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When was the war in Spain?: liberal state, illiberal justice in the twentieth century

Abstract

The article analyses increasingly militarized state power and public order in twentieth-century Spain, discussing these in the context of other European states' disciplinary regimes, with their ubiquitous Social-Darwinist dimension in an era of accelerating urban, industrial change and emergent mass societies. The article offers a dissection of the often problematically opaque term 'liberal', arguing that wherever Spain or other twentieth-century European states were positioned on the dictatorial-through-parliamentary-constitutional spectrum, they all came to be 'gardening states' (Bauman). Each state's goal was to sculpt its population as part of a nationalist project – nationalism being the norm, whether named as such or not. Francoism is analysed in this framework, as a hybrid war-born political order blending old-style, top-down military control with new forms of populist mass mobilization from below, the latter enabled and accelerated by the war of 1936-39. The article defines the Franco dictatorship as fascist in the 1940s and totalitarian for far longer, until macro-economic changes – which its cupola believed for a long time need not affect the deep form of Spanish society – hollowed out Francoism's own ideological categories (and its 'disciplinary' efficacy), but not its obsession with social control, which it called 'social peace'.

Keywords

Liberal states, 'gardening' states, militarized justice, Francoism, fascism, totalitarianism, social control

The basic requirement of an authentic, fully realized Empire is internal political homogeneity.
(Eugenio d'Ors, 'Colonial Empires do not exist', 1938)

In the beginning: the liberal legacy and its discontents

The coalition of social and political forces from which Francoism emerged coalesced in the 1930s to resist the 'nightmare' of mass participatory democracy that Spanish conservatives, both patrician and popular, saw represented in the Second Republic. All believed the identity markers of their crisis to be uniquely Spanish, and much fear-driven mythologizing ensued.[1] In

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[1] A tour d'horizon and an analysis in P. Preston, 'Theorists of extermination', *The Spanish Holocaust. Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain*, 34-51; A. Quiroga, *Making Spaniards. Primo de Rivera and the Nationalization of the Masses, 1923-30 (*Basingstoke, 2007), 6-31 (on the roots of National-Catholicism); cf. also J. Labanyi, 'Women, Asian Hordes and the Treat to the Self in Giménez Caballero's *Genio de España*', *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies,* LXXIII, 1996, which returns us to the useful theoretical frame of Klaus Theweleit's *Male Fantasies* (Cambridge, 1987), an interdisciplinary analysis of writings by German paramilitaries (*Freikorps*) in the early

reality, however, the coordinates of the crisis which brought them together were common ones emerging across Europe from the end of the 1914-18 war, as old hierarchies juddered or collapsed, and new constituencies arose and became delineated inside post-war societies, especially among returning soldiers and war workers, who sought to gain traction – to achieve economic benefit (often land) and political rights, in short, an effective voice. Spain had not of course been a belligerent power in 1914-18, but the war nonetheless profoundly affected its polity and society in many qualitatively similar, i.e. structurally mobilizing ways. As Paco Romero expressed it in his study of Spain and WWI, 'Spain did not enter the war, but the war entered Spain'.[2] It did so by delivering a massive jolt to the demand for its industrial products, which as a result saw large-scale worker migration to industrial centres, and especially to Barcelona, with the substantial expansion of its industrial suburbs and a concomitant growth of unionization and labour disputes.[3] But Barcelona was still Spain's only metropolis, and the relatively circumscribed, semi-contained nature of industrial and urban development elsewhere in the country, inside a 'sea' of agriculture, meant the central state's view from Madrid remained that of the powerfully entrenched agrarian oligarchy. It saw the new political demands of an emergent mass – and class – society not in terms of challenges to be met and bargained with strategically, but in terms of 'old' public order problems to be dealt with in the traditional manner, by the deployment of concerted – and disproportionate – military force, top down.

This process of militarized public order became thoroughly ingrained during Spain's monarchy (1874-1931), and especially through its serial impositions of 'states of war', in various legal incarnations, and/or the suspension of constitutional guarantees. Across all or part of Spain, there were up to a hundred occurrences of this over the monarchy's fifty-six years, which turned the military into the ultimate arbiter of public order and, in turn, fixed in it the habit of, and the will to, rule.[4] The deep reasons for this went back to the very process of central liberal state formation in Spain, through successive wars across the nineteenth century, and the

Weimar period; also P. Preston, *Architects of Terror. Paranoia, Conspiracy and Anti-Semitism in Franco's Spain* (HarperCollins, forthcoming 2023).

[2] F. Romero, 'Spain and the First World War: The Structural Crisis of the Liberal Monarchy', *European History Quarterly*, 25 (1995), 532; F. Romero, *Spain 1914-1918. Between War and Revolution* (London, 1999), *passim*.

[3] C. Ealham, *Class Culture and Conflict in Barcelona 1898-1937* (London, 2005); and the specifically demographic and topographical aspect in J.L. Oyón, *La quiebra de la ciudad popular. Espacio urbano, inmigración y anarquismo en la Barcelona de entreguerras, 1914-1936* (Barcelona, 2008). An encapsulation of Barcelona's sociological uniqueness in early twentieth-century Spain in H. Graham, 'Against the state': a genealogy of the Barcelona May Days (1937), *European History Quarterly*, 29, 4 (1999), 489-91; see also C. Ealham, 'An imagined geography: ideology, urban space and the creation of Barcelona's "Chinatown" (c.1835-1936)', *International Review of Social History*, 50, 3 (2005) 373-98.

[4] E. González Calleja, 'La política de orden público en la Restauración' *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, 20 (2008), esp. 101-103; on the ingrained illiberalism of public order policy under the monarchy, González Calleja, *El máuser y el sufragio. Orden público, subversión y violencia política en la crisis de la Restauración (1917-1931)* (Madrid, 1999), 11-17; by the same author, *La razón de la fuerza: orden público: subversión y violencia política en la España de la Restauración (1875-1917)* (Madrid, 1998).

central state's subsequent reliance on military personnel.[5] This said, the deployment of military force to repel bids to extend political rights down the social pyramid was hardly unique to Spain – consider the manner of the Paris Commune's destruction in 1871 at the hands of a French army defeated in an external war against Prussia, and then turned on an internal movement which represented egalitarian reform in the metropolis. Moreover, in the context of an early twentieth-century urbanizing and industrializing Europe, all economically 'liberal' states were everywhere far less liberal, i.e. *laissez-faire*, when it came to matters of public order and punishment.[6] They sought to sculpt and shape their populations and to develop tighter social disciplining and control over the mass of workers and 'underclasses' in the expanding cities: out of these fears and desires would be honed and developed the discourse and practices of social Darwinism, which were also themselves explicitly understood as strategies of war.[7]

