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In Praise of the Developmental State

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In Praise of the Developmental State

Amiya Kumar Bagchi*

1. The concept of the developmental state and its transformations through history

Like most human institutions - the family, the village, the city, the state, customs, laws, the nation - the developmental state had been born long before anybody thought of naming it. As in the case of many other institutions, there are debates about when it was born, and about whether all developmental states as they are usually characterized are properly so called, and whether there have been developmental states that have not been recognized in the literature. I will claim in this paper that indeed there were developmental states long before the dates of birth economists, political scientists or historians have assigned to them and that not all developmental states as conventionally labelled have been true members of the select club of developmental states.

First, let us see what a developmental state means in the era of the global spread of capitalism. It is a state that puts economic development as the top priority of governmental policy and is able to design effective instruments to promote such a goal. The instruments would include the forging of new formal institutions, the weaving of formal and informal networks of collaboration among the citizens and officials, and utilising new opportunities for trade and profitable production. Whether the state governs the market or exploits opportunities thrown up by the market depends on particular new historical conjunctures. One feature of a successful developmental state is its ability to switch gears from market-directed to state-directed growth or vice versa, depending on geopolitical circumstances, and combine both market - and state-direction in a synergistic manner, when opportunity beckons.

This preliminary definition of a developmental state will at once indicate that the degree and the nature of involvement of such a state in economic activity are likely to vary over time, and neither undiluted **etatisme** nor a dogmatic commitment to the free market is likely to characterize a successful developmental state. We will also see that the instruments for pursuing these goals are likely to change from state to state and epoch to epoch.

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2. The Netherlands as a developmental state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

The first developmental state in our sense to emerge since the sixteenth century was that of the northern part of the Spanish Netherlands, which after the reconquest of the southern part by Spain, evolved into today's Netherlands. The beginning of an independent state of Netherlands is generally dated to 1568, when the Protestant dukes of Egmont and Hoorn were executed at Brussels by the Spanish authorities. Then in 1572, the Calvinist 'Sea Beggars' captured Den Briel, a port at the mouth of the Rhine. In 1579, the seven northern provinces formed themselves into the United Provinces, with a States-General elected by them as the legislative (and executive) body for the federation. In 1581, William I of Orange, speaking on behalf of the seven provinces, renounced allegiance to Spain, and their career began as federated States (Boxer, 1973, pp. 332-3).

Over the period of the next fifty years, the Netherlands, a country of about 1.5 million people in 1600 (Klep, 1988, Table 13.4), became the top seafaring nation in Europe and the world, with an empire that dotted the globe from Indonesia (and briefly, Formosa, today's Taiwan, as well) to the Caribbean. There were many elements that led to this achievement, geography, social structure, nationalism, a fierce spirit of independence, undaunted realism and an ability to adapt their strategy to the military and political needs of the day -- all played their part.

The Geography was at least partly responsible for a situation in which feudalism had been virtually unknown in Holland and other maritime provinces of the Netherlands since the thirteenth century. Dikes had to be built in order to protect the land, water had to be drained in order to reclaim it, and an elaborate system of maintenance had to be devised in order to ensure that centuries of effort were not swept away in devastating floods, destroying villages and towns, and killing hundreds and thousands of people and livestock. This 'flood society' dispensed with both the functional need and the historical justification that buttressed social dependence in the rest of the European countryside. If deference to social superiors was based on reciprocity for physical safety, it was the dike reeve and the locally elected *heemraadschappen*, the water guardians, rather than any vassal lord, who were in the best position to require it. The autonomy of local communities in respect of taxing themselves to meet hydraulic needs was the territorial basis for their assumptions about 'the "ascending" nature of political authority, conferred (or at least assented to) from below, rather than devolved from above' (Schama, 1987, p. 40). Intensive involvement in trade and commerce facilitated by their numerous rivers, inlets and ports, and the innovations called forth in the struggle to subdue an inclement nature made the agriculture and

animal husbandry of the Low Countries the most productive in the whole of western Europe and provided the basis for a highly urbanized society in which more people engaged in trade, industry and other non-agricultural activities than in agriculture by the middle of the seventeenth century (De Vries, 1976, pp. 69-75).

Among the causes of the revolt of the Netherlands were not only the attempt of Philip II to impose Roman Catholicism on a country in which a large proportion had renounced it but also his attempt to impose centrally appointed (and inexperienced) dike inspectors and centralize the powers to tax the villages and towns for the purpose of maintaining the dikes and waterworks. The successful revolt of the Dutch and the ability of the burgher oligarchs of the towns to maintain themselves in power in open conflict with their erstwhile Spanish overlords, and sometimes in opposition to rural landowners exercising political power in the inland provinces, were factors that strengthened a state run by merchant princes and manufacturers. Burgher rule was a very potent weapon for the victory of the Dutch over many of their enemy realms which were still ruled by feudal lords (Boxer, 1973, chapter 1; Schama 1987, chapters 1-4).

A second factor which made the Netherlands into a formidable developmental state was the intense patriotism of the Dutch, which was strengthened rather than weakened in their epic conflict with the most powerful state in Europe, viz., the Spanish empire straddling Spain, parts of Italy, the southern Netherlands and a considerable part of Germany. The Dutch rejected most of their recent history, except that part which invoked the heroism and martyrdom of their revolutionary leaders; and they reached back into the days of the Roman empire and the history of the Jews in order to create a patriotic lore for themselves. They thought of themselves as the inheritors of the Batavian republic which reputedly resisted Roman rule and also as the Chosen People who would be tested by God in trials by water and fire (Boxer, 1973, chapter 1; Mulier, 1987, chapter 1 and Schama, 1987, chapters 1 and 2).

Their nationalism was, however, intensely practical. While they were ever ready to combat Spanish aggression and smite the Popish infidels wherever they could, they would make peace whenever the oligarchs considered it profitable to consolidate their gains rather than squander their resources for glory. This patriotism also meant that they expected the rulers to engage in prodigious efforts and had no conjunction in sacrificing them when national interest seemed to demand it. Thus Johan van Oldenbarnveld, the chief minister of the Dutch Republic, personally promoted a huge land reclamation project and also played an active part in promoting the Dutch East India Company which proved such a formidable agency for wresting control of the trade of Indonesia and the spice trade from the Portuguese (Schama, 1987, pp. 38-9; Boxer, 1987, pp. 25-

6). Oldenbarnweld guided the destinies of the republic for most of the period of the twelve years' peace with Spain (from 1609 to 1621). But he was executed in a trumped-up charge in 1619, when the war party represented by Maurice of Nassau gained the upper hand. Normally, the two most important personages among the rulers of the country would be the Stadholder, always a member of the house of Orange, and the Grand Pensionary of Holland. But between 1650 and 1672, the country was without a Stadholder (who was a half-way incumbent between the commander-in-chief of the Dutch armed forces and a constitutional monarch) and was guided by Johan De Witt, a fervent republican (Mulier, 1987). However, in 1672, the Netherlands got involved in a war with two of their most powerful enemies, the English and the French. The brothers De Witt were murdered by an Amsterdam mob, and William III assumed charge of Dutch defence.

Not only were the practical Dutch willing to sacrifice their rulers when need arose, the rulers also did not hesitate to tax themselves, and, of course, the common people for keeping up the defence forces, maintaining the elaborate infrastructure for agriculture and trade, and to some extent, succouring the poor who were no longer looked after by the church. The ironical fact is that the independent state extracted a higher rate of tax from the Dutch burghers than the Spanish rulers ever managed.

A third characteristic of the Dutch state that should be emphasized was its religious tolerance which effectively countered the zeal of the Calvinists who provided the ideological edge for the fight against heathen Popism. While Protestantism or even its narrower version, Calvinism, was made the state religion in several of the states, the regents generally managed to keep the zealots from enacting Draconian measures against the dissenters (Boxer, 1973, chapter 5; Schama, 1987, chapters 1-2). As a result, not only the persecuted Protestants from southern Netherlands and Huguenots from France found a refuge in the northern Netherlands, but to the republic also flocked Jews and heretics fleeing the Spanish Inquisition. The influx of these refugees strengthened the skill-base of the new republic and made for an accession of wealth. The southern Netherlands, and especially Antwerp, had enjoyed primacy in trade and commerce before the revolt of the Netherlands. But they lost it after their reconquest by the Spanish army and the sacking of Antwerp by the mutinous soldiers of that army in 1576 when Philip II went bankrupt yet again. The departure of the Protestant burghers contributed to this downfall. Conversely, the northern Netherlands gained from the influx of the same refugees.

A fourth characteristic of the Dutch republic was a deliberate attempt to create institutions and habitats which would facilitate clean living and growth. The cleanliness of Dutch cities and the orderliness of its institutions of credit and taxation became a byword among contemporaries.

