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# A Multiscale modeling framework for Scenario Modeling: Characterizing the Heterogeneity of the COVID-19 Epidemic in the US

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## Abstract

The Scenario Modeling Hub (SMH) initiative provides projections of potential epidemic scenarios in the United States (US) by using a multi-model approach. Our contribution to the SMH is generated by a multi-scale model that combines the global epidemic metapopulation modeling approach (GLEAM) with a local epidemic and mobility model of the US (LEAM-US), first introduced here. The LEAM-US model consists of 3,142 subpopulations each representing a single county across the 50 US states and the District of Columbia, enabling us to project state and national trajectories of COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths under different epidemic scenarios. The model is age-structured, and multi-strain. It integrates data on vaccine administration, human mobility, and non-pharmaceutical interventions. The model contributed to all 17 rounds of the SMH, and allows for the mechanistic characterization of the spatio-temporal heterogeneities observed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Here we describe the mathematical and computational structure underpinning our model, and present as a case study the results concerning the emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 Alpha variant (lineage designation B.1.1.7). Our findings reveal considerable spatial and temporal heterogeneity in the introduction and diffusion of the Alpha variant, both at the level of individual states and combined statistical areas, as it competes against the ancestral lineage. We discuss the key factors driving the time required for the Alpha variant to rise to dominance within a population, and quantify the significant impact that the emergence of the Alpha variant had on the effective reproduction number at the state level. Overall, we show that our multiscale modeling approach is able to capture the complexity and heterogeneity of the COVID-19 pandemic response in the US.

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## 1. Introduction

Mathematical and computational models have been essential in understanding the transmission mechanisms of SARS-CoV-2, providing situational awareness throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, and enabling the exploration of hypothetical intervention scenarios for public health planning and response (Holmdahl and Buckee, 2020; Jewell et al., 2020; Poletto et al., 2020; Brooks-Pollock et al., 2021; Biggerstaff et al., 2022; Reich et al., 2022). Despite the many successful applications of predictive modeling, there are often

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7 challenges in communicating the results to policymakers and the public due to poor coordination among  
8 modeling teams, divergent results caused by different underlying assumptions and scenarios, and a lack of  
9 clarity regarding the implemented methods. To address these issues, the Scenario Modeling Hub (Scenario  
10 Modeling Hub, 2023) has convened multiple modeling teams to generate and analyze multi-model projec-  
11 tions of well-defined scenarios (Borchering, 2021; Biggerstaff et al., 2022; Truelove et al., 2022; Howerton  
12 et al., 2023; Borchering et al., 2023). This coordinated approach allows for a synoptic analysis of results,  
13 ensembling different estimates, rigorous validation of findings, and clearer communication of results.

14 As of July 2023, we have contributed 17 rounds of projections coordinated by the SMH, which en-  
15 compass 70 different modeling scenarios defined at various points in time starting in 2021. Our modeling  
16 approach combines two stochastic, age-structured, multi-strain, metapopulation models operating on differ-  
17 ent scales (Balcan et al., 2010). This lets us capture both the local dynamics that integrate the vaccination  
18 rollout plans and the strength of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) as well as the global dynamics  
19 responsible for the introduction of new variants. In particular, the Global Epidemic and Mobility model  
20 (GLEAM) which has been used to study the international spread of pathogens such as Zika (Zhang et al.,  
21 2017), Ebola (Gomes et al., 2014; Pastore y Piontti et al., 2016), and the initial wave of COVID-19 (Chinazzi  
22 et al., 2020; Davis et al., 2021), can simulate introduction events of new variants in the United States (US)  
23 from other countries. Then, the output of this first model is used to define the initial conditions of the Local  
24 Epidemic and Mobility model (LEAM-US) that in turn simulates the disease dynamics only in the US.

25 Here we describe our general modeling approach and report the detailed results obtained following the  
26 guidelines of the scenario design of Round 5 of the SMH (COVID-19 Scenario Modeling Hub, 2021). The  
27 four scenarios of this round address the impact of vaccination coverage and relaxation of NPIs during the  
28 wave initiated by the Alpha variant (Phylogenetic Assignment of Named Global Outbreak, PANGO, lineage  
29 designation B.1.1.7). The Alpha variant was first identified in December 2020 in the United Kingdom (UK)  
30 (Walensky et al., 2021; World Health Organization, 2021). It was traced back to two samples collected in  
31 September 2020 (Science Magazine, 2020; Rambaut et al., 2020). The multiscale structure of our model  
32 and its capacity to link international importations with domestic contact patterns and mobility, provides a  
33 detailed characterization of the heterogeneous spread of the Alpha variant in the US. We estimate that its  
34 introduction and trajectory towards dominance exhibited significant spatiotemporal variation. In particular,  
35 our model finds that by March 2021 the Alpha variant accounted for 50% or more of the total infections  
36 only in roughly one third of states. In contrast, other states didn't reach this proportion until the end of April  
37 or early May. Notably, this heterogeneity is even more pronounced at the combined statistical areas (CSAs)  
38 level within states. Additionally, we show how the emergence of the Alpha variant affected variations in the  
39 effective reproduction number at the state level.

40 Overall, our multiscale model offers a comprehensive and detailed approach to projecting the COVID-  
41 19 pandemic in the US, incorporating factors such as population demographics, travel patterns, NPIs, vac-  
42 cination status, and new SARS-CoV-2 variants. These projections can inform public health policy and  
43 decision-making by capturing the heterogeneity and complexity of the COVID-19 pandemic response in the  
44 US.

