Security in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel Region after Idris Déby

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Abstract

Idris Déby's counterinsurgency in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and the Sahel crafted imaginaries of Déby as a bulwark against terrorism in the region. Existing scholarship argue that Déby's death would accentuate insecurity in the region. The study adopts critical analysis and anchors on the theory of security regionalism to argue that the politics of Déby as a regional strongman constricted democratic spaces, invited violent opposition, and sustained rebellion in parts of the region. Although Déby provided occasional pushback when the terrorists inflicted harm on Chadian interests, he would not have won the war against terror unilaterally without regional cooperation.

Keywords: Terrorism; Sahel; Lake Chad Basin (LCB); insecurity; insurgency; war on terror; Idris Déby; counterinsurgency; Chadian Army

Introduction

President Idris Itno Déby of Chad died battling insurgents on April 20, 2021. He deposed President Hissenne Habre in 1990 and went on to win a sixth term in presidential elections on April 11, 2021, which triggered an invasion by a Libya-based rebel organization named the Force for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT).[1] His long term in office with a political structure designed to reproduce and sustain the domination of Chad by his family and cronies attracted violent opposition which kept him fighting wars for most of his reign. His military victories aided by his foreign allies projected Déby as a single dominant stabilizer of the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). His death has raised concerns about the stability of the countries within the LCB and the Sahel.[2] There are fears that the situation has the potential to destabilize Chad and accentuate instability in the Sahel region and the greater Central Africa.[3]

The anxiety over security in the LCB and Sahel in the aftermath of Déby's death is related to the imaginaries of his role as a visible determined actor in the fight against terrorism in the region. For thirty years, Déby sustained himself as the president of Chad by manipulating the constitution and the electoral process, weakening the opposition and civil society through the strategies of co-optation and repression,[4] as well as fighting different rebels and Jihadist insurgents within Chad and across the Sahel in order to present himself as a regional strongman and power broker.[5] His commitment to the war against terrorism was as unwavering as his commitment to retain political power by all means.[6] In pursuit of these two mutually reinforcing interests, he frequently took command of the Chadian fighting forces during external military interventions.[7] Perhaps, this courage of leading from the front which Déby presented as an altruistic intervention to rid the region of terrorist groups gave Chad international recognition and support,[8] that contributed to imbuing Chad's military force with high level of effectiveness

in expeditionary warfare particularly, in the desert zone.[9] In fact, the last major offensive against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin was by Chadian troops directly commanded by Déby. In that campaign, Boko Haram lost more than 1000 fighters while a large cache of their weaponry were captured by Déby's troop.[10] While this singular incident tended to be a source of question about national troops across the Sahel and LCB such as Nigeria that had not been able to defeat terror groups such as Boko Haram despite huge investments in the war for over a decade, it added to the international prestige of Déby as the strong man of Sahel and LCB, who is almost indispensable in the counterinsurgency in the region.

Existing literature on security in the LCB and Sahel in the aftermath of Déby's death presents two distinct lines of argument. One portrays Déby as a regional stabiliser who leads the fight against terrorism throughout the Sahel and plays a critical role in regional stabilisation.[11] Another line of argument presents Déby as a self-serving dictator who used the strategies of co-optation and repression against the opposition and the wider civil society in order to sustain his regime despite his poor governance and economic mismanagement in Chad.[12]

The 'regional stabiliser' school of thought lauded Déby and envisioned him as a stabilising force for Chad, the LCB, and the broader Sahel. They emphasise Déby's role in the fight against terrorism and argue that his demise spells doom for the region, as Chad may shift its focus to regime security and scale back, if not completely eliminate, its military intervention in the region.[13] Narratives of Déby as a stabilizer portray his military activities as selfless. Regrettably, this notion obscures Déby's self-serving aims, as his security interests in the region align more with the need for his regime security and by portraying himself as a regional strongman his objective was to gain Western favour and support. In supporting Déby, his Western allies tended to keep a limited focus on his military achievement and capacity to maintain at least a fragile

peace in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel. They overlooked Déby's undemocratic leadership,[14] and how his self-serving objectives fostered and prolonged instability in Chad and throughout the Sahel.

Conversely, the 'self-serving dictator' school argue that Déby was a selfish dictator who stifled democracy in Chad and whose support for counterinsurgency in Africa was driven by the need protect and sustain his reign in Chad.[15] Chad itself does not enjoy internal stability, rather what seems like stability in Chad was built on a weak foundation of Déby's personal dealings with the military and neighbouring countries.[16] Despite the nuances in existing scholarship, there appears to be widespread pessimism about Chad's and the region's stability in the aftermath of Déby's death. This pessimism arises mainly from the lack of research into how Déby's harsh dictatorship and regional strongman politics unwittingly fostered and maintained regional instability. Consequently, it is necessary to illustrate the connection between Déby's rule and the escalation of instability in Chad, the LCB, and the broader Sahel region and demonstrate that his removal may not worsen the region's security after all.

The core principles of security regionalism are that state and non-state actors are prominent players in regions, also that contestations over the concept of security and the securitisation of threats impact regional security dynamics. In order to impose their preferred kind of order within the region, regionalising actors pursue security projects based on their construction of the term 'security' and securitization of threats.[17] Adopting the theoretical perspective of security regionalism ensures a nuanced analysis of Deby's strongman politics, his military campaign against insurgencies and the dynamics of security in Chad, the LCB, and the larger Sahel region. We relied on data from secondary sources such as peer reviewed articles and experts' analysis published by reputable organisations which we critically analysed to illustrate the interests and

strategies adopted by key security actors and how these shapes security dynamics in the LCB and Sahel.

Following this introduction, the next two sections present the debate in extant literature and theoretical approach to the study respectively; the fourth section presents narrative of Déby's strongman politics in the region and its outcome in terms of proliferation of rebel groups, the fifth section explains Déby's dealings with the military, neighbouring countries and rebel groups across the LCB; the sixth section describes the nature of non-state armed groups in Chad, the LCB and Sahel; section seven shows the level of international support for Déby; section eight presents our narrative of security in the LCB and Sahel after Déby while last section presents conclusion of the study.