Between 1640 and 1655, the rate of interest at which the Dutch republic was able to raise government loans came down from 6 1/6 per cent to 4 per cent. Even in 1672, when the French troops overran the Dutch territory, the republic was able to raise loans for hiring auxiliary troops (Clark, 1947, pp. 44-5). The Bank of Amsterdam, founded in 1609, became a model for all subsequent state banks of western Europe, and presided over a system of public and private credit extended at low rates of interest. These low rates in turn encouraged accumulation.

In many of their designs and projects the Dutch consciously emulated Italian city states or Spain or Portugal. But they introduced their own innovations so as to adapt the foreign designs to their needs. This applied to the variety of Dutch ships which had to be easily manoeuvrable in the treacherous shoals and islands of the North Sea, but which had also to allow them to carry guns that would be effective in naval warfare on the open seas. Even in armed warfare on land, Maurice of Nassau and his brother William Louis introduced major innovations such as constant drill in peacetime, and countermarches by formations of soldiers armed with slow-firing muskets who could fire almost continuous volleys at the enemy (McNeill, 1983, pp. 128-36; Parker, 1988, pp. 18-19). Maurice was also the first to use modern instruments such as the telescope in the business of war (for a list of Maurice's innovations, see Clark, 1947, pp. 112-3).

It is important to note that all these innovations presupposed a ruling class which was literate and often highly educated. The Dutch ruling class encouraged education and the useful arts and founded academies or training institutes for advancing them. New universities were founded at Leyden (in 1575) after the siege of the town by the Spanish army had been lifted (in 1574), at Harderwijk in 1600, Groningen in 1614, and Utrecht in 1634. These universities proved to be the freest seats of learning in Europe of the seventeenth century (Clark, 1947, pp. 291-2). Thus the Dutch also displayed a high degree of ability and willingness to learn from others.

The Dutch republic, of course, was not an idyllic commonwealth. It was a highly unequal society, with great differences in income and political power between the poor and the rich. Only the wealthy merchants and landowners could participate in the apparatus of rule at different levels, and the poor were kept tightly under control. But the poor were looked after, even though under a harsh regime. The rasphauses (where brazilwood was rasped to serve as dyes) and spinning houses of Holland became tourist attractions and later on, models of workhouses in other west European countries (Lis and Soly, 1982, pp. 118-19; Schama, 1987, chapter 1). During its career as an effective developmental agency, the Dutch state followed a policy of full employment for its original inhabitants and for the immigrants whom it recognized as legal entrants.

Later, we will briefly examine the causes of the demise of the developmental state of the Netherlands and some of its consequences. As we shall see, both the success of that state and the malignity and accession of strength to its competitors made for the death of the developmental state and the decline of the Netherlands (Wilson, 1939).

3. England (or Britain) as a developmental state 1560-1851

In many (if not most) accounts of the triumph of industrialization in England and its emergence as the first industrial nation, only the role of private enterprise and free trade are emphasized. However, in the victory of private enterprise, the construction of a state fostering its growth played a critical role, and free trade as a policy did not gain ascendancy until Britain had already emerged as the most powerful nation in the world - economically, militarily and politically. It was the maturation of the developmental state that made a policy of free trade optimal for the British ruling classes, and without the success of the former, such an outcome might have remained highly problematic.

The recognition of England, and later on, the United Kingdom, as a developmental state, has been delayed for several reasons. First, it was very slow in its maturation process. Secondly, long before it became a fully free-trading nation, it had begun preaching the doctrine of free trade to others, and even enforcing it with gunboats and soldiers, as in the case of the first Opium War, or its intervention in the wars of independence launched by the Latin American *Criollos* against Spain and Portugal. Thirdly, while by the beginning of the eighteenth century, Britain had emerged as a state with all powers of national policy-making centralized in the Parliament, it operated a highly decentralized state apparatus run by the property-owners in the counties, provincial cities and towns. But the current of discourse has turned now (see for example, Corrigan and Sayer, 1985; Brewer, 1989).

The beginnings of the developmental state in Britain go back to the sixteenth century, if not earlier. The peasant revolts from the fourteenth century had managed to eradicate most of the real content of serfdom and feudal subjugation of the peasantry by the time the Tudor kings came to rule England. The reformation in England occurred very much as a state-led enterprise. This had the momentous result of destroying the established (Roman Catholic) church as owner of property and a power independent of the throne, and also of creating a new section of landowners who became enriched through the expropriation of the church. The final remnants of feudalism in England were abolished in the conflict, and the civil war, between the king and the parliament, and under the short-lived but mighty republic created by the parliamentary party under the leadership of Oliver Cromwell (Hill, 1961, chapters 3 and 9; Corrigan and Sayer, 1985, chapters

3 and 4). England was the first large country in Western Europe (barring the Netherlands, that is) to abolish all the usual appurtenances of feudalism and convert land into a commodity, transferable, salable and heritable, except for restrictions which sought to preserve large properties in their integrity. In the rest of Western Europe, it took another century and a half (from 1780s to the end of Napoleon's wars) for feudalism to release land and peasants from its bondage. In much of central and eastern Europe, feudal tenures were not abolished until after the revolutions of 1848, and in Russia, Hungary and Rumania, it was only in the 1860s that feudal tenures and serfdom were formally abolished (Blum, 1978, chapters 16-19).

The abolition of feudal tenures and the formal freeing of labour from non-market bondage, the easing of medieval restrictions on trade, and the acquisition of political power by a group who owed their position to ownership of property rather than rank and birth per se gave England an enormous advantage over all its proto-capitalist competitors in Europe and allowed her to beat first the Netherlands and then France in the race for political, economic and military dominance in Europe, and extend that dominance to the whole world by the middle of the nineteenth century. While the acquisition of colonies and the engrossing of the major part of the Atlantic slave trade by Britain on its way to such dominance helped her to accumulate capital and ease its climb to the position of supremacy, Britain's ability to conquer other lands militarily and economically must be seen as a result primarily of the domestic transformation that made it the formidable developmental state that it became.

A second aspect of the developmental state that was also characteristic of the British state and society it presided over was its ability to learn, and its ability to make its own adaptations and innovations on the foundation of foreign learning and its own innovations. The British, of course, learned from the other European countries, of whom perhaps the foremost were the Italian city states. Theories of states which were guided by precepts other than those of religion of feudal notions of honour and vassalage were imbibed from Maclucevelli and other Italian writers. Then in the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and a host of other theorists formulated the principles of sovereignty and citizenship in constitutional monarchies and republics alike. In the areas of technology the British were learning from the Italians, the Huguenot refugees from France and the Dutch (especially in the areas of agriculture, irrigation, drainage and reclamation). In the reign of Elizabeth I, the British imitated the practice of the Venetians of granting patents for introduction and use of foreign innovations on English soil and encouraging domestic innovations. These patents were granted to foreign immigrants endowed with the scarce knowledge and skill and increasingly to Englishmen (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985, p. 66 and MacLeod, 1988, chapter 1). But in order to prevent abuse of latter patents by arbitrary rulers, the

parliament introduced the Statute of monopolies in order to restrict the issue of patents to genuine innovations and select projects judged to be of overriding public interest. By the eighteenth century Britain emerged as the pacesetter of technological innovations the world over.

The role of the state has been underestimated in the economic development of Britain, because through measures of decentralization, through the taxing of property of the landowners and through the operation of the navy rather than a large national standing army as the bulwark of British defence and its major offensive force, the state was rendered 'invisible' to many observers, and partly even to the common people in normal times (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985, chapter 5). But we would like to stress the strength of the British state and its influence on both the supply and the demand sides of burgeoning private enterprise. On the supply side, the growth of private enterprise was smoothed by the removal of most restrictions on the mobility and transferability of assets, the regulation of the labour market and the disciplining of labour through a series of legislative Acts going back to the Statute of Artificers of 1563, various Acts regulating the relations of masters and 'servants', the outlawing of 'workers' combinations, draconian laws such as the Black Act of 1723 protecting property (including Acts that made petty stealing a capital offence) and public and private Acts enforcing the enclosure of millions of acres of land (Thompson, 1977; Corrigan and Sayer, 1985, pp. 95-99). On the demand side the national market was protected for the production of corn, sugar, textiles, naval stores, and timber by imposing tariffs, banning the import of various kinds of goods from foreign countries including France, Spain, India, from colonies (such as Ireland), by passing Navigation Acts in 1651 and 1662, which made it illegal to import goods from abroad in foreign or third country bottoms and by sumptuary regulations restricting or banning the consumption of certain kinds of foreign goods within British territory.

On the demand side, again, the navy played a very important role by providing custom for a host of industries catering to shipbuilding and naval armament. The British state generally spent much more on the navy than on the army (Clark, 1947, p. 110; Brewer, 1989, chapters 2-4). As the strength of the British economy and its armed forces grew, so did military spending. Between 1710 and 1780, the estimated national income of Britain rose from £ 59.8 million to £ 97.7 million and military spending increased from £ 5.4 million to £ 12.2 million (Brewer, 1989, p. 41). Both were to grow, and military spending at a much faster rate, during the 1790s and up to 1815, as a result of the wars with the French. Moreover, owing to the necessity of managing naval ships and large merchant boats, the skills of organizing and disciplining the workforce of large factories became diffused among property owners in Britain. A typical man-of-war in the

eighteenth century cost several times a cotton spinning mill, the largest modern factory known up till then.