But notable in Spain's case was the sheer longevity of the army's protagonism and its overshadowing of civil state authorities in matters of public order. The military hung on tenaciously, and from the 1880s into the twentieth century they gradually extended their sphere of responsibility in public order roles. As the empire shrank back, so the military looked towards making a compensatory sphere for itself inside Spain, for reasons that were clearly material as well as ideological.[8] The key means by which this happened was through a raft of

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[5] In part this was as a consequence of the plentiful, countrywide supply of military (i.e. officer) personnel to fulfil government and administrative functions across Spanish metropolitan territory. But out of this came not only a centralized (territorial) system, but also the embedding of a set of militarizing practices, values, and political 'imaginaries' within that state, and projected by it into broader society. The standard work on this is Manuel Ballbé's *Orden público y militarismo en la España constitucional* (1812-1983) (Madrid, 1985). We could say that military action had largely produced Spain's central(ized)state, and given the persistent absence of anything resembling an 'assimilationist' system of national public education – in part the result of the repeated fragmentations/fissiparous nature of Spain's liberal forces across the nineteenth century, and the weakening/further marginalization each time of its more progressive sectors, in 1808, 1848 and 1874 – the 'cohesiveness'/vertebration of the military grew steadily in importance, being virtually the only territorially integrative structure. For the officer class too, the importance of this metropolitan role would increase as Spain's external empire receded across the nineteenth century, to which this article returns later.

[6] 'Liberal' obviously means the removal of feudal constraints on a capitalist market/economy, and, where beneficial, also the promotion of free trade. But on the political plane, liberal states still put constraints in place to counter the emergence of mass industrializing society.

[7] Amir Weiner (ed.), L*andscaping the Human Garden: Twentieth-Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework* (Stanford, 2003); P. Holquist, '"Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work": Bolshevik Surveillance in Its Pan-European Context', *Journal of Modern History*, 69 (Sept. 1997), 415-50; Daniel Beer's *Renovating Russia. The Human Sciences and the Fate of Liberal Modernity* (Ithaca, New York, 2008) indicates the continuities, including through the service of expert personnel, of anxiety-driven 'gardening' between liberal state and Stalinist state, the latter which, under cumulative pressure of wars, external and internal, justified other forms of war against vast swathes of its own population in order that the geographical space of the revolution would not 'go under' (i.e. thus becoming an ultranationalism that never spoke its name).

[8] J.J del Águila, *El TOP [Tribunal de Orden Público]: la represión de la libertad (1963-1977)*, 363-4 and 361-2 makes this point in a way that usefully highlights the import of the 'special jurisdictions' (*jurisdicciones especiales*), of which Franco's TOP would be another. The book appendix lists them all, whether military or otherwise. One of the most infamous of these military laws was the 1906 Law of Jurisdictions (*Ley de Jurisdicciones*), but that came *after* others whose impact was accretional, as explained in Eduardo González Calleja's above (and below-) cited powerfully comprehensive summary article.

army legislation which arrogated to the military courts all crimes against state security, the crown, *and the church*, which was thus already positioned underneath the state umbrella (see Gómez Bravo).[9] Crimes against state security included symbolic ones (insults[10]), and 'security' was very rapidly understood as meaning the internal political life of Spain too, in other words modes of disciplining the civilian population.[11] The structural violence generated by this increasingly militarized society can be glimpsed in turn-of-the-century and early twentieth-century accounts – one observer, for example, noted the effects of the 'ceremonial eruption' of the state into worker neighbourhoods in parades where military and ecclesiastical symbolism and personnel melded indistinguishably. Such sights were described as producing 'an unhealthy atmosphere, like a mixture of sadness and panic', as did the sight of public executions, or of prisoners in a lamentable state being herded on foot through the streets of poor areas – a scene that came to be replicated in the 1940s.[12] The 'special jurisdictions' for the military, which Franco would later make extensive use of, were already undermining the unity of the constitutional legal system in early twentieth-century Spain, and thus its safeness: the more special sections appeared, the nearer to autocracy/dictatorship. But they were waved through by a monarch who himself favoured a militarized view of the world.

The military continued building up its control relatively unchallenged by either conventional police forces or paramilitary formations. This in turn bespoke the relative slowness or, more precisely, the uneven development of a variegated class structure in Spain, and especially the late and patchy appearance of urban middling classes. Their rise elsewhere tended to stimulate the development of civilian policing, which increased the state's political legitimacy in the eyes of these emerging constituencies. But Spain's police would continue to exist very much in the military's shadow – rudimentary, under-professionalized and generally underdeveloped and under-resourced, in direct proportion to the similar condition of its urban middling classes, which along with industry, remained a phenomenon of the geographical periphery into the 1920s. In Spain's central agrarian 'sea', its market-town inhabitants of the 'middling' sort –

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[9] González Calleja, 'La política de orden público', 98 indicating the law of 1901 which made criticism of the ecclesiastical authorities answerable to the military courts. The Church was thus already being treated as part of the state, which, in turn, cuts the Gordian knot/logjam, of some Anglo-American historians' and political scientists' curious making – that Francoism was never fascist because of the presence of the Catholic church. But the 1940s autarkic Franco state logically deployed all the conducive local material to hand, including, therefore, church and lay Catholic personnel, to build its ultranationalist, mass mobilized state order, in other words, a fascist one. For Franco's deployment of Catholic personnel as state servants, see Gómez Bravo in this special issue.

[10] Perpetuated through and beyond Francoism, the weight of this militarized, summary legislation is still felt today, for example, the gaoling of a Catalan rapper in February 2021 for insulting the crown (another rapper remains outside Spain to avoid prison). An example from 1983 here: https://www.elconfidencial.com/cultura/cine/2014-01-22/a-la-mierda-espana-y-a-la-mierda-el-pais vasco 78962/ where anti-terrorist legislation was used against a Basque indie/punk group, a procedure clearly echoing Francoist ideas on the achieving of 'social peace', discussed later in this article.

[11] Note that Spain's monarchist constitution defined its (remaining) colonies as *provinces* of Spain. In the thinking of conservative army officers, the opposite also came to be the case – they deemed those among Spain's metropolitan population demanding political and social reform to require colonial-style repression.