Idris Déby, strongman politics and the stability of the LCB/Sahel region: Contending perspectives

There are two broad lines of argument in existing literature with regards to the politics of Déby and stability in the LCB and Sahel. One emphasises Déby's role as a regional stabiliser who spearheaded the war against terrorism across the Sahel,[18] the other emphasises his role in deepening instability in Chad and neighbouring nations.[19] The regional stabiliser school of thought lauded Déby for his role in stabilising Chad and the larger Sahel. They emphasised Déby's involvement in the fight against terrorism and contend that his demise signals doom for the region as Chad may shift its priority to regime security and scale back, if not wholly eliminate, its military intervention in the region.

In line with the thoughts of the regional stabilizer school, Monerieff, Lesueur and Gazzini, argued that Déby's death generated uncertainty in Chad and dealt a blow to the G5 Sahel because

the exit of Déby jeopardised the region's ability to confront terror.[20] According to them, Chad under Déby made a substantial contribution to the region's fight against insurgency by playing a prominent military role in the war against terror in the Sahel. For instance, it contributed over 1,400 personnel for the UN peacekeeping in the region, another 1,200 personnel as part of the G5 Sahel in the border areas around Burkina Faso, Mali & Niger.[21] Devermont agreed that the death of Déby brought about uncertainty which could destabilize Chad. Post-Déby Chad will struggle to sustain its role in regional counterterrorism operations as it may suspend further deployment of troops and focus more on regime security as seen by recent recall of troops to help fight rebellion from armed groups such as the FACT which may likely increase with the demise of Déby.[22]

 In a similar vein, Blanchard, Arieff, Blanchard, and Husted assert Déby's death could jeopardise the region's counterinsurgency effort by diverting Chadian forces away from the LCB and greater Sahel to focus on internal security, as Chad's military intervention in the region had already overstretched its forces.[23] Orosz submitted that the demise of Déby could undermine counterterrorism because of possibility of reduced Chadian engagement in counterterrorism and the difficulty of replacing the Chadian troops in various operations such as MNJTF, G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5JF) or United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).[24]

Generally, viewpoint expressed by the line of argument which presents Déby as a regional stabiliser is taken in light of the likelihood that the military dictatorship established by Déby's son may prioritise regime security and focus more on internal insurrection to the detriment of regional counterinsurgency. As a result, Chadian forces deployed for counter-insurgency operations in the region may be repatriated to focus on internal security and this would have

repercussions for the fight against terror in the Sahel.[25] As noted by Blanchard, Arieff, Blanchard, and Husted, diversion of Chadian forces from the LCB could compromise the effectiveness of counterinsurgency in the region.[26] This explains why some analysts fear that Déby's demise would worsen the growing insecurity in the region.

Countering the narrative of Déby as a regional stabilizer, Shorey and Nickels exposed the political, economic, and structural vulnerabilities and risks associated with Déby's authoritarian rule in Chad, which they characterised as a precarious partner in the fight against terrorism. They warn that these vulnerabilities could spark instability in Chad and that excessive reliance on Chad in counterterrorism poses a threat to Central and West Africa, as 'there are no guarantees that Chad will remain stable long enough to mitigate or overcome terror threats in West and Central Africa'.[27] In another development, Eizenga warn that the much-vaunted political and military stability of Chad under Déby was built on a weak foundation characterized by continued and increasingly severe repression of the political opposition and civil society, fiscal crisis and disruption of the electoral calendar as well as the absence of succession planning.[28]

Extending the view of Eizenga, Happi narrates how Déby has consolidated power by manipulation of the constitution and repression of opposition and civil society in order to remain in power. This over-centralization of power engendered proliferation of several rebel groups that attempted severally to overthrow the government. Secondly, the harsh and deteriorating economic conditions in Chad contributed to violent protest against the government. Thirdly, the spillover effect of conflict across Chad's borders and neighbouring countries like Sudan, Libya and the Central African Republic heightens tension in the country.[29]

De Bruijn and Both aptly noted that repression was a pivotal political tool utilised by Déby, who, under the guise of war against terrorism, repressed civil society and introduced 'harsh measures

to fight against the perceived terrorist groups'.[30] De Bruijn and Both noted war on terror crusade by Déby paid off as it helped to legitimize his authoritarian rule among the international community by 'reaffirming his legitimacy as a president from a regional (i.e. an external) perspective'.[31] Déby, according to De Bruijn and Both created disorder by deliberately creating inequality, co-opting people to become part of the ruling party, plundering state resources and not providing services or salaries for the common man.[32]

Furthering the characterization of Déby as a self-serving dictator who contributed to instability in the region in pursuit of his selfish interest, Tubiana and Debos demonstrated that Chad's foreign policy under Déby was anchored on armed diplomacy which aimed at boosting its regional influence through military interventions in neighbouring countries.[33] This enabled Chad to establish good relations with its neigbouring states, obtain foreign support while repressing its domestic enemies. Chad under Déby interfered in the domestic affairs of weaker neighbours to install more friendly regimes. For instance, in the Republic of Congo, where Chad intervened in 1997 to help Denis Sassou-Nguesso retake power from the elected Pascal Lissouba, and in the Central African Republic (CAR), where they supported Francois Bozizé's takeover in 2003.[34]

Accordingly, Marc presents Déby as a selfish strong man of Chad who personalized the military and undermined institutionalization of the military. Marc further identified the objectives of Déby's military intervention to include regime protection, international recognition and legitimization of his poor governance in Chad.[35] Ultimately, the selfish ambition of Déby made him frame a Janus-faced politics which on the one hand supported regional stability through his military stunts against terrorists. On the other hand, he intervened in the internal conflict of neighbouring countries by aligning with some armed parties in such conflict as was seen in the case of CAR in 2013. More recently, Welz employed the theory of omnibalancing to

demonstrate how Déby sustained his authoritarian regime through three main strategies – appeasement, co-optation and repression. He suppressed internal threats through cooptation and appeasement of opposition groups while fighting and repressing opposition groups who refused cooptation or appeasement. He mitigated external threats to his regime through appeasing his immediate African neighbours while silencing international critiques by participating actively in international interventions against terrorism.[36]

Altogether, the debate in extant literature focused much on the significant role of Déby in countering terrorism in the region and possibility worsening insecurity and drawbacks in the fight against terrorism in the LCB and Sahel following the death of Déby. Existing narratives have not been able to consider how the domestic politics of Déby induced conflicts in Chad while his personal-interest and support for conflicting factions in the affairs of other states were important undercurrents of the conflicts in the Lake Chad Basin. Placing this factor side by side with the claim that the death of Déby would result in a setback in the region's peace, the logical flaw becomes quite evident.

