

## Differences in Organizational Behavior amongst Startup and Established Company: A Literature Review

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**Abstract.** Two business models differ significantly between an established company and a startup in the industrial world. There are notable distinctions between the two business models in several areas that, upon closer examination, can offer entrepreneurs, practitioners, researchers, and the government guidance in devising the most appropriate business model approach. The subsequent goal of this research is to conduct a more thorough analysis of the organizational behavior variations between startups and larger businesses. Because numerous research sources have been completed but have yet to be more thoroughly consolidated, this study uses a literature review approach to address the research issues posed. This approach is also capable of identifying variations from the given context. According to the study, established businesses and startups differ in three ways. The study's findings, to be more precise, revealed variations in the two business models' definitions and life cycles. Second, the social relations system and structure derived from these two company models differ. Finally, these two categories of businesses must deal with varying degrees of uncertainty in the workplace. This research suggests that by examining the distinctions between large and small companies which are just starting, business actors can benefit from this research and use it as a guide to improve organizational performance.

**Keywords:** entrepreneurship; established company; organizational behavior; startup

### Introduction

Numerous startups have surfaced in recent years as a type of company model derived from entrepreneurial concepts. There were 2,272 new digital startups established in 2021, with Indonesia placing fifth among the nations that produce these businesses (Startup Ranking, 2021). In fact, research from the Global Entrepreneurship Research Association (2018) indicates that the world will see an increase in entrepreneurial endeavors like startups. On the other hand, in addition to startups, there

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are established companies, and these established companies are another business model that has a significant impact on the global economy. In order to ascertain the precise strategies required for these two business models, it is imperative that researchers and practitioners recognize the distinctions between the two. In the past, the domain of Human Resource Management (HRM) has predominantly examined research findings from well-established organizations, often disregarding the presence of smaller organizations, including startups (Cary, 1998). This oversight underscores the importance of recognizing this distinction. This is because they hold the belief that research outcomes pertaining to well-established enterprises possess a broader applicability in comparison to startups and other lesser businesses.

The features of established businesses and startups differ, so it's critical to understand how these two business models differ. Both have established organizational behavior that demonstrates these qualities. Certain business models do not allow for the generalization of an organization's behavior to other business models. This implies that organizational behavior in newly founded organizations will undoubtedly differ from that of existing businesses. According to Ensley et al. (2006), there are a few distinctions between the two business models. For instance, established organizations typically have more defined objectives, organizational structures, and workflows. On the other hand, startups, or businesses that are just getting started, typically have goals that need to be tested to see if the company they build are will be accepted by customers. As a result, their business processes are naturally simpler because they have less capital available to them (Prats & Amigó, 2017).

Established companies are also seen in their life cycle, always trying to improve where their business operates. Established companies have gone through much time to develop a product that they believe will be successful. In contrast, start-ups are defined by flexible, fast, and cost-effective management, where the entrepreneur conveys his vision or first product to clients who may be interested from the start. Eric Ries views start-ups as an experiment, with the aim of testing whether and how an inventor's vision can create synergy with customer needs segments (Ries, 2011). Their small size also allows them to be closer to customers and adapt quickly to changes in purchasing behavior (Fischer & Arz, 2016).

Business players will reap numerous advantages if they can identify the most appropriate approach, which will be devised by examining the organizational behavior of the two business models. To name a few benefits, it can lessen unproductive conduct that might harm the business (Chang & Smithikrai, 2010; Spector & Fox, 2005), inspire everyone to work toward the company's objectives (Greenberg et al., 2008), and support managerial decision-making. (Robbins & Judge, 2007) as well as contribute to enhancing a favorable work environment (Glisson & James, 2002).

Based on the explanation above, this research asks the question: how are the differences in organizational behavior such as the definition and life cycle, structure and relationships built up to the contact between established companies and startups?

## Discussion

### *Differences in Definition and Organizational Life Cycle*

Several articles mention a difference in the definition between an established company and a startup. Judging from the work process, established companies usually have several characteristics, such as having continuous production activities by selling their products or services (Dumas et al., 2013). Routine production activities show that there are already customers who always use the products they produce. Customers will easily find or recognize products produced by established companies. This company will be more intense in building the trust of existing customers and trying to maintain it (Buttle, 2009). Companies are more interested in existing market share and are less likely to try to create new markets (Buckley & Prashantham, 2016). However, this does not mean a company will not carry out a customer acquisition strategy (Reinartz et al., 2004). For companies that are already established, it is still carried out even though with different priorities (Reinartz et al., 2004).

