christophe
0021 Lüchinger, René
0022 Studer, Ruedi
0023 Cina, Jean-Michel
0024 Bourgeois, Jacques
0025 Zeller, René
0026 Pilet, Jacques
0027 Adler, Oliver
0028 Vogt, Valentin
0029 Gemperli, Simon
0030 Spillmann, Markus
0031 Stamm, Luzi
0032 Brand, Heinz
0033 Brutschin, Christoph
0034 Karrer, Heinz
0035 Rechsteiner, Paul
0036 Cherix, Francois
0037 Nordmann, Francois
0038 Hess, Hans
0039 Pfister, Gerhard
0040 Steinegger, Franz
0041 Neff, Martin
0042 Calmy-Rey, Micheline
0043 Bopp, Ralf
0044 Sturm, Jan-Egbert
0045 Haemmerli, Thomas
0046 Mazzoleni, Oscar
0047 Voiblet, Claude-Alain
0048 Minsch, Rudolf
0049 Emmenegger, Patrick
0050 Veya, Pierre
0051 Koidl, Roman
0052 Baumgartner, Markus
0053 Kalbermatten, Markus
0054 Roch, Philippe
0055 Sommaruga, Carlo
0056 Schmid, Ulrich
0057 Gartenmann, Werner
0058 Fykse Tveit, Olav
0059 Eloi, Frank
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0060 Freysinger, Oskar
0061 Brabeck, Peter
0062 Fischer, Peter A.
0063 Bigler, Hans-Ulrich
0064 Freiburghaus, Dieter
0065 Couchepin, Pascal
0066 Schwok, René
0067 Kaddous, Christine
0068 Amarelle, Cesla
0069 Amstutz, Adrian
0070 Aebischer, Patrick
0071 Dell'Ambrogio, Mauro
0072 Epiney, Astrid
0073 Rusotto/ Russotto, Jean
0074 Miéville, Daniel S.
0075 Chappaz, Pierre
0076 Köppel, Roger
0077 Zimmermann, Ivo
0078 Ribi, Yvonne
0079 Senn, Martin
0080 Jaisli, Hannes
0081 Loprieno, Antonio
0082 Hildebrand, Philipp
0083 Hayek, Nick
0084 Falbriard, Géraldine
0085 Armuna, Tatiana
0086 Neirynck, Jacques
0087 Etwareea, Ram
0088 Maire, Jacques-André
0089 Steinmann, Walter
0090 Höltschi, René
0091 Wolter, Stefan
0092 Schwaller, Urs
0093 Siegwart, Roland
0094 Schenker, Andrea
0095 Thorens Goumaz, Adèle
0096 Stöhlker, Klaus
0097 Ritter, Markus
0098 Vergauwen, Guido
0099 Arlettaz, Dominique
0100 Poggia, Mauro
0101 Rechsteiner, Ruedi
0102 Tobler, Christa
0103 de Buman, Dominique
0104 Blattner, Niklaus
0105 Senti, Martin
0106 Ernst, Wolfgang
0107 Michel, Matthias
0108 Armingeon, Klaus
0109 Fehr, Jaqueline
0110 Broulis, Pascal
0111 Maudet, Pierre
0112 Juillard, Charles
0113 Rime, Jean-Francois
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0114 Büchi, Christophe
0115 Mörgeli, Christoph
0116 Bulcke, Paul
0117 Jenny, Matthias
0118 Wyplosz, Charles
0119 Lautenberg, Alexis
0120 Kern, Thomas
0121 Moser, Beat
0122 Monnier, Philippe
0123 Diener, Verena
0124 Weber, Franz
0125 Nidegger, Yves
0126 Hitzfeld, Ottmar
0127 Schöchli, Hansueli
0128 Tingler, Philipp
0129 Brelaz, Daniel
0130 Salerno, Sandrine
0131 Fehr, Erich
0132 Mauch, Corine
0133 Morin, Guy
0134 Tschäppät, Alexander
0135 Meyer, Andreas
0136 Berberat, Didier
0137 Kuntz, Joelle
0138 Sheldon, George
0139 Dufour, Nicolas
0140 Buss, Pierre-Emmanuel
0141 Behrens, Miriam
0142 Oehen, Valentin
0143 Lombard, Thierry
0144 Park, Susin
0145 Nikolic, Dejan
0146 Cottier, Thomas
0147 Jürgens, Udo
0148 Schiesser, Fritz
0149 Muschg, Adolf
0150 Minder, Thomas
0151 de Watteville, Jacques
0152 Rossini, Stéphane
0153 Schilling, Guido
0154 Lange, Tobias
0155 Schnopp Max
0156 Levrat, Nicolas
0157 Geissbühler, Andrea
0158 Parmelin, Guy
0159 Reynard, Mathias
0160 Steiert, Jean-Francois
0161 Eichler, Ralph
0162 Cormon, Pierre
0163 de Boccard, Alexandre
0164 Savoia, Sergio
0165 Widmer-Schlumpf, Eveline
0166 Gottraux, Philippe
0167 Fluckiger, Alexandre
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0168 Salzmann, Nadège
0169 Lanzoni, Matthias
0170 Grillet, Ornella
0171 Courvoisier, Francois
0172 Marques, Claudio
0173 de Preux, Julien
0174 Gutzwiller, Felix
0175 Rösti, Albert
0176 Guetta, Bernard
0177 Baranzini, Andrea
0178 Ramirez, José
0179 Pedrina, Fabio
0180 Höcker, Christoph
0181 Engler, Conrad
0182 Inauen, Yasmine
0183 Wehrli, Christoph
0184 Buono, Stefano
0185 Pittet, Denis
0186 Mosimann, Philip
0187 Spuhler, Peter
0188 Koch, Markus
0189 Meyer, Thomas D.
0190 Modoux, Francois
0191 Béguelin, Jean-Pierre
0192 Schwab, Klaus
0193 Werlen, Raymond
0194 Feller, Olivier
0195 Unternährer, Stefan
0196 Künzli, Klaus
0197 Graber, Stéphane
0198 Dietrich, Peter
0199 Sutter, Joos
0200 Beltraminelli, Paolo
0201 Hauri, Ernst
0202 Schuler, Martin
0203 Zwahlen, Jean
0204 Aubert, Josianne
0205 Markwalder, Christa
0206 Naef, Martin
0207 Schwaab, Jean-Christophe
0208 Casasus, Gilbert
0209 Mahaim, Raphael
0210 Mori, Daniel
0211 Alleva, Vania
0212 Vonlanthen, Beat
0213 Boder, Willy
0214 Meyer, Thomas
0215 Bumbacher, Beat
0216 Guldimann, Tim
0217 Ritterband, Charles
0218 Laufer, David
0219 Derrous-Brodard, Touria
0220 Rilliet, Julliet
0221 Glättli, Balthasar
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0222 Dessoulavy, Jean
0223 Rickenbacher, Andreas
0224 Moser, Tiana Angelina
0225 John-Calame, Francine
0226 Schneider-Schneiter, Elisabeth
0227 Bélaz, Charles
0228 Parish, Matthew
0229 Morais, Julia
0230 Koch, Klaus-Dieter
0231 Stadler, Rainer
0232 Turcan, Ayse
0233 Ten Hoedt, Rob
0234 Kraus, Daniel
0235 Obrist, Thierry
0236 Küng, Daniel
0237 Krone, Irenka
0238 Müller, Matthias
0239 Küttel, Olivier
0240 Pedrina, Vasco
0241 Baltisser, Martin
0242 Wermuth, Cédric
