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1 **A Lost Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Educational**  
2 **Mobility in China**

3

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8

9 **Abstract**

10

11 Despite the significant political, economic, and geographical diversity in China, there is limited  
12 research on spatial differences in intergenerational mobility in China. This research aims to fill  
13 this gap by exploring the spatial and temporal dimensions of intergenerational educational  
14 mobility in China. The data used for the analysis is the 2010-2018 China Family Panel Studies  
15 (CFPS), a nationally representative longitudinal general social survey. The analysis  
16 incorporates both relative and absolute mobility measures to provide a comprehensive  
17 description of intergenerational educational mobility. The results reveal substantial regional  
18 differences in intergenerational educational mobility across various economic zones in China,  
19 with a rising geographic inequality over time. The southwest and northeast regions stand out  
20 as the areas where the educational prospects of the young generation have become not only  
21 bleaker but dependent more on their parents. Additionally, this study presents the first  
22 education Great Gatsby Curve for China, highlighting the strong relationship between  
23 intergenerational mobility and education inequality at the regional level, particularly after  
24 China's market reform. The findings highlight the need for regionally targeted policies and  
25 levelling up agendas to promote educational opportunities in low-mobility regions.

26

27 **Keywords:** intergenerational mobility, education inequality, regional inequality, Great Gatsby  
28 Curve

29

30 **1. Introduction**

31

32 Intergenerational mobility refers to the movement of socioeconomic status between  
33 generations. It is an important indicator of the equality of opportunity in society, or more  
34 generally, the degree of equity and fairness in a society (Aydemir & Yazici, 2019). Copious

35 empirical evidence all over the world has shown that people's life chances are, albeit to a  
36 different extent, affected by family background<sup>1</sup>. Moreover, historical and comparative  
37 research has revealed considerable differences in intergenerational mobility across time and  
38 countries (e.g., Blanden, 2013), highlighting the importance of institutional features and social  
39 contexts in different countries and historical periods in shaping intergenerational mobility.

40

41 However, even within the same countries, the lived experiences, and the prospect of upward  
42 mobility for people born in certain areas may differ greatly from the national average (Buscha  
43 et al., 2021). A country is a collection of regions with widely varying local contexts and  
44 features, such as community and neighbourhood environments, school quality, labour market  
45 developments, industry composition, economic growth, and government policies. In addition  
46 to family backgrounds, these locally specific and unique environments are potentially  
47 important determinants of individuals' socio-economic opportunities (Chetty & Hendren,  
48 2018). Therefore, a more nuanced perspective on intergenerational mobility is needed to  
49 uncover the geographical variation in intergenerational social mobility within countries.

50

51 This is particularly true in China, a vast country in terms of both population and territory. With  
52 the transition to a market-oriented economy, it has achieved unprecedented economic success.  
53 However, the rapid economic growth is simultaneously accompanied by increasing concerns  
54 about the widening regional inequality and income gap, which poses potential threats to the  
55 Chinese Communist Party's stated objective of making China a more harmonious society  
56 (Whyte & Im, 2014). There are widespread regional disparities in economic performance,  
57 labour market conditions, and education quality, particularly between coastal areas and the  
58 hinterland (Wu et al., 2019). However, there is almost no research on regional differences in  
59 intergenerational mobility in the Chinese context.

60

61 Against this background, this study aims to provide a new geographically differentiated  
62 perspective to the current mobility research in China. The primary objective is to estimate the  
63 degree and patterns of intergenerational mobility in China at a sub-national level over a  
64 relatively long period since 1949, using a suite of statistics of both relative and absolute  
65 mobility to provide a comprehensive picture of intergenerational education mobility. In

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<sup>1</sup> For reviews of the vast literature on the topic of intergenerational mobility, see Black & Devereux (2011) and Iversen et al. (2021).

66 addition to the new subnational portrait of intergenerational mobility, we further explore how  
67 this spatiotemporal pattern of intergenerational education mobility may vary by gender or  
68 household registration status. For example, will the gender premium cancel out or at least partly  
69 offset the misfortune of being born in relatively low-mobility provinces or regions? Is having  
70 a rural household registration status associated with higher opportunities for upward mobility  
71 in metropolitan Beijing, than having an urban status in the least developed province in western  
72 China? Answers to these questions will add a more nuanced understanding of social mobility  
73 in China.

74

75 Our research identifies substantial regional differences in intergenerational educational  
76 mobility across various economic zones in China, revealing a growing geographic inequality  
77 over time. Further analysis also demonstrates a significant correlation between  
78 intergenerational educational mobility and regional education inequality. This underscores the  
79 importance of regional factors in studying mobility and geographical disparities. We argue that  
80 linking regional factors with social mobility would enhance our understanding of how both  
81 social backgrounds and geographical conditions influence people's life chances, as well as how  
82 other families' demographic behaviours shape family and population processes. Therefore, our  
83 findings also speak to a broader literature on regional economic performance and inequality  
84 factors, closely intertwined with regional labour markets, neighbourhood contexts (Andersson  
85 et al., 2021), cross-region migration (Yu, 2022), as well as traditional families structure (Zhang  
86 et al., 2018) and other demographic processes (Song, 2021).

87

88 Overall, the research contributes to the extensive literature on inequality and intergenerational  
89 mobility in the following dimensions. Firstly, it presents several previously unknown facts  
90 about the geography of intergenerational education mobility in contemporary China which are  
91 of significant public and policy interest. Secondly, this is the first study that documents  
92 intergenerational education mobility differences in both physical space and social space in  
93 China by exploring the heterogeneity of regional differences by gender and household  
94 registration status. Finally, this paper expands the existing literature on the Great Gatsby Curve  
95 (GGC) and provides the first educational Gatsby curve in China.

96

97 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical  
98 background and reviews related literature on the geography of intergenerational mobility.  
99 Section 3 describes the methods and data used for analysis. The following section presents

100 empirical estimates of intergenerational education mobility in China at the regional level.  
101 Section 5 discusses the findings and provides policy implications.

