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Realist or Liberal? Canadian Foreign Policy in the 1960s¹

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Abstract

The realist/liberal internationalist debate in international relations has been ongoing in the modern era dating back to Carr and existed in earlier eras in less explicit terms. This research contributes to the long-standing debate by examining Canadian foreign policy in the 1960s. Canada's behavior in this decade is often associated with Lester Pearson and liberal internationalism. Two sets of hypotheses based on realism and liberalism are developed to test if the standard appraisal of Canadian foreign policy is accurate. Drawing on the cases listed in Canada's World Historic Timeline, this research finds that although greater support exists for the notion that Canada acted along the lines of theoretical liberalism, realism can also help explain significant Canadian activities. In fact, realism performs well in cases of high politics. These findings suggest that portraying Canadian foreign policy in broad and sweeping liberal terms may be a misrepresentation or simplification of reality during that volatile decade.

Canada's so-called liberal internationalist values have hardly been liberal, or even liberal. There is a tradition underlying the philosophy of Canadian external relations, but it is one derived primarily...from the values of conservatism (Chapnick 2005).

It has too often been too easy for rulers and governments to incite man to war.
Lester Pearson (The Nobel Foundation 1999, 140).

Canadian liberal internationalism has been touted as ideologically dominant over the decades (Munton and Keating 2001). Often highlighting the foreign policy decision-making of Prime Ministers St. Laurent and Pearson as the pinnacle of "good international citizenship" (Nossal 1998-1999), the discussions frequently revolve around the depth of belief in or support for liberal internationalism or whether this Canadian foreign policy perspective is in decline

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(Munton and Keating 2001). This portrayal raises important questions. How accurate a depiction is this representation of Canadian foreign policy? Is this more the musings of proud internationalist Canadian scholars than an accurate presentation of reality? Are there other potential theoretical explanations for Canadian foreign policy behavior? How consistent has Canadian foreign policy been over time? Has Canada achieved a level of foreign policy independence in spite of the long shadow of American power (for discussion, see Bow and Lennox 2009; Clarkson 1968; Clarkson 2002) or is it better seen as a partner to the United States (see Doran 1984)?

This research seeks to address these questions by assessing how well liberalism and realism help explain Canadian foreign policy in the 1960s. Realism and liberalism are theoretical standard bearers in the international relations field (IR) and should therefore be tested regarding their effectiveness in explaining state behavior. The conventional wisdom is that Canadian foreign policy is profoundly liberal in orientation, yet not all agree with this conclusion. Some Canadian scholars argue that Canadian foreign policy leans towards realism (Stairs 2003; Lagassé and Robinson 2008). The focus on the 1960s puts Lester B. Pearson, Prime Minister for the majority of the decade, front and center. This fits well with the goal of assessing these theories as Pearson is noted for his liberal internationalist tendencies.² Accordingly, support for realism during this period is particularly relevant in terms of theoretical debates about Canadian foreign policy.

The article begins by reviewing both realist and liberal internationalist theory. Hypotheses are developed for each theory that enables comparison based on their contrasting expectations. The methods applied here are then outlined. The ensuing section reviews 15 cases

² Pearson, however, should not be understood as a simplistic idealist. His views were nuanced and complex. He was not unaware of the power realities of the international arena or completely dismissive of the use of force. For reviews of Pearson's time in office, see English (2011) and Pearson (1975).

of Canadian foreign policy behavior in the 1960s. Special attention is paid to instances of “high politics.” The results generally support the notion that Canada acted according to the precepts of liberalism in the 1960s. Closer examination of the instances of high politics suggests that realism does have utility in explaining Canadian behavior, even in this supposed era of liberal dominance. This finding supports the notion of theoretical pluralism. Additional theoretical and methodological issues raised by the study are also examined in hopes of contributing to IR’s ability to assess reality.

Realism

The primary foci of realist theories are issues of war and peace, the impact of anarchy on state behavior, and the conflictual nature of international relations. At the heart of such approaches are state capacities in terms of hard or coercive power, in particular military power. Classical realist thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, E.H Carr, and Hans Morgenthau present a pessimistic view of international interactions with emphases on a human lust for power, anarchy, self-helping states seeking to maximize their power relative to their counterparts to guarantee state survival/sovereignty, and balance of power. Trust-based cooperation, on the other hand, is seen as counter to the natural behavior and motivations of states and, when practiced, naive. From the realist viewpoint, peace is attained through deterrence brought on by the symmetrical balancing of great powers rather than the development of interstate trust or idealistic international values. Kenneth Waltz, the father of neo-realism, moved in a rationalist direction while maintaining the general, power-based principles of classical realism. Waltz (1979, 88-93) emphasized international structure based on what he called ordering principles. From this perspective, the basis for international order in an anarchic world is comparative state power where the most powerful states establish international patterns of behavior as they seek to

increase their power and influence. Therefore, the toughest kids on the block establish the international structures which influence how all states behave. The international pecking order is crucial as those who can help themselves do so while those that cannot abide by the demands and strength of the powerful. Harknett and Yalcin (2012) capture the two essential independent variables inherent in realism, namely the survival motivation and the distribution of power.

Overall, realism is more a set of similarly focused theories than a tightly organized doctrine. Although some realist presentations are dogmatic (see Mearsheimer 1995; Keohane and Martin 1995), the theoretical system that is realism has assumptions and suppositions that have allowed for theoretical variation. The impact of Waltz's (1979) work in establishing *neo*-realism sent shock waves through international relations academia and, for some time, constrained realism within a set of theoretical parameters. In the last few decades, however, realists have thrown off Waltz's shackles (see Glaser 1994/1995; Schweller 1997; Scheuerman 2009) with some returning to less structured but more flexible propositions found in classical realism exemplified by the work of Hans Morgenthau. This theoretical broadening allows for the inclusion of a greater range of variables within theoretical reasoning. One such variable, as discussed below, is economics. Inspired by the theoretical evolution of realism, this research draws upon both classical and neo-realism logic to develop hypotheses.

