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Parochial Altruism and Political Ideology

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Parochial altruism refers to the propensity to direct prosocial behavior toward members of one's own ingroup to a greater extent than toward those outside one's group. Both theory and empirical research suggest that parochialism may be linked to political ideology, with conservatives more likely than liberals to exhibit ingroup bias in altruistic behavior. The present study, conducted in the United States and Italy, tested this relationship in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, assessing willingness to contribute money to charities at different levels of inclusiveness—local versus national versus international. Results indicated that conservatives contributed less money overall and were more likely to limit their contribution to the local charity while liberals were significantly more likely to contribute to national and international charities, exhibiting less parochialism. Conservatives and liberals also differed in social identification and trust, with conservatives higher in social identity and trust at the local and national levels and liberals higher in global social identity and trust in global others. Differences in global social identity partially accounted for the effects of political ideology on donations.

KEY WORDS: parochialism, altruism, political ideology, moral foundations, social identity

Like climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic has challenged our ability as humans to override individual, local, and national self-interest and cooperate at a global level (Muldoon et al., 2021). However, existing accounts of cooperation and human altruism suggest a parochial character for prosociality (Choi & Bowles, 2007; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000), that is, a higher propensity to extend benefits to members of one's own ingroup rather than to member of outgroups (Bernhard et al., 2006; DeDreu et al., 2010; Romano et al., 2017; Romano, Sutter, Liu, Yamagishi, & Balliet, 2021).

Most research on parochialism poses the question whether prosociality is greater when directed toward ingroup members than toward outgroup members, where the two groups are mutually exclusive. Ingroup bias in this form has been demonstrated across a wide variety of group identities, including religion, ethnicity, and political groups (Balliet et al., 2014). We propose, however, that another way to define parochialism is in terms of the *inclusiveness* of ingroup identities. For example, empirical studies of parochial altruism often define the ingroup in terms of national identity (e.g., Dorrough & Glöckner, 2016; Romano, Sutter, Liu, Yamagishi, & Balliet, 2021), asking whether individuals are more likely to act cooperatively or prosocially toward others who are members of their own nation compared to others from outgroup nations. Yet, in contemporary societies, ingroups come at different levels of inclusiveness—small, local groups are frequently nested within larger collectives (such as villages within states within nations) (Turner et al., 1987), and nations themselves are subgroups of a global community which can also be a social identity (McFarland et al., 2012, 2019).

In contrast to mutually exclusive ingroup-outgroup divisions, with nested social identities an ingroup at the subgroup level is included within superordinate groups. Thus, benefiting the superordinate also benefits members of the ingroup as well as members of other subgroups. In such a system of nested group identities, parochialism can be defined as limiting one's prosocial behavior to ingroups at lower levels of inclusiveness when more inclusive group identities are available (Gallier et al., 2019; Grimalda et al., 2021). The question then becomes whether individuals privilege more local ingroups rather than benefiting more broadly inclusive or universal collectives (Aaldering & Böhm, 2020; Blackwell & McKee, 2003; Enke et al., 2021; Fellner & Lünser, 2014; Grimalda et al., 2021; Wit & Kerr, 2002).

Research on social identities at different levels of inclusiveness generally shows that, on average, community identity is stronger than national identity, which in turn is stronger than global human identification (McFarland et al., 2012). Results from field experiments on charitable giving also suggest that giving is largely parochial. In an experiment on the effectiveness of normative appeals, Agerström et al. (2016) found that local norms were more effective than global norms for increasing donations. Further, when individuals are given a choice between charities at different levels of inclusiveness, most choose to give to more local charities rather than to international ones (Knowles & Sullivan, 2017).

However, individuals vary in where they invest their primary social identities and the strength of identification at different levels of inclusiveness can vary under different circumstances. Individuals high in “moral universalism” are more likely to donate money globally rather than locally (Enke et al., 2021; McFarland et al., 2012), and identification with the global community is associated with contributing to international causes (Buchan et al., 2011; McFarland et al., 2019). Further, identities are often fluid and highly susceptible to being shaped by globalization (Buchan et al., 2011; Held et al., 2000; Rosenmann et al., 2016). Thus, that prosociality during a global crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic is parochial is not a foregone conclusion. This is particularly the case for a pandemic, where averting the pandemic in one country will also benefit other countries within the larger global community, although to a lesser degree (Barragan et al., 2021; Vignoles et al., 2021). It is precisely global shocks like COVID-19 that can trigger a stronger sense of “humanity as a whole” (Giddens, 1991) that may supersede more parochial identities.