102

## 103 **2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review**

104

105 Classical human capital models of intergenerational mobility (Becker & Tomes, 1979, 1986)  
106 have revealed mechanisms underlying the intergenerational process that might differ across  
107 time and space. Firstly, economic development and income levels are associated with  
108 intergenerational mobility. In countries or regions with lower average family incomes or  
109 greater income inequality, poor parents would face credit constraints and be less able to invest  
110 in their children's human capital than their richer counterparts, leading to a strong  
111 intergenerational persistence. Moreover, local labour markets also play a major role in the  
112 intergenerational transmission process. Higher returns to human capital would encourage  
113 higher-income parents to invest more in their children's human capital (Corak, 2020) and  
114 labour market regulations and policies, such as the presence of unions, the degree of  
115 employment protection, the presence of minimum wages, and the provision of unemployment  
116 benefits, may change the income distribution of both generations (Checchi et al., 2016).

117

118 Factors that operate in the educational system through the provision of high-quality public  
119 education and government education funding may also generate influences on intergenerational  
120 mobility. Compelling evidence has shown not only a strong positive association between  
121 government education spending and intergenerational income elasticity (Mayer & Lopoo,  
122 2008) but also the causal effects of school spending on the earnings of students (Jackson et al.,  
123 2016), despite the debates about whether the expenditure targeted at early or higher education  
124 are equally important (Restuccia & Urrutia, 2004). Since areas with higher levels of economic  
125 development are probably more able to provide public education expenditure, regional  
126 economic development maps onto intergenerational mobility.

127

128 In addition to the economic investments in the human capital of children, intergenerational  
129 mobility may be associated with the social influences on these investments, such as social  
130 interactions, norms, social networks, and group membership and identity. Neighbourhoods,  
131 among many other social factors, are considered the geographic basis for social interactions  
132 that have powerful influences on local children's socio-economic outcomes (Chetty &  
133 Hendren, 2018).

134

135 Following these theoretical justifications for and interpretations of regional differences in  
136 intergenerational persistence, an important and growing literature has started to explore the  
137 geography of mobility. Research shows substantial variation in intergenerational mobility  
138 across the world and reveals a visual scenario of the negative relationship between  
139 intergenerational mobility and the level of cross-sectional inequality, known as the Great  
140 Gatsby Curve (Corak, 2013). The seminal paper of Chetty et al. (2014) explores the  
141 heterogeneity in intergenerational income mobility across small areas of the United States and  
142 offers a new framework for intergenerational mobility analysis at the sub-national level.

143

144 Several follow-up studies looked at regional variation in mobility in different Western  
145 countries (Buscha et al., 2021; Card et al., 2018; Deutscher & Mazumder, 2020). Although  
146 focusing on various contexts and aspects of mobility, these studies have convincingly shown  
147 regional differences in intergenerational mobility of income, education, occupation, and social  
148 class. The literature also reveals several possible explanations of the regional mobility patterns,  
149 particularly the levels of income inequality, degrees of educational inequality, and the  
150 heterogeneity in natural resources, among many other economic, social, and political factors,  
151 which has provided extensive empirical evidence for the GGC-like patterns<sup>2</sup>.

152

153 Despite the literature on regional differences in intergenerational mobility in Western  
154 countries, research on finer geography about intergenerational mobility in China is limited,  
155 even though it seems to be a very promising area for research in geographic divisions in  
156 intergenerational persistence. Research has provided copious evidence on the static cross-  
157 sectional inequalities across Chinese provinces and regions in economic growth rates and  
158 human capital development. Per-capita GDP in the poorest provinces (such as Yunnan and  
159 Gansu) was less than 30% of the wealthiest places such as Beijing and Shanghai in 2017 (Felice  
160 et al., 2021). Due to the financial and administration decentralisation since the late 1980s and  
161 the increase in schooling costs<sup>3</sup>, regional economic inequalities have been translated into  
162 inequalities in human capital investment and educational attainment across regions.  
163 Furthermore, the wide regional economic and educational inequalities have been accompanied  
164 by intensive rural-urban disparities in China, due to the unique household registration (hukou)

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<sup>2</sup> See DiPrete (2020) for synthesis of theoretical and empirical work on GGC in the economic literature and Durlauf et al., (2022) from the sociological perspective.

<sup>3</sup> See Knight et al. (2011) and Xiang et al. (2020) for more Chinese policy background and educational reforms.

165 system in China, which essentially divides China into two separate societies (Wu, 2019; Wu &  
166 Treiman, 2004).

167

168 In the context of such large political, economic, and geographical variation, existing research  
169 on intergenerational mobility in China has, however, largely focused on estimates of mobility  
170 at the national level (e.g., Gruijters, 2021; Xie et al., 2022). Despite great contributions in terms  
171 of revealing trends of social mobility in China and nuanced heterogeneity by gender and hukou  
172 groups, these studies have not fully considered the role of the widely observed regional  
173 imbalances and different spatial characteristics in shaping the levels and mechanisms of the  
174 dynamic intergenerational process. One notable exception is the research of Fan et al. (2021),  
175 which presents the first preliminary analysis that links intergenerational mobility to province-  
176 based institutional and socioeconomic characteristics. While an insightful study, their research  
177 has some data shortcomings in that the CFPS data is not strictly representative at the provincial  
178 level, and that the sample size at the provincial level is relatively small, leading to statistically  
179 indistinguishable estimates of the provincial mobility levels. An alternative approach is  
180 provided by Geng (2021), who relies on the 1% samples of the 1982, 1990, and 2000 census  
181 data to explore intergenerational education mobility at three geographical levels: national,  
182 provincial, and prefectures. This is the most comprehensive analysis thus far, showing great  
183 spatial variation in educational mobility across China. However, census data collect  
184 information only on parents living in the same household, which is likely to generate the  
185 coresidence bias since better-educated people tend to leave the household earlier. Another  
186 major issue of the census data is that a person's place of residence is defined by their current  
187 living address, a problem that is also observed in one early attempt to discover spatial patterns  
188 of intergenerational educational mobility in China (Qin et al., 2020). Their assignment of  
189 current location when analysing regional differences in intergenerational mobility may suffer  
190 from bias, as the high mobility level in some regions may partly result from high levels of  
191 internal migration and self-selection of certain groups of people.