Theoretical premise: Security Regionalism

Our analysis is anchored on the theory of security regionalism which conceives the region and its security as a construction of the dominant actors contesting for space and seeking to shape the security priorities within the region.[37] Security regionalism describes the pattern of competition by different regional actors wherein a dominant actor articulates dominant regional security priority and works towards forcing other actors to adapt accordingly.[38] The theory underscores the fact that regionalism and security are mutually constitutive given that regions are usually contested and constructed in ways that suit the security projects and practices of actors.[39] Baldaro contends that security regionalism within the context of the Sahel is better appreciated by

locating non-state and informal actors of different natures as agents able to implement their own regional projects irrespective of those advanced by indigenous governments and international actors. Regional security dynamics are usually products of security transformation representing the unintended consequences of the (in)actions of a dominant actor and the corresponding resistance from other critical actors resisting such (in)actions.[40]

The theory of security regionalism is analytically germane for this study because it presents the Sahel region and the (in)security thereof as imaginaries constructed by a dominant actor who attempts to shape the security project and architecture of the region in accordance with the actor's (in)security perception and priorities. The real security dynamics of the region is not usually the outcome of the (in)actions by such dominant actor but a product of contestation of various other actors competing for power and space in the region while also constructing (in)security within their own lenses as well as pursuing their own security priorities.[41]

The theory of security regionalism provides a veritable analytical framework for illuminating the outcome of Idris Déby's regional strongman politics and counterterrorism efforts in the region. Déby became the president of Chad on 5 December 1990 following his overthrow of Hissène Habré under whom he served as chief military adviser. Since after his emergence as the president of Chad, for 30 years, Déby ruled Chad as a single dominant actor and intervened in politics of weaker neighbours in ways that led to proliferation and sustenance of violent opposition groups which undermine the stability of Chad and the entire LCB.

Déby's strongman politics and the consequent proliferation of violent opposition is explained by two factors which contextualized his rule. First is constriction of the democratic space through repression of opposition and civil society, manipulation of the constitution and electoral processes. Second is personalization of the military and a foreign policy anchored on armed

diplomacy aimed at denying his opposition groups safe haven across the Sahel. While he narrowed the democratic space, prompted the rise of violent armed opposition groups, the pursuit of armed diplomacy incubated/sustained rebel groups across the LCB and Sahel but has endeared him to Western powers who perceived him as a regional strongman and a veritable ally critical for the success of the fight against terrorism in the Sahel.

Déby's Strongman Politics and (In)Stability in Chad/LCB

All through his rule as the president of Chad, Déby constricted the democratic space by manipulating the constitution to extend his rule while adopting a mixed strategy of cooptation, intimidation and repression of the opposition including the entire civil society. For instance, in 2001 when Déby was reelected as the President through an election considered to be fraudulent, he promised that would be his last mandate as he would arrange for a smooth transition for a new President in Chad. By 2003, Déby hatched plans to renege on his promise using his cronies to submit a proposal for a constitutional amendment to allow Déby unlimited terms in office.[42] Despite opposition to this plan, in 2005, a referendum approved a change to the constitution to allow Déby contest the 2006 election.

In 2018, history was repeated when the constitution was amended to allow Déby contest the 2021 election and serve two terms in office. The new constitution returned the two-term limit scrapped in the 2005 referendum. But it was not applied retroactively, thereby granting Déby the possibility of serving two terms after the election in 2021. This allowed Déby to contest and win the 2021 elections in Chad. To ensure complete control over the legislative arm of government, Déby adopted the strategy of postponing parliamentary elections on grounds of lack of funds and delays in the process of biometric voter registration.[43] This enabled him to ensure the dominance of his party in the parliament. The National Assembly that was elected in 2002 to serve for just

four years sat until 2011. In 2015, parliamentary elections were postponed even when the mandate of the National Assembly ended in 2014.[44] The ad-hoc scheduling of the electoral calendar under Déby meant that elections into the National Assembly were irregular. This undermined the efficacy of the legislature and weakened democratic governance in Chad given that the legislature is a defining feature of democratic rule and government accountability.[45]

Beyond extending his stay in power through manipulation of the constitution and electoral processes, Déby weakened the opposition parties through cooptation involving rewarding members of opposition groups with positions and money while intimidating or in some cases assassinating other strong opposition figures who refused cooptation. This resulted in continuous failure of the opposition in Chad's presidential elections and their inability to secure a majority in the National Assembly since the first election held under Déby in 1996. For instance, following the 2008 offensive against N'Djamena by rebel groups who attempted to overthrow Déby, the main opposition figure, Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, was allegedly kidnapped by Déby's bodyguards and assassinated hours after the defeat of the offensive in early February 2008.[46]

Since the introduction of the multiparty system in 1991, at least 150 political parties have been registered in Chad; even though the number had reached 200 by 2016, only 36 of these parties had representatives in one or more of Chad's National Assemblies elected since 1996.[47] In 2016 due to the strategy of repression and cooptation, at least, ninety-six political parties joined a presidential alliance supporting Déby's candidacy for the 2016 presidential election.[48] The opposition's continued electoral failure bolsters our argument about Déby's constriction of democratic space. As Huntington remarked, a system is undemocratic to the extent that it

marginalises the opposition. The opposition political party's persistent failure to win office via election in any state casts doubt on the degree of competition permitted by the system.[49]

Likewise, civil society was subject to ongoing persecution as the government violently suppressed protest groups opposing Déby's authoritarian authority. In 2016, Chadian citizens, especially youths, took to the streets to protest against the regime following the re-election of president Déby in April in an election considered fraudulent and the cuts in students' monthly allowances, including civil servants' bonuses, on the grounds of shortage in state's treasury resulting from declining oil prices. The state repressed these protests, cutting off the internet and blocking bloggers' websites.[50]

In the same year, several civil society platforms such as *Enough Is Enough* and the Iyina Youth Movement protested during the presidential electoral campaign, demanding political change. Security forces, responded by arresting members of the Union of Trade Unions of Chad. Chadian authorities also arrested the spokespersons of Enough is Enough and Iyina youth movement. They were charged with 'incitement to an unarmed gathering,' 'disobeying an order' and 'disturbing public order'.[51]

