



**JPPUMA: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan dan Sosial Politik UMA
(Journal of Governance and Political Social UMA)**

Available online <http://ojs.uma.ac.id/index.php/jppuma>

Human Security Implications of Foreign Military Bases in Djibouti

Kester C Onor

Senior Research Fellow, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
Lagos, Nigeria

Received: November 12, 2023; Reviewed: December 12, 2023; Accepted: December 25, 2023

Abstract

The principles of sovereignty and non-interference have historically shaped China's foreign policy, serving as fundamental tenets to safeguard the nation from external interventions, particularly during and after the Cold War. However, in recent times, there has been a noticeable shift in China's foreign policy as it embarks on an unprecedented expansion of its military presence beyond its borders. This shift is exemplified by the establishment of a permanent military base in Djibouti, situated in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, which China refers to as "support facilities" or "logistical facilities." This marks China's inaugural venture into maintaining a permanent military presence outside its territorial boundaries. This study delves into the motivations behind China's adjusted foreign policy stance and examines the implications of this new approach on human security. While acknowledging the critical human insecurity implications associated with China's military presence in Djibouti, the analysis reveals a multifaceted strategy encompassing economic, political, ideological, and security interests. This strategic move positions China as a significant global player, shaping its role on the world stage.

Keywords: Sovereignty; Non-Interference; China; Foreign Policy; Military Presence

How to Cite: Onor, K.C. (2023). Human Security Implications of Foreign Military Bases in Djibouti. *JPPUMA: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan dan Sosial Politik UMA (Journal of Governance and Political Social UMA)*, 11 (2): 119-137

*Corresponding author:
E-mail: kaestercee@yahoo.com

ISSN 2549-1660 (Print)
ISSN 2550-1305 (Online)



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

INTRODUCTION

China holds an opinion of itself as a world center of civilization. However, during the 'century of humiliation' which is described as the period between the mid-19th and the mid-20th century, the country experienced semi-colonization, civil war, internal turmoil, and military defeat. The season ended with the Communist Revolution of 1949 (Rühlig, 2018). Jakobson (2013) argues that since 1949, the Communist Party has emphasized the need for China to regain dignity and respect as a great nation after decades of humiliation (Jakobson, 2013). Leaders such as Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping made several efforts to rejuvenate the nation and pursued foreign policy objectives aimed at driving the country to greatness (Rühlig, 2018). Over the years, China has formally described its foreign policy goals as sovereign security, national unification, domestic political stability, territorial integrity as well and China's sustainable social and economic development (Jakobson, 2013). Summarily, domestic stability aimed at ensuring that the socialist system remains intact, and the Communist Party stays in power are its primary objectives. Additionally, the Chinese Communist Party anticipates reinforcing its legitimacy through an urbane foreign policy that would position China as an influential actor or player on the world stage. Invariably, these domestic agendas remain the driving force of China's foreign policy. No wonder, there have been significant transformations in Chinese foreign policy as it has expanded global influence even into Africa (Rühlig, 2018).

The Horn of Africa, comprising Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia is one of the economically, geographically, and strategically significant regions in the world. Its economic significance is hinged on its coastal opening on the Red Sea which positions it along an important maritime trade artery that links Asia and Europe. Furthermore, it provides low labor costs to

emerging markets and also has huge natural resource deposits (Alem et al., 2017). On the other hand, the region is highly fragile and has been susceptible to conflicts such as the civil wars in Somalia, Darfur, and South Sudan, the continued attacks of Somalia by Al-Shabaab, piracy along the Somalian coast, and ethnic unrest in Ethiopia amongst others. In light of the interception of the realities of trade interests, instability, and conflicts, for various reasons, the region has been transformed into a paramount theatre where movements, governments, and political groups have sought to intervene in the region's internal affairs (Alem et al., 2017).

Since 2001, the Horn of Africa has experienced numerous deployments of foreign military. A variety of international and regional security actors are presently operational there. The foreign military plants include land-based facilities such as airstrips, bases, training camps, ports, and logistics hubs as well as naval forces on either regular or permanent deployment. The foreign military forces in the region include those of China, France, Egypt, Germany, Iran, Italy, India, Israel, South Korea, Russia, Spain, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United States, Spain, Russia, and Turkey (*Education in China A Snapshot*, 2016).

Foreign military bases have been part of modern States' history and warfare. They are found in more than 120 countries and territories. It is necessary to state that they have multiplied in places where States have national interests to pursue. Put differently, countries set up military bases in foreign locations where they have their expenditures to secure. With the ever-increasing numbers of foreign bases, the consequences especially on humans are expected to rise. China's military presence in parts of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a sharp stray from its non-intervention policy which has been a major aspect of China's foreign policy for decades.

It is in this light that this study examines the impetus or morale for China's decision to set up a military base in Djibouti and the humanistic implication of foreign military bases in the host country.

It is expected that e-government will widen the citizens' participation in the decision-making of their society, state, or globally. The transformation that is embedded in e-government has generated great interest among the citizens with increased citizen participation thereby propagating democracy with its embedded principles that can also form the basis of policies in the state. E-government idea in the world is targeted at increasing government performance in policy formulation, service delivery, and general development.

Democracy according to the popular definition of Abraham Lincoln is, "the government of the people by the people and for the people". This, in other words, entails that government has emanated from the people and all functions of it are carried out by the people for their ultimate benefit. Democracy as a form of government is practically different and separated from other forms such as aristocracy, monarchy, and dictatorship as they lack the provisions availed by democracy.

When a democratic system is in place with fairness, honesty, accountability, and transparency built into it, political stability may be guaranteed in any nation. Coordinated illumination involving the populace is necessary to bring about this level of stability (Nwaogu, Vilém, & Vit, 2019). In this light, e-government initiatives can speed the achievement of sustainable development goals while also guaranteeing that everyone is carried along. The e-government and democracy will become a boost to sustainable development when they are applied to all sustaining sectors such as the economy, politics, society, agriculture, education, and others alike.

E-government, on the other hand, is a subset of e-governance because it focuses on an institutional approach. Its main goal is to employ Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and internet-enabled activities to bring about the necessary transformation by introducing new ideas into the workings of government organizations. Individual governmental entities can employ technology to help them fulfill their mandates through e-government. This same strategy is also applicable at the international level with organizations like the United Nations.

Since 2001, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) has produced the UN E-Government Survey, which is the only publication in the world to give an overview of national e-government performance for all 193 UN Member States. Participants in the survey are urged to be policymakers, government employees, academics, members of civil society, businesspeople, and other professionals and specialists in the domains of public administration, e-government, and ICTs for development (LeSage & Chih, 2016).

Technologies, particularly information and communication technologies (ICT), are inextricably related to the development of today's society and play a critical role in achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development's 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (LeSage & Chih, 2016).