## 45 2. Methods

46 The multiscale modeling approach combines two distinct epidemic models that work at different geo-  
47 graphical resolutions: the Global Epidemic and Mobility model (GLEAM) and the Local Epidemic and  
48 Mobility model in the US (LEAM-US) (Fig. 1). Both models are stochastic, spatial, age-structured,  
49 metapopulation models (Balcan et al., 2009, 2010; Pastore y Piontti et al., 2018; Chinazzi et al., 2020).  
50 LEAM-US, considers 3,142 counties (or their statistical equivalent) as individual subpopulations in each of  
51 the 50 US states and the District of Columbia. GLEAM considers 3,200 subpopulations across nearly 190  
52 countries, defined as catchment areas around major transportation hubs. GLEAM and LEAM-US integrate




Figure 1: Visual depiction of the multiscale modeling approach that combines the GLEAM and LEAM-US models

53 a human mobility layer, represented as a network, using both short-range (i.e., commuting) and long-range  
 54 (i.e., air traveling) mobility data from different sources. International and domestic airline mobility data, in  
 55 the origin-destination format, are from the Official Aviation Guide database and are used to model airline  
 56 transportation (OAG, 2020). Ground mobility and commuting flows are derived from data collected from  
 57 statistics offices of 30 countries on 5 continents and account for travel restrictions and government policies  
 58 (Hale et al., 2021). The model also considers the reduction of internal country-wide mobility and changes  
 59 in contact patterns in each country and state (Google LLC, 2021a). In both models we consider individuals  
 60 divided into 10 age groups: 0-9, 10-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70-79, and 80+ years  
 61 old. We use effective contact matrices to model age-dependent and country/state specific mixing across four  
 62 settings: households, schools, workplaces, and contacts occurring in the general community. The contact  
 63 matrix for a given location is a weighted linear combination of the derived matrices for the four social set-  
 64 tings and encodes information on the average number of *effective* contacts (contacts that can lead to the  
 65 transmission of a disease) between individuals of particular age groups. Details on the contact data and the  
 66 construction of the matrices can be found in Mistry et al (Mistry et al., 2021) and Prem et al (Prem et al.,  
 67 2017).

68 In the LEAM-US model, contact matrices, age-specific traveling probabilities, and air traffic flows are  
 69 properly mapped to the county-level resolution. Counties' populations and age distributions are based on  
 70 the Census' annual resident population estimates during 2019, and commuting flows between counties are  
 71 obtained from the 2011-2015 5-Year ACS Commuting Flows survey and properly adjusted to account for  
 72 differences in population totals since the creation of the dataset (U.S. Census Bureau). Google's COVID-19  
 73 Community Mobility Reports data collected at the county-level resolution are used to model mobility and  
 74 the effects of NPIs on individual behaviors (Google LLC, 2021a).

### 75 2.1. SARS-CoV-2 transmission model

76 In both GLEAM and LEAM-US, within each subpopulation, we adopt a classic *SLIR*-like disease in-  
 77 fection dynamics. The model is extended to account for the presence of multiple lineages and vaccination  
 78 protocols. After establishing the mobility data layers and defining the dynamics of the disease, the popula-  
 79 tion count within each compartment, denoted as  $m$ , for each age group  $i$ , and for each subpopulation  $j$ , is  
 80 governed by a discrete and stochastic dynamical equation. This equation is formulated as follows:

$$X_j^{[m,i]}(t + \Delta t) - X_j^{[m,i]}(t) = \Delta X_j^{[m,i]} + \Omega_j([m, i]) \quad (1)$$

81 where the term  $\Delta X_j^{[m,i]}$  denotes the change attributable to transitions within compartments, which are driven  
 82 by the dynamics of disease transmission. Additionally, the operator  $\Omega_j([m, i])$  encapsulates the variations



83 arising from individual mobility. This particular operator accounts for long-range mobility, specifically via  
 84 airlines, and establishes the minimal integration time scale as one day. Finally, the impact of commuting  
 85 flows on mobility is incorporated by defining effective forces of infection. This is achieved through a time  
 86 scale separation approximation, the specifics of which are detailed in Balcan et al. (2010) and Balcan and  
 87 Vespignani (2011). The function  $\Delta X_j^{[m,i]}$  is defined as the aggregate of all transitions into and out of the  
 88 disease compartment  $m$  for individuals within age group  $i$ , denoted as  $[m, i]$ . The operator  $\mathcal{D}_j([m, i], [n, i])$   
 89 quantifies the transitions from  $[m, i]$  to  $[n, i]$  over the time interval  $\Delta t$ . Each element of this operator is  
 90 derived as a random variable, following a multinomial distribution. Therefore, the change in the compart-  
 91 ment  $[m, i]$  over the interval  $\Delta t$ , represented as  $\Delta X_j^{[m,i]}$ , is calculated by summing all the random variables  
 92  $\{\mathcal{D}_j([m, i], [n, i])\}$  as follows

$$\Delta X_j^{[m,i]} = \sum_{[n,i]} \{-\mathcal{D}_j([m, i], [n, i]) + \mathcal{D}_j([n, i], [m, i])\}. \quad (2)$$

93 To illustrate the the above equation with a specific example, let's examine the dynamics of the latent com-  
 94 partment. Consider individuals within age group  $i$  of subpopulation  $j$ . These individuals have two potential  
 95 transitions: they can either move into the latent compartment, denoted as  $L_j^i$ , from the susceptible com-  
 96 partment, represented as  $S_j^i$ , or they can exit the latent compartment to enter the infectious compartment,  
 97 indicated by  $I_j^i$ . The components of the operator that define the  $L_j^i$  dynamic are thus determined by the fol-  
 98 lowing binomial distributions  $Pr^{Bin}(L_j^i(t), p_{L_j^i \rightarrow I_j^i})$  and  $Pr^{Bin}(S_j^i(t), p_{S_j^i \rightarrow L_j^i})$ , where  $p_{L_j^i \rightarrow I_j^i}$  and  $p_{S_j^i \rightarrow L_j^i}$  are the  
 99 transition probabilities from the latent to the infectious state and from the susceptible to the latent state, re-  
 100 spectively. We model the transition process as memoryless, discrete, and stochastic. The transition probabili-  
 101 ty  $p_{S_j^i \rightarrow L_j^i}$ , representing the force of infection, is influenced by several factors: commuting flows, interaction  
 102 patterns as defined in age-structured contact matrices, and the implementation of local Non-Pharmaceutical  
 103 Interventions (NPIs). For a comprehensive description of the analytical framework underpinning this model,  
 104 we direct readers to the detailed exposition provided in Balcan et al. (2010) Balcan et al. (2010).

