

University of Groningen

Netherlands

van Leunen, Sebastiaan; Lucardie, Paul

Published in:
Civil Democracy Protection

DOI:
[10.4324/9781003321880-10](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003321880-10)

IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below.

Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Publication date:
2024

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

van Leunen, S., & Lucardie, P. (2024). Netherlands: Civil democracy protection and the marginal role of anti-extremist organisations. In U. Backes, & T. Lindenberger (Eds.), *Civil Democracy Protection: Success Conditions of Non-Governmental Organisations in Comparison* (pp. 134-146). (Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003321880-10>

Copyright

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license. More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: <https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment>.

Take-down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): <http://www.rug.nl/research/portal>. For technical reasons the number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.

7 Netherlands

Civil democracy protection and the marginal role of anti-extremist organisations

Sebastiaan van Leunen and Paul Lucardie

Anti-extremist organisations have been, and still are, a relatively marginal phenomenon in the Netherlands. Although the Netherlands is traditionally regarded as having a strong civil society, organisations that actively oppose anti-democratic extremism have been rather rare. This chapter provides an overview of arguably the most important anti-extremist organisations in the Netherlands over the last 100 years and attempts to provide an explanation for the relatively marginal role and influence of these organisations. We will concentrate on three waves of extremism and the reaction against them: the rise of national socialism and communism in the 1930s, the brief heyday of the Communist Party after the Second World War, and the emergence of national populism and anti-institutional extremism since 1970.

The selection of organisations was made on the basis of two criteria: firstly, the organisation should be a civil organisation, not affiliated with the Dutch state or government. Secondly, these organisations must explicitly fight anti-democratic extremism: we did not discuss organisations fighting discrimination or terrorism. In the first period, two organisations clearly meet our criteria: Unity through Democracy (Eenheid door Democratie, EdD) and the Dutch Committee of Vigilance of anti-national-socialist intellectuals (Comité van waakzaamheid van anti-nationaal-socialistische intellectuelen). It is less clear if any organisation meets our criteria in the second and third periods, but we decided to select two potential candidates: the Anne Frank Foundation and the anti-fascist research group Kafka.¹ We conclude the chapter with a few remarks on the influence of the organisations discussed.²

Before dealing with the three periods, a few comments on the way the Dutch state handles political extremism and protects democracy are called for.

Dutch government and extremism

Like in other countries, the Dutch state has always kept a close watch on extremist revolutionary groups and persons. The General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD) and its predecessors investigate and monitor various forms of extremism within the Netherlands.³

Traditionally, the Dutch government has been reluctant to regulate political parties, including the possibility of banning a political party.⁴ However, this

tradition of “non-interventionism” is expected to be broken soon, with the introduction of an upcoming Act on Political Parties.

Yet currently, Dutch law includes only a rather generic provision on banning organisations or legal personalities in general: article 2:20 of the Dutch Civil Code.⁵ When a legal personality strives for goals or is engaged in activities that are against public order, a Dutch judge can ban and dissolve such an organisation. The possibility of banning legal personalities has been used with great caution by the Dutch judiciary. Examples of banned organisations are the neo-nazi Dutch People’s Union (Nederlandse Volksunie, NVU) and the (in spite of its name rather extreme) Centre Party ’86 (CP’86).⁶ Immediately after the Second World War, the National Socialist Movement in the Netherlands (Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging in Nederland, NSB), was banned, but this was based on a decree by the Dutch Government.⁷

The government is currently preparing an Act on Political Parties and a proposal went into public consultation in December 2022.⁸ This proposed Act includes a new provision on banning political parties that constitute an “actual and serious threat to one or more fundamental principles of the democratic rule of law.”⁹ The government decided to include such a provision on the advice of the State Committee on the Parliamentary System, which in its 2018 report argued that the criterion from 2:20 Dutch Civil Code (public order) is too vague for political parties. The Minister of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations decided to adopt this advice, since “the democratic rule of law asks for continuous maintenance.” The influential position of political parties within the democratic system needs “clarity on the boundaries.”¹⁰ The announcement received a great deal of attention in the Dutch media, both because of its novelty and because of the anti-democratic statements of the far-right political party Forum for Democracy (Forum voor Democratie, which will be discussed more elaborately later in this chapter) and the question of whether the party ban would be used against this party.¹¹

