

ERASING OR RESTORING UKRAINIAN HERITAGE

From Stalin to Putin

Fabien Bellat

ABSTRACT: In Ukraine, heritage has been a battlefield since World War II. In those years, the Kyiv reconstruction was dominated by Russian architects, and Ukrainian architects were marginalized in their own city. However, restoration of churches slowly became a topic where policy changed from Stalin's doctrines to his successors' principles, and where Ukrainian builders managed to gain some success in heritage protection. This prevailed more after independence in 1991. The present war that Putin triggered against Ukraine is accelerating heritage issues. The destructions of this war have hit all types of buildings, but some of the reactions of the people in charge should arouse worry for the preservation of the 20th century heritage. The obvious lack of interest for the modern heritage of the 1920s and 1930s, or even for the more classical Stalinist buildings of the 1940s and 1950s, expresses a kind of selective memory. Soon this may lead to regrettable deletions, adding more disaster to the destructive traces that the war has already left. Consequently, and despite the many ghosts left by the Soviet regime (something which understandably led to the controversial decommunization laws), more studies should be launched on the Constructivist and Stalinist legacy in particular, in order to help saving this significant part of Ukraine history. This research could be useful when the reconstruction and conservation of the damaged towns eventually begins.

KEYWORDS: Ukraine, war, ideology, modern heritage, restoration and conservation

INTRODUCTION: Each war sows its share of hateful struggles. When nations clash, heritage becomes part of the collateral damage, or even an object attracting destructive rage. In this regard, the current war waged by the Putinist dictatorship on Ukrainian territory is just another egregious example of naked power play. The biased rewriting of history has turned into an obsession for Putin, always in favor of his imperialist vision of Russia. Rather than supporting scholars who have maintained genuine standards of historical ethics, such as Sergei Mironenko, the Kremlin prefers to highlight someone like Vladimir Medinsky—Minister of Culture from 2012 to 2020, although he has been repeatedly accused of plagiarism in his so-called academic works.¹ The current Minister of Culture, Olga Lyoubimova, has multiplied patriotic films blatantly exploiting the sanctified memory of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45), in order to line up the population behind a militarist credo.² However, the Russian public itself does not spare its criticism of this propagandist cinema, which is rarely convincing. Indeed, my teaching experience in

Russia, between 2013 and 2015 in Togliatti, helped me to better measure how the Soviet past was exploited there, erasing aspects unfavorable to the country's image. On the one hand, the municipality encouraged my efforts to understand the process that guided the creation of this new town. On the other hand, I noticed the federal power's discomfort about a foreigner exploring all the archives. Apart from a few exceptions, I almost always had access to the sources. What I accomplished in Togliatti would now be impossible. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, I conducted no further research in Russia, finding that growing chauvinism would prevent serious historical exploration.

The Russian attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, revealed more than a conflict between two countries. The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict insists on the safeguarding of heritage by both belligerents. Therefore, the intentional destruction or pillaging of cultural property committed by the Russian forces are also a crime. Heritage issues should yet be re-examined in a larger scale, both in the light of

the devastations in progress and what they reveal of previous tensions and cultural choices. Decisions concerning heritage in Ukraine have long depended on antagonistic visions. The collective memory inherits an ambiguous past. This also becomes the bearer of lasting clashes, indirectly polluting reflections on heritage, and threatening to lead to other regrettable deletions.

DELIBERATE HERITAGE CHOICES IN THE PAST?

Already in 1944, the competition for Kyiv's reconstruction tacitly questioned Ukrainian architects' place. Several renowned Moscow architects, such as Karo Alabian (1897-1959), Georgi Goltz (1893-1946) and Aleksandr Vlassov (1900-1962) for instance were invited to submit proposals. The first was already in charge of Stalingrad, an ideologically major project. The second was a talented practitioner of the Stalinist neo-Palladian style. The third had good relations with Nikita Khrushchev, leader of the Party in Ukraine since 1937. During this competition, Ukrainian architects such as Volodymyr Zabolotni (1898-1962) and Oleksei Tatsi (1903-1967) were allowed to submit plans, so that the consultation did not appear to be totally guided by Moscow. Zabolotni was clearly inspired by the Ukrainian Baroque of the 17th and 18th centuries, brilliantly adapted to the USSR requirements of ideological representation. Tatsi was more cautious, seeking a compromise between solving the complex topographical problems of the center and adapting to Kyiv a patriotic Neo-Classicism updating the "1812 style" with a grandiloquent Stalinist tone. Following virulent accusations of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism", Zabolotni chose to withdraw himself from the competition, no doubt fearing that these attacks were the prelude to an even more

