



AALBORG UNIVERSITY
DENMARK

Aalborg Universitet

Dimensions of Dialogue

an Inquiry into the Role of Music and of Words in Creative Music Therapy

Garred, Rudy

Publication date:
2004

Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print

[Link to publication from Aalborg University](#)

Citation for published version (APA):
Garred, R. (2004). *Dimensions of Dialogue: an Inquiry into the Role of Music and of Words in Creative Music Therapy*. Aalborg Universitetsforlag.

General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Dimensions of Dialogue

*An Inquiry into the Role of Music and of Words
in Creative Music Therapy*

Rudy Garred

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Institute of Music and Music Therapy
AALBORG UNIVERSITY
January 2004

Abstract

The title of this thesis is: *Dimensions of Dialogue: An Inquiry Into the Role of Music and of Words in Creative Music Therapy.*

Background

Within the field of music therapy there has been a lively discussion on the use of words in therapy. A central question has been whether or not to include verbal processing. Some have insisted on such processing being necessary for actual therapy to take place, while others have insisted on music harboring therapeutic potentials on its own account, and would *not* want to incorporate verbal processing.

Problem

In this study it is presumed that the differences between these two stances, which have not appeared to be easy to reconcile, may be just as much a matter of frame as of issue. That is to say, within a certain psychodynamically oriented outlook, therapy that does not include gaining insight through the medium of talking is not readily recognized as therapy. The possibility of a “purely musical” therapy is therefore questioned. But this stance is taken from within its own frame of understanding. The question that could be posed then is whether this is the only possible frame. Is it possible to frame a purely musical therapy that is not dependent on verbal processing? Such framing is a theoretical matter; it is about ways of viewing, which also has to be built on certain basic assumptions. The thesis in this study is that a *dialogical perspective* may contribute to frame such a possibility, of a music-based rather than a talking-based music therapy.

Focus

“Creative Music Therapy”, originated by Nordoff and Robbins is regarded as a main model of music-based therapy, and is the main focus of the study, that is to say, theoretical discourses related to this approach.

Method

The method for this study is philosophical inquiry, because the question posed brings up issues of an inherently philosophical nature, not only about ways of viewing, but also about different grounds for different ways of viewing. The main approach used is explicating the concept of dialogue, and then applying this to an inquiry into how a music-based, rather than talking-based music therapy might be theoretically framed. The methodological approach also involves integration of theory, and incorporation examples from practice, to illustrate the argument. Comparing views related to underlying assumptions is also featured. The study as a whole is synoptically directed, building a theoretical framework, on a dialogical basis, to show the possibility of a music-based music therapy.

The concept of dialogue

Martin Buber’s philosophy, mainly as this was formulated in the classic work, *I and Thou*, is chosen as a basis for developing a dialogical perspective, on account of his statement being originative, yet still considered to be relevant and applicable. A distinction between second and third person relations is used as a guiding line in the interpretation of the two basic attitudinal modes of I-Thou and I-It, regarded as the difference between *talking to* and *talking about*. And an interpretation is made that emphasizes the dynamic interrelation between these two attitudinal modes, not considering any one of them to be self-sufficient.

Encounter with music

According to the basic “dialogical principle”, as it is applied in the study, anything, within any sphere may also be related to, rather than just objectified. This opens for considering relational processes across various spheres. The question how *music* may be related to, what the encounter with music entails according to a dialogical perspective,

is first considered, finding that a distinction can be made between the realities of music as *presence*, as it appears within the everyday, or as an *object*, as made into a thing. In the creative act a form is made into a work, an It, which may subsequently be encountered, in the receptive act, and again made into a living presence, as a Thou. In becoming an object for understanding music is turned into an It again, but this understanding may serve as a background for new encounters. A basic dialectics of alternation between the modes of presence and object, both creatively and receptively, appears then.

The music therapy triangle

The position of music in music therapy is seen to be different from music as a work of art. It may not be considered as an end in itself, made for its own sake, and valued on its own terms. Nor is it to be regarded merely as a means. A dialogical outlook will counter a view on music as an external means for some other end, an It and nothing but an It, on account of the inherent qualities of the medium then not being taken into consideration, which will not serve as a credible grounding for its use in therapy, and which potentially may be reifying towards the client, applied in that way. On the basis of a relational outlook a triangular model is set up, with the three elemental ingredients of the music therapy setting, client, therapist and music, placed at each of the three poles, indicating how one side mediates the relation between the others. The *interpersonal* relationship between the client and therapist is mediated by the music. The therapist *responsibly* mediates the client's relationship to music. The therapist's relation to music is *functionally* (or clinically) mediated by the client. The position of music is thus found to be not as an autonomous end in itself, or as a means for and external end, but *between* these, as a *medium for therapy*.

The therapist's responsibility

The therapist's responsibility towards the client is found *not* simply to be an I-Thou relation, but a bi-polar relation, in which the therapist continuously has to consider what effect therapy has on the client, whereas the client does not have this kind of relation to the therapist. It is the client's needs that are in focus for both. The relation is not completely mutual, on accord of the structure of the roles between them, though it is found that it may *approach* mutuality in especially potent moments. Therapeutic work

from the side of the therapist is seen to involve an active imagination, which, in cooperation with the client, facilitates discovering new possibilities that the situation might hold for the client.

Across the spheres of the interpersonal and the musical

The three poles of the triangle represent amongst themselves *two different spheres*. A dynamics of the interrelations between the spheres of the musical and the interpersonal is found, and brought out by drawing a horizontal and vertical line through the triangle figure, to indicate the crossing between these spheres. Recent developmental theory, as this has been related to change processes in psychotherapy is used here, to elaborate on these interrelations, both *accommodating* music therapy practice to this perspective, by applying it towards the interrelational dynamics of therapy, but also *assimilating* the theory to specific music therapy needs and concerns. This assimilation of theory considers how music as such may be related to in therapy, and what change processes that may be involved in this relation. The interrelation between these two aspects is illuminated by reference to anthropological theory on ritual processes. A music-based music therapy it is found, may this way be based on a two-sided implicit relational change process, instead of one verbal and one relational, as in regular psychoanalytic psychotherapy. A theoretical perspective on change processes in music therapy, in which music replaces words as the main medium for therapy, is this way suggested.

The use of words in therapy

Further considerations on the relation of music to the use of words in therapy is done by comparing a psychoanalytically based music therapy, *Analytical Music Therapy*, which incorporates music with the use of verbal processing, and *Creative Music Therapy*, as a music-based approach. Analytical Music Therapy is an interpretive approach, whereas Creative Music Therapy is an active approach, and whereas in the first, music is found to facilitate talking, in the second talking may be used rather to facilitate music. It is found that talking about music may well be incorporated on this basis, but at the same time it is found that it may create a distance, and that it therefore will not take any primary position in therapy. Furthermore it is found that a distinction needs to be made between *taking about music*, and *taking about music about the client*, implying that music may be regarded as an aesthetic expression or as a symbolic projection,

respectively. These are two roles to music that are found to be mutually exclusive of each other. A main difference that is found is that symbolic projection requires verbalization both to be brought forth, and to be processed, *as* a symbolic projection. Music as an aesthetic expression on the other side is not dependent on such verbalization to bring out its communicative and experiential power. Music as an aesthetic expression is found to be more than a reflection of the psyche of the individual. It acquires a *communal* meaning.

Developing a relational view

Closer analysis reveals essentialist tendencies within Creative Music Therapy theory, with subjectivistic notions that do not seem to be well aligned with actual practice. A dialogical perspective is developed as an alternative outlook, based on a proposed “definition” of music as *a formed image in sound*. Music is seen as constituted relationally. The client engages *in*, and is engaged *by* music, relating *as* a whole person *to* music as a whole, which this way is seen to harbor multifarious potentials of significance, which may be related by the client to all facets and dimension of existence. In this, it is proposed, lies its therapeutic potential, in actively engaging the whole person.

Making music *related to*, rather than *like* the client

The relational perspective is developed further with regards to the therapist’s relation to music. Music not considered to be a mere reflection of the client, gives a different perspective to the therapist’s music making. The therapist can be seen to make music *related* to the client, not necessarily *like* the client. This implies that the therapist may contribute on a wider basis *musically* to the situation. And the music that the client makes may on the other hand not only be “read” or heard as a reflection of the client, but also as a *musical* contribution, which both share in. Music, according to the definition given, is formed, and *as formed* it expresses something new, something that was not known before, which is what makes it worthwhile and rewarding to be engaging in, and which makes it an epistemological contradiction to consider it merely as a reflection of something. As a formed, aesthetic expression, music acquires a status of its own; it is related to as itself.

Musical idioms in therapy

The significance of music is found to be not so much what it is an expression of, as *how* what is expressed, is expressed, the intensity of the experience, which also reveals, in each concrete instance, the power of music, *in the response to it*. A dialogical point of view stresses the *situationally creative* in the use of any form, style or idiom, which nevertheless are crucially necessary in making music. An alternation is found, between the given and the creatively open in any music making, and likewise then in making music from *therapeutic* musical idioms, that are incorporated and developed in music therapy practice.

Outlining a dialogical rationale

Drawing the lines from these discussions together some central aspects and features of a *dialogical rationale* for a music-based music therapy are outlined. This is based on an explicated philosophical anthropology, emphasizing increase in the client's capacity to relate as a basic aim for therapy. The rationale indicates a dialectic between *working*, as building of music skill, and *playing*, as entering into the creative moment, and the relation between these are not considered to be one-to-one, but open, in such a way that musical expression and technical proficiency levels are not necessarily aligned. This entails a *potentiality of musical expression by simple means*, which implies that music may be entered into experientially at any proficiency level. And this is what the music therapist mediates for the client, the possibility of entering into relationship with music. Powerful musical experience may this way be shared, which makes possible the development also of a positive dynamic relation between client and therapist. Relation in one sphere may enhance relation in the other, leading to an intensification of relation that may facilitate change processes for the client. Transference and countertransference issues are contained primarily within the working phase, to be minimized when entering into the mode of play. The dialogical outlook emphasizes the moment of meeting as a change-inducing event. There will necessarily also be gradual, incremental change processes though, which also may be related both to the musical and the interpersonal sphere. These two aspects, taken together then, imply possibilities of *both* continuous *and* discontinuous change processes in therapy.

Framing the possibility of a music-based therapy

A music-based therapy, as framed dialogically here, is based on the logic of a “positive” approach, enhancing resources, rather than a “negative”, in the sense of removing hindrances. In conclusion it is found that a conflict-oriented approach to therapy, needing verbalization for disentangling and working through specific issues, may not be considered exclusive as a form of therapy. And this kind of “negative” logic of therapy not being considered exclusive is what opens for the possibility of a music-based rather than talking-based therapy, as a “positive” (resource-oriented), transformative approach.

Resymé

Denne afhandlings titel er: *Dialogiske dimensioner: En undersøgelse af musikkens og ordenes rolle i Kreativ musikterapi.*

Baggrund

Inden for musikterapiområdet har man længe og livligt diskuteret spørgsmålet, om verbal bearbejdning er nødvendig eller ikke. Nogen har insisteret på at en sådan bearbejdning er nødvendig for at virkelig terapi skal finde sted, mens andre har insisteret på, at musikken rummer terapeutiske potentialer på egne vilkår, og ønsker *ikke* nødvendigvis at inkorporere verbal bearbejdning.

Problemformulering

I denne undersøgelse forudsættes det, at uenigheden mellem disse to positioner, som ikke har ladet sig forene, i lige så høj grad kan være et spørgsmål om forskelle i forståelsesramme som i selve sagen. Det skal dog bemærkes, at terapi inden for en vis psykodynamisk orienteret opfattelse, som ikke inkluderer verbal bearbejdning gennem samtale som medium, ikke vil kunne regnes som virkelig terapi. Muligheden for en ”rent musikalsk” terapi bliver der derfor sat spørgsmålstejn ved. Men dette standpunkt tages inden for denne opfattelses egen forståelsesramme. Man kan stille spørgsmålet, om dette er den eneste mulige ramme. – Er det muligt at etablere en forståelsesramme for en rent musikalsk terapi, som ikke er afhængig af verbal bearbejdning for at terapi virkelig skal finde sted? Etablering af en sådan forståelsesramme er et teoretisk anliggende; det drejer sig om måder at se og forstå sagen på, noget som nødvendigvis også bygger på visse grundlæggende forudsætninger. Tesen i denne undersøgelse er, at

et *dialogisk perspektiv* kan bidrage til at etablere en ramme for en mulig musikbaseret frem for en samtalebaseret terapi.

Fokus

”Kreativ musikterapi”, som Nordoff og Robbins er ophavsmænd til, regnes her som en hovedretning inden for musikbaseret musikterapi, og retningen udgør det væsentligste fokus for denne undersøgelse, det vil sige teoretiske udkast udviklet i forhold til denne retning.

Metode

Metoden i denne afhandling er filosofisk undersøgelse, fordi spørgsmålet aktualiserer temaer som i sig selv er af filosofisk karakter, om forskellige måder at se på, og forskelligt grundlag for forskellige synsmåder. den vigtigste fremgangsmåde i afhandlingen er at eksplicitere et dialogisk perspektiv, og så aplikere dette i en undersøgelse af, hvordan en musikbaseret frem for en samtalebaseret musikterapi kan indrammes teoretisk. Den metodologiske tilnærming indbefatter også integrering af teori, såvel som indlemmelse af eksempler fra praksis, for at illustrere argumentet. Undersøgelsen som helhed er synoptisk anlagt, på den måde at en teoretisk rammefortåelse udarbejdes på et dialogisk grundlag, for at vise muligheden af en musikbaseret musikterapi.

Dialog-begrebet

Martin Bubers filosofi, hovedsagelig sådan som denne er formuleret i det klassiske værk *Jeg og Du*, er valgt som basis for at udvikle et dialogisk perspektiv knyttet til temaet for denne undersøgelse, fordi hans fremstilling må regnes som en primær kilde for denne type orientering, samtidig med at den fortsat er relevant og anvendelig. En distinktion mellem anden- og tredje person-forhold anføres som en rettesnor i tolkningen af de to grundlæggende holdningsmodaliteter Jeg-Du og Jeg-Det i Buber’s tekst, opfattet som forskellen mellem at *snakke med* og *snakke om*. En fortolkning udvikles som lægger vægt på den dynamiske interrelation mellem disse to holdningsmodaliteter, uden at anse nogen af dem for at være tilstrækkelige i sig selv.

Møde med musik

Ifølge det ”dialogiske princip”, slig dette bliver bliver anvendt i undesøgelsen, kan hvad som helst, inden for en hvilken som helst sfære, *også* kan relateres til, snarere enn kun at kunne objektiveres. Dette åbner for at se på relationelle processer på tværs af forskellige sfærer. Først bliver da spørgsmålet hvordan man kan relatere til *musik*, hvad mødet med musikken indebærer, set nærmere på. Her bliver det fundet at der kan gøres en distinktion mellem musikkens realitet som *nærvær* og som *objekt*, som noget tingsliggjort. I den kreative handling bliver en form til et værk, et Det, som siden kan mødes i den receptive handling, og dér igen forandret til et levende nærvær, et Du. Ved at blive gjort til genstand for forståelse bliver musikken til et Det igen, men på denne baggrund kan nye møder finde sted. En grundlæggende dialektisk vekselvirkning mellem nærvær og objekt som modaliteter, både kreativt og receptivt, træder her frem.

Musikterapi-trekanten

Musikkens position i musikterapi ses imidlertid at være anderledes end musik som kunstværk. Den kan ikke ansees som et mål i sig selv, frembragt for sin egen skyld, og den vurderes ikke på egne vilkår. Men den kan heller ikke blot anses som et middel. Et dialogisk perspektiv vil gå imod et syn på musik som et eksternt middel til et andet mål, et Det og ikke andet end et Det, på baggrund af at mediets egne kvaliteter, som i så fald ikke bliver taget i betragtning, – noget som ikke kan fungere som et troværdigt grundlag for musikkens anvendelse i terapi, og som potentielt kan være tingsliggørende i forhold til klienten, hvis den anvendes på den måde. På basis af et relationelt perspektiv opstilles en trekant-model af musikterapi med tre elementære bestanddele: klient, terapeut og musik – placeret ved hver af de tre poler, for slig at indikere hvordan en side formidler forholdet mellem de to andre. Forholdet mellem klient og terapeut er formidlet af musikken. Klientens forhold til musikken er ansvarligt formidlet af terapeuten. Terapeutens forhold til musikken er funktionelt (eller klinisk) formidlet af klienten. Musikkens position forstås således ikke som et mål i sig selv, og heller ikke som et middel for et udvendigt mål, men *mellem* disse, som et medium for terapi.

Terapeutens ansvar

Terapeutens ansvar i forhold til klienten viser sig *ikke* ganske enkelt at være et Jeg-Det forhold, men et to-sidigt forhold, hvor terapeuten må tage med i betragtning, hvilken effekt den fælles virksomhed har på klienten, mens klienten ikke har dette forhold til terapeuten. Det er klientens behov som er i fokus for begge. Forholdet er ikke fuldstændig gensidigt, hvilket følger af rollefordelingen mellem dem, men det kan *tilnærme* sig full gjensidighed i spesielle virkningsfulle øyeblikk. Terapeutisk arbejde, set fra terapeutens side, betragtes som noget, der indebærer en aktiv brug af fantasi, som, i samarbejde med klienten, muliggør opdagelse af de nye muligheder som situationen måtte indeholde for klienten.

Overgange mellem den mellemmenneskelige og den musikalske sfære

De tre poler i trekanten er placeret imellem *to forskellige sfærer*. Dynamikken af relationer mellem den mellemmenneskelige og den musikalske sfære anskueliggøres ved at trække en horisontal og en vertikal linje gennem den opstillede trekantfigur, for at vise overgangen mellem sfærene. Nyere udviklingspsykologi, sådan som denne er blevet relateret til forandringsprocesser i psykoterapi, bliver her inddraget, både ved at *akkomodere* musikterapeutisk praksis til dette perspektiv, ved at anvende det i forhold til den mellemmenneskelige dynamik i terapi, men også ved at *assimilere* teorien til specifikke behov og anliggender inden for musikterapi. Assimileringen af teorien, på grundlag af et dialogisk perspektiv om møde med musikk, vurderer hvordan man kan relatere til musik i terapi, og hvilke forandringsprocesser der kan være involveret i denne relation. Forholdet mellem disse to aspekter vurderes efterfølgende, og antropologisk teori om rituelle processer inddrages. Resultatet af undersøgelsen er, at en musikbaseret musikterapi på denne måde kan baseres på en to-sidig implicit relationel forandringsproces, i stedet for én verbalt-deklarativ, og én implicit relationel, som normalt i psykoanalytisk psykoterapi. På denne måde udvikles et teoretisk perspektiv omkring forandringsprocesser i musikterapi, hvor musikken erstatter brugen af ord som det primære medium for terapi.

Brugen af ord i terapi

Forholdet mellem brugen af ord og musik bliver endvidere belyst ved at sammenligne *Analytisk musikterapi* – en psykoanalytisk baseret musikterapi, som forbinder musik med brugen af verbal bearbejdning – og *Kreativ musikterapi*, som er en musikbaseret fremgangsmåde. Analytisk musikterapi er en fortolkende terapeutisk fremgangsmåde, mens Kreativ musikterapi er en aktiv fremgangsmåde, og mens musikken i den førstnævnte blir fundet aktivt å fremme brugen af sprog, bliver musikken i den sidstnævnte brugt snarere til at fremme musikken. Det viser sig, at man godt kan inkludere det at *snakke om* musikken på denne basis, men samtidig viser det sig, at dette kan skabe distance, og at det derfor ikke vil spille en hovedrolle i terapien. Endvidere viser det sig at det er nødvendig at skelne mellem at snakke om musik, og at *snakke om musikken om klienten*, hvilket indebærer at musikken opfattes henholdsvis som et æstetisk udtryk eller som en symbolsk projektion. Disse to roller for musikken bliver fundet at udelukke hinanden gensidigt. En hovedforskel er, at symbolsk projektion forudsætter verbalisering for overhovedet at kunne frembringes, og for at kunne bearbejdes. Uden dette er det ikke muligt at relatere til den *som* symbolsk projektion. Imidlertid er musikken, betragtet som æstetisk udtryk, ikke afhængig af en sådan verbalisering for at kunne kommunikerer gennem og erfares. Som æstetisk udtryk viser musik sig videre at være mere end en refleksion af den individuelle psyke. Den får en *fælles* mening.

Udvikling af et relationelt perspektiv

Der fremanalyseres essentialistiske tendenser inden for Kreativ musikterapi- teori, med subjektivistiske synsmåder som ikke synes at svare til den faktiske praksis. Et dialogisk perspektiv udvikles som et alternativ, baseret på en tentativ ”definition” af musik som *et forestillingsbillede formet i lyd*. Musik ses som relationelt konstitueret. Klienten engagerer sig *i* og bliver engageret *af* musikken, relaterer som en hel person til musikken som et hele, som på denne måde viser sig at indholde mangfoldige betydningspotentialer, og som kan relateres til alle facetter og dimensioner ved tilværelsen af klienten. Heri, foreslås det, ligger musikkens terapeutiske potentiale: aktivt at engagere hele personen.

At lave musik er *relateret til*, snarere end *lignende* barnet

Det relationelle perspektiv videreudvikles med hensyn til terapeutens forhold til musikken. Da musikken ikke forstås blot som en refleksion af klienten, gir dette et andet perspektiv på musikken som terapeuten laver. Terapeuten kan betragtes som én, der skaber musik *relateret* til klienten, ikke nødvendigvis *lignende* klienten. Dette indebærer at terapeuten kan bidrage på en bredere måde *musikalsk* til situationen. Og musikken som klienten frembringer, kan på den anden side ikke blot "læses" eller høres som en refleksion af klienten, men også som et *musikalsk* bidrag, der deles af begge. Musik er, ifølge den givne definition, *formet*, og *som formet* udtrykker den noget nyt, noget som ikke var kendt før, hvilket er det som gør den berigende og værd at engagere sig i. Dette medfører, at det bliver en epistemologisk kontradiktion at anse den blot som en refleksion af noget. Som et *formet*, æstetisk udtryk tilegner musikken sig en egen status, som den er relateret til som sig selv.

Muskalske idiommer i terapi

Musikens betydning bliver fundet at være ikke så mæget i hva den udtrykker, som i hvordan det der udtrykkes, udtrykker, intensiteten i erfaringen, hvilket også bringer frem, i hvert konkrete tilfælde, musikens kraft, i responsen til den. Brugen af idiommer anskues fra et dialogisk perspektiv, der understreger det situationelt kreative i brugen af enhver form, stil, eller musikalsk idiom. Alligevel anses brugen af idiommer som helt nødvendig i det at skabe musik. Der er ifølge et dialogisk perspektiv en vekselvirkning mellem det givne og det kreativt åbne i enhver frembringelse af musik, også i at skabe musik ud fra *terapeutiske* musikalske idiommer, som er blevet inkorporeret og udviklet i musikterapeutisk praksis.

Udkast til et dialogisk rationale

Ved at trække linierne fra diskussionerne sammen kan nogle centrale aspekter og karakteristiske træk ved et *dialogisk rationale* for en musikbaseret musikterapi præciseres, baseret på en eksplicit filosofisk antropologi, som lægger vægt på en forbedring af klientens relationelle kapacitet som et grundlæggende mål for terapi. Rationalet indikerer en dialektik mellem udviklingen af musikalske færdigheder som "arbejde" på den ene side, på den anden side "spil/leg" som det at træde ind i det

kreative øjeblik. Relationen mellem disse to forstås ikke som 'en til en', men som åben, sådan at musikalsk udtryk og teknisk færdighedsniveau ikke nødvendigvis anses for at være sammenfaldende. Dette indebærer et potentiale for musikalsk udtryk på et hvilket som helst teknisk færdighedsniveau, gennem terapeutisk formidling. Sådan kan stærke musikalske erfaringer deles, og dette muliggør udviklingen af en positiv dynamisk relation mellem klient og terapeut. Relationsforhold inden for den ene kan forstærke relationsforhold inden for den anden, med intensiverede relationelle forhold som følge af dette – hvilket også kan føre til ændringsprocesser for klienten. Overføring og modoverføring rummes primært inden for "arbejds"-fasen, for at minimeres ved indtræden i "leg/spil"-modaliteten. Det dialogiske perspektiv lægger vægt på mødets øjeblik som en forandringsfremkaldende begivenhed. Det vil imidlertid nødvendigvis også altid finde sted gradvise ændringer, relateret både til musikken og til den mellem menneskelige sfære. Disse to aspekter, set i sammenheng, indebærer da muligheder for *både* steg for steg, progressive, og diskontinuerlige, springvise forandringsprocesser i terapi.

Indramning af muligheden for en musikbaseret terapi

En musikbaseret terapi er, sådan som den teoretisk er indrammet her, baseret på logikken i en "positiv" indfaldsvinkel, som fokuserer på det at fremme ressourcer, frem for en "negativ", som fokuserer på at fjerne hindringer. Som konklusion fremføres det, at en konfliktorienteret indfaldsvinkel til terapi, hvor verbalisering er nødvendig for at identificere og bearbejde underliggende temaer, ikke kan betragtes som den eneste gyldige form for terapi. Og netop det, at denne type "negativ" logik, som fjernelse af forhindrede, ikke betragtes som enegyldig, kan åbne for muligheden af en musikbaseret frem for en samtalebaseret terapi – som en "positiv", ressoursorienteret, transformativ indfaldsvinkel.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank some of the people that have helped me complete this thesis. Professor Even Ruud I consider my mentor in writing on music therapy theory, and he has continuously and generously been a resource for all my work within the field. My Supervisor at Aalborg University, Lars Ole Bonde has given feedback throughout the process, keeping me on track, and striking a balance between his own relevant suggestions and critique and leaving sufficient space for my own responsibility to enable a personal approach in grappling with the issues, which I appreciate.

My thanks also to professor Tony Wigram, responsible for the PhD program, and who has arranged a series of courses of consistent high quality, with internationally acclaimed presenters within the field. The social aspect to these courses have also made them quite unique, offering opportunities for making new acquaintances and going into discussions on many levels, and in many ways. They have certainly been highly rewarding learning experiences.

Here I have to mention particularly David Aldridge who has been a co-leader of the courses, and who has provided a constant input of perspective and thought, related to the presenters, and not least to each of the PhD students presenting, which in itself has been highly instructive. I have to include myself among those who have received decisive challenge, support and guidance on the way.

Having had the opportunity to present regularly the work in process at the PhD seminars, receiving responses both from the staff at Aalborg University, the guest presenters, and the students, has been very important indeed. I must also thank my fellow doctoral students, who have been a great resource and inspiration throughout the process.

I am also grateful for responses from colleagues at presentations given at conferences. And also for the opportunity to publish on the Internet cite *Voices* and to receive responses through a moderated discussion on this cite. I have to mention the editors Brynjulf Stige and Carolyn Kenny, who also published a book including the article from the Internet cite.

My thanks also go to Aalborg University for accepting me into their program, and for providing necessary conditions and means for completing the required work. I also have to thank Stavanger University College for generously allowing me leave from teaching assignments to complete this work.

I dedicate this thesis to my mother and father.

Love is, in fact, an intensification of life, a completeness, a fullness, a wholeness of life. We do not live merely in order to vegetate through our days until we die. Nor do we live merely in order to take part in the routines of work and amusement that go on around us. We are not just machines that have to be cared for and driven carefully until they run down. In other words, life is not a straight horizontal line between two points, birth and death. Life curves upward to a peak of intensity, a high point of value and meaning, at which all its latent creative possibilities go into action and the person transcends himself or herself in encounter, response, and communion with another. It is for this that we came into the world – this communion and self-transcendence. We do not become fully human until we give ourselves to each other in love. And this must not be confined only to sexual fulfillment: it embraces everything in the human person – the capacity for self-giving, for sharing, for creativity, for mutual care, for spiritual concern.

Thomas Merton

*The Way that can be told of is not an eternal Way;
The names that can be named are not eternal names.*

Lao Tsu: *Tao Tê Ching*

Contents

Abstract	i
Resymé	vii
Acknowledgements	xv
Contents	xix
Tables and Figures.....	xxvi
1 MUSIC, WORDS, AND THERAPY.....	1
1.1 THE TERM “MUSIC THERAPY”	1
1.1.1 <i>Music Therapy and Psychotherapy</i>	2
1.1.2 <i>Analysis and Synthesis</i>	4
1.1.3 <i>“Purely Musical” Therapy</i>	5
1.2 THE NEED FOR VERBAL PROCESSING	6
1.2.1 <i>Questioning the Need to Verbalize</i>	8
1.2.2 <i>“Psychodynamically Informed” Music Therapy</i>	10
1.3 THEORETICAL DISCOURSE	13
1.3.1 <i>Field Discourse</i>	14
1.3.2 <i>The Early Interaction Analogy</i>	14
1.3.3 <i>“New Musicology” and Music Therapy Theory</i>	17
1.3.4 <i>The Meaning of Words and the Meaning of Music</i>	20
1.3.5 <i>Clinical and Music-based Theories</i>	22
1.3.6 <i>“Community Music Therapy”</i>	23
1.4 FRAME AND PICTURE	25
1.4.1 <i>The Possibility of a Music-Based Therapy</i>	26
1.4.2 <i>General or “Local” Theory</i>	27
1.4.3 <i>Philosophy, Theory and Practice</i>	30
1.4.4 <i>An Existential-Humanistic Orientation</i>	31
1.5 A DIALOGICAL PERSPECTIVE.....	32
1.5.1 <i>Buber’s Dialogical Philosophy</i>	33
1.5.2 <i>Problem Statement</i>	34
1.5.3 <i>Focus on Creative Music Therapy</i>	35
1.5.4 <i>Outline of the Thesis</i>	36
2 PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY.....	38
2.1 AN APPLICATIVE STUDY.....	38
2.1.1 <i>Developing a Rationale</i>	39
2.2 INDIGENOUS AND IMPORTED THEORY.....	41

2.2.1	<i>Integration of Theory</i>	43
2.2.2	<i>Philosophy and Theory</i>	44
2.2.3	<i>Two Aspects of Philosophical Analysis</i>	44
2.3	CHARACTERISTIC PROCEDURES	45
2.3.1	<i>Clarifying the Meaning of Terms Used</i>	46
2.3.2	<i>Exposing and Evaluating Underlying Assumptions</i>	46
2.3.3	<i>Systematization of Theory</i>	47
2.3.4	<i>The Use of Argument as the Primary Mode of Inquiry</i>	48
2.4	CONTEXTS OF PHILOSOPHIZING	49
2.4.1	<i>Creating a Philosophy</i>	49
2.4.2	<i>Comparing Theories</i>	50
2.4.3	<i>Characteristic Questions</i>	51
2.5	ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS	52
2.5.1	<i>Reconciling Multiple Perspectives</i>	53
2.5.2	<i>What Philosophy can Bring</i>	54
2.5.3	<i>Reflective Synthesis</i>	55
2.6	THEORY AND PRACTICE.....	59
2.6.1	<i>Closeness and Distance to Practice</i>	59
2.6.2	<i>The Location Chosen From Which to View</i>	60
2.6.3	<i>Method and Content</i>	61
2.6.4	<i>Performing Philosophy</i>	62
2.7	BACKGROUND AND PREMISES	63
2.7.1	<i>Personal Background</i>	64
2.7.2	<i>Premises and Orientation</i>	65
2.7.3	<i>Axioms and Values</i>	67
2.8	EXPLICATING A DIALOGICAL PERSPECTIVE	67
2.8.1	<i>Applying the Term Dialogue</i>	68
2.8.2	<i>Relating to Current Issues</i>	70
2.9	SUMMARY OF THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH	70
3	THE CONCEPT OF DIALOGUE	72
3.1	ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT	72
3.1.1	<i>Two Phases</i>	74
3.2	TWOFOLD ATTITUDE	75
3.2.1	<i>Second Versus Third Person</i>	76
3.2.2	<i>Immediacy</i>	77
3.2.3	<i>Presence and Object</i>	78
3.2.4	<i>The Whole Being Involved</i>	78
3.2.5	<i>Encounter</i>	80
3.2.6	<i>Mutuality</i>	81
3.2.7	<i>Responsibility</i>	81
3.2.8	<i>Actuality and Latency</i>	82
3.2.9	<i>The Eternal You</i>	83
3.3	FURTHER COMMENTARY	84
3.3.1	<i>Theology and Philosophy</i>	84
3.3.2	<i>The Problem of Intersubjectivity</i>	86
3.3.3	<i>Philosophical Anthropology and Psychotherapy</i>	87
3.3.4	<i>On Freud's Psychoanalysis</i>	90

3.3.5 <i>The Debate with Jung</i>	91
3.3.6 <i>Postmodern Themes</i>	92
3.4 ALTERNATING BETWEEN ATTITUDINAL MODES.....	95
3.4.1 <i>Method or Discipline</i>	95
3.4.2 <i>Explanation and Understanding</i>	96
3.4.3 <i>The Constructive Role of It</i>	98
3.5 APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF DIALOGUE.....	99
3.5.1 <i>The “Dialogical Principle”</i>	100
3.5.2 <i>Dialogical Methodology</i>	100
3.6 SUMMARY.....	101
4 ENCOUNTER WITH MUSIC.....	102
4.1 THE WORK OF ART AS A THOU	102
4.1.1 <i>Relating to and Talking About</i>	103
4.1.2 <i>The Creative Encounter</i>	104
4.1.3 <i>Two Sides of “Acting Upon”</i>	106
4.2 THE ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION DISPUTE.....	108
4.2.1 <i>Musical “Subjectivity”</i>	109
4.2.2 <i>Analysis De-subjectifying</i>	110
4.2.3 <i>Categorical Distinction</i>	112
4.3 A DIALOGICAL VIEW	113
4.3.1 <i>Both Interpretation and Analysis as Objectifications</i>	114
4.3.2 <i>An Ethical Aspect</i>	115
4.3.3 <i>Dialectic Alternation Between Presence and Object</i>	117
4.4 THE MUSICAL WORK.....	117
4.4.1 <i>Other Ontologies of Music</i>	118
4.4.2 <i>Music in Culture</i>	119
4.4.3 <i>Music, Therapist and Client</i>	120
5 MUSIC AS A MEANS, END IN ITSELF, OR AS A MEDIUM.....	122
5.1 MUSIC AS A LINEAR MEANS	122
5.1.1 <i>Means versus Medium</i>	123
5.1.2 <i>The Logic of Means and End</i>	124
5.1.3 <i>Treating Human Beings as Things</i>	126
5.1.4 <i>Music as a “Physical Object”</i>	129
5.2 THE MUSIC THERAPY TRIANGLE	131
5.2.1 <i>An Illustrative Example: Annabel</i>	133
5.2.2 <i>Child-Therapist Relation Mediated by Music</i>	135
5.2.3 <i>Child-Music Relationship Mediated by the Therapist</i>	136
5.2.4 <i>Therapist-Music Relation Functionally Mediated by the Child</i>	137
5.2.5 <i>Music as a Medium</i>	137
5.3 MUSIC AS ART, AND MUSIC AS THERAPY	138
5.4 CONTRAST WITH A SEMIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE	140
5.5 THE CONCEPT OF THE “MUSICAL BETWEEN”	143
5.5.1 <i>Fusing or Spacing “the Between”</i>	145
5.6 MUSICAL ANALYSIS AND PRAGMATICS	147
5.6.1 <i>Text and Context</i>	148
5.6.2 <i>Intertextuality</i>	151

5.6.3 <i>Illustrative Analysis of a Music Therapy Song</i>	152
5.6.4 <i>Reflection on Musical Qualities</i>	156
5.6.5 <i>Clarifying Therapeutic Function</i>	157
5.7 A MEDIUM ACROSS TWO DIFFERENT SPHERES	159
6 DYNAMICS OF THE INTERPERSONAL SPHERE.....	161
6.1 THERAPEUTIC RESPONSIBILITY.....	161
6.1.1 <i>A “Bi-polar” Relation from the Side of the Therapist</i>	162
6.1.2 <i>Artistic and Therapeutic Imagination</i>	164
6.1.3 <i>Musical Therapeutic Technique</i>	166
6.2 THE EARLY INTERACTION ANALOGY	167
6.2.1 <i>Preverbal Communication</i>	167
6.2.2 <i>“Affect Attunement” and “Connection”</i>	169
6.2.3 <i>“Dynamic Form”</i>	170
6.2.4 <i>Change Processes in Therapy</i>	172
6.3 “IMPLICIT RELATIONAL KNOWING”.....	173
6.3.1 <i>The “Moment of Meeting”</i>	174
6.3.2 <i>Three “Phases” of Transition</i>	175
6.3.3 <i>Transference Issues Minimized</i>	176
6.3.4 <i>A Change that Happens</i>	176
6.4 APPLICATION TO EXAMPLES FROM THE LITERATURE	178
6.4.1 <i>The Example of David</i>	179
6.4.2 <i>The Example of Mathew</i>	180
6.4.3 <i>Relational Change</i>	182
6.5 AN EXAMPLE FROM MY OWN PRACTICE: LISA	182
6.5.1 <i>A Drum-Playing Incident</i>	184
6.5.2 <i>The Relationship Changed Through Musicking</i>	186
6.5.3 <i>The Relation to Music in Therapy</i>	187
7 CHANGE PROCESS ACROSS TWO SPHERES.....	188
7.1 KNOWING RELATIONALLY.....	188
7.2 MUSICOLOGY AND “MUSIC ITSELF”	190
7.2.1 <i>To Know Some Music</i>	191
7.2.2 <i>Declarative and Implicit Knowledge of Music</i>	192
7.3 CHANGE IN THE IMPLICIT RELATION TO MUSIC.....	193
7.3.1 <i>Change in Practical implicit knowing</i>	194
7.3.2 <i>Change in the Sense of Self</i>	195
7.3.3 <i>“Peak Experience”</i>	195
7.3.4 <i>Incremental Changes</i>	198
7.3.5 <i>Musical Transference and Countertransference</i>	199
7.4 THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN THE TWO SPHERES.....	199
7.4.1 <i>Playing Together</i>	200
7.4.2 <i>“Communitas”</i>	201
7.4.3 <i>Crossing Vertical and Horizontal Lines</i>	202
7.5 REPLACING WORDS WITH MUSIC	204
7.5.1 <i>The Relation Between Music and Words</i>	205
8 SYMBOLIC PROJECTION VERSUS AESTHETIC EXPRESSION	206
8.1 CREATIVE MUSIC THERAPY	206

8.2 ANALYTICAL MUSIC THERAPY	208
8.2.1 “Referential” Improvisation	210
8.2.2 Verbal Translations of Musical Improvisation.....	212
8.2.3 Both Client and Therapist Providing Material and Listening to it	213
8.3 CREATIVE MUSIC THERAPY AS AN ACTIVE APPROACH	214
8.3.1 The Concept of “Work”	214
8.3.2 Resolving Conflict	216
8.3.3 Musical Progression.....	216
8.3.4 Words Facilitating Music	218
8.3.5 Music in its Full Significance as Music.....	219
8.3.6 Music as a “World”	220
8.4 “HERMENEUTICAL” VERSUS “PHENOMENOLOGICAL” POSITIONS	222
8.4.1 Talking about Music in Therapy.....	224
8.4.2 Closeness Versus Setting a Distance	225
8.4.3 Music About the Client	227
8.5 PROJECTION AND EXPRESSION	227
8.5.1 Improvisation as “Free Association”	228
8.5.2 Improvisation as an Aesthetic Expression.....	229
8.5.3 More than Representing the Individual.....	230
8.5.4 The Inevitability of Transference and Countertransference	231
8.5.5 “Hermeneutics of Suspicion”	233
8.6 WORDS NECESSARY OR NOT	237
8.6.1 On the Possible Integration of the Perspectives.....	237
8.6.2 Different Roles, Different “Plays”	239
8.7 WAYS OF TALKING	241
8.7.1 Equating Musical Change and Personal Change	242
9 DEVELOPING A RELATIONAL VIEW	243
9.1 TENDENCIES OF SUBJECTIVISM	243
9.1.1 The Concept of the “Music Child”	244
9.1.2 Later Developments of the Concept.....	245
9.1.3 Change “From Within”	247
9.1.4 Psychoanalytic Concepts Translated	247
9.1.5 Relational Practice	248
9.2 BUBER’S VIEWS ON ART.....	249
9.2.1 The Perfected Image.....	251
9.2.2 “Gebild” as “Image-Creation”	252
9.3 A DEFINITION OF MUSIC	254
9.3.1 Looking and Seeing, Listening and Hearing	255
9.3.2 The Ambiguity of the Image.....	257
9.3.3 Culture and Conventionally Ascribed Meaning	258
9.3.4 Universality and Particularity of Music.....	261
9.3.5 Sound and Musical Material	261
9.3.6 The Perfected Image.....	263
9.3.7 Any Likeness to be Found.....	265
9.4 RELATING TO MUSIC	266
9.4.1 Related to as a Whole, by the Whole Person.....	269
9.4.2 Music as an Activity.....	271

9.4.3 Music Engaging the Person.....	274
9.4.4 The Child Engaged in Music	275
9.5 A RELATIONAL DIRECTION FOR THEORY.....	275
10 BETWEEN SUBJECTIVISM AND OBJECTIVISM	277
10.1 CLINICAL IMPROVISATION	277
10.1.1 Finding the “Right” Music.....	278
10.1.2 The Aesthetic Aspect.....	279
10.1.3 Musical Significance	281
10.1.4 Music as Something to Relate to	282
10.2 OBJECTIVISTIC NOTIONS ABOUT MUSIC	282
10.2.1 “Objective, but not Universal”	284
10.2.2 Non-prescriptive Application of Musical Styles	284
10.2.3 Musical Idioms as “Archetypes”	286
10.2.4 Crossing Borders of Nation or Culture	289
10.2.5 Remaining Open Question.....	290
10.2.6 Power as it Manifests in Relation.....	292
10.3 MUSICAL ARCHETYPES AS “ETERNAL IDEAS”	292
10.3.1 Music Present or Mystified.....	293
10.3.2 The Interval Theory	294
10.3.3 Heuristic Use of Concepts	295
10.4 MUSICAL PRESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIFICATION	297
10.4.1 The Use of Idioms in Music Making	297
10.4.2 Facilitating Creativity	298
10.4.3 Creative and Sensitive Application of a Therapeutic Repertoire.....	299
10.4.4 Technique Necessary but not Sufficient.....	300
10.4.5 The Situational Use of Idioms in Therapy.....	300
10.5 SUMMARIZED THEORETICAL STATEMENT	301
11 OUTLINING A DIALOGICAL RATIONALE	303
11.1 A THERAPEUTIC PURSUIT	303
11.1.1 Philosophical Anthropology.....	304
11.1.2 Capacity to Relate	306
11.2 WORKING AND PLAYING	307
11.2.1 The Concept of Play	307
11.2.2 The Dialectics Between “Working” and “Playing”	309
11.2.3 Musical Expression by Simple Means	310
11.2.4 Engaging the Whole Person in Music	311
11.2.5 Participation in Playing Together.....	312
11.3 THE MOMENT OF CHANGE.....	312
11.3.1 Gradual Development and Sudden Change	313
11.3.2 Enhancing Resources	314
11.3.3 No Specific Client Group.....	315
11.4 REPAIR AND REGENERATION	316
11.4.1 “Intervention” and Healing	316
11.4.2 Intensive and Primary Levels of Practice	318
11.4.3 Diagnosis and Treatment	318
11.4.4 “Clinical Intervention” in Music Therapy.....	320

11.5 MUSICAL AND PERSONAL CHANGE.....	321
11.5.1 <i>The Making of the Person</i>	322
11.5.2 <i>What and How you Play</i>	323
11.5.3 <i>“Participatory Discrepancies”</i>	325
11.5.4 <i>Personal Empowerment</i>	327
11.6 THERAPEUTIC PRACTICE.....	327
11.6.1 <i>A Socially Instituted Practice</i>	328
11.6.2 <i>The Setting</i>	329
11.6.3 <i>Community Music Therapy</i>	329
11.6.4 <i>Group Work</i>	331
11.6.5 <i>The Cultural Dimension</i>	332
11.6.6 <i>Cultural Identity</i>	333
11.6.7 <i>Contextualizing Music Therapy as a Situated Praxis</i>	334
11.7 RESEARCH AND LEGITIMIZATION	337
11.7.1 <i>Dynamics of Mutuality and Reciprocity</i>	338
11.7.2 <i>Multiple Research Approaches</i>	338
11.7.3 <i>Reflexivity</i>	339
11.7.4 <i>Creativity</i>	340
11.7.5 <i>Ethics</i>	340
11.8 A SUMMARY OF THE RATIONALE.....	341
11.8.1 <i>The Two Main Interrelated Aspects</i>	343
12 FRAMING THE POSSIBILITY OF A MUSIC-BASED THERAPY.....	345
12.1 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS	346
12.1.1 <i>A Triangular Set-up</i>	346
12.1.2 <i>Change Processes Across Two Spheres</i>	347
12.1.3 <i>Expressive or Symptomatic Role</i>	347
12.1.4 <i>Ways of Using Words</i>	348
12.1.5 <i>Engaging in, and Being Engaged by Music</i>	350
12.1.6 <i>Increasing Relational Capacity through Involvement with Music</i>	350
12.2 CONCLUSIONS.....	352
12.2.1 <i>Framing “Therapy in Music” as a Possibility</i>	352
12.3 THE RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY	354
12.3.1 <i>The Role of Theory</i>	355
12.4 A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORETICAL DISCOURSE	356
12.4.1 <i>Discontinuous Processes of Change</i>	357
12.4.2 <i>Mediation and Immediacy</i>	357
12.5 METHODOLOGICAL VALIDATION AND CRITIQUE	358
12.5.1 <i>Incompatibilities Between or Variations Within Approaches</i>	359
12.5.2 <i>Both Accommodation and Assimilation of Theory</i>	360
12.5.3 <i>Coherence and Comprehensiveness</i>	360
12.5.4 <i>Other Dialogical Theorists</i>	361
12.5.5 <i>Power Relations</i>	362
12.5.6 <i>The Use of Buber’s Dialogical Philosophy</i>	363
12.6 FURTHER STUDIES	364
12.6.1 <i>Pointing Where to Look</i>	366
12.7 VOICING	367
REFERENCES	369

TABLES AND FIGURES

<i>Table 1: Two Roles of Music in AMT and CMT</i>	241
<i>Table 2: Interrelated Aspects of Music Therapeutic Process</i>	343
<i>Figure 1: A Linear Model</i>	123
<i>Figure 2: The Music Therapy Triangle</i> :.....	132
<i>Figure 3: The “Tripartition” Schema</i> :.....	141
<i>Figure 4: A Series of Figures from Ansdell (1995)</i>	145
<i>Figure 5: The Intercrossing of Two Spheres within the Music Therapy Triangle</i>	204
<i>Figure 6: The Old Self and New Self (Robbins and Robbins 1991)</i>	246
<i>Figure 7: The Example of the 6/4 Chord, from Healing Heritage</i>	265
<i>Figure 8: Music Therapy Triangle Contextualized</i>	336

1 Music, Words, and Therapy

The theme for this study is the possibility of a music therapy that does not *necessarily* include verbal processing, as found in the traditional type of “talking cure” therapy. The necessity, or not, of including verbal processing has been an issue of some controversy within the field. The thesis that is put forward here is that a *dialogical perspective* may serve to frame the possibility of such a therapy, and to indicate its potentials and limitations.

In the present chapter I review some of the relevant literature within music therapy theory relating to the theme of verbalization in music therapy. I refer to some of the main terms and arguments that have been used in the discussion, and try to distinguish among the major positions, and also grounds for the differences between them. I then consider how the discussion might be furthered, proposing that this could be done by explicating differences as being of frame rather than of issue. I suggest using the concept of “dialogue” to bring this out in a clearer manner. On this background I present the problem statement for the study, and its delimitations. Finally I present a brief outline of the study as a whole.

1.1 The Term “Music Therapy”

Who may benefit from music therapy, and how? When and why should a person be receiving music therapy? What would indicate a – more or less acute – need for music therapy, and when would there no longer be any such need? When is music therapy successfully completed? There does not really seem to be apparent and ready answers to these questions. The title of the profession of music therapy may lead to confusions, as Ansdell (1995) has pointed out. Contrary to for instance speech therapy, physical

therapy or even psychotherapy, for which in each case it is clear to where the effort is directed; to the speech, the body, or the psyche, in broad terms, music therapy does not have a clear such designated direction. The question might be asked, analogous to these other therapies: For what purpose do we have music therapy? - For some kind of “music” problems? For people having problems with their “music” in some way, whatever that may mean? Not in any literal sense, for sure. Having “music” problems is not generally recognized as a reason for seeking therapy. It seems clear that music therapy is another kind of story, as far as therapy goes. There is an inherently different logic of terms in this title, which seems to rest upon the direct focus on the therapeutic medium itself. Music therapy, according to its own terms, is defined primarily by the medium, rather than by the particular area of its application. The logic of the term points to qualities of the medium itself, as being therapeutic, rather than what it specifically is therapeutic for. As a descriptive term music therapy is about the benefits that may come from applying music therapeutically, rather than it being directed specifically towards any particular, predefined ills or problems.

This characteristic could probably account somewhat for the more or less chronic identity problems very often, or almost invariably, encountered by music therapists (Bruscia 1998a). On the other side, it might also account for the creative diversity of application within a wide and growing range of fields. The identity of music therapy may be difficult to pin down or to explain in any easy terms, but it also seems to have an inherent creative dynamism as an *idea*, which apparently is far from exhausted. Maybe the tensions of identification, which are not so easy to resolve, at the same time also keeps driving the field on forwards into new uncharted territories?

1.1.1 Music Therapy and Psychotherapy

The difference in the internal logic between these various terms of therapy is not altogether clear-cut though, because the term “psychotherapy” for instance, may be defined not only as a treatment specifically for the psyche, but as “the treatment of mental or emotional problems by psychological means” (*Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* 1999). Psychotherapy as a term not only indicates the area of treatment then, but also the means, which are *psychological*. Music therapy as a term likewise – and in

this case primarily – indicates the means, which are *musical*. But what does this imply then, therapy by “musical means”?

Ansdell (1995) makes a distinction between “music in therapy” and “therapy in music”. The last of these phrases is taken directly from a classic title by Nordoff and Robbins: *Therapy in Music for Handicapped Children* (1972). “Therapy in music”, according to Ansdell, is about therapy coming as a direct result of being engaged in musical activities, rather than music being a part of an extrinsic system of therapy, playing a subordinate role or function, in which case we have “music in therapy”. Bruscia (1987) has made a similar, much referred to distinction between “music *in* therapy” and “music *as* therapy”. Music *in* therapy is the use of music as a medium within another treatment modality, in which case music is not the main focus, but rather serves a facilitating purpose through the course of therapy. Music *as* therapy is music serving as the primary medium, the client’s therapeutic change being facilitated through relating directly to music.

Ansdell considers his own practice to be “therapy in music”. In the book *Music for Life: Aspects of Creative Music Therapy with Adult Clients*, he presents cases from his own work, and from other music therapists that he considers belong under this heading. Ansdell’s basic stance is that music therapy “works the way music itself works” (p. 222) – that is to say, the results of music therapy are essentially of the same kind as music achieves for all of us. A natural consequence of this view is that the way music therapy works will be the same for anyone, whether it be a handicapped child or a trained musician.

A clear instance of “music in therapy”, according to Ansdell, in contrast to his own approach, is music used within a psychotherapeutic model. The main difference between the two is to be found in the role of music in relation to words. In music *psychotherapy* the function of music is to facilitate words, the musical experience is seen as bringing forth an occasion for verbalizing, in which the “real” therapeutic work takes place. Psychotherapy, even when integrating music still remains essentially a “talking cure”, Ansdell maintains. His own brand of “therapy in music” on the other hand is a “purely music” therapy, not dependent on verbalization for its effectiveness, he claims.

1.1.2 Analysis and Synthesis

To clarify this difference regarding the role of words in therapy Ansdell makes a further distinction between processes of *analysis* and of *synthesis*. He cites the musicologist Victor Zuckerkandl: “Words divide, tones unite. The unity of existence that the word constantly breaks up, dividing thing from thing, object from object, is constantly restored in the tone” (Zuckerkandl 1973, cited by Ansdell p. 30). Psychotherapy is rightly called a process of *analysis* Ansdell points out, using words to divide, to take apart our personal construction of the world, examining our experiences, our thoughts and feelings by the use of verbal language. By working through language, psychotherapy also “works the way language works”, Ansdell claims. The way words are used to tell about past experience through verbal narrative, and subsequently to interpret, through re-description, is characteristic of the way language works, in taking apart, analyzing.

In contrast to such analysis Ansdell sets up a process of *synthesis*, and such a process may be found in the way music works. “If words take us apart, then music puts us together – physically, emotionally, mentally and socially. It acts to synthesize, not to analyze”, Ansdell writes (p. 31), and he further points out that it is not necessary for the client to have verbal competence in order to have this kind of therapy. This was one of the reasons for the approach of Creative Music Therapy being developed this way, because many of the handicapped and psychotic children that the originators Paul Nordoff and Clive Robbins worked with often had little or no language. Music became a non-verbal bridge to meaning and communication.

Kenneth Aigen (1998b) refers to a current debate within Nordoff-Robbins music therapy regarding the relation to psychotherapeutic concepts and practice. Although he admits that it is not uncontroversial, he finds that there are traits in certain of the early cases in Nordoff and Robbins’ work, that are of a psychodynamic character. He bases this viewpoint on a qualitative research study he conducted on central cases of the early Nordoff-Robbins work, at the time when the approach found its main formation. Aigen nevertheless underscores that the originators initially did not define themselves within a psychodynamic framework. Referring to Ansdell’s distinction between “synthetic” and “analytic” types of therapy though, Aigen considers that not all the cases that he researched into, through listening to the recordings and reading notes from each case,

should be regarded as “synthetic”. Some cases could be described as predominantly synthetic, and others as analytic, he proposes. The primarily synthetic cases involve consolidation of latent capacities, without uncovering and directly confronting conflicts. There is more of a total acceptance of the person. In primarily analytic cases the therapist directly confronts what is considered pathologically determined aspects of the client. In such instances therapy should be considered a form of psychotherapy, in that it confronts and seeks to resolve conflict material, Aigen suggests.

1.1.3 “Purely Musical” Therapy

The question could be raised here however, whether “analytic”, in Ansdell’s sense of the word, is the right term for this kind of processing, because Ansdell refers specifically to the use of verbal language in this form of therapy, as a tool for taking apart and examining, that is, for analyzing. The cases described by Aigen do not involve this kind of verbal processing; rather the processes take place in and through the musical activities themselves. This does not mean that words were not used at all during the sessions. They naturally were – Nordoff and Robbins were not at all completely mute during the sessions, as the recordings clearly demonstrate. But the main focus still remained on the music. The question apparently, is about the *way* of using words in the therapeutic process, whether or not they are directed towards the analysis and processing of conflict issues or not. Ansdell would presumably not consider the Nordoff-Robbins cases as analytic in this particular sense.

Aigen (1999) has made a note on a difference between Europe and the United States regarding the relation between the terms music therapy and psychotherapy. In the US, a common usage is “music psychotherapy”, as a general term, set off from other domains of music therapy practice – educational, medical, or rehabilitation. It is defined by the “locus of effect” being the psyche. As such it is an umbrella term, which can encompass a broad specter of diverse therapies, including Nordoff-Robbins music therapy, Aigen holds forth. In the United Kingdom, and in Europe generally, Aigen finds that saying that Nordoff-Robbins music therapy is a form of psychotherapy is per definition to place it in theory and practice within the confines of a particular conception of therapy, namely psychodynamically oriented, verbal psychotherapy.

And this particular confinement is what Ansdell quite clearly wants to place himself on the outside of. Ansdell not only maintains the possibility of a “purely musical” therapy, where the therapeutic locus remains purely within the musical, a therapy based on the power of music itself. He also regards this therapy as itself a form of music making, rather than a musical form of clinical therapy. Therefore it is not answerable to another system. This means that Ansdell does not want to depend on what he calls “extra-musical theory” to describe what happens in music therapy, because the focus of attention then might move away from the musical component of therapy and onto the conceptual system of whatever approach was being used. Ansdell is worried that the music then might tend to become “deleted”.

For the purpose of delimitation Ansdell sets up a list of what he considers characterizes music psychotherapy specifically: That music may function as a bridge between unconscious and conscious process; that it is a symbolic phenomenon representing something that can be translated or reformulated in words; that music facilitates words; that verbalizations are necessary for the therapeutic process; and that it is necessary to examine, interpret and process the relation between client and therapist within this setting. He characterizes a music psychotherapeutic stance by citing David John’s statement in the article “Towards Music Psychotherapy” (John 1992):

“This process of music being literally a medium through which unconscious material can bypass repression and become conscious in words forms the basis of music psychotherapy”(cited p. 177).

This statement highlights the crucial aspect within music psychotherapy of unconscious material becoming “conscious in words”. Ansdell then simply exclaims: “For the time being I leave it to the reader to contrast this stance with that taken by the therapists who have represented their work in the present book” (p. 177).

1.2 The Need for Verbal Processing

This difference of stance, it turns out, has given rise to some rather heated debate. Pavlicevic (1997) actually notes that “current debate among music therapists suggests that the question of ‘verbalising’ has generated a crisis in music therapy thinking” (p. 11). Elaine Streeter (1999b) has delivered a rather stark critique of a music therapy that

confines itself to purely “musical awareness”, as she terms it, not taking into due consideration what she calls “psychological thinking”. A balance is needed between these two, she insists. And there are several psychological theories to choose from, whether they are developmental or psychodynamic.

To illustrate her point she applies some basic psychoanalytic concepts on two case studies from the literature, one from Ansdell’s book referred to previously, about a woman with Downs syndrome, and one from Colin Lee’s case study *Music at the Edge: The Music Therapy Experiences of a Musician with AIDS* (1996). Her aim is to show how these cases might have benefited from applying the concepts of *transference* and *counter transference*. Streeter actually questions the “safety” of the clients in therapy if the therapist is not taking these matters into due consideration. And she holds forth that a “purely musical” perspective does not adequately address the distinction between therapist and client. The therapeutic boundaries tend to become blurred. Streeter takes Lee’s case study in particular as an example of this, where the therapist during the course of therapy with a patient dying from AIDS, on the patient’s request, concords to becoming a friend, rather than continuing as a “therapist”. Streeter holds this to be untenable, and sees it as a consequence of not having therapeutic boundaries held sufficiently clear.

Instead of the “purely musical” Streeter proposes alternatively that musical improvisation can be likened to free association, and that just as in the case of free association, the material coming out from this should be processed verbally in order that insight can be gained, making the unconscious conscious, for the purpose of obtaining release from the control of the unconscious, which is what she considers therapy to be about.

Streeter is vehemently opposed to any music therapy being aimed at “merging” with the client. Descriptions from case studies suggesting a unity between the therapist and client in the musical improvisational experience she considers alarming, because merged states may equally be related to pathological as well as to developmental experience, in the first case in the form of psychosis. She warns that such merged states, though having a developmental function, if not psychologically processed by the therapist: “are potentially dangerous states of mind where no objective thinking can take place, and a loss of self may result” (p. 11).

It seems uncertain if Streeter is here actually implying that Nordoff-Robbins music therapy might lead to psychosis, if it is not properly processed through the application of psychological concepts. Certainly she does not report or refer to any record of this. But she continuously does refer to the “safety” of the client if such processing is not included. What in any case is clear, is that she insists on the necessity of psychological thinking in balance with musical awareness, a balance she finds lacking in much of the current theory and practice of music therapy, based on “musical awareness”.

1.2.1 Questioning the Need to Verbalize

Streeter’s critique, as might be expected, has been met with objections. Sandra Brown (1999) remarks that improvisation is not quite the same as “free association”, needing to be monitored externally, but entails its own processes, and finds structures within its own domain. In music therapy there may be moments when music appears to take on a life of its own, through the experience of creative freedom. In this she finds that music may offer something more, – “an enabling of creative flow, of putting us in touch with our larger ‘self’, our creative source, and the possibility of bringing that into balance with our rationality and ego” (p. 67). Brown sees two avenues of therapy, depending on client group and individual needs, involving either the development of ego-structures, or else the loosening of these, bringing forth a “refinding”, as she terms it, of the depths of the “self”.

In a reply to Streeter, Aigen (1999) questions the relevance of the psychoanalytic model as it is recommended by Streeter. Contrary to Streeter’s accusation of music therapists not monitoring their own role as therapists, Aigen points to the practice within Nordoff-Robbins music therapy of reviewing the recordings of every session, and creating detailed written indexes of these sessions. This brings about intense self-scrutiny, through a “phenomenological, non-interpretive experiencing of the music”, Aigen holds forth (p. 78). Aigen also questions the validity of the psychoanalytic outlook when it comes to creative experience. Along similar veins as Brown, he takes up the issue of ego-boundaries, and maintains that creative process has not been handled well by psychoanalysis, particularly in its “classical” form, because the loosening of ego-boundaries and the associated experiences of unity have tended to be viewed as

phenomena of regression. And although in more recent theory the concept of “regression in the service of the ego” has been developed, Aigen questions the use of the concept as such, stating that this is the psychological process “to which many of humankind’s grandest achievements often get reduced in psychoanalytic theory” (p. 80). Aigen is on the whole not satisfied with any psychologically derived, imported theory whose primary mechanisms relate to the analysis of relationship dynamics or unconscious material, to explain how and why music therapy works. This is best done by what he calls “music-centered music therapy theory”.

Aigen further remarks on Streeter’s critique related to Ansdell’s (1995) case study of a woman with Down’s syndrome, Emanuella, who followed a certain pattern of initial resistance before joining in on the musical improvisation in each session. Streeter complains that no attempt was made evidently, to think in psychological terms about the biography of the client, and of her relation to the therapist, and how her resistance might have been processed in such a way as to relieve her of anxiety. Streeter regards this to be a crucial aim of therapy. And even though she recognizes that there is a temporary experience of freedom from resistance, she nevertheless proclaims: “Of course, many of us are aware of the temporary nature of such freedoms, clients returning again and again, as this one did, with their resistances unprocessed” (p. 7). To this Aigen laconically replies: “I could make the opposite anecdotally-based claim from Streeter: That is, that many of us are aware of clients who have had their resistances analyzed ad nauseam without having any concomitant personality change” (p. 81). Aigen furthermore questions whether the insight into one’s unconscious dynamics actually is an appropriate goal for a middle-aged woman with Down’s syndrome, or for a man, as in the case story narrated by Lee (1996), facing the end of his own life.

The stances remain quite opposed to each other then. What this debate all in all clearly shows is that the way it looks is dependent on the frame in which the picture is set. On the one side the insistence on the necessity of “psychological thinking”, and of verbal processing for actual therapy to take place, and on the other the stress put on the significance of the musical experience itself. It does not seem easy to include one within the perspective of the other.

1.2.2 “Psychodynamically Informed” Music Therapy

Helen Odell-Miller (2001) has advocated what she terms “psychoanalytically informed” music therapy. This is a position that recognizes music therapy as a “discrete entity in itself”, as she terms it, within which therapy takes place. It is not just an adjunct to something else. Psychoanalytic concepts may nevertheless be drawn on, to *inform* the practice:

These concepts are integrally bound up in a method in which music, thinking, and talking are of equal importance and are bound together to produce an emergent music therapy approach in its own right. Music can have a pre-verbal, a holding function, a supportive function, an “action leading to thought” function, all of which can lead to some change that otherwise may not have occurred without the music (p. 152).

Such an “emergent music therapy approach” is not simply another form of psychotherapy, with music included, but an approach in its own right, in which music remains central, Odell-Miller holds forth. She contrasts this approach with a more traditional approach to “music psychotherapy”, in which music serves merely a subordinate function to the words, a *psychotherapy with music*. Odell-Miller sees this represented by the French psychoanalyst and music therapist Edith Lecourt (1992). For practicing as a psychoanalytically informed music therapist one has to be both a highly trained musician and a therapist, Odell-Miller points out, but not necessarily a fully trained psychoanalyst. This brand of therapy is *informed* by, not completely identified with this approach. Odell-Miller consequently takes side with Streeter, in claiming the need for “psychological thinking” in music therapy, but still aims to retain the uniqueness of the discipline.¹

There is still the question of frame to consider. Free improvisation in music therapy, according to Odell-Miller, as also Streeter suggested, could be seen as similar to free association and to free-floating attention in psychoanalytic work. And as such, she proposes, it could be interpreted though a fluid movement between music, thinking and words, not dividing them into separate parts. But this is precisely the point to which Ansdell presumably would object. There is a crucial difference he states, between music therapy as a “phenomenological” approach, in which the music is related to just as it is,

¹ A question could be posed here though, regarding the “safety” of the clients, as Streeter was concerned about, in applying psychodynamic concepts for verbal processing, in a not fully qualified way.

and psychotherapy, which is “hermeneutical”, directed towards making interpretations through the use of words.

Implicitly opposing Ansdell’s “music only” position Odell-Miller writes: “However, my concern would be that, particularly when the patients can speak, half the process is missing if there is no room for talking and thinking” (p. 145). But this wanting to include both aspects, not just “half” the process, although sounding quite plausible, is maybe too simple, because the differences it would seem, are other than just including “talking and thinking” or not, to make therapy complete.

What Ansdell is seeking to establish is the possibility of a music therapy, that does not necessarily have to use words in a psychodynamic, analytic way, relying more on what he considers to be the synthetic power of the non-verbal medium of music itself. What the claim basically amounts to from the side of the proponents of “musical awareness” is that not all music therapy necessarily has to be based on such verbalization for its effectiveness.

Analytically Oriented Music Therapy

It has to be underlined that the debate referred to here is not at all representative of the whole psychodynamic field. Many analytically oriented music therapists have obviously moved beyond the position of classical psychoanalysis, based on Freud’s libido theory. Bonde, Pedersen and Wigram refer to a discussion within psychotherapeutic circles on whether or not therapy can rightly be described as “analysis” when interpretation and insight no longer are central curative factors. This actually resembles the music therapy debate on whether verbalization processing is necessary for therapy to take place. A more recent focus of psychoanalytic treatment on regressive illnesses has caused some psychotherapists to suggest that the classical understanding should be supplemented with a developmental psychological frame of reference, implying an understanding of the therapist/client relationship as a healing potential. Rather than interpretation for insight, techniques such as “containing” (Bion), “holding environment” (Winnicott), “affirmation and emphatic identification” (Killingmo) are used. This represents an affirmative approach, which eventually may be followed by more insight-oriented therapy.

It is important to be aware that these more recent approaches, representing a gradual paradigm shift via object relations theories, ego-psychology, self-psychology, interpersonal theories and interactional theories, offer a much more nuanced picture with regards to the use and function of verbal processing in therapy. “Implicit” or “tacit” knowledge becomes an important aspect of the therapeutic process according to these newer developments, which have contributed greatly to the understanding of relational processes in psychotherapy. Bonde, Pedersen and Wigram consider that these new approaches may be more easily applied to the practice of music therapy. They refer to Daniel Stern’s theory about pre-verbal interaction, which, according to Stern, contains many of the same communicative elements as music, such as tempo, rhythm, tone, phrasing, form and intensity. This similarity may support the assumption that musical improvisation and listening can reflect and activate relational patterns and senses of self, the authors hold forth. And these implicit experiences cannot be explicitly verbalized they stress. Language may actually create a distance to the preverbal sense of self. Music as a non-verbal medium may well be better suited for expressing these relational aspects:

The theory also implies that transformation of these basic patterns can also take place without words. We believe, in addition, that in some cases these patterns may actually be clearer in a non-verbal or musical context (p. 88).

The issue of verbal processing as a necessity is clearly not as sharply focused within the entire field of analytically oriented music therapy then. Still there seems to be some way to go before a complete alignment of a “purely musical” approach with an analytically oriented music psychotherapy would be achieved and accepted by both sides. Music may, in the light of these later psychodynamic developments, be considered as associated or fused with relational aspects of therapy, but though this certainly creates some space for musically based, non-verbal processes within such therapy, it is hardly acceptable, as seen from the side of the proponents of “musical awareness”, as a solution to *all* that a “purely musical” approach would entail. They can hardly be expected to succumb to this outlook, to say nothing more about the matter. And certainly the use of music *and* verbalization *is* still a crucial part of any analytically oriented approach.

1.3 Theoretical Discourse

The question then is what kind of thinking to apply to a music-based music therapy, if it is *not* to be a psychodynamic one. “Thinking” is not generally, or exclusively, the same as psychodynamic conceptualizations, which of course are not in themselves neutral and objective. Psychodynamic theory is not “thinking” simply, it is a particular kind of thinking, a particular outlook. Granting that psychodynamic conceptions are not simply the truth, what alternative views might serve as a basis for music therapy? It is interesting to note that Nordoff and Robbins (1972), in accounting for how they developed their method, report as an advantage for their first work at Sunfield Children’s Home in Worcestershire the following:

The openmindedness of the professional staff to the research in music therapy and *the absence of any restricted system of psychological thought* facilitated a wide perception of the scope of musical influence and the formulation of several working concepts (p. 19, italics added).

An absence of “psychological thinking” was present right from the start then, and happily so, apparently! Nordoff and Robbins did not have any well-rounded, comprehensive theory at the outset. They developed their approach mainly on a practical, creative basis. Though they naturally did write books, and held courses, formulating notions about what they were doing. And they necessarily did have some notions about “therapy”, and certainly some notions about what music means, and how it can be applied in working with handicapped children.

But although they in a certain sense initially were a-theoretical, at least in not being unduly “restricted”, as they called it, by preconceived notions, this state of innocence is hardly tenable in the long run within a discipline. The task then is to develop theory that “fits”, that contributes to increasing the understanding of practice, and that may legitimize practice, and that even may serve to point directions for future practice, to inspire and to envision. And if theory is considered to just get in the way, this is actually *also* a theory, about how certain conceptions and notions may contribute to confuse or misrepresent, to inhibit rather than release creative practice. This incidentally is presumably what Ansdell is hinting at when he states that he would do better without any “extra-musical” theory.

1.3.1 Field Discourse

The closest to no “interfering” theory at all is maybe notions held by practicing music therapists, and how this is reflected in their own discourse about practice. Several studies have been made on field discourses in music therapy. Forinash (1992), has made a phenomenological study using depth interviews as a method, to find out about how music therapists describe and experience their work in clinical improvisation. Amir (1992) has made a study using grounded theory techniques to find out about what she terms “meaningful moments” in music therapy, from the view of both therapists and clients. Recently she has made a similar study on musical and verbal interventions in music therapy (Amir 1999). Ansdell has made a qualitative study in music therapy discourse, having a diverse group of experts and non-experts comment on audio excerpts of music therapy sessions, the intention being to illumine the relation of language to music therapy practice. This he calls the “music-therapeutic juncture” which is about having to account not only for the relation between music and words – the so-called “musicological juncture” – but also to include within this junction the dimension of the therapeutic (Ansdell 1996).

These types of research indeed do contribute to the theory of music therapy by making direct connections between use of language and music therapy practice, and by constructing categories on this basis that are relevant for developing theory, on an empirical basis. Such categories nevertheless, ultimately have to be set within some kind of frame to be meaningful. If not, we would – in the long run – just acquire an endless accumulation of categories, which we would not really know how to relate to one another meaningfully.²

1.3.2 The Early Interaction Analogy

And some theory indeed has been developed. Pavlicevic has made contributions to Creative Music Therapy theory, based on early infant interaction research. She has

² I find it interesting that Forinash in her study notes that the most pervasive response of the therapists, when given the opportunity to review their own statements was “discomfort at reading their sometimes searching and faltering process as they explored the experience in Clinical Improvisation during the interview process”. Forinash relates that almost all the therapists wanted to refine their sentences and perfect their thoughts. This points to the crucial aspect of *formulating* theory, which is not necessarily more true the closer it is to coming right out from the therapeutic situation, not even to the therapists themselves having made the statements (!)

proposed the concept of *dynamic form*, which she has developed over several years (1990; 1995a; 1995b; 1997) In a recent statement of her theory, “Dynamic Interplay in Clinical Improvisation” (2002) she also addresses more specifically the debate on the position of words in relation to music in music therapy.

Pavlicevic refers to Stern’s theory of “vitality affects”, that are not categorical feelings themselves, like fear, anger, joy, grief, but rather the *forms* of feelings, in a more abstract sense, how feelings may be “surging”, “fading away”, “fleeting”, “drawn out” etc. These are crossmodal, that is to say, the same *form* may be perceived as similar across different expressive modalities, between sound and gesture/movement for instance. Pavlicevic says she would like to call these “dynamic forms”, and suggests that they may be found within musical interchange. They may be considered as the basis for communicative musical improvisation.

Pavlicevic also relates to Trevarthen’s concept of “intersubjectivity”, which could be regarded as almost synonymous with playing music together. Musical terms may be used to describe what is happening in early interaction regarded as intersubjectivity Pavlicevic points out:

When the relationship is inter-subjective, both infant and mother initiate, complement and respond to one another in a highly fluid and intimate dance, within which their internal states resonate with one another through their apprehending one another’s dynamic form. This “dance” has all the complexities and subtleties of a musical improvisation duet, and includes expressive features of tempo (e.g. *accelerando*, *rubato*, *ritardando*, *allargando*, *ritenuto*); of dynamics (e.g. *sforzando*, *crescendo*); of timbre (e.g. changes in voice quality) and of pitch (melodic contours and harmonic colour) (Pavlicevic 2002, ¶ 8).

“Dynamic form” is what is exchanged intersubjectively in musical improvisation. And through this interpersonal relationship is established, and this relationship has no need for words, Pavlicevic claims. What is crucial is the interactive potential of the improvisation, which may be sensitively “stretched” by the therapist, to facilitate development:

The joint improvisation provides an opportunity to make dynamic form, to try out new bits of them, to recombine them and to make new patterns. This is the therapeutic process in clinical improvisation (¶ 28).

Pavlicevic regards it as the strength of clinical improvisation that the dynamic form of emotion emerges instantly and in sharp focus within the musical relationship, without

having to assign referential meaning to these forms, and warns that in attempting to speak about the improvisation “the profound and complex emotional experience may be reduced to satisfy the semantic limitation of words” (§ 30).

In relating to the debate on the position of words in therapy Pavlicevic does not want to dismiss on an overall basis the value of spoken interchange, as patients frequently do make spontaneous comments after improvisations, but she regards verbal interchange as *adjunct to the musical relationship*. It may be necessary to use words to check the patient’s experience and feelings, not least in early sessions. Words as such are not prohibited or ruled out from therapy. Still it is not a *primary* medium. An extensive verbal relationship may confuse the musical relationship she holds forth. Verbal relationship reveals its own dynamic forms, not necessarily corresponding to those elicited through improvisations. The result of developing two concurrent relationships may hinder both, Pavlicevic claims.

Pavlicevic still clearly acknowledges the possibility of music being adjunct to verbal therapy. Music in this case may serve as a vehicle for verbalization. The main point for Pavlicevic is to establish a ground for the possibility *also* of music therapy in which verbal interchange is adjunctive, as an alternative to verbal psychotherapy, to which music may be adjunct.

Limitations to the Analogy

I think Pavlicevic has pointed very precisely here to a crucial issue with regards to the relation between words and music in music therapy and verbal psychotherapy. Still, there is more to be said about the difference between the two positions regarding the necessity or not of verbalization. This is more than a question obviously, of music being adjunct to words, or words being adjunct to music, switching these two whatever which way. The difference between the two media, language and music, as they relate in different ways to the therapeutic process must be explicated further, to meet the challenge of the proponents of the necessity of verbal processing, I believe. They are not simply interchangeable with each other, in such a way that they both can be used alternatively to achieve the same results. There is more of a difference between them.

Furthermore, although the parallels to early infant interaction may be striking, there may be reason to be cautious in using this analogy. There clearly are limitations to

early interaction as a theoretical basis for music therapy. Pavlicevic herself actually warns precautiously against too literal a comparison. The non-verbal communication between mother and infant is not the same kind as that between music therapist and client. And on the other hand; a music therapy situation does not recreate the early mother-infant situation for the client (Pavlicevic 1997).

It may be pointed out that although early interaction in many ways *resembles* musical improvisation, it is not itself what is generally considered to be music; it is not counted as a form of music in the general usage of this term. It is maybe *like* music, and musical improvisation is maybe *like* early interaction, but there is certainly more to music *as music* than this resemblance or analogy to early mother-infant interaction, and which needs to be taken into consideration in any theory of music therapy, I believe.

1.3.3 “New Musicology” and Music Therapy Theory

Ansdell (Ansdell 1997, 2001), has asked why music therapists seemingly have taken so little notice of the latest thinking about music itself. He holds forth that too little attention has been given to how the efficacy of music therapy is determined by the specifically musical. Musicology, as the systematic study of music itself, would seem relevant for this. Ansdell refers to Colin Lee’s writings on the matter (Lee 1992, 1995, 1996, 2000), which he recognizes as being in the forefront of a musicological perspective as this relates to music therapy, but which he finds to be problematic in that it is bound up in what he terms “traditional musicology”, focusing on structural analysis of the music, without managing to make the link to the experiential side of music therapy practice.

But now recent developments in musicology have ventured to place music within a wider setting, as a process rather than a structure, intimately tied to human affect and meaning. Music is viewed as participatory and inherently social, determined by culture and context. It is considered as performed, live, improvised and personal. And such assumptions are readily aligned with basic tenets of music therapy, Ansdell suggests. He also points to the relevance the other way around of music therapy for the “New Musicology”, as a virtual laboratory of new ways of practicing and understanding music, that would be useful to include within this new kind of perspective on music. He

sees a great potential in the mutual awareness between music therapy and New Musicology, which may bring forth a cross-fertilization between the two fields.

A concept which for Ansdell perhaps encapsulates the central thesis of the New Musicology is Christopher Small's *Musicking* (Small 1998). He cites Small's definition of the term:

To music is to take part, in any capacity in a musical performance, whether by performing, by listening, by rehearsing or practicing, by providing material for performance (what is called composing), or by dancing (Small, 1998, p. 9, cited in Ansdell 2001, p. 21).

Regarding music as a verb rather than a noun quite effectively directs the attention towards the performative rather than the structural aspect of music, which makes this concept highly relevant for application in theoretical perspectives on music therapy, Ansdell holds forth. The word "musicking" emphasizes the social practice of doing music, and one variety of musicking might well be music therapy. The term "musicking" could then be a way of conceptualizing music therapy practice.

Ansdell's contention is that the theory of music therapy, in the continuing struggle to demonstrate the efficacy and legitimacy of the practice, has concentrated on allying musical practices to psychotherapeutic, medical and learning theories, showing more interest in allying music therapy to established therapeutic and clinical models of thinking than considering the characteristics of the musical aspect, which has been taken more or less as given. He finds it vital to keep up with the latest critical thinking on the subject of music, as many of the issues of music therapy theory have their origin at least as much in issues within music as within therapy. In this way he is actually in effect taking the opposite stance regarding the balance of music therapy theory from Streeter, that the need is not so much for more "psychological thinking", as Streeter calls for, but for more *musicological* perspectives, finding the recent development of New Musicology to be particularly promising here.

But even though the concept of musicking then, for instance, is wider than more traditional, structural notions of music as found within musicology, the question is if this could be considered enough for the "thinking" needed within therapy. The relevance of the concept of musicking seems quite indisputable. But music therapy is not just another form of "musicking". This is not sufficient as a category denoting what kind of practice music therapy is, because the concept of "musicking" naturally still

retains the *musical* as its primary focus. The concept of musicking, although it may considerably widen the view ecologically of what music is about, does not itself entirely solve the “case” of music therapy. No matter how comprehensively and elaborately such a conception might be developed, it retains its primary focus on music, whereas music therapy, after all, is some kind of *therapeutic* practice.

“Health Musicking”

Stige (2002a) has apparently sensed such a limitation and launches the term “health musicking” as part of a proposed (re-) definition of music therapy. He relates this term to a distinction that needs to be made in defining music therapy on the different levels of discipline, profession, and practice. Stige would like different words to cover these different levels, not just “music therapy” for both discipline, profession and practice, and plays with the thought of what he would call the discipline level “if there was no history and we could start all over”, proposing “health musicology” instead of “music therapy” as a possible hypothetical term. What he does come up with as an actual suggestion though, is “music and health”, as the discipline upon which the profession and the practice of music therapy could be built upon. And in line with this the term “health musicking” will constitute a part of the definition of what music therapy on the level of *practice* is about.

The question is how much this notion helps though. It is based on a wish for establishing a new discipline, or at least a redefined one, widened and at the same time even more focused, “music and health” which nevertheless does not as yet actually exist (!)³

³ It might seem that Stige is confusing a critical sociological term with a descriptive one. He states for instance that “The school in fact could be seen as one of the more important “health institutions” in the life of children”. From a critical point of view this may be very valid, that the way schools function in society, in numerous aspects, will have a great impact on children’s health. But the school is not a “health institution” in the *descriptive* sociological sense of the word. It is an *educational* institution, to state the obvious. A basic characteristic of modern society is the differentiation of society into various sectors, from out of the confines of families in local communities, in traditional societies, and into the relatively autonomized spheres of production, education, health, and culture. Various social institutions are placed within these larger sectors, which have their own particular functions in society, viewed as a whole (Østerberg and Engelstad 1995). That these institutions may be regarded critically as to whether they actually do function the way they are “supposed” to, does not question the reality of this differentiation within modern society. A distinction between a “health” institution as a critical or as descriptive sociological term has to be made in order not to confuse this issue. And a designation such as “music and health”, in modern society, needs to be related to such a distinction, in what sense it could be regarded as a critical and/or descriptive term. “Music and health”, as a discipline, would have to be not only culturally

Stige's concern is very much about *broadening* the field of music therapy, so that it may become more inclusive, rather than delimiting it unduly. His argument moves on a different level of abstraction than the issue that is addressed here then, regarding the balancing, or overbalancing to one or the other side, of "psychological thinking" versus "musical awareness". Stige's attempt at a redefining music therapy is primarily about encompassing the whole field, (not least it seems, his own community music therapy approach), and not as much about sorting out specific differences between different approaches. The term "health musicking" will in and of itself then not readily serve to entangle the issues regarding the necessity of verbalization or not within a music-centered approach.

1.3.4 The Meaning of Words and the Meaning of Music

Regarding the specific issue of the relation between words and music in music therapy, Stige has also addressed this matter (Stige 1998, 2002a). He refers to the Norwegian philosopher Johannessen's Wittgenstein-inspired discussion of intransitive understanding, of which music could be seen as a paradigmatic example. Such understanding cannot be explained by arguments; the "reasons" that are to be given in intransitive understanding are further descriptions, based on metaphors, analogies, comparisons, gestures etc., presupposing some familiarity at the outset. Stige asserts that this kind of understanding could be applied also to language, as well as to music, and on this basis he draws the conclusion that language and music are not that different in the way meaning is made. Both are contextual and based on meaning as *use*. He refers to a particular sentence in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*: "Understanding a sentence is more akin to understanding a theme in music than one might think ...", and contends that Wittgenstein thus indicated some similarities between music and words, and that both might be "polysemic, open and changing". Stige then infers:

So why should not words be an important part of Creative Music Therapy? Verbal interaction – not as representation of inner states of affairs, but as mutual construction of meaning – is not only possible, but a "natural" and potentially fruitful part of music therapy (1998, p. 36).

but also *sociologically* contextualized. A rather complex matter, related not least to questions of recognition and legitimatization, and to processes of institutionalization.

I do think this interpretation of Wittgenstein regarding the difference, or lack of difference, between language and music could be questioned. (It is quite a leap from suggesting that there might be a certain similarity between the way sentences and musical themes are understood, as Wittgenstein suggests, and to *equating* the way music and language acquire meaning.) This line of argument serves rather to blur than to clarify any distinction between words and music in therapy. I think it is very hard to come by that there *are* crucial differences between language and music, and that this needs to be taken into account in any theory of the role of words and of music in therapy, and their relation to each other.

The aesthetician Susanne Langer (1979) has pointed to what she regards as a crucial difference between verbal language and music. She questions if music has meaning in the restricted sense of the word, that is to say, meaning in the usual sense recognized within semantics, which includes the condition of conventional reference. Music, contrary to verbal language, has no assigned meaning to any of its parts in the way words have, and therefore it lacks one of the basic characteristics of language Langer claims, which is fixed association. This means that it does not have any single, unequivocal reference. Music is not a language, because it has no *vocabulary*.

Langer's theory of language, which is derived from (the early) Wittgenstein has been critiqued, (not least from the point of view of Wittgenstein's *later* theory, which Stige refers to), but I think her general point as to the difference between verbal language and music still holds in this respect, that the referential qualities of verbal language makes it possible to talk about something other than itself, *discursively*, which music, which ever way you view it, cannot be regarded as being capable of in exactly the same way. And this I believe is a crucial difference that needs to be taken into account in the discussion on the use of words in relation to music in therapy. That musical meaning is in some respect *also* culturally contingent is not in itself enough to extinguish this basic distinction between language and music. Music is not conventionally referential in the way verbal language is.

Language Used for Making Art

There is another aspect to the similarity between music and verbal language that should be noted though. Language may have many different functions and uses, as (the later)

Wittgenstein insistently points out. In contrasting words and music Ansdell does not consider the many other different kinds of functions that language may have besides the capacity for analysis, which is what is basic for the way it is used within verbal psychotherapy. Aldridge (1996a) refers to the language we use for science purposes. This is built upon a grammar, which orders subject, object and predicate, and which thereby makes the content of understanding subjected to a given linguistic form of objectification. This is in accordance with Ansdell's notion that verbalization necessarily works the way language works, that this mode of understanding has its own characteristic features that also forms its content. But language, as Aldridge points out, may also be used directly as a medium of art, in which case it facilitates a dynamic creative activity, which is not confined to any fixed meaning in the same singular way. In this way it could be regarded as more similar to music, as in the making of poetry, for instance. Ansdell does not relate specifically to this aspect of language, but restricts himself to the particular aspect of verbal language as a tool specifically for analysis, as it is used for this purpose within psychotherapy. And relating to it in this way there does seem to be a case for holding that there is a marked difference between music and words, in the way they acquire meaning in this setting.

1.3.5 Clinical and Music-based Theories

In his discussion on the meaning of words and of music Stige does ask the crucial question related to the theme of this study though: "But is language a necessary part of music therapy? In other words, is a *therapy in music* possible?" (p. 26), recognizing the problem or issue here still. He states that this cannot be answered with the help of Wittgenstein's philosophy, but needs to be related to clinical theories and research. He refers to what he considers a parallel discussion in psychotherapy regarding the relative importance of verbal interpretations versus relational experience (Karterud and Monsen 1997). On the background of the increased understanding of the interaction between these two dimensions, Stige purports: "Labels such as "music in therapy versus "therapy in music" do not help us very much" (p. 26).

Stige exclaims that he does not find the distinction helpful, but has the issue then actually been resolved? It is hardly enough to point to this particular discussion within psychotherapy, because the specific role of *music* in this connection is not addressed.

Once again, this view implies not taking into account the difference between language and music. There remains a difference between therapy as a talking cure, and music therapy not *necessarily* being a talking cure, related to differences in characteristics of the primary mediums used. I think some distinction is still necessary to uphold, to account for differences in the role of music and the role of words in therapy.

So while it is easy to agree that fixed dichotomies in the long run ultimately may prove not to be “helpful”, it is not necessarily always wise to hasten to dissolve them prematurely, before they have served their – more or less preliminary – purpose. Bunt and Hoskyns (2002), in their recent *Handbook of Music Therapy* report that the theme concerning the spectrum between clinical theories and various music-based theories still tends to engender much passion, and appears to touch the profession deeply:

It is a dichotomy that challenges every music therapist who cares to think more than casually about their work.... The subject will not go away, it will not leave us alone. It will continue to surface, need framing and reframing depending on context and the different cultural and political demands. The topic is too powerful a subject to defy any attempt to squash it (Bunt and Hoskyns 2002: 24)

Bunt and Hoskyns make it clear then that they expect further discussions on the topic.

1.3.6 “Community Music Therapy”

And indeed the latest round in the discussion has revolved around the issue of “Community Music Therapy”. Again Ansdell has fronted a music-based position in clear opposition to what he now terms the “consensus model” (at least in the UK) of music therapy, which is a psychodynamically oriented music therapy (Ansdell 2002). In quite close accord with Stige, Ansdell argues for a broader practice of music therapy, and for a broader theoretical model to support this. He announces that a “paradigm shift” may be underway in the discipline, a context-based and music-centered model highlighting social and cultural factors. And this, he argues, is incommensurable with the current “consensus model”. He even envisions a change to a “new consensual ‘consensus model’” (p. 110). Thus he actually looks forward to seeing the current (psychotherapeutic) consensus model being replaced by a new one.

Ansdell refers to both previous (Ruud 1998a) and more recent discussions in the literature on the communal aspect of music therapy, as found in Stige (2002a), who stress the cultural context of any music therapy work. Ansdell presents several vignettes

as examples of what he considers could be characterized as Community Music Therapy. He contrasts these cases with what he outlines as the consensus model, which is termed “improvisational music psychotherapy”. He elaborates on the differences between the approaches with regards to the role and identity of the therapist, which in the “new paradigm” is not confined to the “therapeutic relationship” as the psychotherapist would define and enact this, but to a balance of the identity as musician and therapist in a broader social and cultural context. The *cites* of the practice are expanded beyond the literally closed doors of the therapeutic protected space, and into community, incorporating aims of enhancing the quality of people’s life within communities. The ultimate aim is to move people from therapy *to* community, Ansdell writes. The focus is thus moved away from the exclusively individual and intrapsychic to include also the community, the “outer” aspects of the client’s life.

A New Paradigm?

This stance has (naturally) caused further debate; not least on the Internet cite *Voices, A World Forum for Music Therapy*, which is an international music therapy journal and discussion forum online, (and on which Ansdell’s article first was published). One objection that has been voiced is that this is really not something new – that many music therapists have been working like this, across the individual-community continuum, for a long time already, also music therapists working in a psychodynamically oriented way. Maratos (2002) refers to the notion of the “integrative therapeutic community” within psychoanalytic theory, and looks forward to debate on a specifically “psychodynamic community music therapy model”.

Another issue has been what makes “Community Music Therapy” different from *Community Music*. Jane Edwards, teaching music therapy at a university center that also offers an MA in Community Music, takes issue with the idea that there is such a phenomenon as “community music therapy”. She is reluctant to mixing these two different approaches of working musically with people and wants to keep the name “music therapy”, and be proud of it, as she writes. At the same time she fully recognizes the community dimension in the work also for music therapists, which is an already long time established practice, she upholds, and for which she would rather use the name “culturally sensitive music therapy” (Edwards 2002).

It seems quite a feat to replace one paradigm with another. Ansdell continues to point to New Musicology as a promising field from which such a necessary theory might be drawn. In a somewhat similar vein as Stige, who, as seen previously, envisioned a “health musicology”, Ansdell sees a future for a “clinical musicology”, which will include musical ontology, musical phenomenology, musical morphology, and musical sociology/anthropology. He admits to this looking like some grand “totalizing” project but nevertheless asks to be indulged a little “grandiosity” for the beginning of a “new current”, as he puts it, in music therapy.