One factor that may moderate the relationship between group identity and altruism is political ideology (Romano, Sutter, Liu, & Balliet, 2021). Research on endorsement of personal values indicates that conservatives place significantly greater emphasis than do liberals on conformity, loyalty, and group cohesion (Jost, 2017). Similarly, liberals and conservatives have been

found to rely on different psychological foundations to construct their moral systems, with liberals consistently showing greatest endorsement of harm/care and fairness foundations (individualizing foundations) whereas conservatives give relatively more importance to authority/respect, ingroup loyalty, and purity/sanctity (communal-binding foundations) (Graham et al., 2009; Sinn & Hayes, 2017). Relatedly, conservatives have been found to be lower than liberals in empathic concern in general (Ruisch et al., 2021) and to have a tighter moral circle, showing greater compassion toward smaller and well-defined groups, while liberals tend to express compassion toward broader groups (Waytz et al., 2019). Finally, cross-national studies of social-value orientation have shown that those with prosocial orientations are more likely to endorse conservative political preferences than do those with prosocial orientation (Van Lange et al., 2012). All of this research suggests that conservatives may be less altruistic than liberals in general, and more importantly, that their altruistic behavior may be more limited to local ingroup members (i.e., more parochial) than is the case for liberals.

Little research has been done to directly test the relationship between political ideology and parochialism in cooperation. In one experimental games study, Aaldering and Böhm (2020, Experiment 1) found that participants who identified as Democrats were more likely to exhibit universal cooperation (contributing to ingroup and outgroup equally) than did those who identified as Republicans. Balliet et al. (2018) tested whether Republicans and Democrats differed in the extent of ingroup bias in cooperation with members of their own versus the other party but did not find a significant effect of ideology. Both Republicans and Democrats expressed greater trust (expectation of cooperation) in members of their own party, and this accounted for their willingness to extend more cooperation to their ingroup relative to the outgroup. Similarly, Fowler and Kam (2007) found that both Republicans and Democrats showed partisan bias in allocations to a partner in a dictator game, and bias was related to strength of party identification.

In field research, a large cross-national study by Romano, Sutter, Liu, and Balliet (2021) was conducted to compare liberals and conservatives on cooperation and national parochialism. In this study, participants from 42 different nations played a series of cooperation games with different partners who were either from the participant's own nation, an outgroup nation, or unidentified. In the game, each player is given an endowment and then decides how much of the endowment to keep for themselves and how much (if any) to give to the other player. Any amount given to the other is then doubled by the researcher so that the more each gives, the greater the total payoff, but the payoff for each individual depends on what the other has decided to give. Cooperation is measured by the amount of endowment sent to the partner by each participant in each game, and ingroup bias (national parochialism) is measured by the difference in each player's donations to a partner from the same nation compared to one from an outgroup nation or stranger.

Combining data from all 42 nations, Romano et al. (2021) found that (1) liberals, compared to conservatives, cooperated more, independent of the other's group membership, (2) liberals showed less national parochialism (ingroup bias) in cooperation than conservatives, (3) conservatives had higher trust (i.e., expectation of cooperation) in ingroup members relative to outgroup members to a greater extent than liberals, and (4) liberals, compared to conservatives, identified less with their nationality and more with the world as a whole. These results provided strong support for the hypothesis that political ideology moderates the extent to which cooperation is limited by parochial identity and that these differences are associated with differences in social identification and trust.