Drawing on realist logic, power transition theorist A.F.K. Organski (1958) divided states into four categories: superpowers, great powers, middle powers, and small powers. Realist emphasis on power and its impact on international order or outcomes naturally lead to a greater focus on super- or great powers. After all, if middle and small powers do not influence international behaviors very much, paying much attention to them diverts one from what matters most. Canada is frequently seen as an archetypal middle power (see Cooper 2011). Hence,

realism, neo-realism in particular, would be less-than-interested in Canada. Yet middle powers like Canada can play a role in the international balance of power. In addition, Escudé (1988, 1989; cited in Giacalone 2012) developed the concept of peripheral realism to explain behaviors of “lesser” states. A primary focus of peripheral realism is that weaker states will emphasize internal economic development as a means to maintain state autonomy (see Giacalone 2012). In other words, economics can have a significant role in realist theory. Therefore, simply because structural realists would be inclined to ignore Canada does not mean realist theory cannot be applied to the case. Accordingly, this research develops realist hypotheses to assess the theory’s applicability to Canadian foreign policy behavior.

Realist Expectations for Canada

Although Canada must deal with the international structures developed by the super- or great powers, that does not mean that Canada will not seek to help itself within these parameters. Realist scholars have spilled a great deal of ink about how states “balance” through the creation of alliances to help maintain or enhance their position in the international arena. In other words, states will make alliances with other states that match the relative power of threatening or potential enemy states and their potential alliances to deter such states from attacking them. Moreover, such efforts are in-line with the survival motivation. This independent variable, however, can have alternative manifestations than just state alignment. Therefore all techniques designed to enhance state sovereignty must also be included to incorporate both the survival motivation and the issues of distribution of power (see Harknett and Yalcin 2012). Accordingly, the first realist hypothesis (RH) focuses on balancing and sovereignty:

RH 1: Canada will align itself with allies sufficiently powerful enough to deter attacks from threatening or potential enemy states. Moreover, Canada, in general, will take

steps to guarantee state survival and hence protect a fundamental level of state sovereignty.

In addition to balancing, realist scholars have also investigated bandwagoning.

Bandwagoning can be defined as instances when middle or small powers align themselves with super- or great powers to avoid being targeted by such states or to obtain some form of gain or profit. In the first instance, less powerful states will align themselves with threatening states to avoid being in the crosshairs of the powerful state (see Walt 1987). An example of this behavior is when Hungary joined the Axis alliance to avoid being invaded by Nazi Germany. In the latter case, less powerful states align with more powerful states with “the expectation of profit and easy gains” (Schweller 1997, 928). For example, Poland joined the Coalition of the Willing for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 with hopes of receiving increased foreign aid and connections with the United States and winning contracts in Iraq. In the case of Canada, alignment with the United States can be seen as a form of bandwagoning. Cooperating with the U.S. can prevent drawing the ire of America while at the same time facilitating trade which greatly benefits Canada.

Moreover, because the international system is seen as fundamentally anarchic from the realist perspective, Canada would be expected to pursue self-help through unilateralist means. Bilateral techniques would also have a role in foreign policy as a means of achieving self-interested gains. Even in cases when alliances play a role in foreign policy, the ultimate goal would be to serve narrow Canadian self-interest rather than loftier, ethically-based, systemic gains. This research, therefore, investigates the following realist hypotheses:

RH 2: Canada will align itself with powerful states to avoid being targeted by such states or to achieve profits or easy gains.

RH 3: Canada will pursue unilateral, self-help oriented bilateral or military alliance-based strategies rather than ethically-oriented bilateral or internationalist (multilateral), non-military alliance, IGO approaches.

Finally, the importance of economics in issues of “high politics,” a factor often cited by liberals, has been neglected by some realists (see Waltz 1979). Significant economic events, however, have led some realists to acknowledge that economics can join issues of war and peace within the realm of high politics. For instance, Henry Kissinger came to such a conclusion after the experience of the 1973 Oil Embargo (Kissinger 1979). Applying realist logic to economics, one would expect states to focus on the promotion of their own economic success. In fact, states will seek economic gains in relative terms compared to other states. In other words, states will try to patriate profits to enhance their economic power. Hence, realist economics are intrinsically mercantilist in nature. Accordingly, Canada should show little interest in providing foreign aid assistance to less developed countries except when seeking to open markets for Canadian businesses. From this perspective, one would expect Canada to promote Canadian businesses. With all this in mind, the last of the realist hypotheses applies to economic behavior:

RH 4: Canada will pursue economic policies that promote Canadian macroeconomic and/or businesses' interests, even at the expense of other states' economic fortunes.

RH 5: Canada will offer foreign aid assistance to less developed countries primarily as a means to increase access to foreign markets.

RH 6: Canada will promote/champion Canadian companies.

Liberalism/Liberal Institutionalism

Liberalism is a term that has a myriad of applications. When applied to international behavior, however, there are clear and consistent characteristics regarding the meaning of the

term. Liberals do not deny that conflict is a part of international relations and that hard power issues are baseline features of international structures (see Keohane and Nye 2001). Liberals, however, see a much greater potential for cooperation than realists (Axelrod 1981; Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 2001). As Rourke and Boyer (2010, 20) note, “[L]iberals argue that foreign policy should be and sometimes is formulated according to the standards of cooperation and even altruism.”