Regarding the need for theory Ansdell writes, “in particular, Music Therapy notably lacks an informing discourse of the relationship between the musical and the social-psychological (2002, p. 138). Though this called-for discourse is something that Ansdell presumably anticipates may come from a “clinical musicology”, the pointing to a future outcome of a proposed new discipline could hardly be enough to expect any opposing side to change their mind, and to “convert” to a new consensus model on this ground. And the debate so far indeed has shown little sign of this.⁴

1.4 Frame and Picture

The question is if reaching such a consensus model is really what is called for. In the recurring debate, back and forth, between the two sides of “psychological thinking” versus “musical awareness” I think the issue is not just about which kind of theory to use, or of balancing the one side in a “right” proportion with the other, but rather the underlying assumptions of each position, which is where I would suspect much of the actual basis for the differences may be found. Keeping the discussions on a level of competing theoretical positions, without explicating the underlying assumptions, will not necessarily contribute to any fruitful outcome from these discussions. The opposing stances of clinical versus music-centered theories are about different frames of reference, rather than differences of issue, and each frame has to be related to some philosophical grounding, which may be more or less common between them. The

⁴ In Ansdell’s most recent article “The Stories We Tell: Some Meta-theoretical Reflections on Music Therapy” (Ansdell 2003), he focuses on the need for critical thinking and meta-theoretical reflection, as represented by the New Musicology, and asks if meeting this challenge may result in a “New Music Therapy”, though he does state that this remains to be seen.

discussions then actually revolve around some underlying – *and* to quite some extent non-explicated – assumptions and presuppositions, which presumably is what oftentimes makes them so heated.

This is one reason why it would be hard to imagine psychodynamically oriented music therapists giving up their conception of therapy to convert to a new paradigm, at least not without having gone through a discussion about the basis for their own views. And this would probably not happen without some sense of crisis emerging from within this perspective itself.⁵ But this is not at all what seems to be the case. On the other side the question is if a music-centered conception of music therapy by necessity *has* to adhere to any specific clinical theory. There may very well be differences in the basic philosophical stance regarding music and therapy that will make the subsumption of music therapy under any such theory not necessarily a perfect fit. The mismatch could for instance, as the discussion reviewed here might exemplify, be about a psychodynamic approach insisting on verbalization, and not recognizing other practice and theory as possible, or even tenable, as therapy.

1.4.1 The Possibility of a Music-Based Therapy

On the background of this discussion I want to make clear that what I am concerned with in the present study is the possibility of a “therapy in music”. I want to consider more closely the possibility of music therapy based on the qualities of the medium itself: A *music*-based, rather than a *talking*-based therapy. That is to say, a music therapy that is not subsumed under a psychodynamic framework, and that does not have to use verbal processing in order to be “proper” therapy.

But if not subsumed under such a framework, the crucial question then will be what theory it is to be based on. The challenge that has been posed from psychodynamically oriented therapists is basically this: “Music awareness” is not enough. And verbal psychotherapy *has* a theory to base its practice on. Or, as the German music therapist Frohne-Hageman points out, *music psychotherapy* has not yet developed its own foundational theory, but is based on established models of psychotherapy:

⁵ An assumption made according to Kuhn’s theory on discontinuous change in the history of disciplines, brought forth through a building up of a crisis within the internal understanding of the discipline itself, as described in his seminal book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (Kuhn 1970).

Es gibt noch keine definierte spezifisch musiktherapeutische Erkenntnistheorie, keine eigene Persönlichkeitstheorie, keine eigene Krankheits- und Gesundheitslehre, keine umfassende entsprechende Diagnostik etc., d.h. Metatheorien, welche Musiktherapie als eigenständiges Verfahren legitimieren könnten. Statt dessen profitieren wir von den Theorien der großen Psychotherapieschulen, und Musiktherapie kann damit auch als Methode dieser übergeordneten Psychotherapien verformuliert worden (Frohne-Hagemann 1990, p. 11).⁶

A music-based music therapy that does not adhere to any established model of psychotherapy, and that does not consider itself to be a method within any such particular model, will need to develop a corresponding theory of its own.

As seen here, some hold that music therapy could be *informed* by such theory. The “purely music” position though, has been reluctant to incorporate such thinking, because it is feared that it may “detract” from the music. The question, or challenge nevertheless remains how to account for a therapeutic process in which verbal, referential language is not used as a primary processing medium for psychological insight. The role of music itself then becomes a central issue. Some specific theory for the role of music in therapy is inevitably needed, giving some notion about the features and functions of this medium in a therapeutic setting.

1.4.2 General or “Local” Theory

Carolyn Kenny (2000) has propagated the development of a general theory for music therapy. The question could be posed however, is really a general theory what we need, to encompass *all* music therapy practice? I would tend to accept Ruud’s contention that all knowledge and theory is local, which actually implies multiple perspectives, even within a single discipline such as music therapy. Lars Ole Bonde (2003) expresses a certain ambivalence concerning the whole idea of “General Music Therapy Theory”. On the one hand he firmly believes in the advantages of concepts, models and theories that enable communication within the field, and with related fields. On the other hand he leans towards phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches, emphasizing local narrative truths, and to research that is grounded in culturally situated clinical practice,

⁶ The challenge still remains though, even when subsuming music therapy under such schools of psychotherapy, of incorporating theoretically the use of the medium of *music* within such general models of specifically verbal psychotherapy.

reflecting the experience of clients and therapists. The dilemma calls for constant discussion and reflection he holds forth, and he cites Kenny here:

Music therapy will not endure if it does not develop substantive theory. Our theories must be substantive, yet flexible and free to adapt to place, to the constantly changing themes of discourse in which future music therapists will engage (cited in Bonde (2003, p. 69).

Henk Smeijsters has also propagated the necessity of developing a general theory of music therapy, and in the article “Forms of Feeling and Forms of Perception: The fundamentals of Analogy in Music Therapy” (Smeijsters 2003), he presents some concepts for a general theory of music therapy. It may be instructive here to see how such an attempt, in the context of the present discussion, even at the very outset may become problematic though.

In previous writings Smeijsters has used the terms *sound* or *sound progressions* instead of music. By this usage he intended to indicate that he did not accept that music in music therapy could be considered a cultural/artistic phenomenon, wherefore the use “sound” or “sound progression”. And he still holds this view. He makes his stance clear in the statement:

I do not believe that the mere aesthetic experience of music in itself is healing if the musical form does not sound the inner processes and psychological changes of the client (p. 71).

Smeijsters admits that this previous usage of the words had proved controversial, and on this background decides to use the word “music” after all, even though he actually still holds the same position regarding music in music therapy.

It should be clear that proposing such a definition of music as a basic concept for a general theory for music therapy will not necessarily find support from those who hold a different view as to the role of music in therapy, Ansdell being a clear case. Another author that holds a rather similar position in this respect is Colin Lee. Colin Lee (1996), who regards his own approach explicitly to be music *as* therapy, and in a likewise manner to Ansdell (though of course there are differences of nuance between these authors), is concerned that what he calls “extraneous non-musical theory” may lead to the significance of music itself becoming “diluted”, as he puts it.

Lee terms his own approach: “Aesthetic Music Therapy” (AeMT), and his stance, which involves aesthetics as a key term, entails a sharp contrast to Smeijsters, as the following statement makes clear:

The inherent knowledge underlying AeMT is that *music is intrinsically healing*; what must be learned during training, then, is how to adapt one’s musical skills to develop resources which are clinically, artistically, and aesthetically suitable for both the client and the process (p. 7, italics added).

It would be hard to imagine either Lee, or any of the other authors of the “musical awareness” position, subscribing to the view that music in music therapy should *not* be considered a cultural/artistic phenomenon, and that “the musical is the psychological”, as Smeijsters propagates. Smeijsters’ presentation of his theory as a “general theory” would seem to be prescribing a generality to his own notions about therapy that are not readily acceptable to the field or discipline as a whole.

On the other hand it would be difficult to imagine Smeijsters concurring to a new paradigm, as the one envisioned by Ansdell, for example. A “grand” theory of music therapy still seems to be quite far off then. And as I will say, I am not sure that we need it. Smeijsters’ theory and approach may work fine within the confines of his own, and similar kinds of practice. It is trying to encompass more in theory than what it in each case actually can hold, that may be problematic.

Accepting Difference

Any theory as such is general, naturally, or else it simply was not a theory. The point is not so much then that general theory is not possible or advisable. This is indeed not a tenable position. It has to be recognized that there in any case will be a need for *some* theory at *some* level of generality with a discipline or field. The point is rather explicating in each case *how* general a theory is. A “grand” theory may be criticized on the grounds of being *too* general, with a claim to encompass more than it actually does hold.

Kenny emphasizes the importance of listening and reflecting on *difference*, and actually states that it is only through accepting and respecting difference that we may arrive at anything “general”. And this is precisely what I believe is mostly required here, bringing out differences, rather than arriving at the consensual. Not to refute the other side, but to contrast, and to show what the contrasts consist in. And what I would

propose, as indicated above, is that in the present discussion this particular kind of “generality” is what is needed, accepting differences as differences of frame. I do not think one may expect to have the issues between these different stances resolved through referring to some common, overarching general theory, or by aiming for any all-inclusive definition of music therapy. I think a progress in the discussion could be made rather through clearer explications of frames. The point then will not be trying to “refute” the other position, or attempting to subsume one under the other, but trying to show the possibility of each side on its own accord. The theoretical challenge on the side of a music-based music therapy then will be showing at all *how it may be framed*. And this is the main theme that I want to deal with in the present study.

1.4.3 Philosophy, Theory and Practice

There are no objective external criteria to use that may simply solve the case of what is to be the “right” or the “wrong” frame. The matter of explicating frames is a philosophical undertaking. What this means is that the question is not only a matter of importing one or another theory or not, but of considering the assumptions upon which these different theories may be based. There are different levels then to the discussion of how a music-based music therapy may be framed, and it is necessary to take all these into due consideration, to get the complete picture.

Kenny (1989) has made a simple but useful distinction, I believe. She states that if theory serves as a foundation for practice, philosophy serves as the foundation for theory. Every practice has a theoretical foundation, which may be more or less explicit, but which nevertheless is present in some way through the practice that is made. Whether or not it is articulated, the structure of some underlying theory gives sense to what we are doing in practice. And this underlying theoretical structure is necessarily grounded in particular stances on issues of philosophy, whether one is aware of this or not. Kenny points to this oftentimes-ignored intimate relation between practice, theory and philosophy. There is a constant creative movement between these; one springs out from the other.

1.4.4 An Existential-Humanistic Orientation

As Ruud (1980) has shown, practices of music therapy may be related to different theoretical and philosophical positions. And Nordoff-Robbins music therapy has historically been related to an existential humanistic tradition, in contrast to both psychoanalytic and behavioral models. The existential humanistic orientation, with its emphasis on intentionality, spontaneity and creativity has been perceived to be more in accordance with fundamental stances and values within this kind of practice.

Stephen Levine (1996) has more recently written about the search for a foundation for the expressive arts as a whole, and relates to the existential tradition mainly as Heidegger represents this. Heidegger, in contrast to both ancient and modern traditions, tending to view art and truth in a contradictory relationship to each other, art being at a somewhat removed position from reality, (as Plato and his followers uphold), on the contrary considers art as a primordial way in which truth becomes manifest. As an essential manifestation of truth art is capable of giving meaning and direction to human existence. This capacity Heidegger terms 'poiesis', using the old Greek word for poetry and art making. Levine finds this perspective relevant for the development of a foundation in the expressive arts.

But Levine also draws attention to significant areas that are neglected in Heidegger's thought, as reflected by several authors. Merleau-Ponty has pointed out the neglect of the body in Heidegger's thinking. It is through our lived bodily experience we sense and act in the world, Merleau-Ponty holds forth. The philosopher Emmanuel Levinas has delivered a critique of Heidegger on the basis that the experience of the Other is not clearly visible in his thinking. He suggests, as an alternative view, to begin with the appeal of the Other to me, rather than with my own search for existence. Lastly Levine refers to Jacques Derrida who has expanded on notions in Heidegger's thought to include a perspective, otherwise missing, on community. These three areas; the body, the Other and community or communality, are all of great importance, and need to be included in any foundation of expressive arts therapy, Levine maintains.

1.5 A Dialogical Perspective

Generally there seems to have been a clear individualistic trait in existential thought, from Kierkegaard via Nietzsche and onwards. One exception to this is Martin Buber who formulated a philosophy of reciprocity and mutuality in his now classic book *I and Thou*. In a master thesis that I wrote (Garred 1995), I made an interpretation of the concept of “encounter”, based on Buber’s exposition of this term, and applied it to improvisational music therapy, using the concept to illuminate both the relation to music within music therapy, and to an analysis of the therapeutic relationship.⁷ In the present study I want to develop this further.

The basic concept of this study will be “dialogue”. Let me make clear that I do not at all believe this to be a novel or exceptional stance. Dialogue has been, and still is, both implicitly and explicitly, very much present in music therapy thinking and practice. This is actually a main reason for choosing this concept; not its originality as such, but what I perceive to be its centrality and relevance. In my own experience as a music therapist the dimension of dialogue has always struck me as a crucial aspect of what this practice was about, and my clear impression is that I am not alone in sensing this, or seeing it this way. What I want to explicate here is a *radical* view, in the etymological meaning of going to the roots. I want to try to make clear what a dialogical perspective entails, because I don’t think this has been sufficiently explicated, or even appreciated for what it may contribute with. I will propose that a dialogical perspective may be both highly relevant and applicable in trying to develop a theory, or a *frame*, for a music-based music therapy.

Let me emphasize, on the background of the previous discussion, that I am not setting out to try to formulate a general theory of music therapy. I am trying to sort out some issues specifically related to a “therapy in music”, not for all music therapy, in all settings and circumstances, taken as a whole. A dialogical perspective as such, indecently, is well aligned with a “postmodern” trend of not making (too) grand schemes. It could itself be characterized as improvisational, performative, literally “conversational”. I am not looking for any all-encompassing perspective then, but rather

⁷ I have also written an article on this theme, published in the *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy* (Garred 1995).

a greater depth of understanding, through attempting to explicate somewhat more what such a perspective might entail, in relation to the question of how a theory for a music-based music therapy might be developed.

1.5.1 Buber's Dialogical Philosophy

Martin Buber has repeatedly been referred to in music therapy literature. First introduced maybe by Ruud (1980), who used Buber in a critique of present day behavior models of music therapy in his study. Ansdell (1995) has a chapter called "Meeting in Music", which draws heavily on an interpretation of Buber. Towards the end of the book, in summarizing, Ansdell writes:

Music lives between people; it makes contact, communicates patterns of thought and feeling, moves people together. The heart of Creative Music Therapy lies in the fact of musical dialogue... (Ansdell 1995, p. 120-21).

Ansdell then states that Buber's concept of "meeting" seems the best description of the quality of relationship in music therapy as dialogue.

Ruud (1998a) has more recently referred to the social anthropologist Victor Turner's theories in a description of essential characteristics of music improvisation, within both jazz and music therapy. In music therapy there is an attempt to create a spontaneous, immediate social interaction, what Turner terms "communitas", Ruud points out. In Turners own words: "These individuals are not segmented into roles and status but confront each other rather in the manner of Martin Buber's I and Thou" (cited in Ruud 1998a, p. 132). The direct experience of meeting in Buber's sense constitutes Turners spontaneous, existential "communitas", which Ruud considers as an especially appropriate description of improvisation in both jazz and music therapy, as a subject-subject relationship.

Buber has already been introduced into writings of music therapy theory then. I think there is more to be said though. Buber's writings must be considered an original statement, a main source for a dialogical philosophy. It is also representative for such a view, as is reflected in reissues, new translations, discussions and critical studies in a steadily growing body of secondary literature. (His collected works are now being

issued, which presumably will spur further studies and scholarship.)⁸ I will maintain that his work is in itself a powerful and sharply focused statement, which lends itself to exposition, commentary and critique, and also to further developments and applications. I have found Buber's writings, and particularly *I and Thou*, to be a rich and suggestive source, which relevance is still far from exhausted, and which maintains a present significance.

1.5.2 Problem Statement

I now want to focus in on the formulation of a problem statement for this study. The problem area or theme that is addressed here is the question whether a "therapy in music" possible, and on what grounds it could be based. If not based on a psychodynamic framework, how can a music-based music therapy make its case? The challenge I believe has to be met by developing a frame that specifically shows the possibility of such a therapy in music. What I would like to try to do then is to explicate a dialogical outlook that may serve as a basis for developing a theory for a music-based music therapy. – Which is to say, a music therapy that is not subsumed under a psychodynamic conception of therapy as a "talking cure". Not so much to finally resolve the debate, as to show how the picture might look from a different perspective, and what the implications of such a different perspective could be. The question posed in this study then is:

How may a dialogical perspective contribute to frame the possibility of a music-based, rather than a talking-based, music therapy?

My *thesis* is that a dialogical perspective may serve to ground theory *both* with regards to interpersonal relations, *and* with regards to the role of music, *and* furthermore to the interrelation between these two aspects. This I believe is a necessary requirement for any theory of a music-based music therapy. Not just clinical/therapeutic or musical/musicological theory then; *both* sides need to be addressed, and interrelated, to

⁸ The first of 21 volumes has been released: *Werke, Band 1; Frühe kulturkritische und philosophische Schriften*, Buber, Martin, Mendes-Flohr, Paul; Schäfer, Peter (ed.), Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2001.

frame such therapy. And my thesis then is that the concept of dialogue may be used to ground a theory that addresses both these sides, and relates them to each other.

1.5.3 Focus on Creative Music Therapy

My main *focus* will be on Creative Music Therapy as I consider this approach a prime example of a music-based music therapy. It is a major model internationally within music therapy as a field, and has developed over several decades. The term “Creative Music Therapy” has its own history, of course. In the book “*Creative Music Therapy: Individualized Treatment for the Handicapped Child*” the originators Paul Nordoff and Clive Robbins (1977) give a detailed account of their approach to music therapy, using improvisation in individualized therapeutic work with handicapped children. The term “Creative Music Therapy” has since then been widely used as a name for this approach. Another term that is currently much in use though, is “Nordoff-Robbins Music Therapy”. Ansdell (1995) announces that he uses the term “Creative Music Therapy” as an alternative to “Nordoff-Robbins Music Therapy”, to indicate an approach to music therapy with *adult* clients, rather than with children, to which he considers the other term is associated. It seems difficult to concur with this usage on a general basis though, since for other practitioners the term “Nordoff-Robbins Music Therapy” may very well include working with adults, as well as with children. And the term “Creative Music Therapy” has actually from the very beginning been associated, and particularly so even, with work with children, for instance, and not at all least, in the book from which the name is derived (!)⁹

Here I choose to apply the term “Creative Music Therapy” to include the original approach, *and* subsequent developments inspired by the original work by Nordoff and Robbins, for *both* children and adults, not distinguishing between these regarding the term used. “Nordoff-Robbins Music Therapy” I would reserve as a term for the work done by trained and registered practitioners, coming from training centers in several countries.¹⁰ Using the term “Creative Music Therapy” to include also further

⁹ *Creative Music Therapy: Individualized Treatment for the Handicapped Child* (Nordoff and Robbins 1977)

¹⁰ My own training as a music therapist in Norway was with the teachers Tom Næss, and Unni Johns, who had been taught by the original team (they both attended the six month training course offered at Goldie Leigh Hospital, England, in 1974, in addition to other courses, held in Oslo, Norway). The two year training that I attended was not defined strictly and exclusively as a Nordoff-Robbins approach,

developments and variations on the approach, springing out from the pioneering work of Nordoff and Robbins entails a somewhat wider usage then.¹¹ Still it remains somewhat associated, by its name, with the originators of this kind of approach to music therapy. This is the solution regarding these terms that, for present purposes, I will adhere to.

I will also add here that it is primarily the theoretical discussions that have evolved around this practice that I will be relating to in this study, and that I will attempt to contribute to.

1.5.4 Outline of the Thesis

Having used the recent and still ongoing discussions within the field of music therapy as a background for arriving at a formulation of a problem statement let me now briefly sketch the outline for the rest of this study. In chapter two I will account for the method used for inquiring into the problem statement. Following this, in chapter three, I will give a presentation and interpretation of the concept of dialogue, as this will be applied within the study. In chapter four I will first try to show what a dialogical perspective implies specifically in relation to music as an art. In chapter five I will position music within music therapy, setting up a basic triangular figure, involving therapist, music and client, interrelating them through the lines that may be drawn between them. In the following chapter six I venture, on the basis of this triangular set-up, to elaborate more on the relational aspect of therapy, both with regards to therapeutic responsibility and the significance of the therapeutic relation for the client. In the following chapter seven I consider more closely the relation to music as such in therapy, and the therapeutic significance of this relation, interrelating it also to the interpersonal aspect, considering

though it certainly was much inspired by this. Worth noting here is that a therapeutic vignette, signed by Tom Næss is actually included in the book *Creative Music Therapy*, with photographs from the sessions. The authors write: “The following photographs are mainly of colleagues and associates at work. They are leading music therapists in Denmark, England, Norway and the United States. All have adopted and studied for various lengths of time this essentially creative clinical approach in music: each is applying it in his own way to meet the situation a child is presenting.” (Nordoff and Robbins 1977, p.2.) This rather close association also applies to the teacher of theory, Even Ruud, who also was quite intimately acquainted with the work of Nordoff and Robbins, which is reflected in his extensive publishing on issues related to this approach.

¹¹ There is a parallel here to the term “Guided Imagery and Music“, which may have a somewhat broader usage than the term “Bonny Method of Guided Imagery and Music“, which is now what is preferred by many of the trained and certified practitioners of this specific approach (Bruscia and Grocke 2002).

how this may affect processes of therapeutic change. In chapter eight I consider more closely the role of music related to the use of words in therapy, contrasting Nordoff and Robbins' Creative Music Therapy with Mary Priestley's Analytical Music Therapy, which is taken as a main representative of a music psychotherapy approach incorporating verbal processing. In chapter nine I discuss some apparent theoretical contradictions related to the issue of subjectivism within Creative Music Therapy theory, and develop an alternative dialogical perspective. Following this, in chapter ten, there is a discussion on the issue of objectivistic notions of music within Creative Music Therapy theory. In chapter eleven I outline a *dialogical rationale* for a *music-based music therapy*, based on an explicated philosophical anthropology. In the final chapter twelve there is a summary and discussion with a conclusion, an assessment of the relevance of the study, followed by a critical evaluation of the methodology used.

2 Philosophical Inquiry

The main method for this study will be philosophical inquiry, because answering the problem statement about how the possibility of a music-based therapy could be theoretically framed, on a dialogical basis, implies relating to fundamental questions of an inherently philosophical nature. It is not simply a matter of investigating into a given state of affairs. It is about ways of viewing, and different grounds for different ways of viewing. This requires a consideration of philosophical method, and how it may be applied to the question posed in this study, which is the subject matter of the present chapter.

In the first part I consider some basic characteristics of philosophical inquiry, and what kind of philosophical inquiry that is called for in the present context. I then refer to the discussion on whether and how to import theory, and how theory is related to philosophy. Then I look somewhat more into procedures and contexts of philosophizing, and indicate which methodological approaches that are relevant and will be used in this study, (clarifying also what kind of approaches that will *not* be followed). The issue of reflexivity is dealt with, through which I account for my own stances, and for the theoretical premises and axioms that underpin this study.

2.1 An Applicative Study

James Johnson (1991), gives an outline of various procedures of philosophical research, elaborating on method for philosophical studies in music education, which I believe is a field that shares much of the same kind of issues as music therapy regarding philosophical method. Johnson points out that there are really no elementary problems in the philosophical realm; all questions and issues are related to each other.

Furthermore the results from this kind of inquiry are not quantifiable, and there are no criteria for any final and complete analysis, or perfect induction.

It is important to be aware, Johnson holds forth, that the manner in which a question is posed at the outset predetermines its answer. Johnson urges that in philosophical studies, the criticism of one position in terms of another is usually not convincing, rather the attempt should be to show in its own terms that a doctrine is erroneous. The standard, by which the usefulness of the ever-expanding questions and concerns of philosophical inquiry should be measured, is the degree to which they achieve cohesiveness and internal validity.

The province of philosophy is not empirical, but conceptual, Johnson points out; it pursues meaning and clarification of the implications of concepts. Johnson readily recognizes that any field needs to address pragmatic concerns, but maintains that questions regarding the most efficient ways to accomplish practical goals cannot be isolated from, but must be seen in conjunction with the examination and establishment of conceptual structures of understanding. Johnson also maintains that the philosophical grounding of a field, such as music education, and by implication music therapy, needs to be established on its own terms, and not merely by connecting to another area of intellectual endeavor, or translating concerns from other fields.

2.1.1 Developing a Rationale

If philosophy is about the fundamental questions that underpin all fields of knowledge, the question might be raised as to what the relation between the underlying philosophy and a theory of a particular field may be. In the article “Philosophy as a Method of Inquiry”, Eleanor Stubley (1992), also writing from within the field of music education, characterizes philosophical inquiries directed towards concerns of a field of practice as *applicative studies*, and defines this in the following manner:

Applicative studies emphasize clarification and analysis as a means of identifying the implications of a particular distinction or way of seeing in a particular context (p. 49).

This matches quite well with the requirements for an inquiry into the problem statement presented here, which will be a matter of analyzing and clarifying what the implications

of a dialogical perspective may be on the issue of the possibility of a music-based music therapy as a field of practice.

Terry Gates (1991), who is also writing from within the tradition of music education, but with concerns that are relevant for music therapy as well, I believe, maintains that a rationale that is developed through engaging theory and practice dialectically in relation to each other may amount to what he terms a *professional philosophy*. He warns that this undertaking also may create sound criticisms and challenge cherished beliefs within a field. Still he underscores its necessity. Such a rationale will be in more or less alignment with practice, and the adjustment of this goes both ways, from the rationale to the implementation in practice, and from practice to a subsequent re-formulation of the rationale.

The implications of theory for therapeutic practice then, is the formulation of its basis, its aim, its method, its evaluation, in short its rationale. And this is the kind of “thinking” that indeed is inevitable, I believe, and without which no therapy can be carried out. The rationale is what relates theory, developed from some basic philosophical assumptions, to practice. Not recognizing these crucial interrelations might in the long run prove to make practice suffer, by not having functional guiding structures that are meaningfully and convincingly grounded. Frank (1989), somewhat disrespectfully maybe in someone’s ears, calls the therapeutic rationale a “myth”, and the actual practice a “ritual”. Any ritual needs a myth or course, to give it meaning. A rationale may also point to new possibilities and new areas of application in practice. Furthermore it may facilitate communication with other professionals and other fields. It may make music therapy more clear and comprehensible for others, whether they are in agreement with the presented rationale or not.

A rationale is always tested on its suitability and credibility in relation to practice. And it is always present in practice, though it may be more or less explicated, clear, consistent and convincing. And how it works or does not work in practice informs its adjustments and revisions, bringing back experiences from practice and into the development of new theory. It is important to be aware that there will always be a two-way movement across these levels here, as Kenny (1987) indicates, because the theoretical development will only be meaningful to the extent that it springs out from real concerns of practice. The implications of attempting to develop theory for a music-

based music therapy will be found here then, by contributing to the formulation of a rationale for such therapy, related to practice, as a professional philosophy, in Gates' terms. And this will be a set aim for the present study.

Different Issues, Similar Kinds of Questions

Music education and music therapy, though related, represent different fields of practice though, and a rationale for education will be different than a rationale for therapy. What is similar though, is the *need* for a rationale, related to practice. And this rationale will be based on some specific assumptions that necessarily will be philosophically based. Both will have to deal with underlying philosophical questions. Therapy actualizes somewhat different issues than does education though. In music education music is the subject matter, whereas in therapy it is the client that is the subject. There are different aims then for education and therapy, although both basically are about music in relation to human concerns. Therapy entails a different *contract* than does education, with different roles for teacher and therapist, and for pupil and client (Bonde 1994). Both disciplines will nevertheless involve basic philosophical questions, dealing with what it means to be human, and what human needs are, in relation to music. At the level of philosophy underlying the development of theoretical perspectives on practice, the *kind* of questions dealt with are similar, which makes a *methodological* approach to philosophical inquiry within music education relevant also for music therapy. But still music therapy will have its own issues to deal with that will be different, regarding particularly the role music as it is related to therapy.

2.2 Indigenous and Imported Theory

Aigen (1991a) has propagated the need for a unique or so-called *indigenous theory* of music therapy. He has been concerned with not placing music therapy under a positivistic "Unity of Science" heading, with the strict, or rather, restricted requirements for research within the field that follows from this. He has argued for an alternative, qualitative paradigm for music therapy research, closely related to clinical practice.

Pavlicevic (1997) wants to keep the doors open for borrowing theoretical perspectives from other fields and disciplines. She calls for a balanced import of

discourses from other fields in the development of music therapy theory, to broaden its meaning and enrich the understanding, as long as, and only as long as this theory remains close to practice. In a later writing, elaborating on this issue, Pavlicevic (1999b) suggests that it may be naive to think in terms of “a” (singular) music therapy discourse. She proposes instead to deal with a dialogue of many discourses that can be negotiated, created and recreated, and continuously developed. Pavlicevic furthermore refers to Aldridge, Brandt and Wohler (1990), who endorse the creating of a common language for the creative arts, and she supports creating such a common language, rather than a separate, indigenous discourse, available exclusively to music therapists amongst the creative arts therapists.

Aigen (2003) has more recently made a finer distinction between *three* types of theory. *Recontextualized theory*, which seeks to describe and explain the processes and phenomena of music therapy in terms of other disciplines, such as psychoanalysis, neurology or behavioral learning theory. While Aigen acknowledges the advantage of thereby being able to communicate with other fields, he finds that these types of exposition tend to be reductionistic in that music therapy phenomena may appear to be sufficiently explained when being rephrased, or “recontextualized” as Aigen terms this, in imported terms. This is the on the other extreme side to *indigenous theory* then, referred to above, which is based on the rationale that all domains of inquiry have unique qualities, and that development of theory within a particular discipline should proceed from these. Aigen considers this kind of theory to be most appropriate when the primary audience is music therapists, and the purpose is to advance developments in the forefront of the profession. A prime example here, according to Aigen, is Nordoff and Robbins’ (1977) concept of the “music child”, which he considers is not a concept that is drawn from elsewhere, and which is not meant to explain other phenomena than those that gave rise to it.

In between these two poles of indigenous and recontextualized theory, Aigen places so-called *bridging theory*, which establishes connections between terms and concepts from different disciplines, by combining constructs from other areas with those that are specific to music therapy. Examples here are concepts from New Musicology that have been applied to issues of music therapy theory, like Keil and Feld’s (1994) concept of “participatory discrepancies” which has been used in the

analysis of interactions in jazz rhythm sections, and which Aigen himself has used in an analogous way to study music therapy improvisation processes (Aigen 2001b). Another example here would be Ansdell (2002) and Stige's (2002a) use of Small's concept of musicking, referred to in the introductory chapter.

Aigen lists Pavlicevic's development of the concept of "dynamic form" as an instance of "bridging theory", based partly on Susanne Langer's aesthetic theory, in an indirect way, and more directly on infant communication theory, as represented by Daniel Stern. Different disciplines may offer unique perspectives on music therapy phenomena, while at the same time not fitting music therapy in a neat way. Therefore these perspectives have to be adapted and supplemented with considerations that are unique to music therapy, Aigen holds forth.

2.2.1 Integration of Theory

Bruscia (2003) uses another term for this kind of process, he talks about *integration* as a method of theory building, which he defines as a theory that is developed by relating concepts or practices in music therapy with those in another field, most often by importing theory, practice and research from a field outside of music therapy. Bruscia distinguishes between two different processes that may be involved here, *accommodation* and *assimilation*:

In the accommodation process, phenomena in music therapy are fit into theories or constructs in other fields, and in the process, some aspect of music therapy is expanded, limited, revised, or modified to accommodate the other field. In the assimilation process, theories or constructs outside the field are modified to fit into music therapy. Here the external model is expanded, limited, revised or modified to accommodate music therapy phenomena (p. 11).¹²

Accommodation, as one of two different approaches to integration, is when music therapy is brought to accommodate with another field. This could seem to imply moving in the direction of recontextualization, in Aigen's terms. The other approach, assimilation, is when the imported theory is assimilated into the confines of what is specific to music therapy, and itself being modified during this process. This could be seen as approaching the indigenous side of the spectrum, in Aigen's terms. Bruscia

¹² I am here referring to pages in a (somewhat extended) version of the chapter that is to appear in Wheeler's second edition of the book: *Music Therapy Research* (in press), that Bruscia kindly has sent to me. See also *Defining Music Therapy* [Bruscia, 1998 #87].

makes clear that these two approaches should be seen as joint processes, but that theories that integrate music therapy with other fields can vary greatly according to the relative emphasis given to the one or the other side, of accommodation or assimilation.

2.2.2 Philosophy and Theory

The question nevertheless is not just which theory to import or not, and from where, and how, but on which basis. It is important to be aware, I believe, that on a philosophical, foundationa0l level issues are somewhat broader than what adheres to one single discipline. The basic ontological, epistemological, and axiological presuppositions are shared concerns between different fields and disciplines. Bruscia (in press) points out that every theory, practice or research in a particular domain or discipline has its roots “in an entire philosophy about life, knowledge, reason, values, and ethics” (p. 5). Philosophy lays the foundation for all fields and forms of knowledge. But besides from this philosophy may also serve to provide a meta-perspective, Bruscia holds forth. Philosophical ideas can be used to illuminate and evaluate, by considering what kind of ontological or epistemological stances that are implied in different perspectives, or which kind of values that are involved. Philosophical ideas that form the roots of theory, practice and research may also serve as an overarching perspective upon which to reflect upon these practices.

Bruscia furthermore points out that philosophy and theory have many similarities. They have a common aim, which is understanding, and both use reflection, criticism, speculation, intuition, and imagination, moving into new areas of exploration. They are abstract, ideational, rather than practical and empirical. If practice is about doing, and research about discovering, philosophy and theory are about understanding, Bruscia states. Both require such activities as defining, differentiating, relating, clarifying, organizing, deducing, inducing, inferring, generalizing and arguing. The difference is that theory deals with a *particular field* of knowledge, whereas philosophy deals with *fundamental questions* that underpin all fields of knowledge.

2.2.3 Two Aspects of Philosophical Analysis

Bruscia differentiates between two aspects also of *philosophical analysis* as a methodological approach in theory building. The first is to import a philosophical

theory or construct into music therapy, and then apply it to a particular theory, practice or research, the aim being to enlarge or to expand upon existing notions in music therapy. In the present study this will be a main aspect, through applying the concept of dialogue to demonstrate or exemplify how a music-based music therapy may be theoretically framed. The difference of this approach from integration of theory, Bruscia holds forth, is based on whether music is being analyzed philosophically, that is to say according to fundamental notions of ontology, epistemology and axiology, or according to another discipline, such as sociology or psychology, in which case one would talk rather about integration of theory from another field. Philosophical analysis as a methodological approach involves relating explicitly to fundamental questions. And the concept of dialogue that is to be imported and applied here clearly will be used philosophically in this sense, relating it to fundamental notions about both music and therapy. This is what makes it into a philosophical inquiry then.

The other side to philosophical analysis according to Bruscia is to analyze existing music therapy theory, in order to identify or further clarify its philosophical underpinnings. I will be using this approach also to some extent, in bringing out basic notions and differences between theories of both music-based and talking-based therapy, for purposes of clarification though making comparisons.

2.3 Characteristic Procedures

Philosophical inquiry involves different kinds of procedures to be applied. Kenneth Aigen has written a chapter on philosophical inquiry within music therapy (Aigen 1995b), which is structurally based on a schema from Estelle Jorgensen's chapter in *The Handbook of Research in Music Education*, titled: "Philosophical method" (Jorgensen 1992). Aigen finds that although Jorgensen is writing about the relevance of philosophical inquiry for music teaching and learning, her schema is useful for grasping the varieties of doing philosophy in general, and is therefore also applicable to music therapy. Aigen defines philosophy as a system of underlying principles or beliefs guiding action. Following Jorgensen he distinguishes between characteristic procedures of philosophy, such as clarifying terms, exposing and evaluating underlying

assumptions, and relating ideas as systematic theory. On his own account he adds using argument as the primary mode of inquiry, and as presentational device.

2.3.1 Clarifying the Meaning of Terms Used

An important procedure within philosophical method, Jorgensen holds forth, is clarifying the denotation and significance of words used, to ensure the greatest possible precision in meaning. This may enable one to critique, and to illuminate interrelationships and connections between ideas. Through continued critiques of terms within a field their use in discourse may become more precise. One way to clarify terms in relation to one another is to set up taxonomies of classification. Some such distinctions might sometimes seem rather fine initially, but upon reflection their importance can become more apparent. Clarifying terms also serves to enable subsequent philosophical discussion within a field.

As an example of such work within the field of music therapy, Aigen refers to Kenneth Bruscia's *Defining Music Therapy*, a study seeking to clarify the term "music therapy" itself. Bruscia has since then expanded and made further clarifications in a revised second edition of his book (1989). Bruscia presents his own definition (somewhat revised in the second edition) of music therapy, but Aigen points out that such a definition can only give a partial understanding, since music therapy – as Bruscia's also points out – has a collective identity.

Such clarification of terms has already to some extent been applied in the first chapter of the present study, as part of arriving at the problem statement, through the process of differentiating between a talking-based and a music-based music therapy. A main issue in the present study will actually be to clarify what the term music-based music therapy itself might mean. In what follows the significance and way of understanding the concept of dialogue also has to be made clear, prior to explicating what this term entails related to the issues involved in the formulated problem statement of this study.

2.3.2 Exposing and Evaluating Underlying Assumptions

A second characteristic procedure of philosophy, according to Jorgensen, is exposing and evaluating underlying assumptions. Assumptions predicate and underlie action,

though they may be more or less implicit or explicit. Philosophical inquiry seeks to make assumptions explicit. This may facilitate a more penetrating analysis, exposing possible conflicts and contradictions within given assumptive sets. It may furthermore assist in deciding between alternatives, and also contribute to developing better-articulated and defended views.

A notable example within music therapy, which Aigen refers to, is Ruud's *Music Therapy and its Relation to Current Treatment Theories* (1980). Ruud presents primary psychological orientations, and theories of music therapy derived from these, examining their underlying assumptions. He draws parallels through comparisons of rationales, goals and procedures of some representative music therapists with the various psychological orientations, and their corresponding philosophies. He then proceeds to make a comparative, critical analysis on the basis of these exposed assumptions.

A central aspect of the present study will be to contrast perspectives through exposing underlying assumptions, related specifically to music-based versus talking-based music therapy, showing where differences or conflicts may lie, thus seeking to avoid confusing or mixing incompatible views, and aiming at a more coherent and convincing theoretical grounding for a music-based view, on its own terms.

2.3.3 Systematization of Theory

Jorgensen's third characteristic procedure in philosophical inquiry is systematization of theory, which connects with other ideas and systems of thought. This, according to Jorgensen, is about articulating frames of reference within which one sees one's version of the world. Working this way may clarify ideas that are ambiguous and in disarray. It is aimed at designing conceptual frameworks that are ordered and insightful. The use of examples is essential here to illustrate and test ideas, Jorgensen holds forth. There is a possibility of connecting to various traditions and ways of knowing – also more artistic modes. And any philosophical undertaking will be placed within a philosophical tradition, from which it draws ideas, and to which it contributes for further developments.

Aigen refers to an article by Kenny (1985), in which she makes use of systems theory to create a larger context in which to understand music and healing, to give an

example of this particular kind of methodological procedure applied within the field of music therapy.

A crucial aspect of the present study will be to apply ideas from a dialogical philosophy to the field of music therapy, connecting to theoretical developments that exist within this field, and trying to put them into some perspective. This will be related to discourses within other fields, which have also been referred to within music therapy theory, such as developmental psychology or New Musicology, as seen previously here. The procedure of relating to various currents of thought as parts of a systematized theory will be both relevant and necessary for the coherence and consistency of argument within this study. A certain discipline must be exerted here though, not to expand into areas too remote for the purposes of this study, viewed as a whole.

Citing Examples

Jorgensen stresses the significance of examples. Giving and citing examples is a regular and extensively used procedure within philosophical inquiry, for illustrating and testing ideas. A significant aspect of this is the use also of counterexamples in refuting arguments.

The use of examples in philosophical inquiry is for conceptual clarification, and not for empirical documentation. The use of such examples will in any case only be for illustrating the point of the argument, not being assigned any objective status *yo*, establishing the actual “truth” about the matter. An important source of examples may actually be drawn directly and creatively from imagination. As Winch (1958) points out, Wittgenstein, for instance, would use examples from a slightly different imaginative world to bring out crucial points he was trying to make regarding language use and meaning.

2.3.4 The Use of Argument as the Primary Mode of Inquiry

Aigen lists one more central characteristic of doing philosophical work, which is the use of argument as the primary mode of inquiry. He does not give any particular examples here. Presumably it would be hard to find any philosophical work that was not based primarily on argument. Still Aigen suggests that the line of argument in various theoretical writings, also within music therapy, is not always apparent. It may

sometimes be mostly implicit. The reader will then have to reconstruct the argument from the author's rhetoric, this being the only way then to any evaluate these writings philosophically.

A recent theoretical contribution to music therapy theory predominantly in the mode of argument is Stige's *Culture Centered Music Therapy*, in which the author in the introduction courteously "allows" the reader to read the chapters of the book in any preferred order, (he has no choice really, he points out), but at the same time he makes clear that he considers that the whole book follows a line of argument, based on his stated premises:

The text is written as a continuous argument, and as such the different chapters link and should be seen in connection to each other. If the book is read as a whole, the depths and relationships of the arguments will be better understood (Stige 2002a, p. 12).

This will certainly also will be the case for the present study. There will be a line of argument to follow in and through the different chapters and sections, leading from an initial problem statement and to a conclusion.

2.4 Contexts of Philosophizing

Another aspect or side to philosophical method that Aigen highlights, besides the procedures involved, is the *contexts* in which philosophizing arises. He mentions 1) creating a philosophy, 2) comparing and evaluating theories and systems of thought, and 3) addressing questions that are inherently philosophical.

2.4.1 Creating a Philosophy

One such context in which philosophizing arises according to Aigen then, is *creating a philosophy*, which is the constitution of an aggregation of underlying principles guiding activity, such as music therapy treatment, training and research. The connection between such underlying principles and concrete human concerns is established by the usefulness of the activities suggested by the philosophical precepts that are developed, Aigen suggests. Creating a philosophy is in this way about developing a whole outlook that puts what one is doing into perspective.

Music therapy clinicians whose writings go beyond the theorizing necessary to explain clinical phenomena to create *larger ethical, conceptual, or spiritual contexts for their theories are engaging in creating a philosophy* (p. 448 italics added).

Aigen refers, as an example, to his own study *Being in Music: Foundations of Nordoff-Robbins Music Therapy* (Aigen 1996), in which he made a qualitative study of the recorded transcripts of a training course offered by Nordoff and Robbins at Goldie Leigh Hospital in London in 1974, to elicit the underlying and unifying principles of this approach, as it was reflected through this course. This was done in the recognition of the need of formulating a philosophy for this central approach to music therapy. The present study is related to something of the same kind of contextual issue or concern, through at least attempting to contribute to creating a philosophy, from a dialogical outlook, that may serve to develop a theoretical frame for the possibility of a music-based, rather than a talking-based music therapy.

2.4.2 Comparing Theories

The second of the *contexts* in which philosophizing arises that Aigen mentions, is evaluating and comparing theories, theoretical systems, and comprehensive philosophical systems of thought. Comparing diverse theoretical orientations may involve translating concepts to facilitate communication between music therapists and other professionals. Or to enable adherents of one tradition to understand the ideas of others, and become less bound to one way of looking at things. Furthermore this type of analysis can also show whether translation of concepts between different systems of thought is even possible to do in an integral way:

On the other hand, such analysis might just as easily have the opposite result, showing that the underlying premises from the different systems are so different that it is impossible to translate concepts from one orientation to the other without sacrificing something essential ((Aigen 1995b, p. 461).

Aigen refers to psychoanalytic versus transpersonal interpretations of merging with the music, as an example. Conceptual analysis may highlight the differences and similarities between different traditions. This type of analysis may clearly also be related to the problem posed in this study on the possibility of framing a music-based music therapy. Different orientations or theories that are implied in a music-based and a

talking-based therapy respectively may turn out to be more or less compatible or incompatible. It has to be underlined here that this is not the same thing as refuting one on behalf of the other, but may rather be about showing that two theories cannot be applied in the same way towards the same phenomenon.

This kind of methodological approach of translating and comparing may help to bring these differences out, and it may show how a perspective on a phenomenon may change according to the theories that are applied, and *why this is so*, and furthermore what the different implications might be. It also makes possible an evaluation of different theories as they apply to a phenomenon. The study to follow, according to the problem formulation, will naturally involve some such comparison. A crucial issue will be a comparison of the basic notion of music that is implied in a talking-based versus a music-based therapy.

2.4.3 Characteristic Questions

Rather obvious it might seem, Jorgensen, within her overall scheme holds forth that philosophy addresses questions that are *characteristically philosophical*. This is also a way of delimiting and defining the type of inquiry that is involved. Aigen, following Jorgensen here, refers to questions that are ontological, epistemological, or axiological, ethical or aesthetic. Jorgensen also mentions logical and political issues. The main point here is that these types of questions are themselves characteristically philosophical, and thereby call for a philosophical treatment. This constitutes the third context of philosophizing, according to Aigen.

Such philosophical question-sets, which are always necessarily interrelated, address a wide range of issues. In relation to the field of music therapy, the question of how music can be applied in some form of therapy is dependent on what kind of epistemology, or theory of knowledge, that is adhered to (Aigen 1991a; Ruud 1998e). And this epistemology will necessarily be grounded on a fundamental ontology, with consequences for the view on the nature of music (Kenny 1985). The significance of the musical experience, and also of the therapeutic relationship will depend upon a philosophical anthropology, regarding views on human nature, related to matters of axiology, of value. An example here is David Aldridge's vision of man as a symphonic rather than a mechanical being (Aldridge 1996b). This conception must be considered a

contribution to a philosophical anthropology, using a musical metaphor for a description of an essential feature of man. Stances on such matters imply issues of ethics to consider. And a view on man's relation to music clearly actualizes questions of aesthetics, on the nature of music as an art form (Solomon 1995; Salas 1990). Social, political and cultural issues are furthermore also relevant in relation to music therapy (Ruud 1998f; Stige 2002a).

What is common to philosophical questions, Jorgensen holds forth, is their challenge to the validity of extant ideas and practices. Philosophic questioning systematically asks whether these ideas and practices are well grounded. In this way it may ultimately challenge a discipline's very reason for being.

But Jorgensen also points out that there have been rather insistent attempts at downgrading philosophy. She finds that one major reason for this has been positivism, which in its most extreme empiricist form did not leave much space for philosophy, beyond logic. This has now on the whole been left as tenable position, and what has increasingly been recognized is that theory is necessary to organize empirical findings, and to formulate hypothesis prior to empirical research. Jorgensen contrasts positivism with phenomenology, though she also points out that the lines are maybe no longer as sharply drawn. What broadly characterizes phenomenology is an analysis of phenomena as they present themselves to awareness, taking into consideration human consciousness as an integral part of reality.

2.5 Analysis and Synthesis

Among different contrasting positions regarding the approach to philosophy, such as phenomenology versus positivism, reflecting differences in epistemological stance, or deduction versus induction, reflecting different perspectives to reasoning, Jorgensen also mentions the contrasting positions of approach of *synopsis* and *analysis*, related to the purpose of doing philosophy. She defines "synopsis" in the following manner:

Synopsis ... involves constructing a comprehensive paradigm that elaborates one's own philosophical perspective, while building on the views of other philosophers. One's objective is not so much to critique other points of view (although critique is included) as to utilize them in explicating elements of one's own philosophy for purposes of *verification rather than refutation* (p. 98, italics included).

Synopsis, Jorgensen points out, is *constructive*. *Analysis*, on the other hand, is about breaking something down into its various parts. Analytic philosophers, Jorgensen holds forth, approach the ideas of other philosophers critically, using evidence for purposes of *refutation rather than verification*. Philosophers using a synoptic approach she metaphorically calls “architectures and builders of the house”, whereas analytic philosophers are its “inspectors and appraisers”. Jorgensen makes the point that this is not to say that some analysis does not go on in the midst of synopsis too, and vice versa, but that the focus of philosophical endeavor differs significantly between these approaches.

Jorgensen indicates that even though there is no strict division between doing one and the other then, there still remains a basic difference of focus between these two approaches. And this is precisely what I believe is necessary to consider methodologically with regards to the approach that is to be taken in the present study. The task is synoptic rather than analytical in the sense of building or synthesizing a perspective, showing the *possibility of framing* a music-based music therapy this way. This means that it is not primarily about critically refuting one position in favor of another, which is not what the problem statement here is about. The approach is rather constructively showing the possibility of framing a music-based music therapy that does not necessarily have to be subsumed under a talking-based therapy, thereby countering the claim that there could be no other alternative.

Actually talking-based music therapy as such is not questioned here. What is attempted to bring forth is a multi-perspective, showing the possibility *also* of a music-based approach, and how this may be theoretically framed. It might be called *indirectly* critical or “deconstructive” of a grand narrative of therapy that would not recognize the possibility of a music-based music therapy as such.

2.5.1 Reconciling Multiple Perspectives

The issue of different positions, and how to relate or reconcile them to each other is treated by Jorgensen in a chapter in *The New Handbook of Research in Music Teaching and Learning* (Colwell and Richardson 2002). Jorgensen writes about philosophical issues in curriculum, and outlines different positions related to the way of conceptualizing curriculum in music education (Jorgensen 2002). It may be regarded in

a traditional way as instructional content; or as a system of learning objectives within an educational program; it may be regarded mainly as a creative process, not emphasizing musical product one-sidedly; or as constituting a distinct realm of meaning; it may alternatively be regarded as the practical application of reason; or as itself a discourse, that may be analyzed and read as a “text”, revealing underlying ideologies, that then may be seen in the context of social and political processes. Jorgensen critiques each of these positions, contrasts and evaluates them in relation to each other. Her conclusion though, is not choosing one before another, but rather suggesting a “both/and” dialectical view. Mapping the different “images” of curriculum enables researchers and teachers to reflect on their own approach and way of practice, and how it may be legitimatised. In allowing for, and respecting differences, tensions, and even conflicts between different images or conceptions, and invoking imaginative and critical thought in negotiating between them, this dialectical approach opens up the possibility for many ways to teach and learn music with integrity, Jorgenson suggests.

This methodological point could very easily be applied to music therapy, I believe, which will tend to show a similar wide range of different conceptions, along several dimensions of music and therapy, that may not be so easy to reconcile, but that may be negotiated between, as Jorgensen suggests, rather than one simply opposing the other. This way there may be an opening for a broader and more inclusive perspective, not expecting to arrive at any single one point of view to be held as the only, generally valid one. This is an approach that I will adhere to here. I am not aiming to show how one side or view is right and one is wrong, in this case a music-based, versus a talking-based music therapy, but to bring out characteristics and differences between different stances, to reflect upon, for illumination, for an increased understanding of the varieties and potentialities of different kinds of music therapy practice.

2.5.2 What Philosophy can Bring

In a recent article, summarizing some of her main points on the issue, Jorgensen asks what philosophy can bring to music education (Jorgensen 2003), and which could be seen analogously to music therapy then. She finds that it may serve three important tasks: Clarifying ideas, interrogating commonplaces, and suggesting applications to practice. This implies that the philosopher asks questions that may help to unpack

meaning and prompt reflection on the part of those engaged in the work of music education. It may interrogate the taken for granted notions that are held that have not been sufficiently examined and critically evaluated. Furthermore philosophy may facilitate thinking through the “might be” – the possibilities for better direction and practice in the future.

Jorgensen takes the notion of musicianship and its relevance as a conception, related to music education, as a case in point, to exemplify the philosopher’s crucial role as she sees this. She makes the further point that the work of philosophy need not be undertaken by just the few. Rather, she proposes, music teachers may as well participate in the work of philosophy in music education, in asking important and sometimes uncomfortable questions. In so doing, Jorgensen envisions, all involved within the field can contribute to the thought and work of music education.

2.5.3 Reflective Synthesis

Picking up on Jorgensen’s suggestion as to who may do the work of philosophy, reference could be made to Kenny (1989) who advises to keep doing, or at least vividly remembering one’s own current or previous music therapy practice while doing theoretical work, to keep a basic connection to direct experience through this resource of memory. This could be related to what Bruscia calls *reflective synthesis* as a method of theory building. He defines it in the following way:

A theory is developed by reflecting on one’s own experiences with a phenomenon, relating these reflections to existing ideas or perspectives of other theorists, looking at research, and intuitively synthesizing all these sources of insight into an original theory or vision. The theory may start from any of the sources.

A process of synthesis is involved here, where theoretical perspectives, research, and one’s own experiences as a music therapist serve as a basis for reflection, through which a whole or at least more complete view is developed. Reflective synthesis usually includes a number of propositions that are related to each other Bruscia points out, and he considers that Carolyn Kenny provides one of the best examples of such reflective theoretical work. She has applied this method over many years, in a series of publications (Kenny 1982, 1985, 1989, 1996). Bruscia cites Kenny on this matter:

My approach to the task at hand is reflective. My scholarship has informed me, but no more than my direct experience with clients. I have been influenced by powerful thoughts of eloquent scholars. I have attempted to finely tune my ability to discern categories. I have studied the major intellectual influences of our time and the historical contexts of movements of thought. I release them all. I surrender my thoughts to Debbie, Jack, Robyn, Maggie, Mable and many other patients and clients in my clinical work life (cited in Bruscia, in press, p. 19).

My own approach in the present study will actually involve reflective synthesis, by incorporating my own experience as a music therapist into the development of a theoretical perspective on a music-based music therapy. I will illustrate the argument by narrating examples from my own practice, as an aspect of the overall methodological approach. It is important to underline though, that I will regard this methodological aspect of incorporating personal experience into theory building mainly as a use of *examples* for the argument.

This use of reflective synthesis as an aspect of the methodological approach within this study may be seen in the light of Jorgenson's distinction between a synoptic and analytical approach. It is, as the term itself indicates, an approach towards synthesis, and is quite naturally aligned with a primarily constructive "building" approach to theory, rather than a primarily "deconstructive", critical, analytical approach, in Jorgenson's sense. Though analysis is naturally always an integral part of any philosophizing, also when the approach is synoptic in its purpose and aim.

Linking theory with practice through reflection means that these two sides cannot be completely separated. Bruscia (in press) underlines that theory is always *created*, that the propositions of a theory are actually a person's logical "constructions" about what is known or hypothesized about a phenomenon. This implies, Bruscia holds forth, that theory is both descriptive and interpretive, or both empirical and speculative. The "truth" of a theory may in this perspective mainly lie in its heuristic value. That is to say, whether or not the propositions efficiently and economically account for phenomena, and provide guidance in decision-making.

Bruscia in this way emphasizes that there can be no strict, clear-cut division between what is theoretical and what is empirical. Still it is necessary to make clear, I believe, that the method of reflective synthesis as represented by Kenny, is a method of *theory building*, and not in itself an empirical research method. And the main reason clearly why it cannot be considered thus is that it does not involve any *systematic*

procedures of gathering empirical data, taking into consideration matters of validity and reliability throughout those procedures. Reflective synthesis, though involving both the empirical and speculative, the descriptive and the interpretive, as any theory inevitably actually does, according to Bruscia, is still mainly a method of *theory building*, as I will consider it here, in which personal experience is incorporated together with theoretical perspectives and research results to form a whole, integrated view.

It is important to underline then that the method of reflective synthesis cannot be considered as some form of empirical research. Incorporating personal experiences from practice as a music therapist in this context serves the purpose of illustrating a theoretical argument, by relating it to such experience. The possible relevance of incorporating these kinds of experiences – for illustrative purposes – does not in and of itself imply any particular status *methodologically* of empirical documentation.

Not a Case Study

It must be emphasized furthermore that reflective synthesis as a methodological approach is not the same as a case study. A case study is an empirical research endeavor. Reflective synthesis is a constructive theoretical endeavor. As stressed here it is not empirical in any systematic, procedural way, and does not meet requirements of validity and reliability to “count” as empirical “evidence”. *If* this study were intended to count as empirical documentation, a series of qualifications would clearly have to be made. But it isn't. I am not researching into what “really happened” in some or other particular instance, I am inquiring into frames of understanding. Which is to say, philosophy. And reflective synthesis, which is a methodological approach which incorporates one's one experiences from practice together with theoretical reflection and research within the field, is in the present study only an *aspect* of the overall methodological approach.

Aigen writes about the use of clinical examples for *illustrating theory*, in a book on writing and presenting in music therapy, but which relates directly to the function of such examples within theoretical inquiry:

Successful theory communications make effective but judicious use of clinical examples. Whereas the primary purpose of clinical examples in case study presentations is to present the living reality of music therapy work, in theory communications the purpose is to illustrate the theory, make it more

comprehensible, and demonstrate the utility of the theory by grounding it in practice. The clinical examples can be drawn from many individuals if so desired, and in fact, this is a strength as it can demonstrate the breath of the application of the theory (p.13).

It is for illustrative purposes that I will draw, to some extent, in parts of the study, on my own experiences as a practicing music therapist. A further qualification has to be made with regards to the aspect of reflective synthesis, and that is that I will not delimit examples taken from practice to my own experience as a working music therapist, but I will also incorporate other accounts than my own, from the literature.

Not Ethnographical or Historical Research

To make some further delimitations: This is not an ethnographic research study, viewing some particular music therapy practice through participant observation, describing and analyzing, to find more out about it, on an empirical basis, as a social/cultural practice, though the cultural dimension of music therapy is both recognized and regarded as inevitable (Stige 2002a). Nor is it a historical study, though it is not a-historical. The dimension of history is also always present within inquiry into any field or discipline. It is not possible to make a strict division between the systematic and the historical. Going back to the origins of a point of view is often clarifying. It may put into relief issues that are being discussed in more recent discourses. It is important to take heed to this historical dimension, also within more systematically oriented discussions and discourses, not least to avoid going round in circles, not learning from lessons of history.

When describing different approaches and models of music therapy in the context of the present study, this is done for purpose of conceptual clarification and analysis. They are not to be taken as statements documenting empirical states of affairs. This is not what the domain of the present inquiry is, which is about the frame through which the field is seen, rather than what is found within this field empirically, in either an ethnographic or historical sense. Though all music therapy necessarily is situated within a cultural and historical context. The point is that the focus is not here on empirical questions. It is rather about how the chosen frame determines – to some extent – what the picture looks like, what is highlighted and included. And even when taking a chronology at least somewhat into consideration, as in the introductory chapter, in

which the development of the discussion was reviewed up to the present point, this of course is still not historical research, because there is no systematic gathering and analysis of primary and secondary sources, to secure worthwhile results as a historical study considered (Solomon 1995).

2.6 Theory and Practice

Bruscia (in press) holds forth that *theory* and *practice* may be considered two different *types* of knowledge, and two different *ways* of knowing, theory being more abstract, providing broad principles, that have to be applied and modified by the practitioner according to the specific situation, which is a concrete reality. Theory is the thinking part whereas practice is the doing part of music therapy. The point to be made here is the need to take into consideration the *interconnections* between these two types and ways of knowing. To the extent that theory becomes self-sufficient in relation to practice it will become irrelevant. Theory could be regarded as dialogical relation to practice, which implies that there is never a complete overlap between the two. The relation is never completely congruent, only more or less so. Sometimes theory may need to catch up with practice. Within the field of music therapy it may appear that practice in many instances far exceeds the theory behind it, which is often rudimentary and not particularly developed. There is also a possibility of theory showing the way, inspiring and pointing to new possibilities. Sometimes the relation between theory and practice within the field may be a mixture of both these at the same time.

2.6.1 Closeness and Distance to Practice

The relation between the researcher and the field of practice has stirred some debate. Being distant or close to practice is also an issue to consider. There is probably not just one right solution here. Being close to practice is obviously good for drawing on experience, making relevant points and suggestions. At the same time being too close to practice may not be ideal for a reflection on this practice. You may become so engrossed, so invested that you cannot have an “objective”, or balanced view. You may become blind to aspects of your work, both good and bad, because you are so near to it.

An overall picture is probably better from some distance. (Like the painter taking a step back to view the whole picture, before proceeding to paint.)

And this is a necessary function too. Or else the work would soon become engrossed *practicism*, in which a wider perspective necessary for further development would be lost. From a practicist point of view theoretical speculation may be regarded as a nuisance, questioning what one would like to consider obvious, in an implicit way. The danger of theoretical speculation is of course coming to far off, to the point even of losing sight of practice altogether. – A real danger admittedly. But this is precisely the issue here, finding the right distance to enable a necessary overview. There has to be a relation, but also some distance. Another aspect to consider is that it is necessary to look beyond just one's own practice in the development of theory. Theory *is* abstraction and generalization, and has to be applicable beyond the confines of any singular individual practice.

2.6.2 The Location Chosen From Which to View

It has to be recognized that no matter how directly related to practice a theory might be there will always be other alternatives, other angles and ways of seeing that could be applied. Nevertheless one perspective or other has to be chosen, which is something that just has to be accepted, because there is no context-free location from which to look. As Ruud puts it:

Truth is local and the best we can do is make good interpretations and write good descriptions of what happened there and then (Ruud 1998c, p. 116).

We cannot extract ourselves out from our present situation, from which our view appears for us. And what we see depends on the language that we use to describe it with, Ruud contends, our interpretations and descriptions necessarily always being communicated through language:

This means our descriptions of reality are forced into our choice of metaphors and narrative structure, However we see music, whether as “communication,” “interaction,” “reinforcement,” “expression,” or something else, we choose our metaphors from other fields of language, other theoretical models (p. 116).

There are no neutral or objective terms to describe reality by. The question then, rather than to assume such neutrality, is to make explicit what terms we use, in an awareness

of their inevitable “coloring” of what we see. Ruud makes the further point that we should be aware that our ways of describing and interpreting as a form of discourse creates reality as we see it. This is the basic constructive notion that we create our own reality by the discourses we use to describe it.

Ruud stresses the reflexivity involved in scientific activity, and that this is an aspect that may create a conflict within the music therapist as a researcher and as a clinician. This implies that credibility will be related to the degree of reflexivity involved in any scientific endeavor incorporating one’s own clinical practice:

As researchers, we must always deal with the underlying values of our activity, our ways of conceptualizing and narrating our perceptions. This, in the end, reveals the contingency of our ways of telling the story of our work, the arbitrary nature of our choice of communicative form (p.116).¹³

2.6.3 Method and Content

There is also the question of method itself. Ruud cites Aigen stating:

Method is neither a guarantor nor an arbiter of truth. Because so much of qualitative research is dependent upon the skills, personal qualities, and insight of the researcher, it is possible that a given method could be meticulously followed and still not produce valuable or trustworthy findings.

Though Aigen is here addressing specifically qualitative research, I think this is true of any inquiry, qualitative or quantitative, historical ethnographic, theoretical, and certainly any philosophical inquiry too. Something more is needed than following meticulously some methodological procedure. What comes out of any inquiry is naturally dependent just as much on *how* it is done as *what* particular methodological approach is used. This implies that there is a *performative* side to inquiry too, which is to say, how well it is done.

This is an aspect that I believe bears some relevance to the question of the relation between theory and practice. A clinician may do his or her work well. Which is

¹³ Here it might seem that the argument turns back on itself though. The question could be asked on what basis these claims about the contingency and arbitrary nature of our way of telling, and our communicative forms are made. These statements themselves actually appear as rather absolute and categorical. I am not at all disputing Ruud’s general points about reflexivity, or implying that they are not valid, I am just saying there ultimately seems to be a paradox involved here. What about “discourse”, what about “narrative”, are not these metaphors too? (And is not “metaphor” in this context a metaphor too?) Is not this particular use of language itself also “enforced upon our descriptions of reality”? Are the claims Ruud holds forth “in the end” then *also* arbitrary? Is relativism relative too? If not, is it absolute? Relativism, taken to its extreme, does seem to contain its own inherent self-contradictions and problems.

something different from theoretical work. But it would be a hasty conclusion to say that theory is not needed then, or that it is superfluous, that one can do very well without. This would become one-sided because, as Bruscia points out, theory and practice are different kinds and different ways of knowing. And when it comes down to it, it is the same with theory as with practice. If it is done well, it may have something to say, something to contribute with. People may find something of significance in it. And it is not given of course, that a good clinician automatically will be a good researcher or theorist, and vice versa. The key for both then, whether it is the clinician as clinician, or theorist as theorist, which ever way they may be combined, is whether what is done, is done well.

2.6.4 Performing Philosophy

Mary Reichling (1996) in her article “On the Question of Method in Philosophical Research” points out that philosophical method as such cannot be articulated in any definitive way. It should permit flexibility and freedom in its application. It should invoke query, allow invention and extension of its components. Critical ingredients should include imagination and wonder, impelling to explore possibilities. Analytic skills are required, but so are creativity and a certain amount of ingenuity. Reichling thus warns against a sharp dichotomy between method and content, because an overemphasis on method could result in losing the focus on the substantive content of the inquiry. She further maintains that in a philosophical study all the objectives cannot be articulated in advance of the work; they unfold as the work progresses, like the writing of a musical composition.

In a philosophical inquiry then, there is not a clear-cut dichotomy between problem and method, enabling a standard linear procedure going from the one and leading to the other. Lawrence Ferrara (1984) points out that philosophy *is* inquiry, and that method and content are inextricable linked to one another. The method evolves out of the content of the inquiry, as well as the other way around. The question that has been addressed, and the way it is answered, does not in effect become completely clear before the study is actually completed then, as performed.

2.7 Background and Premises

In an article on “Philosophical Issues in Psychotherapy” Messer and Woolfolk (1998) point out that one of the most important lessons that philosophy has taught us is that every intellectual endeavor has a starting point that is prior to empirical investigation, but which constitutes such investigation, makes it possible by framing it. They refer to the tradition from Kant, with his notion of the “a priori”, via Hegel’s thesis that any epistemology is predicated by an assumed ontology, to Heidegger’s concept of pre-understanding. What this implies is that when we look at the world, we look through the “lenses”, the conceptual schemes that influence what we see. Messer and Woolfolk hold forth that philosophical analysis is a tool for making the properties of these lenses explicit, and that it may offer understanding of the conceptual schemes that underline our thinking.

One aspect of the a priori, and that is related to the issue of reflexivity, is what a contemporary philosopher such as Searle (1995) refers to as the “Background”. (Similar notions have been developed by philosophers and sociologists such as Wittgenstein (1953/1967), Heidegger, (1996), and Bourdieu (1990), Messer and Woolfolk point out) The “Background” comprises the collection of tacit assumptions about physical and social reality that is the foundation of all of our activities in the world. It contains the taken-for-granted knowledge and norms that are implicit in any activity. The Background is pervasive, Messer and Woolfolk underline, and so complex that it can never be made entirely explicit.

This actualizes *reflexivity*, but also the limits to reflexivity. Reflexivity is about considering the significance of ones’ own background for a study to be undertaken, recognizing and becoming aware of the many contextual influences and frames that underpin the development of a theory (Bruscia, in press). But you cannot bring out everything there is to bring out about the “Background”. Not even you own, and how it relates to your own inquiry. Attempting this you will get an inevitable infinite regress of accounting reflexively for reflexivity, and then accounting for this again, and so forth. Where you start and where you end could be rather “arbitrary” anyway then, in Ruud’s terms.

2.7.1 Personal Background

Still there clearly is a point of making your own background clear, at least what could be considered relevant, and for my own part, within the context of the present study I would mention my background in playing in jazz-groups, and maybe particularly within the free jazz genre, prior to educating myself as a music therapist. Some of the experiences here with regards both to the playing and communication within the group, and in some particular instances with the audience, were clearly formative. I will not say simply that this was the background for my decision to start working with music therapy, though these experiences were highly significant for me. Or maybe some of the same basic interests were involved *both* in the free-jazz playing, *and* in deciding to train as a music therapist. I could also mention that a part of my personal background is having studied philosophy at both undergraduate and graduate levels, with an emphasis on aesthetics, and on oriental philosophy.

My training as a music therapist, (as referred to in note 11, in the first chapter), has been within a Nordoff-Robbins inspired, Creative Music Therapy approach. *Not* being a registered Nordoff-Robbins therapist, and not being directly associated with a Nordoff-Robbins center, means that my position is somewhat more independent, for better or worse. That is to say, I am partly, but not a complete “insider” to this particular approach to music therapy. And while this to a certain extent means that I am not altogether that “knowledgeable” about the approach as I would have been if I were a trained and registered Nordoff-Robbins therapist, it also means that I may, from my own training and background, have a different perspective on some of the issues within this approach. This might well facilitate “interrogation of commonplaces”, as Jorgensen puts it. And in this study I will engage somewhat in such “interrogation”. Still, I would consider my own practice as coming from a Creative Music Therapy approach, and any such interrogation would be for the purpose of *revision* rather than refutation, based on common concerns.

I am addressing the question as to the possibility of theoretically framing a music-based rather than talking-based music therapy. It should also be pointed out that I am not trained within a psychodynamic approach to improvisational music therapy that would insist on verbal processing as necessary for accomplishing therapeutic change. And when I am contrasting a music-based with a talking-based therapy, I am not, as

stressed here, aiming at refuting the possibility of a talking-based therapy at all. I am contrasting, to bring out differences in frame of understanding, to oppose any claim to exclusivity of a talking-based approach, rather than challenge this approach in itself.¹⁴

2.7.2 Premises and Orientation

I now want to account for the theoretical premises and the basic orientation taken within this study, giving a broader view initially, and then focusing gradually in on specifics. In concordance with Ruud's plead to accept the discursive and narrative aspects of scientific activity, Messer and Woolfolk, besides background mention "narrative form" as another a priori framework for understanding, and they apply this principle to different orientations within psychotherapy. Amongst different typologies of narratives they choose the literary theorist Northrop Frye's description of four different "visions" or viewpoints; the romantic, the tragic, the ironic and the comic, and consider these in relation to the different main positions within psychotherapy; the psychoanalytic, the behavioral and the humanistic.

Messer and Woolfolk find that the romantic vision is fundamental to the humanistic approach to psychotherapy, with life viewed primarily as an adventuresome quest. But they also find strands of comic vision here, in the enhancement of a freer, more joyful way of living. Many aspects of psychoanalytic therapy fall within a tragic vision they find, with the demands of the drives seen as fundamentally at odds with the strains of society, and with socialization, though psychoanalysis also partakes somewhat of a romantic vision, in the heroic exploration of the unconscious. There is also a clear ironic trait in psychoanalysis in that the analysand may well come to see himself or herself as being *less* in some respects, than was initially thought, having been under the (neurotic) sway of unconscious ideas of omnipotence. The humanistic approach in contrast with this would tend to aim for clients seeing themselves and their possibilities in life as *more* than before therapy. Cognitive behavior therapy is practical rather than romantic, and not ironic in that it tends to take whatever comes up at face value so to

¹⁴ I could mention that I am presently engaged in level three training in the Bonny Method of Guided Imagery and Music, which is more related to the psychodynamic talking-based mode of therapy (My primary trainer is the Danish GIM therapist Torben Moe). This is a predominantly receptive approach, rather than an improvisational active one, which is the focus of the present study. But this training nevertheless has some bearing reflexively on the relation to a talking-based music therapy, and bares mentioning in this respect.

speak. To some extent it may be seen to represent a comical vision in the optimistic head-on attack of phobias and complaints that are dealt with, and sought to be overcome by true and tested means.

There is no clear-cut assigning of one approach to a single vision, but each approach may be seen in various ways to represent different aspects of these visions in different “narrative forms”. Messer and Woolfolk want to challenge the notion that psychotherapy, psychopathology and psycho diagnosis can be constituted by knowledge provided by “objective” findings of empirical psychology and biology. They point to the inevitability of “narrative forms” at the outset forming the point of view. And no such narrative form can in itself claim to hold the complete and exclusive picture of what the reality of psychotherapy contains. This means that some choices have to be made, some approach has to be taken.

Creative Music Therapy clearly has adhered to a predominantly humanistic orientation, and this will be taken as a premise for the present study. Behavioral and psychodynamic perspectives and aspects to Creative Music Therapy might well be found, and some such connections have to some extent been made. But I will take a humanistic orientation as a point of departure for the study to follow here. This means that I am not aiming to develop, on a metatheoretical scale, different possible orientations that Creative Music Therapy might be seen from. The question that is posed here is not primarily about making a comparative metatheoretical inquiry into how different orientations might be related to Creative Music Therapy, for critical comparisons between them. I am not questioning the basic humanistic stance that has been held, but actually accepting it, and adhering to it.

To state this unequivocally: My stance ontologically is that human action may not be reduced ultimately to causal explanation, whether this is related to physical forces, biological drives, or internal psychic mechanisms. Human action, considered as such, has to be seen in the light of intentionality. That the reality of physics, for instance, is the only one there is, and that all valid knowledge has to emanate from the one kind of method that is related to this single reality is a stance that I would not accept as universally valid – what in effect amounts to the so-called *methodological monism* of positivism (von Wright 1971). This means that my position is not a “traditional research stance”, as Bruscia (in press) calls it, but rather a constructive one, which implies the

possibility of different perspectives on reality, and not just a single one, held to be true in contradistinction to all others.

2.7.3 Axioms and Values

I would want to stress nevertheless, that I do not consider the position taken here as “arbitrary”, even though it is both admitted and accepted that there may be different stances. This is because it is an axiological matter, a question of values. Values cannot be considered as completely arbitrary. There is a difference here. It is an inherent characteristic of values that they are not regarded as completely arbitrary, or else they simply were not values. And even though they do have a social/cultural context they are not *determined* by context. Which is why a complete relativism will miss the mark here. Values are chosen, they are held. For good reasons, though these of course may differ. This is an axiological rather than any “arbitrary” matter then.

The concepts, (or “metaphors” as Ruud calls them), that we use are not neutral, but reflect our values. And values cannot be “proven”. But what you can do is account for your values, your axiological stances, and how the main concepts you use are related to this. And the main concept that is to be applied in the present study is *dialogue*. I consider this concept to be in close accordance with a basic humanistic outlook. I regard it as a non-mechanistic concept, which may be used in the development of a non-reductionistic point of view. This should be considered a basis for my choice of this concept in the present study, and which I want to make entirely clear. This is why I use it.

2.8 Explicating a Dialogical Perspective

Within a humanistic orientation there may be various approaches and emphases. Within this overall approach I am aiming for explicating a perspective based on the concept of dialogue, which I find to be particularly appropriate to illuminate music therapy processes. And not only will my choice of this concept color the descriptions and interpretations of music therapy practice (Bruscia 2001) – within the present study such description and interpretation will actually be made with the specific intention of bringing out just what a dialogical perspective entails.

Bruscia (in press) lists *explication* as a main method of theory building. He defines this method in the following way:

A theory is developed by identifying, differentiating, defining, classifying, organizing, and naming concepts, practices, and terms found in music therapy. The focus may be on what clinicians, researchers, and theorists do, how they conceptualize what they do, and/or what terminology they use to describe their work. Explication requires a clearly delimited focus on a particular aspect of music therapy, and what is already known or done in relation to it. As suggested by the name for this method, the theorist makes explicit what is implicit; or the theorist describes what is, or what is done based on his or her perceptions and perspectives (p. 9).

In this study I will be using explication as a methodological approach in relation to the concept of dialogue. Not only is this basic “metaphor” forming and coloring what is described and interpreted then. I want to explicate it, to find more out about how it may form ways of looking, and then draw implications from what comes out of this explication. I want to make explicit what a dialogical perspective on music therapy entails, which I believe has not been sufficiently brought out, although it may seem very much implicit in music therapy practice.

2.8.1 Applying the Term Dialogue

A central procedure within philosophical research, as Johnson points out (1991) is to focus on examining a single concept, and a step that follows from this is to relate to other concepts implied by the one that is under consideration. Furthermore it is relevant to see what other philosophers have had to say, and whether there are various schools of thought related to this concept. This is relevant for the present study in that it sets out to apply the concept of dialogue, and its implications within a humanistic outlook, related to music therapy practice. A main challenge though, Johnson writes, is to delimit the implications of such a single concept, so that these may not become too extended and far-reaching for consideration within the limits of one study.

As a simple descriptive term the word “dialogue” may not need much elaboration, but it may also be used on a broader basis. And the term has had manifold applications within several fields, from theology, to sociology, to psychology, to arts and the humanities (Friedman 1996b). As a foundational concept the term may serve to illuminate *dynamics of interrelation*. I will choose to go to the roots of this broader

application of the term, namely Martin Buber, and in particular his book *I and Thou*, from 1923, which clearly must be regarded as a primary source for modern/postmodern dialogical thinking. Buber was an originator in the breakthrough of dialogical thinking in the 20th century, as Horwitz (1978) documents. His formulation in *I and Thou* has come to stand as a central initial statement of this kind of view, also within his own authorship. It is the understanding of dialogue developed from this initial source that I will attempt to apply to the issues of music therapy theory related to here.

It has to be made clear that this is not intended as a critical study of *Buber's philosophy*. Nevertheless I will also relate to critical studies that have been made, as secondary sources, for the interpretation of the basic notion of dialogue that is to be applied in the present study, based on Buber's original text.

Not a Comparative Study

To make a further methodological qualification here, there are also other theorists of dialogue that could have been considered. For instance the Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin (1981) who over the last years has been much applied, not least within cultural studies, and also to some extent referred to within music therapy theory.¹⁵ Although Bakhtin, (who according to his own statement was heavily indebted to Buber, (Friedman 2002b)), clearly does have relevant dialogical conceptions, I will not base the discussion here primarily on this writer. I will keep to Buber's original statement as a point of departure, and view other perspectives, developments and variations in relation to this, and according to their relevance for the theme of the study.

Emmanuel Levinas is a French philosopher who (as previously mentioned) has developed a dialogical ethics based on the significance of relating to the Other. Levinas engaged in a discussion with Buber (Levinas 1967), though it seems not very much did come out of this discussion, which, according to some commentators (Bernasconi 1988; Gordon 1999), was based to quite some degree on misreadings and misunderstandings. No doubt interesting comparisons could nevertheless be made between Buber and Levinas, but this discussion would soon lead off the main track of the focus for present study, and I will confine myself, as stated previously, to Buber's original conception,

¹⁵ See Karette Stensæth (1999; 2002). Stige also refers to Bakhtin (Stige 2001b, 2002a). See also Weisethaunet (2000).

without getting too entangled in such disputes, as a matter of economy partly, but also because of the status of Buber's text as originitive for this kind of outlook. This delimitation is of course also related to the focus of the study, which is applicative, and not critical, in which case such a comparative consideration would be more relevant. But as I see it, the present study will not be the right place for attempting to disentangle differences between Buber and Levinas.¹⁶

2.8.2 Relating to Current Issues

One reason for *not* using Buber's text could be its status as a "classic" text. It has been much referred to. Actually there might be a tendency that the title itself has become a "household" notion, considered as well established, and not needing further elaboration when being referred to. Of course this could spur a looking for something "new" that was not so "worn". But I consider the original statement made by Buber still to be a rich source, and one that is well suited for the present purposes. And that there have been numerous (not least popular) references is of course in itself no guarantee of any depth of understanding of the original text. Besides from this, looking for something "new" might just as well be superficial. ("Older" authors might even also naturally have been considered!) The point here, as I see it, is relating this original statement to current discussions, and aiming at developing new and relevant perspectives related to present day concerns, which is also the main criterion that the study as such will have to be evaluated by.

2.9 Summary of the Methodological Approach

To sum up the main overall methodological approach here, I will be explicating the concept of dialogue, to apply it to an inquiry into how a music-based, rather than

¹⁶ There are naturally other authors that could also have been considered comparatively, such as Marcel, Heidegger or Sartre, or even Derrida, who has been influenced by Levinas. This could have been both plausible and possible, but I find that in this way widening the basis for the construct to be applied, and then relating it to the theme for this study would rather complicate the matter unduly, and tend to bring the real issue off focus, not saying that interesting results might not be gained by doing so! My point nevertheless is not showing how the result might differ more or less by using various outlooks. My aim for the study is not comparative in this particular sense.

talking-based music therapy may be theoretically framed. This implies an applicative study, which will aim at formulating a rationale for such a music therapy approach. Although the method will be philosophical in that it will address fundamental questions related to the discipline, it will also involve integration of theory, both accommodating and assimilating theory, on a philosophical basis, to develop such a frame. Clarification of terms, comparisons and systematization of theory will be involved in this endeavor. Theory will be related to practice by the use of clinical examples, incorporating so-called reflective synthesis. It is nevertheless underlined that the province of the study is the conceptual rather than the empirical. The main approach of the inquiry as a whole will be synoptic, building theory, on a dialogical basis, to show the possibility of framing a music-based music therapy, rather than a talking-based therapy. Personal background has been considered, as well as the premises and basic orientations, making clear the axiomatic stances. The performative aspect of any study, philosophizing included, has been highlighted, and recognized.

What this chapter has shown then, is that this study will involve a combination of procedures and contextualizations applied within philosophical inquiry as an overall methodological approach. The first task will be to present and develop an interpretation of the concept of dialogue as this is to be applied within this study, which will be the content matter of the next chapter.

3 The Concept of Dialogue

As indicated in the previous chapter the stance taken here is an existential humanistic orientation, and a dialogical outlook within this orientation. In the following I want to develop an interpretation of the concept of dialogue, based on Martin Buber's book *I and Thou*, as a conceptual construct that may be used in a philosophical inquiry into how the possibility of a therapy in music could be framed. First I will give a background for the development of Buber's philosophy, to contextualize the concept. Then I will present an interpretation, based on a reading of the text. This interpretation is further elaborated and commented on through references to the secondary literature, before I arrive at an understanding of a basic conceptual construct that will be applied in a philosophical inquiry into the theme and problem statement of the present study.

3.1 Origin and History of the Concept

Martin Buber's book *I and Thou*, from 1923, represents what Horwitz (1978) has called "a breakthrough of dialogical thinking in this century". According to the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel the term "Thou" in relation to "I" was itself actually first introduced by the German philosopher Feuerbach, in the following remark:

The individual man does not contain in himself the essence of man either in so far as he is a moral being or in so far as he is a thinking being. The essence of man is contained only in the community, in the unity of man and man – a unity which rests upon the reality of the difference between 'I' and 'Thou' (in "The program of 1845", quoted by Marcel 1967, p. 42).

Feuerbach did not elaborate or draw consequences of this "capital discovery", as Marcel calls it, though. Buber (1967a) acknowledges this remark by Feuerbach as contributing to his own conception. But what Buber at the time achieved, according to Horwitz, was

“focusing attention on the theme of *two types of relation, I-Thou and I-It*”, (p. 17, italics added). The contrasting of these two different types or modes of relation is what constitutes the germ of his dialogical philosophy.

As Horwitz also points out, the philosopher H. Cohen of the Austrian neo-Kantian Marnburg School, whom Buber knew and was acquainted with, also used these terms, in a work that was published shortly after the publication of *I and Thou*.¹⁷ And Theunissen (1984) points to the fact that several writers at this time were using similar terms, for similar purposes, including the Jewish theologian F. Rosenweig,¹⁸ the Christian theologian F. Ebner¹⁹, the French philosopher G. Marcel²⁰ and the German philosopher E. Griesebach²¹. What is rather striking Theunissen holds forth, is that there does not seem to be any direct connection between these writers, that they have developed their to a certain degree parallel thoughts independently of each other. This has also been recognized by these writers themselves, and considered to be significant, he reports.

Thus there is a movement, which at the time came to be termed “new thought”, which was based on a “dialogical principle”. This movement was opposed on the one side to idealism, as the philosophy of the universal subject, or “consciousness in general”. Instead of an abstract or ideal *I*, the concern was with the factual, concrete *I* of everyday life. On the other side this “new thought” was opposed to the dominating subject-object logic that had been prevailing in modern philosophy from the start, from Descartes and onwards. The dialogical principle was at the time considered to be a true turnaround, a Copernican turn in philosophy.

Buber must be considered a main representative of this “new thought”. His book *I and Thou* has become a classic and highly influential statement. It is also a central if not *the* central work within Buber’s own authorship. Much of his own subsequent writings, as he himself recognizes, may be seen as commentary and elaborations on this work (Buber 1967a).

¹⁷ Religion der Vernunft aus der Quellen des Judentums.

¹⁸ Der Stern der Erlösung.

¹⁹ Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten and Wort und Liebe.

²⁰ Journal metaphysique.

²¹ Gegenwart. Eine kritische Ethik

3.1.1 Two Phases

Regarding later developments of a dialogical perspective, Bollnow (1976) distinguishes between two main phases. Bollnow recognizes Buber as the main source of this kind of outlook, with the publication of the book *I and Thou* in 1923. He refers particularly to the concept of “encounter” as the meeting between *I* and *Thou*. This concept, at the time of publication, could be seen specifically in contrast to a then prevailing subjectivistic philosophy, which had as a basic notion that development takes place from internal potentials in each singular individual, Bollnow holds forth. In contrast to this Buber’s concept of encounter directed attention towards the significance of *relation* for human development, that development may not be seen as something that just springs out from within the individual, but comes as a result of interaction with an Other.

The second phase, which developed within the existential movement in philosophy after the Second World War, considers encounter to be much more of an upsetting, agonizing experience, leading oftentimes to a questioning of one’s whole existence, according to Bollnow. This was in concord with the mood of the times, after the war, in which so many things one had previously believed in had collapsed, and so much of what previously had been taken for granted, had dissolved. An encounter as a direct confrontation with the hard and many times merciless conditions of life was something that could be related to with some measure of credibility. This interpretation of the concept of encounter met a current need for an expression that seemed true and trustworthy, and it gained a quite widespread reception at the time, Bollnow writes.

Bollnow calls this interpretation of the concept the *narrow* concept of encounter. It is something that one is abruptly shaken by, oftentimes in an agonizing and dramatic way. Bollnow characterizes Buber’s concept of encounter as open and positive, a *wider* concept of encounter, which is more universal in character, and not directed towards particularly shocking, upsetting or disturbing events. It is about human relations in general, and their significance, and besides this in the widest sense the relation to the world one lives in. Bollnow himself adheres to the later conception of the concept of encounter, which he applies in relation to questions of education, but he stresses that both these variants of interpretation are in current use, and that they to a certain extent may overlap. But he holds forth that in all cases it is necessary to make clear what main content one considers the concept to have, if one wants to use it. And to follow directly

up on this; it is the original conception of encounter, as found in Buber's basic statement that I will relate to here, because I find this the most relevant to apply within the present setting, and because I prefer to take the original statement as a point of departure.

I now want to present a sketch of some main tenets of Buber's dialogical philosophy, as initially formulated in his book *I and Thou*. For the English translations I will be using Walter Kaufmann's translation from 1970, arguably the most accurate, occasionally consulting Ronald Gregor Smith's translation from 1958, arguably the most poetic. Both translations are variously referred to in the secondary literature on Buber. For references to the original text, I will be using the second edition, from 1958, which has an important a postscript added (Buber 1958b), as I will be returning to later (and which both translations are based on).

3.2 Twofold Attitude

Buber presents a main thesis already in the first sentence of his book: "The world is twofold for man according to his twofold attitude" (1970, p. 53). This "twofold attitude", Buber proposes, is reflected in two fundamentally different ways of relating to the world, denoted by the two so-called "basic words" of *I-Thou* and *I-It*. The world of *It* is a world of experience and use. It is the world of our daily affairs, in which we deal with diverse items and tools for specific practical purposes. We use devices that we have at hand as means towards various determined ends. We set up goals that we try to accomplish through proven and regular procedures. The world of *It* is comprised of manifold parts that are ordered and separated into categories. It is essentially a world of things. "Speaking", as Buber calls it, the basic word *I-It* implies seeing the world as objects with certain defined qualities and characteristics. Speaking the word *I-Thou* on the other hand is not confronting some *thing* as an object. What the basic word of *I-Thou* establishes is *the world of relation*.

And Buber distinguishes between *three spheres* within the world of relation: Life with nature, life with human beings, and life with what he calls "geistigen Wesenheiten" (1958b, p. 11). Both Kaufmann and Smith translate this as "spiritual beings", but this may cause some confusion. What Buber means with "geistigen Wesenheiten" is surely

not any kind of “beings”, as the English expression “spiritual beings” might indicate or connote. Wood (1999) uses the term “forms of the spirit” as a translation, which may seem to convey the meaning more directly and precisely, and this is what I will prefer to use here. A prime example that Buber uses, of such “forms of the spirit”, is the work of art, though the sphere as a whole encompasses all the various and manifold manifestations, or “forms”, of human culture. This is what is related to within this sphere.

It is important to take note here that Buber, in using the basic word I-Thou, is not just talking about interpersonal relations then, but actually about relating to the world as a whole. As Theunissen (1984) points out, anything, within whatever sphere can be related to either in the manner of I-Thou or I-It. This widened metaphorical usage is crucial I believe, in considering applications of his dialogical perspective.

3.2.1 Second Versus Third Person

Buber furthermore states in the opening paragraph of the book that the “It” of the I-It, can be replaced with either “He” or “She”, without this implying any change in the status of this basic word. The distinction between “speaking” the two basic words seems to be made on the basis of differences between second person and third person relations then. Accordingly one might as well have said “I-He” or “I-She” as “I –It”, including both the masculine, feminine and neuter forms. All these must be considered equally valid expressions for this basic word. And “I-Thou” might just as well, from a grammatical point of view, been written I-*You*, though most translations of the German expression “Ich-Du” use “I-Thou”, which is maybe more akin to the style of Buber’s book. One exception is actually the translator Kaufmann, who in the title of the book has kept *I and Thou*, but uses the form “I-You” in the translation of the text (!)

What I want to emphasize here is that the two different attitudinal modes may be seen to represent second person I-You, and third person I-He/She/It relations respectively. Wood (1999) points out that the first implies talking *to* someone, whereas the second implies talking *about* someone or something. In what follows I will elaborate somewhat more on this basic distinction between I-You and I-It, using the difference between second and third person relations as a guiding line for the interpretation. Keeping a focus on this may serve to illuminate the distinction, I believe, and contribute

to clarifying some main characteristics of these two fundamental different ways of relating to the world, according to Buber.

3.2.2 Immediacy

What might be said to characterize a second person relation between I and You, is first of all that it is immediate:

The relation to the You is unmediated (unmittelbar).²² Nothing conceptual (“keine Begrifflichkeit”) intervenes between I and You, no prior knowledge and no imagination; and memory itself is changed as it plunges from particularity into wholeness. Every means is an obstacle. Only when every means has collapsed does the meeting come about (Buber 1970, p. 11-12).²³

The relation between I and You has nothing placed in between to qualify it, it is a direct, face-to-face approach, one to another. There is no set distance, and no inserted delay; it is right here, and now. And in this immediacy the You does not appear as some means to an external end. The relation is rather its own fulfillment, not directed towards bringing about something different from itself. Relation as such is what characterizes the speaking of the I-Thou basic word; it is what the taking of this attitude entails. Buber actually reserves the word “relation” only for such direct encounters one to another.

