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*What is the Difference between Iconography and Semiotics?*

**Abstract:** The article asks to what extent, if at all, the methodological *modus operandi* of Erwin Panofsky's three-level model for iconographic-iconological interpretation and analysis parallels that of semiotics as conceived by Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles Sanders Peirce. That this is the case has occasionally been asserted, for instance by Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson, as well as Giulio Carlo Argan. The exposition begins with an outline of features of iconography and of semiotics pertinent to the argument. It then proceeds to relate the grounds on which the two systems have been taken to resemble each other. Lastly, the alleged correspondence is contested on the grounds of differences regarding both the practices and objectives of iconography and semiotics respectively.<sup>1</sup>

**Keywords:** Iconography, Iconology, Semiotics, Sign, Visual Analysis, Image, Meaning-making, Erwin Panofsky, Ferdinand de Saussure, Charles S. Peirce, Cesare Ripa

## What is the Difference between Iconography and Semiotics?

*Lena Liepe*



*Fig. 1 a. Cesare Ripa, c. 1555–1622.*



*Fig. 1 b. Ferdinand de Saussure, 1857–1913.*



*Fig. 1 c. Charles Sanders Peirce, 1839–1914.*



*Fig. 1 d. Erwin Panofsky, 1892–1968.*

The title of this article reflects a question I received from a student a few years ago, after a lecture on iconography. The topic of the previous class had been semiotics, and the student had perceived parallels that made her ask for a clarification. It is a good question – so good that I had to do some reading and thinking before I had a proper answer.

Of course, the student was far from the first to notice the resemblance, or possible connection, between iconography and semiotics as methods of interpreting images. In their widely read essay “Semiotics and Art History”, Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson claim that: “From one point of view, it can be said that the semiotic perspective has long been present in art history: the work of Riegl and Panofsky can be shown to be congenial to the basic tenets of Peirce and Saussure”,<sup>2</sup> and that “Much of art historical work [...] bring forth insight into the historical changeability of conventions. This kind of work can be seen as analysis of the symbolic as a code. Iconography is in this sense a semiotic approach.”<sup>3</sup> And in a chapter appropriately (for my present purpose) entitled “Panofsky, Iconography, and Semiotics”, Christine Hasenmueller opens by stating that, “The work of Erwin Panofsky, especially, has been considered ‘semiotic’ in character. Argan [Giulio Carlo Argan 1975] recently found it so clear-

ly so that he labelled Panofsky the ‘Saussure’ of art history.’<sup>4</sup> She continues: “Panofsky’s concepts *iconography* and *iconology* certainly [...] bear striking resemblances to some ideas typical of *semiology*.”<sup>5</sup>

The issue obviously merits attention, and I have continued to ponder over it since the student faced me with her question. This article builds on a keynote address that I gave at the yearly research seminar of the Åbo Academy and the Turku University in 2021. The topic of the seminar was *Exploring the Boundaries of Iconography*, which offered me an opportunity to look a bit further into the matter. I make no claims to be an expert in semiotics, which is a large and complex theoretical field characterized by a multitude of conceptual models constructed by various theorists over the years, from Charles Sanders Peirce onwards. My focus here will not be on semiotics *per se*, but on iconography *and* semiotics, and I will approach both schools of thought as methods, not as theories.

Although semiotics can be extremely demanding to tackle theory-wise, from a methodological point of view a basic semiotic conceptual apparatus can be remarkably useful as a tool for structuring a visual analysis. Further, iconography/iconology as devised by Panofsky is primarily a method, not a theory – or at least that is how it is normally conceived. It rests, of course, on a theoretical foundation: philosophically Panofsky’s model is based in historical hermeneutics. However, since today’s art historians who study iconography tend to employ a hermeneutical mindset, although tempered with poststructuralist reservations, the theoretical underpinnings of Panofsky’s analytical model are commonly taken more or less for granted and rarely elaborated upon.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, I will leave theory aside and focus on methodology.