It is important to note that the reasoning behind the emphasis on cooperation is rationalism rather than, as Carr (2001) frames it, idealism. In other words, states can decide to cooperate to achieve self-interested rather than normative and belief-driven ends. Axelrod (1984) and Keohane (1984) outline the logic behind how states learn that cooperation is in their egoistic interests through an iterative tit-for-tat. Realists, neo-realists in particular, often see each interaction as essentially a-historically new. States assume that other states will take advantage of them if it is in that state’s self-interest. Axelrod argues that relying on single interactions neglects state-learning that occurs through repeated interactions. He contends that over time, states will learn that cooperation will lead to greater pay-offs for both sides. Mutual interests, therefore, serve as a means to motivate cooperative/ethical behaviors. Moreover, this shared history can help develop trust between states. By ignoring the fact that states have long-term understanding of other states based on a history of interactions, a history which affects whether another state can be trusted or not, realists fail to see the importance of cooperation and trust and hence come to overly pessimistic conclusions. In other words, cooperation and ethics contribute to a state’s self-interest. Moreover, the costs of conflict in blood and treasure further reinforce the potential gains of cooperation.

Liberal Expectations for Canada

From the liberal perspective, ethics matter. If a state acts unethically, other states will trust that state less and cooperate with it less. Therefore, states that act unethically pay a price. States that act ethically, on the other hand, improve their international standing through enhanced status and prestige. This is especially the case for middle powers that lack the resources to apply hard power to shape international developments. With this logic in mind, state sovereignty may take a backseat to ethics based on these potential alternative gains. For instance, middle powers may be inclined to provide United Nations peacekeepers as a means of enhancing their international standing even if their troops are not under the command of their own officers and the peacekeeping mission does not have any implications for the peacekeeper-donor state's national security. For these reasons, many have argued that we should expect middle powers to promote ethical behavior (Thakur 1991; Cooper et al. 1993; Nossal 1993; Higgott 1997; Cooper 2001). One would expect Canada, as a middle power, would exemplify such behaviors.

Therefore the first liberal hypothesis (LH) involves ethics:

*LH 1: Canada will be involved in international efforts to promote ethical behavior, even at the expense of sovereignty.*³

The belief in the significance of international cooperation reveals an assumption that international politics, based on mutual interests, can be a positive-sum game, i.e. multiple actors can gain simultaneously. Whereas realism sees international relations more as a zero-sum game, where states try to gain relative to other states to enhance their survivability, liberalism emphasizes win-win situations where absolute gains can be attained for many (for discussion, see Powell 1991). Accordingly, liberalism sees International Governmental Organizations (IGO) as

³ One would expect states to make the claim that their foreign policies are ethical. The fact that this research can view actions in hindsight enables assessment as to the degree to which behavior involved ethical components.

having a significant role and/or promise in international politics (Keohane and Martin 1995). Middle powers can use IGOs to promote their standing in moving international politics in a cooperative and ethical direction (Fox 1977; Jensen 1987; Papadakis and Starr 1987; Wood 1988; Pratt 1990; Thakur 1991; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993; Keating 1993; Nossal 1993; Nossal 2010; Stairs 1998).⁴ After all, middle powers' "power" rests more in the techniques of soft rather than hard power (Flemes 2007).

From this perspective, middle powers should be expected to pursue foreign policies that benefit the international environment as a whole (i.e. absolute gains) rather than focus on narrow, national self-interests (Cooper 2001, 321). Again, the conclusion is rational and not necessarily based on Carr's "idealism." As a middle power, one would expect Canada to place great weight on participation in IGOs, in particular the United Nations, and to maintain significant ethical components within its foreign policy. Bilateralism can also play a role as long as ethics play a central role in the policy. Hence the logic for the following liberal hypotheses:

LH 2: Canada will pursue foreign policies that promote absolute gains rather than narrow, self-interested gains.

LH 3: Canada will pursue ethically-oriented bilateral or internationalist (multilateral), non-military alliance, IGO approaches to international problems rather than unilateralist, self-help oriented bilateral or military alliance-based techniques.

In the realm of economics, neo-liberalism posits that the international system is not as anarchical as realists suggest due to the intricate web of interconnectivity among states in terms of economic and social exchange known as "complex interdependence" (Keohane and Nye 2001, Rourke and Boyer 2010, 22). The gains to be had by avoiding conflict through continued trade

⁴ International ethics include obligations of economically developed countries to aid less developed states (for discussion, see Baylis, Smith and Owens 2008, Chapter 11).

and lower expenditures on the military lead to the promotion of international law/ethics.⁵ As agents for such efforts, IGOs status will be enhanced and anarchy will diminish. IGOs that promote the liberal economics of free trade will be of particular importance as vehicles for international economic regimes that promote cooperative strategies to economic growth.

The status of middle powers suggests that they have received at least some benefits from the international economic structures established at Bretton Woods in 1944. This indicates that middle powers would be likely to support the liberal international economic order. Add to this artifact the expectations that middle powers will pursue absolute gains as noted above, one would expect Canada to support multilateral approaches to international economics, in particular those associated with a positive-sum view of trade, rather than mercantilistic perspectives. Finally, as middle powers are expected to pursue altruistic foreign policies to promote a less anarchic and more ethical/just world, foreign aid assistance should be geared to aiding needy states rather than opening markets for the benefit of Canadian businesses. The liberal economic hypotheses for this research are as follows:

LH 4: Canada will strongly support the liberal international economic order and the IGOs that promote a positive-sum view of economics.

LH 5: Canadian foreign aid assistance will be primarily geared towards aiding needy states rather than as a means to open up markets and/or aid Canadian businesses.

LH 6: Canada will not promote/champion Canadian businesses.

The complexities and nuances of realism and liberal internationalism naturally contribute to divisions within each school of thought. Accordingly, ontological debates can occur within each theory regarding rationalist and normative motivations. Profound theoretical debates can

⁵ Some recent research has gone so far as to argue that capitalism promotes international peace (see Gartzke 2007), although not all agree with this conclusion (Seung-Whan 2011).

naturally contribute to variance of interpretation. Hence, divergence of opinion is expected regarding fundamental expectations of grand theories. The hypotheses presented here cannot bridge such discord. These expectations, however, are grounded in the fundamental suppositions of each theory.