This scale of public expenditure required a reliable system of public credit and taxation. Here also the British learned from advanced foreign competitors and added innovations of their own. The British consciously followed the example the Bank of Amsterdam in establishing their own Bank of England in 1694. The latter was a private bank but most of its capital was laid out for loans to the government which in turn allowed the bank to issue its own notes which could be used to settle public dues. The Bank of England, the East India Company and the South Sea Company provided the bastion of public credit which allowed the British state to raise loans at a low rate during wars as well as in peacetime (Dickson, 1967; Brewer, 1989).

But wars also required higher taxes. Here the British ruling classes showed both their wisdom in emergencies and their sense of responsibility as rulers by taxing themselves. They, of course, raised a number of indirect taxes which impinged on the poor. But with the onset of the wars under Dutch William in the 1690s, a land tax was introduced on landowners without any exemption. The landowners generally managed to pass the tax on to their tenants and to consumers through higher prices (since the production of corn was protected by tariffs, or sometimes, outright prohibition of imports) (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985, chapter 5). But the upper classes did pay the tax and did not generally try to evade it. 'In the 1760s Britain succeeded in appropriating about 20 per cent of the nation's output in taxation, almost twice the corresponding French figure' (Thane, 1990, p. 3). This was very important at the time, because France had emerged as England's chief competitor for supremacy. Not only did the French state fail to get as large a percentage as the British state in taxes, its taxes were also resented more by the general populace. Indeed, the taxation system was a major contributor to the popular upsurge that led to the French revolution. Again, in 1799, the British parliament imposed an income tax which was levied on all incomes above a certain level; it promptly abolished it in 1816, when it was no longer considered necessary since the French had been thoroughly beaten.

The taxability and disciplining of the upper classes along with the lower is thus a characteristic of the developmental state (the economic decline of the Netherlands in its '*periwig*' phase occurred partly because its upper classes chose a life of ease rather than one of stern self-discipline).

Finally, we turn to another aspect of Britain as a developmental state which is often relegated to a chapter on social history, or with Polanyi, is considered a positive hindrance to Britain's career

as the first fully evolved market economy. This is the extensive and decentralized system of poor relief evolved since the time of Elizabeth I. 'The Elizabethan poor laws, an amalgam of earlier laws and practices, were codified in 1597-98 and reenacted in 1601. The latter ... established the principles of the "old poor law" as it later became known: the parish as the basic unit of administration, a compulsory poor rate levied on householders by overseers appointed by the local justices (the overseers obliged to serve under penalty of a fine), and various types of relief for various kinds of needy - alms and almshouses for the aged and infirm, apprenticeships for children, and work for the able-bodied (and punishment or confinement for the "sturdy beggar")' (Himmelfarb, 1984, p. 25). The poor laws were, of course, enforced with differing degrees of slackness or harshness in the succeeding centuries. But they were taken seriously enough for them to have cost more than £ 2 million in rates in the second decade of the eighteenth century, in a total population of under 6 million (Ibid., objective p. 26). The objective of the laws (including a law which allowed the local authorities to send back paupers or persons who might claim poor relief to the parish they came from) was to discipline labour and regulate the labour market in the interest of property as well as to succour the poor.

By the end of the eighteenth century it was accepted that the local authorities had a special duty to relieve the poor in periods of acute scarcity. During the French wars of the 1790s prices of necessities rose all round and severely hit the poor. 'The justices of Berkshire [in England], meeting at the Pelikan Inn, in Speenhamland, near Newbury, on May 6, 1795, in a time of great distress, decided that subsidies in aid of wages should be granted in accordance with a scale dependent upon the price of bread' (Polanyi, 1957, p. 78). This measure still did not prevent real wages, especially of agricultural labourers, from declining substantially in the decades up to the 1820s and 1830s in many countries of England. But they helped contain social and political discontent and put a ratchet below the domestic demand for the basic consumer goods.

4. The developmental state in Germany 1850-1914

The spectacular rise of a unified Germany between 1871 and 1914 to the position of the premier industrial nation in Europe, ranking only second to the USA, has obscured the fact that the career of Germany as a developmental state had begun considerably earlier. I have traced the real beginnings to 1850 not only because, according to Tilly's new estimates the real acceleration of the rate of growth of net domestic product is dated to the decade of the 1850s and 1860s but also because it was only after the abortive revolution of 1848 that the last remnants of feudalism were abolished all over the German territory (Tilly, 1991, pp. 176-77).

Many of the usual explanations of the pattern of German development take either Hoffman's theory of stages industrial development or Gerschenkron's hypothesis of the advantages of moderate backwardness as their starting point. In the former theory, based primarily on Britain's experience, the share of capital goods in factory production is supposed to go up only at a later stage of development while consumer goods produced in factories acts as the lead sector in the beginning. Germany did not fit this pattern since by the time factory production made its presence felt on any scale, production of iron, steel and mineral products took the lead. Gerschenkron's hypothesis adds on to this early growth of capital and basic goods sectors certain institutional features, such as a more pervasive intervention of the state in guiding the economy, and a more pronounced role of banks in financing industry as characteristics of the development of a backward economy (Hoffman, 1955; Gerschenkron 1952/1965).

The beginning of Germany's 'relative backwardness' within western Europe can be traced back to the Thirty Years' War in the first half of the seventeenth century which led to a precipitous population decline, a devastation of the infrastructure, and the consolidation of feudal-military authoritarianism in a Germany which was fragmented into a few large states (such as Prussia or Bavaria) and hundreds of tiny principalities. In the eastern parts of Germany the commercialization of the grain trade had induced a further consolidation of feudal power and the reduction of the dependent peasants to virtual slavery (Borchardt, 1973, pp. 85-98). The abolition of feudalism in most German states was the direct outcome of the challenge posed by a revolutionary France which was easily able to defeat the military forces of the most powerful German princes, until the final overthrow of Napoleon in 1815. The abolition of feudalism (which took place between the 1810s and 1850s) led also to the creation of a rural proletariat because emancipation came with a stiff price for the peasants. The latter had to buy the land they cultivated at a price capitalized at twenty years' rent, and hundreds of thousands of peasants became landless when they were unable to raise the required sum (Blum, 1978, Borchardt, 1973).

The process of abolition of direct rule by feudal princes and the emergence of Prussia as by far the most powerful state in Germany facilitated German unification. German nationalism had remained dormant, and mostly confined to the sphere of literature and culture, in the centuries of feudal consolidation following the defeat of the peasant wars of the sixteenth century. It gained a new impetus from the example of the power of French nationalism that was unleashed after 1789 (Greenfeld, 1992, chapter 4). The major central and south German states (except Austria which was part of the Austro-Hungarian empire) joined a customs union with Prussia in 1834, and the other German states joined the union between 1834 and 1867 (Borchardt, 1973, p. 105).

The economic unification of the German states, the abolition of internal tariffs and customs, and of serfdom, and massive investments in railway networks by Prussia and other German states from the 1830s led to a vigorous expansion of the domestic market. The bourgeoisie did not manage to gain control of the state apparatus, which was captured by the powerful bureaucrats and nobility with roots in the ancien regime. But the state effectively pursued goals of capitalist development, partly as a means of enhancing its military power and partly, of course, with the objective of enhancing the levels of living of all Germans. The state remained highly authoritarian in character, and authoritarianism acquired a nationalist rationale under Bismarck with his successful pursuit of a policy of Prussian imperialism. From the 1880s, the social democrats challenged the authoritarian and inegalitarian policies of the Prussian state. But this did not alter the character of the state until the German empire collapsed in defeat in the first World War. For our purpose, it is not necessary to enter into debates about whether the German state was ruled by bureaucrats and aristocrats who embraced bourgeois values or whether Germans were effectively 'feudalized' in their values and behaviour (for a survey of the debate see Blackbourn and Eley, 1984). There is little doubt, however, that, especially after the consolidation of rule by conservative forces under Bismarck's patronage, and the pact between the landlords and industrialists on tariff protection, the power of the Junkers in Prussia gained a new lease of life, and agrarian capitalism remained constrained to that extent (on Junker power and agrarian capitalism, see Byres, 1991, pp. 23-7).