The present study addresses the same questions about the role of political ideology on parochialism as Romano, Sutter, Liu, and Balliet (2021). However, the present study does not

define parochialism in terms of the difference between ingroup and outgroup cooperation. Instead, we compare altruism directed toward groups at different levels of inclusiveness—local, national, and international. We keep these three levels as nested with one another, which is consistent with the interdependent nature of collective action during a pandemic. This design allows us to assess whether parochialism is more evident at the local or national level and how it compares to nonparochial (global) altruism in the context of a global crisis. Furthermore, our study occurs in the context of the coronavirus pandemic, measuring prosociality in the form of unilateral contributions to either a local, national, or global charity, rather than cooperation in an experimental game where direct interdependence between specific players was more evident.

The present study was conducted in the United States and Italy. We ran parallel surveys in two countries in order to assess whether any effects of political ideology generalized outside of the prevailing political context in the United States. In the context of an online survey, participants were given an unexpected monetary bonus and then asked whether they wished to donate some or all of the bonus and, if so, to which one of three charitable organizations providing aid to those affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Any amount donated was doubled by the researchers. The three charities participants were given to choose from varied in level of inclusiveness—one at the international (global) level, one at the national (United States or Italy) level, and one at the local (state or region) level. Thus, our decision task provided a measure of both *how much* participants were willing to give (from 0% to 100%) and *to whom* they preferred to direct their donation, if any.

The online survey also asked participants to rate their political orientation on a liberal-conservative dimension and assessed their degree of social identification and trust with their local (state or region) ingroup, their national ingroup, and the world as a whole. This provided the opportunity to determine whether the findings by Romano, Sutter, Liu, and Balliet (2021) with respect to differences between conservatives and liberals in parochial cooperation, social identity, and trust would extend to a different measure of prosociality (altruistic charitable giving rather than cooperation) and adding local identity as another level of parochialism.

Method

Recruitment and Selection of Participants

In the United States, the survey was conducted during the week between May 13 and May 20, 2020. Respondents ($N = 932$) were recruited from the Prolific worker pool, screened to include only U.S. citizens or permanent residents and using quota sampling to achieve equal participation across the four Center for Disease Control (CDC) regions of the United States and two age groups (18–30; over 30). The replication of the survey was conducted in Italy between 11 and June 23, 2020. Respondents in Italy ($N = 723$) were recruited from the same worker pool used in the United States, thus ensuring roughly comparable socioeconomic characteristics for participants from the two countries and their exposure to identical survey procedures. Although the Prolific worker pool is not a representative random sample of the countries as a whole, we applied quota sampling for region of residence, gender, and age to achieve sufficient variability and to ensure equivalent frequencies in the two countries on these dimensions. The survey questionnaire was translated from the original English version into Italian by bilingual members of the research team and cross-checked with a third party.

Along with other demographic questions, survey respondents were asked to identify their political orientation on a scale ranging from 1 (*very liberal*) to 5 (*very conservative*). For purposes of the present study, those who rated themselves as 1 or 2 were classified as liberals, and those who self-rated as 4 or 5 were classified as conservative. We decided to treat ideology as a categorical variable for a number of reasons. First, it is not reasonable to assume that the 5-point scale is a continuous equal-interval measure (as multiple regression requires). Respondents who chose the midpoint of the scale are a heterogeneous set, some of whom (in the U.S. data) identify as Republicans and some as Democrats. We preferred to make comparisons only between those who were clearly self-identified liberals and conservatives.¹ As partial validation of this categorization, data on self-reported political affiliation in the U.S. sample indicated that of respondents who self-identified as liberals, 75% also identified as Democrats and only 1% as Republicans; of self-identified conservatives, 73% were Republican and 5% Democrats. In addition, mean comparisons are more meaningful and interpretable than regression weights (b coefficients) that assume equal intervals.

Across both samples, 889 respondents identified as liberals (483 in the United States; 406 in Italy) and 363 identified as conservative (268 in the United States; 95 in Italy). Although the subsample of conservatives is proportionally smaller in Italy than in the United States, the pattern of donation data and intercorrelations among the measures were the same for both countries (see the online supporting information, [Tables S1a–c](#) and [S2](#)), so our analyses used the combined samples. These respondents (total $N = 1252$) constituted the sample for the present study.