Apart from how well-established companies achieve fame for their products and focus on customers, established companies often share ownership among several individuals. Shareholders are generally limited to investing only, where they usually do not actively manage the corporation. Shareholders tend to elect or appoint a board of directors to control the company (T. B. Courtney, 2002). Large companies with legal entities protect minority shareholders by separating personal control from dominant shareholders (Aras & Crowther, 2009). On the other hand, sometimes shareholders can also function as directors or officers of the company. From an economic perspective, explaining the interests of corporations is the interests of shareholders as its main constituency (Davis, 2009). Not only are they responsible to shareholders, but large companies also have responsibilities to their employees, customers, creditors, and the general public (Ciepley, 2013).

When compared to established companies that have generally been around for a long time, startups are generally defined as new businesses that entrepreneurs initiate by combining business ideas and resources (Low, 1988; Smith & Miner, 1983; Usman & Vanhaverbeke, 2017) into something more economically useful (Baron, 2002; Hessels & van Stel, 2009; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Startups will usually be bound by obligation, and novelty is new companies created and designed to seek repeatable and scalable business models (Dorf & Blank, 2012; Katila et al., 2012; Usman & Vanhaverbeke, 2017). A startup is not only building new business opportunities but is also a business that is just developing. However, startup is more synonymous with companies that use technology, the web, the internet, and those related to these domains. A startup is an organization launched to create a new product or service in uncertainty (Deakins & Whittam, 2000; Duncan, 1972). Because the products they produce have just been found, only a few people may recognize this company. There are very few potential customers who will use their product, so the first thing they do is concentrate on their customer acquisition strategy (Agnihotri & Rapp, 2010).

The following criterion is that control in established companies is usually not only carried out by top leaders but also by shareholders who also dominate the direction and goals of the company. While at startups, the control over the company is entirely part of the founder of the business (Delmar

& Shane, 2006). Founders will usually use their startup capital from investors or even from their own pockets, and this is a reasonably tricky part that they have to face as a new company (Salamzadeh & Kesim, 2015).

The distinction between the life cycles of startups and established businesses is further demonstrated by this definitional difference. An entrepreneurial venture goes through three stages in its development life cycle: pre-launch, launch, and post-launch (Baron, 2002). Additionally, these three stages bootstrap, seed stage, and creation stage are identical to the three stages proposed by Salamzadeh and Kesim (2015). According to Baron (2002), entrepreneurs begin to identify their business concepts during the pre launch period. This is comparable to Salamzadeh and Kesim (2015) bootstrap stage. At this stage, the leader's role dominates organizational behavior, which will affect the startup's future (Carpenter et al., 2004). Delmar and Shane (2006) state that one of the key factors determining whether a concept will be realized as a product or service is the leader's (founder's) decision-making, as the product has not yet been manufactured. Members and leaders will begin assessing the market and the technology employed when a decision has been made (Kuratko, 2017). During this stage, planning and opportunity analysis are given priority by reflecting organizational behavior. Startups typically rely heavily on their leaders' decision-making since they have few resources (Freear et al., 2002; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; National Research Council, 2012). Experienced leaders will be more equipped to handle all of the potential that is currently available since they have the knowledge and abilities to do so (Dahl & Reichstein, 2007; Delmar & Shane, 2006). On the other hand, executives in new business models who lack expertise typically mimic the practices of prosperous companies and steer clear of the blunders made by inexperienced firm owners (Dahl & Reichstein, 2007).

The launch phase is the next step. At this stage, the business concept has been developed into a good or service that consumers may purchase (Baron, 2002). One of the organizational behaviors that arises from this phase is the product marketing process, as startups have begun to sell items or services that they have previously generated. Before launching, the marketing strategy which includes the target market statement, desired positioning, and marketing mix must be thoroughly thought out and created (Ottum, 1996). An inadequate product offering, insufficient channels, poor targeting, unfocused efforts, and a slow reaction to product flaws are all signs of a poorly thought out marketing strategy, which can lead to a disastrous launch (Stryker, 1996). At this point, the leader starts to assess how well the newly launched product is selling (Kumbhat & Sushil, 2018). This suggests that when their items are sold, companies will be able to pinpoint the precise demographic and volume of their customers. This second stage, which Salamzadeh and Kesim (2015) refer to as the "seed stage," requires the company to use more capital resources. According to Bocken (2015), companies that are unable to secure investors at this point will face a higher rate of failure.