We have stressed that one of the characteristics of a developmental state is that it actively encourages learning from foreigners, adaptation of technologies and organizations to local conditions and introduction of productive innovations. In that sense, even small German principalities and states had been gearing up to enable the full development of a developmental state long before Germany was unified. Most German states had founded universities by the eighteenth century where theology, philosophy, law, mathematics and even science was taught. Most of the states encouraged the formal training of craftsmen and technologists in state-supported or guild-supported technical schools (Blackbourn, 1984, pp. 176-7). From the eighteenth century many states also encouraged the setting up factories on the British model. While only a few of these enterprises proved financially viable, they acted as training grounds for businessmen, technocrats and technologists and laboratories for trying out the techniques and products that might ultimately win the race (Landes, 1965, pp. 364-6). Some constituent states were among the pioneers of compulsory education in Europe. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Germany, with a much larger population than Britain had a considerably higher rate of literacy. Within Prussia, already by 1850, the percentage of bridegrooms who signed with marks (and were, therefore, functionally illiterate) had declined to 10 per cent, whereas in England and

Wales, even in 1853-5, the corresponding percentage was 30 and in that country it was not until 1886, the same degree of decline in illiteracy as in the Prussia of 1850 was attained (Mitchell, 1973, pp. 801-2). In the discussion of the retardation of the British economy since the last third of the nineteenth century, this aspect of the British underperformance compared with the German is often overlooked.

We finally turn to the other aspects of the developmental state in Germany, especially after the effective unification of the country since 1866, that have received considerable attention in the literature around the Gershenkron hypothesis - the character of state patronage, and especially its paternalism and protectionism, the sectoral composition of German industrial growth, and the role of the banking system.

In Germany, both the state and the big employers tried to act paternalistically towards the workers (Lee, 1978; Craig, 1981, pp. 150-2). The big employers such as Krupp and Zeiss of Jena provided housing and other facilities to workers, partly to attach the workers to the company, partly to protect industrial secrets through close surveillance, and partly in order to fend off the threat of militant trade unions, which became a serious force after the growth of the social democratic party under the leadership of Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel. In the 1880s, Germany took the leadership in Europe in passing successively a sickness insurance law for workers (in 1883), an accident insurance law (in 1884) and an old age and disability insurance law (in 1889). These laws were accompanied by the savage antisocialist laws and politics followed by Bismarck since 1879. Creating loyalty among workers, fighting trade unions with ideologies which fought the established order and fending off the challenge from socialists - all acted as powerful motives for Bismarck and the conservative-authoritarian elements guiding the destinies of Germany in the years before the first World War. There were some differences between the large firms of cartels operating in iron and steel, electrical and chemicals, and other industries in which the predominant elements were small firms or even craftsmen among whom trade union organization faced lesser obstacles. During this period German scientists and technologists made major innovations (such as the Heber process for producing ammonia) which proved highly profitable. They also proved adept at taking over and further advancing inventions from other countries (such as innovations in the electrical industry by Siemens and AEG, and the Gilchrist-Thomas process for reduction of phosphatic iron ore). However, side by side with such innovation originating in or affecting large-scale firms, Germany continued the old system of apprenticeship and certification by craft associations and guilds, and built up perhaps the best-educated and best-trained working force in Europe. This system was a major departure from that prevailing in Britain, illustrating the point that every successful developmental state introduces its own

innovations in the economic and social organization of the country and cannot afford to simply live on imitations.

In the banking sector, Germany created the system of universal banking, and the associated system in which banks had a strong presence on the boards of companies funded by them, and often exercised a supervisory function, especially in periods of crisis. This system developed since the days of the railway boom of the 1830s and 1840s but matured especially after the economic crisis that followed the boom and inflation produced by the German victory in the Franco-Prussian war (Tilly, 1986, 1991; Sylla, 1991). The interventionist policy of banks partly compensated, and partly substituted for, the lack of a developed stock market in Germany until the industrialization process had gone quite far.

Finally, the German developmental state was highly protectionist and interventionist especially from the late 1870s (Craig, 1981, pp. 78-100; Tilly 1991). The German states had been strongly influenced by liberal doctrines of free trade and were only moderately protectionist until the late 1870s. But the agricultural depression beginning in 1873 hit the east German grain producers hard and some producers of iron steel also found it difficult to cope with foreign competition. So Bismarck presided over a marriage of 'iron and rye' by steeply increasing duties on imported iron and steel and grain. The grain tariff was increased again in 1888 and 1902 as the German producers were threatened by increases in imports. The economic growth of Germany was spurred not only by this protection but also by the strong growth of capital goods industries which was sustained by high rates of private capital accumulation, public expenditure on social overhead capital and military expenditures by the government (Tilly, 1978). German rates of capital formation as a proportion of net national product were about one-eighth in 1870, but had gone up to about one-sixth in 1899, and the corresponding figures for the U.K. were a little above one-sixteenth in 1870 and one-eleventh in 1899 (Mitchell, 1978, Table J1).

The German developmental state was hampered by its burden of military expenditure and the associated authoritarianism that kept down the growth of real wages below the strong rates of growth of productivity. The full flowering of this developmental state, as in the case of Japan, was to be witnessed only after the military authoritarian apparatus had been largely dismantled as a result of defeat in the second World War.

5. The developmental state in Japan

As in the case of other developmental states, the Japanese developmental state also evolved over time until it assumed its mature form from the late 1950s. The usual date for the beginning of modern Japanese development is generally assigned to the period of the Meiji Restoration, and by and large this chronology is right. But we should note that some preconditions for the development of a developmental state had been laid down before 1868. These included freedom from foreign rule; in spite of the unequal treaties imposed on Japan after Commodore Perry's successful bombardment of Japanese ports, the Japanese attained a high degree of national autonomy in policy making. Other factors included the intense nationalism of the Japanese ruling class, and its demonstrated ability in different periods of history to learn from foreigners such as the Chinese who had better technologies of production or war, or useful principles for organization of the state and society (Kahn, 1973, chapter 2; Morishima, 1982, 'Introduction').

After the Meiji Restoration, the earlier, feudal 'categories of court noble, warrior, peasant, merchant and outcast were down away with and restructured into two new classes - a small nobility and everyone else. By the 1876 the government also succeeded in pensioning off all former members of the warrior class [the **samurai** - A.B.]. Previously 'they had received stipends from Tokugawa or from their domains - at a cost of over 200 million yen' (Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1978, pp. 142-3). The Meiji law also freed labour in agriculture from various degrees of debt bondage ranging from servitude for life to bondage only for the duration that the loan was not repaid (Taira, 1978, p. 170). But the law did not give the land to the peasants as Rosovsky and Ohkawa (1978, p. 143) claim. It converted feudal into private tenures and most of the dependent peasantry of feudal times became tenants or part-time tenants eking out their income from their small holdings with labour on the fields of others. Around 1853, about 80 per cent of the people were farmers. By 1940 this proportion had gone down to 40 per cent, but the absolute number of families dependent on agriculture had gone up from 5,518,000 in 1886 to 5,642,000 in 1932 (Ladejinsky, 1947/1977, p. 70). Because of the highly unequal distribution of land in a land-scarce economy (with 2.7 acres of land per agricultural household in 1938), in the 1940s 28 per cent of the farmers owned land, and 40 per cent had to supplement their income from owned land by leasing in land from others (Ibid., p. 68). Because of the scarcity of land and lack of fast expanding alternative employment opportunities, the tenants and part tenants were virtually tied to the land and their landlords, and had to pay very high rents. In the 1930s a survey of 9,134 villages by the Japanese Department of Agriculture showed that 'in 70 per cent of the cases the rental from a single-crop field constituted more than 50 per cent of the crop; from a two-crop field the rent [was] around 60 per cent of the crop' (Ibid., p. 41). The net income of the peasant was

even lower than this figure indicates, because he had to bear the cost of cultivation, and pay a number of taxes besides the land tax.

Thus the developmental state in Japan was even more hampered, before the second World War, by the burden of a highly exploitative landlord class than the developmental state of Bismarck's Germany. This is one of the main reasons why, in spite of a tremendous effort to industrialize without allowing foreigners to gain control of any sector of the economy, the rate of growth of the Japanese economy did not attain the spectacular levels that have been witnessed since 1953 or so, by which date Japan had reconstructed her war-ravaged economy (Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1978, Table 28; Ohkawa et al., 1993, Table 2.4). The annual rates of growth of Japanese national income in the periods 1897-1919 and 1919-1938 were 2.8 per cent and 3.5 per cent respectively, and these were pulled up by two war-induced spurts in the periods 1912-1917 and 1931-1937 when the respective annual rates of growth of GNP were 4.56 per cent and 5.71 per cent (Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1978, Table 28). By contrast, the annual rates of growth of Japanese national income in the periods 1953-1969 and 1969-1979 were 10.0 per cent and 8.5 per cent respectively (Ohkawa et al., 1993, Table 2.4).