The first wave of extremism: the 1930s

In the 1930s, the Netherlands experienced an economic crisis like most other European countries, but not a political crisis. The pillarised party system remained quite stable: almost all Catholics continued to vote for the Catholic Party, most Protestants remained loyal to the Protestant parties, and secular workers voted for the Social Democratic Party, though a small section shifted to the Communist Party which won a little over three per cent of the popular vote in 1933 and 1937. The pillar parties could rely on the support of a network (pillar, *zuil* in Dutch) of trade unions, women’s clubs, youth clubs, farmers’ associations, newspapers, and the new broadcasting associations.¹² Only the secular middle class largely escaped the pillarisation process, hence its loyalty to liberal parties turned out to be more fragile. Fascist and other anti-democratic parties managed to recruit members and voters from this class.¹³

At provincial elections in 1935 the National Socialist Movement captured eight per cent of the popular vote, which caused a shock in the Dutch media. The NSB

had been founded in 1931 and although initially it was mostly inspired by Italian Fascism, from 1935 onwards it started to copy the German party and became more radical, racist, and anti-Semitic.¹⁴ At the parliamentary elections of 1937 it received only four per cent of the popular vote. The rapid decline of the NSB could be attributed to many factors, one of them being its increasingly negative image in public opinion. Two civil organisations played an important role here.

Unity through Democracy (Eenheid door Democratie)

In June 1935, directly after the electoral success of the NSB, a diverse group founded Unity through Democracy (Eenheid door Democratie, EdD).¹⁵ Famous members were the historian Pieter Geyl, the socialist leader Koos Vorrink, and Willem Schermerhorn, professor of civil engineering at Delft. The latter was one of the founders of EdD and later served as Dutch Prime Minister for a short period after the Second World War. EdD tried to mirror the NSB by building a mass organisation (with around 30,000 members at the peak of its popularity) to exercise political influence.¹⁶ To some extent, the members of EdD also mirrored the electorate of the NSB: EdD consisted mostly of people who were less attached to a pillar, in particular liberal bourgeois circles close to the political centre. They might have differed from the voters of the NSB in so far as they were probably less affected by the economic crisis.¹⁷

The goals and ideology of EdD were summed up in a programme of seven points. The main point was the constitutional guarantee of a democratic form of government. Moreover, EdD advocated a kind of civic nationalism and criticised Dutch pillarisation because it detracted from national unity. EdD reacted against the international, and therefore “non-Dutch,” character of fascist but also of communist ideology.¹⁸

EdD tried to spread its ideas and critique of the NSB through public meetings, national conferences, and especially through publicity in its own propaganda magazine, brochures, and pamphlets. It also published polemics and advertisements in the regular press.¹⁹ Later, EdD started to mobilise political pressure, for example in support of Jewish refugees from Germany after the Kristallnacht.²⁰ EdD existed until the start of the German occupation of the Netherlands. During the war, some members of EdD were arrested, interrogated, and imprisoned, although most of its members were left undisturbed, partly because of the effective destruction of its membership register.²¹

Dutch Committee of Vigilance of anti-national-socialist intellectuals

The Dutch Committee of Vigilance of anti-national-socialist intellectuals (Comité van waakzaamheid van anti-nationaal-socialistische intellectuelen) was modelled after the French Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes and established by the Dutch writers Menno ter Braak and Eduard du Perron. The latter lived in Paris during the 1930s and was in close contact with members of the French committee.²² Although the writers had already attempted to establish the Committee before

1935, it was the success of the NSB that helped them to win over intellectuals who initially were reluctant to join an organisation which included communists.²³

The Committee's main goal, according to its statement of principles, was to defend spiritual and cultural liberty and to combat National Socialism because it was a threat to this "essential cultural good." In a later version of the statement, the Committee focused more on democracy as the only acceptable form of government and struck "anti-national-socialist" from the name in 1938.²⁴

The Committee could be regarded as a more intellectual counterpart of EdD and never became the mass organisation EdD was, although it tried to establish branches throughout the Netherlands.²⁵ Besides organising public meetings and lectures by prominent members, the Committee published a series of brochures – 24 to be exact. In these brochures, it criticised fascism from different angles, emphasising its dangerous and irrational aspects. Perhaps the most important brochure was written by Menno ter Braak which was entitled *National Socialism as a Doctrine of Rancour* (Nationaal-Socialisme als Rancuneleer).²⁶

In contrast to EdD, the Committee did not agitate against communism. This is one of the reasons EdD and the Committee never collaborated, as EdD had rejected communism explicitly. However, after the German–Russian pact in 1939 the discussion on communism within the organisation became quite heated with some members demanding communists be expelled from the Committee. This conflict led to the dissolution of the Committee in the same year.²⁷

Influence

It is difficult to assess the actual influence of both EdD and the Vigilance Committee given the paucity of data. According to historian Ernst Kossmann, both organisations had some influence on public opinion, which became increasingly critical of the NSB after 1935.²⁸ However, condemnation of the party by the Catholic bishops and the Calvinist (Gereformeerde) Church and the prohibition of party membership in the civil service might have had more of an impact.²⁹ Perhaps the provincial election result of 1935 was just a very atypical election outcome and "corrected" in 1937.

