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**THE AGA KHAN UNIVERSITY**  
**Graduate School of Media and Communications**

**ANALYSIS OF KENYA'S PRINT MEDIA FRAMING OF THE DUSIT D2  
TERROR SUSPECTS**

By  
Ibrahim Galgalo Bocha  
535158

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts in Digital Journalism

Nairobi, Kenya

20/02/2023  
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APPROVAL PAGE

The Aga Khan University  
Graduate School of Media and Communications

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master  
of Arts in Digital Journalism

Members of the Thesis Evaluation Committee appointed to examine the thesis of  
IBRAHIM GALGALO BOCHA-535158, find it satisfactory and recommended that it  
be accepted.

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Prof. Nancy Booker,  
Interim Dean,  
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Member,  
Thesis Evaluation Committee

20/02/2023

## DECLARATION

### **ANALYSIS OF KENYA'S PRINT MEDIA FRAMING OF THE DUSIT D2 TERROR ATTACK PERPETRATORS**

I, **IBRAHIM GALGALO BOCHA-535158**, declare that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university and that to the best of my knowledge it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. The editorial assistance provided to me has in no way added to the substance of my thesis, which is the product of my research endeavours.

---

Signature

---

Date

## DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my family.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I give all glory, honour and heartfelt thanks to my grand instructor Allah for his guidance and protection that has brought me this far. Special appreciations also go to my Supervisors Prof. Peter Kimani, Dr. James Oranga, and Dr. Sam Kamau, for their guidance and patience throughout this research. I am also very thankful to my family for standing by me in my prayers during my studies.

## ABSTRACT

The reporting of Terror Incidents (TIs) by the media in Kenya started when the first case was reported under the reign of President Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), with the first incident reported in 1980, when Palestinian militants staged an attack at Norfolk Hotel on New Year's eve. Whereas the media has had to balance covering TIs in a timely, factual and objective manner, journalists also need to frame their narratives to reflect the event's social, economic and psychological dimensions. They strive to avoid sensationalism, bias and a presentation of facts that could be seen to fan militants' propaganda. This study aimed to analyse frames the mainstream print media applied in the coverage of the Dusit Kenya. The study sought to identify the frames adopted by mainstream print media in the coverage of the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya, which took place in 2019. The study examined factors influencing the framing of perpetrators involved in the Dusit D2 hotel TI by the mainstream print media. The framing theory guided the study. The study employed a concurrent research design using a mixed methods approach. The population of the study was all 44 print publications/newspapers in Kenya. The target population consisted of 217 stories on the Dusit D2 TI identified pre-study published by the Daily Nation and the Standard over three weeks, between 16<sup>th</sup> January and 6<sup>th</sup> February. The study used individual articles (hard news, features, commentary, letters to the editors, and editorials) on Dusit D2 hotel TI, as a unit of analysis. The study also interviewed key journalists and editors who covered the event to understand their knowledge of framing, framing considerations, and measures they would apply to bridge framing gaps. The study used a coding sheet and interview guides as the main tools to gather quantitative and qualitative data, respectively. The data analysis was carried out using descriptive analysis for quantitative data and thematic analysis for qualitative data. The study found that the responsibility frame was the major frame used. The other major frames used were human interest, crime, and conflict. The findings also indicated that the newspapers framed the terrorists as homegrown but with foreign ideologies, with some articles framing them as foreigners. It was also determined that Al-Qaeda/Al Shabab was the main organisation mentioned in the coverage of the stories. The study determined that social media, phone calls, fellow reporters and the use of television were major sources of receiving information on the terrorists' attack at the Dusit D2 Hotel on January 16, 2019. The study concluded that the newspapers initially reported that the terror suspects were foreigners and Somalia-based in the first week of the reporting. This perception lingered on, portraying the terror suspects as foreigners, even as emerging news disproved that the suspects were Somalis or Somalia-based. The study recommends an approach reporters and editors can use to publish stories that give factual and verified data. This means that the coverage of terror-related incidences should incorporate facts, both objective and interpretive analyses, that provide accurate information. The study also recommends that the newspapers should involve terrorism experts in their future reporting stories, which will help provide solutions to issues surrounding terror attacks.



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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<b>AKU:</b>	Aga Khan University
<b>DN:</b>	Daily Nation
<b>EAS:</b>	The East African Standard
<b>KDF:</b>	Kenya Defence forces
<b>TI:</b>	Terror Incidences
<b>USA:</b>	United States of America

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

#### 1.1 Introduction

On 15 January 2019, Al-Shabaab, a Somalia-based terror group, attacked a foreign-owned hotel in Nairobi. The attack at the Thai-owned Dusit D2 Hotel in Nairobi's 14 Riverside Drive, located in the Westland neighbourhood, started in the afternoon of 15 January at around midday. Following a deadly raid by Al-Shabab on Kenya's Garissa University on April 2, 2015, the attack was the country's first significant terrorist incident in four years, in which 148 people, many of them students, perished. Dusit D2, an entire facility in the wealthy Westlands district of Nairobi that often attracts international guests and hosts foreign embassies, was never an accident (Bryden & Bahra, 2019). Facilitating an attack in such a location can lead to maximum media attention, which is fodder for propaganda for the Al-Shabab.

Terror attacks involving violence contrary to humans with the aim of initiating terror or fear, continue to dominate public debates both locally and internationally (Silke, 2003; Morin, 2016; Fahmy, 2017). These incidences also keep receiving wide media coverage in both international and Kenyan media due to the psychological, physical and economic impacts of such attacks.

By targeting a wealthy suburb of Nairobi with international businesses and embassies, the militants rightly projected instant media attention, which unfurled almost in real-time as the siege was still on. Within two hours of the attack, Al-Shabab requested responsibility through the group's military operations spokesman, Sheik Abdiasis Abu Musab, by speaking to Reuters. The British wire agency has a global reach, so the news was picked by many regional and world media. The group claimed

the attack was “a response to US President Donald Trump’s decision to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel” (Bryden & Bahra, 2019, p.11). Kenyan security personnel finally shut down the hotel complex the following day at about 20:00. There were at least 21 fatalities, including the five shooters. It is unclear whether Kenyan authorities killed the five gunmen or if they took their own lives.

This internationalization of the terror attack, as well as the Shabab operating out of Somalia, which has not had a central government for over 30 years, somewhat skewed the tone of the local media, whose initial reporting appeared to suggest that the terror suspects were radicalised Somali Muslims. In any case, one could argue that previous terror attacks on Kenyan soil had been orchestrated by foreigners, many of them affiliates of the Al-Qaeda terror network.

For instance, one of the earliest terror attacks on Kenyan soil, on 31 December 1980, one the Norfolk hotel, was orchestrated by pro-Palestinian militants who reportedly retaliated to protest Kenya’s support for Israel during Operation Entebbe when a rescue mission was staged to rescue Israelis who been abducted from a commercial flight in Uganda. The bomb attack killed 20 people had different nationalities (Koome, 2013). During the Hilton hotel attack, Kenyan media depicted the TI as an external matter in which the Israel-Palestinian conflict was playing out in Kenya.

## 1.2 Background to the Study

However, one of the worst attacks in Kenya was witnessed in August 1998. During the incident, 213 people were killed and 4,000 injured when the United States of America (USA) embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi were attacked. Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were seen as Western lackeys and easy targets. Once again, the reportage

on this TI presented terrorism as an external import, with Al-Qaeda having active cells, albeit dominated by international jihadists.

Another major attack on Kenyan soil was staged on the coastal region on November 28, 2002, ‘when a group of Israeli tourists visiting an Israeli-owned hotel were targeted. In the attack, 13 people died; many Kenyan traditional dancers were killed, and 80 others were injured. The terror suspects also launched missiles at an Israeli airplane but missed the target. Nevertheless, Kenya’s leading newspaper, *The Standard* headlined the event: “Agents of Terror Return to Kenya” implying that the attack was an external threat (Schaefer, 2005).

This perception was further fanned in ‘2011, when French tourist Marie Dedieu was nabbed from the Kenyan territory on October 1, 2011. Kenya responded by deploying her troops to Somalia. The incursion of the Kenya Defence Forces into Somali opened a new frontier, as subsequent attacks on Kenya by terror suspects were explained away as a protest against Kenya’s continued presence in Somalia (Kiarie & Mogambi, 2017).

However, the attack on Dusit D2 was different in various ways.. Within a few days following the attack, police identified a number of the terrorists, including Ali Salim Gichunge, known by the alias “Farouk,” who was thought to be the team commander. ‘Farouk,’ a 26-year-old student from Nyeri in central Kenya, was sent to a Catholic school in Isiolo, in eastern Kenya, where he was radicalised according to his sister. Eric Kinyanjui, who apparently was born in Isiolo but lived in Limuru, a suburb of Nairobi, was also identified by police. ‘Farouk’ and Kinyanjui match an expanding pattern of non-Somalis joining Al-Shabab. In Farouk’s hometown of Nyeri, intelligence and law enforcement sources asserted that Al-Shabab recruiters were present in the slums and actively seeking out members of the Kikuyu ethnic group in addition to



Somalis. According to Nasubo and Luvaga (2020), although Al-Shabab has repeatedly attacked Kenya with fatal attacks, the Dusit D2 attack was a radical departure as the terror suspects were homeboys who had lived in different parts of the country and embraced other faiths before converting to Islam. They were homegrown terror suspects, specifically Kenyans not of Somali descent (Bryden & Bahra, 2019). Therefore, this study sought to analyse frames the typical print media applied in the coverage of the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya, given the unique set of circumstances relating to the terror suspects.

### 1.3 Statement of the Problem

The reporting of Terror Incidents (TIs) by the media in Kenya started when the first case was reported under the reign of President Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), with the first incident reported in 1980, when Palestinian militants staged an attack at Norfolk Hotel on New Year's eve. Whereas the media has had to strike a balance between covering TIs in a timely, factual and objective manner, journalists also need to frame their narratives to reflect social, economic and psychological dimensions of the event, they strive to avoid sensationalism, bias and a presentation of facts that could be seen to fan militants' propaganda.

For this study, two TIs are worth noting as they amplify other dominant frames in the coverage of terror attacks. First, the 2013 Westgate attack and the 2015 Garissa University College terror attacks, attracted some coverage that appeared to suggest that the attacks were justifiable political responses to Kenyan forces occupation of Somalia (Ogega, 2019). Other frames pointed to the possibility that Kenya's Muslim fraternity was sympathetic to the terrorism agenda.

The Westgate/ Garissa coverage was that the media were awash with the coverage of Westgate given to its location – a wealthy suburb frequented by affluent

Kenyans and foreigners. At the same time, Garissa University, remotely situated, rural and generally poor, received fleeting media, despite the higher number of casualties of 148. In the two TIs, the terror suspects were foreign and/or Somali-based extremists who used their Muslim faith to justify the attack on “faithless” Kenyans. At Westgate and Garissa, victims were asked to recite verses from the Koran to prove their faith. Those who failed took the bullet. Muslim leaders protested this angle, arguing that the media was engaged in propaganda and the media reports bespoke an agenda to conceal factual and balanced information (Ogormegbunem, 2014; Kiarie & Mogambi, 2017; Chike et al., 2017).

The Media Council of Kenya (MCK) notes that previous media coverage of TIs glorified and amplified acts of terror by being hyperbolic and sensationalist (MCK, 2014). In addition, media framing of TIs had the potency of creating discord among citizens of Kenya since audiences may innocuously consume information that would generate a conflict among citizens. Whereas the media has to strike a smart balance between covering TIs in a timely, factual and objective manner, media framing needs to consider social, economic and psychological aspects that may give a different shade of reality. Increasingly, a persistent framing of TIs that has been labelled hyperbolic, sensationalist, biased and wrongful depiction of facts needs to be interrogated. It is important to establish what influences the diverse frames employed by the media to discuss TIs. Previous studies have examined the different frames used and prominence to TIs story based on location/page in the publication, but none had examined why those frames are used. This research needed to seal that gap by seeking answers to the study’s problem statement: What influences framing in the print media houses as they report on TIs?

#### 1.4 Objectives of the Study

The general objective of the research was to analyse frames applied by the mainstream print media in the coverage of the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya.

##### *1.4.1 Specific Objectives*

- i. To identify the frames adopted by mainstream print media to cover the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya.
- ii. To examine if mainstream print media coverage of perpetrators recalibrated instantly to provide an accurate depiction of the suspects
- iii. To identify factors influencing the framing of perpetrators involved in the Dusit D2 hotel TI by the mainstream print media.

##### *1.4.2 Research Questions*

- i. What frames did the mainstream print media in Kenya use to cover the Dusit D2 terror attack?
- ii. Did the mainstream print media coverage of homegrown terrorists recalibrate instantly to provide an accurate depiction of the suspects as locals, or was there hesitance in correcting this perception?
- iii. What factors influenced mainstream print media framing of the Dusit D2D2 hotel TI?

#### 1.5 Justification of the Study

This study sought to uncover the range of understandings held by reporters and editors who covered this TI and to verify if there was an implicit bias in their depiction of the TI in Kenya as the handiwork of foreigners, usually Muslim Somalis, based on the framing theory by Bateson (1972). The framing concept in media studies explains how the mass media uses selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration to support a

specific definition of an issue (Lee & Cheng, 2018). Through an overview of the print coverage of the incident, the study sought to clarify if the reporting implied that the terror suspects were foreigners and what informed the gradual shift towards identifying them as locals.

### 1.6 Significance of the Study

The results of the frames applied by the mainstream print media in covering the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya will be significant to reporters and editors while covering TIs. This will be achieved by first determining frames employed by the mainstream print media in the coverage of the Dusit D2 terror attack and whether the coverage of homegrown terrorists recalibrated instantly to provide the accurate depiction of the suspects as locals and the factors that influenced the framing of the attack.

Media researchers and scholars will benefit from the study by providing a source of literature for future studies and take part in the media studies development. In addition, the government, policy makers and media professionals will benefit from the findings by recommending reforms that can be adopted to improve media reporting.

### 1.7 Scope of the Study

This research examined two dailies' reportage by focusing on the frames the media houses used to report the attack on the Dusit D2 hotel. The researcher focused on the news stories about the Dusit D2D2 hotel TI, headlines, and opinion articles that discussed the attack. This is because the study was interested in determining the frames and the depiction of those suspected to have been behind the attack. The study focused on stories on the Dusit D2D2 TI attack published by the Standard and Daily Nation over three weeks ranging between 16<sup>th</sup> January and 6<sup>th</sup> February 2019. This date was

chosen because it was the period when there was extensive coverage by the media on the attack, after which the focus shifted to other issues.

### 1.8 Limitations of the Study

The participants' busy schedules hindered the investigator's efforts to undertake physical interviews in this research. In this regard, the investigator made prior engagements with the crucial informants and scheduled interviews at their convenience. The researcher also was challenged by getting secondary data from the newspapers as the information sought was scattered. Therefore, the researcher had to look for all the hard copies of the newspapers analyzed from public and private libraries and respective media houses' archives.