disastrous fate.³ As for Tatsi, the praise for his work only served as a cover to hide the obvious: it was Aleksandr Vlassov, much more politically connected to the Kremlin, who was to lead the rebuilding of Kyiv from 1947 onwards, in order to transform it into an architectural satellite of the Muscovite sun [FIGURE 01].

This led to strange circumstances, because in 1949 Vlassov became Moscow's chief architect, while continuing to direct the Kyiv reconstruction from afar. His assistant, Anatoli Dobrovolski (1910-1988), trained at the Kyiv Institute of Construction, faithfully applied the monumental urban scenography advocated by Vlassov. This led, among other things, to the successive projects for the Hotel Ukraina—first thought of as a typical Stalinist skyscraper. It derived from Muscovite models, but its long construction time finally resulted in a de-Stalinization, leaving in the city panorama a typical building from the architectural transition between Stalinist monumentality and the Khrushchevite return to more sobriety. Similarly, Boris Prymak (1909-1996), a builder trained in Kharkiv, produced several of the Maidan ensembles according to the aesthetic and technical standardizing data determined under Vlassov's aegis. Tatsi could only achieve a middle-size cinema in the city center, adapting the outline of standardized theater models, typical of the Stalin era. In short, Ukrainian professionals were reduced to the unenviable role of extras, applying to their own capital the architectural principles decided for them by Muscovite colleagues subservient to the Stalinist ruling circles. Only a few ornamental elements superficially reflected the Ukrainian stylistic legacy. It was another way of marginalizing the country's culture, which was surreptitiously erased behind the pretext of Stalinist Socialist Realism,

01 Project for the reconstruction of Kyiv by Aleksandr Vlassov (dir.), 1944 © Private collection.



supposedly respectful of national identities, but resulting actually in an almost complete cancellation of their creative autonomy.

Unsurprisingly, the urgent task of raising Kyiv from its ruins left little room for the protection of historic buildings, which were considered to be anachronistic remnants of a reactionary social order. This disregard applied especially to religious monuments. Blown up by the occupiers in November 1941, the Cathedral of the Dormition (11th century, and remodeled in the 15th and 18th centuries) remained almost an untouched ruin for a time. The official idea was that the ravaged sanctuary would serve as a witness to Nazi barbarism, but in reality, this was a very convenient way for the Stalinist hierarchy to save themselves the costly and delicate restoration of a place of worship which also bore witness to the antiquity of Ukrainian culture. In comparison, in the Russian SSR, Aleksei Shchusev (1873-1949) planned as early as 1944 to integrate the restoration of the Novgorod medieval ecclesiastical ensembles into the master plan of the rebuilt city.⁴ Nevertheless, some work of consolidation and study of the Kyiv cathedral remains were initiated in 1947. Later, in 1971 the architect Oleg Graujis (1944-2018) fitted out the remaining chapel, to promote its use for tourist purposes. Graujis then began a global reconstruction project, resorting to photogrammetry during the 1980s — to compensate for the absence of plans sufficiently documenting the building's state before destruction. However, the budgetary slump of the declining USSR, in addition to a certain political ill-will, to which were added virulent debates, prevented the realization of this restoration — causing the very symbolic anniversary of the thousandth anniversary of the baptism of the Rus to be missed in 1988. It was only after independence that this important project was resumed in 1995, still under Graujis's direction. The Cathedral of the Dormition was finally restored in 2000. Despite debates on the archaeological authenticity of the result, this restoration finally recreated a major monument of Ukrainian culture, remedying decades of concealment of the country's memory.