In April 2017, Nadjo Kaina and Bertrand Solloh, leaders of the citizen movement *IYINA* ("We are tired" in local Arabic), were arrested by Chadian National Security Agency — *Agencenationale de sécurité* (ANS) agents for calling on citizens to wear red on 10 April, the anniversary of the 2016 presidential election, to protest against corruption and impunity. Both were tortured while in detention, including being suffocated with plastic bags containing chili.[52]

The dominance of state politics and the constriction of the democratic space under Déby engendered a proliferation of armed opposition in and around Chad, which attempted to

destabilise the country and overthrow Déby. For instance, following the 2005 constitutional amendment allowing Déby unlimited term in office, in late 2005, new armed groups emerged and announced that they intended to overthrow Idris Déby. Many officers in the military and the then Presidential Guard left to join the opposition including hardcore opponents of Déby's regime such as Tama or Waddaï people as well as some cadres of Déby's Zaghawa ethnic group who had helped in building Déby's regime. This led to the emergence of a loose alliance of rebel groups that mounted the 2008 offensive to overthrow Déby.[53]

It was the declaration of Déby as winner of the April 11, 2021 election which gave him the sixth term presidency that triggered an invasion by a Libya-based rebel group – FACT – which led to eventual death of Déby.[54] The group noted that it resorted to arms because of the constriction of democratic space in Chad where it desires democratic transition.[55] Thus, the constriction of the democratic space under Déby and the resort to armed opposition by various groups who sought to overthrow the autocratic regime with which they were dissatisfied demonstrates that Déby's style of rule contributed to the emergence and sustenance of violent opposition and instability in Chad during the over 30 years of his reign in Chad.

Personalisation of the military, pursuit of armed diplomacy and sustenance of rebels across the LCB

Having examined how Déby constricted the democratic space and the discontent it created within Chad, we now examine how he personalized the military and foreign policy of Chad in ways that created/sustained armed groups outside Chad particularly within the LCB. Chad has a long history of primordial division within its military orchestrated by the presidents who sought personal control of the armed forces to ensure regime security. Tombalbye, the first president of

Chad promoted Sara officers over the Muslim Hadjarai group,[56] as a way of favouring his ethnic group and controlling the military.

In the same way, Déby personalized Chadian military by ensuring that the military was structured to revolve around him as a single individual with military officers being individually loyal to him as a person instead of the military as an institution. This he achieved through the recruitment process, the composition, command structure and reward system in the military which were based on personal interests on Déby. Many members of Chad's armed forces under Déby were recruited directly from the rebel MPS forces that brought Déby to power. The MPS was formed by Déby in 1989 when he fled to Sudan after being accused of plotting a coup against Habre's regime.[57] Supported by France, Sudan and Libya, the MPS overthrew Habre and Déby assumed power as the president of Chad on December, 5 1990.[58]

In terms of ethnic composition, Déby's military was a mosaic of different ethnic groups, clans and kin who were individually loyal to Déby. Many key officers who dominated the armed forces were Déby's Beri kinsmen. He maintained this mosaic composition of the military to ensure disunity among members of the armed forces due to their ethnic differences. More so, the ethnic composition of the military and their disunity gave Déby the opportunity to reward individuals/groups loyal to him while suppressing and coercing those suspected not to be loyal (Orosz, 2021). The president's relatives, including his sons, occupied more important positions in the military. The *Direction générale des services de sécurité des institutions de l'Etat* (DGSSIE, or General Direction of the Security Services of State Institutions) was commanded by the president's son, Mahamat "Kaka", the National Nomadic Guard was commanded by Déby's cousin, Mahamat Saleh Brahim, while Ahmat Yusuf - another cousin of Déby- headed the *Renseignementmilitaire* (Military Intelligence), his other cousin, Bokhit Digin, led the joint

Chad-Sudan border force, while his brother, Omar, directed the strategic reserve (armaments and other supplies). At lower levels, non-Beri officers often had Beri deputies, who wield the real power.[59]

With regards to hierarchy of command, orders did not always flow according to the rank and file in the military hierarchy as members of the Chadian Armed Forces individually responded to orders from president Déby himself. Key officers of the Chadian national army – ANT – including the ANT Deputy Chief of Staff, Saleh Toma, Ground Forces Commander Ismaïl Hur, the head of the Gendarmerie Taher Erda, and various zonal commanders reported directly to president Déby. Some of the departments within the armed forces such as the DGSSIE got their budgets directly from the presidency.[60] This distortion of the normal hierarchy of the military ensured that commands were issued directly by Déby to suit his personal interests while information flowed directly to him from the rank and file, thereby maintaining his strong control over the military as well as avoiding mutiny by any group within the military. The military was at the beck and call of Déby and he swiftly deployed it in pursuit of his personal interests in Chad and across the LCB.

Chad's foreign policy under Déby was not institutionalised and was centred on Déby's personality and interests. Under Déby, Chad's foreign policy was based on armed diplomacy, which bolstered Déby's image as Africa's strongman and enabled him to secure military assistance from the West to conduct additional regional military interventions across the LCB and Sahel. Déby accomplished two critical objectives in this manner.

First, Déby decimated his domestic adversaries with external assistance and denied them any foreign assistance or haven throughout the region through his aggressive anti-terrorism campaign. With international support, Chad was able to decimate elements of the *janjaweed* who

were active in Chad as well as armed groups like the *Front uni pour le changement* (FUC), also called the *Front uni pour le Changement Démocratique* (FUCD) which received support from Sudan to destabilize Eastern Chad and install a pro-Sudanese regime in N'Djamena.[61] In fact, the raid on N'Djamena in April 2006 by the FUCD provided opportunity for Déby to obtain international support such as Resolution 1778, adopted unanimously by the United Nations Security Council on 25 September 2007, and subsequently created the European Union Force (EUFOR) Chad/CAR, which deployed at least 3,700 troops, conducted more than 2000 short-range patrols, over 440 long-range patrols and about 500 air missions in Eastern Chad and in the North East of the Central African Republic .[62]