### 1.9 Operational Definition of Terms

**AFP:** This refers to a global news organization whose headquarters is in Paris headquartered in Paris, France, which is the world's ancient news agency which transmits graphics, videos and stories in German, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, English, and French.

**Al Shabab:** It implies an Islam insurgent group located in Somalia.

**Al-Qaeda:** Osama bin Laden created this extremist Sunni Muslim group in 1988 with the goal of eradicating the presence of the West in Arab nations and vehemently opposing the Western foreign policy.

**Article:** This refers to a piece of writing published in a newspaper in journalism. Articles in the framework of this study are writings regarding the Nairobi terror attack at the Dusit D2 hotel.

**BBC:** National broadcaster of the United Kingdom, which broadcasts radio, television and online programmes.

**Framing:** For this study, it refers to a set of stories and assumptions that people use to interpret and respond to situations. This would refer to a particular story's packaging in the context of this study.

**IED:** A bomb or other harmful device constructed at home that can kill, disable, harass, or divert.

**Media organization:** An individual or organization distributing information to the general public via a newspaper, magazine, other publication, radio, television, cable television, or other mass communication means.

**Print media:** A type of mass communication in printed form. Examples include newspapers or magazines. In this study, print media focused on hard news, features, commentaries, op-eds, letters to the editor and editorials.

**Reuters:** One of the biggest news organizations in the world, Thomson Reuters owns this global news organization with journalists and photojournalists in about 200 locations.

**Terror incident:** A violent act that endangers the lives of citizens. The acts are intended to intimidate or coerce a government into a given position. Terrorist groups perpetrate the acts.

**Terrorism:** A strategy that incites fear and exploits threats of violence to further political or ideological goals (UNODC, 2018).

## 1.10 Summary

The research focused on stories on the Dusit D2D2 TI attack circulated by the Standard and Daily Nation over three weeks ranging between 16<sup>th</sup> January and 6<sup>th</sup> February 2019. This chapter has illustrated the introduction, research background, study's objectives and statement of the problem, research questions, study rationale, significance, limitations and scope, and the operational definition of terms. The subsequent chapter indicates the literature review that guided the research.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses pertinent academic literature in the area of research. The research and theories discussed in the literature reviewed in this part are relevant to the study's main goal, which was to comprehend how the Daily Nation and the Standard newspapers covered the Dusit d2 terror assault.

#### 2.2 Theoretical Framework

##### *2.2.1 Framing Theory*

The study was anchored on framing theory. Gregory Bateson first advanced the theory in 1972 when he referred to it as a theory of “play and fantasy”. The theory gained popularity in the mid-60s when it was used in different fields to understand media effects on individuals. Tuchman (1978) also looked at it by comparing news to a window through which a viewer can focus on a specific perception of realities while limiting focus on other elements of those realities. Later, Erving Goffman extended it further in his 1974 frame analysis study by discussing and illustrating how people refer to and interpret issues around their lives through their primary frameworks, thus framing the situation for goal-oriented purposes (D’angelo, 2019). Goffman argues that conceptual frames structure an individual perception, stating that the frame represents “structure” used to hold together individuals “context of their lives experiences. He explains that the idea of framing is to draw attention to certain attributes and the objects themselves. That individuals use natural and social frameworks to process information (data) and interpret the meaning of occurrence and interaction with people around them (Orowolo, 2017)



Robert Entman examined it broadly and concludes that “framing includes salience and selection”. Entman opines that some features of reality are designated and given better importance and that frames are employed to describe problems, detect causes, offer moral rulings and propose appropriate solutions.

According to Entman, “When media select certain aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient (given greater emphasis or importance) in a communication text (news story, feature, commentary among others), the problem is defined, its causes are diagnosed, moral judgments are suggested, appropriate solutions and actions are proposed”. Journalism is a method of understanding global events for the public (Bruggemann, 2014). This sense-making is accomplished by choosing news items depending on their editorial stance and newsworthiness. Therefore, it’s critical to comprehend how journalists construct their stories by looking at their sources and whether they insert their own opinions into the news reporting process (D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010). Media give a perspective of a new story by the selective selection of reality to influence meaning (Franzosi & Vicari, 2018) by making certain realities more prominent than others to influence audience interpretation.

The framing concept in media studies explains how the mass media uses selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration to support a specific definition of an issue (Lee & Cheng, 2018). A cognitive method of understanding the social world (an event or problem) is provided by media frames (Koon et al., 2016). This conversion is accomplished through source selection, word/text choice (e.g., citing a government officer than another source/ informant), and using specific examples as usual (Reese, 2001; McQuail, 2010; Baresch, Hsu, & Reese, 2017). You can spot these frames in a news story by observing how the journalist delivers the 5Ws + H. (What has happened, Where has it happened, who is involved, When did it happen, Where has it happened,

How did it happen, Why did it happen). Reese (2010) contends that the “What” and “How” parts of a news item include a significant amount of the text’s framing. As a result, framing educations are attentive to how a topic is offered in the media, what features of the topic are highlighted, and how this topic may influence viewer judgments (Springer & Harwood, 2015).

It has been determined that news providers purposefully put out messages with a setting, which might occasionally affect how journalists come up with their stories. This is of particular importance to this study (Bruggemann, 2014). In addition, according to other research, news media, in particular, has been demonstrated to follow a narrative in its reporting that is motivated by socio-political agendas (DeVreese, Hajo, & Holli, 2011).

The framing hypothesis can be useful in Dusit 2 TI to shed light on how journalists portray terrorism. According to framing theory, communications that follow specific patterns of exclusion and emphasis can shape how individuals think when exposed to them (McLeod & Shah, 2015). This corresponds to the research’s goal of identifying the main frames utilized by the Standard and Daily Nation newspapers in their analysis of the attack on the Dusit D2.

Scholars can analyze ideas outside of objectivity and personal bias using framing theory, particularly when the media has covered a particular phenomenon (Tankard, 2001; Coleman & Perlmutter, 2005). “Frames alter opinions basically by having some reasons tend to be more crucial than others, and these concerns, finally carry higher weight for the last attitude”, explains Nelson et al. (1997, p.19). According to Tankard (2001), framing is distinct from individual bias since it is a more complex idea that adds a mental dimension while acknowledging a text’s or a media presentation’s capacity to describe a scenario, define concerns, and set the parameters

for a debate. These edges may be issue-oriented, that is, applicable particularly to particular themes, or generic, which can be recognized in the covering of various subjects and various circumstances.

The media is the chief information cradle about terrorism to the overall public thus, its use of language in such communication greatly influence the image that the public build of such events (Spencer, 2012). A number of studies argue that terrorists influence media framing for effective communication of its core objective (propaganda), such as the spread of panic among the public.

In this study, the Standard and the Daily Nation's coverage of the Nairobi hotel attack at the Dusit D2 were analyzed using this idea. According to Ardevol-Abreu (2015), the framing theory has been employed to comprehend how the media tackles terrorism in various parts of the globe. Framing is the process through which journalists display images and texts to the public to raise their understanding and awareness of current events and concerns.

Thus, framing theory is considered valuable in this study because it provides a window through which to examine media material regarding selection frequency and event interpretation. This allows a researcher to investigate and comprehend the news-producing process (Baresch, Hsu, & Reese, 2017). The justification for framing analysis is that how the media presents a problem can impact the public. For example, the media can choose which stories to cover and what perspectives to include, which can either make the articles objective or sensational or persuade the audience to hold a particular opinion about the issue being investigated.

Researchers have examined variables that affect frame construction (how media frames an event). According to Dekavalla (2018), several frames used to describe

terrorist attacks may be context- or issue-specific and applicable to reporting various incidents. Shoemaker and Reese (2014) tried to pinpoint the variables that affect news framing. According to their investigation, human characteristics, newsroom routines, organizational factors, social, institutional factors, and social systems all impact how news is framed.

According to McQuail (2010) and Kiwanuka-Tondo et al. (2012), the hierarchical model by Shoemaker and Reese (2014) in Figure 1 below highlights individual factors (at the individual level) that are related to one's beliefs and values. Reporters' opinions will likely influence how they structure a story in this situation. The following level of the hierarchy dealt with newsroom practices that adhere to established procedures and are influenced by codes of conduct like the MCK code of conduct for Kenyan media personnel. The third set of organizational characteristics suggests that the organizational level perceives media businesses, their ownership, and their organizational structures as affecting news framing. The social institution variables, which come in at number four in the model, illustrate how the media interacts with other influential institutions and this affects how news is presented. Social systems, including ideological effects from the social system as a whole, are the last influence in the model.




Figure 1: Graphic illustration of the hierarchical model by Shoemaker & Reese

### 2.3 General and Empirical Literature Review

The literature on framing and the variables that affect how a terror event is framed and presented in this section. This section’s literature analysis contrasts how local and international media present terrorist incidents.

#### 2.3.1 History of Terror Incidents on Kenyan Soil

Since the 7th of August 1998, when explosives went off outside the US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing hundreds of people, Kenya has been the target of numerous terrorist attacks. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) connected the assaults to the terrorist organizations al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Another terrorist incident that targeted Israeli vacationers struck the Kenyan coast in 2002. After take-off at the Mombasa International airport, a missile strike on an Israel jet was the beginning of the attack. Later, the attack spread to the Kikambala hotel on the Kenyan coast, where a party of Israeli vacationers had just arrived. Numerous fatalities and numerous injuries occurred. The Israel vacationers and other tourists who wished to leave were evacuated by an Israel plane (Laing, 2013).

The permeable northern Kenyan border, which allows for the tranquil movement of light weapons and small arms, has mostly served as fuel for terrorist strikes in Kenya. The border is unlocked, and government efforts to erect a wall have

proven fruitless (Odhiambo, 2012). Due to a lack of a contingency fund, a rapid reaction team, and adequate/adequate surveillance cameras in some areas of the country to identify crime, the security systems and institutions have been inadequate and slow to respond to attacks (Howden, 2013). Kenya's security apparatus responded slowly to the Garissa incident, and the rescue squad arrived late. Terrorism has also been influenced by regional conflicts and tensions amongst Somalia and Kenya and between various clans and tribes in Northern Kenya (Simon, 2015).

At least 17 attacks in Kenya between 2011 and 2012 used grenades or other explosives. Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, and Dadaab were the key North Eastern Province towns where the majority of these terrorist assaults took place. Other grenade attacks took place in Nairobi and the coastal city of Mombasa, with hotels, markets, police stations, churches, transport stations, supermarkets, and shopping malls among the targets. Several Kenyans were killed in these attacks, and there were also injuries and property losses.

Al-Shabab took credit for TIs in Kenya in 2008. The group claimed to carry out the threats in retaliation deaths of its members after Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) were deployed into Somalia South to generate a shield zone amongst Kenya, and Al-Shabab held territories (Mohamed, 2019). However, security analysts suggest that these attacks target high-end businesses as such, businesses remain a symbol of capitalism and bespeaks of a capitalist West. Kenya also houses several international media houses, like the British-owned BBC, Reuters, AFP and China Global TV Network (CGTN) African headquarters. Attacking targets in Nairobi can therefore be seen as well calculated to attract maximum media attention. Typically, terrorists are interested in publicizing their crimes, either to be celebrated or to inspire other groups with similar goals. Therefore, chances are that those who commit terror need local and international

media to converse with the larger spectators. Media, on the other hand operates to inform the public of happenings in their surrounding, thereby get emotional, exciting, and bloody news from TIs (Spencer, 2012).

TIs continued in Kenya, with another attack on the 21<sup>st</sup> of September 2013 at the West gate shopping mall in Nairobi. During the incident, 71 lives were lost, with over 100 injuries, including destroying property of unknown value. Finally, on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of May 2015, Gunmen who entered Garissa University College were thought to be members of the Al-Shabab group shot and murdered an estimated 148 persons, mostly students and security personnel. The main targets for this attack were non-Muslims some of whom were slain after being used as captives, while others have not yet been located (Wafula, 2014).

There has been debate on what constitutes a terror incident and how it is handled by those in authority and media portrayal in Kenya. For instance, during the struggle for independence, led by the *Mau Mau* fighters who rebelled against colonial rule in 1952 - 1956, the British equipped and sent out the Kikuyu Home Guard, an African militant, to protect their interests against the fighters. The *Mau Mau* fighters were seen as terrorists by the colonial administration, as they took the oath and then obeyed such laws as killing their rulers who sympathized with the colonial administration, women and small children (Bennett, 2013). The *Mau Mau* fighters were referred to interchangeably across articles as ‘fanatics’, a ‘society’, ‘an army’, ‘terrorists’, a ‘campaign’, ‘cultists’, and ‘insurgents.’ While the Kenya Government Press Office deliberately influenced how the British press perceived Mau Mau terrorism, these designations were supported by radio broadcasts and public statements by Lyttleton and Baring (Durrant, 2018). This shows that politics has been a major issue in the fight against terrorism, which is also evident in Kenya.

### *2.3.2 Preceding Terror Incidents to Dusit D2 Terror Incident*

Two major terror incidents preceded the Dusit D2 terror incident. These include the 2013 September 21 attack on the Westgate mall, which claimed 71 lives. Then, on May 3, 2015, four gunmen attacked the Garissa University in Kenya, leaving 148 people dead. Westgate is singled out in this study because of the massive international attention. How Kenyan media presented the Al-Shabab-led terror attack on Nairobi's Westgate mall in September 2013 was concerning. Some of these issues were brought up by the National Assembly Joint Committee on National and Administration Security, Defense and Foreign Relations and the Media Council of Kenya, a constitutional group recognized by the Media Council, No. 20 of 2013, to oversee the media and the discipline and conduct of journalists in Kenya (Kenya National Assembly, 2013). The National Assembly committee noted that media exposed security operations and vilified Kenya soldiers on claims of looting the mall. In order to ensure that information management and delivery do not jeopardize national security, it was advised that the government create a policy to regulate media content when streaming live from emergency circumstances. The committee argues the proposal should only censure irresponsible journalism and reckless social media and not infringe on the role of media of informing the public and question state narratives.

Regarding the Westgate terror attack, Gaitho (2019) concedes that there was an apprehension that a sector of Kenyan media, specifically TV stations, framed the incident in a way that showed personal and religious bias. However, some analysts have argued that the attack on the media seemed to indicate that the media's frames were not what the government had anticipated. Gaitho (2019) discourses that Kenyan media is occasionally compelled to frame stories in a particular way due to the complex nature



of reporting TIs and bureaucratic barriers in sharing information about such critical situations.

The 2015 Garissa University College terror attacks are also of interest in this study, as it experienced muted media coverage for various reasons. First, it was staged in a far-removed rural location, as opposed to an urban centre where the media are based. Second, it was generally seen as a local incident involving homegrown terrorists, even though some had received training in Shabab camps in Somalia. Third, the attack had a number of articles written to seemingly suggest that the attacks were a justifiable political and social response to the incursion in Somalia. However, the media did not rush to report on the terrorists, as they were not all Somali as they expected (Nyambega, 2019).