This is contrasted to the world of I-It, which is a world of experience and use. Buber uses the word “experience” in a special sense here, as the “subjective” apprehension of an externalized object, which is viewed in a distanced manner. “Experience” in this sense is the “subjective” side of the objectification of the world. The experience is “inside”, while the objectified world is “outside”. The I and It are not directly and intimately related, but have become parted, distanced from one another. No longer directly related to, the It can be put into perspective, can be assigned qualities and characteristics to, an entity for various uses and purposes.

²² The most literal translation of “unmittelbar” could arguably be “immediate” here. Smith translates with “direct”.

²³ In the following I will put the original German citations from *Ich und Du* (second edition 1958) in notes: “Die Beziehung zum Du ist unmittelbar. Zwischen Ich und Du steht keine Begrifflichkeit, kein Vorwissen und keine Phantasie; und das Gedächtnis selber verwandelt sich, da es aus der Einzelung in die Ganzheit stürzt. Alles Mittel ist Hindernis. Nur wo alles Mittel zerfallen ist, geschieht die Begegnung“ (Buber 1958b, p. 16).

3.2.3 Presence and Object

What is constituted by direct relation, Buber holds forth, is *presence*:

The present – not that which is like a point and merely designates whatever our thoughts may posit as the end of “elapsed” time, the fiction of the fixed lapse, but the actual and fulfilled present – exists only insofar as presentness, encounter, and relation exist. Only as the You becomes present does presence come into being (p. 63).²⁴

This is contrasted with what comes out of the saying of the basic word I-It, namely the *object*:

The I of the basic word I-It ... has only a past and no present. In other words: insofar as a human being makes do with the things that he experiences as uses, he lives in the past, and his moment has no presence. He has nothing but objects; But objects consist in having been (p. 63-64).²⁵

The object, as object considered, is no longer present as an actuality before us. It has become fixed in itself, in what it has become. It is something that is already defined and comprehended. It has been placed within the scheme of things, and is this way no longer a living, immediate presence before us. The object has become established as what it is from past experience with it, and remains identified as what it has become.

The contrasting of presence with distance is a line that may be drawn on both a spatial and on a chronological correlate then. The object is distanced and thus *placed* in both time and space. Presence as such is not located in time and space. The relation between I and You has no such set of coordinates, it is simply actualized *in the moment*.

3.2.4 The Whole Being Involved

Buber maintains that speaking the basic word I-You involves *the whole person*. Entering into direct relation is an act of the whole being. It requires a whole undivided attention, or else it would not be such a relation. The saying of I-It on the other hand *cannot* involve the whole being, because what is considered as an It is set apart, to be

²⁴ “Gegenwart, nicht die punkthafte, die nur den jeweilig im Gedanken gesetzten Schluß der „abgelaufenen“ Zeit, den Schein des festgehaltenen Ablaufs bezeichnet, sondern die wirkliche und erfüllte, gibt es nur insofern, als es Gegenwärtigkeit, Begegnung gibt. Nur dadurch, das das Du gegenwärtig wird, entsteht Gegenwart“ (p. 16).

²⁵ “Das Ich des Grundwortes Ich-Es ... hat nur Vergangenheit, keine Gegenwart. Mit anderm Wort: insofern der Mensch sich an den Dingen genügen lässt, die er erfährt und gebraucht, lebt er in der Vergangenheit, und sein Augenblick ist ohne Präsenz. Er hat nichts als Gegenstände; Gegenstände aber bestehen im Gewesensein“ (p. 16).

looked at, amongst manifold other objects of attention. The relation of I to You is approaching and directly confronting another being, which is not partly attended to, besides other things. The I-It, -He or -She attitude does not involve the whole being in this way, it concerns the speaker only partially, in dealing variously with a manifold of different objectifications.

And the relation of I to You is furthermore directed towards *the whole being of the other*. Nothing particular is singled out and set apart in directly relating to a You. Buber terms this the *exclusiveness* of the I-You relation:

When I confront a human being as my You, and speak the basic word I-You to him, then he is no thing among things, nor does he consist of things.

He is no longer He or She, limited by other Hes and Shes, a dot in the world grid of space and time, nor a condition that can be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities (p. 59)²⁶.

Buber makes an analogy with hearing a melody, which is not perceived as merely a collection of single notes, but must be grasped as a whole. And so it is with the saying of You, the person does not consist merely of a sum of qualities:

I can abstract from him the color of his hair or the color of his speech or the color of his graciousness; I have to do this again and again; but immediately he is no longer You (p. 59).²⁷

That the person may have certain features and characteristics is something that he or she shares in a general way with others, the color of hair, or quality of speech, or of character. But no matter how many such qualities that are attributed, these will not define the person in a complete way, there is no comprehensive list that would define a single person entirely. A person talked *about* may be seen to have a certain set of qualities and characteristics, but when talking *to* someone the focus is on the other in the immediacy of his being, not towards this or that generalized aspect, but the single and unique one of the other, related to as a whole being.

²⁶ "Stehe ich einem Menschen als meinem Du gegenüber, spreche das Grundwort Ich-Du zu ihm, ist er kein Ding unter Dingen und nicht aus Dingen bestehend. Nicht Er oder Sie ist er, von andern Er und Sie begrenzt, im Weltnetz aus Raum und Zeit eingetragener Punkt; und nicht eine Beschaffenheit, erfahrbar, beschreibbar, lockeres Bündel benannter Eigenschaften" (p. 13).

²⁷ "Ich kann die Farbe seiner Rede oder die Farbe seiner Güte aus ihm holen, ich muß es immer wieder; aber schon ist er nicht mehr Du" (p. 13).

3.2.5 Encounter

Relating then involves the whole being, and is directed towards the whole being of the other. But this in itself is actually not enough for an encounter to take place. Unless the other also turns towards me, makes a movement from the other side, there can be no direct relation between I-and You.

The You encounters me. But I enter into a direct relationship to it. Thus the relationship is election and electing, passive and active at once. An action of the whole being must approach passivity, for it does away with all partial actions and thus with any sense of action, which always depends on limited exertions (p. 62).²⁸

I have to actively initiate, to make my move, and enter into relation, and at the same time it has to happen to me, by the other coming towards me, meeting me in the encounter. Which is not something that I can fully control. I cannot control the will of the other person making such a move. I do not know beforehand what the other will say or do. I relate to the other, and *am met* by the other.

The moment of meeting cannot be calculated or predicted then. It requires on the one side a turning of the I towards a You, and at the same time one has to be met by the You to which one turns. This is not something that follows by any necessity, it happens. You do not know exactly where, and when, or how you will actually be meeting the You. The moment of meeting comes out of *grace*, Buber states, because it cannot be predetermined in any exact way. It is not the result of some fixed law, formula or rule. Meeting takes place not in a world of prediction, but in a world of *will*, and, at the same time, paradoxically, of *grace*. This grace is not something that one has to worry or care about though, precisely because one does not know for sure when and how it might happen. What one has to be concerned about is the turning, the will to turn towards, the entering into relationship, and whether this actually becomes a meeting is a question of grace, and this is how it inevitably has to be.

²⁸ “Das Du begegnet mir. Aber ich trete in die unmittelbare Beziehung zu ihm. So ist die Beziehung Erwähltwerden und Erwählen, Passion und Aktion in einem. Wie denn eine Aktion des ganzen Wesens, als die Aufhebung aller Teilhandlungen und somit aller – nur in deren Grenzhaftigkeit gegründeter – Handlungsempfindungen, der Passion ähnlich werden muß“ (p. 15).

3.2.6 Mutuality

In such encounter the relation between I and You is mutual, a mutuality of one recognizing, accepting and affirming the other as an interactive partner. It is reciprocal, a relation of influence both ways. It is not a one-way mastering, or ruling, by an active subject over a passive, subordinate object. Relation is itself mutuality, Buber states. The You affects me, as I affect the You. And this is not described along any lines of strict causality:

The unlimited sway of causality in the It-world, which is of fundamental importance for the scientific ordering of nature, is not felt to be oppressive by the man who is not confined to the It-world but free to step out of it again and again and into the world of relation. Here I and You confront each other freely in a reciprocity that is not involved in or tainted by any causality; here man finds guaranteed (*verbürgt*)²⁹ the freedom of his being and of being (p. 100).³⁰

Moving into relation is stepping into a realm of freedom. Relation is mutual; there is a reciprocal affecting of the one on the other, not just a mechanical unilateral cause or effect from one side to the other. In the world of relation there is a freedom to decide again and again, from one's own will, whereby one moves towards one's own destiny, Buber holds forth. And the only thing that really may impair one's freedom is one's own suppression of it, through lack of faith in its reality.

3.2.7 Responsibility

The nature of the action that establishes directness in relations between human beings, Buber holds forth, is love. He makes it very clear that he is not talking about love as some kind of "feeling" that one may have for another, a feeling that one is attached to, for an other: "Love does not cling to an I, as if the You were merely its "content" or object; it is between I and You" (p. 66). And here is where its potential effect is to be found:

²⁹ Smith's translation of "*verbürgt*" with "assured", rather than "guaranteed", would seem better here.

³⁰ "Das uneingeschränkte walten der Ursächlichkeit in der Eswelt, für das wissenschaftliche Ordnen der Natur von grundlegender Wichtigkeit, bedrückt den Menschen nicht, der auf die Eswelt nicht eingeschränkt ist, sondern ihr immer wieder in die Welt der Beziehung entschreiten darf. Hier stehen Ich und du einander frei gegenüber, in einer Wechselwirkung, die in keine Ursächlichkeit einbezogen und von keiner tingiert ist; hier verbürgt sich dem Menschen die Freiheit seines und des Wesens" (p. 48).

Love is a cosmic force. For those who stand in it and behold in it, men emerge from their entanglement in busy-ness; and the good and the evil, the clever and the foolish, the beautiful and the ugly, one after another become actual and a You for them; that is, liberated, emerging into a unique confrontation. Exclusiveness comes into being miraculously again and again – and *now one can act, help, heal, educate, raise, redeem*. Love is a responsibility of an I for a You (p. 66, italics added).³¹

The effect of mutuality between human beings in the deepest sense comes from love, as responsibility for the other. There is in this a turning towards the other, who may stand out from all definitions and delimitations, as a You simply, allowing for being helped and healed, in and through such meeting, such being met.

3.2.8 Actuality and Latency

Inevitably the moment of meeting ceases though, and what was a simple presence of a You, subsides and becomes an It, through memory, an object among objects that may be described and classified. Even love cannot persist indeterminately. It can *endure* though, Buber holds forth, through an interchange of *actuality and latency*. But each and every person, having once been met, nevertheless has to become an objectified He or She, as soon as the relation comes to a completion:

The human being who but now was unique and devoid of qualities, not at hand but only present, not experienceable, only touchable, has again become a He or She, an aggregate of qualities, a quantum with a shape (p. 69).³²

The memory of a particular moment with a person will necessarily be placed within coordinates of time and space. The person was met in a particular location at a particular time. His or her features can now be considered, whether of looks or of character, and may be talked about, thus becoming objectified. Buber does not support the notion then that we should, or even could seek continuously to live in a world of direct relation.

³¹ “Liebe ist ein welthaftes Wirken. Wer in ihr steht, in ihr schaut, dem lösen sich Menschen aus ihrer Verflochtenheit ins Getriebe; Gute und Böse, Kluge und Törichte, schöne und Häßliche, einer um den anderen wird ihm wirklich und zum Du, das ist, losgemacht, herausgetreten, einzig und gegenüber wesend; Ausschließlichkeit ersteht wunderbar Mal um Mal – und so kann er wirken, kann helfen, heilen, erziehen, erheben, erlösen. Liebe ist Verantwortung eines Ich für ein Du“ (p. 18).

³² “Der Mensch, der eben noch einzig und unbeschaffen, nicht vorhanden, nur gegenwärtig, nicht erfahrbar, nur berührbar war, ist nun wieder ein Er oder eine Sie, eine Summe von Eigenschaften, ein figurhaftes Quantum geworden“ (p. 20).

3.2.9 The Eternal You

The encounter between I and You has no external purpose; it is not a means for something other than itself. It is its own aim. The world of acquiring, possessing and using sustains life, but the reality of encounter *is* life, Buber states. He recognizes both the inevitableness and the necessity of the world of It. Indeed, without this man could not live, he ascertains. What he strongly opposes though is any claim to the exclusive reign of the It-world, of *settling* for living entirely and completely in a world of It, which maybe could be tempting in its apparent security and convenience. As he puts it in the following rhetorically posed question:

In this firm and wholesome chronicle the You-moments appear as queer lyric-dramatic episodes. Their spell may be seductive, but they pull us dangerously to extremes, loosening the well-tried structure, leaving behind more doubt than satisfaction, shaking up our security – altogether uncanny, altogether indispensable. Why not call to order that which confronts us and send it home into objectivity?” (p. 84-85).³³

Buber’s own reply is that even though it is possible to conceive of arranging one’s life this way, and even though one cannot live continuously in the pure present without being utterly consumed, there is an inherent value in the meeting between I-You, and without which life as such would be dehumanized.

For Buber this value is clearly connected with his conviction that through every meeting with a You we touch the Eternal You, which by nature never can be reduced to a He, She or It:

In every sphere, through everything that becomes present to us we gaze toward the train of the eternal You; in which we perceive a breath of it; in every You we address the eternal You, in every sphere according to its manner (p. 57).³⁴

This, for Buber, is ultimately what each single encounter is about.

³³ “Die Du-Momente erscheinen in dieser festen un zuträglichen Chronik als wunderliche lyrisch-dramatische Episoden, von einem verführenden Zauber wohl, aber gefährlich ins Äußerste reißend, den erprobten Zusammenhang lockernd, mehr frage als Zufriedenheit hinterlassend, die Sicherheit erschütternd, eben unheimlich, und eben unentbehrlich. Da man aus ihnen doch in „die Welt“ zurückkehren muß, warum nicht in ihr verbleiben?“ (p. 33).

³⁴ “In jeder Sphäre, durch jedes ins gegenwärtig Werdende blicken wir an den Saum des ewigen Du hin, aus jedem vernehmen wir ein Wehen von ihm, in jedem Du reden wir das ewige an, in jeder Sphäre nach ihrer Weise“ (. 12).

3.3 Further Commentary

I will now add some points of commentary, to put Buber's view into some perspective, relating also to some central secondary literature.

3.3.1 Theology and Philosophy

It is clear that for Buber the main motivation for writing *I and Thou* was deep concerns with religious themes. As Horwitz (1978) has shown, many of the central themes dealt with in *I and Thou* were already present in a series of lectures titled *Religion als Gegenwart*, which Buber held previous to writing this book.

On a biographical note Horowitz relates one incident in which Buber, prior to his writing of *I and Thou*, was asked by a Christian priest with whom he had been talking: "Do you believe in God?" – Without there and then giving any – in his own view – satisfactory answer. Buber subsequently pondered the question for quite some time, until it struck him that the answer had to be: "Not in the third person." It was not possible to believe in God as a "He". This Horwitz implies, might be significant for understanding the background for how Buber actually came to develop his views, and his coining of the twofold terms I-It (or He or She) and I-Thou.

In his "Autobiographical fragments" Buber informs that his dialogical thought evolved out from his occupation with Hasidism (Buber 1967a).³⁵ He writes that that over a seven-year period from 1912 to 1919 he had a series of experiences that became present to him as *one* experience of faith, and that it was this experience that he had attempted to elaborate philosophically in his subsequent writings. Buber recognizes that this might bring up the question regarding the status of his writings, as being theological rather than philosophical:

One might now protest somewhat as follows: if that connection of experiences is to be understood as an experience of faith, then its communication is certainly to be called preferably a theological one. But that is not so. For by theology is understood, certainly, a teaching about God, even if it is only a "negative" one which then perhaps appears instead of a teaching of the nature of God, a teaching

³⁵ The Hebrew word *Hasid*, means "pious". The term came to denote an adherent of a popular East European Jewish religious movement, which originated in the 18th century, emphasizing simple, sincere, intuitive devotion, and a sanctification of everyday life. Buber studied the Hasidic literature and prior to writing *I and Thou* published several collections of Hasidic stories and legends (Buber 1947, 1956, 1969).

of the word of God. But I am absolutely not capable or even disposed to teach this or that about God. I cannot include God himself at any point in my explanation, any more than I could detach from history the, to me indubitable, working of God in it, and make of it an object of my contemplation. As I know no theological world history, so *I know no theological anthropology in this sense; I know only a philosophical one* (Buber 1967b, p. 690, italics added).

What Buber claims to have worked out then is a *philosophical anthropology* rather than any theology as such. Theunissen (1984) points out that Buber's dialogical philosophy does spring out from an "experience of faith", but which is translated into philosophical concepts. Theunissen raises the question concerning the justification of venturing to bring a religiously founded thought form to the scrutiny of judgement of philosophical criticism. The justification, he holds forth, consists in just this: That Buber himself *translates his thought into philosophical language*. And that it can and must be related to as such. It has to be taken at face value so to speak, as philosophy, notwithstanding the nature of the of the experiential background for its writing.

Relating to the same issue Robert Wood (1999) sees a parallel between Buber and Marcel in that both were deeply religious thinkers. He relates that Marcel considered that his work was a generalization of his Christian faith and in this way available to all humans, regardless of their peculiar religious or non-religious commitment (Marcel et al. 1973). Wood holds that Buber in a similar fashion may be understood to have developed the Jewish Hassidic mysticism of the everyday life into a general philosophy available to all mankind.

It could be noted here that Buber was himself highly critical of institutionalized religion, and did not adhere to any orthodoxy, much to the dismay of representatives of the religious establishment. He is purported to have stated that even an atheist might be closer to his philosophy if he genuinely relates, than a conventionally religious person who has just taken on a religious dogma as a postulate, rather than truly living his faith.³⁶

The question of the relation to the Eternal Thou nevertheless remains central for Buber, and his writings have proven to be highly relevant for the field of theology, having had a significant impact on writers such as Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr. In the present context I want to stress that his thoughts though, as emphasized by Buber

³⁶ L. Schneider (1996) incidentally has edited a book titled: *Buber für Atheisten. Ausgewählte Texte*.

himself, and by commentators such as Theunissen and Wood, are *formulated as a general philosophy*. And his thought has made a marked impact on several fields within both the humanities and social studies. His thought has proven to have a wide applicability, also outside of the confines of theology. And it is in the line of such wider application that I will relate to his writings here.

As to the question of how to relate to his thought that through the meeting with each Thou we ultimately address the Eternal Thou, this is, when it comes to it, a matter of faith, which as such transcends argument. And this is simply where I will leave it here, for each one personally to consider.

3.3.2 The Problem of Intersubjectivity

Regarding the general philosophical significance of Buber's thought, Stewart (1985) points to what he calls Buber central insight, which he considers to be a "discovery" with important implications for a dialogical philosophy. He relates this to the problem of intersubjectivity. Buber believed, Stewart points out, that Husserl, Heidegger and other phenomenologists accurately had identified the fundamental relational character of intentional consciousness. What he was concerned with in the writing of *I and Thou* was that they somehow had failed to notice, or to make clear, that there are two qualities of relationship, corresponding to *two modes of intentionality*. And this was the discovery that was made by Buber, Stewart maintains, that there are two modes of intentionality, the one being the subject-object (I-It) relation and the other the "subject-subject" (I-Thou) relation. Stewart uses quotation marks for "subject-subject" here, because he recognizes that this expression may actually be somewhat misleading, because what characterizes the I-Thou relation is consciousness *prior to any distinction between subject and object*. He finds it convenient though, to use the term as a contrast to "subject-object".

Stewart holds forth that *I and Thou* may be read as the description and application of this discovery related specifically to the problem of intersubjectivity. He finds three crucial distinctions emphasized by Buber between these twofold attitudes. In the subject-object mode, the other is perceived merely as one among many, as a "client", "student" or "customer", or even as one of many "friends" or "loved ones". In the 'subject-subject' mode the other is recognized in his or her *primary uniqueness*. This

mode then is characterized by an awareness of uniqueness. Secondly, the other regarded as an object is seen as measurable, and finite, as an entity that can be descriptively accounted for in a complete way. As a *subject* the other, in contradistinction to this, is seen in a dynamic way, *beyond all efforts to circumscribe or exhaustively encompass*. Thirdly, Stewart points out, in the “subject-subject” mode the other is considered not as an organism that reacts in certain expected or predefined ways, but as a *self-initiating and participating agent*.

Stewart points out that Buber also uses the word “faith”, though not in a strictly religious sense, but in a more general meaning; the faith that the world is relatable to, and that it answers, responds. This is what the non-objectifying mode of relating to the world must be based upon: simply believing and trusting that it is possible to relate, *having that attitude*. And this is how Buber comes to terms with the problem of intersubjectivity, Stewart suggests. One might follow up on this thought by suggesting that if systematic Cartesian “doubt” leads towards a dualistic outlook, with a division of subject and object, such “faith” is what leads Buber to relation, to the possibility of encountering the world *also in a non-objectifying manner*.

3.3.3 Philosophical Anthropology and Psychotherapy

Buber clearly recognizes the general anthropological significance and implications of his main outlook. In a series of essays, following the publication of *I and Thou*, (Buber 1961; 1965b, originally published from 1930 and onwards), in which he elaborates further on his views, he also applies his outlook to the field of education, and to issues of psychotherapy.³⁷

Yalom is an existential psychotherapist that has made extensive references to Buber (Yalom 1980). Yalom applies Buber’s basic notions to bring out the significance of what he calls a “need-free love”:

If one is to relate truly to another with less than one’s whole being, if one holds something back by, for example, relating through greed or anticipation of some return, or if one remains in the objective attitude, a spectator, and wonders about the impression one’s actions will make on the other, then one has transferred an I-Thou encounter into an I-it one (p. 365).

³⁷ Some of these essays have recently been republished in book titled: *Martin Buber on Psychology and Psychotherapy* (Agassi 1999) together with other writings, letters and dialogues dealing with this subject matter.

Yalom on the basis of Buber's outlook underlines the significance of *listening*, and its significance for the therapeutic relationship:

If one is to relate truly to another, one must truly listen to the other: relinquish stereotypes and anticipations of the other, and allow oneself to be shaped by the other's response. (p. 365).

Yalom brings forth a qualification though, regarding Buber's philosophy as it relates to his own outlook. Yalom adheres to a basic notion of *existential isolation*, which is clearly not in accordance with Buber's assertion of a disposition for relationship to be "innate" and given, even from within the mother's womb, and right from the start, from the moment of birth. Yalom tries to reconcile his outlook with Buber's by referring to and commenting on a recurring dream that Buber reported, (which he called the "the dream of the double cry"). In this recurring dream there is a responding cry, that Buber held to be highly significant. Yalom gives a different interpretation than Buber himself, stressing the beginning of the dream in which he found himself alone "in a vast cave, or a mud building, or on the fringes of a gigantic forest whose like I cannot remember having seen", (cited in Yalom p. 367). Yalom considers that this might give expression to his own notion of existential isolation. I think this procedure of dream re-interpretation, giving it an altogether different meaning, might be questioned as to its validity and relevance though, (despite Yalom actually being a renown psychotherapist!)

I believe Yalom's point of view could be related to Bollnow's distinction between the two phases of the concept of encounter, the earlier, wider, and later, more narrow, which Bollnow associates with the post second world war movement of existentialism. Yalom could well be seen to belong to, and represent, the latter orientation and approach, as reflected in his general existential outlook. As mentioned previously, in contrast to Yalom's attempt towards reinterpreting Buber's conception to fit with his notion of existential isolation, I will adhere to the original wider conception of encounter considering the human being's basic mode of existence as relational.³⁸

Worth noting here is that recent developmental psychology researching into early interaction might seem to attest to Buber's original exposition, which makes his

³⁸ Van Deurzen (1997) also cites Buber as an influential philosopher for an existential approach and orientation to psychotherapy, although she notices that he does not fit completely within this philosophical tradition. I think his basic affirmative relational outlook may be precisely something of what marks him off from the somewhat later "existentialists".

statement more applicable and relevant today. To underline then, it is not in the narrow sense of the second “existential” phase of the concept of encounter that I will adhere to here then, but to the first original conception, which it seems to me has become even more relevant, as it relates to recent developments in developmental psychology, which also have proven to be of relevance for the theory of psychotherapy. This is itself a reason for using Buber’s dialogical outlook today. His original affirmative statement, rather than the later conceptions, has acquired renewed actuality as a philosophical grounding, I believe.

The “Vulgarization” of the Concept of Encounter

This capacity and drive towards relation from the very beginning is a part of Buber’s philosophical anthropology. In his exposition of Buber’s basic notions Yalom states that dialogue is simply the turning toward another with one’s whole being. When turning away from the other dialogue vanishes, and “monologue” rules, in which one is concerned only with oneself, forgetting about the particular being of the other. Yalom refers to Victor Frankl (1973), who has made a similar point related to what he considered, at the time, to be a “vulgarization” of the concept of encounter, in co-called “encounter groups” of the day:

Frankl argues ... that “encounter” as it often occurs in the basic encounter group is no encounter at all but instead a self-expression, an adoration of affect-discharge whose rationale is rooted in a psychological “monadology” which pictures the human being as a windowless cell, a creature who cannot transcend oneself, who cannot “turn toward the other.” Consequently there is, too often, an emphasis on getting one’s aggression out, on beating a pillow or a punching bag, on self-esteem, on using others to solve ancient problems, on self-actualization. Instead of turning toward the other, there is as Buber would say, sequential “monologues disguised as dialogue” (p. 366-67).

What Frankl, according to Yalom, in effect is saying is that the prevailing picture of the human in such encounter groups implies a vulgarization of the concept of encounter, in that it is not about turning towards the other, but rather a preoccupation with self. This may be a reminder of the crucial point that a dialogical outlook is not individualistic. And this has to do with the picturing of the human then, which is to say the underlying philosophical anthropology. Buber’s outlook implies taking seriously into consideration the turning towards the other, and the significance of this for human healing,

development and growth – not least of course, within a psychotherapeutic setting. And this is what is lacking in the implied philosophical anthropology that Frankl sees reflected in some of the so-called encounter groups of the day.

As Yalom points out, encounter may be a demanding task that is not always easy to achieve or realize. And it is not something that is possible to uphold at all times, which would result in “one’s burning oneself up in the flame of the ‘Thou’” (p. 367). But it may constitute an ideal to strive for, even if it is only achieved in rare moments. It is about keeping this in mind then, the value and significance of human relation.

3.3.4 On Freud’s Psychoanalysis

Buber was critical of Freud’s psychology. He had early on planned to write a book on the subject, but according to Agassi (1999) was dissuaded from executing this plan by Lou Andreas-Salome, who was a member of Freud’s circle. She held forth that the movement still needed time to mature.³⁹ Buber did later write an essay on guilt and guilt feelings (Buber 1965b), in which he critiqued the notion of “guilt feelings” in psychoanalysis, which had to distinguished from true guilt, which was not something that could be explained by psychological mechanisms alone, but which had to be confronted on an existential basis, and dealt with as a reality in itself, not merely as a neurotic reaction.

Buber made other comments on psychoanalysis both through other writings and in dialogues and letters (Agassi 1999). Friedman (2002a) holds forth that according to Buber’s dialogical outlook what the patient brings up in therapy cannot be considered as something coming just as it is, out from the “unconscious”. What is brought up in each instance is also dependent on the relationship with the therapist. It is made and produced *between* patient and therapist. Buber used the phrase “healing through meeting”,⁴⁰ indicating, as Friedman emphasizes, that healing takes place not primarily by the investigation of individual psychological complications but through relating to the whole person:

³⁹ Agassi (1999) also refers to an unpublished essay on Freud from Buber’s hand that apparently is lost.

⁴⁰ The title “Healing Through Meeting” was used in an introduction to a book by the analytical psychotherapist Hans Trüb, bearing the same name. This introduction is reprinted in Agassi (1999).

The patient must be summoned to bring his or her inner being to unity so that he or she may respond to the address of the being or beings that face one (Friedman 2002a. p.15).

This emphasis on relation is the consequence of a dialogically oriented philosophical anthropology, as a basis for both the aims and procedures of psychotherapy.⁴¹

3.3.5 The Debate with Jung

In contrast to the restraint Buber put on himself regarding a critique of Freud's theories, he rather surprisingly engaged in a quite heated debate with Jung. As one might expect Buber initially did find Jung's concerns with religious issues in psychology to be rather closer to his own outlook than Freud's. But in 1952, in the article "Religion and Modern Thinking" he initiated a debate with Jung on the grounds that Jung, as he saw it, overstepped the boundaries of psychology by reducing questions of theology to psychology.⁴² Buber would object to psychology trying to fill the space of theology, by considering religion "a living relation to psychic events", as Jung's psychology would purport. He would not accord some independent status of reality to any fixed content of the psyche. Friedman sums up this difference in the following way: "Both God and man are incorporated by Jung in 'the self', and this means that they are included not as Thou, but as It" (p. 221).

For Buber it is the reality of *relation* that holds primary focus. Friedman contrasts Buber and Jung by their different aims. For Jung the ultimate aim of psychotherapy is individuation. For Buber the integration of the personality is not an end in itself. One becomes whole in order to be able to *respond* to what addresses one. And any conception of the integrated self as "indistinguishable from a divine image", in Jung's words, or of self-realization as "the incarnation of God" amounts to nothing much but an untenable self-deification, in Buber's view.⁴³

⁴¹ In more recent developments of psychoanalysis, not least from Heinz Kohut on (Kohut 1971, 1977), and more recently Robert Stolorow (Stolorow and Atwood 1992) there has been a so-called "relational turn", which reflects much of the same kind of outlook on psychotherapy.

⁴² German original: "Religion und Modernes Denken", (Buber 1952b). Subsequently printed as chapter 5 in *The Eclipse of God* (Buber 1952a).

⁴³ For a more extensive study on the debate between Jung and Buber see Stephens (2001).

3.3.6 Postmodern Themes

Buber's thought has had a broad influence on various fields within the Human Sciences; on hermeneutics and aesthetics, on psychotherapy and education, and on sociology, politics and even economics (Friedman 1996b). Wood (1999) points out though, that after a wave of popularity in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, Buber's thought, along with the philosopher Gabriel Marcel's, with whom he has a close affinity, has received less attention, except for the book *I and Thou*, which still holds a classic status of its own. Wood argues for the enduring relevance of Buber and Marcel's thought though, not least because of their sustained interest in the question of *wholeness*. Both these writers Wood maintains, are oriented towards a lived sense of the whole itself, rather than exclusively dealing with abstract delineations and piecemeal treatments of diverse issues within an encompassing framework. For Buber this is what the I-Thou relationship entails, Wood proposes, moving beyond all the manifold bits and parts of I-It dealings, turning with the whole of oneself, towards the whole of the other.

Wood writes about Buber's distinction between presence and object. In the I-Thou relation the other is met, but not comprehended. Comprehension is the act of objectifying what *has been* met. Wood points out that this kind of conception of presence is clearly not what is referred to in the more recent-day critique of the "metaphysics of presence", as found in the deconstruction movement, represented foremost by Derrida (1973). This is because the kind of presence that Buber talks about is not one of objectified knowledge. The critique of the metaphysics of presence is directed towards a position in which totality is in some sense present at hand for the gaze for the speculative thinker, Wood writes. And Wood holds forth that Buber emphatically does *not* stake this claim on behalf of man, that he can occupy such a position.

Suspicion of Meta-narratives

Anderson and Cissna (1998) relate the dialogic theories of Buber and the psychologist Carl Rogers to postmodern themes. They have made a study on a published public dialogue between these two thinkers from 1957, also consulting their respective writings, and find that they at least foreshadow certain themes of the postmodern trend. One such theme is suspicion of meta-narratives, as introduced by Lyotard (1984) in *The*

Postmodern Condition. Lyotard used the term “meta-narrative” to designate a totalizing story, an overall discursive structure that also describes the ways other stories are subservient to it. Such meta-narratives have increasingly been cast into doubt in what Lyotard calls postmodern culture, because they cannot, it turns out, fulfill their claim to totality in the face of the diversity of views held in postmodern culture. This is a culture that consequently does not readily recognize overarching “modern” discursive schemas as valid. Anderson and Cissna cite Lyotard who actually mentions Buber as one thinker who in effect contributed to a de-legitimatization of the mystique of science, thus opening for a conception of science not as an exclusive and singular holder of truth, but one among many. Buber’s thought was widely interpreted as a questioning and a critique of the claim to all-encompassing validity of the established scientific-technological *It*, particularly as this related to essential human concerns. In this way it contributed to pave the way for the more recent deconstructive perspectives on various so-called meta-narratives, which opens for a multiplicity of perspectives and views.

Another theme that Cissna and Anderson find in Buber and Rogers, and which they suggest to some extent prefigures postmodern thought, is the de-centering of the “monological self”, seeing human identity as emergent from interaction rather than confined within the individual. Dialogue means unpredictability and surprise, even possible discordance, they point out. This opens for conversational ways of creating meaning and truth, which then are not singular or imposed, but dialectical rather, fluctuating, interpersonal and momentary. This may also be seen as what characterizes the inherent uncertainty of the postmodern condition. The consequence of this point of view is an emergent, multiform reality, which is socially constructed. Cissna and Anderson furthermore emphasize the respect both Buber and Rogers display for difference and otherness, another central theme within the postmodern trend.

Cultural Creativity

It should be made clear though, that even though some themes of Buber’s thinking may be seen to prefigure certain themes within postmodern thought, there are crucial differences between Buber and present-day postmodern theorists. Buber was certainly not a postmodernist, though aspects of his thought may to some extent be compatible with central trains of thought within the postmodern trend. In his article: “Martin Buber

in the Postmodern age” Eisenstadt (1997) points out that the central problem of deconstruction, as a main issue of postmodernism, concerning the question of whether there exists any objective value, has primarily been related to the presentation, analysis and interpretation of *texts* (which could be regarded as “forms of the spirit” in Buber’s terms). He regards Buber’s approach to be very close to that of deconstruction, because of his insistence that orthodox interpretations of a text must be repudiated in favor of opening the text, and allowing the text to speak to the reader. Buber was concerned about not being tied down by dogma, and Eisenstadt considers that he in effect advised what today would be called “deconstructing the text”. Eisenstadt points out that Buber nevertheless always sought to connect the text with a center of gravity, according to which it could be judged. Unless this also was taken into consideration, such “deconstruction” would be meaningless.

Eisenstadt points out that Buber in his social thought was wary of what he calls “rigidifying” tendencies in society, and that he regarded the process of de-charismatization of large social formations like nation, state, and ideological parties to be inevitable. He advocated a *cultural creativity* for necessary renewal in society, and believed that this well might take place in more informal, and dispersed cultural spaces (like a Kibbutz). But Eisenstadt points out that what is crucial here though, is that Buber nevertheless wants to remain open for a search for ultimate values, without which deconstruction would become nihilistic. So rather than seeking to achieve any kind of immutable solution in the form of a rigid social framework, Buber holds forth the necessity for constant cultural renewal in society, at the same time as this renewal must be based on a search, a striving towards value. In this lies his answer to the postmodern predicament of paradoxical alternation in society between rigid boundaries and continual fluidity, Eisenstadt maintains.

One might propose that it is in this movement between rigidities and essentialism on the one hand, and disintegration and nihilism on the other, that Buber’s *mode of thought*, might be seen to hold an acute present relevance, that has not necessarily become less over time.

3.4 Alternating Between Attitudinal Modes

Criticism has been raised against Buber though. An objection has been that he underestimates the significance of the It-mode, placing altogether too much emphasis on the relation to the Thou. In the following I will address this matter somewhat more closely, to clarify the position taken here with regards to this question. I will relate this to some crucial issues within philosophical hermeneutics, which will be of particular relevance in the discussions to that are to follow.

3.4.1 Method or Discipline

The study of the methodological principles of interpretation in the humanities has been termed hermeneutics. A main representative of hermeneutics in recent times is H. G. Gadamer, who has written the seminal work *Truth and Method* (1989).⁴⁴ In this work Gadamer is critical towards establishing specific procedures of method within the humanities, that are set up to ensure “truthful” results. He distances hermeneutics from the search for general laws, and also from a historical critical method that aims to “reconstruct” the author’s actual intent. Gadamer likens the “text”, the “work”, or, in the broadest sense, “tradition”, to a Thou, which the interpreter engages interactively with. Although he does not explicitly refer to Buber, his view seems to be in close accordance with Buber’s basic notions here.⁴⁵ A difference of terms though, is that Gadamer distinguishes between three different kinds of I-Thou relation, the first two refer respectively to the search for general laws, and to a strictly reconstructive historical method. Both of these are more in accordance with what would be referred to as belonging to an I-It mode in Buber’s terms. It is the third, interactive kind, which clearly is more synonymous with what Buber would call an I-Thou relation.

Gadamer develops the notion that the interpreter and work are placed within different horizons. The horizon of the work, from the time in which it was created, the questions and concerns it then was a response to, are not necessarily identical to the horizon, the questions and concerns of the present interpreter. Therefore understanding

⁴⁴ Published in the original German as *Wahrheit und Methode*. (Gadamer 1965).

⁴⁵ Gadamer of course was well aware of Buber’s writings, and acknowledged his contribution, viewing his treatment of the other as “the most poetic, if not the deepest analysis of that topic” (personal communication with Gadamer referenced by Stewart, 1985, p. 333).

the work may be seen as a process in which there is a fusion of horizons, of the work and the interpreter. Another way of saying this is that the interpreter always has a pre-understanding when entering into an interpretive relationship with a work. And as the work is approached more closely there may be a development of the perception and understanding of it, resulting in a new understanding. Subsequent interpretations will have this as an integral part of the new pre-understanding. Thus there is a circular or spiral process of increasing, or developing understanding, the so-called hermeneutic circle.

Gadamer emphasizes the dialogical nature of this process. Understanding is the result of a dialogical process of interpretation in which an interactive “conversation” between text and reader takes place. There is no unprejudiced reading of a text, and therefore there is no original or objective meaning to be extracted from it. And the reader does not remain unchanged in the process of reading. His outlook melts with the perspective of the text, making new insight and understanding possible.

Gadamer considers these principles of interpretation not to be a *method* in a strict sense. There is no procedure to guarantee understanding as a given outcome. Instead he stresses that a *discipline* of questioning and inquiring is what must take place in gaining understanding and knowledge within the humanities. In this way he underscores the division between the humanities (*Geisteswissenschaften*) and natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*), with the former based on “*verstehen*” - interpretive understanding, and the latter on “*erklären*”- based on causal explanation. Employing scientific explanatory methodologies may actually block for the truth that may be gained from engaging in the hermeneutic discipline of understanding, Gadamer holds forth.⁴⁶

3.4.2 Explanation and Understanding

This might at first sight all seem to fit very well with Buber’s distinction between the two ways of relating, to a Thou or to an It. Still the picture is maybe not that simple. Writing on Buber’s biblical hermeneutics, Kepnes (1996) shows that Buber in his

⁴⁶ It was Buber’s teacher Dilthey who developed the distinction between *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften*, claiming that these two fields of knowledge necessarily differed in their methodology. In the *Geisteswissenschaften* interpretative methods of understanding need to be applied, and these are not to be found within the causal and explanatory methods of natural science, which holds mathematical physics as an ideal for the acquiring of knowledge.

translation of the Bible, (in collaboration with Franz Rosenweig), also employed technical methods of interpretation, particularly in the use of so-called “Leitworte” which are consistent and direct translations of Hebrew word roots into German, producing new meanings and a somewhat different sounding language than the vernacular German, and which was considered to be closer to the Hebrew original. The translators also employed historical critical methodologies in their interpretation of the texts, as a basis for the translation. Though Buber, as one would expect, attempted to approach the work of translating the Bible in a basic attitude of I-Thou, he also employed techniques and methods of explanation to assist in the interpretation and translation of the text. Thus, if his biblical hermeneutics are to serve as some kind of model, Buber did not resort to a discipline that was based solely on one mode of understanding. In contrast to what Gadamer might suggest, stressing the non-methodical basis of understanding, he does not adhere exclusively to a strict dialogical hermeneutic approach, in Gadamer’s sense, but also employs methods and techniques of explanation, Kepnes points out.

Kepnes refers here to the French philosopher Ricoeur who has argued that explanation and understanding are not modes that can be strictly divided. The one develops and supports the other. He refers specifically to Ricoeur’s (1978) example of a conversation as a model of human communication:

When two people understand one another, statement builds on statement, and creative dialogue rich with intuitive understanding ensues. Yet if one interlocutor suddenly does not understand the other, then free conversation is stopped and the partner is asked for explanations, reasons, exact information, analysis. After this is done the free and creative dialogue can continue (cited in Kepnes 1996 p. 185).

In this example then, explanation assists understanding. And this naturally is even more so the case with the interpretation of texts, Ricoeur argues. Explanatory modes are necessary to decipher the cultural codes that the text assumes. We need information about the premises and background of the text to even begin to dialogue with it, Ricoeur holds forth. Thus explanation may aid understanding. Kepnes on this background suggests that although Buber in *I and Thou* establishes a radical distinction between I-Thou and I-It modes, the recognition in his biblical hermeneutics of a complementary relationship between understanding and explanatory methods may contribute to bridge the gap between these two modes.

3.4.3 The Constructive Role of It

Friedman (1996a), who is a central interpreter of Buber (and also his biographer (Friedman 1981)), has made an interpretation of Buber along these lines of a movement between the modes of I-Thou and I-It. He refers to a metaphor used by Buber, the “narrow ridge”, which designates a movement between dichotomies, between various forms of abstractions, such as freedom versus discipline, individualism versus collectivism. The “narrow ridge” constitutes a demarcation line enabling a staying close to the concrete. Buber was not a dualist, quite the contrary Friedman maintains. To claim that he held that one should strive only for the I-Thou relation would be a misunderstanding. The I-Thou relation is a direct and full relation to another where no part of the other is separated out from this meeting. There is no objectified and separated knowledge about the person within this direct meeting; it is just a mutual relation between beings. But eventually this direct meeting may be developed into some knowledge *about*. The subject-object relation thus regarded, is nothing other than the socially constructed and elaborated product of what came out of the original meeting, Friedman holds forth. The direct meeting has no *general* content; it has only a situational, unique content. What Buber was not satisfied with was settling merely for objectified knowledge. The real meeting is where the source of all renewal is. So, Friedman points out, Buber indeed propagated the necessity of *both* the I-Thou and the I-It relation. Not choosing between one and the other, but maintaining a necessary alternation between the two.

Buber was neither an absolutist, nor a relativist, Friedman maintains. These are stances within a dualistic framework. Buber could not accept anything that turned into a universal; he was above all concerned with the concrete. For Buber the I-Thou is the source of knowledge, which is elaborated on by constructions of reflective thought. But reason, as Friedman puts it, “with its gigantic structure of general concepts, cannot replace the smallest perception of something particular and unique, cannot by means of it take part in the grasping of what here and now confronts me” (Friedman 1996a. p.18). Buber, thus understood, emphasizes dialogue as the actual source of understanding, and the subsequent elaborations of reason as following from this.

Whether or not Buber actually did overemphasize one side, or maybe, on the other side, underestimated the other, is a matter of some dispute then.⁴⁷ At any rate, what I want to adhere to here is that it is important to keep this alternation that Friedman points to in mind, and not interpret Buber in any kind of moralistic sense as meaning that the I-It relation should be considered unwholesome or “evil” in some way, and to be avoided. This at least is the interpretation that will be followed here. The I-It mode is thus to be considered as both inevitable and necessary in a constructive way, in *alternation* with the relation to Thou.

3.5 Application of the Concept of Dialogue

It is important to underline here that my methodological angle is not exegetical. I am performing an *applicative study* in Stubley’s (1992) sense. I am using an interpretation of Buber’s writings as a point of departure for the development of a dialogical perspective on central issues within music therapy, and there is in this no intention of making any “Buberian” kind of theory as such. This, incidentally, would not at all have been in accordance with the spirit of Buber’s own writings, in which fixated and dogmatic views are very much warned against and opposed.

Stewart (1996) refers to Buber’s distinction between “critical” and “personal” scholarship, the former treating its topic as an object of knowledge, whilst the second attempts to bring the vitality and force of the text that is studied into current concerns. And this involves a personal engagement by the interpreter going beyond any watching from a distance. Rather it is a venturing into the “waters” of the subject matter of the text, rediscovering its present significance anew. Within the present study, what I do hope is that a dialogical conception, as it is interpreted here on the basis of Buber’s original text, might facilitate a “personal” scholarship that could be constructive and fruitful specifically in illuminating questions related to the problem statement in this study.

⁴⁷ He actually admits, in his “Autobiographical Fragments”, that he might not have done full justice to the I-It relation (Buber 1967a).

3.5.1 The “Dialogical Principle”

After this exposition and commentary I want to sum up, and establish the focus for applying the concept of dialogue in this study. It has to be mentioned here that Buber did not actually use the word “dialogue” in *I and Thou* (!) He introduced this term in his writings in a text a few years later, in “Zwiesprache” from 1930, which is the first of several essays in which he sought to fill out and apply what had been said in *I and Thou*.⁴⁸ In “Zwiesprache”, or “Dialogue”, as it is titled in the English translation (Buber 1961), Buber wished to clarify what he now termed the “dialogical principle” which he regarded to be implied in *I and Thou*.

It should be clear that for Buber the “dialogic principle” quite obviously is about something more than the literal meaning of dialogue as conversation. He uses the term as a metaphor for relational processes, of what happens in inter-relation. The capacity to relate is general, not directed only to the sphere of human interrelations, but towards any sphere, towards anything in the world that man and woman confronts. Terming this the “dialogical principle” is to propose a kind of metaphor for any process of relational interchange. This makes it applicable to a wide variety of areas and fields, which in itself opens up for new perspectives, at the same time as it makes possible integrated views, *between* various aspects and dimensions, holding these together through the unifying focal lens of the dialogical principle as a conceptual construct. And this is basically how I wish to apply it in the present context.

3.5.2 Dialogical Methodology

The method itself here might be characterized as dialogical, in several ways. First of all is the attempt to extract so to speak, a conceptual construct from the texts through an interactive interpretive process, consulting both the original text and secondary literature. The understanding of the “dialogical principle” thus arrived at, should not be considered to represent any system of thought though, but to be regarded more as a way of seeing. A dialogical perspective is considered here as a consciously open outlook, skeptical to enclosed systems of thought. Such systems, according to this outlook, may (too) easily evolve into grand scale speculations, leading to alienation from direct

⁴⁸ Collected in *Das dialogische Prinzip* (Buber 1965a).

human experience, which such a philosophy, for the sake of its own credibility, will seek to relate intimately to.

The understanding of what a dialogical perspective itself entails should not be considered to be a closed story either, once presented. Further aspects and interpretations will be included on the way, according to their relevance and need as the study unfolds, keeping with the nature of query, as Reichling (1996) and Ferrara (1993) point to. And what comes out of this application of the concept should furthermore itself not be considered to be final or definitive in any way, but a contribution rather to the ongoing discourse within the field or discipline of music therapy. The attempt here will not be to construct any closed and complete systematized theory. The aim will be to *clarify a way of viewing* rather than building any more or less encompassing system of thought. It will be up to each reader then to decide what to make of it, and to respond. Also in this sense the methodology of this study, and what comes out of it, should be considered as dialogical.

3.6 Summary

In this chapter I have presented and developed an interpretation of the concept of dialogue as it is to be applied in the present study. I have based this interpretation on Buber's original formulation in *I and Thou*, keeping to the original, wider sense of the term "encounter". I have used a distinction between second and third person relations as a guiding line in the interpretation of the two basic attitudinal modes of I-Thou and I-It, regarded as the difference between *talking to* and *talking about*. I have tried to show how the distinction may have a philosophical relevance and application, serving as a basis for a philosophical anthropology, which also may be related to psychotherapy. I have made an interpretation that emphasizes the dynamic interrelation between two attitudinal modes, not considering any of them to be self-sufficient. Finally I have delimited the applicative approach of this study from critical or comparative studies into Buber's philosophy, emphasizing the dialogical quality and approach of the study itself, as this relates both to the interpretation of the concept, and of its application to the field of music therapy.

4 Encounter with Music

Having presented and accounted for the interpretation of the concept of dialogue as it is to be applied within this study, I now venture, on the background of the methodological approach that was outlined in *Chapter 2*, to apply this basic construct to the theme of this study, as it was presented in the introductory first chapter, namely how a dialogical perspective might contribute to frame a music-based therapy, that is not dependent on verbal processing. I will first of all attempt to explicate a central and crucial feature of a dialogical outlook as it relates to the theme of this study, namely the possibility of entering into the attitudinal mode of I-Thou specifically in relation *to music*.

4.1 The Work of Art as a Thou

Within the sphere of “spiritual forms” as Buber terms it, is the field of the humanities. And within the humanities it has become a general usage to talk about *encountering* a work of art. Gadamer, as mentioned previously, says about a given text within a tradition, that it “expresses itself like a Thou” (Gadamer 1989, p. 358). Understanding comes through turning towards a particular work, and the work opening itself, in a way that cannot be fully predicted or foreseen. From this it may be regarded as having the character of an encounter. As Palmer (1969) in his book *Hermeneutics* explains the usage (referring explicitly to Buber here):

To put the matter in the familiar terminology of Martin Buber’s I-Thou relationship, it is helpful to see the work not as an it that is at my disposal but as a thou who addresses me, and to remember that meaning is not an objective, eternal idea but something that arises in relationships (cited in Berkaak and Ruud 1992, p. 48).

To elaborate somewhat on this: In any encounter with music there will always be something that is not entirely foreseen. This is the case even for an already known work, because it is always in the given situation that the work is encountered, and what listening to it brings is in some sense unique, each single time. Our response to a piece of music is not completely and unambiguously given beforehand, because then, presumably, there would be no meaning in listening to it again. Nothing in particular would be gained by doing so. Listening would simply have become redundant. What a particular musical encounter entails is never really apparent until it actually occurs. It is not something that may be deduced by necessity from any given set of premises. How music affects us then, is not predetermined. That a particular work of music will have such and such an effect unconditionally, or mechanically, is not something that can be either expected or guaranteed. An encounter with music is always open, which gives it a quality of address. Encountering music, we are being “addressed” by it as well. In this way music may be seen not as an It, but as a Thou, as Palmer suggests.

4.1.1 Relating to and Talking About

There is also the movement the other way around. From our initial encounter with music new understanding can be developed, which becomes the point of departure for subsequent encounters. This turning from the direct relation of I-Thou into the objectification of I-It is the basic process of social construction, as Friedman points out. Here the so-called hermeneutic circle, or spiral, may be recognized, which stresses pre-understanding prior to the encounter, and the development of new understanding. Thus the encounter is not something that has to ensue from a “blank” position. Through the objectifying mode knowledge *about* the music may be increased, and new understanding gained.

Yet this construction will not contain the whole story about music. This could be further clarified by applying the contrast between the two basic attitudinal modes of I-Thou and I-It as a difference between second and third person relations. That is to say, as the difference between talking to, and talking about. The encounter is about the *attitudinal mode* with which the music is met. Not distancing from, but relating *to* the music in its immediate presence. Having initially encountered music one may talk *about* it, in the third person mode, making it into an object of understanding. But having

talked about music this way, not everything that could possibly be said about it, has actually been said. We can hardly expect to have made it completely and exhaustively objectified.

Ultimately nothing conclusive can be said about any given music. A new meeting may always bring something new. This is what the characteristic of the encounter as a second person relation consists in. One may gain an increased understanding each new time, but this does not at any given point become final or complete in itself. Even though the making of objectifications will have a natural drive so to speak, towards completion, towards getting it right, completing the whole picture, actually arriving at this destination is really not to be expected. Musical study, in any variant, and however elaborate, will not be able to pin down its object of study to any final conclusion. This is to say: Music will, as long as there is any meaning whatsoever in approaching it, never become a complete object, a total It, and nothing more.

If you do not actually encounter the music, you will not have much to talk about. And if you merely talk about music, without acknowledging its present reality in the encounter, there will hardly be much substance to what is said. So this is what a view to the dialectics between these two different attitudinal modes of *I-You* and *I-It* may help to keep in focus then: The encounter with music itself, subsequently leading to objectifications of understanding, and then a returning from the objectifications made, and back to the encounter, without which any gained understanding will lose its purpose and meaning.

4.1.2 The Creative Encounter

The focus so far has been on the receptive side of the encounter with music, but there is also the side of *producing* music to consider. Buber indicates that also in the creative act there is an I-Thou relation between the maker and what is being made. The initial spark in the creative process is an artistic form or gestalt, which appears for the maker, proposing, or “demanding” as Buber phrases it, to be realized into some work. And as the maker engages with this form that has “disclosed” itself, a creative power is released, making possible the bringing forth of the work to its completion.

Not a figment of his soul but *something that appears to the soul and demands the soul's creative power*. What is required is a deed that a man does with his whole

being: if he commits it and speaks with his whole being the basic word to the form that appears, then the creative power is released and the work comes into being (Buber 1970, p. 60, italics added).⁴⁹

This creative bringing forth of the work is not something that pours out unilaterally from the inside of the maker then, (as a traditionally romantic notion of creativity would tend to assume), but comes about through a dynamic relation with the disclosed form or gestalt that *appears* for the maker to make something out of it. On the one side it is necessary to bring the engagement of the whole person towards bringing forth this suggestive form to its complete realization. But at the same time engaging in this process of making the gestalt into a realized work itself *releases* creative power.

Engaging with the form that appears for the maker and realizing it into a work may be regarded as second person kind of relating, a “conversational” process. It is not like the “objective” monological course of action in which the outcome is known and counted on beforehand, as in some regular procedures for certain predefined tasks dealt with on a regular basis in practical life. What comes out of the creative act is never completely known beforehand. There is a risk involved, an uncertainty. The making of music as a work of art can never be completely predetermined then, or else it was simply not creative, not something new that was brought forth.

Not a Subjectivist Notion of Creativity

I want to underscore that this does not imply a “subjectivist” notion of creativity, as in the traditional romantic idea of a composer-genius standing forth as a sole agent, bringing music more or less entirely from the “inside” and out. The process according to a dialogical perspective is a relational one, which means that it cannot be confined to something “from within” that is brought out; it is realized through creative enactment.

And through such a conversational productive process something gives itself, which cannot be reduced solely and completely to the music maker’s initial subjective intention. It is not merely this intention that is at play, but the meeting of intention with the materials of the medium, according to a dialogical view. There is a dynamic interplay with the characteristics of the medium itself, resulting actually in *more* than

⁴⁹ Keine Ausgeburt seiner Seele, sondern Erscheinung, die an sie tritt und von ihr die wirkende Kraft erheischt. Es kommt auf eine Wesenstat des Menschen an: vollzieht er sie, spricht er mit seinem Wesen das Grundwort zu erscheinenden Gestalt, dann strömt die wirkende Kraft, das Werk entsteht (Buber 1958b. p. 14).

could be strictly foreseen or predicted. There is a give and take. The medium offers some resistance; it does not accept anything. What is made is not plainly molded entirely according to the music maker's own preconception then, but has to be worked out. And there is the possibility of a powerful dynamics in this. The materials of the medium lend themselves to be brought into life, in a unique way in each instance, facilitating creative outlet, as vehicles of expression. What comes out of the creative act may actually to some extent then be something that was not totally foreseen. And the maker of the music may even subsequently discover aspects of the work that he or she was not fully aware of when making it, but which developed as a result of this "conversational" relationship with the materials of the medium in the making of the music.

This kind of dialogical process is also reflected in interpretations, playing a given composition. A way of playing a particular phrase may bring out a quality in it that was not seen or heard before. New aspects of the composition may be discovered, possibilities of expression that have to do with the inherent richness of the medium. It is something to *play*; in the way it has been composed, through the materials that have been used, which is not all necessarily entirely deduced from the composer's intention. The inherent characteristics of the medium seems to have a "surplus" of meaning to uncover beyond what any single individual might have intended to put there, but which does not at all detract from the achievement in the making of the particular work.

4.1.3 Two Sides of "Acting Upon"

What happens in the creative act according to Buber (1970) is a sacrifice of limitless possibility, the making of a suggestive form into something definitive, a movement from limitless potential to a definitive realization. The creative act is choosing from many options, or from endless options actually; in a process of discovery, eventually turning the apprehended gestalt into a completed work:

Such work is creation, inventing is finding. Forming is discovery. As I actualize, I uncover. I lead the form across – into the world of It. The created work is a thing among things and can be experienced and described as an aggregate of qualities. But the receptive beholder may be bodily confronted again and again (p. 61).

The dialectic of alternation between two attitudinal modes in is also reflected in the making of the work, in the creative act. Buber underlines this:

The essential deed of art determines the process whereby the form becomes a work. That which confronts me is fulfilled through the encounter through which it enters into the world of things in order to remain incessantly effective, incessantly It – but also infinitely to become again a You, enchanting and inspiring (p. 65-66).

The creative act, which is a forming process, results in a work. This product then, this object, becomes an It, and enters into “the world of things”. But this It, through subsequent encounters, may again become a Thou in the reception of it, whereby new understanding and appreciation opens up. So the realization of the musical work is a dialectic turning from a *Thou into an It* on the productive side, and from an *It into a Thou* again on the receptive side.

In this way there are two sides to the alternation between the attitudinal modes of I-Thou and I-It, related to the musical work. And there are consequently two aspects of “acting upon” here. One side is the maker acting on the work that is made. The other side is the work itself acting, remaining “incessantly effective,” as Buber puts it, on the receiver in the encounter with it. In the receptive process the work may then act on the *person*. In both cases a “making of” is brought forth, of the work on the one side, and of the person on the other.

A difference between these two sides though, is that the work, once made in the creative act, is something that is done and completed, whereas the receptive encounter with it may happen again and again. When a work is completed it takes on a life of its own, and becomes what may be encountered again and again as an object tuning into a musical Thou in the reception of it. And for each time a deepened understanding is made possible. Thus for each new meeting *you* actually also may change. This point of view is also clearly reflected in Gadamer’s notion about the melting of *two* horizons in the hermeneutic process, between the horizon of the work and of the interpreter.

There are consequently *two* processes of alternation between the two modes of Thou and It to be seen here. First the work of art, which through the creative act becomes an object, an It, that may turn back into a Thou for the listener in the reception of it. And this listening may subsequently *also* produce an It, in the objectification, the talking *about* the music, the new understanding that may be constructed subsequent to listening to it. This is the actual product of *musicology*, as the discipline of gaining new

knowledge and understanding about music, and which may be brought back in renewed listening to it, with the music once again appearing as a Thou. There are *two objectifications* of music here then, first the *artistic*, and second the *musicological*, each facilitating a process of alternation, leading from Thou to It, and from It to Thou, creatively and receptively.

4.2 The Analysis and Interpretation Dispute

Taking this dialogical notion of *encounter with music* as a point of departure, I would like to go somewhat more into the New Musicology discussion mentioned in the introductory chapter, regarding the limitations of structural analysis, to bring some of the crucial features of a dialogical outlook into further relief.

Musical analysis developed from a transcendentalism of musical form, in the romantic area of Western classical music history. The development of musicology in the 20th century, mainly in the post-war years, and particularly in the United States and Britain, took on a different character though, in accordance with new musical developments and new ideals. Analysis became increasingly abstract. This was in part connected with the development of modernism at the time, what Kerman (1985) terms the “second phase” of modernism, which includes in particular the development of serial music. And in parallel to this: analysis now became “scientific”. Kerman writes about the appeal of analysis with regards to this kind of prospect:

Qua criticism, musical analysis is limited and limiting; yet it is also capable of more rigorous and powerful determinations in its own sphere than are available to formalistic criticism in any of the other arts. That is why the serious critic cannot help being fascinated and exasperated by analysis (p. 18).

Kerman considered this kind of analysis, becoming ever more technically advanced, to be “positivistic” in that it now strived ideally to account for strictly objective, measurable characteristics of the object of study. He writes that the potentials of analysis are formidable, but limiting if it restrains itself to remain within its own sphere. He asks:

Why should analysts concentrate solely on the internal structure of the individual work of art as an autonomous entity, and take no account of such considerable

matters as history, communication affect, texts and programmes, the existence of other works of art, and so much else? (p. 18).

The whole cultural context, which is necessary for gaining a wider understanding of what the meaning of the work might be, needs to be included Kerman purports, and this is the kind of musicology he will endorse. Kerman's views marked a turning point for a new train of thought on music.

4.2.1 Musical "Subjectivity"

Lawrence Kramer, (who actually coined the term "New Musicology", in relation to a paper presented at the 1990 meeting of the American Musicological society, according to Cook, 1998),⁵⁰ similarly holds forth the necessity of a wider *interpretation* of music, instead of restricting musicology to formal structural analysis. In the article: "The Mysteries of Animation; History, Analysis and Musical Subjectivity" (Kramer 2001). Kramer develops his views on the matter, through an extension and revision of a model that was first presented in the influential book *Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge* (1985). In this article Kramer sketches a theory of *musical animation*. He points out that the art of music, unlike other less abstract media, appears in a *disembodied* way. It is sound rendered independent of its sources and cut into form. It is not like in drama, where the subject is bodied in the form of a character, like Hamlet, or in animated cartoons where the subject, although virtual, still has a body, like the figure Mickey Mouse. The subject of music has no such body to reside in. Thus music appears as a pure subjectivity, apprehended through one's own bodily identification with its subject matter, Kramer holds forth. Music is conveyed through bodies of performers, and realized within the body of the listener, but none of these can be identified "as" the musical subject, which has no body of its own. Music is thus invisible, not specifically located anywhere, it is not palpably formable, it is not pulled by gravity, it has no weight, and does not smell. Music animates without a body of its own, which opens for the listening subject to identify with it in a more direct way:

Music meant to be listened to with a degree of focused attention addresses itself to an actual or virtual subject position that the listening subject ventures to fill (p.157).

⁵⁰ The title of the paper was "*Carnival, Cross-Dressing and the Woman in the Mirror*", and was later published (Kramer 1993).

Music, and Kramer is talking specifically about music coming out of the Western classical tradition, in this way invites subjectivity, it addresses itself to a subject position, helping to produce, embody and reward the position addressed. This is the basis for music's formative potential on the subject or person, Kramer claims. In the nineteenth century music becomes a vehicle for assessing the depth of the person, through *interior resonance*, as Hegel at the time would term it, Kramer relates.

Listening to music to enhance such depth, in a personally formative rather than merely "practical" way, increasing capacities for insight and self-development, Kramer calls *subjectifying* music. And, he points out, what may be threatening to such a way of listening could be a perceived excess of technique or form, degrading the ideal adequation of form and content. In the nineteenth century this was found in the complaint, which both Hegel and Rousseau adhered to, that melody was becoming subordinate to increasingly advanced harmonic development, in effect reducing the natural emotional expressiveness of music. This has not earned Hegel or Rousseau reputations as musical progressives, but Kramer finds that this kind of view is illustrative of a concern, or worry, that music, as subjectivity, may fall victim to the technical means of producing it. Adorno, for instance, would later complain about the dehumanizing effect of mechanical reproduction of music, as found in what he and Horkheimer termed the "culture industry" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1971). And though these kinds of worries soon may seem to become dated, they point to the central need of keeping up the possibility of relating to music as subjectivity, to animate music with sense and spirit, Kramer holds forth. In the 20th century there has been a rather widespread complaint about melodic clarity being undercut by harmonic obfuscation, through modernist "dissonance" and "atonality". And though Schönberg may be seen to be 'right' in some sense, and more progressive, holding the contrary view that melody is only significant in the context of an enveloping total conception, expressive of a germinal idea, this "still seems powerless against the appeal of a good tune", Kramer remarks laconically (p. 160).

4.2.2 Analysis De-subjectifying

The issue is constant in that there will always be the possibility of music that repels, rather than invites subjectivity. And this is a matter that needs to be taken seriously,

Kramer holds forth. He takes the side of, or at least sympathizes with, the “amateur” against the “professional” here. And it is from this position that he actually launches an attack on musicological analysis. The problem with the practice of structural analysis is that it effectively *de*-subjectifies music, by bracketing or at least temporarily avoiding its subject positions, Kramer purports. He presents the following definition:

Analysis” will mean a discourse that ... focuses primarily on the formal elements of music and is understood – no matter how closely it may mesh with more “subjective” or hermeneutic statements – to be *capable of development independent of any other focus* (p. 169, italics added).

Analysis is based on relating music to some specific norm of unity, consistency, or system, independent of the engagement of the analyst as an agent. The generation of descriptions by a taxonomic system is thus not dependent on a “historicized subject”, Kramer holds forth. Or, putting it more strongly:

The descriptions *exclude such a subject*, exclude the density of affect and concept, memory and desire, that fill up and at times even overgrow such a subject (p. 170, italics added).

The point he is making is that analysis is executed independently of the position of the subject in relation to the music. It thus becomes more of a formal, technical affair, of objective registration and classification. What in this way is missed out is the liveliness of musical experience. Kramer on this ground supports the common, “folk” skepticism towards excessive analysis in that it tends to detract from musical experience, and what may be gained from this.

Re-subjectifying

Kramer still opens for a role for structural analysis in that it, through a *preliminary suspension of subjectivity*, may delimit and multiply sites of meaning, which may be more fully elaborated hermeneutically. After (necessarily) *de*-subjectifying music through formal, structural analysis, it may be *re*-subjectified through a new subject position in relation to it. This represents a cultural standpoint that values music for its relation to subjectivity, and for the enjoyment of it thereby. Though analysis may seem a solid enterprise, and accounts of musical subjectivity may seem rather frail in comparison, the choice of one to the exclusion of the other would seem premature. As Kramer concludes:

Yet it is precisely by recognizing and holding open the gap between analytical description and the mysteries of animation that we can best do justice to both the infinite plasticity of “purely musical” relations and the social, psychological, even spiritual force of the subject positions without which music is so much lifeless sound (p. 174).

Kramer does after all find a space for analysis, under the presupposition that the music having been structurally analyzed subsequently is returned to hermeneutics.

4.2.3 Categorical Distinction

Kramer makes a very sharp - indeed categorical - distinction between the ‘subjectifying’ interpretive, and ‘de-subjectifying’ analytic mode of relating to music. Against the suggestion that also the analytic elaboration of musical meaning could be considered a social and cultural human practice he flatly denies this, stating that:

Purely analytic discourse lies outside the discursive systems by which western societies produce “humanly significant” subjectivity (p. 172).

Assigning “human significance” to analytical elaborations he considers being a linguistic mistake (in Wittgenstein’s terms), or a category error (in Bakhtin’s terms). It seems Kramer, despite his stress on historicity, nevertheless tends largely to disregard the history of musical aesthetics as this relates specifically to musical analysis, which originated as a response to the “reading” of instrumental music as transcendent form. Only later, in the last half of the 20th century did analysis take on a more formalistic “positivistic” strain, as Kerman has made clear.

And the question might be raised as to the “human significance” of making musicological interpretations. There is hardly any guarantee that an “amateur’s” skepticism towards “professional” formalistic dissection of music will readily embrace any given hermeneutic interpretation of a beloved piece of music. New musicological readings of classical works have certainly been known to stir controversy. One example could be feministic re-readings that have been made of acclaimed masterpieces from the classical canon, like for instance Beethoven’s ninth symphony, as in the following – much cited and commented on – paragraph:

The point of recapitulation in the first movement of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony unleashes one of the most horrifyingly violent episodes in the history of music... The entire first key area in the recapitulation is pockmarked with explosions. It is the consequent juxtaposition of desire and unspeakable violence in the moment

that creates its unparalleled fusion of murderous rage and yet a kind of pleasure in its fulfillment of formal demands (McClary 1991,p.128).

Whether or not such an interpretational reading, tracing musical signs of murderous (sexual) assault in a work broadly considered to give sublime expression to the “Brotherhood of Man” is valid, (and some do think it is not), it is at any rate not necessarily less “professional”, in the sense of using an “expert” terminology in a rather advanced way, than any given structural analysis, which uses a more technical language, and it might just as well be perceived to “get in the way” of the appreciation of music from an “amateur” point of view, I am afraid. There is no guarantee then that any given hermeneutic interpretation necessarily will be perceived to be “humanly significant”, in complete contradistinction to any structural analysis of music.

4.3 A Dialogical View

I want to propose a somewhat different perspective on the relation between analysis and interpretation here, using the conceptual constructs of Buber’s dialogical philosophy. A main concern of the New Musicology, as Kramer insistently voices it, has been that structural analysis becomes too narrow, and that a hermeneutic interpretation of the music is necessary to bring out its full reservoir of meaning. From a dialogical perspective it is important to uphold that the dividing line is not necessarily to be found simply between structural analysis and hermeneutic interpretation. The problem of structural musical analysis, seen from a dialogical perspective, is that it indeed ultimately may tend to reduce music to a mere structural/syntactic object, an *It*, and nothing much more. And this is in close concord with Kramer’s concern about the tendency to de-subjectify music. Analysis that, as Kramer puts it, is “capable of development independent of any other focus”, that is, which becomes self-sufficient, may as a consequence loose track of the original musical experience. In its one-sided focus on technicalities it may become “dehumanizing”, as Kramer warns.

“Subjectifying” music, as Kramer calls it, could furthermore be seen to be in close concord with regarding the work of art as a *Thou*, indicating that the work may appear as a subject addressing itself to the beholder. Kramer’s “subjectifying” of music may in this way be seen as according with the dialogical notion of music as a *Thou*, although he

tends to stretch this even one step further, *identifying* with the music actually, “animating” it through one’s own body. Which actually implies apprehending music as an “I”, in some sense, as much as a Thou. But there still inevitably will be two sides. Such identification with the music would have to be regarded as paradoxical rather than literal then, of course.

4.3.1 *Both Interpretation and Analysis as Objectifications*

Kramer suggests that a “re-subjectification” of music may take place through giving a revised interpretation of the work from the structural characteristics what have been brought out through formal analysis. And this is where some care must be taken not to become too categorical, as seen from a dialogical perspective. The point here is that *both* interpretations made of a given music *and* formal-structural analysis of the interrelations of elements within a score, are *objectifications* of music, albeit two different types of objectification. It is not possible to put analysis on one side (“desubjectifying”) and interpretation on the other (“resubjectifying”). The categorical difference between analysis and interpretation turns out to be somewhat misleading from a dialogical point of view. It is the *staying* with analysis that becomes “dehumanizing”. The value of analysis is in the extent to which it may bring forth new and enriching encounters with music, something which certainly cannot be regarded as impossible. It *is* possible to go back to music from analysis. Kramer’s assertion that it is a category mistake or a linguistic error to consider that analysis may say anything at all “humanly significant” is hardly a tenable position. Musical analysis is not simply objective; it is a culturally conditioned human practice. The “human significance” of dealing with musical analysis cannot be ruled out on one side only, in favor exclusively of interpretation.

Moving from analysis on to interpretation is not necessarily in itself making music into a subject again, because any given interpretation may actually *also* in the last resort become self-sufficient. It does seem like a fruitful suggestion to combine the two approaches, but Kramer seems to want to let interpretation literally have the last word, giving it an altogether different status. He seems in this way to want to establish a new regime. What he accuses analysis of, he may consequently himself ultimately end up

with too, “dehumanizing” or desubjectifying music in the guise of *culturalism*, rather than *formalism*.

Both structural analysis and hermeneutic interpretation are translations music. They *are* not the music. According to a dialogical view it is the *returning*, the alternation between objectification and directly relating to it that is necessary. This is the crucial point, not the method, analytical or hermeneutical. Both approaches may or may not make a such a return, and the extent to which they do not, they miss out on the meaning for embarking on their respective endeavors in the first place, the love – as word the “amateur” etymologically signifies – presumably, for the music.

The satisfaction coming from actually having found what is perceived as a “right” interpretation, and this is indeed what is sought after in some sense, should not overshadow what the interpretation is an interpretation *of*, however tempting this might be for the proud, objectifying mind. And this counts as much for any given interpretation, however elaborate, well founded, and to the point, as for any formal structural analysis. It is at the heart of a dialogical perspective that such “forgetting” of what originally was translated indeed must be considered reifying. In this perspective there is hardly a categorical difference then between interpretation and analysis. Both are objectifications, using different languages, and different procedures, which *may* turn out to be reifying.

4.3.2 An Ethical Aspect

Cook (Cook 1998) summarizes the complaint originally voiced by Kerman that musicological theory and analysis had become increasingly technical and incomprehensible to anyone besides specialists. It had, in Cooks words: “ended up substituting its own scientific jargon for *the personal living experience of music* that had presumably drawn the theorists to it in the fist place” (p. 89, italics added). Not only was there the “guilt” as Cook puts it, of a lack of dealing with a living encounter with music, in the effort to remain within the confines of what was considered “scientific”, there was even a *refusal* to engage directly with music in such a manner, on the grounds that it was unnecessary and philosophically suspect.

As Cook’s use of the word “guilt” may imply, there is an ethical dimension to such reduction then, which also may be related to a dialogical view. The question may

be posed what analysis is *for*; if it is not related back to what it originally was intended as an analysis *of*. It is important to bring out here that objectifications are not “bad”; they are actually and quite legitimately what musicological study produces. Objectifications of music are the products of musicological studies; they are the natural outcome of any study of music, *but not as aims in themselves*. No matter how extensive, how sophisticated and advanced the methods used might be, they are not legitimatised merely on their own accord.

From a dialogical point of view the reason for making objectifications must be for some defined purpose and aim, for some *use*. This is what objectification is *for*. But if objectifying becomes an end in itself, instead of serving an actual purpose, it fails its mission, and becomes “useless”. And this is what may be ethically objected to. Using a certain recognized (or at least apparently) “scientific” method is not enough to secure the validity and relevance of the endeavor. The ethical point is that objectification is not at all “bad”, but if it is to be used, it should be useful for some purpose. This is what its legitimacy rests on. Empty objectifications, however formally and technically advanced have no legitimizations in themselves. Making music into an It is not inherently “good” either!

Cook points out that Kerman’s characterization of post-war theory and analysis within musicology may have been rather unbalanced, and something of a caricature. Which may very well be the case. The main point here has been that this kind of critique may be applied to *any* method or approach to musicological study that does not return to the music, and that this may apply just as well to hermeneutical interpretations of music as well, if it becomes its own aim. *Returning* is what is central according to a dialogical perspective. The crux of the matter then is not that one mode is “good” and the other “bad”, it is about alternating between the two modes of Thou and It, and not remaining more or less indefinitely in either one of them.

I have to make it clear that I am not at all here attempting to “solve” this whole issue within musicology. I am regarding the discussion as a point of departure to highlight what a dialogical perspective entails, and how it relates to underlying assumptions of different positions within the current debate within musicology, to bring out something more of what this outlook itself represents, for purposes of the present study.

4.3.3 Dialectic Alternation Between Presence and Object

To summarize this first elucidation of how the dialogical principle may be applied specifically to music, a basic ontological distinction can be made between the realities of music as presence, as it appears within the everyday, or as an object, as something made into a thing. An alternation between these two modes of reality may be found. In the creative act a form that suggests itself is developed and made into a work, completed as an object, an It. This object may subsequently be encountered, in the receptive act, in which the music is met as a living presence, made into a Thou again. The interpretive act may lead to music becoming an object for the understanding, this way turned into an It again. On the basis of this understanding though, new encounters with the music may take place. The creative act, making music into a work, may be a singular act, but the receptive act may be repeated in ever-new encounters with the music, bringing it alive to deepened appreciation on the basis of increased understanding that is developed, but that never is complete, and that may be ever renewed. This is the basic “dialectics” of the alternation between the modes of presence and object, creatively and receptively, as this is brought forth through the application of the dialogical principle to the encounter with music.

4.4 The Musical Work

What I have been trying to do so far in this chapter is to explicate the basic “logic” of the dialogical principle, as the distinction and alternation between the two modes of I-Thou and I-It, as this may be applied, within the sphere of “spiritual forms”, to music. The matter is somewhat more complex though, with regards to the status of the *musical work*. In the tradition of classical music the work from the composer’s hand is completed through the writing of the score. Still it is not completely ready for reception, as the painting can be, when it is completed. There are some differences between the various arts as to the status of the work. The musical score represents the work, of which there may be many *performances*. And of course each performance of the work in itself represents an artistic statement, a work in its own right. There are never two performances that are alike, the performance itself being a personal interpretation of the work coming from the composer’s hand. There is no single solution to the playing of

any work in all details, even if every note and every marking (tempo and dynamics etc.) of the composer is meticulously followed. Performing a composition is a dialogical process in its own right; it is not merely a technical or mechanical matter of re-playing the notes. Each performance is unique.

This is illustratively seen in the applause after a live performance. The applause is an expression of an essentially unpredictable meeting – here too there is a dialogical relation, between performer and audience – an inherent tension and expectation that is released in the applause, which reflects the quality of the relation in that unique moment, that unique event. If the outcome of a performance were completely guaranteed and predictable, there would be no grounds for giving applause. This is why it is not natural to applaud after having played a CD, for instance, no matter how good it might be, because this *is* a purely technical matter, namely the reproduction of music through sound equipment. Which does not have the same element of risk and surprise. – Not that a recording may not be highly appreciated. The performance is nevertheless related to indirectly here, through a mechanical reproduction.⁵¹

4.4.1 Other Ontologies of Music

Within the New Musicology, it has become increasingly common to include other genres than Western classical music. And what then becomes apparent is the different status to the work that may be found in different genres, what is called different *ontologies* of music (Bohlman 1999), which is about the different modes of being, the different ways of music being realized. A contrast to the case of Western classical music is jazz. Here the performance itself tends to acquire a first rank position in relation to the composition. The composition may be a so-called standard tune, which is a popular song used as a basis for improvisation, and it is the improvisation on this tune that primarily constitutes the work in this instance. The tune is just a frame, a form to improvise upon. In some cases the jazz musician may even create a new melody on the chord changes of the tune, thus making it his or her own composition (not least for royalty purposes). The *chord changes* of the standard tune, in a re-harmonized version, making them better fit for improvising upon, is the basic a starting point for the creative

⁵¹ The famous Canadian pianist Glenn Gould incidentally found applause at live performances to be a nuisance. He even stopped performing in public, and concentrated on studio recordings though which he could perfect his performances to an even higher greater degree.

work, which is naturally also dialogical in character, in relation to the given frame. The work of the jazz musician *is* the improvisation on the chord changes, *as* a performance. And this is reflected in that the applause from the audience here may come *after each solo*, within the same tune.

New technologies bring new possibilities for ways of realizing works of music. The realization of a composition to be distributed in a score was made practically possible through the invention of printing, and the market economy gradually replacing the feudal system. The recording technology has likewise more recently given new possibilities. A rock group may spend quite some time working in the studio, making a record production, which is subsequently released for sale. In rock music the *album* has tended to acquire the primary status of work.⁵² The performance in this case may take the form of a tour, with its own particular signs of appreciation from the audience, moving and dancing, waving lighters, singing along, or shouting, as a kind of cultural ritual.

4.4.2 Music in Culture

The modes of being of music within different genres vary considerably then. And the picture becomes increasingly complex when also non-western music is considered. In some cultures, as is often pointed out, it may even be difficult to find a term that accords with our term “music”. The phenomenon we recognize as “music” may be so embedded in specific cultural practices as to not have acquired any single term of its own (Bohlman 1999).

Ethnomusicologists have also turned their attention to diverse music practices within one’s own society and culture, also practices that are not considered to at all produce “works” of music as objects of art. Tia DeNora (2000) represents this field, and has studied what she calls “music in everyday life”, which includes the music of for instance aerobic lessons, or background music in stores, *and* music in music therapy sessions. In all these cases music does not take on the form of an autonomous work, but rather functions as a “technology of self” DeNora proposes. She uses the term technology in the widest sense here as a tool or device, and relates it to the psychologist

⁵² A point made by Anne Danielsen in the paper “Presence and pleasure: A study in the Funk of James Brown” at the 13th Nordic Musicological Conference in Aarhus, Denmark, 2000.

J.J. Gibson's (1966) concept of affordance. "Objects 'afford' actors certain things; a ball, for example, affords rolling, bounding and kicking in a way that a cube of the same size, texture and weight would not", she explains (p. 39). Inspired by Anderson and Sharrrock (1993), who have used the concept of affordance in ethnographic studies of organizations, DeNora considers music as an "object" that may constitute different affordances in different social settings within everyday life, the characteristics of which may be brought out through ethnographic studies. Stige (2002a) strongly supports the notion of music therapy as a culturally embedded, everyday life social practice. And he welcomes the "dethroning", as he calls it, of music as high art in music therapy, as this perspective implies (Stige 2001b).

4.4.3 Music, Therapist and Client

It does seem clear that the ontological status of music in music therapy is different from music as a *work*. Whether the work is an "opus", as it is materialized in a score, as in classical music, to be performed on later occasions, or the performance of a jazz musician, on a club session, or the rock album or CD. Music therapy is not directed towards the production of a musical work in any of these senses.

One aspect of music considered as a work is that it becomes an entity that continues in a certain sense a "life of its own". It is not dependent on the composer, who in the case of classical music has finished the work through writing it down in a score, and then sending it off for publishing. The score may then be played at occasions of which the composer has no particular influence other than being the one having made the work. And the work may live on long after the composer, being performed in ever-new circumstances, and experienced and regarded in ever-new ways of interpretation. The work in this way becomes something of an independent entity.

In music therapy the music, in contradistinction to this, is not made primarily to become an end in itself, as a product on its own terms, released, published, or broadcast, and thereby "sent off" on its own, as an independent entity. *Not* to become an It, as Buber described the work of art. But what is the status of music then, if not as a work? What is the *mode of reality* of music in music therapy?

Taking the concrete, most basic setting as a nucleolus situation, there are *three sides* or parts to music therapy, between client, therapist and music. These are the

elemental ingredients, so to speak. In music therapy there is no objectification of music into a work, an object in its own right, and a division between on the one side a producer of the work, and on the other a receiver. Music in this case remains within a situation that also includes a therapist and client presently related to each other. The question then is how they are interrelated. The specific ontology of music in music therapy, its mode of being will depend on its placement within this basic setting. In the following chapter I will attempt to try to elucidate these interrelations somewhat more, to set a stage on which the role of music may be further considered.

5 Music as a Means, End in itself, or as a Medium

After having attempted to bring out what encountering music entails, considered mainly as a work of art, I will now look more closely at the position and status of music in music therapy, placing it within a music therapy setting, which involves client and therapist and music as integral parts. I will first discuss setting up these relations in a linear model, based on a means-and-end logic, and then, following a critique of this view from a dialogical perspective, I present a *triangular* set-up, to illustrate the inter-relational dynamics between all three sides. This is contrasted with some other related ways theoretically of positioning music within the music therapy situation, to clarify the position that is taken here. This will serve as a point of departure for a further development of the argument in the chapters to follow.

5.1 Music as a Linear Means

In the case of music therapy it will not be appropriate to consider music acquiring any autonomous and independent status. Its mode of reality is different. In music therapy music is not primarily an object to be valued and considered solely for its own inherent qualities, as an object of art. Music in this instance clearly serves some extraneous purpose. One suggestion, very near at hand then, might be that music instead of being an autonomous, independent entity – *an end in itself*, serves as *a means towards some predefined end*. The therapist applies music as a means for the betterment of the client. The model in its most basic form will look something like the following:

Figure 1: A Linear Model



From a dialogical point of view music as a means pure and simple fundamentally becomes an It, belonging squarely to the technical and practical mode of use, of expedient measures at hand to be applied on a regular basis for certain predefined objectives or aims. And this, at the outset, is not in itself wrong. The It-mode, as Buber stresses, is both inevitable and necessary in the sustaining of life. And music may naturally be consciously used as a means in various settings, like the background music being played for easing nerves and/or countering boredom and impatience for airplane passengers in the time period before take off. (Though some also might also be annoyed, for various reasons, by this use of music.)

The question may nevertheless be raised whether a strictly and exclusively instrumental perspective actually brings out all the qualities of music as a therapeutic medium. If the use of music within therapy is legitimatised solely on the ground of it being a means for a predefined aim, music as such becomes just a means besides any other means. And considered as a means, it is of no particular interest in itself. Its interest lies in what can be accomplished through its use. Within a purely instrumentalistic view of music, being used solely for the purpose of something else, music, *as music considered*, recedes to the background. The distinctive qualities of the medium do not carry any weight on their own accord within such a position.

5.1.1 Means versus Medium

Aigen (1995a) refers to John Dewey who in *Art as Experience* (Dewey 1980, first published 1934) makes a distinction between two kinds of means, those that are external to what is accomplished, and those that are incorporated in the outcome. An example of the last kind is making a journey for the pleasure of it, rather than for merely coming from one place to the other. As an external means for arriving at the chosen destination, the travel becomes something that one in principle just as well could do without. Taking a journey for its own inherent pleasure, the trip becomes a medium for enjoyment. Here there is a unity between means and end. It makes no sense to say that one could just as

well do without the trip to accomplish the goal, because the trip itself is the goal. And such a unity between means and end, Aigen points out, is a defining characteristic of the aesthetic, according to Dewey.

Aigen does recognize that in some instances music might be used merely as an external means, but in addition to this he suggests that in music therapy, in cases where music is not applied merely as a means, but where the aesthetic dimension is also considered and included, music may more accurately be considered as a medium (pp. 238-39).

5.1.2 The Logic of Means and End

The logic of using music primarily as a means for accomplishing some extraneous end tends not to consider the particular qualities of music itself, because as a means bare and simple it is not connected as such to the outcome it is supposed to bring about. The pure logic of means and end does not presuppose any internal relation between the set aim and means applied; rather they are in principle split apart. This raises the question: If you do not meet the music for its own inherent qualities, will you then actually receive the full beneficial “effects”? If you do not put the music first, on its own accord, will you gain the benefit that *follows*? For instance, you would not on the whole decide to develop your social skills, and thereafter join an orchestra, band or choir, irrespective of your interest in these activities. You may join any of these, *and* receive such benefits. If you do not really care so much about the music activity, you could hardly expect to receive the full positive gains connected with it. The pure means and end logic tends to put the order the other way around, missing out on the qualities of the medium, from which the benefits follow.

For the client in music therapy the primary motivation is likely to be connected to the music activity itself, and if it were not, one could hardly expect any improvement of functions following from this activity. Using music solely as a means for improving functions will tend to overlook this crucial intentional aspect of doing music.

Playing the Piano for Some Other Purpose

The means and end logic is nevertheless quite frequently referred to. An example that may be reported is that piano playing, for instance, may help develop fine motor skills.

But if considered more closely, how credible is this? The strict logic of means and end presupposes some extraneous end that has been set up, with means found to accomplish this particular end. I cannot help suspecting that the example cited might have been constructed the other way around: “What *might* music – as a means – be good for? Let’s say, for instance, piano playing... Well, *fine motor skills*, of course!” This might be an answer quite literally close at hand to suggest. But the question is: Do people on the whole have some specific problems with fine motor skills that that piano playing may be found and proven to be a particularly effective means of alleviating, among other means that might be sought for just this purpose? The order of reasoning here is crucial for deciding upon whether it is an *ad hoc* argument or a true means and end logic has been applied. That is, whether one has started from a sought for outcome, and found an expedient means, or actually decided on the means in advance, (piano playing) instead of selecting them subsequently and *independently*, as would be required for this kind of logic.

There is a further question of credibility here. Is not developing fine motor skills good for piano playing? Fine motor skills may relevantly and meaningfully be developed precisely for playing the piano, a perfectly legitimate end in itself. It would seem rather artificial to evaluate the progress of learning to play the piano *solely* on the basis of the extent to which the related fine motor skills have been developed for some *other* purpose. One might all in all suspect then, that this kind of example is actually proposed to comply (apparently) with the strict logic of means applied to an extraneous end, rather than emerging from actual practice as having been found to be a well suited means for a certain defined end.

A Counter-example Considered

Here I would nevertheless like to cite an example, to illustrate and test the argument, in which a man with Multiple Scleroses actually did ask a music therapist for piano lessons, with the expressed purpose of trying to maintain as much as possible of his functional level of fine motor skills of the hands.⁵³ Another aspect though, was that he wanted to learn some children’s songs, to play for his young son. Engaging in such

⁵³ Personal communication from the Danish music therapist Hanne Mette Ochsner Ridder, Aalborg, 2001.

activity also had something to do with finding something meaningful to do, despite the prognoses of his diagnosed affliction. He was intent on not just giving up, taking an active counterapproach to the consequences of the illness. Learning to play the piano was about having such a project he explained to the music therapist, of still looking forwards, and of engaging in something that also might be supportive of his relating to others, particularly his son. So the aims here after all, were wider than a singular intent towards fine motor training. His playing would thus acquire a broader significance; something with inherent value still.

This man continued his piano lessons with the music therapist for several years. It turns out that he originally had approached the music therapist because he assumed that she would have some competence in adjusting the teaching to his specific needs. So initially his motivation was actually not solely using piano for fine motor skills training then. (One might even speculate if his stating the development of fine motor skills as a motivation could partly have been a way for him of getting the *music therapist* interested in learning him to play the piano – having heard somewhere that this is something music therapists may be quite concerned with. This at least is conceivable.)

What this example could serve to illustrate is that even though there might be *aspects* of music therapy based on a simple means and end logic, *restricting* an account of the role of music in music therapy to a means merely for an extraneous end very soon will become too narrow.

5.1.3 Treating Human Beings as Things

A basic critique that may be raised from a dialogical perspective in using music more or less exclusively in the manner of an It, an expedient means merely, a tool for use, is that this will tend to bring about treating humans in an objectifying way too, as that which this means or tool works upon. To use music in a squarely technical, instrumental way in itself may actually entail reification of the human being, a treatment of people too *as if they were things*.

To illustrate this point, which is crucial, I would suggest a scenario, based on imagination, (any likeness to actual practice is not necessarily entirely coincidental though), of an adolescent boy with cerebral palsy. He is sitting in a wheel chair, and having a music therapy session. The therapist is playing the piano, and the co-therapist

is assisting by placing a cymbal so that he can manage to hit it with a stick held in his hand, in a joint musical improvisation. He is becoming really excited and enthusiastic, managing to hit the cymbal despite his physical inhibitions and limitations, with great and satisfying music effect, related to what the therapist is playing. – The therapist is skillfully and imaginatively adapting the music to the capabilities and response of this young person. He has a broad smile on his face, and though he is not speaking, he is uttering some sparse but intense vocal sounds that seem to express an utmost joy in this activity. Then there is the following “intervention”: The co-therapist gradually places the cymbal higher up, and then somewhat more to the side, and then further backwards from where he is sitting, making it gradually more difficult to hit the cymbal, by placing it at further and further away and at increasingly more awkward positions. The conscious aim here being that this young boy in this way can have some *gross motor training*, by having to stretch his arm more and more in various directions, to hit the cymbal.

There *might* be good reasons for having this young boy become engaged in such gross motor activity, given his cerebral palsy condition. Still there is a fine line to be drawn here with regards to intentionality. I believe a serious question could be raised whether there might not be something highly manipulative about this way of thinking and acting towards another human being. The aim for the therapy becomes inaccessible for him, because his *own* experience and intent presumably is not primarily about performing gross motor training. For him, in this case, it is obviously the music and the playing together that is his primary motivation, and that engages him. In this imagined example, the real aim remains hidden; it is not immediately obvious for the young boy involved what it is about. And if he should in some way become aware of what “really” was going on, of what the aim of the activity was supposed to be, namely the repeated, steadily increased stretching of his arm in different directions, for the purpose of gross motor training, there presumably would be more than a slight chance that his enchantment and engagement with the activity would become reduced, because this would not necessarily be in accordance with his own intention.