0243 Lenz, Pedro
0244 Chetail, Vincent
0245 Helble, Yvonne
0246 Dépraz, Alex
0247 Sidjanski, Dusan
0248 Kuprecht, Alex
0249 Rytz, Regula
0250 Thommen, Andreas
0251 Müggler, Silvan
0252 Ley, Thomas
0253 Imwinkelried, Daniel
0254 Messmer, Werner
0255 Clerc, Alain
0256 Ouanes, Taoufik
0257 Strahm, Rudolf
0258 Moret, Isabelle
0259 Suter, Martin
0260 Schneeberger, Paul
0261 Loderer, Benedikt
0262 Petignat, Yves
0263 Müri, Felix
0264 Tschümperlin, Andy
0265 Nussbaumer, Eric
0266 Föhn, Peter
0267 Comte, Raphael
0268 Egerszegi, Christine
0269 Häfliger, Markus
0270 Cramer, Robert
0271 Beglinger, Nick
0272 Favre, Janelise
0273 Roguet, Jean-Charles
0274 Heer, Alfred
0275 Swing, William Lacy
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0276 Ackermann, Joe
0277 Schlüer, Ulrich
0278 Braglia, Riccardo
0279 Anastasia, Vittorino
0280 Solari, Marco
0281 Hafner, Elias
0282 Holzhey, Matthias
0283 Meier, Ursula
0284 Ermotti, Sergio P.
0285 Gugger, Harry
0286 Reeb-Landry, Frèderique
0287 Leuthard, Doris
0288 Bertoli, Manuele
0289 Fehr, Mario
0290 Rotziger, Ulrich
0291 Keller, Florian
0292 Walker-Späh, Carmen
0293 Wyss, Hansjörg
0294 Croci, Sindaco
0295 Marfurt, Bernhard
0296 Ziegler, Roman
0297 Ambühl, Michael
0298 Vogt, Hans-Ueli
0299 Birchler, Felix
0300 Pult, Jon
0301 Tornare, Manuel
0302 Kronenberg, Philipp
0303 Langer, Marie-Astrid
0304 Lombardi, Filipo
0305 Pardini, Corrado
0306 Wolff, Richard
0307 Geiger, Hans
0308 Aeschbacher, Ruedi
0309 Lüscher, Christian
0310 Wasescha, Luzius
0311 Berset, Alain
0312 Weber, Axel
0313 Tschoumy, Jacques-André
0314 Zurkinden, Philipp
0315 Wysling, Andres
0316 Fellay, Jean-Blaise
0317 Zimmermann, Wajd
0318 Germann, Hannes
0319 Gabriel, Martin
0320 Lustenberger, Ruedi
0321Wuthrich, Bernard
0322 Martullo-Blocher, Magdalena
0323 Halbeis, Matthias
0324 Marra, Ada
0325 Schiavi, Rita
0326 Bäumle, Martin
0327 Landolt, Martin
0328 Rey, Anne-Marie
0329 Büeler, Benno
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0330 Kellenberger, Jakob
0331 Nuspliger, Niklaus
0332 Gattiker, Mario
0333 Rochat, Frédéric
0334 Wanner, Philippe
0335 Piguet, Etienne
0336 Büchel, Roland Rino
0337 Fiala, Doris
0338 Wandfluh, Hansruedi
0339 Grisel, Etienne
0340 Somm, Markus
0341 Balzaretti, Roberto
0342 Leimgruber, Walter
0343 Bütler, Monika
0344 Jositsch, Daniel
0345 Huth, Petra
0346 Koch, Brice
0347 Büschi, Barbara
0348 Gallarotti, Ermes
0349 Salamin, Alain
0350 Constantin, Frédéric
0351 Carron, Maxence
0352 Maiani, Francesco
0353 Lobe, Max
0354 Freymond, Jean F.
0355 Flückiger, Yves
0356 Reimann, Lukas
0357 Martel Fus, Andrea
0358 Gratwohl, Natalie
0359 Leuba, Philippe
0360 Signer, David
0361 Bischoff, Markus
0362 Müller, Thomas
0363 Meyer, Frank A.
0364 Badran, Jacqueline
0365 Pepshi, Keshtjella
0366 Kessler, Olivier
0367 Wolffers, Felix
0368 Auer, Andreas
0369 Geiser, Thomas
0370 Wasserfallen, Flavia
0371 Leitner, Matthias
0372 Gobbi, Norman
0373 Dolivo, Jean Michel
0374 Liebrand, Anian
0375 Winter, Herbert
0376 Müller, Tobias
0377 Weder, Rolf
0378 Noser, Ruedi
0379 Frammery, Catherine
0380 Ocbe, Daniel
0381 Hosp, Gerald
0382 Pettigrew, Michel
0383 Gomm, Peter
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0384 Walti, Beat
0385 Hohler, Franz
0386 Niederöst, Peter
0387 Domergue, Jean-Michel
0388 Fluri, Kurt
0389 Graf, Guido
0390 Elze, Fiona
0391 Casella, Alexandre
0392 Gössi, Petra
0393 Streiff-Feller, Marianne
0394 Rutz, Gregor
0395 Nantermod, Philippe
0396 Addor, Jean-Luc
0397 Buffat, Michaël
0398 Romano, Marco
0399 Feldges, Dominik
0400 Pätsi, Tuomo
0401 Rühl, Monika
0402 Schenker, Silvia
0403 Aeschi, Thomas
0404 Rásonyi, Peter
0405 Gaillard, Serge
0406 Binswanger, Mathias
0407 Brunier, Alain
0408 Stauffer, Eric
0409 Ackeret, Markus
0410 Widmer, Joël
0411 Jamal Aldin, Samir
0412 Cretton, Cilette
0413 Rochel, Johan
0414 Perrin, Yvan
0415 Kleiber, Charles
0416 Vaccaro, Luciana
0417 Cueni, Thomas
0418 Sauter, Regine
0419 Kielholz, Walter
0420 Gnesa, Eduard
0421 Grangier, Kevin
0422 Gujer, Eric
0423 Amaudruz, Céline
0424 Frey, Bruno S.
0425 Osterloh, Margit
0426 Karle, Alexandra
0427 Riklin, Kathy
0428 Hehli, Simon
0429 Hengartner, Michael
0430 Gmür, Heidi
0431 Friedli, Esther
0432 Funiciello, Tamara
0433 Huber-Hotz, Annemarie
0434 Linder, Wolf
0435 Menzato, Nico
0436 Guillaume, Michel
0437 Caroni, Andrea
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0438 Sciarini. Pascal
0439 Stöckli, Hans
0440 Bühler, Manfred
0441 Chevalley, Isabelle
0442 Heiniger, Thomas
0443 Fournier, Jean-René
0444 Sauter, Bruno
0445 Hösly, Balz
0446 Menzato, Nico
0447 Besson, Sylvain
0448 Glarner, Andreas
0449 Ineichen-Fleisch, Marie-Gabrielle
0450 Sangines, Alan David
0451 Shaibal, Roy
0452 Bignasca, Giuliano
0453 Lenz, Christoph
0454 Thomsen, Marie Owens
0455 Baur, Francois
0456 Bewes, Diccon
0457 Flückiger, Jan
0458 Maillard, Pierre-Yves
0459 Mazzone, Lisa
0460 Mirabaud, Pierre
0461 Schäubli, Thomas
0462 Stephan, Cora
0463 Jaccoud, Jessica
0464 Najy, Cenni
0465 Bischof, Pirmin
0466 Albert, Eric
0467 Schnegg, Pierre-Alain
0468 Cescato, Claudio
0469 Jauslin, Matthias


