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African Conflicts

Background Factors, Motives and Patterns

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Publication date:
2003

Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

[Link to publication from Aalborg University](#)

Citation for published version (APA):
Møller, B. (2003). *African Conflicts: Background Factors, Motives and Patterns*. Institut for Historie, Internationale Studier og Samfundsforhold, Aalborg Universitet.

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DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH SERIES
RESEARCH CENTER ON DEVELOPMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (DIR)

WORKING PAPER NO. 120

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Research Center on Development and International Relations (DIR)
Aalborg University
Denmark
Development Research Series
Working Paper No. 120

ISSN 0904-8154

Published by
DIR & Institute for History, International and Social Studies
Aalborg University

Distribution
The University Bookshop
Fibigerstræde 15,
DK-9220 Aalborg East
Phone + 45 96 35 80 71
E-mail: Info@centerboghandel.dk
www.centerboghandel.auc.dk

Lay-out and wordprocessing
Britta Mailund

Print
Centertrykkeriet, 2003

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African Conflicts: Background Factors, Motives and Patterns

Bjørn Møller*

This paper is devoted to some of the potential causes and general features of African conflicts, focusing on the background factors. It commences with assessing the legacy of colonialism with which the newly independent states in Africa were bequeathed, both economically and politically, followed by a brief survey of the implications of the bipolar system into which they were “born” as well as the consequences of its disappearance around 1990. This is followed by an analysis of the economic and political “pathologies” of African countries as well as “the African security predicament”. It concludes with analyses of the various conflict patterns as well as the motives underlying them.

Decolonisation and the Inheritance

There are various theories about the causes of decolonisation, largely overlapping with the theories about the nature of colonialism and imperialism.

Causes and Dynamics of Decolonisation

Some analysts focus on the cyclical pattern of empire from ascendancy via over-extension to decline, a structural mode of explanation which basically depicts decolonisation as inevitable, and which may even provide some clues as to the timing.¹ Others have focused on the proximate causes of decolonisation, pointing *inter alia* to economic factors such as the changing price structures created by the great depression of the 1930s, which made colonial production less lucrative; to political factors such the rise of a new great power (the United States) which had (almost) no colonies and was therefore inclined to support independence; to ideological factors such as the growing acknowledgement of human rights and the delegitimation of all forms of racism after the genocidal excesses of Nazi Germany; or to the struggle of the liberation movements in the colonies. As all these factors point in the same direction, and as all possess some intrinsic plausibility, it is entirely possible that decolonisation was over determined.² In any case, it happened, albeit in stages.

The First World War and the defeat of Germany as well as the Ottoman Empire produced a certain reordering of the imperial map, as the vanquished had to relinquish their colonies. However, by that time the norm of national self-

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determination had gained some ground, e.g. as formulated by U.S. president Wilson in his “fourteen points”³ and as codified (albeit in rather vague and ambiguous terms) by the League of Nations.⁴ Hence, imperialism was no longer entirely *comme il faut*. In article 22 of its covenant the League thus referred to colonies as “not yet able to stand by themselves” with the implication that “the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation”. Hence the need for “tutelage”, which should be entrusted to “advanced nations”, acting on behalf of the League.

As a consequence, the colonies of the vanquished were not simply taken over by the victors as colonies, but as “trusts”, and a norm of accountability was established, the mandate powers having to provide annual reports on their administration to the League. Moreover, the way in which the former colonies were classified according to their prospects of independence also established certain precedents and certainly a compelling logic, according to which colonies could progress towards independence, in due course.⁵

In Africa the reordering of the colonial map meant that the former German colonies Rwanda and Burundi were to be administered by Belgium, Tanganyika by the UK and South-West Africa by the UK as well, which chose to “outsource” the administration to the *de facto* (but not *de jure*) independent South Africa. The colonies Togo and Cameroon, in their turn, were divided between the UK and France.⁶

After the Second World War the League’s norm of national self-determination was taken over by the United Nation,⁷ as evidenced by its creation of a Trusteeship Council. Moreover, in 1960 some clarification was achieved as to the implications of self-determination when the General Assembly passed resolution 1514, known as the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Countries*, which effectively removed whatever legitimacy colonialism might have retained.

The General Assembly,

(...) Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its manifestations. Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents the development of international economic cooperation, impedes the social, cultural and economic development of dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations ideal of universal peace.

(...) Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith.

Declares that: (...)

2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural

development. (...)

4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected. (...)

6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

While this declaration certainly provided legitimacy as well as urgency to decolonisation, it was not without its intrinsic contradictions. National self-determination was thus interpreted as applying only to geographically distinct territories, but neither to contiguous territories such as the Russian and Soviet conquests (sometimes referred to as the “saltwater criterion”)⁸ nor to parts of colonies. General Assembly resolution 1541 (15 December 1960) thus mentioned an implicit criterion for *prima facie* accepting a territory as a colony, namely that it should be “geographically separate and (..) distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it” (Art. IV), in which case the said territory should be allowed to freely decide whether to form an independent state or integrate, or enter into an association, with an already independent state (Art. VI). Moreover, it was made clear that national self-determination was a right to be exercised only once, and that it did not apply to parts of former colonies.

This norm was put to a test with the several cases of attempted secession from newly independent African states, such as that of Katanga (from Congo) in 1961 and of Biafra (from Nigeria) in 1967-1970.⁹ In both cases the secessionist attempt was condemned by virtually the entire international community and recognition was denied to the secessionists. The case of Western Sahara (i.e. what Africans call Sahrawi) was different, the African countries recognising it as an independent state, but the rest of the world withholding recognition.¹⁰ The case of Eritrea was even more *sui generis* as this was a former Italian colony which had initially (1952) been associated, in the form of a federation, with independent Ethiopia (in line with resolution 1541) but subsequently effectively annexed (1962), thereby provoking an ultimately (1991) victorious war of secession.¹¹

Table 1: Decolonisation in Africa¹²					
Present Name	Independe	Temporary adm.	Present Name	Independe	Temporary adm.
German Colonies			Italian Colonies		
Burundi	1962	Belgium	Eritrea^c	1993	Ethiopia
Cameroon	1960	UK/France	Libya	1951	
Namibia	1990	South Africa	Somalia^f	1960	
Rwanda	1962	UK/Belgium	Belgian Colonies		
Tanzania^a	1961/63	UK	DR of Congo	1960	n.a.
Togo^b	1960	UK/France	French Colonies		
British Colonies			Algeria	1962	n.a.
Botswana	1966	n.a.	Benin	1960	n.a.
Egypt	1922	n.a.	Burkina Faso	1960	n.a.
The Gambia	1965	n.a.	Central Afr. Rep.	1960	n.a.
Ghana	1957	n.a.	Chad	1960	n.a.
Kenya	1963	n.a.	Comoros	1975	n.a.
Lesotho	1966	n.a.	Congo, Rep. Of	1960	n.a.
Malawi	1964	n.a.	Cote d'Ivoire	1960	n.a.
Mauritius	1968	n.a.	Djibouti	1977	n.a.
Nigeria	1960	n.a.	Gabon	1960	n.a.
Seychelles	1976	n.a.	Guinea	1958	n.a.
Sierra Leone	1961	n.a.	Madagascar	1960	n.a.
South Africa^c	1910/94	n.a.	Mali	1960	n.a.
Swaziland	1968	n.a.	Mauritania	1960	n.a.
Sudan^d	1956	Egypt	Morocco	1956	n.a.
Uganda	1962	n.a.	Niger	1960	n.a.
Zambia	1964	n.a.	Senegal	1960	n.a.
Zimbabwe^e	1965/80	n.a.	Tunisia	1956	n.a.
Portuguese Colonies			Spanish Colonies		
Angola	1975	n.a.	Eq. Guinea	1968	n.a.
Cape Verde	1975	n.a.	Sarawi^g	n.a.	Morocco
Guinea-Bissau	1974	n.a.	Independent throughout		
Mozambique	1975	n.a.	Ethiopia^h	1941/55	n.a.
Sao Tome/Pr.	1975	n.a.	Liberia	1847	n.a.
Legend: a) Independence of Tanganyika (former mandate territory) and Zanzibar (former colony), respectively; b) French mandate territory, British part ceded to Ghana; c) Independence/transition to majority rule; d) Anglo-Egyptian condominium; e) Federated with Ethiopia in 1952, annexed in 1962; f) Merger of Italian and British Somalia; g) The former Spanish West Sahara has been recognised by most African countries under the name Sarawi, but not by Morocco; h) Formally an Italian colony from 1936 until it was liberated by the UK in 1941, but only formally recognised as a state in 1955.					

While there were some examples of liberation by force as well as several cases where the use of force played a significant role, there is little doubt that the major colonial powers would have been able to hold on to their empires militarily, had they been determined to do so. Much more significant than the actual use of force was the vanishing legitimacy of such military force as would have been required to quell the liberation struggles. In most cases independence was thus achieved after negotiations between the major liberation movements

and the colonial power in question—sometimes preceded by minor disturbances. The great wave of decolonisation came around 1960 as summarised in Table 1.

In a few instances, however, independence was achieved through a victorious war, leaving (the political wing of) an armed liberation movement in power, as was arguably the case of Algeria's liberation from France.¹³ In other cases liberation was not directly produced by armed struggle, but a violent rebellion nevertheless played an important role in making the colonial power reassess the pros and cons of empire. This was, for instance, the case of Kenya's independence from the UK, which was preceded by the bloody Mau-Mau rebellion, but where the links between the armed insurgents and the subsequent rulers, led by Yomo Kenyatta, were less than clear.¹⁴

Whereas the major colonial powers thus, for whatever reason, gradually saw the writing on the wall and around 1960 became prepared to grant independence voluntarily, there were a few instances of belated and enforced decolonisation, where the use of violence played a significant, or even decisive, role.

- Portugal stubbornly clung to its five African colonies, i.e. Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Saõ Tomé and Príncipe and especially Mozambique and Angola, provoking protracted liberation wars.¹⁵ While the waging of these wars became prohibitively costly (both in financial terms and in terms of casualties) for Portugal, it nevertheless required an uprising in the colonial metropole to bring about a withdrawal from empire.
- In the British colony of South Rhodesia peaceful transition to independence was pre-empted by a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) on the part of the white settler minority under Ian Smith, whence ensued an armed struggle lasting until the achievement of independence in 1980.¹⁶
- In South Africa, the era of colonialism arguably only came to an end with the peaceful transition to majority rule in 1994. The ANC had created armed forces (*Umkonto we Sizwe*, i.e. “Spear of the Nation”, with the acronym MK) and had, as a matter of principle, refused to renounce the use of armed force, but it would be hard to argue that this was the decisive factor in bringing about the fall of apartheid.¹⁷
- The former German colony Southwest Africa had, as mentioned above, by the League of Nations been made a South African mandate territory, initially acting on behalf of the UK—a curious instance of “colonisation by proxy”, which rendered decolonisation more problematic. When the mandate was subsequently retracted by the UN the apartheid regime simply refused to withdraw and maintained its hold on what was in 1990, after a protracted armed struggle by SWAPO (South-West African People's Organisation), to become the present Namibia.¹⁸

- A somewhat similar case was that of Eritrea mentioned above, where independence was, likewise, only achieved *de facto* in 1991 after a protracted armed struggle by the EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front)¹⁹ and *de jure* two years later.
- The same was the case with the former British colony of Somaliland which was merged with Italian Somalia, but which has subsequently become *de facto* independent following the effective collapse of Somalia around 1992.²⁰
- A similar case (in some respects) was that of Western Sahara which had been administered by newly liberated Morocco after Spain's withdrawal, producing an armed liberation struggle by the POLISARIO (*Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio Do Oro*) and recognition of it as the legitimate representatives of "Sahrawi" by all other African states, except Morocco.²¹

The Legacy of Colonialism

The around three quarters of a century of colonial rule which most of Africa had endured inevitably left an indelible imprint, both politically and economically, on what around 1960 became independent states.²²

Focusing on the political development, Basil Davidson dismissed the era of colonialism as a setback for a process of modernisation, which would otherwise have been very likely to take place:

In retrospect, the whole great European project in Africa, stretching over more than a hundred years, can only seem a vast obstacle thrust across every reasonable avenue of African progress out of preliterate and prescientific societies into the "modern world".²³

Whereas pre-colonial Africa had seen a wide variety of political systems, featuring city-states, more or less European-style monarchies, loose empires, etc., the fact that decolonisation took place at a point in time when the state had become the paradigmatic form of political organisation meant that the former colonies had few options other than adopting statehood as known from Europe, lock, stock and barrel. While the continent, on the very eve of independence, experienced a strong current of pan-Africanism, envisaging a unified continent,²⁴ these ideologies soon lost out to those of statehood, which were also being promoted by the colonial powers and the UN.

With such statehood came borders clearly separating the "inside" from the "outside",²⁵ along with the presumption that the state was sovereign "inside" in the Weberian sense of enjoying a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.²⁶ Moreover, the new states were born into a highly regulated state system,²⁷ where not only the norms of statehood as such were well established—codified in, inter alia, the *Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States* of 1949²⁸—but where

they had been supplemented with a panoply of norms about democracy, civil liberties and human rights.

The borders between the former colonies automatically became those of the new independent states, regardless of the fact that they were often far from “rational”. Neither did they always represent “natural boundaries” (e.g. delimited by mountain ranges or rivers), nor did they correspond well to the residential patterns of nations, tribes or ethnic groupings, quite a few of which were, moreover, nomadic. As a result the post-colonial states were often extremely ethnically diverse, hence vulnerable to ethnic strife, and awkwardly sized and/or shaped, e.g. landlocked, containing exclaves, unmanageably large or unsustainably small.²⁹

In many states, identities had been affected, e.g. because the colonial masters applied an ethnic or (almost always) a racial matrix to distinguish between various segments of the population under their control. These “manufactured identities” gradually became internalised, thereby forming the basis for many post-independence internecine conflicts, more about which later.³⁰ Furthermore, most of the newly independent states (but with great variations between the various colonies) lacked a competent civil service to run the state’s institutions. In many cases, they did not even have the educational system to train such a civil service as most of the tertiary (and in some cases also secondary) education had taken place in the colonial motherland. Finally, most post-colonial states were born with a severely skewed economic structure, which made them critically dependent on the trade with the former colonial masters, or even on development aid. Whereas some of the colonial powers had constructed a certain infrastructure (e.g. roads and railways), most of this was designed for transport and communication between the “motherland” and its colony rather than between the various parts of the former colony (*vide infra*).³¹

There is thus little doubt that the colonial past had a profound impact on developments after the achievement of independence. Hence the term “post-colonialism” and “post-colonial states,”³² and the accompanying “post-colonial discourse”, which is, however, all too often used as an instrument of “buck-passing”. First of all, it must be acknowledged that, in the vast majority of cases, colonialism ended almost half a century ago, and that in such a period other countries have managed to solve whatever problems they may have had with their past. Secondly, for all its indisputable merits, the postcolonial discourse may allow those leaders of the new independent states to evade responsibility for their own failures. As formulated by George Ayittey:

The constant vailing over colonial legacies was at best disingenuous and attributing much of Africa's crisis to external factors alone was intellectually deficient. In fact, they became standard excuses that many African leaders conveniently employed to conceal their own failures and incompetence.³³

The Cold War and After

Another "standard excuse", in which there is also more than just a grain of truth, is that of Africa as a victim of the Cold War. This is sometimes combined with a related explanation of, or excuse for, Africa's present troubles to the effect that the *end* of the Cold War has left the continent marginalised and powerless in the face of American unipolar power. Needless to say, it is very difficult to combine these two discourses of African victimisation without logical inconsistencies.

Most African states did, indeed, achieve independence during the Cold War, i.e. they were "born" into a bipolar international system in the making of which they had played no part and in which they had no obvious stakes.³⁴ In recognition thereof, many African states joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which played a certain role during the Cold War.³⁵ However, there was very little scope for a middle way between the two superpowers, as each was inclined to interpret neutrality as tantamount to siding with the respective other. Hence, even though neither side may have been interested in an area *per se* the mere suspicion on the part of one superpower that the other might contemplate becoming involved was reason enough to get involved, preferably even preemptively.³⁶

As a result of the Sino-Soviet conflict from around 1960, China also became involved, albeit less consistently and on a smaller scale, in African conflicts in order to reign in Soviet influence, often at the price of aligning itself with the lesser enemy, i.e. the United States. During the "Cultural Revolution" this was combined with the view of China as a natural leader of the Third World, in its turn seen as the source of a communist (or "anti-imperialist") world revolution.³⁷

Even though Africa was merely a secondary (or even tertiary) arena for the global contest between East and West, the Cold War nevertheless impacted on some African conflicts.³⁸ Not only were the two superpowers (and sometimes China) willing to provide African countries with weapons, often on quite favourable terms.³⁹ They also had an interest in "winning the hearts and minds" of the peoples in Africa, which provided a certain incentive for them to provide development aid.⁴⁰ These basically selfish superpower interests offered some opportunities for African states to play out one superpower against the other (or play "the China card"), e.g. by letting it be known that they might reconsider their sympathies and side with the respective other unless their "legitimate"

demands for development aid or military support were met.

One consequence thereof may well have been that the total flow of arms to Africa was more substantial than it would have been in the absence of the Cold War, hence that bipolarity contributed to intensifying and/or prolonging armed conflicts on the continent.⁴¹ Another consequence may have been that certain African governments may have managed to survive for longer than they “deserved”. They could simply benefit from the “OSB logic”, according to which even the worst African or other Third World despot was eligible for support if only he was “Our Son-of-a-Bitch”.⁴² The US-supported Mobutu regime in Zaire and the Soviet-supported one of Mengistu in Ethiopia may be examples of this logic.⁴³ While the provision of economic aid to Africa by the superpowers and their respective allies might appear as an undivided blessing, regardless of whatever selfish interests may have motivated it, this aid may also have had detrimental effects on the economic development of the recipient countries, as we shall see below in section 4.3.3.