The critique that could be raised here is that this young boy’s own will and intent is not taken into consideration. If the real aim remains hidden, even intentionally so by the therapists, *luring* him so to speak into greater arm movement, the more eager he gets

musically, this actually is disallowing the qualities of the music as he experiences it in the given situation, and thereby undermining the integrity the person. There is in such a case no intentional inner connection between means and end as seen from the side of the client. And if there is no such connection, the use of music as a means towards him becomes reifying. He is treated as if he was a thing, his own will and experience bracketed in favor of the two therapists' decision as to what is best for him.

This raises some ethical issues, not the least when dealing with people who are to a large degree at our mercy due to problems of inhibitions, physically and/or mentally. Great caution is needed here. From a dialogical point of view it is crucial that humans are not treated in a reifying manner, lest the therapeutic practice itself simply becomes dehumanizing. A basic stance of a dialogical perspective is that the treatment of human beings not be conducted entirely in an It-mode, that is, not as a purely manipulative, technical relation, but a relation where the one who is helping or serving, meets the other as a human being, in a direct person to person relation, and not as to something external, like to a thing.

The "Classical" Critique of Reification

This is the basic, "classic" one might almost call it, critique of strictly technical modes of treatment of human beings, as has been brought forward from a humanistic stance. In his book *Music Therapy and its Relationship to Current Treatment Theories* (Ruud 1980) contrasts a behavioral and humanistic/existential view of therapy on the ground that the behavioral view, not taking human consciousness into due consideration, and actually striving for an "objective" approach, will miss the dimension of human will and action which is central from an humanistic/existential point of view. There is a therapeutic potential in the meeting itself between therapist and client as real persons. The real self of the therapist, characterized by spontaneity, as an expression of "being oneself", may bring forth the real self also of the client. Ruud here applies Buber's distinction between I-Thou and I-It relations, stressing that an objective attitude from the therapist may not be conducive for bringing out the "real-self" of the client. To further the client's responsible action and capacity to make own choices, the therapist has to be humanly present. This dimension will not be readily available through a merely technical approach, Ruud holds forth. It is only in the relation to the other as a

Thou that the relation may be spontaneous in character. Behavioral learning principles, implying a technical and objective way of relating does not allow space for such spontaneity, Ruud purports.

I will not go any further into discussion on a behavioral orientation and variants of this. It also has to be noted here that Ruud does not at all support any sweeping rejection or dismissal of a behavioral approach. His intent seems to be rather to show some of the limitations of this kind of approach. He recognizes that behavioral modification procedures have proven effective in a variety of situations.

The overall aim of this discussion on reification has been to show that from a dialogical point of view it must be considered too simple to regard music in music therapy as *just* an It; as a bare means, a tool, a purely technical matter, and nothing else. Legitimatising the role of music in therapy on this basis becomes too narrow indeed, in that it does not take sufficient care of the inherent qualities of music as such, and how humans as intentional beings relate to these.

5.1.4 Music as a “Physical Object”

Another aspect of seeing the position of music in music therapy along a singular line of means and end, in which the therapist uses music for a purpose directed towards the client, is the issue of cause and effect. A means and end view in its strictest form will imply a cause and effect relation between the means applied and the outcome or result. The effect of music in this view comes from applying music as a cause with a given predicted outcome. The question here is whether this is the kind of effect to be expected from applying music, and whether music in this sense can be considered a “cause”. Classic natural science has had as an axiom that recurrence will produce equal conditions; that is to say, it will bring about identical results. This has been the presupposition for conducting experiments and for being able to discover universally valid laws of nature, from which it is possible to make predictions. And this possibility for prediction is what constitutes the basis for the application of these laws in various forms of technology.

If one were to discover natural laws, in a similar way, for the effect of music, this would mean viewing the reality of music, its mode of existence, from this particular point of view. Within a natural science paradigm, based on physics, music will be

regarded as sound waves, or more precisely: longitudinal pressure waves in air, or other mediums. These pressure waves are operationally measurable through an apparatus registering the parameters of frequency, amplitude, duration and waveform. And this is what music, according to this perspective, will be considered to exist of (Seashore 1938). Stating that this also is the reality of music would follow as a consequence of so the called “methodological monism” of positivism, which has claimed that only that which can be researched into by the methods of natural science, and by these methods only, is what can be counted as valid knowledge of what is real (von Wright 1971). Music within this “unity of science” paradigm thus becomes a *physical object*, measurable as longitudinal pressure waves in air.

But that this and nothing else is what music should be supposed to be, must lead to unreasonable consequences. For music, as sound, must be regarded to be sound *as heard*. There is little meaning in claiming that music “actually” consists of pressure waves in air. This does not at all give any description of the music *as music*. One does not find melodies, rhythms, timbres, and dynamic changes as musical qualities in quantitative descriptions of frequencies, durations, waveforms and intensities of longitudinal pressure waves moving through air. These are physical states of affair, which no doubt are necessary conditions for the existence of music. There is of course no reason whatsoever to doubt the physical basis of musical sound residing in just these longitudinal waves. But to claim that this is music, “really”, would imply a *physical reduction* that actually erases music, as music considered, quite out of the picture. Sound waves may be registered, measured and calculated, as a physical phenomenon, and of course there may be good reasons for doing so. The field of acoustics, for instance, is both relevant and significant for music. But to claim that this was the *only* true reality of music, *and* how it works, would indicate a “scientific” attitude that does not actually recognize music as a sounding reality in our everyday life. And without taking this into full consideration it would be hard to at all carry on any meaningful discussion on how it “works”.

To view music as in reality a physical entity results in a reduction, dislocates it and makes it not at all recognizable *as music*. It becomes turned into something different, an It, and nothing more than an It, distanced and objectified. In contrast to this, holding open the possibility of relating to music as a Thou, places music directly

into our life world, or within the *everyday*, as Buber terms it. This is where we confront it and experience it, and where it gives meaning to us. This is where we hear it. It is in this life of the everyday that we may relate to music *as music*. It is not located anywhere else really, whether as pressure waves, or as electrochemical processes somewhere inside the brain. The orientation then is phenomenological.

Music viewed dialogically as an encounter implies that it cannot be defined purely on a physical basis. And from this follows that the way music works, or the effects of music, according to this point of view, cannot simply be of the same sort as those found in the causal explanation of physical phenomena. Such a view would have to be considered as a mixing terms on a basic ontological level. It is describing something with a set of terms that belong to an altogether different sphere of reality, literally a kind of “ontological confusion”. The effect of music, *as music*, is not like the effect of a biochemical reaction coming from taking a pill. It is a different kind of effect that needs to be accounted for, on different terms than physical or biochemical cause and effect schemes. The one is not simply reduced or equated with the other.


This of course is not at all to dispute any physiological effects of music, nor of inherent acoustic properties of different scales, chords, and rhythms. From a dialogical perspective the matter is rather about not confusing modes of reality. It is acknowledging the world of relation, and that the inter-dynamics of relation are not meaningfully or entirely described in terms of linear cause and effect schemes. The world of relation is a world that must be described rather in terms of processes of mutuality and reciprocity.

5.2 The Music Therapy Triangle

Having tried to show the inadequacy, from a dialogical point of view, of a simple linear model of a therapist using music as a means for some extraneous end, towards a client, I would now like to try to develop an alternative perspective, based on a “logic” of reciprocity and mutuality. I want to suggest another kind of model than one moving in a one-way direction along a single line. To set therapist and client in a direct interrelation to each other, as well as the to music, *three lines* are needed to interconnect these, not just a line directed from the therapist, via music, towards the client at the other end. I

will, instead of placing music in a middle position on a unidirectional line from one side to the other, suggest turning the single line into a triangle:

Figure 2: The Music Therapy Triangle:



With two-way lines drawn between the three sides the position of music becomes altogether different, compared to placing it along a single line. A triangle makes it possible to bring out the connection between all three sides in relation to each other. It indicates that both the therapist and the client and their relation to music are reciprocally interconnected, and thus a dynamic interrelation between each of these poles is illustrated. Furthermore, and not least significant, such a model may open for a perspective showing the interrelations of one to the other two: how one part mediates the relation between the two others. Three aspects may be seen to this:

First of all, the relation between the therapist and the client is *mediated by the music*. The music is not just sent off in one direction. Within this basic triangle model a reciprocal relation between therapist and client is indicated. The therapist may address the client musically, and may receive musical response. And the therapist may respond back to the client's address to him. This becomes a process of reciprocity. Music between the therapist and client may facilitate a communication, a mutual address and response, through music. The triangle in this way indicates not simply a one-way connection between a therapist and a client, but a relation between the two, mediated by music.

Secondly, the therapist in this perspective *mediates the client's relation to music*. The therapist is not simply engaging in some music activity together with the client, but has an active responsibility within the given therapeutic setting for how the client can

relate to the music. The therapist in this perspective may be seen to mediate how music serves the therapeutic process of the client.

The third pole in the triangle, the client, may be seen to *mediate the therapist's relation to music*, in an indirect, in a certain sense passive way. The therapist is not engaging in music within this setting primarily for his or her own personal expression. The focus of the music activity is serving the needs of the client. The client on the other hand does not have a direct and active role in mediating the therapist's relations to music, but may nevertheless be considered to *functionally* mediate the therapist's relation to music, in that it is the client's needs that are the primary focus in the therapist's relation to the music.

5.2.1 An Illustrative Example: Annabel

There are a series of dialogical processes that are involved then. In the following I would like to give an illustrative example here, from my own practice as a music therapist, to elaborate further on these three sides or aspects of mediation as indicated above. I want to underline that this example is presented here to facilitate a conceptual clarification and development by way of exemplification, and that it is not at all intended or proposed to have any validating status beyond this. The use of the example here is for an illustration of the argument, and not for any purposes of empirical documentation. I first give a brief narrative account, and then use this narrative for a further elucidation of how the three sides may be seen as related to each other, by mediation. This will then serve as a background for further theoretical clarification and elaboration.

Annabel is a girl of about 14 years of age, with Rett syndrome. This is a progressive neurological condition, almost exclusively contracted by girls, in which the child from a very early age on starts losing basic already acquired abilities, like walking and talking, developing a multi handicap condition. Very often there is a characteristic movement of the hands resembling hand washing. I am having individual sessions of music therapy once a week with this girl, in a special education setting. The aim for these sessions is trying to engage her in some meaningful activity. She is very much in recluse, sitting quite self-absorbed in her wheelchair, and with a rather incessant

movement of the hands. She does not have any functional verbal language, and remains very much in a world of her own, not being easy to “reach”, or contact.

I start by singing some songs for her. There is some response here it seems, but she is still rather withdrawn. I try to think about how to engage her somewhat more. I then ask her if I may take her hand, gently releasing one of her hands, which is “hand washing” with the other, and holding it for a while. I then gradually lead it down towards her lap, holding it here. She seems OK with this. The other hand is continuing a more or less automatic movement towards the other hand though, which is not right there any more. I now take a tambourine and place it before her, so that she hits the tambourine as she makes the movement with her hand. This startles her, again and again. I then start singing a song, which I make up spontaneously, in a mode that seems to fit in with the overall “beat” movement of the hand.

An - ne Brit can play the tam - bou - rin! An - ne Brit can play the tam - bou -

rin! And she's play - ing ve - ry well. Yes she's play - ing ve - ry well. An - ne

Brit can the - tam - bou - rin!

This engages her more. After some time she apparently recognizes the song and the activity quite well. When the activity is announced and about to start she is looking rather eagerly towards the instrument and making some effort it seems, to get her hand started. So even if this initially was a quite automatic movement, she now seems intent on hitting and making a sound on the tambourine.

Eventually, as a further step in the development of this activity, I deliberately just sing the first part of the first phrase of the song up to the point: “Annabel can play the tambou- ...” - and then wait for her to actually hit the tambourine with her hand. The moment she does, I continue with the end of the word, and of the phrase: “-rine!” This creates a musical suspension, which is released as she hits the skin of the instrument.

What happens now is that she bursts into a laugh. Her whole face just lights up. I continue likewise through the song, singing part of a phrase, and waiting for her to hit the tambourine before continuing the song. And she just laughs and seems really to be delighted about this. She raises her eyes, and looks up at me in what seems to be astonishment and surprise, and when the song is finished we just sit looking at each other. She is smiling, bursting occasionally into a soft laugh. I am smiling too, having a very strong sense of contact in this moment. This has become a favorite activity for her. She may be quite distant and withdrawn when coming in to have the session, but really lights up whenever we start this activity.

5.2.2 Child-Therapist Relation Mediated by Music

Since this girl does not use verbal language one has to make some guess as to what gain she might have had from this activity, by observing what happens in the session. My own impression was that what really seemed to cause her to light up and become available for contact was that she had a clear feeling that what she did, had some consequence for another person. She might enjoy the song, and find playing the instrument rather fun in and of itself, but the big change in her reaction came when I very markedly adjusted the song to the tempo of her playing, creating a musical suspense that was directly tied up with what she was doing, and that was released by an action from *her*. The musical suspension that was built up was not released until the moment she hit the tambourine with her hand. I had a clear impression at that moment, that this was what made her react with such apparent amazement. And then she looked up towards me, and smiled a big smile.

It turns out that she was capable of making contact then, when there actually was some reason to! There were not many activities in which she could interact on any kind of even level with someone else. Through this activity we achieved some contact. As we were sitting afterwards, just looking at each other, it seemed very clear to me that we were having some mutual recognition of each other. Through the playing she could establish: “Yes, here am I, and I mean something to you. You recognize me for what I am, for what I am capable of doing”. And I could affirm, “Yes, I see you, I see who you are. I see what you can do, and that we can do something together.” In this activity there seemed to be rather more involved then, than what traditionally and more narrowly

could be defined as “learning to play the tambourine”. It was a very simple activity in itself, but it gained a wider significance.

This communicative interchange happened *through music*, and the qualities of the medium are what facilitated it. Without music I would not have had this particular opportunity to reach through. Music became a channel for me to reach through, to get across to her in some way. It was possible for me as a therapist to address her in some way through music. And, very significantly here, I believe, it was through the medium of music that she *herself* was being made able to reach out, and to respond. By her attempting to play, to the by now well known song, and me adjusting the song to her playing, we established a kind of musical interaction, a playing together at a very basic level. The melody had become familiar, for both of us, and waiting for the song to be continued as the tambourine was struck became musically exciting and meaningful. It was music as something we shared in that made contact and interpersonal interaction possible. The relationship between the child and therapist in this way was *mediated by the music*.

5.2.3 Child-Music Relationship Mediated by the Therapist

As mentioned, this girl could not use verbal language. Still it became possible for her to express herself, to make some kind of statement of significance for another person that could be recognized for what it was: Her own. Music is very flexible when it comes to levels of proficiency. It certainly allows for rising to exceedingly high levels of artistry, but it may also be a powerful personal expression at a most elementary level, which is what was aimed at in this case. This is a multi-handicapped girl, with rather limited options for activity. Music proved to be a medium flexible enough to facilitate participation at this level. Annabel was given a possibility to manage, indeed to succeed in this activity. Maybe she would conventionally not be considered a probable candidate at all for engaging in any kind of musical ensemble playing. But through taking her movements of the hand to be intentional, or creating a frame in which they might appear as intentional, the potential intentionality of the movements were actualized in a way. The therapeutic task consisted in facilitating the child’s participation in music by adapting the activity to her capabilities and needs. She would not readily have had just

this possibility of relating to music without the active and creative mediation by the therapist. The therapist thus responsibly *mediated the child's relationship to the music*.

5.2.4 Therapist-Music Relation Functionally Mediated by the Child

The song was a spontaneous creation in the moment, and would not of itself have been made by the therapist outside of this particular setting. It was the situation that called forth the song. This exemplifies the third side of the therapist's relation to music being mediated by the relationship to the client. The way the song was made was related to how it facilitated the participation of the child, and this is also what it should be evaluated by. The rhythm, the melody, the text and the playing activity all go together in the overall simple structure of the song, and also the way it was used, with fermatas inserted and extended in the waiting for the girl to hit the instrument. The song was made for this specific situation, for therapeutic purposes, naturally including all these elements into a whole. The therapist's relation to the making and performing of this particular music was in effect then *mediated by its function for the child*.

5.2.5 Music as a Medium

The lines drawn here, indicating how each side mediates the relation between the two others, suggests that any single cause and effect outcome between one side and the other will be hard to find. Instead a reciprocity between all three sides is found, rather than any unidirectional A leading to B. There is no mechanical one-way connection drawn between music and client, administered by the therapist, because *one side related to the other is mediated by the third*. This implies that the workings of music in music therapy, according to such a view, must be found in dynamics of interrelation, rather than in one-to-one mechanical effects. In Buber's basic terms, it is in *the world of relation*, rather than in the predictable and manageable world of objects and things, that the primary workings of music in music therapy take place.

The position or status, that is to say the ontology of music in music therapy then, according to the triangular perspective drawn here, is not as an object aimed towards becoming an autonomous work of art, an independent entity to be valued on its own terms. Nor is the status of music to be defined solely as an external means, instrumentally applied for some other predefined end. The position of music in music

therapy may, in accordance with a dialogical view, be considered to be *between* these two, as a *medium*. The effect of music thus considered is not to be found residing within music itself. The way music works is seen rather in and through its interrelations. This suggests that the place to look for the actual effect or power of music in music therapy may be *between* means purely for an end, and an end in itself, which is to say: as a medium.

An Illustrative Device for the Argument

The triangle set-up here is merely a graphic illustrative device for the argument presented.⁵⁴ There is always the danger of reading too much into such a figure, resulting in a restriction rather than a broadening of thought (Elliott 2002). It is important to be aware that an *argument*, other than the most simple, may not be put up this way. Therefore, the figure as such should not be taken too literally as a model in itself. It is a support for the argument here and has to be seen in the light of this.

5.3 Music as Art, and Music as Therapy

The perspective outlined here apparently implies a somewhat different position for music as a medium than the one suggested by Aigen (1995a), referred to here previously, which is based on John Dewey's philosophy. Dewey (1980) sought to bring something of the aesthetic, as a quality of unity between means and end, into daily life experience. He proposed this as one way of alleviating alienating tendencies of modern society. And on the other side he objected to the modern autonomy of art. Dewey thus sought a higher integration of art with life and life with art. While it is easy to sympathize with this notion, I think some distinction regarding the status of art, *as art* needs to be upheld in this context, for the purpose of not confusing the issue when it comes to the position of music in music therapy. Not so much because of differences as of likeness, taking note that resemblance is not the same as identity.

⁵⁴ I have not taken this illustrative form from any particular music therapy theory source. The basic idea of relating these three sides to each other through a triangle figure I initially found in the Wittgenstein- inspired aesthetics of the Norwegian philosopher Kjell S. Johannessen, though the three sides represented in his model are "artist", "artwork" and "receiver", in Danbolt (1979). The triangular figure is here modified to interrelate the three specific sides of a *music therapy* setting, the therapist, the music and the client, and interpreted in a somewhat different way, as depicting a concrete situation in which all three sides are *presently* connected with each other, and thereby dynamically related.

Aigen could seem to imply that there is really not that big a difference between music therapy and music as an art, in the way Dewey regards this. He bases his argument on Dewey's notion of a medium being a unity between means and end. But this would be just as valid for a *general aesthetics* of music. Aigen's conception of medium does not distinguish in a clear way the differences, which I think after all have to be admitted, between music as art, and its position and role in therapy. If life, as Dewey envisions, is art, or should be approaching art, then everything could be art, but not necessarily in the more narrow sense of the term. And we still need such a narrow term, not to literally confuse art with just about everything else in life.

I believe it is significant to retain a certain distinction between *music therapy* and *music as art*, because of a crucial difference in focus and aim. There is a purpose, or an aim for music therapy, namely benefiting, helping the client. Music therapy is not about making musical works of art as such. In music therapy music becomes a medium, because it is not made into a *work*, made autonomous as an independent entity in itself. Thus it *remains* within the setting of the therapist and client, as indicated by the triangle set-up. It is by retaining its position within the setting that music may obtain a status as a medium. By not letting music *objectify* into a work, it remains within the present situation, and in this way it may become a *medium* for the therapeutic process of the client. Music therapy then, is not primarily for having some *music* produced that continues a life on its own; it is for the sake of the client, for the *client* to gain a life of his or her own.

There are not just two sides to this positioning then, as indicated in the distinction made by Dewey between two types of means, external and in some sense internal, which is characterized by a unity of means and end, and to which music therapy as a form of "art" can be placed. A differentiation is needed between therapy and the work of art. Music in music therapy is not a medium for life in general terms, but a medium *for therapy*, which does not mean that it is not for life, but that it is not similar to making music for the sake of art. It is not an end in itself, as a work of art, nor is it a means for some external end, as some technical device, it is a medium for therapy, in which its own qualities are adhered to, but for another end than itself, the betterment of the client.

We might well, with Dewey, ideally envision a society in which there is no therapy and no art, just life lived to the full. But completely erasing any distinction

between art and therapy on the way, *before* arriving at this ideal state, would just confuse the issue itself, make it into a blur, rather than solve it in any way. To live life *as* art, we have to know what art is. If and when we realize the union of art and life, we might well forget about art as anything on its own accord, but not before achieving this lofty goal. Or else we would have nothing to go by. Maybe art in this way is for remembering, for becoming aware, until so long.

5.4 Contrast With a Semiological Perspective

I would like to clarify further my position regarding the basic triangle set-up by way of contrast with another theoretical view. In his review of new musicological theories Ansdell refers to Jean-Jacques Nattiez, who through his principal work *Music and Discourse* (1990), gives a comprehensive account of a semiological outlook. Ansdell highlights some principles from this work that he finds may be relevant to consider for music therapy, centered round the question, “How does music mean?” This is set-up as a contrast to the traditional musicological formalist concern with “How does it work?” Ansdell defines semiology as the study of how things signify other things – *how one thing stands for another*. And he refers to Nattiez, who holds forth that for symbolic systems like music what is implied is not a simple matter of sending a coded message that is decoded by the receiver. Regarding music as a language in such a sense leads to what Nattiez calls the “communication fallacy”. Instead he divides the process in three. At the center of the system of communication stands a “trace”, in the form of the material product. To the one side of this trace is the production process, which Nattiez calls *poietic*, and to other the reception process, which Nattiez calls *esthesis*. Ansdell elaborates:

The important point is that the receiver may not necessarily receive any meaning intended by the producer... Instead the producer constructs and leaves a ‘trace’ ... and the receiver makes sense of this according to their perception and interpretation (p. 41).

Nattiez calls this idea the ‘Tripartition’ of symbolic forms. It may be used to explain how it is possible to make sense of music that is radically different from what one is familiar with, as will often be the case in the field of ethnomusicology, in which Nattiez mainly has worked. Ansdell applies the idea to musical situations in music therapy, as

for instance when the question is posed: "...how we can 'make musical sense' ... of the playing of the autistic child, when we don't know what he 'means'". The tripartition may help to chart the extremely complex situation of improvisation in music therapy, either in the actual playing, or listening back to a recording preserved as a "trace", Ansdell maintains. The main point, he claims, is that in any case we are actually constructing musical sense. Still it is possible to exert some "control" of this process, by what he terms the "quasi-objective study of the preserved material detail of the 'trace'". This is the music represented in its structural aspect.

Critique has been raised towards this theory, also from within the New Musicological position. Liz Garnett (1998a) in the article: "Musical Meaning Revisited: Thoughts on an 'Epic' Critical Musicology" informs that such a notion of resorting to an analysis of a "neutral level" represented by the material trace, to circumvent cultural bias, has come under attack. Her main objection to the model is that it is intensely individualistic, separating *the* composer, *the* listener, *the* work. It obscures the degree to which there actually can be communities in which musical codes are shared. Also, the roles are not always as distinct as the model would make them appear. She is concerned that such a fundamentally individualistic conception of musical meaning puts in question the very possibility of socially mediated values in music, by in effect erasing the site in which such meaning is grounded.

Ansdell seems to sense a similar train of thought within the model, and accordingly qualifies it somewhat by saying that: "There is still a 'musical between' where our worlds meet, but the communicative system of music-making is nevertheless essentially ambiguous (or 'polysemic' in the jargon)" (Ansdell 1997. p. 42). He proposes that the gain of this outlook for music therapy is primarily that in the end it gives both creative and analytic freedom, by clearly indicating the two sides of the "poietic" and "esthetic", related from each side to the music in the middle. This gives a different model of interrelations:

Figure 3: The "Tripartition" Schema:

Poietic process Esthetic process



Although this perspective may illuminate aspects related to music therapy, as indicated by Ansdell, there are crucial differences though. The rejection of a simple conception of music as a language of codes that merely need to be decoded to achieve understanding of the message may well be accepted, but this does not imply that there has to be a complete *separation* between the productive and receptive aspect. As Garnett stresses, there may be some common ground. If the “language model” in its simplest sense may be characterized as a “communication fallacy”, music therapy still clearly adheres to an idea that communication, despite the necessary poietic and esthetic processes from each side respectively of the materialized “trace”, is possible.

The roles in music therapy are not at all easily fitted within the tripartition scheme. In music therapy *both* the client and therapist are engaged in “poietic” processes, through joint improvisation, *and* in esthetic, in the perception of the music, and the meaning found in it. How to account for the relations and communication between the participants within this interrelated process remains largely unaddressed by the “tripartition” schema. Furthermore the “esthetic” process, in Nattiez’s terms, remains directed towards gaining meaning from the music itself as a “trace”, as Garnett points out. Within music therapy the meaning of the music has to be seen within the context of therapy, which means the *significance it may have for the client*. It is the meaning not of the music itself, but of the music for the client that needs to be in focus.

Nattiez’s basic model all in all then does not present itself as particularly applicable or suitable to outline the specific characteristics of the music therapy situation. It remains “musicological” in the more narrow sense of the word, centered mainly on the musical “text”, as it on one side has been made, and as it on the other is being made sense of, not depicting any direct relations *between* these two sides, or of any specifically personal relation to the music within each side. These objections aside, the model may naturally open for a broader view than a simple language/code model, illustrating complexities of musical communication, particularly, as mentioned, in the encounter with unfamiliar music, as often is the case in ethno-musicological research, the needs of which this model originally was intended as a response to.

⁵⁵ From Nattiez (1990). p. 17.

The needs of music therapy, as indicated here, are somewhat different though, and the model, as it stands, seems hardly directly transplantable. A particular characteristic of the music therapy situation is the *concurrence* of the processes of *making* and *making sense* of music in a complex interaction that *remains* in a single situational place and time, which poses different questions as to processes of understanding than does music history or ethnomusicology, as a study of *other* music, over temporal and cultural distances. And a triangular situational model interrelating the three sides *presently* to each other takes more care of this, I will propose.

5.5 The Concept of the “Musical Between”

As mentioned above, Ansdell purported that there still was a “musical between” within the music therapy setting. In his book *Music for life: Aspects of Creative Music Therapy with Adult Clients*, Ansdell (1995) has a chapter entitled: “Meeting”, in which he applies Buber’s concept of the “between” to what he terms the “musical meeting”. This of course is highly relevant to consider in the present context, though I think there are some problems with Ansdell’s exposition of the term, as I will try to show in the following.

Ansdell relates that he finds it is difficult to quote Buber, because of the unusual vocabulary that is used in the development of the argument. So he bases his application on an interpretation made by Danah Zohar in the book: *The Quantum Self*. Ansdell quotes:

In intimacy, I and you appear to influence each other, we seem to ‘get inside’ each other and change each other from within in such a way that ‘I’ and ‘You’ become a ‘We’. This ‘We’ that we experience is not just ‘I+You’, it is a new thing in itself, a new entity... the ‘We’ that appears to arise in intimate relationships is the ‘I-Thou’ written about by Martin Buber. (Zohar 1990). (Quoted in Ansdell p. 68.)

There are manifold interpretations of Buber, given in a great variety of settings and contexts. This particular interpretation is not a much-cited reference in the secondary literature though, and actually quite problematic, I believe, in particular in the making of the construct “We” as “a new thing in itself, a new entity”, as Zohar phrases it. Buber takes great pains not to make any kind of “entity” of what is relational. It is actually a basic feature of his philosophical outlook that the relational as such is considered as

non-objectified. I suspect he would strongly object to turning the I-Thou relation into a “We”, designated as a kind of “new entity” or “thing in itself”, as Zohar actually phrases it. This clearly sounds more like what would belong to the world of It in Buber’s terms. Making objectifications of what is relational is arguably precisely what Buber seeks to avoid. Basing a reading of Buber on this particular interpretation, it may seem that Ansdell does tend to run into some problems with the constructs made. I will try to sort some of this out in the following.

At the outset Ansdell takes this “We” to be synonymous with Buber’s concept of the “Between”. Applying this concept he then writes:

In music therapy the ‘Between’ *is the music itself*, where our creative responses can draw an ‘I’ and a ‘You’ into an ‘I-You’ and finally perhaps into ‘We’ (p. 68, italics added).

Buber developed the concept of “the between” for designating the relational field in which the bridging of the gap between distance and relation takes place (Buber 1961). Making an equation of “the between” with the “music itself” tends towards turning “the between” as a field of relation into an entity, into some kind of thing, namely the music. Ansdell furthermore introduces a new conceptual construct along these lines, the “musical between”, putting these two words together into one:

Within this “musical between” a relationship can come about which is primarily *in the music*, established in the improvisation from the first time a musical contact is made, and developed through to the point where a true ‘meeting’ can come *in the music* (p. 68, italics added).

Ansdell repeatedly uses phrases like “relationship *in* the music”, or “relationship *inside* the music”, or a “musical meeting ... *within the purely musical* (p.65, 67, italics added). The insistence on the relationship residing *within* the music seems to be conceptually based on the equation of music with the “between”, or this at least seems to be what is suggested. Music *is* “the between”, or “the between” *is* music in some sense. Music seems this way to be positioned *within* “the between”.

Ansdell’s phrase “musical meeting” implies a *fused notion* of the interpersonal and the musical relationship. But this I think may be questioned. Is the relationship as such “inside” the music? Is not relationship actually between people? Any meeting between people must surely be an interpersonal affair, and not just residing somehow within the so-called “purely musical”. “Musical meeting” may thus seem a rather

artificial conceptual construct. “Meeting *through* music” would be more in accordance with the perspective that I am trying to develop here. The distinction between the musical and the interpersonal needs to be upheld, I believe, to be able account for the *mediation between them*, across the two interrelated spheres of the musical and the interpersonal relationships.

5.5.1 Fusing or Spacing ”the Between”

Ansdell makes no claim to other than a suggestion of the implications of Buber’s approach to dialogue as this may be applied to music therapy. On the basis of the interpretation given by Zohar (1990), with the I and You becoming a We, he presents a schema illustrating the different levels of relationship within therapy, moving from an initial attempt to make contact, from the therapist, to the responding of the client, to mutual relating, and finally to meeting.

Ansdell’s use of the term I and Thou here, together with the illustrations, is rather creative, though not necessarily particularly precise. He initially makes the construct “I>You”, which he places on the therapist side throughout the series, up until the last illustration where just a “We” is presented, in the middle. Of course the initial intent with the concepts “I” and “You” was to show relation between two sides, and it may seem a bit odd to have both of these on one side, but Ansdell’s construct could be interpreted as indicating a relational attitude from the therapist towards the client, the therapist continuously addressing the client as a You. The first stage in the process is contact, achieved oftentimes from an initial isolation within a singular “I”, on the side of the client, or on the other hand just the complying to the other as a “You”, without any real personal engagement. The next phase - Ansdell takes care to underline that this is a different process in each case - is indicated by “I” (“You?”) on the client side; an I with a You in brackets, *and* with a question mark included (!) This would presumably indicate the careful approach towards response. The next level is relating, with the “I”>”You” on the therapist side being mirrored by a reverse “You”< “I”, on the side of the client, indicating both having an I-You attitude towards the other. And finally there is just a common “We” in meeting, placed between the two:

Figure 4: A Series of Figures from Ansdell (1995)




Figure 8.4 Contacting




Figure 8.5




Figure 8.6 Responding




Figure 8.7 Relating




Figure 8.8 Meeting

I will leave the idiosyncrasies in the use of Buber's concepts here. And also accept the description given through these series of the different levels from contact via response to relating and meeting as both relevant and meaningful. Still there remains a problem concerning the position of music within this schema. There is actually, and quite remarkably so, no music in his model other than the illustration of the piano on the therapist side and the drum on the client side within the first figure. This might seem to reflect that interpersonal relationship and music, in accordance with the basic conceptual construct of the "musical between", are practically equated. This is also indicated in the expressions that Ansdell uses, for instance in the first figure the client "experiences only herself in the music". This peculiar phrase seems to be in accordance with the abovementioned tendency to simply equate the interpersonal, or in this case just the personal, before any interpersonal engagement, and the musical. In the final figure it seems that *both* the therapist and client *and* the music as such become fused into the "We", which Ansdell then terms the "musical meeting".

The "Between" in Buber's sense, is the *relational field* as such, and by ultimately fusing all the elemental ingredients of music therapy together, the fields of relation and

interrelation close together into one single point, as seen in Ansdell's final figure. This, as I see it, is the main problem with Ansdell's frame of view. Neither the interpersonal nor the relation to music is clearly accounted for in the insistence on near identity between these two aspects. And neither is the relation between them. Therefore I will prefer keeping the lines that can be drawn between therapist and client, and the lines from both of these to music, to get some kind of view of the relational and inter-relational fields between them, instead of ultimately fusing them into one.

The triangular set-up shows interrelations along three lines, across two different spheres. And the nature of the relation is different for each of these three sides. They each have different characteristics, as seen in the differences in the way each side mediates the relation between the two others. And this is the main reason for keeping these lines between open, rather than merging them all "in" the music. A problem with "containing" in some sense the relationship "within the music" is that these various aspects of each line of relation, and of the interrelation with the other ones are not brought out clearly. The "Between" is not some fused entity, it is no "thing" at all, it is the *space* in which relation is opened for. And this space I believe has to be kept open, not closed, in order to distinguish what is in it, and what happens within it, and if some fusion into a single point at some time might occur, to see what is fused and how this could have come about.

5.6 Musical Analysis and Pragmatics

A further issue related to the position of music as set up in the triangular model is the relevance of musical analysis. In an article on "'New Musicology', Music Education and Music Therapy" Even Ruud, (2001a) stresses the necessity of contextualizing the music, claiming that the question of musical pragmatics is vital if music therapy is to get an understanding based on real life situations, instead of remaining stuck to what he calls "age old speculative traditions". Ruud nevertheless acknowledges that musical analysis occupies a necessary place within the discipline of music therapy, which in this respect shares a common ground with musicology. The agenda will be completely different though, Ruud maintains. A main issue is that there is a need to correlate the stream of music and the moments of therapeutic significance. This no doubt will prove

to be a difficult task, Ruud emphasizes, but given the case that such correlation has been found, the next step is to proceed with analysis, from a transcription or score of the music. Here Ruud stops up to ask a question:

But what do we look for? Thematic unity, tempo changes, texture, dialogic patterns, changes in complexity, melodic or thematic characteristics (§ 33)?

These of course are standard questions of musical analysis as performed by traditional musicology, and Ruud assumes that any of these may apply, according to the character of the piece in question. Still an additional problem needs to be addressed:

To what extent can we expect a correspondence between the music as heard or notated and the experience as it occurred for the client? Is it possible to translate from the analysis to the experience (§ 33)?

Ruud gives the tentative answer that the problem of over-interpretation is serious here. He cautions against making general claims about the relations between formal characteristics of music, and possible mental reactions, and insists that the effects for music have to be understood within a context, including instruments and technologies as part of the transactions. Furthermore, self-reflexivity is required regarding the particular concepts and metaphors that are being applied in the analysis.

Stige (2001a) points to the text-context issue as a main cross point between musicology and music therapy:

Although the problem of text versus context is shared, the differences in practices and their objectives are so large that quite rarely can methods of analysis developed within musicology be transplanted to music therapy (§ 8).

But the issue is hardly closed with this. It will in any case not just a matter of transplanting. Musical analysis has been developed for a certain purpose, and using it in another context (!) requires an awareness as to what it is to be used for. This of course is related to the discussion on structural analysis within musicology. The argument that is put forward here is that reading the text is not sufficient; the context also needs to be considered.

5.6.1 Text and Context

This is a complex issue, for which it is necessary I believe, to draw some distinctions, to clarify what it entails. Some nuances are needed. Etymologically the word “context”

means to “weave together”. A dictionary definition is as follows: “The parts of a discourse that surround a word or passage and can throw light on its meaning” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary). Text-context is thus naturally of central importance *within* musical structural. A melody or theme finds its significance within the context of the entire musical web, and within the work as a whole. Any musical element actually finds its meaning through its relation to all the others that surround it. And the procedures and vocabulary of analysis are naturally developed to bring this out.

Historical Background for Musical Analysis

It is important, I believe, to view the issue of the musicological relevance of structural analysis in a historical perspective. Around the mid-eighteenth century a new and “autonomous” sphere in society was created, the sphere of art, as a part of the increasing differentiation of modern society. Fine art and music at this time ceased to be tied up exclusively to the church, for ritual purposes, or to the court, for representative purposes, but was now – supported by a new and rising bourgeoisie class – presented in galleries and concert halls, as “objects” to be valued on their own terms. The concept of aesthetics was introduced by Baumgarten and developed further by Kant, who stressed the “disinterested” nature of the perception of works of art. Art became, ideally at least, a sphere, a haven of its own, released from daily practical concerns. Purely instrumental music now gradually gained an increasingly greater significance, which was unprecedented. During this time the music, which came to be called “classical”, also became structurally more developed, and was at the same time listened to more closely and attentively. – In the concert halls it now became a common practice to listen in *silence*, contemplating the music. The elaborated forms of instrumental music were eventually given transcendental significance, in accordance with the romantic philosophy of art that developed during the nineteenth century (Bø-Rygg 1985).

If music is listened to in a contemplative way, as now became a social practice, it quite naturally gives meaning to consider its features closer, to gain a deeper understanding of it. The *score* turns out to be eminently suited for such analysis. It represents a frozen picture so to speak, of the whole work, (before the time of sound recordings,) which can be examined closer both for an overall view and for specific details, independent of the actual flow of music in time. Music as a sounding

phenomenon is not at all easy to grasp and hold on to in each and every aspect and detail, and the written score, presents itself as much easier to handle, and to analyze. This becomes all the more relevant as the musical work itself eventually is regarded as realized through the score. There may be many single performances of the work, and it needs to be played on instruments in order to be realized as sounding music, but the work, or *opus*, as represented by the score, could be analyzed through consulting the score directly. This was done through procedures and vocabularies that were developed specifically for such analysis. In this way a closer consideration of the work on its own terms was made possible, in accordance with the new focus on its structural, autonomous qualities.

This, of course, is not what is objected to in the “New Musicology” critique of traditional musicology. It is *limiting* the context considered to the internal musical structure that is questioned. Subotnic (1996) has accused traditional musicology for treating music as “a text without a context”. The text, quite literally here then, is the score. And the context that is not included is the cultural setting, the extra-musical meanings beyond what may be found through the mere syntactic analysis of the score. What this accusation amounts to, is *formalism*, taking the formal elements to be the whole thing, reducing the object to its interrelated formal elements. Reading the musical score as a self-contained entity entails a gross simplification of text-context relations in that it, taken to the extreme, creates a schism between the structural aspect of the musical work and the culturally mediated meanings that may attached to those forms.

Against a formalist reduction new musicologists point to the necessity to take into consideration other interrelated aspects. The *wider*, that is to say, cultural context needs to be taken into consideration. The question of course is how much such context to include, because there is no limit to how much that may be included. Also, making a schism between “text” and “context” may turn out not to be fruitful. There may be a danger of moving off to the other extreme, to a “context without a text”. Which is what traditional musicologists have then would accuse new musicologists of. How to include cultural context and not loose sight of music itself as “text”, be that as a score or otherwise, as performance, has been the challenge.

5.6.2 Intertextuality

Hans Weisethaunet (2000) purports that the whole text-context issue has become oversimplified. He refers here to Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogic literary theory, to illustrate some of the complexities of the issue. (According to Weisethaunet the concept of dialogue would seem to serve as an obvious master key for understanding Bakhtin's work as a whole).

Weisethaunet refers to Bakhtin's critique of the discipline of linguistics, which has considered the *sentence* as the basic unit of language. Bakhtin proposes instead the *utterance* as a basic unit of "speech communication". And no utterance can be isolated in itself, it always presupposes other utterances, that precede and that follow it. No utterance is either first or last. An utterance furthermore always has an "addressee", real or virtual, giving it an inherent dialogical quality. Linguistic studies have been primarily concerned about the structure of sentences within language as a system, but not about the relation between utterances and how they relate to a common reality. It is not the "sentence" that gives meaning, but the "utterance" as a whole. Bakhtin transfers the communicative quality of utterances, as may be found in everyday speech, to the readings of literary texts, particularly the novel. The consequence of this, Weisethaunet points out, is not a withdrawal from textual analysis into context. Rather the contrary he writes:

Bakhtin teaches us how the readings of texts might be broadened by opening up the possibilities of multiple meanings and heterogeneous ends within interpretation.

The reader is considered a co-author in this process, actively rendering the material meaningful through the reading process. The French literary theorist and psychoanalyst, Julia Kristeva, in her reading of Bakhtin has proposed the influential term *intertextuality*, to capture this dialogic quality of utterances. This term refers to the interrelations *between* texts, and the meaning that may be drawn from this. Any single text can be seen in relation to other texts that have preceded it. This implies that the dichotomy text/context becomes too gross. Weisethaunet suggests that this kind of view, from literary theory, may be transferred to music. The concept of intertextuality may illuminate the complexity of musical aesthetics, as an alternative to constructing music as simple objects, he writes.

Weisethaunet points out that Bakhtin in his early works claims that recognizing an aesthetic work is to feel another consciousness inside it, in a way similar to how one feels in the presence of another human being. (A clear parallel may be seen here to Kramer's notion of the subjectification of music, and the hermenutical usage of regarding the work of art as a *Thou*.) The aesthetic experience then, according to Bakhtin, is "dialogic" and not passively receptive. Bakhtin regards the reader a co-author of the text. Weisethaunet draws a parallel between reading a text as co-authoring, and listening to music:


"The event of listening does not require speech acts, however, the listening experience is contingent on sensory activity on behalf of the listener. In this sense the music listener is also an author, co-authoring a specific and unique self/other relation in music (Weisethaunet 2000. p. 11).

The listener may this way be considered as a co-author of the musical "text". This dialogic perspective implies deconstructing a simple schema of text and context in music, because there is no definitive meaning to be found within the musical text, and it is not found merely by looking at the context either. An active participation is constitutive for finding meaning in music, in each case, which makes it a process that is not divided into two simple versions of a simple "structuralist" text versus a "culturalist" context. Listening to music as a dialogic process presupposes enactment, which is not split up between either textual structure or cultural context, one to each side, but a complex interrelation through various interconnected levels and aspects between both texts and contexts. Thus wise music somewhat paradoxically retains autonomy, as utterance within life, not in isolation from it, but participating in it, according to a Bakhtinian view, Weisethaunet suggests. This dialogical outlook then could be seen to support setting music up with a position of its own within the triangular model, neither as a fixated "text" nor completely dissolved into a wider "context", but retaining its own position in and through its being "co-composed" by those relating to it.

5.6.3 Illustrative Analysis of a Music Therapy Song

To illustrate the issue of musical analysis more closely I will here make an analysis of a music therapy song, namely the one referred to previously in the example with

“Annabel”, and through this elaborate somewhat further on the relevance or not, of structural analysis for music therapy.



The song, notated here in F major, starts with an upbeat, with two semi-quavers moving downwards the interval of a third, from the third step of the scale (the note A) via first step (the note F), down to the fifth step (the note C), in the octave below. Here the melody continues on four repeated Cs, establishing a clear dominant quality towards the final beat of this measure, in which it turns with two semi-quaver notes up one step to D and back down to C. The movement up to the sixth step D and then back to the fifth step C accentuates an expectation that something has to happen. And this is precisely where the fermata was put in, to accentuate this even more. The melodic tension that is built up this way is released through a melodic skip of a fourth upwards back to the note of F, which is the keynote, and in which it finds rest, for the time being.

This constitutes the first phrase of the melody, which fits with the sentence: “Annabel can play the tambourine!” The final leap of a fourth upwards from the eighth-note valued C towards the keynote F, placed on the strong first beat of the bar, with a dotted half-note value, gives the melody a certain exclamatory character just here, underlining in this way the affirmative statement of the text. To make a comparison: This ancient musical devise of an upward leaping fourth, from an upbeat, landing on a strong beat of the bar is much used, with dramatic effect, for instance in fanfares. And though the effect clearly is not quite this strong, there is something of this character to the melodic form here, a certain “hint” at least, that fits well with the appreciative character of the text describing the action. Furthermore, this return to the keynote is where the tambourine is actually hit by the girl, which serves to frame this point as musically significant. This is where the phrase finally ‘lands’, leading at the same time to the hitting of the tambourine.

The initial first two notes on the upbeat at the beginning of the phrase have quite another effect though, a “calling” quality rather, through the descending third. This is a much-used melodic formula in children’s spontaneous song in play activities, and often functions to call attention from another child (Bjorkvold 1992). This function is

accentuated in the song by using the two first syllables of the child's name together with the formula, "Anne-". The last syllable "bel" is placed on the low fifth. This is where the further development of the phrase starts, where the telling of what is happening is done, and from where the phrase eventually builds tension towards the final exclamatory release into the keynote at the start of the next measure, as shown in the previous paragraph.

This phrase is then repeated. The effect of this is to make it even clearer, stating it once more, musically and textually, establishing it. Then there is a variation, with a somewhat more elaborate melodic movement, moving through the full span of an octave. A musical/lyric comment one might say, that is stated twice: "And she's playing very well, yes she's playing very well".



In the first very version made of the song the introductory phrase is then repeated, giving the song a clear sense of closure. The song on the whole then appears in the very basic AABA form. There is a twice-made statement, a variation, and a repetition of the statement. The song thus has a very simple but efficient structure, making it easy to perceive, to recognize and to remember.

The quality of the song should not be measured by any formal criteria of musical art, but rather by how it was applicable to its particular use. The song was made rather spontaneously; still it turned out highly structured, as the analysis shows, with both the text and the melody in relation to each other. Developing and using this song-activity, was all the time monitored according to Annabel's response and reactions. The tempo, the rhythm, the melody all had to be adjusted to this. And as the analysis given here suggests, the simple calling quality of the two first notes, the tension-building quality of the following measure, with the fermata at the end, naturally increasing the tension before returning to the key note, served to highlight the playing of the tambourine, as Annabel hit it on the first beat of the second measure. The repeating of this phrase, the B-part and the return to the first phrase may in the light of this structure all be seen to contribute to frame and make meaningful the tambourine playing for the girl.

The song is pentatonic, based on a five-tone scale, with no half notes. This is cognitively the simplest form of melody to comprehend. Diatonic melody with seven notes within the span of one octave, and with the use of half steps, is quite naturally somewhat more demanding to comprehend. A modulating diatonic melody would be even more challenging, not to speak of more or less extensive chromatics. As a melodic gestalt a pentatonic melody is relatively easy grasp and learn. And my aim was to reach through, to make something that might catch and hold her attention. I did not decide on this beforehand though. That fact that the song was pentatonic was something that I was not even consciously aware of before I made an analysis of it, I must admit, though it is quite readily apparent. That it turned out this way was a reflection of the needs of the situation, as they were accommodated spontaneously in the making of the song. Analysis here proves to reveal simplicity rather than complexity, which in this context is of significance in itself. The song furthermore, was unaccompanied by any chord instrument, not relying on any specific chord progressions to support it.

Further development of the song

The simplicity of the song thus was a main point. My first inclination was indeed to keep it as simple and basic as possible, but when I found that I was reaching through, I could make it just a little bit more elaborate. I soon actually made the last phrase of the song somewhat different, finding that it was not necessary to keep it as strictly elementary. I made a variation moving upwards in the last repetition of the A phrase, “Annabel can play the tambourine”, which now could be marked A’, introducing a diatonic element with the adding of the note Bb a half step up from A towards C, trying to make a more poignant ending of the song.



Sensing that the girl was following, I made a little bit more out of it then, to avoid dullness. This entails keeping a balance between the simple and the complex, which

seemed to work. The song became simple enough to understand, and engaging enough to participate in.

And then, as I sensed that she knew the song and had become used to it, I eventually moved into some improvisational variations of the song, after having sung it once, making the phrases somewhat more rhythmically active, as can be seen in the following examples:

The first example shows a musical score in 2/4 time with a key signature of one flat (Bb). The vocal line (treble clef) consists of two phrases: "An - na - bel can play - An - na - bel can play - An - na -" and "bel can play the tam - bou - rine!". The tambourine line (treble clef) features a triplet of eighth notes in the first measure, followed by a quarter note, and ends with a repeat sign.

And, in this second instance in which there is a move towards a tonal inversion of the previous theme variation, and in which the second diatonic note of E is introduced.

The second example shows a musical score in 2/4 time with a key signature of one flat (Bb). The vocal line (treble clef) consists of two phrases: "An - na - bel can play - An - na - bel can play - An - na -" and "bel can play the tam - bou - rine!". The tambourine line (treble clef) features a triplet of eighth notes in the first measure, followed by a quarter note, and ends with a repeat sign.

These improvisational variations facilitated a musical extension of the activity, making it possible to stretch it somewhat, to make more out of it. I sang the song first, and then made some improvisational variations, which were naturally adjusted to her mood and level of engagement, as she continued participating on the tambourine, and then rounded of with a return to the original melody. This gave a sense of final closure to the whole activity.

5.6.4 Reflection on Musical Qualities

This is just one example of a musical analysis applied to a music therapeutic song and activity. Such analysis may bring out the structure of the song more clearly, and the relation of the structure to the therapeutic function or intent. Becoming more aware of

this may contribute to further development of the activity, and for learning, by increasing knowledge and understanding of the way the structure of the music may be related to therapeutic process and intent. This may inform the making of new songs and activities.

Musical analysis here becomes a reflection on the music made, and may illuminate the considerations that have gone into it, rather spontaneously, in making the song work in a given situation. It may this way contribute to make the qualities of the song, as a therapeutic song, clearer. - For instance the “calling” quality of the two first eight-notes. Through retrospective analysis it is possible to see how this aspect, if the situation called for it, for instance if it had been more difficult to elicit an initial response from the child, could have been used with even greater effect, if these two notes had been repeated, maybe several times even, intensifying their appealing, “calling-for-attention”-quality. This would imply singing on repeated descending thirds: “Anna ... Anna... Anna... “ – and, when noticing response, continuing with “-bel can play” etc. Analysis and reflection on musical structure may, as seen in this example, contribute to becoming more ware of inherent musical qualities of the song and how it may be used for therapeutic purpose.

This of course is just one simple example, and the intention is not at all to present it as typical or exemplary in any way. It is showing a single instance of musical analysis related to music therapy practice, and how it may be applied, for the purpose of clarifying the role of music in therapy, quite concretely, in this particular case. No inference beyond this should be made about how musical analysis should and could be performed within music therapy. It is just showing, by way of example, that musical analysis *can* be applied to music in music therapy, to contribute to clarify the role of music, and its function within therapy.

5.6.5 Clarifying Therapeutic Function

This analysis shows that all three sides of the triangle have to be taken into consideration, the musical and the interpersonal relations, to make sense of the music as such, and its function. As Ruud makes clear, the relation between the music and the client must be accounted for, beyond any simplistic notions about musical effects. This implies that analysis is not for finding out about procedures for using musical formula

in a technical manner. The conclusions drawn from such analysis cannot be generalized. The conclusions that can be drawn are different from saying, for instance, that certain intervals have certain effects.

Musical analysis may be used to illuminate why music works the way it works *musically*. And this may be related to the therapeutic application of music, as shown in the example. Certainly there is ample room then for analysis. It is just that one has to be aware of why one wants to use it. A formalism that states that only this kind of “objective” knowledge is true knowledge certainly will fall off the track very quickly. Analysis will not say much about the effect of music on the listener, objectively or mechanically, as Ruud points out. But it may illuminate musical characteristics that might be significant for how music *can* be used in therapy. The analytic tools of musicology are not developed specifically for the purpose of dealing with the issue of how music works in therapy. Still there might be use for these tools to consider aspects of the way the music works from the way it is structured, as could be seen in the case of the analysis of Annabel’s song here.

There is a crucial difference then between structural musical analysis in musicology and in music therapy. Music in music therapy practice is not identified (ontologically) with the score, as in the Western classical tradition, not even when it transcribed. There is no automatic turning music of into an object for study in this way, because in music therapy music has not acquired an autonomous status in the same way as art. So even if it is notated through transcription, traditional musicological analysis does not apply directly to make sense of it in the therapeutic setting. Music acquires a different role here. The basis then for analysis becomes different. The relevance has to be decided for in each case. The terminology and procedures may be used, as they are found relevant in each case. The way musical analysis may be applied must necessarily be related to its purpose in each case, and sweeping statements about analysis, one way or the other, is maybe out of order then. It is a tool that may be used for certain tasks. It is certainly not the only tool, nor is the use of this tool any guarantee of worthwhile or relevant results, “scientific” or otherwise.

The conclusion that could be drawn is that there is no one-to-one connection between what is found by musical analysis and its therapeutic significance; it has to be contextualized, as Ruud points out. Analysis does not in itself give any single, simple

clue as to the therapeutic “effect” of any given music. The contextualization in this case was retained within the music therapy setting itself. A further wider cultural contextualization could also have been considered, related to the use of the particular, culturally defined musical idiom, which could have been particularly relevant maybe, if the girl for instance had come from an Arab refugee family, being accustomed to different musical modes. This could make for different issues to consider and reflect upon, regarding structure and meaning, and the relevance of this for the therapeutic function of the music used.

Now seeing that the issue of analysis indeed is complex, it becomes clear that a narrow view as to how and why to perform musical analysis is not particularly relevant for music therapy, though it still may function as a tool. The point here is that it may not simplistically be considered a solution as to what music is about in music therapy. Which implies that music is not just a means to be decided on by formalistic analysis either. All three sides then within the music therapy triangle, related to each other, still have to be taken into account, even when making analysis of the music as such.⁵⁶

5.7 A Medium Across Two Different Spheres

A crucial aspect of the triangular set-up, and that needs to be emphasized, is that the three poles represent amongst themselves *two different spheres*. The relation between therapist and client is interpersonal, whereas the relation of both these to music is of a different sort; it is a relation within the sphere of “forms of the spirit”, to which music belongs. It is a decisive feature of the “dialogical principle” as it is interpreted here, that it allows a relational view to be applied towards different spheres, and in this case it is applied for indicating interrelations *across* two different spheres. I will consider this a

⁵⁶ Several music therapists have applied analysis, for different purposes, and without going further into these different approaches mention could be made of Gudrun Aldridge, who has made a thorough analysis of the development of melody in improvisation, with women with breast cancer, under the hypothesis that such melodic development may be highly significant in the therapeutic process (Aldridge 1996c). Colin Lee, stresses the significance of musicological analysis, and has, recently published a book in which he gives examples of such analysis related to issues of improvisational music therapy, including both more modern idioms and jazz within this overall approach (Lee 2003). Cochavit Elefant has made an analysis of songs preferred by girls with Rett syndrome, as a tool within a research study indicating how intentionality could be demonstrated in the song choices of these girls (Elefant 2002).

major asset of a dialogical outlook in this context, that it may be used to imply and elaborate on interrelations across the spheres of the interpersonal and the musical. It is precisely in the dynamics of interrelation across these two spheres that, as I have tried to indicate, the basis for regarding music as a medium for therapy is constituted. This facilitates processes of mediation between the three involved sides of client, therapist and music.

In the following two chapters I will try to consider more closely what kind of processes that may be involved in the movement between these two spheres, beginning in the following chapter with the interpersonal sphere.

6 Dynamics of the Interpersonal Sphere

Having now established a basis for the further discussion, in positioning music in music therapy as a medium, within a triangular set-up that also includes client and therapist, I will proceed by developing a dialogical perspective on each of the two relational fields that are indicated by this set-up, the interpersonal and the musical respectively. In the present chapter I will consider the sphere of interpersonal relation more closely. First I will deal with the issue of mutuality in the therapeutic relationship. Then I will consider some recent theory that has been developed regarding the significance of the relational aspect in the therapeutic process, which is seen to accord with a dialogical perspective, and relate this specifically to music therapy.

6.1 Therapeutic Responsibility

Let me emphasize that setting the three sides of therapist, music, and client in a triangular relation to each other does not by itself “solve” any problem of music therapy, but it indicates lines of interrelation that may be further illuminated and discussed. And even though the basis for setting up these lines, according to a dialogical perspective, is the reciprocity to be found between them, these lines are not simply and comprehensively described as I-Thou relations. Each line will have its own specific characteristics and features that are not readily apparent by the lines as such. This is actually what the triangle set-up here is intended to serve, *the discussion of the specific characteristics of each side related to the other two*, which is different for each of the

three lines. These interrelations may actually be rather complex, as indicated by the various ways that the one mediates between the two others. I now want to elaborate somewhat more on one crucial aspect of these interrelations, the line between the therapist and client.

6.1.1 A “Bi-polar” Relation from the Side of the Therapist

As outlined above, the mediation of music in therapy is the responsibility of the therapist. One might expect the adhering to a dialogical view to entail propagating the “I-Thou” as the main characteristic of the therapeutic relation. But the therapeutic relation cannot quite simply be described as an I-Thou relationship. This would not suffice to make clear the particular nature of this relationship. Buber addressed this question in a postscript to the second edition of *I and Thou* (published in 1958). What Buber points out is that the therapist must all the time have an eye for, not only what he or she brings forth, but also for how what is said and done affects the client. This is done by seeing the situation not only from one’s own perspective, but also from how it must feel and be experienced by the client. Buber terms this “embracing” (“Umfassung”):

But this he can only do if he encounters him as a partner in a bipolar situation. And to give his influence unity and meaning, he must live through this situation in all its aspects not only from his own point of view, but also from that of his partner. He must practice the kind of realization that I call embracing (Buber 1970, p. 178).⁵⁷

This entails a kind a “bipolar” relation for the therapist, who constantly has to try to see the situation also from the other’s perspective. The client does not have and cannot have the same kind of relation to the therapist, because in this context it is not the therapist’s process that is in focus. This means that the relation is not completely symmetrical. Still this does not imply that the relation between therapist and client necessarily is distant and externalized. Buber maintains that that the relation, if it is to be truly healing for the person, has to be based on mutuality. Both sides are involved. But in this specific case it

⁵⁷ Das aber vermag er nur, wenn er ihm jeweils als seinem Partner in einer bipolaren Situation begegnet. Und damit seine Einwirkung auf ihn eine einheitlich sinnvolle sei, muß er diese Situation jeweils nicht bloß von seinem eigenen Ende aus, sondern auch von dem seines Gegenüber aus in all ihren Momenten erleben; er muß die Art von Realisation üben, die ich Umfassung nenne (Buber 1958b, p. 113-114).

will not be a complete mutuality, it is *structurally* limited by the different roles of therapist and client.

A Conversation Between Martin Buber and Carl Rogers

In 1957 Martin Buber had a public “conversation” with the psychologist Carl Rogers, in Michigan USA. This was led by Maurice Friedman, and was since published (Buber et al. 1997). In the article “Reflections on the Buber-Rogers Dialogue” Friedman (1994) discusses some topics from this conversation, and central amongst these is the relation between therapist and client. Rogers, having developed his own model termed “Client Centered Therapy”, noticed what he perceived to be many parallels between his own way of understanding and practicing psychotherapy and Buber’s philosophy of encounter. He would regard his relation to the client as an *I-Thou* relationship, and asks Buber in this conversation, after having presented his own views about the matter more closely, how he sees this. In his reply Buber insists that it *cannot* be a complete *I-Thou* relation, because the therapeutic relation has to be considered as bi-polar by constitution.

Friedman purports that Rogers and Buber nevertheless maybe do not disagree so much after all. Because Buber does open for the possibility that in therapy there may occur a full *I-Thou* relation between therapist and client, but only for shorter moments. The relation on the whole cannot be regarded as completely mutual; because it is the client’s problematic that is central for the attention of *both*. But in a certain moment or a short while a direct meeting between therapist and client may be opened up, into a relation between an *I* and a *Thou*. And this then may also become a special and potent moment in the course of therapy; it may bring about a breakthrough, Friedman points out. This moment may in itself be of particular significance in the therapeutic process. So even if there is a limitation to mutuality, in that the setting itself structurally and normatively makes the relation not completely mutual, at the same time there may be an opening for a meeting within this setting. Within this frame the therapist may open for perhaps particularly potent moments approximating and even touching upon full mutuality.

6.1.2 Artistic and Therapeutic Imagination

Buber also uses another term in this connection, “Realphantasie”, or “imagining the real” as Friedman (1996) translates it. The term may seem like a contradiction of terms, to “imagine” what is “real”. What Buber means here might be clarified through contrasting with artistic imagination. The artist uses imagination, to see what forms are hidden so to speak, in the material that is to be shaped into a work. In this case it is an imagination of something that is not yet present, but which may become. Such imagination is necessary for the artist in order to make a work out of a given material, making something come into being that was not before. Without imagination this clearly would not be possible. The artist has to envision what he or she wants to make out of the work, and in the process of realization it becomes more and more clear what this is. When the work is completed, what was imagined has become a reality, more or less in accordance with the original vision maybe, but realized through a vision without which it indeed could not have been made.

There is a certain amount of artistic imagination necessary in music therapy too, related to the musical creativity that is involved. But this will not in itself be sufficient for the completion of the task, because music therapy, as seen here, is not just making music. Another kind of imagination is also needed, the kind of imagination that is needed for working with helping other people. And this is what Buber calls, paradoxically, “imagining the real” (Buber 1970, “Afterword”). The significance of the word “real” in this connection is that it is an attempt to see, to envision for oneself the *reality* of the other in a wider sense, not just seeing what is, but also including what potentials and possibilities the situation holds. This kind of imagination is a basis for any attempt to try to help the other, by participating in the effort to see how and where to move on, given the reality and the experience of the other. And without seeing this, *imagining* this, beyond a pure empathizing, there will be no prospect of progress.

Contrasting with the Notion of Empathy

Ernst Simon (1967) contrasts the term imagining the real with empathy, which indicates an attempt to identify with the other person, trying to see the world as it is for the other. Buber’s term “imagination” is more active, Simon holds forth; it is not just a spectator-

like trying to identify with the other, but more an act of seeing what and where the other person may happen to be, and what the situation entails or holds, as a whole:

The realistic imagination is differentiated from empathy by the fact that in the former the individuality of each of the partners is fully maintained, while in empathy, because of the attempted participation in the internal experiences of the other, temporarily one partner becomes identical with the other, or, at least, tries to do so. In the act of the realistic imagination something of the essence of an act of will is added to the act of will of the other, that is, each “full realization” is not merely spectator-like and passive, but participating and active (p. 563).

Claiming empathy to be passive might well cause objection though. Heinz Kohut, the pioneer of co-called Self-psychology within the psychoanalytic movement, has emphasized the significance of empathy in the therapeutic relation (Kohut 1959). He has held forth that empathy in the psychoanalytic setting involves an effort, an enduring empathy is necessary to come to understand the client, and for the client to experience being understood. Only on this basis may interpretations be made. Empathy is not at all entirely “passive” then.

Buber’s concept nevertheless does seem to point somewhat beyond the notion of empathy, it is about imagining the potentials that the whole situation holds, the direction for development and growth that may be found, as seen from the part of the patient, and that could be possible to realize, or rather, it is helping or *joining* the client in seeing or discovering this. Van Deurzen, writing on existential psychotherapy, seems to hold a similar view, claiming that what the therapist offers is not affection, or even empathy or unconditional approval, but rather “scrupulously responding to the client from a position of acting as a catalyst for transformation and clarification”(Van Deurzen 2002, p. 96). What Buber stresses is that this involves a particular *imagination*, necessary for doing therapeutic work, just as the artist needs imagination to conceive a work of art. The work of the therapist may require another *kind* of imagination, but the involvement of the imagination is nevertheless needed to bring to fruition also this kind of work.

Imagination as a Basis for Therapeutic Work

To go back to the example of Annabel here, from the previous chapter: Through taking Annabel’s movements of the hand to be intentional, or creating a setting in which they might appear as intentional, the *potential intentionality* of the movements were actualized. The hitting of the tambourine became framed as an active participation by

the song accompanying it. As a therapist I had to take into consideration her experience, I had to try to see, or “imagine the real”, where she was and where she might go. This imagination is what led to the activity, which simply could not have been realized without it; in this case imagining what it would be like for her to participate actively in the music. Without having this imagination it would not have been possible to develop the activity that came out of it. The therapeutic responsibility and task then consisted in actively and creatively mediating the child’s relation to the music, to try to realize this “imagination of the real”, of the potential of the whole situation for the child.

6.1.3 Musical Therapeutic Technique

Though the therapeutic application of music in this instance was based on some musical and therapeutic imagination, it was of course also founded on acquired methods and techniques established within music therapy practice. For instance trying to frame involuntary movements in such a way that significance may be assigned to them. And the use of a song individually tailored for the child’s needs is a “standard” music therapeutic procedure. So, just as learning to play a musical instrument requires the development of a certain technique, it is necessary for a music therapist to base the work on some music therapeutic method and technique. There was a necessary technical basis of knowledge and skill involved in the development of the activity. And what came out of it was a song that I could add to my own music therapy repertoire, with this girl, and possibly in modified versions used also in other situations. The combined therapeutic/artistic imagination thus resulted in an It, in a song activity that could be used – not as a work of art in this case, but as a new therapeutic tool. The song itself actually became a method then, a technique to be applied in the music therapy situation.

All of this is part and parcel of a music therapeutic way of working. Still, it could not have been predicted entirely beforehand how the activity would turn out, with this song, and the way it was used. There was a creative response to the demands of the situation, which was not just applying a technical means in a mechanical way, with a certain and counted on outcome. From a dialogical perspective there is an alternation between relation and objectification to be found also here. Therapeutic techniques are necessary. Just like some measure of technique is necessary in any performance of music. There is an It-dimension also to any music therapeutic work, which has to be

recognized, in the objectified repertoire of methods and activities that are learnt and applied. But just as with music in general, technique is not enough. There is a dimension of encounter involved in addressing the needs and potentials of the client in each unique situation. The therapist is mediating music for the benefit of the client. This implies an intentional use of music as a medium for therapy. Not mechanically, or technologically, following some predefined scheme, but creatively and responsibly, according to the conditions of the present situation.

The bipolar situation of therapy furthermore implies that it is not simply one part working on the other. It is not just the therapist using music as a means for a predefined purpose, for an effect regardless of what the client may think, know, or be aware of. Therapy is necessarily a joint effort; it is not just an act that is executed solely from the side of the therapist, but is realized cooperatively, which means that the input from the therapist, as stressed here, is necessarily mediated by what the client needs and brings to the situation. For the therapist the responsibility is supplying the appropriate therapeutic service. For the client the responsibility is one's own life. What is in focus, for both, is the client. As in Annabel's case, she was given an opportunity to have a say, to participate in relation to another. And this, in accordance with a dialogical outlook, is what the therapeutic outcome was about, the *person* coming forth, bringing forth the person.

6.2 The Early Interaction Analogy

With regards to the interpersonal aspect of therapy there have been an increasing number of references within music therapy theory to research on mother and infant interaction, which has been seen as an analogue to communication processes in improvisational music therapy.

6.2.1 Preverbal Communication

Bunt (1994) has pointed out that several of these researchers actually use musical terms in describing the early preverbal communication, like Bullowa (1985) who writes about movement, sound and rhythm making up much of the common experience infant and parent bring to their meeting, seen in patterns of synchrony and of counterpoint and

syncopation. Bunt also refers to Daniel Stern (1985), who uses terms like rhythm, dynamics, tempo, and orchestration in his description of the playful vocal interaction between mother and infant. Comparisons have been drawn on the basis of this apparent similarity, between this early interaction and clinical improvisation (Bunt 1994; Hughes 1995; Oldfield 1995; Rolvsjord 2002; Pavlicevic 1997).

Ulla Holck (2001) points out that early interaction of course is not the same as music as a cultural form, but that music actually may be seen to rest on the same communicative elements as early interaction between mother (parent) and infant.⁵⁸ Holck summarizes some of these elements of communication that are applicable to music therapy, such as the appeal of sound, imitation, turn-taking, pausing or “freezing”, building up expectation, variations on a theme, and small musical-drama sequences. What is central from a therapeutic point of view, in all these musical communicative elements, according to Holck, is the development of relation through such communicative interplay.

Trevarthen and Malloch (2000) have proposed to extend the concept of *nonverbal communication*, which they find inadequate to cover the broad spectrum of human interaction that it is actually intended to cover, and introduce the alternative metaphoric term *communicative musicality*, relating this to the Greek word “mousiké”, which applies to all the temporal arts together. They suggest that such “communicative musicality” is the source of the music therapeutic experience and its effects, based on an inborn musicality that is uncovered in acoustic analysis of parent/infant vocal interactions.

Therapy by ‘conversational improvisation’ of music is an art and clinical technique that directly addresses human intersubjective feelings and expressions in time. It communicates a dance of human wellbeing, an activity that taps the musicality of both therapist and client (p. 14).

The musicality referred to here is both in the narrow sense, related to music activity as such, and to “communicative musicality” in the wider sense, which Trevarthen and Malloch view as more than just “non-verbal” or “pre-verbal”. The use of music in

⁵⁸ This point has recently also been put forward on an ethological basis by Ellen Dissanayake (2001), who states that antecedents of musical behavior can be identified in ritualized vocal, visual, and kinesic components of mother-infant interaction, which during human evolution provided rudiments for the development of music in ceremonial practices of culture. (The question of course is whether this is a *sufficient* explanation for the origins of music.)

therapy they consider to be based on the human trait – which is life-long, and not belonging just to a preverbal stage of human development – of “creating companionship with another by structuring expressive time together” (p. 14).

The “A priori” of Relation

It is significant to note here, regarding a philosophical grounding for such theory that Buber uses the communicative capabilities of the infant as a prime example in *I and Thou* to bring out basic features of a dialogical outlook. He asserts that the newborn child has a communicative ability right from the start, and that the child seeks immediately, that it is a fundamental human trait from the very beginning to be directed *towards* something. And this is a given precondition Buber claims. It is a fundamental basis for the development of every kind of relation. It is the “a priori” of relation, as he calls it, or the “innate You” (p. 78).

6.2.2 “Affect Attunement” and “Connection”

A representative of early interaction research, who has been extensively referred to in music therapy theory, is Daniel Stern (1985). A rather early exposition of some of his views as they may be applied to music therapy is found in Bunt (1994). A crucial aspect in the comparison between infant research and music therapy has been imitation and turn taking, which are basic forms of interaction both within the early mother- infant communication and within improvisational music therapy. Bunt emphasizes that it is not sufficient for a real conversation to take place just to imitate and take turns in a regular pattern though. He refers to Sterns central concept of “affect attunement”. What is found in the early interaction research is that the grown up initially may notice what the child does. Then he or she might well show and demonstrate that what has been expressed, has been perceived and registered, by imitating this in sound and gesture. But something else needs to be added, something more than a direct imitation, and this is done by giving a response that is not purely imitative, but that still clearly resembles the child’s expression, which the child can respond to, in his or her own way, in a similar fashion. Thus a chain of interaction is brought about, and through this a *connection*, as Stern terms it, on an emotional level between the child and the grown up. Through such interchange there is an experience that also the emotional content behind

the expression is reflected, which is not achieved by any mere mechanical imitation. This presumably is what makes it dialogical, what makes it into a “conversation”, or “protoconversation” (first conversation) as it has also been termed.

This process may be transferred quite directly to the interplay of improvisational music therapy, where different messages that resemble one another and are related to each other can be interchanged between the participants, through the musical interaction. As the therapist is directed towards giving a musical response, without just doing a pure imitation, a give and take of emotional content behind the musical expression is opened for, and this way “connection” in Stern’s terms, may be established.

6.2.3 “Dynamic Form”

To develop this issue further Pavlicevic (1997), as mentioned in the first chapter, has proposed the concept of “Dynamic form”. She uses this term to make a critical distinction between a purely musical improvisation and one that uses music in order to create an interpersonal engagement. Dynamic form corresponds to Daniel Stern’s “vitality affects”, but is explicitly musical in character, Pavlicevic suggests. Vitality affects, which as a term designates the non-referential dynamic process underpinning various feelings, rather than categorical emotional states as such, are a-modal or cross-modal in character, which explains why the dynamic form of emotions can be illustrated musically, through inter-modal correlation. Pavlicevic uses the concept “dynamic form” to bring out the duality of musical and emotional process in clinical improvisation. Hearing the music not only as music, but also as an expression of a feeling mode, or feeling state of the client, the therapist is informed about the qualities and condition of the client, and is able to relate directly to this through the joint music making. Dynamic form then is a term that focuses on the interface between music and emotion in clinical improvisation, which is not just making music for its one sake, but for relating to the other this way, achieving contact and interaction.

As a research experiment Pavlicevic and music therapist colleague Sandra Brown conducted a study in which they recorded three music sessions, in which each took turns at being client and therapist in the first two, and in the third they just played together as musicians (Brown and Pavlicevic 1996). Playing these recordings for music therapists,

and blind rating them, it was possible for these therapists to distinguish between the therapeutic and the playing sessions, in that in the therapy sessions the listeners could hear the improvisation was formed in order for the therapist to follow and support the idiosyncrasies of the client's utterances, whereas in the music sessions the music followed a path that was dictated by musical concerns, the playing was "musical" rather than "personal". Dynamic form is a concept that is intended to capture this portrayal of one person in relation to another through musical sound.

As Pavlicevic sees it, it is dynamic form that the music therapist "reads" and that both the client and therapist experience directly, in improvisational music therapy. It is a reading directed towards the personal rather than purely musical qualities. The musical interaction is regarded as revealing the communicative quality of the interaction. She stresses that music and emotions are nevertheless not completely contained within each other. They necessarily maintain their autonomy. Dynamic form is about the interface between the two. Pavlicevic opens then, for a direct kind of "knowing" of another, through musical improvisation. And this is intuitive and immediate rather than analytical and interpretive. It is a direct sense of the other through musical expression:

"This relationship is a *direct knowing* by the therapist and client through soundform – a knowing that may be highly intimate" (1999a, p. 61, italics added).

It is a way of both listening and playing then, where the therapist is focused on the communicative aspect of playing.

A Spoken Address and a Heard Response

This perspective on dynamic form in improvisational music therapy could be related to the position of music as a medium as suggested here. This way of listening could be contrasted to listening to a musical composition, completed and contained in itself. Music *remaining non-objectified* acquires an inherent quality of *address and response* within the music therapy setting, and which makes it *intimate*, as Pavlicevic writes. In the music therapy setting music may mediate the presence of one towards the other. This is in clear contrast to the statement of the composer, who makes a *public address*, to some audience, for their appreciation and evaluation of the *work*. The client in music therapy is clearly not expected to regard the music made as a work of art in this sense, with this kind of public address. In the music therapy situation the music is perceived

rather as being *for* someone, and as *coming* from someone. With music remaining within the music therapy setting, facilitating an address and response reciprocity, it attains a “conversational” character. Thus it moves both ways, between the two sides. And dynamic form is what may be “read” out of it, in Pavlicevic’ terms.

In music therapy music could be regarded as *spoken*; it is addressed to the other as “speech”, rather than being formed into some “text”, with an independent status, as the musical composition may actually literally be in a score. “Speech” seems to be a better term than “text” for the mode of reality of music in music therapy then. This of course is also in closer accord with the quality of musical communication in general, which is oral, not written. So rather than “read”, I would prefer to say that the conversational exchange through music as a medium is *heard*. And this accords also with the direct, immediate character, as Pavlicevic stresses, of this musical exchange of dynamic form; it is heard rather than read.⁵⁹

6.2.4 Change Processes in Therapy

Ruud has also referred to Daniel Stern in his article “Improvisation as Social Interaction, or Getting into the Groove of Music Therapy” (Ruud 1998b). Ruud particularly focuses on Stern’s discussion on how and why *change* occurs in psychotherapy, and that this involves something more than making the unconscious conscious:

As psychotherapy research has shown, clients may recall, many years after actual therapy sessions that some special moments in sessions, especially in their relationship with the therapist, contributed to the change process. These meaningful moments, or moments of presence, were linked to the client’s perception of the relationship with the therapist as an authentic “real” relationship. An important element in this relationship would have to be the therapist’s courage to disclose himself, to be really present, much in the same sense as Buber’s “meeting” (p. 160).

Ruud refers to Stern’s notion about “hot present moments”, through which a new intersubjective frame of interaction may be created, thereby facilitating therapeutic change, and links this to the process of improvisation in music therapy, in which such “hot present moments” may readily occur. This is a notion that may help in

⁵⁹ Bakhtin’s oral/aural concepts of “speech act”, “utterance”, and “polyphony” could be relevant to consider in relation to music as “spoken”. See Weisethaunet (2000).

understanding how people may change through “music as therapy” Ruud proposes. Ruud indicates a basic concordance with Buber’s views here, and I will take this as a point of departure for a further development of a dialogical perspective along these lines, relating particularly to the crucial issue of change processes in therapy, which I think is of utmost importance to bring out and account for theoretically. The focus firstly here will be on the relational aspect of therapy, and its significance for therapeutic change.

6.3 “Implicit Relational Knowing”

Daniel Stern has been part of a collective of authors calling themselves the *The Process of Change Study Group*. These authors have written an article called “Non-Interpretive Mechanisms in Psychoanalytic Therapy: The ‘Something More’ than Interpretation” (Stern et al. 1998a). (In later publications the collective has changed their name to *The Boston Change Process Study Group*, with the acronym CPSG, which is what I will use in referring to this group of authors.) There has long been a consensus CPSG emphasize, that for change to occur in psychotherapy something more is needed than interpretation, in the sense of making the unconscious conscious. They differentiate between two change-inducing or mutative phenomena: the interpretation and the “moment of meeting”, the last of these representing the “something more” which the authors attempt to elucidate in the paper. CPSG point to anecdotal evidence that shows that most patients after successful treatment tend to remember two kinds of nodal changing events for them, one concerning key interpretation that rearranged their intrapsychic landscape, and the other the special “moments” of authentic person-to-person connection with the therapist, that altered the relationship and thereby the patient’s own sense of self. A clear distinction between these two phenomena has to be made. One is not explicable in terms of the other they claim, and they present a conceptual framework for understanding the “something more” that this moment of meeting represents.

CPSG distinguish between two kinds of knowledge, declarative knowledge, which is explicit and conscious, and which is the content matter of interpretation, and procedural knowledge of relationships, which is implicit and operates outside of both

focal attention and conscious, verbal experience. It is represented non-symbolically in the form that the authors suggest may be called *implicit relational knowing*. Such knowing integrates affect, cognition and interactive dimensions, and alters the relational field of relationship.

6.3.1 The “Moment of Meeting”

The concept, the authors relate, has been central in the developmental psychology of pre-verbal infants, though it is not unique to infants. Such knowing of the many ways of being with others continues throughout life. And the authors make it clear that such knowing is often not symbolically represented, but at the same time it is not necessarily unconscious, in the sense of being defensively excluded from awareness. They make the following claim:

Just as interpretation is the therapeutic event that rearranges the patient’s conscious declarative knowledge, we propose that what we call a ‘moment of meeting’ is the event that rearranges the implicit relational knowing for patient and analyst alike (p. 906).

It is such a “moment” that takes on the role as the basic unit of change in the domain of implicit relational knowing. Change in relationship is precipitated by a “moment of meeting”, which brings forth a sudden shift in implicit relational knowing of both analyst and patient. Such a moment of meeting is inevitably well prepared for, but it is not determined. A new intersubjective environment is created, through the altering of the “implicit relational knowing”. The authors provide an example as an illustration:

If in the course of playing, a mother and infant unexpectedly achieve a new and higher level of activation and intensity of joy, the infant’s capacity to tolerate higher levels of mutually created positive excitement has been expanded for future interactions. Once an expansion of the range has occurred, and there is the mutual recognition that the two partners have successfully interacted together in a higher orbit of joy, their subsequent interactions will be conducted within this altered intersubjective environment. It is not the simple fact of each having done it before, but the sense that the two have been here before. The domain of implicit relational knowing has been altered (p. 909).

This description of mother and infant playing seems readily applicable also to the process of improvisation within music therapy, as a kind of “playing” too, in which new “heights” occasionally may be reached. The immediate consequence of “moments of meeting” is that through altering the intersubjective environment they create an open

space, where new initiative is possible. The constraint of old habits and ways are loosened, and new ways may be found.

6.3.2 Three “Phases” of Transition

The process of change involves phases of transition. CPSG talk about “now moments” which can turn into “moments of meeting”, if the opportunity is seized upon. These “now moments”, which bear some hint of possibility, are often accompanied by expectancy or anxiety because there is a need of choice, in which one may not just take refuge to some habitual technical move, which will not suffice. There is a sense of an opportunity that may be taken advantage of. The authors distinguish between three phases of the “now moment”. A “pregnancy phase”, filled with a feeling of imminence; a “weird phase”, entering some unknown and unexpected intersubjective space; and thirdly, the “decision phase”, whether or not to seize the opportunity of the moment. If it is seized the “now moment” may lead to a “moment of meeting”. The authors present these concepts as a descriptive terminology for showing how the something more (than interpretation) operates as a vehicle for change in psychoanalytic therapy. “Now moments” must be considered as the threshold to an emergent property of the interaction, which is the “moment of meeting”. During such a meeting a novel intersubjective contact becomes established. It is a nodal event, the point at which the intersubjective context gets altered, which means that the implicit relational knowledge in the patient-therapist relationship has changed.

CPSG take great pains to distinguish this process from interpretation. A moment of meeting can well occur if an interpretation is made in a way in which the therapist also affectively participates. The one may strengthen the effect of the other. It may also be that an excellent interpretation is made, but that the opportunity to seize the moment interpersonally, through a personal engagement, is not met with. The consequence may very well be that the interpretation all in all becomes much less potent. On the other side an interpretation may actually close out a now moment, that could potentially turn into a moment of meeting, by explaining it too much, or by elaborating or generalizing it.

6.3.3 Transference Issues Minimized

A significant point is that during the “moment of meeting”, transference and countertransference issues are at a minimum, according to the authors. This is because the traditional therapeutic role is downplayed during such moments. In the traditional interpretation involving transference material, the therapist is not called into the open as a person and put into play, and the shared implicit relationship as such is not called into the open. The therapeutic understanding and response as it occurs within the analytic role is rather what is called into play. In the “moment of meeting” the personhood of the interactants is what is put into play, relatively strapped of the regular role trappings. Thus an “open space” is established,⁶⁰ in which individual creativity becomes possible. This happens as a consequence of the patient’s implicit relational knowing having been “freed of constraints imposed by the habitual”, as the authors put it (p. 915).

Each part has his or her own implicit knowledge, which is unique to each individual. What the authors term the “shared implicit relationship” is the overlap between each partner’s implicit knowledge about the relationship. And this shared implicit relationship is never symmetrical, the authors point out. CPSG summarize by stating that though interpretation traditionally has been viewed as the nodal event of therapy, acting within and upon transference relationship to alter the intrapsychic environment, “moments of meeting” may be viewed as nodal events altering implicit knowledge, which is both intrapsychic and interpersonal. These must be considered complementary processes, entailing different change mechanisms.

6.3.4 A Change that Happens

The notion of “moment” in the expression “moment of meeting”, used by CPSG, indicates a “happening” that is not the result of some methodic procedure from which the outcome will be expected as a matter of course. The establishment and development of “implicit relational knowing” is not a brick at a time building then, but appears discontinuous, in leaps and sudden breakthroughs. This is in close accordance with the dialogical principle as Buber presents this. Indeed the expression “moment of

⁶⁰ The authors here refer to Winnicott’s much cited conception, usually referred to a “potential space” (Winnicott 1971).

meeting”, indicating a change process, is actually literally to be found in Buber’s text. He speaks of “der Moment der Begegnung” (Buber 1958b, p. 95), which is translated variously as the “moment of encounter”,⁶¹ and the “moment of meeting”.⁶² Whether CPSG’s expression directly or indirectly in some way stems from Buber’s original formulation, (or other sources related to this), is not a direct concern here. But an affinity and concordance of outlook is in any case readily apparent. The “moment of meeting” according to Buber is a moment from which the human emerges, being no longer the same as when entering into it. It is not just entered into and nicely rounded off without further consequence:

The moment of encounter is not a “living experience” that stirs in the receptive soul and blissfully rounds itself out: something happens to man. At times it is like feeling a breath, and at times like a wrestling match; no matter; something happens (Buber 1970, p. 158).

Buber thus stresses that a *change* of the person is what comes out of such a moment. And what this implies, he elaborates in the following way:

The man who steps out of the essential act of pure relation has *something More* in his being, something new has grown there of which he did not know before and for whose origin he lacks any suitable words (p. 158, italics added).

Again one may actually find the identical phrase: “something More”, as in the article by CPSG, on the “something more” in psychoanalytic therapy. (The translator has put in a capital letter for the word ‘More’ for emphasis, thus stressing the significance of this phrase. - The German “ein Mehr” capitalizes anyway, of course). This adds to the concordance of outlook between CPSG and Buber, and if the authors were not directly inspired, (there is no reference to Buber in the article,) this is quite a concurrence of phrases, the “moment of meeting”, and the “something more”. Buber’s text also accentuates the “lack of suitable words”, which is something of the same as saying that it cannot be put into “declarative” propositions. The conclusion here I think is that there seems to be a close concordance between this theoretical perspective and Buber’s basic philosophy of the dialogical principle.

⁶¹ Kaufmann’s translation (Buber 1970: 157).

⁶² Smith’s translation (Buber 1958a: 159)

Not a “Mechanism”

A basic postulate then is that there is a “*moment*” through which change occurs. And this moment is something that *happens*, which means that it is not entirely predictable.

Buber writes explicitly about this:

Wherever the scientific world orientation in its legitimate desire for a causal chain without gaps may place the origin of what is new here: for us, being concerned with the actual contemplation of the actual, *no subconscious and no other psychic apparatus will do*. Actually we receive what we did not have before, in such a manner that we know: it has been given to us (p. 158, italics added).

The “something More”, is received not as consequence of a mechanical cause and effect chain, and neither from some “psychodynamic” mechanism. Buber does not accept an explanation regarding the change brought about through the moment of meeting as stemming from a “subconscious”, or any “psychic apparatus”. It is *given*, he states, which means that it has come by through some condition of grace. Here we see a nuance of difference from CPSG, who use psychoanalytic language terms, talking about “non-interpretive *mechanisms*”. Buber would presumably not concur with the expression “mechanism”. The moment of meeting, and what comes out of it, is not to be considered as any kind of “mechanism” in Buber’s view.

6.4 Application to Examples from the Literature

CPSG show how a crucial interpretation may facilitate a “moment of meeting” in psychotherapy, which may bring about therapeutic change. As Ruud (1998b) indicates, improvisation may also bring about a “hot present moment”. The thesis that is implied in this is that musical improvisation, as a mode of therapy, may likewise bring about this specific kind of therapeutic change, through facilitating the occurrences of such moments. I will try to illustrate this point of view with some examples both from the literature, and from my own experience as a music therapist, and see how CPSG’s concepts could be applied to these.

6.4.1 The Example of David

In her reply to Streeter's challenge to therapy based on "musical awareness", referred to in the introductory chapter, Sandra Brown (1999) actually refers to this particular article by CPSG, and finds that both in terminology and logic it relates directly to a case from her own practice, which she describes briefly. David, who had referred himself to music therapy, had a very persistent need for control, and the work in therapy consisted in "enabling him to allow access to his 'creative self', unhampered by thought", Brown writes. This was inordinately difficult, she relates, but in one session, at the end of an improvisation on two pianos, something happened. Brown writes in her notes:

Feeling of timelessness between us, ... Directionless – endless moving forward/round and round without moving. No direction – just remaining in the same place, continually finding and losing and refinding the place (p. 69).

In the summary of the session she writes:

The constant holding myself in the openness of letting go, of suspending direction, of endless consecutive "nows". At one point terror rising in me, desperate to move away, to – resolution? From the not-knowing? The non-direction? (p. 69).

Brown informs that the poetic connotations of these written phrases were quite unusual compared to the notes she usually made. The client also had difficulties in finding any adequate expression for the experience, which was shared by the two. This moment, Brown relates, became a turning point in the therapeutic work.

If we apply CPSG's constructs here and compare with the three "phases" of the now moment, there is a "pregnancy phase", in which the musical improvisation is building up. Then there comes a "weird phase", as described in a new feeling of timelessness emerging, of no direction, just returning to the same place. And even a feeling of momentary terror, before in a way deciding to stay with it, to remain in the open. Thus the third "decision phase" is seen moving into a "moment of meeting", the special, ineffable quality of which was recognized by both parts. The experience, besides from being a turning point in therapy also left the therapist subsequently pondering about the significance of the event, relating it to theory and also to poetry.

6.4.2 The Example of Mathew

Ansdell (1995) refers to a similar experience in the final case of his book *Music for Life*. Actually there are two events that are reported with Mathew, a man with Down's syndrome who had become depressed, withdrawn and occasionally aggressive after his mother's death, and after subsequently having moved to a community hostel for adults with special needs. The first event is when Mathew suddenly takes a drumstick from the top of the piano, rises, and starts conducting. At first the therapist plays as might be expected, improvising music that can support the beating of music in time, which might correspond to the "pregnancy phase". But then it became unclear as to who was leading and who was following. Eventually it became apparent that Mathew was taking musically charge. Which might be seen to correspond to the "weird phase", being something highly unexpected and unusual. After having brought the co-therapist who had been participating by singing to stop, he turned towards the therapist at the piano:

This was when the real change in the piece happened. A totally different music emerged – I found myself singing a slow, hymnlike melody, accompanied by rich chords in E major ... giving an almost reverential atmosphere. It seemed perfect for Mathew, his body swaying as he conducted. But he was also firmly in control, letting me sing the first phrase, then bringing Cheow (the co-therapist) in for the second, the two dovetailing perfectly (p. 202).

Here again a "decision phase" is followed by a "moment of meeting".

Though there was no readily apparent sudden transformation of the playing itself in the sessions to follow after this incident, Ansdell reports that he and the co-therapist felt justified in making the sessions more of a challenge to Mathew, who steadily developed through the work. A reflection of this new way of conducting the sessions was that the room was set up differently, with an array of instruments surrounding the piano. Here we may see a very concrete result of change in the implicit relational knowing. As CPSG point out, it is the nature of such change that it is in both the therapist and client, and that the interactional environment changes. In this case even in the way the room was arranged. This could be seen as a concrete manifestation of change in the shared implicit relationship, in CPSG's terms.

The second of the events with Mathew, or "episodes" as Ansdell terms them, was a particular session, which Ansdell finds significant enough to date. It started off ten minutes late and there was nothing beforehand indicating that there would be anything

extraordinary about the session. As the playing started, Mathew seemed especially concentrated and committed. There was a certain intensity of atmosphere Ansdell relates, which also was picked up by the co-therapist. This could well be seen as a “pregnancy phase”. Ansdell writes about the session as it developed:

There was an incredibly close connection between us in the music – a real sharing of intention. But at the same time there was something of the feeling that we were both testing one another – that we were both trying too hard (p. 205).