Barring the failure to abolish landlordism in the countryside and to take adequate measures to succour the working population, the quality of the effort made and the strategy adopted by the Japanese ruling classes after the Meiji Restoration remain very impressive by the standards of Japan's forerunners in the industrialization race, and especially by contrast with the trajectories travelled by the ruling classes of most other non-European nations. For example, many members of the samurai played an important role in abolishing their own class and the old rank-order of society: they realized that these impeded the release of the energy of the country and its defence against aggressive Western powers. For example, Itagaki Taisuke, head of a middle level samurai family argued in 1871 that 'human skills were the result of natural endowment' and did not depend on 'a division into classes, as samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants' (Beasley, 197, p. 384). He wanted the responsibility for civil and military function to be spread among the people without confining them to the samurai, so 'that each [might] develop his own skill and abilities' (Ibid.). Itagaki cited the stiff resistance of the ordinary Frenchmen against Prussian aggression at the time of the Paris Commune to argue for the creation of institutions that accorded dignity to the people: 'In order to make it possible for our country to confront the world and succeed in the task of achieving national prosperity, the whole of the people must be made to cherish sentiments of patriotism, and institutions established under which people are treated as equals. There is no other course ... After all, the people's wealth and strength are the government's wealth and strength, and the people's poverty and weakness the government's

poverty and weakness' (Memorial by Itagaki Taisuke, 1870-71, as translated and quoted by Beasley, 1973, pp. 384-5).

The leaders of the Meiji Restoration realized the supreme importance of education in their pursuit of 'civilization and enlightenment', and their campaign for strengthening the state so as to be able to resist the Western intruders. Hence in 1872 a law was proclaimed, which not only set out a scheme of education from the primary to university levels, but also made primary education compulsory. The enforcement of this law was not smooth-sailing (Taira, 1978, pp. 196-9), but eventually resistance was overcome and the money was found for funding the programme. As a result, while in 1873 only 28 per cent of the school age population was attending school, the corresponding figure had risen to 98 by the end of the century, rendering Japan one of the most literate countries in the world (Morishima, 1982, p. 102). The close integration of government planning and business strategies also date from the early days of the Meiji Restoration.

The other institutions that became characteristic of the Japanese economy - the close links between conglomerates and banks, the life-time employment system for skilled workers and managers, the promotion of managers on the basis of seniority, profit-sharing systems tying workers and employers, extensive subcontracting between a few principals and numerous small and medium-scale firms - all had their basis in a bedrock of nationalism, and the ability of the Japanese ruling classes - many of them ex-samurai but many springing from families of merchants or prosperous farmers - to work together so as to keep out foreign control. But the specific institutions grew out of particular circumstances the Japanese rulers faced in different phases of Japanese history since the Meiji Restoration (Watanabe, 1987; Wan, 1988).

In a sustained effort to speed up the development of the economy and increase its military potential, the Japanese government promoted and financed railways, telegraph lines, ports, shipyards and naval installations. But it also set up pioneer factories. Most of these government-sponsored shipyards and factories were later turned over to private enterprise. But they acted as training grounds for workers, technologists and managers, and led to adaptations of techniques and management styles to Japanese conditions and requirements. Because of the government's continued interest in the development of capital goods industries and armaments factories and its repeated involvement in war, starting with the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, the close collaboration between government and business continued and was even intensified in the most militaristic phases of Japan, viz., in the period from 1931 to 1945.

The close relation of banks and trading houses grew up quite early in the Japanese drive toward industrialization: trading houses found that it was useful to start a bank which would finance their trading, and even more, their long-station investment activities. They were devices for mobilizing capital and spreading risks (Yamamura, 1972, 1978).

Similarly, the profit-sharing system and the relatively low differential in salaries between different levels of management and between skilled workers and managers was a response to the shortage of trained personnel in the initial decades of industrialization and the disincentive effects of conspicuously large salaries in a society in which a sense of duty and responsibility to the state still exerted a powerful influence (Taira, 1978; Morishima, 1982, chapters 3-4). Again, the so-called lifetime employment system which governs perhaps a third of the male workers in large enterprises in Japan was a response to severe labour shortages, absenteeism and labour poaching during the first World War and the 1920s. Paradoxically enough, these institutions, along with a deliberate management strategy to win the loyalty of workers through the formation of company or plant-level trade unions, were strengthened in response to some initiatives taken by the post-Second World War American occupation authorities (SCAP) to provide security to workers (Taira, 1978; Bagchi, 1987b).

Throughout these years, even when unequal treaties were still in force, Japan kept foreign capital and foreign enterprise at bay. While showing a fierce determination to learn 'the skills of the barbarians', the Japanese government got rid of foreign experts as soon as the skills had been absorbed and never allowed foreign enterprises to obtain a foothold in any significant Japanese enterprise. Japan's drive for increasing exports almost at any cost was also motivated by its desire to avoid any dependence on foreign capital and hence any risk of foreign political control. It is a measure of the strength of Japan's nationalism that such policies could be continued even when Japan was occupied by the Allied (American) forces.

It should be noted that despite all these remarkable features of the Japanese society and economy, the Japanese miracle did not happen until after the Second World War. One of the key contributory factors to that miracle was the thoroughgoing land reform that was carried out under American supervision. There had been a number of attempts in Japan from 1922 to improve the condition of tenants and redistribute land to them. But the lack of any provision for confiscation or compulsory sale of land by landlords with ownership holdings above a certain size rendered such efforts ineffectual (Ladejinsky 1947/1977, p. 87). In December 1945, a defeated Japanese government placed before the Diet a land reform law which would have allowed landlords to retain up to 5 hectares of owned land, and would have freed forty per cent of the tenanted land

as the property of former tenants (Dore, 1959; Todashi, 1967/1976). But the occupation authorities proposed a much more drastic land reform which was enacted the following year as 'the second land reform law'. This law specified that '(1) all the land of absentee owners [was] to be purchased by the government; (2) all tenanted land owned by resident landowners in excess of one cho (2.5 acres), or 4 cho in Hokkaido, [was] to be purchased by the government'; and '(3) the purchase price would be in bonds bearing interest rates of 3.6 per cent and redeemable in 30 years' plus some bonus in cash (Tsuru, 1993, p. 21). This was virtually a confiscatory land reform. This measure ended the power of the landlords in the countryside and released the agricultural surplus labour for non-agricultural employment when economic growth started at unprecedented rates in the 1950s.

The SCAP imposed on Japan a number of other reforms such as those in the areas of civil service, labour and industrial relations (which we have already referred to), constitutional provisions and institutions for establishing formal, western-style democracy (Tsuru, 1993, pp. 18-36). The Occupation authorities at first also wanted to break up the *Zaibatsu*, the Japanese conglomerates, since they saw them as major pillars of militarism. However, in every case, the Japanese ruling class adapted the reforms to suit their own conditions. This was made easier after the U.S. involvement in the Korean War, when the American government came to regard Japan as the main bastion of their defensive wall against communism in Asia, and wanted to revive Japan's economy rather than to keep it weakened.

I will end this section by citing only one example of the Japanese ability to turn defeat into an opportunity in the postwar period. This is the case of the attempted abolition of the *zaibatsu* and the concentration of economic power embodied in them by the occupation authorities. When the directors and controllers of the *ex-Zaibatsu* groups were removed, the middle-level managers of the companies

found themselves unexpectedly promoted to the top without any preparation ... these new young executives began securing their positions by making their friends' companies become big shareholders in their own companies so that these persons could support them.

However, these new shareholders were poor because they too had first been promoted from positions of middle management... They exploited the power accompanying [their new] positions to establish a system for the mutual support of these proletarian managers....

This is how it was done. Suppose bank A and companies C and D belonged to a *zaibatsu* combination A. After A was disbanded, its members still kept in contact with each other. C asked B as a favour for the loan of a certain amount of money in order to buy shares newly issued by D. Company C then became a shareholder in D with the money obtained, and D deposited this amount in B. Similarly, company D borrowed a similar amount of money from B and bought newly issued shares in C; like D, C deposited the money it had obtained in bank B. Then B's lending increased, and its deposits also increased by the same amount, so that its position did not change in net terms. On the other hand, C became a shareholder of D, and vice versa. Thus neither B, C, nor D were made any worse off as a result of these arrangements.... The shares held by company C were represented by its chairman c, while chairman d of company D would represent the shares D held. Where C and D obtained a sufficient number of shares in D and C respectively, c's and d's position as chairman or president could also be secured (Morishima, 1995, pp. 151-2).

Thus the interlocking of directorships of different firms, and of trading and industrial firms and banks, and the close involvement of banks and firms in monitoring one another was re-established in postwar Japan and was styled the relationship between *keiretsu* firms. This system largely insulated firms from hostile takeover bids, from 'short-termism' and from liquidity crises and financial collapses stemming from short-term difficulties. These relations together with profit-sharing arrangements between firms and their employees, and the reluctance of firms to get rid of employees who had served them for a long time also ensured a degree of management-employee collaboration which was the envy of most advanced capitalist countries (Aoki, 1987, Koike, 1987; Ito, 1993, chapter 7). The relatively egalitarian distribution of earnings between managers and workers, and the drive to increase market shares of firms contributed to the growth of the domestic market, and made Japanese firms formidable competitors in export markets. The opening of western European and US markets, of course, also contributed to Japanese growth. The abolition of the burden of military expenditures freed Japanese resources and innovations for concentration on the development of products for civilian use.