By comparison, the Dusit d2 attack received enormous coverage because its setting was a rich suburb of the affluent Westlands district of Nairobi, where diplomatic missions and top NGOs are based. However, the tenor of the reporting did not appear to be in a rush to clarify that the attackers, while having external affiliations with foreign terror networks, were home-grown terrorists. The local media's initial coverage of the terror attack was as an external one and not an internal threat. The information from the police affirming the terror suspects as home-grown terrorists were gradually presented in the coverage. This disparity informs this study, and the researcher aims to establish if there was an implicit or explicit bias in presenting the terror suspects as ethnic Somalis and Muslims, even though they were not. To achieve that, the researcher probed the range of understandings held by reporters and editors who covered the event and distilled that information to assess how those perspectives influenced their editorial decisions and their frames of reporting.

### 2.3.3 *Media Frames*

According to media studies, framing is the way of picking specific features of a realized reality to make them more apparent in a communicating text, in order to advocate a particular description of an issue, treatment description, moral judgement and causal interpretation for the item (Kanji, 2018). What the public learns about an occurrence is decided by journalists when deciding whether TI details should be included or left out of a report. By tying together diverse facts, events, and leaders and being evaluative by identifying culprits, identifying victims, and assigning blame, framing analysis aids in analyzing how editors depict TIs to the open (Norris et al., 2003; Powell 2011; Kanji, 2018). Based on the foregoing discussion, it is important to analyse how Kenyan media reports TIs using the most recent attack at the Dusit D2 hotel. Such an analysis can help in interrogating print and broadcast media reporting of TIs in the country so that audiences can get a better perspective of the attacks.

Episodic and thematic frames are nearly the prevalent frames that arise in media analysis of terror acts globally, according to media scholars (Zerback & Peter, 2018). According to media experts, thematic framing addresses a matter as sector of an ongoing theme or topic, usually facilitated with expert and analysis interviews, whereas episodic framing focuses on “coverage of one unique occurrence” (Arthur, 2012; Pece, 2018). The scholars further state that media create episodic frames by giving a specific element of an event without looking into details or in an event context. This frame may create sympathy in readers. Conversely, a thematic frame broadly presents an issue or problem, showcasing different perspectives. According to media scholars, this frame may leave the audience emotionally disconnected and less concerned with the event.

However, it has been established in news writing practice that news stories/reports are rarely exclusively thematic or episodic but instead combine single-

case information with extra overall statistics or information (Ostfed & Mutz, 2014) because the news writing process requires a reporter to provide more context for a story than just reportage. In addition to the above-discussed episodic and thematic frames, content analysis can also reveal additional frames that are contained inside them. According to Kioko's 2018 study on "media framing of Westgate and Garissa University terror incidents," such frames are widely used in Kenyan media. Nwafor also identified a similar trend, and Orji-Egwu (2017), in their comparative research of frames used in reporting Al-Shabab in Kenya and Boko Haram in Nigeria and MCK assessment of the media part in religious radicalization and intolerance. The prevalence of the dominant frames in the three separate research on the Kenyan print media framing of TIs used human interest, conflicts, ethnicity, religion, economic consequences, attribution of responsibility, and the quest for security, morality, international cooperation and justice frames.

Chike et al. (2017) posit that the Kenyan print media favoured negative and divisive frames in reporting Al-Shabab TIs, compared to Nigerian print media, which favoured positive frames such as policy response in reporting Boko Haram attacks. These researchers arrived at the consensus that these frames mainly were derived from episodic frames compared to thematic frames. The above findings confirmed analysis of frames Kenyan, US and British print media employed in the coverage of the August 1998 US embassy attack in Nairobi. The analysis of the selected newspapers in the study revealed the dominance of tragedy, illegal political frames, Islamic issues, and evil and crime issues in their coverage of that attack (Mainye 2011, Ruigrok & Van (2007).

The reality frame, which Pece (2018) describes as a second frame, is a collection of visuals that can independently and somewhat "objectively" convey the news. The

third is the War Frame, which resembles a narrative trope connected to a “war scenario” in some aspects. For instance, Pece (2018) showed 3 prominent frames - The War Frames, Reality Frames and Human Drama Frames. Human Drama frames, Reality Frames, and War Frames-in an investigation of media frames in the UK press. The researcher contends that the human drama frame incorporates images that primarily emphasize the reader’s feelings, highlighting the incident’s dramatic character and the human aspect. In this sense, a reporter reporting the news is more like a storyteller or a writer crafting a make-believe tale. Journalists would utilize dramatic terms like “thousands hurt, many people are presumed dead” in these tales.

News media religious frames were used by Kenya media on the Al-Shabab inception attacks in Kenya. There are other frames that the Kenya media have used to tell the story about TIs in Kenya. The trend of framing news on TIs in Kenya and other parts of Africa suggests a practice that the media in the West have used to report terror incidents. Studies show that media outlets in the United States and Australia devoted more concern to terror and terrorism-associated activity especially when an attack occurs within their territory or targets their interests in other parts of the world (Schmidt, 2014; Kanji, 2018; Kearns & Amarasingam, 2019).

Between January 2015 and June 2015, 1142 articles about terrorist attacks were analyzed by Kiarie and Mogambi. The results showed that episodic frames were more prevalent than theme ones, with news reported in 65% of stories. The analysis concludes that the two newspapers made little attempt to analyze and provide in-depth coverage of terror incidents. The results point out that there was lack of holistic analysis of the attack. The use of terrorism experts would have helped unpack other underlying factors that may have contributed to the attack, such as poor intelligence and preparedness. The newspaper analyses the effectiveness of some of the security

policies, especially the involvement of the public in intelligence gatherings to halt such attacks. This is clearly demonstrated by the dismal use of thematic frames in the coverage.

#### *2.3.4 Coverage of Terrorism by Kenyan Media*

Since April 1975, when attackers invaded Nairobi's Starlight Nightclub, terrorism committed on Kenyan soil has been reported by the country's media (START, 2013; Kipsang, 2014). However, the bombing of the American embassy in Nairobi August 1998 was the first attack that received substantial notice in the Kenyan media. Using a vehicle bomb that crashed into the American embassy, the Al-Qaeda gang carried off the deadliest attack Kenya had ever seen. Over 200 people were killed, and 4,000 were injured (START, 2013).

Al-Shabab has effectively used technology and social media to claim responsibility for such attacks and advance its propaganda. Al-Shabab was first linked to the kidnapping of aid workers in Garissa, Wajir and Mandera counties and tourists in Lamu County before grenade attacks in Nairobi, Mombasa, Garissa and other towns (Stanford, 2019; Nyambega, 2019). The group conducted its first high-profile attacks in Kenya at Westgate Mall, Nairobi, in 2013 and Garissa University in 2015 after the infamous *2010 FIFA World Cup final Kampala bombing* (Al-Jazeera.com, 2013).

In some studies, Al-Shabab has been described as technology "savvy" for exploiting social media, including chat rooms, YouTube and Twitter, to employ, radicalise youths and fundraise internationally (Menkhaus, 2014). The group has also used foreign print and electronic media, such as Reuters and Al-Jazeera, to claim responsibility of major attacks it carried inside and outside Somalia, including the Dusit

D2 (Burke, 2018). In addition, the group has been using local radio stations for general public communication and jihad propagation within areas of Southern Somalia under its control. As Kenya continues to endure terror attacks by an Al-Shabab terror group located in Somalia that is connected to the terrorist network of Al-Qaeda, these incidents have been used as a point of comparison in analysing media coverage of terror strikes on Kenyan land.

According to research by Kipsang (2014), terrorist attacks received significant coverage in Kenyan media. These conclusions were supported by Walsh (2010), who argues that the length of a newspaper story or the amount of time devoted to a news segment serves as indicator of media attention to an issue (in the case of electronic media). The Media Council of Kenya concluded that Another study on how the Kenyan media covered an attack on the Westgate mall in Nairobi found that the print and electronic media in Kenya has become implicated in the fight against extremism, radicalization, and terrorism especially when the TIs often receives hyperbolic and sensationalist media coverage in another study on how the Kenyan media covered an attack on the Westgate mall in Nairobi (MCK, 2014). The way that government forces sent to contain the situation and terrorists were depicted in the media was of particular concern. The study pointed out that print and electronic media coverage offered publicity to terrorists and lacked the right balance between informing the public of such an important event in their lives and the safety of security officers involved in the Westgate mall attack operations.

Kipsang (2014) asserts that the security services fighting terrorism were depicted in the media as being weak. One of the bloodiest attacks in Kenya since Kenyan defence forces began their campaign against Al-Shabab in Somalia, the Garissa University terror attack was covered by the Standard and the Daily Nation, according

to a study by Kiarie and Mogambi (2017). Additional research reveals that the media only emphasized a terror occurrence's seriousness. The results of this research support prior results by Kipsang (2014) that the media primarily held the government responsible for the country's terrorist attacks. The research further argues that the media should report TIs without compromising their work while avoiding using words that would serve as publicity to terrorists and hamper counterterrorism efforts. The finding suggests that the media focused on direct reporting (hard news), overlooking experts with useful details and enriching the coverage quality to boost the media's ability to set the right public agenda. Happer (2013) argues that inadequate media coverage of critical events, like terrorists attacks, deprives masses of evidence with which they could comprehend such matters and offer other keys.

Nonetheless, MCK (2016) study indicated that there were uneasy conditions in the division of the information of terror attacks of the government with the media on "national security" reasons. This move, seen as the reason for biased media reporting of Tis in Kenya, is also perceived by the media as a form of state censorship. Further, in his study of counter-terrorism procedures and media autonomy in Kenya since 2015, Woldemariam (2018) established that the government of Kenya remained the only source of terror-related stories and was uncomfortable with media criticism. His study also found that journalists resort to self-censorship and use anonymous sources while writing stories critical to the state.

Terrorist acts undermine public confidence and destroy government credibility (Canel, 2012). The government machinery uses strategic communication to shape public opinion, manage information flow, and shield its authority from criticism, particularly after unprecedented terrorist assaults. Marthoz (2017), in his research on the role of western media in terrorism reporting, Spencer (2012) observes: "So

preventing media reporting on terrorism altogether is not only normatively problematic. The vast range of new media outlets and channels of communication via the internet make it impossible to stop the reporting of terrorist acts. However, considering the communicative strategy by terrorist groups of spreading fear in the general public, one may be able to at least alleviate this by officially framing terrorism in a particular kind of way” (Spencer, 2012, p.2).

When tracing TIs in Kenya, similar problem trouble other countries and regions. Similarly, the media has reported the attacks from different viewpoints. Boko Haram – a terror group in West Africa, has reigned havoc in Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Mali, Chad and Benin (Union, 2015). Media has taken shifting frames over the years in Nigeria. Akinro and Zeng (2019) argue that the frames initially focused on the singular attacks perceiving the attacks as episodic. Damarest et al. (2020), on the other hand, saw the attacks framed as religious attacks.

Generally, the foregoing discussion suggests that the growing threat that terrorist attacks pose to society seems to be reflected in media coverage, which forces news outlets to compete to be the first to break stories on TIs (Assad & Aldanan, 2017). Increased media coverage leads to what Boydston, Hardy and Walgrave (2014) refer to as a media storm, a situation where the public is exposed to a sudden flow in news reporting of an item, coming up with high attention over a sustained time span.

While many may contend that the obligation to inform audiences of all social developments motivates growing media coverage (Ravi, 2012), researchers like Tuman (2010) contend that news will always focus on the anomalous. Conflicts and potential conflicts would naturally fall on the journalist’s plate, and reportage of such conflicts would take an angle. Spencer (2015) agrees with the foregoing discussion, noting that the reason for this heightened media attention to terrorism is that terrorists supply the



media with gripping, thrilling, and gory news that promotes their products (newspapers, websites and airtime). Framing theory is hinged on the tenet that the media give more concern to specific events and then places them within a field of meaning. The theory presupposes that while the news is often regarded as objective and value-free, the reality is that cases of subjectivity are not unique. In four presidential terms, a number of themes can be established, such as TIs as episodic, conflict, religious, responsibility, human interest and economic consequence frames.

Terrorism meaning has been a subject of debate for many years. Schmid (2004) assessed definitions of terrorism and identified 22 elements that help define terrorism. Schmid (2004) defined terrorism as an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby, in contrast to assassination, the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. Instead, the immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

Jongman (2017), on the other hand, defines terrorism as an anxiety-inspired method of recurring violence by individuals, semi-clandestine groups or public actors for political, criminal or idiosyncratic reasons. While Morin (2016) opines that ‘terrorism is a fierce act of communication whose aim is not its instant victims, but a wide audience. Likewise, Matusitz (2013) terms terrorism as a communication process or communicative act intended for a broad audience (government, general public and

organizations) beyond the direct targets. The attack imprints signs, messages and images in our minds. Audiences communicate individually and collectively and both directly and indirectly. The scholar further observes that terrorism is two-way communication, where a message trigger direct (government action or public discourse) or indirect (media coverage) feedback.

Therefore, the effects of terrorism make TIs items of interest to the media (Nazaroff, 2018) and a country like Kenya, which has witnessed attacks carried out by the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the Al- Qaeda and the Somalia-based Al-Shabab Islamist terror militant group. Kenya is naturally more prone to attacks than its neighbours due to its proximity to Somalia, vibrant free press and independent media, global status and visibility location and its perceived affiliation with the west, which the terror group regards as anti-Islamic. Attacks by terror groups are therefore meant to send a signal, particularly to the United States of America, Israel and the west. In addition, the group frequent attacks are also meant to gain wider publicity and international status affirmation (Cannon & Ruto, 2019).

The place of Nairobi in global politics and commerce cannot also be gainsaid. For instance, Kenya hosts two United Nations agencies – the UN-Habitat and the UN Environment Program, which have their headquarters in Gigiri in Nairobi. Nairobi is also a host to a number of international media houses. The British owned BBC operates one of its biggest bureaus outside the United Kingdom in Nairobi (BBC, 2018), and it is also home to number of international bureaus like Reuters, AFP, China Global TV Network (CGTN) African headquarters (MCK, Accredited Journalists in Kenya, 2019). The nation's strategic position as a regional economic hub and home to several multinationals. Nairobi also hosts several Israeli-owned businesses, such as Westgate Mall and Norfolk Hotel (owned by the Jack Block family before changing hands), both

suffered TIs in 2013 and 1980, respectively (Protus, 2013; Momanyi, 2018). Al-Shabab also exploits surveillance, ethnic profiling, mass incarceration and deportation of Kenyan and foreign Somalis (Findlay 2014; Harry 2014).

Any TIs within Nairobi also propagate their global jihad ideology as a form of retaliation against Kenya's military incursion inside Somalia. It is also exacerbated by acts of torture, forcefully vanishings, and extra-judicial murders of terror defendants by the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) domiciled within the city (Brendon, 2019; Human Rights Watch, 2016; Horowitz, 2013). Attacking targets in Nairobi, therefore, can be seen as calculated to attract maximum media attention by causing economic loss, a division between local and international communities through deaths, injuries, emotional stress and a loss of public confidence in the authorities (Diego, 2019).

