EXPLAINING ACCEPTANCE OF STATE SURVEILLANCE: POLARIZATION, IDEOLOGY, AND PARTISAN ALIGNMENT

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ABSTRACT

Ian Wallace: Explaining Acceptance of State Surveillance: Polarization, Ideology, and Partisan Alignment
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This paper tests whether partisan alignment, defined as having last voted for the governing party, leads to greater acceptance of state surveillance powers. The present study frames partisan alignment as a potential locus of political polarization around which individuals may structure attitudes towards the state wielding its authority to conduct surveillance. The analysis provides evidence that ptisan alignment has a positive predictive effect on public opinion regarding state surveillance irrespective of national levels of polarization. Partisan alignment was additionally found to be positively associated with counterterrorism policing as well. Further exploration reveals that the effects on state surveillance are particularly pronounced in countries with ideologically right-leaning governments and are reduced in countries with left-leaning and centrist governments. The results suggest that an individual's opinion of governmental powers and policies outwardly intended to maintain public safety are influenced by their alignment with the parties in control of government.

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INTRODUCTION & LITERATURE REVIEW

From the public street corner to the assumed privacy of one's home, individuals around the world find themselves, wittingly or not, captured in a net of surveillance systems. Surveillance, and the rationalization of information for central authorities, is a condition of modernity apparent in nearly all aspects of life, serving a central role for disciplinary authority (Haggerty and Ericson 2006). No longer crystalized in the panopticon's tower, surveillance has become liquid, flowing and seeping into nearly all aspects of modern social life (Lyon 2018; Bauman and Lyon 2013).

The spread of mass communication technology, as well as countries and companies sharing surveillance software and hardware, have aided in this universalization of experiences. Though experiences with surveillance have grown ubiquitous, real, and imagined, risks from such systems differ widely across individuals both within and between countries. Public opinion regarding surveillance is far from unilaterally positive or negative; respondents across the world and within countries possess contrasting opinions on their government's right to conduct surveillance. In fact, ideas and feelings about surveillance are partially independent of the actual technologies (Marx 2016). Popular discourse on attitudes towards state surveillance often frames the discussion as a tradeoff between liberty and security. Though scholarship indicates that such a tradeoff may not exists at all, as surveillance has become increasingly participatory and ultimately creates the same feelings of insecurity it outwardly claims to assuage (Lyon 2018; Pavone and Esposti 2012). As theory on the *culture of fear* instructs, fear and perceived risks are often misplaced, and refocusing fears on imagined threats assists fear mongers and certain authorities to promote their agendas, such as the further spread of surveillance technologies (Glassner 1999). Surveillance is an exceptionally expansive topic for discussion, likewise this paper restricts its scope to the policies, laws, and actions of states and state-aligned entities take regarding the collection and analysis of information about populations.

Starting in the late twentieth century, monitoring of public spaces came to be achieved through widespread use of surveillance cameras, a form of surveillance first put into wide use in French and British seaside resort towns in the 1980s as a means of controlling adolescent hooliganism. The adoption of surveillance cameras in Germany, by contrast, was a relatively more hesitant process, though there was popular support for the expansion of close circuit television (Hempel and Töpfer 2009). The United Kingdom, under a Conservative government, became an early adopter of mass use of surveillance cameras in order to combat the perception of town-centers as unsafe. Within twenty years surveillance cameras transformed from a novelty to an unremarkable part of city and townscapes (Goold, Loader, and Thumala 2013). Trust in law enforcement has been shown to be correlated with support for surveillance cameras, though the evidence of surveillance cameras' effectiveness at preventing crime and acts of terror has been mixed (Gurinskaya 2020; Piza et al. 2019; Stutzer and Zehnder 2013; Welsh and Farrington 2004). Surveillance camera's longtime use has contributed to a perception of it as an unassuming way to preserve public safety seemingly irrespective of recent innovations, such as in facial recognition, which may substantively alter its reach and potential (Huey 2010; Gill, Bryan, and Allen 2007).

The years following 9/11 saw an intensification of the surveillance powers afforded to, and assumed by, the police (Quinlan 2021). Counterterrorism policing, exceptional actions law enforcement authorities take in the case of a purported terrorist threat, emerged as a central tool of the state to ostensibly preserve public safety (Bloss 2007). These actions and tactics have been accomplished through means including phone tapping, preventative detentions, and stopping and searching people at random. The period also saw the passage of the Patriot Act in the United States, which greatly expanded the government and police's authority to surveille and engage in preemptive crime control (https://www.justice.gov/archive). North American and European Muslim communities, in particular, became both targets and participants in police efforts to combat terrorism (Rytter and Pedersen 2014; Tyler, Schulhofer, and Huq 2010). Though ostensibly legal, the use of these methods motivated significant concern regarding the erosion of civil liberties (Cole 2009; Deflem and McDonough 2015).