0500 Bundesrat
0501 Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP)
0501.1 SVP Kanton Tessin
0502 Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (FDP)
0502.1 FDP Kanton Tessin
0503 Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (CVP)
0504 Sozialdemokratische Partei (SP)
0504.1 SP Kanton Tessin
0504.2 SP Kanton Graubünden
0505 Grüne Partei
0505.1 Grüne Partei, Tessiner Sektion
0506 Auslandschweizerorganisation
0507 Gewerkschaftsbund (SGB)
0508 Vereinigung Ecopop
0509 auns
0510 UBS
0511 Schweizer Gewerbeverband
0512 Bevölkerung
0513 Lega di Ticinesi
0514 economiesuisse
0515 Bundesratsparteien
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0516 Novartis
0517 Neue Zürcher Zeitung
0518 Credit Suisse
0519 Swisselectric
0520 Verband Schweizerischer Elektrizitätsunternehmen
0521 Schweizer Bauernverband (SBV)
0522 Verband der Schweizer Studierendenschaften
0523 Movement Citoyens genevois
0524 Switzerland Global Enterprise
0525 Zürcher Studierendenverbände
0526 Jones Lang LaSalle
0527 UNIA
0528 The Other Half
0529 Greenpeace
0530 Amnesty International
0531 Tagesanzeiger
0532 Grosse Rat Tessin
0533 ETH Zürich
0534 Staatssekretariat für Bildung, Forschung und Innovation
0535 SPK Ständerat
0536 Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen (Kdk)
0537 Swissmem
0538 Kommission für Wissenschaft, Bildung und Kultur
0539 Gastrosuisse
0540 Scienceindustries
0541 AvenirSuisse
0542 Operation Libero
0543 Comité des jeunes pour la Suisse
0544 Jungsozialisten (JUSO)
0545 Seco (Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft)
0546 Gewerkschaften
0547 Regierung Kanton Zürich
0548 Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband
0549 SPK Nationalrat
0550 Klagemauer-TV
0551 Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik (SGA)
0552 foraus - Forum Aussenpolitik
0553 Ständerat
0554 Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei (BDP)
0555 Rektorenkonferenz (Crus)
0556 Arbeitgeberverband (AGV)
0557 Staatssekretariat für Migration (SEM) / BFM
0558 Neue Europäische Bewegung Schweiz (Nebs)
0559 Richement
0560 HEKS
0561 Aussenministerium (EDA)
0562 Grünliberale Partei (GLP)
0563 Raus aus der Sackgasse (Rasa)
0564 Eidgenössische Kommission für Migrationsfragen (EKM)
0565 Schweizer Tourismusverband
0566 Parlament
0567 Regierung Kanton Zürich
0568 Schweizerische Bankiervereinigung (SBVg)
0569 Collectif R