[12] E. Salut, *Vivers de revolucionaris: punts histórics del districte cinquè* (1938), ['District Five' was the Raval], cited in M. Thomas, *The Faith and the Fury. Popular Anticlerical Violence and Iconoclasm in Spain, 1931-1936* (Eastbourne, 2013), 26-7, 191.

those who serviced the estates surrounding them (lawyers, notaries, shopkeepers, pharmacists, estate/farm stewards and managers), Spain's equivalent of the central European gentry class – still felt themselves to be more or less safe and secure in an old world of fixed hierarchies to which they felt bound by ties of custom, social respect and deference. They had still not yet directly experienced the fearful wake of mobilizing change which elsewhere in the 1920s often took their equivalents into counterrevolutionary paramilitary formations.

But already by 1918 signs of change were evident elsewhere in Spain. In Barcelona's industrial ambit the army general who was military governor made an informal 'defence pact' with local factory owners. The object was to discipline unruly labour and push back strike action, which had mushroomed in the wake of the power shift caused by accelerated production to meet escalating export targets from Europe's belligerent powers. By 1920, this military governor, General Severiano Martínez Anido, had assumed civil governor powers: in this capacity he unleashed a dirty war of systematized intimidation, torture, and the rolling-out on an industrial scale of Spain's time-honoured form of extrajudicial assassination, the *ley de fugas* (prisoners were shot in the back while allegedly 'escaping'). This period also saw the birth in Barcelona of Spain's first modern paramilitary organisation, the Free Unions (*Sindicatos Libres*) whose members received training and support inside the barracks.[13] They engaged in a spiral of reciprocal, violent street action with labour activists of the anarcho-syndicalist CNT in what, between 1919 and the early 1920s, was an intra-societal war, or, as the military saw it, a 'campaign'. In the midst of the bombs and assassinations, Martínez Anido, speaking as the civil governor, threatened that for every *Sindicato Libre* gunman killed they'd kill three of the CNT's. The maintenance of a military fief, or near-monopoly in public order, and the continued application of military solutions to quell political unrest and block political reform movements in the face of the growing popular mobilization of the post-1917 period, gave a particular hallmark to 'the war in Spain' and to the forms of illiberal justice deployed to fight it. The cost of the ensuing escalation – in itself an indication that the system was not working – was the imposition of a full-scale military dictatorship in Spain in 1923, with the monarch's blessing. Probably inevitably, given its traditional power base of crown, landowners, and church, the dictatorship did little to address the need to modernize a post-imperial Spain's fiscal *and political* structures, required to ensure that the country could pay its way in new times. Rather the dictatorship further extended the military's special jurisdictions and ingrained the idea that 'nation' and 'culture' in Spain could only mean a militarized – and paramilitarized – core,[14] all the while encouraging nostalgic colonial adventures in Spain's North African colonies, as

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[13] On the *Sindicatos Libres*, F. Romero, *The Foundations of Civil War: Revolution, Social Conflict and Reaction in Liberal Spain, 1916-1923* (London, 2008), 196-7, 227-8, which also provides a summary of the (relatively sparse) related historiography, including the above-cited González Calleja, *El máuser y el sufragio*. As Romero outlines, there was a crossover between the *Libres* and the older *Somatén* (Catalan parapolice of recruited civilians) which also played a part in this conflict, and was later consolidated as a quasi-fascist force under Primo de Rivera's military dictatorship (1923-30), Quiroga, *Making Spaniards,* 146-64; E. González Calleja and F. del Rey Reguillo, *La defensa armada contra la revolución. Una historia de las guardias cívicas en la España del siglo XX* (Madrid, 1995) is a comprehensive discussion of the *Somatén,* for the period 1919-23, 71-103 (the links to the *Sindicatos Libres*, 90) and for Primo's military dictatorship, 165-219.

[14] On this process, and the integral role of Catholicism therein, A. Quiroga, *Making Spaniards. Primo de Rivera and the Nationalization of the Masses, 1923-30 (*Basingstoke, 2007), *passim.*

inconclusive as they were wasteful. These could never 'replace' the empire, but they did mortgage the future. It was a modern inflection of imperial Spain's centuries-old dilemma – to fund external war or reform the metropolis.

On the face of things, the future was still opening up, as the 1920s European boom fuelled further urbanizing change in Spain. Many other cities expanded, including Madrid,[15] and there was a notable catch-up urbanization of town centres on Spain's eastern seaboard, down through Valencia and Alicante to Almería in the south east. All of this acted as midwife to the new democratic Republic, born in 1931 out of the wreckage of a delegitimized military dictatorship which had continued to stifle the social and political aspirations of the emerging middling classes on this burgeoning urban periphery. But no sooner was the new Republic in existence than it came hard up against the overweening corporate desires of the powerful military establishment. Not that the liberal Republican political elite wasn't also greatly exercised by the need to guarantee public order and discipline mass society – it was, and social-darwinist discourses of 'social defence' were perfectly present among leading republicans in power. (Indeed the law which made preventive detention legal for the first time in Spain, and which the Franco dictatorship would use so extensively (see Richards and Graham/Lorenzo Rubio in this special issue), was designed and promulgated by the liberal republicans in summer 1933.[16]) However, they were also committed to demilitarizing public order, indeed civilianizing the state lay at the core of republican reforms. So, the Republic pushed back against the 'creep' of special jurisdictions and abolished the most powerful and infamous of them.[17] Just as it also, to a certain extent, concomitantly developed civilian policing.

Military hostility at this attempt on its corporate power also came with a powerful ideological sting – for the unassuaged imperial dreams were now projected inward onto the metropolis, in the search of a war to fight against internal enemies which could also expunge the memory of earlier, massive colonial defeat.[18] Soon this angry political imaginary coalesced with, and came

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[15] On the significant boom-led rural to urban inward migration to Madrid across the 1920s, and its political impact in the 1930s, Santos Juliá, *Madrid 1931-1934. De la fiesta popular a la lucha de clases* (Madrid, 1984).

[16] The *Ley de Vagos y Maleantes* [anti-vagrancy law – literally 'Law of Vagrants and Malefactors'] permitted the legal detention of those who had committed no crime, but whose profile appeared to the police to be 'suspicious'. On the use of it under the Republic to control the poor, the unemployed and those labour organizers who mobilized them, a summary in H. Graham, *The Spanish Republic at War*, 1936-1939 (Cambridge, 2002), 38-9; see also C. Ealham, 'La lluita pel carrer, els venedors ambulants durant la II República', *L'Avenç*, 230 (1998) and 'Anarchism and illegality in Barcelona, 1931-7', *Contemporary European History*, 4, 2, 1995, 33-51.