105 In the removed compartment, individuals can no longer infect others, meaning they have either recover-  
 106 ed, been hospitalized, or isolated. Hospitalizations and deaths are computed from the removed compart-  
 107 ment by considering a geometrically distributed time delay between the time of removal to hospitalization  
 108 and death (details on the delay implementation are provided in the Supplementary Information). Infection  
 109 hospitalization ratios (IHR) and infection fatality ratios (IFR) are age-structured and taken from the litera-  
 110 ture to account for different variants and vaccination statuses (Shapiro et al., 2021; Verity et al., 2020; Salje  
 111 et al., 2020). It is worth remarking that the model's parameters vary across SMH rounds as new variants and  
 112 knowledge on vaccine efficacy emerged and as the prescribed scenarios changed.

## 113 2.2. Non-pharmaceutical interventions and human mobility

114 In our model, we dynamically incorporate international travel restrictions based on data from the Oxford  
 115 COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (Hale et al., 2021). To accurately reflect changes in travel pat-  
 116 terns since the pandemic's onset, both international and domestic travel flows are adjusted using real-time  
 117 origin-destination data provided by OAG (OAG, 2020), capturing the observed reductions in air traffic. Ad-  
 118 ditionally, we adjust short-range mobility by utilizing workplace visitation data as a proxy. This approach,  
 119 in comparison to pre-pandemic levels, is informed by the insights from Google's COVID-19 Community  
 120 Mobility Reports (Google LLC, 2021a), ensuring a dynamic representation of mobility patterns during the  
 121 pandemic. Contact patterns and mixing rates among different age groups in our model are adjusted to reflect  
 122 the impact of policy interventions on individual behaviors. Specifically, we modulate the school contacts  
 123 matrix layer to simulate the effects of school closures, whether due to governmental policies or scheduled  
 124 holiday breaks. For workplace and general community settings, we utilize data from Google's Mobility

125 Reports. The workplaces percent change from baseline metric informs us of the reduction in con-  
 126 tacts within workplaces, while the retail and recreation percent change from baseline gives  
 127 insights into contact reductions in broader community settings. We achieve this by proportionally rescaling  
 128 the corresponding layers in the contact matrices. This rescaling factor,  $\omega_s(t) = \omega_s(1 + r_l(t)/100)^2$ , is applied,  
 129 where  $r_l(t)$  represents the daily percentage change in visitors to specific locations  $s$  relative to pre-pandemic  
 130 levels. The squared term in this factor is crucial as it reflects the understanding that the potential number  
 131 of contacts at a location is proportional to the square of the visitor count. We selected specific fields from  
 132 Google's Community Mobility Report data due to their alignment with the definitions of various place cat-  
 133 egories. The 'retail and recreation percent change from baseline' field effectively represents mobility trends  
 134 for locations such as movie theaters, restaurants, cafes, and shopping centers. This particular data is most  
 135 representative of the interactions occurring within the general community layer of our contact matrices.  
 136 Meanwhile, the 'workplaces percent change from baseline' field is instrumental in measuring the mobility  
 137 trends of individuals commuting to and from their workplaces, providing valuable insights for our modeling  
 138 purposes Google LLC (2021b).

### 139 2.3. Vaccine allocation and administration

140 Our models explicitly incorporate the time series data of daily administered COVID-19 vaccine doses.  
 141 In the United States, the allocation of the daily vaccine stockpile for each county is based on the observed  
 142 vaccination rates at the state level. We then distribute these doses within each state, proportionally to the  
 143 population size of each county. Furthermore, the strategy for vaccine rollout is designed to align with the  
 144 recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). This approach involves  
 145 prioritizing different age groups in a phased manner, depending on the specific stage of the vaccination  
 146 campaign reached (Dooling, 2020). In particular, in phase 1a doses were distributed between the 10 age  
 147 groups according to the number of healthcare workers and long-term care facility residents in the population;  
 148 in phase 1b they were distributed with priority to front-line essential workers and adults aged 75+; in phase  
 149 1c to other essential workers, adults with high-risk conditions, and the 65-74 age group; and lastly, in phase  
 150 2, doses were distributed to the general population aged 18+. The vaccine uptake in the in-sample calibration  
 151 window follows the data provided by the CDC and Our World in Data platform (CDC; Our World in Data).  
 152 In the out-of-sample projection period, the vaccine uptake of each SMH round follows the directions of the  
 153 specific scenarios available at (COVID-19 Scenario Modeling Hub, 2021). Our model incorporates various  
 154 vaccine effects, including vaccine efficacy in reducing the risk of infection ( $VE^S$ ), hospitalization ( $VE^H$ ),  
 155 and deaths ( $VE^D$ ). The specific values for these vaccine efficacies vary across different scenario rounds and  
 156 are informed by an ongoing analysis of efficacy against different variants. Additionally, the model accounts  
 157 for the waning of vaccine-induced protection starting from round 8.