Secondly, Déby was able to intervene in conflict of neighbouring countries where he supported his allies against perceived non-allies in pursuit of his personal interest under the guise of fighting terrorism. For instance, in 2003, Déby supported François Bozizé's takeover in CAR through a military coup. Between 2012 and 2013 as relationship between Déby and Bozizé waned, Déby provided support to Seleka rebels in CAR to undermine François Bozizé's.[63] So, through his foreign policy of armed diplomacy geared at regime protection, Déby sowed discord in neighbouring countries by encouraging insurrection in those nations. As noted by Tubiana 'although Chad has at times been depicted as a centre of stability in the region, it has often played a destabilizing role in Darfur – dividing the rebels, intentionally or not – and in the CAR'.[64]

Understanding the nature of non-state armed groups in Chad, the LCB and Sahel region

Based on operational location and core interest, we categorised the non-state armed actors (NSAGs) operating in the LCB and Sahel into two broad categories. The first broad category consists of the rebel groups led by ethnic and political warlords whose core interest is to

reconfigure the power structure in their country of origin through overthrow of the incumbent. The second broad category consists of the jihadist insurgents involved in acts of terrorism while seeking to take control of territorial space in countries where they operate with the ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic Caliphate in the Sahel.[65]

Within the context of Idris Déby's politics and war on terror, we further subdivide the first broad category of NSAGs (i.e. rebel groups) into two distinct types rebels based on their operational areas and interest. First are rebel groups contesting political power within Chad and are products of Déby's authoritarian rule. This group is mainly made up of defectors from Déby's government and military who sought to overthrow Déby. Such groups include the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD).[66] The second type of rebel groups are those contesting power in other neighbouring states. Déby at sometimes supported this second type of rebel groups while he pursued his interests in the region but at sometimes pushed fought them when they were no longer useful to him or when their activities threatened the security of his regime. This includes the rebel groups like the Seleka in CAR.

We begin with the analysis of the two types of rebel groups destabilizing the region to show how some are products of either political repression by Déby or his support at one time or the other in pursuit of his personal interest across the region. The UFDD, exemplifies the rebel groups which are products of Déby's repressive rule. The UFDD emerged in 2006 as one of the largest rebel groups operating in eastern Chad under the leadership of Mahamat Nouri with an estimated 2,000 - 3,000 militants under its command. Mahamat Nouri defected from Déby's regime after serving in his cabinet between 1995 and 2004 including serving as Chad's ambassador to Saudi Arabia. In 2006, the UFDD led an unsuccessful offensive on N'Djamena, in order to overthrow Déby's regime. The UFDD also received support from Sudan in retaliation for Chad's support to

rebel groups operating in Sudan.[67] Since its formation, due to a mix of internal bickering leading to defection of some of its members, the failed offensive against Déby's regime and supports received from Sudan, the Mahamat Nouri led UFDD has mutated in structure and membership but remained resilient and committed to overthrowing Déby.

In 2008, after the failed attack on N'Djamena, Sudan supported the launch of a new rebel coalition called the Alliance Nationale (AN) which was still headed by Mahamat Nouri but comprised of the remnants of Nouri's UFDD, and the *Front pour le salut de la République* (FSR), recently formed and led by Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane, a Chadian Arab and a former minister under Déby. It was also joined by the *Union des forces pour le changement démocratique* (UFCD), founded less than one month earlier from Ouaddaïan splinters of the UFDD and *Rassemblement des forces pour le changement* – RFC rebels.[68]

By 2016, a number of rebel groups unified under the leadership of Mahamat Nouri and Mahdi Ali Mahamat to form the Front for the Change and Unity in Chad (FACT). FACT emerged as splinter group of the former UFDD and has an estimated 1000 combatants.[69] In April 2021, FACT forces launched an offensive from southeastern Libya into northern Chad leading to the death of Déby from injuries sustained in the battlefield.[70] It needs to be noted that the geographical location of Chad and its ethnic configuration creates room for cross-border ties among distinct ethnic groups in different neighbouring countries. The Christian/animist Sara of southern Chad are prominent in both Chad and Central African Republic. The Arabs of eastern Chad are have ethnic connections with Sudan while the Tubus in northern Chad have links with Fezzane Province in Libya.[71] This makes it easy for rebel groups in Chad to mobilize cross-border support to launch attacks against the incumbent in N'Djamena from outside Chad.

We now look at the second type of rebels – those contesting political power in other countries but sometimes supported by Chad – with a view to demonstrating how Déby incubated and used such rebel groups to bring instability to the region. Déby provided supports to the Seleka rebels in CAR as well as various factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Sudan. Although in the early days of his rule, Déby had refused support to the SLA and JEM, by 2003, he began to support some factions of the rebel groups mainly due to pressures from his Beri kinsmen who made up the groups. His support for factions of the SLA and JEM made Sudan to provide safe haven for armed opposition aiming to overthrow Déby including the *Janjaweed* elements in Chad fighting against the government of Déby.

Throughout 2005, Déby formed closer alliance with the JEM and the Zaghawa faction of the SLA, led by Minni Arku Minnawi. In February 2005, Déby paid SDG 500 million (approximately USD 240,000) to the SLA which enabled the group to purchase anti-aircraft weapons in Chad and from the end of 2005 Chad armed Darfur rebels directly by transferring arms taken from Chadian rebels to the JEM rebel groups which also fought along Chadian army to repel rebel groups in Chad.[72] In CAR, Seleka emerged in 2012 as an alliance of various armed groups sought to overthrow Bozizé's regime. In order to actualize Chad's objective of maintaining security in the border region and ensuring that the CAR does not become a sanctuary for Chadian armed opposition groups, Déby provided support for the Seleka group by withdrawing Chadian army units posted in Bangui to provide personal security to Bozizé, liberating Seleka leaders such as Noureddine Adam and Mohammed Moussa Dhaffane from house arrest and providing the Seleka rebels with intelligence and military equipment.[73] Chadian

officers occupied high-ranking positions in the Seleka leadership and Brigadier General of the Chadian army, Mahamat Bahar was nominated by Seleka as its Chief of military intelligence.