[17] It abolished the infamous 1906 Law of Jurisdictions in 1931, and re-asserted 'unidad jurisdiccional' (unitary body of law) (under Article VII of the new Republican Constitution) - a unified corpus of law to which all (civilians) were subject. (del Aguila) In strategic terms, however, there were errors, the 1931 campaign against military responsibilities (for defeat in Morocco and endemic corruption) was a big one, especially when it combined with never getting around to removing from the military the right to declare a 'state of war' (Ballbé).

[18] Civilian politicians were first blamed for the loss of empire post 1898, but then the 'search for the guilty' was extended to include those social constituencies demanding political change inside the metropolis. A familiar pattern – consider the 'stab in the back' myth that haunted Weimar, an accusation which the old military establishment directed at the German social democratic movement: earlier of course Bismarck had, in the name of nationalism, waged a (legal and cultural) war against it, just as the Nazis would later wage their own populist, ultranationalist war against the SPD.

to service, an equally strong and fearful civilian one of elite and popular conservative hostility to the modest measure of social and economic levelling proposed by the new Republic. Once the civilian right had failed to block structural reform by legal, parliamentary means, the coordinates were set for the military to intervene to stop the clock.[19]

The officers who made the coup of July 1936 likely expected to be able to deliver a standard, time-honoured military repertoire of 'restraint', even if this would potentially incorporate a larger-scale use of exemplary, lethal violence against resisters. This was military action designed to 'court martial' the very possibility of social change and drive Spanish society back into its traditional hierarchical mould, something which would also assure the endangered corporate prerogatives and the ideological interests of conservative army officers. But even the conspirators understood that this 'reverse' could only go so far: the bulletin they issued to justify the coup implies they already understood that this was now a battle to win popular legitimacy – or at least to affirm it discursively – even if not, of course, to champion popular sovereignty.[20] So it was back to the mid-nineteenth century, rather than the eighteenth. But the military insurgents expected resisters to look like the striking workers of 1917 in Barcelona. So they were surprised by the far greater scale and social variegation of resistance to the coup. (Indeed, even today we still tend to see this resistance signed as exclusively worker – in the iconography of street fighting, or indeed discursively in a later, highly freighted propagandizing around 'anticommunism', whether Francoist or Cold War-originated more generally.) But the resistance in Spain's cities and towns was a sociologically mixed one, in part the result of the aforementioned speeding-up of urbanization in the 1920s, but also of the general politicization of the middling classes therein, who were increasingly angered at being excluded by the crown-sanctioned military dictatorship of 1923-30, and among whom a specific social and cultural identity also arose, not least through their constitution as a radio-listening group. These middling classes too would be wartime resisters, protagonists, victims, and perpetrators.[21] Emblematic of this social change and of the concomitant professionalization, was the

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[19] Aimé Césaire pointed out that fascism was imperialism come home: in Spain it was the army, leaving the scene of imperial defeat, which brought it home. Eugenio d'Ors' comment cited in this article's epigraph, continues: 'colonization supposes that the colonies and the metropolis are heterogenous. An Empire has *provinces,* not regions.' The monarchist constitution defined Spain's colonies as provinces and it was a short step, and very few years, to the military conceiving of 'unruly' metropolitan populations as requiring the application of colonial forms of repression.

[20] The speech is couched as one where the coup-makers speak to, and 'in the name of the people', from whom they claim their legitimacy, 'Spaniards, the nation calls you to defend it'; other phrasings echo revolutionary France's *levée en masse,* and the broadcast is peppered with references to fraternity, social justice and the defence of the Constitution, *Alocución radiada* broadcast by Franco from Tetuán, Spanish Morocco, 17 July 1936 and published in the press, 23 July. Reproduced in F. Díaz Plaja, *La Guerra de España en sus documentos* (Barcelona, 1969), 11-13.

[21] Radio-listening, Enlightenment-minded cohorts existed far beyond the big cities too, including in the market towns of gentry-class strength, where they then fell prey to the death squads, an example (León) in 'Ghosts of change: the story of Amparo Barayón' in H. Graham, *The war and its shadow: Spain's civil war in Europe's long twentieth century (Eastbourne, 2012), 51-73*. For cases of this new middling class as Republican perpetrators, J.L. Ledesma, *Los dias de llamas de la revolución: violencia y política en la retaguardia republicana* (Zaragoza, 2003), *240-1 and* M. Thomas, *The faith and the fury: popular anticlerical violence and iconoclasm in Spain, 1931-1936* (Eastbourne, 2013), 79-81.

participation of members of Spain's late-developing civilian police forces in the anti-coup resistance – in fact everywhere that the Republic did prevail in urban Spain (which was mostly) it had portions of police forces with it, although relatively less support within the militarized civil guard.[22]

So, although the insurgents were not expecting to trigger a war, they did so, because 1936 Spain was already a different society to the one they perceived it to be. Topographically and sociologically, we can point to some parallels with the cashiering of a socially reforming democracy in Austria in February 1934. But the 'urban Spain' of 1936 was bigger, more variegated, and much more spread out.[23] The escalation of the conflict to become by 1937 a total war, mobilizing civilian as well as military fronts – indeed mobilizing in one way or another virtually the entirety of Spain's population – was also importantly a consequence of external factors, namely the expansionist foreign policies of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. But the effects inside Spain were revolutionary in domestic terms, including (though this is less commonly understood) inside the insurgent/Francoist zone. It was the process of the war itself which, like a tidal wave, drowned all trace and possibility of the coup makers' original objective of a military coup which would achieve total social demobilization. It did so most visibly through the military conscription process which total war came to dictate in both the Republican and Francoist zones – although in Franco's Spain there was no need for any mobilization of industrial war workers, given the plentiful, guaranteed and integrated military hardware that came from Hitler and Mussolini. But a more searing, lasting and toxic mobilization came through all forms of the subterranean dirty war behind the lines. In the Francoist zone, civilian-on-civilian violence always occurred under the permissive watch of the military, and shored up their own power. But it also created new grassroots allegiances the military authorities could then deploy, through the very fact of perpetration – as civilians mobilized in paramilitary death squads annihilated those other bodies that disturbed the established order of things. Thus the rage and fear of mobilized populist conservatism is something that also fuelled the new Francoist order in the making.