The full-grown Japanese developmental state was very much a post-war phenomenon as was the Japanese miracle. This state began facing a crisis only at the end of the 1980s, but while it lasted it lifted Japan out of only a condition of moderate industrialization with mediocre living standards to the position of the second industrial power globally and allowed the Japanese a standard of

living or surpassing those of the western European countries, U.S.A, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

6. South Korea: the final frontier of the developmental state?

We now turn to South Korea, which has been celebrated in the recent literature as one of the four East Asian dragons or tigers. South Korea is distinguished from our earlier examples of developmental states by two major characteristics, viz., it is a former colony of an imperial power, and secondly its spectacular growth is almost entirely a post-second World War phenomenon. It can be argued that the Netherlands had also been a colony of Spain. But in fact, the Netherlands was only a part of the so called Holy Roman Empire, with a system of governance of its own, and it was the attempt of Philip II to rule it as a part of a centralized state that led to the revolt of the Netherlands, and the emergence of a separate Dutch state.

As a corrective to the extreme view that in the case of South Korea we need look no further back than 1962, the year the military government of Park Chung Hee took over, it has been sometimes argued, especially by some Japanese and American scholars that Japanese colonialism had laid the foundations of postwar growth in Korea, and that Korean growth can be understood as more or less a continuous process since the days of Japanese colonialism (cf. Fei, Ohkawa, and Ranis, 1985, and Kikuchi and Hayami, 1985). But in fact, under Japanese colonialism, the growth of Korea (and Taiwan) was, though respectable by standards of most nonwhite colonies of the European powers, not at all spectacular and may have actually impoverished the mass of Koreans (Ladejinsky, 1940/1977; Woo, 1991, chapter 2).

It has been alleged by Alice Amsden (1987;1989, chapter 1) in her otherwise excellent book that South Korea shares with other 'late industrializers' the peculiarity that its industrialization was based on learning from other countries rather than on any innovations in processes or products. But as we have seen, one distinguishing mark of successful developmental states is their ability to learn from others. There were not many product or process innovations which were associated with the emergence of the Dutch as the supreme naval power in Europe in the seventeenth century except perhaps in shipbuilding. In the case of Japan, the most important 'late industrializing country' by Amsden's criterion, innovations in automatic looms in cotton weaving preceded the second World War, and Japan has emerged as a major innovator in a whole range of consumer durables and processes of production involving microelectronic technologies since the 1960s. Moreover, innovations in organizational techniques have been almost wholly neglected by Amsden.

Korea was formally occupied by Japan in 1910, although the country had already come under effective Japanese domination by the first decade of the twentieth century. It was then developed as a base for the supply of rice to Japan. The Japanese government created nationwide gendarmerie and army to prevent peasant mobilization, instituted a cadastral survey and compulsory land registration, and in the process, vast numbers of Koreans who could not prove their title lost their land to the Japanese occupying government, and Japanese companies and individuals. The Japanese established the Oriental Development Company for exploiting Korean resources, but also passed a 'Corporation Law that empowered the colonial government to control, and to dissolve if necessary, both new and established businesses in Korea' (Woo, 1991, p. 22). 'Through 1919 ... those industries that thrived in colonial Korea were mostly household industries that did not require company registration, and large-scale factories, employing more than fifty workers numbered only 89 (and were mostly Japanese owned), even as late as 1922' (Ibid., p. 23). In 1929, 'the bulk of manufacturing output still remained in foodstuffs at 63.5 per cent, followed by textiles at 10.9 per cent.' (Ibid., p. 24).

When Japan tried to conquer Manchuria and the rest of China, the Japanese government, and Japanese financial and industrial firms sought to convert Korea into a supply base for the Japanese war effort. The Bank of Chosen, supposedly the central bank of Korea, the Oriental Development Company, the Dai-Ichi Bank, and the Industrial Bank of Japan extended long-term loans to development corporations, and the *Zaibatsu* to establish hydraelectric power stations, steel mills, heavy machinery works and chemical factories in Korea. This policy also led to an extreme concentration of heavy industries in the hands of a few *Zaibatsu*. By 1945, one single *Zaibatsu* under the control of Noguchi Jun controlled about 35 per cent of Japanese direct investment in Korea (Ibid., p.35). 'By 1945, Japanese ownership, most of which was in the hands of the *Zaibatsu*, constituted 81.7 per cent of the paid-up capital of all industrial enterprises in Korea; 97 per cent in chemical industry, 93 per cent in metal and machinery, 97 per cent in cement. Even in light manufacturing such as textiles and flour mills, the ratios were 80 per cent and 81 per cent, respectively' (Ibid., p. 40).

Under Japanese programmes of development and exploitation, the output of farm products, especially of rice, increased fast in colonial Korea, but so did landlessness and tenancy. According to one estimate, in Korea, whereas in 1914, out of a total number of farming households of 2.59 million, 0.57 million were owner-cultivators, 1.07 million were part-owners and part-tenants, and 0.91 million were full tenants, by 1938, the number of owner-cultivator households and part-tenant and part-owner households had declined to 0.54 million and 0.81 million respectively, whereas the number of part-tenant households had risen to 1.51 million

(Ladejinsky, 1940/1977, p.50). It was estimated that by the end of 1930, the Japanese owned 1.5 million acres or about 11 per cent of the taxable land area in the colony (Ibid., p. 51). By the time of the US occupation of Korea after the defeat of Japan, land held by Japanese companies, and individuals amounted to 13-15 per cent of arable area (Choudhury and Islam, 1993, p. 62).

The confiscation of Japanese property thus at once transferred a large stock of industrial assets to the successor government, and a substantial percentage of the land which could be distributed to the Koreans. The American authorities and the Korean government proceeded with land reform measures out of fear that peasant unrest would prepare the road for the victory of communism as in China. Moreover, there were strong nationalist and left-wing movements demanding the abolition of landlordism of the Japanese and the Koreans, since the Korean landlords were seen as collaborators of the colonial power. The North Koreans in their initial drive through South Korea during the period of the Korean War had abolished landlordism even during their brief sway in South Korea (Cumings, 1987 p. 66). The Korean land reform law was similar to the Japanese, in that the government was empowered to purchase the lands of all absentee landlords, lands entirely given out in lease, and lands above 3 acres per household even when they were cultivated by the owners. This land was sold to tenants or owners with a holding size of less than 3 hectares on relatively easy terms (Lee, 1979; Choudhury and Islam, 1993, pp. 62-2). As a result of the land reform process, between 1947 and 1965 the percentage of full owners among farm households increased from 16.5 to 69.5, whereas that of pure tenants declined from 42.1 to 7.0 only. Correspondingly, the number of landholdings above 3 hectares per household declined from 31,000 in 1947 to 3,000 in 1965, and the number of households owning from less than 0.5 hectare to 1 hectare of land increased from 1,619,000 to 1,780,000, while the number of households owning between 1 hectare and 3 hectares showed a marginal decline (Lee, 1979, p. 26). These data also indicate the very low land/person ratio in Korea.

As a result of the pro-peasant land reform measures, rural incomes and assets became relatively equalized, and they increased substantially after 1963, especially in the 1970s (Ibid.) Land was eliminated as an asset for speculation or as a lever for keeping actual producers dependent. Thus as in the other cases of developmental states, landlordism was eliminated in South Korea, and one of the major characteristics of a developmental state was put in place.

South Korea also fulfilled another characteristic of a developmental state, namely, a strong and realistic sense of nationalism. This sense worked in unsuspected ways. Syngman Rhee, the dictatorial ruler of South Korea from the late 1940s to 1960, when he fell as a result of student revolt which the military refused to suppress, was utterly dependent on U. S. military and

economic aid. But he worked on American fears of the resurgence of communism if Rhee fell, and on his threat to invade North Korea and thus involve the U.S.A. again in a major war, to extract more aid and thwart various American designs (Haggard, 1990, pp. 54-61; Woo, 1991, chapter 3). He frustrated American attempts to privatise state-owned assets and to liberalise the foreign trade regime so as to make Korea revert to its prewar place of mainly supplying agricultural products in an East Asian international division of labour (mirroring the Japanese-engineered Co-prosperity Sphere) with Japan at the centre of it. During the 1950s Rhee's regime presided over an import substitution process and the rate of economic growth was quite respectable - 4.5 per cent of GDP growth per year - during that phase.

Another contribution of the Rhee era was the education of the Koreans. From relatively low levels of literacy at the time of the end of Japanese colonial rule, the adult literacy rates were raised to 71 per cent already by 1960, and by 1980, it had gone up to 92 per cent (Chaudhury and Islam, 1993, p. 152.)

Of course, American aid and the Korean involvement in feeding the supply lines of the American war effort and military presence in the whole of East Asia, including China, Korea and later on, Vietnam, helped ease South Korea's resource constraints and aided its skill formation (Mason et al., 1980, p. 165; Bagchi, 1987, pp. 33-35). But a special effort at focussing of the national effort and coordination of strategies was needed to utilise the privileged access South Korea enjoyed to U.S. capital and U.S. markets, especially in the 1960s and 1970s.