Just as the Cold War gave the superpowers an interest in becoming involved in Africa, it also offered them several reasons *not* to do so, unless some kind of cooperation, or at least a tacit understanding, with the respective other was possible.⁴⁴ Neither of them was prepared to be “sucked into” an African conflict that might eventually result in them fighting each other directly, with all the accompanying risks of uncontrollable escalation.⁴⁵ Hence the tendency (especially on the part of the USSR) to disengage before conflict might escalate out of control and pose risks of a direct confrontation between US and Soviet forces.⁴⁶

With the disappearance of these risks along with the bipolar conflict as such, there are no longer any such powerful security political reasons *not* to become involved. Alas, however, with the end of the Cold War⁴⁷ the Third World in general, and Africa in particular, have also lost their former geopolitical importance,⁴⁸ indeed they may already have lost it with the Soviet reassessment of the importance of the Third World in the Gorbachev years.⁴⁹ As a consequence, Africa has become increasingly marginalised, removing most of the incentives for the sole remaining superpower to become engaged in Africa,⁵⁰ especially if the costs are significant in terms of casualties, as they were deemed to be in the ill-fated US intervention in Somalia. Hence, the US reluctance to intervene in the genocide in Rwanda⁵¹ and its prevarication about whether or not to send peacekeeping troops to Liberia in the summer of 2003.⁵²

Whether the “war against terrorism” as well as against the “axis of evil” which was proclaimed by the United States after the 11 September attacks in 2001⁵³

will somehow allow some African states to escape marginalisation, say by making themselves important pieces in the total puzzle, remained, by the time of writing, to be seen. At least it had made the United States establish a new regional military headquarters in Djibouti (under the auspices of CENTCOM, i.e. the Central Command in charge of the Persian Gulf area, including occupied Iraq),⁵⁴ and induced President George W. Bush to embark on a journey to selected African countries in July 2003.⁵⁵

Having now described the historical and international context of African conflicts, the time has come for some elaboration on the structural causes of these conflicts. This analysis will be attempted at a fairly high level of generalisation to which some analyst will surely object, claiming that all conflicts are unique. While there is certainly some truth in this, generalisation from individual cases is an indispensable, and therefore legitimate, element in any scholarly endeavour. Moreover, whatever excessive simplifications this may entail will, hopefully, be corrected by the case studies. The analysis will commence by what I have called “economic pathologies” and proceed with “nation and state pathologies” and a description of “the African security predicament”.

Economic Pathologies

As mentioned above, the economic point of departure for the new states in Africa was far from ideal, as they inherited in most cases from their colonial rulers a country with an infrastructure that was quite inadequate and which, at best, was designed to connect the production sites to the colonial motherland, but not to ensure communication within the country; a workforce which was inadequately trained, especially as far as white-collar jobs were concerned; and an economic structure which was designed to maximise the production of a narrow range of cash crops and other commodities for export. Even more importantly, they inherited a dependency on the developed world which had been deliberately forged by their colonial masters who had generally neglected economic ties between their own colonies and positively discouraged ties with the colonies of others—with a very low intensity of inter-African economic relations as a consequence.

The Enigma of Africa's Persistent Under-development

At independence, virtually all African countries were thus seriously under-developed—i.e. generally impoverished, endowed with a low and depleted capital stock, insufficient human resources, very uneven land distribution and a skewed economic structure, exhibiting an extraordinarily high proportion of GDP coming from agriculture and extractive industries (e.g. mining) and a very low proportion coming from manufacturing industries⁵⁶—a structure mirrored in the distribution of the workforce, most members of which were found in

agriculture—the bottom line of which being extreme poverty.

Today, i.e. around forty-something years hence, the situation has not improved significantly, and large tracts of Africa remain critically dependent on aid from the developed world, including their former colonial masters, and most of inhabitants continue to live in abject poverty (*vide infra*). This is more of an enigma than one might think. Other countries have started from more or less the same level of development (see Table 2), but have progressed significantly over the decades, most prominently the countries in East Asia, many of which have experienced a veritable economic miracle.⁵⁷

Table 2: Average annual Growth rates (pct.) ⁵⁸	GDP			Per Capita income		
	1966-73	1974-90	1991-97	1966-73	1974-90	1991-97
Industrialised countries	4.8	2.6	2.0	3.9	2	1.3
Asia	5.5	6.3	8.5	2.9	4.3	6.9
Latin America	6.6	2.5	3.3	3.9	0.3	1.5
Africa	4.7	2.1	2.4	2.0	-0.9	-0.2

Economic Strategies: Neoclassical and Afro-Marxist

Part of the explanation may, of course be that Africans have made serious mistakes with regard to their economic policies. We shall therefore commence with a survey of the economic theories and strategies, which have guided economic policies in Africa.

As should come as no surprise in view of the low level of university education and research in Africa at independence, most of these theories have been of European or North American origins. Moreover, quite a few of them were somehow influenced by the Cold War, where the struggle between communism and democracy/capitalism was mirrored in an ideological controversy between marxist and liberal economic theory, the latter subdivided into Keynesian, neoclassic and monetarist theories.⁵⁹

From the United States came neo-classical economic theories about how to ensure the transition from a traditional to a modern economy such as that of Walt Rostow, who highlighted the critical stage of “take-off”, gradually leading up to the final stage of “mass consumption.”⁶⁰ Referring to his work as an “anti-communist manifesto”, it stands to reason that he did not at all recommend a (Keynesian or even Marxist) central role of the state in bringing about take-off. Rather, building on an analogy with the development of capitalism in the West, Rostow placed his trust in the emergence of an entrepreneurial class of capitalists, harnessing the forces of the market in general and the world market in particular, to gain access to modern technologies, bring about productivity growth and industrialisation—all with some transitory assistance, in the form of development aid, from the industrialised world, yet with the objective of

generating self-sustaining economic growth that would, in due course, make it superfluous.

Understandably, the reliance on the market, which was not only favoured by the West but also by organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was interpreted by critics as simply a way of perpetuating dependency and economic imperialism, albeit without formal colonies. More specifically this was seen as furthering the interests of the United States, which had never relied on colonies, and which stood to prevail and achieve domination via the world market. Hence the charges by African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah as well as western Marxists against “neo-colonialism”,⁶¹ which were favourably responded to by the Soviet block⁶²

Other critics included economists working within the UN system such as Raoull Prebisch and other Latin Americans associated with ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America),⁶³ who developed a *Dependencia* theory with some Marxist inspiration. While certain critics such as the Norwegian sociologist and peace researcher Johan Galtung refused to be labelled Marxist,⁶⁴ other critics of the prevailing economic orthodoxy were avowed Marxists, such as Arghiri Emmanuel, Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein. Most of them had in common a systemic view of the world, which was analysed as an economic system for the generation of profits and the accumulation of capital. It fell roughly into two parts, labelled centre and periphery, respectively, by Wallerstein, while Frank preferred the terms metropole and satellite for roughly the same phenomena.

Their claim was that profits were generated in the periphery/satellite countries and transferred to the centre/metropole as profits from direct investments, interests paid through debt servicing, etc, but also via what Emmanuel labelled “uneven exchange”, i.e. terms of trade that were systematically skewed in the centre’s favour—a theory to which an organisation such as UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) remains partly committed.⁶⁵ Both Frank and Wallerstein also operated with notions of “semi peripheries” in two different senses, i.e. that of semi peripheral countries serving as links or nodes for the trade and other interaction between the centre and the periphery (as has been the case of countries such as Singapore), and that of internal semi peripheries (alternatively labelled “compradors”) consisting of certain sectors in periphery countries benefiting from the links, e.g. local capitalists, merchants and bureaucrats.⁶⁶ As Africa clearly belongs to the periphery these theories, if correct, would certainly go a long way towards explaining the underdevelopment of the continent, whereas they would not really provide the answer to the enigma mentioned above, i.e. why Africa has been doing

significantly worse than other parts of the periphery such as East Asia.

Both the diagnosis and the suggested cure was the exact opposite of those of neoclassical theories. While the latter saw global capitalism and the world market as locomotives of growth which would ensure that even the remotest and most backward countries would, in due course, modernise and prosper, the Marxists saw the capitalist-dominated world system with its free market as an impediment to economic development and therefore recommended a withdrawal from the market, albeit usually in rather vague and equivocal terms. More clearly they advocated a strengthening of productive structures in the periphery working for the needs of the population, and they foresaw a central economic role for the state in this respect.

In most African states, the state did, indeed, come to play such a central role.⁶⁷ Partly under inspiration from the USSR and China (whose economies did, by that time, appear to thrive) the continent saw a surge of “African socialism.”⁶⁸ The first wave included countries such as Guinea, Ghana, Tanzania and others, where foreign property in the productive sector was often nationalised, thus creating a large public sector and huge parastatals, mostly in the extractive and heavy industries, combined with collectivisation schemes in the agricultural sector—some of which claimed, not without some justification, to build on traditional (i.e. pre-colonial) African modes of production.⁶⁹ The second wave of African socialism came with the liberation of the former Portuguese colonies in 1975, the victory of the liberation movements in their “second *Chimurenga*” in Rhodesia (then to become Zimbabwe in 1980) and the 1974 military coup or revolution in Ethiopia, which brought to power the *Derg*.⁷⁰ The African countries which jumped this bandwagon of African socialism, however wholeheartedly, were usually eligible for Soviet or, in some cases, Chinese development and other aid—even though the Cold War logic meant that this usually disqualified them from the assistance of the West, with the partial exception of the Scandinavian countries.

To some extent bridging the divide between liberal and socialist theory (albeit leaning somewhat more towards Marxism) were those demands for a “New International Economic Order” (NIEO) which were voiced in the early seventies, e.g. under the auspices of UNCTAD in 1974, but subsequently also endorsed by the UN General Assembly.⁷¹ The latter in 1974 passed a *Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States*, which included the right and duty to “eliminate colonialism, apartheid, racial discrimination, [and] neo-colonialism” (art. 16). More specifically it obliged developed countries to grant, “generalised preferential, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory treatment to developing countries” (art. 18), whilst explicitly condoning nationalisation of foreign

property (art. 2c).

Demands such as the above, voiced by Africa and the rest of the Third World, were partly motivated by the worsening economic situation, which could partly be attributed to the deteriorating terms of trade. These were, of course, exacerbated for all African countries, except the oil-producing ones, by the 1974 “oil crisis”. However, the OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries) experience was also seen as a source of inspiration by some who thought that similar cartels in other sectors could accomplish the same as OPEC, hopes which were soon revealed as groundless—not only because oil was special in terms of demand, but also because the typical export commodities of African countries, i.e. agricultural products, could not be easily withheld from the market to keep prices up.

The NIEO controversy produced few tangible political results, and the continent’s economic problems continued to grow, indeed became what Nicolas van de Walle has aptly characterised as “a permanent crisis”.⁷² Inadequate economic performance was in many cases made up for with economic aid or loans, some of which were also utilised for (in most cases failed) attempts at economic modernisation, producing a growing national debt, also because a substantial part of development assistance came in the form of loans. By the early 1980s, several African countries thus found themselves locked in a “debt trap”, having to spend the better part of their export earnings on servicing their foreign debt—but the international financial institutions (IFI), and with them the rest of the developed world, also found themselves in a serious debt crisis. Beyond a certain size a loan ceases to be merely a problem of the borrower and also becomes one of the lender.⁷³

What made matters worse for the developing countries, however, was that both the World Bank and the IMF were by that time heavily influenced by the monetarist theories of the “Chicago School” around Milton Friedman and others,⁷⁴ whose views became even more influential when Friedman was appointed to President Ronald Reagan’s Economic Policy Advisory Board in 1980. Hence the terms of negotiation were very tough, the Bretton Woods institutions typically insisting on public spending austerity, deflationary policies and a removal of protectionist barriers to trade.

The Washington Consensus, Globalisation and Aid

Out of the above economic crisis sprang a general “development pessimism” in the North. Combined with the end of the Cold War (labelled “the end of history” by Francis Fukuyama),⁷⁵ this produced by the early 1990s what has been labelled “the Washington consensus” or the “new liberal orthodoxy” (NLO).

This entails an at least ostensible consensus on general principles such as the need for fiscal discipline, a priority on investment in public spending, tax reform (preferably reductions), financial, trade and currency exchange liberalisation, encouragement of foreign direct investment, privatisation of state enterprises and guaranteed property rights.⁷⁶

While this alleged consensus has certainly been challenged by critics,⁷⁷ its main tenets are being implemented (e.g. by means of development aid conditionalities) by those donor governments sharing in the consensus as well as by the IMF and World Bank, who are implementing it, e.g. by means of structural adjustment programmes (SAP), to which many African countries have been subjected.⁷⁸ In all fairness, however, it must be acknowledged that both the IMF and, to an even larger extent, the World Bank and many individual donors have abandoned their previous fixation on economic growth pure and simple to include also concerns for poverty reduction, sustainable development, good governance and, most recently, conflict issues, e.g. conflict prevention and the reconstruction of war-torn societies.⁷⁹

One of the reasons why the NLO was so powerful was that the international system was evolving in ways that made strategies of opting out of the Washington consensus in favour of national or even regional autarchy seem utterly unpromising—what is often referred to as “globalisation”. While it may be debatable to what extent globalisation is new and what exactly it entails,⁸⁰ there can probably be no disputing some of its main manifestations. Nor can there be any doubt that this impacts on the Third World, including Africa, in several ways, for good and perhaps mostly for bad.⁸¹ Not only is the volume of global trade increasing steadily, creating growing interdependency among national economies, but production is also becoming internationalised in new ways where the various components of a final product are produced in several countries. The revolutionary developments in information technologies mean that everything happens at a faster pace, including exchange rate fluctuations, some of which can cripple an already weak economy.

Its global effects notwithstanding, globalisation is not evenly spread across the globe. Some regions risk marginalisation, which seems to be the fate that Africa has suffered.⁸² The more global trade moves into the information technologies the more it tends to by-pass Africa; and the more hi-tech production becomes, the less attractive Africa becomes for investors. Hence, Africa seems to become economically less and less important for the rest of the world, which has unfortunately coincided with a decline of its political importance as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. As the rest of the world and the technological revolution it is experiencing remains at least equally important for

Africa, the continent has been faced with the challenge of coping with the demands of globalisation, but from a vantage point of extreme weakness.

One of the strategies selected has been to strengthen regional and sub-regional economic collaboration, e.g. by means of trade blocs, customs unions and free trade areas such as ECOWAS (Economic Organisation of West African States), SACU (Southern African Customs Union), COMESA (Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa), etc.⁸³ However, even though this may boost intra-regional economic transactions, there seem to be no realistic prospects for “European-style” economic integration, as the African economies are simply too similar to be able to achieve true complementarity.⁸⁴

Another strategy has been national accommodation to the above NLO, which requires states to liberalise and privatise their economies, as has, for instance, been the selected strategy of the Ethiopian government since the toppling of the *Derg* regime in 1991, or of Mozambique since the achievement of peace in 1992.⁸⁵ While this may make individual countries the darlings of the international donor community, the required policies usually come at a high price for the population. A combination of the two strategies is entailed by the launch, on the initiative of South Africa, of NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development), the main innovative feature of which may be the institutionalisation of an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This is intended as a means of overseeing economic reform in African countries, partly as a precondition of eligibility for economic assistance from the developed world, conceived of as Africa’s “partners” in development.⁸⁶

One of the most striking and problematic features of Africa’s economic predicament has been the persistent need for external assistance, e.g. for development aid. This has been granted by wide array of actors, in various forms (including Official Development Assistance, ODA), spurred by a variety of motives and accompanied by a shifting panoply of conditionalities. Some of these conditionalities have been strictly economic (e.g. the insistence on sustainability) whereas others have included demands for good governance to which have been added concerns for conflict prevention and management and, most recently, for recipients to join in the global “war against terror”.⁸⁷

Most conspicuous, however, has been the declining volume of aid, reflecting a receding interest in Africa or the rest of the Third World on the part of the traditional donors. Table 3 shows the total volume of ODA granted to African LDCs to have risen from 1985 to 1990, but subsequently declined. It also shows the wide disparity in aid received by those for whom aid is ostensibly intended, i.e. the poor population, ranging in 1999 from a munificent 406 dollars per

Senegalese living in poverty (i.e. for less than one dollar per day) to a stingy three dollars for each Congolese in a similar, probably even worse, economic situation. Poverty reduction is thus seemingly not the only criterion applied for the allocation of aid, to put it mildly.

Table 3: ODA to African LDCs⁸⁸

Country	1985	1990	1997	1998	1999	2000	Poor	ODA
							(000)	p.c. 1999 (US\$)
Angola	91	269	355	335	388	307	8,535	45
Benin	95	268	221	211	211	239	1,029	205
Burkina Faso	195	331	368	400	398	366	6,446	62
Burundi	139	264	56	77	74	93	4,531	16
Cape Verde	70	108	111	130	137	94	n.a.	n.a.
CAR	104	250	91	120	117	76	2,295	51
Chad	181	314	228	168	188	131	5,792	32
Zaire/DRC	306	897	158	126	132	184	42,340	3
Djibouti	81	194	85	81	75	71	352	213
Eq. Guinea	17	61	24	25	20	21	n.a.	n.a.
Eritrea	n.a.	n.a.	123	167	149	176	n.a.	n.a.
Ethiopia	719	1,016	579	660	643	693	51,011	13
Gambia	50	99	39	39	33	49	420	79
Guinea	115	293	381	359	238	153	4,492	53
Guinea-Bissau	58	129	124	96	52	80	897	58
Lesotho	93	142	92	66	31	42	912	34
Liberia	91	114	76	73	94	68	1,366	69
Madagascar	186	398	834	495	359	322	6,732	53
Malawi	113	503	343	434	446	445	6,031	74
Mali	376	482	429	347	354	360	7,229	49
Mauritania	207	237	238	172	219	212	763	287
Mozambique	300	1,002	948	1,040	804	876	6,650	121
Niger	303	396	333	292	187	211	7,301	26
Rwanda	180	291	230	350	373	322	4,507	83
Sao Tome/Principe	12	55	33	28	28	35	n.a.	n.a.
Senegal	289	818	423	501	536	423	1,321	406
Sierra Leone	65	61	119	106	74	182	2,874	26
Somalia	353	494	81	80	115	104	6,307	18
Sudan	1,129	822	139	209	243	225	6,487	37
Togo	484	1,173	945	1,000	990	1,045	2,878	344
Uganda	3	5	10	5	7	4	8,681	1
Tanzania	180	668	813	647	591	819	24,785	24
Zambia	322	480	610	349	623	795	7,547	83
Sub-Saharan African LDCs	6,907	12,634	9,639	9,188	8,929	9,223	n.a.	n.a.
All LDC	9,492	16,752	13,036	12,806	12,325	12,476	494,626	25
All Dev. Countries	30,255	56,471	48,041	50,247	51,677	50,310	n.a.	n.a.