Data/Methods

The cases for this exploratory investigation are drawn from Canada's World Historic Timeline, a listing of major initiatives and events since 1931 compiled by the Canadian government which can be found at <http://www.canadasworld.ca/timeline>. The sample drawn from the Timeline consists of 15 cases of Canadian foreign policy behavior in the 1960s. The potential for selection bias obviously exists due to the fact that instances of Canadian foreign policy behavior are exponentially more numerous than those contained in the list. Why is the timeline used as the sample source? To begin, the timeline is an external source, hence preventing purposeful or inadvertent researcher selection bias based on personal theoretical beliefs. After all, author predispositions are one of the most ready contributors to selection bias. Secondly, the timeline includes all of the most significant foreign policy decisions from the 1960s. The data comes from a public source that can be independently evaluated by the reader. A review of the cases makes abundantly clear that there are no noteworthy omissions. Moreover, none of the decisions are trivial or inconsequential, which enhances the plausibility of this test of Canadian foreign policy. In short, the Canada's World Historic Timeline is a solid and robust rendering of the substantial foreign policy issues with which Canada was confronted during the decade. A third reason is the timeline contains an array of behaviors, which allows for an examination of a broad range of actions. This provides for a more thorough test of the contending theories. A fourth factor behind the use of the timeline is practical in nature: space

considerations limit the possibility of investigating all Canadian foreign policy actions in the 1960s. With all this in mind, the present investigation provides a baseline for assessing Canadian foreign policy in the 1960s and is therefore a starting, rather than ending, point. It is hoped that such an examination helps encourage further debate regarding the reality of Canadian foreign policy behavior during this vital decade.

Brief descriptions of individual cases are provided followed by a discussion outlining the logic regarding the fit of the hypotheses. The results of the accuracy of the hypotheses are compiled below in Table 1. As the hypotheses are international in nature, cases that are bilateral without systemic implication are not included in the data. The semi-sovereign nature of the province makes Quebec's growing relations with France a difficult case. Quebec is treated as a component of Canada rather than a sovereign actor when its behaviors are international in nature. Accordingly, the Canadian national government has to be involved in the international behavior for the event to be included in the data. Moreover, cases from the timeline that involve only Ottawa and Quebec City are seen in this research as internal rather than international in nature and are not included in sample.

Canadian Foreign Policy in the 1960s

In December 1960, the Canadian government approved the sale of wheat to the People's Republic of China. The decision was made even though Canada did not have formal diplomatic links with mainland China. The decision was made in part to aid the famine stricken country. The policy contributed to "Red" China becoming Canada's second largest customer of grain, coming in just barely behind Great Britain ("Canada: Grain to Red China" 1961).

The decision demonstrates foreign policy independence from the U.S., hence protecting state sovereignty, does have Canada aligning with a powerful state to achieve profits, and

promotes Canadian agricultural interests; therefore realist hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 fit this instance. The case can also be interpreted as a means of promoting peace with China which can contribute to absolute international gains. In addition the action does aid a state in need, therefore liberal hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 5 are a good fit. The selling of wheat did aid Canadian farmers, but it did not open access for other goods. Accordingly, realist hypothesis 5 and liberal hypothesis 6 are not supported. Neoliberalism is not relevant in the case so liberal hypothesis 4 is not applicable.

1960 and 1961 saw the expansion of Canadian aid to Africa through the inclusion of two programs in its foreign aid portfolio: Commonwealth Africa (1960) and francophone Africa (1961). The aid programs can be seen as multilaterally promoting international well-being by assisting states in need in a manner that is not designed to primarily promote Canadian economic interests. This means that liberal hypothesis 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 fit the behavior. The foreign policy decision does not, however, fit the expectations of any of the realist hypotheses. Liberal hypothesis 4 is not applicable as the decision is not related to neoliberalism.

In March 1961, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker joined African and Asian members of the British Commonwealth at the Commonwealth Conference in India in opposing South Africa's application for renewal of Commonwealth membership due to racist policies of white minority rule. Canada was the only predominantly white country to take the stance. Ultimately South Africa withdrew its application. Clearly Canada was promoting ethical state behavior and absolute gains in a multilateral manner. Accordingly, liberal hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 6 are a good fit. The action varied from Great Britain's position and therefore is not an instance of alignment. Moreover, this is not case of promoting Canadian economic interests or businesses. The result is

that realist hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 are not supported. Neither aid nor neoliberalism play a part in the issues, so realist hypotheses 5 and liberal hypotheses 4 and 5 are not applicable.

Canada became a founding member of the Development Assistance Committee, a forum for member states to address issues with relations with developing countries, in July 1961. There were originally 24 member countries and the World Bank, IMF and the United Nations Development Programme participated as observers. The OECD associated program focused on aid, but also developing sustainable development within the Liberal International Economic Order.

The decision is multilateral in nature, designed to aid needy states within the framework of neoliberal institutions, seeks absolute gains and international well-being. This fits the expectation of all of the liberal hypotheses. The action could also be interpreted as an alignment to achieve economic benefits so realist hypothesis 2 is seen here as fitting the behavior. It is, however, the only realist hypothesis to do so.⁶

Canadian activity regarding Africa continued in 1962 as Canada officially endorsed the principle of black majority rule in Rhodesia. Canada also made known its support for economic sanctions against the white minority regime of Ian Smith. Moreover, Canada expressed interest in providing humanitarian aid to socialist-oriented states such as Tanzania. These steps were not in line with U.S. policy at the time. These actions demonstrate foreign policy independence and, accordingly, the assertion of sovereignty, hence offering support for realist hypothesis 1. The behaviors, however, run counter to all of the other realist hypotheses, especially in the case of aid to “socialist-oriented” Tanzania, and liberal hypothesis 4. On the other hand, the efforts do exhibit altruism and promote ethical behavior. In particular, interest in aiding Tanzania strongly

⁶ The Canada’s World Timeline included Quebec opening up an official office in Paris in 1961. As this is an act of the province of Quebec and not the Canadian national government, this research does not include the case.

supports liberal hypothesis 5. The policies are also examples of ethically-oriented bilateralism. Hence, all of the remaining liberal hypotheses are supported.