Erwin Panofsky (fig. 1 d) is not the originator of iconography and iconology as analytical concepts, there were others before him: not only Cesare Ripa (fig. 1 a) and Aby Warburg, but in particular the Dutch art historian Godefridus Johannes Hoogewerff, who already in 1928 suggested a similar use of the terms as the one adopted by Panofsky in the 1930s.<sup>7</sup> Nonetheless, Panofsky’s three-level scheme has become *the* standard model for iconographic/iconological analysis. I will begin by highlighting features of iconography and of semiotics pertinent to my argument. I will then proceed by, first, indicating on what grounds the two systems have been taken to resemble, or even parallel, each other. Second, I will disqualify this by pointing out differences regarding both means and objectives of iconography and semiotics respectively. I lean heavily

### Erwin Panofsky’s three-level model in *Meaning in the Visual Arts*, 1955

OBJECT OF INTERPRETATION	ACT OF INTERPRETATION	EQUIPMENT FOR INTERPRETATION	CORRECTIVE PRINCIPLE OF INTERPRETATION
<b>I</b> <i>Primary or natural</i> subject matter – (A) factual, (B) expressive – constituting the world of artistic motifs.	<i>Pre-iconographical description</i> (and pseudo-formal analysis).	<i>Practical experience</i> (familiarity with objects and events).	History of <i>style</i> (insights into the manner in which, under varying historical conditions, <i>objects</i> and <i>events</i> were expressed by <i>forms</i> ).
<b>II</b> <i>Secondary or conventional</i> subject matter, constituting the world of <i>images</i> , <i>stories</i> and <i>allegories</i> .	<i>Iconographical analysis</i> .	<i>Knowledge of literary sources</i> (familiarity with specific <i>themes</i> and <i>concepts</i> ).	History of <i>types</i> (insight into the manner in which, under varying historical conditions, specific <i>themes</i> or <i>concepts</i> were expressed by <i>objects</i> and <i>events</i> ).
<b>III</b> <i>Intrinsic meaning or content</i> , constituting the world of “symbolical” values.	<i>Iconological interpretation</i> .	<i>Synthetic intuition</i> (familiarity with the <i>essential tendencies of the human mind</i> ), conditioned by personal psychology and “ <i>Weltanschauung</i> ”).	History of <i>cultural symptoms</i> or “ <i>symbols</i> ” in general (insight into the manner in which, under varying historical conditions, <i>essential tendencies of the human mind</i> were expressed by specific <i>themes</i> and <i>concepts</i> ).

Fig. 2. E. Panofsky: *Synoptical table for iconographic/iconological analysis*. After Panofsky 1955, 40–41.

on the works by Christine Hasenmueller (1978), David Summers (1995) and Willibald Sauerländer (1995).

#### *Panofsky’s three-level model*

The table in fig. 2 is taken from the 1955 edition of Panofsky’s foundational essay “Iconography and iconology. An introduction to the study of Renaissance art”. There are two earlier versions as well and I will soon have reason to return to the first of these, but I will begin here since this is where Panofsky introduces the term “iconology”, or “iconological interpretation”, for the third stratum or level. The table is divided into four categories of interpretation: 1. *Object* of interpretation, 2. *Act* of interpretation, 3. *Equipment* for interpretation and, not least important, 4. *Corrective* principles of interpretation.

1. On the first level, the *object* of interpretation is the artistic motif of the artwork, the visual components from which it is put together. In the pre-iconographical *act* of interpretation, the *equipment* of the person doing



the analysis is the practical *experience* of things. This is checked against one's knowledge of the history of style (the *corrective principle*) to avoid misinterpretations of features that, because of the stylistic norms of the period in question, deviates from what would otherwise be expected. Hence, the reclining woman on the thirteenth century mosaic in Santa Maria in Trastevere in Rome (fig. 3) does not hover in the air above the bed; it merely looks that way because of the flattened perspective.<sup>8</sup>

2. On the second level, the *object* of interpretation is the conventional subject matter which is identified by an *act* of iconographical analysis. The resource here is knowledge of literary sources, and the *corrective principle* is the insight into the history of types – how specific themes were rendered under various conditions. Thus, the experienced iconographer soon realizes that the mosaic does not represent a Nativity: too many details differ. What we see is, instead, the Birth of the Virgin Mary.
3. On the third and last level the *object* of interpretation is the intrinsic meaning or content: the worldview or mentality or *Zeitgeist* that the artwork is an expression of. This is uncovered in the *iconological* act of interpretation where the art historian needs to be *equipped* with a familiarity with the essential tendencies of the human mind, on an individual level as well as in the form of a supra-individual, time-specific 'Weltanschauung.' The *corrective principle* here is a thorough knowledge of how these essential tendencies were expressed in philosophy, religion, literature, science, art, and all other cultural and intellectual systems of the time. To fully answer this demand, one would need to be as erudite as Panofsky himself, and in actual fact this stage of the analytical model is seldom carried out, at least not in the way outlined in the essay – not even by Panofsky himself.