Other churches or ancient buildings experienced similar tribulations. Born in Kyiv, the historian and architect-restorer Iouri Aseev (1917-2005) distinguished himself in this field. In 1943 his Russian colleague Piotr Baranovski (1892-1984) had commissioned him to investigate the old Ukrainian monuments damaged or destroyed by the Nazi occupiers during WWII. This first perilous mission made Aseev a specialist who was later mobilized for many restorations, or even reconstructions, of ancient monuments in the Ukrainian SSR, including the Kyiv Church of St. Cyril, or the Golden Gate and the Chernihiv Cathedral of the Assumption. One of his most significant projects

concerned the Kyiv Pyrochochcha Church (12th century). This had been demolished by the Soviet regime in 1935, but its foundations were archaeologically excavated in 1976. After contributing to the study of the remains, Aseev finally rebuilt this sanctuary in 1997, combining scholarly analysis of the building's history with architectural interpretation of its supposed original state. The palinodes undergone by the religious heritage in Ukraine under the USSR and after independence testify to profound societal reversals. The elimination and then the restitution of this historical legacy reveal the changes in conceptions of identity, under which heritage depends very much on the political regime in power. Stalin preferred to obliterate the churches, Brezhnev allowed their research, Kuchma rebuilt them—to reaffirm the value of antiquity of the national heritage.

CONSEQUENCES FOR HERITAGE IN THE FUTURE?

After these efforts, significant of a distancing from the Soviet past, Ukraine experienced other major internal and external clashes, which endangered its memory and its tangible heritage. The decommunization laws passed in 2015, following the annexation of Crimea and the start of the Donbass conflict in 2014, had paradoxical effects. The municipalities' debaptization made it possible to break with the celebration of Soviet figures with often negative liabilities, and to reconnect with a Ukrainian toponymy. The *Leninopad*, eliminating the first Bolshevik leader's statues from the urban environment, is part of a more brutal erasure.⁵ This post-revolutionary iconoclasm against the symbols of the defunct regime could no doubt have been better framed, in order to avoid the destruction of sometimes high-quality artistic works, which could have been brought together on a museum site, and therefore replaced in their previous ideological context, to better explain their former role. The recent dismantling of the *Kyiv Monument of Friendship between Peoples* stems from the same reflex, wanting to erase strongly connoted ideological representations, in this case a portrayal of Ukraine as inferiorized under the cumbersome tutelage of the Russian Big Brother.⁶ As the country battles the Putinist invasion, these actions are an understandable response to the devastation left by the current invader. However, these gestures were immediately instrumentalized by Putinist propaganda to justify its supposed "special military operation" claiming to "liberate Ukraine from Neo-Nazis" — a strange rhetoric, so similar to the fascist forgeries used during WWII. Nevertheless, for the moment, each elimination of a Soviet monument in Ukraine unfortunately gives advantages to the captive media of the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, the fighting takes its toll on lives and

heritage. In Ukraine, several websites effectively list the devastation caused by the Russian army: this clearly identifies the first need as being for stabilization, and will help subsequent steps of restoration. However, consultation of some of these databases seems to put perhaps too much emphasis on religious or domestic heritage, and not enough on the damage suffered by Constructivist and Stalinist heritage.⁷ Does this stem from an urgency dictated by the current battles, or choice revealing tacit memory preferences? Although well-accepted and revered by the scholarly and academic community, the modern Constructivist and classicist Stalinist heritage is apparently still struggling to be accepted in Ukraine by political authorities, from municipal to regional and even national level. Moreover, Russia and Belarus are experiencing the same historical transmission impasse. I experienced this when the Belarusian dictatorship tried to prevent me from carrying out research on the Minsk remodeling during the first three decades of Soviet power in 2016.

These questions underlie the first initiatives considering reconstruction. Recently, the offer of the prominent English architect Sir Norman Foster to rebuild Kharkiv raises questions in several respects. The focus is on Art Nouveau buildings to be restored—like, for instance, the Selivanov flats, built in 1907 by Oleksandr Ginzburg (1876-1948). But, meanwhile, the architectural achievements from the Constructivist or Stalinist period are never mentioned. Even worse, they are subject of a tacit denial: Kharkiv is described as a city “known for its architecture in the Art Nouveau style”, and Foster adds that he wants to combine “the most appreciated and revered heritage of the past with the most desirable and ecological infrastructures and buildings”⁸. Unsurprisingly, the mayor said he “really wants to see this new, progressive style in our city. I would like us to have a city center which becomes one of the strong points of Europe”⁹. This at the cost of the amnesia of an essential part of the Kharkiv historic urban landscape.