In governments of different states and regions, there has been growing interest in reforming the public sector with the application of information technology (ICT) as a channel of communicating with consumers and businesses and offering services to them. This fast-spreading phenomenon is known as "e-government" around the world. Governments have explored innovative ways to control expenses and increase organizational efficiencies leading to the consideration of

e-government as a major managerial public reform over the last decade (Nauck, 2014).

It is the core duty of government to champion the continuous development and implementation of e-government. This is vital mainly due to its relevance in the execution of its daily activities as policy formulation and implementation, accountability, fulfilling governmental functions on the people, receiving, and giving out information with other numerous sub-activities. In all government relationships with the people, it is confronted with the people in the state. The state plays a major role in the political participation of the people in the society irrespective of whether they are dominant or minority groups. A nation's leadership and its structures are inextricably linked to the condition of various social groupings (Chukwudi, Idowu, & Gberevbie, 2022). Most Western countries have speedily developed diversified aspects of e-government which has enabled them to govern with ease;

A significant change in governing, organizational, and working methods has taken place in the majority of Western nations, and regulation and policy implementation have moved from the central government to various levels and social spheres. This transformation is characterized as the procedure of allowing government to be more governed by partnerships and network-oriented decision-making in a complex interaction of public, private, and non-profit groups (Nauck, 2014).

This situation as obtainable in Western countries strongly sustains a level of political stability, Ugo, et al (2012) proposed that political stability is achieved when political institutions and systems are stable and firm in how they function and when authority is present but not in danger (Rossi & Vanolo, 2012). The achievement of this needs a serious commitment by all stakeholders. A high level of people's commitment is impactful on sustainable

development. The success of sustainable development is based on the devotedness of the stakeholders and Sustainable development is "the eras of "e", hardware, software, service, and people" (Angulo, Giannini, De Souza, & Lessa, 2022).

Information and communication technology developments have opened up new opportunities to enhance citizen-government contact, which is essential for long-term development and the goal of improved governance. E-government increases the effectiveness of resource management, which can help to improve the current use of natural resources while preventing long-term harm to that use (Angulo et al., 2022).

Despite the factual positive contributory impact of the application of e-government to governance, there are numerous challenges facing its perfect use in our society. These challenges range from lack of finance, unskilled personnel, conservatism on the side of the government, illiteracy of the masses, low political culture, and other such challenges that abound. Gberevbie et al (2014) have seen the indication of workers' unethical conduct in public offices as a huge obstacle to the country's development (Gberevbie, Joshua, Excellence-Oluye, & Oyeyemi, 2017).

All these defects have dwarfed the progress of the nation's democracy and in the same line impacted negatively on sustainable development. As submitted by Klischewski et al (2015), challenges of e-government are more pronounced in development; these difficulties include a constrained budget, donor dependence, technology transfer, the departure of non-local employees once a project is completed, and a politically and economically uncertain climate (Klischewski & Lessa, 2015).

Undoubtedly, studies have shown that previous research has not delved into how the addition of e-government into democracy has impacted positively on

sustainable development. To fill this gap, this study is out to unravel various ways e-government and democracy have unitedly boosted sustainable development. The study therefore concludes that e-government has played a positive role in the administration of democracy and, therefore stands as a boost to sustainable development despite some challenges faced.

DISCUSSION

Human Security and Foreign Military Bases: A Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

Conceptually, a military base is “an installation created to serve as support for military operations and logistics” (Rodrigues & Glebov, 2009). It is a broad range of the utilization by foreign troops, on a contractual basis, of the territory of a certain country for military purposes (Biletskyi, 2014). Oftentimes, this agreement is between no less than two parties. That is a nation that gives a part of its territory to the foreign army (lessor nation) and a nation that conveys or deploys its army installation on this region (lessee country) (Biletskyi, 2014).

To comprehend the significance of foreign military installations, it is expedient to study the history and use of such bases from the beginning of time. Traditionally, a foreign troop on sovereign soil is unusual, as it impedes the territorial integrity of the country. However, it is not a rare occurrence. Establishing military bases on sovereign soil is an ancient practice linked to the Greek city-states (Lersch & Sarti, 2014). The writings of the Greek Philosopher Thucydides give accounts of the oldest source of foreign military bases. In his narrate of the Peloponnesian war of the fifth century, Thucydides documented the rise of the Delian League, which was organized around the naval force of Athens, while on the other hand, the Peloponnesian League was built around Land locked Spartan Army (Sealey, 1974). These two

leagues made use of bases in strategic locations in other to secure routes for feeding and supplying weaponry to their troops and denying the other league the same benefit. In addition, both Rome and Persia anchored on strategic bases that enabled them access to land and water routes which allowed them to maintain their imperial status over acquired territories (Calder, 2008). However, the Persian Empire, under the reign of Darius, placed more emphasis on road construction leading to a 2,500km route spread of roads. These roads had stone based every 29km for accommodating soldiers and other personnel of the State. They were also stocked with edibles. The creation of the roads had ripple effects on commerce, transportation of goods, and commodities, and on individuals. It also affected the transfer of messages as messages that were often delayed by poor transport systems were aided by better road networks. The road networks also hampered the capabilities of the armed forces capabilities because they facilitated the movement of weapons.

By the 15th century, major maritime empires like Britain, Portugal, and Spain established commercial posts, hubs, ports, and foreign bases to strengthen their control and increase their spheres of influence, aiming to secure vital interests. These maritime empires had mercantilist policies and backed up their trade explorations with their military might. Another key antecedent in the history of foreign military bases was the presence of colonial troops in colonies, through which they subjugated the people and countered revolts. By the 20th century, foreign military bases became products of the two Great Wars and the Cold War. These wars were a conglomeration of several battles fought on several grounds or battle theaters. Battles blocs pitched against each other. Forward basing became more crucial after WW2 when America posted officers of its military to several military bases in

other Countries to curtail the advances of communism. Foreign bases were also used to fight proxy wars during the Cold War. On the one hand, the West spearheaded by America, drove both financial and military capacity to prevent the spread of Soviet communism while on the other hand, Eastern Europe spearheaded by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) propagated communism against capitalism with the use of foreign financial or humanitarian aid. It is tantamount to state that the quantity of foreign bases met a decline after the Cold War ended.

Military installations or bases can be categorized into two categories. They are the bases that are within a country's national terrain and bases established in another sovereign State. Though such territory has been leased out for the installation of a foreign base, this base can serve both home and foreign nations. Under the law of Nations, a state's government has full control over the affairs within its geographical territory and this includes its air-space and its water bodies, this is referred to as the principle of sovereignty as stipulated by the Westphalia treaty of 1648. However, foreign military bases have in many ways impeded this principle. The consequences or implications of the operations of the bases have several economic, political, and socio-cultural implications for the host country.