The three-level model was, and still is, a major blockbuster: it is without doubt Panofsky's lasting contribution to art history. It is a staple in the methodological toolkit of the discipline; . It has been questioned and criticized for decades, but it is very difficult to do without it; all undergraduate art history students are taught how to apply it. It is attractive in its seeming simplicity, and a particularly appealing feature is how every step is neatly embedded in the next level. One needs to recognize the shapes and contours of the mosaic as depictions of people and things, and to use one's stylistic knowledge for a correct reading of

the perspective (in other words, to do a correct pre-iconographical identification) to, on the next level, be able to identify the iconography as a representation of the Birth of the Virgin. And the iconographic choice of subject matter, in its turn, is the key for the iconological interpretation of the mosaic as an expression, in the visual vocabulary of thirteenth century Italy, of the essential tendencies of the human mind. In this manner, every level of the model is built into the next as a prerequisite for analysis and interpretation. The whole has an alluring aura of completeness that is at the same time seductive and deceptive.

### *The semiotic model*

So far I have been referring to the 1955 version of Panofsky's essay. The first English edition appeared in 1939, but as early as in 1932 Panofsky published a paper in German, "Zum Problem der Beschreibung und Inhaltsdeutung von Werken der bildenden Kunst" ("On the Problem of Describing and Interpreting Works of the Visual Arts") where the main concepts and trains of thought of the later English essays are presented. Here, Panofsky summarizes the manner in which an artwork on the iconological level can be an expression of the

Fig. 3. Pietro Cavallini, mosaic in Santa Maria in Trastevere, Rome, 1296–1300. Wikimedia Commons (Web Gallery of Art), 2011.



essential human tendencies of its time without its creator – the artist – being aware of it, in the following way: “der Künstler (um einen geistvollen Amerikaner zu zitieren) [weiß] nur ‘what he confesses’, nicht aber ‘what he betrays’” – “the artist (in the words of a witty American) only knows what he confesses, not what he betrays.”<sup>9</sup>

The “witty American” is none other than Charles Sanders Peirce (fig. 1 c) whom Panofsky seems to have read, or at least to have read about.<sup>10</sup> Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure (fig. 1 b) are as foundational for the varieties of semiotics commonly applied by art historians as Panofsky is for iconography and iconology. Semiotics is defined as the study of signs and sign systems, and of how signs convey meanings. Whereas the concept of the sign is the basic building block of all semiotic theory, one of the fundamental differences between Saussure and Peirce is the division of a sign into a dichotomy and a trichotomy respectively. According to Saussure, a sign is made up of two parts, the *signifier* and the *signified*: the signifier is the present part that is recorded by the senses, and the signified is the absent or invisible part that the signifier refers to. Peirce’s model is more complex in that it is built from three components. The sign’s present, perceivable part is here called a *representamen*, or *sign vehicle*, which is synonymous to Saussure’s signifier. Peirce applies several different terms for the same thing (*sign, representamen, ground*); here I use sign vehicle. The sign vehicle refers to an external, absent *object*. The third element is the *interpretant*, the mental image formed in the process. The interpretant points to the object and adds something to it that was not there before: the interpretant consists of the receiver’s associations and is thus different for each person involved, as is the sign that is the outcome of the interpreting process.

This effort towards an explanation is abstract and possibly a bit difficult to grasp, and the unwieldy terminology coined by Peirce is an added challenge. Saussure’s model is handier and more accessible, but it has its drawbacks too. One of them is that it is heavily biased in favor of verbal language. Saussure was a linguist, and the model is essentially geared for the analysis of linguistic structures. Saussure defines language as a socially constituted system consisting of arbitrary signs, with no given or absolute relation to the external reality they signify. This may be true for verbal language, but not necessarily so for visual sign systems, or images.<sup>11</sup> Peirce, on the other hand, was not a linguist but a philosopher and strived towards a universal science of signs and sign systems

regardless of medium. His well-known categorization of three types of signs is helpful here: the icon, the index, and the symbol, where the symbol comes closest to Saussure’s definition.