In order to bolster the strength of the Seleka rebels, the Chadian contingent within the *Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduit africaine* (MISCA) peacekeeping mission at Damara, stopped preventing the advance of rebel forces towards Bangui. This enable the Seleka group to take over power after the coup of March 2013.[74] The overthrow of Bozizé created room for the Seleka to pillage the towns, extort the people and commit various acts of human rights violations and including extrajudicial killings which plunged CAR into widespread instability in 2014.[75] The intervention of Déby in the local politics of CAR, particularly the support it provided for the Seleka rebels and the concomitant instability arising from the activities of the Seleka rebels demonstrates to role of Déby as a purveyor of instability in the Sahel.

Having analysed the nature of various rebel groups in the region and the place of Déby in incubating and/or accentuating their rebellion, we now turn to activities of the Jihadists insurgents in the region and Déby's engagement with this category of non-state armed groups. The overarching objectives of the Jihadist insurgents in the Sahel is to extend the global jihad and establish Islamic caliphate in the Sahel.[76] Accordingly, by 2007, the GSPC (*Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat or Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat*) – a terrorist group established during the Algerian Civil War – transformed into AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) after declaring allegiance to Al-Qaeda.

The core objective of the AQIM was to fight local corrupt states and their Western allies and replace them with an African Islamic caliphate.[77] It is within this context that insurgents like Boko Haram emerged in Nigeria in 2009 with material, logistic and doctrinal support from the

AQIM,[78] to contest the sovereignty and legitimacy of the Nigerian state. By 2014, Boko Haram had started to move across the borders of Chad and escalated its violence in the LCB throughout 2015, leading to death of hundreds of Chadians. In June 2015, the group launched an offensive on the police headquarters and national police academy in N'Djamena which resulted in death of 37 people with more than 100 others wounded.[79]   Although the National Assembly in Chad established a state of emergency in the Lake region and placed it under military administration in November 2015 in order to contain the activities of Boko Haram, by March 2020, Boko Haram fighters attacked Chadian military base at Bohoma killing 98 soldiers.[80]   Déby fought aggressively against Boko Haram by participating effectively in the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with its headquarters based in N'Djamena. In April 2020, Chadian armed forces launched a major attack against Boko Haram which led to the death of at least 1000 Boko Haram fighters.[81]

Déby was described as Nigeria's strongest ally in the MNJTF due to the significant role he played making Chad a buffer between North Africa, the Sahel, East and West Africa.[82] Elsewhere, in places like the tri-border region linking Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, where local Jihadist insurgents affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are active, Déby played significant counterterrorism roles.[83]   However, while Déby contributed to the push back of Boko Haram insurgents and other Jihadist terrorist groups in the LCB, he also provided the interstices exploited by the Jihadist group to proliferate in the region. If for no other reason, the political repression and economic deprivation in Chad had the tendency of churning out large number of potential recruits for the Jihadist insurgents and provided havens for incubation of insurgents in Chad. There is evidence that some of Boko Haram members included individuals from Chad.[84]

The nature and outcome of Déby's intervention in war on terror across the Sahel as shown in the case of Boko Haram demonstrates that Déby would not have defeated the monstrous war on terror by Jihadist insurgents as a single dominant regional actor, but had capacity to occasionally pushback and degrade the terrorists when the terrorists inflict major harm on Chadian interests and threatens security of Déby's regime. As will be seen in the next section, even the nature of commitment and support of Western donors to Chad in the fight against terrorism only ended up degrading but not completely destroying the jihadists thereby giving them opportunity to recuperate and mutate.[85]

International recognition and support to Déby for counter terrorism in the LCB and Sahel

In this section, we raised questions about the nature of commitment of major powers and multilateral organisations in their assistance on the war against terror. Déby's positioning as the strongman of the Sahel in terms of fight against Jihadist insurgency and terrorism yielded positive results for Déby as Chad was appointed in leadership position in international communities including the AU and UN. Chad represented Central Africa in the AU Peace and Security Council, and successfully campaigned for a seat as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.[86]

Chad's government under Déby made new connections with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).[87] In 2016 Déby was appointed Chairperson of AU and in March 2017 Moussa Faki who served as Déby's Prime Minister between 2003 and 2005, then as foreign minister from 2008 became Chairperson of the AU Commission.[88] Déby's counter terrorism interventions raised his international status, and made major powers turn blind eyes on concerns over repression, human rights abuses, and corruption under Déby's regime.[89]In the past few years, the AU had suspended all countries with an unconstitutional change of government (Egypt

2013, Burkina Faso 2014, Sudan 2019 and Mali 2020). But the perception of Chad as dominant actor in the fight against Jihadist insurgents in the Sahel made AU grant Chad an exemption and suspension was avoided after the military junta took over in 2021.[90]

Beyond the international recognition, Chad attracted support of the Western countries particularly, France and the U.S in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel either as a direct recipient of funds, military equipment, capacity building, troops or as a strategic ally in operational intervention. French military cooperation is considered most successful in Chad out of all of its African partners. Prior to the 2008 rebel offensive in Chad, France had helped Chad develop a viable air force and provided 50 per cent of the fuel for the air force[91]. This enabled Déby to defeat the rebels in 2008. France assisted in modernization and restructuring of Chadian army in the areas of organizing military human resources, overseeing training programs, logistics management, and intelligence gathering.[92]

In 2007, Déby obtained support of the UNSC which adopted Resolution 1778 under whose mandate the European Union conducted a military bridging operation - European Union Force (EUFOR) Chad/CAR – from 28 January 2008 to 15 March 2009. The EUFOR Tchad/CAR was considered as the most multinational military operation deployed in Africa with 14 European Union (EU) Member States present in the field, 19 in theatre, and 22 at the operation headquarters at Mont Valérien.[93] Between 2009 and 2013, the United States obligated approximately $13 million in TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) funds to Chad and have trained the Chadian Army's elite Special Anti-Terrorism Group which is the only African force to participate in the French-led offensive in Mali in early 2013.[94]

The supports from the major powers and multilateral organisations are driven by two key factors. First is the geostrategic location of Chad which allows major powers such as France to maneuver

and respond swiftly between its other bases Africa.[95] This explains why Chad served as the force headquarters of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA and currently provides the headquarters for Operation Berkhane, MNJTF amongst others. Second is the philosophy and strategy that undergird support of major powers. The major powers consider countries of the Sahel as fragile states which lack capacity to enforce sovereignty thereby creating room for proliferation of non-state armed actors which threaten international order and need to be contained via building security capacities of the state.[96]