Canadian foreign policy, after a short delay in the initial stages, involved basic cooperation with the United States in October 1962 during the Cuban Missile crisis. The threat posed by missiles in Cuba led Canada to cooperate with the United States and support its actions. In this crisis situation, Canada aligned with a powerful ally. Moreover, despite Cuban claims that Canada was not in their crosshairs, a nuclear attack on the U.S could lead to fall-out drifting north and therefore sovereignty was an issue. These factors strongly support realist hypotheses 1 and 3. The actions involved self-interest, relative gains, and the protection of sovereignty and was alliance-based so liberal hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are not supported. The nature of the event does not lend itself to the other hypotheses and they are therefore categorized as not applicable.⁷

The year 1961 saw Canada accept the inclusion of nuclear weapons in the Canadian armed forces. Although there were some doubts about the move, Canada accepted nuclear weapons by 1963. Cooperation with the United States regarding the storage of such weapons was later approved. Such coordination strongly supports realist hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 and runs counter to the expectations of liberal hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. As the decision is not economic in nature, hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 for both theories are not applicable.

Canada sent peacekeepers to Cyprus in April 1964 to help aid in stabilizing the situation and calming tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Canadian peacekeepers have been

⁷ The election of the Liberal Party in 1963 led to a set of new priorities representing the goals of the new Prime Minister Lester Pearson. The priorities are as follows: 1. Ensuring Western Democracies and collective security through NORAD and NATO, 2. Fostering arms control at the UN, 3. Responding peacefully to limited wars through UN peacekeeping and mediation, 4. Reducing economic disparities abroad and instability through multilateral aid, 5. Developing international peacekeeping as envisioned in the UN Charter. The items on the list lean towards liberalism yet are not devoid of realism, in particular priority 1. This research focuses on actual state behaviors, however, and therefore excludes such state proclamations.

present in Cyprus ever since this date. The behavior is multilateral, ethically-oriented with absolute gains prevalent, and promotes peace. Accordingly, liberal hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are strongly supported. Peacekeeping in Cyprus goes against the basic precepts of realist theory and the expectation of realist hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. As with the case immediately above, the rest of the hypotheses are not applicable.⁸

During the escalation of the war in Vietnam during 1965, Canada had the choice to join the United States. Canada officially decided not to participate. Moreover, in April 1965, Prime Minister Pearson criticized U.S. policy in Vietnam and called for the suspension of the bombing campaign Operation Rolling Thunder during a speech at Temple University in Philadelphia. Foreign Minister Paul Martin even came up with the idea of brokering a peace agreement with Hanoi independent of the United States, much to the consternation of their powerful southern neighbor (Bow and Lennox, 2009). On the other hand, the Canadian government and Canadian manufacturers were involved in procuring defense contracts associated with the war in Vietnam based on the 1958 Defense Production Sharing Agreement between the two countries. \$2.47 billion worth of war materials was supplied to the United States by Canadian industries between 1965 and 1973.

The questioning of the unilateral war on ethical grounds while risking good relations with a powerful ally fits with the expectations of liberal hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 and do not support realist hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. Canadian war-profiteering, however, is in accordance with realist hypotheses 4 and 6 and runs counter to liberal hypothesis 6. The Vietnam War was peripheral to

⁸ Canada's World Timeline includes the ratification of the Columbia River Treaty in September 1964. The treaty is a cooperative effort between the United States and Canada to develop and sustain the upper Columbia River basin in British Columbia and Washington State. Although this could be interpreted as a "liberal" move, the treaty is a pragmatic move between existing allies and therefore does not provide a good opportunity to test the theories examined here. Accordingly the case is excluded from this research.

issues of neoliberalism and providing aid to needy states, hence realist hypothesis 5 and liberal hypotheses 4 and 5 are not applicable.⁹

The Canadian government negotiated an agreement with France to allow the signing of cooperative agreements between Paris and Quebec City. This led to the signing of an agreement on cultural cooperation between Quebec and France in 1965. Ottawa's consent indicates openness to resolving conceivable conflictual relations with the Quebecois and France even at the expense of a possible loss of sovereignty. A central feature is respect of the liberties of francophones, which fits the expectations of liberal hypotheses 1 and 2. Paradoxically, this decision can be seen as a means of protecting against a greater loss of sovereignty through the appeasement of Quebec and hence can be interpreted as indicating mild support for realist hypothesis 1. These contradictory analyses indicate that this bilateral agreement can be interpreted as oriented in either an ethically OR self-help direction. Accordingly, the ironic conclusion is that support exists for both realist hypothesis 3 and liberal hypothesis 3. Realist hypothesis 2, however, is not supported as the cultural orientation of the agreement does not speak to profits or easy gains. The issues involved are not clearly economic so the rest of the hypotheses are categorized as not applicable.