The understanding of the humanistic impact of foreign military bases on the citizenry of the host country requires an important shift from the umbrella of national security to human security which is a component of national security. Hence, the human security paradigm becomes a more attractive instrument of analysis than hitherto known analytical frameworks such as political realism, national interest, and liberal idealism among others. The human security concept has gained momentum in studies of security. The focal point of development is the shift of focus from the state-centric analysis to humans, life,

people, men, women, and children. In a nutshell, it is simply a "human-focused" or "human-centric" idea of security ("Human Development Report 2016 | United Nations Development Programme," 2017). The human security paradigm connotes a paradigm shift from the norm, that is, from State-centered ideas of security that emphasized state protection from external aggression to the protection and empowerment of lives. It also focuses on the vast threats that range from the different spheres of man's existence and their effect on security and development. Finally, it promotes and coordinates people-oriented paradigms to advance security. The paradigm shift from state to human unites human characteristics as human rights, protections, and development. The human security concept is interdisciplinary. It takes into cognizance a wide expanse of factors that threaten human survival, identity, dignity, and livelihood, and pays attention to seeking solutions to these threats.

The Human security paradigm is not sufficient to analyze the human implication of foreign bases, neither is it capable of giving the motivation behind the setting up of foreign bases, however, it is capable of describing the effect of bases. Hence, the balance of power theory is applied to analyze the motivations for foreign bases. The balance of power theory emphasizes how states choose friends and form alliances in the international system. Originally, it was not a theory about overseas bases' military presence, however, it has been re-contextualized in this study to give a general idea about the strategic positioning of bases (Ohtomo, 2012). Alliances and coalitions are mechanisms under the balance of power theory. When there are formal alliances and ties between countries, it indicates that the parties are willing to have formal agreements.

Military bases fit the mechanism of armament or arms race for balancing

power in the international system. Strategic positioning of bases is key. If there is a need to counter a perceived threat, proximity of the base to the threat can be very useful. The defunct USSR's base in Cuba was strategically installed because of its proximity to America. This installation in Cuba led to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. In the same vein, China's military installation in Djibouti was a strategic move, because Djibouti is naturally located close to the world's busiest shipping lanes and acts as a refueling center.

According to Glaser (2017), great powers built foreign military bases for fundamental imperial drives such as the acquisition of more territories, colonization of new lands, control of distant resources for the material advantage of the state, enabling future conquest, and out-compete other empires (Glaser, 2017). Forward bases are designed to provide the preliminary responses essential to preventing easy defeat while expecting the arrival of maritime, ground, and aerial back-ups from the sending state (Lostumbo et al., 2012). They often benefit from the adaptability and interoperability skills as well as the cultural consciousness gained from regular training with foreign partners. Forward basing is a state-centered or state-centric practice that emphasizes state security and national interest to the detriment of the citizenry of the host country. This posits that bases are not just established without logic but are established strategically. For instance, Britain's presence in the Pacific can best be understood by understanding the location of the Indian Territory and how it serves as a passage to Asia (Lersch & Sarti, 2014). With its military presence in India, Britain has been able to protect its commercial interest in Asia. Additionally, as a product of the industrial revolution that was sweeping through Europe and America, the United States by the 19th century was also in the business of expansion in search of markets and raw materials. It can be

pontificated that America's bases are usually located in countries that have formal alliances or ties with America. China and Djibouti's base agreement shows that the two have or share similar strategic interests that are usually multifaceted but mostly along military, economic, and other gains.

China and Africa's Relations

Africa and China have been relating for many years, but the relations gained momentum in the 15th century, during the Ming dynasty. The era was characterized by the development of maritime technology, which placed China at an advantage and aided the first voyage of Chinese Navy fleets and merchants to Africa's Eastern shore (Besada & O'Bright, 2017). China's military relation with the continent, however, dates back to the 1950s when China supported the decolonization and development of the continent. The Bandung or Asian-African Conference which was held between 18 and 24 April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia was very influential in building the Sino-African relationship (Timossi, 2015). The agenda of the conference included the issues of imperialism, colonialism, and the hegemonic positioning of the Western powers. According to Foster, Butterfield, Chen & Pushak (2009), a common feature or denominator of the countries at the conference was their perception of Western/white dominance and their common history (Foster, Butterfield, & Chen, 2009). Therefore, the conference was instrumental and noteworthy in inciting the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle of the colonially dominated Asian and African people. Enuka (2011) argued that the conference was the beginning of the interest by the People's Republic of China in its anti-colonial tussle in particular and African affairs in general (Enuka, 2011).

China's relations with Africa have been commended and criticized by different scholars (*China's Growing Role in*

African Peace and Security, 2011; Hanauer & Morris, 2014). On one hand, China's relationship is described to be beneficial when compared to the ex-colonial power relations with Africa, which make use of stringent policies that further widen the gap of inequality between the global South and North. On the other hand, China is said to also be ripping off the African continent, taking advantage of the vulnerable unstable African States. However, Besada & O'Bright (2016) in their article "Maturing Sino-Africa Relations" identified two perceptions of which they describe China's policy to Africa (Besada & O'Bright, 2017). To start with, China being an emerging superpower is only playing its national role conception with other regions of the world as a global power, which is not dissimilar from the traditional behavior of other superpowers. The sharp difference as stated in the Chinese policy statement is centered on the principle of non-interference in the domestic activities of other countries. This posits that China lends support to and pursues its interests in Africa without "strings attached". To some African leaders, Sino-African relations are a lot refreshing when compared to relations with European powers. For instance, in 2008, a former Senegalese Head of State, Abdoulaye Wade, argued that "China's approach to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of European investors" (Caffrey, 2011). Similarly, President Yoweri Museveni, Uganda's president argues that "when Western ruling groups are conceited, full of themselves, ignorant of our conditions' the Chinese are much more business-like" (Caffrey, 2011).

To Besada & O'Bright (2016), the second perception describes the relationship as being beneficial more to African countries than China (Besada & O'Bright, 2017). To them, most of the African countries that have profited from China's swelling investment, debt relief, and trade are not endowed with mineral

resources and offer limited investment prospects to Chinese industries. However, for African States to gain from the bilateral relationship, the African Leaders have to make policy decisions that are factual for outlining the terms of engagement of external powers. In essence, China's engagement in Africa should not be understood as simply being exploitive and a quest to reap Africa of its natural resources. The Premier of the State Council of China, Li Keqiang, stated in an editorial survey that Africa as a whole should be regarded as a major bloc taking into cognizance the number of seats occupied by the continent in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as well as its geography and demography. He highlights that the four principles on which the Sino-African relations are based are: i) the principle of equality, stating that China and Africa have a similar history of colonialism by Europeans; ii) the principle of solidarity, profound respect for one another and mutual trust, iii) the principle of inclusive development of which China is ready to share its knowledge, expertise, experience, and technology with developing states in Africa and its continental organizations, including the African Union; and iv) which calls for the expansion from resources and infrastructure but to include financial cooperation, ecological protection, collaborative poverty reduction, aviation cooperation plan, environmental and encouraging cultural exchange and improving security and peace in both regions.