192

193 This paper follows these pioneering efforts to develop a comprehensive regional analysis of  
194 intergenerational mobility in China but improves on several dimensions. Firstly, by assigning  
195 individuals' regions based on their childhood location, rather than their current address, the  
196 regional differences in intergenerational mobility can be more confidently attributed to the  
197 childhood exposure effects on educational outcomes (Heidrich, 2017). Secondly, this paper  
198 extends intergenerational mobility analysis from income mobility to education mobility and

199 provides the first education Great Gatsby Curve in China. Thirdly, in addition to the relative  
200 mobility measures estimated by Geng (2021), this paper intends to incorporate a broader range  
201 of intergenerational mobility statistics to provide a comprehensive analysis of intergenerational  
202 education mobility in China. Finally, this research considers not only physical space, as has  
203 been done in most studies on regional differences in mobility but also the interactions between  
204 the physical space and social and institutional space by which individuals are clustered,  
205 particularly the household registration status.

206

### 207 **3. Methodology**

208

#### 209 **3.1 Measures of Intergenerational Education Mobility**

210

211 Intergenerational education mobility captures the relationship between parents' and children's  
212 educational achievement. There are two types of mobility measures in answering the question  
213 of how offspring's socio-economic outcomes depend on their parental background: relative  
214 and absolute mobility<sup>4</sup>.

215

216 Relative educational mobility captures the outcomes of children from less-advantaged families  
217 compared with their better-off counterparts. Following the standard econometric specification  
218 in the economic literature (Becker & Tomes, 1979, 1986), the canonical measure of relative  
219 mobility is the intergenerational regression coefficient, obtained from a simple bivariate linear  
220 regression of children's educational outcomes on parental educational attainment in family  $i$ :

221

$$222 \quad Cedu_i = \alpha + \beta Pedu_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

223

224 where the coefficient  $\beta$  is the parameter of interest, providing an intuitive impression of the  
225 average predictive power of parents' education on the schooling of the next generation. Higher  
226 values of this coefficient indicate a stronger intergenerational relation of education attainment  
227 and thus lower intergenerational mobility.

228

---

<sup>4</sup> See Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002) for a theoretical exploration of different mobility, as well as the recent book of Iversen et al. (2021) for a more detailed discussion on different concepts and measures of intergenerational mobility.



229 In addition, an alternative measure of intergenerational correlation is the rank-rank  
230 specification, adopted in the seminal paper of Chetty et al. (2014). It can be obtained by  
231 replacing  $Cedu_i$  and  $Pedu_i$  with children's and parents' percentile ranks in their respective  
232 distribution:

233

$$234 \quad R_{icr}^C = \alpha_{icr}^R + \beta_{icr}^R R_{icr}^P + \varepsilon_{icr} \quad (2)$$

235

236 where  $R_{icr}^C$  denotes the national percentile rank of education of the child  $i$  among his/her peers  
237 in the same birth cohort  $c$  and from the same region  $r$ , and  $R_{icr}^P$  the similar ranks of parents.

238

239 This is a desirable measure of intergenerational mobility. Firstly, the relationship in education  
240 between parents and children may be nonlinear, while the rank-rank relation is almost perfectly  
241 linear in the analysis by Chetty et al. (2014). Moreover, in the context of sub-national analysis,  
242 when both parents and children are ranked based on their position in the national education  
243 distribution (Bell et al., 2022), even though regressions are run separately in each geographical  
244 area, the relative intergenerational persistence and educational outcomes of children can be  
245 compared on a fixed national scale.

246

247 However, relying completely on the measures of relative mobility has some pitfalls. When  
248 comparing intergenerational mobility across subgroups, such as gender or ethnicity groups,  
249 although the higher coefficient implies higher relative mobility in the country, it provides no  
250 information about the absolute levels of education they achieve given the same parental  
251 background. For example, girls may suffer a large educational disadvantage compared with  
252 their male counterparts, even when these two groups have a nearly identical level of relative  
253 mobility. Therefore, absolute mobility, as a complementary way to picture the complicated  
254 intergenerational relationship, has been of great normative and policy interest.

255

256 Alesina et al. (2021) measure intergenerational mobility as the probability of completing  
257 primary education for children with illiterate parents<sup>5</sup>. However, this measurement seems to be  
258 less meaningful for understanding education mobility in developing countries where rapid  
259 economic growth and education expansion have occurred (Emran et al., 2019), as primary

---

<sup>5</sup> Card et al. (2018) and Davis and Mazumder (2018) also focus on absolute transition likelihoods to measure absolute intergenerational mobility.

260 attainment eventually becomes universal. Since the 1990s, there has been the implementation  
261 of nine-year compulsory education, leading to an almost 100% transition rate to junior high  
262 school in China (Wu, 2010). Therefore, we focus on the probability of completing senior high  
263 school for children born to parents with up to primary education as the measure of absolute  
264 upward mobility. The major reason is that access to senior high school in China is far from  
265 universal and transition to high school is a crucial turning point that could potentially alter  
266 subsequent life course trajectories.

267

268 In conclusion, both relative and absolute mobility are relevant in revealing dimensions of the  
269 intergenerational process. The choice among them is collectively determined by the  
270 philosophical understanding of equality, the purpose of analysis, and the political imagination.  
271 This paper reports both absolute and relative mobility, aiming to provide complementary  
272 information for the analysis of intergeneration educational mobility in China.

273

### 274 3.2 Data

275

276 The main dataset used for analysis is the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), a nationally  
277 representative longitudinal general social survey conducted biennially since 2010 by the  
278 Institute of Social Science Survey (ISSS) of Peking University, China. Extensive information  
279 on community, family, and individual levels has been collected through computer-assisted  
280 interviews, including family structures, economic activities, dynamics and migration, and a  
281 comprehensive history of all family members' marriage, education, and occupational status,  
282 among others (see Xie & Hu, 2014 for detailed discussions about survey design and sampling  
283 of CFPS). To maximise the sample size, we use the pooled cross-sectional data from 2010,  
284 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018, which constitutes a total of 74,130 individuals.


285

286 The CFPS turns out to be the most suitable for analysing the geographical differences in  
287 intergenerational mobility in China, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, unlike conventional  
288 household surveys that interview individuals living in the same households, it defines family  
289 members as both immediate relatives who are economically connected, regardless of whether  
290 they live together or not, as well as non-immediate family members who have lived in the same  
291 household for at least 3 months. Therefore, this survey overcomes the coresidence problem that  
292 could generate considerable estimation bias but is commonly found in analysis using household  
293 survey data (Fan et al., 2021). Another exceptional advantage of the CFPS is that it collects

294 information on individuals' province of residence during childhood, which enables the  
295 exploration of how the socioeconomic characteristics of places of residence during children's  
296 developmental stage may be associated with their intergenerational mobility (Aydemir &  
297 Yazici, 2019).