While increased coverage of terrorism may seem to be a manifestation of how the media informs the populace. Arguments have been raised about how the media frames such incidents and the impact this reporting may have on audiences. Of concern has been the opinion raised by Nazaroff (2018), who notes that increased media coverage of TIs with different representations increases communication volume, facilitating diverse groups to come up with multiple narratives and framings of the same event. There is also the view that- while reporting a TI, the media may at times misrepresent, distort or amplify a point of view through the selective use of words and phrases chosen, either by a source to distort or misrepresent the contexts to which they are used or the media (Ruthenberg, 2012). These concerns have led to increased interest in frame analysis, which attempts to understand the types of frames used in the media coverage of such events (Chike et al., 2017).

*Table 1: Terror attacks in Kenya between 2002 and 2011*

<b>Timeline</b>	<b>Suspected Perpetrator</b>	<b>Target</b>	<b>Casualties</b>
August 7, 1998	Al-Qaeda	Nairobi US embassy	213 people died
November 22, 2002	Al-Qaeda	Paradise Hotel (Kikambala/Kilifi)	15 people died
August 2007 and 2008	Ugandan army	Turkana pastoralists Koten	5,000 people died
21 October 2010	Al-Shabab	Kenya Somali border	30 dead
10 March 2012	Al-Shabab	Machakos bus station in Nairobi	6 dead 60 injured
May 15, 2012	Al-Shabab	Bella Vista club, Mombasa	One person dead, three others injured
18 November 2012	Al-Shabab	Nairobi matatu	7 dead 33 injured
21 September 2013	Al-Shabab	Westgate Shopping Mall	68 dead over 150 injured
23 November 2013	Al-Shabab	Passenger bus Arabiya area, Mandera County	28 dead
April 5, 2014	Al-Shabab	Chania Travellers bus, Mombasa	3 people dead 24 injured
15 June and 17 June 2014	Al-Shabab	Mpeketoni Lamu	60 dead
July 2014,	Al-Shabab	Hindi village Lamu county	21 dead
November 21, 2014	Al-Shabab	Nairobi-bound bus - Mandera County	28 dead
April 2, 2015	Al-Shabab	Garissa University killing	148 dead
July 7, 2015	Al-Shabab	Mandera quarry	14 dead
October 25, 2016	Al-Shabab	Boshari Guest house	12 dead
November 6, 2017	Al-Shabab	Daba City, Mandera County	Police vehicle destroyed
August 13, 2017	Al-Shabab	Mandera	Police vehicle destroyed
September 25, 2018	Al-Shabab	Kenyan military base in Taksile (Lamu county)	10 dead
January 15, 2019	Al-Shabab	Dusit D2 hotel	21 dead

*Source: Atallah (2019) with inclusions from the Author*

Kenya has one of the best vibrant media industries in East and Central Africa, with over 467 television stations, about 365 radio stations (MCK, 2016; Business Today, 2019) and six daily newspapers. This landscape provides audiences with various news on different events, including TIs, with journalists who cover terrorism maintaining that their terrorism coverage is guided by a desire to inform the public and honesty (Gaitho, 2019). Several attempts have also been made to ensure Kenyan journalists understand how to cover TIs. Among these are several publications, a code of conduct for the journalism practice in Kenya and training conducted by the (MCK). Regarding reporting on terrorism and combating violent extremism in Kenya, Article 4 of the Second Schedule of the MCK Act 2013 states that journalists shall present news with integrity and common decency, avoiding real or perceived conflicts of interest, and respect the dignity and intelligence of the audience as well as the subjects of news (MCK, 2016) is one of the reporting guidelines the MCK has developed.

Media outlets should generally refrain from airing or giving space to those with extreme views on terrorism and jihadism. In addition, such radicalized utterances should be prohibited and edited from interviews and news source documentaries. The two findings demonstrate that while presenting articles about the fight against terrorism, radicalization, and even religious extremism, the media should avoid inflaming or stoking tensions.

In his study on the peace journalism character in the coverage of the codenamed *Operation Linda Nchi*, Ogega (2012) establishes that Standard newspapers and Daily Nation sanitized and supported the military operation due to fear of Al Shabab threats on the country's political economy. In 2016, The Jamia Mosque Committee management in Nairobi wrote to the MCK to complaint against what they alleged to be stories that led to hate against Muslims by portraying them as sympathisers of terrorism (Nairobi News, 2016). Such a frame drives the terrorists' agenda of creating religious

division among the citizenry. It also fuels stereotyping of specific communities, exacerbating societal cultural and social conflicts.

### *2.3.5 Factors Influencing Media Framing*

Since the start of the twenty-first century, there have been more terrorist incidents worldwide, which has motivated many academics to study how the media portrays and reports on terrorism (Schmidt, 2014). This increased interest in media framing stems from the media's important role in modelling public know-how of terrorism (Mansur, 2013). Reporters and editors typically decide the content to present to their readers, managing the public's information about an event and the lens or frame through which the public interprets such information (Valenzuela, Pina, & Ramirez, 2017). However, a news story is not an actual presentation of reality but a reconstruction from several angles as influenced by a number of factors. According to Simiyu (2013), these factors include media owners, media managers, advertisers, government, audience and information sources. This is not to argue that journalists always tell lies or purposefully twist the truth, but rather that journalists who work for various organizations cover different stories and use different sources from diverse news perspectives selectively create reality (Graham & Silke, 2015).

Although the country's constitution pledges press freedom, it has been discovered that the Kenyan government exerts more control or pressure on media framing. The Kenyan government exerts significant control over news reporting, pressuring outlets to downplay criticism of government failures to avoid being refused government advertising (Davidson, 2017). Due to this, media executives must exert pressure on editorial teams to structure news in a way that does not criticize the government (Simiyu, 2013). Journalists consequently become overly reliant on official sources. It has been argued that attacks by terrorists always put the government's

reputation into question, thus needing specific framing policies to cater for the situation (Canel, 2012). In his study communicating strategically in the face of terrorism: The Spanish government's response to the 2004 Madrid attacks, Canel points out that the government, which serves as a major information source during terrorist acts, skews the flow of information and ideas to its benefit by carefully deciding how the media will portray such occurrences. The government expects the media to use a predominant frame in reporting terrorism to influence the simple and effective transmission of its policy priorities and orient positive public discourse in order to fight terrorists' objectives, according to Norris, Kern and Just (2003). It has been suggested elsewhere that these frames are pervasive in nations where governments directly or indirectly own or control most of the media.

In other instances, Kenyan journalists have been found to take part in censorship for fear of harming the government (Otieno, 2018). Topics deemed crucial, such as criticism of the Deputy President, President and other important individuals, are among the areas where media professionals exhibit a significant degree of self-censorship (Freedom House, 2016).

The situation in Kenya is comparable to prior studies that found that government interests (political interests) shape news framing in various nations (Rodelo & Muiz, 2018). Due to the confluence of actual-world happenings, journalistic decisions criteria and cultural norms with the occasionally skilful and other moments inept ways of contending elites to sustain the news, this leads to prejudiced framing where journalists appear to favour one party in a disagreement (Entman, 2010).

Ogega (2012), analysing the Standard and Daily Nation newspapers' contribution to peace journalism in Operation *Linda Nchi*, and posits that the Kenyan government influenced their coverage under the shroud of national security. He argues

that the two print media publications got themselves into the trap of the state apparatus and the ruling political elite pushing national security interest agenda in Kenya's military operation against Al- Shabab in Somalia. Mwangi (2020), on the other hand, avers that Kenyan government policies and laws on terrorism and international community pressure have a bearing on how local dailies report terrorism. The laws include the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 which limits media freedom, among others, to the degree of stopping the terrorism commission (Kenyalaw.org, 2013).

It has also been argued that the 2012 National Intelligence Service Act limits freedom of expression to regulate the mechanical telecommunication operation, television or satellite communication, internet, communication and wireless broadcasting (Kenyalaw.org, 2012). The act also limits access to information and empowers the security cabinet secretary to determine which information should be classified as *confidential* and *restricted* under national security. Other laws curtailing media freedom include the Kenya Information and Communication Act, 2013 (Kenyalaw.org, 2013), which controls and regulates media contents and the Official Secrecy Act, which limits the possession and sharing of information, articles or photographs deemed secret by the state (Kenyalaw.org 1968).

Other scholars and media commentators have also argued that the state may unleash these laws at any point to curtail the print and electronic media coverage of TIs in Kenya. According to Mwangi (2020), Kenyan print media and other publications may exercise caution in their reporting of terror attacks out of fear of such unprecedented state action. Similarly, David (2013) avers that the Kenyan government leverage these national security policies and laws to influence editorial decision-making and framing of TIs, making it difficult for reporters and editors to present alternative perspective for objective and balanced coverage.



This local scenario endorses the findings of Ying and Lulu's (2018) frame analysis of two significant terrorist attacks in the United States and China, which found that every nation framed the assaults in accordance with its ideological traditions and national objectives. Hugo Chavez's coverage in the American media was examined using a framing theory by Richardson (2013), who found that the media frequently reflects the opinions of the government and the American president. This supports Entmans' (2010) assertion that occasionally structures flow to the media from political actors. The study found that Hugo Chavez's portrayal in American publications did shift when the presidential administration changed (Richardson, 2013). The portrayal of the presentation of American foreign strategy on terrorism after 9/11 TI and the Persian Gulf War in 1991 both followed a similar trend, with American media emphasizing intimidating information and emotive descriptions that added the likelihood that the open would support strategies used by political leaders, particularly the President (Narcos et al., 2011; Gadarian, 2010; Alberson & Gadarian, 2014; Gadarian, 2015).

Since 9/11 TI, the American media has frequently equated Islam with terrorism in its fight on terrorism narrative (Yosof, Hassan, Hassan, & Osman, 2013). However, research has revealed that media portrayals of Muslims as terrorists almost always do not portray non-Muslims as terrorists (Ahmed & Matthes, 2016). A more updated study by Kimberly (2018) on how terror acts are portrayed in the United States, which included an investigation of 11 TIs that occurred from 2011 to 2016, found that non-Muslim perpetrators of Tis are framed in a different way than Muslims. This analysis appears to support a previous study by Saeed (2007) that identified the same tendency in the British media. On the other hand, Kearns, Betus, and Lemieux (2018) found that any attack by a Muslim would probably be viewed as a terror act and would get more coverage in the media. These results support arguments made by Ardèvol-Abreu

(2015), who maintains that when framing an event, journalists often concentrate on one piece of information while ignoring others, which results in some aspects of the reality as it is perceived through the news being more prominent than others.

Researchers have too attempted to examine how Arab media outlets present terrorist attacks. According to Assad and Aldanani (2016), academic evidence backs up their recommendation that the Arab media devote a sizable amount of time to covering TIs. Aljazeera and the Al Iraqiya channels reportedly similarly covered TIs, according to Gerhards and Schafer (2014). However, Al Jazeera Arabic and other Arab media spent far less time covering terrorism in the Arab world than CNN in America, according to a content study by Al-Majdhoub and Hamzha (2016). The frames utilized in their reporting were also varied, with the Arabic networks giving the humanitarian frame less weight and CNN emphasizing the pain caused by TIs on a humanitarian level. CNN spent more time (83.05%) than Al Jazeera English (16.95%) reporting on terrorist deeds being done by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), according to a study that used content analysis.

Onwe, Nwafor, and Orji-Egwu (2017) used content analysis to describe how Nigeria and Kenya frame the Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram attacks to better understand how African media portrays TIs. Their findings demonstrate that the media mostly used a policy response framing in Kenya and Nigeria. It also showed that news reports about terrorism in Kenya declared negative labelling, ethnic, religious, war contexts, and conspiracy framing. The study did, however, identify a flow of contagious framing whereby journalists use western news frames due to a contagion outcome (Norris et al., 2003; Epkins, 2011). These results also support assertions that some media (in the south) are subject to a trickle-down effect in which they derive their framing and

reporting practices from powerful western media based in the United States (Dimitrova & Stromback, 2008; Entman, 2004; Epkins, 2008).

### *2.3.6 Media Frames and Agenda Setting*

Honesty and a desire to inform the public are the driving forces behind the journalistic practice in any democracy, including Kenya, as outlined in the various codes of conduct that direct the profession. Kenya's code of conduct prohibits the publication of false, misleading, or distorted stories for journalism practice (MCK, 2014). According to the code, an individual subject to this act will illustrate news properly and impartially, giving relevance and significance first priority. The codes aim to advance journalism practice professionalism (Mbeke, Ungangu, & Okello-Orlale, 2010). By obtaining and reporting accurate, objective, and balanced information, professional journalistic practice, as proposed in the MCK code, seeks to ascertain that journalists enlighten, educate, and amuse Kenyans (Masaviru, 2015). However, since journalists are social catalysts in and of themselves, professional norms of conduct for the journalism practice do not prohibit or limit the media from presenting a government narrative (Slattery, 2016). This postulates that besides government influence, media framing is cheered up by other indicators such as personal and religious biases and media ownership and management.

### *2.3.7 Media Frames and Personal/Religious Biases*

Newspaper readers and general media consumers in Kenya and the rest of the universe expect journalists to be fair in reporting events as guided by codes of conduct that regulate journalism. However, Simiyu (2013) postulates that different biases influence media reporting in Kenya. These biases are initiated by underlying cultural, religious, socio-economic and political viewpoints (Elejalde, Ferres, & Herder, 2018).

Similarly, Ross (2008), in his book, *My Tribe is Journalism: Special Edition Kenya. Conflict Sensitive journalism* observes that “no journalist can be objective. Like everyone else, journalists uphold the ideals of their native nation, religion, and ethnicity. He argues that media sometimes take sides in conflict reporting such TIs unless journalists divorce their values and report professionally based on “accuracy, impartiality and responsibility”.

In their study, “*Strengthening Kenyan Media Exploring a Path Towards Journalism in the Public Interest*”, Asch et al. (2018) state that reporters and editors interviewed concede that “ethnic bias does occasionally affect” their “reporting”. Ethnic identity is knitted into Kenyan media in the same way it is woven into Kenyan culture and politics. It can be seen in choices regarding which stories to tackle and how to tackle them, as well as how viewers react to reporting that they believe to be biased against certain groups. The majority of citizen respondents said that traditional media outlets had more compassion for specific ethnic communities. The scholars established that Kenyans triangulate through multiple outlets, such as social media and trusted individuals, in search of alternative views and know the potential biases in media coverage and omitted information.

In a publication titled “*Deconstructing Terror Assessing Media’s role in Religious Intolerance and Radicalization*”, the Media Council of Kenya finds existence of faith biases among Kenya journalists in their terror coverage (MCK, 2014). This study established that the biases could be due to journalists’ lack of deep knowledge and experience about terrorism, albeit plot of them being targeted as conveyor belts for the spread of different narratives by protagonists and antagonists of the war. Judging from the MCK (2014) statement, this study opines that the perpetrators’ religious affiliations also influence how the media frames TIs. Scholars like Kanji (2018) and

Kearns and Amarasingam (2019), who demonstrated that not all acts of terrorism are depicted in the same light in the electronic and print media, support this claim. In their research, Kearns and Amarasingam (2019) examined 146 cable network programs and found that incidents of terrorism in which Islam was the primary target received, on average, 4.5 times more attention than those committed by non-Muslims.