The second wave: post-war communism

After the Second World War, the Communist Party initially benefited from its role in Dutch resistance against the Nazis and from the prestige of the Soviet Union. In 1946, it won almost 11 per cent of the popular vote and ten seats (out of 100) in parliament, while its newspaper *The Truth* (*De Waarheid*) sold more copies than any other paper. Yet, within two years support started to decline rapidly: eight per cent in 1948, six per cent in 1952, five per cent in 1956, two per cent in 1959. Dutch communists were not allowed to participate in government, unlike their comrades in Belgium, France, Finland, and many other European countries. Their isolation was due not only to pillarisation but also to their firm opposition to the colonial war in Indonesia.³⁰ Anti-communism seemed quite strong in public opinion, fostered

by the pillarised media of the Catholic and Protestant parties but also the Social Democrats and Liberals. A few attempts were made to encourage anticommunism through civil organisations independent of the pillars, but their impact seems to have been marginal. In 1951 an association was founded called Peace and Freedom (Vrede en Vrijheid) which published a newspaper entitled *The Real Truth (De Echte Waarheid)* and distributed anti-communist posters and pamphlets – addressed specifically to shopkeepers advertising in the communist newspaper. It was succeeded in the 1960s by the more academic East-West Institute (Oost-West Instituut), which published periodicals and organised conferences.³¹ However, both organisations were sponsored by the Dutch Intelligence Service and funded (at least partly) by the CIA. Therefore, they do not clearly meet our criteria of an independent civil organisation. The Dutch Intelligence Service was probably more active in investigating and combating communism than its counterparts in other countries.³²

The third wave: the emergence of nationalist populism

Meanwhile, fascism and National Socialism had become dirty words and had contaminated concepts like nationalism, conservatism, and even “right-wing.” The NSB was banned in 1945. Some former National Socialists joined the conservative (and populist) Farmers’ Party (Boerenpartij) which won three seats (out of 150) in parliament in 1963. Others joined the Dutch People’s Union (Nederlandse Volksunie, NVU), founded in 1971 by young ethnic nationalists, and managed to gain increasing influence within the small party.³³ As a consequence, (relatively) moderate nationalists from the NVU (which had never won a seat) set up a new party in 1980, named Centre Party (Centrumpartij, CP), to emphasise its moderateness. The CP won a seat in parliament in 1982 (with 0.8 per cent of the popular vote). It soon fell apart due to internal strife but its offshoot, the Centre Democrats (Centrumdemocraten), won 0.9 per cent of the vote in 1989 and 2.5 per cent in 1994. A smaller and more radical offshoot, CP’86, won only a few local seats and was banned in 1998.³⁴ Though both the CP and the CD remained small and isolated parties, their presence triggered several anti-fascist actions at both the national and local level.

By 2002, these parties had ceased to function, while their supporters flocked to a new party founded by a maverick intellectual named Pim Fortuyn. In May 2002, his List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) entered parliament with 26 seats (out of 150; 17 per cent of the popular vote) with a moderately nationalist and populist programme – nine days after Fortuyn had been assassinated by an animal rights activist.³⁵ Though some politicians like GreenLeft (GroenLinks) leader Paul Rosenmöller had called Fortuyn a right-wing extremist, academics generally would not apply this label to him and his party.³⁶

More controversial was the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) which had entered parliament in 2006 with nine seats (six per cent of the popular vote), while the LPF had lost all seats at the same election. The PVV was founded by Geert Wilders when he left the Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) but retained his seat in parliament. Wilders remained a liberal with respect to socio-economic issues, but the core of his ideology became

increasingly anti-Islamism, combined with nationalism and populism.³⁷ Unlike the LPF, the Party for Freedom did not have a democratic structure; all decisions were taken by Wilders who was formally its only member. In the media and in parliament, Wilders has often used provocative language, for example calling the house “a fake parliament.”³⁸ After co-operation with a centre-right coalition of Liberals and Christian Democrats failed in 2012, the PVV became more and more isolated in parliament (and in society) while continuing to attract between 10 and 13 per cent of the popular vote.