According to Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson in “Semiotics and Art History”, a weak point in Saussure’s sign model is its closed and static character, where the relation between signifier and signified is fixed in the sense that the verbal expression, the signifier, is connected to a specific content, or signified. The signified of the word “tree” is the mental image that the word evokes, period – within each language, in this case English, it’s a set relation. In contrast, Peirce’s addition of the interpretant as the third component of the sign, the association that the mental combination of sign vehicle and object gives rise to, opens for a continued meaning-making that never stops. The relationship may be likened to a ladder where what is a complete sign on one level at the next stage becomes only the first or signifying part that merges with a new associative content to constitute a new sign. A marble statue of an almost nude woman – Venus de Milo, now in the Louvre, Paris – becomes the visible or present part of the sign “Greek sculpture”, that then in its turn becomes a constituent of the sign “classical art”, that transforms into a constituent of the sign “epitome of Western culture” – and so on (fig. 4 a–b). Every finished sign entity has the potential to enter a new sign relationship where it triggers new associations and hence shapes new signs. Meaning is not stable and predictable, it is created again and again in an ever-ongoing semiosis, or motion of meaning-making: in fact, a spiral case rather than a ladder.

#### *Iconography/iconology versus semiotics*

The semiotic toolbox contains many more terms than the ones accounted for here; one of the main characteristics of the field is the vast amount of intricate and complex conceptual apparatuses that have been launched by its practitioners over the years. But for the purposes of this article, the properties of signs and the sign systems just outlined are sufficient. I will now go on to mention features that have caused several writers to see Panofsky’s analytical model as an equivalent to semiotics.

1. The first feature is the structure of the analytical procedure where, in Panofsky’s model, the result on each level becomes a component of the






Fig. 4 a. Venus de Milo, 150–100 BCE.  
Photo Jean-Pol Grandmont 2011, Wikimedia Commons (slightly cropped).




Fig. 4 b. Advertisement for the Venus brand of pencils produced by the American Lead Pencil Company, 1905. The pencils were aimed at artists and architects, hence the connotations of classical perfection evoked by the brand name. Private coll.

interpretation on the next level, so that the pre-iconographic motives identified on the first level are incorporated into the next level where they are joined to textual sources and become building parts in the conventional subject matter that is the object of iconographic analysis. The results thus derived are then assimilated into the whole repertoire of expressions of the mentality or *Weltanschauung* that defines the last stage of the analysis. This is felt to be reminiscent of how, in semiotics, what at one stage of the signification process is a finished sign, on the next level becomes a component of a new sign, that is then again transformed into the signifying part of a new sign, and so on.

2. Second, the underlying assumption of Panofsky's model is that the *Weltanschauung*, the essential tendencies of the human mind, is expressed in every aspect of an artwork down to the minutest technical choices. According to Panofsky, even pre-iconographic, purely formal means of indicating, for instance, light and shadow, can be perceived as an expression of the overarching mentality of the epoch.<sup>12</sup> As Christine Hasenmueller has pointed out, this belief in an underlying unity of art, based on determining principles that manifest themselves on every level, allies Panofsky with structuralists and semiologists, even though in Panofsky's case the roots should be traced further back, to Hegel and his notion of a *Geistesgeschichte* that manifests itself in the world.<sup>13</sup>
3. Yet a parallel is the knowledge of certain *codes* as a prerequisite for the correct identification of the meaning on each level.<sup>14</sup> A correct pre-iconographic description presupposes insight into stylistic conventions, and the iconographic analysis requires knowledge of both literary sources and typology. The very manner in which Panofsky grounds the stylistic idioms and the iconographic content of an image in the conventions of the epoch in question, echoes Saussure's definition of language as a socially constituted system consisting of arbitrary, or conventional, signs.<sup>15</sup> The third, iconological level of Panofsky's model is problematic, however, since the various expressions of the mentality of an epoch or, in Panofsky's words, of the essential tendencies of the human mind, are difficult to systematize into a code – and very tellingly the competence prescribed by Panofsky for this is not knowledge, but synthetic intuition, which seems like a rather fluffy capacity.

This last observation connects to one of the arguments *against* the attempts to define iconography as a variety of semiotics, namely the lack of continuity in Panofsky's scheme.<sup>16</sup> In semiotics, the same analytical procedure applies to each step in the analysis: 'meaning' is approached as a continuum whose levels transform into each other, and the concept of the sign is consistently employed in the decoding of meaning on every level. Panofsky, however, pays no heed to the concept of the sign. Since semiotics is the study of signs, this is a major obstacle for identifying him as a semiotician.