0570 Die Schweizer Kantone/Sozial- und Polizeidirektoren
0571 Le Matin
0572 Mouvement Citoyens Genevois (MCG)
0573 Swissuniversities
0574 Fachhochschule Westschweiz (HES-SO)
0575 Etablissement Vaudois d'Acceuil des Migrants (EVAM)
0576 Zürcher Regierungsrat
0577 Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ)

party (Affiliation with a political party)

001 Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP)
002 Sozialdemokratische Partei (SPS)
003 Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (FDP)
004 Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (CVP)
005 Grüne Partei (GP)
006 Grünliberale Partei (GLP)
007 Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei (BDP)
008 Lega dei Ticinesi
009 Mouvement Citoyens Genevois (MCG)
010 Jungfreisinnige
011 JUSO
012 JCVP
013 Alternative Linke (AL)
014 La Gauche
015 EVP
999 no party, unknown

area (Location of the actor)

1 media
2 politics
3 economy
4 civil society
5 science
999 Other, unknown

function (Function)

Media
001 journalist
002 editor, publisher
003columnist
004 other media function
005 former journalist

Politics
101 executive, national
102 legislative, national
103 executive, regional
104 legislative, regional
105 executive, supra-national
106 legislative, supra-national

107 administration, national
108 administration, regional
109 administration, supra-national
110 leadership political party
111 executive, local
112 politician, former
113 administration, former
114 diplomacy, intergovernmental organisation
115 diplomacy, former
116 legislative, local

Economy
201 industrial association
202 farmer association
203 service association
204 umbrella organisation (firms/employer)
205 union, christian
206 union, socialist
207 union, economist
208 bank
209 Small and medium enterprise (SME)
210 large enterprise
211 corporate specialist

Civil Society
301 pro-openness organisation
302 pro-closure organisation
303 humanitarian organisation
304 environmental organisation
305 think-tank
306 cultural organisation
307 other NGO
308 religious organisation
309 educational organisation
310 sport organisation

Science
401 professor
402 administration or representation
403 other academic function

policy Policy position on immigration

1 openness
0 closure
999 unknown

negotiation (Evaluation of negotiations between Switzerland and the European Union on the free movement agreement and the room of manoeuvre of the Swiss government.)

1 options
2 constraints

999 unknown

domestic_measures (Call for domestic measures in combination with policy/negotiation statement)

1 labour market protectionism
2 restrictive access to social benefits
3 increase of domestic employment
4 integration
5 measures non-migration related
6 Combination 2/4
7 Combination 1/2
8 Combination 1/2/4
9 population policy (increase native population)
10 Combination 1/4
11 attracting high-skilled immigrants
12 defence of national culture/identity
13 more rights for immigrants
14 fight discrimination and xenophobia
15 more law and order in immigration control
16 Combination 2/3
17 Combination 4/9
18 emigration prevention
19 Combination 15/22
20 more effective asylum procedures
21 Combination 4/12
22 development aid
23 deterrence measures
24 more inclusive citizenship policy
25 humanitarian aid
26 more European solidarity/cooperation
27 Combination 25/26
28 Combination 20/26
29 Combination 15/25
30 Combination 22/26
31 Combination 1/15
32 Combination 1/26
33 Combination 3/5
34 Combination 15/26
35 Combination 1/2/14
36 Combination 4/20
37 Combination 2/3/4
38 Combination 15/20/26
39 Combination 2/14
40 Combination 4/26
41 Combination 20/24
42 Combination 4/15
43 Combination 2/20
44 Combination 14/15
45 more administrative resources
46 Combination 15/20
47 Combination 20/45
48 Combination 26/45
49 Combination 2/15

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50 Combination 4/45
51 Combination 3/4
52 Combination 20/22
53 Combination 15/20/26/45
54 Combination 15/45
55 more exclusive citizenship policy
56 restrict export of war material
57 Combination 22/45
58 Combination 2/15/45
59 Combination 15/26/45
60 Combination 4/15/26
61 Combination 12/15
62 Combination 1/3
999 none
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B.4   Details to the surveys

This section provides detailed information to the surveys used in the empirical analysis of the Swiss case study. This section contains basic information on the different surveys, their method and sample as well as the detailed wording of the survey questions.

Smart Vote (2007, 2011, 2015)
Smart Vote is an online voting advice application. A few weeks before the election date, candidates for the National Council answer a questionnaire stating their positions on various policy issues. Based on these information, voters can identify those candidates that are closest to their own views. Therefore, the personal survey responses of the candidates are publicly available and represent the policy profile the candidates communicate to voters. Sample size: N = 2604 (2007); N = 3471 (2011); N = 3801 (2015).