The Francoist authorities soon began harnessing this energy, channelling it in various forms into official 'virtue' – the mobilized mass commemoration of the 'martyred' dead and other forms of public grief-building that the Franco authorities rapidly attached to the 'sacred' memory of those killed by 'the other side', and which, in turn, consolidated and legitimized the new Francoist order, emerging now both as radicalized popular movement and proto-state (termed the *estado campamental*[24])*.* Many in Spain's gentry class had in 1936 taken up arms as volunteers to defend an older world of service and tradition. But their wartime political and physical encadrement saw them transformed by their experience, and melded with other cohorts – the footsoldiers of Francoism, drawn from the conservative, inland smallholding

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[22] H. Graham, *The Spanish Republic at War*, 94.

[23] Austria being another country with a big rural base and a circumscribed urban constituency (Vienna). In February 1934 military force was used to push back against the extension of social and political rights. Austria, like Spain, had developed an anti-reform coalition: army + police + *Heimwehr*, the paramilitaries of the right-wing (Christian Social Party).

[24] 'battlefield state' (literally 'state in a campaign tent').

peasantry of Old Castile, the middling classes of its old market towns (whence the Falange also drew heavily), the army's new non-commissioned officers (*alféreces provisionales*), a mass of veterans (including ex-prisoners of the Republicans and/or relatives of the 'martyred dead' – i.e. those killed in the war against the Republic, and especially if those deaths were extrajudicial ones, and part of the dirty war behind the lines).[25] All these mobilized groups played a pivotal role from 1939 in sustaining the Francoist edifice-under-construction, just as the *alféreces provisionales* would also provide core new staff to run the prisons.[26]

Through the war(s), both battlefield and other, mass mobilization remade Francoism as something new and modern. War was, then, the crucible that transformed the insurgency, to produce Francoism *tout court* as Spanish fascism (i.e. this was not only about the self-declared fascist *Falange*). Nor does the key role of the Catholic church gainsay this definition of Francoism *per se* as fascist.[27] As has been observed, the peasant 'footsoldiers' went into the war to defend their Catholic religion but came out of it defending an ultranationalist Catholic state.[28] The militarized state had, moreover, long owned the church – that much is clear from the turn-of-the-century monarchist legislation discussed earlier. (Since the 1880s, the military courts adjuging crimes against state security, had included in their ambit the ecclesiastical authorities – see footnote 9 above.) So Francoist state-building would do no more than use appropriate local pre-existing structures – including those of the most fundamentalist Catholic church in Europe – as the means of defining, channelling and accelerating its mobilized, populist ultranationalism which 'worshipped' hierarchy and homogeneity. Both of these values were epitomized by 'true empire', as encapsulated in the words of the Catalan modernist writer and Francoist intellectual, Eugenio d'Ors, which appear in this article's epigraph. After all, the Cardinal Primate of Spain, Gomá y Tomás, had himself spoken longingly in the 1930s of forms of 'divine totalitarianism' (Gómez Bravo, in this special issue).

The chronology of this war to construct a fascist state overflowed the conventional one of the battlefield war of 1936-39, and continued across the 1940s, during which time Francoism emerged as a hybrid phenomenon. It never ceased using the overarching militarized state

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[25] H. Graham, 'The Sacred Dead' *London Review of Books*, 37, 5 (5 March, 2015) 32-3*, *; the footage of the *evocación de caídos* (official commemoration of Franco's 'martyred' wartime dead – i.e. those extrajudicially killed in the Republican zone) in B. Martín-Patino's documentary film, *Canciones para después de una Guerra* [Songs for after a War] (1971, released 1976); G. Gómez Bravo & J. Marco, *La obra del miedo. Violencia y sociedad en la España franquista (1936-1950)* (Barcelona, 2011), *passim*, (forthcoming in 2023 in a revised English edition, *The Fabric of Fear).*

[26] They were given privileged career entry after 1939. On war veterans' role in the construction of the new Francoist state, A. Alcalde, *Los excombatientes franquistas. La cultura de guerra del fascismo español y la Delegación Nacional de Excombatientes (1939-1965)*, (Zaragoza, 2014); also A. Alcalde, '*Alféreces provisionales*: junior officers, war experience and Francoist ideology', in A. Alcalde *et. al.* (eds),*The Crucible of Francoism. Combat, violence and ideology in the Spanish civil war* (Eastbourne, 2021), 139-49.

[27] There is a persistent Anglo-American historiographical remnant, deriving its position from dated, intellectually rigid North American political science, which is unable (or unwilling) to 'compute' what it means that church and lay Catholic personnel played a key role structurally in Franco's ultranationalist state-building, see footnote 9 above, also Gómez Bravo's article in this special issue.

[28] M. Richards, 'Civil war, mass murder and the nation state in Spain', forum on Paul Preston's *The Spanish Holocaust*, *Journal of Genocide Research*, 16, 1 (2014), 150

frame: mass military trials of the defeated; militarized justice and the proliferation of special jurisdictions therein;[29] the war against the guerrilla; an actually declared state of war until 1948, followed by numerous further declarations of states-of-war until virtually the end of the dictatorship; a prison system that imposed militarized discipline and routines on inmates right until the end of the 1970s, and which was run by secret military decree, whatever the cosmetic discourse presented textually from the mid-1950s to the UN and other international interlocutors. But none of this conforms to old-fashioned authoritarianism, i.e. political demobilization of the population, after the fashion of, say, Horthy's Hungary post WWI. For inhabiting Franco's militarized framework was a war-born mass movement which would drive forward the building of the new state, on the foundations of mass repression of the defeated. The Franco state exhorted its faithful to denounce the 'internal enemy' – often neighbours, acquaintances, sometimes family members – to which the 'faithful' responded, for reasons which blended revenge, hatred, fear, lucre: only sometimes was there a conscious ultra-nationalist commitment, though certainly there was always a canny understanding of how the new political climate could be profited from.[30] Among the denouncers, war veterans merged with mobilized civilians – sometimes, but not always, from the new massified *Falange*, which the war, or rather the army, had made. Their role as denouncers in this state- and nation-building was to trigger investigations by the military courts which, in effect, produced the mass trials of the defeated. They also 'bore witness' to the state committees charged with purging public life and the professions of 'enemies', or delivered testimony to the tribunals of political responsibilities (which imposed economic sanctions on the defeated, property expropriation, fines etc.); or made representation to the *Causa General*, the state law suit against the Republic that became the influential showcase and disseminator of Francoist propaganda. All of this mass action involved modern psychological conscription, yet was simultaneously framed by an older repertoire of top-down military power which would continue to employ militarized techniques of public order/social control that had been honed across decades in Spain. So the assemblage of mechanisms and machinery that fused as Francoism was always a powerful blend. It is therefore something of a conundrum that so many Anglo-American commentators, historians included, still see the Francoist dictatorship as only one part of that 'blend' – i.e. resurgent antiquatedness, when the cumulative evidence clearly indicates that Francoism was something new: *the enduring and extensive application of militarized discipline to a highly mobilized and rapidly modernizing society.*

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[29] Del Aguila, *El TOP*, 364-79.