Procedure

After participants had responded to the demographic questions (including the respondent's state or region of residence), the critical decision task was introduced as part of the survey questionnaire. The decision was preceded by a short paragraph reminding participants of the seriousness of the COVID-19 pandemic as a medical and economic crisis. Participants then received instructions containing the following information:

As a participant in this study being conducted at the height of the coronavirus pandemic crisis, you will be given a bonus payment of \$5 (adjusted to 4€ in Italy) in addition to the \$3 (€2.5) base pay for completing this survey.

You may keep the bonus payment for yourself or you can choose to donate some, all or none of it to one of three charitable organizations that are providing food, medical, and other assistance to individuals and families that have been seriously impacted by the pandemic.

The three options for donations are (A) an aid organization in [participant's state or region] to provide for those most affected by the pandemic across the state (region); (B) a national aid organization to provide for those most affected by the pandemic across the United States (Italy); (C) an international aid organization to provide for those most affected by the pandemic across the world.² No specific charities were named so the three options varied only in scope of operations (level of inclusiveness).

If you choose to make a donation, you will first have to select one among those three options. Then you will be asked to indicate how much money you want to contribute toward that organization. For any amount of money you contribute, we will double that amount by a matching donation from our funds. (Note that because of doubling, the donation decision had one basic property of a public goods dilemma: Contributed funds resulted in increased benefits at the collective level but

a loss at the personal level for the individual donor. However, because the decision is unilateral, it most accurately reflects a measure of altruism rather than cooperation or trust.)

Respondents were given a comprehension test to be sure they understood the nature of the decision. (A participant would be rejected from the study in the event of failure after three test trials, with no further collection of data.) They were then asked whether they wanted to make a donation to one of the three listed charities or preferred not to donate. If they chose to donate to one of the options they then specified how much, in any amount up to \$5 (€4).

Measures

The amount that participants chose to donate to charity and the decision about which charity to designate constituted the dependent variables in this study. Following the decision task, the online questionnaire contained items assessing respondents' perceptions of the pandemic and their degree of social identification with and trust of others in their local region, nation, and the world as a whole.

Social Identity Scales

We used answers to a three-item scale inquiring about the participant's attachment, closeness, and perception of being a typical member of the local, national, and international community to construct a measure of social identity for each level considered in our study. The items were taken from previous research by Buchan et al. (2009, 2011). Ratings for each item were made on a 4-point scale and then averaged to create an index of strength of social identity at each level of collectivity.

Trust

The questionnaire included single-item measures of trust in other people in their local community, people in their own country, and people in other countries (the world as a whole). Each item was rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*do not trust them at all*) to 5 (*trust them completely*). Both the social identity and trust measures were adopted from previous research, using the original scale values. Since the trust ratings were made on a single-item scale, 5 points provide for more variance, whereas the social identity measures were three-item scales with 4 points for each item.

Ethical Approval

Our research plan was approved by the Institutional Review Board for Human Subjects at the University of South Carolina (Pro00099715) for the United States and by the Reggio Emilia Behavioral and Experimental Laboratory for Italy. Participation in the research was voluntary and informed consent was obtained from all participants. There was no deception involved in the study. Any bonus money designated by participants for contributions was doubled and distributed to relevant charities by the researchers.

Results

Descriptive statistics for our primary measures are reported in [Table 1](#) for the sample as a whole and for conservative and liberal subsamples. (Intercorrelations among the measures are reported in [Table S1](#) in the online supporting information).

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Overall ($N = 1,250$)	Liberals ($N = 889$)	Conservatives ($N = 363$)
Total Donation (.00–1.0)	$M = .42$ $SD = .37$	$M = .48$ $SD = .37$	$M = .30$ $SD = .34$
Local Donation (.00–1.0)	$M = .21$ $SD = .32$	$M = .21$ $SD = .33$	$M = .22$ $SD = .31$
Nation Donation (.00–1.0)	$M = .12$ $SD = .27$	$M = .14$ $SD = .30$	$M = .06$ $SD = .20$
World Donation (.00–1.0)	$M = .10$ $SD = .27$	$M = .13$ $SD = .31$	$M = .02$ $SD = .13$
Local Social Id (1–4)	$M = 2.50$ $SD = .75$	$M = 2.44$ $SD = .72$	$M = 2.63$ $SD = .79$
Nation Social Id (1–4)	$M = 2.70$ $SD = .77$	$M = 2.57$ $SD = .75$	$M = 3.02$ $SD = .71$
Global Social Id (1–4)	$M = 2.63$ $SD = .86$	$M = 2.79$ $SD = .84$	$M = 2.23$ $SD = .80$
Local Trust (1–5)	$M = 3.07$ $SD = .88$	$M = 2.98$ $SD = .88$	$M = 3.28$ $SD = .86$
Own Nation Trust (1–5)	$M = 2.69$ $SD = .85$	$M = 2.58$ $SD = .84$	$M = 2.96$ $SD = .84$
Other Nation Trust (1–5)	$M = 2.82$ $SD = .80$	$M = 2.93$ $SD = .74$	$M = 2.56$ $SD = .88$