In 2017, the PVV had to compete with a new nationalist populist party, Forum for Democracy (Forum voor Democratie, FVD) founded by another maverick intellectual, Thierry Baudet. FVD won two seats in parliament. At first, the FVD appeared more moderate than the PVV and attracted quite a few cadres from the conservative wing of the Liberal Party. Its main enemy seemed to be the established “party cartel” rather than Islam. However, within a few years the party radicalised and lost most of its conservative liberals. Baudet made statements (in speeches, privately, or on social media) which seemed to evidence anti-Semitism, racism, and a Spenglerian nostalgia for a reactionary regime. Rejecting the principles of the French Revolution (equality, liberty, and fraternity) as well as modern art, he wanted to “turn the clock back” and called for a “renaissance” of European civilisation led by a “new elite.”³⁹ While Baudet showed sympathy for authoritarian leaders like Putin, he did not advocate an authoritarian regime in the Netherlands, quite the contrary: he favoured more direct democracy.⁴⁰ At the 2021 elections the FVD obtained eight seats (five per cent of the popular vote) after a rather militant campaign against the globalist “COVID conspiracy,” while its moderate offshoot, the Conservative Liberal Party JA21, won three seats (two per cent of the vote).⁴¹ Yet increasingly FVD seemed to grow sceptic of elections and began to concentrate more on building a “parallel society” with its own media and schools – inspired also by Orania and the Afrikaner Solidarity Movement in South Africa.⁴²

The ideology of the FVD may overlap to some extent with the new “anti-institutional extremism” analysed by the AIVD in a recent report.⁴³ It defines this relatively new variety of extremism as the belief in an evil global elite which aims at total control over society through manipulation of the media and the judiciary as well as the organisation of the COVID pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and other disasters.⁴⁴ This belief might undermine democracy indirectly, by eroding public support for its institutions and confidence in the public media. The AIVD does not mention FVD explicitly.

The rise of new nationalist and populist parties as well as anti-institutional extremism since 2000 has so far not triggered the founding of new anti-extremist organisations but it has attracted the attention of the existing ones, in particular the Anne Frank Foundation and the Research Group Kafka. Both will be discussed here.

Anne Frank Foundation (Anne Frank Stichting)

The Dutch Anne Frank Foundation (Anne Frank Stichting) was established in 1957, initially to save the house where Anne Frank hid during the Second World

War, *het Achterhuis*, from demolition. Anne Frank became a symbol or icon of the fate of Dutch and other European Jews during the Shoah through her posthumously published diary.⁴⁵ Having saved the *Achterhuis* from destruction, the foundation also wanted to spread the ideals that were expressed in the diary of Anne Frank, specifically the promotion of democracy and dialogue as well as a peaceful co-existence of different religions from a non-partisan perspective.⁴⁶ The Second World War functioned as a sort of “negative” stimulus for the activities which consisted mainly of lectures, conferences, and other forms of discussion.

From the 1970s onwards, the Anne Frank Foundation has taken a firmer stance in the public debate, reacting against discrimination of immigrants in Dutch society and the rise of neo-Nazism and ethnic nationalism. The Second World War is still a benchmark, but the focus has shifted from dialogue to actively fighting against discrimination and prejudice.⁴⁷

In the 1980s, right-wing extremism became the central point of attention, especially after the emergence of the CP. The Anne Frank Foundation tried to get the CP banned.⁴⁸ Expressing its views in publications and through the media, the foundation continued to warn of the dangers of right-wing extremism.

By the late 1980s, the Anne Frank Foundation was concentrating more on research and analysis of extremist and racist tendencies in the Netherlands.⁴⁹ In the 2000s, its researchers began to study and criticise the PVV, which they regarded as a right-wing extremist party. They had been reluctant to apply those terms to the LPF.⁵⁰ The anti-Islamism of the PVV seemed to be sufficient reason for Jaap van Donselaar and his colleagues to classify the party as extremist. They had also detected authoritarian tendencies in the PVV. By 2018, Willem Wagenaar, a researcher at the Anne Frank Foundation, had a more nuanced view of the PVV but voiced his concern about the FVD. The FVD maintained contacts with extremist fringe groups and at times flirted with racist and anti-democratic ideas.⁵¹

In 1997, as part of its role as a “moral watchdog,” the foundation started publishing an annual report or “monitor” on racism, anti-Semitism, and the extreme right in the Netherlands.⁵² However, education on the Second World War and themes such as racism and extremism continue to make up an important part of the foundation’s work. The Anne Frank Foundation does not receive any structural government subsidies, and depends on private donations, museum revenues, and incidental subsidies.⁵³