### 158 2.4. Model Calibration

159 The model is initialized by considering the introductions of infections during the early stage of the  
 160 COVID-19 pandemic by coupling the LEAM-US model to the importations from the GLEAM model cali-  
 161 brated as reported in Davis et al. (2021). In each state, we assume a flat prior for the effective reproductive  
 162 number  $R_{eff}$  at the start of the in-sample calibration time window. In order to account for variations in the  
 163 IFR and IHR across states, we also consider a  $\pm 30\%$  difference with respect to the baseline parameterization,  
 164 assuming a uniform prior. The specifications set by the SMH in each round inform the time window used to  
 165 calibrate the model. We calibrate our model using an Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC) rejection  
 166 approach (Sunnåker et al., 2013). This process involves comparing the model's weekly estimated deaths  
 167 and/or hospitalizations with the actual figures reported by the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center  
 168 (Dong et al., 2020) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services U.S. Department of Health  
 169 & Human Services. To assess the accuracy of our model, we calculate the distance, denoted as  $s(E', E)$ ,  
 170 between the surveillance data (evidence  $E$ ) and the model estimates ( $E'$ ) for each stochastic realization.




Figure 2: (A) We implement a *S-LIR*-like model extended to account for the presence of two strains and vaccination. The superscript  $\alpha$  refers to compartments with individuals infected with the Alpha variant of concern. Subscripts *vax1* and *vax2* are used to identify compartments with individuals who received one or two doses of the vaccine, respectively. Vertical dashed lines represent transitions between compartments due to vaccinations. (B) Ratios of WIS scores between the GLEAM/LEAM-US model and the COVIDhub baseline reference model. (C) Ratios of WIS scores between the GLEAM/LEAM-US model and the COVIDhub ensemble reference model.

171 Distances are measured using either the weighted mean absolute percentage error or the residuals. We then  
 172 establish a tolerance level, based on a selected quantile of the empirical distance distribution, to serve as  
 173 our threshold. Any realizations that result in distances exceeding this threshold are rejected (Beaumont  
 174 et al., 2002). Specifically, we keep the top 2.00% of realizations with the smallest distance. For each specific  
 175 SMH-scenario definition, we performed between 15,000 to 50,000 stochastic independent realizations. We  
 176 have also performed extensive sensitivity analyses testing the calibration approaches at the global and local  
 177 level as reported in Davis et al. (2021).

### 178 2.5. Round 5 specific model design: Integrating the Alpha variant

179 To incorporate the emergence of the Alpha variant mechanistically we employ a two-strain model. This  
 180 model allows us to mechanistically capture the cocirculation of the ancestral SARS-CoV-2 lineages and  
 181 the Alpha variant. The model considers the following compartments: susceptible; two latent and infec-  
 182 tious compartments (capturing individuals infected with both the ancestral lineages and the Alpha variant);  
 183 and the removed compartments. Additionally, each of the previous compartments appears in the model in  
 184 three different ways (as shown in Fig. 2A) to distinguish between unvaccinated individuals, individuals who  
 185 received the first vaccine dose, and vaccinated individuals who received two doses. Susceptible (*S*) indi-  
 186 viduals become latent through interactions with infectious individuals carrying either the ancestral lineage or  
 187 the variant. In the first case, individuals will transition into the ancestral lineage latent compartment (*L*); in  
 188 the second they will transition into the variant latent compartment (*L*<sup>α</sup>). We assume that the two lineages  
 189 have different transmission rates ( $\beta$  and  $\beta^\alpha$ ) but the same latent and infectious periods ( $\varepsilon^{-1}$  and  $\mu^{-1}$ ). Fur-  
 190 thermore, we capture the increase in transmissibility of the Alpha variant by assuming that  $\beta^\alpha = \beta(1 + \psi)$   
 191 (Galloway et al., 2021). The increase of transmissibility was introduced following previous studies indi-  
 192 cating that the Alpha variant was 30% – 70% more transmissible with respect to ancestral SARS-CoV-2

193 lineages (NERVTAG, 2020; PHE, 2021; Davies et al., 2021). Latent individuals move to the infectious  
 194 stage,  $I$  for the ancestral lineage and  $I^\alpha$  for the Alpha variant, at a rate  $\varepsilon$  that is inversely proportional to the  
 195 latent period. Infectious individuals transition to the removed compartment ( $R$ ) at a rate  $\mu$  that is inversely  
 196 proportional to the infectious period. In our model, individuals transition between different compartments  
 197 through stochastic binomial chain processes. These transitions are guided by parameter values sourced from  
 198 existing literature, which outline the natural progression of the disease. During the period of our projections,  
 199 the vaccination campaign was focused on administering the initial complete regimen of two doses. Accord-  
 200 ingly, our model accounts for varying levels of vaccine efficacy against infection, hospitalization, and death,  
 201 distinguishing between the effects after the administration of the first and second doses. In collaboration with  
 202 the SMH, the vaccine efficacy (VE) values for one dose and two doses were established at 70% and 90%  
 203 for susceptibility to infection ( $VE^S$ ), and 75% and 95% for both hospitalization ( $VE^H$ ) and deaths ( $VE^D$ ).  
 204 It is important to note that during the scenario design phase, detailed information on vaccine efficacy was  
 205 limited, except for the efficacy against symptomatic disease, which was informed by phase 3 trials (Polack  
 206 et al., 2020; Pilishvili et al., 2021). The protection conferred by the vaccination for the Alpha variant was  
 207 assumed to be similar to those of the ancestral lineages, after considering the increased transmissibility.