China-Africa bilateral trade has been on the increase for the past 16 years. In building the economic relationship between Africa and China, Chinese investments afterward rose from USD 51.19 million between 1979 and 1990, to USD 2.1 billion in 2010 alone (Besada & O'Bright, 2017). Although China accounts for about 15 percent of African trade which makes it Africa's largest single trading partner, Africa accounts for about 5 percent

of Chinese trade (Gandhi, 2018). According to Jayaram, Kassiri, & Sun (2017), there are over 10,000 Chinese firms operational in Africa (Jayaram, Kassiri, & Sun, 2017). Furthermore, a 2016 report compiled by the China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI) at John Hopkins University states that China's accumulated load to Africa since 2002 was \$124 billion (Tubei, 2018). Chinese citizens in Africa are beginning to become large on the African continent, rising above a million legal and illegal migrants. The testimony to Chinese far and wide emigration is seen in a country like Djibouti which is barely 1 million in population.

The Geo-Strategic importance of Djibouti to China

Djibouti is one of the smallest countries in Africa. Djibouti is a relatively stable country located in an unstable region. It is geo-strategically located next to Babel Mandeb which in English translates to the Gate of Tears. It is a critical maritime chokepoint. Being an access to the Suez Canal, it is a compulsory route for very imperative maritime trade, thus, exposing it to a concentration of busy and dynamic international trade (Boujrada, 2018). It is a seaport with access to growing economies in East Africa and landlocked Ethiopia which makes it a strategic choice for the establishment of military bases by various countries, including China. In 1977, Djibouti gained independence from France. However, France remained in Djibouti for another two decades. The French army assured Djibouti of defenses against external threats in exchange for the establishment of military bases and training facilities. The need for defense against external threats arose from the volatility of the region and instabilities that climaxed in the overthrow of authoritarian governments such as those of Somalia and Ethiopia in 1991. The creation of Eritrea to the north and Somaliland to the south was a watershed for Djibouti because its

populace shares both linguistic and clan affinities with various Somali clans in Somaliland and the Afars in Eritrea. Archaeologically, Djibouti owes its existence to its port. Two decades after its independence there has been steady growth of its port facilities and the activities expanded to include the transshipments of containers. In the past decades, four major factors have influenced Djibouti's strategic foreign policies. They are alterations in US strategy in the Arabian Peninsula and Africa since 9/11, the Ethiopian-Eritrean war of 1998-2000, the surge in piracy along Somali coasts and the Gulf of Aden, and the rapid economic transformation in Ethiopia.

Djibouti is home to other foreign military camps, such as the United States' Camp Lemonnier Base, and the Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa, accommodating over 4000 personnel, used for operations in Somalia & Yemen. It has an estimated rent of \$70 million annually (Dahir, 2017). It also hosts France's Héronnaval base which is one of France's largest bases. It stations about 2,900 personnel. Also, it hosts German, Italian, Japanese, and Spanish forces amongst others. Italy's Base Militare Nazionale di Supporto stations about 300 personnel and it is used for counter-piracy missions. Also, Japan's Ambouli airport, the first overseas base is used for counter-piracy activities and the evacuation of Japanese citizens from the region during turmoil (Saffee, 2017). Djibouti now hosts more foreign military bases than other countries in the world. From the experience of foreign military bases in other countries, the proliferation of military bases in Djibouti can only have a major impact on the State which includes the amplified competition for African resources among external powers.

On 11 July 2017, the Chinese government deployed its defense and offense forces to Djibouti, to establish its maritime camp called the PLAN. It is a logistics support base in Djibouti which is

located in the southwest of the Doraleh Multipurpose Port (Pant & Haidar, 2017). According to Vandiver (2018), it was the first network of Chinese military bases. The proclamation of the Chinese base provoked substantial international assumptions about China's military and strategic aims (Vandiver, 2018). Chinese experts and policymakers have called it "a strategic strong point" that justified China's commitments to international peacekeeping and anti-piracy amongst other operations, as well as guarding its increasing overseas possessions and evacuating Chinese citizens during a crisis (Kennedy, 2019).

Before now, China had also been neck-deep in peacekeeping operations in Sudan and other parts of the continent (Large, 2007). For instance, China deployed about 1000 troops to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). However, China's military base in Djibouti is a paradigm shift from its original non-intervention policies that it has operated for decades. Since it deviated from that foreign policy posture China has built some economic or commercial ties/relations with several African countries. Additionally, in 2015, China passed a law that provided the domestic legal basis for overseas intelligence-gathering, operations, and counterterrorism. As such, the numerous military bases China has in Djibouti give credence to the pursuit of the law as the base has been enabling China to conduct counterterrorism operations in the region. However, it is its very initial military presence in Africa occurred with the launching of an anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden. Consequently, China has maintained a persistent naval anti-piracy presence in the Horn of Africa region. In April 2019, it dispatched its 32nd mission to the Gulf of Aden (Kaufman, 2009). Between 2008 and 2018, about 26,000 personnel of the Chinese Navy have been deployed to the region, undertaking various maritime security operations. The

PLAN was created to support the naval missions there. Thus, between 2009 and 2012, PLAN depended on logistics support from the port of Djibouti. The inevitability of regional logistics became handy and clear in 2011 when its maritime troops evacuated about 35,000 Chinese from Libya (Collins & Erickson, 2011). Likewise, in 2015, Djibouti played a further significant role in protecting Chinese citizens abroad, when the PLAN evacuated about 800 Chinese and persons of other foreign nationalities from Yemen by ships to Djibouti to board flights to their various countries ("Yemen Crisis: China Evacuates Citizens and Foreigners from Aden," 2015). China has also supported UN missions in various African countries such as Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Liberia (Cabestan, 2018).

There is a need to explain the factors that necessitated China's decision to establish a military base in Djibouti within the broader framework of its key interests in the MENA region. Wang (2018) argues that China's operations or activities in the region and specifically in Djibouti are strictly for military and economic reasons (Wang, 2018). Put differently, the reasons are centered on the geo-economic and geo-strategic goals of China in the MENA. Chaziza (2018) posits that some of the strategic goals China has pursued include ensuring the freedom of navigation for their oil imports and maritime trade, protecting her hefty energy investments; facilitating cooperation with potential and or current African and Mideast allies; preserving a global image and posture in international politics; guaranteeing logistical support for the activities of PLAN in the region; safeguarding the Bab al-Mandab Strait which is one of the most transversed waterways in the world and strategic maritime transport chokepoint; preserving and ensuring stability in the Horn of Africa; and carrying out non-combatant

evacuation, counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations (Chaziza, 2018).