Legend: Poor number of people living for less than one dollar a day

That the volume of aid is declining is not necessarily a bad thing, as quite a strong argument can be made to the effect that aid, whatever its stated rationale, may actually do more harm than good, e.g. by postponing much needed

economic reforms, by bolstering regimes that had better be toppled, prolonging conflicts,⁸⁹ etc. Nicolas van de Walle thus claims that

[A]id resources and in particular the aid given for the purpose of structural adjustment, have served an essentially conservative function in the region, by lessening the incentives African governments have to undertake policy reform. The combination of massive aid increases and uneven or ineffective policy conditionality has ensured the sustainability of policies that otherwise would have been disciplined by market forces. In brief, aid has made reform less likely, not more.⁹⁰

That reforms are indeed needed will be argued in the following.

The Economic Predicament of Africa

The economic structure of African societies has not changed much over the last twenty years or, indeed, since colonial times, as agriculture still makes up for a large share of GDP, whereas industry’s share is declining (see Table 4). The share of services has gone up, but this is far from a sign of movement towards a post-industrial society, as it might be in the developed world, but rather a sign of the growth of the informal sectors of the economy, such as street vendors⁹¹

Moreover, the large agricultural sector notwithstanding, Africa is still experiencing repeated shortages of staple foods and recurrent food crises. In 2003, for instance, FAO (the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation) reported food emergencies in 23 countries (Angola, Burundi, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, the two Congos, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe) citing reasons such as drought, economic disruption, civil strife and migration, the latter including both IDPs (internally displaced persons) and returnees, i.e. people returning from a refuge in neighbouring countries.⁹²

Table 4: Gross Domestic Product by Sector⁹³

	Agriculture		Industry		Manufacturing		Services	
	1980	2000	1980	2000	1980	2000	1980	2000
Africa	22.3	20.0	39.0	26.3	8.7	13.2	38.7	53.7
North	13.5	16.6	48.5	37.6	8.8	11.3	38.0	45.8
West	33.7	36.3	18.6	28.6	5.9	7.7	47.7	35.1
Central	28.9	20.9	32.7	38.2	6.8	10.1	38.4	40.9
East	32.6	38.3	16.6	18.2	8.3	7.5	50.8	43.5
Southern	22.9	11.0	28.3	37.4	10.8	20.5	48.8	51.6

One of the reasons of the poor yield of agriculture may be the setting aside of vast land (usually the best quality) for cash crops, intended for exports. Another explanation may be the very uneven distribution of land found throughout the continent, especially in the former settler colonies, which has also given rise to

political disturbances, e.g. in Zimbabwe and South Africa.⁹⁴

The poor yields of agriculture may be a sufficient explanation for the lacking industrialisation, as agriculture has been unable to generate any capital that might have been invested in other sectors. Another explanation may be that the amount of what might have made up for the shortage, foreign direct investment (FDI), remains low, as shown in Table 5.

Group/Region	1986-90	1991-92	1993-98	1999-2000	2001
Developed Countries	82.4	66.5	61.2	80.0	68.4
Developing Countries	17.5	31.2	35.3	17.9	27.9
Africa	1.8	2.2	1.8	0.8	2.3
Latin America/Car.	5.0	11.7	12.3	7.9	11.6
Asia and Pac.	10.6	17.4	21.2	9.2	13.9
East-Central Eur.	0.1	2.2	3.5	2.0	3.7
Memorandum LDC	0.4	1.1	0.6	0.4	0.5

Its level is down from 25 percent in the early 1970s to a mere five percent of total FDI in developing countries in 2000. Moreover, what little FDI remains is very unevenly distributed, South Africa receiving no less than 8.7 billion US dollars out of a total for sub-Saharan Africa of 10.7 billion in the 1995-99 period. In all fairness, however, it must be acknowledged that South Africa is investing heavily in the rest of Africa, averaging around one billion a year, a good part of which may well be “recycled” non-African FDI.⁹⁶

That there is little FDI in Africa does not mean that foreign capital is absent. In fact, many African countries are so heavily indebted that the servicing of their foreign debt constitutes a serious drain on their export earnings, especially as far as the poorest countries are concerned, as shown in Table 6.

Part of Africa’s problems with employing and feeding its population, evidenced by low GDP per capita figures, may be that the total population continues to grow. Demographic patterns in Africa do not yet show any clear signs of what has been called “demographic transition”,⁹⁷ i.e. of such a shift towards low fertility as well as mortality rates as has historically accompanied modernisation, producing a stable population size.


Table 6: Debt burden of African LDC⁹⁸

Country	Debt. (\$ mill)			Debt service (\$ mill)			Debt/GDP %			Debt Serv/exports %		
	1980	1990	1999	1980	1990	1998	1980	1990	1998/9	1980	1990	1997/8
Angola	3,045	8,348	8314	372	328	588	45	81	97	15	8	16
Benin	774	1,394	1701	38	48	54	74	76	72	15	18	14
Burkina Faso	574	1,094	1539	32	36	56	40	40	60	21	10	16
Burundi	476	1,017	1115	26	54	34	41	90	156	20	61	48
Cape Verde	108	139	366	6	7	17	n.a.	41	63	n.a.	16	14
CAR	354	861	855	30	36	40	41	58	81	17	16	24
Chad	172	593	1092	15	15	36	17	34	71	12	6	11
Zaire/DRC	5,795	10,318	9094	654	555	124	81	110	208	33	20	6
Djibouti	305	210	350	40	28	10	89	49	66	n.a.	n.a.	6
Eq. Guinea	111	196	226	12	7	8	139	148	32	50	17	2
Eritrea	n.a.	n.a.	220	n.a.	n.a.	4	n.a.	n.a.	34	n.a.	n.a.	4
Ethiopia	4,135	8,441	9205	153	189	112	62	123	143	28	35	11
Gambia	241	390	514	13	35	28	107	123	143	13	18	13
Guinea	1,335	2,596	3259	82	174	148	n.a.	92	94	n.a.	20	18
Guinea-Bissau	380	626	822	17	8	7	264	257	377	121	33	23
Lesotho	169	469	999	22	29	122	58	75	114	54	28	51
Liberia	1,400	1,731	1507	87	71	30	128	n.a.	n.a.	19	n.a.	n.a.
Madagascar	2,139	3,538	3977	145	265	153	75	115	107	41	52	19
Malawi	1,034	1,557	2594	120	116	108	91	86	143	44	26	19
Mali	1,463	2,548	3109	56	80	95	111	105	121	25	10	15
Mauritania	1,469	2,041	2285	115	151	106	215	200	239	28	32	27
Mozambique	2,276	4,168	7001	184	125	123	51	166	176	145	61	30
Niger	1,239	1,796	1497	124	136	53	86	72	74	42	37	14
Rwanda	374	806	1275	27	32	24	22	31	65	14	22	22
Sao Tome/Pr.	86	128	253	4	2	5	165	221	538	44	25	42
Senegal	2,467	4,362	4286	176	391	267	96	77	90	24	13	39
Sierra Leone	632	657	1067	43	28	37	53	73	159	24	13	39
Somalia	1,884	2,165	2005	56	35	9	215	236	n.a.	102	139	n.a.
Sudan	8,346	11,139	9288	281	25	61	67	85	96	39	n.a.	n.a.
Togo	984	1,460	1605	78	124	46	129	90	114	21	23	10
Uganda	1,156	2,406	3622	150	121	165	33	56	56	31	39	24
Tanzania	3,393	5,420	6043	112	177	269	n.a.	127	69	n.a.	33	24
Zambia	4,532	5,462	6153	219	246	162	201	166	195	21	21	19

While mortality has declined significantly (at least until the HIV/AIDS epidemic took hold, *vide infra*), fertility remains high. Hence, population growth continues almost throughout the continent, with a few exceptions such as Mauritius,⁹⁹ and the total population is expected to quadruple over the next fifty years (see Table 7).

Table 7: Birth and Death Rates ¹⁰⁰	1955-60		1965-70		1975-80		1985-90		1995-2000	
	Births	Deaths	Births	Deaths	Births	Deaths	Births	Deaths	Births	Deaths
Region	Per 1000									
Africa	25	49	21	47	18	46	15	43	14	39
<i>Northern</i>	22	47	19	45	14	41	10	35	8	28
<i>Eastern</i>	26	50	21	49	19	48	17	46	18	43
<i>Middle</i>	26	46	23	47	19	47	17	47	16	46
<i>Southern</i>	19	43	15	40	12	36	10	32	12	28
<i>Western</i>	27	50	23	49	20	49	17	46	15	42
Asia	20	40	14	38	10	29	9	28	8	22
Europe	10	21	10	17	10	15	11	14	12	10
Latin America	14	41	11	38	9	33	7	28	7	23
Northern America	9	25	9	18	9	15	9	16	8	14
World	17	36	13	34	11	28	10	27	9	23

Hence the population of Africa as well as its share of world population is forecast to grow, as set out in Chart 1.¹⁰¹



As a result, Africa is likely to see a growing number of inhabitants, whose lives may well turn out to be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” because of deteriorating living conditions.¹⁰² Whereas the number of people living on less than one dollar a day has been declining globally over the last decade, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage, it has thus risen in Africa (see Table 8).

Region	Percentage		Number	
	1990	1999	1990	1999
Sub-Saharan Africa	47.4	49.0	241	315
East Asia and Pacific	30.5	15.6	486	279
South Asia	45.0	36.6	506	488
Latin America/Caribbean	11.0	11.1	48	57
Central/Eastern Europe and CIS	6.8	20.3	31	97
Middle East/North Africa	2.1	2.2	5	6
Total	29.6	23.2	1,292	1,169

A large number of these impoverished people are going to be urban youth, as both rapid urbanisation and a large percentage of young people continue to characterise all of Africa (see Table 9). Unless job creation takes a huge leap forward, the coming years are thus going to see a growing number of jobless young urban residents, which surely bodes ill for political stability.¹⁰⁴

Country	Urban Population (percent)		Under 15 (percent)	Country	Urban Population (percent)		Under 15 (percent)
	1975	2001	2001		1975	2001	2001
Seychelles	33.3	64.5	n.a.	Mauritania	20.3	59.0	43.2
Mauritius	43.4	41.6	25.5	Eritrea	12.7	19.1	45.7
Cape Verde	21.4	63.3	40.9	Senegal	34.2	48.1	43.8
South Africa	48.0	57.6	33.6	Guinea	16.3	27.9	44.1
Eq. Guinea	27.1	49.2	43.5	Rwanda	4.0	6.3	45.3
Gabon	40.0	82.1	41.3	Benin	21.9	43.0	45.9
Sao Tome/Pr.	27.0	47.6	41.2	Tanzania	10.1	33.2	45.6
Namibia	20.6	31.4	43.2	Cote d'Ivoire	32.1	44.0	42.3
Botswana	12.8	49.4	40.0	Malawi	7.7	15.1	45.9
Ghana	30.1	36.4	40.6	Zambia	34.8	39.8	46.4
Swaziland	14.0	26.7	44.0	Angola	17.8	34.8	47.4
Lesotho	10.8	28.7	40.2	Chad	15.6	24.2	46.6
Sudan	18.9	37.0	39.9	Guinea-Bissau	15.9	32.3	46.9
Congo	35.0	66.0	46.6	DRC	29.5	n.a.	46.8
Togo	16.3	33.9	44.1	CAR	33.7	41.7	43.1
Cameroon	26.9	49.6	42.7	Ethiopia	9.5	15.9	45.8
Zimbabwe	19.6	36.0	43.5	Mozambique	8.7	33.2	44.0
Kenya	12.9	34.3	42.7	Burundi	3.2	9.3	47.5
Uganda	8.3	14.5	50.0	Mali	16.2	30.8	49.2
Madagascar	16.3	30.1	44.7	Burkina Faso	6.3	16.9	48.9
Gambia	17.0	31.2	41.1	Niger	10.6	21.0	49.7
Nigeria	23.4	44.8	44.8	Sierra Leone	21.4	37.3	44.0
Djibouti	68.9	84.2	43.0	Legend: Under 15: percent of total population			

Depressing, as the above may seem, there may be signs of improvement.

What may warrant a moderately optimistic reading of Africa's future is that most recent economic trends have been surprisingly positive, as shown in Table 10.

		1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
GDP growth (Africa)		3.1	3.2	3.5	4.3	3.4
<i>West</i>		3.6	3.2	2.7	3.3	3.7
<i>Central</i>	Percent	4.9	4.4	4.4	4.9	4.4
<i>East</i>		2.5	4.1	3.1	5.0	5.2
<i>Southern</i>		1.7	2.2	3.0	2.4	3.5
Exports		98.8	105.9	133.1	132.8	n.a.
Imports	US\$ bill.	104.4	104.4	110.4	117.8	n.a.
Trade Balance		-5.6	1.4	22.7	15.0	n.a.
External debt	US\$ bill.	291.4	290.8	285.1	275.1	n.a.
Debt service payment	% of exports	23.3	21.4	18.0	18.9	n.a.
Inflation	Percent	10.8	11.5	13.6	12.6	n.a.

Not only has GDP growth been fairly steady and rising, but inflation has also been kept under control, and the trade balance has improved with a slight alleviation of the debt situation as a result. A partial explanation of the positive trade balance may be a substantial increase in exports to the United States as a consequence of the passing of the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act in June 2000.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, Africa seems to have been (so far, at least) less affected by the global economic recession following in the wake of the 11 September attacks than most other regions.¹⁰⁸

However, the aggregate figures in Table 10 conceal enormous disparities among countries. For instance, the rather modest average inflation rates conceal countries with serious problems in this respect (such as the DRC with a hyperinflation of 553 percent in 2000 or Angola with 325 percent); and national growth figures span from a negative growth of 7.3 percent in Zimbabwe to an incredible positive growth (based on off-shore oil) in Equatorial Guinea of 65 percent in 2001 (*sic*).¹⁰⁹

UNCTAD distinguishes between four different categories within the category of LDCs, to which most of Africa belongs (See Table 11). Oil-producing countries have generally been doing quite well, of which there are seven in sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Nigeria. They tend to be doing significantly better than the rest in terms of GDP growth, but not at all well according to other yardsticks such as poverty reduction.¹¹⁰ Moreover, even in countries experiencing rapid growth, this may be so unevenly distributed as to do little to alleviate poverty, as may, indeed, be the case of Equatorial Guinea, where the richest five percent control eighty percent of the total income.¹¹¹

Table 11: Economic Growth in African LDCs (annual average, percent)¹¹²

	Real GDP growth	p.c.	Real GDP growth	p.c.
High				
Eq Guinea	19.4	16.2	Cape Verde	7.0 3.9
Mozambique	7.6	5.4	Burkina Faso	5.9 3.3
Rwanda	6.9	4.2	Uganda	6.0 3.1
Moderate				
Senegal	5.3	2.4	Mali	4.7 2.2
Gambia	5.5	2.3	Tanzania	4.6 2.1
Central Afr. Rep.	4.1	2.3	Benin	4.8 2.1
Slow				
Madagascar	4.5	1.3	Malawi	3.0 0.8
Angola	4.1	1.2	Niger	4.2 0.7
Guinea	3.4	1.0	Ethiopia	3.1 0.6
Mauretania	4.3	1.0	Sao Tome/Princ.	2.7 0.4
Regressing				
			Zambia	1.2 -1.0
Chad	2.6	-0.2	Togo	1.2 -1.8
Djibouti	1.3	-0.6	Sierra Leone	-2.1 -4.1
Burundi	1.3	-0.6	Eritrea	-1.6 -4.3
Lesotho	0.8	-0.7	Guinea-Bissau	-5.6 -7.5

What make the prospects for Africa especially unpredictable, but most likely bleaker than suggested by the above, are the consequences of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The incidence of AIDS in Africa is truly mind-boggling, with the estimated number of infected persons in 2001 amounting to 29.4 million, causing 2.4 million deaths—but not averting approximately 3.5 million new infections. Among those living with HIV infection are ten million youngsters (age 15-24) and three million children under fifteen. The epidemic has reduced life expectancies in sub-Saharan Africa from 62 to 47 years.¹¹³

Whereas other epidemics (such as the medieval plague in Europe, known as the “Black Death”) may have had certain benign long-term economic consequences,¹¹⁴ the economic consequences of the AIDS epidemic are unlikely to work this way, at least according to most analyses. The UN agency UNAIDS, in a paper produced for the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, thus enumerated the detrimental economic effects:

By robbing communities and nations of their greatest wealth—their people—AIDS drains the human and institutional capacities that fuel sustainable development. (...) By draining human resources, the epidemic distorts labour markets, disrupts production and consumption, and ultimately diminishes national wealth. (...) Productive capacities—including in the informal sector—are eroded as workers and managers fall prey to the disease. Flagging consumption, along with the loss of skills and capacities, in turn drains public revenue and undermines the State’s ability to serve the common interest of development and human well-being. The cycle is dynamic and vicious. (...) Negative development and HIV/AIDS lock into a dynamic relationship, whereby one feeds on the other.¹¹⁵

Having thus described the economic predicament of Africa, we are left with explaining how this might impact on its conflict-proneness, to which the following section is devoted.

The Economy and Conflict

A large body of literature exists on the economic causes of conflict, establishing causal relations in both directions. Not only do economic factor impact on conflicts, both by affecting their likelihood and their intensity, but conflict also impacts on the economy. This interrelationship could easily translate into a chicken-and-egg puzzle, as the economic consequences of conflict might well contribute to a new round of conflict, having economic consequences, etc. *ad infinitum*. The following, inevitably superficial, account is nevertheless subdivided accordingly, i.e. beginning with the economic causes and proceeding with the economic consequences of conflict, in both cases with some tentative indications as to the implications for Africa.