Product sales revenues are utilized to maintain the company's viability throughout the third phase, which follows the launch Joglekar and Lévesque (2009). This stage will demonstrate the startup's own growth (Locke & Baum, 2007; Schjoedt & Shaver, 2007). The proceeds from sales serve as starting capital, which is utilized to build the management function that is subsequently created. The leader's main focus throughout this stage will be on providing the goods or services that the

market demands (Keogh & Johnson, 2021). Additionally, as they conduct more hiring, leaders will hone their managerial skills by filling additional roles inside their organizational structure. As the business developed, the founders also started to standardize the duties that would subsequently be completed by its members, freeing them up to engage in more strategically oriented activities like decision-making (Zaech & Baldegger, 2017).

**Figure 1**  
*Organizational Life Cycle (Miller & Friesen, 1984)*




Figure 1 illustrates the life cycle of this business model, which is currently in the maturity phase in established organizations (Boulding, 1950; Miller & Friesen, 1984). Established organizations create ideas as part of product development that they have already created, but startups focus more on developing company concepts, introducing products, cultivating relationships with clients, and growing businesses from the profits received (Kuratko et al., 2020). Established businesses typically have a consumer base that will purchase their products, even if startups prioritize acquiring new clients.

The evolution of an organization's life cycle is significantly influenced by its customers. In both large corporations and startups, customers are a crucial component to research in a variety of business models (Kotler & Keller, 2012). Even Drucker (1973) underlined that acquiring consumers is the only goal of business. Marketing is the field that deals with the function that customers play in organizational management. In the meantime, marketing's job is to help the business create value for its clients and cultivate enduring connections with them so that it may obtain value from them in return (Kotler et al., 2013).

Acquisition of new customers, retention of current customers, and development of customer value comprise the three primary stages of the customer life cycle (Buttle, 2009). The study findings of Chaffey and Smith (2013), which categorize the primary responsibilities of marketing strategy in businesses into three groups: acquisition, conversion, and retention further support this. In order

to acquire clients, some business models may select one or more categories of marketing strategies (Reinartz et al., 2004).


Established companies most definitely don't have to worry about the kind of clients they will serve with their goods and services. According to Buttle (2009) and (Reinartz et al., 2004), this kind of business typically employs a customer maintenance approach up until the point at which it begins collecting consumer trust. Maintaining continuous interactions between customers and the business over the long term is known as customer retention (Buttle, 2009). That being said, an established company may nevertheless implement a client acquisition plan (Reinartz et al., 2004). In established companies, this practice persists despite variations in intensity (Reinartz et al., 2004). According to (Buckley & Prashantham, 2016), the focus of established companies is mostly on maintaining their current market share rather than branching out into new markets.

Based on the explanation above, this stage shows that the life cycle of an established company is the result of the steps that have been passed previously. This means that an established company may have gone through the initial stages of being a new company and reaching a higher point. On the other hand, the organizational life cycle, both startups and companies, is described as a series of life cycles. This can be seen when the company that was born previously was a startup business model that was increasingly mature until it experienced a decline process (Gurianova et al., 2014).

#### *Differences in the Structure and System of Social Relations*

Significant differences between the business models of established companies and startups can be seen in the organizational structure, which directly affects the form of coordination and the system of social relations between levels within it. This is reinforced by the results of Blau (1972), who stated that an effect size affects the structure of the difference in relationships in different company sizes (Blau, 1972). Established companies, for example, will tend to have a larger and higher organizational structure than organizations still pioneering, such as startups (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2008). The broader and taller organizational structure in the established company indicates the variation of duties and responsibilities between positions within the organization. The more comprehensive and taller a structure also affects the coordination system, which will be more complex and longer than a more straightforward structure (Brandau & Young, 2000). The following is an illustration of the differences in organizational structure in startups (on the left) and established companies (on the right) (Delmar & Shane, 2006; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2008).

**Figure 2**  
*Illustration of the Differences in the Organizational Structure of Startups and Established Companies*



Based on Figure 2, you can see the difference in the complexity of the organizational structure of startups (on the left) and established companies (on the right). Some literature states that the organizational structure of startups tends to be more straightforward compared to established companies, even with only one level of management (Delmar & Shane, 2006; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2008). Organizational structure is a set of methods of dividing tasks to each position and coordinating them (Monavarian et al., 2007). Coordination at every work in this organizational structure will undoubtedly affect the system of relationships that exist at every level of work.