In 1967, from April to October, Montreal was host to the International and Universal Exposition (Expo 67). Sixty-two nations participated and the Expo had over 50 million visitors. It was during his visit to the Expo that French President Charles De Gaulle gave his famous speech declaring "Vive le Quebec libre" in support of Quebec separatism. The declaration was not well received in Canada and led to diplomatic difficulties between Canada and France. The Expo was international, cooperative, involved absolute gains, and fit with neoliberalism while

⁹ Canada's World Timeline includes the adoption of the present Canadian Flag in its list. This action is seen here as a mix of internal and bilateral considerations regarding symbolism rather than state behavior and is therefore excluded from the dataset.

also promoting Canadian businesses; hence there is support for liberal hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 and realist hypothesis 6. These factors are not in accordance with realist hypotheses 2, 3, or 4. Because the event was not military in nature and did not involve international threat nor did it involve aiding needy states, realist hypotheses 1 and 5 and liberal hypothesis 5 are not applicable (Note both RH 6 and LH 6 are supported as the Expo provided the opportunity to promote Canadian businesses but also provided similar opportunities to other states simultaneously, hence the strange situation of both hypotheses being supported).¹⁰

March 1968 saw the Canadian government suspend diplomatic relations with the Republic of Gabon after Quebec was invited to a francophone educational conference while Canada was not. Canada interpreted the move as initiated and backed by Paris and hence Canada threatened to break off diplomatic relations with France. The actions here were self-interested and ran counter to multilateralism and therefore liberal hypotheses 2 and 3 are not supported. The unique nature of the event was not applicable to the other hypotheses.

Canada signed the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty in July 1968 and ratified it in January 1969. The three pillars of the treaty are non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Signing the treaty fits the expectations of liberal hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 and does not support realist hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. The economic hypotheses are not applicable.

To manage Canada's growing aid program, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was established in 1968. CIDA runs counter to all of the realist hypotheses and supports all of the liberal hypotheses except hypothesis 4. Liberal hypothesis 4 is counted as not

¹⁰ Canada's World Timeline includes a new list of priorities for Prime Minister Lester Pearson for 1967. The list is as follows: 1. National security, 2. National unity, 3. Political liberty and social justice, 4. The rule of law in national and international affairs, 5. The values of Christian civilizations, 6. Acceptance of international responsibility in accordance with Canada's interests and ability to contribute to international peacekeeping. Again, this research is investigating actions and not proclamations so this event is not in the data.

applicable because issues of neoliberalism are lacking. Realist hypothesis 1 is also not applicable because of the lack of issues involving military threat.

In 1969, with Lester Peterson's guidance, the Commission on International Development published a report entitled "Partners in Development" which urged developed nations to devote 1% of their GNP to foreign aid. Again all the liberal hypotheses are supported here except 4 for the same reasons as stated in the case immediately above. Similarly, none of the realist hypotheses are supported and realist hypothesis 1 is categorized as not applicable.

Cases of High Politics

The Cuban Missile Crisis

The installation of Russian medium range missiles in Cuba in 1962 led to a confrontation between the two superpowers that potentially threatened all states on the planet. Canada was no exception. Canada's proximity to the U.S., however, made the danger even more immediate. As state survival was an issue, the event is as clear and certain an example of high politics as one could find.

The Cuban Missile Crisis started on October 14, 1962, after photographs of the construction of several missile deployment sites were taken in Cuba by an American U2 spy plane. Within a few days, the Kennedy administration informed Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker of the developments. Much to Kennedy's chagrin, Diefenbaker initially doubted the intelligence and called for UN inspection of Cuban missile sites. Moreover, Diefenbaker initially refused to put Canadian military awareness on a higher level (roughly similar to the U.S.'s DEFCON 3) as requested by the Kennedy administration.

What could have contributed to the delay? One explanation is based on Diefenbaker's desire to maintain independence over Canadian foreign policy. If so, it can be argued that this

fits realist expectations of states protecting their sovereignty. Another explanation is the chilly relations between Kennedy and Diefenbaker. The two leaders first met in May 1961. Following the meeting, Diefenbaker discovered the “Rostow Memo,” which outlined the goals of the Kennedy administration for the meeting. Seeing these attempts to move Canada toward behaviors beneficial to the U.S. enraged Diefenbaker as he saw this as an American effort to dominate Canada--for discussion, see the University of Saskatchewan’s Diefenbaker Canada Centre (2013) website.

With Soviet ships approaching the quarantine zone, however, the Canadian government authorized a higher level alert on October 24. Moreover, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) played a part in the developments by enhancing their patrols of the seas to help fill the void created when the bulk of U.S. Naval moved into the Caribbean Sea. In particular, the RCN screened the Atlantic for Soviet submarines and fishing and trawling vessels. Although what actually occurred is debated, retired submariner Peter Haydon suggests the contacts with Soviet submarines were numerous during October and that developments became heated when Russian fishing vessels harassed RCN destroyers as they attempted to corner a Soviet submarine on Georges Bank (Haydon 1993; Haydon 2007; McKenna 2012).

Theoretically, one could argue that leadership personality and psychology played an important role in how events played out. One could also claim that Diefenbaker was trying to restrain Canada’s overly aggressive southern neighbor which would indicate strains of liberal internationalism. On the other hand, Canada only delayed action. Heightened alertness was declared regarding Canadian military readiness by October 24 and the RCN apparently played a part in the grand strategy.

The Vietnam War

U.S. involvement in Vietnam escalated dramatically following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which greatly enhanced President Lyndon Johnson's ability to wage war against the Vietnamese Communists. Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson refused to directly engage in the conflict and frequently criticized the nature of the U.S. tactics in the war. Canada also became home for thousands of U.S. draft dodgers and deserters. This was the public face of the Canadian position during the Vietnam War.

Despite this public impression, Canada was complicit in American involvement in Vietnam in multiple ways (Bow and Lennox 2009, 7). Canadian delegates to the truce commission aided the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in introducing American arms and personnel into South Vietnam covertly. The delegates also spotted for U.S. bombers over North Vietnam. It should be mentioned that the Canadian position in the truce commission leaned strongly towards South Vietnam and against the North. Canadian humanitarian aid during the war only went to South Vietnam. In addition, 500 Canadian firms sold \$2.5 billion worth of war materials to the Pentagon including ammunition, napalm, aircraft engines, and explosives. Canadian firms also sold \$10 billion in food, beverages, berets and boots for soldiers in addition to nickel, copper, lead, brass, oil, wiring, plate armor and military transport. Moreover, the herbicide "Agent Orange" was tested at CFB Gagetown, NB, prior to its use in Vietnam (Levant 2012; see also Levant 1986).