Wording of questions:

- `answer_396`

  Seit 1. Januar 2007 sind Rumänien und Bulgarien Mitglieder der Europäischen Union (EU) Befürworten Sie, dass der freie Personenverkehr zwischen der Schweiz und der EU auf diese beiden Länder ausgedehnt wird? (response categories: ja; eher ja; eher nein; nein) (Smart Vote 2007)

- `answer_61`

  Befürworten Sie das bestehende Personenfreizügigkeitsabkommen mit der EU? (response categories: ja; eher ja; eher nein; nein) (Smart Vote 2011)

- `answer_1494`

  Hat für Sie die strikte Umsetzung der Masseneinwanderungsinitiative Priorität gegenüber dem Erhalt der bilateralen Verträge mit der EU? (response categories: ja; eher ja; eher nein; nein) (Smart Vote 2015)

Source: SmartVote - Online Wahlhilfe, Bern. `www.smartvote.ch`

Selects (2011, 2015)
The Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects) are different surveys covering the national elections. The candidate survey asks candidates about their campaign activities, policy positions and views on representation. It is carried out among all candidates for the national parliament (standardised questionnaire paper-based or online). Sample size: N = 1776. The Selects Voter survey asks Swiss voters after the national elections about election-related questions and political attitudes. Sample size N = 4391 (response rate 35 %).

Wording of questions:

- `f15804`

  Die Schweiz sollte die Personenfreizügigkeit mit der EU neu verhandeln, um die Zahl der Einwanderer begrenzen zu können (response categories: totally agree; rather agree; neither nor; rather disagree; totally disagree) (Selects voter survey 2011)

- `C2i`

  Einwanderer sind gut für die Schweizer Wirtschaft (response categories: Lehne voll ab; Lehne eher ab; weder noch; Stimme eher zu; stimme voll zu) (Selects Candidate Survey 2015)

Source 1: Selects: Enquête auprès des électrices et électeurs après les élections - 2011 [Dataset]. Distributed by FORS, Lausanne, 2012. `www.selects.ch` - `https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-590-1`

Source 2: Selects Candidate survey - 2015 [Dataset]. Distributed by FORS, Lausanne, 2016. `www.selects.ch` - `https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-829-3`

Mosaich (2013, 2015, 2017)

*The MOSAiCH "**M**easurement and **O**bservation of **S**ocial **A**ttitudes **i**n Switzerland (**CH**)" survey is a cross-sectional survey that focuses on the Swiss population's values and attitudes toward a wide range of social issues. The respondents are drawn from a probabilistic sample representing the country's population from the age of 18. MOSAiCH is conducted every two years as a face-to-face interview, followed with a paper questionnaire (in 2017). The 2017 wave was conducted between February and August 2017 (just after the three-year implementation period required by the Swiss constitution). Sample size (2011) is N = 1212 (response rate = 50.9 %). Sample size (2015) is N = 1235 (response rate = 51.7 %). Sample size (2017) is N = 1066 for the face-to-face interviews and N = 800 for the paper questionnaire. Response rate of 51.7 %.*

Wording of questions:

- `CH16new`

  In der Schweiz gilt seit dem 1. Juni 2004 die Personenfreizügigkeit, die es allen EU- Bürgern erlaubt, in der Schweiz zu arbeiten und sich hier niederzulassen. Finden Sie, dass sich der freie Personenverkehr eher positiv oder eher negativ auf die Situation in der Schweiz ausgewirkt hat? (response categories: Sehr positiv; Eher positiv; Weder positiv noch negativ; Eher negativ; Sehr negativ) (Mosaich 2013)

- `CHS2`

  Am 9. Februar 2014 hat das Schweizer Stimmvolk über die Masseneinwanderungsinitiative abgestimmt. Falls Sie auch abgestimmt haben: Haben Sie Ja oder Nein gestimmt? (response categories: Hat ja gestimmt; Hat nein gestimmt; Weiss nicht / erinnert sich nicht; Hatte kein Stimmrecht; Hat nicht abgestimmt) (Mosaich 2015, 2017, face-to-face)

- `CHS3a`

  Angenommen, wir müssten am nächsten Sonntag erneut über diese Initiative gegen die Masseneinwanderung abstimmen: Wie würden Sie abstimmen? (response categories: würde ja stimmen; Würde nein stimmen; Würde nicht abstimmen; Kann ich nicht sagen) (Mosaich 2015, 2017, face-to-face)

- `CHS3b`

  Angenommen, Sie könnten heute über diese Initiative gegen die Masseneinwanderung abstimmen: Wie würden Sie abstimmen? (response categories: würde ja stimmen; Würde nein stimmen; Würde nicht abstimmen; Kann ich nicht sagen) (Mosaich 2015, 2017, face-to-face)

- `POL4`

  In der Politik spricht man von 'links' und 'rechts'. Wie würden Sie persönlich Ihren politischen Standpunkt auf dieser Liste einordnen? 1 heisst links und 10 heisst rechts. (Mosaich 2017, face-to-face)

- POL5b

  Gibt es eine politische Partei, die Ihnen nahe steht? Wenn JA: Fühlen Sie sich dieser Partei sehr verbunden, ziemlich verbunden oder sind Sie nur Sympathisant/in? ... Um welche Partei handelt es sich? (response categories: Die Liberalen (FDP); Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (CVP); Sozialdemokratische Partei (SP); Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP); Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei (BDP); Evangelische Volkspartei der Schweiz (EVP); Christlich-soziale Partei (CSP); Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz (PdA); Die Grünen (GPS); Grünliberale (GLP); Schweizer Demokraten (SD); Eidgenössische Demokratische Union (EDU); Lega dei Ticinesi (Lega); Mouvement Citoyens Romand (MCR): beinhaltet MCGe und die anderen kantonalen Parteien; Solidarität; Sonstige (notieren)) (Mosaich 2017, face-to-face)