In research of how Muslims and non-Muslims portray ideological violence in Canadian media, Kanji (2018) conducted a quantitative content analysis of 3 Canadian newspapers (The Mail, Globe, and the National Post) and came to nearly identical conclusions. The research demonstrates that Canadian media paid more time to terrorist deeds by Muslims, with coverage of Muslim-instigated violence being 1.5 times greater than coverage of attacks conducted by non-Muslims. An additional investigation by Kearns, Betis, and Lemieux (2019) looked at how American media outlets covered incidents in the country between 2006 and 2015. The study found that attacks by Muslims received 357% more media coverage than the overall number (N=36). These researchers claim that it has been proven that in the media's coverage of terrorism, labels or frames that occasionally portray Muslims as TI perpetrators have been employed. The Daily Mail, the Daily Mirror, and the Sun were among the British media outlets that allegedly violated the ethical standards of journalism by breaking the story quickly and sensationalizing it for financial gain after a terrorist assault in Christchurch, New Zealand, that lost 50 lives.

### *2.3.8 Media Frames and Ownership Influence*

Some employers sometimes pressure media managers to have stories angled or framed in a manner that pleases the government, the employer's self-interest and the advertiser's interests. Simiyu (2013) suggests that ownership interference in media framing is best exemplified by a case in which the national newspaper (one of Africa's

most respected newspapers) editor, George Githii, resigned from his position on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July 1982, citing pressure to compromise journalistic standards at the behest of management which was, in turn, being pressured by the government. About 34 years later, on January 20<sup>th</sup> 2016, George Galava, another editor from the same media house, wrote on his Twitter handle, *Just been fired over the editorial I wrote in the Saturday Nation on January 2<sup>nd</sup>* (Galava, 2016).

The Daily Nation also sacked one of its celebrated cartoonists in the same period over what the cartoonist Paul Kelemba (Gado) was to claim later was a result of corporate and political pressure; “It is unfortunate that The Nation [newspaper] is succumbing to corporate and political pressure. The manner in which I was sacked is unacceptable. However, it is not just Gado; this should not happen to any journalist. Political pressures in newsrooms are always there, but how they are handled matters” (Gado, n.d., p.6)

Further studies have also established that besides the covert influence through pressure exerted through boardroom meetings and editorial briefings, ownership influence is sometimes exhibited through space allocation and framing. In his study titled “*an ethical and professional assessment of Media coverage of insecurity in Kenya*”, Amos (2015) argues that increased conglomerates media ownership undermines independent and critical journalism in TIs reportage. Furthermore, he argues that media owners hinder journalists’ capacity to professionally and ethically report insecurity due to pressure they endure from other forces, including the state, described by the researcher as another power influencing TIs coverage. Elsewhere, in his book titled: *In the service of power: Media capture and the threat to democracy*, Schiffrin (2017) observes that after the introduction of multiparty politics in 1997 and the exit of President Daniel Arap Moi from power in 2016, wealthy individuals with ties to the state acquired licenses run print and other media businesses. The author

argues that these individuals with core political and commercial interests control the media and erode the wish of the majority for a vibrant free press in Kenya meant to serve the public.

For example, in his frame analysis of Kenya's print media analysis of the international criminal court confirmation of charges hearings against Uhuru Kenyatta, Simiyu (2013) established that People Daily newspaper which the Kenyatta family owns had extra constructive content for Uhuru Kenyatta as compared to other dailies in the country. Wasserman and Benequista (2017) made a similar viewpoint, asserting that the ownership of 3 main media-holding organizations in Kenya, are ranged indirectly or directly, with main political dynasties. They claim that due to such ownership, there have always been "violent competition amongst media houses to entice government advertisement", which affects editorial freedom.

#### 2.4 Conceptual Framework

According to the discussion above, which was grounded on a literature review on content analysis and media framing, this research conceptualized that a variety of factors, such as social and cultural issues, political frames, group frames (both local and global), and individual beliefs, can affect how the media frames an event. Based on the conceptual framework illustrated below, this research proposed that policy-focused coverage of a terror attack in Kenya would be influenced by journalists' perceptions of their part in the task and the strong influence of political cradles. In contrast, journalistic conventions of balance and media firms' perceptions of what would draw audiences would encourage policy-focused coverage. According to this analysis, borrowed frames from other foreign media would influence the event's coverage.

## 2.5 Summary

This chapter has illustrated appropriate literature connected to media houses' frames to report terror attacks. Literature in this chapter was therefore concerned with studies and ideas related to terror incidences, headlines and frames used, and opinion articles that discuss TI. A theoretical framework based on the framing theory has also been offered. The study's methodology is presented in the following chapter.



## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter maps out the methodology used in this study which aimed at establishing how the print media in Kenya covered the Dusit d2 hotel TI. The chapter discusses the study's research design, data collection tools, data collection methodology, and data analysis, to ensure that the study's goal is met and the research questions are sufficiently addressed

#### 3.2 Research Approach and Research Design

##### *3.2.1 Research Approach*

This research used a mixed method combining quantitative and qualitative. For the former, the researcher used a code sheet to harness and interpret data while reserving qualitative analysis for key informants. The aim was to assess how the Daily Nation and the Standard newspapers covered the Dusit D2 hotel TI. The researcher read through sampled articles to analyse how the reports were framed and other reporting issues such as use of sources and attributions. The framing theory steered this analysis.

##### *3.2.2 Research Design*

The study's design is concurrent research design because the researcher used insights from both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The concurrent research design refers to a type of research design where data is collected and analyzed simultaneously instead of sequentially (Babbie, 2013). In this design, multiple data collection methods are used simultaneously to gather information from participants, such as surveys and interviews. The concurrent approach allows for a more comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the research topic, providing multiple

perspectives on the same issue (Wanyonyi, 2022). This study chose to employ a concurrent research design using both quantitative and qualitative data. Qualitative research was used to bring out the range of understandings held by editors at the Daily Nation and the Standard, while data bore out the quantitative survey sought out if the assumptions made.

For this research, the study objective was to describe how the print media framed the Dusit D2 TI. The design was suitable for this research because it aided the study to observe newspaper content and get answers regarding different frames employed by the Standard and Daily Nation newspapers to report the TI under investigation. Therefore, the method was ideal for this study because it allowed the researcher to look at several papers (features, editorials and news) against a pre-existing coding sheet and compare different frames employed by the publications under investigation.

Generally, this research employed interview guides and a coding sheet as the main gears to gather both qualitative and quantitative data because, as McCombs (2011) observes, subjecting newspaper articles to content analysis enables the researcher to gather sufficient data to explain how the Standard newspapers and the Daily Nation covered the Dusit D2 TI as an event by comparing how the two publications framed the issue. The coding sheet provided the study with quantitative data on different frames employed by the two media on different articles regarding the TI, thus eliciting deeper insights into the framing of the attack (Krippendorff, 1980; Downe-Wamboldt, 1992; Sandelowski, 1995; Atieno, 2009; Rahman, 2016). To respond to the study questions, the investigator selected 21 duplicates of each newspaper published within twenty-one days (three weeks after the attack). The 21-day period is significant because, after 21 days, the media coverage dissipates with attention moving to other emerging topical issues.

### 3.3 Population

The study targeted all print newspapers in Kenya as the research's population. There are forty-four (44) print media newspapers in Kenya, such as the Standard, People Daily, Daily Nation, *Taifa Leo*, Business Daily and The Star, among others. Nation newspapers and the Standard have a long publishing tradition and are authoritative market leaders. They also enjoy the largest circulation, The Daily Nation (including the Saturday and Sunday Nation) is the major flowing newspaper in Kenya, followed by The Standard (including Saturday and Sunday Standard). The two publications control 60% of the newspaper market share, Nation (40%) and the Standard (20%) (GeoPoll, 2015). The Business Daily mostly depends on entrepreneurs and business decision-makers in finance and economy, while The Star covers stories similar to those of the Nation, Standard and *Taifa Leo*. The People Daily Newspaper is the only freely circulated daily in Kenya.

*Table 2: Population*

Population (All Kenyan Dailies)	Sampling (Purposive)	Description/ Justification
Daily Nation	Nation Newspaper	Long publishing tradition Wide circulation Trust Market leaders Authoritative
The Standard	Standard Newspaper	
Business Daily	Business Daily Newspaper	Specialized readers (business owners and decision-makers))
The Star	The Star Newspaper	A daily tabloid with lower readership and circulation than the Nation, Standard, and Taifa newspapers.
The People Daily	People Daily Newspaper	The only free daily in Kenya has a readership and circulation challenges.
Taifa Leo	Gazeti la Taifa Leo	The only Kiswahili Daily designed for a general readership. Successive survey rate it as the third in readership.

Source: Researcher (2020)

### 3.4 Target Population

The population targeted during frame analysis consisted of 217 stories on the Dusit D2 TI identified pre-study published by the Standard and Daily Nation over three weeks ranging between 16<sup>th</sup> January and 6<sup>th</sup> February. This study tried to ascertain whether the media in Kenya had changed its framing of TIs. Therefore, for the resolution of this research, the researcher used individual articles (editorials, letters to the editors, commentary, features and hard news) on Dusit D2 hotel TI as an analysis element. For the research's purpose, unity of analysis is the sequence, picture, whole story, item, sentence, phrase or word. Stories were examined according to the seven themes shown in the research (human interest and economic consequence frames, responsibility, religious, conflict, episodic and thematic frame).

*Table 3: Target Population*

Population	Sampling (Purposive)	Description/ Justification
Daily Nation	Nation Newspaper	Long publishing tradition
The Standard	Standard Newspaper	Wide circulation Trust Market leaders Authoritative

Source: Researcher (2020)

### 3.5 Study Site

The research essentially focused on the print media coverage of the Dusit D2 attack by picking the Standard and Nation centre offices in Nairobi as its study sites. Quantitative data was obtained from the libraries of the two dailies. The Standard newspapers library is at the Standard Group centre along Mombasa road in Nairobi, whereas the Daily Nation library is at the Nation centre on Kimathi Street in Nairobi. The picking of DN and Standard for the analysis was led by the fact that these dailies are widely circulated. According to a poll by GeoPoll's Media Measurement Service,

the Daily Nation and its two additional weekly editions, the Sunday Nation and the Saturday Nation have an average daily circulation of about 4,379,400. The Standard, which also publishes Saturday and Sunday Standard, comes in second with 2,223,500 average readers (GeoPoll, 2015). This analysis supports a previous study by Mbeke and Mshindi (2008) that found the Daily Nation and the Standard to be the nation's most widely read paid-for newspapers. Nation (40%) and the Standard (20%) are the two periodicals in charge of 60% of the newspaper market share. The analysis concluded that the two periodicals were typical of Kenya's print media market.

### 3.6 Sample Size

The study began by asking for consent from the media houses before accessing their libraries. Thereafter the investigator counted the number of stories on Dusit D2 TI, which were 217 articles comprising news, features and editorials in this case. Based on Creswell and Clark (2017), the study sampled 20% of the articles; therefore, 42 articles were analysed. The sampling was systematic, where 14 articles were analysed weekly. A content analysis tool (code sheet) based on various topics was used to analyze this (economic consequence frames, human interest, responsibility, religion, conflict, episodic and thematic frame) developed by the researcher. Key informant interviews were also conducted. The Dusit D2 TI was covered by 72 (38 Nation reporters and 34 from Standard). From these reporters, the researcher interviewed six personnel: four reporters from the Standard newspapers and Daily Nation and two editors charged with key editorial decision-making processes (coverage, selection and framing).

### 3.7 Sampling Procedures

Data analysis was carried out by use of content analysis. The researcher examined all articles on Dusit D2 hotel TI published in the Standard and Daily Nation between 15 January 2019 and 6 February 2019. The Standard and Daily Nation stories were collected and analysed using seven parameters (economic consequence frames, human interest, responsibility, religious, conflict, episodic and thematic frame). The two dailies were selected to represent all dailies enjoying national wide circulation and readership in Kenya.

### 3.8 Research Method

The study used a quantitative content analysis that used specified quantifiable units to measure newspaper content (Assad & Aldanani, 2017). According to Stempel et al. (2003) and Gunter (2000), whether to do a content analysis depends primarily on the study's objectives. The research also interviewed key reporters and editors who covered the attack to clarify issues reflected during content analysis.

### 3.9 Data Generation/Collection Tools

To answer RQ1 and RQ3, the study used a coding sheet developed by Entman (1991) and adopted in this study. The guideline helped the researcher analyse the frames in the news stories. The coding sheet is annexed in Appendix B. Prior to analysis, the coding sheet specifies the titles of the newspapers and the kind of story. The following frames are available for the programmer to choose from in the tool: episodic, thematic, economic effects, conflict, religious, culpability (if the assailants are named in the stories), and human interest (telling the story in a manner that gives it a human face, showing the effect in human terms). On the TI for the Dusit D2 hotel, a separate coding sheet was utilized for each story.

For data collection from the interviews to answer RQ2 on whether the mainstream print media coverage of perpetrators recalibrated instantly to provide an accurate depiction of the suspects, the researcher personally distributed the interview using Google forms. The interview guides were open-ended.

### 3.10 Data Collection Procedures

The researcher asked the Daily Nation archives at the Nation Centre in Nairobi and the Standard offices on Mombasa Road in Nairobi for PDF and paper copies of the publications. Each newspaper was examined to determine which articles on terrorism were published. After that, the researcher analysed and noted several frames on the coding sheet. The sheet shows the subsequent;

- Episodic frames examined how much the media focused on the one terrorist assault at the Dusit D2 hotel.
- Thematic frame includes how thoroughly stories were examined and placed in the context of a larger sequence of events.
- Economic effects framing (how much do stories discuss how the attack affected Kenyan tourism, a significant foreign earner and a substantial source of income for many). It also looked at how reports quantify the impact on investors.
- Conflict context (presenting the attack as part of a conflict between the government of Kenya and the terrorist group operating in Somalia)
- Theological context (how the attack was framed as a religious attack)
- The frame of responsibility (if the attackers are identified in the stories)
- A frame of human interest (telling the story in a manner that gives it a human face, showing the effect in human terms)

The study also interviewed reporters and editors who covered or processed the news on the attack to understand their knowledge of framing, framing considerations,

and measures they would apply to bridge framing gaps. The researcher requested to interview the key informants for this research. Each participant was informed of the ethical considerations generated in this research. Each interview took less than 15 minutes and were tape recorded for transcribing and analysis. A pilot testing was done to measure the timing, build rapport with the informants, and assess the questions' appropriateness for an in-depth interview. An Interview guide was used to record interviews with the reporters and editors who covered Dusit 2 hotel attack. This helped the researcher to achieve objective II of this study.

### 3.11 Pre-testing of Data Generation/Collection Tools

Piloting was achieved on a code sheet using The Star Newspaper over a three-week term between 16<sup>th</sup> January and 6<sup>th</sup> February. The investigator recruited two research assistants who were trained on how to collect data. After data was obtained, the pilot data was analyzed to assess the reliability and validity of the study instruments. Reliability refers to the consistency of the results obtained using the study instruments, while validity refers to the accuracy of the results (Babbie, 2013). By conducting a pilot study and analyzing the data, the researcher was able to determine the effectiveness of the study instruments and make any necessary adjustments before conducting the full study.