In contrast to semiotics, in Panofsky's model the procedure for interpretation is unique on each stage. The measures that are taken and the resources that are required for carrying out the analysis on the pre-iconographic level are not the same as those of iconography, nor are those of iconography the same as those of iconology. This is again in contrast to semiotics, where the way in which meaning is produced in the signifying process remains the same irrespective of where in the system it takes place: it is a case of difference of scale, not of essence. In Panofsky's scheme, neither the method nor the medium of the signifying units is consistent. On the first (pre-iconographic) level "pure forms", i.e., visual elements, are identified: configurations of line and color are recognized as representations of natural objects.<sup>17</sup> And again on the third (iconological) level, purely visual elements are recognized as potential carriers of meaning: I have already pointed to how devices such as perspective, distribution of light and shadow and the linear patterns on an engraved surface can be understood as expressions of a mentality or *Weltanschauung*. But on the medium level, in the iconographic analysis, meaning is normally sought by connecting the artistic motif to a literary source, to text; visual configurations are not assigned the capacity to convey conventional meaning by purely visual means.<sup>18</sup>

Basically, the disparity between the two systems is a consequence of a fundamental difference in objectives. The purpose of semiotics is to uncover the mechanisms behind meaning-making as a process: semiotics asks how meaning is produced, communicated, and decoded, but does not necessarily take an interest in what is being said. In semiotics, it is the *how* of meaning-making that is investigated, whereas Panofsky's focus of interest lies on the *what*: the purpose of his scheme is to define a *modus operandi* for correctly identifying the meaning of images, what they are, or were, meant to represent when they were made.<sup>19</sup> Another way of saying this is that Panofsky's account centers on inten-

tion: on the "sender" part of a communication model in an effort to uncover the intended, and thus historically authentic meaning of a work of art.<sup>20</sup> Semiotics, on the other hand, is oriented towards reception at the other end of the model; meaning, or signification, is seen as something that emerges every time a beholder/receiver interprets a message.<sup>21</sup> Thus, meaning is constructed anew every time a beholder experiences an image: *semiosis* never stops, it goes on and on. In contrast, the interpretation of meaning according to Panofsky's model comes to a halt when the interpretation has reached the last level (although it can potentially be refined and elaborated and enriched as the researcher goes deeper and deeper into the philosophy and theology and science and arts of the period). There is no unlimited *semiosis* here, the historical meaning of a work of art is not negotiable from the point of view of the present.<sup>22</sup>

This connects to yet another crucial distinction, namely, that of historicity. Semiotics as a methodological approach is unbound by temporal and cultural limitations: it acts like a grid or mesh that can be spread over anything, anywhere and anytime, to explore the mechanisms of signs and sign systems. As for Panofsky, the very subtitle of his essay – "An introduction to the study of Renaissance art" – signals the historical specificity of the analytical model. The historical context is the necessary foundation for the entire analytical operation, to the extent that culture specific phenomena condition the interpretation on every level, from stylistic idioms to the deriving of the subject matter from literary sources, and the supra-individual *Weltanschauung*, or mentality of the period.<sup>23</sup> Not only is iconography/iconology embedded in history, it also takes the historical context as a given, and not as something that is construed by the analyst in a rhetorical move to bolster the interpretation, as semiotics would have it.<sup>24</sup> For the iconographer/iconologist, history preexists independent of the interpretative act. Thus, the entire iconographic/iconological model is premised on history as an *external* precondition for an artwork to function as a vehicle of communication, whereas semiotics define culture as yet another set of systems or codes of symbols and meanings – and so an integral part of the semiotic signifying process.<sup>25</sup>

But, and this is important, this does not mean that Panofsky conceives the interpretative process merely in terms of an objective and unbiased search for the historically correct meaning of a work of art. Quite on the contrary, he is well aware of the subjective foundation of all historical interpretation, in the

interpreter's choice of perspective. In the essay "Art history as a humanistic discipline" he points to the risk that the hermeneutic effort to examine the meaning of a singular work in the light of the general worldview of the period turns into a vicious circle, i.e., a circular argument.<sup>26</sup> The escape from this circle lies in the accumulation of knowledge of the manner in which essential tendencies of the human mind are expressed by specific themes and concepts – in other words, the corrective principle that has to guide the interpretation on the third, iconological level of the scheme.