There seems to be a move into some sort of “weird phase”. Mathew then made an initiative towards the co-therapist that she should join on the xylophone. The improvisation then changed character:

Many things seemed to change at the same time: Mathew’s drumming seemed to take on a different quality, changing from a heavy ‘down’ it became a source of ‘up’ energy, giving a sense of dance to the music. Around this Chew and I ‘danced’ syncopated pentatonic melodies and cross rhythms. My feeling was of a sudden lightness of touch, a freedom from controlling the situation or determining the music. I remember looking down at my hands in disbelief and seeing them playing (p.205).

Here it seems that a transition to the decision phase had been made, by deciding not to try so hard, to let it happen. Then there is an entering into a “moment of meeting”. “Everything seemed to lift”, Ansdell recalls, finding lightness the only metaphor that accurately could describe the loss of effort and the joy of playing. He further relates:

The other feeling was that though none of us was doing anything especially remarkable, that somehow the music had happened itself and had taken off and taken us with it! Suddenly all the parts seemed to connect and the music seemed to come through... (p. 206).

Ansdell finds words poor to describe the experience, which he terms “mystical”. It was genuinely beyond planning and controlling, he states, and even beyond individuals: “– it was more than any one of us, but at the same time included each of us totally”

Ansdell considers that these special experiences with Mathew during his two and a half year in music therapy surely were a significant part at least, of what helped to bring about a change that was reported. Mathew was now generally in a happier mood, more confident, and more socially active. It seems that a conclusion could be made, according to Ansdell’s narrative, about a change that had occurred in the domain of

implicit relational knowledge, to use CPSG's term here, within the music therapy setting, having transference value to his everyday life.

6.4.3 Relational Change

What these examples may suggest is that such incidents in Creative Music Therapy can be described in terms that are meant to give a phenomenological description of the "something more" in psychotherapy, and which is considered may induce relational change. It seems that CPSG's terms may well be applied to this aspect, as indicated through the examples above, and may indeed serve to account for a possible process of change through the "moment of meeting", as it may occur also in Creative Music Therapy, as well as in psychoanalytic therapy.

The intention here of course is not to put up a scheme that is to show how it is in each and every case. This is obviously not possible, and the variations will always ensure that no schema in itself can be either final or complete. But such conceptual constructs may serve to illuminate processes of therapy. The point here is to show how such a conceptual construct intended for showing processes of change in psychotherapy, with regards to the relational aspect, may be applied to Creative Music Therapy, in a parallel way, to account for change in music therapy.

This is particularly relevant considering the challenge that has been put to Creative Music Therapy that since it does not employ verbal interpretations it cannot account for therapeutic change. It seems that change through the relational aspect may be a highly relevant consideration then for the theory of a music-based music therapy. And, as CPSG do stress, this process of change does not involve verbalization as a necessary ingredient.

6.5 An Example From My Own Practice:

Lisa

I will supply an example from my own practice here, to further illuminate this kind of perspective, applying the conceptual constructs of CPSG, stressing once again that this

is not presented as empirical documentation or “proof” in any way, but for illustrative purposes for the argument.

Lisa was a 15-year-old girl with autism, whom I had weekly one-hour music therapy sessions with, at a special school. She was a strong and robust girl, and very intense. She would sometimes have rather outrageous fits, which were sometimes difficult for one single person to handle. Therefore it was considered necessary to have two persons following her up through the day. These fits were not part of the music therapy sessions though. This was one activity during the week in which she showed a keen interest in attending. When it was mentioned to her that it was time to leave, she would immediately and very eagerly put on her shoes, and be anxious to leave from her base room, the staff reported to me.

She liked singing, in her own way, and in the beginning this was a good way to get to know each other more. When I suggested that we could try playing the piano she sternly refused having anything to do with this. But after a while she got more amenable, showing more interest, and one day she suddenly just sat down right in front of the piano. I took a chair and sat beside her, to the right. We were just sitting there in front of the keyboard. And I really did not know what to do, how to start off. A “pregnancy phase” was moving very quickly, I felt, towards some “weird” phase, in which I had to come to a decision. On the spur of the moment, I picked out the two black keys c-sharp and d-sharp, and played each one of them with the index fingers of left and right hand, in a firm “back and forth”, two semiquavers and a quaver-note rhythm figure, D# -C#- D#. Made a pause and then repeated this. This seemed a most simple gestalt, and I waited to see if and how Lisa would respond. She sat a moment perplexed, but somehow delighted apparently, and then she herself seized the opportunity and with a big smile played the same short motive with her two index fingers at her lower register on the piano. I “answered” back, and she seemed utterly exited. From this we developed a joint improvisation at the piano.

In the sessions to follow we broadened the range, and Lisa would try out new combinations of tones, and rhythms, often using sonorous open fifths, moving on to the white keys as well. The improvisations would extend quite a lot, and when we really hit on something, Lisa would display the broadest smile, occasionally looking rather enthusiastically at my fingers when some particular phrase on my side caught her

attention. Occasionally we would return to our original two-note motive before expanding again.

These improvisations could be seen to proceed through a succession of “present moments”, occasionally moving into a “now moment”, in which there was a possibility of making something more out of it, and when this did happen Lisa would invariably tune in and catch this up, and respond to it. I was often amazed by her keen perception of nuances in the improvisation. If we hit some swing or groove, or if the melody took off in some unexpected way, she really sensed this, and appreciated it.

One might say, applying the conceptual construct of CPSG, that that there had been an initial “moment of meeting”, through the piano playing, at the outset, after a rather long “pregnancy phase”, before taking position in front of the piano keyboard, and a short “weird phase”, right at the start, before we hit on the rhythmic two-note motive in a “decision phase”, going into a “moment of meeting”, with an extensive development following this. It turned out that the establishment of this playing together at the piano motivated her very much to attend the sessions. When she came into the room, she would go straight to the piano with determined steps, put the chair resolutely in front of the piano, and wait for me to sit down and join. A change in the implicit relational knowledge had clearly occurred through our playing together this way.

6.5.1 A Drum-Playing Incident

But there is one other, somewhat later, particular incident that I want to relate here. Lisa and I were playing drums together, like we had done on several other occasions for quite some time by now. And then, as it sometimes is with playing music, something happens. A special moment occurs. We were sitting right towards each other, playing djembe-type drums. As usual her gaze was fixed somewhere between us, and she was playing the drums in an engaged and concentrated manner, while at the same time intently listening it seemed, to what I was playing in relation to her own beat. We came into a nice steady groove. And then, for my own part I suddenly notice a possibility, a sense that I can break through something. It is as if a musical opening suddenly presents itself. At the same time I feel some kind of anxiety, something like: “Is this in order, is this really allowed here, to make a move into this? Into such a space, here, now?” It was like a feeling of “momentary terror” as Brown states it. And then, with no further

deliberation, and with a great sense of daring, I plunged into something new. Not that the playing changed that much, it was more about the quality of the swing or groove, which really interlocked with Lisa's steady beat. There was suddenly a much greater intensity to the playing, which in some way seemed hard to comprehend. It had a kind of "unheard of" sound to it, there and then.

And Lisa sensed this immediately. Her expression changed. First she just seemed stunned. And then, as the playing continued, and we were really getting into something unprecedented, she became very serious-looking, kind of shocked. Still she was completely into the playing. And then I sensed a growing tension. It seemed like a question was written all over her: "What is going on here? What is happening?" And then, in a moment, it seems she just can't resist, she just has to look up. "Who *is* this guy playing here with me? What *is* he doing?" The strange thing is that it was just as much a question for me. Our playing was interlocked in a way that I did not feel I had any "control" over; it was happening as if by itself. At this point my gaze was directed towards her, and then, when she looked up, obviously much to her surprise, or should I say off-guard, our eyes met. And now it becomes difficult to describe. I can clearly say; I have never before experienced such intensity in a brief moment of eye contact. It was almost like a physical sensation. I mean; I actually felt some kind of physical sensation in my eyes as the gazes met. It was so incredibly intense, it even seemed like you could hear a kind of "swoosh" sound in the room. We were actually both taken by surprise. She looked down again, quite perplexed it seemed, or shaken, not knowing really what to do, or make of it apparently. As we continued the playing, which now gradually cooled off, and came to a natural close, she seemed marked by the experience. And as the session ended, she quietly left the room.

In retrospect I have had to ponder on how this meeting of gazes could acquire such a, for me at least, and I cannot but assume, for her too, extraordinary intensity. By reflection it has occurred to me that meeting each other's gazes in our daily life is a very natural thing. There is a vast specter of various modes of eye contact in interpersonal communication. And so much so that we hardly even think about it. It became clear to me that Lisa, as part of her autism, on her part was investing a considerable amount of energy in *avoiding* this. Eye contact being such a natural and spontaneous response, a very high degree of attention is actually needed to avoid it. When a person with autism

is looking another way, it is not just looking at something quite arbitrarily; it is actively looking away *from* something, namely direct eye contact with another person. And this is hard work, which has to be invested in with both effort and determination, because eye contact is not easy to avoid. With autism it is clearly not just a case of eyes wandering off in any other involuntary or accidental direction. It seems to be directed, and very intently so, in any direction *but* direct eye contact with another. And this was what was jeopardized for a moment with Lisa. The intensity of the music experience made her forget about this concern, enough at least to be caught off guard. And in that moment what she had invested so much energy in avoiding was suddenly, in a moment, and very powerfully, turned around. In a way this brief moment represented the other side of all that energy usually put into the avoidance of such contact. Which is, I suppose, why it made such an immediate impact, on both of us.

6.5.2 The Relationship Changed Through Musicking

The incident, or what one might call it, followed the process outlined by CPSG, in broad terms. The pregnancy phase could be seen when the joint drumming settled into a steady groove. And then the weird phase set in, for me, in which I was feeling on the brink of something, not knowing whether I could or even should take the decisive step, musically. Then there was a sense of making a decision, despite all this, and just plunging into something of which the outcome was not known. And a “moment of meeting” did occur. By engaging myself in this way, Lisa also became personally engaged, and provoked, by accident almost, to cross a border. For just a single moment she had to look up. And we had a brief contact that was different, and new.

I believe our relationship was changed. There was no way that it could continue as before. Something had happened that could not be overlooked. Some meeting had taken place. And in the following sessions, if I noticed something, it was a greater quietness or stillness, or possibly cautiousness. Probably so, I would guess, and I had to respect that. The moment could not simply be repeated. I very soon realized that what had happened did not imply that now we could start looking each other in the eyes as we were playing together. Still the sense of our relationship had changed in some way. And I believe that it was significant for Lisa to be given an opportunity for a brief glimpse into this world, of relation. We had moved into some uncharted relational territory. And

though it was necessary to retreat, we had been there, and both knew it. This was something that we carried with us in the subsequent music therapy sessions. Thus there was a sense of having had, in CPSG's terms, the implicit relational knowledge changed.

6.5.3 The Relation to Music in Therapy

CPSG developed the conception of “non-interpretive mechanisms” in psychoanalytic therapy in connection with the observation that one of the crucial factors or decisive moments in psychotherapy was, besides interpretive breakthroughs, a change in implicit relational knowledge between client and therapist. These conceptions have been applied here in an analogous way, mainly to the interpersonal aspect of music therapy. The focus in this connection has then been on the interpersonal relation, *through* the music. It was music that made the interpersonal process with Lisa possible. The intensity of the musical experience, which it seemed, was not possible to remain distanced from. It provoked immediacy, and some kind of intimacy between us. It was a *musical* moment of meeting then too, which had a great potency in affecting the relational aspect.

What I would want to develop, or suggest further here is how this kind of perspective regarding implicit relational knowing also might be applied with a focus on the “music itself”. That is, I want to see how it could be applied to the sphere of *musical relation*, in accordance with the basic dialogical principle that it is possible to relate to any sphere, also to the sphere of “forms of the spirit”. And I want to see how this may be aligned with the triangle model as set up here, with regards to mediation *across* the spheres of the interpersonal and the musical.

7 Change Process Across Two Spheres

In the present chapter I will attempt to develop a further theoretical perspective on the significance of the *musical* relationship in music therapy, and then view the musical and the interpersonal in relation to each other, with regards to the significance of this interrelation for the therapeutic process.

7.1 Knowing Relationally

If music is about more than can be put in words, the question is what do we know then about music, *beyond* language? What “cannot be said” is clearly not a mere blank; it is something of significance, something of which one may have knowledge of some sort, something of which one may know in some sense, what is. I want to use the distinction between declarative and implicit knowledge, to see how this could be applied to music, and the relevance of such an application for music therapy theory.

But first I want to explicate a basic dialogical outlook on the epistemological issue involved here, on what kind of knowledge this represents. I will take as a point of departure Buber’s example of an encounter – within the sphere of nature – with a tree. He considers various ways it may be related to:

I can accept it as a picture: a rigid pillar in a flood of light, or splashes of green traversed by the gentleness of the silver blue background.

I can feel it as movement: the flowing veins around the sturdy, striving core, the sucking of the roots, the breathing of the leaves, the infinite commerce with earth and air – and the growing itself in its darkness. I can assign it to a species and observe it as an instance, with an eye to its construction and its way

of life. I can overcome its uniqueness and form so rigorously that I recognize it only as an expression of the law – those laws to which a constant opposition of forces is continually adjusted, or those laws to which the elements mix and separate.

I can dissolve it into a number, into a pure relation between numbers, and eternalize it (p. 57-58).⁶³

These are all ways of viewing the tree, in increasingly abstract ways, from picture, movement, species, to law and number, *as an object*, within its place and time, its kind and condition. But then a shift may occur:

But it can also happen, if will and grace are joined, that as I contemplate the tree I am drawn into a relation, and the tree now ceases to be an It. The power of exclusiveness has seized me (p. 58).⁶⁴

With the term “exclusiveness” here Buber indicates that there is nothing besides this; the whole attention is directed directly towards that unique and particular tree. This does not mean however, he stresses, that all the previous different ways of considering the tree must be forgone:

There is nothing that I must not see in order to see, and there is no knowledge that I must forget. Rather is everything, picture and movement, species and instance, law and number included and inseparably fused.

All is included, the form and color, the biological processes and species, the relations to the surroundings. Buber further asserts that the tree in this encounter is no mere impression, or play of fantasy, or aspect of mood; it is confronted as a body of its own. And though he insists on the mutuality of relation, also towards such a tree, this does not imply that the tree has some kind of consciousness or “soul”: “What I encounter is neither the soul of a tree nor a dryad, but the tree itself” (p. 59).

⁶³ Ich kann ihn als Bild aufnehmen: starrender Pfeiler im Anprall des Lichts, oder das spritzende Gegrün von der Sanftmut des blauen Grundsilbers durchflossen.

Ich kann ihn als Bewegung verspüren: das flutende Geäder am haftenden und strebenden Kern, saugen der Wurzeln, Atmen der Blätter, unendlicher Verkehr mit Erde und Luft – und das dunkle Wachsen selber.

Ich kann ihn einer Gattung einreihen und als Exemplar beobachten, auf Bau und Lebensweise.

Ich kann seine Diesmaligkeit und Geformtheit so hart überwinden, daß ich ihn nur noch als Ausdruck des Gesetzes erkenne – der Gesetze, nach denen ein stetes Gegeneinander von Kräften sich stetig schlichtet, oder der Gesetze, nach denen die Stoffe sich mischen und entmischen.

Ich kann ihn zur Zahl, zum reinen Zahlenverhältnis verflüchtigen und verewigen (Buber 1958b, p. 12).

⁶⁴ Es kann aber auch geschehen, aus Willen und Gnade in einem, daß ich, den Baum betrachtend, in die beziehung zu ihm eingefaßt werde, und nun ist er kein Es mehr. Die macht der Ausschließlichkeit hat mir ergriffen (Buber 1958b. p. 12).

The tree is related to in its embodied and concrete uniqueness, not merely as an item placed under a category of some sort, though its categorization does not need to be disregarded, forgotten or ignored. What is confronted is this unique tree. The reality of which is acknowledged as such. A tree may be objectified in any number of ways, as the example here indicates, covering different aspects and characteristics, but by entering into relation what comes into focus is just this tree, and nothing else. All the different aspects may be included, but nothing is extracted and made to stand out separately. That the tree does not itself have a consciousness, as humans do, is no reason Buber finds, for “dividing the indivisible”, which is the simple and direct relating to the tree itself, as a whole. Buber holds forth the reality of the direct relation, not splitting this up into any number of ascribed features of the object, however comprehensive they may be. They will not themselves sum up to a direct encounter with just this tree.

Entering into relation is entering into a different attitudinal mode, not dividing up into subject and object, but relating directly to what is encountered as a whole, unique, present and immediate reality. And this, as noted here previously, may be done towards any sphere, be it inanimate or animate nature, the human sphere, or with artifacts, products of culture.

7.2 Musicology and “Music Itself”

Taking the tree example as an analogy to ways of relating also to music, one could distinguish between various fields and disciplines within musicology as the discipline of the systematic study of music: history, theory, analysis, psychology, anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, acoustics, biology, physiology, aesthetics, technology, and more. These would represent various aspects of music study, using different methods and approaches. Both traditional and New Musicology approaches could be included in this list, though there quite naturally would be discussion both within and between the various sub-disciplines of music study as to the validity and relevance of each approach (as with the discussion referred to previously here on interpretation versus structural analysis). Taken together though, and including the internal discussions, they all, following the proposed analogy here, would say something *about* music. They would

represent different ways of studying music, and as such they could be expected to contribute broadly and extensively to the total knowledge within the field.

At the same time music is not *merely* this, or even the sum total of all this. Entering into direct relation to music all and any of these aspects may be included, to varying degrees, but they will not in themselves in any case fully replace the encounter with music itself as a present, living reality.⁶⁵ The main point from a dialogical perspective is that there is really no way of coming to a complete and comprehensive picture of music *as an object*. Still there is the very real possibility at any one time of encountering music as it presents itself in daily life. Music *is* and remains a very vivid reality for us in our encounter with it, in its living presence. Buber makes his main epistemological point in the following paradoxical way:

What then does one experience of the You? – *Nothing at all*. For one does not experience it. – What, then, does one know of the You? – *Only everything*. For one no longer knows particulars (p. 61, italics added).

The *You* cannot be grasped, and yet it is possible to *know* the other. What Buber seems to be driving at is that when you meet a person for instance, in a direct, immediate, and full relation, you do not sort out particular aspects that you attend to specifically and exclusively, ruling out all other parts. Engaging in a mutual encounter with another you invest yourself wholly and fully towards the other. In this way you get to *know* the person, or rather, you get to know *each other*. And this is not the same as the knowledge *about* someone. This is also reflected in everyday language: You may have heard *about* someone, but you would not claim to *know* the other unless you had *met* him or her, on some occasion. Not even if you had actually *seen* someone somewhere you would readily claim that you knew the person, unless you actually had *met* the other.

7.2.1 To Know Some Music

To relate this perspective now to ways of knowing music: How do you know a piece of music? The simple answer is: By actually having heard it. If you had not heard it in some way, you could hardly say that you knew it. No matter how much data you might have gathered about the music, you can hardly claim to know it if you have not actually

⁶⁵ Kjerschow (2000) has made a similar point regarding musicology, based on Heidegger's existential phenomenology.

encountered it as a sounding reality. (Hearing it imaginatively through reading a score constitutes a special case.) Hearing the music as a sounding reality of course involves not only the sense of hearing exclusively, but also bodily senses, in a total response of the person to the music. And having heard it, there is just no way of giving anything like a full coverage in a verbal account, that would make another person's listening to it superfluous, in getting to know it. In the following I want to elaborate somewhat more on this epistemological issue, applying CPSG's concepts of "declarative" and "implicit relational knowing".

7.2.2 Declarative and Implicit Knowledge of Music

How do you know, for instance, a movement from a Brahms symphony? You may, after repeated hearings have become familiar with a great amount of detail, with themes, and their developments, rhythmic and harmonic features, instrumentation, dynamics and overall form. And this familiarity could well have been established independently of actually having put it into what CPSG term "declarative knowledge". You "know" it even if you have not made any effort to describe each detail in words, although you might on occasion have made more or less elaborate descriptions and comments. And actually there is no fixed limit as to what could be said about it either. You could elaborate more or less indefinitely on all aspects of the music, including all manner of context surrounding it, its time, its place, its reception history, its ideological implications, and more. There is no fixed limit as to what can be said about it. And still, not everything can be said. It cannot all be put into words, which implies that you have some "implicit relational knowledge" of the music, in CPSG's terms.

And seeing this the other way around, you do not need any definite, specific amount of declarative knowledge to "know" the music in this implicit sense. You do not have to know who the composer is, for instance, to appreciate the piece, nor what movement it is, from which symphony, or even that it was from a symphony. You do not have to know the title of the piece, or its opus number, or what key or mode it is in. You do not have to know who played or recorded it, where or when. You do not have to know which CD it is on. You do not have to know what instruments are playing, what they are called, or under which category of formal structure the music belongs, whether it is a rondo, a sonata form, or a theme and variations. Though this does not at all mean

that any such knowledge may not contribute to the understanding and even appreciation of the piece. What it means is that there is no fixed amount of declarative knowledge that must be acquired, to appreciate a given piece of music. If you hear the same music on several occasions, the relationship may be deepened. And all you may learn, with respect to declarative knowledge about the music will still naturally be integrated into your whole knowledge of the piece. But there will always also be the implicit knowledge, which is not reducible entirely to declarative knowledge.

“Tacit” Knowledge

Polanyi (1958) has made a similar and much cited distinction between two kinds of knowledge, which he calls *open* and *tacit*. As one example of tacit knowledge, which is not explicitly stated, he uses the recognition of faces. You may well know a face without having formulated verbally to yourself or others the characteristics that make you recognize this particular face. We may recognize a face among indeed a very large number, without having given a single thought on how to explain or account for how it is recognized. Declarative knowledge is dependent on language, but for implicit knowledge it is not necessary or required to be able to state the knowledge in verbal language terms. You *may* know something without having had it put into words. You may remember a piece of music and cherish it then, as you remember a face. You do not have to formulate verbally, in declarative knowledge, every feature of the music to retain it in memory, or to appreciate it.

7.3 Change in the Implicit Relation to Music

And now to relate this aspect of knowing music specifically to music therapy, a crucial issue here will be about *change* in implicit relational knowledge. Because the decisive aspect regarding the “non-interpretive mechanisms”, the “something more” of therapy, according to CPSG is the occurrence of a *change* in the “implicit relational knowledge” between client and therapist, which happens in the “moment of meeting”. What I am suggesting or proposing here is that in music therapy there may also be a “moment of meeting” *in the relation specifically to music*, and that *this too may harbor potentials of therapeutic change*.

The “something more”, musically, may occur when there is a sudden moment of change, in the relation *to the music*. Musical improvisation, for instance, as a main method in music therapy practice, may be a steady progression of what CPSG term “present moments”. But then a “now-moment” may occur. The now moment, as seen previously here, is described as consisting of the three phases, a pregnancy-, a weird- and a decision-phase. In relation to music the pregnancy phase may be when playing as usual so to speak. Then something may present itself as a possibility; there is a sudden opening, something new that might be explored. The weird phase sets in whether to follow up on this, or not, and just stick with the regular manner of practicing, or playing. The decision phase is when this opportunity is seized, and a new way of playing, which was not known before, is entered into, leading to a “moment of meeting”.

These kinds of musical process will be readily recognizable for anyone who has developed a facility in musical improvisation, I believe, and they may be more or less dramatic, more or less vast in range. What in any case is important to take into consideration here is that for a change in “implicit relational knowing” to occur, there must be a change in the *whole relationship*, not merely some part, or variation on an established practice. It is not merely adding some new technical device. And such change, furthermore, happens in a moment. It is not just a matter of building brick upon brick. Building methodically may naturally *precede* such a moment, and be necessary too. But what happens in the moment of the musical meeting is suddenly a new possibility of improvising opening up, and the whole relation to playing music becoming changed.

7.3.1 Change in *Practical* implicit knowing

This is a change that may include a *practical* implicit knowing. Like knowing how to ride a bicycle. A child learning to ride a bike may suddenly discover that it is possible to keep the balance, and ride without support, taking a leap and really riding the bicycle. One might as well think of a similar process that may occur in learning to improvise, coming to a point of knowing, of realizing how to do it, of feeling confident in that it is possible to just do it, letting go of the need for support. In the moment of being ready, just leaping into it, seizing the moment. It seems such learning processes are

discontinuous. It is not *merely* a matter of building up skill step by step then, one leading securely to the other. Truly knowing how to improvise may, in CPSG's terms, happen in a moment, through a *change in the implicit relational knowing of music*.

7.3.2 Change in the Sense of Self

CPSG consider that a change in "implicit relational knowledge" on a general basis implies a *change in the sense of self*. The one does not happen without the other. Thus there is no change in "implicit relational knowing" without a change in the sense of self, which is what gives it its crucial function in therapy. What I am suggesting here then, is that a relation may be built up and established towards *music*, as a reality in itself. During the course of therapy crucial moments may occur, in which there is a decisive change in this relationship towards music, which implies a change in the "implicit relational knowing" of music. And such change of the implicit relational knowing towards music as such, implies a change in the sense of self.

This may, as suggested above, be the moment one really embarks on the improvisational journey, having suddenly come to realize how to do it, or how to do it one's own way. It may be discovering, after having worked with the voice, on bringing it out, on making it sound, that suddenly: "I can sing! Now I know how to sing! Like I did not know before. To really sing!" Or, after some period of trying out, of building some facility, of getting some grip on it, to one's own amazement and astonishment: "I can beat that drum! I can make that drum sound! I can really get into and join in on this music, and make something out of it in my own way, that I couldn't even imagine before!"

The basic premise for the line of argument that is presented here is that it is possible to relate in a direct way to music, in accordance with the dialogical principle that entering into the world of relation may partake of any sphere. This opens for considering other kinds of implicit relational knowing than the interpersonal, in this case specifically of *music*.

7.3.3 "Peak Experience"

This line of thought may also be related to other theoretical perspectives that have historically been applied to Creative Music Therapy. One concept that has been much

referred to in literature related to the approach is the humanistic psychologist Abraham Maslow's "peak experience". The concept of the "moment of meeting" as a change within the implicit relational knowledge, implying a change in the sense of self, might well be seen to have a quite close affinity with this notion.

Maslow's point of departure was to inquire into what was common for people who had developed in a healthy way, rather than in a pathological way. He wanted to research into what constituted psychic health, rather than illness. In this way he wanted to see if there were any keys to a rich and fulfilling life. One such key he found in what he termed "peak experience". He found that it was a common feature of people recognized as having achieved a degree of self-realization that they had experienced certain decisive "peak experiences". These experiences had inserted a decisive influence on the person's view of the world, and his or her own role in it, with consequences for the course of their whole life. From this a conclusion might be drawn that such experiences might be very positive in the development of psychic health, Maslow pointed out.

In his research Maslow found that one of the most common sources that was reported inducing such experiences was music. He writes that musical as well as other art-related peak experiences might have the same kind of effect, or outcome as a psychotherapeutic process:

Music and art in a certain sense can do the same; there is a certain overlap, they can do the same there as psychotherapy... We can certainly talk, on the one hand of the breaking up of symptoms, like the breaking up of clichés, of anxieties, or the like; or on the other hand, we can talk about the development of spontaneity, and of courage, and of Olympian or Godlike humor and suchness, sensory awareness, body awareness, and the like (Maslow 1973, p. 170).

It seems the first part of this statement deals with the more regular work of therapy, oriented towards the "breaking up of clichés, of anxieties", whereas the second part deals with what might belong on the side of the "something more", with development of spontaneity, courage, presence, humor, sensory and bodily awareness. Music (and the arts in general) then, Maslow suggests, may help not only by loosening up difficulties and problems, but also by directly enhancing positive life qualities.

What this implies is the possibility of a direct and therapeutically potent relation to music, which basically accords with what has been suggested above here. Maslow's

concept of “peak experience” could clearly be considered to belong within the domain of “implicit relational knowing”. And the application of this concept may support a notion of change stemming from a change in the implicit relational knowing towards music, through what might be called a specifically *musical* peak experience. Such an experience with music implies a change in the relation to it. Suddenly it opens up in new way, exhibiting dimensions not known before. The point is that after a musical peak experience, the whole relation to music is not the same, and neither is the person having experienced this. This suggests the potentials of the experiential aspect of music within Creative Music Therapy, brought about by change in the relation to the medium, through a musical peak experience, and this contributing then to a change in the sense of self.

Integrating the Experience

As this process is a change of implicit relational knowledge, it is not required to take hold of it verbally for any particular processing of declarative issues implied. It is experiential rather than insight-oriented. Not needing verbal processing of declarative issues raises another question though, on how such experience of the “something more” in relation to music is integrated. For though it is not verbally processed, it needs to be integrated.

Maslow holds forth that the main limitation of entering into and assimilating peak experiences has to do with how much the body, or the whole organism of a person, in its actual state in the given situation is able to receive. In an experientially oriented therapy then, the consideration will be just as much whether the client will be overwhelmed, as whether there is avoidance in confronting the material. Bruscia actually points to this aspect in a comment on peak-experiences in Creative Music Therapy:

The child-therapist relationship is often propelled from one stage to next by a musical “peak experience” which brings the child and therapist into an intimate therapeutic encounter. It can be a wonderful moment of truth, acceptance, contact, achievement, joy or truce. Immediately after such an experience however, the child may feel threatened and various forms of resistiveness may appear and even persist for some time. The resistiveness is a natural and healthy means of defense the child uses to avoid being overwhelmed and to gain the time needed to assimilate the experience. 63

This is a different kind of defense though, than the so-called defense-mechanism within insight-oriented verbal psychotherapy, which is about avoiding what is initially difficult to confront. It is more a warding off of what appears too overwhelming to handle. What seems to be crucial is the *time* needed, both to prepare, *and* to assimilate the experience. The therapeutic process necessarily extends beyond the moment, in time. As Maslow relates, a singular experience can release a long process of integration and change, even throughout the perspective of a whole lifetime.

7.3.4 Incremental Changes

An important qualification to consider here is that the “moment” may be more or less groundbreaking, and there may be degrees to the so-called peak-experience. A real peak experience is by nature a singular, unique event. It is not part of the regular day-to-day affairs. The authors behind the article “Non Interpretive Mechanisms of Psychoanalytic Therapy: The “Something More” than Interpretation” (CPSG), referred to here, have more recently written an article where they qualify their position regarding the “moment of meeting” in therapy (Bruschweiler-Stern et al. 2002).⁶⁶ They introduce the notion of a step-by-step “fitting together” process taking place in therapy on the interrelational level, and which also may prove to be significant in the therapeutic change process:

What we did not previously emphasize, as we confined our conceptualizations to charged moments, was that fittedness, or the recognition of specifically fitted complementary actions, is the central clinical notion that captures the tendency of systems towards greater coherence. Fittedness is being evaluated continually with respect to multiple levels of intentional activity in the moving-along process and concerns issues along a spectrum of import. Reaching fittedness leads to incremental changes in implicit relational knowing, which are experienced as “getting better” (p. 1059).

It is important to take into account, as indicated previously here, that it is not possible to go for any complete presence of the moment towards music *all* the time. The charged moments will naturally alter with more regular ones of basic “moving along”. Actually the charged moment cannot be imagined without the other, by terms of contrast. There

⁶⁶ In the previously referenced article by the same authors Stern’s name was put first. In this article the names are listed alphabetically, the first name then being Nadia Bruschiweiler-Stern. This article is referenced here as Bruschiweiler-Stern et al. then.

will always be two sides or two aspects to this process then. An alternation between a regular “something”, and a “something more”, is both necessary and inevitable.

7.3.5 Musical Transference and Countertransference

Regarding the alternation between these two sides of a regular “something” and a “something more” in relation to music, a further aspect to consider in applying the conceptual construct of implicit relational knowing is that in the “moment of meeting”, as mentioned previously, issues of transference and countertransference are minimized, according to CPSG (Stern et al. 1998b). Relationship in such a moment approaches a mutuality and reciprocity that is not barred by such issues. It is a characteristic of such moments that these “mechanisms” tend to drop away, and become irrelevant.

A similar state of affairs may in an analogous way actually be seen within the *musical* relationship too. One might also think of conflict issues with music, having difficulties in relating to it, “transferring” and “counter-transferring” personal issues onto the music. Being angry at the music, when it is difficult to perform, getting bored with having to exert oneself towards it. Finding it resistive, and not willing to comply with one’s own immediate wishes and needs. The “moment of meeting” with music though, is not a moment of conflict and strife. It is not at this point one is exasperated from practicing, or feeling that one is not able to perform for some reason, that one does not find that one can relate to the music in any fruitful and meaningful way. At the moment of meeting such concerns will tend to fall away, becoming minimized, allowing the potency of the moment to actualize fully and freely. This is what such a moment, with regards *also to the relation to music* then, implies.

7.4 The Interrelation Between the Two Spheres

What I have done here is to apply CPSG’s theory of the “something more” of change in implicit relational knowledge not only to the interpersonal relation in therapy but also to the relation to *music* in Creative Music Therapy. The conception of a specifically

musical peak experience has also been used here to support the notion of a possible change in implicit relational knowing of music, leading to a change in the sense of self.

The question then must be posed how these two aspects, the interpersonal and the musical, are related to each other. This may become clearer through comparing with verbal psychotherapy. According to CPSG there are two kinds knowledge involved in psychoanalysis, declarative, which deals with conflict issues and facilitates interpretations, leading to insight and change, *and* implicit knowledge, which is relational, and which may also lead to change, as seen here. CPSG point out that there is a relation between these two. A crucial interpretation may lead to a moment of meeting interpersonally, but not necessarily. The opportunity has to be seized.

If the therapeutic mode of verbalization, as found in the psychotherapeutic “talking cure”, is replaced with musical improvisation, as in Creative Music Therapy, a different dynamics is found. Here, instead of one declarative and one implicit relational aspect, we find *two* implicit relational aspects, belonging to the two different spheres of the interpersonal and the musical. The declarative aspect is for all practical purposes omitted then, and instead there is a *two-sided implicit relational dynamics*. This could be seen as a “weakness”, in that only the one type of knowledge is involved in the process, but also as a strength, in that this type of knowledge here becomes involved in a particularly dynamic way.

7.4.1 Playing Together

In Creative Music Therapy there seems to be a somewhat more intimate relation between the two aspects of therapeutic process in that the interpersonal “something more” seems more closely connected to the medium of therapy, which is to say music, which itself is of an implicit relational character. It might seem possible to keep more of a “distance” through declarative verbal interpretive processing, than through music making together, which somewhat more readily may enhance interpersonal relationship. Not least because by using music as a therapeutic medium therapist and client are *playing together*.

There is a powerful interpersonal dynamics inherent in such playing together. It invites a sharing of experience. But this does not happen automatically. People may well remain distant to each other in participating in music activity too, but the medium

harbors its own characteristic potentials for *enhancing relationship*, in particular when there is something musically significant and engaging happening, if, that is to say, there is a “moment of meeting” with music. A shared *musical* moment of meeting may thus lead to an *interpersonal* moment of meeting.

7.4.2 “Communitas”

The interrelation between these two spheres could further be illuminated by relating to anthropological theory on rituals. Ruud (1998a) has developed a theory on “communitas” in improvisational music therapy, based on anthropologist Victor Turner’s concept of *liminality*. Turner builds on the anthropologist Arnold van Gennep who at the beginning of the 20th century made the observation that what he coined “rites of passage”, that is, rituals associated with movements or passages from one position to another within a social structure, such as births, initiations, confirmations, weddings, funerals, tended to have a similar structure within diverse cultures. First there is a separation phase, in which one leaves the previous held normal position of everyday life. Then there is an intermediary or transitional phase, between old and new worlds, and lastly a reaggregation phase, leading back to the “normal” society, but now with a new identity. Turner later developed these notions and proposed that the second transitional phase is marked by what he termed *liminality*, from the Latin word “limen”, which means threshold, a kind of indeterminate state where there is a loss of the old identity, but in which a new one has not yet been acquired. This state according to Turner often induces a particular community between the participants of such a ritual, which he termed “communitas” – characterized by direct and egalitarian interpersonal relations, outside of regular social distinctions and dividing lines. As mentioned in the introductory chapter Turner explicitly likens this to Buber’s “I and Thou” relation.

Ruud suggests that improvisational music therapy may be regarded to entail a liminal type of threshold experience, outside of conventional delimitations, in an “eternal now“, which may lead to such communitas, as a kind of I-Thou relation in Buber’s sense. Ruud regards it as a main characteristic of such improvisational activity, that it may take place not in the conventional coordinates of time and space, but rather in a flow, an indefinable void:

Turner's spontaneous or existential "communitas" is an especially appropriate description of improvisation – the spirit of community before the introduction of rules and social systems. Buber's view fits well with the humanistic ideology of music therapy, which posits the subject-subject relationship as the norm for therapeutic relations, exactly as it is experienced in improvisation. When we try to relate the specific musical aspect of the improvisation to the liminal aspects of the I-Thou, we can again focus on the aspect of "flow" – the timeless – that seems to constitute the core of spontaneous "communitas" (p. 132).

Ruud's notion of the liminal aspects of improvisation leading to communitas could well say something about how the special kind of experience that musical improvisation may be, occasionally transcending conventional delimitations and bonds, may lead to communitas, that is to say, to a heightened sense of being together. It may say something about the relation between the musical and the interpersonal moment of meeting then, how one may lead to another.⁶⁷

Communitas Qualified

But a qualification needs to be made though, because, as stressed previously here, a therapeutic relationship is not completely mutual. Communitas will, according to Turner, tend to bracket all regular roles and distinctions. As such the defined role relation necessarily found between therapist and client will never come to a full and complete communitas, without the character of this relationship as therapeutic then coming to an end. The therapist needs to have a bi-polar perspective. Though there may, as seen here, be *moments* of meeting, with a great therapeutic potential.

7.4.3 Crossing Vertical and Horizontal Lines

It is important to make clear here that the "moments of meeting" musically and interpersonally are interrelated, but *not the same*. The thesis that is put forward here is that *both* the interpersonal and the musical relation may harbor potentials for personal transformation. There is a two-sided change of implicit relational knowledge that may occur: towards music and interpersonally, the one propelling the other; two kinds of implicit relational knowledge that are interrelated, and mutually enhancing each other.

⁶⁷ There is a quite striking similarity here to the three phases of change in implicit knowing, separation corresponding to the pregnancy phase, the intermediate "liminal" state corresponding to the "weird" phase, leading through a decision phase to a moment of meeting, and finally reaggregation implying a new identity and return to society, which corresponds with personal change.

And what is crucial not to “forget” then, according to a dialogical perspective, is that though a shared musical experience may create a bond between people, this does not happen in any mechanical way, but in a dynamic and open *situational* way.


The analogy with protoconversation shows its limitations here, because music in music therapy, within the dynamics of this two-sided process, it is not merely or exclusively a means for interpersonal interaction. It becomes itself of “interest”. The musical dimension *as such* needs to be included. The dynamics of the music therapy setting are to be found through the interrelations, the mediations between all three sides of the triangle set-up then, with the therapist mediating the client’s relation to music, approaching and sometimes maybe touching upon special musical moments, and in this also potentially moving towards an interpersonal meeting.

Replacing verbal language as a medium in therapy with music is not just putting in some different means of communication. The modality of music gathers the attention, so to speak, towards itself. Music is not so much about something else, in the way verbal language is, as it is *itself related to*. Thus there is a relational aspect to music itself. And a singular focus on the level of interpersonal interaction will not fully cover this aspect. In accordance with the triangle of interrelations set up here we have to move across the spheres, also to the music side, to get a fuller picture.⁶⁸

The interrelation across the two spheres of the interpersonal and the musical within the music therapy process could be indicated by introducing a horizontal and a vertical line into the music therapy triangle that are crossed both ways and at the same time related to each other:

⁶⁸ I choose not to use the term “intermusical” here, as a parallel expression to “interpersonal”, because “inter” means between, and interpersonal then is about relations between persons. Intermusical is not about relation between musics. At least that is not what I am talking about here. I prefer to use the terms “interpersonal relationship” for the relation *between persons* and “musical relationship” for the relation of *persons to music*.

Figure 5: The Intercrossing of Two Spheres within the Music Therapy Triangle



7.5 Replacing Words with Music

This chapter has dealt with the epistemological consequences of using music instead of words in therapy. Music has been seen to replace verbal interpretation as the main medium of therapy, playing has taken the place of talking. This “substitution” has implied a different role to the therapeutic medium, because of the different characteristics between the two media. The theme of this chapter has centered around epistemological issues then, based on a dialogical kind of outlook, specifically regarding *relational knowledge*, which has been defined as implicit rather than declarative, and which has been considered *both* with respect to interpersonal relations

and to the relation to music, in accordance with the basic dialogical principle of regarding relation as a potent actuality within any and all spheres.

Music as a therapeutic medium is not applicable to the treatment of specific issues in the way language is. The reason for using it then will not be for what it says about something, dealing with declarative knowledge, but rather for facilitating implicit relational knowing, both towards itself, and for the mediation of a potentially powerful communal experience between client and therapist. A *dynamics between two aspects of implicit relation* is found then, rather than a dynamics between on the one side a declarative and on the other an implicit kind of knowing, as in the psychoanalytic “talking cure”.

Replacing words with music as a therapeutic medium, actually requires a somewhat different set-up for the interrelations in therapy, because music is not just *about* something, as a means for communication between therapist and client, as words are; it is *itself* related to, for its own qualities. The dimension of implicit relational knowing of music then becomes itself a reason for setting up a triangular interrelation of the parts involved in the “scene“ of music therapy. Music itself becomes a “part” in the “play”, in that it is itself related to, rather than just mediating some *other* content between the *two* parts of therapist and client.

7.5.1 The Relation Between Music and Words

A question still remains as to the relation *between* music and verbal processing in therapy, that is to say, music not just substituted for language, but also *combined* with verbal language. What is the relation between music and words in a music-based therapy? Are words even necessary, or should they be excluded? What is gained, and what is lost using words? What are the different roles that words may play, and how may these be related to the role of music? In the next chapter I want to deal with these issues, by comparing Creative Music Therapy with Analytical Music Therapy, looking more closely at differences between the roles of music within these two approaches, and how this relates to the use of words.

8 Symbolic Projection versus Aesthetic Expression

In the following chapter I want to look more into the role of music in a music-based music therapy by performing a comparative analysis of Creative Music Therapy and Analytic Music Therapy. The reason for using Analytical Music Therapy as a basis for comparison is that it represents an approach to music psychotherapy incorporating both music improvisation *and* verbalization. I do not want to make any complete exposition of Analytical Music Therapy as such, however. I want to use it for contrasting purposes, with regards to the role of music in therapy and how music may be related to the use of words within a music-based music therapy. The way music is related to is different within these two approaches, because the role of music is different, and I believe bringing this out clearly may help furthering the discussion on whether a “therapy in music” is possible. I want to try to contribute to this issue by bringing out a dialogical perspective on Creative Music Therapy and Analytical Music Therapy respectively, particularly with regards to the issue of the necessity or not of verbalization, seen in relation to the role of music within these two models of therapy.

8.1 Creative Music Therapy

Creative Music Therapy originated in the work of Nordoff and Robbins through a 16 year period from the late fifties up to around the mid seventies.⁶⁹ It was originally

⁶⁹ The primary sources of Nordoff-Robbins therapy that used here are *Therapy in Music for Handicapped Children* (Nordoff and Robbins 1972), and *Creative Music Therapy: Individualized Treatment for the Handicapped Child* (Nordoff and Robbins 1977). Central secondary literature consulted

developed for work with mentally and physically handicapped children, using improvisation as a main tool for engaging the children in a musically based therapeutic process. There is a strong emphasis on developing the child's relation to music, regarding music as the main agent of change. In the original setting two therapists work as a team, one playing the piano, and the other helping and supporting the child to respond and participate in the joint musical therapeutic activity. Most often the child beats a drum and a cymbal, and may also vocalize. Other instruments are added when necessary and appropriate. The therapist improvising may vocalize too, in addition to playing the piano. Songs may be developed, with lyrics tailored to the present needs of the individual child. Usually there is a welcome song and a goodbye song, to frame the session (Nordoff and Robbins 1972, 1977).

Bruscia (1987) has made a systematic exposition of the model, that is often referred to, according to which therapy runs through three phases, which nevertheless are not followed in a fixed order at all times, but may rather occur as natural developmental spirals, with a different emphasis of each phase, at any turn. The first is called "meeting the child musically". Through this first phase the therapist attempts to improvise music that corresponds with the emotional expression of the child, to establish a musical contact, and a feeling of trust and acceptance. In the second phase, "evoking a musical response", the emphasis is on engaging the child in contributing a musical response, either on instruments, or vocally. This response is likely to be marked by limitations stemming from the child's disability, and the next phase in therapy is for the child to come out of fixated and stereotyped ways of playing, through various improvisational methods or techniques implemented by the therapist. Thereby the child's proficiency in playing is increased, which opens for new expressive possibilities. The child may then also discover more of the give-and-take of musical interresponsiveness with the therapist. This third phase then, according to Bruscia, is called "developing musical skills, expressive freedom, and interresponsiveness" (p. 50).

The aim for moving through these phases is the development of a full range of musical expression in accordance with the child's potential. It is assumed that through this the child will develop inner resources leading to personality change and a

includes Bruscia: *Improvisational Models of Music Therapy* (Bruscia 1987), Ansdell's *Creative Music Therapy: Aspects of Creative Music Therapy with Adult Clients* (Ansdell 1995), and Aigen's *Paths of Development on Nordoff-Robbins Music Therapy* (Aigen 1998b).

strengthening of functional level. Bruscia emphasizes the significance of music within this model. He maintains that it is the relation to music itself that is of primal importance here. And the role of the therapist is to facilitate and support the child-music relationship. The relation that is developed between the therapist and the child is meant to serve to enhance the therapeutic powers inherent in the child-music relationship. It is thus a clear example of music *as* therapy, Bruscia maintains.

This does seem to accord with Nordoff and Robbins who in the opening paragraph in the introduction to their first book state that: “The therapy that lies *in music* can have a far-reaching effect upon the development of children who bear the handicaps of mental impairment, emotional disturbance or physical disability” (p. 15, italics added). Their aim is formulated as follows:

Our aim is to provide musicians, therapists, teachers and students with a wide, practical orientation in the implementation of *music as therapy* by exemplifying the creative use of musical and artistically related principles in a variety of working situations (p. 17, italics added).

The expression “music as therapy” is found here already. Nordoff and Robbins consider that music serves as a medium through which a child may develop from an exceptional state, in the sense of being inhibited or impaired, to a more universal state. Music may bring forth inner sources of development for the child. Bringing forth these sources they term activating the “music child” (Nordoff and Robbins 1977).

Although Nordoff-Robbins therapy started out working with handicapped children it has since developed to include work also with adults, in a variety of settings, including somatic medicine and psychiatry (Aldridge 1996a; Ansdell 1995).

8.2 Analytical Music Therapy

Mary Priestley calls the model she has developed “Analytical Music Therapy”.⁷⁰ The term “analytical” is brought in from psychoanalysis. Priestley combines a

⁷⁰ The main primary sources used here are *Music Therapy in Action* (Priestley 1985), and *Essays on Analytical Music Therapy* (Priestley 1994). A central secondary source is Bruscia’s chapter “Unit Four: Analytical Music Therapy” in his *Improvisational Models of Music Therapy*, in which he gives a broad systematic outline of this model (along the same lines as the one given to the Nordoff-Robbins approach in the chapter: “Unit two: Creative Music Therapy”). A book edited by Johannes Th. Eschen, a first pupil of Priestley, who also has contributed considerably in its development, has recently been published, which includes articles from central representatives of the approach today.

psychoanalytically oriented therapy with music therapy, by incorporating, in addition to the traditional verbal talking, musical improvisation.⁷¹

Priestly has developed several techniques in which therapist and client improvise together. Therapy runs through a cyclic process, starting with a conversation in which one focuses in on a theme that is presently relevant for the client, and which is formulated into a title for an improvisation. The therapist and client then play together, on piano and various percussion instruments. They may decide to act different roles musically, for instance two parts in a conflict. The improvisation is recorded on audiotape, listened to and processed afterwards, by interpreting verbally to find out what kind of insights that may be won. This may then become a point of departure for a new theme, with a new title, possibly an exchange of roles before a new round with musical improvisation.

The aim for this therapy is that the client may have an opportunity to work through problems and personal issues in a quite parallel way to psychoanalysis. The main difference is that instead of just the verbal, one also uses musical improvisation as a medium for therapeutic insight. In Analytical Music Therapy improvisation gets something of the same function as free association in psychoanalysis, except that in contradistinction from this it is a non-verbal expression. This furthermore makes possible a special, intimate interaction by the therapist actively participating in the improvisation, and not just remaining receptive to the free association, as in the classical psychoanalytic verbal therapy. Through the joint improvisation the therapist may establish a close relationship with the client, which is not like verbal conversation in

⁷¹ For a period Priestly would call it “Explorative Music Therapy”, to distinguish it clearer from traditional psychoanalysis, but eventually decided to return to the original term (Priestly and Eschen 2002). Analytical Music Therapy was actually originally developed by Mary Priestly together with Marjorie Wardle and Peter Wright in the early 1970s, working as colleagues in a psychiatric hospital. Priestly has continued to develop the model, writing about it and providing training. The approach has since been developed further by her students, and in countries like Denmark and Germany the term for the approach has been changed to “Analytically Oriented Music Therapy” (Wigram, Bonde, and Nygaard Pedersen 2002). This is to indicate that the theoretical grounding is not held strictly within a psychoanalytic basis. Still the term Analytical Music Therapy seems to be a quite common usage internationally, as reflected in recent publications, and in conference presentations. (It was presented under this name as a main model of music therapy at the World Conference in music therapy in Washington 1999). Though some will find this highly problematic, because the approach may in this way become too closely associated with a traditional psychoanalytical stance, which does not reflect its current broader basis. Though this concern is recognized and readily accepted, “Analytical Music Therapy” is nevertheless the term that will be used here, because I choose to focus mainly on the original formulation by Mary Priestly.

which one speaks alternately, after turn. The musical improvisation may become more like an embrace, or sometimes even like a fight, Priestly reports (1994).

8.2.1 “Referential” Improvisation

Bruscia (1987) has made an extensive systematic exposition of several models of improvisational music therapy, including Creative Music Therapy and Analytical Music Therapy, thereby enabling comparisons between them (Bruscia 1987). Regarding the different roles of music in these two approaches he states that in Analytical Music Therapy the use of improvisation is “referential” in character, which means that music symbolizes or refers to something outside of itself. Taking a title, related to the issue or theme of therapy, as a point of departure for improvisation, as in Analytical Music Therapy, is a programmatic, “referential” use of musical improvisation. Creative Music Therapy on the other side is “non-referential”, Bruscia holds forth. The improvisations are created according to strictly musical considerations, not referring to anything outside of the music. Music is itself regarded as intrinsically meaningful, not dependent upon any extra-musical program or theme.

What the “Program” is About

There seems to be a need for a qualification though, in applying such a distinction to music therapy. Clearly there actually *is* some kind of program for the improvisation in Analytical Music Therapy, or at least a title indicating a theme, which the therapist and client decide upon beforehand. Therefore the improvisation could be regarded as referring to something outside itself, as program music in some sense. Still it is not quite this simple. To clarify this matter I think it will be instructive to consider somewhat more closely what the term “program music” implies. As Dahlhaus (1982) in his *Aesthetics of Music* points out, it is a crude misunderstanding to think that the program is the meaning of for instance a symphonic poem; that the program as such could be used to decode the music, as if it were a text in cipher. Goethe’s *Faust* is not the literal content of Liszt’s “Faust” Symphony, but merely its *subject*, the material that the composer elaborates, Dahlhaus holds forth. Dahlhaus writes on the relation between the subject and the music:

A supply of tones and a subject, if we may simplify the point, constitute two kinds of material. Only from the interaction of subject and ‘forms moved in sounding’ does the musical content arise; a wish to narrate the content involves a misunderstanding about its mode of existence. If the subject specifies meanings for musical themes and motives, the opposite is equally valid: the broad significance and import of the subject is newly minted by the musical themes and motives. Program music rests on the interdependence of its components (p. 59).

There is an interdependence to be found, as Dahlhaus sees it, between the music and its program. The phrase “forms moved in sounding” is of course a reference to Hanslick’s famous definition of absolute music, which implied an attack on program music within 19th century debate on the aesthetics of classical European music. Dahlhaus considers his point of view as a qualified defense of program music, of its possibility at least, in the interrelation between music and its program, in which the one cannot be seen independently of the other.

What is outlined here is clearly a dialogical point of view on the relation between music and its program. The one illuminates the other. The program is not to be “read” out of the music; it is rather a subject that the music is *related* to. The program may thus serve to illuminate what the music as it sounds, is about. And the music on the other hand, may illuminate the program, by characterizing and elaborating on it by musical means. The meaning of the music, as program music, is in the *interaction* with the program, and not by its replacement.

On this background it is clear that in music therapy a crucial distinction needs to be made regarding the programmatic “content” of the music. An improvisation in Analytical Music Therapy, though initiated through a decided upon title, can scarcely be considered program music as such. The music is not simply about the program, but about the *client’s* relation to this program. This is where the concern is. The music is not related to or valued directly *as* program music, but rather as music programmatic of a theme related to the client’s personal concerns. What is at the center of interest is the client’s relation to the “program”, not the music, nor even the program as such. By listening to the recording of the improvisation the interpretations that are made infer something about the *client*, not the music as program music. It is not just a matter here then, of applying the distinction between referential or non-referential meaning, or considering the relation between music and program, which are debated issues within

musical aesthetics. The question that is posed is what improvised, programmatic music means or reveals *about the client*.

8.2.2 Verbal Translations of Musical Improvisation

In Analytical Music Therapy musical improvisation is used as a medium for bringing out unconscious psychic material. This poses a further question as to the interpretation of the music, because free association, used for this purpose in psychoanalytic therapy is verbal, and thus *has* a direct literal meaning to start with, whilst music does not have a specific literal meaning in the same way, even if it is related to a programmatic theme through an assigned title. There is a *double translation* here, one might say, first of what the music as such actually expresses, and then what to make out of this in psychodynamic terms, as a projection of psychic content. In free association the words may be directly interpreted for eliciting repressed unconscious conflict material, through their immediate literal meaning, whereas in musical improvisation some interpretation of what the music expresses necessarily has to be made before further psychodynamic interpretations are made.

This kind of interpretation is different from program music, because what it is about is not apparent in the same way. The difference is that in program music the program is given, and is related to as the program for the music. In Analytical Music Therapy the improvisation on the theme is given, after having been agreed upon, but the improvisation is not performed simply for elaborating on the theme as such, but for revealing what is hidden, within the psyche of the player, by the way in which it is executed. It is interpreted symptomatically, for a “hidden” meaning. This of course becomes even more of an issue when the music is just freely improvised, as a musical counterpart to free association. Here there is no predecided title to relate to, just the musical expression as such.

The function of music thus is somewhat different than the free verbal association. Of course it may be considered a main strength of music improvisation that it taps directly into unconscious material, *bypassing* words. And this has been brought forth as a particularly relevant reason for using music in analytic therapy. But making psychodynamic interpretations one has to go through words on the way *back* anyhow, because no matter how you regard the question of referential or non-referential, or

program music versus absolute music, the meaning of music is less specific than words, and to deal with issues of unconscious conflict material, a translation back into verbal language is nonetheless necessary.

This kind of processing, unveiling and attempting to deal with hidden conflict material clearly needs language as a discursive medium. Without talking about what the musical expression represents, the psychic content would not be revealed. The talking itself could be considered to be what *brings it out*. If the improvisations were not talked about, to extract psychic material, this material would not be captured for further processing, and might as well return to the unconscious. Talking is furthermore necessary to *process* the conflict material brought out this way. This is the regular verbal processing, the “talking cure”, which in this specific case is based on the material brought forth through the interpretation of the improvised music.

8.2.3 Both Client and Therapist Providing Material *and* Listening to it

A further difference from classic verbal free association is the issue of the therapist’s versus the client’s own interpretation of the music, as *both* listen to the recording afterwards, whereas in the classical setting the psychoanalyst is alone in the listening position while the client is engaged in verbal free association. There is a *joint* listening then, afterwards, to a recording, and on this basis making interpretations of the music. These naturally may not be congruent between the therapist and client, and a whole array of additional interpretive issues thereby arise, including of course matters of transference and counter-transference between therapist and client in the interpretations made.

A further decisive difference still is that in the classic psychotherapeutic setting it is the client only that comes up with the material for analysis, through verbal free association, whereas in Analytical Music Therapy the improvisation is actually performed not only by the client, but *also by the therapist*. Different approaches may be used here, as assigning and playing different roles to therapist and client, that also may be conflictual, or taking on specific functions within the musical improvisation, like so-called “holding” techniques, in which the client is given musical support from the therapist to allow emotional musical “tantrums”. The therapist is here consequently actively contributing with material, in a co-operation with the client. This of course

poses further challenges as to interpretive issues in the music, in sorting out between the therapist and client, both during the actual playing and in the subsequent listening to it.

All in all a rather more complex situation compared with the classic psychoanalytic setting, and which poses quite some challenges as to accounting for the ground and validity of interpretation and verbalization in relation to the music. My intent here is not to attempt to solve these issues though, or even strive to give any comprehensive account of all aspects of interpretation within Analytical Music Therapy. I am sketching the various sides and aspects to interpretation in relation to music and verbalization within Analytical Music Therapy, with a view to compare and to contrast with Creative Music Therapy, for purposes of clarifying the issue of the role of music, and the relation of music to words in therapy.

8.3 Creative Music Therapy as an Active Approach

In contrast to Analytical Music Therapy as an interpretive approach, Creative Music Therapy may be considered primarily an active approach to therapy.

8.3.1 The Concept of “Work”

In Analytical Music Therapy The “central work”, as Priestly (1985) calls it, is resolving personal issues through processing programmatic improvisations through verbal interpretation. In Creative Music Therapy the “central work” takes place rather through the musical activity itself. Aigen actually regards the concept of “work” to be central to a Creative Music Therapy approach to music therapy. Based on his research into recordings and notes of early Nordoff-Robbins case material, he even states that there is perhaps no other concept as central to the understanding of early Nordoff-Robbins practice as the concept of “work” (Aigen 1998b).

Activating the Will

The central component of “work” in Creative Music Therapy is gaining musical skills. But this is not just aimed at as a goal in itself. Through developing musical skills, the

will of the child is activated. Nordoff and Robbins were quite directive in their approach, almost to the point of being authoritarian, Aigen holds forth. The child was directly challenged to participate in music activity. To respond to the challenge, and develop musical skill, the child would have to activate and apply the will. And an effort of the will was considered to be an effort of the self. In this way being engaged in musical activity implied a concrete step in self-actualization. Creative Music Therapy then is an *active* rather than interpretive approach towards music. And here is where the central work of therapy is to be found, engaging the child in musical activity, striving to increase the child's level of participation and capacity for self-expression. This represents the main direction and aim for Creative Music Therapy.

Function Versus the Whole Child

Working with music, developing musical skills at the same time naturally contributes to activate cognitive, affective, and physical processes. Through such musical participation several faculties may be integrated in a developmental process. The gaining of musical skills may then reflect a parallel developmental change. Musical activity may in this way stimulate diverse developmental processes (Nordoff and Robbins 1972).

Though Aigen does recognize this as an aspect of therapy, he stresses that what primarily is sought in Creative Music Therapy is *overall* change in the client's capacity for finding meaning in life, and relating to the world. He does not consider that it is fruitful to isolate any particular functional area from another to define therapeutic work in relation to just one of these. A change directed towards the whole of the child is the aim for therapy. And besides from this, the developmental areas that are activated by the gaining of musical skill are different for each child. There is no similar or universal pattern in the beneficial effects stemming from the participation in the musical activity. It is in any case the whole, particular child that is considered, not this or that developmental functioning, seen in isolation as an independent aim. On this basis Aigen considers Creative Music Therapy to be a form of psychotherapy, on account of being focused on self-actualization through music making, which in itself "is an active manifestation of a fully functional human being" (p. 296).⁷²

⁷² This naturally implies a wider definition of psychotherapy, beyond its delimitation to an interpretive "talking cure".

8.3.2 Resolving Conflict

According to Aigen, Nordoff and Robbins, particularly in the early stages of the development of their approach, displayed a certain “impatience” towards what they considered as pathologically determined behavior. When called for, they would take a clear confrontational clinical stance, challenging the child to participate. This might on occasion actually build up towards a crisis, with a subsequent resolving of the conflict, leading to a greater freedom of expression for the child, not being as restricted in the involvement with the music. This is also one reason why Aigen would consider the work to be psychotherapeutic in character, in that it deals, at least in some cases, directly with conflict material.

Aigen underlines that although Creative Music Therapy is not directly aimed towards the remediation of pathology, or alleviating symptoms, therapy still did not always circumvent the pathology of the children through just bringing them positive experiences. He describes early Nordoff-Robbins therapy as sometimes assuming the character of a battlefield, in which psychological and social conflicts were addressed, in order to be resolved, allowing a self-actualizing process to proceed.

Resistiveness and Participation

Nordoff and Robbins used the word resistiveness. This is somewhat different from the term “resistance” as this is commonly used in psychotherapeutic terminology. Generally, what is meant by the term is resistance towards uncovering what is felt to be unpleasant unconscious material. Accepting and integrating the repressed unconscious psychic content may overcome this resistance. “Resistiveness” as this is understood in Nordoff-Robbins music therapy, in accordance with its active approach, is towards *participation*. Thus it is not resistance to bringing forth and dealing with repressed unconscious material, but resistiveness towards full participation in music activity.

8.3.3 Musical Progression

In Creative Music Therapy there is an intention to take care of the musical ideas and developments that emerge through the improvisation, and seek to build on these in the following sessions. A clear contrast can be seen here in that in Analytical Music

Therapy it is the actual theme, the “referential” content as such, that one is concerned with and seeks to develop further. What is picked up on subsequent sessions is not primarily the musical elements, but the (next) theme to be improvised upon, the program title of the improvisation that is to follow.

Thus there are two different routes of progression through the course of therapy in each of these models. In Creative Music Therapy the expressive possibilities inherent in the musical materials at hand are emphasized. One works consciously towards building up and developing certain musical skills, from the client’s own presuppositions, to enable musical expression and development. The improvisations then are performed on increasing levels of musical accomplishment, within the therapeutic setting. The purely programmatic use of music improvisation on the other hand presupposes no such conscious work on musical proficiency, and does not necessarily lead to any development in this regard, Priestly underlines. Contrasting it with merely a music lesson she writes:

The results of successful music therapy should be looked for in the quality of the patient’s life and being, and not in the improvement in the quality of her musical improvisation or performance, ... *Indeed her music may be the one factor that shows little or no change at all after as much as five years of quite successful therapeutic work* (p. 5, italics added).

The *one* factor in the person’s life that may *not* change in any significant way is the client’s *music*, Priestly declares. Even after as much as five years (!) of music therapy. This seems to imply that the use of improvisation during the whole course of therapy will remain on an aesthetic zero growth level. This could be seen as a consequence stemming from the fact that this form of therapy is not directed towards development of the musical expression in its own terms.⁷³ Priestly actually prefers to use the term “sound expression” instead of music. Instead of talking about music she will say to the client: “Make sound to let me know what you are feeling” (Priestly and Eschen 2002, p. 13), which could be seen to reflect her basic position on the role of music in Analytical Music Therapy. Johannes Eschen (Eschen 2002) uses the term: “associative

⁷³ Of course Priestley’s statement here must be considered somewhat of an exaggeration. It would not be difficult to find other formulations from Priestley that could qualify such a clear-cut stance. Still it is quite useful in setting up a contrast here, with regards to differences in the role of music between Creative Music Therapy and Analytical Music Therapy, precisely as a rather blunt statement of an extreme position.

improvisations” which of course is intended to indicate a musical counterpoint to verbal “free association.”

In Analytical Music Therapy the aesthetic aspect of music is largely bracketed then. Improvisation, as seen from this position, becomes an outpouring of unconscious psychic material, unhampered by any aesthetic concerns. Actually an “aesthetic” expression could easily become questioned in Analytical Music Therapy, as being expressive possibly of resistance, as not being purely projective, and therefore not truly reflective of the unconscious.

8.3.4 Words Facilitating Music

Having now attempted to put the contrast between the two approaches regarding the “central work” of therapy into some relief, particularly how this relates to the role of music, a crucial difference may be seen regarding the use of words. Whereas in Analytical Music Therapy words are necessary both to elicit the relevant meaning out from the music, *and* to process what thus is brought out, in Creative Music Therapy there is no intent to get to any “hidden” meaning, to the supposedly underlying psychic conflict material, and to further process this.

By way of contrast Ansdell (1995) has put forward the notion that in psychodynamically oriented music therapy music functions to *facilitate words*. This might be a quite fitting expression, because, as seen here previously, the whole therapeutic process in Analytical Music Therapy is dependent on subsequent verbalization, to bring out the significance of the improvisation as it relates to the client’s issues: the improvised music facilitates talking about these issues. One might suggest that in Creative Music Therapy it is the other way around, regarding verbalization, that it is the function of words rather to *facilitate music*.

What may be heard in the recordings of sessions with Nordoff and Robbins is urging and encouraging the child to play, oftentimes giving positive verbal feedback on the playing when the child has accomplished something musically noteworthy. There is no inherent reason *not* to speak in practicing Creative Music Therapy then.⁷⁴ Words

⁷⁴ The verbalization issue as such does tend to create some confusion, it seems. Streeter mentions an example from her own practice, where she was a co-therapist working with Norman, a 13 year old boy with learning difficulties, taking over from a previous co-therapist. During the course of therapy the boy at one time asked a question about what had happened to the previous co-therapist. Why did she leave, he

may naturally be a necessary part of the process, establishing the setting, and communicating with the child during the session. But it is still clear that the main focus is on the music. To the extent that words *are* used then, a main function may be to facilitate the active music making.

But sometimes words nevertheless may just get in the way. As when too much explanation leads off the track rather than pointing the direction in which to move. To the extent that Creative Music Therapy is about going directly into the music, rather than trying to make any interpretation of it, there may be good reason not to talk, or to try to keep talk at a practical minimum. Not because it is wrong, or because one may not know how, but because such talk is not what is aimed at. Although Nordoff and Robbins actually did use verbal language during sessions, a main characteristic, according to Aigen, was to *minimize* verbal language, to create more space in which to establish musical interaction, through reliance on a session-long aesthetic form, with musical beginnings, endings, and transitions during the session, using and developing all means of musical resources.

8.3.5 Music in its Full Significance as Music

On this background a main difference as to the role of music in Creative Music Therapy and Analytical Music Therapy may be seen: In Analytical Music Therapy it is the programmatic content as such that becomes the central focus in the therapeutic process. Music serves basically to illustrate the chosen title or theme, and to serve as a material from which unconscious psychic conflict material may be extracted, *through verbal translation*. – And what you “talk about” then, is mainly what you get. There is no real concern about the music having had some meaning *beyond* what is interpreted and extracted from it in this way. In Creative Music Therapy improvisation there is no

wondered. Streeter reports that the previous co-therapist had left without there being much discussion about this with Norman, on account of, as she writes “talking not having been thought appropriate by the therapists because they did not feel skilled to use this modality”. Surely this must have been a misunderstanding. The psychoanalytic use of words for interpretation in therapy certainly does require its own kind of training, but this does not preclude the use of words in the management of other therapeutic modalities, including Creative Music Therapy! The issue of a co-therapist coming or leaving certainly is more about basic information that Norman should be entitled to receive, than something that should be avoided due to lack of skill in psychotherapeutic verbalization processing, of course. This example shows how the frame, rather confusingly in this case, as something like: “Talking means psychodynamic processing, for which you have to be trained, and from which you must abstain if you do not have this training”, forms the picture of what one is doing, for better or worse then.

particular *theme or content* that the music is related to. Music is itself positioned in the foreground. Creative Music Therapy is about entering into an active relation to music, without having to translate it in any way, which means that it is directed towards music in its full meaning and significance *as music*.

8.3.6 Music as a “World”

Aigen writes that through researching into the cases included in his study, it became apparent to him that when entering music therapy sessions the individuals seemed to be stepping into a novel experiential realm characterized by its own values. He found that accounting for music therapy improvisations as some form of *language* between two or more individuals would not cover completely the processes found in the early Nordoff-Robbins cases. Instead, he suggests, what could be seen to take place was the establishment of a mutually experienced *world*.

This “world”, or realm, becomes a place where the child can be and act differently, in a way that is less constrained by the restricting conditions regularly encountered in life. The world of music presents new possibilities for interaction. Thus it is not just providing someone with a language providing communication of an inner state. It is something more, Aigen holds forth: an establishment of a new experiential realm, which allows for the transcendence of disability. This is made possible by presenting a musical world into which the children may enter, in which their capacities are heightened, and their tendencies to withdraw from life are counteracted. Moving into this realm entails creating a world in which their limitations are not evoked. And the conception of music as a language does not suffice as an account of this aspect, Aigen purports. Entering into a musical world for these children is being transported into a new medium that allows for other physical, emotional and interactive possibilities. Fragmented action may become transformed in meaningful musical interaction through individually tailored musical activity, suited the capacities of each individual child. Dissipated energy becomes constructively channeled into significant expression, in different ways for each child. Music becomes a different world, to which the child is transported. In this world the potential of the child may be evoked, without working directly with pathology.

Nordoff and Robbins (1972) actually do use this concept, for instance when they write about children who were “distractible, hyperactive and difficult to manage”, who nevertheless were sitting quietly during the sessions, which incorporated music that was often “wild and dissonant”:

I had the feeling that music therapy in this situation could not consist in using music as a tranquillizer. The music therapist would have to take hold of the child’s disordered life of impulse as it expressed itself rhythmically, and work with this musically. Therapy would then lie in leading the child into the experiences of mobility and organization *latent in the world of music*. The child could only *accompany me into this world* and gain these experiences through his own activities (p. 41, italics added).

Here we see the use of the conception “the world of music”, into which the child may accompany the therapist. In the last chapter, the “Epilogue: To the musician therapist”, the first sentence is the statement: “Music is a world”. The authors point out that everyone has a personal experience of that world, whether it is as a listener, performer, or composer, or indeed as a music therapist. Working as a music therapist, new dimensions of the art of music itself may be discovered. “The world of music opens anew, now disclosing an inner musical life of therapeutic potential” (p. 142). The responsibility of the therapist is as a mediator of therapeutic music. What Aigen emphasizes is that by this *the child* is enabled to enter into the world of music.

Aigen makes the further point that in the early Nordoff-Robbins cases such a musical world was not established on the account that words were not available, because also with children for whom language was an assessable medium, and who were less socially isolated, there was an establishing of such a world. In Creative Music Therapy music may therefore not be regarded primarily as a *language substitution*, used in a compensatory way.

The Musical Relational Field

With regards to the establishing of a musical world Aigen refers to Ansdell’s use of Buber’s concept of the “Between” (Ansdell 1995). He considers that Ansdell has identified a similar phenomenon as the “musical world” through the use of this concept. Ansdell’s use of the concept of the “musical between” might be questioned though, as held forth here previously (in chapter 5). The conception of the “musical between”, indicating a relationship that is “primarily *in the music*”, as Ansdell phrases it, seems to

entail a tendency to fuse the distinction between the musical and the interpersonal. I believe it is crucial to keep this distinction clear, because, as held forth here, these two forms of relation are not the same thing, though they are interrelated.

The “world” of music could nevertheless, as Aigen suggests, well be indicated or pointed to through Buber’s concept of the “between” (Buber 1965b), though not interpreted as fused with the music *as such*. “The between” is itself no thing. Ansdell’s tendency to equate music with the between, and place the interpersonal relation “in” the music *as* the between, actually tends to reify this concept. “The between”, in Buber’s sense, is the *field* bridging the distance between the one and the other. In accordance with the basic dialogical presupposition that anything, within any sphere, may be directly related to, *as well as* becoming objectified in some way – which implies that objectification is not an exclusive mode, the “world of music” may be considered as what is entered into by *relating* to music, by engaging fully and presently with music. The “world” or “sphere” of music may thus be regarded as synonymous with the *musical relational field*, which has to be distinguished from (*and* related to) the *interpersonal relational field*.

8.4 “Hermeneutical” Versus “Phenomenological” Positions

Ansdell (Ansdell 1995) regards Analytical Music Therapy as a “hermeneutical” or “interpretive” approach, whereas Creative Music Therapy on the other hand is considered to be “phenomenological”, and considers this to be crucial with regards to the issue of verbalization in therapy. Hermeneutics he characterizes as a “reading” of something, by interpreting, translating, decoding. It tries to express verbally the “meaning” of the music by what it is found to represent, whereas phenomenology, in contrast to this, tries to understand a thing in its own terms, resisting interpretation. Ansdell’s makes the distinction in the following way:

A hermeneutics of music tries to express verbally the ‘meaning’ of the music – what it represents. In contrast a phenomenology tries to understand a thing on its own terms – resisting interpretation. In Creative Music Therapy the focus of the work and any explanation is phenomenological – needing no verbal account but allowing the music to ‘mean itself’ (p. 30).

Setting up such a phenomenological position towards music, in a fixed contrast with hermeneutics is questionable though. It seems hard to avoid *any* interpretive approach to music, even when regarding it purely on its “own terms”. Ansdell does address this matter, seeing that some kind of interpretation after all is unavoidable. He proposes (“experimentally” as he says,) two kinds of interpretation of music: “extrinsic” and “intrinsic”. Extrinsic interpretation is the kind of interpretation that is done in a psychotherapeutic context, through the symbolic translation of musical improvisation, revealing unconscious psychic content. Intrinsic interpretation in contrast to this is itself a musical response, a “musical understanding” of the playing of the client. It is a creative musical response “that includes both the client and the therapist in the music” (p.179). Ansdell still keeps close to his “all in the music” position here, not leaving much leeway for interpretation, even within the so-called intrinsic mode, which is itself actually an active *musical* response, based on a musical understanding, and not requiring any verbalization at all then.

The use of the term “phenomenological” in this way, in contrast to “hermeneutical”, is hardly an accurate application of the term, at least if it is taken as referring to the school of phenomenology, as grounded by Edmund Husserl. Phenomenology, as originally conceived by Husserl, is about revealing the essence of things, by putting in brackets all preconceptions, suspending all judgment (*epochè*), thus trying to establish a basis for a “scientific” procedure of gaining true knowledge. Equating “phenomenological” with “needing no verbal account”, as Ansdell suggests, seems to be quite contradictory to this approach. The whole aim of phenomenological analysis – *proceeding* from the initial *epochè* – is to arrive at descriptive *characterization*, which inevitably is verbal. This of course is also the basis for the applications of phenomenology within methods of qualitative research, developing various procedures for arriving at such phenomenologically based categories.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ Ricoeur has made a comparison between Husserl’s phenomenology and Marcel’s philosophy, which has close affinities with Buber’s. Ricoeur stresses the significance of the use of the word *Thou* in Marcel (in an analogous way to Buber), in his overcoming of the subjectivistic tendency that is to be found in Husserl, and his problems with the interpersonal. Marcel has a notion of the “uncharacterizability” of being, which ultimately does away with phenomenological analysis in the strict sense, as Husserl envisions this, Ricoeur purports. Stewart (1985), as mentioned in the chapter on the concept of dialogue, on similar grounds has pointed out that it may be considered one of the major philosophical contributions of Buber’s philosophy, that it contributes in overcoming the problem of solipsism inherent in Husserl’s phenomenological approach.

Developing categories is as such clearly within the domain of *I-It*, and from a dialogical point of view a perfectly legitimate endeavor in the acquisition of knowledge. But what presumably is hinted at through the use of the term “phenomenological” though, in this context, is rather the reality of music in its immediate presence, a view more in the direction of music as a *Thou*. What Ansdell and others using these terms are trying to bring forth through a juxtaposition of “phenomenological” and “hermeneutical” is maybe more accurately illustrated through a dialogical perspective, as I will try to show in the following.

8.4.1 Talking about Music in Therapy

A common ground between a dialogical outlook and phenomenology is the focus on phenomena as they present themselves for human consciousness in the “life world”, as Husserl calls it. Buber uses the word “the everyday”. But it is important to uphold a distinction between the approaches on account of their rather different aims. Husserl is trying to establish a basis for an objective science, by turning to the experience of the life world, as seen from the perspective of human intentionality and consciousness, whereas Buber on the other hand is attempting to overcome an overriding split between subject and object by pointing directly to the relational dimension. Both have a similar point of departure, the everyday life experience, but move in somewhat different directions: phenomenology towards descriptive categorization, and a dialogical perspective emphasizing the significance and dynamics of relation.

Rather than setting up a dichotomy between phenomenology and hermeneutics a dialogical perspective would propose the alternation between attitudinal modes. Second person relating is not without pre-understanding. And third person “talking about” is not completely without a direct relation implied, because objectification must have had some direct encounter as a *prerequisite*, or else there was nothing really to talk *about*. Thus there is no split into a dichotomy, but a necessary dialectical move between these two attitudinal modes of second and third person relating. And what should be stressed here is that the second person mode of directly relating does not at all entail that there are no preconceptions, or that these could be stripped away to arrive at some “bare” object. What a dialogical perspective implies is not *limiting the reality of music to the*

mere objectification of it, but acknowledging and recognizing the reality of its *immediate and living presence in everyday life*.

A dialectic perspective upholds *both* the reality of music as it is present in everyday life, *and* the pre-understanding that always must play some a part in the appreciation of it, and furthermore the new understanding, new conceptions and views that inevitably follow the direct encounter with music in its immediacy. In this view categorization is not at all to be considered unnecessary, or to be avoided, but what a dialogical perspective does seek to counter is any definitive reduction. A dialogical perspective recognizes the irreducibility of music. Not entirely reduced, it remains something to relate to. If music were not a reality on its own terms, there would be nothing to relate to. To put it in the simplest dialogical terms, it acknowledges the reality of music as a *Thou*. And this is what it may contribute with here, pointing to the twofold attitude of second and third person relations, not excluding one for the other. And this is presumably what there is a need for, holding up this reality of music, not loosing it for the various objectifications that can be made *of* it.

Loosing touch with the living experience of music may be a problem inherent for instance in certain forms of musical analysis, according to some “new musicological” critics, who advocate interpretational procedures as an alternative, as seen previously here. Ansdell seems to voice the same kind of objection, but towards *interpretation*, within music therapy. What hermeneutically oriented interpreters in musicology worry about structural analysis of music, Ansdell seems to worry about interpretation in music therapy, that the living musical experience will reside to the background. The problem with interpretation in this light, as also indicated here previously, could actually be much the same as that of analysis, of tending to forget about the music, from which it originally sprang. Ansdell is afraid of *loosing* something of the music it seems, through making specific interpretations of it.

8.4.2 Closeness Versus Setting a Distance

Hermeneutics, as Gadamer (1989) has shown, is about overcoming distance. It is a dialogical process of aligning or melting the horizon of the work, which was created out from concerns and issues of the day of its making, with the horizon of the interpreter, which is inevitably colored by his or her own pre-understanding of the present day.

Hermeneutics addresses this issue of bridging a gap of time and place, history and culture, between when and where the work was made, and the present encounter with it. Overcoming such distance according to Gadamer, is not right away striving to minimize it, trying to make it less, in which case the “horizons” would just become blurred. In hermeneutics the initial aim is to become aware of the distance, as a point of departure for traversing the distance between. Thus, developing a sense of “strangeness” is crucial for embarking on any hermeneutical attempt. Making a clear distinction between the horizons of the work and the interpreter is a necessary precondition for any hermeneutic task, aiming eventually at a melting, to some extent at least, but not completely, of horizons

Hermeneutics as a discipline in the humanities is thus about overcoming a distance, historically and culturally. But in Creative Music Therapy practice the situation is somewhat different. Here the relation to music is immediate, *to start with*. There is an initial *closeness* rather than distance to the music. And making interpretations in this setting may actually be perceived rather to *create* distance, than to overcome it. And the strategy of setting a distance to the music here may seem artificial, because in music therapy the aim is not to say something more, of finding something more out about the music, finding new aspects, or new ways of illuminating it, for gaining a deeper understanding of music as such. – In music therapy it is the person’s *relation* to music that is of foremost concern. Music therapy is *about the musical moment rather than the objectification of it*.

Not Mistaking the Interpretation for what is Interpreted

But why not talk about music then in music therapy? Even though the aim is not producing objectified knowledge about music, as in musicology, comments and talking about the music is a natural part of practicing it anyhow, even within a predominantly active approach. And talking is of course invaluable in assessing and evaluating the client’s relation to the music. Talking about music certainly has to be allowed. The main point is quite simply not mistaking the interpretation for the music itself. And this is

presumably what Ansdell is concerned about, loosing music itself, in verbal constructions about it.⁷⁶

8.4.3 Music About the Client

Returning to the main question about the difference between Creative Music Therapy and Analytical Music Therapy with regards to the role of music and how it relates to words, the issue nevertheless is clearly not solved simply in saying that music *may* be talked about also in Creative Music Therapy, given certain precautions and qualifications. The difference between these two approaches goes deeper than this. It is not only a matter of talking about here, of making interpretations of the music as such. A further distinction needs to be introduced here to make this somewhat clearer. It is not just a matter of *talking about music* or not, but of *talking about music about the client*. A crucial difference in the role of music may be found here, in that in Analytical Music Therapy the music made becomes a *symbolic projection*, whereas in Creative Music Therapy the music could be characterized as an *aesthetic expression*. In the following I will elaborate on this crucial difference and some of the implications that may be drawn from it.

8.5 Projection and Expression

In her article “Theoretical Bases of Analytical Music therapy” Susan Hadley, (2002), points out that in Analytical Music Therapy music is projective in the sense that it is a manifestation of the unconscious. She relates this to Priestley’s concept of “inner

⁷⁶ Another aspect is the “coloring” that any interpretation implies. Interpretation is choosing one reading over many other possible. It is necessarily a narrowing down of available options. An interpretation has to specify what it entails, and as such serves to delimit meaning, without which it was no interpretation. And any interpretation makes use of metaphor to get its point across. The suspicion of course is that the meaning of the music in some way may become restricted through interpretations made of it. As the musicologist Cook remarks: “In its patterns of similarity and difference divergence and convergence, conflict and resolution, music has a generality that is inevitably distorted by the elaboration of any individual metaphor we use for it.” (Cook 1998, p. 116.) Cook points to the abstract nature of musical form, which is never captured by any verbal description. And still the use of words may bring out traits and aspects that would remain “hidden” if they were not applied. Music is pregnant with meaning, and words function as music’s midwife, transforming latent into actual meaning, Cook suggests. There are two aspects to verbal interpretation of music then. - One bringing out meaning, and the other limiting, restricting it. Words may illuminate, but at a certain cost. And the question in each case is what is gained and what is lost, in narrowing down or opening up. As Cook points out, the developing of illuminating metaphors is not just representing something, but leads you to experience the music differently.

music”, which is “the prevailing emotional climate behind the structure of one’s thought” (Priestley 1985, p. 199). Hadley makes clear that this “inner music” is not the same as a person’s musicality or musical potential, but is to be regarded as the core of the psyche, “where the unconscious resides” (Hadley 2002, p. 35). Improvised music in Analytical Music Therapy is considered a projection of the individual psyche then. Bruscia (1995) likewise holds forth that such use of music as a projective device, for understanding the individual who has produced the music, is based on the notion, in psychodynamic terms, of *generalized projection*.

8.5.1 Improvisation as “Free Association”

In this way musical improvisation is seen as an analogue to verbal free association, as a medium for bringing up unconscious material. There is a difference, nevertheless, in the use of media here; one being musical and the other verbal, and a comparison between the two may be illuminating. Verbal language, in contrast to music, may refer explicitly to something *outside* itself. It is referential, which is what makes it possible to use to talk *about* something, whereas music as an aesthetic medium draws attention to itself, to its own inherent qualities. Verbal language does not draw this kind of attention to itself, unless it is poetry. In which case it will, through what Jakobsen (1960) has called “the poetic function”. The poetic function according to Jacobsen is the function of language drawing attention to *how* something is said, rather than to *what* is said, and which may be found not least in poetry as a literary genre, of course.

In Analytical Music Therapy free improvisation takes the place of free association. And free association as a verbal “genre” is not poetry. Quite the contrary; it is language that to a very high degree is *not* formed, in order to draw attention to *how* it is said rather than *what* is said. This is the main point with free association; it is just about the least consciously formed of verbal language. It is not even language as used in a regular social setting. It is just a pouring out of *content*, rather than form, within the confines of the therapeutic setting, and, being taken this way, scrutinized for hidden meanings, regardless of the way it is said, regardless of convention, whether it be grammatical, social, artistic or otherwise. It is very far from an *aesthetic* expression in just this respect. “Free improvisation”, considered to be analogous to free association is

in this sense not regarded as consciously formed, that is to say, as aesthetic. A different conception of music is implied here.

Analytical Music Therapy does not presuppose any particular musical skills. And neither, as Priestly insists, are any skills necessary to develop during the course of therapy. Through an equation of musical improvisation, or “sound expression”, as Priestly prefers to call it, with projection of the inner psyche, the unconscious of the client, there is no need to “learn” how to play. Whatever is played, more or less “instantly”, is seen as a projection of psychic content. In the article “Linking Sound and Symbol”, Priestley writes:

The music is a purely spontaneous sound expression on simple instruments and, contrary to general supposition, most patients, though totally innocent of any musical training, find no difficulty in this. There are no expectations or instructions, but as they discover the flow of their present emotions through sound patients experience relief, satisfaction, and often pride and delight (Priestley 1995, p. 133).

The improvisation is read as symbolic of psychic content then. Making the music is instant, the work consists in eliciting the psychodynamically relevant meaning *from* it, through verbalization, finding out what it symbolizes coming out from the psyche of the client.

8.5.2 Improvisation as an Aesthetic Expression

In contrast with this Creative Music Therapy music is not regarded as having *another* meaning than the musical. It is not translated into some other meaning, and not processed according to what could be “revealed” through such a translation. The main point then is that however language may be used, it is not used for extracting or teasing out any *other* meaning than the musical. In Creative Music Therapy improvisation is a musical, which is to say, an *aesthetic* expression. Such expression is not merely a revealing of what is already within the psyche. It is not just mirroring some hidden psychic content. Musical expression is forming some material, and through this forming something new is made. It becomes a statement, which is to be taken for what it is, not as revealing something else.

In Creative Music Therapy, music, related to in an explicitly aesthetic way, becomes more of an *expression* than a projection. And as an aesthetic expression it

acquires a broader significance, not considered merely as a symptomatic reflection of the player's inner state. A wider view is implied in this perspective, in which the qualities of the medium *beyond* individual idiosyncrasies necessarily are taken into consideration. The significance of musical expression goes beyond the purely autobiographical. Music is something more than this, which means that it has a *communal meaning*, and not merely a private one. The analytical approach, which implies translating into language what the music played reveals about the psyche of the person, by consequence reduces music into something private and idiosyncratic. And thereby it becomes stripped of its wider aesthetic significance. It loses or at least brackets this dimension. So there *is* a cost in regarding music this way.

Hadley (1999) points out that the main focus in Analytical Music Therapy is on bringing resolved emotional material into consciousness, and helping the client understand why he or she has been responding in certain ways. Therefore biographical material is essential. In Creative Music Therapy the focus is, and remains, on the here and now. Creative Music Therapy is about actualizing a potential not experienced before:

Certain emotions may never have been expressed, not because they were repressed into the unconscious as a result of an emotionally debilitating experience, but *because the capacity to express them has not been activated and developed* (p. 16, italics added).

Ansdell (1995) makes a similar point, referring to the aesthetician Susan Langer, who claimed that in many cases music presents feelings that we have not felt before. Through aesthetic expression it is possible to explore new forms and new feelings. Ansdell points out that musical expression is not merely letting feelings out in a cathartic manner either.

8.5.3 More than Representing the Individual

As an aesthetic medium music represents more than the individual then, as an aesthetic expression it is about something in principle anyone, or all, can relate to. It is not merely a report of the inner state of the person making it. As such it would have limited interest. An aesthetic expression is made through forming a medium in such a way that there is something *recognizable*, something that is reflected in this form that conveys

some common meaning. The meaning to be found in aesthetic expression is not a pure symbolic representation of the creator's inner state, but a more common, universal statement⁷⁷.

This way of viewing music opens for going more into the depths of music as an aesthetic medium, independent of its direct connection with purely individual problems and concerns. Thus one is freer to approach what is maybe more than just personal. There is a wider palette, not having to restrict oneself exclusively to one's own issues. And thus there is a greater potential reward in the engagement with the medium. One may here cross borders into greater dimensions, becoming more intimate with the whole span or specter of musical significance, ultimately approaching the ineffable meaning of music. Of what in the last resort maybe still cannot be said, but must remain unspoken. In a music making that is not merely symptomatic, a person may move *beyond* his fixed limits, transcending them. It is about the power of music to lift up, to bring further. It is from this point of view not restricted to personal limitations, but rather transcending them. And a precondition for allowing this aspect of music is approaching it in its full sense as an aesthetic medium.

8.5.4 The Inevitability of Transference and Countertransference

Transference and countertransference issues become relevant in different ways according to which way music is regarded in therapy. As Streeter (1999a), in a chapter on the definition and use of "the musical transference relationship" proposes: "My premise is that what we offer in free improvisation is free association within music. *And that transference then is inevitable* (p. 88, italics added). Inge Nygaard Pedersen (2002) stresses the significance of the tools of countertransference in an analytically oriented approach to music therapy: "The use of transference issues as core tools, and musical improvisation as a symbolic channel for human expression, is still the basic platform for this approach" (p. 82).

As Hadley summarizes this issue, based on Priestley's expositions, transference in Analytical Music Therapy is to be found in the client's projection on the therapist, the

⁷⁷ Kramer (2001) talks about music of the classical tradition not just being a reflection of the individual composer, and nothing more, but of the "Big Other". The literary theorist Bakhtin (1986) in a similar vein talks about the "Superaddresse". Friedman (2002b) relates this concept of Bakhtin to Buber's "Eternal Thou".

music, or the musical instrument. It is conscious, pre-conscious or unconscious, and can be positive or negative. She further points out that Priestley distinguishes between three types of countertransference: classical, which can be destructive of the therapeutic relationship, complementary, as a guide to the client's hidden inner life, or emotional countertransference, as sympathetic resonance. Also these can be both positive and negative, and both aspects should be analyzed.⁷⁸ Such analysis inevitably involves discursive language.

Alan Turry (1998) has shown the relevance of dealing with transference and counter transference issues in Creative Music Therapy, becoming aware of these kinds of processes to help to clear the way for more effective and potent musical interactions. This represents a different angle though, than the analytical working through issues by elaborating on transference and countertransference as a process of gaining insight in therapy. Turry underscores the significance of not letting the music recede to the background:

The concepts of transference and countertransference can be useful tools when we do not use them to explain the totality of the musical encounter. Their examination expands our perceptions, consciousness, and the range of potential interactions. The music therapist must be able to *maintain the wonder and mystery of the encounter and live in it* (p. 209).