298

299 The basic unit of analysis is the parent-child educational relationship. Figure 1 shows the  
300 process of obtaining a final sample of 41,255 from a raw sample of 74,130 unique individuals  
301 surveyed from all eight waves. Firstly, the international research paradigm on intergenerational  
302 mobility considers only individuals in their mid-20s or older to reduce the chances that they  
303 may still be in school or university (e.g., Xie et al., 2022). Given that the typical age of students  
304 enrolled in higher education is between 18-22<sup>6</sup>, we chose individuals aged 23 and above. The  
305 sample is then restricted to those who can be matched to at least one parent with education  
306 information. Finally, individuals who have missing data on the main variables of their own  
307 education and residential information are also excluded.



308

309

310

311

Figure 1. Selection of the analytical sample

### 312 3.3 Main variables

313

314 The estimation of intergenerational educational mobility depends on how educational  
315 attainment is measured. The CFPS collects respondents' educational information by directly  
316 asking about both the highest degree of education they obtained and their completed years of  
317 formal schooling, but we focus on years of schooling as the measure of education attainment.

318

---

<sup>6</sup> See Wang et al. (2022) for a summary of the education system in China.

319 Another key variable in the analysis is the residential place. Based on empirical evidence that  
320 early circumstances, school environment, and peer effects, together, have huge influences on  
321 the accumulation of child's human capital and their later socio-economic success (Emran &  
322 Shilpi, 2015), the focus is the place where children were raised, grew up, and received an  
323 education. Such a definition is better than the use of places of residence at the survey time  
324 because the population is geographically mobile, and their migration probabilities are based on  
325 their own and families' socioeconomic achievement (Corak, 2020). Specifically, this paper  
326 looks at comparisons among eight different regions in China, based on the classification of  
327 economic zones proposed by the Development Research Centre of the State Council<sup>7</sup>.

328

329 Table A1 in the Appendix A presents summary statistics. There are differences in people's  
330 schooling years among regions, with Eastern coastal China, where Shanghai is located, being  
331 the most educationally advantaged region while the average number of years of education in  
332 the southwest region is about 3 years less. This highlights geography as a significant  
333 educational stratifier in China, echoing the findings of Hannum and Wang (2006). These  
334 summary statistics warrant further scrutiny of the effects of geography in status attainment  
335 research.

336

## 337 **4. Results**

338

### 339 4.1 Geographical differences in intergenerational education mobility

340

341 This section provides an analysis of the variation in intergenerational education mobility across  
342 different economic regions within China. It is important to bear in mind that, these  
343 intergenerational mobility measures are based on regressions that do not control for other  
344 individual characteristics. In other words, the results are summaries of all potential complex  
345 mechanisms underlying the association between parents and children, rather than the causal  
346 effects of parental education on children's education achievement. The primary aim here is to  
347 explore how these intergenerational associations differ across time and space, thereby  
348 providing a spatial-temporal depiction of intergenerational education mobility in China.

---

<sup>7</sup> These include northeast China (NEC), northern coastal China (NCC), southern coastal China (SCC), eastern coastal China (ECC), the middle reaches of the Yellow River (MRYLR), the middle reaches of the Yangtze River (MRYTR), southwest China (SWC), and northwest China (NWC). See Wu et al. (2019) for discussions about eight economic zones and provincial-scale units in China.

349

350 Figure 2 presents a heat map of relative mobility across regions in China, for the 1949-1978  
351 cohort and 1979-1995 cohort respectively<sup>8</sup>. The cutoff point of 1979 denotes the beginning of  
352 Chinese economic reforms, an evolutionary transition in China that has led to dramatic multi-  
353 dimensional socio-economic changes in every part of the society including the education  
354 sector. Lighter colours represent a weaker association between parents' and children's national  
355 education ranks and therefore higher levels of intergenerational mobility.

356

357 For the first cohort, the educational rank gap between children from the most advantaged and  
358 disadvantaged families varies somewhat across China from 23.2 percentiles in northeast China  
359 to 31.4 percentiles in provinces around the middle of the Yangtze River, suggesting marginally  
360 different levels of intergenerational persistence across regions<sup>9</sup>. Intergenerational education  
361 mobility decreases dramatically over time in every region, as the colour within each region has  
362 become darker in the right panel. This sub-national analysis is consistent with the evidence of  
363 reducing relative education mobility at the national level<sup>10</sup> and shows that children's  
364 educational attainment has become increasingly dependent on their parents' education levels  
365 and this trend has been seen in all regions in China with no exception.

366

367 Furthermore, this decline pattern in intergenerational education mobility has been more  
368 significant in certain areas, leading to relative mobility being more geographically disparate  
369 after 1979. The gaps in children's education ranks between the best and worst parental  
370 background for the 1979-1995 cohort have been particularly high in the north-eastern region  
371 (around 50 percentiles) and the south-western region (around 45 percentiles)<sup>11</sup>. In comparison,  
372 northern coastal China, where Beijing is located, and southern coastal China have relatively  
373 low education persistence between parents' and children's educational achievement and thus  
374 the highest relative mobility. Fan et al. (2015) conclude that the regional disparity in relative  
375 income mobility may be attributed to the better economic conditions of families from those

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
<sup>8</sup> Corresponding statistics are summarised in Table A3 in the Appendix A. Figure A1 presents estimated absolute mobility across 8 economic regions in China with 95% confidential intervals.

<sup>9</sup> The 95% confidence interval for the northeast region is [20.5, 25.8] while that for Middle of the Yangtze River is [27.8, 35.0]. For the other regions, however, most confidence intervals overlap.

<sup>10</sup> Estimates at the national level is presented in Table A2 in the Appendix A.

<sup>11</sup> The regression analysis of the interaction effects between parental education and regions in China confirms that the educational levels of children born and growing up in southwest and northeast regions are statistically more dependent on their family background than other regions of China. Compared to northern coastal China, where Beijing is located, Northeast China has significantly higher coefficients by 0.16 and Southwest China 0.11 (p-values are 0.000 and 0.001 respectively).