The turn in the 1960s in the South Korean economic policy has been often portrayed as the turn to export-led growth (e.g., Haggard, 1990, chapter 3). It is better seen as a turn towards coherent planning and a drive towards accumulation for the sake of greater national strength. The bases for this had already been laid in the 1950s. A national planning body had been established in 1958, and the short-lived government of Chang Myon had drawn up a five year development plan. But real teeth were put into planning when the Park government organised an Economic Planning Board which took over the Bureau of the Budget from the Ministry of Finance, and the Bureau of Statistics from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Its head was given the rank of Deputy Prime Minister (Jones and Sakong, 1980, pp. 46-8, and Bagchi, 1987, p. 36). Since Korea had a large balance of payments deficit, it made sense to put special emphasis on exports in order to gain policy autonomy vis-a-vis the US government who were the sole source of aid. The basis for the export drive had been laid in the 1950s through the growth of the textile industry and a number of other light industries. The 1950s had also seen the emergence of the South Korean *chaebol*, who closely corresponded to the Japanese *zaibatsu*. Park's government proceeded to

discipline them for purposes of national accumulation, by first arresting the chief tax-evaders among the big businessmen, and then allowing them to go free and make money, on condition that they invested in areas designated by the government. The government made sure of this by nationalizing all the commercial banks (which had been briefly privatized under US pressure) and taking over all foreign exchange for allocation between designated uses (Bagchi, 1987, pp. 36-8; Woo, 1991, chapters 4-5).

But apart from treatment of exports for favoured allocation of foreign exchange, there is no evidence that the relative price structure particularly favoured exports (Bagchi, 1987, pp. 38-40). What favoured exports was growth, improvements in productivity through rising levels of education of the workforce, learning by doing and learning by using, and exploitation of economies of scale through the favoured treatment of large firms especially in exports (Bagchi, 1987, pp- 40-49). The regulation of real wages, which rose with productivity but less fast, a rise in the share of profits and their systematic ploughing back into investment drove the growth process favoured but, of course, led to a more unequal distribution of income (Ibid., and Amsden, 1989, pp. 16-17n). One difference between the Japanese and Korean developmental states and the Dutch and the British ones is that there was little explicit provision for preventing destitution through national social insurance or anti-poverty measures. However, in both cases, drastic, pro-peasant land reforms removed the worst cases of rural poverty after the second World War, and rapid growth and a tightening labour market raised real wages, especially for the more skilled male workers.

Eventually higher expenditures on R & D, a determined tying up of R & D set-ups run by the government and industrial firms, and a deliberate restructuring of industry with emphasis on such industries as shipbuilding, electronics, automobiles, iron and steel, and petrochemicals made South Korea one of the champion performers in domestic investment and saving, the growth of national income, and exports of manufactures (Bagchi, 1987, chapter 3; Amsden, 1989, chapters 4-6). In this process, the close collaboration between government and business, and the effective monitoring by government of strategic business decisions played a highly important role.

As the South Korean manufacturing sector has developed, and South Korea has begun generating large surpluses vis-a-vis the U.S.A., the Korean government has played a less interventionist role in the economy, and many of the formal restrictions on entry of foreign goods and foreign capital have been relaxed, partly under the pressure of the US government and foreign transnational corporations. But South Korea still remains primarily an economy in which foreign firms play only a minor role. The Korean government had followed the Japanese in putting various

restrictions on the entry of foreign investment, especially in the 1960s. After the tremendous growth of the economy, and the emergence of such global players as Hyundai, Daewoo, Samsung, and other South Korean conglomerates, few formal restrictions are needed to deter foreign capital from dominating the domestic economy. As yet there is little sign that the developmental state in South Korea is extinct, since the financial sector has not emerged to dominate industry - an eventuality which overtook the developmental states in the Netherlands and Britain.

There are other developmental states alive and kicking in East Asia. The most dynamic among them is the People's Republic of China, but the delineation of that state as the prime mover in development deserves a separate paper. We turn next to the financialized twilight of the developmental states.

7. The twilight of the developmental state: the dominance of finance over production

The Dutch developmental state first faltered and then crumbled for a number of reasons: the small size of the domestic market, the rise of wages beyond what would give the Dutch a competitive edge in comparison with their two major rivals, viz., Britain and France, and the unequal military competition in which the Netherlands became engaged with England and France all played their part (Wilson, 1939; Boxer, 1973, chapter 10; De Vries, 1982). But there are three other features which I would emphasize as major contributory factors - factors they shared with another major developmental state, viz., Britain. The first was the enmeshing of the economy in a network of international trade which prevented it from competing on equal terms with the newly emerging developmental states. While Britain, France and other close competitors of the Dutch took measures to protect their fisheries, ship-building, or infant textile industries against foreign competition and unified their national markets, the Dutch could not follow them all the way without hurting their entrepot trades. Moreover, the decentralized nature of the Dutch state prevented them from getting their act together against the increasingly centralized British and French states.

Secondly, changes in the social structure, the increasing transformation of shipowners-cum-ship captains or merchants into pure shipowners, the inability of the Dutch with a stagnant population and an overurbanized state to find seamen and other workers in adequate numbers, and the large-scale conversion of Dutch bourgeoisie into pure financiers and rentiers blunted the competitive edge of the Dutch (Boxer, 1973, chapter 10). Moreover, they not only failed to innovate on their own, when the British industrial revolution set the pace for technical innovation in Europe, but

they also failed to learn from other countries, and remained stuck in their outmoded ways in such vital branches of economic activity as ocean navigation, shipbuilding, whale-fishing and textiles.

Finally, the Dutch capitalists increasingly used their capital to finance the public debts of England and other countries and this investment went often to finance not only the wars but also the business enterprises of their competitors. By 1782, for example, out of an estimated Dutch investment of a thousand million florins in public loans and precious metals, fully 335 million was invested in foreign loans and another 140 million in colonial loans. Of the 335 million lent to foreigners, 280 million was invested in English loans (Braudel, 1984, p. 267). In 1801, the Dutch were found to be the largest foreign holders of English national debt: they held £ 10.54 million out of £17.44 million of the English debt held abroad (Neal, 1990, p. 207).

After the decline and fall of the Dutch republic in the 1790s, the effort at industrialization in the nineteenth century had to be resumed on different assumptions, and on the basis of an acknowledged role as the follower of the British. The latter aided this effort by allowing the Dutch to take over Indonesia as a colony again as part of the post-Napoleonic settlement. The colonial plunder of Indonesia enormously aided the Dutch industrialization process and the regaining of their position as member of the western European club of affluent nations (Bagchi, 1982, chapter 4).

I need not spend many words here on the decline of the British developmental state, for, the narration and explanation of the end of British economic hegemony in the nineteenth century have spawned an enormous amount of literature. The decline of the spirit of entrepreneurship, the conversion of businessmen to the ethos of the public school with its school-boy codes of honour, the stiff upper lip, and the values of the gentleman who scorn trade and the sordid affair of making money, more strictly economic factors such as a relatively low rate of saving and too little investment in the domestic economy have all been held responsible for the decline of Britain as an economic power (Elbaum and Lazonick, 1986; McCloskey, 1973; Wiener, 1981). It has been found that British capital markets through the nineteenth century remained imperfect and systematically discriminated against domestic industry and favoured agriculture and portfolio foreign investments and foreign and colonial public loans (Kennedy, 1987). Britain invested half of its savings in foreign loans and investments during the period 1870-1914, but that investment was in fact matched by the income generated by its past investments (Pollard, 1985). British agriculture and some parts of its staple industries suffered badly in the so called Great Depression from the 1870s to the 1890s but British policies favoured free trade and free mobility of capital because the interests of the empire and its payments balances and those of its upper class

demanded these policies. Domestic industrial growth could be traded against burgeoning incomes from the empire and foreign investments. The dominance of finance and the empire ultimately proved detrimental to the upkeep of a developmental state.

It has been hypothesized that the latest example of a developmental state to join the select club of G7, viz., Japan, is bound to follow the earlier example of the Dutch republic and Britain, and allow finance to dominate industry, and foreign investment to lord it over the priorities of domestic economic growth. However, despite the deep crisis in stock markets and prices of real estate in Japan since the end of the 1990s (Morishima, 1995), there is as yet no sign that Japan is about to fall into the trap of financial dominance. The close linkages of industrial firms, their subcontractors and the main banks are still in place despite some deregulation of money and capital markets (Ito, 1992, chapters 5 and 7; Aoki, 1994). Again, the proportion of imported manufactures in the consumption bundle of the Japanese remains far lower than the corresponding figure for other affluent countries with similar levels of income. Finally, the Japanese have proved more tenacious than other advanced countries in retaining so called sunset industries and have allocated considerable amounts of public funds for adapting those industries to competition from lower-wage countries. If Japan has still managed to retain many of the features of the developmental states, a similar observation holds *a fortiori* to the three latest arrivals among developmental states in East Asia, viz., South Korea, Taiwan and the Peoples' Republic of China.