This is a statement that is quite obviously in general accord with a dialogical view, in highlighting the significance of the musical encounter. Turry holds forth that the investigation of transference and countertransference phenomena can be considered primarily as *tools to enhance creativity*. They are not dealt with for their own sake. And Turry emphasizes that working with countertransference in music therapy is not

⁷⁸ This variety of aspects of transference and counter-transference is a reflection of course, of the complex interrelations between therapist and client in the use of music in this form of music therapy, deciding on a theme, improvising alone and together, recording and then listening to it, talking about it and interpreting it, and finally relating it to conscious and unconscious issues of the client. The different concepts of transference that are applied and developed by Priestly (1985; 1994) are meant to cover all these interrelated dynamics within the approach.

It could be mentioned that in addition to the varieties mentioned by Hadley, Priestly (1995) has developed a notion of *somatic* response to counter-transference, which is about what she considers *physical* countertransference reactions related to the client's issues, as for instance "a kind of creeping paralysis of my hands which turned out to be some feelings that the patient had "killed off" and not allowed to surface, to be spoken about or even to be expressed between us" (p. 134), or experiencing a total memory block in playing a piece of Bach on the violin for a stroke patient who had lost her short term memory. Through the help of her analyst these experiences were translated to further understanding and facilitate insight for the clients, she reports. Further perspectives on transference and countertransference within several models and approaches of music therapy are presented in a collections of essays, *The Dynamics of Music Psychotherapy*, edited by Bruscia (1998b).

enough. Technical abilities must be developed, he underscores. This indicates that dealing with transference-issues indeed is seen as tools to clear the way so to speak, for working creatively with music.

Transference issues might belong primarily to the “work” aspect of Creative Music Therapy then, in preparation for entering into the “world” of music, in Aigen’s terms. In the world of relation, as CPSG indicate, transference and countertransference issues become minimized. Transference could actually be seen to arise as a consequence of *making* a distance. Thinking about each other, (and inevitably mixing things up), rather than relating directly. And to regard music as symbolic projection of the psyche of the person is an act of distancing, rather than relating directly and immediately to the musical expression as such. This distancing may itself be seen to be what actualizes the dealing with transference and countertransference issues that this way are opened for.

There remains a crucial difference then, regarding transference and countertransference issues, between music considered as a symbolic projection, or as an aesthetic expression. In the last case therapy does not necessarily involve dealing with transference for working with some underlying (hidden) issues, and the extent to which it may be found necessary to go into matters of transference and countertransference, primarily within the “working” phase of therapy, it is to *dispel* rather than to develop and elaborate on this. In this case what is involved then may primarily be what Bruscia terms “containing the transference” (Bruscia 1998c). Thus analysis of such issues, through the use of verbal language, is not aimed at as a goal in itself. The aim is rather minimize them.

It *may* be necessary to sort out some such issues analytically during the course of therapy then, and this of course should be readily recognized. It is not *inevitable* though, as Streeter puts it, as when considering and relating to music as a symbolic projection in therapy, in which case analysis is an integral part. In a certain sense one might actually say, regarding the need for verbal processing in therapy, that analysis is what *makes* the music into a symbolic projection.

8.5.5 “Hermeneutics of Suspicion”

A further issue regarding interpretation and verbalization related to these two kinds of approach to music therapy needs to be addressed, I believe. The French philosopher

Paul Ricoeur has made a distinction between two different modes or approaches to interpretation, what he calls an *interpretation of trust*, and an *interpretation of suspicion*. He does not claim the one to be better than the other, or one right and one wrong, but that they are applicable in different situations according to the specific needs that they may be applied for. Psychoanalytic interpretation, as pioneered by Freud, according to Ricoeur, is a “hermeneutics of suspicion” rather than a “hermeneutics of trust” (Ricoeur 1970). Psychoanalysis is oriented towards emancipation from repression, through insight gained by interpretation of unconscious psychic material. Psychoanalytic hermeneutics then is about things not being what they seem, brought about by various mechanisms of resistance and transference. Through an interpretive movement insight is sought, that may relieve confusion and thus contribute to a more liberated way of living. Thus in psychoanalysis words very often are not what they mean apparently – they mean something else, really. This is a conflict-oriented hermeneutics then, in contrast to for instance Gadamer’s hermeneutics, which is more consensus-oriented, in finding meaning in “tradition”.

In Analytical Music Therapy, considered as a psychoanalytically established and grounded approach, it is not just a matter then of coming to an understanding of what the “sound expression” as a symbolic projection of the inner psyche means, at “face value”, so to speak. There is a focus on signs of repressed inner conflict, that have become unconscious, and that need to be made conscious, to be resolved. In Analytical Music Therapy, according to the logic of its analytical hermeneutics, there is, in accordance with Ricoeur’s distinction, a “suspicious” interpreting, to find out about how what is expressed means *something else* than what it means *apparently*. It may be that the music turns out to be about something quite different than what was set up as the title of the improvisation for instance, revealing a psychic conflict matter that was repressed. (The improvisation may *really* have been about issues connected with intimate fantasy relationships the client “unconsciously” may have had with her father, as Priestley in one case suggests (Priestley 1988).)

As a symbolic projection it is not just a matter of regarding the improvisation as a projection, pure and simple, of the psyche of the client then, but trying to elicit the “unconscious” content revealed in that projection, in order to process it, to make it conscious. And as stressed here, language is needed for this translation, both for

establishing what might be *behind* the apparent meaning, and for processing this, finding out *why* it is hidden, or repressed.⁷⁹

Reading the Client through Dynamic Form

There may still actually be a perception of the client through the music that is made in Creative Music Therapy too, as reflected in Pavlicevic's concept of dynamic form. Here too I think that it is relevant to consider the distinction between a hermeneutics of suspicion and of trust. Regarding music as dynamic form, reflecting the client in some way, would have to be considered a listening of trust, of belief, in Ricoeur's terms, not a critical, questioning listening, looking for hidden meanings behind various defense mechanisms, as in psychodynamic conflict-oriented therapy. And, as Pavlicevic points out, verbalization is not necessary for this listening to the client through dynamic form. Words are not needed to tease out the meaning of this form, in the way it necessarily has to be done in a "hermeneutics of suspicion", to bring out the symbolic, repressed psychic content. It is a "direct knowing", as Pavlicevic puts it, (or implicit relational knowledge in CPSG's sense, as suggested here previously.) Dynamic form cannot be considered as a symbolic projection then, on account of it being a direct perception rather than verbally mediated symbolic psychic content that is extracted out from the improvisation. Dynamic form belongs within music considered as an expressive form then rather than a projection. Gary Ansdell in a quite parallel sense uses the phrase "listening directly to the person-in-the music", through improvised dialogue between two people (p. 55, and 157).⁸⁰

⁷⁹ More recent psychoanalytic developments, as represented by authors such as Winnicott, Kohut, Stolorow, or Stern, who represent a so-called relational turn within psychoanalytic theory approaches, may not as readily be characterized as employing a "hermeneutics of suspicion" in Ricoeur's sense. These authors have been incorporated into later developments of analytically oriented music therapy, (Scheiby 2002; Pedersen 2002; Smeijsters 2003; Langenberg 1999). Within these approaches there may be a greater focus on the immediate rather than the "hidden" meaning of the music that is improvised during sessions.

⁸⁰ A hermeneutics of suspicion would be more in alignment with a confrontational conception of dialogue, the "narrow" conception, according to Bollnow (1976), emphasizing conflict and struggle, whereas a hermeneutics of trust would be more in alignment with the "wider" conception, as a general mutuality, which Buber represents. Taking mother-infant interaction as an example, this would surely be a model of such a wider conception. The (healthy) relation between mother and infant is not generally to be described as one of suspicion, conflict and strife, but of a basic trust and mutuality. Once again, there is no claim here that a conflict-oriented approach does not have its place, or is "wrong" in any sense, but that one or the other of these conceptions of dialogue, as Bollnow indicates, has to be chosen. You cannot actually do both simultaneously, being both trustful and suspicious at the same time.

But what also has to be considered here is that the concept of dynamic form, reflecting the client, and the relation between the client and therapist in the making of music between them, relates primarily to the interpersonal aspect of improvisational music therapy. Dynamic form is a “reading”, (or “hearing” as suggested here previously), of the child through music, which does not need to use verbal language. But which does not say everything about the role of music in CMT. Pavlicevic’s concept of dynamic form, considered as an expression of vitality affects, may seem to have a somewhat of an interpersonal “bias” in this perspective. In a recent article (in collaborating with Leslie Bunt), after having stressed that the music therapist’s skill is not solely a “musical” one, the authors state:

Rather music therapists’ skills lie in their capacity to interface the personal and musical in music therapy improvisation; to ‘read’ music therapy improvisation as an interpersonal event (in the way that mothers and babies read one another’s acts not as musical or temporal, but as emotionally expressive and communicative); and to support, develop, and extend the jointly created improvisation according to personal and therapeutic, rather than musical-aesthetic, needs and dictates (Bunt and Pavlicevic 2001, p. 194).

This seems to be a primarily interpersonally based conception of music, as an analogue to mother and child reading each other’s acts as expressive and communicative. Musical improvisation is considered as “an interpersonal event”. Even though an interface with music is purported, the concept of dynamic form does not seem to cover this sufficiently. Based on Stern’s concept of vitality affects it points to dynamic forms of feeling. But music is not just “feeling” in this sense. The relation to music is certainly quite a lot more than responding through vitality affects. Explaining music this way would not suffice to account for its appeal. The interpersonal relation is one aspect of doing music together, but the role of music in a music therapy setting is not just this, and nothing beyond this. “Dynamic form” as a concept links music primarily to the interpersonal process involved in the music making, and quite successfully so. But there is more to it, related to the aesthetic dimension. The concept does not emphasize the aesthetic aspect as such, *aesthetic form*, which, as underlined here, actually points beyond the mere reading, or hearing, of the person in the music. The perspective that is developed here implies that the “horizontal” – the interpersonally relational, as well as the “vertical” – the transcending, the entering into a world of music, *both* need to be included, to cover the dynamics and the role of music within a Creative Music Therapy

approach. Music as an expression is not only interpersonally “dynamic”, it is also, as music considered, aesthetic, the qualities of which should be recognized in order to bring out its full potential as a therapeutic medium.

8.6 Words Necessary or Not

What I have hoped to show through this comparative analysis of Analytical Music Therapy and Creative Music Therapy related to the use of words, is that it is not simply a matter of choosing to include verbal processing or not, because the meaning of the music, its significance and *role* in therapy, is different within these two approaches, as a symbolic projection or as an aesthetic expression respectively. And having different roles the need or not for verbalization becomes different in each case. A primarily projective role to music *presupposes* verbalization both to bring out the symbolic meaning and to process it. An expressive role to music does not imply *having* to verbalize its meaning to bring out its therapeutic potential. In the role of aesthetic expression music does not need to be processed through verbalization, because it is *directly related* to, and this is where the dynamics of change are to be found, in and through this direct relation to it.

Music as an aesthetic expression remains characteristically open, not having any specific “content”. Which means that it may not serve as a basis for eliciting the kind of psychic conflict material that is processed in psychoanalytically oriented interpretation, through the use of words. So the kinds of issue brought up in verbal psychotherapy are not directly worked with here. And cannot be. In this is also at the same time found the limitation of such a form of therapy. It has to renounce so to speak the mode of analytical insight, to embark on the experiential journey, which nevertheless holds its own promises. One of which is a natural concentration on, and intensification of the relational aspect, and the therapeutic potentials inherent in this.

8.6.1 On the Possible Integration of the Perspectives

The analysis here has been founded on “ideal-typical” descriptions. Qualifications can always be made though. It must be mentioned here that Eschen (2002), for instance, in addition to the term “associative improvisation” also uses the term “material oriented

improvisation”, in which there is a focus on the musical materials as such, and which may be used to round off the session, without bringing up new urgent material that needs to be processed. Priestley of course also applies music in manifold ways in her practice, which is clearly reflected in her writings (Priestley 1994).

It bears mentioning here that Priestley has written a postlude to her collections of essays (Priestley 1994). It was spurred by a question that was posed to her why she had never written about the *beauty* of music. She admits to having been both frightened and reluctant to take on such a task, but attempts at least to say something about what she calls “the ineffable”, what cannot be said or spoken about. She refers to those special moments of improvising when both the client and therapist feel strangely united in, but somehow overshadowed by the music. The sensation may be that the music has become greater than the two of them, and the players, rather than playing, feel *played by* the music. She terms this a “receptive creative experience” (RCE), which instead of passing in time she would consider takes place in an Eternal Now.

Priestley stresses that this is something that just happens, and that it may not only be difficult to talk about, but that this may not even be necessary. After relating one such experience occurring in a small group of four or five patients, she accounts:

Did we talk about it? Not a word. Although it seemed fairly obvious that we must all have been aware of something for us to play with such unity but perhaps we each felt we had had an odd, rather private, valuable experience and that we had better keep it to ourselves. And so we did.

And then, on a more general note, she adds:

Indeed I have never questioned patients about whether they shared these experiences, words seem too flat-footed and insensitive as vehicles for these emotions. The music had said it. What more did we need? (p. 323).

Here there seems to be some overlap with the outlook of Creative Music Therapy, some recognition of the musical aspect as such, after all, that is not dependent on verbalization.

Could these outlooks be integrated then? I think that the discussion here shows that nevertheless they cannot. As Hadley points out, regarding this ineffable aspect of improvisation, Priestley does not consider this as either essential or sufficient for a therapeutic process to take place, and her *main* approach is certainly not oriented this way. There *is* a difference of approach between the two.

When Eschen proposes that so-called “material-oriented improvisation” may represent the superego through establishing music order, and that the borders between “associative” and “material” oriented improvisations are shiftable, - that there may be the possibility of organic cyclic changes between the two, according to the patient’s needs, this point of view nevertheless *remains within a psychodynamic frame of understanding*, and I do not think it is easy to integrate Creative Music Therapy within this frame. I have to agree with Hadley (1999), who after comparing the basic philosophy behind each approach comes to the conclusion:

In pointing out the differences in the ways in which wellness/health and pathology and the nature of therapy are conceptualized, it demonstrates that an integration of the two models may be inappropriate because the fundamental premises underlying the two models are conceptually incompatible. Creative Music Therapy and Analytical music therapy encompass fundamentally different philosophies of personality development and the process of growth. They represent two distinctly different paradigms (p. 18).

It seems they will have to remain two different approaches. Trying to mix them together will not necessarily bring out any well functioning all rounded combination, due to irreconcilable differences in basic assumptions.

Pedersen (2002) does claim, following Bruscia, that Analytical Music Therapy *is* basically music *in* therapy, but she nevertheless points out that in practice this is not so clearly defined, because many psychological transformations may take place *within* the musical duets themselves. It may seem that the role of music may change through phases of a session, or a series of sessions, and that practicing music therapists may assign flexible roles to music, and to some extent at least move between the two modes of therapy. Still it seems difficult to uphold a notion of combining the two, due to the different dynamic processes that are involved, not least with regards to the necessity of incorporating verbal processing

8.6.2 Different Roles, Different “Plays”

What the discussion here all in all has brought out then, is that the aesthetically expressive and the symbolically projective are two not compatible roles of music in music therapy. To elaborate somewhat on the dramaturgical metaphor of “role” within the triangular “staging: The role of music may change between different “plays” of

therapy, as a projective “sound expression” or as an aesthetic, musical expression, but these two different roles may not be played simultaneously. A single actor can play different roles, even in one play conceivably, *but not at the same time*. And fusing roles in an attempt to include all kinds of sides or aspects into one single character within a play would not necessarily be either convincing or dramatically functional. Furthermore, you may prefer one play to the other, but you cannot refute one way of playing a role by the way another role should be played, in another play. How different roles are to be played must be seen within the confines of each play. And different “plays” of music therapy will have somewhat different roles, for therapist, client, and music, and their relation to each other.

To conclude, it would seem like you cannot have music to be an aesthetic expression, acquiring a broader, more common significance, which is something more than just revealing idiosyncrasies of the music maker, *and* a symbolic projection, primarily regarded to reflect the inner state of the client, both at the same time.

The differences between these two roles, as they have been brought out here, may be summed up in a table:

Table 1: Two Roles of Music in AMT and CMT

ASPECT	The Role Of Music In AMT	The role of Music in CMT
<i>Function:</i>	Symbolic projection	Aesthetic expression
<i>Time:</i>	Instant	Worked with
<i>Competence:</i>	Staying unskilled	Becoming Skilled
<i>Kind:</i>	“Authentic”	“Artified”
<i>Meaning:</i>	Psychic content	Artistic form
<i>Modality:</i>	Translated into words	In the musical vernacular
<i>Work:</i>	Verbally processed	Actively participated in
<i>Context:</i>	Individual, biographical	Shared, communal
<i>Domain:</i>	Psychological	Existential
<i>Direction:</i>	Looking to what has been	Making up something new
<i>Character:</i>	Reflective, mirroring	Creative, transcending
<i>Perspective:</i>	Revealing problems	Suggesting possibilities
<i>Cause:</i>	Bringing up conflict	Harmonizing
<i>Aim:</i>	Removing hindrances	Increasing capacities
<i>Purpose:</i>	For something else	Its own fulfillment

8.7 Ways of Talking

The basic theme in this chapter has been the way words relate to music within Creative Music Therapy, making a comparative analysis with Analytical Music Therapy in order to bring this out, by way of contrast. In Creative Music Therapy words may be used to *facilitate music*, and to talk about the music made, but not to the extent of taking the primary position. The basic dialogical outlook may point to the significance of relation as such, which cannot be substituted by any amount of verbalization, and which excessive verbalization may turn out to be counterproductive for. Creative Music Therapy is not about making objectifications of music, neither as a work of art, nor as an object of understanding, bringing forth musicological knowledge. And furthermore: talking about the music has to be distinguished from *talking about the music about the client*. Which is what the projective function will be about. The difference here is in the *kind* of talking then, related to the role of music in therapy. Different roles to music may be seen to imply different relations between therapist and client with regards to verbal

and non-verbal communication in therapy then, and as to what is required – in what way – of words and verbal processing.

8.7.1 Equating Musical Change and Personal Change

Still, a tension remains in regarding music as an aesthetic expression in therapy. An essential feature of aesthetic expression, as seen here is that though it is personal, it is never merely private. It is not just about the person that made it. It says something of a more general nature, something that may be recognized by others. In this lies its appeal. But: *If* we cannot say that the music reflects the child directly, this has consequences for the theory of Creative Music Therapy. It represents new problems or new challenges. The question is how to consider the relation between the music and the client. On this matter Turry (1998) states:

Part of the theory underlying the Nordoff-Robbins approach is that when a client's music changes, she is changing; *there is no differentiation between the two* (p. 181, italics added.)

In this uncharacteristically categorical statement from Turry, the notion of an equation between musical change and personal change is presented as basis for a Nordoff-Robbins approach. But setting up such a connection between the individual person and the music seems hardly tenable if the music is to be regarded as an aesthetic expression, and not just symptomatic of the individual. Making an aesthetic expression may certainly say something about the person, but there is not any one-to-one connection to be found. A person may give expression to feelings not even felt before, may venture into new territories. What is expressed is thus not just a reflection of the inner state of the client, *and may not be read simply as such*. And though this venturing into new creative territory may be highly significant from a personal point of view, musical change is not *exactly* the same as personal change. I believe there may be good reason to question such a direct and simple equation. In the following chapter I want to deal with this issue, and try to say something more about this from a specifically dialogical perspective, which I elaborate on in the chapters to follow, to see how it may be applied to the issue of developing a frame for a music-based music therapy.

9 Developing a Relational View

In this chapter I want to consider some problems of Creative Music Therapy theory concerning tendencies towards subjectivism and essentialism. I will make a critical assessment of the notion of “music child”, particularly theoretical developments elaborating further on this notion, from a dialogical point of view, finding these developments to be rather individualistic, and actually in disaccord with the practice. I venture to develop an alternative dialogical perspective on music and the way music may affect the listener, suggesting that this might be a direction to move to achieve more of an alignment of theory with actual Creative Music Therapy practice.

9.1 Tendencies of Subjectivism

In Creative Music Therapy musical and personal development tend to be considered a mutual expression of each other. Still, it is hardly that simple. There can be no guarantee or necessity in the one following the other in complete concordance. There is a need then to account for this relation, beyond a simple one to one correlation between musical expression and the state or condition of the client. If musical and personal development were in principal equated, the aim for the therapeutic work would become tied with developing musical expression. Bruscia (1987), apparently supporting such a notion, writes:

In Creative Music Therapy, the way the child relates to music is a reflection of self-awareness, egodevelopment, expressive freedom, and interresponsiveness. Similarly, changes in the way the child relates to music reflect changes in these same areas. *Thus, musical growth is therapeutic growth, and the musical process reveals the therapeutic process* (p. 59, italics added).

The rather bold claim put forward here is that musical growth actually *is* therapeutic growth. But Bruscia nevertheless, it seems, has come to second thoughts about this matter. On the Internet cite “Forum” of the *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy*, in a final comment (so far), on a discussion about his own schema for categorizing various aspects of improvisational music therapy, the so-called “Improvisational Profile Assessment”, from his book of 1987, Bruscia (2002) writes about what he calls an “epistemological contradiction” in music therapy. He sees a tendency to pull back in accepting the theoretical premises needed for making the claim that music can be used as a diagnostic or projective tool, nevertheless still wanting to uphold this as a practice. Bruscia on this background poses the following rather provocative question:

And so I ask. How many music therapists really believe that the qualities of one’s music reflect the qualities of one’s health? And, how many caveats are necessary to answer this question with a simple yes or no (Bruscia 2002, ¶ 5)?

Trying to keep the number low of such caveats is not necessarily a convincing solution, if not sufficiently substantiated. There may rather be too many simple solutions, which presumably is what Bruscia is concerned about. Bruscia poses a serious question here, which deserves attention. Some caveats will indeed necessarily have to be given, I believe, before answering a simple yes or no to the posed question of whether the quality of one’s music reflects the qualities of one’s health. Not least with music regarded in a wider sense as an aesthetic expression within the therapeutic setting, rather than just a symbolic projective device.

9.1.1 The Concept of the “Music Child”

Within the tradition of Creative Music Therapy Nordoff and Robbins (1977), have suggested the term “music child” to bring together the musical process and the development of the child. They propose that the concept of the “music child”:

... focuses attention on that entity in every child which responds to musical experience, finds it meaningful and engaging, remembers music, and enjoys some form of musical expression (p. 1).

The “music child” represents the universal innate musicality of each human being. But at the same time this may not be fully realized, the authors hold forth. For instance with children with disabilities the music child may not have been realized to the full because

of circumstances following the disability. Only when some communicative directed or some responsive order, some perceptive openness or some freedom from confining habitual activity develops can it be said that the music child is “being awakened”, is being brought into full being. The “awakening” of this “music child” entails a use of many abilities and qualities, like perception, recognition, memory, and goal orientation, self-confidence and spontaneity. The full participation in musical improvisation may then lead to a self-realization and integration through the activation of all these functions.

Bruscia (1987) points out that the concept of “music child” is inspired by Rudolf Steiner who founded the school of anthroposophy. Steiner holds forth that man has several finer bodies of a spiritual nature, beyond the physical. One of these is the so-called ‘astral body’, and the concept of “music child”, according to Bruscia, may be related to this:

The astral body is that part of every human being where impulses, drives, passions, and emotions live as experience. It works within us according to rhythms, and melodies in the cosmos which are also found in our physical form (Bruscia 1987, p. 31).

Steiner terms the astral body as the “musician inside every man”. He links the melody specifically to the soul of man:

Melody exists in the soul of man. The soul is indeed the harp upon which the musician plays. The whole feeling body of man is a musical instrument on which the soul responds and the soul produces melody (cited in Bruscia 1987: 31).

The concept of the “music child” thus originates initially from an Anthroposophical orientation. And this was also quite natural. The first institutions at which the Nordoff-Robbins team initially worked had an Anthroposophical outlook.

9.1.2 Later Developments of the Concept


Carol and Clive Robbins (Robbins 1991) have developed the concept of the “music child” further in the article “Self-Communications in Creative Music Therapy”. They take as a point of departure that the child, because of limitations that stem from disability, has developed what they call a “conditioned child”, a self that is conditioned by the disability. By activating the inner “music child” through improvisational playing, the boundaries of this established “conditioned child” are broken, and a new Self is

created, freer and more open. The “music child” is something within the child that brings about a change in the more outer, “conditioned child”, thus forming a new Self. Robbins and Robbins then pose the question how this may come about:

From where does it get the power to do this, to be a self-creating force within the self? In answer, we introduce a concept we considered earlier, one that will complete this working model: the “being within the self.” We term this the “being child”, and find that it is contained within the music child (p. 69).

Robbins and Robbins base their view on the thesis that within the “music child” there is a “being child”, and that this is what generates the necessary power from within bringing forth change in the “conditioned Self”. This is illustrated in a series of figures, of which the last one is the following (p. 59):

Figure 6: The Old Self and New Self (Robbins and Robbins 1991)



Robbins and Robbins have obviously, and rightly so I believe, felt a need to explain how the “music child” can effect or activate a change in the “condition child”. They try to resolve this question by introducing yet an entity within the entity already placed within the child, that is: the “being child” within the “music child”. (Not written into the figure, but presupposed then to be residing within the music child.) This, they propose, is actually what activates the music child in the inducing of change in the condition child, towards the realization of a new Self, as this is manifested outwardly.

9.1.3 Change “From Within”

Although the need to address this issue is acknowledged here, it may seem like this explanation creates more questions than it answers. The relation between these different internal instances remains somewhat unclear. How does “the being within the Self” then, as Robbins and Robbins term it, within and via the “music child”, work to transform or change the “conditioned child”? How does the therapist relate to these various psychic instances, and the way they presumably work in relation to each other, through musical improvisation? The aspect of interpersonal relation is strangely absent from this model of personal change in music therapy; it all seems to come from “within”, or even from within instances within. The whole issue of communication seems to be difficult to address through such a model, which, as it stands, appears rather excessively individualistic and essentialistic, the child pictured according to the illustration almost as a Chinese box of psychic entities, one within the other.

These conceptions as they are developed here, are clearly not easy to reconcile with a dialogical perspective. The “music child” may well be regarded to exist, naturally, as the inherent musical ability of each unique child.⁸¹ This should not be problematic. But according to a dialogical perspective, what is awakened in any actual encounter is nothing other than the human being, as a whole, the person as such. Which is what is activated through the musical improvisation, and nothing else in particular. From a dialogical point of view there is no need to divide this whole up into various entities working on or within each other, to account for the presence of a person engaging in music.

9.1.4 Psychoanalytic Concepts Translated

Aigen (Aigen 1998b) relates that Robbins and Robbins’ further development of the concept of “music child” followed from an earlier, suggestive use of some psychoanalytic terms, centered round different ego-functions. The original concepts, which were termed “old ego-function” and “new ego-function”, were replaced by the terms “Condition Child” and “Being Child”. The introduction of the new terms, replacing the psychoanalytically inspired ones, came from dissatisfaction with the

⁸¹ Just as there is a language child, a math child, a sports child, an arts child, a social child, and a self-knowing child. See Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences (Gardner 1993).

limitations of a Freudian view, which was considered to be inadequate in accounting for the transformative potentials of being involved in music as an art form. It is not just the “ego-function” that is affected by music, but the very essence of the child’s existence. And it is not the “ego-structure” which is musically disposed, but what is considered an “autonomous constellation of abilities known as the Music Child” (p.145).

The question is what is gained by this kind of conceptualization entailing some entity or instance within the psyche. “Being Child” has replaced the concept of “new ego”. Is this conceptual innovation really an improvement in accounting for the therapeutic process? From a relational point of view this construct will rather be considered to display a tendency towards subjectivism and essentialism. Is there really such a thing as a “Being Child”? What meaning can there actually be in such a composite conception, putting together the words “Being” and “Child”? What *is* this? If there is such a thing as a “Being Child”, what is *not* part of it? The term “Being”, surely must be very difficult, not to say problematic, to handle in any composite conceptual construction. Being, as a term within existential philosophy, has been contrasted with “Nothingness” (Heidegger 1996; Sartre 1989). It makes little sense to use it in any composite conceptual construction, because of the totalizing connotation of the term. It is simply too broad. Connecting this term up to the designation of a psychic function or entity within the child would seem to imply an essentialist position to a very high degree.

9.1.5 Relational Practice

I want to underline: Creative Music Therapy in practice is *not* subjectivistic. I do not think anyone could claim this. Relation abounds. What this is about then is aligning theory and practice. The term “music child” might well be used as a notion about the “inner” musicality of the child, (though even “musicality” has a performative aspect to it). But what I have tried to show here is that developing the conception of the “music child” further along individualistic or subjectivistic lines, soon may lead quite far off from the track of developing a notion that might serve to account for the actual practice, both “classical” and current, which, as underlined here, itself not at all can be characterized as individualistic.

Robbins and Robbins talk about some innate influence so to speak, from the old to the new self, “a self-creating force within the self”, whereas the dynamics of change, according to a dialogical philosophy, is to be found in relation. The immediacy and presence of a person, from a relational perspective, is not established by any fixed internal entity or instance, but unfolds in and through meeting with the other. Buber actually goes so far as to say that the I “in itself” does not exist, that the self is constituted by the relations into which it enters. It is in the mutual encounter with the other, in the widest sense, that the self is created, is healed, and can develop.

A dialogical conception, I would want suggest, could point in another direction, which might seem more in accordance with the actual practice of Creative Music Therapy, providing a relational perspective on what may bring about personal change through therapeutic musical improvisation. In the following I want to try to develop a dialogical perspective as an alternative to a subjectivistic view on the child or client’s relation to music in music therapy. First I want to explicate a basic dialogical perspective on what a relation to music entails, from which the further argument will be developed. I will relate initially to an essay that Buber wrote entitled „Der Mensch und sein Gebild“ (Buber 1955),⁸² which deals with the matter of art, placing it within the frame of his general philosophical outlook. Then I want to see how this outlook could be applied more specifically to music, to provide a basis for the development of an alternative to a subjectivistic view within music therapy theory.

9.2 Buber’s Views on Art

The starting point for Buber in considering art and its human significance is the world of the senses. Buber cites the Renaissance artist Albrecht Dürer, who stated: “For art truly is hidden in nature; he who can tear it out, has it.”⁸³ This citation is also used by Heidegger (1960) in his *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, though Buber in contradistinction to Heidegger tries not to make too “profound” (as he somewhat ironically calls Heidegger’s twists and turns of language) ramifications of this formulation, but strives to keep as close as possible to a simple and direct reading of the

⁸² Included in an English translation by Friedman in *The Knowledge of Man* (Buber 1965b).

⁸³ „Denn wahrhaftig steckt die Kunst in der Natur, wer sie heraus kann reißen, der hat sie“ (cited in Buber (1955), p. 16).

statement. He finds that the word “nature”, as used by Dürer, is to be understood quite literally as the world of the senses, thought of as existing independent of us. He contrasts this notion with the world as it appears through the lenses of natural science, which registers the world through observation, and which clearly is not what Dürer in his time and context was thinking about with the word “nature”.

Buber holds forth that human perception of the sense world is not a bare observation. From the intercourse with the world as a whole, as it appears to the senses, clearly outlined forms of sound and color emerge. Vision is figurating, Buber states. “All visibility, the visibility of all the senses, has a direction toward figuration” (p. 149). The world is not perceived just as it is, but gestalted through our perception of it. Now this gestalt-perception of the world, through all of the senses, of “nature” in Dürer’s sense, even though it involves a figurating, is not itself what art is, of course. Although even the perception of the world is in a way an “extracting” something, this is clearly not what Dürer was talking about when he said that the artist “tears” out what is hidden from nature. Art is *adding* to the figuration of the world, through a formative work, a *second figuration*. And this second figuration is in a still higher measure than the first, through which the world is perceived, a personal one, and thus “immeasurably manifold” Buber states. Instead of making what one is confronting an object of perception, it is forming an image:

The artist is the man who instead of objectifying what is over against him forms it into an image.... That does not mean this or that phenomenon, this or that piece of the external world, some complex of appearance given to the sight or hearing in the actual experience, but whatever in the whole possible world-sphere enters into that sense with which this particular art is associated, the whole possible world-sphere of sight, the whole possible world-sphere of hearing (p.150).⁸⁴

The artist perceives artistically, Buber holds forth, by virtue of the second completion of figuration, the becoming of the image. The sense world then constitutes the primal matter from which the form is brought forth. Artistic imagination is discovery through figuration upon this matter. And it is not the complete sense world that the artist in this

⁸⁴ Der Künstler ist der Mensch, der, statt das ihm Gegenüberstehende zum Gegenstand zu objektivieren, es zum Gebild gestaltet.... – das heißt nicht etwa dieses oder jenes Phänomen, dieses oder jenes Stück Außenwelt, irgendein dem Gesicht oder Gehör in der jeweiligen Erfahrung gegebener Erscheinungskomplex, sondern was alles in die ganze mögliche Weltsphäre genes Sinns eingeht, dem diese bestimmte Kunst zugeordnet ist die ganze mögliche Weltsphäre des Gesichts, die ganze mögliche Weltsphäre des Gehörs (Buber 1955, p. 38-39).

wise is standing over against, but the sphere that is decisive for his or her art, for plastic arts the optical sphere, for music the acoustic sphere. This is a crucial aspect, according to Buber. Each of these spheres is determined by a single sense, (the exception is poetry, which relates in a special way to language), which means that each of the other senses cannot gain a footing in it, but can only be related to it:

Every artistic activity is made possible through an elemental renunciation, through a productive shrinking of the world to the exclusiveness of a single sphere (p.151).⁸⁵

So what the artist does is, through figurative imagination, and within the exclusive sense sphere of his or her art, to create an image.

9.2.1 The Perfected Image

Now why this “superfluous” activity that does not relate to the world as an object, and that therefore is not based on any apparent necessity? What is its human significance? This is the crucial question for Buber. How has such activity gained such power and hold within the human realm? Here Buber does not see the element of play, which man also shares with the animals, as sufficient for explaining art. He relates art to a human dissatisfaction and longing. In all human practical doings and work, in all the satisfaction of needs, in all use and recreation even, a person may nonetheless awaken to a sense of dissatisfaction – a dissatisfaction with imperfect relations, that are not sensed to be full and complete, or as full and complete as they could be. And with this dissatisfaction arises in the person what Buber calls a “longing for the perfected relation or for perfection in the relation”. And through this longing four “doorways” open, assisting against such human alienation, and these are, in broad terms, *knowledge*, *love*, *art* and *faith*. Each with their own potentials toward perfected relations. The way that this particularly is found in art, as one of these four “doorways”, is that the artist, through a peculiar intensity of perception, is not satisfied with the mere perception of the world:

He wants, in that sphere among the senses to which his art is oriented, to experience and realize the perfection of the relation to the substratum of the sense things: through the figuration in the vision and in work. He does not portray the

⁸⁵ Jede künstlerische Tätigkeit ist durch einen elementaren Verzicht ermöglicht, durch eine produktive Einschränkung der Welt auf die Ausschließlichkeit einer einzigen Sphäre (p. 42).

form, he does not really remold it; he drives it ... into its perfection in its fully figured reality, and the whole optical, the whole acoustical field becomes refashioned ever anew (p.154).⁸⁶

There is a power in the exclusiveness of keeping to the one sense of the art. The renunciation of the whole of the world of the senses to the exclusiveness of the single sphere is precisely what opens up and facilitates new possibilities in forming the image within that particular sphere, what makes it possible exclude so to speak, all the other senses in order that the working within the one sense may attain to such perfection in figuration. Buber makes clear however, that this exclusiveness of one sense does not entail isolating the work from the rest of world:

But the life of all the other senses is secretly included in the working and the work; deep correspondences, magical evocations exist here, and our concrete understanding is enriched when we succeed, say, in becoming aware of the rhythm in a work of sculpture (p. 154-55).⁸⁷

So the work of art is made out from the world of the senses, or “nature” in Dürer’s meaning of the word. It has to be “torn” out from nature through human agency. Thus, according to Buber, art is “neither the mystery of the things nor that of the spirit that is represented in art, but the relation between the two”. The artist is not one who tries to penetrate behind the world of the senses, as in the case of natural science, discovering laws and principles of the physical ground of nature. The artist finds what is “hidden” in nature through perfecting its form into the completed image, Buber holds forth, and concludes: “In the completion, however, we find the origin.”

9.2.2 “Gebild” as “Image-Creation”

In the essay referred to here Buber has not developed any fully-fledged aesthetic theory. What is addressed is rather the question of what the meaning, the significance of art is within the frame of his philosophical anthropology. He does not present any

⁸⁶ Er begehrt, in der Sphäre desjenigen unter den Sinnen, dem seine Kunst zugeordnet ist die Vollkommenheit der Beziehung zu den Substraten der Sinnendinge zu erfahren und zu verwirklichen: durch die Figuration in der Schau und im Werk. Er bildet die Gestalt nicht ab, er bildet sie nicht eigentlich um, er treibt sie, in ihre Vollkommenheit, in ihre voll figurierte Wirklichkeit, und das ganze optische, das ganze akustische Feld wird immer neu durchgestaltet (p. 50).

⁸⁷ Aber das Leben aller andern Sinne ist hier in Wirkung und Werk insgeheim eingeschlossen; es gibt her tiefe Korrespondenzen, zaubrige Evokationen, und unser konkretes Verständnis wird bereichert, wenn es uns etwa glückt, an einer Skulptur des Rhythmus gewahr zu werden (p. 50-51).

comprehensive aesthetic theory, covering all the various arts in detail. He writes very little specifically about music. There is one subordinate clause to be found, in a general comment on the ways in which the various arts relate to the dimensions of space and time: "... music by embodying time itself in tones, as though indeed, there were no space" (p.152). In the following I would like to elaborate somewhat more on music, on the background of Buber's notions on art, as found in the essay referenced here, and his general outlook, and try to develop a dialogical perspective, as a basis for addressing some of the issues actualized in the discussion on musical subjectivism, and to suggest a direction in which an alternative view could be developed.

But first of all I want to comment on a central term. Friedman's translation of Buber's term "Gebild" is "image-work". Friedman writes in an introductory essay that he consulted Buber on the translation, and it has to be assumed then that the title for each essay has been approved, so "Der Mensch und sein Gebild" has become "Man and his image-work". There is no note as to why the unusual construction "image-work" was chosen though. In a postscript to a Swedish translation (Buber 1991), Sällström refers to a sentence in the first paragraph of the work: "Die Kunst ist als Gebild des Menschen, das eigentümliche Gebild seiner Eigentümlichkeit zu betrachten". ("That means that art must be regarded as the image-work of man, the peculiar image-work of his peculiarity", Buber, 1965, p. 139.) Sällström notes that the use of the word "Gebild" (incidentally also used by Heidegger, Sällström notes) instead of "Bild" indicates that it refers to something that is made. The word is not used to indicate some kind of reflection merely, but something humanly *produced*. This, one might assume then, is the reason why the translation "image-work" was chosen, rather than just "image", to bring out the difference of meaning between "Gebild" and "Bild". I find the use of the construction "image-work" for "Gebild" rather cumbersome though, and somewhat obscure as to what "work" means here. Another word that could be used is "image-creation", which I believe gives a clearer sense of what the notion of "Gebild" might mean.⁸⁸ Gebild may be regarded to refer to a *humanly made image-creation*. And more

⁸⁸ A reason why Buber would *not* want to use such a term is that he explicitly wants to retain the notion of "creation" in its original biblical sense, which he explains in the following way: "Creation means originally and decisively bringing forth, certainly not out of nothing but out of the creating itself; it is independent of all otherness, but we may only hope for an anthropological understanding of art if we take account of the dependence of man on that which exists independently of him" (Buber, 1965 p.140). Man as a creature is not an independent creator in the biblical (theological) sense. Buber points out that

specifically, it is a humanly made creation of a second figuration, in Buber's terms, which means that it is *formed*. To conclude here, I will choose to use the word "formed image", rather than image-work here, finding this to be less cumbersome and more focused as to its meaning.

As to "image", the term does have connotations of something visual. But Buber clearly gives it a broader meaning, including both sight and sound. A formed image may be both optical and acoustical then. This broader usage is what I will adhere to here.

9.3 A Definition of Music

As a point of departure I actually now want to propose a definition of music. Please take note that I am well aware of the numerous attempts that have been made at this, and the difficulties in coming to any agreement on the matter, and – scarcely necessary to say – I am not aiming at any once and for all, all time universal solution, applicable to all times and places, and comprehensively covering all the essential aspects of the phenomenon, for everyone. My purpose rather, is for the proposed definition to serve as a focus for the discussion, as a heuristic device for the argument, related to the present issues of music therapy that are discussed here. The definition, which is basically following up on Buber's notions on art, applied specifically to music, is as follows: Music is a *formed image in sound*. In the following I want to use this definition to try to elaborate and develop somewhat further a dialogical outlook on music, through explicating what this definition might entail.

First of all, according to the definition presented here, music is *formed*. It is not something that is found as such in nature, as a purely natural phenomenon. It is humanly produced. And, it is made of *sound*. This is the raw material, without which it simply would not exist. Music is brought forth from the sense world of sound. Furthermore the definition holds that it is an *image*. Music is not just some sounding signal, for instance, like the sound of the horn in a car, or of a telephone or doorbell. And it is not quite the

the German philosopher Johan Georg Hamann introduced the modern use of the word "creative" referring also to human creativity, in the eighteenth century. I will choose to use this modern notion of creativity here, which is well established of course, finding it indispensable in the more narrow and limited sense, as referring specifically to human creativity, not as independent of, but as partaking of creation.

same as verbal language, with referential meanings assigned to different vocally produced sounds, as words. It is a *musical image*, which is a special kind of image, and which could be compared with other kinds of images. The musical image is not the same as a three dimensional sculptural image for instance, physically placed for being viewed within a room, or a two-dimensional painting on a canvas, hung up on a wall. Music moves in time. Music is an image in time, rather than in space, as the visual arts are. It is a dynamic image. What characterizes it is that it is a *moving image*, one might say.

The aspect of *moving* was a central aspect of Hanslick's (1973) famous definition of music as "tönend *bewegte* Formen", (usually translated as "sounding *moved* forms"). Although I will not go further into any discussion on Hanslick's aesthetics here (see Kjerschow 1978, 2000), this definition is cited for the purpose of setting up a contrast with the formulation presented here. Hanslick points to "sounding *moved forms*". But this could be questioned on the account that any form is a shaping *of* something, there is hardly any abstracted form *as such*. - One of the main points in the debate on Hanslick, of course, is the accusation of formalism. I want to underline that what is held here, in contrast to a formalist position, is that *being formed* is precisely what makes music *into an image*, being formed *as* something, a moving image that is formed in sound, rather than music being some kind of "sounding *moved form*".⁸⁹

9.3.1 Looking and Seeing, Listening and Hearing

Besides from this dynamic, moving aspect, music regarded as an image nevertheless tends to be somewhat more abstract than what is found for instance within the visual arts. It does not depict figuratively quite in the same way as in the visual arts. An apple may be shown as an image on canvas both by shape and color, whether it was green or red. "Sound painting", imitating more or less "naturalistically" the sound of creeks or birds, engines, trains, or ocean waves breaking at the shore, does not reach very far, and is hardly the most central or rewarding aspect of music making and appreciation. (Though this is an element that on occasion, when it is put in, and mostly for effect, *can*

⁸⁹ I use Hanslick's much-cited phrase here just to bring out this point without thereby having claimed to have refuted Hanslick's position as such. As Kjerschow points out, Hanslick's argument has more nuances than some of his opponents might have been inclined to recognize. But, as mentioned, I will not enter further into this particular debate here.

be heard.) The question remains what music depicts beyond such simple imitative sound painting.

What could be proposed here is that this really is no different from seeing what a painting depicts, as an image considered. The crucial point here is that as an image it cannot be stated completely what it is, and this counts for *any* image, of whatever sort. Just as you cannot say *everything* that is contained within a painting, all the details of how each and every part is pictured in it, viewed as a whole. – You just have to see it. So it is with music as a sound image. – You just have to hear it. If you do not look at the painting you will not find out what it might be a picture of, what it shows, or what it means. And likewise with music: in *listening* to it, you will hear it, and find out what it contains.

You just cannot tell what a painting shows if you do not look at it. And this is precisely where and when you find this out, and nowhere else actually. What the painting shows becomes apparent in and through directly relating to it. This is the decisive point from a dialogical perspective; that the reality of what is shown is found in the direct encounter with it. Listening to music is a prerequisite for discovering what it contains. This is where it is discovered what is in it, which is not more or less “subjective” than seeing for instance what a painting contains. What the picture shows, is not more or less subjective than what is in the music, in listening to it. Listening to music requires a certain focus and concentration, or else you will simply not *hear* it. Just as you will not be able to tell what the picture is like if you do not actually look in a focused way at it.

From Potential to Actual Existence

Biswas (1996) points out that Buber’s concept of art as dialogue, which is concerned with the work in an experiential dimension, accords with the distinction made by Dufrenne (1973), in his phenomenological aesthetic theory, between the *work of art* and the *aesthetic object*, which concords with the notion of a work of art as a thing, an It, on the one hand, and as a presence, a Thou in the reception of it, on the other. Dufrenne, according to Biswas, regards the work of art as not being dependent on being experienced, whereas the *aesthetic object* exists only as experienced by the spectator, or, as could be added here with regards to music, the listener. In Dufrenne’s words:

“The work must offer itself to perception: it must be performed in order to pass, as it were, from a potential to an actual existence” (cited in Biswas 1996 p. 232). Biswas sums this up in the following way:

The work of art is the perduring structural foundation for the aesthetic object. As an unaccomplished, unfulfilled form it is within the domain of aesthetic experience, after creation it sinks back into an It but awaits a Thou (i.e., the artist or the beholder), to become an “image-work” – an aesthetic object (Biswas 1996, p. 232).

The reality of music as a “formed image” then, as I have preferred to name it, is *as heard*; listening to it brings out what it is.⁹⁰

9.3.2 The Ambiguity of the Image

Having established that the reality of the musical image from a dialogical point of view is in the hearing of it, through listening to it, the question could be posed as to what music as a formed image then is an image *of*. An image, in contradistinction to a concept, which the image as such may be contrasted with, is perceived directly. It *shows* something, rather than infers something, as the concept does. The image then, *as an image*, is *ambiguous*. The concept is aimed at significance in a clear, abstract and universal way, whereas the image on the other hand is concrete, particular. But it may still point beyond this particularity to a more general significance through *likeness*. An image is likened, not identified with, and therefore it is, and remains, ambiguous. There is an inherent richness to be found in the various aspects of likeness, which is not delimited and definable in any exact sense.

To take an example, a child may be like his father. This may be duly noticed and commented upon, but never comprehensively and exhaustively accounted for exactly how. What can be done is to point to, suggest, indicate and so forth, more or less convincingly. And by saying such a thing, you are not just considering yourself to report a subjective state – even though you are saying something about what you see – but saying something with a claim to validity. There is no absolutely right or wrong, but certainly one may agree to a more or less extent with a statement made, *how* right or

⁹⁰ This also concords with a general phenomenological outlook on music, as has been developed by Thomas Clifton in his book titled: *Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Phenomenology*.

wrong it is. Because the image as an image is ambiguous any statement *about* it is necessarily suggestive.

When you are saying something about the musical image then, you are *suggesting* something about it. And this may be agreed upon more or less by others. What the matter is about then is the logic of these kinds of statements. You *can* suggest something about the music, and this is not necessarily stating something private or merely idiosyncratic. It is meant to be a statement to be agreed upon, or not, or else there was no point in putting it forward. There is no definitive right or wrong, but this does not necessarily mean that it is completely arbitrary. People may not agree. But the discussion is itself a way of *making* judgments. What can be said about what music is about is not objective, nor subjective then, but suggestive on intersubjective grounds, and this is precisely the basis for any discussion about it, which means that it could be said to be dialogically established.

This of course is a major theme in the history of aesthetics, from Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, and up to recent day discussions by for instance Peter Kivy (1990), who makes a distinction between music *expressing* and being *expressive of* emotion, to show how emotive language can apply intelligibly to music on an intersubjective basis. That emotive predicates can apply to music, beyond being reports merely of subjective states, is well aligned with a dialogical outlook, which will consider this a part of the process of objectification, of establishing characteristics though *talking about*, though this will not lead ultimately to any *definitive* conclusion, but will remain dialectically open. (This pertains to any kind of objectification or characterization though, not just emotive.)

9.3.3 Culture and Conventionally Ascribed Meaning

There is an aspect of culture involved. The perception of the image is not formed on any completely "innocent" basis, but according to a familiarity with the particular genre of music. Whether this kind of music, or a more or less similar kind, has been heard before, and in what way is clearly of significance to how it is perceived. The more familiar with the music, the more likely one is to be able to perform a "competent" listening to it. Familiarity does play a role in how the music is listened to, and what is heard.

Music as a *form* of culture has to be listened to as a *part* of culture. There is no escaping this cultural dimension in the musical image-creation as *humanly made*. Still the image as such is not decided upon entirely by assigning meaning to it *arbitrarily*, that is to say, *independent of its form*. To compare with painting again, it is not *just* a matter of convention how you paint and see a chair in visual art. There are not any set of lines to be drawn that are a conventionally decided upon to be the likes of a chair, which might just as well have been a table or a bowl, or any other depicted object. And likewise with the musical image: It is not just some given form of sound, to which some content is arbitrarily assigned to, as a convention.

Saying that it is not *just* a convention is not saying that it is *free* from convention. Which it of course it is not. But there are some gestalt principles at work in musical perception, as well as in visual art, as stressed by Buber, which are hard to come by. And again the image must be distinguished from the concept in the way meaning may be ascribed to it. The image, even though the way it is made is based on some familiarity and social convention, is nevertheless still perceived in a more direct and immediate way. You do not have to decode the painting or the music through cognitive processing to find out what it is about, as an image.

Hearing what the music, as a humanly made image-creation in sound is about, is not *merely* a matter of social/cultural convention. Garnett (1998a) states that it in recent years it has become a truism that musical codes can and do carry social values, and that social meanings encoded in music now form part of the musicological landscape. Garnett favors a position that regards cultural codes as inevitably built into musical configurations. Music is not only a sphere which can reflect a culture's ideologies, but is also an activity "whose very conceptualization is created by and within social beliefs" (p. 5). And she purports: "There is no extra-cultural locus from which to observe music, nor extra-cultural meanings to observe". Kjerschow (1995), countering such a position, holds forth that music has an *immediate* appeal that is not completely assignable to culturally conventional signs, which makes problematic an *absolute* cultural relativism. Kjerschow points out analogously that dancing in Africa is something different than dancing in Europe, but not something *completely* different. If it were completely different there would be no comparative ground on which to account for what it entails.

That men and women sing together in unison one octave apart, rather than a seventh, is not just because it is a social convention that might just as well have been the other way around. It is because of the “identical” quality of singing a tune in either of the two octaves. This is what makes it work, and not that it has been decided upon by some social convention. Exceptions to the rule may always be found, as in the case of the people of New Guinea that Steven Feld has made anthropological studies of, and who sing not in unison, but – to western ears – in different “keys” simultaneously (Feld 1990). Still I do not think that citing this example will relativize *completely* the experiential reality of the interval of the octave as identical tones, one on a higher plane than the other, as a cross-cultural phenomenon. A *complete* relativism will miss the mark here.

Not an Arbitrarily Assigned Meaning

Music is not assigned meaning to arbitrarily in the way verbal language is. There is a crucial difference here. And considering that music, as a code could be re-constructed through a process of decoding leaves this difference unaccounted for. In language meaning is assigned arbitrarily in relation to the sound of the word. Although there on occasion may be found onomatopoeic elements to such designations of meaning, this is not at all the overall case, and this may certainly not generally serve as a basis for determining the meaning of words in verbal language. Different languages may use quite different sounding words to mean the same thing. And though codes in particular circumstances may be assigned to certain musical structures or elements, like when the beginning of a tune serves as a signal for the beginning of a radio program, the meaning of music on the whole is not delimited in this wise. The meaning in music is tied up with its own form in a different way than language is. You can say the same thing in different languages, but you cannot say the same thing with different music. Or, putting it otherwise, in contrast to verbal language saying *something*, music *is* the saying.⁹¹

⁹¹ There may be different meanings to the term ‘code’, which may be more or less loosely defined. Knowing a code in a broader sense as for instance in the “knowing” what to wear on different occasions, adhering to a “dress-code”. And there may be found something of this kind of code in music too. In modern jazz, ever since the event of Bebop, certain chord progressions on the whole are considered to sound “corny”, and are substituted. These same progressions may nevertheless be used in country and western music, without any such connotations attached in this context, and for which jazz-substitutions would be quite out of order. The code in this sense is about being familiar with the requirements of the style, an aspect that Ruud has emphasized (Ruud 1998d, 1998b).

9.3.4 Universality and Particularity of Music

A universal trait in music means going beyond the particular culture from which it originated. And certainly music can do this. – The “evidence” is overwhelming. It would be a rather farfetched theoretical stance to say that since music is culturally produced and therefore relative, it is not universal. It is not *totally* universal. This has to be granted. But then again a dialogical perspective will point to a “middle way”. Music may to some extent be universal in the meaning of potentially going beyond a *particular* culture, which does not mean that it is placed *outside* of culture anywhere, it finds its meaning within culture, and *between* cultures.

Music *is* culture, but not *all* culture. It is in the interface between nature and culture that the image is formed, which reflects *both* the particulars of the culture – in the making – *and* the universals of nature – from which it is made. And because of its placement within the interface of the culturally potential, and the naturally given, the musical image accordingly may point beyond any *particular* culture. It is not confined within the boundaries of the particular culture from which it is made. – Because it is not *just* a making. It is made from something, and what this something is, is sound, which has universal characteristics, as a natural phenomenon, no matter how it may be applied within different cultures. Sound, even *as heard*, is simply not *entirely* reduced to culture.

Reducing musical meaning entirely to being conventionally ascribed would result in a plain culturalism. What would be overlooked in this case is that music has a side of *nature* to it. As the definition presented here states, it is an image made of *sound*. And sound, it turns out, is not just some palpable mass that may be formed in any one way, according either to one’s own sovereign decision, *or* to one’s culture. Sound has some very specific qualities that necessarily must be related to, and it is naturally just these that facilitate the forming of this material into the cultural product of music.

9.3.5 Sound and Musical Material

Another famous definition of music, besides from the aforementioned one by Hanslick, from the 20th century, and which highlights the use of *sound* is the composer Ernst Krenek’s much cited expression of music being “organized sound”. This definition seems to have acquired a ring of “objectivity” to it; it is unmistakably modern in its

implied claim to universality. And both of the two words used in relation to each other, “organized” and “sound”, have a pronounced modern connotation in this context. The formulation is decisively anti-romantic, not least in what is left out, namely any references whatsoever to anything supernatural, or metaphysical. There is not even anything emotional implied in the definition. “Sound”, which is not “melody”, or “harmony”, or “rhythm”, may actually be regarded as something physical, as in acoustics. And the term seems to have something of this “scientifically objective” connotation to it. And to “organize” is indeed quite far off from the romantic notion about what the composer as a creative genius actually does. To “organize sounds” might be taken to be a rather technical affair, as could be executed by some kind of engineer.

The dividing line from Krenek’s much cited phrase in relation to the definition presented here, will first of all be that the notion of “sound” here is explicitly not sound as defined by physics, but sound as it is appears to us within the world of the senses. This needs to be underlined. And secondly, rather than “organized” the definition presented here uses the term “formed”. Organizing usually means just putting together elements, arranging what is already given. From a dialogical perspective “formed” seems more appropriate, because it is not just arranging something that is given, but rather inventing or creating something, something new, not just putting together what is at hand in some new order.

Culturally Mediated, rather than Purely “Natural” Sound

It is important to underline then, that the making of music is not primarily concerned with the physical basis of sound as such, but with the *qualities* of sound, that is, sound as it appears within the world of senses, for the human.

A qualification needs to be made here. The material used for making music is actually not sound simply as a “natural” phenomenon, even though music is made of sound, which comes from nature. Sound is rather the basic “raw material” from which *musical materials* are developed, like tones, scales, rhythms, timbres, harmony. Music has its own culturally developed and defined materials, brought forth through the way it has been, and presently is, creatively formed. The use of sound in music is culturally mediated then, through the way the sound has been, and presently continues to be, formed into an image. It is not a use of sound as such, directly then.

Sound as heard has inherent natural characteristics that determine how it *can* be formed. (Not how it *must* be formed, though.) And this is actually something given, (as long as nature remains the same), although new aspects to the material continuously may be discovered. These given characteristics then harbor *potentials* of music making with sound. And these are not limited in any specific way. There is no fixed limit as to *how* these inherent characteristics of sound may be used in developing material for music making.

A further contrast with Krenek's phrase "organized sound" is that according to the definition presented here, music is a formed *image* in sound, not just some kind of "sound" that is "organized".⁹² – What is formed in sound *is* something, namely an image.

9.3.6 The Perfected Image

Music, as defined here, is brought forth in an interface between nature (as consisting of sound) and culture (as humanly formed). The question still remains: What is brought forth through this interface, what is it an image of? Relating to Buber's views on the human significance of art, what can be suggested is that it is a *perfected* image. Which does not mean that it is in all cases, or even any case, "perfect". It is not so much about the adjective perfect, as the verb: to perfect. This is what the making of it consists in. It is a perfected image, as far as this was possible to attain. And for Buber it is through the delimitation to a single sense sphere – for music, sound – that a potentiality is opened, to achieve some, one might say higher, degree of perfection, within this singular sphere. The perfection thus reached, within the given delimitation, may extend somewhat beyond what otherwise might be recognized in the broader, multifarious context of life. Thus it may show a direction towards what Buber, as referred to previously, terms the perfect relation, or the perfected relation, to which some basic human sense of dissatisfaction, or alienation, may awaken a longing for.

⁹² The intent here is not to refute Krenek's definition either, which has served, and possibly still serves, its own (modernistic) purposes, though its implied claim to universality is questioned (using "neutral" terms, to include "objectively" all kinds of music). As with the previous citing of Hanslick's famous/infamous definition, seeing both the similarities and differences in the terms used, may bring out clearer the characteristics of a dialogically based conception of music, as this is sought to be developed here.


Music as an image made *in sound* establishes by the use of this singular sense a kind of sphere of its own. It forms a whole in itself. When listened to, nothing outside of it really interferes with it; it becomes self-contained, though of course it may be *related to*, in multiple ways. This gives it a peculiar quality. Within a sphere of its own the image forms a whole. And as a whole it may appear as the image of a “better world” so to speak, one that is not split up and fragmented, divided within itself in strife and conflict. Music depicts a world that is whole, not broken.⁹³ The musical image may be reflecting life, or what life *could* be in a way, showing integration within its own sphere.

I want to give a simple example here, just to illustrate this sense to it, in the form of a remark, made by Paul Nordoff. This of course is not taken as any direct support for the argument here, but is cited just as an illustration, and which naturally could be replaced by any other example to illustrate this point. In a chapter exploring and comparing triads and their inversions, in *Healing and Heritage* (Robbins and Robbins 1998), the six-four chord is presented and explained:

With the six-four chord something absolutely new happens. The six-four chord is a chord that opens doors. It’s a chord that announces the cadenzas in concertos. It’s a chord that leaves tonal space for something to happen. As you know, it is an extremely important chord in the cadence (playing and naming the chords) the one (six-four) ... five-seven ... one (p. 57):

⁹³ The etymological root of the word “health” incidentally, is “whole”. What is whole is integrated; every part has its place related to the whole. One might speculate if this is could be one of the reasons for the widespread and close association of music with health, that it convincingly depicts such wholeness. The word “whole” of course is also related etymologically to the word “holy”.

Figure 7: The Example of the 6/4 Chord, from *Healing Heritage*.



And then, after having played the example Nordoff makes the following remark:

If every event in life could be as completely satisfactory as that! That just says all that needs to be said (p. 57).

An utterly simple musical cadence in A-minor, played as an example in the context of a training course, and then Nordoff is motivated to make a remark with such indeed wide implications! Amazing as this may be, it seems he, in just this moment, is tapping right into the aspect of perfection, the potential of music to depict something “completely satisfactory”, and at the same time he expresses a sense of deep longing: “If every event in life could be...” He finally even puts forward that this “just says all that needs to be said.” – A far-reaching statement indeed, relating to just a singular musical cadence, played as an example. This spontaneous remark is cited here for illustrative purposes, because it may be seen to give one highly pregnant expression, within its particular setting, of what music as a perfected image entails.

9.3.7 Any Likeness to be Found

But even still, music being a perfected image, what is it an image *of*? Being perfected, it is nevertheless still ambiguous naturally, as an image necessarily is, in contradistinction to the concept. And because it is ambiguous, it is never completely defined, bounded and delimited as to its specific content and meaning, which does not mean that it can mean or depict just anything, but that there is no singular determination as to what it does depict. It is ambiguous and potentially rich, because there is *no specific limit as to the likeness of the image*. Buber indicates that the other senses are “secretly included” in the making of an image within the one sphere, and that there are correspondences between the image perfected within the sphere of one sense and the rest of the senses. In

the last resort then, the made image within a singular sense sphere may be related to the world of the senses as a whole, and not just some part of it, which is to say, *to any likeness of which may be found within the whole world of the senses*. Whatever the image, as an image, may be found to be *alike*, its “resemblance potentials”, which are neither entirely definitive, nor arbitrary, within any sphere, and related to any sense, is what it is about.

9.4 Relating to Music

The outlook that has been developed here is a phenomenological one, based on the perception of music as sound within the human sensual world. In his phenomenological study on music Clifton presents his own definition of music. I will not go into any extended comparison of his outlook with the one that is presented here, besides pointing to a concordance of basic view. His definition is as follows: “Music is an ordered arrangement of sounds and silences whose meaning is presentative rather than denotive” (p 1). I will just notice here that he uses the term “ordered arrangement”, which I believe connotatively strikes a somewhat similar note as Krenek’s “organized”. I still prefer *formed image*. That the meaning is presentative rather than denotive would accord with the use of the concept of image, which quite naturally could be regarded to be presentative rather than denotive, which is characteristic of the concept.

Clifton includes not only sounds, but also *silences* and this of course is a valid point. Music is a play of sound *and* silences, which lend significance to each other. Sound should actually be considered as a relational concept, to be seen in contrast with silence. Because what you hear is on the background of silence. If there were no silence there was no sound, no background on which the sound could appear, as a phenomenon. Sound and silence constitute each other reciprocally within the world of the senses. (Noise is irrelevant sound - sound getting in the way. It cannot be regarded as a positive word, whereas music is an inherently positive word; it is sound with a positive connotation to it. Silence can actually have both positive and negative connotations.)

In attempting to make his definition more precise Clifton offers an additional formulation:

Music is the actualization of the possibility of any sound whatever to present to some human being a meaning which he experiences with his body – that is to say, with his mind, his feelings, his sense, his will, and his metabolism (p. 1).

I want to point to the crucial aspect of the many-sided response to music that is emphasized here. This relates directly to the notion of correspondences that was mentioned above, between all the different senses in the perception of the image, formed from one singular sense.

Louis Z. Hammer (1967) has written on the relevance of Buber to aesthetics. In accordance with Buber's dialogical perspective, Hammer views art as a special feature of "the other", namely "its "capacity to disclose itself in sensible form" (p. 613). He proposes that the work of art is sensible form that is worked on and realized as a created whole. Hammer considers that this work is essentially an act of preserving Creation as present being, by this disclosing of itself as sensible form. But he underlines that at the same time it is an unmistakable disclosing of *human* ordering.

Hammer relates to the discussion on subjectivist and objectivist views on how beauty may be assigned to art, and finds that from the point of view of Buber's thought that the division into objectivist and subjectivist views results from a failure to comprehend the "between", where the person meets what is in the world. Beauty could be viewed dialogically:

Beauty is a mode of being of things in dialogue with the senses of man. Things that are called beautiful present themselves from their fullness of being, and they require the person open to encounter. Beauty is the meeting between man and the sensuous presence of something in the world (p. 621).

And this meeting, revealing beauty, may pertain to nature or to art.

Hammer proceeds to show how music specifically might be approached within the framework of Buber's thought. First having rejected notions of music as "expressing emotion" through "extra-musical reference", or that it "signifies" or "symbolizes" patterns of feelings (Langer) or that it on the other side only embodies musical ideas (Hanslick, Stravinsky), he proposes the view as suggested by Buber's thought:

What happens in music is that sound in its fullness of structure is brought into relation with man. In each "pure" musical work some part of the order realizable in the sphere of sound is disclosed. *Every variety of structure, dynamic, shading, coloration found in encounter with the world is relevant to the encounter with the musical work.* Yet nothing is given in sound itself; nothing is intended or referred to outside the work. The work does not express or symbolize any specific

emotional qualities. But in its ordering of sound it can *echo any phase of the world's presence to man* (p. 623, italics added).

Instead of “ordering” sound (Hammer incidentally also uses the phrase “organized sound” in his article), I still will keep to the notion of *forming*. The “echo” of “any phase of the world’s presence to man” could be related to what I have referred to above as “the likeness of the image”.

Hammer underlines that in responding to the work of music the total person, with feeling, cognition and will is demanded. The response to music is the response of the whole person, and emotion then, he emphasizes, is only one strand of this response. To connect music only with feeling, Hammer holds forth, is to suppose without warrant that feeling or emotion is somehow a separable element within the person, and he finds that the importance of music would rather seem to lie in its capacity to involve the listener, including all aspects and depths of response.

The Danish writer on music education, Frede Nielsen (1998) presents a phenomenologically oriented view on music as a multi-spectered universe of meaning, which seems to be in quite close accord with this kind of perspective on all the various aspects that may be involved relating to music. Nielsen also actually uses the concept of *correspondence* to interrelate multiple layers of meaning in the musical object and layers of consciousness in the person experiencing the music.

These layers include acoustic, structural, kinetic-motor, tensional, emotional, existential/spiritual layers of meaning, that may be corresponded variously to, and to more or less degree, by each listening and experiencing person. Nielsen holds forth that such correspondence may take on the character of an intense encounter, bordering on identification with the music. He refers here to a viewpoint by Dufrenne (1973), who writes:

I intend the aesthetic object, but I intend it as consubstantial with myself. While penetrating into it, I allow it to penetrate into me, rather than keeping it at a distance. It does not cease being an object while it mingles with me. The distance which it has is not abolished because I am absorbed in it, since it remains a rule for me and imposes its meaning on me. Such is the paradox: I become the melody or the statue and yet the melody and the statue remain external to me. I become them so that they can be themselves. It is in me that the aesthetic object is constituted as other than me (p. 232).

With this paradoxical elucidation of the relation to the work, Dufrenne brings out the dialogical character of the relation to the “aesthetic object”. Dufrenne also speaks about the work of art as a Thou to be met, that is to say, he calls it a “quasi-Thou”, this way underlining the metaphoric character of the term in this connection. Nielsen points out that the bringing together of the subject and object within a phenomenal field is what characterizes phenomenological thought, and in this sense it seems to be readily aligned with a dialogical view, as represented by Buber.

Not that there are not differences though. Biswas (1996). writes that Dufrenne, in spite of his instance on communion, holds forth that the communion with the aesthetic object becomes apparent through feeling, which reveals *subjectivity*. Biswas points out that Buber’s aesthetic philosophy does not admit of any priority to any subjective or psychological element such as feeling, but regards communion (I-Thou) as fundamental, which cannot be subsumed under the category of subjectivity, (nor of objectivity for that matter). It is not the feeling that conjures up the aesthetic present, Biswas holds forth. According to a dialogical perspective it is rather the other way around: communion, in constituting and bringing forth presence, *allows* feelings to be conjured.

9.4.1 Related to as a Whole, by the Whole Person

I want to underline, following the line of thought that has been developed here somewhat further, that what the formed image conveys is not anything *specific*; it relates to wholes rather than parts. As a whole itself, the formed image reveals something or corresponds with the world of the senses as a whole, (as a macrocosm), and in so doing also reflects the human being as a whole, (as a microcosm), within this world. And because what this is about is not entirely specific, it may not be related exclusively to any *part* of the human being. – To the emotions for instance, but it may nonetheless *also* relate to emotions, within the whole. This is how the “logic” of this kind of relation works then. There is nothing in particular to single out that it is *not* about, that the image as such is not related to.⁹⁴ Consequently, according to this view, what the made image may be regarded to relate to, or correspond with, to use this term,

⁹⁴ As Biswas puts it, relating to the artistic creation which unfolds itself in terms of its own space and time: “Even the entire world, from the point of view of this single creation, is seen in a different way, in an intimate perspective of the creator and/or beholder” (Biswas 1996, p. 235)

is not emotions or “feelings” as separate *parts* of the person, but the *whole* person, *with* emotions, *with* feelings.

Relating to the formed image in sound as a whole, there are several dimensions of meaning that may be found as to what it is about then. It may be a bodily kinetic sense, inciting movement, a feeling that is stirred, an emotion, a mood that is struck, some intricate pattern or web of interacting lines that catches the attention, and captivates the mind. The moving images in sound may be perceived to display an exquisite beauty all their own, and to exhibit a direct sensuous appeal. A tactical impact may be sensed, waves literally hitting the body. Images may be provoked, and memories, thoughts, or associations, and maybe synaesthesiatic sensations. There is no specific response that may be extracted and set up as the one valid “objective” and definitive.

Still, and this should be held very clear; it is not just a matter of a display of individual idiosyncrasies. What a dialogical view implies is rather that each listener may attain to different depths of listening, and in so doing may discover more about the sound image, in ever-new aspects of details appearing within and illuminating the whole. Which furthermore is not just a matter of “structural” versus “hermeneutical” listening. According to this basic outlook you cannot effectively divide the two.⁹⁵

Relating to this specific issue Nielsen (1998) puts forwards the argument that there are three different basic views to the form/content problem of musical meaning. One is that these are two different things, that musical form points to some specific non-musical content. The other is that the structure of the music is itself what the music is about. The third, and to which he adheres, and which is in accordance with the view presented here then, is that the musical structure is embedded within layers of different meanings, structural, kinetic, emotional, spiritual, existential, that are mutually

⁹⁵ In a critical note on some of the assumptions of “New Musicology” Treitler (2000) has questioned the use of word-pairs such as “congeneric-extraneous” (Coker 1972), or “embodied” vs. “referential” meaning (Meyer 1956), or “introversive” vs. “extroversive semiosis” (Agawu 1991). “In their shared implication of the objective-subjective divide and their reference to ‘musical’ and ‘extramusical’ meaning they presume too much about the clarity of that general conception, the sharpness of the divide between the two sides, and the exactness with which one can speak of ‘musical meaning’” (Treitler 2000, p. 11). Suspicion as to whether this epistemology works arises from an effort to coordinate them even in what would seem to be clear-cut instances, Treitler states. He finds that the two sides are not easy to separate in that the expressive quality is immanent in the structure of the music, and not separable from this in any simple way. Treitler expresses an acute discomfort with setting up such dichotomies, filing phenomena on one side, or the other, which inevitably leads to contradictions and confusion. He wants to be able to talk about music without invoking such simple and misleading dichotomies.

interrelated in a spectrum that is not possible to divide into separate parts or components.

No Fixed Limit as to What to Hear

What the musical image is about becomes apparent as people listen then, which means that in relating to the music it may open up in different ways. We cannot simply say that everyone in each instance will hear the same. Actually it will be different and unique for every single person every single time of listening to some music. It can be regarded as “infinitely multifarious”, as Buber called it, *both* ways then, in the making of it, *and* in the reception of it. There is no fixed limit as to how much to hear or discover in music, of what it may reveal, as there is no specific limit as to the likeness of the image. There is no measured and delimited, given “content” objectively residing within, which can be extracted out in any precisely defined manner. As an image it will always have multifarious “resemblance potentials”.

9.4.2 Music as an Activity

The dialogical outlook implies that the relation to music is active, indeed that music as an experiential reality is constituted by human action, both in the making and in the reception of it. The active aspect of music has been emphasized by Christopher Small, who has developed the concept of *musicking*, as mentioned in the introductory chapter (Small 1998).⁹⁶ His main point in using the term *verb* musicking, rather than the noun “music”, is to convey the idea that music is first and foremost action. Small, (as seen previously, in the introductory chapter), defines the term musicking, in the following manner:

Too music is to take part, in any capacity, in a musical performance, whether by performing, by listening, by rehearsing or practicing, by providing material for performance (what is called composing) or by dancing (p. 9).

⁹⁶ David Elliott has also developed a concept of *musicing* (spelled without a “k”) (Elliott 1995). Robert Walser has also used the term defining it in the following manner: ‘Musicking’ embraces composition, performance, listening, dancing – all of the social practices of which musical scores and recordings are merely one-dimensional traces (Walser 1993). The verb form or the term music is of course not at all new. According to Oxford English Dictionary usage has been registered as far back as the seventeenth century, but it has not been common of late, and the present usage clearly represents a new context for the meaning of this form of the word as a verb.

Small of course does have an agenda, clearly reflected in the insistence that performance, which is his main concern, does not exist in order to present musical works, the authority of which he then questions. His outlook is rather that musical works exist in order to “give performers something to perform”. This “bias” might account for the rather curious notion that he proposes: “providing material for performance”, which he explicitly uses instead of the word “composing” in his definition. Musicking then consists of listening, rehearsing, practicing performing, and “providing material for performance”, plus dancing.⁹⁷

The definition of music that has been presented here could maybe be seen somewhat more in concordance with the notion of musicking by turning it into an active statement, using a verb to rephrase the formulation into “*forming* an image in sound”. I would want to suggest that there are two main sides or aspects to forming an image in sound, a receptive and a productive. (The receptive is of course always a part of the productive too.) The receptive aspect, according to the dialogical outlook that has been presented here, is not at all a passive registration, but an engaged *perceptive forming* of the image in sound *as* music, as it is heard. The productive aspect includes both composing and performing, rehearsing and practicing, and, I might add here, improvising.

Small’s definition does not stress the *forming* aspect of music making, but focuses rather on *per-forming*. But the aspect of forming I believe is crucial, as it can be related to the *creative endeavor* that music making inevitably brings about. Composing, in any sense of the term, is something more than “providing material”, at *any* level. To “provide” something does not indicate how it was produced. A question remains as to where it came from. From where has it been supplied? From a compositional warehouse or stock of some sort? Is music some kind of readymade that can just be made available for performance, by “providing” it? According to the dialogical perspective that has been outlined here, an emphasis is put on the production of music as a *creative act*. It is a two-way process of making something out of an idea through the use of a culturally mediated musical material. It is a humanly made image-creation; it is indeed *forming* an

⁹⁷ Small actually wants to add, possibly, persons selling tickets, roadies, or cleaners that may be involved, to be participating in musicking. I do think this is stretching a term for music a bit too far from general usage. It might sound very politically correct, but I am not at all convinced that the people referred to here would be comfortable with, or even accept having been bestowed upon the social “honor” of participating in doing music, through defining it this way.

image in sound. And the forming of music is involved in any relation to it, also in performing, rehearsing practicing, as well as in listening and composing or improvising, in whichever way or manner.

Small includes dancing into his definition of musicking. Music and dance are very close indeed, but I still would prefer not to consider them identical. Dance has its own specific qualities and characteristic that may be intimately related to music, but not subsumed under a common heading with music I believe. I am aware that in some cultures there may not be separate words for music and for dance, (like in the Swahili word “Ngoma”, see Bjorkvold (1992)), but trying to put these words together, by defining them under a common conceptual construction, will not suffice to change the way we regard dance as a distinct expressive mode besides music. And I would prefer not to subsume dance completely under music, not least to consider the *relation* between these two expressive modes.

Relating to Music Through Dance

One way of relating to music is through movement, and through dance. And music may empower dance. This is hardly disputable. But this can nevertheless not be considered a simple cause an effect relation. There are obviously aspects as to which kind of rhythms, beats, tempos etc. “work” as different kinds of dance music, related to human physics and physiology. But dancing is about *relating* to the music through bodily movement, letting the music literally move you physically. It is a matter of engaging yourself in it. Going into it, according to the mood and of the situation. It is not a purely objective effect though Music does not *make* you dance, but it may make you *want* to dance.⁹⁸

⁹⁸ Automatic, or quasi-automatic physiological functions of music will in any case naturally be part of the interface between culture and nature in the relation between the musical image and the human in bodily movement, whether dancing or just tapping a foot. Listening to music is connected with the more involuntary physiological process of breathing, for instance; the listening to music will be synchronized in some way with the movement of the breath. A deep and calm breath will be conducive for listening attentively to music, and listening deeply to music may induce a deep and calm breath. But even this - clearly measurable - physiological response is not completely mechanical. It is bound up with enactment, with allowing oneself to be taken in by the music. There is an intentional dimension involved then. And enactment being a necessary precondition there will be no guaranteed “objective” effect. But it has to be mentioned that music no doubt does have physiological effects, as research has shown (particularly within the field of music psychology). And this has been applied therapeutically, for instance in so-called Vibroacoustic Therapy, using low frequency sounds that have a direct physiological impact on the body (Wigram, Bonde, and Nygaard Pedersen 2002).

9.4.3 Music Engaging the Person

The other side to this dialogical process of relating to music, as seen from the part of the person engaged, is that this forming, this making of music entails *activating* creative power. The active engagement with music thus requires bringing forth the effective creative power necessary from the side of the person to form the music. And this is also a crucial aspect to the personal involvement with music.

According to the dialogical outlook developed here there are two sides to be seen in the engagement with music then, and which are involved in *both* the receptive and active modes of relating to music. Not only does the listener, performer, composer, or improviser actively engage with music, to bring out all the potentials of significance in the experience of it. Also, *music engages and activates the person*. It is not just a one-way process of the person bringing some meaning to the music. Music affects the listener, or else there was no basis on which to engage with it. This is what constitutes the dynamics of the relation, the dialogical quality inherent in doing music.

Relating to music is an enactment. And it is in effect an *activating process*, involving the whole person, with body, emotions, and mind and imagination. I will propose then that Creative Music Therapy, from this point of view, is about bringing forth a response of the person, the *whole person*, engaged in music, because there is no single part of the person that is left out in the relation to music. Any listening to music for instance, involves some kind of movement, however microscopic or imperceptible it may seem, some kind of kinesthetic sense activated in the response to it. And some kind of emotional resonance activated, whether it be strong or weak. Some kind of mental and imaginal capacity is involved too, in at all perceiving the music, getting a “picture” of it. Saying this another way: *By presupposing a full engagement as a necessary requirement for actually participating in music, the client’s response to music entails an awakening of the full capacities of the person to relate.*

This is what a conversational, or dialogical principle applied to music implies regarding the relation to music: Not only is the meaning of music creatively brought forth through personal engagement; the whole person as such is activated in any involved response to the music. And herein may be found a dynamic potential and power, to *engage* the person, and this may be considered a basic principle for its application as therapy.

9.4.4 The Child Engaged in Music

The perspective outlined here indicates that subjectivism becomes one-sided and insufficient in accounting for the musical response from the side of the client in music therapy. Relating to music is an enactment. What is involved then, seen from this perspective is not so much bringing forth a “music child” from within, as *engaging the whole child in music*. A revision of theory for Creative Music Therapy may be suggested on this basis, moving towards interrelation rather than towards increasingly individualistic or subjectivistic notions. This would indicate a shift of perspective towards *the field of music activity*. The whole child engaged or activated in music, as a relational conception, is a dynamic, personal realization of musical potentialities, within a field of action, through which the music is brought forth, both creatively and receptively. This is what a theoretical development along relational, dialogical lines will imply. The expression “Music Child” has an appealing poetic quality, and I would really not want to suggest it being replaced for instance by a term such as “the whole child (or client) activated through making music”. But what I would propose, on the background of the discussion here, is that the term could be taken rather more *in this sense*.

Bruscia (1987) has listed three reasons for calling Creative Music Therapy specifically “creative”, focusing firstly on the therapist creating musical resources, and secondly on how these are to be used within each clinical setting; thirdly, how the therapeutic process may be structured as a whole sequence. All three of these relate specifically to the therapist’s role. Another crucial aspect though, which is what is highlighted here, is the creativity of the *client*. I would suggest also including the *client’s creativity* as a decisive aspect to the involvement with music in Creative Music Therapy. It could be regarded a crucial quality of any active music therapy that it activates such creative power in and through the person making the music, which never turns out entirely the same, in any single instance of making it.

9.5 A Relational Direction for Theory

In this chapter I have been addressing the need to move beyond a subjectivistic conception of the relation to music in Creative Music Therapy, from the side of the

client, as reflected in theoretical developments of the notion of the “music child”, which have been shown to harbor rather pronounced essentialist tendencies. A dialogical outlook, taking Buber’s perspectives on art as a point of departure, has been developed, proposing and elaborating on a definition of music, emphasizing music as an activity, and thereby indicating a direction for a further development of theory, which points to the significance of dynamic *relation*, which would seem to be more aligned with the actual practice of Creative Music Therapy.

10 Between Subjectivism and Objectivism

In this chapter I will try to elaborate somewhat more on the implications of a dialogical perspective on music, as developed in the previous chapter, to include the further aspect of the engagement of *the therapist* with music in music therapy, and to consider more closely the position and status of music within the basic triangular set-up. I will also relate this perspective to the notion of the “objectivity” of music in therapy, with regards particularly to the use of idioms in music therapy.

10.1 Clinical Improvisation

Bruscia (1987) writes that Nordoff and Robbins insisted that the therapist should not play to express himself, but instead play “clinically”. This entails that improvisation is to be based on the therapist’s impression of the *child*. The therapist tries to find some way of expression that harmonizes with the mood and the emotional level of the child as perceived in the given situation, rather than trying to play out his *own* feelings there and then. The therapist then plays clinically, which means to say: from what he perceives to be the client’s condition and needs. That the therapist in this way plays “clinically” may be seen as an expression of the musical meeting between therapist and client not being completely mutual, but based on a helping serving function. It is the client’s needs that are in focus for the improvisational playing. And as such it is therapy, and not quite simply playing together.

10.1.1 Finding the “Right” Music

But improvising, though having a “clinical” intent is nevertheless still creative. In Creative Music Therapy there is from the side of the therapist the special case of making music, *and* relating this specifically to a particular client. This is a creative process with *two* aspects then: In the making of music as such, *and* in relating this music to the child or client. Not that one necessarily comes first and the other after – they are necessarily integrated. Let me elaborate somewhat on this by giving an example in the form of an analogy.

Take the example of making a melody to a given lyric. The way this melody should sound or be like cannot be entirely deduced from the lyric. What melody that might fit to a given lyric is not predetermined, just as there is no singular text that may be deduced from a given tune or melody. But the relationship between a lyric and a melody that is made to it is not completely arbitrary either. They will make up a more or less convincing “couple”. The question will be how they fit together, because in making a melody to a lyric there are endless possibilities, and coming up with a particular melody is necessarily making a choice, deciding eventually on bringing together just this melody to this lyric. And there will always be a certain inherent tension between the choice made and the multiple possibilities lying behind the choice, which actualizes the question whether it is a good (just right for each other) match, which is what has to be considered in making the melody. A good relationship between lyrics and melody is when both “comment” on each other, mutually bringing out each other’s (best) qualities.

In a similar vein one could see the matter of creatively finding the right music, the right “melody”, for *the client* in therapy. There is a tension of choice here too, between endless possibilities and the actual choice made, in fitting together, in bringing out qualities. It is just the hitting of the right tune from endless possibilities that makes a “match” satisfying, because there is no guarantee here. And this is actually itself the basis for appreciation of the music made, when something is found that speaks to the other, recognizes the other, and sometimes maybe even reveals the other, brings out some quality about the other. I would propose that what is entailed here is not so much an “iso-principle”, as has been often referred to in music therapy, (introduced by Altschuler (1954)), producing music that is “equal” to the client in some way, whether it

be mood or tempo, volume or rhythm (Bunt 1994). Rather, what is entailed could be viewed as a dialogical, or *conversational principle*. The client and the music are not as much equal or similar, as they are *related* – *somewhat* like making a melody to a lyric. (Of course it is something much more than finding a melody to a lyric, it is just an analogy that is considered here.) Thus the music that is made is not predetermined, but it is not arbitrary either, and in this may be found a basis for a dynamic relationship. If the music were just a simple equalization or imitation it would itself be nothing substantial for the client to relate to. If it were just the outcome of a deductive procedure of finding the right, or correct similar music, there would be no reason for response from the client, or appreciation.

Finding the music that fits is a musical creative task, and at the same time reflects a personal engagement towards the child by the therapist. If the therapist just aimed for something “imitative” there would be no clear sign, no revealing of a personal engagement towards the child. The effort put in, in finding some music that may be related to *by* the child, signifies a seeing and a caring about. And this is actually the basis for the response. The main point here is that as a technical application of music towards the client would lose this. You may discover the child *and* the child discover you, or your relation to the child, through the music made *related* to the child.

This process entails reciprocity, *address and response*, rather than stimuli and response. It is not “monological”. The responsibility of the therapist is not being the all knower here, the expert in applying the right means, unilaterally, but rather creating music dialogically in relation to the client. What is crucial to consider here, from a dialogical perspective, is that the music made may say something about the child or client, *but not all*. And what is said could always have been said in many ways. The *way* it is said becomes *what* is said then, as a relational statement. It is in this sense it is an address, not merely a stimuli directed towards the child. And the music made from the therapist being an address is the basis on which a response from the client may come. The address is just the other side to the expected, or hoped for, response.

10.1.2 The Aesthetic Aspect

As emphasized in the protoconversation analogy, music may be considered a non-verbal medium of “conversation”. This analogy implies that it is possible to communicate

through music, as a special and potentially rich non-verbal medium of communication. But another aspect to the music made, related to the client or child, is that music is not *just* communication for the sake of communication. Protoconversation is an interpersonally aimed, communicative, playful exchange between the two participants, the mother and the child. But as pointed out here previously, this is an analogy that does not fully cover the use of music in music therapy, because in Creative Music Therapy music is seen to have aesthetic properties.

In this respect the *lullaby* could serve analogously to bring out the specifically *aesthetic* aspect of Creative Music Therapy. The lullaby draws the child's attention to itself, not just to the mother as the singer. There is something in the *song*, some quality in the form of the particular song that draws attention. The child's attention is caught *beyond* the mother communicating then, to something else too, and still an intense communal sense remains. The attention being caught, the child is soothed, quieted, before eventually falling asleep. Here it is clearly the *aesthetic properties* of the lullaby that facilitate this process. Not as a mechanical effect, but as an integral part of the whole situation. And done with love, on the part of the mother, that the child trusts in. And when it comes to lullabies: *This* is music. Protoconversation may be similar to music in many ways, but the lullaby *is* unequivocally music, used within an intimate interpersonal setting. It includes an aesthetic dimension that goes beyond protoconversation as such.

Music therapy could in an analogous way be regarded to have similar functions, in that music, in music therapy, is not produced for any external audience or event, but for the needs and conditions of the current situation, for those presently involved. Music here belongs to the situation, and finds its function and meaning here. Music therapy is not primarily for putting the client to sleep though, even though soothing may not always be out of order, it is mainly for awakening and activating the child. And this is where the limit to the analogy is found. But what remains similar is the aesthetic quality of the medium, which draws attention to itself, to its own qualities; by the way it is formed, beyond its purely interpersonal communicative function.

10.1.3 Musical Significance

What this implies is that the therapist's playing may also be *musically* significant for the client, beyond being personally "matched" or "fitted". It is not just an interpersonal communication medium; it is something more, which makes it interesting and rewarding to relate to in itself. The music made by the therapist *relates* to the unique quality of the child. Not merely reflecting the child but relating to the child through the music made. It is not merely an "iso principle" that is applied, precisely because the music is not just reflecting, but also relating, which means that it may bring *something new*, to be *responded to*. Which was not there before. And therefore it is not, and cannot be, just reflective. And because it is not just a reflection, this implies that the therapist also may contribute substantively *musically*, on the basis of which the client and therapist may *share* musical experience. Thereby opening for a development of the interpersonal relationship, in a communal direction, on the basis of *shared musical experience*

And on the other side, what the client plays and contributes musically is not to be regarded by the therapist merely as a reflection of the client, but again, as something more, substantially *as music*. As held forth here previously, a music that was just reflective of the individual music maker would not be very interesting or engaging, apart from being related to this particular person. But this is hardly what the appeal of music mostly is about, in and of itself, that it was made by some particular individual. Music is heard and appreciated far beyond the specific interest in the particular individual that made it. There is a common appeal, something that extends beyond this connection to the music maker. What this means is that the meaning of the music is broader than being a reflection of any single individual. And, according to the perspective that is drawn here, it is in the extending beyond the individual, through the interface of the naturally given and the culturally made, that the formed image in sound is enabled to correspond to a wider significance, at the same time as it may be intimately and directly related to, as music.

And as seen from the side of the person making music, this engaging in forming the medium, to make something out of it, something that is *not just given beforehand*, is what makes the effort worthwhile; this is why it is enriching. Because if what came out of it was all residing inside the person already, there would be nothing to gain, no

satisfaction to be found from engaging with the medium, no drive to make something out of it. *Because* it is worked with, because it is formed, and not just poured out, what comes out of it goes beyond just what any individual at any given time represents. What is actively *formed* is not merely a reflection, but is *made* into something.

10.1.4 Music as Something to Relate to

This implies that music *is* something, which means to say, it has its own qualities, and what these are, is revealed in each unique new instance of encountering it. It is not merely an object then, because what it represents becomes clear in relating to it. Music in this way becomes an “actor” itself within the music therapy setting. And being something in itself, to relate to, it obtains a certain *relative autonomy*. Music may be seen to have a certain relative autonomy, a certain own being, which is the necessary basis for at all being related to.

This implies that the interaction in therapy is not only about the music being related to the client then. It is also the music being related to, as music. Music *is* something too. It is not just a doing. What it represents is not covered entirely by a verb then. Though it is made, it is not just the making. *Both* sides need to be included then, the active process, the verb “musicking”, and what comes of it, the formed image, the music, as a *noun*. It is a noun, a substantive too. It is something to be shared, and to be related to, which is to say that we need the noun too, not just the verb. We need, after all, to be able to talk about *music* in music therapy, not just musicking, which is necessary to indicate music as an *aesthetic reality* in therapy.

And this is why music is set up as one of the three sides of the triangle. It is related to as something in itself. But this does not imply an essentialist position. It has a relative autonomy, (not absolute). This is what the logic of the triangle, as *three sides interrelated, across two spheres*, basically implies.

10.2 Objectivistic Notions about Music

Subjectivism will oftentimes tend to lead to a concurrent objectivism; the one would seem to produce the other. In the case of Creative Music Therapy there has been a notion not only of music residing inside the child so to speak, effecting change from

“within”. There is also, at the same time, a notion of music affecting the child from the “outside” in some “objective” way. Aigen (1998b) regards what he calls the “objectivity” of music to be a central tenet of the Nordoff-Robbins approach. He defines it in the following way:

By the term „the objectivity of music“ I refer to the belief that there are qualities inherent in music which give rise to particular human experiences. In this view music can be said to have an essential identity, which is neither created by the individual human consciousness nor resulting from the association of particular forms of music with different human events and experiences (p. 255).