- CH1

  Wie viel Vertrauen haben Sie in jede der folgenden Institutionen? ... Der Bundesrat (response categories: Sehr viel Vertrauen; Ziemlich viel Vertrauen; Wenig Vertrauen; Überhaupt kein Vertrauen; Kann ich nicht sagen) (Mosaich 2017, face-to-face)

- CHS4

  Das Parlament hat kürzlich ein Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Masseneinwanderungsinitiative mit dem sogenannten Inländervorrang Light beschlossen. Das Gesetz sieht eine Meldepflicht für offene Stellen vor. Politikerinnen und Politiker haben darauf sehr unterschiedlich reagiert. Was ist Ihre Meinung dazu? Mit dem Gesetz wird die Masseneinwanderungsinitiative ... (response categories: vollständig umgesetzt; teilweise umgesetzt; eher nicht umgesetzt; gar nicht umgesetzt) (Mosaich 2017, face-to-face)

- CH27

  Die Schweiz wird sich möglicherweise entscheiden müssen, ob sie die bilateralen Verhandlungen mit der EU weiterführen will oder ob sie die Zuwanderung beschränken will. Was ist Ihre heutige Meinung dazu? Sind Sie eher für die bilateralen Verträge oder eher für eine Beschränkung der Zuwanderung? (response categories: Eindeutig für die bilateralen Verträge; Eher für die bilateralen Verträge; Eher für eine Beschränkung der Zuwanderung; Eindeutig für eine Beschränkung der Zuwanderung; Kann ich nicht sagen) (Mosaich 2017, face-to-face)

- CH28a

  In Sachen Europapolitik kann ich mich in der Regel auf den Bundesrat und die Bundesverwaltung verlassen. Sie handeln in Kenntnis der Sachlage und für das Allgemeinwohl. (response categories: Stimme stark zu; Stimme zu; Weder noch; Lehne ab: Lehne stark ab) (Mosaich 2017, face-to-face)

- CH6b

  Ich bitte Sie, mir zu sagen, was Sie sich für die Schweiz wünschen: ... eine Schweiz, die sich vermehrt nach aussen öffnet / eine Schweiz, die sich vor äusseren Einflüssen vermehrt schützt. (response categories: 1 = Stimme linker Aussage sehr zu; 6 = Stimme rechter Aussage sehr zu; Kann ich nicht sagen) (Mosaich 2015, 2017, face-to-face)

- CH6k

  Ich bitte Sie, mir zu sagen, was Sie sich für die Schweiz wünschen: ... eine Schweiz, die die Personenfreizügigkeit beendet / eine Schweiz, die die Personenfreizügigkeit beibehält, aber flankierende Massnahmen zum Schutz der Arbeitnehmer ergreift. (response categories: 1 = Stimme linker Aussage sehr zu; 6 = Stimme rechter Aussage sehr zu; Kann ich nicht sagen) (Mosaich 2015, 2017, face-to-face)

- CHS18_p

  Die Schweiz hat versucht, die Masseneinwanderungsinitiative im Einvernehmen mit der EU umzusetzen. Welcher Aussage stimmen Sie eher zu? (response categories: Die Schweiz hat das maximal Mögliche herausgeholt; Die Schweiz hätte mehr herausholen können, wenn sie härter verhandelt hätte) (Mosaich 2017, paper questionnaire)

- CHS17b_p

  Die Schweiz hat keine Trümpfe in der Hand, um die EU zu echten Zugeständnissen bei der Personenfreizügigkeit zu bringen. (response categories: Stimme stark zu; Stimme zu; Weder noch; Lehne ab; Lehne stark ab) (Mosaich 2017, paper questionnaire)

- `CHS18_p`

Die Schweiz hat versucht, die Masseneinwanderungsinitiative vom 9. Februar 2014 im Einvernehmen mit der EU umzusetzen. Welcher Aussage stimmen Sie eher zu? (response categories: Die Schweiz hat das maximal Mögliche herausgeholt; Die Schweiz hätte mehr herausholen können, wenn sie härter verhandelt hätte) (Mosaich 2017, paper questionnaire)

Knowledge questions

- `CHS19_p`

Welche Massnahme stand Ihrer Meinung nach im Zentrum der Masseneinwanderungsinitiative, über die am 9.Februar 2014 abgestimmt wurde? (response categories: Kontingente und Höchstzahlen für Ausländer; Strenge Regelung des Asylwesens; Schutz der Schweizer Löhne, Stellenmeldepflicht für Unternehmen) Correct answer: Kontingente und Höchstzahlen für Ausländer. (Mosaich 2017, paper questionnaire)

- `CHS20_p`

Welches Mitgliedsland der EU verfolgte ihrer Meinung nach in der jüngsten Flüchtlingskrise eine besonders strenge Politik gegenuber Flüchtlingen? (response categories: Germany, France, Portugal, Hungary). Correct answer: Hungary. (Mosaich 2017, paper questionnaire)

- `CHS21_p`

Wer bestimmt Ihrer Meinung nach die politischen Ziele der Europäischen Union? (response categories: The European Commission under the leadership of Mr. Juncker; The European Council of Heads of Government or State; the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers). Correct answer: The European Council (Mosaich 2017, paper questionnaire)