376 provinces and thus fewer constraints when investing in the education of their children. Against  
 377 the background of soaring educational costs and the decentralisation of education funding in  
 378 the 1980s, children from these poor regions may face a tightened link between their educational  
 379 destination and their family origins.  
 380



381  
 382 Figure 2. Geography of relative education mobility in China. The figures present heat maps of the relative  
 383 measure of intergenerational education mobility by region in China, derived from within-province OLS  
 384 regressions of child education ranks against parent education ranks. Individuals are assigned to provinces  
 385 based on their residential location when they were 12 years old. The darker colours indicate higher  
 386 intergenerational education persistence and thus lower intergenerational mobility. There is no data for  
 387 Neimenggu, Hainan, Xizang, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Hongkong, and Macao.


388  
 389 Figure 3 presents a corresponding heat map of absolute upward educational mobility in China.  
 390 Similarly, lighter colours represent higher absolute educational mobility. During the pre-reform  
 391 period (1949-1978), there is a clear geographical feature of upward educational mobility<sup>12</sup>. The  
 392 probability of completing at least high school education for children with up to primary  
 393 educated parents was statistically higher in the east regions but lower in the west regions. The  
 394 eastern coastal region, where Shanghai is located, stood out as being the most upwardly mobile  
 395 region for this cohort. Just over one in five (21.3%) of children from the most disadvantaged  
 396 family background (parents having up to primary education) could obtain at least high school

<sup>12</sup> Corresponding statistics are summarised in Table A3 in the appendix. Figure A2 presents estimated absolute mobility across 8 economic regions in China with 95% confidential intervals.

397 education. In contrast, only about 9% of similarly disadvantaged children from southwest  
 398 China managed to complete high school education. The findings suggest that even under  
 399 Maoism when deliberate efforts were made to create an egalitarian society (Gruijters, 2021),  
 400 regional inequalities in educational opportunities were evident.

401

402 For individuals born after 1979, the probability of completing high school education has  
 403 increased in all regions, probably due to the introduction of compulsory education and  
 404 educational expansion in China in the late 1980s and substantial educational expansion  
 405 thereafter. However, some regions have been particularly good at providing high school  
 406 opportunities for disadvantaged children, leading to the enlarged geographic inequality in  
 407 absolute upward mobility. Eastern areas remained more mobile than western provinces in terms  
 408 of enabling children from educationally disadvantaged backgrounds to complete at least high  
 409 school education. The eastern coastal region, among all, has been the best place of opportunity  
 410 for the most disadvantaged children, with 50% of them being able to complete high school. In  
 411 comparison, southwestern areas remained unchanged as having the lowest probability for  
 412 disadvantaged children to achieve intergenerational upward mobility (the figure was 21.8%).  
 413 After China's economic reform in the late 1970s, the regional disparity in absolute education  
 414 mobility became so large that children born to at least primary educated parents in the eastern  
 415 coastal region had almost the same probability of getting high school as their peers with better-  
 416 educated parents in other places, as shown in the right panel of Figure A3.



417

418 Figure 3. Geography of absolute education mobility in China. The figures present heat maps of the absolute  
419 measure of intergenerational education mobility by region in China. Individuals are assigned to provinces  
420 based on their residential location when they were 12 years old. The absolute education mobility is defined  
421 as the probability of completing middle school for children born to illiterate parents. The darker colour  
422 presents a lower probability of obtaining at least high school given that their parents have up to primary  
423 education. There is no data for Neimenggu, Hainan, Xizang, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Taiwan,  
424 Hongkong, and Macao.

425

426 Figure A4 in the Appendix A compares the changing pattern in both relative and absolute  
427 mobility measures and shows that while absolute mobility has increased substantially in all  
428 regions over time, relative mobility decreased. A larger proportion of children has performed  
429 much better than their parents in education, due to the elevator effect of a general increase in  
430 years of schooling caused by the considerable expansion of formal education in recent decades  
431 in China. Nevertheless, as measured by relative mobility, the parent-to-child intergenerational  
432 persistence has indeed been strengthened. Children's position on the educational ladder has  
433 been increasingly determined by their family background, pointing out a nationally wide  
434 decrease in equality of educational opportunities in China in recent decades.

435

436 We further explore the relationship between intergenerational mobility and educational  
437 inequality, measured by the education Gini coefficients<sup>13</sup>. As shown in Figure 4, there is a  
438 positive correlation between the relative intergenerational persistence in education and the  
439 educational Gini coefficient for the cohorts born after China's economic reform in 1978<sup>14</sup>.  
440 Although the positive relationship presented here is descriptive and does not imply any causal  
441 effects of educational inequality on intergenerational mobility, this finding provides new  
442 empirical evidence for the existence of the educational Great Gatsby Curve in China after its  
443 market-oriented reforms. It echoes the widely observed pattern between income inequality and  
444 income mobility both at the cross-national level in many developed countries (Corak, 2013;  
445 Jerrim & Macmillan, 2015).


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<sup>13</sup> See Appendix B for the calculation of educational Gini coefficients in China using CFPS 2010-2018 data.

<sup>14</sup> There is almost no clear relationship between education Gini and intergenerational mobility for the 1949-1978 cohort.





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Figure 4. The educational Great Gatsby curve. The Gini coefficient is calculated by province and cohort. Relative mobility refers to the association between the educational rank of parents and that of their children.

#### 452 4.2. Geography of mobility by gender and household registration status


453

454 The analysis so far has shown that geographic location is an important factor in understanding  
455 education mobility in contemporary China. This section takes a further step to explore whether  
456 the observed differences in intergenerational mobility in terms of geographical space are also  
457 related to the heterogeneity in the social space. Specifically, we look at the geographic pattern  
458 in intergenerational education mobility separately by gender and household registration status.  
459 Here we focus only on absolute intergenerational mobility to highlight the differences in  
460 upward educational mobility across regions, gender, and household registration status, under  
461 the context of compulsory education popularisation and large-scale education expansion in  
462 China.