The fact remains that Canada did not directly participate in open warfare during the Vietnam War. Canada did, however, participate in aiding and abetting the United States in the controversial war, much to its own profit despite the lack of direct military engagement and its public criticism of the war.

Table 1. Results of the application of realist and liberal hypotheses for 1960s

Realist Hypotheses	Total Number of Times Hypothesis Fit the Case	Total Number of Times Hypothesis are Not Supported	Percentage for Good Fit of Hypothesis when Applied	Total Number of Times Hypothesis are Not Applicable	Total Number of Hypotheses Applications
RH 1	5	7	41.7%	3	12
RH 2	3	10	23.1%	2	13
RH 3	4	10	28.6%	1	14
RH 4	2	7	22.2%	6	9
RH 5	0	6	0%	9	6
RH6	3	6	33%	6	9
Totals	17	46	27%	27	63
Liberal Hypotheses					
LH 1	11	2	84.6%	2	13
LH 2	12	3	80%	0	15
LH 3	12	3	80%	0	15
LH 4	2	1	66.7%	12	3
LH 5	6	0	100%	9	6
LH 6	7	2	77.8%	6	9
Totals	50	11	81.9%	29	61

Results

The results for the application of the liberal and realist hypotheses to 15 instances of Canadian state behavior during the 1960s are provided in Table 1. The percentages indicate that theoretical liberalism is significantly more applicable to the case of Canadian foreign policy in the 1960s than is realism. When weighing cases of “High Politics,” however, the evidence is mixed. The four cases that clearly fit in that category are 1. The Cuban Missile Crisis, 2. Cooperation with the United States regarding nuclear weapons, 3. The Vietnam War, and 4. The signing and ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The results for the cases of high politics are in Table 2. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, an instance that had obvious geo-

strategic national security implications, Canada aligned itself with the United States despite Diefenbaker's controversial pause. Moreover, Canada cooperated with the United States with the inclusion of nuclear weapons into the Canadian Armed Forces. In both instances, Canadian Foreign Policy behavior follows the dictums of realism indicating that Canadian realists might be on to something (see Stairs 2003; Lagassé and Robinson 2008).

At first glance, lack of participation in and criticism of the Vietnam War appears to defy realism and provide support for liberal internationalism. When considering the geo-strategic significance of the war, however, this support is not as strong. Vietnam is on the other side of the globe and was not

Table 2. Results of the application of realist and liberal hypotheses for 1960s for cases of “high politics”

Realist Hypotheses	Total Number of Times Hypothesis Fit the Case	Total Number of Times Hypothesis are Not Supported	Percentage for Good Fit of Hypothesis when Applied	Total Number of Times Hypothesis are Not Applicable	Total Number of Hypotheses Applications
RH 1	2	2	50%	0	4
RH 2	2	2	50%	0	4
RH 3	2	2	50%	0	4
RH 4	1	0	100%	3	1
RH 5	0	0	-	4	0
RH6	1	0	100%	3	1
Totals	8	6	57.1%	10	14
Liberal Hypotheses					
LH 1	2	2	50%	0	4
LH 2	2	2	50%	0	4
LH 3	2	2	50%	0	4
LH 4	0	0	-	4	0
LH 5	0	0	-	4	0
LH 6	0	1	0%	3	1
Totals	6	7	46.2%	11	13

considered one of the core areas of significance to George Kennan, the architect of Containment policy (see Gaddis 1982). Accordingly, the geo-strategic importance of Vietnam was not vital to Canadian interests. The Great Power rationality of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War may still be debated, but for a middle power like Canada such logic simply does not hold. Yet Canadian delegates to the truce commission did aid the CIA. Canadian businesses also made significant financial gains through the sale of war supplies to the United States. On the other hand, the public lack of Canadian support for the war may have undermined and therefore weakened the United States at the international level. In short, closer examination of the Canada's lack of direct participation in the Vietnam War is not as theoretically clear.

The signing and ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty fits the first three liberal hypotheses developed here. Realists could argue, however, that Canada was dove-tailing the United States, Canada's most significant geo-strategic ally. The nature of the treaty has both alliance-based and broader multilateral implications and therefore can be interpreted from multiple perspectives. The emphasis on absolute gains inherent in the decision led this research to conclude that the first three realist hypotheses did not fit. One could argue, however, that these realist hypotheses do fit and therefore conclude that the results are mixed.

The results from Table 2 indicate greater support for realism. On the other hand, the performance of liberal internationalism is only slightly behind. Yet it should be noted that the parameters for the concept of 'high politics' were outlined by realists, in particular Kenneth Waltz (1979). The limited applicability of the economic hypotheses speaks to this problematic fact to a certain degree, i.e. the omission of economics from high politics. With this in mind, one could argue that the results for liberalism are more supportive than the numbers suggest, especially since the totals are close and the sample is small.

When examining issues involving “Low Politics,” the evidence is not as mixed and strongly supports liberal internationalism. The development of the Canadian International Development Agency, the sending of peacekeepers to Cyprus, lack of support for White-minority governments in Rhodesia and South Africa, and aid to Africa and China speak to the longer-term logic of liberal internationalism. The promotion of individual liberty, contributing to the suppression of hostilities, and aid to the needy at the international level fit the long-cycle view that such values will contribute to a more peaceful world, a rational goal that contributes to the security of all states. Moreover, Canadian participation in the Development Assistance Committee indicates support for the liberal international economic order and the notion that economics can be a vehicle for international peace and stability.