As far as economic causes of conflict are concerned, we find relevant hypotheses at both the macro and the micro level. At the macro-level, a number of theories have established a correlation between trade, interdependency and war-proneness. First of all, trade is arguably a central element in the fashionable “liberal peace” thesis, according to which liberal states are unlikely to go to war against each other. Trading states are allegedly less prone to wars of aggression than others, also because they do not really need territory in the sense that agrarian countries do, hence are unlikely to go to war for it.¹¹⁶ An extension of this theory includes other forms of interaction, whilst specifying that it is not volume as such that matters, but the importance of this interaction. According to these theories, the greater the interdependency between countries (economically or otherwise), the less likely they are to go to war against each other.¹¹⁷ If these hypotheses hold true, the implied predictions for Africa are not favourable, as no African state would seem to fall within the category of trading states, and as economic or other interdependence between African states remains very low and is unlikely to rise in the foreseeable future.

At the micro-level we find a number of theories about the links between poverty and war, mentioned in chapter one. Most agree that poverty is not a cause of conflict as such, but that (economic and other) inequalities may produce distributional conflicts.¹¹⁸ One manifestation of this phenomenon may be the several conflicts in Africa waged over resources such as oil, timber, diamonds and minerals—both by states, rebel movements and warlords. I shall return to these phenomena under the heading of “greed and survival conflicts” below.

As far as the economic consequences of conflict are concerned, an array of theories and hypotheses seem relevant, including those, which deal with the economic impact of that military spending which is an almost inevitable by-product of conflict. Whereas Émile Benoit argued in favour of a positive link between the two, referring to the alleged modernising effects of the military,¹¹⁹ most analysts have arrived at the opposite conclusion, i.e. that military spending comes at the expense of development.¹²⁰ The multiplier effects of military spending which may operate in developed countries¹²¹ tend to pale into insignificance in the Third World, including Africa. This is especially the case for countries relying exclusively on arms imports for equipping their armed forces, but it is also the case of such “third tier arms producers”¹²² as South Africa. They manufacture, at best, a small share of their total arms consumption, their products are seldomly really competitive on the world market, and they usually depend on licenced production, inter alia because they cannot afford an indigenous research and development (R&D) programme.¹²³

The only exception to this general rule that military spending harms the economy may be that there seems to be a positive correlation between military spending and ODA. However, this may well be a spurious correlation, reflecting the fact that these countries may be strategically important and therefore have both their military and civilian economies boosted by external assistance. Against a causal relationship also speaks the fact that international financial institutions and donor agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank increasingly tend to view excessive military spending as disqualifying countries from aid.¹²⁴ The correlation may therefore soon become a thing of the past.

Some attempts have been made at quantifying the economic (and social) consequences of armed conflict.¹²⁵ Even though there are numerous methodological problems involved in such analyses, including the large number of counterfactuals to which analysts need to resort,¹²⁶ quite convincing estimates have been produced of the staggering economic costs of the conflicts in Mozambique, Sudan, Rwanda and Somalia.¹²⁷ A special case, which has been receiving considerable attention through the 1990s, is the long-term economic effects of the (mostly anti-personnel) landmines, which have been employed in huge numbers in several of Africa’s civil wars. Even after the signing of a peace agreement, their very presence may hamper a resumption of agricultural production, thereby postponing post-war economic recovery—as has, for instance, been the case in Mozambique and as will certainly be the case in Angola.¹²⁸

This is merely a special case of the new body of literature dealing with what we may call “the political economy of reconstruction.”¹²⁹ Besides the often-

enormous costs of rebuilding the physical infrastructure of a country after war, there are substantial costs involved in securing the human capital of a war-torn country. This calls for, inter alia, the disarmament, demobilisation and repatriation and reintegration (DDR&R) of former combatants into civilian society, usually presupposing cash payments, vocational training, etc. which is often well beyond the means of a country coming out of a protracted civil war.¹³⁰

We have thus seen that Africa is haunted by economic problems and that these tend to increase the likelihood of conflict, but also that violent conflict tends to exacerbate already existing economic problems. These economic problems are, furthermore, intertwined with the political problems (“nation and state pathologies”) to which we shall now turn.

Nation and State Pathologies

As argued in the chapter three, the era of colonialism cut short what might have been a process of indigenous nation and state-building in Africa, replacing African forms of governance with colonial forms of “quasi-statehood”, lacking the central element of sovereignty which rested with the colonial power.


Fast track Nation and State-building

Upon their achievement of independence, the new African states found themselves vested with the aforementioned legacy of colonial political and administrative structures in combination with various scattered elements of traditional rule, which had survived from the pre-colonial era, often as components of indirect rule. What resulted from this blend was, in most cases, a combination of formal political structures (usually codified in a constitution modelled on that of the colonial power) with an informal power structure bearing very little resemblance with the formal one.

Problems have been compounded by the simultaneity and “telescoping together” of nation and state-building, where African states have been expected to do within the span of decades what the European countries did over the same number of centuries, i.e. create both nations and states, able to fit into the pre-existing state system. As aptly put by Mohammed Ayooob,

[W]e can well imagine the enormity of the challenge faced by the postcolonial states of the Third World. The problem for those states has been compounded by the fact that they are under pressure to demonstrate adequate stateness quickly and to perform the task of state making in a humane, civilized, and consensual fashion—all in an era of mass politics. The inadequacy of the time element and the fact that several sequential phases involved in the state-making process have had to be collapsed or telescoped together into one mammoth state-building enterprise go a long way in explaining the security predicament of the Third World state.¹³¹

As illustrated in Fig. 1, not only have African and other Third World states been expected to develop a functioning state with the requisite administrative capacity to provide for both security, infrastructure and various welfare functions; and to find their place within an already established state system. They have also been expected to ensure that this incipient state complied with the now well-established norms within this state system of democracy, human rights and good governance; and their states have been supposed to conform to the paradigm of the nation-state—norms which had gradually developed in Europe over centuries.



In Europe the state as a sovereign political entity thus dates back to around the 16th century,¹³² and the state system to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.¹³³ Democracy only appeared as a norm with the 1789 French Revolution and, in most cases, much later as a reality.¹³⁴ Nationalism began to grow around the middle of the 19th century with the notion that state boundaries ought to conform to those of the nation resulting, among other things, in turmoil in the Habsburg and Ottoman empires and in the unification of Germany in 1871.¹³⁵ Even though civil rights are of a somewhat older vintage, dating back to US independence and the French revolution, human rights did not until 1948 become codified in binding conventions, thus completing the picture of the modern state as we know it.

In Africa, all these gigantic tasks have had to be fulfilled in the span of the around four decades that have passed since the achievement of independence. That only few states have been able to accomplish this gargantuan task to perfection is thus hardly surprising. Rather, most states have exhibited one or several of the following features, which might be labelled “state pathologies”.

Ethnic Diversity and Strife

Partly as a result of the artificial boundaries drawn by the European colonial

powers, most African states are hosts to a diversity of ethnic groups and nations, i.e. they are multinational states.¹³⁶ For instance, Nigeria includes within its borders no less than three major ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba) and between two and four hundred “ethnic minorities”.¹³⁷

Unless the new state succeeds in fostering a sense of political nationhood, built around the notion of citizenship, to supersede ethnic or tribal identities—which often presupposes that state institutions perform satisfactorily—people all too often direct their identification and loyalties towards their respective tribe or ethnic group. From such identification often springs conflict,¹³⁸ which is frequently violent and which may even reach genocidal levels, as it has done on more than one occasion in Rwanda and Burundi.

In any case, ethnic strife tends to weaken the state, the institutions of which are often viewed as the prize for which to struggle in ethnic conflicts, as it can both ensure privileges to the members of the ethnic group controlling it and constitute a threat to those who do not—a clear case of the so-called “security dilemma of ethnic conflict”.¹³⁹ In the absence of effective mechanisms for power-sharing such as federalism or consociationalism,¹⁴⁰ the state tends to be weakened by ethnic strife, if only because this frequently leads to secessionist attempts, as with the Katanga and Biafra wars mentioned above, or the various ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia.¹⁴¹

Neopatrimonial Rule

One of the reasons why Africans tend not to identify with their respective states is that these states do not function satisfactorily. Most African states are characterised by neopatrimonial rule, where the real power structure consists of a web of personal ties. While traditional patrimonialism (as described by Max Weber and others)¹⁴² rested on authentic tradition, e.g. in the form of legitimate succession to power or religious legitimation (as with the Golden Stool of the Ashanti or the legendary descent of Ethiopian kings and emperors from King Solomon),¹⁴³ neopatrimonialism is built around “strong-men”, often coming from the economic sphere or from the military.¹⁴⁴ Power is personalised and based on patron-client relations, where the patron enjoys the support of his clients in return for the favours he is able to bestow on them, e.g. in the form of jobs or protection, all in a very informal manner, in fact presupposing a primacy of the informal.

While neopatrimonialism is thus the antithesis of the Weberian meritocracy, it may nevertheless be tantamount to a social contract of sorts, as argued by Patrice Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz in a recent book with the telling title *Africa Works*, who also find traces of accountability and representation:

[T]he foundations of political accountability in Africa are both collective and extra-institutional: they rest on the particularistic links between Big Men, or patrons, and their constituent communities (...) That is why, despite the undeniably large gap (in terms of resources and lifestyle) between elites and populace, leaders are never dissociated from their supporters. They remain directly linked to them through a myriad of nepotistic or clientilistic networks staffed by dependent intermediaries.¹⁴⁵

It is, however, also possible to hold a much less favourable view of neopatrimonial rule and to view it as one of the vehicles for predation and illegitimate extraction and waste of scarce resources by a “vampire state”, as argued by George Ayittey in his work with the equally telling title *Africa in Chaos*:

[I]n Africa, government officials do not serve the people. The African state has been reduced to a mafia-like bazaar, where everyone with an official designation can pillage at will. In effect, it is a “state” that has been hijacked by gangsters, crooks, and scoundrels. (...) The inviolate ethic of vampire elites is self-aggrandizement and self-perpetuation in power. To achieve those objectives, they subvert every institution of government: the civil service, judiciary, military, media, and banking. As a result, these institutions become paralyzed. (...) Regardless of their forms, the effects of clientelism are the same. Politics is viewed as essentially extractive. The state sector becomes fused with the political arena and is seen as a source of wealth, and therefore, personal aggrandizement.¹⁴⁶

For all its possible merits, neopatrimonialism thus tends to lack accountability¹⁴⁷ and to privilege certain groups over others, often by being linked to the ethnic divides in society.

Table 12: 2002 Corruption Perceptions Index¹⁴⁸

Rank	Country	Score	Rank	Country	Score
1	Finland	9.7	68	Malawi	2.9
10	United Kingdom	8.7	71	Côte d’Ivoire	2.7
16	United States	7.7	75	Tanzania	2.7
24	Botswana	6.4	76	Zimbabwe	2.7
25	France	6.3	80	Zambia	2.6
28	Namibia	5.7	90	Cameroon	2.2
38	South Africa	4.8	94	Uganda	2.1
42	Mauritius	4.5	97	Kenya	1.9
50	Ghana	3.9	98	Angola	1.7
61	Ethiopia	3.5	99	Madagascar	1.7
66	Senegal	3.1	101	Nigeria	1.6

Another factor that weakens the state, *inter alia* as a consequence of neopatrimonialism and the lack of accountability is the propensity for “kleptocracy”, i.e. of state agents abusing their power for personal gain—as was most grotesquely practiced in Mobuto’s Zaïre.¹⁴⁹ This is not only a problem at the pinnacle of society, but corruption is endemic all the way down to the lowliest civil servants and traffic wardens.¹⁵⁰

Table 12 provides a “corruption perceptions index” for 2003, which is computed annually by the NGO Transparency International. It shows most African countries as scoring very low in comparison with the selected Western countries thrown in for comparison. Measuring expectations of corruption among government officials rather than their actual corruption, it shows Africans to be accustomed to corruption, perhaps even to the point of experiencing it as the normal way of “doing business”.

Attempted Democratisation

Democracy is usually seen as the antithesis of (neo-) patrimonialism as well as a good safeguard against kleptocracy, as it supposedly ensures accountability. However, at least until recently Africa’s experience with democracy was far from an unqualified success.¹⁵¹ Either democracy has not lasted, but democratically elected governments have been toppled by the military (*vide infra*), or government has been usurped by leaders, who may well have been democratically elected in the first place, but who were not inclined to relinquish power.

Most African states have therefore seen an alternation between, and sometimes even a combination of, one-party systems and military rule, with governments elected through free and fair multiparty elections constituting, at most, democratic interludes. For all their faults and shortcomings, however, it is important not to confuse the African versions of one-party rule (or “no-party” government, as in Museveni’s Uganda)¹⁵² with totalitarian rule as known from communist countries. Even though quite a few of the one-party systems have been ideologically Marxist or even Marxist-Leninist, and even though some of them have sought to build “vanguard” communist parties,¹⁵³ they have generally failed in this endeavour. African parties have, with a few exceptions, been fairly open and diverse structures bearing little resemblance to parties such as the Soviet or Chinese communist parties, exhibiting ideological “purity” and orthodoxy, governed by democratic centralism and with a firm grip on all aspects of society.¹⁵⁴ Still, genuine democracy is, of course, incompatible with one-party rule, as it presupposes polyarchy.¹⁵⁵

What further exacerbates the fragility of democracy are the very facts of dependency, implying that the state is often confronted with conflicting demands and a need for “dual accountability”, *vis-à-vis* its electorate and foreign donors, the demands of which are not automatically compatible. While the voters may demand increased public expenditures on welfare and job creation, foreign donors often demand the exact opposite. When demands are not met, the government in question may resort to all sorts of machinations, which inevitably

undermines democracy.¹⁵⁶ In response, the voters whose demands are not met may turn to violence.

Since the early 1990s, however, a global wave of democratisation seems to have reached Africa. This has coincided with the end of the Cold War, but is not necessarily related to it, even though it has afforded the great powers of Europe and North America the “luxury” of being able to put pressure on non-democratic states to democratise.¹⁵⁷ It has also well nigh removed alternative avenues to legitimacy, as the norm of democracy has now become universally acknowledged,¹⁵⁸ albeit perhaps “more honour’d in the breach than the observance” (*Hamlet*, I.4). As we shall see in chapter five, it has also been acknowledged by the regional and sub regional institutions in Africa, which have even taken steps towards ensuring compliance with the norm.

Table 13: Multi-party Elections and Government Changes in Africa (1989-2000)¹⁵⁹

Country	Multi-party Elections	Government changes after elections	Country	Multi-party Elections	Government changes after elections
Algeria †	1997		Libya	None	
Angola †	1992		Madagascar †	1993, 1998	1993, 1996
Benin †	1991, 1995, 1999	1991, 1996	Malawi †	1994, 1999	1994
Botswana ‡	1989, 1994, 1999		Mali †	1992, 1997	
Burkina Faso †	1992, 1997		Mauritania †	1992, 1996, 2001	
Burundi	None		Mauritius ‡	1991, 1995, 2000	1995, 2000
Cameroon †	1992, 1997		Morocco ‡	1993, 1997	
Cape Verde †	1991, 1995, 2001	1991, 2001	Mozambique †	1994, 1999	
CAR †	None	1993	Namibia †	1989, 1994, 1999	
Chad †	1997		Niger †	1993, 1995, 1996, 1999	
Comoros	None		Nigeria †	1999	
DRC/Zaire	None		Rwanda	None	
Rep. of Congo	None		Sao Tome/Pr. †	1991, 1994, 1998	1991
Cote d'Ivoire †	1990, 1996, 2000		Sahrawi	n.a.	
Djibouti †	1992, 1997		Senegal ‡	1993, 1998, 2001	2000
Egypt ‡	1990, 1995, 2000		Seychelles †	1993, 1998	
Eq. Guinea †	1993, 1999		Sierra Leone †	1996	
Eritrea	None		Somalia	None	
Ethiopia †	1995, 2000		South Africa †	1994, 1999	
Gabon †	1991, 1996, 2001		Sudan	None	
The Gambia †	1992, 1997		Swaziland	None	
Ghana †	1992, 1996, 2000	2000	Tanzania †	1995, 2000	
Guinea †	1995		Togo †	1994, 1999	
Guinea-Bissau †	1994, 1999	2000	Tunisia ‡	1989, 1994, 1999	
Kenya †	1992, 1997		Uganda	None	
Lesotho †	1993, 1998		Zambia †	1991, 1996, 2001	1991
Liberia †	1997		Zimbabwe ‡	1990, 1995, 2000	

Legend: “Multiparty elections”: For the legislature alone; † Multiparty constitutions adopted 1989-1999
‡ Multiparty constitutions in place before 1989

Whatever the reasons may be, the fact is that a growing number of African states have adopted democratic constitutions¹⁶⁰ and held multi-party elections in the 1990s (see Table 13), some of which have been “reasonably free and fair”. Moreover, the continent has even witnessed a number of peaceful government changes following such elections, most recently after Kenya’s elections of 27 December 2002.¹⁶¹ The glass may thus be far from full, but it is certainly not completely empty either.

That elections are held and sometimes even bring about government changes does not automatically make states free and liberal, as it is entirely conceivable that even elected governments may be corrupt and authoritarian and violate the civil and political rights of their citizens. True democracy may also presuppose a free press, a well-established party system and civil society institutions to ensure a free exchange of opinion and public participation. However, because of the neopatrimonial structures the state tends to be hard to distinguish from society and almost all pervasive, which makes it hard to find authentic civil society intuitions that are not tied up with the state.¹⁶²

If colonialism was the main reason for the political failures of post-colonial states one would assume that their political performance would improve over time, i.e. the further they progressed from the colonial era. Judging by the ratings published annually by the renowned Freedom House, however, there is no such discernable trend, but the picture is rather one of slow progress alternating with setbacks (See Table 14).