Kafka and the Anti-Fascist Action

Anti-fascist research group Kafka was set up in 1988 in response to the emergence of extreme right organisations in Dutch society with the aim of providing reliable information on these organisations and their members.⁵⁴ It does this with an outspoken anti-fascist signature and therefore could be characterised as an anti-extremist organisation. Although at the beginning, the organisation presented its name as an acronym for “Collective Anti-Fascist/Capitalist Archive” (Kollektief Anti Fascistisch/Kapitalistisch Archief, KAFKA), nowadays it states on the website that the name is a reference to the writer Franz Kafka and the critique of totalitarian

regimes in his work. Between 1993 and 2013, it regularly published its research results in *Alert!*, the magazine of the Antifascist Action (Antifascistische Actie) in the Netherlands, and later on its own website as well as in other media. Although Kafka cooperates with AFA in the Netherlands, it is an independent organisation, with different goals and activities than AFA.⁵⁵

The research by Kafka concerns extreme right organisations such as the NVU, the Identitarian Movement, and Pegida in the Netherlands, but also less extreme right-wing parties such as the CP and its offshoots as well as the PVV and FVD.⁵⁶

While Kafka researches right-wing extremist movements, the organisation itself has been accused of left-wing extremism. The AIVD stated in 2010 that there is a “related threat” from the AFA and Kafka as they pursue anti-democratic goals, such as removing everything that is right-wing from the public domain, at times by using intimidation and by inciting violence.⁵⁷

Kafka does not receive any subsidies from the government and depends on private donations.

Influence

In their fight against right-wing extremism, both the Anne Frank Foundation and Kafka adopted the strategy of doing research and sharing the outcomes with the general public, by which both organisations try to warn of the dangers of the extreme right. It seems plausible, though hard to prove, that both organisations have had some actual impact on public opinion and helped stop the growth of organisations like the NVU and the CP and its offshoots.⁵⁸ They seem to have been less successful in containing the growth of the PVV and FVD. Of course, several other factors may be involved here: both party-internal factors such as leadership and cohesion of the party and external factors such as Islamist terrorism. The decline of traditional media and the rise of social media may also have played a role: the voice of far-right parties has become more present in the public debate due to these social media platforms. However, radical statements of both the PVV and FVD are still often heavily criticised in the public debate. Research by the Anne Frank Foundation and Kafka is frequently used as a source by regular media and therefore could be regarded as a booster of this critical public opinion on radicalism and extremism, although their research is probably not the only cause: pressure from other parties and investigative journalism also play roles in shaping public opinion.

Concluding remarks

Four organisations have been described here as more or less relevant in the protection of civil democracy in the Netherlands: Unity Through Democracy, the Dutch Committee of Vigilance of anti-national-socialist intellectuals, the Anne Frank Foundation, and Kafka.

Although it is difficult to measure the precise influence of these organisations, it is very likely that all of them have had some impact, although in different ways. Unity Through Democracy “socialised” its members and mobilised the masses – at

least to some extent – while the Committee spread its ideas in brochures and lectures. Both post-war organisations, the Anne Frank Foundation and Kafka, tended to focus on research. The Anne Frank Foundation operates more in an academic context, while Kafka concentrates on investigative journalism.

However, most organisations only made an impact over a short period. Only the Anne Frank Foundation may have exerted some influence over a longer period because of its reputation as a serious research organisation – and perhaps to some extent also because of its connection with Anne Frank.

What were the exact challenges that triggered the establishment of these organisations? This may be rather difficult to answer given the relatively marginal role of anti-democratic extremist organisations in the Netherlands, both before and after the Second World War. As a consequence, there have been few significant Dutch organisations engaged in fighting anti-democratic extremism. Civil organisations combating left-wing extremism seem totally absent, whereas the organisations fighting right-wing extremism have been relatively small. Moreover, the major post-war organisation, the Anne Frank Foundation, has concentrated more on education and research than on political activism.

None of the organisations described cooperated with the Dutch government. Even the (relative) success of the Anne Frank Foundation has not led to its incorporation but quite possibly to a tacit or informal division of labour with the Dutch intelligence service while the latter has continued to do its own research. Nevertheless, the Anne Frank Foundation does not receive any structural government subsidies.

So far, the involvement of the Dutch state in democracy protection has also been rather modest. One might explain this in terms of a deeply rooted liberal tradition that goes back to the era of pillarisation and possibly even further, to the Dutch Republic of the 17th and 18th centuries where a very weak central state had to negotiate with semi-sovereign provinces and cities. Another plausible reason might be the relatively modest success of anti-democratic extremist parties and movements in The Netherlands, compared to many other European countries – at least until recently.⁵⁹

The new legislation on political parties that is being prepared does not seem the (visible) result of pressure from an NGO but has been advised by a committee appointed by parliament.⁶⁰ Therefore, we conclude that the Dutch state may be trying to adopt a more assertive position towards political extremism, but also that extremism and hence anti-extremist organisations continue to play a relatively minor role on the Dutch political stage.