By this, Panofsky aims to diminish as far as possible the degree of violence that the very act of interpretation exerts on the work of art. In the 1932 German version of his essay, Panofsky cites Martin Heidegger's statement from the latter's book on Kant (*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 1929), that to interpret a philosophical text amounts to more than a mere reflection of what is expressly stated; it implies an uncovering of the unsaid that lies beneath what is actually said. Consequently, every interpretation entails a certain amount of force, or violence (*Gewalt*).<sup>27</sup> While acknowledging the application of violence as a fundamental condition for all interpretation, Panofsky raises the question of where to draw the line. What measures can be taken to prevent the interpreter from forcing his (or her) way beyond the confines of the historically permissible? The answer, again, lies in the objective correctives: *Gestaltungsgeschichte*, or the history of form; *Typengeschichte*, or the history of types; and *die allgemeine Geistesgeschichte*, or the general history of the human spirit, all supply regulative constraints founded on historic factuality.

Panofsky thereby lifts the whole issue of interpretation to an ethical level, highlighting the necessity to safeguard against abusive, ahistorical, or arbitrary interpretations. In comparison, semiotics appears to be indifferent to moral issues. The underlying assumption of iconography is that the meaning of a work of art is premised on a preexisting intention, and if this intention is misrepresented by the interpreter, he or she commits an act of violence against it. But if, as semiotics has it, meaning emerges in the reception of a work of art, it "belongs" to the beholder or recipient, with no moral or ethical obligations towards the work itself, or its creator.

This may be a provocative, or at least an unexpected, conclusion. Iconography charges the interpreter with a moral responsibility towards the work and its historical situatedness, whereas semiotics understands meaning-making as

a thing of the present and dependent on the connotative load that the interpreter brings to the table, so to speak: which seems to exclude the question of the integrity of the artwork from any consideration of the morally defensible or, alternatively, unjustifiable in the interpretation. Panofsky took the moral implications of the interpretation of historical works of art very seriously. Since his time, however, issues related to the ethics of iconography (and of semiotics) have not attracted much attention. It may be that these questions deserve to be brought to the fore again, ninety years after Panofsky spoke of interpretation as a violent practice. Further debate on the topic is welcome.



## Notes

- 1 For the parallels between iconography and semiotics, see also Fred Andersson's article "Avbildade tecken & avbildningar som tecken. Ikonologins och semiotikens delade skäl", *ICO Iconographisk Post. Nordisk tidskrift för bildtolkning – Nordic Review of Iconography*, n. 1, p. 4–33, Aug. 2016. <<https://ojs.abo.fi/ojs/index.php/ico/article/view/852>> (editor's comm.) Accessed 01 Apr. 2023.
- 2 Bal & Bryson 1991, 174.
- 3 Bal & Bryson 1991, 191.
- 4 Hasenmueller 1978, 289.
- 5 Hasenmueller 1978, 289.
- 6 Moxey 1985–1986, 268–269; Sauerländer 1995, 387; Summers 1995, 18–20.
- 7 See Liepe 2020, 16–17.
- 8 Style as a corrective principle is of vital importance here. David Summers underlines that for Panofsky, everyday experience is *not* sufficient to identify a pre-iconographical motif; "a painted image is a mediated perception, the representation of a representation [- -] representation is always mediated by a specific style which must itself be addressed." (Summers 1995, 12).
- 9 Panofsky 1932, 117.
- 10 Summers 1995, 15.
- 11 Bal & Bryson 1991, 194–195.
- 12 Panofsky 1955, 30.
- 13 Hasenmueller 1978, 296.
- 14 Hasenmueller 1978, 292–294.
- 15 Hasenmueller 1978, 291.
- 16 Hasenmueller 1978, 298.
- 17 Panofsky 1955, 28.
- 18 Damisch 1975, 31; Hasenmueller 1975, 294–295; Sauerländer 1995, 388.
- 19 Damisch 1975, 29.
- 20 Moxey 1985–1986, 271.
- 21 Bal & Bryson 1991, 184–188.
- 22 Sauerländer 1995, 386; Moxey 1985–1986, 268–269; Summers 1995, 18–19.
- 23 Panofsky 1955, 30; cf. Hasenmueller 1978, 298.
- 24 Bal & Bryson 1991, 176–180.
- 25 Leeds-Hurwitz 1993, 17.
- 26 Panofsky 1955, 9; cf. Sauerländer 1995, 389–390.
- 27 Heidegger 1929, 192–194. Cf. Ferretti (1984) 1989, 221–233; Moxey 1985–1986, 267, Summers 1995.

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