[30] P. Anderson, *The Francoist Military Trials: Terror and Complicity, 1939-1945* (London, 2010), 78, although one could argue for parallels with Nazi Germany too (as well as the contrasts Anderson highlights in his work) – if one 'thinks behind' the Francoist ideology being spoken/deployed by local denouncers. Spain in the 1930s had certainly become a highly politically mobilized society, even before the civil war. But that did not prevent ordinary people 'marshalling' ideology for their own use/benefit – especially when they had already accepted the general assumptions underlying it, while not themselves being primarily ideologically driven, cf. note 31 below, for a source which discusses this in the case of Nazi Germany.) On the emerging Francoist order as a kleptocratic one, R. Serém, *A Laboratory of Terror: conspiracy, coup d'état and civil war in Seville, 1936-1939* (Eastbourne, 2017), 147-89. On endemic corruption in the prison system, see the articles by Gómez Bravo and Graham/Lorenzo Rubio in this special issue.

What had started back in July 1936 as an attempt by conservative military to block social change had thus failed on its own first premise – notwithstanding the fact that Franco won a military victory. Now Francoism was to become a totalizing project to remake state and society by means of coercion, practised not only against those it excluded (the 'enemy', the 'anti-nation') but also as a form of discipline to encourage 'community insiders' to conform. The model worked exactly as it had done in Nazi Germany (right down to the workings of the 'really existing *Volksgemeinschaft*'[31]) or in the Soviet Union, against both the excluded and included: and here 'war' is not only actual war, but also conceived as Franco state-impelled or -fostered forms of economic development involving mass structural violence against the population, as would be the case in Stalinism too.[32] Few among Spain's ordinary population could choose to stand entirely aside (although in many cases the ethical choice *not* to denounce remained, and refraining from doing so did not usually put the potential denouncer in mortal danger.[33] Another matter entirely, however, was the all-pervasive fear that saturated life for many ordinary Spaniards, especially in the 1940s.[34]) One way or another, the entire population was to be mobilized: Francoism was only some twenty years on from the white terror of Horthy's – much more rural – Hungary, but it seemed more like two hundred years in terms of the transformative effects of mass mobilization. By 1940 the 'old conservative' or 'traditionalist' preference within the Francoist coalition stood defeated by the first principle of the French revolution. But that was little consolation to those being constructed by the new Franco state as 'anti-nation'. The state's major focus in the 1940s on political prisoners (i.e. their incarceration *en masse* in gaols and labour camps[35]) was because they constituted an alternative, indeed for Francoism a *competing* way of seeing and organizing Spain's polity and society. And the 'enemy' here was not only workers, but also protean forms of middling class constituencies across Spain, mostly but not always urban, who had also 'seen' the world differently by 1936.

All were delegitimized at a stroke in Francoist pronouncements by the description of them as 'degenerate communists', a screen discourse that was to be much facilitated from the end of the 1940s by the ascendant Cold War in Europe and globally. But the use of the adjectival qualification 'degenerate' indicates how the Franco state was blurring the categories between

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[31] J. Connelly, 'The uses of Volksgemeinschaft: letters to the NSDAP *Kreisleitung Eisenach*, 1939-1940', *Journal of Modern History*, 68, 4 (1996), 899-930.

[32] For the Soviet Union, war, revolution, civil wars under the threat of foreign invasion, had by the 1920s created a society that was permanently on a war footing (aka 'the war for industrial development against a host of internal and external enemies'). Stalinism was both the incarnation of this order and also the name for a state machine which was itself permanently at war with its own population: D. Shearer, 'Elements Near and Alien: Passportization, Policing, and Identity in the Stalinist State, 1932-1952', *Journal of Modern History*, 76 (2004), 835-81; Dan Healey, *Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia. The Regulation of Sexual and Gender Dissent* (Chicago, 2001).

[33] P. Anderson, 'Singling out victims: denunciation and collusion in the post-civil war Francoist repression in Spain, 1939-45', *European History Quarterly*, 39, 1, (2009), 16.

[34] On fear as a constant technique of rule, Gómez Bravo and Marco, *La obra del miedo,* [The Fabric of Fear] above-cited.

[35] Statistics for both are included in the two articles in this special issue by Gómez Bravo and Graham/Lorenzo Rubio.

political enemies more specifically defined, and other social threats which a mass urbanizing society (and the poor *tout court*, whether urban or rural) were inherently seen as posing to its preferred order of stable, traditional and self-perpetuating hierarchical society – what in Francoist ideology would always be termed 'social peace'. Here Franco's enemies turn out to be of qualitatively similar category to those 'identified' by other gardening and sculpting states across twentieth-century Europe: 'reds' (or 'whites', depending on the case), 'ethnic others', social 'degenerates', 'wayward' women, 'homosexuals', 'delinquent youth', the 'workshy', 'inveterate criminals' – and by 'identified' we of course mean manufactured. Thus, in its discourse and policies, Francoism positions itself on a continuum of liberal sculpting states – a definition which can perfectly well include totalitarian states, whether fascist or otherwise.[36] Such states, wherever located on the dictatorial-through-constitutional/parliamentary continuum, wanted to control how their populations lived and to do this they used a variety of techniques, including coercive, or at the very least 'sculpting', welfare. In sum, no subject or citizen could live any longer against, or outside, the state.

But unlike Stalin's state, Franco's was unable to maintain an autarkic (i.e. economically self-sufficient) course. Spain lacked the internal resources to pursue a model of primary industrialization under its own strength, as the Soviet Union had done. Rurality without an empire to back it economically was equally an impossibility, for all the discursive dreaming of 1940s Francoism. By the 1950s economic *force majeure* obliged Francoism to accept the consumerist industrializing model for Spain's future, buoyed by necessary foreign investment and, closely linked to that, a clientelist relationship with the US. Certainly a post-imperial Spain had no viable way forward other than through industrialization, otherwise state bankruptcy and Francoism's own collapse would have loomed.[37] The form of industrialization the regime undertook posed all sorts of 'moral dangers' to Francoism's dream of an ultra-hierarchical and closely surveilled society. But it also produced the means to satisfy, pacify, divert or enslave a variety of potentially troublesome old and new social constituencies and, what is more, keep them perpetually on the outside of the Francoist polity – along with the middle classes of peripheral nationalism, the remnants of older urban middling classes elsewhere, and, of course, all those of whatever social constituency who had, or would, serve time as political prisoners of the dictatorship.