Donations

With respect to the decision whether to donate any bonus money to a charity, liberals were significantly higher than conservatives in percentage of donors (70% vs. 56%; $z = 4.67$; $p < .001$) and amount donated. Mean donations (as a proportion of bonus money, including zeros) to each of the charities by liberals and conservatives are presented in Figure 1. In total (across all three charities), liberals donated more of their bonus money ($M = .48$) than did conservatives ($M = .30$) ($t = 7.57$, $df = 1250$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = .472$). However, both liberals and conservatives donated the most to the *local* (state or region) level and did not differ significantly in mean donations at that level (mean difference = $-.014$; $t = -0.677$; $df = 1250$; $p = .50$). The difference between the two groups showed in donations to the national level charity (mean difference = $.08$; $t = 4.43$; $df = 1250$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = .276$) and the international charity (mean difference = $.11$; $t = 6.61$; $df = 1250$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = .410$).

Compared to liberals, conservatives showed a significantly bigger drop in donations between local and national levels ($t = -4.92$; $p < .001$) and between local and the world charities ($t = -3.26$; $p < .001$). Thus, although both groups show a preference to donate to the local charity, conservatives show a greater tendency to limit their charitable donations to the most local level, whereas liberals donate more evenly across the levels and give significantly more than conservatives to the more inclusive charities.

Social Identity

Figure 2 depicts the mean level of social identification with each of the three collective identities (local, national, world) for liberals and conservatives. Replicating the findings of Romano, Sutter, Liu, and Balliet (2021), compared to liberals, conservatives were higher on local (mean




Figure 1. Mean aggregate donations by charity type and conservatism status.




Figure 2. Mean social identity score by locality and conservatism status.

difference = $-.19$; $t = 4.09$, $df = 1250$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = -.255$) and national identification (mean difference = $-.45$; $t = 9.96$, $df = 1250$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = -.602$), whereas liberals scored higher on global social identity (mean difference = $.55$; $t = 10.74$; $df = 1250$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = .669$).

What is of interest in comparing the results for donations (Figure 1) and social identity (Figure 2) is that, although conservatives are higher than liberals on identification with the nation, they are significantly less likely than liberals to give their donations to that level. Instead, conservatives show a greater pull toward donating at the most parochial level despite greater identification at the national rather than local level.

Trust

In addition to differences between liberals and conservatives in nationalism, Romano, Sutter, Liu, and Balliet (2021) found that liberals reported higher levels of trust (i.e., expectations that others would reciprocate contributions) regardless of nationality, whereas conservatives reported higher trust for ingroup members than for members of outgroups. Consistent with that finding, the results from our measures of trust in other people showed a pattern that parallels that for social identification (see Figure 3). Conservatives were higher than liberals in trust in people from local community (mean difference = $-.30$; $t = 5.44$, $df = 1250$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = -.339$) and own country (mean difference = $-.38$; $t = 7.19$, $df = 1250$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = -.448$), but significantly lower in trust in people from other countries (mean difference = $.37$; $t = 7.59$, $df = 1250$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = .474$). Thus, conservatives exhibit significantly more differential trust in ingroup members than outgroup members compared to liberals who make less distinction between ingroups and outgroups in




Figure 3. Mean trust score by locality and conservatism status.

their assessments of trustworthiness. Conservative parochialism is reflected in trust ratings as well as behavioral altruism.