Why this deafening silence on the entire Soviet heritage, including postwar and well as interwar built environments? A team of researchers in Kharkiv has already carefully listed buildings with undoubted heritage value.¹⁰ For instance, the Derzhprom complex (The State Industry Building), built between 1925 and 1928 by Sergei Serafimov (1878-1939), Samuel Kravets (1891-1966) and Mark Felger (1881-1962) is one of the most epic achievements of Constructivism. It legitimately attracted the attention of UNESCO and was put on the tentative list in 2017. The former Party headquarters, built in 1951 in a grandiose Stalinist style, under the direction of Veniamin Kostenko (1903-1969) is another example. The building was bombed and its case arouses emblematic disagreements. As architect Vladimir Novgorodov said:

“As a person who has been dealing with architectural monuments all my life, I think that it is not only possible, but necessary to restore this building”¹¹. The same opinion is held by Katerina Kublitskaya, who also believes the building can be restored, adding that here “the architects will not have as big problems as their French colleagues, engaged in the restoration of Notre-Dame cathedral. In Kharkiv, you don’t need to search for forgotten technologies or the wood of a 300-year-old oak tree, you only need sand-lime bricks and concrete”¹². Despite these professional statements, other voices in the press—coming from people without architectural skills—strongly emphasize the cracks and instability of the monument. Despite the burned roof and gutted windows, the photos nevertheless show almost intact facades, and the structural problems do not seem insurmountable. Clearly, some would like to see this symbol of the communist regime disappear, even if it means ignoring technical realities to push for its demolition.¹³

Luckily, the Kharkiv railway station remains intact to this day. It was built in 1952 by Boris Mezentsev (1911-1970)—under Stalin, one of the best architects attached to the construction of railway facilities, and also author of the stations of Vitebsk in Belarus and Smolensk in Russia.¹⁴ This typical work of Stalinist Baroque is a key witness to the Soviet policy of reconstruction. Its aesthetic quality deserves an enhancement of the heritage status, especially since it was designed to serve as a triumphal gateway to the city.

While the municipality is wisely asking for new hospitals and schools, its insistence on offices is aimed more at economic interests, to accommodate the lucrative high-tech sector. In this logic, the search for foreign investors seeks to market a selective image of local heritage, highlighting only the most consensual buildings, to the detriment of almost everything stemming from the 20th century – a wilful act of further erasure that would only compound the erasures already being inflicted by Putinist violence. Thus, faced with such shortcomings, is Norman Foster’s proposal of any real architectural and historical worth? Its disconnection from the realities on the ground, based on a failure to consult the Ukrainian architectural community—would be the source of predictable and destructive disputes.¹⁵

The city of Mariupol has also paid a heavy price in human and heritage losses. The center was adorned with a theater typical of the standardizing formulas of the end of the Stalinist period.¹⁶ This complex, produced in 1959 by Oleg Malichenko (1905-1979) and A. Krilova (dates not known) testified to the continuation of the Stalinist neo-classical style even after the architectural destalinization that began after Khrushchev’s speech to Soviet architects in December 1954. Malichenko and Krilova had designed,

a little earlier, the similar Poltava theater, distinguished by the arcades of its facade. Their creations therefore belong to a creative category in balance between classical monumentality and duplication of a typology. If it is not a particularly original example of heritage, a monument such as this deserves at least historic status as a major cultural site in the urban fabric. In the case of Mariupol, the place now carries a tragic memory. With many children having taken refuge there during the Russian bombardments, the deliberate destruction of this theater will remain as one of the most abhorrent crimes committed by the Putinist army. Despite the almost total collapse of the interiors, part of the facades remains standing. An identical exterior restoration would be possible, if only to preserve this essential building of the city, even if it means modernizing the interiors. The restoration of this monument could lead to a memorial addition, commemorating the victims.