For obvious reasons, China's choice of Djibouti for the implementation of its economic investments and interests is good for her because of its geo-strategic location. Wang (2018) draws attention to energy security as a reason that could propel China's desire to secure a permanent installation in Djibouti (Wang, 2018). Beijing has a growing dependency on Middle Eastern oil and needs entrance to the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf. It is also investing profoundly in the oil sector in the region. Thus, the Djibouti base will facilitate the transport of crude oil through the strait and help to guard oil imports from the Middle East which transverse the Indian Ocean on their way back. Chaudburi (2019) maintains that Djibouti controls entry to both the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea (Chaudhury, 2019). It also links the Horn of Africa, Europe, the Persian Gulf, and the Far East. Its location at the entrance of the Red Sea positions Djibouti as an idyllic transshipment center for ships going in and out of the MENA region. Furthermore, it offers potential for long-term growth as economic impetus as the immediacy deepens over time. According to Derso & Waberi (2018), it is situated at the intersection of one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world (Derso, 2018). A significant percentage of Beijing's trade with the EU, valued at over \$1 billion a day, is shipped en route to the Gulf of Aden, and forty percent of all the total oil importation of China passes through the Indian Ocean. Djibouti is of general strategic significance for its severely trafficked sea lanes, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, and the waters of the Red Sea, although only 3% of China's crude oil and 4% of China's natural gas imports pass through the strait (Metelitsa & Mercer, 2014). The establishment of a military base occurred in the setting of developing commercial and financial connections between Djibouti, Ethiopia, and China as validated by the construction of the

Djibouti-Ethiopia Water Pipeline, Djibouti-Ethiopia Railway and, very imperatively Chinese investment in the establishment of the first phase of the Doraleh Multipurpose Port that was opened in May 2017. Since the base was created, there has been expansion for massive military presence which includes the building of a 450-meter dock that can house naval fleets as well as large warships (Chan, 2017); huge facilities underground that measure about 23,000 square meters (Stratfor, 2017); the creation of a marine company with armored vehicles positioned there.

China and Djibouti enjoy some collaborations that have grown steadily in recent years, with practical collaboration carried out in several fields (Panda, 2015b). More broadly, the strategic arrangement between the two countries is much more than the establishment of a naval base as it also strengthens Djibouti's position as a key entry point in terms of infrastructure, which will expand its trade and logistics capabilities. For instance, most of Djibouti's fourteen major infrastructure projects including a railway line that will transit from Djibouti to Addis Ababa cumulatively estimated to be \$14.4 billion were financed by Chinese banks (Chaziza, 2015). China also funded a pipeline that will transport natural gas from Djibouti ports to China. Every year, the pipeline was estimated to transport natural gas of 12 billion cubic meters from Ethiopia to Djibouti (Arteh, 2017). The Djibouti International Free Trade Zone is another major project China funded. It is a 10-year project that is expected to comprise a total investment of \$3.5 billion. At its completion, the free trade zone connected to Djibouti's main ports is built on an area of 4,800 hectares, which makes it the biggest free trade zone in Africa. In July 2019, the initial phase of the zone was launched on a 240-hectare space. It involved an investment of \$370 million. It was jointly by a multiparty joint venture composed of China Merchants Group. Over 20 companies have signed pacts to operate

in the trade zone (Yingqun, 2019). Furthermore, Chatzky & McBride (2019) avow that Djibouti is an ideal spot for inclusion in Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) an ambitious infrastructure investment that would connect China to the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean and through the Suez Canal (McBride, Berman, & Chatzky, 2023). A Chinese base in Djibouti would enable an upsurge in trade through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea and make the country more vital for the efficacious execution of the BRI connecting Europe and Africa with Asia. China's base in Djibouti is an important component in the implementation of the BRI. While it is clear that BRI is essentially an economic plan, it also has a strong military component wherein Beijing may attempt to exert dominance over global shipping routes, both militarily and economically. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China (2015) states that at a meeting the Chinese President, Xi Jinping appreciated the president of Djibouti, Ismail Omar Guelleh, for Djibouti's involvement in developing the Beijing recommended 21st-century Maritime Silk Road ("Xi Jinping Meets with President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti," 2015). For the PLAN navy, that infers noteworthy modification to their new role as a global maritime power.

In terms of the geo-strategic location of the base in Djibouti, Braude & Jiang (2016), argue that the naval base in Djibouti boosts the ability of the PLAN to display its power in the MENA region and beyond (Braude & Jiang, 2017). A permanent military presence in Djibouti is seemingly a new gem in China's "string of pearls" strategy. Additionally, a base in Djibouti to host PLAN vessels can help boost the global potential of the Chinese navy, as well as being essential to projects that influence beyond China's immediate neighbors. This is especially so, as for decades the Chinese navy has been investing in developing a blue water navy to give it a global reach.

Lague & Lim (2019) thus posits that having regional naval bases provides an immediate boost to China's capabilities. It is tipping off the balance against the USA in the Pacific (Lague & Lim, 2019).

Beyond its strategic importance to the Horn of Africa, MacLeod (2016) posits that China's base in Djibouti and the tactical forward deployment competence is in support of the policy endorsing the tactics for the rise of Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean (MacLeod, 2016). This will be via the creation of networks of commercial and military facilities prevalently called the String of Pearls to surround India and stimulate the steady increase of Chinese sea power in the Indian Ocean. According to the ("Xi Jinping Meets with President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti," 2015), a permanent base in Djibouti would give the PLAN a formidable maritime and possible midair springboard deep into the northwest Indian Ocean region, as well as east, central Africa, and north. China's growing global military presence therefore challenges India with Beijing's plan to build a frictionless projection of power in the Indian Ocean. A Chinese permanent military presence in Djibouti with its involvement in Pakistan port in Gwadar makes it a maritime player in the region that poses a threat to the Indian navy. Moreover, a military base in Djibouti enables Beijing to base its naval air resources there which are proficient in sustaining surveillance over India's island territories that are off the Western coast as well as the Arabian Sea (Blanchard, 2016).

Wang (2018) argues that Djibouti's location makes it a strategic center for the Chinese navy to fight piracy w(Wang, 2018). Since 2008, China has used Djibouti as a logistics base for its navy operating against piracy in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. Collins and Erickson (2015) argue that since the inauguration of the mission, Chinese naval ships have purportedly visited the port over 50 times (Collins & Erickson, 2011).

Arising from the increasing number of Chinese ships navigating the waters of the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa and the swelling frequency of the operations of PLAN in the region, a long-lasting military installation would aid China in supporting these missions (Panda, 2015b). Moreover, Djibouti because of its relatively stable terrain has been a perfect base for conducting non-combatant withdrawal operations, as was observed when China used Djibouti to evacuate some foreigners and Chinese nationals from Yemen in March and April 2015 (Blanchard, 2016).

From the foregoing, it becomes clear that China challenges the existing world order and hopes to become a global power (Xuetong, 2018). The building of overseas permanent bases hosting long-range strategic aircraft and warships helps to project and portray its power in the MENA region and beyond. More specifically, China's naval presence in Djibouti will challenge U.S. geopolitical interests in the MENA region and Africa. This is because it gives China the capability to survey or hack sensitive defense technology. That is because the Chinese base is close in proximity to the USA's only permanent military base in Africa, that is its Djibouti's Camp Lemonnier, which is used for covert and other anti-terror operations in Somalia, Yemen, and other places in Africa (Panda, 2015a). The presence of China and control of the Doraleh port has caused some faceoff between China and the USA which forged some concerns that the USA might have to leave its bases in Djibouti. Furthermore, the tension hinged on the accusation that the Chinese base personnel of engaging lasers to blindfold US pilots. China however denied this (Sonne, 2018).