'Developmentalist' Francoism

In terms of 'pacification', the 'economic miracle' accelerating across the 1960s would create a new, middle-managerial, and predominantly Castilian-born support class for Francoism:[38] they

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[36] D. Beer, *Renovating Russia,* and 'Blueprints for change: the human sciences and the coercive transformation of deviants in Russia, 1890-1930, Osiris, 22 (2007), 26-47.

[37] The commanding heights of the Franco regime believed for a very long time, however, in the *short-order reversibility* of these economic changes, A. Viñas, 'Reflexiones sobre la economía española durante el franquismo', in J.L. de la Granja *et.al*. (eds) *Tuñón de Lara y la historiografía española* (Madrid, 1999), esp. 211-12, also 205-208. – something which explains the 'contradictions' outsiders believed they were seeing in instances of hardline Francoist state repression in the 1970s.

[38] Wherever they came to be resident – including in Barcelona and Bilbao – via internal migration.

were the white-collar urbans and suburbans, satisfied with the benefits of relative affluence and consumerist domesticity. These novelties widened the old Francoist coalition to absorb these new groups, thereby reducing the destabilizing effects of the mass rural-to-urban migration necessary to deliver the industrial workforce. But, in any case, state social control was facilitated by its disorienting effects, and the ensuing further social dislocation and fragmentation occasioned by inward-migration itself. This soon also came to uproot the impoverished peasantry of the Castilian heartlands/north-west, once Franco's footsoldiers. Life was harsh for all the inward migrants: it became a form of enslavement, the 'war for survival' prefigured in social-darwinist ideology, and an all-consuming reality, notwithstanding the rhythms of migration which to some extent allowed old social and geographical support networks to be reproduced inside the shanties and slums of the urban industrial peripheries.[39]

Francoism's rapidly emerging neo-liberal model of the 1960s, with low state expenditure and a correspondingly scant supply of public goods – whether education, health care, or publicly-funded social housing, made this struggle for survival inevitable. The fall-out for those migrants and other poorer urban workers who either could not make it, or who would not conform to the few permitted Francoist models of behaviour (old-style austerity or new-style private domesticity) had to be managed in various ways. But all of them can be subsumed under the heading of 'spatial containment', whether inside or outside of prison.

High levels of police surveillance were key to 'outside' forms of control, and especially to the business of policing the underside of the economic miracle. By 1970 Spain had 1 police per 320 inhabitants.[40] Urban policing was ubiquitous, but the dictatorship inevitably had more interest in controlling areas where potentially disruptive constituencies congregated, and thus where migrants and other groups of the poor lived and worked. Popular neighbourhoods inside big city centres were closely surveilled: for example, El Perchel in Málaga, or the Raval in Barcelona, indicating that the state's gaze 'mapped' those spaces with 'unruly' pasts. Also closely supervised were 'suspicious subjects' found beyond these, in well-to-do quarters of cities, when neither work nor any other 'credible' motive (or credible to the detaining police) could be

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[39] M. Richards, *After the Civil War: Making memory and re-making Spain since 1936* (2013), 156-86. In rural as well as urban Spain the workings of economic change were harsh for the poor − vivid accounts in both Juan Goytisolo's travelogue on Almería on the south-east coast/rural hinterland, *Campos de Níjar* (undertaken 1960-1 and published 1963) and Juan Marsé's *Viaje al sur,* a mirror image of Goytisolo's, this time on western Andalusia (from Málaga westwards, coast and hinterland) but much more explicitly anthropological, as well as politically critical in its commentary, and altogether more sympathetic to its subjects. Marsé visited and wrote up his trip in October 1962, but the results were only published posthumously (Lumen,2020). Marsé's coverage includes El Perchel (Málaga) and El Zapal, the massive, beachside shanty town of some 3,500 inhabitants which abutted the small coastal town of Barbate de Franco, (201-220). Marsé observes the weary, patient rural labourers queuing outside the state labour offices, a reflection of the Franco dictatorship's keenness by the 1960s to export its 'overspill' southern population as external migrants, *Viaje al sur*, 100-102. On forms of resistance to/living with Francoist developmentalism, see also: I. Ofer, *Claiming the city and contesting the state: squatting, community formation and democratization in Spain (1955-1986)* (London, 2017); P. Radciff, *Making democratic citizens in Spain: civil society and the popular origins of the democratic transition, 1960-1978* (London, 2011); A. Cazorla, *Fear and progress: ordinary lives in Franco's Spain, 1939-1975* (Chichester, 2010).
[40] In a population of c. 34 million in Spain; in France in 1970 there was approximately 1 police per 870 inhabitants.

adduced to justify their presence. Such 'subjects' often found themselves swallowed by the system of preventive detention, a process which could easily lead to a period of prison detention, even though the detained person had not broken any law nor committed a crime (see Graham/Lorenzo Rubio). Police presence in the burgeoning peripheries of worker dormitory blocs and/or shanty towns (*chabolas*) was rather more sparse – the safety valve there being their apartness. Spatial segregation was partly an effect of the economic model, but of course it was also highly desirable to Francoism's model of 'social peace': in other words, here was a social apartheid to match Francoism's political variety.[41]

Another key form of social disciplining on the urban frontier came via the extensive infrastructure and activities of the Catholic Church. Long established Catholic associationalist networks ran a range of pastoral and welfare centres to minister to the material needs of migrants and other poor constituencies, but also to seek control through new evangelization programmes. Into these worlds of the city poor and new industrial suburbs came the 'good women' of the Francoist upper middle classes, as if missionaries into the colonies.[42] Evangelization attempts were not in themselves likely to be successful, but more subtle forms of dependency and acceptance were achieved: for example, via the (popular) sports facilities provided for children and adolescents, or the vital material aid regularly dispensed through food and clothes donations.