Table 4.14: Political and Civil Liberties (1972/73 – 2001/02)¹⁶³

	1972-73			1982-83			1992-93			2001-02			Trend		
	P	C	F	P	C	F	P	C	F	P	C	F	P	C	F
Angola		n.a.		7	7	NF	6	6	NF	6	6	NF	1	1	0
Benin	7	5	NF	7	6	NF	2	3	F	3	2	F	4	3	++
Botswana	3	4	PF	2	3	F	1	2	F	2	2	F	1	2	+
Burkina Faso	3	4	PF	6	5	NF	5	5	PF	4	4	PF	-1	0	0
Burundi	7	7	NF	6	6	NF	6	5	PF	6	6	NF	1	1	0
Cameroon	6	4	PF	6	6	NF	6	5	NF	6	6	NF	0	-2	-
Cape Verde		n.a.		6	6	NF	1	2	F	1	2	F	5	4	++
CAS	7	7	NF	7	5	NF	6	5	PF	5	5	PF	2	2	+
Chad	6	7	NF	6	7	NF	6	6	NF	6	6	NF	0	1	0
Comoros		n.a.		4	5	PF	4	2	PF	6	4	PF	-2	1	0
DRC	7	6	NF	6	7	NF	6	5	NF	6	6	NF	1	0	0
ROC	7	7	NF	7	6	NF	3	3	PF	5	4	PF	2	3	+
Cote d'Ivoire	6	6	NF	5	5	PF	6	4	PF	5	4	PF	1	2	+
Djibouti		n.a.		5	6	NF	6	6	NF	4	5	PF	1	1	+
Eq. Guinea	6	6	NF	6	6	NF	7	6	NF	6	6	NF	0	0	0
Eritrea				n.a.						7	6	NF	n.a.		
Ethiopia	5	6	NF	7	7	NF	6	4	PF	5	5	PF	0	1	+
Gabon	6	6	NF	6	6	NF	4	4	PF	5	4	PF	1	2	+
The Gambia	2	2	F	3	3	PF	1	2	F	5	5	PF	-3	-3	-
Ghana	6	6	NF	6	5	NF	5	5	PF	2	3	F	4	3	++
Guinea	7	7	NF	7	7	NF	6	5	PF	6	5	NF	1	2	0
Guinea-Bissau		n.a.		6	6	NF	6	5	PF	4	5	PF	2	1	+
Kenya	5	4	PF	5	5	PF	4	5	PF	6	5	NF	-1	-1	-
Lesotho	7	4	NF	5	5	PF	6	4	PF	4	4	PF	3	0	+
Liberia	6	6	NF	6	6	NF	7	6	NF	6	5	PF	0	1	+
Madagascar	5	3	PF	5	5	PF	4	4	PF	2	4	PF	3	-1	0
Malawi	7	6	NF	6	7	NF	6	7	NF	4	3	PF	3	3	+
Mali	7	6	NF	7	6	NF	2	3	F	2	3	F	5	3	++
Mauritania	6	6	NF	7	6	NF	7	6	NF	5	5	PF	1	1	+
Mauritius	3	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	1	2	F	2	0	0
Mozambique		n.a.		7	7	NF	6	4	PF	3	4	PF	4	3	+
Namibia				n.a.			2	2	F	2	3	F	-2	-3	0
Niger	6	6	NF	7	6	NF	5	4	PF	4	4	PF	2	2	+
Nigeria	6	4	PF	2	3	F	5	4	PF	4	5	PF	2	-1	0
Rwanda	7	6	NF	6	6	NF	6	5	NF	7	6	NF	0	0	0
Sao Tome/Princ.		n.a.		6	6	NF	2	3	F	1	3	F	5	3	++
Senegal	6	6	NF	4	4	PF	4	3	PF	3	4	PF	3	2	+
Seychelles		n.a.		6	6	NF	6	4	PF	3	3	PF	3	3	+
Sierra Leone	4	5	PF	5	5	PF	7	6	NF	4	5	PF	0	0	0
Somalia	7	6	NF	7	7	NF	7	7	NF	6	7	NF	1	-1	0
South Africa	5	6	NF	5	6	NF	5	4	PF	1	2	F	4	4	++
Sudan	6	6	NF	5	5	PF	7	7	NF	7	7	NF	-1	-1	0
Swaziland	4	2	PF	5	5	PF	6	5	PF	6	5	NF	-2	-3	-
Tanzania	6	6	NF	6	6	NF	6	5	PF	4	4	PF	2	2	+
Togo	7	5	NF	7	6	NF	6	5	NF	5	5	PF	2	0	+
Uganda	7	7	NF	5	5	PF	6	5	NF	6	5	PF	1	2	+
Zambia	5	5	PF	5	6	PF	2	3	F	5	4	PF	0	1	0
Zimbabwe	6	5	NF	3	5	PF	5	4	PF	6	6	NF	0	-1	0

Legend: P: Political freedom, C: Civil liberties, both ranked from 1 (best) to 7 (worst)
 F: Freedom, ranked NF: no freedom, PF: partial freedom and F: free; Trend:
 Development in "freedom" since first decade of independence, ranked :-
 deterioration, 0: no change +: improvement (from NF to PF or from PF to F), ++:
 improvement from NF to F)

Security Sector Deficiencies

An important—indeed arguably the central—component of the state is the “security sector”, i.e. those institution which are tasked with upholding order within as well as protecting the state and its citizens against threats from without.

In Europe and the rest of the West (or North) war and the preparations for war have been the exclusive domain of the state at least since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), just as the state has enjoyed a weberian “monopoly on the legitimate use of force” within its sovereign domain, while the international arena has remained anarchic. By implication, the external and internal aspects of security (i.e. national defence and domestic order, respectively) have been clearly separated, but both have been prerogatives of the state, represented by the army, the police and the judiciary. While these boundaries may be gradually eroding in the developed and increasingly “post-modern” North,¹⁶⁴ they have never been clearly demarcated in Africa, where non-state agents have all along played significant roles as set out in Table 15.

Table 15: The Security Sector		External security	Internal security		Other functions
Europe					
Mission		National defence	Domestic Order		Rescue etc.
State agencies		Army, Navy, Air Force Intelligence service(s)	Police Internal intelligence service(s)		Army, Navy, Air Force, Police
Non-state agencies		None	PSC (Relatively few and insignificant)		Private companies
Africa					
Mission		National defence	Counter-insurgency	Domestic order	Rescue etc. Economic activities
State agencies		Army, Navy, Air Force Military and foreign intelligence service(s)	Army Internal intelligence service(s)	Police, Army	Police, Army, intelligence service(s)
Non-state agencies		PMC	PMC	PSC, Vigilante groups	PMC, PSC
Legend: PMC: Private Military Companies, PSC: Private Security Companies					

Here the term “security sector” (or “security structures”) may be a useful generic term for the multitude of institutions, which are involved in the field of “security” (*vide infra*), but usually covering such institutions as the army and police and their respective intelligence agencies as well as their respective functional equivalents in the private sector.¹⁶⁵ Examples of how distinctions are becoming blurred include the following:

- Armies often have domestic security as their primary goal, e.g. in the form of counter-insurgency warfare or constabulary duties.¹⁶⁶
- Armies do not merely engage in military activities, but sometimes are also domestic economic actors in their own right, occasionally behaving as “predators”, as seems to have been the case of the forces operating on opposing sides in the war in the DRC (see case study in chapter eight).¹⁶⁷
- A major part of the “policing” tasks are performed not by state agents but by either neighbourhood watch groups, vigilante groups or (for those who can afford it) private security companies.¹⁶⁸
- Mercenary companies such as the (now dismantled) Executive Outcomes and Sandline have been involved in both domestic and external forms of security, e.g. in Angola, Sierra Leone and the DRC.¹⁶⁹

One of the reasons for the prevalence of private actors is the weakness of the state, both with regard to national defence and internal security. In general, African armies are quite small and weak, certainly in comparison with their European counterparts, and especially in view of the large territories and long borders they are supposed to defend against neighbours who are often far from confidence-inspiring (see Table 16).

Table 16: Force Densities¹⁷⁰

Country	Armed Forces (000)				Territory 1000 Km2	Land border Km.	Km2/Troops		Km / Total Troops
	Reg.	Res.	Param.	Total			Regular	Total	
Angola	108	..	10	118	1,247	5,198	11.6	10.61	0.044
Benin	5	..	3	7	113	1,989	23.5	15.43	0.272
Botswana	9	..	1	10	600	4,013	66.7	60.04	0.401
Burkina Faso	7	..	5	11	274	3,192	40.3	24.27	0.282
Burundi	40	..	6	46	28	974	0.70	0.61	0.021
Cameroon	13	..	9	22	475	4,591	36.29	21.51	0.208
Cape Verde	1	..	0	1	4	0	3.67	3.36	0.000
Central Af. R.	3	..	2	5	623	5,203	200.96	115.37	0.964
Chad	30	..	5	35	1,284	5,968	42.66	37.11	0.172
Congo (Rep. of)	10	..	5	15	342	5,504	34.20	22.80	0.367
Congo (DRC)	56	..	37	93	2,345	10,744	41.96	25.25	0.116
Côte d'Ivoire	8	12	7	27	322	3,110	38.39	11.77	0.114
Djibouti	8	..	4	13	22	508	2.62	1.75	0.040
Eq. Guinea	1	..	0	2	28	539	21.58	17.53	0.337
Eritrea	200	120	..	320	121	1,630	0.61	0.38	0.005
Ethiopia	353	353	1,127	5,311	3.20	3.20	0.015
Gabon	5	..	2	7	268	2,551	56.95	39.95	0.381
Gambia	1	1	11	740	14.13	14.13	0.925
Ghana	7	..	1	8	239	2,093	34.08	29.82	0.262
Guinea	10	..	10	19	246	3,399	25.35	12.74	0.176
Guinea-Bissau	7	..	2	9	36	724	4.95	3.88	0.078
Kenya	22	..	5	27	583	3,446	26.25	21.42	0.127
Lesotho	2	2	30	909	15.18	15.18	0.455
Liberia	15	15	111	1,585	7.42	7.42	0.106
Madagascar	21	..	8	29	587	0	27.95	20.60	0.000
Malawi	5	..	1	6	118	2,881	23.70	19.75	0.480
Mali	7	..	8	15	1,240	7,243	167.57	81.58	0.477
Mauritania	16	..	5	21	1,031	5,074	65.65	49.79	0.245
Mauritius	2	2	2	0	n.a.	1.03	0.000
Mozambique	6	6	802	4,571	131.41	131.41	0.749
Namibia	9	..	0	9	825	3,824	91.71	90.71	0.420
Niger	5	..	5	11	1,267	5,697	239.06	118.41	0.532
Nigeria	77	..	30	107	924	4,047	12.08	8.67	0.038
Rwanda	70	..	6	76	26	893	0.38	0.35	0.012
Senegal	9	..	6	15	196	2,640	20.87	12.74	0.171
Seychelles	0	..	0	1	0.5	0	2.28	0.91	0.000
Sierra Leone	3	..	1	4	72	958	23.91	18.88	0.252
Somalia	50	50	638	2,366	12.75	12.75	0.047
South Africa	63	87	8	159	1,220	4,750	19.24	7.67	0.030
Sudan	105	..	15	120	2,506	7,687	23.98	20.97	0.064
Swaziland	0	17	535	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Tanzania	34	80	1	115	945	3,402	27.80	8.19	0.029
Togo	7	..	1	8	57	1,647	8.11	7.28	0.211
Uganda	50	..	1	51	236	2,698	4.72	4.66	0.053
Zambia	22	..	1	23	753	5,664	34.84	32.72	0.246
Zimbabwe	40	..	22	62	390	3,066	9.76	6.32	0.050
Total	1,5120	299	233	2,053	24,333	143,564	16.0	0.5	0.070
For comparison									
USA	1,366	1,212	89	2,666	9,629	12,248	7.1	3.6	0.005
Germany	221	364	..	585	357	3,618	1.6	0.6	0.006
France	294	419	95	808	547	2,889	1.9	0.7	0.004
Denmark	22	65	..	87	43	68	2.0	0.5	0.001

Legend: Reg.: Regular armed forces; Res.: Reserves; Param.: Paramilitary forces

The above comparison of military manpower even underestimates the deficiencies in terms of military strength and the wide gap between Africa and the North, as it takes into account neither the quality of the troops nor of their equipment. First of all, military personnel in African armed forces are generally poorly educated and trained in comparison with their northern colleagues; and the armies are often ethnically very mixed, even in such countries where ethnic divisions run deep, making their loyalty to the state somewhat dubious.¹⁷¹

Secondly, these deficiencies in terms of manpower are all the more crippling, as African states cannot afford the luxury of replacing men with machines, i.e. of making their defence more capital- or weapons-intensive. This is all the more impossible, because they have no indigenous arms production but, with the exception of South Africa,¹⁷² rely almost exclusively on arms imports. During the Cold War the major arms producers had strategic reasons to furnish African states with weapons for free or at discounted prices,¹⁷³ but this is no longer the case. As a result arms acquisitions by African states have become an even greater burden on the national economies—to say nothing of the actual arms embargoes, which have, over the last five years, been imposed on several African states.¹⁷⁴ While slowly rising, the import of major weapons systems by African states thus remains minuscule compared with most of the rest of the world (See Table 17).

Table 17: Arms Imports¹⁷⁵ 1990 US\$m

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Sub-Saharan Africa	310	196	259	122	256	387	669	668	437	425
North Africa	76	126	306	431	212	209	118	496	299	382
North America	537	721	1,031	514	473	649	139	143	517	584
Central and South America	546	521	836	887	1,050	1,472	823	883	814	1,240
Asia and Oceania	5,567	6,070	5,694	8,178	8,188	11,423	9,035	9,906	5,660	7,436
Europe	6,325	5,175	4,462	3,013	3,409	3,802	4,570	3,988	3,710	3,976
Middle East	6,843	9,031	6,426	6,109	6,699	6,888	7,916	5,079	3,680	2,156
World	20,204	21,840	19,014	19,254	20,287	24,830	23,270	21,163	15,117	16,199
Sub-Saharan African share (%)	1.53	0.90	1.36	0.63	1.26	1.56	2.87	3.16	2.89	2.62

African armies are therefore poorly armed and equipped, as shown in Table 18, which even underestimates the deficiencies, as it does not measure quality.

Each African soldier is thus much more poorly armed and equipped, and as a consequence probably capable of covering much less border or territory than European or American troops—a problem which is even more serious because of the more demanding terrain and lack of adequate infrastructure that usually characterise Africa.

Table 18: Major Weapons Systems in Africa¹⁷⁶

Country	MBT	APC	Art.	Ac.	Hel.	Country	MBT	APC	Art.	Ac.	Hel.
Angola	400	570	404	140	40	Mali	33	50	20	16	0
Benin	0	0	16	0	0	Mauritania	35	0	75	7	0
Botswana	0	30	18	30	0	Mauritius	0	0	0	0	0
Burk. Faso	0	13	14	5	0	Mozambique	80	275	136	0	4
Burundi	0	29	18	4	0	Namibia	?	60	24	2	2
Cameroon	0	35	54	15	4	Niger	0	22	0	0	0
Cape V.	0	0	24	0	0	Nigeria	200	330	458	86	10
CAR	4	39	0	0	0	Rwanda	12	50	35	5	0
Chad	60	103	5	2	2	Senegal	0	28	18	8	0
ROC	40	68	?	12	0	Seychelles	0	0	0	0	0
DRC	60	?	100	4	6	Sierra Leone	0	0	0	0	6
Côte 'Ivoire	0	29	4	5	0	Somalia	?	?	?	?	?
Djibouti	0	12	6	0	0	South Africa	168	2,833	190	86	7
Eq. Guinea	0	10	0	0	0	Sudan	200	343	460	35	10
Eritrea	100	50	100	17	?	Swaziland	?	?	?	?	?
Ethiopia	300	200	312	51	26	Tanzania	45	60	265	19	0
Gabon	0	12	4	10	5	Togo	2	54	10	16	0
The Gambia	0	0	0	0	0	Uganda	140	64	225	10	2
Ghana	0	50	6	19	0	Zambia	30	13	96	71	12
Guinea	30	40	26	8	0	Zimbabwe	40	330	30	52	32
Guinea-B.	10	55	26	3	0	Total	2,067	5,949	3,267	779	202
Kenya	78	62	48	29	34	For comparison					
Lesotho	0	0	2	0	0	USA	8,023	22,110	6,763	6,008	554
Liberia	0	0	0	0	0	Germany	2,521	4,776	2,073	434	204
Madag.	0	30	29	12	0	France	809	4,499	794	473	262
Malawi	0	0	9	0	0	Denmark	238	296	475	68	12

Legend: MBT: Main battle tanks; APC: Armoured personnel carriers; Art: Artillery; Ac.: Combat aircraft; Hel.: Armed helicopters

The Spectre of Praetorianism

The praetorianism which has haunted large parts of Africa may be seen as a reflection of all of the above. The term itself simply signifies that the armed forces habitually meddle in politics,¹⁷⁷ in some cases by usurping power directly through a military *coup d'état* of which Africa has seen plenty (see Table 19). Indeed, the first half of 2003 saw two coups, the first one (15-16 March) in the Central African Republic (CAR) and the second one in Sao Tome and Principe (16 July).¹⁷⁸ In other cases, however, the praetorians prefer to remain “in the wings”, while defining the borders of permissible political action for the civilian politicians, e.g. by means of the implicit threat of a military coup.¹⁷⁹

Table 19: Military Coups and other Unconstiutional Political Changes in Africa (-2000)¹⁸⁰

Country	Years	Country	Years
Algeria	1965, 1992	Libya	1969
Angola	None	Madagascar	1972
Benin	<i>1963, 1965(a-b), 1967, 1969, 1972</i>	Malawi	None
Botswana	None	Mali	1968, 1991
Burkina Faso	1966, <i>1974</i> , 1980, <i>1982</i> , 1983, 1987	Mauritania	1978, <i>1980</i> , 1984
Burundi	1966a-b, <i>1976</i> , 1987, 1996	Mauritius	None
Cameroon	None	Morocco	None
Cape Verde	None	Mozambique	None
Central Afr. R.	1966, 1979, 1981	Namibia	None
Chad	<i>1975, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1990</i>	Niger	1974, 1996, 1999
Comoros	<i>1975, 1978, 1989, 1995, 1999</i>	Nigeria	1966a-b, <i>1975</i> , 1983, <i>1985</i> , 1993
DRC/Zaire	1965, 1997	Rwanda	1973, 1994
Rep. Of Congo	<i>1963, 1968, 1977, 1979, 1997</i>	Sao Tome/Pt.	<i>1995</i>
Cote d'Ivoire	1999	Sahrawi	n.a.
Djibouti	None	Senegal	None
Egypt	1952, <i>1954</i>	Seychelles	1977
Eq. Guinea	1979	Sierra Leone	1967, <i>1968</i> , 1992, <i>1996</i> , 1997
Eritrea	None	Somalia	1969, 1991
Ethiopia	1974, 1977, 1991	South Africa	None
Gabon	1964	Sudan	1958, <i>1964</i> , 1969, 1985, 1989
The Gambia	1994	Swaziland	None
Ghana	1966, 1972, <i>1978, 1979</i> , 1981	Tanzania	None
Guinea	1984	Togo	1963, 1967
Guinea-Bissau	1980, 1989, <i>1999</i>	Tunisia	None
Kenya	None	Uganda	1971, <i>1979, 1980</i> , 1985, 1986
Lesotho	1986, 1991, <i>1994</i>	Zambia	None
Liberia	1980, 1990	Zimbabwe	None

Legend: **Boldface:** Military deposes civilian government; *Italics:* Contested categorisation as “military coup”; Regular: Other unconstitutional changes, including “intra-military coups”

For analytical purposes it may make sense to distinguish between two different forms of praetorianism:

Sometimes the military simply represent one neopatrimonial patron-client network among others, albeit usually with more ample resources, which simply wants its share of society’s wealth. Such kleptocratic or “predatory praetorians” rarely relinquish power voluntarily, for obvious reasons. The Doe regime in Liberia may be a case in point,¹⁸¹ but this form of praetorianism also shares many features with the kind of warlordism to which we shall return shortly, the main difference being whether to rule an entire country, or merely parts thereof, by military means and for personal gain.