Relationship Between Trust, Social Identity, and Donation Behavior

The parallels among differences between liberals and conservatives in donations to national and global charities and the differences on the dimensions of social identification and trust lead to the question of whether trust and social identity account for the observed differences in donation behavior. In order to explore this relationship, we combined the data on donations to national and global charities.³ We were not able to run regression analyses separately for each level of donations because the distributions of values for national and world donations were highly skewed owing to the large number of 0s, particularly for global donations (where variance for Conservatives in Italy was 0). For purposes of conducting regression analyses, we then created two new variables for social identification and trust that reflected the extent to which individuals scored higher in identity and trust for their local ingroup compared to that for other people in the world. Differential identification was defined as the difference between strength of identification with local community and identification with the global community. Similarly, differential trust was computed as the difference between trust ratings for members of the local community and trust ratings for people in other nations.

Political ideology, differential identity, and differential trust, along with country and demographic control variables, were entered into regression models to predict national/global donations. Results of these regression analyses are reported in Table 2. Results from Model 1 demonstrate that the contrast variable of political ideology (Conservative—Liberal) was highly significant even after controlling for other relevant demographic characteristics. When differential identity and trust were entered into the prediction (Model 2), two results of interest emerged. First, differential identity had a significant main effect on donations, but differential trust added no significant contribution to prediction of donations once social identity was included.⁴ Social identification and trust were moderately positively correlated at each level of identity ($r_s = .36-.44$) (see Table S1 in the online supporting information). Second, political ideology still made a significant contribution to prediction even after social identification and trust had been added to the equation. The coefficient for ideology was reduced somewhat (.058 compared to .076; with z value dropping from 8.33 to 6.11) but remained significant ($p < .0001$). Thus, the effect of political ideology on donations to more inclusive groups was not fully accounted for by differences between conservatives and liberals in global social identity or trust.

Table 2. Multiple Regressions Predicting National/Global Donation

	Model 1				Model 2			
	Coef. (<i>b</i>)	<i>SE</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>	Coef. (<i>b</i>)	<i>SE</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>
Country	.173	.022	7.71	.000	.150	.022	6.69	.000
Age	.001	.001	.45	.650	.001	.001	.10	.921
Sex	.023	.019	1.20	.229	.017	.019	.92	.360
Income group	.005	.005	1.13	.259	.008	.005	1.67	.094
Conservatism	-.076	.009	-8.33	.000	-.058	.009	-6.11	.000
Diff SocId					-.058	.010	-6.01	.000
Diff Trust					-.001	.010	-.02	.984

Discussion

The primary take-home point from these analyses is that parochial altruism is even more parochial (exclusive) than demonstrated in previous research, particularly among conservatives. When given a choice of contributing to charities at different levels of inclusiveness, conservatives almost exclusively chose the least inclusive (most local) ingroup. Despite a relatively high level of identification and trust in the national ingroup, conservatives rarely directed their donations to charities that would benefit others in the country as a whole, beyond their immediate state or region.⁵Note that, based on the nature of the decision in the present study, we are unable to say whether conservatives would have made donations to the national charity if that had been the only ingroup option. However, the preference for more local benefit is clear from our data. Although liberals also privileged the local charity in their donation choices, they were significantly more likely than conservatives to direct donations to the more broadly inclusive charities at the national or global level and showed significant identification and trust at the global level relative to local and national ingroups.

Overall, the present findings are consistent with previous research on the relationship between political ideology and the moral intuitions (virtues) underlying moral judgments (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). Across multiple measures of moral foundations, liberals consistently show highest endorsement and use of moral appeals to protect and care for others (harm/care foundation) and appeals to fairness and justice (fairness/reciprocity foundation). In their development of moral foundations theory, Haidt and Joseph (2004) labeled these two virtues as the *individualizing foundations* because of their relation to the liberal philosophy tradition and its emphasis on rights and welfare of individuals. Although conservatives also endorse those moral virtues, they give equivalent importance to a cluster of three other moral foundations – ingroup loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Haidt and Joseph labeled this cluster the *binding foundations* because of their emphasis on group-binding loyalty and duty.