Although it has been the subject of several international publications, the heritage of the second Soviet modernity from the 1960s to the 1980s is still undervalued, apart from a few notable exceptions¹⁷. However, many of the buildings bequeathed by this period are major in Ukrainian landscapes.

Like other Soviet republics, Ukraine contributed to the radical architectural transformation made possible by the massive prefabrication initiated by Khrushchev, then generalized under Brezhnev. Architects who started their careers at the end of the Stalin era, such as Vadim Ladni (1918-2011) and Zinaïda Klebnikova (dates unknown) began working on a commercial-domestic ensemble on the Prospekt Peremog in Kyiv in 1966. Horizontal line shops were mixed with glazed curtain wall facades and residential buildings were arranged perpendicularly at the rear—the blind wall on the avenue was covered with mosaics, according to a device then popularized both in Belarus and in Central Asia. The fragility of these decorations will necessarily require restoration.


If the buildings of this period were made mainly via prefabricated series, some larger collective facilities managed to maintain a creative and structural audacity, such as the Ukraina cinema in Kharkiv, created in 1969 by Vadim Vasiliev (1931-) and Iouri Plaksiev (1932-) together with the engineer Volodimir Reusov (1925-2011). The double parabolic vault of this brilliant work is an obvious Soviet response to the Dorton Arena in Raleigh (USA), built in 1952 according to the project of Maciej Nowicki (1910-1950) after his accidental death. Already protected and recently restored, this cinema in Kharkiv deserves increased interest as a fine example of Ukrainian assimilation of international innovations [FIGURE 02].

During the 1960s, the scale of residential districts expanded considerably. The Saltivka district in Kharkiv was

designed by the teams of the Ukrgorstroyproekt Institute originally to accommodate around 250,000 inhabitants. The alternation between standardized nine-storey prefabricated buildings with taller towers was carefully studied, as well as the landscape as a whole¹⁸. This achievement prepared the ground for other large-scale urban extensions, such as that carried out in Russia in Togliatti from 1967 by Boris Roubanenko (1910-1985) and the Soviet Central Scientific Institute for Housing, using mostly the series 121 for buildings¹⁹. A priori, in Saltivka, the type 1KG-480, designed by the ZNIIEP Institute in Kyiv, was the most common, probably alongside similar Russian typologies²⁰. The regular bombardments and firing by the Russian army on Saltivka led to substantial fires, which were difficult to control²¹. The future of these weakened structures remains more than uncertain, since these standardized buildings do not benefit from either aesthetic or social consideration.

The following experiments in the 1970s continued on this path, seeking to combine structural efficiency and spatial comfort, while ensuring that formal solutions were found to energize the facades—despite a diminishing budgetary and administrative context. The circular buildings made in 1973 by Aleksei Zavarov (1917-2003) in the Kyiv Komsomolski district derive directly from the complex that Evgueni Stamo (1912-1987) had just finished in the Moscow Ochakovo-Matveevskoe raïon. As for Piotr Bronnikov (1910-1980), his towers in Mykolaiv, with giant oculi panels [FIGURE 03], seem a Soviet response to Kishō Kurokawa's (1934-2007) recent Capsule Tower in Tokyo, Japan²². In short, Ukrainian housing projects alternated between local choices, adaptation of Russian examples,

02 Ukraina cinema, Kharkiv, by architects Vadim Vasiliev, Iouri Plaksiev, and Volodimir Reusov, 1969.
© Private collection.





03 Towers with giant oculi panels in Mykolaiv by Piotr Bronnikov, 1970s. © Private collection.

and assimilation of innovative foreign constructions. This diversity of solutions tends to contradict the prejudice of a Brezhnev architecture in stagnation: on the contrary, then the builders sometimes tried successfully to play with the constraints of the Soviet system²³. Some of the best apartment buildings of this period should be considered valuable achievements and should be given heritage protection if possible.

If Russia claims not to have targeted residential areas, the facts everywhere contradict this assertion. Many prefabricated buildings from the 1960s to the 1980s were gutted by rocket fire or aerial bombardment. Often this led to their partial collapse. Obviously, many of these badly damaged and now unstable constructions will have to be demolished. However, in the Kyiv *oblast*, the gutted buildings of Borodyanka could give rise to the creation of a memorial inserting a glass structure between the remaining stabilized parts.