Finally, the presence of a naval base in Djibouti will allow China to respond more proactively and quickly to any regional crisis or security changes developing around Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. A Chinese military presence in Djibouti

allows Beijing to deploy its air and naval assets, which could significantly improve its intelligence to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations, counter-terrorism, and counter-piracy operations.

The Humanistic Implications of China's Military Base in Djibouti

The presence of over five foreign military installments in a small country located in a volatile geo-strategic region is a pressing issue to discuss. Foreign military presence on host soil breeds tension among citizens of the occupied country, as well as for observers around the world. In this context, this section examines the implication of full-scale foreign military bases on perceived territorial sovereignty. China's military base in Djibouti is relatively new; the impact the base is likely to have on the citizens can only be ascertained by studying the impacts foreign bases of other countries have had on their environment. Of all the superpowers, the USA has the highest number of foreign bases. These bases have drawn a lot of attention for scandals that US Troops have been involved in while serving in the host country. A major cause for alarm is the inability of the host country to try crimes of foreign officers. An example is the 2002 killing of two teenage girls by a US tank in Korea. The men on duty were not allowed to be tried under the Korean Judicial system but were recalled to the USA. They were tried by their country, America, and found innocent (Ayling, 2002). There are also recorded instances of sexual abuses perpetuated by US military officers stationed in Guantanamo Bay, in Abu Ghraib a base in Iraq. Another example is the case of sex trafficking associated with Dyncorp, which is a firm working with the US Army in Bosnia. Dyncorp and the individuals involved could not be tried in the host country on grounds of immunity. The human implication of a foreign military base is also evident in the US colony of Diego Garcia. This case was very

controversial because of the forceful expulsion of the inhabitants of the island, which largely violated the rights of the people living in the region.

Another impact is negative effect is environmental Degradation. In a 1990 study conducted by Jorge Emmanuel, it was concluded that the activities at Subic and Clark in the Philippines were perhaps producing a toxic brew of acid, industrial sludge, organic solvents, ammunition waste, pesticides, chemical warfare agents, radioactive waste, waste oil and polychlorinated biphenyl (PCBs). The study was later confirmed by America's Government Accountability Office (GAO) report in 1992. The GAO's report enunciated the environmental damages done to the surroundings of the Subic Bay Naval base, the report described the damage as "significant" (Bayoneto, 2011). Furthermore, the report shed light on the power generating plant at Subic Bay, it stated that it possessed unknown volumes of PCBs and other discharges and pollutants directly into the air. It concluded that the practices of US officers on foreign soils did not meet the specifications of US environmental Standards. The effects of these ill practices pose serious threats to the human life of the Philippines. A World Health Organization's inspection of the base revealed that industrial wastewater, polluted stormwater runoff, and untreated sewage were discharged into Subic Bay. Consequently, the World Health Organisation (WHO) supposed that these emissions had settled on the seabed, and may have harmfully affected the life around it (Bayoneto, 2011). The report also stated that the Subic Bay base had poor sanitary facilities or treatment processes, leading to the discharge of toxic waste into the surroundings, directly having a life-threatening impact on the human environment. Djibouti is at risk of facing a similar fate with the 10,000-man base recently established by China, especially

coupled with the fact that other foreign military bases are occupying the territory.

Globally, foreign military bases have been responsible for environmental degradation, the damages are because of toxic leaks and the deliberate dumping of hazardous materials. The consequences of preparations for war include the indirect impacts made through the diversion of funds from environmental development and through the effect of the armaments industry and the direct impact through military operations, weapons testing, and the proliferation of nuclear technology. Bases especially air and naval fields do require an expanse of valuable ecological land which they end up destroying in the process of construction. The result is the creation of a concrete expanse of wasteland in the host country. Chemical and biological warfare exercises, bombing exercises, tactical missile exercises, and artillery practice, nuclear weapons testing severely degrade the natural environment. The social implications of such heavy activities include the breeding of fear and a sense of insecurity. Also, there is strong growing tension between military authorities and agricultural interests in contention for land mass. In 1990, the USA military occupied 25 million acres and still sought to this further by 6 million acres in 16 states.

Foreign bases have enforced pre-existing resources related to the conflict. China's involvement in Djibouti deepens the likelihood of instability, in the sense that China is caught up in the conflict between superpowers that have military bases in Djibouti, most importantly America's camp Lemonnier. The proximity of these camps is inevitably going to raise tension in the small country. This tension however has no limit to the impact it will have on the citizenry. China mobilized military means to guard its economic interests in Sudan and other African countries, therefore causing some deterioration of the already fragile humanitarian and security situations in the

continent. In this resource-induced conflict, at the launch of attacks on its oil installations in Kordofan, the Chinese government deployed nearly 400 soldiers to safeguard its economic investment against the attacks of rebels (Shinn, 2009).

Additionally, human rights abuses caused by the establishment of foreign bases have been enormous. A direct link has been identified between the USA's foreign bases and levels of violation against sex workers. Human and environmental violations have lasting effects on the people. Studies have shown that areas surrounded by bases do experience rise in property taxes and inflation, leading to migration for affordable homes in other areas, thereby seeking new means of livelihood. A major case in point of forced expulsion is the example of a US colony in Diego Garcia where the occupants of the island were forced to find other places to live. A major case in point is the Mahmadiyah rape and killings that occurred on March 12, 2006. It involved the gang rape and subsequent murder of Abeer Qassim Hamza al-Janabi, an Iraqi 14-year-old girl, and the murder of her family by soldiers. The incident, hideous as it was, was neither the first nor the last atrocity committed by members of foreign troops in host nations (Arias, 2017).

China has been associated with the proliferation of various forms of arms in Africa which have either aggravated existing conflicts or instigated new ones (*Briefing Paper China in Sudan: Having It Both Ways*, 2007). Some Chinese companies have been accused of smuggling illegal arms such as machine guns, rockets, rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPG), Chinese made AK-47s into Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and Liberia where rebel groups, militants, and mercenaries were trained and involved in civil wars. Hence, China and others can be accused of willfully sponsoring violence on the continent inadvertently leading to the destruction of human and livestock lives and properties.

Between 2000 and 2003 China supplied about 13% of all the arms trafficked to sub-Saharan Africa, making it the second-highest provider of arms after Russia (Enuka, 2011). Djibouti is a volatile region, with several past civil, political, and ethnic conflicts such as the Djibouti civil war of 1991-1994, the Fraud insurgency, the Djibouti-Eritrean Border Conflict of 2008, and the Somalia civil war of 2011. The volatile nature coupled with the movement of light weapons in the country is likely going to escalate the regional crisis. China established three (3) small arms factories producing light weapons in Sudan and Uganda for use in the region. The existence of bases creates loopholes and cracks through which rebels do secure weapons of mass destruction.