In building security capacities of the states in the Sahel to address insecurity in the region, we argue that the Western powers have preferred security practices which mirror their imaginaries about security in the region. It is within this context that security practices of the West imagine Déby as a dependable regional strongman who can serve as a veritable partner for execution of security strategies of the Western powers which involved amongst others countering terrorism in Sahel with limited footprints of the major powers in the region so as to reduce casualties on the side of the major powers. France military intervention and support in Chad and Africa in general is guided by what DeVore termed strategic satisficing – which means the use of minimal force to produce satisfactory political outcomes.[97] This strategy is not new but has guided France military intervention in Africa since the 1960s. U.S. military intervention in Africa is guided by its light footprint strategy which prioritize supporting her allies in Africa to pursue the objective of containing terrorism in the region.[98]

Chad's long history of fighting insurgency and the willing disposition of Déby to be at the forefront of the fight against terror since his takeover of office makes Chad a perfect partner for the major in the fight against terrorism in the LCB and Sahel. However, the support of Chad by the Western powers to combat terrorism in the Sahel as a regional strongman demonstrated how

security practices of a dominant actor may not respond to the real threats and effectively destroy terrorism in the region. As aptly noted by DeVore, French strategy of intervention in the Sahel ends up degrading but not completely destroying the non-state armed groups.[99] The recuperation of Boko Haram even after pushbacks by Déby attests to this.

Security in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel after Idris Déby

Following the death of Déby, the military suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament and abolished the government which it replaced with the *Conseil Militaire de Transition* or Transitional Military Council (CMT) headed by Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno – the 37-year-old son of Déby.[100] The dominant argument in existing scholarship is that the exit of Déby would worsen instability in the LCB and Sahel.[101] Contrary to this apocalyptic prognosis, we argue that the exit of Déby may attenuate the instability in Chad, the LCB and Sahel due to the following reasons.

Déby's successor may prioritize regime protection, put an end to the self-serving regional strongman politics pursued by Déby and deemphasize intervention in internal politics of neighbouring countries. In order to focus on internal politics of Chad, the successor will likely not provide support for non-state armed actors which Déby had supported in neighbouring countries like CAR and Sudan. This will reduce tension in neighbouring countries and further create opportunity such neighbours to build trust, pursue a more sustainable policy of rapprochement towards Chad and refrain from providing support to Chadian rebel groups operating from such countries. A more stable and united Chad would enable the country dedicate its military resources in a more benign and altruistic manner to focus on one regional enemy – Jihadist insurgents. This will go a long way in degrading and destroying Jihadist insurgents in

the LCB and Sahel, given that resources wasted on fighting and supporting rebel groups will now be channeled to support the ongoing counterterrorism in the region.

The non-state armed groups which had fought Déby's regime will likely cease fire, at least temporarily, to watch the direction of Déby's immediate successor particularly how inclusive the government will be. If the CMT reins in political repression, works within the provision of the constitution and conducts transparent and credible transition to usher in inclusive and popular government, then many non-state armed will likely silence the guns and follow the path of peaceful participation in government. Already, one of the major rebel groups – FACT – has shown willingness to ceasefire and toe the path of dialogue if the current regime opens up the space.[102] Moreover, the CMT has adopted a transitional charter which has provisions for national dialogue and elections.[103] Although there are fears as to whether the CMT would keep to the promise of holding elections,[104] relevant stakeholders could leverage the current opportunity provided by the transition to build peace and stability in Chad by ensuring transparent and participatory decision.

Conclusion

For 30 years, Idris Déby ruled Chad with an iron fist which enabled him to suppress opposition and dissenting voices including the civil society. Beyond Chad, he was seen as a strong dominant actor in the LCB and the Sahel due to his military intervention in weaker neighbours like the CAR and Sudan as well as his aggressive fight against Jihadist insurgents across the region. His military campaign against terrorism endeared him to major powers particularly France and the U.S who saw Déby as a veritable African partner in the fight against terrorism in the region. The

untimely death of Déby in the battle field in 2021 remains a shock and a big source of worry to his Western allies who fear that his death would trigger instability in Chad and undermine fight against terrorism in the LCB and Sahel.

This paper has argued against the notion that Idris Déby's demise will exacerbate the region's insecurity. Without diminishing Déby's outstanding contributions to the fight against terrorism and insurgency in the LCB and Sahel, we shed light on the factors that sustained terrorist insurgency and harmed regional peace. At its heart, we narrated Idris Déby's politics as a single dominant actor, constricting democratic competition spaces and inviting violent opposition. We argued that his exit could pave the way for peacebuilding in Chad and help quell rebellion by rebel groups throughout the region if his successor ended his family's and cronies' stranglehold on Chadian politics.

We examined the character of insurgent and terrorist actors in the region as well as nature of commitment of major powers in their assistance on the war against terror and noted that if anything, Déby and his Western allies have not defeated the monstrous war against Jihadist insurgents, but had provided occasional pushback when the terrorist inflicted major harm on Chadian interests.

The nature of conflicts in the Sahel and LCB and the outcome of Déby's military campaign demonstrates that one national strong man would be incapable of ending insurgency in the region unilaterally without cooperation of other regional neighbours in counterinsurgency against Jihadist insurgents. There is need for regional cooperation and peacebuilding initiatives which takes consideration of the nuances in the internal security dynamics of each state, ensures stability in each of the fragile states in the region as well as effective capacity of sovereign states

to control their borders so as to avoid cross border movement of terror groups and spillover of conflicts into neighboring states in the LCB and Sahel region.

Notes

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1. African Union, "Chad: Idriss Déby Dies," 2.

2. Orosz, "Price of stability"; Devermont, "Déby's Dead."

3. African Union, "Chad: Idriss Déby Dies," 2.

4. De Bruijn and Both, "Youth: Contesting Legitimacy"; Tubiana and Dabos, *"Déby's Chad: Political Manipulation"*; Happi, *"Chad Conflict Insight"*; Welz, "Omnibalancing and International Interventions."

5. Shorey & Nickels, "Chad: A Precarious Partner."

6. Welz, "Omnibalancing and International Interventions."

7. Orosz, "Price of stability"

8. De Bruijn and Both, "Youth: Contesting Legitimacy"

9. Griffin, "Operation Barkhane: French Counterterrorism."

10. Happi, *Chad Conflict Insight.*

11. Griffin, "Operation Barkhane: French Counterterrorism"; Shepherd & Melly, "Stability and vulnerability"; Monerieff, Lesueur and Gazzini, "Chad: After Idriss Déby"; Orosz, "Price of stability."