8. Failed developmental states: the Soviet Union, Brazil, India

The collapse of the Soviet Union is generally seen as the failure of 'actually existing socialism'. But it is perhaps understood better if we view it as the breakdown of a developmental state which could not cope with the challenge of a resurgent global capitalism. The Soviet Five Year plans which were conceived in the 1920s and implemented at the time of the deep crisis of the capitalist system inspired developmentalism in many countries, including those in which the ruling classes professed an extremely anti-communist ideology.

Before we try and summarize the reasons for the failure of the developmental state in the Soviet Union, let me point out some of the major achievements of that state down to the 1950s. It raised the rates of economic growth, however measured, way above the historical trends. It led to a high rate of industrialization, and a rapid transformation of the occupational structure, so that the majority of the people ceased to be employed in agriculture. It is the tremendous effort at accumulation and the building of capital goods industry, and the ideology of a working class bent on building socialism that helped a relatively economically backward Soviet Union to resist the Nazi onslaught and finally play a major role in the overthrow of the Nazi regime. The

reconstruction of the Soviet Union and major parts of eastern Europe after the second World War with little help from the now inimical Western capitalist powers was again a major achievement. In the fields of technology, the independent construction of nuclear power plants, and the credit of putting the first man in space also belong to the era. Down to the end of the 1950s and until the beginning of the 1960s, the Soviet citizen also gained tremendously in general health and longevity.

Bairoch's calculations of comparative industrialization levels (Bairoch, 1982, p. 281) show that the per capita index for the USSR (with the level in the U.K. in 1913 = 100) was 20 in 1913, remained 20 in 1928 (after recovery from the destructive effect of the first World War, foreign invasion and civil war in revolutionary Russia), but had increased to 73 in 1953 (after recovery from the effects of the second World War). For Japan, the per capita levels of industrialization were 20 in 1913, 30 in 1928 and 40 in 1953. So economically, the USSR was doing better than Japan up to the 1950s. After that date, however, there is a drastic slippage: in 1980 the per capita industrialization levels were 252 for the USSR but 353 in Japan. This retrogression is evident also from measured rates of productivity growth (Bergson, 1989, chapter 6). The total factor productivity growth (percentage per year) in the USSR were 3.63, 1.83, and only 0.26 over the periods 1950-60, 1960-70 and 1970-75 respectively. Over this period, the Soviet workers made tremendous advances in education also. If allowance is made for growth in educational attainments of labour, the productivity growth rates over the three periods (1950-60, 1960-70, 1970-75) come down to 3.26, 1.29 and -0.21 respectively (Ibid., p. 113).

Even before the crisis of the 1980s engulfed eastern Europe, it was known that the Soviet economic system had become tied up in a number of problems which reinforced one another (Nove, 1977). These problems included a tendency for public enterprises to systematically demand more resources than were available, and the inability of planning authorities to enforce discipline their use. This led to a tendency towards over-investment and a fall in the productivity of inputs. The problems were compounded by an inability to devise an incentive system that would allow the results of R & D to be used for civilian production purposes: innovations in the military field were not applied to raise standards of consumption in other fields. Even when innovations were put to use in some factories no mechanism existed for their speedy diffusion to other enterprises. Partly because of western embargoes on transfers of key technologies to the Soviet Union but partly also because of the blinkered attitude of the Soviet bureaucratic-political system, the USSR failed increasingly to absorb advances in technology made in other countries (Nove, 1977, chapter 6).

Behind the failure of the Soviet developmental state lay failures in democracy within the Communist party and in the functioning of the political apparatus, the inability of the Soviet Union to use the market mechanism as a supplement to planning and for smoothing out awkward corners (Brus, 1995) and finally, the inability of a failed developmental state to tackle the military and economic challenge posed by an aggressive capitalist block in the 1980s (Halliday, 1990). However, there was nothing inevitable about the collapse of Soviet developmentalism or Soviet-style socialism as it existed until the 1950s. It has been cogently argued (Chandra, 1993) that the real rot set in the 1960s, when Khrushchev's attempts to reform the party apparatus, and its relation to the people, and his bid to discipline enterprise managers through the imposition of an obligation to make profits in a more competitive environment were defeated by an entrenched and self-perpetuating party bureaucracy led by Brezhnev. The fruits of land reforms, expulsion of foreign oligopolists, universal education and an egalitarian income distribution were squandered by a self-seeking nomenclature, and a mockery was made of the real goals of socialism.

The cases of the failed Brazilian and Indian developmental states can be disposed of much more summarily. The reason for failure of Brazilian developmentalism was not simply that it was authoritarian (Fiori, 1992). After all, the Prussian (German), Japanese and South Korean developmental states were also not exactly democratic. But Brazilian authoritarianism had insecure foundations, and was directed towards a rather narrow range of objectives. First, there was never any serious attempt to introduce or implement pro-peasant land reforms in Brazil. This led not only to the entrenchment of landlord power in the villages. But the tentacles of that power extended to the cities and the political apparatus of the nation, involving workers, businessmen, and political bosses in intricate patron-client relations. Secondly, there was no attempt by the state to discipline domestic or foreign capitalists. As domestic investment faltered, the economy became increasingly dependent on foreign capital, and the autonomy of state action became seriously compromised, even when the military seemed to control the whole state apparatus. Thirdly, a weak educational base and an increasingly unequal income distribution badly impaired productivity growth and the international competitive prowess of Brazil.

Very similar comments would apply to the Indian developmental state, some of whose planning ideologies were consciously imitative of Soviet precedents. However, socialism was only a slogan for the top Indian decision-makers (Bagchi, 1995a; Chaudhuri, 1995; Kaviraj, 1995). Except in the three states of Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala and West Bengal, no serious redistribution of land rights in favour of cultivating peasants was effected, and most of India's countryside continued to be dominated by landlords wielding non-market power. Secondly, the progress of education took place at a snail's pace, and the majority of India's population remained illiterate even in the

1980s. Thirdly, significant sectors of the Indian economy were controlled by foreign capital, which inhibited domestic capital and independent entrepreneurial initiatives. Fourthly, property laws governing the major business communities remained family-based and created barriers to entry and enormously increased transactions costs.

Democracy acted as a mechanism for arriving at compromises among the ruling, upper class strata, But it also provided an apparatus for resisting the worst excesses of domestic monopoly capital and transnational corporations. However, the debt crisis of 1991, which was almost deliberately engineered by certain sections of technocrats, businessmen and politicians favouring increased liberalisation has badly damaged the policy autonomy of the Indian state vis-a-vis the IMF, the World Bank, transnational capital, and internationalized domestic capital. It will be a long struggle to restore the autonomy of the state and make it responsible to the majority rather than a coterie of privileged bureaucrats, politicians and oligopolists.

9. The future of the developmental state

I have argued above that at least since the sixteenth century, the developmental state has played a major role in pushing forward the development of economies and societies in major regions of the world. I have also argued that the developmental state is very much alive and kicking in East Asia. There are major forces in the world, especially the really big transnational corporations, transnational banks, the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, the U.S.A. and some other major OECD governments which seek to nip in the bud any possibility of growth of new developmental states in the third world and the post-Soviet economies of eastern Europe. A minimalist state, pursuing policies of free trade, free mobility of capital across national borders and highly restricted international mobility of labour, is likely to have little autonomy or little real support among the masses and will have to rely on external forces - the creditor banks and international agencies, and major OECD governments - for its survival.

It has been argued that strong economies of scale preclude domestic nurturing of infant firms or generation of new technologies. On the other hand, the densely networked economies of East and South East Asia have demonstrated that many such economies can be reaped by regional cooperation within countries and between countries as well. The experience of the so-called third Italy centred on Emilia Romagna has demonstrated the power of municipal nurturing of industry associations which can overcome problems connected with large overhead expenditures and can exploit the external economies of networking. The remarkable growth and dynamism of the town and village enterprises and some of the surviving collective village organizations in China have also shown the power of consciously designed networks of co-operation in production, research,

marketing and finance. In fact, with appropriate changes in social organization and continuous upgradation of human skills through education and learning by doing, a developmental state can be energized by something akin to cellular developmentalism.

Finally, it should be noted that the experience of the period since the second World War demonstrates that with appropriate strategies in place, economies can grow much faster now than they ever did before the War. Japan and Italy made their real transition to affluence since 1945 (Maddison, 1996; Zamagni, 1993, p.37). It appears to be likely that Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea will attain very similar levels of affluence and well-being in another ten years. For such achievements, however the developmental state must effect all the major social changes at one go - say, within a decade. A partial effort will not only slow down the growth process but may put the whole developmental process into reverse gear because of the activities of external predators aided by internal borers which are nurtured by a state apparatus with no real autonomy.

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