208 The assumptions of the future levels of NPIs and vaccination uptake were incorporated based on the  
 209 scenarios presented by the SMH. A full description of all scenarios can be found at this link (COVID-19  
 210 Scenario Modeling Hub, 2021). In round 5 we explore two scenarios that assume different levels, moderate  
 211 and low, of NPIs. More precisely, starting on May 1, 2021, we consider a reduction in the effect of NPIs on  
 212 mobility and contacts relative to the effectiveness of control during the last two weeks in April, 2021. The  
 213 two scenarios assume a gradual reduction of social distancing measures by October 31, 2021 with respect  
 214 to the April 2021 levels: an effective 50% reduction in the moderate NPI scenario, and an effective 80%  
 215 reduction in the low NPI scenario. For example, if NPIs caused mobility to decrease to 50% of its pre-  
 216 pandemic value at the end of April, an 80% reduction in the effectiveness of the interventions would imply  
 217 a final mobility value by end of October, 2021, that would be equal to 90% of its pre-pandemic value (i.e.,  
 218  $0.9 = 1 - (1 - 0.5) \times (1 - 0.8)$ ).

219 Similarly, in the out-of-sample region, we consider two different scenarios for vaccine uptake. The high  
 220 vaccination scenario assumes that vaccination coverage saturates at 83% of the eligible population, while  
 221 the low vaccination scenario assumes a 68% coverage. These different scenarios were used to address the  
 222 impact of vaccine hesitancy. Vaccination data was taken from Ref. (Our World in Data; CDC) until May  
 223 1, 2021. Afterward, according to the SMH scenario specifications, 50 million *first* doses were available per  
 224 month, following the 2-dose protocol (100 million total doses per month).

225 In round 5 the introduction of the Alpha variant in the US is mechanistically modeled by simulating the  
 226 international spread using the GLEAM model. The GLEAM model commences with the introduction of a  
 227 cluster of Alpha variant infections during the week of September 13-19, 2020, specifically in London and  
 228 Kent, UK. These initial infections are modeled as being drawn from a Poisson distribution with a mean of  
 229 40. This approach is based on the fact that the UK was sequencing approximately 5% of positive COVID-19  
 230 cases at that time (WHO, 2020). We have incorporated into our model an assumption that the Alpha variant is  
 231 50% more transmissible than the ancestral strain, denoted by  $\psi = 0.5$ . From this setup, the model generates  
 232 around 300,000 stochastic realizations, each tracing the movement of individuals exposed to the Alpha  
 233 variant traveling to the United States. By aggregating this data, we are able to construct a detailed timeline  
 234 of the stochastic introductions of the Alpha variant into the US. This timeline is particularly important as it  
 235 provides a day-by-day count of individuals traveling from various international locations to US entry points  
 236 that is used at run time by the LEAM-US model as it simulates the dynamic of the Alpha wave.

### 237 3. Results

238 Our multiscale model has been used to generate scenario projections for all rounds of the Scenario Mod-  
239 eling Hub (SMH). Each round required modifications to the model to accommodate specific analyses and  
240 variations in the epidemic landscape, such as the emergence of new variants and changes in mitigation and  
241 vaccination policies. This required adapting the model during the different scenario rounds to incorporate  
242 the mechanistic description of multiple co-circulating variants (up to 4 strains), waning vaccine efficacy  
243 (after round 7), and variations in key disease progression times. The Supplementary Information (SI) pro-  
244 vides a narrative description of the model's changes over the 10 rounds, along with a summary table of key  
245 parameters used, and an assessment of model performance. In the following, we focus on the results con-  
246 cerning the emergence of the Alpha variant in early 2021 (round 5 projections). We will discuss the scenario  
247 assumptions and demonstrate how our multiscale modeling approach enables us to analyze the introduction  
248 and spread of the alpha variant across the US, emphasizing the role of geographical heterogeneity.

#### 249 3.1. Out of sample projections

250 Our model is calibrated using the complete epidemic history within the US, spanning from March 2020  
251 to May 2021, with the calibration process based on weekly reported deaths (in-sample model estimates  
252 and goodness of fit details are provided in the SI). The model is calibrated separately for each of the four  
253 round 5 scenarios (COVID-19 Scenario Modeling Hub, 2021). We generate out-of-sample projections for  
254 the expected number of deaths and hospitalizations, along with associated uncertainties expressed as quan-  
255 tile ranges. These quantile ranges are determined by considering the out-of-sample dynamics of individual  
256 stochastic trajectories, selected using an ABC rejection algorithm during the in-sample calibration period.  
257 Specifically, for each scenario, our models provide target projections consisting of 23 quantiles (ranging  
258 from 0.01 to 0.99 with increments of 0.025), covering each week of the projection period. These quantiles  
259 represent expected incident hospitalizations and deaths. To facilitate the visual representation and assess-  
260 ment of the probabilistic estimates, the quantile projections are transformed into central prediction intervals  
261 (PIs). These prediction intervals encapsulate the model's level of confidence that future observations will  
262 fall within a specified range of values.

263 Evaluating scenario projections requires a fundamentally different approach compared to forecast mod-  
264 els. While accuracy in predicting actual outcomes is the main goal in forecasts, scenario projections have  
265 different purposes. They are designed to explore a range of possible futures, rather than to offer precise  
266 predictions. Therefore, assessing the effectiveness of scenario projections it's not just about how closely  
267 they align with reality, but also about the robustness of the underlying assumptions of each scenario and  
268 their effectiveness in encompassing the spectrum of potential futures. The consideration of both accuracy  
269 and the quality of scenario-based assumptions is the key for scenario modeling evaluation. Despite these  
270 caveats, to assess the performance of scenario projections, we utilize the weighted interval score (WIS) as a  
271 performance indicator (Gneiting and Raftery, 2007; Bracher et al., 2021). The WIS considers the size and  
272 positioning of prediction intervals relative to actual outcomes, along with assigned weights. Lower WIS val-  
273 ues indicate better forecasting performance (see SI for a discussion of WIS methodology). For comparison,  
274 we consider two reference models generated by the COVID-19 Forecast Hub: the naive baseline forecast,  
275 which predicts weekly values similar to the median of the previous week with observed fluctuations, and  
276 the ensemble forecast, aggregating predictions from all modeling teams from the Forecasting Hub (Cramer  
277 et al., 2022). Both reference models focus on four-weeks ahead predictions. We calculate the WIS for our  
278 weekly model projected incident deaths during the first six weeks of the projection period (from May 8 to  
279 June 19, 2021) for each state in the US and the District of Columbia. We compare these WIS scores with  
280 the WIS scores of the baseline and ensemble forecasting models from the COVID-19 Forecast Hub. Weeks  
281 beyond this period are excluded due to the emergence of the Delta variant, which was not considered in the  
282 scenario design. To compare the performance of the scenarios with the reference models, we compute a