463

464 Figure 5 presents differences in absolute upward mobility between men and women across all  
465 regions of China. There is not much difference in the regional pattern of intergenerational  
466 mobility between the two genders, with southwest and northwest regions being the least mobile  
467 places, regardless of gender. After China's economic reforms in the late 1970s, however, the  
468 geographical patterns of intergenerational education persistence differ by gender. Although the  
469 whole sample analysis shows that southwest, northeast, and northwest China are the three least  
470 mobile places, the situations for men and women in these regions have been largely different.  
471 The southwest region remained far from a land of opportunity for all children. In the northwest  
472 region, boys from educationally deprived backgrounds still had a relatively good prospect of

473 high school completion. This reveals that the previously observed low intergenerational  
 474 mobility in northwest China is mainly driven by the low probability of upward mobility for  
 475 girls, whose educational opportunities are normally more limited in the underdeveloped and  
 476 poor regions of China. In comparison, girls born and educated in northeast China had more  
 477 than 10 percentage points higher probabilities of high school completion than their male  
 478 counterparts there. This is somewhat counterintuitive, especially under the traditional  
 479 preference for sons in Chinese culture. Overall, these findings suggest that the effects of local  
 480 economic and social environment on children's educational achievement may interact with  
 481 local gender differences.  
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


483  
 484 Figure 5. The geographic pattern in absolute mobility by gender  
 485

486 The analysis of intergenerational mobility across both geographic and social spaces (hukou)  
 487 provides new nuanced information about the observed geographical pattern. For both cohorts,  
 488 the whole sample analysis shows that children growing up in the southwest and northwest had  
 489 a lower probability of completing senior high school, compared with other parts of China.  
 490 Nevertheless, Figure 6 suggests that it is mainly the particularly low levels of upward mobility  
 491 for rural children that result in the low mobility in these places. For urban residents, these two  
 492 western regions ranked around the middle and even at the top of the national mobility order.  
 493 Together with the finding of gender differences in the geography of education, it is reasonable  
 494 to argue that in the post-reform era, rural women in western regions have increasingly faced  
 495 greater disadvantages in terms of having extremely low absolute educational mobility. This is  
 496 an important finding that would otherwise be ignored by merely focusing on the national-level  
 497 analysis.

498

499 Liu et al. (2020) analyse the effects of hukou and places of residence on educational  
500 achievement and show that structural forces like hukou are more important than family and  
501 individual characteristics in China. Our results extend their study by exploring the interactive  
502 effects of region and hukou in determining educational achievement for disadvantaged  
503 children. The key argument is that the place of residence changes the impact of hukou on  
504 children's upward mobility probabilities, and children's education achievement is largely  
505 determined by the local economic and social environment. Eastern coastal China has become  
506 not only an area with the highest absolute upward mobility level but also a region with  
507 relatively less rural-urban inequality, at least for those from educationally disadvantaged  
508 backgrounds. Moreover, in recent decades, rural disadvantaged children with poor-educated  
509 parents in the eastern coastal region have undistinguishable educational achievement from  
510 urban children in many other regions. One possible explanation is the large-scale urbanisation  
511 of rural areas particularly in provinces such as Zhejiang and Shanghai, which has greatly  
512 improved the welfare and alleviated poverty for rural children (Wang et al., 2022), thereby  
513 increasing the educational opportunities for them.



514

515

516

Figure 6. The geographic pattern in absolute mobility by hukou status

## 517 5. Discussion and Conclusion

518

519 Using data from the 2010-2018 China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), this paper presents a novel  
520 subnational portrait of intergenerational educational mobility in China. It reveals substantial  
521 geographic variation in education mobility for both the 1949-1978 birth cohort and the 1979-  
522 1995 cohort. The regional differences also vary over time, by gender, and by household

523 registration status. Four key insights have emerged from the analysis of the geographical  
524 pattern of education mobility.

525

526 Firstly, our findings show that regional variation in intergenerational educational mobility is  
527 large and increasing over time. There are highly significant and sizable differences in both  
528 relative and absolute mobility across regions in China. Western provinces stand out as the worst  
529 places where the educational fate of the young generation is not only more dependent on their  
530 parents but also greatly bleaker. This finding, in one of the world's largest developing  
531 countries, aligns with extensive research on the within-country heterogeneity in  
532 intergenerational mobility in Western contexts (e.g., Chetty, et al. 2014). In terms of policy  
533 implication, this highlights the need for regionally targeted policies and levelling up agendas  
534 to focus on certain disadvantaged areas to achieve the goal of “equality and quality education  
535 for every child”, as promoted at the 19<sup>th</sup> National Congress.

536

537 Second, intergenerational mobility is inherently multi-dimensional. Relying solely on absolute  
538 or relative measures would result in inaccurate conclusions. Our joint analysis of both measures  
539 suggests that despite having seemingly high probabilities of high school completion because  
540 of educational expansion, children with poorly educated parents (parents with up to primary  
541 education) in some regions still experience strong relative intergenerational persistence which  
542 hinders their ability to progress up the educational ladder. In reality, the misunderstanding of  
543 relative and absolute mobility may explain why the “social volcano” remains dormant in  
544 China— despite the sharply increased inequality since the late 1990s, the Chinese people still  
545 exhibit fairly high levels of acceptance and optimism towards rising inequality (Whyte & Im,  
546 2014). Chinese people believe the Confucian idea that education holds the key to upward social  
547 mobility. Over the years, the rising tide continued to lift all boats, albeit at very different speeds,  
548 leading to steady improvements in educational levels for most young people. As long as  
549 children are attaining higher absolute levels of education than their parents and are optimistic  
550 about their prospects, the increasing importance of social origins for educational attainment  
551 may be overlooked.

552

553 Third, there is a positive correlation between education inequality and intergenerational  
554 education mobility in the post-Mao era. In areas where educational equality is high (low Gini  
555 coefficients of parental education), children from low-educated families have a greater chance  
556 of completing high school education. This provides new insights into mobility and inequality

557 in China, the world's largest transitional economy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the  
558 first educational "Great Gatsby Curve" in China. The worrying fact is that regional educational  
559 inequality exhibits inertia, leading to some regions facing the dual burden of low education  
560 equality and low intergenerational mobility. Children in provinces with greater educational  
561 inequality are faced with fewer opportunities to climb the educational ladder and escape their  
562 lower education backgrounds, resulting in an "educational poverty trap" in China.