In other cases the armed forces view themselves as “guardians of the nation” or of the state, as implied by their professional ethos. They may thus accept, as a matter of principle the norm of civilian supremacy, but nevertheless intervene in

politics in order to “save” the state, for instance from corrupt politicians, in which case they only assume power as a temporary measure. Upon the restoration of “order”, they willingly step down in favour of duly elected and (in their view) “responsible” politicians, thus revealing themselves as what might be called “patriotic praetorians”. An example of this “watchdog model”, as it has aptly been labelled by Peter Schraeder,¹⁸² may be Nigeria. It may thus be similar, in this respect, to the armed forces of Pakistan or Turkey.¹⁸³

Needless to say, however, the dividing line between the two varieties is neither clear-cut nor insurmountable. It is perfectly conceivable that military rulers who initially took over for “patriotic” reasons simply acquire a taste for power and allow themselves to be corrupted, in which case they tend to show little enthusiasm for relinquishing power—as seems to have been the case of some of the Nigerian military rulers such as Ibrahim Babangida (1985-93) and Sani Abacha (1993-98).¹⁸⁴

Even if they are formally civilian, several African governments also rest on the foundation of armed force, as their present rulers have come to power by winning either a civil war or an armed anti-colonial struggle, as is the case of, e.g. Uganda, Zimbabwe and Eritrea. In such cases, the guerilla leader-turned-civilian politician often retains much of the former military or guerilla ethos, and former comrades-in-arms are frequently rewarded with government posts for which they are not always suited.¹⁸⁵

State Failures

While state weakness is thus endemic to Africa, most states have managed to “muddle through” from crisis to crisis without actual collapse.

In some cases, however, weaknesses have been transformed into vicious circles and violent conflicts, which have eventually made the state collapse completely.¹⁸⁶ This was the fate, at least temporarily, of Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Congo/Zaire,¹⁸⁷ which are similar, in many respects, to failed states in other parts of the world such as Afghanistan.¹⁸⁸ In many cases, actual control over a failed state’s territory is taken over by warlords or guerilla groups, leaving the formal government in control of, at best, the capital and its immediate surroundings, as has been the case in many protracted civil wars, e.g. in Liberia, Angola and the Congo.¹⁸⁹

In a few cases such state collapse has prompted an international de-recognition of the state in question, or at least its formal government, leaving it as a curious *terra nullius* in the international system, as has been the case of Somalia, where the TNG (Transitional National Government) remains unrecognised by most

other states.¹⁹⁰ More often the international community has turned the blind eye to state failure. This has left the failed state in question as a “quasi-state”, where the state remains as almost an empty shell, enjoying “formal sovereignty” unaccompanied by any “empirical sovereignty”.¹⁹¹ It is thus recognised as a sovereign state, and thereby legally protected against interference by other states, or even the United Nations, by the norm of “non-interference in internal affairs” (codified, inter alia, in the UN Charter’s article 2.7), but without having any actual control over what happens within its sovereign domain.¹⁹²

We also encounter the opposite phenomenon of functioning polities such as Somaliland, established on the territory of former British Somaliland after the collapse of Somalia and, to some extent, Puntland in the southern part of Somalia, neither of which is internationally recognised even though both would qualify as “*de facto* states”.¹⁹³ Paradoxically, Africa thus features both states recognised as such, even though they have lost all actual elements of statehood, and polities, which are not, even though they come closer than many states to functioning as such.

The African Security Predicament

“Security” is an “essentially contested concept”, and it is a matter of political controversy which issues to “securitise”, i.e. elevate from the realm of ordinary political issues to one where emergency measures can be discussed with reference to the fact that a security problem is urgent and “existential”.¹⁹⁴

In the developed countries, the concept of security is thus being gradually expanded from a narrow one, focusing on international (and mainly military) threats to national security to also include other threats to the security of the state, i.e. its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The focus may also be expanded to include additional “referents” of security such as nations and other human collectives—but the expansion has been piecemeal and a matter of some controversy. In Africa as well as most other parts of the Third World, however, the “traditional” security discourse may all along have been out of touch with reality.

National or Regime Security?

In view of the military weakness of virtually all African countries, it may seem paradoxical that only few of them face any “traditional” military threats to their national security from their neighbours.

Even though their “fences” are typically quite low and/or broken, and their neighbours often quite nasty, the latter are in most cases too weak in terms of offensive military power to launch an attack.¹⁹⁵ While some of them may be

quite fearsome, or at least uncomfortably unpredictable, in terms of intentions, their military capabilities in most cases do not provide them with the means to attack their neighbours. While quite a few African states may be able to undertake small-scale incursions into the territory of neighbouring states, none are really in a position to launch (much less sustain and successfully complete) large-scale cross-border offensives, because of their lack of the means of power projection, both with regard to weapons systems and logistics.

This becomes obvious from a comparison between African states and selected northern great and small powers in terms of their holdings of those types of equipment that were singled out in the CFE negotiations in Europe of the late 1980s as critical for “surprise attack and large-scale offensive action”. Table 4.16 above thus shows the United States to have about four times as many main battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers, twice as much artillery, almost eight times as many combat aircraft and around four times as many armed helicopters as *all of* sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, even a small and relatively peaceful European country such as Denmark, has more “CFE-type” weapon systems than most African states, even such as are, by orders of magnitude, larger.

The comparison even underestimates the discrepancies by not taking qualitative factors into account. While most of the African tanks, for instance, are obsolete Soviet tanks (e.g. T-54s or even T-32s), the holdings of Germany consist almost entirely of Leopard-1 and 2 and those of the USA of Abrams-1 tanks, both of which are much more capable. Moreover, while most of the equipment of the powers of the North is combat-ready (as that which is not is usually “moth-balled” or destroyed), a very large proportion of the equipment of the African armed forces is, at best, suitable for parades, but quite inadequate for actual combat.

Even the continent’s great powers, South Africa and Nigeria, thus have far fewer and less capable tanks or other armoured vehicles and much fewer aircraft than even minor European powers. Their recent experience with military interventions seems to confirm the assessment that their offensive strength is quite limited. Even though they were virtually unopposed by regular military forces, neither the Nigerian interventions (under the auspices of a multilateral ECOWAS force) in Liberia or Sierra Leone nor the South African intervention in Lesotho were thus particularly successful.¹⁹⁶ The main weaknesses may be in the field of logistics, where few states have the capacity to supply their armies over long distances, in turn severely hampering mobility. While this defect affects both the offence and the defence, it is most severe for the former, and few African states have air forces (or air arms) or navies which could make up

for the deficiencies in terms of ground forces.¹⁹⁷

Arguably, Sub-Saharan Africa may thus constitute a “zone of defensiveness” almost by default, as very few countries would be able to attack others, even if unopposed. Certain states may be able to launch small-scale incursions into the territory of their immediate neighbours—as in the combined Rwandan and Ugandan intervention in the DRC¹⁹⁸—but none is able to defeat others decisively, much less to “consummate” victory through occupation. What neighbouring countries (or others) often do is, however, to support insurgents either actively or passively, e.g. by allowing them to use their territory as a staging area for cross-border attack. This has, for instance, long been the case of Sudan and Uganda, the latter allowing the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) to operate out of Uganda and the former supporting Ugandan rebel movements such as the LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army).¹⁹⁹ Needless to say, such “transnational conflicts” can undermine national security to at least the same extent as ordinary interventions or invasions.²⁰⁰

National security, i.e. the absence of threat to the state as such, is often conflated with regime security, i.e. the absence of threats to an incumbent (and often illegitimate) regime.²⁰¹ In actual fact, however, some regimes may not at all serve as guardians of the security of their citizens, but may even represent the most serious threat to this very security, e.g. when they are responsible for genocide, as in Rwanda in 1994. In such cases, national security may even be counterproductive (seen from the vantage point of citizens), as it would be tantamount to the ability of a genocidal regime to defend itself against attempts by other states to halt a genocide in progress by means of a humanitarian intervention.²⁰²

Societal Security

Societal security refers to a society’s (as opposed to state’s) or another human collective’s “ability (...) to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom”.²⁰³

Thus conceived societal security is thus a matter of “identity” which may indeed be threatened. However, appeals to protect societal security (i.e. the securitisation of identity) may also be tantamount to the construction of groups or individuals as threats, combined with an implicit legitimisation of “extraordinary measures”.

Region	Refugees	Asylum seekers	Returned refugees	IDPs & al.	TOTAL
Asia	5,770,300	33,100	49,200	2,968,000	8,820,700
Africa	3,305,100	107,200	266,800	494,500	4,173,500
Europe	2,227,900	335,400	146,500	2,145,600	4,855,400
Northern America	645,100	441,700	—	—	1,086,800
Latin America/Caribbean	37,400	7,900	200	720,000	765,400
Oceania	65,400	15,600	—	300	81,300
TOTAL	12,051,100	940,800	462,700	6,328,400	19,783,100

It may thus be abused for xenophobia, fascism or even genocide, as happened during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, where the instigators appealed to Hutu identity and unity in the face of an alleged threat from the Tutsi “cockroaches”, e.g. in the infamous “Hutu Ten Commandments”.²⁰⁵ A xenophobic or even racist discourse about societal security may also be linked to the phenomenon of migration,²⁰⁶ both voluntary and enforced as in refugee flows, of which Africa has an abundance (see Table 20).

Not only are the total numbers thus very high in Africa, but the continent also hosts some of the very most affected countries, i.e. both countries whence large numbers of people flee and (mostly neighbouring) countries hosting them. Somewhat paradoxically, several countries find themselves in both roles (see Table 21).

Country of Origin	Main Countries of Asylum	Total
Afghanistan	Pakistan / Iran	3,809,600
Burundi	Tanzania	554,000
Iraq	Iran	530,100
Sudan	Uganda/Ethiopia /DRC/Kenya/CAR	489,500
Angola	Zambia/DRC /Namibia	470,600
Somalia	Kenya/Ethiopia/ Yemen /USA/United Kingdom	439,900
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Yugoslavia/USA/Sweden /Denmark /Netherlands	426,000
DRC	Tanzania/Congo/Zambia/Rwanda/Burundi	392,100
Viet Nam	China /USA	353,200
Eritrea	Sudan	333,100

Such problems may be deliberately exploited by unscrupulous leaders seeking to place the blame for economic and social problems on “foreigners”—as has, for instance, been the case in both Zimbabwe and, to a lesser extent, South Africa.²⁰⁸ To the extent that this leads to violent strife between ethnic and/or religious or cultural groups it certainly constitutes a serious societal security problem, where one group's security spells insecurity for the others. This is a genuine “societal security dilemma”, which may even have such abhorrent manifestations as ethnic cleansing or even genocide.²⁰⁹

Even though societal security as a concept has almost exclusively focused on national and ethnic collectives, it supposedly applies to any human collective. One might thus also envision cleavages among other societal groupings, which might eventually come to be securitised, a first step in which direction would surely be political organisation. Religion has already been extensively politicised, if only because of its close links to some forms of nationalism.²¹⁰ When nations are thus defined in religious terms (as, for instance, in Pakistan, Iran and, indirectly, Israel) “alien” religions risk being viewed as threats to national cohesion and therefore securitised. Even when nations or states are not defined in religious terms, the politisation of any religion (even the “national” one) may likewise come to be seen as threat, as when Sudan introduced *Sharia* law, or when parts of Nigeria did the same.²¹¹ The reasons for the “Miss World riots” in Nigeria in 2002, featuring three days of killing over a seemingly trivial issue such as the holding of the Miss World contest, could arguably be traced back to the introduction of *sharia* in the locations affected two years earlier.²¹²

Such developments have obvious human security implications, if only because it is regulated in several human rights conventions. Articles 2 and 18 of the 1948 human rights convention thus makes clear that

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. (Art. 2)

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. (Art. 18)

Human Security

Human security is basically a matter of human well-being and, in the last analysis, survival of people, regardless of their national or other affiliations.²¹³

Even though the state was presumably “created” for the sake of its citizens' security, it can also constitute a threat to their security, as mentioned above. On the other hand, the main security problem in today's Africa may not be an excess, but rather a deficit of state power, as in the failed states described above. In failed and weak states, ordinary crime and intercommunal strife may become so prevalent that security simply becomes “privatised”. When and where the state cannot ensure law and order, people tend to take matters into their own hands. In order to protect themselves, their families and their property, they will resort to self-help, e.g. by arming themselves, or by enlisting the services of private security companies—as we have seen in a country such as South Africa.²¹⁴ This tends to

gradually produce a vicious circle where violence spurs a proliferation of small arms, in its turn producing more violence, etc.

Direct violence (in the terminology of Johan Galtung) is not, however, the only threat to human security, as various forms of “structural violence”²¹⁵ may produce even larger numbers of casualties and even greater human suffering, e.g. in the form of poverty, malnutrition, disease, loss of human dignity, etc. In order to make any analytical sense of this rather “fuzzy” and vague term, however, we have to break it down into sub-categories.

- Non-violent, but nevertheless “intentional” threats to human security, for which the state is to blame, i.e. the broad category of human rights violations, of which Africa has seen more than its fair share., as has been documented, *inter alia*, in the annual *Human Development Reports* of the UNDP, or in the reports of NGOs such as Human Right Watch or Amnesty International.²¹⁶
- Structural violence perpetrated by one societal group against another, as by the white minority against the black and coloured majority in South Africa under apartheid, or the widespread enslavement of blacks by Arabs in Sudan.²¹⁷ The general oppression of women by men would fall into the same category, even though it is, alas, all too often also combined with direct physical violence, including rape.²¹⁸
- Structural violence caused by the global order, e.g. by “imperialism”, “centre-periphery relations” or globalisation, responsible for the relative deprivation of the peoples of the Third World (*vide supra*).
- Threats from “nature”, some of which may surely be exacerbated, but which are not caused by, societal and/or political factors, as is the case of HIV/AIDS.²¹⁹

Whether any of these forms of structural violence should be securitised, i.e. treated as human security issues, is a matter of political choice and controversy, but it probably does little to enhance the analytical rigour of security studies to include the fourth type, which is basically a matter of man's struggle with nature.

Environmental Security

This man/nature relationship is also at the heart of the debate about “environmental security”. That the environment is degrading was discovered several years ago. However, the awareness of ecological challenges was especially boosted by the publication in 1987 of the report of the Brundtland Commission on *Our Common Future*, which inspired a flood of books on “environmental” or “ecologic security”.²²⁰ However, to recognise environmental decay as a problem was, of course, one thing, to elevate it to the status of a *security* problem something else, which remains disputed.

Environmental issues might become subsumed under an expanded notion of security, either as a cause or as consequences. First of all, environmental problems could be caused by war, or preparations for war.²²¹ Examples from Africa include exacerbated deforestation in war-torn southern Sudan, especially the Darfur region, and aggravated poaching and some deforestation in Mozambique during the civil war.²²²

Secondly, wars might accrue from environmental problems, e.g. in the form of resource wars.²²³ An obvious example might be wars over scarce water supplies, say between states sharing the same river, as is, for instance, the case of the Nile. Other conflicts over shared resources in Africa might include poaching (or other forms of over-exploitation) of wildlife, fishing or logging.²²⁴ Moreover, excessive exploitation of natural resources may uproot communities, thus making them (and especially their youth) more inclined to join rebel movements, as may have been the case in Sierra Leone.²²⁵ Paradoxically, what might otherwise be accepted as responsible use of nature's resources (perhaps especially wildlife) may become the target of fanatical environmentalist campaigns in the industrialised world, thereby representing a threat to the livelihood and, by implication, human security of indigenous peoples, as has arguably been the case in Zimbabwe.²²⁶

The Pitfalls of Expansion

Quite a lot can thus be said in favour of adopting a conception of security for Africa which differs significantly from that which appears relevant for Europe, with a distinctly greater emphasis on human security and a lesser one on national security. On the other hand, two caveats may be worth taking seriously.

First of all, the security sector mentioned above is likely to regard security, however conceived, as its business. Hence, to expand the concept will also enlarge the field of action for the security services, thereby militating against a reduction of them. Secondly, as a distinguishing feature of security problems is that they justify extraordinary measures, the labelling of political problems as security problems may allow the regime to justify repression.

Conflict Motives, Objectives and Behaviour

What was above labelled "background factors" only impact on African conflicts indirectly, i.e. by being translated into motives, objectives and behaviour of the various actors, the topic to which this section is devoted.

Statehood Conflicts, Ideology and Power Struggles

Because of the “state pathologies” described above, a number of conflicts have revolved around the state, either its very identity or the control of the state apparatus.