### 3.12 Validity and Reliability of Research Tools

For validity, the study used face validity to determine whether the instruments of the study measured what they are supposed to measure. The code sheet and the analysis criteria were issued to experts in the university, who in this case were the study supervisors. Their proposals were noted and integrated into the last data collection before actual data collection took place. This approach of seeking expert opinion and



integrating their suggestions into the study design helped to enhance the validity of the study instruments and results. It also demonstrates the thoroughness and rigor of the research process, as the study was committed to ensuring the validity and accuracy of study results.

For reliability, based on the data collected by the two research assistants recruited, the researcher conducted tests to determine how the data from the research assistants agreed, using inter-coder reliability. This was achieved by the aid of the statistical tool, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 26. The study found an overall coefficient of 0.876, which was more than 0.8, and therefore the data collected was similar which meant that the researcher could proceed with data collection. This shows that the pilot study was effective in determining the reliability of the study instruments. By conducting inter-coder reliability tests and achieving a coefficient of 0.876, the researcher was able to demonstrate that the data collected was consistent and reliable.

### 3.13 Data Analysis and Presentation Plan

Quantitative data collected from the code sheet in this was coded and keyed into the manual code sheet and then transferred into SPSS version 26 for analysis. The output derived from the data was in the form of themes, patterns and relationships that enabled the two dailies to establish framing of the TI. This provided a good model for the presentation of issues. The use of frequency tables for interpretation then illustrated the data. For the key informant interview guides, thematic analysis was used by grouping together similar responses. This were then presented thematically based on the tenets of objective II.

### 3.14 Ethical Considerations

Throughout the research, a number of ethical problems were addressed, including risk, access, acceptance of secrecy, anonymity, data management, and advantages to the participants. When obtaining copies, the researcher told Daily Nation and Standard management that they were to be utilized for academic research and not to be shared with any other sources. Finally, participants were promised that they may get a copy of the study. The researcher also requested approval from the AKU research bureau to conduct the study after fulfilling university requirements for academic study. He then requested approval and issuance of a research permit for the study from the National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI), a federal organization that issues permits for research in various fields.

### 3.15 Summary

The chapter has presented the research methods employed in answering the study questions. The chapter has presented the study approach and research design, data generation/tools and procedures, research method, sampling procedures, sample size, study site, target population, population, procedures, pretesting, data analysis and ethical considerations and presentation plan. The next chapter presents the ‘ findings from the research.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION, AND INTERPRETATION

#### 4.1 Introduction

The study sought to analyse frames the mainstream print media applied in the coverage of the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya. This chapter illustrates the findings of the research in regard to the three objectives, which sought to: identify the frames adopted by mainstream print media in the coverage of the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya, examine if mainstream print media coverage of perpetrators recalibrated instantly to provide the accurate depiction of the suspects, and identify factors influencing framing of perpetrators involved the Dusit D2 hotel TI by the mainstream print media.

#### 4.2 Presentation, Analysis, and Interpretations

##### *4.2.1 Response Rate and Demographic Results*

The research collected data from a code sheet and key informant interview guides. Requesting PDF and physical copies of the publications from the Daily Nation archives at Nation Centre Nairobi and the Standard headquarters on Mombasa Road in Nairobi allowed the study to gather data. Each newspaper was scrutinized systematically to identify stories on terror that were carried. From the 42 copies requested, 18 copies were found to have stories on terror-related incidences from each newspaper, making the response rate 36 out of 42 stories targeted. This implies that there were three days where there were no stories on terror incidences from each newspaper targeted (Table 4). The researcher also interviewed 6 personnel: four reporters from The Standard and the Daily Nation and two editors charged with key editorial decision-making, including coverage, selection and framing.

*Table 4: Response Rate*

	Sample Size	Response (n)	Response (%)
Daily Nation	21	18	86%
The Standard	21	18	86%
Total	42	36	86%

To help answer the objectives, the research first sought to scrutinize how the articles were published throughout the 3 weeks of the study. The study found that 14 articles were published in the 1<sup>st</sup> week, 12 articles in the 2<sup>nd</sup> week and 10 articles in the 3<sup>rd</sup> week (Table 5).

*Table 5: Date of Publication*

		Newspaper		Total
		Daily Nation	The Standard	
Date/Week	First week	7	7	14
	Second week	6	6	12
	Third week	5	5	10
Total		18	18	36

The research's findings indicate that the publication trend was the same for both the Standard newspaper and the Daily Nation newspaper. Both newspapers published stories on terror in all the first days of the week, with the number of publications on terror reducing to 6 in the second week and finally dropping to 5 days of publications on stories covering terror in the third week for both newspapers. The findings imply that as time went by, the newspapers reduced their publications on terror-related stories, as the news's prominence started to decrease. The media usually publishes stories on topics that are attractive to the audience, and as time went by, interest turned to other events in the country, and terror-related news interest reduced the public.

The research also wanted to determine the beat of the articles published by the Standard Newspaper and the Daily Nation over the three weeks of study. The study determined that the topic of the day (13 articles) and terror-related news (23 articles) dominated the beat of the articles published, as presented in Table 6 below.

*Table 6: The Beat of the Articles Published*

		Newspaper		Total
		Daily Nation	The Standard	
Beat	Topic of the day	5	8	13
	Terror-related news	13	10	23
Total		18	18	36

The results in Table 6 illustrate that the Daily Nation stories were mainly terror-related news (13 stories) as compared to 10 stories from the Standard newspaper. The topic of the day stories were mainly seen in the Standard newspaper (8 stories) as compared to 5 stories in the Daily Nation newspaper. These results suggest that the two newspapers may have different editorial priorities or areas of focus, with the Daily Nation focusing more on terrorism and the Standard focusing more on the day's topic.

The study aimed to determine the story category published by Standard and Daily Nation newspapers. The findings obtained indicate that the hard news dominated the type of stories with 23 stories/articles in total, with letter to the editor (n=6) and an opinion column (op-ed page) (n=4) also being used. On the other hand, the Press-release/statement and letters to the editors were not extensively used (n=1), as shown in Table 7

*Table 7: Type of Story Covered*

		Newspaper		Total
		Daily Nation	The Standard	
Type of Story	Hard news	11	12	23
	Press-release/statement	1	0	1
	Opinion column (op-ed page)	1	3	4
	Letter to the editor	0	1	1
	Feature	4	2	6
	Other	1	0	1
	<b>Total</b>		18	18

The results in Table 7 show that the Standard published more hard news type of stories (n=12) as compared to the Daily Nation (n=11), with the Daily Nation having more feature stories (n=4) as compared to the Standard newspaper (n=2). The opinion columns were also more used in the Standard newspaper (n=3) than in the Daily Nation newspaper (n=1). Therefore, the findings imply that every newspaper had a different publishing culture, using the type of stories that fit their readers' interests.

The research aimed to illustrate the significance level accorded to the two newspapers article. The study found that the newspapers gave a total of 15 articles high focus levels, 14 articles had low focus while 7 articles were accorded medium focus levels by the newspapers (Table 8).

*Table 8: Level of Focus Accorded to the Articles*

		Newspaper		Total
		Daily Nation	The Standard	
Focus	High	8	7	15
	Medium	3	4	7
	Low	7	7	14
<b>Total</b>		18	18	36

From Table 8, the results show that the Daily Nation newspaper accorded the articles higher focus (n=8) on the articles compared to the Standard newspaper (n=7).

However, both newspapers accorded 7 articles each lower focus. The research also sought to assess how the focus changed over the 3 weeks of the study. As shown in Table 9, there was high focus in the first week of article publications (n=14), with medium and low focus articles each having one article published. The focus was medium and low in the second week, which is also true for articles published in the third week.

*Table 9: Level of Focus over Time*

		Focus			Total
		High	Medium	Low	
Date/Week	First week	12	1	1	14
	Second week	2	2	8	12
	Third week	1	4	5	10
Total		15	7	14	36

#### *4.2.2 Frames used in the Coverage of Dusit D2 Terror Attack*

The analysed frames used in the Dusit D2 terror attack coverage. The findings obtained, shown in Table 10, indicate that the responsibility frame was the major frame employed (n=15), followed by the human interest frame (n=6), crime frame (n=6) and the conflict frame (n=4).

Table 10: Frames used in Dusit D2 Terror Attack Coverage

		Newspaper		Total
		Daily Nation	The Standard	
Frames used in the coverage of Dusit D2 terror attack	Coverage of Dusit D2 Hotel TI using conflict frame	1	3	4
	Coverage of Dusit D2 Hotel TI using religious frame	1	1	2
	Coverage of Dusit D2 Hotel TI using responsibility frame	7	8	15
	Projecting Dusit D2 Hotel TI as using human interest frame	3	3	6
	Projecting Dusit D2 Hotel TI as using economic consequence frame	2	1	3
	Projecting Dusit D2 Hotel TI as using crime frame	4	2	6
	<b>Total</b>		18	18

As shown in Table 10, both Standard newspapers and the Daily Nation mainly adopted use of the responsibility frame in the coverage of the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya. The newspapers also adopted the human interest frame, with the Daily Nation using the crime frame (n=4) more than the Standard newspaper (n=2). However, the Standard used the conflict frame (n=3) more than the Daily Nation (n=1). The findings clearly indicate that the newspapers used similar frames while covering the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya.

The research also wanted to determine how the two newspapers framed the origin of the perpetrators in the coverage of the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya. The results in Table 11 below show that the newspapers framed the terrorists as homegrown but with foreign ideologies (n=20), with 6 articles framing them as foreigners.



*Table 11: Framing of the Origin of the Perpetrators in Dusit D2 Terror Attack*

		Newspaper		Total
		Daily Nation	The Standard	
The framing of the origin of the perpetrators in the coverage of Dusit D2 Hotel TI in the newspaper	Home grown but with foreign ideologies	8	12	20
	Foreigners	3	3	6
	Not indicated	7	3	10
Total		18	18	36

From Table 11, it can be seen that the Standard newspaper mainly projected the terrorists as homegrown with foreign ideologies (n=12) as compared to the Daily Nation's 8 articles. However, both newspapers had 3 articles each projecting the terrorists as foreigners. Therefore, the study further sought to determine how the newspapers framing changed over the 3 weeks of study. Table 12 shows that the newspapers reported the terrorists as foreign in the first week (n=2), but did not calibrate this perception, as there were two articles each week that still portrayed the terrorists as foreigners. Therefore, the narrative did not change to homegrown with foreign ideologies in the second and third weeks.

*Table 12: Framing of the Origin of the Perpetrators over Time*

		Date/Week			Total
		First week	Second week	Third week	
The framing of the origin of the perpetrators in the coverage of Dusit D2 Hotel terror in the newspaper	Home grown but with foreign ideologies	11	4	5	20
	Foreigners	2	2	2	6
	Not indicated	1	6	3	10
Total		14	12	10	36

The research finally wanted to scrutinize the terrorists organisations mentioned in the Dusit D2 terror attack coverage. It was determined that Al-Qaeda/Al Shabab was the main organization talked about in the coverage of the stories (n=21), with the Muslims/Extremist/Jihadist/Salafi (n=4) also mentioned (Table 13).

*Table 13: Terrorists' Organisation Mentioned in the Dusit D2 Terror Attack Coverage*

		Newspaper		Total
		Daily Nation	The Standard	
The terrorists' organisation mentioned	Al-Qaeda/Al Shabab	7	14	21
	Muslims/Extremist/Jihadist/Salafi	3	4	7
	Names of attackers mentioned	4	0	4
	Other	4	0	4
Total		18	18	36

From Table 13, it can be deduced that the Standard newspaper articles majorly mentioned the Al-Qaeda/Al Shabab group (n=14), compared to 7 articles from the Daily Nation newspaper. However, the Daily Nation mentioned the attackers' names in 4 articles, with the Standard mentioning in 4 articles the Muslims/Extremist/Jihadist/Salafi.

#### *4.2.3 Mainstream Print Media Coverage of Perpetrators*

The study sought to answer the 2<sup>nd</sup> goal on whether the mainstream print media coverage of perpetrators recalibrated instantly to accurately depict the suspects' nationalities in the coverage of the Dusit D2 terror attack. This was achieved by interviewing 6 personnel - 4 reporters from the Daily Nation and the Standard newspapers and a further 2 editors charged with key editorial decision-making, including coverage, selection and framing.

To answer the objective, the research first sought to determine how the reporters and editors received information of the terrorists' attack at the Dusit D2 Hotel on January 16, 2019. From the responses, it was determined that social media, phone calls, fellow reporters, the television were mentioned, as shown from following responses.

In our case, there were two major sources. These included use of the social media, and from sources within the complex.

The main ways we received information of the terrorists' attack at the Dusit D2 Hotel was through calls, via a colleague - a fellow journalist and through the TV.

The research also sought to assess whom the main attackers in the Dusit D2 terror attack were perceived to be. From the responses obtained below, Al-Shabab terrorists and their members and religious fundamentalists with links to terror groups in the region were mentioned as follows:

I'm not sure, but I will attempt to answer the question. The attackers were identified in police reports as religious fundamentalists with links to regional terror groups.

Can't say who they we're at the time - later identified as terrorists as the scale and magnitude of the attack became clear.

Terrorists such as Al-Shabab terrorists and Al Shabab terror group members were involved.

The study also wanted to determine how the reporters and editors identified the attackers in the first report about the incident. It was found that the terrorists were at first identified as "attackers", then later to "terrorists" or "foreigners" and "home-grown terrorists with foreign ideologies." This is indicated as shown in the following responses:

We identified them as terror suspects and afterwards, after the scale of the attack emerged, as terrorists. They were also identified through CCTV footages and depicted as terrorists.

At first, they were identified as just "attackers." However, afterwards, because they blew themselves killing and injuring many innocent

people at Dusit hotel, that's when we realized that they were not just mere attackers but "terrorists."

The study also sought to determine how the terrorists were identified, whether they were identified as foreigners or locals. From the responses, the key informants said there was mixed speculation on the attackers' identity, with the attackers reported as foreigners on the first day of the attack, and later as locals with foreign ideologies or foreigners. This is seen in the following responses obtained:

They were first identified as suspected terrorists from Somalia. They were later identified as locals.

They were identified as locals who had foreign terrorism links. This line of reporting was buttressed by interviews with family members and friends, who gave short histories of the suspects and their suspected assimilation into terror or fundamentalist networks.

At first, we were not sure of their identity. However, reporting later persisted that they were both foreigners and locals.

Further, the research sought to scrutinize at what time of reporting the reporters and editors established the attackers' true identity. From the findings, it was shown that the identity was obtained after one day/24 hours of reporting, as seen in the following responses:

The identity of the terrorist was revealed after 24 hours later. At around 4 or 5 pm on the day of the attack, when CCTV footage of the attackers began circulating online, it is the time we truly determined their identity.

The following day, the report on the true identity of the attackers was done. It even took other writers three to four days after the attack to depict this clearly in their stories.