Figure 3: (A) Out of sample model projections of weekly reported deaths for the US and selected states until June 28, 2022. The solid lines represent the median values, the darker shaded regions the IQR and the lighter shaded regions the 95% reference range. (B) Out of sample model projections of weekly hospital admissions for the US. The solid lines represent the median values, the darker shaded regions the IQR and the lighter shaded regions the 95% reference range. (C)  $R_t$  estimates for the US and selected states. The solid lines represent the median values and the lighter shaded regions the 95% reference range.

283 WIS ratio. This ratio is obtained by dividing the WIS of a given scenario and location by the WIS of the  
 284 corresponding reference model. A ratio smaller than one implies a better performance of the projections  
 285 with respect to the reference scenario (lower WIS). An inferior performance is indicated by a WIS ratio  
 286 larger than one. The distribution of the WIS of the scenario projections is presented in Fig. 2B and C  
 287 for each analyzed region and scenario, comparing them against the COVIDhub baseline and 4-weeks ahead  
 288 ensemble models. The WIS ratios indicate that the scenario projections outperforms the naive baseline in  
 289 all scenarios and performs comparably to the four-week ahead ensemble model. The median ratios are well  
 290 below one for the baseline model and close to one for the 4-week ahead ensemble, suggesting similar per-  
 291 formance for nearly half the states performing better and the other half performing worse. No significant  
 292 differences in performance are observed across scenarios, likely due to the relatively short assessment win-  
 293 dows of six weeks. Additional rounds of the SMH are evaluated for the most plausible scenarios in the SI. A  
 294 comprehensive discussion of the performance evaluation of scenario projections is provided in (Howerton  
 295 et al., 2023) and in this issue (Bay et al., 2023).

296 In analyzing the performance of our models, it's however crucial to recognize that both the baseline and  
 297 the four-weeks ahead forecast models are not naive in their design. These models undergo weekly revisions  
 298 incorporating updates in surveillance data and changes in contact and mobility levels. This iterative updating  
 299 process sets them apart from scenario projections. Unlike the forecast models, scenario projections are based  
 300 solely on a set of initial assumptions and do not adapt to new information gathered in the out-of-sample  
 301 regime.

### 302 3.2. The dynamics of the Alpha variant

303 To analyze the evolution of the Alpha variant across the US, we focus on the scenario assumptions of  
 304 the high vaccination scenario and ensemble the moderate and low NPIs together, assuming a future decline  
 305 in NPIs effectiveness ranging from 50% to 80%. These two scenarios can be regarded *a posteriori* as the  
 306 most plausible scenarios, meaning they closely align with the actual occurrence. In Fig. 3A and B we show  
 307 the results of the out-of-sample projections for 7 weeks of the weekly number of deaths and hospitalizations  
 308 for the US and selected states (see SI for all states). In the figure, the out-of-sample data are considered up  
 309 to June 28, 2021, after that date the epidemic trajectory shows the emergence of the Delta variant (lineage  
 310 B.1.617.2), which was not considered in the scenario design. Our projections align with the trajectories of  
 311 the deaths and hospitalizations that capture the decline of Alpha wave.

312 With a two-strain model we can distinguish between the infections that are generated from the ancestral  
 313 lineage and Alpha variant separately. Using the daily time series of new infections per lineage, we can disen-  
 314 tangle the contribution of each lineage to the effective reproduction number,  $R_t$ . The effective reproduction  
 315 number represents the average number of secondary infections generated by a single infected individual at  
 316 time  $t$ . The  $R_t$  value is a useful metric because it is affected by factors such as population immunity and  
 317 behavioral changes (e.g., NPIs). In Fig. 3C we report the effective reproductive number  $R_t$  of each lineage,  
 318 including the overall  $R_t$  for the US and selected states (see SI for all states). The  $R_t$  was estimated using  
 319 a Bayesian approach on the time series of the daily new infectious individuals for each lineage taken from  
 320 the median estimates of the calibrated model (Zhang et al., 2020). We observed large heterogeneity's across  
 321 states in the behavior of the overall effective reproductive number.

322 As the more transmissible variant spreads, its prevalence,  $P$ , defined as the proportion of infections  
 323 generated by that variant, increases which could result in an increase in the overall effective reproduction  
 324 number. However, other factors such as population immunity, vaccination prevalence, and NPIs could limit  
 325 the burden of the more transmissible lineage. Across the US we find a heterogeneous burden of the Alpha  
 326 wave. It is also important to stress that a more transmissible variant is bound to become dominant even if  
 327 the overall number of cases is decreasing and the overall effective reproductive number is smaller than one.  
 328 This is evident for a number of states where the increase of the Alpha variant was not associated with a  
 329 sustained increase in epidemic activity.