The large Crimean hotel and spa complexes also pose delicate questions. The Ai-Danil sanatorium in Yalta, built by Boris Mezentsev in 1974 and the Yalta hotel, in the eponymous town, the work of Anatoly Polyanski (1928-1993) in 1977, are among the most impressive achievements of this typology. The functionalism of these large structures and their impact on the site, make them worthy heirs of Narkomfin (1928, Moscow) by Moïse Guinzbourg (1892-1946), or of the Housing Unit (1945, Marseille) by Le Corbusier (1887-1965). Now in territory controlled by Russia since 2014, these extensive facilities are threatened both by a lack of regular maintenance and by external and internal renovations with little concern for the formal qualities of this modern heritage.

Another typology also generalized prefabrication, duplicating thousands of copies of standardized plans:

schools. Nevertheless, some specific cases wanted to push the limits of a potentially stifling standardization, such as the school complex built in the early 1980s by Anatoly Mitiunin (1938-) in Simferopol, Crimea. Alongside a prefabricated complex, with facade panels and standardized openings, the architect added almost neo-Gothic play areas, in an astonishing stylistic collage: a Soviet variant of Postmodernism then in full global expansion. These achievements also become political issues during the current war. The press reports sent by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to its European embassies insist *ad nauseam* on the use of schools by the Ukrainian army, to store equipment and serve as quarters for soldiers. Russian propaganda claims these are war crimes; while these school buildings have lost their usual function because of the fighting, their efficient spaces make it possible to store dangerous weapons without risk to the population. According to the UNESCO, 2,129 schools in Ukraine have been damaged or destroyed²⁴ to date.

In addition to these fairly substantial buildings, the war will undoubtedly accelerate the loss of more modest and everyday postwar heritages, including structures that play a vital role in peri-urban or rural landscapes. Soviet organizations in Ukraine such as the Giproselstroy (Institute of Civil Construction in Agricultural Areas) and its architects V. Kravchenko (dates not known) and V. Mostchil (dates not known) had pioneered plans for reinforced concrete farms in 1954. How many were built? How many have already been destroyed, or will face destruction in the future? Similar remarks could be made about the semi-detached wooden houses designed in the 1980s for the same institution by Yuri Kosenko (1943-2001). This technological standardization was intended to modernize the *kolkhozes* and to allow a decent standard of living despite

shortages of materials. This constitutes a considerable heritage, little known, but certainly deserving interest. Some should be preserved as examples of constructive industrialization.

CONCLUSIONS

The war is still raging. What should the defenders of modernist heritage do when it eventually comes to a conclusion? It is obvious that the Ukrainian (re-)builders will have to meet harsh challenges, within which the preservation of the national heritage, both ancient and modern, will play a revealing role. Let us hope that the Kyiv government will promote a policy respecting all architectural achievements of the country, especially those of the last century. This heritage still arouses fierce polemics, partly because of the painful injuries left by the Soviet Union. However, it, too, is now an ineradicable and vital part of Ukraine's collective memory. Let us also hope that after the war there will be possibilities for Ukrainian and foreign specialists to come together, to jointly promote and realize a reconstruction respectful of the country's entire historic architectural legacy—rescuing and restoring all of the built testimonies of Ukraine's identity for future generations.

REFERENCES

- AMAN A. (1992). *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era. An aspect of Cold War History*, MIT Press, Cambridge.
- BELLAT, F. (2015). *Togliatti, une ville neuve en URSS*, Marseille: Parenthèses.
- BELLAT, F. (2013). Speckled foil. Soviet architecture under the Brezhnev glaxis, In: *Cahiers du monde russe*, n°1, 2013.
- MEUSER, P. (2015). *Die Ästhetik der Platte. Wohnungsbau in der Sowjetunion zwischen Stalin und Glasnost*, Berlin: Dom Publishers.
- MEUSER, P., & Zadorin, D. (2015). *Towards a Typology of Soviet Mass Housing*, Berlin: Dom Publishers.
- RITTER K. (dir.) (2012). *Soviet Modernism 1955-1991 Unknown History*, Zürich: Park Books.
- SEDAK, I. (dir.) (1987). *Architecture of the Soviet Ukraine*, Moscow: Stroizdat.