In a more recent treatment of the relationship between moral judgments and political ideology, Sinn and Hayes (2017) argue that the individuating foundations associated with liberal ideology are better construed as *universalism*, as they reflect a broader set of moral commitments and broader sociality than the egocentric individualism implied by moral foundations theory. The present finding that, compared to conservatives, liberals express greater identification with the world as a whole and higher levels of contribution to global charities provides some support for Sinn and Hayes' reconstrual of the key difference between liberal and conservative ideologies. This reasoning is also supported by results from research on the Identity With All Humanity (IWAH) scale, which is structurally the same as our measure of global social identity. McFarland et al. (2019) report that IWAH correlates positively with the care and justice foundations from the Graham et al. (2011) measure of moral foundations and negatively with loyalty, authority, and purity.

In general, the results from the present study parallel results from the cross-national study by Romano, Sutter, Liu, and Balliet (2021) with respect to the relationship between ideology and cooperation, trust, and social identity. As in the earlier research, a clear difference emerged in our survey between liberals and conservatives in global social identity, and this accounted in part for the difference in donation to national and world charities. However, differences in locus of trust did not appear to mediate donation differences in our data. This contrasts with findings from previous research (Balliet et al., 2018; Romano, Sutter, Liu, & Balliet, 2021) where ingroup trust did account for differences in cooperation with ingroups versus outgroups.

However, our measure of trust was substantially different from that used in these studies, where trust was defined as the expectation that partners (or other group members) would cooperate. It is possible that expectations have a more proximal relationship to cooperative decisions than rating scales like ours that measure generalized trust in others. In addition, the decision task used in the present study (unilateral donations) is most likely not one that requires trust in the recipient, in contrast to cooperation dilemmas where interdependence is more salient.

The present findings also complement other recent studies exploring the role of political ideology and other sociopolitical factors in responses to the coronavirus pandemic (Muldoon et al., 2021). In one study comparing China and the United States in adoption of disease-preventative health behaviors, Chan et al. (2021) found that among conservatives in the United States, strength of national identification was (paradoxically) associated with *low* compliance with recommended health measures, similar to findings in Australia where liberals reported more compliance with physical distancing and handwashing recommendations than conservatives (Cardenas et al., 2021). A related study in Britain (Vignoles et al., 2021) also found that British national identity was not mobilized effectively to promote compliance with health directives to combat the spread of COVID-19, and these authors concluded that only national identity that is *inclusive* across subgroups facilitates collective action. This reasoning may help account for why high levels of national identity among conservatives in the present study did not translate to high contributions to national charities compared to contributions at the local level.

Finally, in combination with the studies cited previously, the results of the present study attest to the generalizability of the relationship between ideology and parochial altruism, across different manifestations of prosociality (experimental games, distribution decisions, charitable giving, compliance with appeals to collective welfare), and across national contexts. It is imperative to consider the implications of this sociopolitical factor for global cooperation, particularly in a context in which political parties around the world appealing to nationalist, xenophobic, and isolationist discourse appear to be gaining popularity (De Matas, 2017). Appeals to collective needs at the local level, more tightly linked and close to home, are likely to be effective for both liberals and conservatives. But appeals to global interdependence will fail among those low on global social identity, trust, and universalistic values, particularly if contributing to global efforts is perceived to be at the expense of local welfare (e.g., stocking vaccine supplies for local use vs. worldwide distribution). Rather than trying to mobilize global social cohesion directly, it may be necessary to create messages that effectively link global cooperation to local welfare in order to engage communal-binding motives and appeal to conservative values.

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Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web site:

Table S1. (a) Intercorrelations: Total Sample ($N = 1252$). (b) Intercorrelations: U.S. Sample ($N = 751$). (c) Intercorrelations: Italy Sample ($N = 501$)

Figure S1. (a) Mean donations by liberals and conservatives: U.S. (b) Mean donations by liberals and conservatives: Italy.

Figure S2. (a) Mean social identity for liberals and conservatives: U.S. (b) Mean social identity for liberals and conservatives: Italy.

Figure S3. (a) Mean trust for liberals and conservatives: U.S. (b) Mean trust for liberals and conservatives: Italy.

Table S2. Alternative Regression Model (Component Scores)