Notes

- 1 As already stated in the text, we did only study organisations that explicitly fight political extremism. We do not discuss organisations fighting discrimination or terrorism, or providing civic and political education (such as ProDemos), although some of our organisations operate as educators or fight discrimination as well. We also excluded secret anti-communist “stay behind” organisations (Gladio) and obscure pre-war organisations

- like the National League Against Revolution. Also, modern anti-racist organisations like Kick Out Zwarte Piet (KOZP) and The Netherlands confesses colour (Nederland bekennt Kleur) are not treated in this contribution.
- 2 The research for this chapter consisted of a study of secondary sources: mainly books, articles in academic journals, and websites.
 - 3 See www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/extremisme, accessed 29 October 2020.
 - 4 Remco Nehmelman, De regulering van politieke partijen in Nederland, *Tijdschrift voor Constitutioneel Recht*, 4 (2013) 2, pp. 130–150.
 - 5 Joep Koornstra/Berend Roorda/Jan Brouwer, Antidemocratische rechtspersonen op ondemocratische wijze verbieden: wetsvoorstel artikel 2:20 BW innerlijk tegenstrijdig, *Nederlands Juristenblad*, 25 (2019) 1430, pp. 1786–1795, here 1787. See Letter on anti-democratic groups by the Minister of Interior and Kingdom Affairs and the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, 2 March 2015, p. 6 (online: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-29279-226.html>, accessed 20 March 2021).
 - 6 District Court Amsterdam, 8 March 1978, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:1978:AC0252 and Supreme Court of the Netherlands 9 March 1979, ECLI:NL:PHR:1979:AC0769, as well as District Court Amsterdam, 18 November 1998, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:1998:AN6055. Due to judicial procedural errors the NVU was declared a forbidden organisation, but was never dissolved.
 - 7 Paul van Sasse van Ysselt, Democratie en antidemocratische groeperingen, *Tijdschrift voor Constitutioneel Recht*, 6 (2015) 4, pp. 356–369, here 362.
 - 8 Public Consultation Act on Political Parties (online: www.internetconsultatie.nl/wpp/b1, accessed 9 June 2023).
 - 9 Dutch text: “indien de partij door haar doelstelling of werkzaamheden een daadwerkelijke en ernstige bedreiging vormt voor een of meer grondbeginselen van de democratische rechtsstaat.” Draft Act on Political Parties, article 86 (online: www.internetconsultatie.nl/wpp2/b1, accessed 9 June 2023).
 - 10 Draft explanatory memorandum Act on Political Parties, p. 34 (online: www.internetconsultatie.nl/wpp2/b1, accessed 9 June 2023).
 - 11 Tobias den Hartog, Kabinet: politieke partij moet verboden kunnen worden als democratie gevaar loopt, *Het Parool*, 22 December 2022; Wilfred Scholten, Een partijverbod, moet je dat wel willen? Met die vraag worstelt de politiek al meer dan honderd jaar, *Trouw*, 7 February 2023.
 - 12 The system has been analysed brilliantly by the Dutch-American political scientist Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, Berkeley 1968.
 - 13 Robin te Slaa/Edwin Klijn, *De NSB. Ontstaan en opkomst van de Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, 1931–1935*, Amsterdam 2009; Peter Mair, Electoral Volatility and the Dutch Party System: A Comparative Perspective, *Acta Politica*, 43 (2008), pp. 235–253.
 - 14 Robin te Slaa/Edwin Klijn, *De NSB. Twee werelden botsen 1936–1940*, Amsterdam 2021, pp. 256, 276ff., 440–445.
 - 15 Frits Rovers, *Eenheid door Democratie. Een analyse van een burgerlijk-democratische volksbeweging in de jaren dertig*, Utrecht 1986, p. 13f.
 - 16 *Ibid.*, pp. 14–21.
 - 17 *Ibid.*, pp. 59–60.
 - 18 *Ibid.*, pp. 1–32, 43; Frits Rovers, “Naar wijder horizon” De Nederlandsche beweging voor Eenheid door Democratie, de crisis van de Westerse cultuur en het verlangen naar een Nieuwe Gemeenschap 1935–1940. In: Ed Jonker/Maarten van Rossem (eds.), *Geschiedenis en cultuur. Achttien opstellen*, The Hague 1990, pp. 131–138, here 132.