China has a history of maintaining close relations with despotic African leaders, and similarly projects a national conception of peace driver on the international stage. Despite the level of human rights abuses by such leaders, as long as they dance to the tune of China's authorities, they keep receiving China's support. A case in point is Sudan where the Chinese government has been opposed to the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) pressure to sanction Omar al-Bashir, and China remains a large supplier of weapons to the Sudanese government. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe when confronted with a sequence of sanctions by Western countries, leading to isolation and economic crisis, came up with Operation Look East policy, looking towards China for assistance. Also, Nigeria between 1993 and 1998, under the leadership of General Sani Abacha, adopted the operation look east in response to the western sanctions. In contrast to the view of peacemaking and peacekeeping, China has been supporting despotic leaders in Africa in as much as such leaders dance to the tune of the Chinese authorities, enabling them to source for oil which their ever-growing economy is dependent on (Brautigam,

2011). Jeuck (2011) argues that despite Zimbabwe's instability and turmoil, China supplied about \$ 28 million worth of arms between 2005 and 2007 (Jeuck, 2011). China besides the sales of light weapons, constructed a weapons factory for Zimbabwe. It has been stated that the president of Djibouti is enthusiastic to sell Djibouti to the highest buyer, having leased the country to over 5 military bases, the multipurpose Chinese port, and the plan for a Chinese free trade zone, it is evident that the small country is creeping deeper into the periphery region that Africa already occupies in the global capitalist system. China is not concerned with the implication of having over 10,000 military officers stationed at Djibouti. The level of dependency and debt crisis will plunge the country into a deep recession of never-seen proportion, leading to poverty and inadvertent loss of life.

Foreign military bases do create fertile breeding grounds for radical protest for sovereignty. The presence of a US base in Saudi Arabia spurred radicalization in protest against foreigners in the holy land, and this was used to raise supporters for the infamous al-Qaeda group. To the citizens of Djibouti, the existence of China and other military bases is likely to create a notion of oppression and marginalization by a large Chinese population presence which will have economic implications. In response to such presence, can be forms of civil unrest and violent radical protest, ranging as high as terrorism.

Furthermore, a possible outcome of the establishment of a Chinese military base in Djibouti is that it can be translated that Djibouti stands with China on international political matters making Djibouti a target country by countries that are not in friendly relations with China or better put anti-Chinese countries. When Cuba sided with the defunct USSR and allowed it to establish a missile base, it automatically became a concern for the United States. If the crisis had not been

mitigated via other means, it would have led to a Third World War, in which the small Cuban country would experience the fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

CONCLUSION

Since the Cold War ended, China has ceased to remain aloof from the recurring conflicts in Africa. There has been a noteworthy change from its non-interference approach to accommodating the globalization of China's strategic and commercial interests. The study has shown that the two underpinning reasons for the Chinese establishment of a permanent naval base in Djibouti are the geo-economic and geo-strategic interests. That is, the bases are for both economic and military purposes. However, the installations have vast and threatening implications for humans as well as the stability of Djibouti. More specifically, military bases have been responsible for environmental degradation from oil spillage, and weapons testing leading to water, air, and soil pollution in host countries. Arising from the foregoing, the study recommends that there is a need for China to strike a balance between her interests and the effects of her presence on human security in the country. Also, there is no doubt that Djibouti has not been able to effectively generate revenue from its citizens for the smooth running of its affairs. It has had a heavy reliance on external sources to generate revenue in exchange for territory for rent seems to be a favorable trade. However, the government of Djibouti should make efforts to ensure the protection of the life and security of its citizens when entering into agreements with other countries for the establishment of bases within its territory.

REFERENCES

- Alem, L., Valentin, E. S. B., Cunha, M. A., Santos, O. C. L., Nogueira, T. L. S., Carvalho, E. F., & Silva, D. A. (2017). Efficiency of DNA Recovery from Fingerprints Enhanced with Black and Magnetic Powders. *Forensic Science International: Genetics Supplement Series*, 6,

- e490-e491.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsigss.2017.09.186>
- Angulo, R. J., Giannini, P. C. F., De Souza, M. C., & Lessa, G. C. (2022). Comments on Castro Et al. (2021) "Relative Sea-Level Curve During the Holocene in Rio De Janeiro, Southeastern Brazil: A Review of the Indicators - RSL, Altimetric and Geochronological Data." *Journal of South American Earth Sciences*, 116. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsames.2022.103791>
- Arias, L. (2017). *Playing by the Rules: An Assessment of Combat Atrocity During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2005-2006*. Wellesley: Wellesley College.
- Arteh, A. (2017, November 16). Djibouti signs preliminary deal with China's POLY-GCL for \$4 bln gas project.
- Ayling, S. (2002, August 1). Killings Of Young Girls By U.S. Troops Ignites Rage.
- Bayoneto, M. V. (2011). The Former U.S. Bases in the Philippines: An Argument for the Application of U.S. Environmental Standards to Overseas Military Bases. *Fordham Environmental Law Review*, 6(1), 111-155.
- Besada, H., & O'Bright, B. (2017). Maturing Sino-African relations. *Third World Quarterly*, 38(3), 655-677. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1191343>
- Biletskyi, V. (2014). Application Aspects of Adsorption Opening Effect of Solids Pore Space Surface. In *Progressive Technologies of Coal, Coalbed Methane, and Ores Mining* (pp. 133-134). Florida: CRC Press. <https://doi.org/10.1201/b17547-22>
- Blanchard, O. (2016). The Phillips Curve: Back to the '60s? *American Economic Review*, 106(5), 31-34. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20161003>
- Boujrada, Z. (2018, March 16). This Tiny Country Has the Most Foreign Military Bases.
- Braude, J., & Jiang, T. (2017, December 6). Why China and Saudi Arabia Are Building Bases in Djibouti.
- Brautigam, D. (2011). *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Briefing Paper China in Sudan: Having it Both Ways*. (2007). Washington, D.C.
- Cabestan, J.-P. (2018). *China's Involvement in Africa's Security: The Case of China's Participation in the UN Mission to Stabilize Mali*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Caffrey, K. (2011). *The Beijing Olympics: Promoting China Soft and Hard Power in Global Politics* (1st Edition). London: Routledge.
- Calder, K. E. (2008). *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Chan, M. (2017, September 27). China Plans to Build Djibouti Facility to Allow Naval Flotilla to Dock at First Overseas Base.
- Chaudhury, D. R. (2019, January 26). Why awarding Padma Vibhushan to Djibouti's President matters to India.
- Chaziza, M. (2015). China's Middle East Foreign Policy And The Yemen Crisis: Challenges And Implications. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 19(2), 18-25.
- Chaziza, M. (2018, August 23). China's Military Base in Djibouti.
- China's growing role in African peace and security*. (2011). London: Saferworld.
- Chukwudi, E. C., Idowu, S. S., & Gberevbie, D. E. (2022). Self-Determination Agitators or Terrorist Affiliates: Interrogating the place of the Indigenous people of Biafra of South-Eastern Nigeria. *African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research*, 3(1).
- Collins, G., & Erickson, A. S. (2011). Implications of China's Military Evacuation of Citizens from Libya Implications of China's Military Evacuation of Citizens from Libya. *China Brief*, 11(4).
- Dahir, A. L. (2017, August 18). How a Tiny African Country Became the World's Key Military Base.
- Derso, B. (2018, August 22). Djibouti Ports Sufficient for Serving Ethiopia: Official Featured.
- Education in China A Snapshot*. (2016). Beijing: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
- Enuka, C. (2011, May 6). China's Military Presence in Africa: Implications for Continental Instability. *Sacha Journal of Policy and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 1, pp. 68-81. Retrieved from <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1833542>
- Foster, V., Butterfield, W., & Chen, C. (2009). *Building Bridges*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-7554-9>
- Gandhi, D. (2018, March 7). Figure of the week: Africa's new trading partners.
- Gberevbie, D., Joshua, S., Excellence-Oluye, N., & Oyeyemi, A. (2017). Accountability for Sustainable Development and the Challenges of Leadership in Nigeria, 1999-2015. *SAGE Open*, 7(4). <https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244017742951>
- Glaser, J. (2017, July 18). Withdrawing from Overseas Bases: Why a Forward-Deployed Military Posture Is Unnecessary, Outdated, and Dangerous.