Some of the studies found that there were identifiable differences in outcomes at each level within established companies. For example, the result of social relations between supervisors and staff, where coordination between these levels is more in the form of routine work completion activities that are more specific according to the departments in the company (Bernerth et al., 2008). Meanwhile,

the outcomes for manager-supervisor social relations are more in the form of policies, rules, and procedures with a broader scope of discussion (Astuti et al., 2020; Cheung et al., 2013). Meanwhile, in startups, the relationship that is built may only be between the founder who is also the CEO and the employees (Delmar & Shane, 2006). The results resulting from the relationships built make the startup team dream more about change than stable things (Brattström, 2019). The changes made will basically affect the duties and responsibilities of each member (Brattström, 2019). Wasserman (2008) suggests that it is essential for startups to use a division of labor that is dynamic and tends to be fair.

Furthermore, the structure of relations that exists in established companies typically begins with more formal coordination and evolves into informal partnerships. (Bernerth et al., 2008; Han & Altman, 2009; Uhl-Bien & Maslyn, 2003). The formal relationship that exists, as described by Graen and Uhl-Bien, starts with the stranger phase, where a leader and subordinates gather as strangers, merely following the rules of their job description, similar to outside group relationships (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Because of self-interest and respect, subordinates obey the formal leader with the power of control and economic advantage. In the stranger phase, the subordinates only do what is required according to their job description. The leader only asks the subordinates to do the things that are needed to do the predetermined workers in the second phase, namely the introduction phase, where the leader begins to test the subordinates to determine if the subordinates are interested in achieving a better working relationship by taking on the responsibilities and challenges of the expanded role assigned by the leader. In this phase, greater mutual trust and respect are developed, more information and resources are shared between the leader and subordinates, and subordinates become more focused on group goals than on their own. The support provided by leaders to subordinates will indirectly have an impact on the performance that will be achieved by these employees (Astuti & Helmi, 2021). Finally, the third phase is the mature partnership phase, in which a high-quality leader-member exchange and a basis of mutual trust, respect, obligation, and reciprocity between the leader and subordinates are developed. The maturity phase of the partnership builds mutual trust and accountability, loyalty, and support. It allows leaders and followers to move beyond their interests for the organization's good. The additional influence between leader and follower in this phase becomes very high (Dobbs & Hamilton, 2007). In startups, the relationship between leaders and subordinates is formed from informal matters, where teams are often formed based on previous friendships (Märijärvi et al., 2016). In several research cases, interpersonal relationships between leaders and employees in smaller companies show more closeness compared to large companies (Dobbs & Hamilton, 2007).

Another difference that can be seen between an established company and a startup is the pattern of decision-making within the organization. Based on Figure 2, there is complexity in the organizational structure between established companies and startups. In a more established company, it will look more hierarchical and bureaucratic. In this sense, structural characteristics, for example, the number of levels in the organization and the number of individuals who report directly to the manager (manager's span of control), influence the decision-making process. On the other hand, decision-making will be slower and less efficient (Bornay-Barrachina & López-Cabrales, 2019). By having a larger organizational structure, companies that have long been established in decision-making



involve many steps (Hitt et al., 2006), and the decision-making process is determined by each manager who has previously gone through a coordination process.

This does not happen at a startup; organizational structure in a startup that tends to flat make startups have limited procedures and routines, and the leadership behavior of the founder and the CEO plays an essential role in decision-making (Delmar & Shane, 2006; Ensley et al., 2006) Prats and Amigó (2017); In contrast to well-established companies, which emphasize that most important decisions are made by top leaders, according to Brandau and Young (2000), at startups, founders or entrepreneurs from the start already have high enough trust in their employees to make decisions and take on high-level responsibilities since they joined. This could be because there is limited capital, so meeting human resource needs is also limited (Romanelli, 1989; Wagrell & Baraldi, 2019). Apart from that, if in corporations the relationship between superiors and subordinates begins in a formal form between superiors and subordinates who may not know each other and are more like strangers (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995), then in startups, it is possible to take an informal form, where teams are often formed based on previous friendships (Märijärvi et al., 2016). In several research cases, interpersonal relationships between leaders and employees in smaller companies show more closeness compared to large companies (Dobbs & Hamilton, 2007).