563

564 Finally, this study sheds light on the nuanced gender and rural-urban perspectives of the  
565 geography of intergenerational mobility. Gender inequality in intergenerational education  
566 persistence remains an issue in certain regions of China, particularly the northeast and  
567 northwest, where mobility levels are already low. The household registration system, a major  
568 structural barrier unique to China, is still at the root of the rural educational crisis in most  
569 regions (Zhang, 2022). Given that education is crucial for future earning capacity and long-  
570 term opportunities, it is essential to reform the Chinese educational system and promote  
571 balanced and coordinated development between urban and rural areas. This can be achieved  
572 through, for example, increased public investment in education, removing restrictions on  
573 accessing urban schooling, and raising rural families' ability to invest in human capital.

574

575 There are certain limitations in our research. The sample size is not quite sufficient to analyse  
576 educational mobility at the provincial level, resulting in relatively large confidence intervals  
577 when comparing mobility between provinces. Future research could use more comprehensive  
578 and representative data to examine the differences in intergenerational mobility between  
579 provinces, districts, and counties, to provide a clearer understanding of the widespread regional  
580 imbalance in China. Moreover, it should be emphasised that the analysis of the geographical  
581 pattern of intergenerational mobility in China does not provide any insight into the cause of  
582 regional differences in mobility.

583

584 However, these estimates reveal a previously unknown aspect of the regional geography of  
585 intergenerational education mobility in China over several decades. It highlights an important  
586 topic that requires further exploration, especially in developing countries. It also serves as the  
587 first step towards a closer inspection of causality, laying down a firm foundation for future  
588 discussion of causal mechanisms underlying spatial disparity. One promising direction for  
589 future research would be to explore the differences in the implementation of national-wide  
590 educational policies across China, specifically the compulsory education law, and assess the

591 impact of other local policy changes on social mobility. Another avenue would be to explore  
592 whether the observed regional differences in intergenerational mobility are a result of sorting  
593 or regional childhood exposure effects, as studied in other contexts (Alesina et al., 2021; Chetty  
594 & Hendren, 2018). Additionally, it is crucial to advance the identification of regional exposure  
595 effects and examine area-related factors that contribute to the spatial variation in  
596 intergenerational mobility, such as regional economic development, income inequality, and  
597 provincial public investment in education. This will provide a deeper understanding of the  
598 underlying mechanisms behind the geographic patterns of intergenerational mobility, which  
599 would be valuable in developing public policy prescriptions for low-education mobility  
600 regions.

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
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757 **Appendix A. Figures and Tables**  
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 760 Figure A1. Relative mobility across regions with 95% confidence intervals  
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


Figure A2. Absolute mobility by region with 95% CIs

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


Figure A3. Probability of high school completion by parental background and region

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


Figure A4. Absolute and relative mobility across regions and time. Absolute mobility is measured by the probability of completing high school

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education for children with up to primary educated parents; Relative mobility is measured as the association between children's and parents' educational ranks in the national distribution of education by cohort.

Table A1. Summary Statistics

	Northern coastal China	Eastern coastal China	Southern coastal China	North-east China	Middle of the Yellow River	Middle of the Yangtze River	North-west China	South-west China
<b>Sample size</b>	4485	4357	4603	5404	7464	3914	4904	6085
<b>Years of education</b>								
Mean (SD)	8.03 (4.89)	9.08 (5.08)	7.92 (4.82)	8.60 (4.50)	8.15 (4.76)	8.21 (5.07)	6.60 (5.38)	6.25 (4.96)
<b>Educational degree</b>								
illiterate	948 (21.1%)	747 (17.1%)	964 (20.9%)	813 (15.0%)	1424 (19.1%)	802 (20.5%)	1706 (34.8%)	2021 (33.2%)
primary education	816 (18.2%)	622 (14.3%)	948 (20.6%)	1116 (20.7%)	1407 (18.9%)	717 (18.3%)	845 (17.2%)	1335 (21.9%)
lower-secondary education	1421 (31.7%)	1232 (28.3%)	1331 (28.9%)	1836 (34.0%)	2476 (33.2%)	1108 (28.3%)	1149 (23.4%)	1612 (26.5%)
higher-secondary education	731 (16.3%)	832 (19.1%)	785 (17.1%)	867 (16.0%)	1200 (16.1%)	679 (17.3%)	659 (13.4%)	634 (10.4%)
higher education	569 (12.7%)	924 (21.2%)	575 (12.5%)	772 (14.3%)	957 (12.8%)	608 (15.5%)	545 (11.1%)	483 (7.9%)
<b>Parents' years of education</b>								
Mean (SD)	5.10 (4.57)	5.21 (4.87)	4.73 (4.59)	5.53 (4.68)	5.33 (4.68)	5.10 (4.75)	4.24 (4.66)	3.68 (4.29)
<b>Parents' educational degree</b>								
illiterate	1754 (39.1%)	1769 (40.6%)	2012 (43.7%)	1924 (35.6%)	2872 (38.5%)	1588 (40.6%)	2466 (50.3%)	3266 (53.7%)
primary education	1254 (28.0%)	1075 (24.7%)	1144 (24.9%)	1486 (27.5%)	1805 (24.2%)	1046 (26.7%)	1058 (21.6%)	1488 (24.5%)
lower-secondary education	911 (20.3%)	859 (19.7%)	900 (19.6%)	1216 (22.5%)	1696 (22.7%)	723 (18.5%)	821 (16.7%)	918 (15.1%)
higher-secondary education	472 (10.5%)	464 (10.6%)	472 (10.3%)	582 (10.8%)	925 (12.4%)	416 (10.6%)	469 (9.6%)	337 (5.5%)
higher education	94 (2.1%)	190 (4.4%)	75 (1.6%)	196 (3.6%)	166 (2.2%)	141 (3.6%)	90 (1.8%)	76 (1.2%)
<b>Age in 2018</b>								
Mean (SD)	50.14 (16.75)	52.45 (16.96)	46.30 (16.72)	49.96 (15.54)	47.86 (16.50)	48.08 (15.54)	46.14 (15.65)	47.98 (16.16)
<b>Gender</b>								
Female	2182 (48.7%)	2127 (48.8%)	2122 (46.1%)	2703 (50.0%)	3612 (48.4%)	1933 (49.4%)	2342 (47.8%)	2970 (48.8%)
Male	2303 (51.3%)	2230 (51.2%)	2481 (53.9%)	2701 (50.0%)	3852 (51.6%)	1981 (50.6%)	2562 (52.2%)	3115 (51.2%)
<b>Hukou status at age 12</b>								
Urban	477 (10.6%)	1311 (30.1%)	637 (13.8%)	1781 (33.0%)	885 (11.9%)	648 (16.6%)	290 (5.9%)	417 (6.9%)
Rural	4008 (89.4%)	3046 (69.9%)	3966 (86.2%)	3623 (67.0%)	6579 (88.1%)	3266 (83.4%)	4614 (94.1%)	5668 (93.1%)