- Hanauer, L., & Morris, L. (2014). *China in Africa: Implications of a Deepening Relationship*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. <https://doi.org/10.7249/RB9760>
- Human Development Report 2016 | United Nations Development Programme. (2017, March 20). Retrieved October 31, 2022, from undp.org website: <https://www.undp.org/publications/human-development-report-2016>
- Jakobson, L. (2013, February 5). China's Foreign Policy Dilemma. Retrieved December 16, 2023, from lowyinstitute.org website: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/china-s-foreign-policy-dilemma>
- Jayaram, K., Kassiri, O., & Sun, I. Y. (2017, June 28). The closest look yet at Chinese economic engagement in Africa.
- Jeuck, L. (2011). *Arms Transfers To Zimbabwe: Implications For An Arms Trade Treaty*. Stockholm.
- Kaufman, A. A. (2009). *China's Participation in Anti-Piracy Operations Off the Horn of Africa: Drivers and Implications*.
- Kennedy, C. (2019). Strategic Strong Points and Chinese Naval Strategy. *China Brief*, 19(6).
- Klischewski, R., & Lessa, L. (2015). Sustainability of E-Government Success. In *Public Affairs and Administration* (pp. 294–313). Pennsylvania: IGI Global. <https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-8358-7.ch014>
- Lague, D., & Lim, B. K. (2019, April 30). China's vast fleet is tipping the balance of power in the Pacific.
- Large, D. (2007). Beyond "Dragon in the Bush": The Study of China Africa Relations. *African Affairs*, 107(426), 45–61. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adm069>
- Lersch, B. dos S., & Sarti, J. S. (2014). The Establishment of Foreign Military Bases and the International Distribution of Power. *UFRGS Model United Nations*, 2, 83–135.
- LeSage, J. P., & Chih, Y.-Y. (2016). Interpreting Heterogeneous Coefficient Spatial Autoregressive Panel Models. *Economics Letters*, 142, 1–5. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.033>
- Lostumbo, M. J., McNerney, M. J., Peltz, E., Eaton, D., Frelinger, D. R., Greenfield, V. A., & Halliday, J. (2012). *Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits*. Santa Monica.
- MacLeod, C. (2016, August 24). China adds to its string of pearls with a new African military base.
- McBride, J., Berman, N., & Chatzky, A. (2023, February 2). China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative.
- Metelitsa, A., & Mercer, M. (2014, December 1). World Oil Transit Chokepoints Critical to Global Energy Security.
- Nauck, B. (2014). Value of Children and the Social Production of Welfare. *Demographic Research*, 30, 1793–1824. <https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2014.30.66>
- Nwaogu, C., Vilém, P., & Vit, V. (2019). Responses of Soil and Plants to Spatio-Temporal Changes in Landscape Under Different Land Use in Imo Watershed, Southern Nigeria. *Archives of Agronomy and Soil Science*, 65(10), 1460–1476. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03650340.2019.1566714>
- Ohtomo, T. (2012). Understanding U.S. Overseas Military Presence after World War II. *Journal of International and Advanced Japanese Studies*, 4, 17–29.
- Panda, A. (2015a, May 11). What the Pentagon Thinks of China's Military.
- Panda, A. (2015b, May 13). A Naval Base on the Horn of Africa for China?
- Pant, H. V., & Haidar, A. M. (2017). China's Expanding Military Footprint in Africa. *Observer Research Foundation (ORF)*, (195), 1–12.
- Rodrigues, L., & Glebov, S. (Eds.). (2009). *Military Bases: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Challenges*. Amsterdam: IOS Press.
- Rossi, U., & Vanolo, A. (2012). *Urban Political Geographies: A Global Perspective*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446288948>
- Rühlig, T. (2018, March 2). A "New" Chinese Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping? Retrieved December 16, 2023, from isdp.eu website: <https://isdp.eu/publication/new-chinese-foreign-policy-xi-jinping-implications-european-policy-making/>
- Saffee, A. (2017, August 30). Issue Brief on "Chinese Naval Base in Djibouti: Possibilities and Implications."
- Sealey, R. (1974). The Causes of the Peloponnesian War. *Classical Philology*, 70(2), 89–109.
- Shinn, D. H. (2009). Africa: The United States And China Court The Continent. *Journal of International Affairs*, 62(2), 37–53.
- Sonne, P. (2018, May 4). U.S. accuses China of directing blinding lasers at American military aircraft in Djibouti.
- Stratfor. (2017, July 26). Looking Over China's Latest Great Wall.
- Timossi, A. J. (2015, May 15). Revisiting the 1955 Bandung Asian-African Conference and Its Legacy.
- Tubei, G. (2018, September 25). The sad similarity between Sri Lanka, Zambia and now Djibouti

- that best exemplifies China's "debt trap" diplomacy (Pulse).
- Vandiver, J. (2018, March 6). AFRICOM chief: Expect more Chinese bases in Africa.
- Wang, M. (2018, April 13). China's Strategy in Djibouti: Mixing Commercial and Military Interests.
- Xi Jinping Meets with President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh of Djibouti. (2015, December 4).
- Xuetong, Y. (2018, December 11). The Age of Uneasy Peace Chinese Power in a Divided World.
- Yemen Crisis: China Evacuates Citizens and Foreigners from Aden. (2015, April 3).
- Yingqun, C. (2019, April 25). Chinese Investment Needed in Djibouti.