Fabien Bellat holds a PhD in art history from Paris X University. He has taught in France, Canada and Russia. He is now researcher at the EVCAU laboratory and associate professor at the Paris Val de Seine School of Architecture. He curated an exhibition on the Soviet new town of Togliatti, shown at the Moscow Museum of Architecture, and published on this topic a book, first in Russian and then in French. His research on Minsk was also published in Russian, while a French version is still planned. He recently also published in Germany with Galda Verlag, Dushanbe: *Urban Palimpsests in Tajikistan*.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Kastouéva-Jean, T., Konkka, O., Kuposov, N., Koustova, E., Volkov, D., and Zhurzhenko, T. (2020). Memory of the Second World War in present-day Russia, *French Institute for International Relations (IFRI)*, p. 36. Director of the State Archives, Mironenko was dismissed by Medinsky, the archivist having, contrary of the minister's wishes, attempted to emphasize the difference between historical facts and propaganda legends distorting military memory. Medinsky is currently the "negotiator" sent by Putin to Ukraine, a position where he stands out above all for his promotion of the war-mongering narrative of the Kremlin.
- 2 <https://tass.ru/kultura/4882895>
- 3 Killeso, T., "Majdan, the emblematic square of kyiv", *Revue des études slaves*, n°4, 2014, p.5. During the Stalinist purges, this kind of denunciation led either to execution or deportation. Zabolotni's contacts with Khrushchev spared him the worst, but his career came to an abrupt halt.
- 4 Pavel Chchusev, Alekseï Chchusev, (2011), Gordeev publishers, Moscow.
- 5 Ackermann, N., *Looking for Lenin*, (2017), FUEL Publishing, London.
- 6 <https://meduza.io/feature/2022/06/13/bolshie-ochen-sovetskie-i-ih-nikomu-ne-zhalo>?
- 7 <https://culturecrimes.mkip.gov.ua/> ; <https://uaculture.org/culture-loss>
- 8 <https://www.lefigaro.fr/culture/patrimoine/guerre-en-ukraine-l-architecte-norman-foster-propose-de-reconstruire-immEDIATEMENT-kharkiv-20220422> ; https://www.francetvinfo.fr/culture/arts-expos/architecture/guerre-en-ukraine-l-architecte-britannique-norman-foster-propose-de-reconstruire-la-ville-de-kharkiv_5095942.html
- 9 Idem.
- 10 <https://constructivism-kharkiv.com/> , or see also https://www.icomos.org/images/DOCUMENTS/Secretariat/2022/Statements/ICOMOS_Statement_Ukraine_EN-FR_20220224.pdf
- 11 <https://2day.kh.ua/ru/kharkow/sokhranit-ili-snesti-cto-budet-s-kharkovskim-domom-sovetov>
- 12 Idem.
- 13 At the author's suggestion, the INHA in France invited Evguenia Gubkina, researcher and architect from Kharkiv, in June 2022 to the art history festival at the Château de Fontainebleau. She declared that the municipal authorities wanted to demolish this monument. If this were to be confirmed, then let us hope that once the war is over, the Ukrainian academic community will manage to prevent this crime against the collective memory of the country.
- 14 A specialist studied by the author in "The temptation of standardization", *Archiscopie*, Paris, July 2021.
- 15 <https://www.dezeen.com/2022/04/27/norman-foster-kharkiv-rebuild-slava-balbek/>
- 16 This interesting subject is summarized in "Serial theaters in the USSR under Stalin: standardization and variations", Thematic notebooks n°20, *editions of the Maison des sciences de l'homme*, ENSA Lille, 2022.
- 17 Ritter, 2012, pp.72-91.
- 18 Meuser, 2015, p.399.
- 19 Bellat, 2015, pp.93-131.
- 20 Meuser & Zadorin, 2105, pp. 311-319.
- 21 <https://atalayar.com/fr/content/saltivka-le-quartier-fantome-de-kharkiv>
- 22 Sedak 1987, p.211.
- 23 Bellat, 2013.
- 24 <https://www.unesco.org/en/ukraine-war/damages-and-victims>.

