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Introduction

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Aristotle (384 B.C.–322 B.C.) was reckoned by St. Thomas Aquinas as “The Philosopher” in medieval university life some sixteen centuries after the death of the Greek Peripatetic. In contemporary university life, some twenty-three centuries after Aristotle, renewed scholarly interest appears in the life, thought, and times of: this Macedonian orphan, student of Plato, Academy teacher, and biological field researcher; this tutor of Alexander the Great, founder and head of the Lyceum in Athens, instaurator of learned fields such as physics, biology, psychology, ethics, economics, politics, rhetoric, logic, poetics, and metaphysics; and this husband, father, widower and political refugee.

In the Fall of 1987, the Department of Philosophy of The University of Dayton conducted its Sixteenth Annual Philosophy Colloquium. The topic was “Aristotle’s Ethics and Metaphysics.” The two distinguished philosophers invited by the Department to offer papers were Julia Annas of the University of Arizona and Alan Code of the University of California at Berkeley. A call for papers was issued. Some sixty submissions were subjected to blind review; fourteen were selected for presentation.

This edition of *The University of Dayton Review* contains the revisions of papers read at the Aristotle Colloquium. Six papers address issues in Aristotle’s ethics; six address issues in his metaphysics. We are grateful to Colloquium presenters for permission to publish these papers as a whole. We especially thank the editors of *Philosophical Topics* for permission to use portions of materials appearing in Alan Code’s paper, and the editors of *Classical Quarterly* for permission to use the paper of Christopher Shields published in the *Classical Quarterly*, N.S. 38 (1988), 140–149. Tim Maudlin’s paper is a revision of material to be published in a larger work in the philosophy of science and appears with the author’s and editors’ permission. Regrettably, not all of the papers could be made available for publication at this time. The papers of Lynne Spellman and Randall R. Curren have been accepted for publication in a forthcoming issue of the *History of Philosophy Quarterly*. Stephen White’s paper is to appear elsewhere and Alfonso Gomez-Lobo’s paper is being revised.

In the past decade, there has been a resurgence of scholarly interest in the virtue theories of ancient Greek ethics to offset modern philosophy’s penchant for action theories of ethics. The Colloquium papers on Aristotle’s ethics carefully examine sundry and controversial requirements for achieving human happiness. These include: external goods of fortune such as good birth, strength, beauty, health, wealth, power, fame, and friends; luck due to the contingencies of external goods of fortune; autonomy of self-determination; acquisition of moral virtues by intelligent habit-formation; observing normed functions in nature as lawlike regulators of conduct; and general versus universal respect for persons.

Professor Annas explores Aristotle’s accounts of the insufficiency of moral virtue alone without some external goods of fortune (in opposition to Socratic exclusion and Stoic preclusion of such goods) for human happiness. Moral virtue and some external goods of fortune are “up to us” for happiness. Professor Glannon finds Aristotle’s explanations of moral virtue and happiness to be based ultimately on luck (rather than choice), owing to the contingencies of external goods of fortune. External goods of fortune, moral virtue, and happiness are thus not really “up to us.” Professor Cole probes Aristotle’s account of the self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) test of happiness not as merely “needing nothing from without” but also as autonomously determining oneself in making friends, in enjoying profitless things, and in engaging in political

associations. Moral virtue and happiness are "up to us." Professor Smith investigates certain similarities of the cognitive base for habit-formation in Aristotle's explanations of moral virtue acquisition through moral education and of acquiring scientific understanding through scientific education. Intelligent habit-formation for moral virtue is "up to us" just as intelligent habit-formation for scientific understanding is "up to us." Professor Miller details Aristotle's views on natural law and natural justice as requisite for a flourishing human nature in the *polis*. A biological analogue of the right-handedness of animals as requisite for fulfilling the need to be mobile is used to illustrate how normed functions in nature can help compare objectively and evaluate not only mobile behavior among animals but also just behavior among political animals. Observation of such normed functions in nature is "up to us." Professor Preus analyzes Aristotle's position on respect for persons, given Aristotle's views on natural slavery, unequal friendships, barbarians, and *genos*. He finds a "proportional" principle of respect for persons in contrast with Kant's universal principle of absolute respect for persons. Yet, for Aristotle, respect for persons is "up to us."

A similar decade-long resurgence of scholarly attention to problems of classical Greek metaphysics has also rekindled interest in Aristotle's metaphysics, particularly the middle books of his *Metaphysics*. Some of these problems include: understanding perceptible substances and, by analogy, understanding god; understanding how perceptible things undergo both change and the continuity of change in a substantial change; understanding how matter does not "sabotage" our knowledge of the physical world; understanding how a special sense can take on the form of the perceptible thing while leaving behind the matter in an act of sensation; understanding how a physical object can be a substance and yet admit a unity of soul and body; and understanding how the soul can be a subject and yet not a "ghost in a machine." The Colloquium papers on Aristotle's metaphysics address these and related issues.

Professor Code examines *Metaphysics Zeta* for the task, focal point, and examples of focal points for metaphysical study as part of Aristotle's general essentialism. This general essentialism is distinct from particular essentialisms (e.g., Aristotle's physics, Descartes' physics, etc.), and, since it uses the results of physical science to understand the causes and principles of all things rather than establishes the principles of physical science, it does not challenge the autonomy of physical science. By analogy with the causes and principles of motions of perceptible substances familiar to us, Aristotle's metaphysics seeks to understand the divine substance called 'god'—the object of "the very best form of intellectual activity" and "superlatively knowable by nature." Professor Graham analyzes some difficulties for understanding both change and continuity of change in a substantial change by Aristotle's occasional conflation of his own matter-form and potentiality-actuality theories. Graham argues the theories are not equivalent, not identical, and not sufficient by themselves to account for substantial change, but that they are complementary and that one bears priority over the other. Professor Morgan probes *Metaphysics Zeta* 4–6 for Aristotle's epistemological worries about knowing the physical world due to Plato's rejection of natural science and his "flight to the Forms" to ward off relativism and skepticism. The role of matter in definition and essence becomes perplexing for Aristotle. Matter seems to be an obstacle for knowing the concrete individual as it is for knowing the specific-form. Professor Silverman proposes a solution to a problem in Aristotle's theory of perception of sensible objects, namely, how a specific sense is "potentially like the sensible and actually like the sensible" in a given act of sensation such as

in seeing a mobile sensible object colored red. Professor Maudlin analyzes how physical objects can be substances at all and how body and soul can be a unity given the “stripping” argument in *Metaphysics* Zeta 3. He traces this non-Aristotelian argument to Plato’s *Timaeus* and *Theaetetus*. Professor Shields explores Aristotle’s sense in which the soul can be a subject and yet avoid the criticisms, stemming from a Rylean dispositional analysis of the mind, of the soul as a “ghost in a machine.”

We express our thanks to all Colloquium participants. Their congenial and scholarly participation in both the formal sessions and in the informal gatherings made for a stimulating and productive Colloquium. We especially acknowledge the efforts of our visiting guest philosophers, Julia Annas and Alan Code, in making this Colloquium truly memorable. And we thank our consultant, Professor Lawrence Jost of the University of Cincinnati, for his much appreciated assistance.

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