- `CHS22_p`

In der Politik spricht man oft von links und rechts. Ordnen Sie die folgenden vier Bundesratsparteien gemass Ihrer Einschätzung auf der links-rechts Skala ein: CVP, FDP, SP, SVP (0 = links, 10 = rechts) (Mosaich 2017, paper questionnaire)

- `DEMO1`

  Geschlecht (response categories: Frau; Mann) (Mosaich 2017, face-to-face)

- `DEMO2`

  Geburtsjahr (Mosaich 2017, face-to-face)

- `INC3`

  Wenn Sie das Einkommen aus allen Quellen zusammenzählen, welcher Buchstabe auf dieser Karte trifft auf das gesamte Nettoeinkommen Ihres Haushaltes zu? Verwenden Sie den Abschnitt der Karte, der Ihnen am geläufigsten ist: Monats- oder Jahreseinkommen. Eine grobe Schätzung ist genügend. (response categories (Wert in CHF): weniger als 2700; zwischen 2700 und 4100; zwischen 4100 und 5300; zwischen 5300 und 6300; zwischen 6300 und 7500; zwischen 7500 und 8900; zwischen 8900 und 10500; zwischen 10500 und 12500; zwischen 12500 und 16200; mehr als 16200: Kein Einkommen im Haushalt; Weiss nicht) (Mosaich2017, face-to-face)

- `EDU1CHISCED`

  Welches ist Ihre höchste abgeschlossene Ausbildung? (response categories: Primarstufe/Primarschule oder weniger (ISCED 0 et 1); Sek I/Sekundarschule (inkl. 10. Schuljahr) (ISCED 2); Sek II/Berufliche Grundbildung (ISCED 3 kurz); Sek II/Lehre 3-4 Jahre (ISCED 3); Sek II/Allgemeinbildung mit (teilw) Zugang zu Tertiärstufe (ISCED 3); Postsek/Berufl Zweitausbildung oder höhere Berufsbildung (ISCED 4+5B); Tertiär 1/Berufl, FH/PH (ISCED 5A); Tertiär 1/Allgm, Uni/Eth (ISCED 5A); Tertiär 2/Doktorat (ISCED 6); Andere) (Mosaich 2017, face-to-face)

Source 1: Michèle Ernst Staehli, Dominique Joye, Marlène Sapin, Alexandre Pollien, Kerstin Dümmler, Dorian Kessler: MOSAiCH: Befragung zu Familie und Veränderung der Geschlechterrollen, Nationale Identität und Staatsbürgerschaft - 2013 [Dataset]. FORS - Schweizer Kompetenzzentrum Sozialwissenschaften, Lausanne. Distributed by FORS, Lausanne, 2014.

Source 2: Michèle Ernst Stähli, Dominique Joye, Marlène Sapin, Alexandre Pollien, Michael Ochsner, Karin Nisple, Anthe van den Hende: MOSAiCH-ISSP: Befragung zur Staatsbürgerschaft und zum Sinn der Arbeit - 2015 [Dataset]. FORS - Schweizer Kompetenzzentrum Sozialwissenschaften, Lausanne. Distributed by FORS, Lausanne, 2015.

Source 3: Michèle Ernst Staehli, Marlène Sapin, Alexandre Pollien, Michael Ochsner, Karin Nisple, Dominique Joye: MOSAiCH 2017. Messung und Observation von Sozialen Aspekten in der Schweiz: Studie zu sozialen Netzwerken und zur Rolle des Staates [Dataset]. Distributed by FORS, Lausanne, 2018. `https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-925-1`

VOX (2014 - Vorlage Nr. 1143)
The VOX survey is a post-vote survey conducted with representative samples of eligible voters and take place during the two or three weeks following a vote. The principal points covered during telephone interviews include: general political opinions and habits, political and associative affinities, degree of knowledge of the items put to vote, the various aspects relating to the decision on how to vote on these items, how the individual's opinion is formed and, finally, the individual's evaluation of the importance of what is at stake with each item. Sample size is N = 1511.

Wording of questions:

- `a02n1143`

  Abstimmungsentscheid (reponse categories)

- `a32c`

  Können Sie mir sagen, was der INHALT der Volksinitiative "Gegen Masseneinwanderung" war? (response categories: 10 Allgemeines; 20 Begrenzung/Beschränkung/Einwanderung einschränken; 30 Kontingentierung; 40 Begrenzung gewisser Gruppen; 50 Folgen der Einwanderung; 60 Asyl-/Flüchtlingswesen; 70 Förderung der Zuwanderung; 80 Populismus/Xenophobie; 90 Anderes)

  Arguments against the initiative

- `arguc1`

  Wir müssen die Einwanderung wieder selbst steuern können. (response categories: Überhaupt nicht einverstanden; Eher nicht einverstanden; Eher einverstanden; Ganz einverstanden; Weiss nicht)

- `arguc3`

  Wenn die Kontrolle der Zuwanderung zu einer Kündigung der bilateralen Verträge mit der EU führt, müssen wir dieses Risiko eingehen. (response categories: Überhaupt nicht einverstanden; Eher nicht einverstanden; Eher einverstanden; Ganz einverstanden; Weiss nicht)

- `arguc5`

  Die unkontrollierte Zuwanderung führt zu Lohndruck, Wohnungs- und Verkehrsproblemen. (response categories: Überhaupt nicht einverstanden; Eher nicht einverstanden; Eher einverstanden; Ganz einverstanden; Weiss nicht)

- `arguc7`

  Durch die Zuwanderung steigt die Kriminalität in der Schweiz. (response categories: Überhaupt nicht einverstanden; Eher nicht einverstanden; Eher einverstanden; Ganz einverstanden; Weiss nicht)