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Table A2. Intergenerational mobility estimates at the national level

	Before 1945	1946- 1955	1956- 1965	1966- 1975	1976- 1985	1986- 1995
<b>Panel A. Relative mobility</b>						
<b>Regression coefficient</b>	0.377*** (0.028)	0.299** (0.017)	0.309** (0.013)	0.397** (0.010)	0.463** (0.011)	0.420** (0.011)
<b>Correlation coefficient</b>	0.268*** (0.018)	0.245** (0.012)	0.277** (0.011)	0.399** (0.010)	0.470** (0.011)	0.416** (0.011)
<b>Rank-rank correlation</b>	0.284*** (0.018)	0.230** (0.012)	0.226** (0.009)	0.349** (0.009)	0.453** (0.010)	0.404** (0.010)
With province FE	0.250*** (0.018)	0.197** (0.012)	0.200** (0.009)	0.304** (0.009)	0.398** (0.011)	0.375** (0.010)
Observations	3,556	5,623	7,141	8,719	7,300	9,032
<b>Panel B. Absolute mobility</b>						
<b>Probability of completing high school</b>						
Parents up to primary edu	0.080*** (0.005)	0.088** (0.004)	0.215** (0.005)	0.128** (0.004)	0.219** (0.007)	0.351** (0.008)
Parents above primary edu	0.262*** (0.032)	0.203** (0.018)	0.429** (0.016)	0.380** (0.010)	0.541** (0.008)	0.638** (0.006)
Gap	0.182*** (0.032)	0.115** (0.018)	0.213** (0.017)	0.253** (0.011)	0.322** (0.011)	0.287** (0.011)
<b>Panel C. Heterogeneity (Rank-rank)</b>						
<b>Gender differences</b>						
Men	0.261*** (0.023)	0.190** (0.016)	0.190** (0.012)	0.321** (0.012)	0.417** (0.014)	0.383** (0.014)
Observations	1,823	2,783	3,607	4,487	3,942	4,658
Women	0.294*** (0.026)	0.265** (0.017)	0.258** (0.013)	0.382** (0.013)	0.495** (0.015)	0.427** (0.015)
Observations	1,733	2,840	3,534	4,232	3,358	4,374
<b>Household registration status</b>						
Urban	0.235*** (0.038)	0.140** (0.020)	0.163** (0.017)	0.275** (0.021)	0.349** (0.024)	0.303** (0.022)
Observations	431	860	1,273	1,198	1,319	1,407
Rural	0.228*** (0.020)	0.159** (0.014)	0.172** (0.010)	0.267** (0.009)	0.340** (0.012)	0.324** (0.013)
Observations	3,125	4,763	5,868	7,521	5,981	7,625

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. No additional regressors are included unless otherwise noted.

Source: The data are from the China Family Panel Studies in 2010-2018.

Table A3. Intergenerational education mobility across eight economic regions

Province	Sample size	Relative mobility		Absolute mobility	
		1949- 1977	1978- 1995	1949-1977	1978- 1995

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Eastern coastal China	4485	0.290	0.384	0.213	0.500
Middle of the Yangtze River	4357	0.314	0.377	0.164	0.386
Middle of the Yellow River	4603	0.251	0.367	0.165	0.287
Northeast China	5404	0.232	0.497	0.185	0.251
Northern coastal China	7464	0.239	0.341	0.173	0.352
Northwest China	3914	0.253	0.366	0.125	0.265
Southern coastal China	4904	0.246	0.345	0.160	0.330
Southwest China	6085	0.272	0.449	0.090	0.218

Notes: relative education mobility is measured as the association between national expected ranks of children's education among their peers of the same birth cohort given their parental education ranks, while absolute education mobility is measured by the probability of completing high school if having parents with up to primary education. All the intergenerational mobility measures are based on regressions that do not control for other individual characteristics. Data from CFPS 2010-2018.

## Appendix B. Educational Gini Coefficients in China

Education inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient of years of schooling among the parental generation by cohort and province. Similar to the Gini coefficient of income, the most prevalent indicator of income inequality, education Gini coefficient is a consistent and robust measure of the relative distribution of education. Following Thomas et al. (2001) the education Gini index is calculated based on the following formula:

$$EduGini = \left( \frac{N}{N-1} \right) * \frac{1}{\mu} * [\sum_{i=2}^n \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} p_i |y_i - y_j| p_j]$$

where N is the number of individuals in the corresponding population,  $\mu$  is the average years of schooling for the corresponding population,  $p_i$  and  $p_j$  are the proportions of the population with certain levels of schooling, and  $y_i$  and  $y_j$  are the years of schooling at corresponding levels of education. The Education Gini statistic ranges from 0 to 1, with larger numbers representing higher levels of inequality.

Based on the education system in China, we divide the population into six educational categories, including illiterate, primary, lower secondary, high school, college, and university levels. The corresponding years of schooling are 0, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 17 years respectively. The Gini index of parental education ranges from 0.41 to 0.75 across 25 Chinese provinces for the 1949-1978 cohort, denoting the dramatic educational inequality in China in the pre-reform era.

816 The education Gini, however, decreases dramatically to the range between 0.21 and 0.39 for  
817 the 1979-1995 cohort, which perfectly lies between the range of 0.226-0.599 calculated by  
818 Yang et al. (2014) using data from the 1996 China Statistical Year Book. The decrease in the  
819 Gini coefficient suggests that China's economic and educational reforms in recent decades  
820 have reduced educational inequality.

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