Canadian behavior regarding Quebec and France indicates a strong interest in maintaining national stability and security as realists would expect. Yet, Canada did agree to expanded cooperation between Quebec City and Paris. Considering the centrality of Quebec’s continued inclusion in the Canadian federation to Canada’s national security, such behavior could be viewed as violating realist logic while leaning toward liberal internationalism. On the other hand, one could argue that the moves were taken to lessen support for Quebec separatism and thus fit the realist focus on protecting sovereignty. The net theoretical results for the case of Quebec, therefore, remain mixed.¹¹

¹¹ Some may argue that the international events involving Quebec are outliers due to the uncommon nature of relations between the province and the central government. Table 3, which is in the appendix, is a summary of the results minus the two cases that include Quebec in a significant fashion, namely the Canadian agreement allowing greater cooperation between France and Quebec and the Canadian decision to suspend diplomatic relations with Gabon after Quebec was invited to a francophone educational conference while Ottawa was not. The results push the needle ever so slightly in a more liberal direction. These changes are very minor when compared to the results for the entire data set.

Another result worth noting is the limited applicability of the economically-based hypotheses during the 1960s. The inclusion of the hypotheses does help in providing evidential support for the evolution of international economic behavior from imperialism to a post-colonial world and its new set of justifications/values. Although still useful in unraveling the theoretical puzzles of international relations theory, the limited utility of these hypotheses suggest the importance of systemic pressures, in this case those of the Cold War.

Discussion

The quantitative findings here indicate support for liberal internationalist theory. This is particularly the case involving issues of “Low Politics.” Canadian behavior in the 1960s often exhibited the ideals of “Good International Citizenship.” Ironically, realists, particularly neo-realists (see Waltz 1979), would argue that the lower gravity of such instances allow for greater variation because the issues at hand are not significant. In spite of such arguments, the evidence is what it is and tends to support liberal expectations of state behavior.

On the other hand, in the cases of “High Politics” we find greater, although not definitive, support for realist expectations. Canada leaned towards self-preservation when national survival was potentially at stake. Yet in the cases of the Vietnam War and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, there is support for liberal interpretations. Moreover, liberal theoreticians do not claim that issues of power do not matter. They would argue that a more complete view of state behavior includes more than simple self-preservation (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Martin 1995). With all this in mind, the conclusion must be that elements of both liberalism and realism can be found in Canadian foreign policy behavior in the 1960s. This finding indicates that theoretical pluralism is an appropriate means for assessing the reality of international relations.

So which theory performs best? The weight of the quantitative and descriptive evidence suggests that Canada did display liberal tendencies in the 1960s as often portrayed. Unpacking the individual cases, especially in cases of high politics, indicates that one must refrain from arguments about the lack of utility of realism. Issues of power could and did matter. This was particularly the case with nuclear weapons or the potential fall-out from nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet these are issues that liberals do not discount. Just because liberals see longer-term iterations/tit-for-tat as a means towards rational ends does not mean that liberals ignore issues of self-preservation in periods of crisis or systemic pressures. Moreover, the problematic distinction between “Low” and “High” politics fails to address the argument that liberals see “Low” politics as a means of addressing “High” politics in the long run.

The methodological implications of this paper highlight some of the difficulties associated with meso-level research (i.e. sample sizes that rest between small “n,” qualitative case studies and large “n” quantitative studies). If one were to rely upon the numbers, one could conclude that liberal internationalism trumps realism in the case of Canada. As the analysis of the results indicates, however, such a conclusion would be somewhat misleading. These findings require reflection and point out the potential drawbacks of relying exclusively on either quantitative or qualitative methods.

Conclusion

Canadian foreign policy behavior of the 1960s and Pearsonian internationalism are often characterized as profoundly liberal in orientation. This research investigates this claim and finds support for it. The book is not closed on the subject, however, as evidential support is found for realism in some of the most significant actions of the decade. The evidence, on the whole, indicates that Canadian foreign policy exhibited theoretical shades of gray that trended towards

liberalism. The conclusion is based on a descriptive and numerical investigation of a meso-level sample of foreign policy behaviors, an approach that contributes to a more nuanced and hopefully representative assessment of reality. This research does not claim to offer the definitive answer as to the precise nature of Canadian action, but rather suggests that there is room for discussion regarding Canada's place in the world during the 1960s.

Lester Pearson (The Nobel Foundation 1999, 138) once stated, "We must keep trying to solve problems, one-by-one, stage-by-stage, if not on the basis of confidence and cooperation, at least on that of mutual toleration and self-interest." In this quote we do not find the pure "idealism" cited by Carr (1946), but rather a liberal internationalist logic that is aware of realist propositions. It appears that Lester Pearson and Canadian foreign policy behavior in the 1960s are not caricatures after all.

Appendix

Table 3. Results of the application of realist and liberal hypotheses for 1960s with cases involving Quebec dropped.

Realist Hypotheses	Total Number of Times Hypothesis Fit the Case	Total Number of Times Hypothesis are Not Supported	Percentage for Good Fit of Hypothesis when Applied	Total Number of Times Hypothesis are Not Applicable	Total Number of Hypotheses Applications
RH 1	4	7	36.4%	2	11
RH 2	3	9	25%	1	12
RH 3	3	10	23.1%	0	13
RH 4	2	7	22.2%	4	9
RH 5	0	6	0%	7	6
RH6	3	6	33%	4	9
Totals	14	46	23.3%	18	60
Liberal Hypotheses					
LH 1	10	2	83.3%	1	12
LH 2	11	2	84.6%	0	13
LH 3	11	2	84.5%	0	13
LH 4	2	1	66.7%	10	3
LH 5	6	0	100%	7	6
LH 6	7	2	77.8%	4	9
Totals	47	9	83.9%	22	56

Two cases were dropped: 1. Canadian agreement allowing greater cooperation between France and Quebec and 2. Canadian suspension of diplomatic relations with Gabon after Quebec alone was invited to a francophone educational conference.

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