Aigen (1998b) holds forth that statements given about music, saying for instance that it is austere, triumphant, tragic etc. are not fundamentally different from saying what key the music is in, the difference being more in the degree of certainty than in the kind of statement made. He refers to Aldrich (1963) who makes a distinction between two ways of perceiving the same thing, the work of art, as a physical or as an aesthetic object. The physical object is experienced through observation, while Aldrich calls the way the aesthetic object is perceived “prehension”. (This seems to be in quite close accordance with Dufrenne’s distinction between the work of art and the aesthetic object, referred to here previously, although Aldrich does not refer explicitly to Dufrenne.) The main point for Aigen is that according to Aldrich the shift between these two modes does not imply going from objective to subjective. It is possible to say something about the aesthetic object that is not just reporting one’s own experience, but which is intended to say something about the work of art. Aigen also refers to Aldrich’s view that the aesthetic properties are not inferred, and do not rise from a process of interpretation, but are rather perceived directly, through the human capacity of aesthetic perception.

Aigen applies this principle about a possible objectivity of statements to the discussion of Nordoff-Robbins thought, giving the following as one example: “the Middle Eastern idiom embodies suffering and survival”. It seems that this kind of statement actually goes one step further than those referred to by Aldrich though, in that it not only says something about an aesthetic object, but also implies something more, that the idiom of the Middle Eastern scale “embodies” a quality, of “suffering and survival”.

This is in accordance with a second claim. Aigen upholds that music has a life of its own in a sense, referring to Victor Zuckerkandl’s concept of “forces” residing in

music. According to Zuckerkandl (1956) scale steps and chord cadences have inherent qualities stemming from their interrelationships within a dynamic field of tone, making possible the creation of anticipations, tensions, and resolutions. These forces within a dynamic field of tone may be revealed through the artful manipulation of musical materials in composition and performance.

10.2.1 “Objective, but not Universal”

Despite the “objectivity” of musical qualities, and its assumed influence on the listener, Aigen purports that the clinical work that he has researched into, from the early Nordoff-Robbins cases in no way could be considered *prescriptive*, in the sense that the use of a certain music is predetermined in some formulaic manner, according to the needs of the client. Aigen finds that there is a seeming paradox in Creative Music Therapy, between the belief in the objectivity of music and the highly individualized nature of each course of therapy, as demonstrated in the cases of early Nordoff and Robbins work. He attempts to solve the paradox by accepting the possibility of musical objectivity, “without granting these objective qualities the status of universality” (p. 257). He suggests that though music entails objective qualities, these will be perceived differently by different individuals, according to their musical and psychological background. This means that when various listeners perceive the music differently, one listener is not necessarily perceiving incorrectly or distorting the nature of the music. There are multiple levels of meaning in music, and aspects of each person’s musical biography determine what the different listeners will respond to. The nature of the objective quality of music is in this way “situationally determined”, Aigen holds forth.

10.2.2 Non-prescriptive Application of Musical Styles

There seems to be two notions of objectivity that are not so easy to reconcile here. Aigen refers to Kivy’s (1990) distinction between music *expressing* and *being expressive of* emotion, which serves to show how emotive language can apply intelligibly to music itself on an intersubjective basis. Aigen states that Kivy’s ideas have important implications for music therapy. Nevertheless he later explicitly departs from Kivy’s theory, in arguing that different individuals may not perceive the objectivities qualities of music in the same way.

The difficulties seem to arise when Aigen tries to reconcile these views with Nordoff-Robbins practice. The problem that Aigen is trying to deal with is to reconcile two distinct features of Creative Music Therapy, namely the reliance on what Nordoff and Robbins actually termed “archetypal” qualities of music, and the open and non-prescriptive way in which these were used. Different idioms, intervals, scales, modes, what Aigen calls “styles” of music, comprise the therapist’s musical resources, that are utilized “with the belief that they contain objective, archetypal qualities that can be employed toward clinical ends” (p. 258). Still Aigen insists; on the background of his research into early Nordoff-Robbins case material, that a priori beliefs about inherent qualities of music did not take precedence over each unique client during the course of therapy. What was actually found most striking was the difference in the quality of the music in each case, not adherence to any musical formula given in advance. Aigen wants to take care of the individuality of the response of the clients, and at the same time he wants to retain a sense of the inherent qualities of the music. And to contain these two considerations he sets up the formula: “Objective but not universal”.

The question still remains how to account closer for *how* music on the one side may be objective, and on the other *not* universal. That music could be considered objective through being “situationally determined” seems like a troublesome, apparently self-contradictory construct. The concepts “situational” and “determined” seem hard to reconcile without further mediation. The juxtaposition of the concepts “objective” and “universal” in the formula also seems unsettled. The term “objective” is usually set in contrast to “subjective”, and “universal” in contrast to “particular”. What the interjection of a negation between these two terms, objective and universal, implies does not seem to be readily apparent. If music does have inherent qualities, are these *not* universal then? Is music “objective” and still not intersubjectively validated, after all?

The objective-subjective split might itself be what causes the problem actually. And avoiding this problem, I believe, is what a dialogical perspective might contribute to. In the following I want to try to develop the important issues that Aigen has brought up, through explicating what a dialogical perspective might entail on these matters. First I will consider somewhat more closely the concept of “musical archetype”.

10.2.3 Musical Idioms as “Archetypes”

Aigen (1998b) regards the term objective musical qualities to be synonymous with “archetypal qualities”, often mentioning them together as “objective archetypal qualities”. The notion of “musical archetype” has its origins in Nordoff and Robbins. It is a term originating from their work, and is clearly the background for Aigen’s own developments of the notion of the objectivity of music. Nordoff and Robbins do speak about “musical archetypes”, though they never made any elaborate theoretical statement on this. I think it is important is to distinguish between different meanings of the word archetype and see in what sense it might be used.

The concept of archetype is commonly associated with C. G. Jung’s theories. Ruud relates in the preface to his book *Music Therapy and its Relationship to Current Treatment Theories* (Ruud 1980) that Nordoff and Robbins, who had read the manuscript, had suggested that a broader section on Jung’s psychology be included, but Ruud writes that this could not be done at the time. Nordoff and Robbins do not themselves mention Jung in their writings, Aigen (2001a) points out, but still they use the concept of archetype a number of times. It seems the use of this concept within Nordoff-Robbins music therapy then is not exclusively associated with Jung’s psychology.

Even though the concept is closely associated with Jung, it does have a broader and more common usage. In the Webster Collegiate Dictionary it is defined as: “The original pattern or model of which all things of the same type are representations or copies: prototype, *also*: a perfect example”. The dictionary also associates the term with the following definition of “idea”: “A transcendent entity that is a real pattern of which existing things are imperfect representations”. As a third main definition of the term Jung’s conception is referred to: “An inherited idea or mode of thought ... that is derived from the experience of the race and is present in the unconscious of the individual”.

To get some notion as to what Nordoff and Robbins originally might have meant with the term I will see how it has been used in the transcripts of the series of lectures at Goldie Leigh Hospital, in England in 1974: *Healing Heritage: Paul Nordoff Exploring the Tonal language of Music*. This of course is not any scholarly treatment of the

subject, but lectures that were based on practical demonstrations. But I think this is a way of getting closer at least, to the sense made out of the term originally.

The chapter “Exploration Fourteen” has the title: “Musical Archetypes, the Children’s Tune, and an Introduction to the Pentatonic.” In presenting the concept of “archetype” Nordoff refers to the etymology of the concept as a “first form or model” (p. 134). This accords quite closely with the first definition cited above. In a brief discussion with the students on the meaning of the term, Jung is actually mentioned, but Nordoff holds a view that he considers is not confined within Jung’s theory.

In Jungian psychology an archetype is a pattern of thought, an image, a model that has been transmitted through generations and becomes part of the racial inheritance. And as part of the racial inheritance, these archetypes live in each one of us, in our souls, our subconscious selves – Jung would probably use the word “psyche” – they live there ready to be touched – this isn’t Jung this is an extension – ready to be touched or awakened by an experience that calls this forth, that touches on the deep memory (p.134).

This statement, though not theoretically very elaborate, which of course it was not intended to be either, nevertheless can be seen to indicate something about the relevance and applicability of the concept for Nordoff, of why he wanted to use it, about something within the child being touched, or awakened, by an experience that calls this forth. Which in this setting of course would be music. And this notion he explicitly considers to be an extension in relation to Jung.

Nordoff then introduces the “Children’s tune as an archetype”. The children’s tune is the melodic phrase as it is found in the song-game “Ring around the rosie”, which is found in not only English speaking, but in various other language cultures. Stige (2002a) finds giving the children’s tune as an example of an archetype problematic, and gives two main reasons (besides generally considering the concept of archetype to be “vague”). One is that it is actually not found all over the world, as Bjorkvold (1989/1992) has demonstrated. It is not found for instance in Russian and Eastern Europe cultures. Therefore it is not universal. Now one might still consider whether or not *similar* phrases, based on these three notes are not found in also these cultures. This particular tune is not universal, but what it is based on may be more universal. And this connects to the second objection made by Stige, that this notion of archetype, as a tune, is very different from that developed by Jung, who thought of

archetypes as basic and more abstract structures in the psyche, and not as concrete cultural expressions, as in the instance of a specific melody.

Now I think there is reason to believe that Nordoff was not thinking entirely as simple as that, that the melody *was* the archetype. Rather he was thinking in terms of idioms. In introducing the “Children’s tune” Nordoff plainly states: “When we start working with idioms we are dealing with archetypes”. He is *not* claiming then that this particular tune is an archetype, but rather that it represents a “first” musical idiom, and as such it could be considered an archetype. From the tree notes which comprise the “Children’s tune” several melodies may be spun, which is then practically demonstrated.

Nordoff proceeds to harmonize this simple melody in fourths, in so-called dyadic harmonization, as found in traditional Chinese music, and then from all the notes used within this harmonization, derives the “archetype”, as he calls it, of the pentatonic scale. From this basic Chinese pentatonic scale further variations, alterations and extensions may be found, in the form of different scales and modes, from all parts of the world. He relates this finally to the development of the western musical system:

The great archetype in our system is, of course, what developed from the seven tones, when the octave, when the twelve tones were found capable of being divided within an octave ... and one could move from key to key. This is an enrichment of the archetype. This was there all the time, and our music is inconceivable without it (p.177).

Nordoff seems to equate what he calls “musical archetypes” with musical idioms then. This could well be related to the dictionary definition of archetype etymologically as a “first form” or “model”. An idiom could be regarded as a “first form” or from which various concrete instances can be drawn. In this sense an idiom may be archetypal, as a creative template, which does not determine exactly how each instance is to be made, but which gives it its grounding structure. And idioms develop and evolve, sometimes one out from the other. On the larger musical scale Nordoff also considers *musical forms* to be archetypes, which also fits quite well with the notion of first form or model. This at least seems to be one central aspect of the meaning of the term musical archetype as it may be found in *Healing Heritage*.

10.2.4 Crossing Borders of Nation or Culture

Another important aspect of Nordoff's view is brought forth through a question of one of the students, asking about the implication that different races (as Jung suggests) have different archetypes, or archetypal music. Nordoff in response to this emphatically holds forth that keeping to this would be much too limited, for instance that one should play only Russian folk music for Russian children, or that a French child should get only French music. Because the main point is that these "musical archetypes" can be used, with great effect he has found, *across* any such borders of race or culture. Nordoff refers to how an American boy responded to a Middle Eastern scale:

Why should the son of an American respond as he did to a Middle Eastern scale, so consistently and extraordinarily that he actually in one session – we have a picture of him – began dancing with his hands held above his head like this [moving in a style directly suggestive of a sinuous belly dance] and moving like this around the drum to this music? This was an autistic child who began his first session as far away from the piano as he could get, and finished up singing songs with me.

Nordoff suggests an answer to why this should happen:

You're finding the music that reaches the chord in that child's psyche or the string – that wants to vibrate, and this idiom sets it vibrating and starts the response (p. 137).

The finding of the right music that starts the response of the child is actually a relational task then.

"Orientalism"

In an essay review of *Healing Heritage* Stige (2002b) is critical to the notion of "archetypes" in referring to inherent qualities certain scales, as for instance of the Middle Eastern scale. Following Said (1995), he considers such views to reflect "orientalism", that is, the Western "Orientalizing" of the Orient, and he accuses it of an inherent essentialism. The essentialism in such a view on the particular qualities of the Middle Eastern idiom may seem hard to come by, implying that there are qualities that are "inherent" in the idiom, and that "affect" the listener accordingly. I think Stige does have a point here. He suggests alternatively that it might be the surprise in using an uncommon scale, a Middle Eastern idiom in a North American setting that may account

for the response found. But does this really explain the issue? Is there not something that engages in this particular idiom beyond being culturally surprising or uncommon? – Something about the musical qualities of the idiom, to which the child also responded to through some highly characteristic movements. Not any surprise as a surprise will work equally well. According to the perspective drawn here a strictly cultural explanation may become one-sided the other way.

10.2.5 Remaining Open Question

In an interview with Aigen, (2001a) Stige, as the interviewer, poses the question why the “objective” qualities that Aigen finds in music simply not could be defined as conventions. Aigen points to Zuckerkandl, who would turn the question the other way around. Why did these particular qualities and features develop into conventions? You cannot explain how the seventh became a leading tone towards the octave just by reference to its repeated use, unless there was something about the quality of the tone, within the tonal field, that made this possible. And though you have to be a sufficiently educated listener to hear these qualities, this does not justify bringing it all down to some kind of associationist behavioral mechanism.

“The *belief* that different styles of music reflect objective archetypal elements is what recommends them as tools to master”, Aigen writes (Aigen 1998b, p. 269). He actually calls it a *belief*, and maybe it has to be this way. On the one hand you cannot with credibility state in any explicit and certain fashion what the music contains. On the other hand if you simply rule out any inherent qualities, there is the risk that something might get lost. The formed image in sound has both cultural, particular traits in being humanly *made*, and natural universal ones in being made from *sound*. The image then becomes difficult to *specify*. The moment you state exactly, you falsify. This *is* rather paradoxical. And this is maybe why the form of statements about these kinds of issues tend on the whole not to be categorical. And *maybe this itself is a significant point here*. There is maybe a sense of this being, and remaining, an *open* question, not to be determined either way.

The problem from this perspective might be not so much whether musical idioms contain “archetypal” qualities or not. It would rather be the suspicion that could be raised towards the attempt to *fixate* this too much. Being too specific about what this in

each instance means, what it entails, a concern that *unwarranted claims* could too easily be made. And this is just why balancing on a narrow ridge *is* necessary here, because it cannot be stated nor refuted definitively either way. The issue then is about not fixating any meaning, that is, taking made objectifications for being definitive, and at the same time not relativizing to the point where each and every inherent characteristic entirely dissolves. The “inherent” qualities do not exist in an objectified state somewhere, but display in the making of the music in each concrete instance. *Keeping it open* is different than relativizing, saying that anything would be just as valid. Keeping it open is also different from making it absolute, which nevertheless does not mean that you cannot say anything about it!

“Musical archetypes” is a difficult word, because it is rather burdened theoretically. “I guess it is enough for me to think that there *are* some objective properties” Aigen states in the previously cited interview (Aigen 2001a). What this could mean is that it is *sufficient* for the present purposes to allow for the connection, or correspondence on this basis. There should be no need to postulate any racial inheritance of the “archetypes” within a “collective unconscious” then, in Jung’s terms.

A main general feature associated with the notion of archetypes is their inherent power. One might look at this from the other side though, from *the power of the musical response*. From this perspective it turns out to be not decisive what musical “archetype” might be at play, because the point is the *response*, as this is revealed within the situation. Any notions of “archetypes” or idioms, or styles, and their qualities and characteristics would then remain heuristic. The point is that no matter how these might be determined, it is still the power of the response that is what is to be looked for, and which the use of the particular music is evaluated by, not whether this or that “archetype” is applied, or should be applied. It is a matter of where to look, and what to look for. From this point of view, moving between the pitfalls of subjectivism and objectivism, it is not necessary to look any other place for the inherent power of any musical style or device. It is in any case revealed within the concrete situation. It is trying to establish music as an independent force or factor that constitutes essentialism. And on the other hand reductionism, naturalist *or* culturalist – misses the point, the great potentials of diverse musical materials, as they may show, and reveal themselves within each concrete musical situation.

The point then is not *what* the Middle Eastern idiom elicits, as much as *that* it elicits a response. Beyond that it is not really important to know, for sure. This might just as well be kept open. And in Creative Music Therapy this is actually not addressed as an issue, through making interpretations. The response of the person is what is in focus, and what is evaluated. No matter what the idiom might “contain”, it is the question *how* that is decisive, how it engages, rather than what it is considered to represent as such. There are no further inferences made as to which musical “archetype” or style that is responded to. There are no particular further conclusions drawn specifically from this as to the therapeutic process. Conclusions are *not* drawn either regarding which style should be used in any given case, nor on the basis of which musical style that was responded to, other than its relevance in eliciting response. So the uses of musical styles are neither *pre-scriptive* nor “*post-scriptive*” in this sense.

10.2.6 Power as it Manifests in Relation

What is proposed here is that the way of viewing might as well be turned around, looking to how the power of the music manifests in the response it elicits. The argument, from a dialogical perspective, is that the relation to music is what is crucial. And any subjective or objective split will tend to miss this out. Music *is* a partner. Not given and predictable. But a partner that not just does what you tell it to. It is dialogical in the sense that you do not know what the other part comes up with, either in listening to it, (even repeatedly) or in making it, creating it. Because it is a dialogue in a sense, there is always something more coming out of it than could be determined beforehand. What music *is*, and what it represents appears in and through human enactment. And still, *what* music is, is never arbitrary, but reflects the potentials the made image, as it has been formed, in ever which way, using whichever materials, *harbors in being responded to*.

10.3 Musical Archetypes as “Eternal Ideas”

As to the aspect or definition of the term archetype as an “eternal idea”, there are suggestions of this to be found in *Healing Heritage*, in statements claiming that the musical archetypes “where there all the time” and “will always be there”. This, of

course, is an ancient notion, and to which the Greek philosopher Plato famously has given the name, “Platonism”, also called the “Theory of Ideas”. Are musical archetypes some kind of “Eternal Ideas”, from which the music of our world is merely a shadow or reflection? I want to elaborate somewhat on this view from a dialogical perspective for purposes of further clarification.

10.3.1 Music Present or Mystified

Taken to its extreme a view of “musical ideas” will state that music, as we hear it, is not music, really. Music has its true existence in an *ideal realm*, of which music in this earthly realm is but a reflection or a shadow. I will not here enter into any extensive discussion of this kind of theory, which would lead too far off here, but I will here just try to suggest how such a perspective may be basically contrasted with a dialogical view.

In *I and Thou* Buber clearly does not accept any kind of third realm comprised by some “world of ideas” mediating between the twofold attitude of I-Thou and I-It. The main point that he puts forward in this respect is that even “ideas” may be objectified, and as such turned into inhabitants of a “world of ideas”. But for Buber this will just become another established world of *It*. He does not recognize any decisive distinction between so-called “inner” or “outer” experiences. It is not necessary to take recourse to a world of “ideas”, he holds forth:

For I speak only of the actual human being, of you and me, of our life and our world, not of any I-in-itself and not of any Being-in-itself. But for an actual human being the real boundary also runs across the world of ideas (p. 65).

Buber does not refer to any separate world of ideas then as the ultimately real. He does not accept such an ideal realm as having acquired some independent status of its own. The world of relation does not have to take recourse to any specific world of ideas. Such a world is not held up as an alternative to a reified material world of *It*, but is considered rather as itself an *idealistically* constructed *It*. Which is not at all to prefer, according to Buber:

Pitiful are those who leave the basic word unspoken, but wretched are those who instead of that address the ideas with a concept or a slogan as if that were their name (p. 65).

“Idealism” is clearly then not regarded as a solution to “materialism”. Buber rejects ideal objectifications as if these were somehow *more* real. The idea of archetypes as self-existing entities might be seen as a case of such tendencies toward “ideal” objectification, and would basically not be supported by a dialogical view.

If we apply this perspective to music, relating to music as a *Thou* does not at all imply considering music to reside any kind of “ideal” realm. The music we encounter as a *Thou* is music as it sounds for us in concretely, in this world in which we are here and now living. Regarding music as a “shadow” of an “idea”, it loses substantiality, and becomes dislocated from what is supposed to be its true actuality. If music was not fully present, how could we actually be able to relate to it? From a dialogical perspective it does not seem that there is much to gain by *mystifying* music and what music is about, because then it becomes distanced, placed somewhere *else* really, becoming something *different* than what it apparently is. It becomes an “ideal” object, reflecting a hypothesized “truer” reality, and in so doing, fades into dim mystification. A dialogical view of music places it neither as a thing merely in a world of things, nor as a mere reflection of some idea in a world of ideas. It relates to it directly and presently, in the everyday, as Buber terms it. To regard music as a *Thou* entails not attempting to make any dualistic split between subject and object, whether this object be a material “thing” solely, or an eternal “idea”. It aims instead towards non-objectifying, direct relation, that is, towards music in its immediate presence here and now. Music is present before us in our encounter with it, and this is where it has its reality for us. It appears to us in our relation to it, lucid and clear in all its uniqueness. It is in this direct encounter that music becomes a reality *as music*, which is to say, as itself.

10.3.2 The Interval Theory

On this ground the question from a dialogical point of view regarding a notion of musical archetypes as “eternal ideas”, will mainly be about the *status* of such notions. Elevating objectifications to the status of some “higher” reality may in effect be restricting as to the potentials of their use. This could be illustrated by considering the so-called “interval theory” that is presented in *Healing Heritage*.

Rudolf Steiner developed an Anthroposophically founded “interval theory” designating specific meanings and characteristics to each single musical interval,

indicating for each one of them what their power of influence could be. Nordoff found these considerations useful as guiding principles for clinical improvisation, developing music with different characteristics according to different clinical needs and requirements.

From a dialogical point of view this kind of theoretical construct may seem somewhat problematic, because any fixed notions about inherent meaning may tend to become non-dynamic, and not embrace fully the potentialities and possibilities of any musical material or element within the given and always unique musical setting or context. Reflecting on the different character and qualities of intervals within musical scales may of course may be completely legitimate, and may also quite obviously contribute to stimulating perspectives and thoughts for the practice and performance of improvisation. Still a question may be asked as to how far-reaching conclusions may be drawn from this. Determining the character of intervals “in themselves” may easily conceal the openness and indeterminate character of any musical element within a context. How the character of the interval works within its musical context can hardly be given any fixed determination prior to its use in each instance. It is in this *unfolding* that we get to experience the real character of the interval, in each instance as it occurs within the music as a whole. And which in each instance in the last resort will be unique.

10.3.3 Heuristic Use of Concepts

Stige (2002a) terms this kind of theory atomistic, in that it is concerned with elements taken in isolation. Still he accepts that such notions may be applicable on a heuristic basis, and that they actually may work well as pedagogical devices. Stige refers to Alveson & Sköldberg’s (2000) views on the functions of concepts, that they may be sensitizing in a specific context, without necessarily being categories to be generalized to other contexts, and he concludes that this particular theory, as a heuristic conceptual device, may have enhanced the students’ musical sensitivity and openness.

And in accordance with a dialogical perspective, this is how such a theory could well be understood, what kind of status that might be assigned to it. Not as a *final* statement, but rather as a *preliminary* result of reflecting upon qualities of intervals. What incidentally is important to note here, is the great ingenuity and independence

with which Nordoff applied these concepts, certainly never using them in any rigid, dogmatic, or unimaginative way. The *practice* then was not idealistically fixated. Nordoff made his own creative, and not least didactic use of this particular theory. As a general theory of music this kind of theory of intervals nonetheless has its limitations. It is not generally accepted in musicological circles for instance, to say the least. But in Nordoff/Robbins music therapy it has served, and still serves apparently, a purpose. It is *practically* employed in improvisation exercises, as educational tools. But then again, according to a dialogical view, not considered as any final and complete determination of the real character of intervals, stated once and for all.

Naturally intervals and scales do have their particular characteristics. It is of course not altogether arbitrary which musical element is used in what way to achieve a certain desired musical effect. A minor third might very well in a given instance be used, rather than the major third, to achieve a “sad” effect. A dialogical perspective – which is important to underline here – in not *fixating* certain predetermined qualities to certain intervals, chords or scales, does not at all preclude that there *is* a relation between certain musical elements and forms and certain expressive characteristics or qualities. What should be taken into account though is that these, *to some extent*, may change also according to time and place. Again Nordoff shows an awareness of this aspect, in a discussion and practical demonstration of how in classical Chinese music the third takes on the character of a dissonance. And that harmony here is based on the fourth as consonant interval, whereas in western music of the recent centuries the third too clearly has acquired the character of a consonance.

The bottom line is that what is essential in the experience of music may not be reduced to a fixed sum of effects of intervals, assigned with pre-determined qualities. The immediate and present possibilities of musical elements in improvisation can, if taken too literally, soon be inhibited or locked by a predetermination as to the “ideal” characteristics of each interval. This is what may be problematic with such a kind of theory, not least in the long run. If it were not open how and with what effect these elements might be used and combined, then the making of music was not really *creative*. What the use of musical intervals and other musical elements and materials implies must be considered again and again, through musical practice. The main matter

here then, is about the *status* of such theory, of not being final, of not being the last word.

10.4 Musical Prescription and Objectification

In the following I want to elaborate somewhat further on implications of a dialogical perspective with regards particularly to the problem that Aigen poses on whether the use of music in music therapy could be prescriptive or not, on an objective basis, and try to explicate more what a dialogical view entails in this particular respect.

10.4.1 The Use of Idioms in Music Making

Musical idioms are practices that have been objectified into forms, into particular ways of making and playing music. And no music making is completely free from idioms. New idioms are continuously made, and established ones developed further. This *It* aspect of music is inevitable, and necessary. It is actually what makes music as a social/cultural practice possible. Idioms as objectifications are *used* for making music. They are not ends in themselves. Musical idioms at any given point in time appear as *given*, and may be applied according to their inherent qualities and characteristics.

Objectifications, as objectifications considered, are established before and after, not *during* the present and immediate music making. There is an alternation between these two sides, which makes for the dynamics of music history, both on a local, and on the grander scale, between musical objectification and creative encounter. And *this*, according to a dialogical outlook is the reality: The situation, the actual musical practice, from which objectifications come and to which they return. Any objectification, having been established, is not in itself more real, it is just a new point of departure for actual music making, which is in the present, always in the present.

Still technique and method are necessary ingredients in the creative act. Knowledge and handling of musical materials and instruments requires a certain amount of acquired skill. The creative work in music may involve using various musical devices and compositional techniques, within different genres and musical forms. Any music

has a vast array of harmonic and melodic formula which executors must have a certain knowledge of, and some acquired skill in applying. But for a process to be creative these aspects must be incorporated into the whole engagement with music making. They must form an integral part of the relation between maker and the work made. A dialogical perspective will decisively counter having creative work reduced to just some formal, technical procedure. To bring forth a work an engagement of the whole person is necessary, in which method, knowledge and technique are included – but not relied on *exclusively* – into the creative act as a whole.

10.4.2 Facilitating Creativity

An important aspect of the musical idiom that needs to be included in this picture is that it is not merely *restrictive*. Actually musical idioms may *facilitate* creativity. Not having any forms or idioms to go by is not necessarily synonymous with being “more” creative. The sonata form for instance, within the Western classical music tradition, facilitates creativity by presenting or suggesting itself, so to speak, as something to relate to, something to converse with in the making of the music. In composing within a sonata form it is not given beforehand entirely how the developmental part should be. There are no compositional techniques that would direct the work towards a single correct solution. Idioms do not contain any set of regular technical procedures, securing a predetermined outcome. They are not prescriptive then. The way the music will sound cannot be deduced completely beforehand from the idiom that is applied. Musical idioms and forms, from a dialogical perspective, are not to be considered as obstacles to creativity, being applied mechanically, but as rather facilitators. Forms and idioms may be brought to life too, in a transition from It to Thou, in each new and unique instance of applying them.

A dialogical outlook, as stressed here, is about never *settling* with objectification. Aiming at objectification as final and conclusive. Rather it is seeing it the other way around. It is seizing the moment, creatively. A dialogue is inherently unpredictable, bringing up something new, something that could not have been known beforehand. This is what makes it a dialogue, not knowing what the other side may come up with. And this is what may be seen in the process of musical creativity. Music is not brought out entirely according to one’s own inclinations, but yields a resistance and at the same

times offers some of its own resources, as an “assistance” or contribution in the making of it.

10.4.3 Creative and Sensitive Application of a Therapeutic Repertoire

Creative Music Therapy represents a *special case* of objectified music repertoire, for therapeutic purposes. How the different idioms “work” is based on experience, and this is also how they are established, that is to say, objectified. And such objectification is necessary. It is not even possible to imagine making up something entirely new all the time in therapy. This would be exhaustive for the therapist, (extending any human capacity) and presumably also for the client! The dialogical point is that an objectification that is established nevertheless does not guarantee repeatability. The situation will decide in each and every instance. But *some* notion of what kind of idiom to use, in different situations is still a part of the therapeutic skill and knowledge. It is a matter of the way of using these skills and techniques then. And this is the clue, *the way of using them*, creatively, dynamically, not prescriptively, mechanically, which will not work, because then the dynamics of the creative application of the idioms will be lost.

It is important to consider here that what is implied in an idiom, clearly must include its expressive potential. Using an idiom is not solely about knowing a certain scale, and how to apply it technically/musically, but also what it represents, what its qualities are. Knowing several idioms, or “styles” as Aigen calls them, *both* technically *and* aesthetically, serves as a basis for finding the “right” music, in therapy, which the child can relate to. The music therapist accordingly should have a pallet of various musical idioms and styles to play by, to find the right music. Aigen relates that what struck him most, initially, in studying the cases from the early Nordoff-Robbins practice, was how *different* the music in each case was.

It is quite clear that the more you have to choose from or idioms styles, the more chance you may have of finding something appropriate. The wider the repertoire, the better the chance maybe, to hit upon something that may elicit a response. The use of music in Creative Music Therapy may be seen to be explorative in relation to the response received to it. Knowing about various idioms may facilitate such exploration. And such response may be hit upon more or less fast, intuitively. And even though

some aesthetic/stylistic premeditation actually could have been considered, it is in the present clinical situation that the meaning of the musical idiom used, stands its test.

10.4.4 Technique Necessary but not Sufficient

It is in the dialectics between the pre-defined techniques and methods, and the requirements of the given situation that the way of proceeding is found. This is how the process works, which contrasts with prescriptions, given beforehand. Musical/therapeutic technique is necessary, and should continuously be further developed and refined, but according to a dialogical principle, this will never become self-sufficient. Finding the right approach in a particular situation with a particular client is not deduced from any given procedure. It is not something that is followed according to a preset schema of progression. It is hit upon. It is creative. It is responsive to the needs and conditions of the situation.

The element of grace has to be accepted, and I would dare to say, even revered. Being open. And still acting, to the best of one's knowledge and skill. This is the kind of logic that is implied. Which of course does not mean just playing anything and hoping for the best. Serious discipline is needed, and acquiring technique. Nevertheless the creative, non-prescriptive aspect of doing music therapy should not be sought excused, but embraced rather as *a central feature and quality of the practice*. Actually it could be considered both crucial and decisive, because without it, as indicated previously, the dynamics of the interpersonal aspect of the therapeutic process could not find any basis either.

10.4.5 The Situational Use of Idioms in Therapy

I have been trying to view the issue regarding the prescriptive use or not of music in music therapy from a dialogical perspective, to attempt to illumine some of the theoretical difficulties that are involved, and to suggest an alternative view, attempting to explicate a non-essentialistic, relational perspective on the matter. What has been brought forth regarding prescription and "objective" qualities of music is that the alternation between relation and objectification, encounter and use, is what facilitates a non-prescriptive, which is to say *situational* use of musical idioms in therapy, idioms *which nevertheless are necessary to apply*. And, in this *alternation* between

objectification as the establishment of idioms and styles to be used in therapy, and encounter, as the situational, the seizing of the moment, a basis for the non-prescriptive therapeutic use of musical idioms may be found, according to a dialogical outlook.

10.5 Summarized Theoretical Statement

In this chapter I have developed some further implications of the dialogical outlook that was presented in the previous chapter, related particularly to the therapist's relation to music making in Creative Music Therapy. I have also considered somewhat more the status of music as a third side in the triangle set-up, and suggested a dialogical perspective as an alternative to both subjectivistic and objectivistic notions of music in therapy. The results could be summarized in the following condensed theoretical statement:

The reality of music is constituted relationally as a present actuality between any notion of subjectivism on the one side or objectivism on the other. It *has* universal features related to the inherent natural characteristics of sound. But these are always culturally mediated, which means that there is also a particular (relative) aspect to music making. It is not *totally* relative though. Saying something *about* music is possible, on an intersubjective basis, within a particular (cultural) context. In therapy what nevertheless is crucial to consider is not as much *what* the music might represent, as *how* it is related to, what *responses* that it may bring forth.

The making of music, necessarily based on given idioms and materials at hand, is nevertheless a creative endeavor, that cannot be performed prescriptively in *any* case, and not in therapy either. The creative use of music in therapy is furthermore the basis for its *interpersonal* significance in therapy, in *relating* it to the client, based on the dynamics of a “conversational principle”, rather than a simple “iso-principle”.

Though making music is always socially/culturally mediated, music *is* something itself. It is not *all* musicking. Which means that it is not just an expression of emotional/expressive qualities through interpersonal interaction, and nothing more. In music therapy there is a third side then, which is the music, related to as such. And related to as such, it *is* found to have its own aesthetic qualities, which are never entirely specified though, but which form the basis for its appeal. The aesthetic dimension of

music in music therapy has its own significance, the qualities of which may facilitate a *shared experience* between client and therapist, which both may participate in, *and* contribute to.

11 Outlining a Dialogical Rationale

In accordance with the aim of making an applicative study I now want to collect the threads from the discussions in the previous chapters and attempt to formulate an overall view on what a dialogical rationale for a music-based music therapy, that is not dependent on verbal processing for therapeutic effect, could look like.

11.1 A Therapeutic Pursuit

In accordance with his basic stance that music therapy “works the way music itself works”, Ansdell considers music therapy to be “an individual artistic pursuit” (Ansdell 1995, p. 219). To understand what happens in music therapy one has to look at the different varieties of musical processes and activities within the music therapy setting. This is his basic theoretical stance, if he has any, he proclaims.

Ansdell uses the basic formula: “Music therapy works the way music works”. Intriguing as this might seem, it could still be too simple. To put it bluntly: Therapy is not art. It is not about producing works of art. Therapy is not evaluated by the quality or standard of a musical product, independently of the process involved for the client, now matter how successful this product, as a product might happen to be. On the other hand: Art is not therapy. A work of art is not evaluated in accordance with its significance for the artist on a strictly personal level. This is generally not considered as a decisive or crucial, not to say comprehensive criterion for the evaluation of a work of art. Not that the relation of the work to the life of the artist may not in any way be relevant. But a

work of art is as such evaluated on its own accord. If it were not up to standards as a work, referring to its particular significance for the artist personally will not actually help, or even count as a valid reason for reconsideration. And sometimes it may turn out that the artist has actually paid a high personal price in the making of the work. This does not necessarily merit a detracting of the worth of the product, as a work of art, (and, for the record, not necessarily increasing its worth either, though materials for various myth-making may be found here). The work of art is nevertheless in any case primarily evaluated on its own terms.

Considering music therapy to be “an individual artistic pursuit” may easily become misleading, because the focus then is set on the music making as such, as what the “pursuit” is about. And this focusing on the music may tend to blur a necessary distinction between art and therapy, namely that in therapy the work to be made is not the music as such; the work is about the client. What actually is needed to focus on is the client, the needs of the client. This is what makes it therapy. Ansdell of course is aware of this, but his formulation may tend to create confusion. Therapy is strictly speaking not the same as an “artistic” pursuit. It is, after all, a “therapeutic pursuit”, is it not?

I want to make clear here that music therapy cannot be considered to be simply about making a musical image in sound, as a *goal in itself*. What is needed, beyond aesthetics, is to ground a therapy in some kind of philosophical anthropology. We need a conception not only of music, but also of the human. Any therapeutic practice naturally does have such a notion implied. In the following I will try to explicate a view of the human implied in a dialogical perspective, as this relates to the aim of therapy.

11.1.1 Philosophical Anthropology

In the “Afterword” to the 1958 edition of *I and Thou* Buber wrote specifically about psychotherapy, as this could be related to his basic philosophical outlook. Buber points out that a therapist might be satisfied to “analyze” his patient, bringing to light unconscious factors and transform the energy invested in them into a conscious project, thereby accomplishing some “repairs”, as he terms it. The therapist may help to bring about more concentration and order, to replace what is diffuse and unstructured. But the

true task of therapy, Buber holds forth, is to go beyond this; it is about the “regeneration of a stunted personal center” (1970, p. 179).

In an article giving a broad outline of a dialogically oriented approach to psychotherapy, Friedman (2002a) positions Buber at “a midway point then between the essential self of modernism and the deconstructed non-unique, socially constructed self of postmodernism” (p. 30). Becoming aware of the person is not possible if the other is made a detached object of observation, the other will only yield his or her wholeness and center as a present partner in dialogue, Friedman holds forth. This regarding of the other as a present partner in dialogue becomes a basis for therapeutic work. Regarding a dialogical outlook on psychotherapy Friedman states: “Sickness is what prevents the return to immediacy” (p. 22). Mental illness is considered as something that has happened to distort, or to objectify in some way, a living presence towards reality. And therapy is about the person becoming whole through relation, by being *made able* to relate.

Friedman cites the well-known existential psychotherapist Irvin Yalom, who insists: “It is the relationship that heals” (cited p. 13). The approach of “healing through meeting”, as Friedman accordingly terms it:

Should not proceed from the investigation of individual psychological complications but rather from the whole person and the relation between persons. The patient must be summoned to bring his or her inner being to unity so that he or she may respond to the address of the being or beings that face one (p. 15).

Friedman contrasts a dialogical focus on relationship with the psychoanalytical notion of the “unconscious”. He purports it to be a radical mistake made by Freud that one could posit a region of the mind as unconscious, harboring “contents” which are to be considered as repressed conscious material, and which could be brought back, without any essential change, into the conscious. A dialogical view contrary to this will regard the material that is brought forth in therapy as *produced* within, and though the relationship between the therapist and client. Therapy then is not accurately described as “making the unconscious conscious”. It is rather a healing process mediated through a therapeutic relationship.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Friedman refers besides Yalom (1989) to several other psychotherapists that he would term dialogical in their orientation and approach. Among these are Carl Jung, who went far beyond Freud in this direction he claims, and Ludvig Binswanger (1975), who transcended Heidegger’s notion of authentic existence for oneself in the concept of “we-ness”. He further refers to Carl Rogers (1961), Ronald D.

11.1.2 Capacity to Relate

Yalom (1980) regards self-transcendence as an ultimate aim in therapy, understood as a basic craving to be able to transcend one's self-interest and to strive toward something outside or beyond oneself. He refers to Buber here:

Though human beings should begin with themselves (by searching their own hearts, integrating themselves, and finding their particular meaning), they should not end with themselves. It is only necessary Buber states, to ask the question "What for? What am I to find my particular way for?" The answer is: "Not for my own sake." One begins with oneself in order to forget oneself and to immerse oneself into the world; *one comprehends oneself in order not to be preoccupied with oneself* (p. 439, italics added).

To elaborate somewhat more on a dialogical outlook on the aim of therapy: a "stunted personal center" as Buber terms it, will according to such a view be characterized by a limited capacity to relate. And how to increase or regenerate such inhibited capacity, is what therapy would need to facilitate. In this way the main aim of therapy will be to *increase the capacity to relate*. And this will imply relating to *all aspects of one's life*. To one's own body, feelings and emotions, memories, dreams, visions, thoughts and ideas, which are all interrelated, *and* to one's relation to others, to family, friends, acquaintances, colleagues, to one's work, to society, and one's place in society, to one's cultural background and identity, to nature, environment, to values and faith, of whatever kind. Such capacity thus includes all aspects of life, but is not itself split up into separate parts. It is the *whole person* that is involved in *any* relation, not just some part, or parts of the self.

A whole self is involved in any relation, for there is no abstracted "self" apart from the relations in which it exists, according to a dialogical view. A self is realized in and through relation, within all dimensions of the human world. It is not some self-sufficient entity then, existing "in itself".¹⁰⁰

Laing (1960; Laing 1971), Sidney Jourard (1971) and Rollo May (1969), who all were influenced by Buber's *I-Thou* philosophy. And also to the self psychology of Heinz Kohut (1971; Kohut 1977) and Robert Stokolow (1992) as having close affinity with a dialogical outlook, and Ervin and Miriam Polster (1974) bringing in a dialogical perspective into Gestalt Therapy.

¹⁰⁰ Van Deurzen (1998) refers to the existential psychotherapist Ludwig Binswanger, who on the basis of Heidegger's Dasein analysis, developed the notions of *Umwelt*, *Mitwelt* and *Eigenwelt*, and also, by implication, according to van Deurzen, *Überwelt*. These she finds, are useful in sketching four dimensions of human relating to the world. These represent the *natural world (Umwelt)*, being with nature, which includes the relation to the body. The basic purpose is pleasure, vitality and strength, the intermediate goal is health, comfort, wealth, fortune, and the ultimate concern is illness, weakness, death.

On the background of a dialogical philosophical anthropology, related to therapy, I want to attempt to outline a rationale for a music-based music therapy. Such therapy then, to state this at the outset here, will be oriented towards healing, towards making the person whole, through relationship. It will be about regenerating a stunted center, increasing the overall capacity of the person to relate.

11.2 Working and Playing

As seen here previously, Aigen has suggested the concept of “work” to be central to music therapy. The “work” in Creative Music Therapy is about building up, methodically, step by step, following some progression. Such basic work in acquiring skill is gaining technique, as a tool, and consequently a kind of objectification, an *It*, in Buber’s terms. And which is entirely necessary in music making. On the other hand, in using the acquired skill, a realm of musical experience may open up in the immediacy of the encounter. The child or client may in this way enter into the “world” of music, as Aigen terms it, in which a new freedom of expression may be found.

There are two aspects here, which may be moved variously into: working methodically, practicing skill, and then applying the skill, as the fruition of the practice, entering into the world of music, and then going back to practice again, to develop skills further, for new excursions to follow. And of course this back and forth movement has many levels and phases of interchanges, not simply one following the other chronologically.

11.2.1 The Concept of Play

Kenny (1989) has developed the concept “field of play” . She bases this on a notion of beauty, inspired by a Navaho prayer about “walking in beauty”. Beauty for Kenny is

The *public world (Mitwelt)* which has to do with social relations has success and power, glory as its basic purpose, recognition, influence, respect as its intermediate goal, and failure, defeat, isolation as its ultimate concern. The *private world (Eigenwelt)* represents the psychological dimension, or being with oneself. Its basic purpose, according to van Deurzen's sketch, is integrity, selfhood, authenticity, its intermediate goal individuality and freedom, its ultimate concern being disintegration, dissolution of self. The *ideal world (Überwelt)* which is about value and meaning in existence has truth, wisdom as its purpose, and understanding, knowledge, faith as its intermediate goal, its ultimate concern is absurdity, groundlessness, void. This fourfold conceptual construct gives a kind of map or overview of existential dimensions for the human being.

synonymous with restoring wholeness into all relationships of life, and in this sense she talks about the “aesthetics” of the person, in the moving toward such wholeness. Her stated assumption is: “As one moves toward beauty, one moves toward wholeness, or the fullest potential of what one can be in the world” (p. 77). One might say that this represents an aesthetics of *therapy*, rather than of art. Beauty, as Kenny sees it, is about making whole, integrating parts within the completed whole, and may be applied in this way not only to the work of art, but also to the making of the person. And this integrating movement, she holds forth, will take place within interrelated fields and spaces of music and aesthetics between therapist and client, constituting music therapy as a form of *ritual*. With regards to the concept of “play”, Kenny cites Winnicott’s much referred to notion:

Psychotherapy has to do with two people playing together. The corollary of this is that where playing is not possible, then the work done by the therapist is directed towards bringing the patient from a state of not being able to play into a state of being able to play (cited in Kenny p. 71).

Play is here both a means and an end at the same time, “playing” therapy, involving both client and therapist, to let the client learn to play.¹⁰¹ The concept of “play” naturally has a particular, actually literal, resonance with music therapy, (in “playing” music), and I think it could be well applied as a contrast to the notion of “work”. That is, the entering into the sphere of the world of music, into the musical relational field, could be considered as entering into *play*, as Kenny suggests, which implies leaving the work mode, for simply playing. There are two aspects in the relation to music in Creative Music Therapy then, that may be termed on the one side “work”, which has to do with the progressive acquiring and building of skill, and on the other “play”, which is about the musical moment, the encounter. I will suggest these two terms of *working* and *playing* to signify two basic aspects of music making, two sides to the necessary dialectic movement between the modes of *It* and *Thou* in “musicking”, within Creative Music Therapy.

¹⁰¹ Pavlicevic (2002) also refers to Winnicott’s notion of play as a relevant term to describe the process of Creative Music Therapy.

11.2.2 The Dialectics Between “Working” and “Playing”

There is an interface between these two aspects of working and playing then, and this is where a decisive point has to be made, regarding a dialogical rationale for Creative Music Therapy: *There is not any given or fixed correspondence between these two aspects.* The dialectics between them do not follow any necessary parallel lines of ascension. This means that higher technical proficiency does not *automatically* bring forth a more powerful musical expression at any given time. Of course such proficiency may very well facilitate a highly appreciated aesthetic expression, but expression as such, entering into the immediacy of the mode of *Thou*, of true musical encounter, is never guaranteed by technical proficiency in and of itself. *And* consequently, seeing this the other way around, this entering into the realm of music can actually happen at *any* technical proficiency level. It may be regarded as a crucial aspect of a Creative Music Therapy rationale that it allows and facilitates, on this basis, the personal engagement of the child or client with music, *whatever the technical proficiency level might be.*

There is in this way no specific aim as to where this level should be set, as will necessarily be found, in one way or another, in music education, for instance. The entering into relation with music may be done wholly, and uniquely, in any given situation, as long as there is an opportunity that is seized, some moment of entering into that space that is decided for, and embraced. This could be seen as one basic assumption of Creative Music Therapy: that it does not presuppose or aim for any specific level of proficiency, but that it *allows for an engagement in musical encounter, no matter the level of technical proficiency.*

What this practically implies is facilitating *entrance into the world of music at very basic technical skill levels.* Supporting participation at very elementary levels indeed. At levels sometimes maybe not even heard of before, involving people that were maybe not as much counted on before, because of the implicit notion or the ideal of music *as an art*, which has aimed at excelling to ever more advanced levels of technical/musical proficiency, increasing the demands for participation accordingly. This opening for participation in music does not set any fixed standard musically-technically that has to be reached before plunging into the depths of the medium, but adapts instead methods and procedures to ensure, or have the child or adult attain to

such experience, at whatever level, according to the present capacities, abilities and potentials.

Music as an art form in our culture has in many ways become ever more specialized and professionalized, as Ruud (1998a) has pointed out, whereas music therapy turns this completely around, seeing to that anyone, no matter his or her capabilities, may participate in making music. And important to take head here; the expressive power to be discovered this way is not just a function of the technical level. Actually there is no “level” of the experiential; there is only degree of intensity, of presence and immediacy in each situation. The experiential basis of Creative Music Therapy then stems from applying this different kind of perspective, this different logic of approach to the medium. The logic is that expressive power may be found *relatively* at any technical proficiency level, and that this is something that may actually be encouraged and proactively sought for, at any acquired level.

11.2.3 Musical Expression by Simple Means

A further important point here is that no matter what level of proficiency, you nevertheless have to *do* some work. It is not just instantaneous. You have to make some effort to form, to make something out of it, to express something through the music. An integral part of a rationale will be then, on the other side, that the experiential is not just something that comes by itself; you have to work for it. And this work, according to the perspective presented here on music as a formed image in sound, implies *perfecting the image*. Not making it perfect, but perfecting it, as your skill and capacities allow. No matter what level, making music still involves perfecting an image, forming it, making it into something. Perfecting is involved in any instance, not only at “higher” levels, but in any making or forming as such, whatever the level or scope. And in perfecting, in *forming* the music, there is a transcending, a going beyond the merely individualistic, giving what is made a *communal* significance, that can be related to by others, while still remaining a personal expression.

Though this perfecting may be on a not very advanced technical level, simple does not necessarily mean lack of depth. It is certainly possible to imagine cases in which some highly complex or “advanced” music making might have lost touch, apparently, with deeper layers of musical significance. Be this as it may. The main point

here is that simple means does not necessarily mean a lack of depth of musical expression. This also then becomes a crucial part of a rationale for Creative Music Therapy, *the potentiality of musical expression by simple means*.

11.2.4 Engaging the Whole Person in Music

The dialectic as outlined here between “working” and “playing” makes possible the participation in music playing at a level that is not necessarily advanced technically, but which nevertheless may entail powerful musical experience. And now to connect this explicitly to a dialogical philosophical anthropology: Relating to music is not performed with any singular part of oneself, but with oneself as a whole. It is not enacted just with the body, or with some emotion, or thought, or imagination. Music relates to the whole spectrum of what a person is. To develop a relation to music is thus by implication to increase the capacity to relate, becoming more able to relate, as a person.

It is *relating* to music that is significant from the point of view of therapy. What is of particular relevance regarding music as a therapeutic medium is that it *lends itself* to powerful experience, because of its expressive flexibility, making the dialectic between the aspects of working and playing possible. Putting it another way: Because it is *possible* to facilitate powerful experience in the engagement with music at such a wide range of technical competency levels, music turns out to be eminently suitable for engaging the person, and not least for a person that otherwise might have few such outlets for engagement. Because it is a medium that *can* be related to in such flexible ways, it opens for the possibility of the person to relate *to something* in a personally involved way, to a greater extent than otherwise might be possible.

The first main aspect of a dialogical rationale for Creative Music Therapy then, to summarize this far, is the dialectics between “working” and “playing”, making possible powerful musical experience on, for the client, the relevant and appropriate level of proficiency, thus facilitating an opportunity for the development of increased relational capacity of the whole person, through the engagement with the musical medium. Because the whole person is engaged, it is the whole person’s capacity to relate that is this way strengthened.

11.2.5 Participation in Playing Together

A second main aspect of a dialogical rationale for Creative Music Therapy will be as follows: *Because* of this powerful musical experience, a special relationship may develop, through the sharing in it. Aiming for the experiential dimension of music as play, may lead towards the occurring of what may be called a *musical moment*. Now this at the same time may open for the possibility of *sharing* such experience, in what then may be termed an *interpersonal moment*. And the interpersonal moment as a human encounter may *also* lead to a potential increase of relational capacity.

There is a special and characteristic dynamics at work here, of a two-sided, interrelated crossing of fields, musically *and* interpersonally. The two aspects of music therapy, the interpersonal and musical, *both* contribute then to the potential increase of the client's capacity to relate. A music-based music therapy thus entails a particular dynamism of interrelation between these two aspects. It is not *just* the music. And it is not *just* the interpersonal relation itself. It is not even just the sum of these two; rather it is *the dynamics of the mutually enhancing interrelation between them*, which facilitates increased possibilities for developing capacity for relation, and through this, *potential change for the client*.

11.3 The Moment of Change

A dialogical philosophical anthropology implies that change happens in a moment. It is not something that follows by any strict necessity, at a given, predetermined *time*. It occurs, it happens in the moment. The point here is that a fixed determination as to when and how it happens represents an altogether different kind of logic. According to a dialogical point of view the moment of change it is not squarely predicted. This is what it implies that it happens by "grace". And there is no way of making it more "reliable", so to speak. Not by any external means. It is in the particular situation that the opportunity has to be seized. And this is up to the persons situated within the concrete setting. There is no formula or procedure to be followed that will guarantee a certain outcome or success. It is unique each time, which is why it is a "moment".¹⁰²

¹⁰² The notion of "moment" actually seems to have a widespread usage in music therapy; it is often referred to, in different combinations of terms. Several music therapy researchers have used the concept

11.3.1 Gradual Development and Sudden Change

Still music therapy is not just about the moment. A qualification needs to be made here. The “work“ aspect of therapy could be viewed as a mainly *gradual* process, of building skills and musical repertoire. And in building skills there is *will* involved, through the *work* that is necessary to put in, as Aigen (1998b) has pointed out. In all the cases from the early Nordoff-Robbins work that he researched into Aigen found that there was a focus on work, through gaining musical skill, for activating the self. It was never sufficient for the therapeutic process just to create relationship, spontaneously relating in the moment, he holds forth. The Nordoff-Robbins team always included a focus on the will, thus addressing the capacity for work. In this way the work aspect in relation to music gains therapeutic significance on its own account.¹⁰³

A progression in musical skill will reflect the effort that is put in, and may in this way say something about the client. A musical progression may say something about an increased engagement in working with music, thereby reflecting the application and possible strengthening of the will. The building of skill involves a regular step-by-step kind of process, and advance in musical skill may be seen in relation to the client’s growth and development. A line of interrelation can be drawn here, the nature of which must be judged about in each single case though, because there is, as a dialogical perspective will underline, clearly no automatic or mechanic connection here, even as a gradual process. It could be pointed out that the use of the term “work” in this instance is as a *verb* rather than a noun. Creative Music Therapy is not so much for *making a work*, as for *working*, and in this way learning to apply the will. The progress is not measured directly in the work then, but in the work as an indicator of the effort that is put in. And this difference of focus needs to be given heed to, not to make any simplistic equation between musical and therapeutic progress.

of moment to indicate therapeutic change, for instance Amir (1992), who has used the term “meaningful moments” in a qualitative study based on intensive interviews with music therapists and their clients. From this data she developed 15 subcategories of such moments. Kasayake (1991) from a Guided Imagery of Music background refers to “the moment of hope”, Gröcke (1999), also with this background, talks about “pivotal moments” in therapy. Worth noting here is not only the variations of kind. The common denominator in all these projects is the use of the term *moment*; they all speak about some kind of “moment”, which in itself might indicate the relevance of this notion in music therapy, by its steady occurrence in all these composite terms.

¹⁰³ Even Ruud (1998g) has stressed this side of therapy, as “increasing possibilities for action” (Ruud 1998g, p. 3).

On the other side is the process of change, which is of a more *sudden* kind, happening in a moment, by some kind of grace, as indicated here. And there is an *interdependence* to be seen between these two sides. Therapy may, on a daily basis so to speak, be run as a matter of course, on the skill-building level. And has to, because there is no way of *continuously* moving in the moment of now, of sudden change. What is sudden has to be seen on the background of what is continuous, and what is continuous in Creative Music Therapy is the *work* with music, as Aigen stresses. Moving into *play* is something that occurs on a sudden basis, and happens more or less occasionally. So there are two sides to music therapy in this way, as any therapy must have. You cannot only have only the one side.

That is to say, you *could* actually have *only* the work side, but what a dialogical perspective will emphasize is what might be missed out in such a case, *ruling out* any other possibility, on account maybe that it does not fit in with a neat and secure, dependable and defensible, ordered and accepted position. Any discontinuous “moment”, would then – rather conveniently maybe – be nothing to worry about. But the danger here would be endorsing a dehumanized music therapy practice as a consequence, not really appreciating or recognizing the potential of what it could be. *Both* sides should be included, according to dialogical rationale as outlined here, both gradual and sudden change in therapy.

This is in accordance with the qualification that CPSG (Bruschweiler-Stern et al. 2002) have made, referred to here previously, regarding the step-by-step process of interpersonal fittedness leading to a gradual, incremental change in implicit relational knowing, in addition to the change coming through the “moment of meeting”. What is implied here then, in accordance with the perspective that has been drawn on the interrelated fields of the interpersonal and musical in music therapy, is the possibility of *both a gradual development and a sudden change* in relation to music. It is both working and playing, together.

11.3.2 Enhancing Resources

The assumption is: Relationship heals. Change that comes by through relational healing is a change in the sense of self, and this, by nature, is global. A self is not dividable into bits and parts. A change in the sense of self brings about a change that is not

compartmentalized. Music therapy as a practice is here indicated to have a particular dynamics that very much relates it to the whole person. It is directed towards the whole person, not any specific problem, or issue, which is to say that it is resource-oriented. And in not processing any specific issues, other aspects than what otherwise might be treated by discursive means are brought up front: body and movement, feelings and sensibility, images, fantasies, visions, creativity, power and energy, rejuvenation, communion, even celebration. Resonating with the potential resources that may be found and activated, a re-enchantment of the whole life of the person is what may be focused on. Becoming more whole, and more capable of living. A music-based music therapy according to this outlook implies an effort towards a regeneration of the self, a “return to immediacy”, as Friedman has put it. Music therapy in this light then becomes paradoxically *a means for immediacy*. Means and ends regarding illness and health become united here, not separated, according to such a view. It is directly enhancing life, rather than removing hindrances for a full living.

11.3.3 No Specific Client Group

A crucial feature of music therapy according to this rationale will be that it is not directed towards any specific client group, or any specific ailment, because the resources that are summoned are to be found in everyone. It is not directed towards any predetermined, isolated problem. And just this may itself be considered an essential quality. A main reason for the use of music therapeutically from a dialogical outlook is that it that may *transcend* difficulties, apparent hindrances, inhibitions, disturbances, and afflictions in moving directly towards the latent capacities of the human. It is not directed towards what is “wrong” with the client, it is not actually directed towards anything particular *but* the client, as a person. Music therapy thus conceived will not primarily be directed towards dealing with some underlying problems, but rather towards relating with the client *in spite of* these, so to speak. Its reason for use will not mainly be that it solves particular problems, but that it *to such a high degree* may be able to get past the problems and direct itself immediately towards the person, bringing about increased relation directly, rather than removing obstacles for it.

11.4 Repair and Regeneration

The question might be raised here whether this is enough. And surely there *is* a limitation in Creative Music Therapy *not* using verbal language for processing conflict material. It is important to underline here that there is no implication that a mainly regenerative approach in all cases, or even in any case, should *replace* a direct working with “repair”. The issue that is considered here is the *possibility* of a regenerative approach, and what the potentialities of such an approach might be.

One might consider though, whether these two sides of regeneration and repair work can be entirely separated. Working “positively”, enhancing resources, may as a natural effect have consequences for the whole person, also for increasing the capability of resolving internal conflict issues, which would come by indirectly then, as a consequence of this kind of process, rather than by direct confrontation of underlying conflict issues. That some issues in some cases may not readily be solved this way, and may need more specific treatment is of course well accepted. A mainly regenerative approach, to state the obvious, should not be considered exclusive and universal. The view presented here implies nevertheless that a “negative” approach (in the logical sense of being directed towards removing hindrances) not necessarily is the *only* way of working, in *all* cases.

There may be a possibility of getting rid of problems as a “side effect” so to speak, a falling away of restrictions, inhibitions and the like, made possible by an increased power gained through a regenerative experience. Not directly confronting problems then, but letting them resolve themselves when they are ready, when time is “ripe”. Letting the defenses fall as personal strength that is built up proves them unnecessary. Hindrances may fall away indirectly, as a result of an increase in personal empowerment, coming from enhancing resources of the person as a whole.

11.4.1 “Intervention” and Healing

I would like to relate this issue to Bruscia’s conception of music therapy. In his book *Defining Music Therapy* Bruscia (1998a) has given what he terms a “working definition” of music therapy, which has been much cited:

Music Therapy is a systematic process of intervention wherein the therapist helps the client to promote health, using musical experiences and the relationships that develop through them as dynamic forces of change (p. 20).

This is a general definition meant to cover the whole field of music therapy. With regards to the rationale here, and without going into any comprehensive discussion of this definition, which is intended to cover a broader scope of practices, I want to draw attention to the term “intervention”. “Intervention” as a concept may immediately be placed quite far off from a term such as “encounter”. Etymologically intervention means to “go between”, while encounter on the contrary is about the immediate and direct, mutual relation. These concepts are not easily reconciled; they may rather be seen to be in direct opposition to one another.

It is interesting to see then what Bruscia writes particularly about Creative Music Therapy, which is presented primarily as a *healing practice*, on a so-called *intensive level* of therapy. The practice is based, Bruscia points out, both on the musical experiences, and relationships that develop through them. Regarding the client-therapist relation he writes:

The therapist or healer plays an integral role in the healing process, however, *rather than “intervene”* in the usual sense, the therapist provides a *supportive presence* to the client and music (p. 209, italics added).

Bruscia actually qualifies his own definition, when it comes to this kind of practice, in the use of the word “intervene”, holding forth instead the therapist’s “supportive presence”. Presence is, as seen here, a central feature of a dialogical outlook. And that this presence should be “supportive” indicates a helping, therapeutic function. This concept then, is more in accordance with a conception of therapy as an encounter.

Bruscia alternatively places Creative Music Therapy under what he terms *Transformative (or Experiential) Music Psychotherapy*, which is characterized by the therapist using music experiences and the relationships that form through them to resolve the therapeutic needs of the client, using verbal techniques only when they enhance the music experience and its therapeutic potential. This practice too is placed on the so-called intensive level of therapy.

11.4.2 Intensive and Primary Levels of Practice

Bruscia distinguishes between four levels of music therapy; *auxiliary*, using music functionally for non-therapeutic, but related purposes; *augmentative*, in which music therapy is used to enhance the efforts of other treatment modalities; *intensive*, in which music therapy takes a central and independent role in the therapeutic process, inducing significant changes for the client; and *primary*, which is any practice in which music therapy takes an indispensable or singular role in meeting the therapeutic needs of the client, inducing pervasive changes.

In placing Creative Music Therapy, both regarded as a healing practice, and as transformative music psychotherapy at the intensive level, Bruscia recognizes the possibility of change being induced through this practice of therapy as an independent modality. This would seem to support the notion here that therapeutic change through a regenerative approach *may* be an alternative to a direct working with conflict material in the discursive mode of verbal language.

Bruscia on the whole considers that therapy on a *primary* level will involve combinations with other areas of music therapy practice at intensive levels. He wants to take into consideration also the *breadth* of approach in defining this level then. It seems he would accept Creative Music Therapy on a primary level in combination with other approaches then. This would also seem to be well in accord with the perspective that is drawn here, not claiming either exclusivity or self-sufficiency to the approach, but pointing rather to potentials that may be found (also) in this kind of work.

11.4.3 Diagnosis and Treatment

Music therapy as a “healing through meeting” can hardly be characterized as *treatment*, because it may not be regarded to work in any specifically curative sense in relation to some diagnostically defined illnesses. A dialogical perspective implies being *open* to the present needs of the other, as this is revealed in the situation. There is no recourse to a “knowing better” *about* the client. This does not mean that diagnosis as such is denied or opposed, but that it is not taken as the *definition* of the person. It is considered as an objectification, an objectification that may be both necessary and useful to consider in each particular instance, but *as* an objectification it has no status as being more real.

What is real is the person, in the concrete situation. Diagnosis may serve a purpose, but not as anything final, or prior to the person.

Yalom (1980), amongst others, has voiced a critique of *some* of the uses of diagnosis in psychotherapy. While he recognizes that no responsible therapist can deny a place for diagnostic evaluation, to ascertain whether a client has some organic disease, or suffers some severe affective disorder requiring pharmacological treatment, or to determine destructive or self-destructive tendencies, or particular fragilities, further diagnostic discriminations beyond such relatively crude determinations, which he holds serve the function of initial triage, may often interfere with the formation of relationship:

Intricate psychoanalytic diagnostic formulations ... are of little help to therapy and, to the extent to which they impede genuine listening, constitute a hindrance. Too often diagnostic categorization is a stimulating intellectual exercise whose sole function is to provide the therapist with a sense of order and mastery. The major task of the maturing therapist is to learn to tolerate uncertainty. What is required is a major shift in perspective: rather than strive to order the interview “material” into an intellectually coherent framework, the therapist must strive toward authentic engagement (pp. 410-411).

Still some form of objectification will be inevitable in therapy, in processes of both assessment and evaluation. And a number of assessment and evaluation schemes have been developed, both from the hands of Nordoff and Robbins (1977) and by Bruscia for instance, with his wide-ranging and rather comprehensive 64 Improvisation Assessment Profiles (Bruscia 1987).¹⁰⁴ Without going into any further detail on these matters here, let it suffice to say that taking both the direct relational aspect and the making of objectifications as necessary and interrelated aspects of any therapeutic work, is a requirement that will need to be included within a rationale for therapy, according to a dialogical perspective which upholds the necessity of *alternating* between the modes of It and Thou. What nevertheless should be emphasized is that no such scheme of assessment or evaluation could be considered final or definitive. In the process of doing therapy, second person relation must be considered primary, and third person objectification secondary, because according to a dialogical perspective therapeutic change *happens* primarily in and through relational processes.

¹⁰⁴ For a recent discussion on Bruscia’s Improvisational Assessment Profiles see the “Forum” Internet cite of the *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy*: “IAP Revisited”, <http://www.hisf.no/njmt/forumiap.html>.

11.4.4 “Clinical Intervention” in Music Therapy

There might still be some room for the notion of intervention in Creative Music Therapy. Pavlicevic (2002) elaborates on the analogy with mother-infant interaction. She refers to Tronick et al., who comment on the “mis-matching” that may occur in the mother infant interaction, where the mother for example over-attunes or under-attunes to the infant’s actions, vocalizing far too slow or erratic for instance, and which may cause an alertness on the side of the infant. Tronick et al. propose that a sensitive mother’s mismatching will not go beyond the baby’s capabilities, and will actually in itself offer an expanded and more complex environment for the baby in which to grow, which a perfectly matched environment of communication would not provide. Pavlicevic makes an analogy with clinical improvisation in music therapy, in which the therapist does not only support the partner’s musical utterances, but offers a variation of musical material, for example extending the rhythm or offering a variation of tempo. This extending or altering of the music Pavlicevic calls *clinical intervention*, which she regards as a feature of clinical improvisation technique. And what comes out of this is that:

The patient is motivated, with the support of the therapist’s clinical intervention, to extend his or her musical performance. Later he [Pavlicevic uses “she” for therapist and “he” for client] begins to take the musical initiative by contributing new, congruent musical material which the therapist responds to. The joint improvisation provides an opportunity to make dynamic forms, to try out new bits of them, to recombine them and to make new patterns (Pavlicevic 2002, ¶ 28).

This therapeutic process in clinical improvisation could seem to accord with gradual, incremental change processes, (adjusting “fittedness” in CPSG’s terms), with continuously working to expand on the possibilities for musical expression. “Reading” what is made as “dynamic form”, the interpersonal aspect is highlighted. Pavlicevic then, analogously to the mother-infant interaction, considers musical “mis-matching”, as an “intervention”, a crucial aspect of the therapeutic process, which may lead to growth for the client, through giving the client opportunities for development. Pavlicevic nevertheless underlines that neither player controls or is threatened by the musical direction, because of a mutual trust in one another’s responsiveness.

Method and Technique Still Needed

Any therapeutic endeavor involves method and technique. If encounter is not initially compatible with the concept of intervention this does not mean that therapy runs entirely as a continuous encounter. The *alternation* is what is the crucial point here, which implies that therapy is not simply intervention either. It is the one-sided view of the exclusivity of the one aspect that a view to the necessity of alternation will counter. Therapy, according to a dialogical perspective then, is about mediation *and* immediacy.

11.5 Musical and Personal Change

Reading the musical as the personal, as the concept of “dynamic form” implies, brings up the question of the relation between musical change and personal change, as was addressed here previously, in chapter 9. In keeping with the dialogical outlook and the aim for therapy, how is capacity to relate reflected in the music? In the following I want to elaborate somewhat on what this issue entails, in accordance with the rationale as it is outlined here.

In a music-based music therapy it is the experiential quality of the relation to music that is the main focus. The level of personal engagement is what the process is to be evaluated by then. When someone hears a disabled child making a heroic effort at participating in playing music, and in doing so exceeding all expectation, it is the personal engagement, this existential aspect that is appreciated, as much as the quality of the music as such. Such effort is quite naturally implicitly measured against other instances of musical engagement, amongst those who maybe do not confront such rather severe obstacles. An example is shown by the engagement that is put in, which may be profoundly moving. Something about being human, about how conditions of fate are faced. It is the engagement of the person, despite difficulties, that moves, and despite the maybe humble “results”. Still performing with pride, and with good reason of being proud, the performance nevertheless becomes convincing.

These are the kinds of criteria music therapy must be evaluated by then, according to a dialogical perspective. The evaluation has to be about the quality of the engagement of the client, not of the musical product as such. The focus is on the person. Showing engagement in the process and outcome, the investing of the whole person in the

making of music. It *is* too simple to say then, as Bruscia questioned about, that musical change *is* personal change. Change in the music may be indicative of change in the relation to music on the side of the client. What to look for then is the quality of the engagement in the music, which may be readily *reflected* in the music, but not in any mechanical way. The focus has to be on the client's *relation to the music*. A change in the music may be a sign so to speak, but not to be regarded as any simple unilateral measure in and of itself. To the extent that a change in music may reflect a change in the way the client *relates* to the music, musical change may *indicate* personal change.

11.5.1 The Making of the Person

There is no automatic or mechanical effect coming from doing music. Therapy is about the person, the making of a whole person. Working with music as a work on its own terms does not take care of this all by itself. The philosopher Herbert Fingarette (1963) points to a crucial difference in the processes of making therapy and of making art:

In the case of art, the integration and awareness are not achieved solely by examining and shaping the self. They are achieved in an “indirect” way, in and through shaping and integrating the work of art. The integration created is not one of the self but of a separate, autonomous entity which includes many other elements besides the personal (p. 283).

The “person”, which is what therapy is aimed at, is one whose *personal life* shows integration, whereas by “artist” we mean a person whose *artifacts* show integration, Fingarette points out. In other words, there can be no simple and straightforward equation between these two, the music made, and the making of the person. The task for the music therapist must therefore be *mediating* the music activity for the development of the person. The relation between musical and personal change cannot be regarded as fixed.

It is naturally possible to imagine musical progress in technique and skill that does not have any particular groundbreaking transformative implications for the client. A steadily increasing technical musical accomplishment, on whatever relative level, is itself no guarantee for personal transformation. The other side to the interrelation between technique and expression, as has been referred to here, is actually the possibility of having an increase in musical skill, learning more and more how to play in a “correct” way, but not actually applying the skills in a new way in any expressively

convincing manner. There may be an increase in skill without a concurrent increase in personal expression. This is according to the dynamics of the interrelation between the two sides of work and play, which is not fixed *either way*. A higher level of technical proficiency does not guarantee a higher degree of personal expression. The therapeutic task is about consciously mediating music making for the *making of the person*.

11.5.2 What and How you Play

In evaluating this interrelation between musical and personal change I would propose distinguishing between a *what* and a *how* aspect of musicking. The thesis is that personal change is to be found in the “how” aspect, rather than the “what” aspect of musicking. A change of the musical “what” can be accomplished in many ways, being able to play a wider repertoire, and at more advanced skill levels. But there is in addition the aspect of *how* you play what you play. The *way*, for instance, of playing the beat on the drum – which is not just a matter of what meter or pattern, or what tempo, or even *accelerando* and *ritardando*. It is the way of playing the rhythm. It is not a matter of changing the rhythm as such, adding or subtracting to it. It is a subtle change in the way of playing it, *while still playing the same rhythm*. Which is what the *way* of playing is about, rather than *what* specifically is played.

There are many levels to the difference between the “what” and the “how” in musicking. The “what” could be considered as the It-side of music making, as the establishing of something musically given. The “how” aspect could be considered the You-side, relating to the music as what it has been musically established, in a personal way. The “how” aspect is making the music alive, infusing it with new expression and meaning. It is this “how” that breathes life into music making. It is not just regarding music as an It, but relating to it in a non-technical, non-mechanical manner, engaging with it as a You, and by so doing expressing something of yourself.

The crucial point here is the interrelation *between* these two aspects. There is always some “what”, because without a “what” there would be no “how”, which is to say, nothing to play on. Both aspects are necessary to include in the picture. Keeping exclusively to a “what”, the playing will become stifled, if there is no opening for the aspect of “how”. And this needs to be taken into consideration regarding the relation between musical change and personal change in music therapy, I believe. There are *two*

sides to the process in the relation to music. Musical change as a change in the “what” aspect, as a building up of *something*, musically, is only a part of the picture, and cannot be taken as any exclusive measure as to the degree of personal development in relation to the music.

Let me illustrate this point with an example. Entertaining the notion that so-called free improvisation, loosening up all ties to tonal and rhythmic structure, by necessity will induce a steadily increasing personal liberation would obviously be a rather simplistic idea.¹⁰⁵ This would imply taking the word free in a literal “what” kind of meaning. It is free in relation to *what* you play. But another sense of freedom is in “how” you play. Not playing freely just what you want, but playing whatever you play in a free way. In a free way means that you are not stuck on the literal “what”, but that you have a personal freedom in execution, in the *way* you are playing.

The realization of musical expression may be seen as a reciprocal shifting between a *given* “what” and an *open* “how” of doing. This means that varying the tempo of playing, for instance, is not in itself to be considered more or less liberating. Increasing and decreasing the tempo may be as stifled as playing in an even tempo. And certainly playing in an even tempo does not mean that the playing is necessarily stale. A steady groove may very well move along without any dramatic fluctuation in tempo. The point is rather *hitting* this groove. And *keeping* a steady tempo instead of increasing, for instance, may just as well indicate musical presence and intensity. (But varying tempo can of course also be a way of becoming liberated from a stifled beating in one unvarying tempo, as has been a regular procedure in Creative Music Therapy.)

The Recognizable Sign of Uniqueness

Friedman (2002a) writes on what it means to become aware of a person, as a basis for therapeutic work:

To become aware of a person ... means to perceive his or her wholeness as a person defined by spirit: to perceive the dynamic center that stamps on all utterances, actions, and attitudes *the recognizable sign of uniqueness* (p.12, italics added).

¹⁰⁵ Although there might seem to be some kind of notion of this implied in some free improvisation “ideology”. See Derek Bailey (1993)

The “recognizable sign of uniqueness” is, to put this in the simplest terms, about the way of doing things. *How* you do what you do. And this is what musical change versus personal change may be related by. Not just what you do musically, but how you do it. In one instance this may well be the changing of the tempo. But the literal “what” aspect of playing in different tempi, or applying *accelerando* or *ritardando* is not all there is to it. To say that the child is playing in different tempi, and therefore has achieved personal change - it is not as simple as that. I would propose that it is just as much about playing in a personal manner. Playing freely in this sense the music becomes self-expressive; by playing it your own way you manifest yourself, who you are, in the way things are done, as much as in what specifically is done.

11.5.3 “Participatory Discrepancies”

Charles Keil (1994) has developed the concept of “participatory discrepancies” that may be relevant to consider here. It indicates the aspect of not playing exactly *what* is to be played, but deviating ever so little, either on top of, or laying back on the beat in rhythm playing, for instance. This concept also covers the slight tonal variations that give life to melodic phrasing in both singing and playing instruments. A very well known example would be the blue notes, played by bending the strings of the guitar. Ruud (1998b) has pointed to the relevance of this concept for the Nordoff and Robbins’ approach to music therapy:

I hypothesize that the concept of “participatory discrepancies” goes right to the heart of Paul Nordoff and Clive Robbins’ work with exceptional children.... It is my impression, after listening to many of the original tapes from these founding years, that the enthusiasm stemming from the improvisations with the children have their roots in the “swing” or “groove” of the musical interaction. Those happy moments of reaching and going beyond the expected, and those openings that were to be filled in by the children can be regarded as evidence of a musical performance tradition manifested as the power to get people to participate (. 159).

In Ruud’s application of the term, the “how” side is emphasized as social participation, and not so much the relation between the how and what, as “discrepancies” musically, which is what I will focus on here.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ As mentioned in Chapter 1, Aigen has also used Keil’s concept of “participatory discrepancies” in a study of a group music therapy setting, of “playing in the band”, in which musical discrepancies are seen to allow a greater space for participation in group playing.

An analogy in this respect could be early interaction between mother and child, applied with a somewhat different angle to it. As Bunt (1994) has pointed out, referring to early interaction research, the mother not only imitates the child, which would imply reflecting mechanically and literally, so to speak, what the child has expressed – the *what*, one might say, but makes something that *resembles* what has been expressed in the response. Not being entirely different, and not being completely the same, in this way achieving a *connection*. The response thereby becomes personally engaged, not just performed as a fixed procedure in a distanced manner, as could be done through a mere imitation. In likewise manner the way of playing music could be seen as not just “imitating” it, not just playing back *what* it is, but doing this in a personal way, and not merely reflecting the music just as it is. Thus the music making may become not a mechanical exercise, but rather a personal expression, through actively and personally relating to it. Let me point out then that I am not using the analogy here for the (usual) interpersonal, but rather for the *musical relation*, the way of relating to the music that is made.

The way of playing is what may be noted as an indicator of personal change in music therapy then. And “participant discrepancies” might well be considered as such indications. Still, if you make this into something in itself you still will miss the mark. Making “PDs” out of it, as another musical *what*. The “swing” or “groove” of rhythm playing is a “how” aspect. If you attempted to make it into a “what” aspect, trying to “secure” it this way, you would still just have to find another “how”, or else you would simply have lost this aspect.¹⁰⁷ The what-how is a paradox, and remains a paradox.

Flow and Grace

The way of doing things may be related to the term *grace*, as used by Buber, which has a double meaning of on the one side a manner of doing things, and being bestowed upon. The way of doing comes by grace. It is never forced or imposed. It is at the same time both willed and “suffered” as Buber says, that is to say, something that just happens upon one. Ruud (1998a) refers to the psychologist Csikszentmihalyi who talks about “flow”, which might be a term that could be used for a characterization of such

¹⁰⁷ This of course is what the ever-recurring challenge of “humanizing” machines and software for music production is about. Trying to make the machine “swing”. Trying to find some effective mathematic formula for this. Approaching this virtually, but never quite succeeding.

graceful action (Csikszentmihalyi 1990). In music therapy then it is the occurrence; the happening of “flow” in the music making that is to be looked for, as a sign so to speak, of the potentially transforming musical experience.

11.5.4 Personal Empowerment

The way of playing, of doing things, might also be related to courage, as a sign of spirit.¹⁰⁸ The psychologist Jerome D. Frank (1989), having made comparative studies of a number of different therapeutic approaches, holds that therapies on the whole have two main components, first those aimed at correcting the specific pathological processes underlying the illness, and second those aimed at what he calls “combating the demoralizing meaning of all illnesses”. And he proposes that many people seeking psychotherapy suffer primarily from the symptoms of demoralization itself. A primarily regenerative music therapy, as outlined here, could quite naturally be aligned with a conception of therapy emphasizing this second aspect, of combating demoralization, which on the positive side then might well be regarded as *building* morale, or “spirit”, to use that word here.

The aim of therapy then according to this point of view is not so much about solving problems as acquiring strength and power to overcome them, to move on. Not so much about “making the unconscious conscious” then, dispelling illusion, but rather empowering the person in a direct manner, enhancing the overall capacity to relate, to whatever one meets in life. What a dialogical philosophical anthropology entails is furthermore that the human being is not reducible *merely* to a machine that needs to be fixed. There is a humanistic dimension to the enhancement of health, related to personal empowerment.

11.6 Therapeutic Practice

By now it should be clear that “musical awareness” indeed is not enough. There has to be a set aim for therapy, which is different from just making music. And in just this it is

¹⁰⁸ As is reflected in the way the word “sprit” is used in daily language, in expressions such as “that’s the spirit”, or “keep up the spirit”, in which the term may be associated on a broad basis with courage, morale. Spirit could be regarded as being about the way of doing things. Not a thing, not a what, not a quantity, but rather a quality, shown in the way of doing things. It could, as Friedman (2002a) indicates, be seen as *what is reflected in becoming more unique, as who one is*.

defined as therapy: As a conscious, intentional use of music as a medium for development and change. Music therapy is not just playing together. The intentional aspect also has to do with the need for philosophy and for theory. Because it is not a mechanical objective effect we are talking about, but intentional work. And this is dependent of the idea behind therapy, the thought. As any action is. If we do not consign music entirely over to the realm of *It*, mechanistically, we need to account for the use of it on an intentional basis. Music is not just a mechanical means applied for an external purpose. There is no automatic effect of music, as we have seen here. And as long as the relation is not such a simple one-to-one connection, it must be accounted for intentionally, for which theory and a rationale is inevitable.

11.6.1 A Socially Instituted Practice

Therapy could be regarded as a socially instituted practice of intentional healing. Music therapy is the intentional use of music in healing, as opposed to the spontaneous healing connected with music that may occur in everyday life. And which of course is perfectly all right. – Just as anyone might have a learning experience for instance, outside of a formal and intentional educational setting. Formal education nevertheless has been defined as the intentional process of learning within a socially instituted educational setting. Spontaneous healing through musical experience and interplay can occur outside of the formal setting of therapy. But the professional music therapist uses music intentionally for healing within a therapeutic setting. And this is the music therapist's responsibility, to create a setting in which music may mediate the betterment of the client. And such intent is necessary for at all calling it music therapy.

The therapeutic intention needs to be included. And this is what the therapeutic responsibility inevitably is about. The role of the music therapist is to facilitate this kind of engagement and interaction with and through music, for the benefit of the client. Or actually: *The mediation between all three sides is what makes it into therapy*, as a socially instituted practice. Music therapy as seen here is defined by the roles of therapist, client and music in relation to each other, and it is from within this staging of roles within the “play” of therapy that the client may emerge in a better state, enriched, empowered, changed.

11.6.2 The Setting

Regarding a dialogical rationale for a music-based music therapy, it could furthermore be noted that *because* the whole person is what is addressed, music therapy may – and naturally has been – applied *within various social institutional settings*, and even within different sectors of society, such as health, culture, or education. So-called ecological practices (Bruscia 1998a), which move beyond the confines of the one to one situation within the therapy room, and into a larger social space, may also be included here (Aasgaard 1999). The client may well be considered within ever-widening circles of ecologically related social contexts, such as family, friends, milieu, local community, society. Stige (2002a) refers to the ecological social psychological theory of Bronfenbrenner (1979), indicating ever-widening contexts of music therapy, from micro, via mesa to macro levels. These will naturally be relevant to consider in any music therapy practice, from the micro situation of the music therapy session, to the institution in which the work might take place, to the family and social environment of the client, to the wider cultural and social/political issues, which may have a direct impact on the client and the work, and to which music therapy as a practice must relate to.

11.6.3 Community Music Therapy

A dialogical perspective would also readily support a Community Music Therapy approach, viewing the individual within a broader relational setting, also working within community settings. According to Ansdell (2002), Community Music Therapists consider their role *in context* both in how they are influenced by, but also how they influence the “circumstantial community” of their clients. Ansdell refers explicitly to Buber here:

A belief in music as *communitas* involves questioning hierarchical and professional roles, given that music-making naturally leads to experiences of human meeting along the lines of Buber’s *I-Thou* encounters. The relationships between Community Music Therapist and clients (and the boundaries to these) are individually and pragmatically negotiated, are in the first place ‘moral’ rather than ‘professional’ – and are as equal as possible under the circumstances (p.133).

Ansdell contrasts a Community Music Therapy approach with what he calls the “consensus model”, described as “improvisational music psychotherapy”, in which the

site of therapy tends to be restricted to a private and secluded room, holding forth the primacy of the therapeutic dyad, in accordance with mainly psychoanalytic theoretical assumptions.¹⁰⁹ A community oriented approach may work privately in a treatment room, but may extend beyond that into public spaces:

The underlying belief in this approach is that the people Music Therapists work with primarily live in ‘circumstantial communities’ of some sort (hospitals, clinics, schools etc.), where people’s health and illness are located *between and amongst* the personal, social, communal, and institutional context they find themselves in. The Community Music Therapist’s job is to work *in* this web of context, and *with* it – the overall aim being to increase the musical spirit of community, and to enhance people’s quality of life within it (p. 134).

It is important to stress here then, that a dialogical rationale will not at all consider therapy necessarily to be confined to an individual music therapy session format. The client has to be seen in a social context, and this may well indicate moving beyond the confines of a private therapy space. Therapeutic processes do not need to be confined within the walls of the therapy room, but may just as well be placed also within a larger context of community.

Here it is significant to consider again the role of music as symbolic projection versus aesthetic expression. Because when the role of music is aesthetically expressive, and not simply symbolically projective of the person, it opens up to community. It obtains a communal meaning, which is not entirely private. In contrast to this music as a projection of conflicts of the inner psyche of the client is not communal, and is not directed towards any public presentation. It remains confidential, secret, more of a private matter. There is an obligation of confidentiality connected with using music as a projective device. As expression rather than projection music can quite naturally be shared within a community.

A qualification has to be made here though. Stige has suggested a notion of the community *as such* as being the client, and that what would come out of Community Music Therapy would be *communal change* (Stige 2002a, 2003). Within an existential dialogical orientation the philosophical anthropology lying at the basis of this outlook will keep a focus on *the person*. Not in isolation in any way, but within an ever

¹⁰⁹ As mentioned in the introduction chapter Ansdell’s characterizations of the “consensus model” has met with objections though. But I will not enter further into this discussion, as this is not the issue right here.

widening range of contexts. The person nevertheless remains the focal interest, and has to retain a central position, not to be entirely “dissolved” into community as such.¹¹⁰

11.6.4 Group Work

An important qualification to the triangle set-up has to be made. The client side may also be defined as plural, in *group therapy* settings. An additional and crucial dimension that comes in here is the relations and dynamics between the group members. A music-based, dialogical rationale will inevitably focus on the communal dimension of the group setting. Music is a medium that has proven quite universally to enhance communal group spirits. It is significant to note that a term such as “spirit” is not exclusively individualistic then, but may just as well be applied as a communal term, in which case it will be about the development and strengthening of relational capacity as seen within a group setting.

In the article “Encounter: The Concept and its Vulgarization” the existential psychiatrist Victor Frankl made a critique of the so-called “encounter groups” of the 60s and 70s (Frankl 1973).¹¹¹ He questioned the cathartic release of emotion as being “authentic”, and whether the “self-expression” sought for in such groups actually were conducive for true emotional development. Psychological maturing might just as well be about containing emotion, Frankl pointed out. This is maybe one crucial aspect as to what may make a music-based group music therapy relevant, in that it may give *form* to expression, rather than just using music as a medium for emotional outlet and projection. Music may serve to give a *form* to interpersonal interaction in a group, facilitating an actual, rather than “vulgarized” encounter in and through this activity.

¹¹⁰ Communal change, as a focus and aim in itself, raises quite a lot of questions though. Who would want, need or accept; who would authorize and prescribe, who would order, on behalf of whom; and who would cover the expenses, and with what money; community music therapy aimed at *communal change*? What would the outcome be, for whom? And how are music therapists to become qualified to assess, bring about, and evaluate communal change? It seems difficult to distinguish between therapy and *politics* here. Stige wants to base such practice on what he would call the discipline of “music and health”. But this poses some further questions. Is *communal change* a matter to be taken care of on the basis of a *health* discipline that uses *music*? These seem to be highly idiosyncratic notions, put together this way as a *conception for therapy*, but which nevertheless Stige has made some effort to elucidate in his writings. I will not follow these questions of theory further though, just underline that a dialogical outlook as developed here, will incorporate the social, cultural dimension, while still retaining *the person* as a focal interest of therapy, that is to say, the person in context, not an isolated individual.

¹¹¹ The article has also been referred to by Yalom (1980), as mentioned in Chapter 3, on the concept of dialogue.

11.6.5 The Cultural Dimension

Stige (2002a) refers to the broader *social anthropological* meaning of culture. Music therapy, as a human praxis, is part of a culture, and derives its meaning from within this context, he stresses. What will be important to keep in mind from a dialogical perspective is that this is not just a question of music therapy as a social praxis being determined by culture, reducing it one-sidedly to a cultural product, but that as a practice it also gives a creative input into culture, it is a part of what *makes* culture too. A dialogical perspective will strictly speaking not be about “turning” to culture then, but acting dialectically *within* culture. It will not be “centered” on culture, but inevitably *related* to the historical and cultural context of its current situated practice. A dialogical rationale will emphasize the “conversational” quality of relating practice to culture too then, “text” to “context”, in mutual reciprocity.

Music related to culture means that it is related to a whole cosmology. Music used within various tribal rituals, for instance, shows clearly what this entails, in being related to gods and demons, ancestors and nature spirits or other cosmological forces or principles (Rouget 1985; Gouk 2000). In these instances music is not regarded as a mere *divertissement*, but takes part in the representation of these powers and forces. It may also contribute to induce trances, facilitating possession states, in which these gods and demons enact within the ritual setting, through the possessed enactor, clothed in the robes of the god or demon. The significance of these rituals is seen within the culture as a whole, and the meaning of the music is tied up to this cultural meaning, based on a whole cosmology.

The Comparison with Shamanism

There have been several attempts to make comparisons between music therapy and shamanism (Aigen 1991b; Moreno 1988, 1995; Joyce-Tillman 2000). Here I will briefly touch on the matter to see how it may look from the dialogical perspective outlined here. There is a matter of similarities, and of differences. At the core of shaman practices is a dialogical dimension, in the relating (phenomenologically) to a “spirit world”. The shaman “travels” to the sound of the drum, or through chanting, to a spirit world. The shaman may here sense or spot harmful spirits, that may cause disease, and by various procedures retrieve these from the person.

An immediately striking similarity with music therapy is the use of musical means to “travel”, and the therapeutic or helping intent of the shaman, facilitated though this traveling. But there are some striking differences as well. In Creative Music Therapy music may be used to “travel” in some sense, though not to a “spirit world”, but rather to the “world of music”. Another crucial difference is that in shamanism it is the shaman that makes the travel to the “other” reality, with some implied psychic correspondence (“synchronicity” in Jung’s terms), at play with the “ordinary” world, whereas in Creative Music Therapy it is the *client’s* experiential engagement that is the main focus. In Creative Music Therapy the client is *brought along* on the travel! The difference then is that shamanism relates to a spirit world, whereas Creative Music Therapy relates *aesthetically* to a music world, bringing the client into this world, and letting possible beneficent effects come directly out of this.

11.6.6 Cultural Identity

A conception of music in music therapy that incorporates an aesthetic aspect opens the issue of culture also in the more narrow sense. Ruud (Ruud 1998e) has pointed to the relevance of considering the significance of culture, related to the client’s *identity*. He stresses that issues of cultural identity actualizes the need for the music therapist to be aware of the cultural background of the client. What nevertheless needs to be taken into account from a dialogical point of view is that as a therapist you cannot abstract yourself entirely from your own culture, and this in itself actualizes the relation between what may be different musical cultures of client and therapist. The literary theorist Bakhtin (1984) talks about “polyphonic voices”, and this may be a relevant term when considering how different musical cultures meet and interact. In the three-sided figure of the triangle the possibility of a plurality of *musics* could well be included. The responsibility of the therapist (or therapists, including possible co-therapists too) entails taking this also into consideration then, which will itself constitute a dimension of dialogue in the therapeutic setting, interrelating different musics in therapy.

It is necessary nevertheless, to consider that music therapy is also a form of cultural practice in itself, and the music that is created and used within this setting is contextualized within this setting. Taking any kind of music into or out from this setting will re-contextualize it, and thereby change something of its meaning and significance.

There is no formula or prescription to follow regarding the cultural dimension of music in music therapy, this has to be assessed and evaluated according to the conditions of the setting taken as a whole, and the unique time, place, and people.