By the later 1960s the challenge for Francoism was how to contain the social and cultural fall-out of necessary economic change in order to protect its never-relinquished ideal of 'social peace'. The authorities were in every regard primarily focused now on the challenges of mass rather than class society. First via the close supervision of those who fell off the work round or who could not, for other reasons, including physical or mental health, survive in the brave new urban world, and who were often managed via 'preventive detention', with or without custodial sentences. Second, there was regime management of broader sectors of society via the still-stringent censorship in place around all forms of media and cultural production *intended for mass consumption*.[43] The Franco state still, of course, operated its 'archaic' mechanics of repression against the politically-encadred anti-Franco resistance, by means of serially-declared states of war/emergency,[44] occupation of university campuses, torture (endemic in police stations) and the military court system for anything deemed an offence

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[41] Francoist new urban planning did explicitly incorporate social control - many developments, whether 'model new town' or otherwise, had one route in and one out, so they were, at least in theory, more easily surveilled. On the 'otherwise', see C. G. de Marcos. 'Ghostxarkoaga: Paisajes después de la batalla', (on the polígono de Otxarkoaga/Ocharcoaga, Bilbao ('inaugurated' in 1962), VV. AA. *Fuera de la Ley* (4) *Gamberros, ultras, quinquis y clandestinos* (1960-1981) (n.p., 2020), 506-18. On the model towns, Guadiana del Caudillo (Badajoz) In 'los pueblos que se inventó Franco', https//elpais.com/elpais/2018/08/20/eps/1534776854 378553.html

[42] Cf. Juan Marse's novel (for which the above-cited *Viaje al sur* served as fieldnotes), *La oscura historia de la prima Montse* (1970). 'Cousin Montse' being one of the 'good women' from an old-established family of the conservative Catalan upper middle classes – although, in her case, of unusual psychological configuration. Another twist on the subject, in Manuel Vázquez Montalbán's novel, *Los mares del sur* (1979), translated to English as *Southern Seas* (1986).

[43] H. Graham, 'Franco's crypt Spanish culture and memory since 1936', *Guardian*, 21 March, 2014.

[44] All of Franco's declared states of war, both total and partial, listed in del Águila, *El TOP*, 75.

against 'state security' (which was always extraordinarily widely defined). Over military justice there always hung the terror-inducing 'mystique' of capital punishment. From 1964, the Franco state also deployed the quasi-civilian Tribunal de Orden Público (TOP) – only quasi, because TOP too was a special jurisdiction, set apart from a unitary code of law. But consider this: that the use of the TOP extended far beyond encadred anti-Franco activists or protesting students, to inscribe the political in wider and wider ways – in short, to castigate 'outbreaks of civil society', and instrumentally to rekindle the insidious, widespread forms of latent social fear that had served the dictatorship so well since the beginning.[45] In this reading, Francoism is then another name for the attempt to bury in perpetuity the possibility of a civil society, of any society beyond *raison d'état*, and to guarantee an order where the state is always incarnated in military values and society always subsumed in a militarized order.

As these more diffuse forms of urban social control expanded (they were still militarized of course, but, in the TOP, fines were also often increasingly present as a form of punishment), then the function of prison itself, i.e. of custodial sentences, continued to mutate. Long gone was the mass population of political prisoners of the 1940s. Francoism still had political prisoners, of course, of both old *and* new types, the latter also with the rise of novel forms of trade union activism by new generations of urban/industrial workers. But now there were hundreds of political detainees, not tens and tens of thousands. The bulk of the prison population now was the ballast of the 'economic miracle', the many thousands swept in as common prisoners through the hurricane of brutal development undertaken in extreme neo-liberal mode. Here the nature of 'common crime' had once again been reconfigured, as it had been previously in the 1940s, through autarky and the black market. Franco's prison authorities still sought to ensure minimal contact between political and other cohorts of prisoner, although politicals and *presos comunes* were usually already separated by a gulf of experience – even before computing Francoist prison strategies for maintaining psychological divisions, given that it was in practice unfeasible to have total physical separation between the two groups (see Graham/Lorenzo Rubio in this special issue).[46] The persistence of such strategies of separation are a reminder of Francoism's immanent fear that the alternative knowledge from (and of) the 1930s, both politically and culturally speaking, might somehow be transmitted from imprisoned political activists to other incarcerated groups. After all, Francoism had fought wars – both on the battlefield and institutionally thereafter – to annihilate that 'knowledge' forever, in all its forms. But this imperative in Francoism was nevertheless fainter and fainter. By the end of the 1960s, the Franco state's will to *sculpt* its population was much attenuated, but not so its will to *control* them – whether inside or outside institutions of confinement. The changes here had to do with the ascendancy of neo-liberal economic modes in Francoism, and perhaps too indicate an implicit recognition of the intractable nature of the 'anthropological revolution' its own economic policies had conjured.

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[45] For example, the case cited in Graham/Lorenzo Rubio in this special issue of neighbourhood protests, such as those organized when a local cinema raised its prices, saw some of the protesters prosecuted under TOP (as they had been before 1964 in the military courts).

[46] Interactions between politicals and *comunes* could of course be more nuanced and more complex. Real 'encounters' occurred and had an impact (in common action against the prison authorities).

Certainly by the end of the 1970s, and Spain's transition out of dictatorship, the idea of prison had ceased to signify any kind of 'front line' in the Francoist political imaginary.[47] Of that there is evidence aplenty in the manner in which Francoism's reformist wing negotiated both the political amnesty of 1977 and a pragmatic prison reform law in 1979 (see Lorenzo Rubio in this special issue).[48] For the rest, the governance of Spain's urban, industrial mass society now happened by other relatively more sophisticated means, while the 'alternatives' once represented by the political detainees of the 1940s had been annihilated – or so at least Francoists believed. For the rest, by the last years of the dictatorship, prisons were already neo-liberal in their functioning as a 'warehouse' for 'ballast' – that human material surplus to economic requirements – rather than as a machine for producing Francoist subjects, or at least outwardly-conforming ones. But nor were the prisons privatized. They continued to be run on a shoestring, but were still seen as a state prerogative in what was late Francoism's hybrid mix of economic neoliberalism and old-style state interventionism/population control, the latter in the manner of the classic liberal states of the European twentieth century.

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[47] 'Bunker' prison personnel had, anyway, always been one cohort of prison officers among a variegated staff, and one which, after the 1940s, were less at the helm, in terms of inflicting violence on prisoners. But abuse of inmates remained endemic, and in any case was never perpetrated only by 'bunker' sectors. On this see Graham/Lorenzo Rubio in this special issue.

[48] Ibid.