Arguments in favour of the initiative

- `arguc2`

  Die Zuwanderung national kontrollieren zu wollen ist gegen das Abkommen zur Personenfreizügigkeit und wird zu einer Kündigung der Bilateralen Verträge mit der EU führen. (response categories: Überhaupt nicht einverstanden; Eher nicht einverstanden; Eher einverstanden; Ganz einverstanden; Weiss nicht)

- `arguc4`

  Die Steuerung der Zuwanderung uber Kontingente führt zu Bürokratie und hohen Kosten. (response categories: Überhaupt nicht einverstanden; Eher nicht einverstanden; Eher einverstanden; Ganz einverstanden; Weiss nicht)

- `arguc6`

  Wenn die Personenfreizügigkeit mit der EU aufgehoben wird, wird ein wichtiger Pfeiler für den Erfolg der Wirtschaft und den Wohlstand in der Schweiz gefährdet. (response categories: Überhaupt nicht einverstanden; Eher nicht einverstanden; Eher einverstanden; Ganz einverstanden; Weiss nicht)

- `arguc8`

  Die Zuwanderung limitieren zu wollen, wird die Schweiz isolieren. (response categories: Überhaupt nicht einverstanden; Eher nicht einverstanden; Eher einverstanden; Ganz einverstanden; Weiss nicht)

- `a43/a53`

  Motivation für die Entscheidung (open responses)

Source: Claude Longchamp, Adrian Vatter, Thomas Widmer, Pascal Sciarini, Martina Imfeld, Stephan Tschöpe: VOX 114 [Informatikdatensatz]. Produktion: GFS.Bern - Forschung für Politik, Kommunikation und Gesellschaft; Universität Zürich, Institut für Politikwissenschaft - IPZ, Abt. Innenpolitik/Vergleichende Politik; Universität Bern, Institut für Politikwissenschaft; Université de Genève, Département de science politique. Vertrieben durch SIDOS, Schweizerischer Informations- und Datenarchivdienst für Sozialwissenschaften, Neuenburg.

Zukunft Bilaterale (2017)
Survey commissioned by Interpharma and conducted by gfs.bern in February 2017. The survey of Swiss citizens contains questions on the Bilateral Agreements between Switzerland and the European Union and the implementation of the initiative 'against mass immigration'. Sample size is N = 2'501.

Wording of question:

- Fast drei Jahre nach der Volksabstimmung gegen 'Masseneinwanderung' haben sich der National- und Standerat fur eine Umsetzung der Initiative mit einem Inlandervorrang entschieden. (...) Wie zufrieden sind Sie mit dieser Umsetzung der Masseneinwanderungsinitiative? Sind Sie sehr zufrieden, eher zufrieden, eher nicht zufrieden oder gar nicht zufrieden mit der Umsetzung?

- Wenn morgen schon über die vom Parlament beschlossene Umsetzung der Masseneinwanderungsinitiative abgestimmt würde, wären Sie dann bestimmt dafür, eher darfür, eher dagegen oder bestimmt dagegen?

- Weil sie mit der Umsetzung der Masseneinwanderungsinitiative nicht zufrieden ist, lanciert die AUNS, die Aktion fur eine unabhangige und neutrale Schweiz, eine Initiative zur Kundigung des Personenfreizugigkeitsabkommens. Wurde eine solche Vorlage zur Kundigung des Personenfreizugigkeitsabkommens mit der Europaischen Union zur Abstimmung kommen, waren Sie dann bestimmt dafur, eher dafur, eher dagegen oder bestimmt dagegen?

Source: Claude Longchamp, Urs Bieri, Carole Gauch, Stephan Tschöpe, Aaron Venetz, Alexander Frind, Noah Herzog (2017) Bilaterale sind Gewinner der parlamentarischen Debatte zur MEI-Umsetzung. Bern: gfs.bern.

B.5 Additional statistical material

Figure B.1: Correlogram of arguments in favour and against the MEI

Note: Correlogram with two different visual representation of the correlation between the eight arguments of the MEI-campaign. Blue = negative correlation, orange = positive correlation.

Table B.1: Explanatory power of arguments on MEI vote choice

	DV: Voted yes	
	(1) LPM	(2) Logit
Argument 1: country needs immigration control	0.351***	3.101***
	(0.044)	(0.562)
Argument 3: risk of a disruption with the EU acceptable	0.072*	0.820
	(0.034)	(0.473)
Argument 5: immigration creates domestic problems	0.053	0.298
	(0.039)	(0.477)
Argument 7: immigration increases crime	0.251***	2.698***
	(0.042)	(0.493)
Argument 2: initiative in conflict with the Bilateral Agreements	−0.065	−0.982*
	(0.038)	(0.473)
Argument 4: immigration quota create lot of bureaucracy	−0.180***	−2.023**
	(0.054)	(0.664)
Argument 6: free movement important for the economy	−0.284***	−2.721***
	(0.044)	(0.481)
Argument 8: initiative leads to isolation of the country	−0.217***	−1.870***
	(0.047)	(0.511)
Constant	0.481***	−0.014
	(0.063)	(0.687)
Observations	732	732
Adjusted R^2 /Pseudo-R^2 (McFadden)	0.651	0.75

Note: Two different model specifications based on VOX survey data (detailed question wording in Appendix B.4). The level of significance is as follows: $^*p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$.

Declaration of authorship

I hereby declare that I have written this thesis without any help from others and without the use of documents and aids other than those stated above. I have mentioned all used sources and cited them correctly according to established academic citation rules. I am aware that otherwise the Senat is entitled to revoke the degree awarded on the basis of this thesis, according to article 36 paragraph 1 letter o of the University Act from 5 September 1996.

Bern, 30.04.2019   Philipp Lutz

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