12. Tubiana, *Chad-Sudan Proxy War*; Shorey and Nickels, "Chad: A Precarious Partner"; De Bruijn and Both, "Youth: Contesting Legitimacy"; Tubiana and Debos, *Déby's Chad: Political Manipulation*; Eizenga, "The Unstable Foundations"; Marc, "Death of Chadian President"; Happi, *Chad Conflict Insight*, Welz "Omnibalancing and International Interventions."

13. Devermont, "Déby's Dead"; Orosz, "Price of stability."

14. Welz "Omnibalancing and International Interventions."

15. ibid

16. Shorey and Nickels, "Chad: A Precarious Partner"; Eizenga, "The Unstable Foundations."

17. Baldaro, "Rashomon in the Sahel," 4.

18. Griffin, "Operation Barkhane: French Counterterrorism"; Shepherd & Melly, "Stability and vulnerability"; Monerieff, Lesueur and Gazzini, "Chad: After Idriss Déby"; Orosz, "Price of stability."

19. Tubiana, *Chad-Sudan Proxy War*; Shorey and Nickels, "Chad: A Precarious Partner"; De Bruijn and Both, "Youth: Contesting Legitimacy"; Tubiana and Debos, *Déby's Chad:*

Political Manipulation; Eizenga, "The Unstable Foundations"; Marc, "Death of Chadian President"; Happi, *Chad Conflict Insight*, Welz "Omnibalancing and International Interventions."

20. Monerieff, Lesueur and Gazzini, "Chad: After Idriss Déby"

21. Ibid., 3

22. Devermont, "Déby's Dead"; Orosz, "Price of stability."

23. Blanchard et al., "Chad: President Déby's Death."

24. Orosz, "Price of stability."

25. Monerieff, Lesueur and Gazzini, "Chad: After Idriss Déby"

26. Blanchard et al., "Chad: President Déby's Death."

27. Shorey and Nickels, "Chad: A Precarious Partner," 10.

28. Eizenga, "The Unstable Foundations."

29. Happi, *Chad Conflict Insight*.

30. De Bruijn and Both, "Youth: Contesting Legitimacy," 786.

31. Ibid., 786.

32. Ibid., 788.

33. Tubiana and Debos, "*Déby's Chad: Political Manipulation.*"

34. Ibid.

35. Marc, "Death of Chadian President"

36. Welz "Omnibalancing and International Interventions."

37. Döring & Herpolsheimer, "The Spaces of Intervention"; Baldaro, "Rashomon in the Sahel."

38. Baldaro, "Rashomon in the Sahel."

39. Charbonneau, "Whose 'West Africa'?"; Döring & Herpolsheimer, "The Spaces of Intervention."

40. Baldaro, "Rashomon in the Sahel."

41. Ibid.

42. Marchal, "An emerging military power."

43. Tubiana and Debos, *Déby's Chad: Political Manipulation.*

44. Tubiana and Debos, *Déby's Chad: Political Manipulation.*

45. Eizenga, "The Unstable Foundations."

46. Marchal, "An emerging military power."

47. Tubiana and Debos, *Déby's Chad: Political Manipulation.*

48. Tubiana and Debos, *Déby's Chad: Political Manipulation.*

49. Huntington. *The Third Wave.*

50. De Bruijn and Both, "Youth: Contesting Legitimacy."

51. Happi, *Chad Conflict Insight.*

52. Amnesty International, "Crackdown on Fundamental Freedom."

53. Marchal, "An emerging military power."

54. African Union, "Chad: Idriss Déby Dies."

55. Blanchard et al., "Chad: President Déby's Death."

56. DeVore, "Preserving Power after Empire."

57. Tubiana and Debos, *Déby's Chad: Political Manipulation,* 6.

58. Ibid., 6.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Tubiana, *Chad-Sudan Proxy War*.

62. Tubiana, *Chad-Sudan Proxy War;* European Union's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), *EU Military Operation*.

63. Weyns et al., *Mapping Conflict Motives*.

64. Tubiana, *Chad-Sudan Proxy War*, 18.

65. Baldaro, "Rashomon in the Sahel."

66. Happi, *Chad Conflict Insight.*

67. Tubiana, *Chad-Sudan Proxy War*.

68. Ibid.

69. Happi, *Chad Conflict Insight.*

70. African Union, "Chad: Idriss Déby Dies."

71. DeVore, "Preserving Power after Empire."

72. Tubiana, *Chad-Sudan Proxy War*.

73. Weyns et al., *Mapping Conflict Motives*.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Baldaro, "Rashomon in the Sahel."

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Happi, *Chad Conflict Insight*.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Blanchard et al., "Chad: President Déby's Death."

83. Ibid.

84. Tubiana and Gramizzi, *Tubu Trouble.*

85. DeVore, "Preserving Power after Empire."

86. Tubiana and Debos, *Déby's Chad: Political Manipulation.*

87. Shorey and Nickels, "Chad: A Precarious Partner."

88. De Bruijn and Both, "Youth: Contesting Legitimacy"

89. Tubiana and Debos, *Déby's Chad: Political Manipulation*; Orosz, "Price of stability."

90. Orosz, "Price of stability."

91. Griffin, "Operation Barkhane: French Counterterrorism."

92. Ibid.

93. European Union's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), *EU Military Operation*.

94. Shorey and Nickels, "Chad: A Precarious Partner."

95. Griffin, "Operation Barkhane: French Counterterrorism."

96. Baldaro, "Rashomon in the Sahel."

97. DeVore, "Preserving Power after Empire."

98. Okoli, "United States Counterterrorism Strategies"

99. DeVore, "Preserving Power after Empire."

100. African Union, "Chad: Idriss Déby Dies."

101. Devermont, "Déby's Dead"; Monerieff, Lesueur and Gazzini, "Chad: After Idriss Déby"; Orosz, "Price of stability."

102. Blanchard et al., "Chad: President Déby's Death."

103. Dizolele and Strouboulis, "Keeping Chad's Transition."

104. Scheele, "Chad After Idriss Déby."

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