330 While a full mechanistic understanding of the dynamics of multiple strains is beyond the scope of this  
 331 study, it is possible to use a simple two-strain deterministic model with full cross-protection to obtain the  
 332 expression for the early growth of the prevalence of the more transmissible strain as

$$P(t) \approx e^{\mu \psi R_{\hat{t}}(t-t_0)}, \quad (3)$$

333 where  $R_{\hat{t}}$  is the effective reproductive number of the dominant and less transmissible strain during the initial  
 334 introduction and spread of the new variant (during the time window  $\hat{t}$ ) and is assumed to be constant,  $t_0$  is the  
 335 time of introduction, and  $\mu$  is the generation time assumed to be the same for both strains (a full derivation  
 336 of this result and its assumptions are reported in the SI). This expression reveals that the emergence of a  
 337 more transmissible strain's dominance can be highly variable across geographic regions, contingent upon  
 338 the timing of its introduction and the local effective reproductive numbers of the ancestral strain, which in  
 339 turn depend on factors such as NPIs, residual immunity, and vaccination rates that vary among different  
 340 states.

### 341 3.3. The introduction and establishment of the Alpha variant

342 In our study, we employed a compartmental structure specifically designed as a two-strain model that  
 343 intentionally excludes direct genomic data integration. This strategic decision was made to prioritize a com-  
 344 prehensive analysis of broader epidemiological dynamics, enabling the model to effectively characterize the  
 345 general behaviors of multiple viral strains without relying on detailed genomic information. During the




Figure 4: (A) Weekly fraction of infections due to the Alpha variant for each state as a function of time for each state in the contiguous US. The black circles indicate the median day the variant becomes dominant. The grey lines indicate the IQR and the white lines the 90% reference range. The triangles show when the variant became dominant for some states according to the Helix data source (Helix, 2021). (B) Fraction of cases due to the Alpha variant over time for: California, Florida, and Michigan. The green line (median) and the shaded areas (90%RR) are the results projected by our model. The orange circles are the reported Helix data and the orange line corresponds to the 5-day moving average.

346 calibration process, specific data on the growth and prevalence of the Alpha variant were not incorporated.  
 347 Remarkably, despite the absence of direct genomic data considerations, our model exhibited a strong capa-  
 348 bility in accurately capturing the prevalence trends of the Alpha variant over time. Indeed, the multiscale  
 349 modeling approach used here leverages the international travel patterns that drive the initial dispersion and  
 350 introduction of the Alpha variant. Our results show that the amount of international travel generated by  
 351 the global transportation network is strongly associated to the initial seeding time of the Alpha lineage (see  
 352 SI). However, the internal mobility and contact patterns at the county level, which are integrated into the  
 353 mechanistic structure of the multiscale model, highlight that the local factors play a critical role in the spread  
 354 of the Alpha variant as it competes with the ancestral lineage. This result parallels findings concerning the  
 355 heterogeneities in the initial introduction of SARS-CoV-2 to the US during the beginning of the COVID-19  
 356 pandemic (Davis et al., 2021). The heterogeneities found here go beyond the simple expression reported in  
 357 Eq. 3. Therefore, to study in detail the path to dominance of the Alpha variant across the US, we calculate  
 358 time-varying prevalence of the Alpha lineage according to our model. We define the time of dominance as  
 359 the date when the prevalence of the variant exceeds 50%; i.e. more than half of the new infections are due to  
 360 the Alpha variant. Fig. 4A shows the weekly fraction of infections due to the Alpha variant over time. The  
 361 results highlight the heterogeneous paths toward dominance. The median estimates of the dominance times  
 362 span three months across the states. Our results are in agreement with previously published projections that  
 363 found that the variant would become dominant by the end of March 2021 (Davies et al., 2021; Galloway



364 et al., 2021; Washington et al., 2021).

365 To further validate our results, we use data from the *The Helix COVID-19 Surveillance Dashboard*  
366 (Helix, 2021) that is based on S-gene target failure. The data reported by this project include the state of  
367 residence, the date of collection of the sample, the number of positive tests results, the number of positive  
368 tests results with S gene target failure, the number of sequenced test results with S gene target failure, and  
369 the number of positive test results that were sequenced and known to be of the Alpha variant (for biases  
370 and limitations see Helix (2021)). By using these metrics, we can build a timeline of the prevalence of the  
371 Alpha variant for each state reported in the dataset and compare it to our estimates. In Fig. 4B, we compare  
372 the daily fraction of infections due to the variant from our model (median and 90% reference range) with  
373 the data from Helix for three states: California, Florida, and Michigan. The surveillance data from Helix  
374 generally fall within the confidence interval of our model. However, for some states, we observe a plateauing  
375 after reaching dominance which deviates from our results. This is due to other strains like the Gamma (or  
376 P.1) and Delta (or B.1.617.2) variants of concern increasing in prevalence, which are not included in our  
377 modeling scheme. In the SI, we show a comparison for all states reported by Helix with a sufficient number  
378 of samples.

379 We leverage the resolution of our model to study combined statistical areas (CSA, 2020). Our results at  
380 a higher geographical resolution confirm that the heterogeneity in reaching dominance is not only present at  
381 the state level but also when we look within a state. In Fig. 5A we show the dynamics of the prevalence of  
382 the Alpha variant across 4 selected weeks in early 2021. In early March (epiweek 2021-09), most CSAs have  
383 either no detections or a less than 25% prevalence of the Alpha variant according to the model except for  
384 a few high-traffic regions such as New York-Newark, NY-NJ-CT-PA, Chicago-Naperville, IL-IN-WI, and  
385 Miami-Port St. Lucie-Fort Lauderdale, FL Springs, GA-AL. Zooming in, in Fig. 5B, for states containing  
386 multiple CSAs, we find high intra-state heterogeneity with respect to the time of dominance of the Alpha  
387 variant. The results show that the heterogeneity is not only observed at the state level but also at CSA  
388 level. Interestingly, across all eight states, the week marking the dominance of the Alpha variant in several  
389 of their CSAs is outside (and mostly occurring after the median) the 90% reference range computed at the  
390 state level. However, some CSAs anticipate the state median. This is the case for Miami and New York.  
391 These two cities in particular are the location of two important international port-of-entries in the US that  
392 are associated with a large incoming flux of travelers as they have the first and third largest traffic volume in  
393 the US, respectively.