- 19 Ibid., pp. 42–46.
- 20 Ibid., p. 21.
- 21 Ibid., pp. 23f.
- 22 Maaike Koffeman, Het Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes. In: Helleke van den Braber/Jan Gielkens (eds.), *In 1934. Nederlandse cultuur in internationale context*, Amsterdam 2010, pp. 145–153, here 145, 149–150.
- 23 Ibid., p. 150; L.R. Wiersma, Het comité van Waakzaamheid van anti-nationaal-socialistische intellectuelen (1936–1940), *BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review*, 86 (1971) 1, pp. 124–160, here 128.
- 24 Koffeman, Het Comité van de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes, p. 151; Wiersma, Het comité van Waakzaamheid, pp. 129–131.
- 25 Wiersma, Het comité van Waakzaamheid, p. 135.
- 26 See Frits Rovers, Intellectuelen in het “roze decennium.” Het Comité van Waakzaamheid en de strijd om de menselijke waardigheid, 1936–1940. In: Alexander van der Haven/Frank Hendrickx/Jan Weerdenburg (eds.), *Intellectuele kringen in de twintigste eeuw*, Utrecht 1995, pp. 49–64, here 57.
- 27 Wiersma, Het comité van Waakzaamheid, pp. 144f.; Koffeman, Het Comité van de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes, p. 152.
- 28 Ernst Kossmann, *De Lage Landen 1780–1940*, Amsterdam 1982, p. 485.
- 29 Te Slaa/Klijn, *De NSB. Twee werelden botsen*, pp. 100–105, 208–212.
- 30 Here we rely on the study of the Dutch sociologist Jos van Dijk, *Ondanks hun dappere rol in het verzet – het isolement van Nederlandse communisten in de koude oorlog*, Soesterberg 2016.
- 31 Van Dijk, *Ondanks hun dappere rol in het verzet*, pp. 97–98, 184–188.
- 32 Van Dijk, *Ondanks hun dappere rol in het verzet*, p. 98.
- 33 Jaap van Donselaar, *Fout na de oorlog. Fascistische en racistische organisaties in Nederland 1950–1990*, Amsterdam 1991, pp. 142ff.
- 34 Paul Lucardie, Een geschiedenis van vijftien jaar Centrumstroming. In: Joop van Holsteyn/Cas Mudde (eds.), *Extreem-rechts in Nederland*, The Hague 1998, pp. 17–30; see also Jaap van Donselaar, *Fout na de oorlog*.
- 35 More on the LPF and Fortuyn in Paul Lucardie/Gerrit Voerman, *Populisten in de polder*, Amsterdam 2012, pp. 91–135; and in Paul Lucardie, *The Netherlands. Populism versus Pillarization*. In: Daniele Albertazzi/Duncan McDonnell (eds.), *Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, Basingstoke 2008, pp. 151–165.
- 36 Paul Lucardie, *The Netherlands: Populism versus Pillarization*. In: Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (eds.), *Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, Basingstoke 2008, pp. 151–165.
- 37 About Wilders and his PVV, see Paul Lucardie/Gerrit Voerman, Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands: A Political Entrepreneur in the Polder. In: Karsten Grabow/Florian Hartleb (eds.), *Exposing the Demagogues. Right-wing and national Populist Parties in Europe*, Brussels/Berlin 2013, pp. 187–203; more detailed is the volume edited by Gerrit Voerman/Koen Vossen (eds.), *Wilders gewogen. 15 jaar reuring in de Nederlandse politiek*, Amsterdam 2019.
- 38 In Dutch: “nepparlement.” More details in Simon Otjes and Tom Louwerse, De PVV in het parlement. In: Voerman/Vossen (eds.), *Wilders gewogen*, pp. 213–230, as well as Henk te Velde, De taal van Geert Wilders en de parlementaire cultuur. In: Ibid., pp. 231–288.
- 39 Interview with Urs Gehrig, There is a proper reawakening across Europe going on, *Die Weltwoche*, 28 March 2019; Sebastiaan Faber, Is Dutch Bad Boy Thierry Baudet