The researcher was also interested in determining the source of information for the reporters and editors. From the responses, it was clear that crowdsourcing, the police, witnesses and relatives of the attackers were the main sources of the information published, as indicated from the responses below:

There was crowdsourcing after CCTV footage of the attackers surfaced, followed afterwards by visits to their Nairobi and rural homes and interviews with their kin.

We obtained information from the police and witnesses. We first saw a CCTV footage of the attack, there were also eye witness accounts that provided vital clues on who these individuals were.

Through my own investigations, police sources and relatives of the attackers.

Further, the study determined that the official identity of the attackers did not differ from what the reporters and editors had initially reported. However, the attackers' identity was not doubted at first, until it was revealed and everyone was surprised that they were locals as opposed to foreigners, as initially reported. As the identity of the suspects was initially misrepresented, the researcher sought to determine if any action was taken to correct this perception in subsequent reporting. All the respondents indicated that there was no action taken in regard to what had been reported, but the subsequent publications corrected this perception to depict the terrorists as home-grown terrorists with foreign ideologies. The following responses were obtained:

We had reporters on the ground. Some were trapped in the building. So we had first-hand info of what was happening, but we reported based on what the government said.

A terror attack, or any other such attack, is fluid and facts only emerge with time. A bomb explosion, for instance, might indicate that 10 people have been confirmed dead, but as the dust settles and things become clearer, that number might exponentially rise. On Dusit D2, therefore, the question about whether the public was correctly informed of the identities of the terrorists follows the same trajectory -- from suspects to terrorists to their actual identities, complete with photographic evidence.

Yes. We gave the info based on our reporters account as well as eye witnesses on the ground. The public was correctly informed because of the photos of the attackers who were killed by government forces later in the coverage of the stories. As the identities were revealed, the public was informed.

#### 4.2.4 Factors Influencing Framing of Perpetrators

The third research's objective was to identify factors influencing framing of perpetrators involved the Dusit D2 hotel attack by the mainstream print media. Therefore, the research first wanted to determine the main actors in the articles published on Dusit D2 hotel terror attack. The findings obtained indicate that the cabinet secretary or top security officials were the main actors in these stories (n=12), followed by the media personnel (n=10) and the members of the public (n=5). The results obtained are illustrated in Table 14.

*Table 14: Main Actor in the Stories*

		Newspaper		Total
		Daily Nation	The Standard	
Main actor	Terrorism expert	1	0	1
	Political leader	1	1	2
	Member of the public	3	2	5
	Cabinet secretary or top security officials	3	9	12
	Media personnel	6	4	10
	Other person / organization	4	2	6
Total		18	18	36

As shown in Table 14, the main actors varied for the Daily Nation newspaper and the Standard newspaper. In the Daily Nation newspaper, the media personnel formed the majority of the actors in the stories (n=6), followed by other persons/organizations such as courts and communication authority (n=4), with the members of the public and the cabinet secretary or top security officials forming 3 articles each. For the Standard newspaper, the cabinet secretary or top security officials dominated the actors list (n=9) with the media personnel following with 4 articles. The

findings, therefore clearly indicate that the newspapers depended on different sources in their publications.

The research also sought to access the role played by the actors in the articles covered on Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya. The findings indicate that most actors in the stories were critical of terror groups (n=19), followed by those that were critical of government (n=5). Some advised the government on terror-related responses and contributed to terror (n=3). The results are shown in Table 15 below.

*Table 15: Main Actor Role in the Stories*

		Newspaper		Total
		Daily Nation	The Standard	
Main actor role	Critical of government	2	3	5
	Critical of terror groups	7	12	19
	Causing panic and instils fear to the public	1	1	2
	Advices the government on terror-related responses	3	0	3
	Contributes to terror	2	1	3
	Other messages	3	1	4
Total		18	18	36

As indicated in Table 15, both Daily Nation and Standard newspapers were critical of terror groups. However, the Standard newspaper had more articles that were critical of terror groups (n=12) than the Daily Nation newspaper (n=7). The Standard newspaper was also more critical of the government with 3 articles, while the Daily Nation had two articles critical of the government. The Daily Nation, however, had 3 articles advising the government on terror-related responses, compared to the Standard's zero.

#### 4.3 Summary of Key Findings

1. The findings revealed that the publication trend was similar for both the Standard newspaper and the Daily Nation newspaper. Both newspapers

published stories on terror in all the first days of the week, with the number of days of publications on terror reducing in the subsequent weeks.

2. The Daily Nation stories were mainly terror-related news (13 stories) as compared to 10 stories from the Standard newspaper. The topic of the day stories were mainly seen in the Standard newspaper (8 stories) as compared to 5 stories in the Daily Nation newspaper. However, the Standard published more hard news type of stories (n=12) as compared to the Daily Nation (11), with the Daily Nation having more feature stories (n=4) as compared to the Standard newspaper (2). The Daily Nation newspaper accorded the articles higher focus on the articles as compared to the Standard newspaper. There was also higher focus in the first week of article publications.
3. The findings indicate that the cabinet secretary or top security officials were the main actors in the stories on the Dusit D2 hotel terror attack. In addition, the findings indicate that most actors in the stories were critical of terror groups, followed by those that were critical of government.
4. The study found that that the responsibility frame was the major frame employed. The other major frames used were the human interest, crime, and conflict.
5. The findings also indicated that the newspapers framed the terrorists as home grown but with foreign ideologies, with some articles framing them as foreigners. It can also be seen that the newspapers reported the terrorists as foreign in the first week, but did not calibrate this perception as there were 2 articles each week that still portrayed the terrorists as foreigners. It was also determined that Al-Qaeda/Al Shabab was the main organisation mentioned in the coverage of the stories.



6. The study determined that social media, phone calls, fellow reporters and use of the television were major sources of receiving information on the terrorists' attack at the Dusit D2 Hotel on January 16, 2019.
7. It was found that there was speculation on the attackers' identity, with the attackers reported as foreigners on the first day of the attack, and later as locals with foreign ideologies or foreigners. The identity of the attackers was obtained after one day/24 hours of reporting. It was further clear that crowdsourcing, the police, witnesses and relatives of the attackers were the main sources of the information published.

#### 4.4 Summary

The Daily Nation and The Standard Newspapers' content analyses were provided in this chapter along with their findings, analyses, and interpretations. Specifically, the chapter has provided the response rate, general information of the data collected, the findings on the objectives: Frames used in the coverage of Dusit D2 Terror attack, mainstream print media coverage of perpetrators and factors influencing framing of perpetrators. Finally, the conclusion, suggestions for improvement, and areas for additional research are provided in the following chapter, which also addresses these findings.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the discussion, conclusion and recommendations on the analysis of Kenya's print media framing of the Dusit D2 terror attack perpetrators. The chapter is directed by the specific objectives which include to: identify the frames adopted by mainstream print media in the coverage of Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya, examine if mainstream print media coverage of perpetrators recalibrated instantly to provide the accurate identity of the suspects, and the factors influencing the reporting of the Dusit D2 hotel TI by the mainstream print media.

#### 5.2 Discussions of Key Findings

This part discusses the main results of the research as they relate to existing literature on Kenya's print media framing of the Dusit D2 terror attack perpetrators. The discussions are focused explicitly on the three research's objectives. The results are also related to the theoretical underpinnings guiding this study.

##### *5.2.1 Frames in the Coverage of Dusit D2 Terror Attack*

The first research's objective was to illustrate the frames approved by mainstream print media in the coverage of the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya. The study found that the responsibility frame was the major frame employed. The other majorly used frames included the human interest, crime, and conflict frames. These study findings find traction with those of Kioko (2018) in his media framing of Westgate and Garissa University terror attacks study, and Nwafor and Orji-Egwu (2017) that such frames are very common in Kenyan media. The studies argued that the prevalence of the dominant frames in the three separate research on the Kenyan

print media framing of TIs used human interest, attribution of responsibility, and the quest for security and justice frames.

The frames obtained in the study, in general, the conflict frame, religious frame, economic consequence frame, human interest frame, responsibility frame and crime frame can be considered into thematic and episodic frames, as indicated in literature by various scholars such as Kanji (2018) and Powell (2011). The use of these frames has also been documented by Zerback and Peter (2018), who posited that the state media create episodic frames by giving specific element of an event without looking into details or in an event context, hence creating sympathy to readers. This is in line with the results of the current study. Furthermore, the analysis of the Daily Nation and the Standard newspapers in the study revealed crime, conflict, economic consequences and religious perspectives in their coverage of that attack, in line with the studies of Mainye (2011) and Ruigrok and Van (2007).

The research findings on the print media use of frames indicate that religious frames were used by Kenya media during the Al Shabab attack and the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya. The trend of framing news on terror incidences in Kenya suggests a practice that the media in the West have used to report terror incidents. Studies show that media outlets in the United States and Australia devote more attention to terror-related activity and terrorism, especially when an attack occurs within their territory or targets their interests in other parts of the world, in accordance to Schmidt (2014), Kanji (2018) and Kearns and Amarasingam (2019). The findings of the study are, however different from those of Pece (2018), who found a different kind of frames in their study and recognized three dominant frames namely the war frames, reality frames and human drama frames which the Daily Nation and Standard newspapers did not use.

The use of war and conflict frames has been adopted by the New York Times, Washington Post, The Telegraph and Daily Mail among others in reporting TIs,

especially in Afghanistan and Iraq wars (Assad & Aldanani, 2016). By presenting the conflict as a war, the media can oversimplify the situation and obscure the underlying causes, motivations, and political dynamics involved. This type of framing can also create a sense of militarization, where violence and military action are emphasized rather than other possible solutions or approaches to resolving the conflict.

Furthermore, the use of war and conflict frames can also contribute to biased and skewed reporting, as it can prioritize one perspective or side over others. This can be particularly damaging in situations where the conflict is complex and involves multiple actors with competing interests. By presenting the conflict through a single lens, the media can influence the public's understanding and perception of the events, which can then have real-world implications for the conflict's resolution and the well-being of the people involved.

### *5.2.2 Mainstream Print Media Coverage of Perpetrators*

The second research's objective was to determine if mainstream print media coverage of perpetrators recalibrated instantly to accurately depict the suspects' identity. 36 newspapers were examined, including 18 from The Daily Nation and 18 from The Standard Newspaper. The investigator found that the newspapers framed the terrorists as foreigners in the first day, then later portrayed them as homegrown but with foreign ideologies. These findings of the study agree with those of Kimberly (2018) that terror attacks involving non-Muslims are considered in another way than those who are Muslims. This analysis supports a previous Saeed (2007) study that identified a comparable pattern in the British media.

On the other hand, Kearns, Betus, and Lemieux (2018) found that any attack by a Muslim would probably be viewed as a terror act and would get more coverage in the media. These results support arguments made by Ardevol-Abreu (2015), who contends

that when framing an event, journalists select a particular piece of information to focus on while ignoring other aspects. As a result, some aspects of reality as it is perceived through the news will be more prominent than others.

The current study established that there was speculation on the attackers' identity, with the attackers reported as foreigners on the first day of the attack, and later as locals with foreign ideologies or foreigners. The attackers' identity was obtained after one day/24 hours of reporting. The study's results align with those of the MCK (2014) that faith biases exist among Kenyan journalists in their terror coverage. This study established that the biases could be due to journalists' lack of knowledge and experience about terrorism. Further, the religious affiliations of the perpetrators also influence how the media frames terror incidents. This assertion is backed by researchers like Kanji (2018) and Kearns and Amarasingam (2019) who indicated that not all terror acts are framed in the same form in the electronic and print media. According to Kearns and Amarasingam's research from 2019, the accountability frame was centred on the fact that incidents involving Muslims received, on average, four to five times as much media attention as those involving non-Muslims.

The results of the study on non-accurate depiction of terror suspects are also similar to the findings found by Kanji (2018), who showed that the media paid much attention to acts of terror done by Muslims, with Muslims-initiated violence receiving approximately two times more coverage than when attackers or an attacker are non-Muslims. According to a different study by Kearns et al. (2019), media coverage of Muslim-related incidents increased by 357%. These researchers claim that the media's portrayal of terrorism has included labels or frames that occasionally attribute acts of terrorism to Muslims. According to Kioko (2018), the media sometimes fails to observe the ethical obligations of journalism by rushing to publish and framing the incident sensationally for profit.

### *5.2.3 Factors Influencing Framing of Perpetrators*

The third research's objective was to determine the factors influencing the framing of perpetrators involved in the Dusit D2 hotel attack by the mainstream print media. It was found that the cabinet secretary or top security officials were the main actors in the stories on Dusit D2 hotel terror attack. These findings imply that the Kenya government was the main media framing actor despite the country's constitution ensuring freedom of the press. According to Davidson (2017), the Kenyan government has significant control over news reporting, forcing media managers to exert pressure on editorial divisions to frame stories in a way that would not anger the government. Simiyu (2013) has also reported the same findings on journalists depending on government sources. According to Canel (2012), terrorist attacks inevitably call into doubt the legitimacy of governments, necessitating the use of specific framing techniques to handle the crisis. Journalists have faced pressure to censor their reporting on sensitive topics, including terrorism, to avoid going against the government or facing the consequences such as harassment, arrest, or loss of their jobs., as reported by Otieno (2018).

The study determined that social media, phone calls, other reporters and the use of television were other major sources of receiving information on the terrorists' attack at the Dusit D2 Hotel. The sourcing methods found by the current study have also been reported by Simiyu (2013) and are influenced by the media owners, media managers, advertisers and the audience. This is not to argue that journalists always tell lies or purposefully twist the truth, but rather that journalists who work for various organizations cover different stories and use different sources from diverse news perspectives are selectively creating reality. These findings also confirm assertions that some media are caught up in a trickle-down effect where powerful media serve as a

reference point from which they draw their frames and reporting routine, as postulated by Graham and Silke (2015) and Epkins (2008).

The study further determined that crowdsourcing, the police, witnesses and relatives of the attackers were other main sources of the information published. These information sources have been documented in the literature by studies such as Nyambega (2019) and Wafula (2014). The information from the police affirming the terror suspects as homegrown terrorists was gradually presented in the coverage, which was later affirmed by these sources. This also explains the study findings that Al-Qaeda/Al Shabab was the main organisation mentioned in the coverage of the stories, which was reported by the police to be the main contributor to these attacks.

### 5.3 Conclusions and Implications for Practice

Finding the frames used by mainstream print media in their coverage of the Dusit D2 terror assault in Kenya was the study's initial goal. Based on this objective, the researchers concluded that four frames were predominantly used in the coverage of the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya and included the human interest frame, responsibility frame, conflict frame and crime frame. The responsibility frame, however, was the most used of the four predominant frames.

The second objective of the research was to assess if mainstream print media coverage of perpetrators recalibrated instantly to provide an accurate depiction of the suspects. The study concluded that the newspapers reported the terrorists as foreign in the first week but did not calibrate this perception, as 2 articles each week still portrayed the terrorists as foreigners. Though the first day was exclusively portraying the terrorists as foreigners, a perception that was corrected in subsequent days, this was not entirely the case.