#### *A Climate of Uncertainty in the Work Environment*

Every business model will face its challenges, including established companies and startups (van Dijk, 1998). Each of them will face a dynamic environment where change occurs in unpredictable ways (Mintzberg, 1994). This is a challenge for companies to obtain relevant information to be used as a basis for decision-making (Duncan, 1972). The information obtained is not always complete, and companies must be directly involved in adaptive strategies to deal with this incomplete information (Bogner & Barr, 2000). When the environment does not provide enough complete information, it will affect the quality and results of managerial decisions will be disrupted (Badertscher et al., 2013). Companies must be able to thrive and compete in a world dominated by unpredictable, unstoppable, and, sometimes, meaningless complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty that can directly impact organizational performance (Jones & Hill, 2010).

Uncertainty can be defined as an organization's inability to predict something accurately (Milliken, 1987). Following the uncertainty description by H. Courtney et al. (1997), they divide it into four levels; the first is a clear enough future marked by a condition that is quite clear about the state of the organization. Leaders can predict the future using standard strategy tools such as market research, cost, and capacity analysis of competitors. While at level two, alternate futures are characterized by various strategies that allow the output desired by the company. At level three, the situation becomes more blurred. This level of a range future shows this condition can be explained how the company can reach an uncertain future. The amount of information that the company can identify and the reach that is so unlimited makes it difficult for companies to predict the future. While at level four, namely true ambiguity, the company will find it very difficult to predict the results and all the possibilities that exist so that everything becomes unclear. Nothing is certain at this level, and anything is possible.

Referring to the four levels of uncertainty formulated by H. Courtney et al. (1997), it can be seen that established companies may have a climate of uncertainty at level one and level two. Why is that this is because established companies usually already have routine work processes. This regular work process also indicates that a relationship has been created between the company and the customers who use its products or services. By having these customers, the company will likely have more capital resources that can be used to meet the company's performance. In addition, leaders in established companies can predict things in the future more clearly. On the other hand, established companies may also face more uncertainty at level two, where the company will consider alternative strategies to deal with threats from its competitors. But on the other hand, the large number of market demands could be one of the things that established companies cannot fulfill. Under these circumstances, companies must learn how to operate effectively in a dynamic production environment, which is characterized by increasingly unpredictable and fast market demands (Westkämper et al., 2000). It is not impossible that if the existing business does not change and is open to innovation, even established companies will be at risk of being replaced by startups. The threat of becoming obsolete is driving companies to figure out how to collaborate with pioneering startups (Kohler, 2016).

While the startup, which is a new company, will develop. Their position may be facing a climate of more uncertainty at level three and level four. Startups are one of the most uncertain business models (Deakins & Whittam, 2000; Duncan, 1972; Ries, 2011; Schmitt et al., 2017; Sommer et al., 2009). This business model will face the rapidly changing economic realities of society (Wubben, 1993). Uncertainty is more in the ambiguity of the work environment, which has absolutely no idea of the future (Baron, 2002). Even some of them cannot predict how the results will be achieved or the possibility that it will happen (Wubben, 1993). This is because startups are new companies and do not yet have limited financial and human resources (Romanelli, 1989; Wagrell & Baraldi, 2019).

This can create multiple dimensions of uncertainty and worse, create an environment that is nearly impossible to predict. The systematic literature review conducted by Magnani and Magnani (2018) classifies the delay that may always occur in startups, namely uncertainty about the outcome of the external environment. In this uncertainty, entrepreneurs cannot be sure of their results because the environment is always dynamic. While the second is uncertainty about the actions of other actors, which is explained through uncertainty as a lack of knowledge and the degree of confidence to deal with uncertainty.

There are several analyses regarding uncertainty in facing a crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic; there are differences in behaviour that emerge from both startups and established companies. For example, a startup is a new business that cannot be certain whether the business being developed will be successful, so the uncertainty about whether it will survive will be very high (Schmitt et al., 2017). Uncertainty can affect the work behaviour of employees working in startups at the individual level, such as taking on more work than usual (Lonteng et al., 2019). Because the number of employees is only small due to limited capital (Romanelli, 1989), employees may have more responsibilities even outside their field, even among employees who have made high-level decisions from an early age (Märijärvi et al., 2016). This was done because the company was unable to hire

new employees so that the company could survive (Romanelli, 1989). Meanwhile, in more stable companies, the division of tasks and responsibilities is more organized. Individuals who have skill A will be assigned to task A and will rarely take on responsibilities that are not commensurate with their abilities (Ensley et al., 2006). Decision-making is also based on the authority of the tasks assigned and is usually carried out by leaders either at the group level, such as departments or leaders at the organizational level, depending on the scope of the decision and work design (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2008).