11.6.7 Contextualizing Music Therapy as a Situated Praxis

The wider contextualization of music therapy as a situated practice may be indicated by an elaborated music therapy triangle figure, (see figure 8). Above the triangle there are overarching cultural contexts (circles might just as well have been used), or actually contexts within contexts, because cultural contexts are several, partly crossing, and partly residing each one within another. In music therapy the relation to culture may be about local culture or national culture, Western culture and Eastern, African or some other culture, main culture and subculture, or even counter-culture. There is also a historical dimension to the developments of different cultures, which also is related to generations, which may have different relations to the same culture even. Music therapy practice is always placed within some set of cultural contexts, which in principle there is no end to, but which is actualized in each instance according to the concerns of those involved in the present situation.


Ideals and values are placed above these overarching cultural circles indicating that they are not here completely relativized within culture, but are given more of an axiological position in relation to particular cultural contexts. The triangle is resting on the ground of nature, in sound and body as naturally given, with natural characteristics.

Music therapy practice is situated at a certain place at a certain time, (whether this be individualized, group, or community based), within a social *institutional setting* of some sort, in a wide sense of this term, which belongs within one or other *sector* of society as a whole. This entails a structural containment, of one “box” placed within, or on top of the other. (Squares within squares could equally well have been used to illustrate this.). This social structural containment could naturally be further extended to levels of region, nation, and beyond, to international organizations and associations, which all taken together form and constitute the social setting of the work.

Within the session it is the situation between the three sides, in singular or plural each, as the case might be, (that is to say music or various musics, therapist and possible co-therapists, and client or groups of clients) that indicates what is actually happening,

within all these contexts, what the moments are, and what processes that are in each concrete instance involved.

Figure 8: Music Therapy Triangle Contextualized.



11.7 Research and Legitimization

That music therapy as a practice may be placed within various institutions and even within various sectors of society may cause tensions, frictions and contradictions in relation to established modes of thought and practice within these different settings. On the one side is health as a sector in modern society, with its heavy reliance on natural science methodology, requesting predictability and evidence, and, responding to economic demands, putting an increased focus on cost-efficiency. The social institution of art in modern society on the other hand, in a clear contradistinction to this, has become established as an “autonomous” sphere. (Though this “autonomy” has been questioned as to its neutrality, related to different interest groups, or classes, in society.) The prevailing ideology here implies shunning any attempts toward an *instrumentalism* of art. Music therapy would then seem to be moving cross-sectorally within society more or less comfortably between such poles.

This actualizes the question of the basis for music therapy as a discipline, according to the dialogical perspective that is outlined here. Music therapy is an intuitive and creative practice, not operational and technological. It is open for the moment, and the needs of the *situation*, both musically and interpersonally. A consequence of this is that what comes out of therapy can neither be strictly predicted, nor repeated even, because each and every situation is unique. A dialogical perspective points to the central role of the open and intentional aspect of providing and receiving music therapy. Methods and techniques are needed, and must be developed and refined, but according to a dialogical perspective practice should not become some quasi-technological affair, lest it become reifying and dehumanizing. There is consequently no need or wish even, no attempt to try to *make* it technological.

Change that happens in a moment is discontinuous, which implies that music therapy processes cannot be completely programmed or scheduled. Which is in contrast to a simple, unilateral cause and effect scheme. What is involved is rather a process of address and response, keeping open what this may bring about. Research into music therapy process then, in accordance with this presupposition, will be about interrelations of mutuality rather than effects coming from the application of music as an *independent*

factor in therapy. A dialogical perspective will not expect research to produce operational results on any mechanistic basis.

11.7.1 Dynamics of Mutuality and Reciprocity

A music-based music therapy as it is presented here is *holistic*, it relates to the whole person. And there will be a question then how to measure results of a holistic approach to therapy. This clearly poses challenges to research. Nevertheless, a dialogical perspective is not about finding out what the world *is*, statically, but how to move, dynamically, within the given conditions, creating something new. It is about what *may* come out of relation, rather than what may be predicted and counted on. What the potentials are, rather than any unequivocal predetermined outcome. This is where you have to look then; this is how you have to account for the process, according to a relational view. It is not that any technological approach as such would not at all be applicable. It is just accepting that this is not particularly where it is at for a music-based music therapy. Research into the mutualities of relation, reciprocities of influences within the therapeutic process becomes relevant then, where they are to be found, what their characteristics are, and how they may be interrelated, and with what possible or potential results, rather than determining any independent effects of one on the other.

11.7.2 Multiple Research Approaches

Qualitative research approaches may be particularly relevant here, of course. This does not mean that it is not possible to do quantitative statistical measurements of effects from music therapy, on a larger scale, according to some specifically posed research question, (though there may be quite some methodological problems and challenges involved, which probably should not be underestimated). A difference has to be made between process and outcome research here (Bunt 1994), though these differences may not just be set up as a difference between qualitative and quantitative research approaches. The particular research question asked should in each instance be the guiding line for the decision on method (Wigram, Bonde, and Nygaard Pedersen 2002).

Following a dialogical logic one may look at it the other way around too. As Alvesson and Sköldbberg (2000) make clear, what constitutes an interesting and

manageable research problem depends on the researcher's fundamental stance on methodological issues:

“More reasonable than the one-sided relationship of dominance between method (and theoretical considerations on methodological questions) on the one hand, and problems on the other, is a mutual relationship between the two” (p.11).

That is to say, the method will to some extent then also determine the question. The one cannot be seen in complete independence of the other.

The practice of music therapy is from a dialogical point of view not based on applying any fixed procedures. And the results of practice will be dependent on the quality of the work, creatively and intuitively, in each instance. But some documentation of outcome is naturally a necessary task. What needs to be underlined is that a dialogical approach still recognizes the need for also viewing practice in the mode of It, from the outside so to speak, making external as well as internal validations (Bunt 1994; Wheeler 2000). This aspect needs to be both accepted and included. A dialogical perspective that recognizes the alternation between the two sides of relation and objectification will acknowledge the need for multiple approaches. That is to say, quantitative, qualitative, theoretical, historical, or arts based research, not at the outset splitting research up into two sides, where one is accepted, and the other not. But a dialogical view will nevertheless be concerned with the possible *misapplication* of research methodology, according to the research questions asked, relating to which level that is addressed, and whether it is process or some kind of outcome research.¹¹²

11.7.3 Reflexivity

A dialogical perspective implies that results from research, of whatever kind, in any case will have to be mediated by the rationale that the therapist uses. There is no direct, objective application of such results. They will have to be incorporated into some sort of rationale, which is to say, some therapeutic intent. A rationale, more or less explicit, more or less coherent and well grounded, is itself is a condition for at all doing music therapy, how it is applied, and what comes out of it, because what comes out of using

¹¹² Aigen (1991a) has made a critique music therapy research that remains unrelated and not sufficiently relevant for music therapy practice, on account of being too much steeped in a certain conventional quantitative research methodology, which he considers constitutes a misfit in relation to actual concerns of practice.

music in therapy is not *automatic* or *mechanical*. The role of music in therapy depends on its intentional use. The effect or role of music in therapy depends on *how* it is used, how it is applied.

Reflexivity is necessary then, to evaluate the results of research, and their relevance and applicability to practice (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000). Research results may become incorporated into the pre-understanding of the therapist, but are not applied *directly*, operationally. Research is applied *via theory into practice*. There is no direct application, independent of its assimilation into a conscious rationale for practice.

11.7.4 Creativity

Pointing beyond method as a fixed procedure, a dialogically oriented approach towards practice is creative, responsive, improvisational, and situational, and this could itself be considered a major quality of the way of practicing the discipline. Objectification of method and technique may still be necessary; to build up a therapeutic repertoire, but this will always be applied in a situation that holds something new, something unique. And this is where what *happens* in music therapy literally will be. And this is the ground on which new technique and “know-how” may be developed.

The way Creative Music Therapy came into being, through the originators Nordoff and Robbins, was itself actually through a creative invention, creating music to be used in a new way in a new setting. It was not technologically or otherwise derived from previous musicological or acoustical or other research. This is what constituted the establishment of the discipline. This is the basis on which it was, and actually still is, mainly founded, as a social, cultural praxis. And further *creative work* will also be needed then, for the development of the discipline, developing *new* musical idioms to use, in new ways, in new settings. There is both an “Ars” basis to music therapy then, related to the practical clinical application of musical recourses, as well as a “Scientia” basis, related to theory and research.

11.7.5 Ethics

Kenny (2001) has voiced some concern on why music therapy has not become “mainstream” yet. It might seem to remain a salient feature of the discipline, repeatedly getting the question what music therapy is, and continuing to have difficulties

answering this question in a way leading to widespread general recognition. Music therapy *is* growing. It is not on decline. New educational programs are established, and in a growing number of countries. And music therapists are increasingly working within new fields and areas. Still there is not much of a sense in social discourse and debate of any urgent need to educate music therapists, and to develop the field.

It might seem that music therapy will remain an *offer*, rather than a demand based on some generally recognized necessity or need. Compassion and care are at the heart of music therapy. There is an ethical basis to music therapy, using music to help people, to heal, grow, develop, change. Music therapists will most likely continue to work from a two-sided engagement, as Bruscia (1989) found to be just about invariably the reason why people had chosen to become music therapists: An interest in music, and an interest in using music in working with people. The ethical basis for music therapy, thus considered, is using music for helping other people, based on one's own personal relation to, and experience with music, and its significance in one's own life. A basis for the work of music therapy, from this point of view, is found in the music therapists themselves then, from their own conviction offering this kind service.¹¹³

11.8 A Summary of the Rationale

The rationale, as outlined here, could be summarized in the following list of sentences:

- In a music-based music therapy the client enters into a therapeutically mediated relationship with music.
- Participation in music activity is enabled by working with the development of skill, at any proficiency level, the therapist responsibly taking the client's present potentials and capacities, whatever they might be, as a point of departure.

¹¹³ The French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1993) has developed a dialogically based ethical theory, that ethic responsibility is constituted in facing the Other, as an "stranger" in a way. The Other is, and will remain "unknowable" in any complete sense, which makes relation not as much an epistemological as an ethical matter. He argues that facing the Other, which is never completely "knowable", always implies an ethical dimension. Not "knowing" the other, but helping the other according to his or her own unique needs. Levinas' theories have been much referred to in discussions on ethics within the helping professions. (A Danish philosopher who argues along somewhat similar lines is K. E. Løgstrup (1956).)

- Working with skill involves a step-by-step gradual progression, involving the application and development of the will in this process.
- At any given time though, an opportunity may present itself, and be seized, to move dynamically into an experiential mode of *play*, at whatever level of proficiency the client presently might have attained.
- Entering into the mode of play, at whatever level of proficiency, implies a *potentiality of musical expression by simple means*.
- Powerful musical experience, resulting from the realization of such potentiality of expression, may enhance and *renew* the client's whole relation to music.
- A musical moment of meeting may be accompanied by an *interpersonal* moment of meeting with the therapist, through the *sharing* of such powerful experience.
- The mutual dynamics between the two sides of the musical and the interpersonal in the joint activity of *playing together* entails a possible *intensification of relation*, that potentially may lead to transforming moments of meeting, *both musically and interpersonally*.
- The change that is aimed at is an increase in the *relational capacity* of the person, which is global rather than specific in its effects, leading to personal empowerment.

Some of the *implications* of this rationale may be summarized as follows:

- The dynamic process of therapy is not about directly confronting problem issues, but rather *enhancing resources* to tackle them, indirectly, through facilitating personal empowerment.
- For such empowerment verbal processing of conflict issues is not necessary, because it is based on change in implicit relational knowing, which does not require dealing with specific issues of declarative knowledge.
- Neither is it necessary to deal with issues of transference and countertransference to bring empowerment about, as the interpersonal relationship, through playing and sharing musical experiences together, approaches a communal character.
- Change is sudden, but the "working phase" of therapy is gradual, and in the working phase transference and countertransference issues *may* be relevant to consider, interpersonally *and musically*, for delimitation through containment rather than

exploration though, in order to be ready for eventually being able to enter into the mode of play.

- There is a necessary alternation between processes of incremental and sudden change processes, both musically and interpersonally, building up to a moment of meeting, and integrating such experience over time.
- Therapy is not directed towards any particular client group, thus this therapeutic process may be applied within in a variety of institutional settings and contexts, and across different sectors of society.

11.8.1 The Two Main Interrelated Aspects

What needs to be underlined is that there are two aspects to the therapeutic process then, which are related to each other. There are two sides, and one is not sufficient without the other. The list of sentences could be supplied then with a table indicating this relationship between the two sides of *working and playing together*, which are *not* dichotomies then, but necessary interrelated aspects of the therapeutic process.

Table 2: Interrelated Aspects of Music Therapeutic Process

Work	Play
Development	Change
Gradual	Sudden
Over time	In the moment
Will	Grace
Technique	Creativity
Resistiveness	Flow
Competence	Talent
Progression	Breakthrough
Learnt	Natural
“What”	“How”

This table is set up to indicate the relation between the two main aspects of music therapy process as this has been outlined in the present chapter. The main point here is not so much each single aspect that is set up, as the interrelations between each side. What I would want to propose, in conclusion here, regarding a rationale for Creative Music Therapy, is that relating these two sides to each other, not just one opposed to the other, could itself be considered a *way* of doing therapy.

These two sides could be related to Buber's construct of the two attitudinal modes, the "what" of working as It, and the "how" of playing as Thou. The point is not settling for one or the other, but including both, It *and* Thou in the therapeutic process. This is actually a basic presupposition for the logic behind the rationale for Creative Music Therapy, as it has been outlined here.

12 Framing the Possibility of a Music-Based Therapy

The problem statement from the introductory chapter was: How may a dialogical perspective contribute to frame the possibility of a music-based, rather than a talking-based music therapy? This is what I have been trying to develop in the previous chapters, through philosophical inquiry.

Philosophical inquiry was used because the question raised was about framing, and framing is about how you see, rather than specifically what you see. It was suggested in the introductory chapter that the differences to be found in discussions within music therapy theory, on the possibility of a “therapy in music” not using verbal processing, were presumably as much about frame as of issue, and that resolving the matters between the different outlooks could not be expected, at least not without explicating the differences of frame, which implies bringing out differences in basic presuppositions, which is to say then, philosophy.

A conceptual tool was developed on the basis of Martin Buber’s philosophy, the *dialogical principle*, highlighting the two-sided attitudinal modes of relation and objectification, presence (Thou) and object (It). A crucial feature of the interpretation of this conceptual construct, as it was to be applied in the present study, was the necessity of seeing these two modes or sides as alternating. Not aiming for the exclusivity of either side, *only* presence, or *only* objectification, all the time, but seeing the dynamic potentials of the alternation between them. In the following I will discuss the results of the application of this conceptual construct to the issues brought up, related to the problem statement, and draw some conclusions.

12.1 Discussion of the Results

The basis for the application of the *dialogical principle*, as outlined and interpreted in the present study, is that it may be related to different spheres, not only to the interpersonal sphere, but also to the sphere of culture, which means that also *music* may be related to dialogically. Applying the dialogical principle on a general basis to music, it was found that there are two sides to the encounter with music, each bringing forth their own kind of object; the creative encounter, bringing forth the work (of music as art), and the receptive encounter, eventually resulting in music being made into an object of understanding (as in musicology). But in music therapy, it has been held forth, music is not aimed primarily at making musical works, as an end in itself. In contrast to this the position or status of music in music therapy, according to a dialogical outlook, could not be regarded within a simple linear model either, implying music being used merely as a means towards some non-musical end.

12.1.1 A Triangular Set-up

A “staging” of the elemental ingredients of music therapy was set up into a triangle configuration, consisting of therapist, client and music, to indicate the interrelations between these three sides. The triangle was meant to illustrate that the three “sides” are presently, and literally related to each other, in both time and space. - In contradistinction to what may be found with music as art, in which the composer may be found at one end, the work having attained an autonomous status, living its own “life”, and the listener at the other end, receiving the work on some occasion, all three in a relative separation from each other, (a distance that in time may even be centuries). In music therapy the three elemental “ingredients” of client, therapist and music are presently interrelated within the music therapy setting. Which makes possible a particular dynamics in that one side can be seen to mediate the relation between the two others. In music therapy music may be regarded neither as an autonomous work, nor an external means for something else, but as a medium. Music therapy as a concrete situation entails *an encounter with and through music*. It is not a two sided one-to-one relation, but a three-sided; between client, therapist and music, and with a mutual dynamics between these three sides.

12.1.2 Change Processes Across Two Spheres

There were found to be *two types* of relation within this triangular set-up, namely the interpersonal relation, and the relation to music. The interpersonal relation in music therapy was illuminated by using CPSG's theories of implicit relational knowing, the "something more" than interpretation in therapy. Thereafter, in accordance with the basic premise of a dialogical outlook, that anything may be related to, in whatever sphere, I applied the notion of *change in relational knowing*, as developed by CPSG, not only to the interpersonal dimension of music therapy, but *also* to the *relation to music*, implying that change in implicit relational knowledge may occur in relation to music too, and that this, as well as such change brought about interpersonally, might lead to a change in the sense of self.

The theoretical proposition then is that in Creative Music Therapy there is an interrelation between *two* relational dimensions, the interpersonal and the musical. And furthermore, that relating to music *together*, sharing in it cooperatively and experientially, enhances interpersonal relation. In this way an increased or intensified relation, both towards the music *and* interpersonally, may be developed, facilitated through the inter-relational dynamics *between* these two. The premise is that change in therapy may come about by change in implicit relational knowing. The argument that is developed here holds forth that in music therapy this may happen *both* through the interpersonal relation, *and* through the relation to music. And the one may enhance the other. It is a process of change across two different, but interrelated spheres.

A particular characteristic of this form of therapy then, is that it does not use the medium of verbal language for dealing with issues of declarative knowledge for the development of insight, but instead relies on an intensified relational process brought about through the dynamics of relation between these two sides of the musical and the interpersonal.

12.1.3 Expressive or Symptomatic Role

In accordance with CPSG's outlook, change in the sense of self, coming from a change in implicit relational knowing, does not presuppose the use of words for processing. In verbal psychotherapy, as a "taking cure", words are needed for eliciting and dealing with declarative knowledge. The necessity of using words will be different in a

therapeutic process primarily involving change in implicit relational knowledge. Still the role of music in relation to words needs to be accounted for more closely.

The role of music in relation to words has been brought out here through a comparison between Creative Music Therapy and Analytical Music Therapy, as representatives of a primarily music-based and a talking-based therapy approach respectively. The comparison of Creative Music Therapy with Analytical Music Therapy as ideal-typical examples shows two different roles to music, mainly as a *symbolic projection* of the individual psyche in Analytical Music Therapy, or as a personal *aesthetic expression*, in Creative Music Therapy. The proposition is that in Creative Music Therapy music is not regarded primarily as projective device for the inner state of the client. It is itself related to, in its full aesthetic significance as music, which transcends the private and merely autobiographical.

And this is also significant for the dynamics of change in implicit relational knowing. A prerequisite for relating to music as such is allowing it to play an aesthetic role, not just a symptomatic one. As an aesthetic expression it may be related to as something in itself. It is not just a medium for communication of a content of some sort. As an aesthetic medium it may be related to as something with its own qualities and characteristics, beyond, and as something more than the reflection of individual idiosyncrasies. And related to directly in this way it may facilitate a change in relational knowing.

It is only as an aesthetic object, as something more than a mere projective device, that music may be *related* to, as something in itself, and therefore the dynamics of change in implicit relational knowing towards music presupposes music playing the role of an aesthetic medium, it presupposes relating to music in its full significance as music. There is an interrelation of epistemology, concerning implicit relational knowledge, and musical aesthetics, concerning inherent qualities of the medium, to be found here.

12.1.4 Ways of Using Words

Regarding the relation of music to words a distinction has been made between verbalization as *talking about music*, and as *talking about music about the client*, which is what the projective function entails. A further distinction still, from Ricoeur, has been applied, namely a hermeneutics of trust and of suspicion, showing that the

psychodynamic process of “making the unconscious conscious” may be regarded as a hermeneutics of suspicion, and that verbal processing is inevitably necessary in this kind of endeavor, for dispelling illusion. This entails the further *talking about the projection* of the client, as this has been found in the music. There are two interpretive steps here, taking about the music, to bring out the projection of the psyche, and then taking about this projection, processing it, to gain insight.

The use of words in Creative Music Therapy has on the other hand been primarily to *facilitate music activity*, and any talking about music beyond this has been considered to be within the mode of trust, rather than of suspicion. It is not for eliciting any “hidden”, repressed meaning. There may be a direct “reading” of the client in Creative Music Therapy, through the music made, (of “dynamic form”, in Pavlicevic’s terms), but this is a direct (relational) knowing. – Knowing the child through music. And even though there may be perceptions here of both limitations and potentials, musically and personally, this reading still cannot be considered a hermeneutics of suspicion. You relate to what has been “said”, as musical as expression. Not to what “made” the other say it, elicited through some verbally mediated (psychodynamic) interpretation.

A dialogical perspective on the encounter with music implies a certain caution regarding the limits of language in accounting for musical meaning. Creative Music Therapy keeps the primary focus on relation as such, it is not for objectification, either as a work of art, or as objectified knowledge, and the mode of talking about the music *may* come in the way of music making itself. There may be a choice between primarily *talking* with the client, establishing a verbally based relationship, or primarily *playing* with the client, establishing a musically based relationship.

There is a further nuance to be made, between talking about the music as such, making some statement about the music, and talking about what it meant for the client, its personal significance, how the client related to the music, which is slightly different, but which does not necessarily need to involve a psychodynamic interpretive process of a hermeneutics of suspicion. This kind of talking may be invaluable in assessment and evaluation of the client’s relation to music. The different *ways of talking about* here need to be carefully distinguished in any discussion on the issue of the relation between words and music in therapy.

12.1.5 Engaging *in*, and Being Engaged *by* Music

The emphasis on music as an aesthetic expression implies that there is no simple correspondence or reflection to be found between musical change and personal change. Some issues regarding on the one hand musical subjectivism and on the other musical objectivism in Creative Music Therapy theory have been addressed, proposing a further development of theory in a relational direction. A “definition” of music has been given, as a *formed image in sound*, and used to indicate directions for such theory, moving between the extremes of subjectivism and objectivism, pointing instead to the reality of music brought forth in and through enactment; engaging in music, and *being engaged by* music in a creative and receptive “conversational” process. The suggestion is that this constitutes the relational field in which the therapeutic potential of music is to be found. A dialogical perspective, pointing to enactment and engagement with music will attempt to move beyond any dualistic subjective-objective divide in relation to music.

The notion of music as a formed image in sound may contribute to illuminate how music, in its full significance *as* music, rather than as a “sound expression”, is not merely projective, which is because it is *formed*. Forming, according to the perspective developed here, is engaging in a dialogical or conversational process with a musical idea that is developed in the materials of the medium. As an image-creation it is a making of something new, it is bringing about an expression of something that was not known before, and could not be known, which is what makes it an epistemological contradiction to think of it merely as a reflection. The active, engaged forming of the image makes it into something more than a reflection of what *has* been. It is expressing something new rather, something that has never been before.

A further implication of this way of viewing is that the significance and potential power of the music is not to be found as much in what it is an expression *of*, as *how* what is expressed, is expressed. The crux of the matter regarding the significance of music, accordingly, is to be found in the intensity of the experience, rather than the specific content of it. This is what the appeal of engaging with it is about.

12.1.6 Increasing Relational Capacity through Involvement with Music

On the background of the dialogical theoretical perspectives that have been explicated and further developed, an outline of a rationale for a music-based music therapy is

presented. A dialogically oriented *philosophical anthropology* is used as a basis for working out this outline. The rationale indicates that there are *two* main aspects to music activity in Creative Music Therapy, namely “working” and “playing”. And the skilful use of the dynamics between these two aspects from the therapist’s side facilitates the client’s participation and experience in music, whatever the capabilities of the client initially may be. This is seen as a main asset in the use of music as a therapeutic medium, that it is highly flexible in the dynamic interrelation between skill acquirement in the “working” phase, and the potentials of personal expression that may be found in the “playing” phase. And it is stressed that in Creative Music Therapy this process is not aimed primarily at the making of some musical work. It is using music as a medium for healing and regenerating the person, through the creative and interpersonal interaction that it may facilitate.

The role of music in this setting is thus to supply an experiential ground on which a person may build up relational capacity, through musical involvement, bringing forth a response of the whole person, bodily, emotionally, cognitively, and imaginatively, *and* furthermore mediating a positive therapeutic relationship, facilitating communion, social participation and interpersonal recognition. The therapeutic relationship takes on a communal quality as the music making moves from the work phase and into playing mode, approaching mutuality through musical interaction. What takes place is a dialogical process across two interrelated and mutually enhancing spheres then, *engaging* in music (creatively and receptively), and *participating* in playing. And it is implied that for both of these there is the possibility of an increase in the capacity to *relate*, which is what therapy according to a dialogical perspective is about, bringing about the regeneration of a stunted personal center.

This implies a different kind of process than a verbally mediated, problem-oriented one. It is resource oriented, not directed towards working through conflict. It is a positive – in the sense of enhancing resources – rather than a negative approach – conceived of as removing hindrances. This makes it global, rather than specifically directed towards any parts or components. It is not confronting conflict issues directly then. The emphasis is not so much to confront the hindrances for life engagement, as encouraging and promoting the engagement itself, and bringing about change through this. The frame of a dialogical rationale as explicated here opens for the possibility of

pursuing a primarily positive way of transcendence, of moving beyond fixed limits, by focusing on resources rather than problems, and in this suggesting a potentiality in mutuality, which might be overlooked by any *exclusive* stress on conflict and strife.

12.2 Conclusions

The claim here is not that work with dispelling illusion through the cognitive medium of verbal language is not possible, or even that it is not necessary in any given case. And it is not saying that a positive approach in all instances will be the *only* valid approach. It *is* suggesting that the logic of a negative approach is not necessarily the only one.

It is important to be aware of the different logics behind the rationales for therapy, and what assumptions they are based on. Any objection to a positive approach based on the exclusiveness of negative stance cannot hold, because it will not recognize the features or characteristics of the other side sufficiently to make this counter-case. It becomes blind to features of the approach by applying a frame that does not fit the picture. Ruling out one perspective on behalf of the logic of another is not in and by itself a tenable position. The conclusion to be drawn here then is that a negative, conflict-oriented logic of therapy may not be considered exclusive, and that a negative logic not being exclusive *is what frames a “therapy in music” as a possibility*, based on the logic of a positive approach.

12.2.1 Framing “Therapy in Music” as a Possibility

A conflict-oriented psychodynamic approach represents itself a philosophical anthropology, and “making the unconscious conscious”, as an aim for therapy, is a notion that naturally is aligned with this anthropology. The claim here is just that this does not have to be considered the only one, or the only *kind* of philosophical anthropology on which to base a therapeutic practice. And, quite basically, you will not be obliged to use a psychodynamic perspective, simply on the grounds that there *are* different frames. It is not a question of right or wrong then, but of how you look at it. Using another frame, you may come to a different conclusion. Not necessarily using a psychodynamic frame implies that you do not *have* to make verbal interpretations and processing of musical experience to do music therapy. Claiming that *all* would have to

do this would be repudiating other positions and approaches on a false basis, namely by misapplication of frame. What is claimed here is the possibility of *choosing* between two main kinds of approaches, called “positive” or “negative”, directed towards building resources or removing hindrances, and that you cannot simply repudiate one by the other.

This does not mean that there may not be reasons for choosing a particular approach, or that they may be just as good in every case. The limitations of such a positive, experiential approach that is not adjunct to words, as outlined here, is clearly that it does not use the capacity of language for dealing cognitively with specific issues. It is not geared directly at any meticulous untangling of conflict material, and cannot be, not using verbal language to sort this out, but moves rather towards personal integration by transformation, in and through intensified relation. And this implies that it is a holistic approach. A holistic view of a person includes all aspects of what the person is, or what the person may relate to, to body, mind, feelings and emotions, to interpersonal relations, social concerns, cultural identity, spiritual longings and aspirations, nature, environment and ecology, any and all of these, and more. A holistic view is about the person, not any single part of the person.

A change of the person is global then, not connected to any specific part, though what brings about such change may be specific. And this is what Creative Music Therapy as a holistic approach addresses: the person, as a whole, through music and through playing music together. Such a view is not confined within any single discipline, like psychology. It is not so much about a “reality principle”, in contrast to fantasies, as hope, courage in the face of despair. Being focused on the person, this is what the parameters are. Creative Music Therapy is about empowerment and about installing hope in the life of a person. And change of the person, according to a dialogical perspective, highlighting the significance of the encounter, may occur in a moment. It is not a regular, gradual progression, but happens in a moment. This is the kind of change process that is involved, in addition to the more regular, progressive development that may occur over time.

To summarize, a dialogical perspective as drawn here may contribute to frame the possibility of a music-based rather than a talking-based therapy by showing how processes of change may come about which are not based on declarative knowledge, but

rather on changes in implicit relational knowing, which may pertain not only to the interpersonal, but also to the musical, and for which verbal processing is not necessary in the same way. The logic applied here is showing another frame as sufficient for any exclusive claims on the side of those holding verbal processing to be necessary, not to be tenable.

12.3 The Relevance of the Study

The study here has not so much been for bringing up or finding out about something completely unknown, or unheard of. I am trying to explicate a view that I believe is found implicitly in much music therapy practice. I am trying to make this kind of perspective more clear. In this way it is not so much making up something new, as reminding. It is about not forgetting a crucial aspect of music therapy practice, the conversational or dialogical principle involved across musical and interpersonal dimensions. It is not for telling people something new then, something they did not know before, it is rather for recognition. Recognizing what one is actually doing, and the potentials inherent in this way of working. And in this way clarifying options. It is not meant to be directive. It is for theoretical consideration, on which to base one's own rationale for music therapy practice. In this way becoming more conscious of what one is actually doing, it might become easier to explain and to legitimize it.

As there is no mechanical application of music as a means for therapy, (according to a basic dialogical premise held here), and as a therapeutic intent itself is constitutive for at all performing music therapy practice, in whatever setting, a rationale is not only needed, it is inevitable. It is an essential part of the music therapist's competence then, the way of thinking concerning practice. The development of theory may serve as a contribution to the field, heightening the quality of practice through a more conscious and considered way of doing things, a greater awareness and a greater security at what one is doing. It may help to develop a more coherent conception, more aligned with actual practice, although this is a never ended endeavor, it is not completed once and for all.

A dialogical conception, as outlined here, implies that music therapy cannot be built solely on technique. Instead it supports a practice and *attitude* that enables unique

“moments of meeting”. When it comes down to it, it is about attitude, which is necessary, but which does not guarantee anything. Still having the “right” attitude may be conducive for such moments, which may thus make a difference. And this is why and how, primarily, a philosophical study may be of relevance for practice, because it may clarify and strengthen a conception of therapy underlying such attitudinal modes *in* practice.

12.3.1 The Role of Theory

Important to note here is that even though we come with theories, to do our practice, we do not necessarily come with our heads loaded with thoughts. We can clear our minds, becoming ready for the direct encounter, not controlled or directed by preconceptions, and not at all excluding them in any way. Letting them be what they are. This is a decisive point of a dialogical perspective, that direct relation is possible, that we do not have to act mechanically according to any preconception, but creatively, and yes, spontaneously, according to the needs of the present situation. Relation is primary, objectification secondary.

We need theory. We need some conception, some idea about therapy, without which our actions would just be arbitrary and incomprehensible, both for ourselves and for others. But entering into practice mode we can “forget” theory, to be present to the situation. And this can itself be of utmost importance. From a dialogical point of view it is the attitudinal mode of I-Thou that may facilitate the process for the client, the bringing about of the engagement of the whole client, and through this the most benefit from therapy. And subsequently reflecting upon what happened, whether or not it accorded with preconceptions, new theory can be developed. Reflecting is remembering, but going into practice once again, theory may be “forgotten” for the challenge of the whole and new situation. Developing theory as a conception of practice could be seen then as a process of remembering and forgetting, forgetting and remembering.

12.4 A Contribution to the Theoretical Discourse

Creative Music Therapy has been the primary focus of this study, or actually recent research and theoretical discourse on this approach to music therapy. A significant finding coming out from the inquiry here I believe, is that there is an apparent discrepancy between theoretical developments and practice within Creative Music Therapy. It has acquired some rather essentialist and individualistic tendencies in theory, but is clearly creatively dynamic and relational in practice. I think in the further development of theory it would be better to move in a more relational direction. The study here could be considered a contribution to CMT theoretical discourse, suggesting a move in a relational direction, which could be more aligned with actual practice, and which could support such practice more firmly.

The “music only” position indeed needs loosening up a little bit, not least by including a perspective on the dynamic interrelation between the interpersonal and the musical in therapy, not attempting to reduce or subsume the one completely under the other. There is a need to look beyond the music making, purely as such, to base the practice as a therapeutic pursuit, at the same time as this is not completely and one-sidedly confined within strictures of “psychological” or “biological” or even “sociological” constructs. An aesthetics of music is not enough. There is a need for balancing, for indeed including some “thinking”.

I have proposed here to base a notion of such a therapeutic pursuit on a dialogical philosophical anthropology, on a humanistic existential basis. One may agree with such an outlook or not, but I do think that some sort of philosophical anthropology, some notion of what human needs are, and relating these to aims for therapy, is necessary, to ground practice. A dialogical *affirmative* existential outlook may suggest itself as a promising and relevant philosophical grounding on which to build a theoretical framework for music therapy, I believe, suited to the needs of the discipline.

12.4.1 Discontinuous Processes of Change

A main point of this study then has been to take *both* sides into due consideration, the musical and the interpersonal, and their interrelation, not reducing one to the other. There may be a tendency to overemphasize the one side on behalf of the other. Recent developmental psychology, which has been extensively referred to in music therapy theory, has made the observation that music, communication, interaction may seem to be made up of the same elements (Wigram, Bonde, and Nygaard Pedersen 2002). What has been stressed here though, is that even though they are similar they are not the same. - That interpersonal and *musical* interaction, entail different, though related aspects of the therapeutic process in a music-based music therapy. And consequently it will not be sufficient to base a theory of *change* in music therapy directly on the analogy with mother-infant interaction. A theory based on developmental child psychology may go some way in indicating a developmental or incremental change process, but will not in itself be sufficient to account for change processes in music therapy, as it remains focused primarily on the interpersonal aspect.

A balance between the musical and the interpersonal is what the perspective drawn out here may help to achieve. The music therapy triangle as it is set up and explicated here, with horizontal and vertical lines crossed within the triangle figure, indicates three sides dynamically interrelated to one another, across two spheres, the interpersonal, and the musical. Working out a dialogically based rationale for music therapy on this basis may contribute to an increased awareness of the possibility of – also – *discontinuous processes of change*, in relation to *both* the interpersonal *and* musical aspects of music therapy.

12.4.2 Mediation and Immediacy

Another main point has been to show the significance of the dialectics between mediation and immediacy in processes of therapy. Both are necessary, but what is shown is that crucial moments of change are located in phases, or happenings of immediacy, of encounter, across both the spheres of the musical and the interpersonal in the therapeutic process. The relevance of a dialogical theory may be in pointing to this crucial aspect, holding it forth, that it may be recognized for what it contributes to the process of therapy, to bring out more about *what kind of processes that are involved* in a

music-based music therapy. Countering any expectation of finding a “solution” to music therapy as an It, that might lead to forgetting the crucial role of Thou.

It is not mechanical. It is situational, creative, open. Dialogical means not knowing what the other side will come up with. It is about change, which happens in the moment. And therefore there is no fixed procedure to be found. But technique is still necessary, is it a back and forth movement. But what a dialogical perspective will insist is that relation needs to be included, it is not reducible to mere objectification. And relation is what makes it “work”. Relation, in manifold diverse forms is what brings the process further, the moments of encounter through which change happens.

We arrive at a fundamental paradox here. If music therapy as a professional practice and method is to be understood as an encounter, it is at the same time clear the encounter as such, *may not be made into a method or technique*. The encounter is precisely the immediate, nothing that is methodically constructed or produced. The professional and intentional use of music as therapy acquires a paradoxical character in that as a method it so to speak becomes *a means for immediacy*. But rather than trying to find ways to eventually reconcile or solve this, it is maybe just through becoming *aware of the paradox* that a fruitful perspective on the dynamics of music therapy processes open up. Because it is just those “non-regular” moments that oftentimes become the most potent and effective, that can induce change and transformation, those that are not put into a structured plan. This type of process will not be so much systematic as intuitive-creative, based on the unique situation, and all that it harbors of possibilities. What is open and unpredictable becomes precisely a main force and power of music therapy practice. And this could be what a dialogical perspective primarily may help to bring out.

12.5 Methodological Validation and Critique

I now want to add some comments on validation and critique of the method used for this study. The overall approach to philosophical inquiry as it has been used within the present study, as outlined in the method chapter, has been *synoptical*, that is to say, building a frame, rather than being analytical in a critical sense, appraising and evaluating a given argument or system. The argument has been oriented towards

showing the possibility of a music-based music therapy by showing how it may be framed, on the basis of a dialogical outlook. I have used the procedure of explicating a dialogical perspective and then applying it to the development of a theory for a music-based, rather than a talking-based music therapy.

12.5.1 Incompatibilities Between or Variations Within Approaches

In order to bring out the characteristics of such therapy a comparison has been made with a talking-based music therapy. This comparison has been performed for purposes of contrast. I could maybe have gone more into this contrasting outlook, evaluating it on its own terms, and maybe attempting to show internal inconsistencies within this frame. But then again my aim has not been to refute the other position. Though there very well might be some implied conflict issues that could have been dealt with more extensively, for instance regarding the difference between a hermeneutics of trust and of suspicion. It is probably not just a matter of choosing different frames here, one being just as good as the other, but rather of different stances that might be sorted out, compared and evaluated somewhat more, as opposing positions. There is more work to be done here, in a more critical analytical vein, and which the methodological approach that has been chosen here does not bring out to any full extent. But then again, my aim has not been to refute the other position, but to explicate the possibility of a frame also for a music-based music therapy, thereby countering any claim to the *exclusivity* of other frames of reference.

On the other hand I could have showed more of the nuances *within* and *between* each approach, as a spectrum within each rather than one kind of relation belonging to one, and another to the other. But I have ventured rather to make differences clear, on which qualifications can be made. I have been trying to explicate frames of understanding, and trying to clarify where incompatibles may be found. What has actually been done is exposing underlying assumptions about the role of music in AMT and CMT, as this relates to the need or not of verbal processing, showing incompatibility of views. Some of these lines of difference could well be found to a more or less extent *within* both analytically *oriented* music therapy and Creative Music Therapy, in a broad sense of the term. But then we also approach more of an empirical/historical study on varieties of practice. My aim here has been theoretical, and

for this purpose I have chosen to consider the more “ideal-typical” instances as a methodological tool to bring out the issues under discussion as clearly as possible, to further theoretical development relating to these issues.

12.5.2 Both Accommodation and Assimilation of Theory

On the basis of a dialogical philosophical basis I have integrated “external” theory into music therapy theory *both* in processes of accommodation, and assimilation, in Bruscia’s terms. A music-based music therapy has been accommodated to CPSG’s theories on psychotherapy with regards to the change in implicit knowledge relating to the interpersonal aspect of therapy. But this theory has also been assimilated into music therapy theory, whereby it has been expanded upon and developed into a new perspective, by the inclusion of the relationship specifically to *music* within the notion of the significance of change in implicit relational knowing in therapy. This process of including both methodological approaches in the integration of theory I think is significant for developing a theory for music therapy that takes sufficient care of the particular and unique characteristics of the practice.

12.5.3 Coherence and Comprehensiveness

The method used has been explication through an elaboration of what a dialogical perspective entails. This explication has then served as a basis for the application of this perspective to issues of music therapy theory. This has implied, in those parts of the thesis in which this explication and application is particularly involved, that thoughts and arguments are developed without an extensive referencing to secondary literature. This is not because I believe every thought to be completely new and original. But I have found that to reference many theories within the explication of a dialogical outlook, based on Buber’s philosophy, would tend to obscure the picture. Methodologically a question might be raised if I should have accounted more for the many different theories that might be found within the history of aesthetics, for instance, in the development of the argument, or at least those theories that might be particularly relevant to compare or contrast. I have found though, that going more in this direction would not serve the purposes of the present study. It is a choice that has to be made, a balance that has to be struck, and I have chosen to try to develop a coherent view, from some basic, stated

presuppositions, rather than make it inclusive of as many viewpoints as possible. This has required a certain singularity of focus, which is also reflected in the writing style, which in parts of the study has been developed by following inherent lines of thought, rather than referencing extensively to many different and diverse sources. My claim is not to the originality of each single thought as such, but to the coherence and relevance of the argument that is developed. This is mainly what I have tried to contribute with.

The application of a dialogical perspective to music therapy, as I have tried to do here, I would consider a “personal scholarship” (Stewart 1996). It is not finding “objectively” what such a view entails, but rather developing a notion of, in this case, a music-based music therapy, through a “conversational” creative process of applying this kind of outlook in a new context, in a new way.

12.5.4 Other Dialogical Theorists

Comparison could nevertheless have been made. I could have used other theorists more, for a broader dialogical outlook and perspective, for instance Bakhtin, who has developed a series of concepts that could illuminate other aspects than the ones emphasized here. – His notion of carnival, for instance, which could have been used for indicating the significance and relevance of opposition and discord within dialogical processes. This could have been a welcome extension of themes related to a dialogical outlook. Not least with regards to issues related to differences of cultural identity. I could also have made comparisons with other theorists of a dialogical outlook, and dealt with discussions between them, for instance the debate between Buber and Levinas. This could have broadened the perspective further, but also at a certain price, namely diversifying the approach to the questions, increasing the complexities in this way, by taking into account and sorting out some more of the apparent or actual contradictions and differences that may be found between different statements adhering to a basic dialogical outlook. You gain something and you lose something then.

I have been using the concept of dialogue primarily as a methodological device here, as a conceptual construct that has been applied to certain issues related to music therapy theory, and have not made the concept *as such* a problematic, beyond supplying necessary perspective and context for understanding the basis for its use here, and the interpretation that has been given to it in this study. As made clear in the introduction, I

have chosen to keep to the interpretation of Buber as a main representative of a dialogical outlook, and to concentrate on this task, to see what can be made out of it. Also because I find that this serves the purpose of the inquiry into the problem statement, keeping the basic conceptual construct to be applied (relatively) simple, in dealing with rather complex issues of application.

I have to say that I do find Buber's basic insight into the two attitudinal modes of distance and relation, objectification and presence, mediation and immediacy to be highly applicable to the issues discussed and developed, not least in facilitating an outlook that does not fall into one or the other of the theoretical "ditches" of subjectivism and objectivism. I think it also serves for balancing between relativism and absolutism, and for these reasons I have found it to be still relevant, significant and applicable.

I could have considered *other concepts* also, naturally, in addressing the theme of the study, to see what they might contribute, but here again a question of delimitation presents itself. My aim has been to show how a music-based music therapy *could be framed*, using, in this case, the concept of dialogue as a theoretical basis. And this in itself has been considered sufficient for countering an opposing view stating that such therapy cannot be considered possible. Showing the possibility of another frame has been considered enough, to counter claims of exclusivity on behalf of an opposing view. The logic is showing another frame as sufficient for any exclusive claims on the side of those holding verbal processing as necessary, not to be tenable. This has been the basis for the methodological approach that has been taken. Trying to explicate a frame, in and of itself, for a music-based music therapy has been considered sufficient here, to show its theoretical possibility, with the intent being to support, defend and further this kind of practice.

12.5.5 Power Relations

Explicating and clarifying what a dialogical view within music-based music therapy entails, in itself may facilitate dialogue with other approaches and fields, be they more or less in accordance with this view. Voicing one's own perspective is a prerequisite for going into dialogue with others. In this connection it is worth noting that there is a power relation also to be considered, and that interdisciplinary dialogue may be an ideal

that is not always fully realized, to say the least. Theoretical framings of practice may encounter both obstacles and resistance on the way, based just as much on power as on convincing argument. This could also have indicated an alternative methodological approach to the problems dealt with here, to include the power issues involved, related to different understandings of different practices in different settings, which could be executed through a discourse analysis, (in the tradition of Michel Foucault (1972)). This could clearly bring out new perspectives on the matter of the relation between frames of understanding and practice. Still I believe an appeal to dialogue is necessary. Power cannot be considered as the final word if discussion, and even science, is at all to be considered meaningful

12.5.6 The Use of Buber's Dialogical Philosophy

I have been using Buber here because I have found that he represents a basic philosophical stance that may be well suited for explicating a positive approach to therapy, on account of its facilitating moving on a "narrow ridge" between reductionism and essentialism. As made clear in the introduction this is not at all an exegetical, or a critical study on Buber. It is an inquiry, applying some basic notions in Buber's philosophy, into current questions within music therapy theory.

I have found that Buber may be used for a critique of essentialism. Buber's conceptual construct is not at all idealistic versus materialistic - it is rather non-dualistic, balancing between extremes. The logic of Buber's construct as it has been applied here, or as I have attempted to apply it, is not at all dividing into two separated and divided parts, it is rather distinguishing *between* such dividing, which subject-object thinking represents, *and* non-objectifying ways of seeing things, or viewing, facilitating potentially at least, a perspective of balancing on the narrow ridge between the extremes of subjectivism and objectivism.

Let me nevertheless also say that I am of course not implying, that music therapy thinking could be confined within the limits of Buber's theory. I have made an inquiry here, to see what could be made out of it, deliberately keeping the focus simple in an attempt to go more into the depth of the matters. I do not consider this theory to be the only one, or the "right" one, that everyone should adhere to. The decision to use it the way I have in this study is just as much methodological as it is substantial, and in no

sense is it “dogmatic”. Needless to say, other types of music therapy, and other questions asked, will actualize other kinds of theories to use.

Critique may, and has been raised against Buber’s theories. Like any theoretical perspective they have their limitations and biases. My aim has not been to make any overall assessment, but on the basis of the interpretation made here – and in particular not regarding one mode as “good” and the other “bad” in any moralistic way, but rather being dialectically interrelated – applying this theory to the issues at hand. As mentioned, there are other traditions and representatives of dialogical philosophical outlooks that might well be applied. Again, my concern has not been to make a broadest possible account of different theoretical positions. I have not ventured to compare different such dialogical perspectives, or even debates within such views. This delimitation does not mean that comparative perspectives might not be illuminating on their own account. What is presented here may well be considered an *exemplar* of a dialogical perspective then.

Furthermore I have to say that even if I have chosen this specific focus, it is far from exhausted, and other theoretical perspectives could as well be developed from the same kind of focus, showing different angles, and illuminating other aspects of the theme in different ways. These are all necessary qualifications that need to be taken into account in validating and considering the status of the present study.

12.6 Further Studies

Another question is the level and range of the theoretical perspective presented here as this is related to the field of music therapy. I think the implications of it can be drawn somewhat wider than being a theory *just* for Nordoff-Robbins music therapy. I would consider it possible to stretch the term Creative Music Therapy beyond the work that is done by registered practitioners of this model or approach, and the issues dealt with here are applicable, I believe, on a wider basis, to any *music-based*, rather than talking-based music therapy. Creative Music Therapy may well be considered to be a primary example of such music-based music therapy. The rationale outlined here may be relevant to adjust and apply to other practices of music therapy as well, that are not within the strict confines of Nordoff-Robbins therapy.

This is something that could be further inquired into. Not least *group* music therapy. There are many different approaches here, which imply different dynamics in the interrelation between therapist and group, and between group members, *and* with regards to the role of music in these different settings. This is something that could have been elaborated on further, on the basis of the outlook that has been developed here. Not least the potentials of the communal dimension of music making in groups, which is seen dynamically in so many cultural settings. This could be considered in relation to conflict-oriented approaches to group work. The specific role, or roles of music would need to be considered here too. There are many aspects to group music therapy then that would need to be expanded on further, on which a rationale specified for such practice also could be formulated then.

Another question is how Creative Music Therapy, in the widest sense of this term, is related to the creative art therapies in general. I think the kind of dialogical perspective developed here, both with regards to the role of music as a formed image in sound, and the philosophical anthropology on which therapy may be grounded, could be widened also to include other modalities, and not least for addressing intermodal possibilities and dynamics between music and movement/dance, lyrics/text, art therapy and drama. There is a common ground between these that I believe could be addressed through a further development of the theoretical perspective that has been presented here.

Another possible application of a dialogical theoretical perspective is of course the *use* of words, in verbal processing of musical experience. A dialogical perspective could naturally be applied also to this particular issue. This has not been the focus of the present study though. What I have been trying to do is explicate a dialogical perspective to frame the possibility of a music-based music therapy that is not dependent on verbal processing, particularly as this is represented by a (classical) psychodynamic approach. More recent developments within psychodynamic orientations to therapy quite obviously show other nuances to the picture. A relevant further question to consider from out of the perspective of the present study could be how the role of music in relation to words could be constituted within a *positive* rather than *negative* logic to the therapeutic approach.

Still another direction in which to develop a dialogical perspective could be in relation to *receptive music therapy*, as represented by the Helen Bonny method of *Guided Imagery and Music*. Here different kinds of dynamics are involved. The music is prerecorded, and selected by the therapist, after a verbal conversation with the client. After the client has been induced into a relaxed, altered state of consciousness, the client and therapist here talk together *during* the listening to the music, eliciting imagery that the client reports related to the music. The therapist takes notes, and writes this down, and afterwards there is a verbal processing. Drawing and other creative media may be used too, to bring out the qualities of the experience for the client. There are clearly a whole series of dynamic interrelations at play here that might be inquired into, and that a dialogical perspective might help to elucidate, to bring out the logic, or possibly different logics, behind the rationale for such therapy.

A further interesting line of inquiry could actually be to consider different logics behind the rationale for therapy *within* each single approach. Actually there may be a spectrum of different kinds of angles within each approach, with somewhat different roles to assigned to the music, whether this be variations of Creative Music Therapy, Analytically oriented music therapy, or Guided Imagery and Music. The perspective outlined here could serve as a point of departure for eliciting the meaning and consequences of different roles within each approach. Different “plays” of therapy, with somewhat different roles assigned to the “cast” of client, therapist and music, *within* each approach.

12.6.1 Pointing Where to Look

A theoretical study does not in itself document how things are. But theory may help in pointing where to look empirically. The outlook that has been developed here could help put a focus on some crucial aspects of the therapeutic process in music therapy. Studies could be made to find more out about the movement between the modes of “work” and “play” in therapy, and how instances of moving into play might influence and change the therapeutic relationship. Inquires could be made into the relation between the kinds of levels of technical proficiency that may be involved, and the qualities and characteristics of personal expressions that on this basis are made. The therapist’s role and approaches in moving from a work mode, and entering into the

mode of play mode in therapy, could also be a theme for further study. I will not attempt to make a comprehensive list here, of all the empirical questions that could be generated from the theory that has been developed here, which will be manifold, and important to consider.

I nevertheless want to make the point that we will not actually have to wait for results from these, this way expecting to arrive at some final conclusion, because what the present study mainly is about is how frames of understanding make the picture look different. I do not think that what a dialogical perspective of music therapy entails has been sufficiently appreciated. And this is what the inquiry here has aimed at, to explicate this somewhat more. What has been pointed to is the dynamics of the *between*, which is where dynamic potential, according to this perspective, in each instance, in each situation, may be found. And the proposition here then is that this could be a place to look to find out about how music works in therapy, for purposes both of practice and of research. Not as an independent factor, but through workings of reciprocity and mutuality. The power of music, viewed this way, is thus not to be found in the music itself, but *in the way, or the ways in which it may be related to*.

12.7 Voicing

As stated in the introductory chapter I do not attempt to give one definition of music therapy here, meant to count for all music therapy. I am presenting what I consider to be a possible rationale for a music-based music therapy, as this looks from a dialogical perspective. I am presenting this rationale to gain some perspective, going more deeply into this one matter theoretically, not sweeping the entire field. It is not a theory of what all music therapy *is*. As a theory it inevitable has to be related to practice, and this is where it stands its test of relevance, whether it may clarify and ground such practice, and whether it may serve purposes of further research.

What I have aimed at here is developing theory highlighting the significance of the non-objectifying, dialogical mode in Creative Music Therapy practice. And through this, defending the view that a music-based music therapy that does not involve verbal processing – “talking cure” style, is possible on its own terms. The intent furthermore has been to explicate a certain kind of voice. To support those who sympathize with it,

and to allow this kind of voice to sound more fully. And if there necessarily must be a polyphony of voices, (as Bakhtin would say) you still have to find your own. I have been trying to convey what a dialogical perspective entails. This inquiry is intended then as a contribution to a theoretical discourse or “conversation” within the field of music therapy. And as such I would like it to be a part, among multiple voices, within this ongoing theoretical discourse. I am leaving it at this, a work that has become an *It*, inevitably, but that the reader hopefully may relate to and bring to life, through his or her own engaged thought.

References

- Agassi, Judith Buber, ed. (1999). *Martin Buber on Psychology and Psychotherapy*.
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Agawu, Kofi (1991). *Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music*.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Aigen, Kenneth (1991a). "The Roots of Music Therapy: Towards an Indigenous
Research Paradigm." DA dissertation, New York.
- (1991b). "The Voice of the Forest: A Conception of Music for Music Therapy."
Music Therapy 10 (1), 77-98.
- (1995a). "An Aesthetic Foundation of Clinical Theory: An Underlying Basis of
Creative Music Therapy." In *Listening, Playing, Creating: Essays on the Power
of Sound*, edited by Carolyn Kenny. Albany: State University of New York
Press.
- (1995b). "Philosophical Inquiry." In *Music Therapy Research: Quantitative and
Qualitative Perspectives*, edited by Barbara Wheeler. Phoenixville, PA:
Barcelona Publishers.
- (1996). *Being in Music: Foundations of Nordoff - Robbins Music Therapy*.
Saint Louis: MMB Music, Inc.
- (1998a). "Creativity in Qualitative Music Therapy Research." *Journal of Music
Therapy* XXXV (3), 155-175.
- (1998b). *Paths of Development in Nordoff-Robbins Music Therapy*. Gilsum
NH: Barcelona Publishers.
- (1999). "The True Nature of Music-Centred Music Therapy Theory: A
Response to Elaine Streeter's 'Finding a Balance between Psychological

- Thinking and Musical Awareness in Music Therapy Theory - a Psychoanalytic Perspective'." *British Journal of Music Therapy* 13 (1), 77-82.
- (2001a). "Music, Meaning, and Experience as Therapy: Kenneth Aigen Interviewed by Brynjulf Stige." *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy* 10 (1), 86-99.
- (2001b). "Playin' in the Band: The Use of Popular Styles in Clinical Improvisation." In *Vermittlungen ... Musically Speaking*, edited by Carl Bergstrøm-Nielsen and Eckhard Weymann. Greven, Germany: Berufsverband der Musiktherapeutinnen und Musiktherapeuten in Deutschland e.V.
- (2003). *A Guide to Writing & Presenting in Music Therapy*. Gilsum NH: Barcelona Publishers.
- Aldrich, Virgil C. (1963). *Philosophy of Art*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Aldridge, D., G. Brandt, and D. Wohler (1990). "Towards a Common Language in the Arts Therapies." *The Arts in Psychotherapy* 17, 189-195.
- Aldridge, David (1996a). *Music Therapy Research and Practice in Medicine: From out of the Silence*. London: Jessica Kingsley.
- (1996b). "Towards the Development of a European Research Culture in Music Therapy." In *Music Therapy within Multi-Disciplinary Teams*, edited by I.N. Pedersen and L. Bonde. Aalborg: Aalborg Universitetsforlag.
- Aldridge, Gudrun (1996c). "'a Walk through Paris': The Development of Melodic Expression in Music Therapy with a Breast-Cancer Patient." *The Arts in Psychotherapy* 23 (3), 207-223.
- Altschuler, Ira. M. (1954). "The Past, the Present and Future of Music Therapy." In *Music Therapy*, edited by Edward. Podolsky. New York: Philosophical Library.
- Alvesson, Matz, and Kaj Sköldböck (2000). *Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research*. London: Sage Publications.
- Amir, Dorit (1992). "Awakening and Expanding the Self: Meaningful Moments in the Music Therapy Process as Experienced and Described by Music Therapists and Music Therapy Clients." DA dissertation, New York University.
- (1999). "Musical and Verbal Interventions in Music Therapy: A Qualitative Study." *Journal of Music Therapy* XXXVI (2), 144-175.
- Anderson, Robert, and Wesley Sharrock (1993). "Can Organisations Afford Knowledge?" *Computer Supported Cooperative Work* 1, 143-61.

- Ansdell, Gary (1995). *Music for Life: Aspects of Creative Music Therapy with Adult Clients*. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
- (1996). "Talking About Music Therapy: A Dilemma and a Qualitative Experiment." *British Journal of Music Therapy* 10 (1), 4-16.
- (1997). "Musical Elaborations: What Has the New Musicology of Say to Music Therapy." *British Journal of Music Therapy* 11 (2), 36-44.
- (2001). "Musicology: Misunderstood Guest at the Music Therapy Feast?" Paper read at Proceedings of the Vth European Music Therapy Congress, at Castel Dell'Ovo, Napoli.
- (2002). "Community Music Therapy and the Winds of Change: A Discussion Paper." In *Contemporary Voices in Music Therapy: Communication, Culture, and Community*, edited by Carolyn Kenny and Brynjulf Stige. Oslo: Unipub forlag.
- (2003). "The Stories We Tell: Some Meta-Theoretical Reflections on Music Therapy." *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy* 12 (2), 152-159.
- Bachtin, Michail, and Caryl Emerson (1984). *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Bailey, Derek (1993). *Improvisation: Its Nature and Practice in Music*. New York: DaCapo Press.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail (1986). *Speech Genres & Other Late Essays*. Translated by Vern W. McGee. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail, and Michael Holquist (1981). *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Berkaak, Odd Are, and Even Ruud (1992). *Den Påbegynte Virkelighet*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Bernasconi, Robert (1988). "'Failure of Communication' as a Surplus: Dialogue and Lack of Dialogue between Buber and Levinas." In *The Provocation of Levinas*, edited by Robert Bernasconi and David Wood. London: Routledge.
- Binswanger, Ludwig, and Jacob Needleman (1975). *Being-in-the-World: Selected Papers*. London: Souvenir Press.
- Biswas, Goutam (1996). "Martin Buber's Concept of Art as Dialogue." In *Martin Buber and the Human Sciences*. Albany: State University of New York Press, Albany.

- Bjorkvold, Jon Roar (1992). *The Muse Within: Creativity and Communication, Song and Play from Childhood through Maturity*. Translated by translated from the Norwegian by William H. Halverson. 1st ed. New York: Harper & Collins Publishers.
- Bohlman, Philip V. (1999). "Ontologies of Music." In *Rethinking Music*, edited by Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bollnow, Otto Friedrich (1976). *Eksistensfilosofi Og Pedagogikk*. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers' forlag.
- Bonde, Lars Ole (1994). "Oplysning - Oplevelse - Oplivelse." *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy* 3 (1), 13-18.
- (2003). "Introduction to "Forms and Feelings and Forms of Perception": Analogy - a Core Concept." *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy* 12 (1), 69-70.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1990). *The Logic of Practice*. Translated by R. Nice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bronfenbrenner, Urie (1979). *The Ecology of Human Development Experiments by Nature and Design*. Cambridge, Mass. ,: Harvard University Press.
- Brown, S. (1999). "Some Thoughts on Music, Therapy, and Music Therapy: A Response to Elaine Streeter's 'Finding a Balance between Psychological Thinking and Musical Awareness in Music Therapy Theory - a Psychoanalytic Perspective'." *British Journal of Music Therapy* 13 (1), 63-71.
- Brown, Sandra, and Mercedes Pavlicevic (1996). "Clinical Improvisation in Creative Music Therapy: Musical Aesthetic and the Interpersonal Dimension." In *The Arts in Psychotherapy*.
- Bruschweiler-Stern, Nadia, Alexandra M. Harrison, Alec C. Morgan, Jeremy P. Nahum, Karlen Lyons-Ruth, Louis W. Sander, Daniel Stern, and Edward Z. Tronick (2002). "Explicating the Implicit: The Local Level and the Microprocess of Change in the Analytic Situation." *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 83, 1051-1062.
- Bruscia, Kenneth E. (1987). *Improvisational Models of Music Therapy*. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.
- (1989). *Defining Music Therapy*. Spring City, PA: Spring House.

- (1995). "The Many Dimensions of Transference." *Journal of the Association for Music & Imagery* 4, 3-16.
- (1998a). *Defining Music Therapy*. Second ed. Gilsum: Barcelona Publishers.
- (1998b). *The Dynamics of Music Psychotherapy*. Gilsum, NH: Barcelona Publishers.
- (1998c). "The Dynamics of Transference." In *The Dynamics of Music Psychotherapy*, edited by Kenneth Bruscia. Gilsum: Barcelona Publishers.
- (2001). "The Nature of Meaning in Music Therapy: Kenneth Bruscia Interviewed by Brynjulf Stige." *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy* 9 (2), 84-96.
- (2002). "Response to the Forum Discussion of the 'Iaps' in the Nordic Journal Web-Site." *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy* 11 (1), 72-80.
- (in press). "Theory Building." In *Research in Music Therapy: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives*, edited by Barbara Wheeler. Gilsum NH: Barcelona Publishers.
- Bruscia, Kenneth E., and Denise E. Grocke, eds (2002). *Guided Imagery and Music: The Bonny Method and Beyond*. Gilsum NH: Barcelona Publishers.
- Buber, Martin (1947). *Tales of the Hasidim*. New York: Schocken Books.
- (1952a). *Eclipse of God : Studies in the Relation between Religion and Philosophy*. N.Y. ,.
- (1952b). "Religion Und Modernes Denken." *Merkur* 6 (2), 101-120.
- (1955). *Der Mensch Und Sein Gebild*. Heidelberg ,.
- (1956). *The Tales of Rabbi Nachman*. New York: Horizon Press.
- (1958a). *I and Thou*. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. Second ed. New York: Scribner.
- (1958b). *Ich Und Du*. Erweit. Neuausg. ed. Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider.
- (1961). *Between Man and Man*. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. London: Collins.
- (1965a). *Das Dialogische Prinzip*. Heidelberg: Schneider.
- (1965b). *The Knowledge of Man*. London ,.
- (1967a). "Autobiographical Fragments." In *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, edited by Maurice Friedman and Paul Arthur Schilpp. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.

- (1967b). "Replies to My Critics." In *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, edited by Maurice Friedman and Paul Arthur Schilpp. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
- (1969). *The Legend of the Baal-Shem*. New York: Schocken Books.
- (1970). *I and Thou*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- (1991). *Människan Och Hennes Bildkonst*. Ludvika: Dualis Förlag.
- Buber, Martin, Rob Anderson, Carl R. Rogers, and Kenneth N. Cissna (1997). *The Martin Buber-Carl Rogers Dialogue : A New Transcript with Commentary*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.
- Bullock, Margaret (1985). *Before Speech: The Beginning of Interpersonal Communication*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bunt, Leslie (1994). *Music Therapy: An Art Beyond Words*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Bunt, Leslie, and Sarah Hoskyns, eds (2002). *The Handbook of Music Therapy*. East Sussex: Brunner-Routledge.
- Bunt, Leslie, and Mercedes Pavlicevic (2001). "Music and Emotion: Perspectives from Music Therapy." In *Music and Emotion: Theory and Research*, edited by Patrick N. Juslin and John A. Sloboda. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bø-Rygg, Arnfinn (1985). "Institusjonen Kunst." In *Kunst Og Kulturformidling*, edited by Arnfinn Bø Rygg and Hild Sørby. Stavanger: Universitetsforlaget.
- Cissna, K.N., and R. Anderson (1998). "Theorizing About Dialogic Moments: The Buber-Rogers Position and Postmodern Themes." *Communication Theory* 8 (1), 63-104.
- Coker, Wilson (1972). *Music and Meaning: A Theoretical Introduction to Aesthetics*. Toronto: The Free Press.
- Colwell, Richard, and Carol Richardson, eds (2002). *The New Handbook of Research on Music Teaching and Learning*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cook, Nicholas (1998). *Music: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly (1990). *Flow : The Psychology of Optimal Experience*. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Dahlhaus, Carl (1982). *Aesthetics of Music*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Danbolt, Gunnar, Tore Nordenstam, and Kjell S. Johannessen (1979). *Den Estetiske Praksis*. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
- DeNora, Tia (2000). *Music in Everyday Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Derrida, Jacques (1973). *Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Dewey, John (1980). *Art as Experience*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.
- Dissanayake, Ellen (2001). "An Ethological View of Music and Its Relevance to Music Therapy." *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy* 10 (2), 159-175.
- Dufrenne, Mikel (1973). *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
- Edwards, Jane (2002). "Music Therapy by Any Other Name Would Smell as Sweet" or "Community Music Therapy" Means "Culturally Sensitive Music Therapy" in Our Language. [online]. Voices: A World Forum for Music Therapy 2002 [cited December 4 2002]. Available from [http://www.voices.no/mainissues/Voices2\(3\)Stige.html](http://www.voices.no/mainissues/Voices2(3)Stige.html).
- Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah (1997). "Martin Buber in the Postmodern Age." *Society* 34 (4), 51-55.
- Elefant, Cochavit (2002). "Enhancing Communication in Girls with Rett Syndrome through Songs in Music Therapy." Institute of Music and Music Therapy, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark.
- Elliott, David J. (1995). *Music Matters: A New Philosophy of Music Education*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- (2002). "Philosophical Perspectives on Research." In *The New Handbook of Research on Music Teaching and Learning*, edited by Richard Colwell and Carol Richardson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Eschen, Johannes Th. (2002). "Analytical Music Therapy: Introduction." In *Analytical Music Therapy*, edited by Johannes Th. Eschen. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
- Feld, Steven (1990). *Sound and Sentiment: Birds, Weeping, Poetics, and Song in Kaluli Expression*. 2nd ed. Philadelphia.
- Ferrara, Lawrence (1984). "Phenomenology as a Tool for Musical Analysis." *The Musical Quarterly* 70 (3), 355-373.

- (1993). "Philosophical Inquiry: Concepts and Techniques." In *A Guide to Research in Music Education. Fourth Edition*, edited by Roger P. Phelps & Lawrence Ferrara & Thomas W. Goolsby. Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.
- Fingarette, Herbert (1963). *The Self in Transformation : Psychoanalysis, Philosophy & the Life of the Spirit*. New York: Basic Books.
- Forinash, Michele (1992). "A Phenomenological Analysis of Nordoff-Robbins Approach to Music Therapy: The Lived Experience of Clinical Improvisation." *Music Therapy* 11 (1), 120-141.
- Foucault, Michel (1972). *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Frank, Jerome D. (1989). "Non-Specific Aspects of Treatment: The View of a Psychotherapist." In *Non-Specific Aspects of Treatment*, edited by M. Shepherd and N. Sartorius. Toronto, Canada: Hans Huber Publishers.
- Frankl, Victor (1973). "Encounter: The Concept and Its Vulgarization." *Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis* 1 (1), 73-83.
- Friedman, Maurice (1981). *Martin Buber's Life and Work*. New York: Dutton.
- (1994). "Reflections on the Buber-Rogers Dialogue." *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* 34 (1), 46-65.
- (1996a). "Martin Buber's 'Narrow Ridge' and the Human Sciences." In *Martin Buber and the Human Sciences*. Albany: State University of New York Press, Albany.
- (2002a). "Martin Buber and Dialogical Psychotherapy." *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* 42 (4), 7-36.
- (2002b). "Martin Buber and Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogue of Voices and the Word That Is Spoken." In *Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue*, edited by Maurice Friedman. London and New York: Routledge.
- , ed. (1996b). *Martin Buber and the Human Sciences*. Albany: State University of New York Press, Albany.
- Friedman, Maurice, and Tamar Kron (1996). "Problems of Confirmation in Psychotherapy." In *Martin Buber and the Human Sciences*. Albany: State University of New York Press, Albany.

- Frohne-Hagemann, Isabelle, ed. (1990). *Musik Und Gestalt: Klinische Musiktherapie Als Integrative Psychotherapie*. Paderborn: Junfermann.
- Gadamer, Hans Georg (1989). *Truth and Method*. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. Second, Revised ed. London: Sheed and Ward.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1965). *Wahrheit Und Methode : Grundzüge Einer Philosophischen Hermeneutik*. 2. Aufl. ed. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Gardner, Howard (1993). *Frames of Mind : The Theory of Multiple Intelligences*. 2nd paper (tenth-anniversary) ed. New York: Basic Books.
- Garred, Rudy (1995). "Improvisasjonens Vei: Musikkterapeutisk Improvisasjon Som "Møte"." Master, Institutt for musikk og teater, University of Oslo, Oslo.
- Gates, J. Terry (1991). "Solving Music Education's Rationale Problem." *The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning* II (3), 30-39.
- Gibson, J.J. (1966). *The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Gordon, Neve. (1999). "Ethics as Reciprocity: An Analysis of Levinas's Reading of Buber." *INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY* 31 (2), 91-109.
- Gouk, Penelope (2000). *Musical Healing in Cultural Contexts*. Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate.
- Grocke, Denise Erdonmez (1999). "Pivotal Moments in Guided Imagery and Music." In *Inside Music Therapy: Client Experiences*, edited by Julie Hibben. Gilsum, NH: Barcelona.
- Hadley, Susan (2002). "Theoretical Bases of Analytical Music Therapy." In *Analytical Music Therapy*, edited by Johannes Th. Eschen. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
- Hadley, Susan J. (1999). "A Comparative Analysis of the Philosophical Premises Underlying Creative Music Therapy and Analytical Music Therapy." *The Australian Journal of Music Therapy* 10, 3-19.
- Hammer, Louis Z. (1967). "The Relevance of Buber's Thought to Aesthetics." In *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, edited by Maurice Friedman and Paul Arthur Schilpp. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
- Hanslick, Eduard (1973). *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen: Ein Beitrag Zur Revision Der Ästhetik Der Tonkunst*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

- Heidegger, Martin (1960). *Der Ursprung Des Kunstwerkes*. Stuttgart: Reclam.
- (1996). *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein Und Zeit (1927)*. Translated by J. Staumbaugh. Albany, N.Y.
- Holck, Ulla (2001). "Musikterapi Med Børn Uden Sprog Og Børn Med Forsinket Eller Afvigende Kommunikativ Udvikling." In *Musikkterapi: Når Ord Ikke Slår Til. En Håndbok I Musikkterapiens Teori Og Praxis I Danmark*, edited by Lars Ole Bonde, Inge Nygaard Pedersen and Tony Wigram. Århus: Forlaget Klim.
- Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno (1971). *Dialektik Der Aufklärung : Philosophische Fragmente 4c Max Horkheimer Und Theodor W. Adorno*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.
- Horwitz, Rivka, and Martin Buber (1978). *Buber's Way to "I and Thou": An Historical Analysis and the First Publication of Martin Buber's Lectures Religion Als Gegenwart*. Heidelberg: Schneider.
- Hughes, Margaret Heal (1995). "A Comparison of Mother-Infant Interaction and the Client-Therapist Relationship in Music Therapy Sessions." In *The Art and Science of Music Therapy*, edited by Tony Wigram, Bruce Saperston and Robert West. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.
- Jakobsen, Roman (1960). "Linguistics and Poetics." In *Style in Language*, edited by Thomas A. Sebeok. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press.
- John, D. (1992). "Towards Music Psychotherapy." *Journal of British Music Therapy* 6 (1), 10-12.
- Johnson, James R. (1991). "Joy and Process: A Philosophical Inquiry." *The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning* II (3), 22-29.
- Jorgensen, Estelle R. (1992). "On Philosophical Method." In *Handbook of Research on Music Teaching and Learning*, edited by R. Colwell. New York: Schirmer Books.
- (2002). "Philosophical Issues in Curriculum." In *The New Handbook of Research on Music Teaching and Learning*, edited by Richard Colwell and Carol Richardson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2003). "What Philosophy Can Bring to Music Education: Musicianship as a Case in Point." *British Journal of Music Education* 20 (2), 197-214.
- Jourard, Sidney M. (1971). *The Transparent Self*. Rev. ed. New York: Van Nostrand.

- Joyce-Tillman, June (2000). *Constructing Musical Healing*. London and Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
- Karterud, S., and T. M. Monsen (1997). *Selvpsykologi. Utviklingen Etter Kohut*. Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal.
- Keil, Charles, and Steven Feld (1994). *Music Grooves : Essays and Dialogues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kenny, Carolyn B. (1982). *The Mythic Artery: The Magic of Music Therapy*. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.
- (1985). "Music: A Whole Systems Approach." *Music therapy: the Journal of the AAMT*.
- (1987). "The Field of Play: A Theoretical Study of Music Therapy Process." PhD, The Fielding Institute.
- (1989). *The Field of Play: A Guide to the Theory and Practice of Music Therapy*. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
- (1996). "The Dilemma of Uniqueness: An Essay on Consciousness and Qualities." *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy* 5 (2), 87-96.
- (2000). "Setting the Stage for General Theory in Music Therapy - Reply to Bärmark and Hallin." *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy* 9 (1), 64-69.
- (2002). *Will Music Therapy Endure?* (Columnist of the week: May 28 - June 3, 2001). *Voices: A World Forum for Music Therapy 2001* [cited 04.03 2002]. Available from <http://www.voices.no/columnist/colkenny280501.html>.
- Kepnes, Steven (1996). "Martin Buber's Dialogical Biblical Hermeneutics." In *Martin Buber and the Human Sciences*. Albany: State University of New York Press, Albany.
- Kerman, Joseph (1985). *Musicology*. London: Fontana Press/Collins.
- Kivy, Peter (1990). *Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Kjerschow, Peder Christian (1978). *Musikk Og Mening : En Studie I Musikkforståelse Med Utgangspunkt I Eduard Hanslick*. Oslo: Tanum-Norli.
- (1995). "Musikk Og Fortrolighet: En Problematisering Av Begrepet Kodefortrolighet." *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy* 4 (1), 21-24.
- (2000). *Før Språket: Musikkfilosofiske Essays*. Oslo: Vidarforlaget.

- Kohut, Heinz (1959). "Introspection, Empathy and Psychoanalysis." *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 7, 459-483.
- (1971). *The Analysis of the Self: A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders*. New York: International Universities Press.
- (1977). *The Restoration of the Self*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Kovach, A. (1985). "Shamanism and Guided Imagery and Music." *Journal of Music Therapy* 22 (3), 154.
- Kramer, Laurence (1993). "Carnival, Cross-Dressing and the Woman in the Mirror." In *Musicology and Difference: Gender and Sexuality in Music Scholarship*, edited by Ruth A. Solie. Berkely.
- Kramer, Lawrence (2001). "The Mysteries of Animation: History, Analysis and Musical Subjectivity." *Musical Analysis* 20 (II), 153-178.
- Kuhn, Thomas (1970). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Laing, Ronald D. (1960). *The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness*. London: Tavistock.
- (1971). *Self and Others*. 2nd ed. London: Penguin Books.
- Langenberg, Mechtild (1999). "Music Therapy and the Meaning of Affect Regulation for Psychosomatic Patients." In *Clinical Applications of Music Therapy in Psychiatry*, edited by Tony Wigram and Jos De Backer. London: Jessica Kingsley.
- Langer, Susanne K. (1979). *Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a New Key*. London and Nenley: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.
- Lecourt, Edith (1992). *Freud Et Le Sonore: Le Tic-Tac Du Desire*. Paris: L'Hartmattan.
- Lee, Colin (1992). "The Analysis of Therapeutic Improvisatory Music with People Living with the Hiv and Aids." City University, London.
- (1995). "The Analysis of Therapeutic Improvisatory Music." In *Art and Music: Therapy and Research*, edited by Andrea Gilroy and Colin Lee. New York: Routledge.

- (1996). *Music at the Edge: Music Therapy Experiences of a Musician with Aids*. London, New York: Routledge.
- (2000). "A Method of Analysing Improvisations in Music Therapy." *Journal of Music Therapy* XXXVII (2), 147-167.
- (2003). *The Architecture of Aesthetic Music Therapy*. Gilsum NH: Barcelona Publishers.
- Levinas, Emmanuel (1967). "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge." In *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, edited by Maurice Friedman and Paul Arthur Schilpp. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
- Levinas, Emmanuel, Hans Kolstad, Asbjørn Aarnes, and Det Norske akademi for sprog og litteratur (1993). *Den Annens Humanisme*. Oslo: Aschehoug : I samarbeid med fondet for Thorleif Dahls kulturbibliotek og Det norske akademi for sprog og litteratur.
- Liotard, J. F (1984). *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press.
- Løgstrup, Knud Ejler (1956). *Den Etske Fordring*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal.
- Maratos, Anna (2002). *Response to Discussion Paper on Community Music Therapy* [online]. Voices: A World Forum for Music Therapy 2002 [cited August 4 2002]. Available from [http://www.voices.no/mainissues/Voices2\(3\)Stige.html](http://www.voices.no/mainissues/Voices2(3)Stige.html).
- Marcel, Gabriel (1967). "I and Thou." In *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, edited by Maurice Friedman and Paul Arthur Schilpp. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
- Marcel, Gabriel, Stephen Jolin, Peter McCormick, and Paul Ricoeur (1973). *Tragic Wisdom and Beyond : Including, Conversations between Paul Ricoeur and Gabriel Marcel*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Maslow, Abraham (1973). *The Farther Reaches of Human Nature*. New York: Viking Press.
- May, Rollo (1969). *Love and Will*. New York: Norton.
- McClary, Susan (1991). *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender and Sexuality*. Minneapolis. *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* (1999). Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam Webster, Incorporated.
- Messer, Stanley B., and Robert L. Woolfolk (1998). "Philosophical Issues in Psychotherapy." *Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice* 5 (251-263).

- Meyer, Leonard B. (1956). *Emotion and Meaning in Music*. [Chicago]: University of Chicago Press.
- Moreno, Joseph J. (1988). "The Music Therapist: The Creative Arts Therapist as Contemporary Shaman." *The Arts in Psychotherapy* 15, 271-280.
- (1995). "Ethnomusic Therapy: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Music and Healing." *The Arts in Psychotherapy* 22 (4), 271-280.
- Nattiez, Jean Jacques (1990). *Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Nielsen, Frede V. (1998). *Almen Musikdidaktik*. 2. rev. og bearb. udg. ed. København: Akademisk Forlag.
- Nordoff, Paul, and Clive Robbins (1972). *Therapy in Music for Handicapped Children*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- (1977). *Creative Music Therapy: Individualized Treatment for the Handicapped Child*. New York: John Day.
- Odell-Miller, Helen (2001). "Music Therapy and Its Relationship to Psychoanalysis." In *Where Analysis Meets the Arts*, edited by Yvonne Searle and Isabelle Streng. London & New York: Karnac Books.
- Oldfield, Amelia (1995). "Communicating through Music: The Balance between Following and Initiating." In *The Art and Science of Music Therapy*, edited by Robert West. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.
- Palmer, R. (1969). *Hermeneutics*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Pavlicevic, Mercedes (1990). "Dynamic Interplay in Clinical Improvisation." *British Journal of Music Therapy* 4 (2), 5-9.
- (1995a). "Interpersonal Processes in Clinical Improvisation: Towards a Subjectively Objective Systematic Definition." In *The Art and Science Music Therapy- a Handbook*, edited by Tony Wigram, Bruce Saperston and Robert West: Harwood Academic Publishes.
- (1995b). "Music and Emotion: Aspects of Music Therapy Research." In *Art and Music: Therapy and Research*, edited by Andrea Gilroy and Colin Lee. London: Routledge.
- (1997). *Music Therapy in Context: Music, Meaning and Relationship*. London: Jessica Kingsley.

- (1999a). "Thoughts, Words and Deeds: Harmonies and Counterpoints in Music Therapy Theory." *British Journal of Music Therapy* 13 (2), 59-62.
- (1999b). "With Listeners in Mind: Creating Meaning in Music Therapy Dialogues." *The Arts in Psychotherapy* 26 (2), 85-94.
- (2002). *Dynamic Interplay in Clinical Improvisation* [online]. Voices: A World Forum for Music Therapy Vol.2(2) 2002 [cited 31. Jul. 2002]. Available from [http://www.voices.no/mainissues/Voices2\(2\)pavlicevic.html](http://www.voices.no/mainissues/Voices2(2)pavlicevic.html).
- Pedersen, Inge Nygaard (2002). "Analytical Music Therapy with Adults in Mental Health and in Counselling Work." In *Psychodynamic Movement: A Basic Training Methodology for Music Therapists*, edited by Johannes Th. Eschen. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
- Polanyi, Michael (1958). *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Polster, Erving, and Miriam Polster (1974). *Gestalt Therapy Integrated : Contours of Theory and Practice*. N.Y.: Vintage.
- Priestley, Mary (1985). *Music Therapy in Action*. St. Louis: Magna-Music Baton.
- (1988). "Music and the Listeners." *Journal of British Music Therapy* 2 (2), 9-13.
- (1994). *Essays on Analytical Music Therapy*. Phoenixville PA: Barcelona Publishers.
- (1995). "Linking Sound and Symbol." In *The Art and Science of Music Therapy*, edited by Tony Wigram, Bruce Saperston and Robert West. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.
- Priestly, Mary, and Johannes Th. Eschen (2002). "Analytical Music Therapy: Origin and Development." In *Analytical Music Therapy*, edited by Johannes Th. Eschen. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
- Reichling, Mary J. (1996). "On the Question of Method in Philosophical Research." *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 4 (2), 117-127.
- Ricoeur, Paul (1970). *Freud and Philosophy : An Essay on Interpretation*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- (1978). *Explanation and Understanding*. New York: Beacon.

- Robbins, Clive Robbins & Carol (1991). "Self-Communications in Creative Music Therapy." In *Case Studies in Music Therapy*, edited by Kenneth Bruscia. Phoenixville: Barcelona.
- Robbins, Clive, and Carol Robbins (1998). *Healing Heritage: Paul Nordoff and the Tonal Language of Music*.
- Rogers, Carl R. (1961). *On Becoming a Person a Therapist's View of Psychotherapy*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Rolvjord, Randi (2002). *Når Musikken Blir Språk: Musikalsk Kommunikasjon I Musikkterapi - Et Dialektisk Perspektiv*. Oslo: Unipub forlag.
- Rouget, Gilbert (1985). *Music and Trance : A Theory of the Relations between Music and Possession*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ruud, Even (1980). *Music Therapy and Its Relationship to Current Treatment Theories*. Saint Louis: MMB Music, Inc.
- (1998a). "Improvisation as Liminal Experience." In *Music Therapy: Improvisation, Communication, and Culture*, edited by Even Ruud. Gilsum, NH: Barcelona Publishers.
- (1998b). "Improvisation as Social Interaction, or Getting into the "Groove" of Music Therapy." In *Music Therapy: Improvisation, Communication, and Culture*, edited by Even Ruud. Gilsum, NH: Barcelona Publishers.
- (1998c). "Improvisation, Interpretation, and Qualitative Research." In *Music Therapy: Improvisation, Communication, and Culture*, edited by Even Ruud. Gilsum, NH: Barcelona Publishers.
- (1998d). "The Individual as Improviser: The Concept of the Individual in Music Therapy." In *Music Therapy: Improvisation, Communication, and Culture*, edited by Even Ruud. Gilsum, NH: Barcelona Publishers.
- (1998e). "Music and Identity." In *Music Therapy: Improvisation, Communication, and Culture*, edited by Even Ruud. Gilsum, NH: Barcelona Publishers.
- (1998f). *Music Therapy: Improvisation, Communication, and Culture*. Gilsum, NH: Barcelona Publishers.

- (1998g). "Pathways to Music Therapy." In *Music Therapy: Improvisation, Communication, and Culture*, edited by Even Ruud. Gilsum, NH: Barcelona Publishers.
- Said, Edward (1995). *Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient*. London: Penguin Books.
- Salas, Jo (1990). "Aesthetic Experience in Music Therapy." *Music Therapy* 9 (1), 1-15.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1989). *Being and Nothingness an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*. London: Routledge.
- Scheiby, Benedicte B. (2002). "Improvisation as a Musical Healing Tool and Life Approach: Theoretical and Clinical Applications of Analytical Music Therapy Improvisation in a Short and Long-Term Rehabilitation Facility." In *Analytical Music Therapy*, edited by Johannes Th. Eschen. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
- Searle, John A. (1995). *The Construction of Social Reality*. New York: Free Press.
- Seashore, C. E. (1938). *Psychology of Music*. New York: Dover Publications.
- Simon, Ernst (1967). "Martin Buber, the Educator." In *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, edited by Maurice Friedman and Paul Arthur Schilpp. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
- Small, Christopher (1998). *Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening*. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.
- Smeijsters, Henk (2003). "Forms and Feelings and Forms of Perception: The Fundamentals of Analogy in Music Therapy." *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy* 12 (1), 71-85.
- Solomon, Alan L. (1995). "Historical Research." In *Music Therapy Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives*, edited by Barbara Wheeler. Phoenixville, PA: Barcelona Publishers.
- Stensæth, Karette (1999). "'Det Karnevalske Liv'." *Musikkterapi* (4), 10-22.
- (2002). "Musikkterapi Som Kjær-Leik." Master thesis, Department of Music and Theatre, University of Oslo, Oslo.
- Stephens, Barbara D. (2001). "The Martin Buber - Carl Jung Disputations: Protecting the Sacred in the Battle for the Boundaries of Analytical Psychology." *Journal of Analytical Psychology* 46, 455-491.
- Stern, Daniel (1985). *The Interpersonal World of the Infant*. New York: Basic Books.

- Stern, Daniel, Louis W. Sander, Jeremy P. Nahum, Alexandra M. Harrison, Karlen Lyons-Ruth, Alec C. Morgan, Nadia Bruschweiler-Stern, and Edward Z. Tronick (1998a). "Non-Interpretive Mechanisms in Psychoanalytic Therapy: The 'Something More' Than Interpretation." *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 79, 903-931.
- (1998b). "The Process of Therapeutic Change Involving Implicit Knowledge: Some Implications of Developmental Observations for Adult Psychotherapy." *Infant Mental Health Journal* 19 (3), 300-308.
- Stewart, John (1985). "Martin Buber's Central Insight: Implications for His Philosophy of Dialogue." In *Dialogue: An Interdisciplinary Approach*, edited by m. Dascal. Amsterdam: John Benjamen Publishing Company.
- (1996). "Two of Buber's Contributions to Contemporary Human Science." In *Martin Buber and the Human Sciences*. Albany: State University of New York Press, Albany.
- Stige, Brynjulf (1998). "Perspectives on Meaning in Music Therapy." *British Journal of Music Therapy* 12 (1), 20-28.
- (2001). *Dancing Interfaces: Responce to Even Ruud's Paper "New Musicology", Music Education and Music Therapy'* [online]. Nordic Journal of Music Therapy 2001a [cited February 12 2001]. Available from <http://www.hisf.no/njmt/artikkelstigedancinginterfaces.html#top>.
- (2001b). "Polyphonic Voices: Aesthetic Aspects of Music Therapy Improvisations." In *Vermittlungen ... Musically Speaking*, edited by Carl Bergstrøm-Nielsen and Eckhard Weymann. Greven, Germany: Berufsforband der Musiktherapeutinnen und Musiktherapeuten in Deutschland e.V.
- (2002a). *Culture-Centered Music Therapy*. Gilsum: Barcelona Publishers.
- (2002b). "History and Heritage - on Tradition and Innovation in Creative Music Therapy." In *Contemporary Voices in Music Therapy: Communication, Culture, and Community*, edited by Carolyn Kenny and Brynjulf Stige. Oslo: Unipub forlag.
- (2003). "Elaborations toward a Notion of Community Music Therapy." Dr.art, Department of Music and Theatre, University of Oslo, Oslo.

- Stolorow, Robert D., and George E. Atwood (1992). *Contexts of Being : The Intersubjective Foundations of Psychological Life*. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.
- Streeter, Elaine (1999a). "Definition and Use of the Musical Transference Relationship." In *Clinical Applications of Music Therapy in Psychiatry*, edited by Tony Wigram and Jos De Backer. London: Jessica Kingsley.
- (1999b). "Finding a Balance between Psychological Thinking and Musical Awareness in Music Therapy Theory: A Psychoanalytic Perspective." *British Journal of Music Therapy* 13 (1), 5-20.
- Stubley, Eleanor V. (1992). "Philosophy as a Method of Inquiry." *The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning* III (1), 44-54.
- Subotnic, Rose Rosengard (1996). *Deconstructive Variations: Music and Reason in Western Society*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Theunissen, Michael (1984). *The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Treitler, Leo (2000). "Hermeneutics, Exegetics, or What?" Paper read at 13th Nordic Musicological Congress, at Aarhus, Denmark.
- Trevarthen, Colwyn, and Stephen N. Malloch (2000). "The Dance of Wellbeing: Defining the Musical Therapeutic Effect." *Nordic Journal of Music Therapy* 9 (2), 3-17.
- Turry, Alan (1998). "Transference and Countertransference in Nordoff-Robbins Music Therapy." In *The Dynamics of Music Psychotherapy*, edited by Kenneth Bruscia. Gilsum: Barcelona Publishers.
- Van Deurzen, Emmy (1997). *Everyday Mysteries : Existential Dimensions of Psychotherapy*. London: Routledge.
- (1998). *Paradox and Passion in Psychotherapy: An Existential Approach to Therapy and Counselling*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
- (2002). *Existential Counselling & Psychotherapy in Practice*. London: Sage Publications.
- von Wright, Georg Henrik (1971). *Explanation and Understanding*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Walser, Robert (1993). *Running with the Devil : Power, Gender, and Madness in Heavy Metal Music*. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.

- Weisethaunet, Hans (2000). "'the Other': Bakhtinian Perspectives on Musical Aesthetics." In *Sociology and Aesthetics*, edited by Jostein Gripsrud. Bergen: Program for kulturstudier, Norges forskningsråd.
- Wheeler, Barbara W. (2000). "Music Therapy Practice , Theory and Research: Growing Perspectives." In *Music Therapy Research: Growing Perspectives in Theory and Practice*, edited by Jacqueline Z. Robarts. Hertfordshire UK: British Society for Music Therapy - BSMT Publications.
- Wigram, Tony, Lars Ole Bonde, and Inge Nygaard Pedersen (2002). *A Comprehensive Guide to Music Therapy : Theory, Clinical Practice, Research, and Training*. Philadelphia, PA: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
- Winch, Peter (1958). *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Winnicott, Donald W. (1971). *Play and Reality*. London: Tavistock.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953/1967). *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wood, R.E. (1999). "The Dialogical Principle and the Mystery of Being - the Enduring Relevance of Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel." *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 45 (2), 83-97.
- Yalom, Irvin D. (1980). *Existential Psychotherapy / Irvin D. Yalom*. New York.: Basic.
- (1989). *Love's Executioner and Other Tales of Psychotherapy*. New York: Basic Books.
- Zohar, Danah (1990). *The Quantum Self*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Zuckerandl, Victor (1956). *Sound and Symbol*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- (1973). *Man : The Musician*.
- Østerberg, Dag, and Fredrik Engelstad (1995). *Samfunnsformasjonen: En Innføring I Sosiologi*. Oslo: Pax forlag.
- Aasgaard, Trygve (1999). "Music Therapy in the Hospice and Paediatric Oncology Ward." In *Music Therapy in Palliative Care: New Voices*, edited by David Aldridge. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.