#### 394 4. Discussion

395 As of March, 2023, the multiscale model presented here has been used to submit 17 rounds of projections  
396 to the SMH. Our approach has undergone many changes to adapt to the scenario specifications and variations  
397 in the epidemiological landscape. The model's calibration time window has also varied based on the SMH  
398 coordinating team's direction. Despite these changes, the basic geographical structure and resolution of the  
399 model have been maintained. Further details on how the epidemic transmission model and other parameters  
400 have changed can be found in the SI. Additionally, we report the performance of our model across 10 rounds  
401 by measuring the WIS for the projection period and calculating the ratio between the scores of two reference  
402 COVID-19 ensemble forecasting models. It is important to note that the initial conditions of the model were  
403 developed as scenarios and not with the goal of forecasting. The scenario projections are also analyzed over  
404 a longer time window, unlike the COVID-19 Forecasting Hub models which only forecast a maximum of 4  
405 weeks ahead. For a full assessment of all rounds and models submitted to the SMH we refer the reader to  
406 Howerton et al. (2023).

407 The results concerning the introduction of the Alpha variant in the US indicate that the importation  
408 events were both temporally and spatially heterogeneous and determined by the source location's connec-  
409 tivity in the global transportation network. The initial importation events and the prevalence of the more




Figure 5: (A) The fraction of Alpha variant infections during 4 different weeks across the US for all CSAs. (B) The time to dominance for selected states and their CSAs. The dark green triangles indicate the median date the variant becomes dominant in a given state and the dark (light) grey bars indicate the IQR (90% reference range). The light green circles indicate the median date the variant becomes dominant in a given CSA that is a part of that state.

transmissible Alpha variant progressed differently across various locations due to the changes in mobility patterns, the distribution of population, and the strength of NPIs. The initial importation of variants into different regions of the US are linked to the global airline traffic determining the entry points and early spread patterns of the virus. Furthermore, international transportation hubs generally resides in areas with high population densities with densely interconnected local mobility (commuting) networks. These networks in their turn contribute to the spread to in nearby regions. Finally, the strength and adherence to NPIs also varied considerably, further contributing to the heterogeneous dynamic of variants. Specifically our model indicates that these factors led to considerable differences in the time when the Alpha variant became the dominant strain, ranging across states from March to May, 2021. Leveraging the resolution of the model we also studied results at the level of CSAs. In doing so, we uncover high heterogeneities even within states. CSAs featuring high mobility fluxes and populations experienced an early growth of infections caused by the new variant with respect to less populated and more secluded areas (as compared to three months, when considering state-level results). This is evident in the contrast between international travel hubs, where the Alpha variant dominance was noted as early as March, and more isolated regions, which saw a later dominance in mid-August.

Like all modeling approaches, our multiscale model has limitations and requires specific assumptions. Although two geographical levels of analysis are considered, there could be heterogeneity in the timing of variant establishment at even smaller scales. Moreover, when projecting scenarios, it is often challenging to obtain accurate information about the growth advantage of emerging variants, which can be attributed to increased transmissibility and/or immune escape (Volz, 2023). Assumptions about how to handle this growth advantage at the mechanistic level can generate different results on long-term projections. Additionally, changes in characteristic times such as the generation time, which are not always available at the moment of estimating the impact of an emerging variant, can also contribute to uncertainty. Furthermore, scenario modeling requires assumptions about vaccine uptake, as well as changes in pathogen transmissibility due to population behavioral changes. Therefore, scenario projections should not be considered as a forecast of

435 the epidemic's future trajectory but rather an attempt to bound possible future trajectories based on different  
436 assumptions.

437 Although the results presented here focused on a particular variant, the methodology can be extended  
438 to study how other, more transmissible strains can spread quickly, take over the share of new infections,  
439 and drastically alter the epidemic trajectory even during a successful vaccine rollout. While modeling ap-  
440 proaches cannot replace ground truth data, mechanistic modeling frameworks can complement genomic  
441 surveillance efforts to track the unfolding of variants of concern and model their introduction, establish-  
442 ment, and path to dominance at a fine-grained geographical scale.

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450 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

#### 451 **Data Availability.**

452 Epidemic surveillance data were collected from the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center [https://](https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/)  
453 [coronavirus.jhu.edu/](https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/). Proprietary airline data are commercially available from OAG ([https://](https://www.oag.com/)  
454 [www.oag.com/](https://www.oag.com/)) and IATA (<https://www.iata.org/>) databases. Other model intervention data includes  
455 Google's COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports available at [https://www.google.com/covid19/](https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/)  
456 [mobility/](https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/) and the Oxford COVID-19 Response Tracker available at [https://github.com/OxCGRT/](https://github.com/OxCGRT/covid-policy-tracker)  
457 [covid-policy-tracker](https://github.com/OxCGRT/covid-policy-tracker).

#### 458 **Code Availability.**

459 The GLEAM model is publicly available at <http://www.gleamviz.org/>.

#### 460 **Author Contributions**

461 M.C., J.T.D., A.P.P., K.P., N.G., M.A., N.P., and A.V. performed research; M.C., J.T.D., A.P.P., K.P. and  
462 A.V. analyzed data; and M.C., J.T.D., A.P.P., K.P., N.G., M.A., N.P., and A.V. wrote and edited the paper.

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### Highlights

- Developed multi-scale epidemic model of potential COVID-19 scenarios in the US
- Spatial/temporal heterogeneity in alpha variant's introductions influenced by airtravel network
- Variability in local mobility, population, and NPIs affected alpha's time to dominance
- Model capable of accurately capturing alpha variant prevalence trends over time

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**Declaration of interests**

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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