In some cases the very identity (“idea” in the terminology of Barry Buzan) of the state has been an issue, as parts of a state’s population have denied the state their loyalty—what might be called a “statehood conflict.” In some cases, this has translated into a political, and largely non-violent, struggle for moderate claims for regional or provincial autonomy, e.g. within a federal structure, as has been the objective of the SPLF (Sudan People’s Liberation Front) in southern Sudan— at least according to its own rhetoric. In other cases, (leaders of) nations feeling “entrapped” in a larger, multinational, state have attempted secession, usually by violent means, as has been the case of Katanga and Biafra (*vide supra*) and as it remains the case of the Cabinda liberation movement FLEC (*Frente da libertação do enclave de Cabinda*), seeking independence from Angola, even though “renegades” have recently sought to strike a compromise with the government in Luanda.²²⁷ Considering the imposed nature of its borders, Africa has arguably seen surprisingly few such attempted secessions, all of which have been quelled, with the exception of Eritrea.²²⁸

The distinction between the two varieties is less clear than one might expect, however, as a political struggle sometimes escalates, not only in terms of means, but also of ends. If political demands for autonomy are not met, and even more so if they are forcefully suppressed, an initially political movement often resorts to armed struggle, which the incumbent government almost always seeks to forcefully repress. The longer this armed struggle last, and the more intense it becomes, the less likely it must appear to the conflicting sides that they will ever be able to co-exist peacefully within the same state—hence a demand for autonomy easily evolves into one for secession. Even if an agreement on autonomy is reached (as between the SPLM and the Sudanese government) mutual suspicions are likely to run very deep indeed. The government is likely to suspect (perhaps rightly) the SPLM of only accepting autonomy as a tactical move and a first step towards secession, and the SPLM is likely (for very good reasons) to be sceptical about Khartoum’s willingness to abide by the agreement.²²⁹

Even though statehood conflicts such as the above have revolved around territorial issues, the bone of contention has not simply been territory. Indeed, the motive of territorial expansion so well-known from other parts of the world, has been conspicuous by its almost complete absence from African conflicts, the

only partial examples being the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia and the recent war between the former and Eritrea.²³⁰ Moreover, neither of these has been about territory pure and simple, but rather about territory containing ethnic kin, thereby revealing the conflict as one of ethnicity. In other cases, conflict has erupted over land as a reservoir of riches, thereby revealing the conflict as one of “greed” (*vide infra*). That “traditional” territorial disputes have been so rare in Africa may be explicable by the relatively ample space available on the continent—a historical fact which Jeffrey Herbst has also highlighted as an explanation for the weakness of African states, who have neither been forced to, nor able to, establish territorial control.²³¹

In most African conflicts, neither the identity nor the borders of the state have been questioned by the contending sides, both or all of whom have merely wanted at least a share of state power. Most of Africa’s numerous military coups (*vide supra*) fall into this category as do a number of guerilla struggles and violent uprisings such as the recent ones (2002/03) in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire.²³² Some of these power struggles have been legitimised in terms of ideology, but in most cases this seems to have been mainly a matter of power. Because of the neopatrimonial nature of most African states, control of the state apparatus allows the incumbent rulers to substitute their own clientilistic network for that of their predecessors, just as it provides ample access to the country’s wealth, perhaps especially so in extractive states (*vide supra*).

In some conflicts, however, at least some of the conflicting sides have been driven by real visions and ideologies. Most prominent have been Marxism and especially Maoism which have all along had a considerable appeal in Africa, even though some movements’ claims to be Marxist may also have been motivated by the hope for Soviet, Chinese or Cuban assistance. Some do, on the other hand, appear authentic, especially those which have combined Marxism with nationalism and anti-colonialism as, for instance, that of Amilcar Cabral of the PAIGC (*Partido africano da independência da Guiné e do Cabo Verde*).²³³

Other movements have been driven by liberal values such as democracy, as has been the case of the ANC (African National Congress) in South Africa, its ties to the Communist Party notwithstanding, as well as perhaps the EPDRF (Ethiopian People’s Democratic and Revolutionary Front) in Ethiopia.²³⁴ Still others have been religiously fundamentalist, either Christian as the Holy Spirit Movement and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda (who are, ironically, among the most ferocious movements in all of Africa) or some of the Islamist groups operating in Ethiopia and elsewhere such as the *Al-Ittihad al-Islamia* (Islamic Union Party), often labelled as terrorists.²³⁵ In some cases traditional religion has been instrumentalised by rebel leaders as means to boost the morale

of the fighters, as in the Zimbabwean *Chimurenga* and in the Liberian civil war.²³⁶

Ethnic and Security Dilemma Conflicts

In view of the fact that most African states are multinational it should come as no surprise that the ethnic factor has loomed large.²³⁷

However much some African scholars and politicians may resent the term ethnicity almost as much as that of tribalism, and granting that ethnic identities are sometimes not “authentically African”, but partly the results of colonial policies of privileging certain ethnic groups over others,²³⁸ it remains a fact that many conflicts at least appear in an ethnic guise. Even if we disregard the primordialist in favour of the social constructivist view of ethnicity as “imagined”, it may well be a fact, albeit a social rather than a physical one—but no less durable for that, and maintained through shared myths of origin, common customs, etc.²³⁹

Moreover, the aforementioned economic and state pathologies may well facilitate the politisation of ethnic identities, as belonging to a certain ethnic group is often the admission ticket into the informal clientilistic networks upon which neopatrimonialism rests—and the very fact of extreme economic scarcity and rampant unemployment may make belonging to these networks a matter of life or death. Furthermore, once ethnic identities are politicised and fought over, this very struggle serves to cement ethnic identification, as it gives rise to enemy images, militates against inter-marriages or even socialising across ethnic divides, etc. Its conflict-proneness and other unappealing manifestations notwithstanding, there is thus nothing “irrational” or primitive about ethnicity as such, but it is merely one of those features shared by Africans with the peoples of other parts of the world, including Europe.²⁴⁰

Ethnicity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of conflict, however, and Africa has both experienced violent conflicts in ethnically homogenous states (e.g. Somalia) and relative peace in multiethnic states such as Kenya or Botswana.²⁴¹ In some cases, ethnic groups are open for new-comers, e.g. through inter-marriage, as has arguably been the case of the (for long periods ruling) Amharas in Ethiopia,²⁴² which makes ethnicity a less obvious rallying point for political conflicts. In other cases, ethnicity is more solid, e.g. if it is constructed around race. The apartheid system in South Africa was the paramount example of this, but the Sudanese divide between Arabs in the North and Africans in the South may also fall into this category.²⁴³

In most cases, ethnically infected motives have been fairly moderate, e.g. to be

allowed to practice whatever is central to one's ethnic group—which is sometimes resented by the central government, as it tends to weaken national cohesiveness and nation-building. In others, ethnic motives have envisioned the quest for privileges, entailing the exclusion of members of other ethnic groups. In the most extreme cases it has been a matter of getting rid of the other ethnic group altogether, either through ethnic cleansing (as with Idi Amin's expulsion of the entire Asian community from Uganda)²⁴⁴ or through genocide as in Rwanda or Burundi.

In some cases the struggle is basically seen as one of survival, as when one ethnic group's control of the state constitutes an acute security risks for the other(s).²⁴⁵ This has, for instance, been the case in both Rwanda and Burundi, where this “ethnic security dilemma” has resulted in genocide. That there is no strong correlation between the “stickiness” of ethnicity and the intensity of the ensuing conflict becomes obvious from the fact that Ethiopia has experienced more than its fair share of ethnic conflicts, between the central government and rebel movements which are ethnically defined as, e.g., Afar, Oromo, Sidama, Tigrayan or Somali,²⁴⁶ and that Burundi and Rwanda with even more “fluid” forms of ethnicity have seen the most atrocious ethnic genocides of the entire continent.²⁴⁷

Greed and Survival Conflicts


In several cases economic factors have been paramount, as highlighted in several recent studies on “the political economy of civil wars”.²⁴⁸ Even though violent conflicts are usually ostensibly fought for other ends, closer analysis has often uncovered a quest for enrichment (“greed”) at the heart of them. However, greed appears at different levels and has different manifestations as well as consequences. As far as the level of analysis is concerned, it makes sense to distinguish between the rank-and-file and the leaders making the big decisions about war or peace, i.e. between the motives and dynamics of “bottom-up” and “top-down” violence, respectively.²⁴⁹

As far as leaders are concerned, the simplest manifestation of greed is, of course, the quest for something valuable, e.g. the control of state power or pieces of territory containing oil fields, diamond mines or whatever. In this case the use of armed force is merely an indirect means to achieving (partial or complete) victory, the spoils of which is control. This is the usual picture of “resource wars”.²⁵⁰ In other cases, the very act of violence becomes almost an end in itself as it provides a favourable climate for all sorts of clandestine economic activities such as smuggling, drug trafficking, etc.—just as it makes the “protection” which armed forces can provide worth paying for, even though they may be the ones causing the violence in the first place. As argued by David Keen,

Conflict can create war economies (...). Under these circumstances, ending civil wars becomes difficult. Winning may not be desirable: the point of war may be precisely the legitimacy which it confers on actions that in peacetime would be punishable as crimes.²⁵¹

The phenomenon of warlordism falls under the same heading, as warlords thrive in such a violent environment, where their “protection” is needed by the civilian population, whereas they would lose control if the struggle were to come to an end—even with their own victory.²⁵²

The two causal paths from greed to profits via the use of armed force are illustrated in Fig. 2. Needless to say, they are not mutually exclusive, as it is entirely possible that leaders strive for victory as in path A whilst at the same time trying to reap profits from the war economy via path B.



Path A may best explain (the economic aspects of) the civil war in Angola, which could be seen as being waged for control of oil and diamond-rich territory by the incumbent MPLA government and the rebel UNITA movement, respectively—or the civil war in southern Sudan where the government in Khartoum is seeking to establish control over SPLM-controlled areas and evict the population for the sake of oil exploration.²⁵³ More or less clear-cut cases of Path B may be the various conflicts in the Mano River region (e.g. Liberia and Sierra Leone),²⁵⁴ and that in the DRC between the state and rival rebel groups as well as their respective foreign patrons.²⁵⁵

Economic motives also play a role for the agents, as opposed to leaders and decision-makers. As far as the private military companies are concerned, the term greed may be entirely appropriate, as they are obviously in their business for the profits (as all other businesses)—and they would obviously be run out of business by any lasting peace. This does not, however, preclude their having an

interest in helping bring about a particular peace, as Executive Outcomes did in Sierra Leone,²⁵⁶ as such an accomplishment may gain them future clients elsewhere.

As far as the fighters themselves are concerned war is often more a matter of survival than of reaping handsome profits to spend on luxuries. Many of Africa’s combatants, both those who are on the payroll of governments and those who have been recruited by the various rebel movements, have few prospects of finding a livelihood in civilian life, as they have no other vocational skills than those of soldiering and usually have been uprooted from their (village or other) communities. Hence their propensity to “live off the land” by plundering the civilian population, and their unfortunate tendency to seek other armed professions, such as those as security guards, mercenaries or criminals, upon their demobilisation following the signing of a peace—or to simply go on fighting, say by joining a splinter movement refusing to demobilise, thus perpetuating the war. Hence also the need, now increasingly acknowledged by the international community, of providing assistance for DDR&R (demobilisation, disarmament, repatriation and reintegration) programmes (*vide supra*).

The Pattern of Conflicts

Compared to most other parts of the world, which are at peace and characterised by more or less radical disarmament, Africa remains fraught with violent conflict, and wars as well as the preparations for and long-term consequences of war continue to exact a heavy toll on already fragile economies and societies. However, even though Africa has definitely been conflict-ridden, the pattern of its conflicts differs significantly from those of other continents, as virtually all conflicts have been intrastate or transnational, whereas the number of genuine international conflicts has been quite low.

Ever since the dawn of independence in the 1960s, sub-Saharan Africa has seen very few regular wars between states (see Table 22), and only the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia and that between Ethiopia and Eritrea were on a major scale.

Table 22: International wars in Africa²⁵⁷	
1983	Chad/Nigeria
1977-78	Ethiopia/Somalia
1985	Burkina Faso/Mali
1987)	Chad/Libya
1989-90	Mauritania/Senegal
1996	Cameroon/Nigeria
1998-2000	Ethiopia/Eritrea

To these international wars should, of course, be added a number of interventions (the distinction between the two admittedly being rather fuzzy), most prominently those undertaken by apartheid South Africa in Angola and Mozambique, the latter preceded by an intervention by the Ian Smith regime of “Rhodesia”.²⁵⁸ Other examples include the intervention by Tanzania in Uganda in 1978, which was also undertaken by regular forces,²⁵⁹ and the intervention by several states in the civil war in the DRC since 1997 (*vide supra*) with an estimated death toll of more than three million, mostly civilians.²⁶⁰

Most of Africa’s wars have, however, been intra-state, i.e. civil wars, as becomes apparent from Table 23, which is based on a data-set jointly developed by Nordic peace research institutes. Africa has seen no less than seventeen civil wars and other major armed intrastate conflicts—counting each conflict only once, even though several of them have been cyclical.²⁶¹

A striking feature of the list in Table 23 is how relatively few conflicts have been over territory, compared to Europe. Another striking feature is how many of these conflicts have involved several conflicting parties, often forming transient and opportunistic alliances, making the binary view of conflicts so often encountered obviously inadequate. What also emerges from the table is how many countries have been affected by wars and other violent conflicts over time, as clarified in Table 4.24, which even underestimates the problem, by counting countries with several simultaneous conflicts only once.

Table 23 : Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa²⁶²

Location	Period	Type	Side A	Side B	Disp. ter.
Angola	1960-65, 1966-74	Decol.	Portugal	MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, Cuba, South Africa, Zaire	Angola
	1975-89	Ext. inv.	Angola, Cuba	UNITA , South Africa, FNLA , Zaire	-
	1990-94, 1995, 1998-99	Intra	Angola	UNITA	-
	1992, 1994, 1996-97	Intra	Angola	FLEC	Cabinda
	2000-01	Ext. inv.	Angola, Namibia	UNITA	-
Burkina Faso	1987	Intra	Burkina Faso	Popular Front	-
Burkina Faso – Mali	1985	Internat.	Burkina Faso	Mali	Agacher Strip
Burundi	1965	Intra	Burundi	Military faction	-
	1990-92, 1995-96, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000-01	Intra	Burundi	Ubumwé, Palipehutu, CNDD, Frolina, CNDD-FDD	-
Camero.	1957-60	Decol.	France	UPC	Cameroon
	1984	Intra	Cameroon	Military faction	-
Camer. – Nigeria	1996	Internat.	Cameroon	Nigeria	Bakassi
Central Afr. R.	2001	Ext. inv.	Central African Republic, Libya	Military faction	-
Chad	1965-88	Ext. inv.	Chad	Various groups, Libya	-
	1989, 1990	Ext. inv.	Chad	Military faction , MOSANAT, Islamic Legion, Libya	-
	1991-94, 1997-01	Intra	Chad	MDD (-FANT), CSNPD, CNR, FNT, FARF, MDJT	-
Chad – Libya	1987	Internat.	Chad	Libya	Aozou strip
Chad – Nigeria	1983	Internat.	Chad	Nigeria	Lake Chad
Comoros	1997	Intra	Comoros	MPA	Anjouan
Congo/ Zaire	1960-62	Intra	Congo/Zaire	Katanga	Katanga
	1960-62	Intra	Congo/Zaire	Independent Mining State of South Kasai	South Kasai
	1964-65	Intra	Congo/Zaire	CNL	-
	1967	Intra	Congo/Zaire	Opposition militias	-
	1977, 1978	Intra	Congo/Zaire	FLNC	-
	1996, 1997	Ext. inv.	Congo/Zaire	AFDL, Rwanda, Angola	-
	1998-99, 2000, 2001	Ext. inv.	Congo/Zaire, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad	RCD, RCD faction, MLC, Rwanda, Uganda	-
Congo- Brazza- ville	1997	Ext. inv.	Congo-Brazzaville	FDU, Angola	-
	1998-99	Ext. inv.	Congo-Brazzaville, Angola	Opposition militias	-
Djibouti	1991-94	Intra	Djibouti	FRUD	-
Eq. Guin.	1979	Intra	Equatorial Guinea	Military faction	-
Eritrea – Ethiopia	1998-00	Internat.	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Badme
Ethiopia	1960	Intra	Ethiopia	Military faction	-

	1962-67, 1968-73, 1974-91	Intra	Ethiopia	ELF , ELF factions, EPLF	Eritrea
	1975-76, 1977-78, 1979-83	Ext. inv.	Ethiopia, Cuba	WSLF	Ogaden
	1976-91	Intra	Ethiopia	EPRP, TPLF , EPDM, OLF	-
	1989-91	Intra	Ethiopia	ALF	Afar
	1996, 1998-01	Intra	Ethiopia	ONLF	Ogaden
	1996	Intra	Ethiopia	ARDUF	Afar
	1996-97, 1999	Intra	Ethiopia	al-Itahad al-Islami	Somali
	1999-01	Intra	Ethiopia	OLF	Oromiya
Ethiopia – Somalia	1960, 1964, 1973, 1983, 1987	Internat.	Ethiopia	Somalia	Ogaden
Gabon	1964	Ext. inv.	Gabon, France	Military faction	-
Gambia	1981	Intra	Gambia	SRLP	-
Ghana	1966, 1981, 1983	Intra	Ghana	Military faction	-
Guinea	1970, 2000-01	Intra	Guinea	Military faction	-
Guinea-Bissau	1963-64, 1965-73	Decol.	Portugal	PAIGC	Guinea-Bissau
	1998, 1999	Ext. inv.	Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Guinea	Military faction	-
Kenya	1952, 1953-56	Decol.	United Kingdom	Mau Mau	Kenya
	1982	Intra	Kenya	Military faction	-
Lesotho	1998	Intra	Lesotho	Military faction	-
Liberia	1980	Intra	Liberia	Military faction	-
	1989, 1992, 1993-95	Intra	Liberia	NPFL, INPFL	-
	1990, 1991	Ext. inv.	Liberia	NPFL, Burkina Faso, INPFL	-
	1996	Intra	Liberia	Ulimo-J	-
	2000-01	Intra	Liberia	LURD	-
Madagascar	1971	Intra	Madagascar	Monima National Independence Movement	-
Mali	1990	Intra	Mali	MPA	Air and Azawad
	1994	Intra	Mali	FIAA	Air and Azawad
Mauritania	1957-58	Decol.	France, Spain	National Liberation Army	Morocco/ Mauritania
Maurit-Senegal	1989-90	Internat.	Mauritania	Senegal	Common border
Mozambique	1964-65, 1966-71, 1972-73, 1974	Decol.	Portugal	Frelimo	Mozamb.
	1976-80, 1981-92	Intra	Mozambique	Renamo	-
Niger	1990-92	Intra	Niger	FLAA	Air and Azawad
	1994	Intra	Niger	CRA	Air and Azawad
	1996	Intra	Niger	FDR	Toubou
	1997	Intra	Niger	UFRA	Air and Azawad
	1997	Intra	Niger	FARS	Toubou
Nigeria	1966	Intra	Nigeria	Military faction	-
	1967-70	Intra	Nigeria	Republic of Biafra	Biafra