- the new face of the European Alt-Right? *The Nation*, 30 April 2018; Jeroen Vullings, Tommy Wieringa tegen Thierry Baudet: Rukken mág!, *Vrij Nederland*, 16 May 2017; Eric Vrijzen, Je zus met een neger, *Elseviers Weekblad*, 6 February 2021.
- 40 Thierry Baudet, *De Gideonsbende. Het unieke verhaal van FVD, de ware aard van de tegenstander en hoe we kunnen winnen*, Amsterdam 2023.
- 41 Only two months after the elections, another offshoot emerged. Three FVD members of parliament led by Wybren van Haga left the party after FVD compared the COVID measures with repression during the Second World War. In July 2021, Van Haga announced the establishment of a new party called “Interest of the Netherlands” (Belang van Nederland). See Rik Rutten/Philip de Witt Wijnen, Baudet laat zich niet corrigeren, *NRC Handelsblad*, 14 May 2021; Kamerlid Van Haga (ex-FVD) begint nieuwe partij, *NOS*, 2 July 2021 (online: <https://nos.nl/artikel/2387704-kamerlid-wybren-van-haga-ex-fvd-begint-nieuwe-partij>, accessed 2 July 2021).
- 42 Baudet, *De Gideonsbende*, pp. 231–235 and the Epilogue written by Simone Kerseboom, pp. 237–241.
- 43 Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD), *Anti-institutioneel-extremisme in Nederland. Een ernstige dreiging voor de democratische rechtsorde?* The Hague, 2023 (online: www.aivd.nl/documenten/publicaties/2023/05/25/anti-institutioneel-extremisme-in-nederland-een-ernstige-dreiging-voor-de-democratische-rechtsorde).
- 44 AIVD, *Anti-institutioneel-extremisme in Nederland*, p. 15.
- 45 Anne Frank Foundation, *Anne Franks Huis. Een museum met een verhaal*, Amsterdam 1999, pp. 248–252; Eva Rensman, *De Anne Frank Stichting en haar lessen uit de Tweede Wereldoorlog 1957–1994*, Utrecht 1995, p. 1.
- 46 Rensman, *De Anne Frank Stichting*, pp. 17f., 28.
- 47 *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 39, 47f.
- 48 *Ibid.*, pp. 52, 54f.
- 49 *Ibid.*, p. 84.
- 50 Marija Davidovic/Jaap van Donselaar/Peter R. Rodrigues/Willem Wagenaar, Het extreemrechtse en discriminatoire gehalte van het gedachtengoed van de PVV. In: Jaap van Donselaar/Peter R. Rodrigues (eds.), *Monitor Racisme & Extremisme. Achtste Rapportage*, Amsterdam 2008, pp. 167–198. For a critique of their definition of right-wing extremism, see Paul Lucardie, Rechts-extremisme, populisme of democratisch patriotisme? Opmerkingen over de politieke plaatsbepaling van de Partij voor de Vrijheid en Trots op Nederland. In: Gerrit Voerman (ed.), *Jaarboek 2007 Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen*, Groningen 2009, pp.176–190. About the LPF Van Donselaar and Rodrigues had published a report in *Monitor racisme en extreem-rechts. Vijfde rapportage*, Amsterdam/Leiden 2002, pp. 59–187.
- 51 Willem Wagenaar, Extreemrechtse formaties en extreemrechts geweld. In: Bas Tierolf et al., *Zevende rapportage racisme, antisemitisme en extreemrechts geweld in Nederland*, Amsterdam 2018, pp. 33–51, especially pp. 43–46 (online: www.verwey-jonker.nl/publicatie/zevende-rapportage-racisme-antisemitisme-en-extreemrechts-geweld-in-nederl-and-incidenten-aangiftes-verdachten-en-afhandeling-in-2017/, accessed 14 May 2021).
- 52 See www.annefrank.org/nl/over-ons/onderzoek/sociaal-onderzoek/monitor-racisme-en-extremisme/, accessed 31 October 2020.
- 53 See www.annefrank.org/nl/over-ons/jaarverslag-2020/organisatie-jaarverslag-2020/, accessed 18 February 2022.
- 54 See <https://kafka.nl/veel-gestelde-vragen/>, <https://kafka.nl/over-kafka/>, accessed 15 October 2020.

- 55 See <https://kafka.nl/veel-gestelde-vragen/>; <http://web.archive.org/web/20180718073721/http://www.alertmagazine.nl:80/>, accessed 15 October 2020.
- 56 Anonymous publication, *Wat vindt Thierry Baudet van LHBTI-rechten?* <https://kafka.nl/wat-vindt-thierry-baudet-van-lhbt-rechten/>, accessed 10 March 2022.
- 57 AIVD, *Afkalvend front. Extreemrechts en rechts-extremisme in Nederland*, 2011, p. 11.
- 58 See for instance Rob Witte, Een kwestie van gewenning? Reacties op de Centrumstroming. In: Holsteyn/Mudde, *Extreem-rechts in Nederland*, pp. 127–142.
- 59 See Eckhard Jesse/Tom Thieme, Extremismus in den EU-Staaten im Vergleich. In: Eckhard Jesse/Tom Thieme (eds.), *Extremismus in den EU-Staaten*, Wiesbaden 2011, pp. 431–482.
- 60 State Commission on the Parliamentary System in the Netherlands, *Democracy and the Rule of Law in Equilibrium*, 2018.