Objective three of the research was to point out factors influencing the framing of perpetrators involved in the Dusit D2 hotel TI by the mainstream print media. The study concluded that the sourcing methods were the major factors that influenced the framing of perpetrators involved in the Dusit D2 hotel terror attack. There were predominantly 8 major factors on how information reported was obtained and included the cabinet secretary or top security officials, social media, phone calls, other reporters, use of television news, crowdsourcing, the police, witnesses and relatives of the attackers.

The study's finding that four frames were predominantly used in the coverage of the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya and that the responsibility frame was the most used has important implications for media coverage of such events. First, it highlights the need for media to balance their reporting with multiple frames to give a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the situation. By focusing too heavily on a single frame, such as the responsibility frame, media organizations may miss important aspects of the event and provide an incomplete picture to the public.

The finding that newspapers reported the terrorists as foreign in the first week, but did not recalibrate this perception in subsequent days, despite a correction, has important implications for the media's role in shaping public perception and understanding. It highlights the need for media organizations to be vigilant in correcting their reporting inaccuracies and adopt ethical reporting standards that prioritize accuracy and impartiality. By failing to do so, media organizations risk perpetuating false narratives and causing harm to individuals or communities.

The study's conclusion that the sourcing methods were the major factors influencing the framing of perpetrators involved in the Dusit D2 hotel terror attack has important implications for media organizations and journalists. It suggests that the sources journalists use play a critical role in shaping how information is reported and



the framing of events. It highlights the need for media organizations and journalists to carefully consider the sources they use and verify information before reporting it to ensure that the public is provided with accurate and impartial information.

#### 5.4 Recommendations

The research recommends that the newspapers can consider using more frames in their reporting of stories, especially those on terror attacks. As there were four dominant frames, other frames such as negative and divisive frames and reality frames can be used for more extensive news coverage.

The study recommends an approach that reporters and editors can use to publish stories that give factual and verified data, as seen in the wrongful depiction of suspects in some instances. This means that the coverage of terror-related incidences should incorporate facts, both objective and interpretive analyses, that provide accurate information.

The study found that using terrorism experts as actors in terror stories was not extensively in the coverage of the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya. Therefore, the experts that would have helped to unpack other underlying factors that may have contributed to the attack, such as poor intelligence and preparedness level, were not exhausted.

In conclusion, this researcher submits that various circumstances complicate and impede free and unbiased reporting of terror incidences in Kenya. Since Kenyan troops invaded Somalia in 2011 in operation named Linda Nchi, whose core mission was to rout out militants who launched attacks from the Horn of Africa nation, local reporting has been flavoured with nationalistic undertones. It has been convenient to frame terror attacks on Kenyan soil as external threats, which shifts blame and accountability from the authorities.

As this research has demonstrated, journalists' reliance on official government sources has led to inadvertent acquiescence of the largest private media into government mouthpieces, churning official narratives. Security experts are another tier of information that fortify the official narrative and often frame TIs towards areas they hope to advise the government on.

While there might be good reasons for these choices, the reading public is served information coloured by different interests other than to approximate truth. By suspending, wilfully or accidentally, the full disclosure of the Dusit d2 attackers as home-grown terrorists, the public was temporarily deprived of accurate information on which to base their judgement of those events and maintain the government's perspective of terror attacks as external.

In his war reporting history, "The First Casualty: From the Crimea to Vietnam: The War Correspondent As Hero, Propagandist and Myth Maker, Phillip Knightly" Fischer (1976) warns how governments use information as their first line of attack in situations of conflict, and that truth sacrificed at the altar of disinformation. Therefore, journalists must not be prepared to dig deeper in pursuit of truth and give all sides equal scrutiny. With a firewall of legislation that criminalises access to information and the heavy censure applied to journalists who publish information from sources outside the government (Duffy, 2014), truth appears stillborn in TI reporting in Kenya.

In this context, journalists must adopt ethical reporting standards and continue to uphold the principles of journalism, such as objectivity, impartiality, and accuracy. Furthermore, they must resist the pressure to conform to government narratives and instead seek out alternative perspectives and sources to give a more complete and nuanced understanding of the situation. By doing so, journalists can help counteract disinformation dissemination and ensure that the public is informed with accurate and reliable information.

Moreover, media organizations to support their journalists in this endeavour by providing them with the resources and protection they need to report on sensitive issues and sources. This includes legal support in cases where journalists face censorship or retaliation, as well as access to secure communication tools to protect the confidentiality of their sources. By standing up for the rights of journalists and ensuring that they can report freely and independently, media organizations can play a crucial role in promoting transparency and accountability in TI reporting in Kenya.

### 5.5 Areas for Further Research

The research focused on the analysis of Kenya's print media framing of the Dusit D2 terror attack perpetrators. The objectives of the research were to: identify the frames adopted by mainstream print media in the coverage of the Dusit D2 terror attack in Kenya, examine if mainstream print media coverage of perpetrators recalibrated instantly to provide an accurate depiction of the suspects and identify factors influencing framing of perpetrators involved the Dusit D2 hotel TI by the mainstream print media. Nonetheless, this research only focussed on the publications of the Standard and the Daily Nation newspapers. Hence, there is a need to study how the other daily publications in Kenya cover such related stories. In addition, other researchers can undertake similar studies on TV, radio or social media platforms, yield comparative findings on various platforms covering terror-related incidences.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Analysis Criteria

Criteria	Details	Codes
Source	Indicates where the article was published	Daily Nation-DN- 1 Saturday Nation Sunday Nation The Standard- ST- 2 Saturday Standard Sunday Standard
Dates	The Day when the article of published	Date Format DD.MM. Starting with 16 <sup>th</sup> January and ending with 6 <sup>th</sup> February 2019.
Day of the week	Indicate the day of the week when the article was published	Monday=1 Tuesday=2 Wednesday=3 Thursday=4 Friday=5 Saturday=6 Sunday=7
Frames	Indicate the frame which was used in the analysis	Thematic frame TF – 1 Episodic EF- 2 Conflict CF-3 Religious RF- 4 Responsibility RRF- 5 Human interest HIF-6 Economic consequence ECF - 7 Crime frame CRF – 8 Military frame MF - 9
Focus	Indicates the level of significance accorded to the article in a newspaper.  <i>High Focus Article</i>         <i>Medium Focus Article</i>	High Focus= F1  Front Page =FP Back Page= BP Has Graphics = G1 Editorial Article=EA Article has more than 20 lines = L1  Medium Focus= F2

	<i>Low Focus Article</i>	Graphic integrates Dusit D2 Hotel TI with another issue= G2 Graphic includes Dusit D2 Hotel TI-related issue=G3 Section of integrated article devotes 10-20 lines= L2  Low Focus F3 Section of integrated related article devotes 5-10 lines= L3
Type of Story	Indicates the type of story covering Dusit D2 hotel TI:	Hard news= T1 Press-release/statement= T2 Editorial= T3 Opinion column (op-ed page) = T4 Special Column = T5 Letter to the editor= T6 Feature=T7
Treatment	Indicates the way that the article is written  <i>General News:</i> any story that emphasizes facts on Dusit D2 Hotel TI.  <i>Reflective:</i> Longer, more insightful tone; covers Dusit D2 Hotel TI in more depth,  <i>Commentary/Criticism:</i> Involves a first-person opinion or is a stated opinion of the newspaper studied	General News= TR1 Reflective= TR2 Commentary/ Criticism= TR3
Origin of the story	Indicate the origin of the story	Reporter=S1 Correspondents/ Journalist(s) = S2 Official/military/police = S3 Witnesses = S4 Victims and relatives = S5 Religious leaders = S6 Health professionals/ Experts = S7 Court officials = S8 Reader=S9 Unknown=S10

Sources	Indicate if any sources were used in writing the story	Interviewing of Dusit D2 Hotel TI victims=ITV Interviewing ordinary people =IOP Interviewing authorities, official/military/police =IA Other = OT
Statistics	Indicate whether the story uses any statistics	Yes= 1 No= 2
Story perspective	Indicates the focus of the views given in the story/article	Story focus is on the event - P1 Story focus is on the government views - P2 Story focus is on the victims' views = P3 Story focus is on perpetrators views =P4 Story focus is on consequence = p5 Other= OT
Dusit D2 Hotel TI perpetrators	Indicates the type of terrorists mentioned in the article	Al-Qaeda - TP1 Muslims/Extremist/Jihadist/Salafi - TP2 Terrorist Combatant =TP3 Names of attackers mentioned =TP4 Attackers/gunman = p5 Other= OT

## Appendix B: Code Sheet

### 1. **Date**

This is the date of the article/story in the newspaper.

### 2. **Title of Story**

This is the title/headline of the article/ story in the newspaper.

### 3. **Beat**

100 Focus / Topic of the day / (could be focused on Dusit D2 Hotel TI)

200 General news

300 Political news

400 Opinion editorials that give perspective on Dusit D2 Hotel TI

500 Terror-related News

1000 Other

### 4. **Type of Story**

100 Hard news

200 Press-release/statement

300 Editorial

400 Opinion column (op-ed page)

500 Special Column

600 Letter to the editor

700 Feature

1000 Other

### 5. **Treatment**

100 General

200 Reflective

300 Commentary/ Criticism

### 6. **Main actor**

The main actor is person/organization or organization that is mentioned most often in the article

100 Terrorism expert

200 Political leader

300 Member of the public



- 400 Cabinet secretary or top security officials
- 500 Media personnel
- 1000 Other person/organization

**7. Main actor role**

- 100 Critical of government
- 200 Critical of terror groups
- 300 Causing panic and instils fear to the public
- 400 Advices the government on terror-related responses
- 1000 Other messages

**8. Frames used in the coverage of Dusit D2 Terror attack**

- 100 Projecting Dusit D2 Hotel TI as using thematic frame
- 200 Projecting Dusit D2 Hotel TI as using episodic frame
- 300 Projecting Dusit D2 Hotel TI as using conflict frame
- 400 Projecting Dusit D2 Hotel TI as using religious frame
- 500 Projecting Dusit D2 Hotel TI as using responsibility frame
- 600 Projecting Dusit D2 Hotel TI as using human interest frame
- 700 Projecting Dusit D2 Hotel TI as using economic consequence frame
- 800 Projecting Dusit D2 Hotel TI as using crime frame
- 900 Projecting Dusit D2 Hotel TI as using military frame
- 1100 Not clear

**9. How the information covered is presented in the newspaper?**

- 100 Uses statistics
- 200 Uses no statistics at all
- 300 Uses images - None of the images used portray fear to the public
- 400 Uses images - Use of images that communicate fear to the public

**10. Type of terrorists mentioned**

- 100 Al-Qaeda
- 200 Muslims/Extremist/Jihadist/Salafi
- 300 Terrorist Combatant
- 400 Names of attackers mentioned
- 500 Attackers/gunman
- 1000 Other

**11. Factors influencing framing of the Dusit D2 Hotel TI**

- 100 Government
- 200 Media owners
- 300 Media managers
- 400 Advertisers
- 500 Audience
- 600 Information sources
- 1000 Other

**12. Any other remarks**

## Appendix C: Interview Guide

1. How was the information on Dusit D2 Hotel TI reported by the newspaper?
2. Did the newspaper report that the terrorists were homegrown from the first day?
3. If no, why was there hesitation to depict them as homegrown?
4. Would you say that the public was correctly informed on the type of terrorists during the Dusit D2 Hotel TI?
5. Was this perception on local homegrown terrorists finally corrected?
6. How long did it take to depict the correct information to the public?

## Appendix D: AKU Ethics Review Committee Approval Letter



**THE AGA KHAN UNIVERSITY**  
*Graduate School of Media and Communications*

REF: AKU-GSMC/ERC/2021/021

Date: November 17, 2021.

Dear Ibrahim Galgalo (Student No. 535158)

**RE: ANALYSIS OF KENYA'S PRINT MEDIA FRAMING OF THE DUSIT D2  
TERROR ATTACK PERPETRATORS**

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This is to inform you that Aga Khan University – Graduate School of Media and Communications Ethics Review Committee has reviewed and approved your above research proposal. Your approval period is November 17, 2021 to November 16, 2022 and your application's approval number is AKU-GSMC/ERC/2021/021.

This approval is subject to compliance with the following, under the supervision of your two supervisors:

1. Only the approved documents including the informed consent form and the data collection instruments will be used.
2. Any changes, made on the approved documents that may increase the risks or affect the welfare or safety of the participants or compromise the integrity of the study must be reported to GSMC within the shortest time possible. The amended documents will be taken through a fresh review and the due process of approval.
3. In the event that the research cannot be completed within the one year approved period, the researcher will request for renewal of approval 30 days prior to the end of the approved period.
4. The researcher will be required to submit a comprehensive progress report when applying for renewal of approval.
5. Submission of an executive summary report to the GSMC's Ethics Review Committee within 90 days of completion of the study.
6. Produce all the data collected using the approved tools as and when required by the Ethics Review Committee within the 90 days of completion of your study.

Prior to commencing your study, you will be required to obtain a research permit from National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI). You can access the application portal from the website on <https://www.nacosti.go.ke/>.

Please feel free to contact me should you require any further information.

Yours sincerely

**Prof Nancy Booker**  
Associate Dean

University Centre, 4th Floor  
P.O. Box 30270 – 00100 G.P.O. Nairobi, Kenya  
Tel: +254 20 3740062/63; +254 (0) 731 888 055; +254 (0) 719 231 530  
Email Address: [info.gsmc@aku.edu](mailto:info.gsmc@aku.edu); Website: [www.aku.edu](http://www.aku.edu)

## Appendix E: Introductory Letter from AKU



**THE AGA KHAN UNIVERSITY**  
*Graduate School of Media and Communications*

National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation  
P. O. Box 30623 – 00100  
Nairobi

November 17, 2021

Dear Sir/Madam.

**IBRAHIM GALGALO (STUDENT NO. 535158)**

Ibrahim Galgalo is a registered student at the Aga Khan University, Graduate School of Media and Communications. He is enrolled in the Master of Arts in Digital Journalism Programme and has completed his course work. He is now working on his Master's thesis. Mr. Galgalo's topic is "Analysis of Kenya's Print Media Framing of the Dusit D2 Terror Attack Perpetrators."

The purpose of my writing is to request you to assist Mr. Galgalo complete this important academic exercise. Any information collected will be used solely for academic purposes. Upon completion of the research, Mr. Galgalo's thesis will be available at our library. He will also submit two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf of his completed work to your department.


We appreciate your support to our student towards his successful completion of his thesis research.


Please feel free to contact me should you require any further information.

Yours sincerely,

**Prof Nancy Booker**  
Associate Dean


Appendix F: NACOSTI Research Licence

  
REPUBLIC OF KENYA

  
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR  
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: **689256** Date of Issue: **25/November/2021**


**RESEARCH LICENSE**




**This is to Certify that Mr., Ibrahim Galgalo Bocha of Aga Khan University, has been licensed to conduct research in Nairobi on the topic: ANALYSIS OF KENYA'S PRINT MEDIA FRAMING OF THE DUSIT D2 TERROR ATTACK PERPETRATORS for the period ending : 25/November/2022.**

License No: **NACOSTI/P/21/14521**

**689256**  
Applicant Identification Number

  
Director General  
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR  
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY &  
INNOVATION

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