Rhodesia	1972-75, 1976-79	Intra	Rhodesia	ZANU , ZAPU	
Rwanda	1990, 1991-92, 1993-94 1998, 1999-00, 2001	Intra	Rwanda	FPR	
		Intra	Rwanda	Opposition alliance	
Senegal	1990, 1992-93, 1995, 1997-01	Intra	Senegal	MFDC	Casamance
Sierra Leone	1991-93, 1994-97, 1998-99 2000	Intra	Sierra Leone	RUF, AFRC, ECOMOG, Kamajors	
		Ext. inv.	Sierra Leone, United Kingdom	RUF, AFRC, ECOMOG, Kamajors	
Somalia	1978 1981-86, 1987-88 1989-92, 1993-96	Intra	Somalia	Military faction	
		Intra	Somalia	SSDF , SNM, SPM	
		Intra	Somalia	SNM , Military faction , SSDF , USC, USC faction	
South Africa	1966-78, 1979, 1980-83, 1984-85, 1986-88 1981-88, 1989-93	Intra	South Africa	SWAPO	Namibia
		Intra	South Africa	ANC, PAC, Azapo	
Sudan	1963-72 1970 1976 1983-92 1993-94, 1995-2001	Intra	Sudan	Anya Nya	Southern Sudan
		Intra	Sudan	Sudanese Communist Party	
		Intra	Sudan	Islamic Charter Front	
		Intra	Sudan	SPLM	Southern Sudan
		Intra	Sudan	SPLM, Faction of SPLM, NDA	Southern Sudan
Togo	1986 1991	Intra	Togo	MTD	
		Intra	Togo	Military faction	
Trinidad	1990	Intra	Trinidad and Tobago	Jamaat al-Muslimeen	
Uganda	1971, 1977 1972 1978, 1979 1981-88 1989, 1990, 1991 1994-95, 1996-2001	Intra	Uganda	Military faction	
		Intra	Uganda	UPA	
		Ext. inv.	Uganda, Libya	UNLA , Tanzania	
		Intra	Uganda	NRA, UFM, UPM, UNRF, UFDM, UPF, UPDA, UPC, UNLA, FOBA, HSM	
		Intra	Uganda	Faction of UPDA, UPA, HSM, UDCM, UPDCA	
Intra	Uganda	LRA, WNBF, ADF			

Legend:

(In column for period)

Normal: Minor conflict, i.e. more than 25 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the period; *Italics*: Intermediate conflict, i.e. more than 25 battle-related deaths per year and a total conflict history of more than 1000 battle-related deaths; **Boldface**: War, i.e. more than 1000 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the period

(In column for type)

Decol.: Decolonisation conflict, in the dataset labelled "Extra-state", i.e. "conflicts over a territory between a government and one or more opposition groups, where the territory is a colony of the government."; Internat. : International conflict, in the dataset labelled "Interstate", i.e. "conflicts between two or more countries and governments"; Intra: Intra-state conflict, in the dataset labelled "Internal", i.e. "conflicts within a country between a government and one or more opposition groups, with no interference from other countries"; Ext. Inv.: External involvement in intra-state conflict, in the dataset labelled "Internatized internal", i.e. "similar to internal conflict, but where the government, the opposition or both sides receive support from other governments"; Disp. ter.: Territory in dispute

Acronyms:

ADF: Alliance of Democratic Forces; **AFDL:** *Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Kinshasa*; **AFRC:** Armed Forces Revolutionary Council; **ALF:** Afar Liberation Front; **ANC:** African National Congress; **ARUF:** Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front; **CNDD:** *Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie*; **CNDD-FDD:** *Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie*; **CNL:** *Conseil national de libération*; **CNR:** *Comité national de redressement*; **CRA:** Coordination of the Armed Resistance; **CSNPD:** *Conseil de salut national pour la paix et la démocratie*; **ECOMOG:** Economic Organization of West African States Monitoring Group; **ELF:** Eritrean Liberation Front; **EPDM:** Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement; **EPLF:** Eritrean People's Liberation Front; **EPRP:** Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party; **FARF:** *Forces armées pour la République fédérale*; **FARS:** *Forces révolutionnaires du Sahara*; **FDR:** *Front démocratique pour le renouveau*; **FDU:** *Forces démocratiques unies*; **FIAA:** *Front islamique arabe de l'Azaouad*; **FLAA:** *Front de libération de l'Aïr et l'Azaouad*; **FLEC:** *Frente da libertação do enclave de Cabinda*; **FLNC:** *Front de libération nationale congolais*; **FNLA:** *Frente nacional da libertação de Angola*; **FNT:** *Front national tchadien*; **FOBA:** Force Obote Back Again; **FPR:** *Front patriotique rwandais*; **FRELIMO:** *Frente de libertação de Moçambique*; **FROLINA:** *Front pour la libération nationale*; **FRUD:** *Front de restauration de l'unité et de la démocratie*; **HSM:** Holy Spirit Movement; **INPFL:** Independent National Patriotic Forces of Liberia; **LRA:** Lord's Resistance Army; **LURD:** Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy; **MDD (-FANT):** *Mouvement pour la démocratie et le développement: Forces armées nationales du Tchad*; **MDJT:** *Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad*; **MFDC:** *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance*; **MLC:** *Mouvement de libération congolais*; **MOSANAT:** *Mouvement pour la salvation nationale tchadienne*; **MPA:** *Mouvement populaire de l'Azaouad*; **MPLA:** *Movimento popular de libertação de Angola*; **MTD:** *Mouvement togolaise pour la démocratie*; **NDA:** National Democratic Alliance; **NPFL:** National Patriotic Forces of Liberia; **NRA:** National Resistance Army; **OLF:** Oromo Liberation Front; **ONLF:** Ogaden National Liberation Front; **PAC:** Pan Africanist Congress; **PAIGC:** *Partido africano da independência da Guiné e do Cabo Verde*; **RCD:** *Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie*; **RENAMO:** *Resistência nacional moçambicana*; **RUF:** Revolutionary United Front; **SNM:** Somali National Movement; **SPLM:** Sudanese People's Liberation Movement; **SPM:** Somali Patriotic Movement; **SRLP:** Socialist and Revolutionary Labour Party; **SSDF:** Somali Salvation Democratic Front; **SWAPO:** South West Africa People's Organization; **TPLF:** Tigrean People's Liberation Front; **UDCM:** United Democratic Christian Movement; **UFDM:** Ugandan Federal Democratic Movement; **UFM:** Uganda Freedom Movement; **UFRA:** *Union des forces de la résistance armée*; **ULIMO-J:** United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia; **UNITA:** *União nacional para a independência total de Angola*; **UNLA:** Uganda National Liberation Army; **UNRF:** Uganda National Rescue Front; **UPA:** Uganda People's Army; **UPC:** Uganda People's Congress; **UPC:** *Union des Populations Camerounaises*; **UPDA:** Ugandan People's Democratic Army; **UPDCA:** Uganda People's Christian Democratic Army; **UPF:** Uganda People's Front; **UPM:** Ugandan Patriotic Movement; **USC:** United Somali Congress; **WNBf:** West Nile Bank Front; **WSLF:** Western Somali Liberation Front; **ZANU:** Zimbabwe African National Union; **ZAPU:** Zimbabwe African People's Union.

Table 4.24: Armed Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa by Year, 1960-2001²⁶³

Year	War	Intermediate	Minor
1960			Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Zaire
1961			Angola, Zaire
1962			Angola, Ethiopia, Zaire
1963	Sudan		Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Zaire
1964	Sudan, Zaire		Angola, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Somalia
1965	Chad, Sudan, Zaire	Guinea-Bissau	Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Mozambique
1966	Chad, Sudan	Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique	Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa
1967	Chad, Nigeria, Sudan	Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique	Ethiopia, South Africa, Zaire
1968	Chad, Nigeria, Sudan	Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique	South Africa
1969	Chad, Nigeria, Sudan	Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique	South Africa
1970	Chad, Nigeria, Sudan	Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique	Guinea, South Africa
1971	Chad, Sudan	Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique	Madagascar, South Africa, Uganda
1972	Chad, Mozambique, Sudan	Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau	Rhodesia, South Africa, Uganda
1973	Chad, Mozambique	Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau	Rhodesia, South Africa, Somalia
1974	Chad, Ethiopia	Angola, Mozambique	Rhodesia, South Africa
1975	Angola, Chad, Ethiopia		Rhodesia, South Africa
1976	Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Rhodesia		Mozambique, South Africa, Sudan
1977	Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Rhodesia		Mozambique, South Africa, Uganda, Zaire

1978	Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Rhodesia	Zaire	Mozambique, South Africa, Somalia, Uganda
1979	Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Rhodesia, Uganda	South Africa	Equatoria Guinea, Mozambique
1980	Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, South Africa		Liberia, Mozambique
1981	Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa		Gambia, Ghana, Somalia, Uganda
1982	Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa		Kenya, Somalia, Uganda
1983	Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa, Sudan		Ghana, Somalia, Uganda
1984	Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sudan	South Africa	Cameroun, Somalia, Uganda
1985	Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sudan	South Africa	Burkina Fasu, Somalia, Uganda
1986	Angola, Chad, Sudan, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Africa		Somalia, Togo, Uganda
1987	Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa, Sudan	Somalia	Burkina Fasu, Uganda
1988	Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa, Sudan	Somalia	Uganda
1989	Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda	Chad	Liberia, Mauritania
1990	Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, South Africa, Somalia, Sudan	Uganda	Burundi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal
1991	Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda	Liberia	Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo
1992	Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan		Chad, Djibouti, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone
1993	Angola	Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia	Chad, Djibouti, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan
1994	Angola	Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia	Chad, Djibouti, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Uganda
1995	Sudan	Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia	Burundi, Senegal, Uganda
1996	Sudan	Angola, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda	Burundi, Cameroun, Ethiopia, Liberia, Niger, Zaire
1997	DRC, ROC, Sudan	Angola, Burundi, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda	Chad, Comoros, Ethiopia, Niger
1998	Angola, Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, ROC, Rwa, Sierra Leone, Sudan	Senegal, Uganda	Chad, Eritrea, Lesotho
1999	Angola, DRC, Ethiopia, ROC, Sierra Leone, Sudan	Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda	Chad, Eritrea
2000	Angola, Burundi, DRC, Sudan	Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda	Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia
2001	Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan	DRC, Uganda	CAR, Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone

Legend: War, i.e. more than 1000 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the period; Intermediate conflict, i.e. more than 25 battle-related deaths per year and a total conflict history of more than 1000 battle-related deaths; Minor conflict, i.e. more than 25 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the period.

Summary

We have thus seen that Africa features not only a large number, but also a broad variety of conflicts, at least some of which can be traced back to background factors such as economic or political “pathologies”. We have also seen that African countries are faced with very real security problems, both in terms of national, societal and human security.

Notes

¹ See, for instance, Gilpin, Robert G.: *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Kennedy, Paul: *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Snyder, Jack: *Myths of Empire. Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Kupchan, Charles A.: *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Lundestad, Geir (ed.): *The Fall of Great Powers. Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Knutsen, Torbjørn L.: *The Rise and Fall of World Orders* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); Abernethy, David B.: *The Dynamics of Global Governance. European Overseas Empires 1415-1980* (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 2000).

² For an overview and comparison of the various causes see Abernethy: *op. cit.* (note 1), pp.325-360. See also Cooper, Frederick: *Africa since 1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 20-84; Young, Crawford: *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 182-217.

³ Reprinted in Knipping, Franz with Ralph Dietl (ed.): *The United Nations System and Its Predecessors* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), vol. II: "Predecessors of the United Nations", pp. 182-184. See also Knock, Thomas J.: *To End All Wars. Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 143-147 & *passim*.

⁴ On the shortcomings of the League of Nations in general see Bennett, A. LeRoy: *International Organizations* 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), pp. 24-42; Northedge F.S.: *The League of Nations. Its Life and Times, 1920-1946* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1986), *passim*; and, of course, the unrivalled classic, Carr, E.H.: *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. 2nd ed. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964).

⁵ Callahan, Michael D.: *Mandates and Empire. The League of Nations and Africa* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), quotations from the appendix, p. 193. See also Wilson, Henry S.: *African Decolonisation* (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), pp. 26-29; Northedge: *op. cit.* (note 4), pp. 34-38, 63-66, 192-220; Walters, F.P.: *A History of the League of Nations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 56-58, 171-173, 211-213; Knipping & Dietl (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 3), vol. II, pp. 301-310. On the importance of norms see Jackson, Robert H.: "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations", in Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane (eds.): *Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 111-138.

⁶ Callahan: *op. cit.* (note 5), p. x & *passim*.

⁷ Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W.: "Self-Determination", in Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner (eds.): *United Nations Legal Order* (Cambridge: Grotius Publishers, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 349-389; Cassese, Antonio: *Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Crawford, Neta: "Decolonization as an International Norm: The Evolution of Practices, Arguments, and Beliefs", in Laura W. Reed & Carl Kaysen (eds.): *Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention* (Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, AAAS, 1993), pp. 37-62; Meadwell, Hudson: "Secession, States and International Society", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25, no. 3 (1999), pp. 371-387.

⁸ See, for instance. Halperin, Morton & David J. Scheffer: *Self-Determination in the New World Order* (Washington, DC: Brookings Books, 1992), p. 22.

⁹ Bartkus, Viva Ona: *The Dynamics of Secession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 73-74, 119-124 & *passim*. On Katanga see also Chomé, Jules: *Moïse Tshombe et l'escroquerie katangaise* (Brussels: Ed. Fond. Jacquemotte, 1966); Wrong, Michela: *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz* (London: Fourth Estate, 2001), pp. 61-82; Durch, William J.: "The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964", in idem (ed.): *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 315-352; Witte, Ludo de: *The Assassination of Lumumba* (London: Verso, 2001), *passim*; Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges: *The Congo. From Leopold to Kabila. A People's History* (London: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 94-120. On Biafra see also Nwankwo, Arthur Agwuncha & Samuel Udochukwe Ifejika: *The Making of a Nation: Biafra* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1969); St. Jorre, John de: *The Brothers' War. Biafra and Nigeria* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); Forsyth, Frederick: *The Biafra Story* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969); Amadi, Elechi: *Sunset in Biafra. A Civil War Diary* (London: Heineman, 1973).

¹⁰ Cassese: *op. cit.* (note 7), pp. 214-218; Bartkus: *op. cit.* (note 9), pp. 73-75 and 119-124; Joffe, George: "The Conflict in Western Sahara", in Oliver Furley (ed.) *Conflict in Africa* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 110-133; Gardner, Anne-Marie: "Self-Determination in the Western Sahara: Legal Opportunities and Political Roadblocks", *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 7, no. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 115-138.

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¹² From Thomson. Alex: *An Introduction to African Politics* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 32-33.

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¹⁶ Martin, David & Phyllis Johnson: *The Struggle for Zimbabwe* (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 2001); Bhebe, Ngwabi & Terence Ranger (eds.): *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (London: James Currey, 1995); Ohlson, Thomas: *Power Politics and Peace Politics. Intra-State Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa*. Report no. 50 (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 1998), pp. 82-88; idem & Stephen John Stedman, with Robert Davies: *The New Is Not Yet Born. Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 82-90.

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²⁰ Ahmed, Ishmail: "Understanding Conflict in Somalia and Somaliland", in Adebayo Adedeji (ed.): *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts. The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance* (London: Zed Books, 1999), pp. 236-256; idem & Reginald Herbold Green: "The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland; Local-level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 1 (February 1999), pp. 113-128. On the background see Hess, Robert L.: *Italian Colonialism in Somalia* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

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²³ Davidson, Basil: *The Black Man's Burden. Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (London: James Currey, 1992), p. 42.

²⁴ See, for instance, Nkrumah, Kwame: *Africa Must Unite* (London: Heinemann, 1963); Nyerere, Julius: *Africa Must Unite* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1969). See also Achah, William B.: *Pan-Africanism: Exploring the Contradictions. Politics, Identity and Development in Africa and the African Diaspora* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); Clapham, Christopher: *Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 106-133; Nadubere, Dani Wadada: "African Unity in Historical Perspective", in Eddy Maloka (ed.): *A United States of Africa* (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2001), pp. 9-28; Ndi-Zambo, Benoit: "African Unity: Looking Back, Looking Forward, and a Recipe for Failure", *ibid.*, pp. 29-40; Duffield, Ian: "Pan-Africanism since 1940", in A.D. Roberts (ed.): *The Cambridge History of Africa*, vol. 7: *From 1905 to 1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 95-141.

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²⁶ Weber, Max: "Politics as Vocation", in H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (eds.): *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Galaxy Books, 1958), pp. 77-128, quote from p. 78.

²⁷ Ayooob, Mohammed: *The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional*

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²⁸ See the website of the UN's International Law Commission at www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/decfra.htm. See also the *Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties*, which contains a chapter on "newly independent states" (articles 16-30), exempting them from some of the obligations to honour the obligations of their former colonial rulers, yet with the presumption that, all other things being equal, these are binding. See www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/tresufra.htm.

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³⁰ See, for instance, Lema, Antoine: *Africa Divided. The Creation of "Ethnic Groups"* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1993).

³¹ Griffiths: *op. cit.* (note 22), pp. 181-190; Cooper: *op. cit.* (note 2), pp.99-103

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³³ Ayittey, George B.N.: *Africa in Chaos* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), p. 40.

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⁵³ The formulation was: “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.” See *State of the Union Address*, 29 January 2002, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.

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⁵⁵ On the Africa policy see White House: *African Policy*, at www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/africa/, which also features transcripts of presidential speeches made during the trip. According to some analysts, the real purpose of the trip was to negotiate base and access rights with selected African countries. See Kevin J. Kelley: “Africa Trip: Bush Was Shopping for Military Bases”, *The East African*, 17 July 2003, at <http://allafrica.com/stories/200307160078.html>.

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