Meanwhile, at the organizational level, uncertainty cannot be separated from the two business models, namely startups and established companies. No business does not face uncertainty. One of the uncertainties faced in crises is the COVID-19 pandemic, which WHO declared in March 2020 (World Health Organization, 2020). Almost all businesses, including those that are already established and those that are just running their businesses like startups, are affected. The organizational behaviour that emerges becomes different when a crisis strikes. In a state of survival, companies that initially formed traditional teams in their business then switched to working virtually, whether working from home or anywhere (Choudhury et al., 2020; Fadillah & Helmi, 2022).

The challenge that must be faced in changing the form of a traditional team towards a virtual team is adapting to the use of technology. For example, startups that tend to use technology in their business processes (Ehsan, 2021), have young employees and are dominated by Generation Y and Generation Z employees (World Economic Forum, 2019) will undoubtedly adapt quickly. With the use of this technology (Candi & Saemundsson, 2011; Menzies, 2014). Both generations chose to work virtually (The Deloitte Global, 2022). The choice of working style in entirely virtual and hybrid teams can help them save on working capital. This is the reason for the highest percentage, namely 76% in Generation Y and 75% in Generation Z, from the results of the (The Deloitte Global, 2022). Another reason this generation chooses to work virtually is because they can arrange work flexibly (Bell & Narz, 2007; Fuller et al., 2006).

Meanwhile, in established companies that have greater employee diversity, there are still baby boomers and Generation X who represent the older generation and have to adapt to the use of technology and work virtually (Magsamen-Conrad et al., 2019). Of course, this is a challenge for companies in getting employees in these two generations to adapt to technology. Many companies have made policies to add training to increase the use of technology for their employees (American Society for Training and Development (ASTD), 2000).

Based on the explanation above, uncertainty is one of the challenges that must be faced by both business models, from startups that are just starting their business to even established companies. No one can genuinely avoid uncertainty. Even though they have different levels of uncertainty, the two business models must still be prepared to face all changes, both at the organizational level and at the individual level, as business implementers.

## Conclusion

From the literature reviewed above, it can be concluded that there are differences in organizational behavior in terms of the definition and life cycle of organizational development. Established companies are often associated with companies that have more routine organizational activities. This is in terms of a more mature company life cycle compared to startups still newly born as an organization. These differences in organizational activities also encourage differences in organizational structure and the built system of relationships. Organizational structures in established companies certainly have different complexities that affect the coordination between individuals within the organization to be more tired. Meanwhile, startups have a more straightforward structure, so the coordination process is faster. On the other hand, these business models will always face an uncertain work environment. Even though the uncertainty they have to face is of different levels.

The research's discussion of organizational behavior deviates more from the definition and life cycle of the two business models—start-ups and establishments—from the relationships and organizational structure that underpin them to how each model interacts with the enclosed environment. As a result, this research has not yet covered a number of additional corporate behavior-related subjects. There are still articles on motivation, culture and values, leadership, and other topics. These subjects can be explored in further detail with more investigation.

### *Recommendation*

The literature reviewed above shows differences in organizational behavior regarding the definition and life cycle of organizational development. Established companies are often associated with companies that have more routine organizational activities. This is in terms of a more mature company life cycle compared to startups still newly born as an organization. These organizational activities also encourage differences in organizational structure and the built system of relationships. Organizational structures in established companies certainly have different complexities that affect the coordination between individuals within the organization. Meanwhile, startups have a more straightforward structure, so the coordination process is faster. On the other hand, these business models will always need a more flexible work environment. Even though the uncertainty they have to face is of different levels. The research discussion of organizational behavior diverges further from the definition and life cycle of two business models—startups and established companies—from the relationships and underlying organizational structures to how each model interacts with the closed environment. This research primarily uses research based on Western culture, which tends to be an individualist society. We have not shown many relationships built in startups and established companies in the Indonesian context, which tends to be a collectivist culture. As a result, this research has not covered several additional subjects related to corporate behavior. There are still articles about motivation, culture and values, leadership, and other topics. These topics can become a basis for other researchers to explore the differences between startup and established companies. These topics can be recommendations for further research so that they can conduct a deeper exploration of differences in organizational behavior

between business models in startup companies and established companies.

## Declarations

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### *Author Contribution*

The authors have contributed equally in the process of writing this article. Conceptualization: TA, AFH, and BR; Methodology: TA, AFH, and BR; Supervision: AFH and BR; Writing original draft preparation: TA; Writing, review, and editing: TA.

### *Conflict of Interest*

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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