Recent years have seen an explosion of internet monitoring and big data surveillance. The leaking of National Security Agency (NSA) files by Edward Snowden represented a watershed moment in public awareness of secret surveillance. The revelations of NSA practices blurred the line between mass surveillance and targeted surveillance (Lyon 2015). The files revealed that NSA and equivalent agencies used big data and metadata to engage in large-scale monitoring of populations, though still for the purported purpose of targeting "suspects" (Lyon 2014). Studies have found that media discourse following Snowden's leaking of NSA files had a normalizing effect on secret surveillance, oftentimes despite journalists' and commentators' own intentions (Wahl-Jorgensen, Bennett, and Cable 2017; Schulze 2015; Mols and Janssen 2017). Snowden believed that uncovering government surveillance and creating awareness would induce public opposition to such policies and actions; there has not been a demonstrated effect of awareness on attitudes (Valentino et al. 2020).

Operationalizations of State Surveillance Attitudes

There are several established general political factors in the political sociology and surveillance studies literature that would be expected to predict attitudes towards government surveillance: concern about privacy and information transparency; fear of crime or terror; trust in authorities; political ideology; polarization; and partisan alignment.

Information Privacy and Transparency Concern

Privacy and transparency concerns have been shown to be a major influence on internet users' willingness to disclose personal information online (Dinev, Hart, and Mullen 2008). Though discourse often frames surveillance as a tradeoff between security and privacy, social scientists have found that there may not be an observable trade-off. When asked, surveillance-concerned citizens view their privacy at risk without any benefit to security, whereas trusting citizens felt more secure without perceiving a risk to their privacy (Pavone and Esposti 2012). Anxiety regarding government monitoring has also been found to be negatively correlated with support for domestic counterterrorism policies (Best, Krueger, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2012). Moreover, individuals who prefer greater transparency regarding the handling of information are less ready to share identifiable information (Dinev et al. 2013; Awad and Krishnan 2006). Though there is a measure

regarding support for transparency of state information in the survey used, I did not use it in my analysis because the literature does not compellingly suggest that transparency concerns cause variations in opinions towards state surveillance.

Fear of Crime & Terror

Fear of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack has been shown to predict support for counterterrorism policies (Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2007). The relationship between terrorist attacks and support for surveillance and restricting civil liberties is not necessarily a direct one. People may be more willing to trade privacy for security measures in the context of a perceived threat to a terrorist attack, as was the case immediately following 9/11 (Huddy et al. 2005). Xenophobia and low tolerance for minorities may also increase support for counterterrorist policies and laws (Davis and Silver 2004). Terrorist attacks may also cause voters to weigh political leadership more heavily into their vote choice calculi. However, some studies have cast doubt on whether terrorist attacks' have any long-term effect on making people more amendable to trading privacy for security (Wester and Giesecke 2019; Bloch-Elkon 2011).

Trust in Authorities

High trust in public institutions has linked to an increase in acceptance of surveillance (Nam 2018; Pavone and Esposti 2012; Trüdinger and Steckermeier 2017). Analysis of Canadian and American respondents found that trust of airport officials and low tolerance of minorities were key predictors of support for surveillance policies (Nakhaie and de Lint 2013). Scholarship additionally suggests that in nations with historically low trust levels, trust in government represents a constraint on support for the expansion of police powers, whereas in historically high-trust countries, the effect of trust in government on support for expanding police power may be negligible. David Denemark used the ISSP 2006 module on the role of government to examine the relationship between political trust and citizens' opposition to anti-terrorism police powers and found that the political context, whether a country was a liberal democracy, moderated the effect of political trust (2012). A recent totalitarian past may contribute lasting distrust in public institutions as well as among compatriots (Lichter, Löffler, and Siegloch 2021; Svenonius and Björklund 2018). Indeed,

looking at the relative support for discrete surveillance tactics in Tables 7 and 8, former-communist states in Europe appear to score lower on support than their Western European counterparts.

Ideology

Individual ideology comprises a key predictor in the literature. Self-identified liberals may express greater concern about privacy violations, than peer conservatives and communitarians (Nam 2017). Partisanship in the US has been shown to moderate individuals' support for restricting the civil liberties of white nationalist and Islamic fundamentalist terrorists such that conservatives are more likely to support restricting the liberties of suspected terrorists, excluding white nationalists (Caton and Mullinix 2022). Moreover, authoritarian beliefs, which are closely associated with prejudice against outgroup members, has been shown to predict acceptance of government surveillance (Cohrs et al. 2005; Duckitt and Sibley 2010). Perception of threats, though, could temporarily collapse differences in attitudes between groups with previously differing ideological commitments. Authoritarian beliefs are motivated by a desire for order and are characterized by support for authorities viewed as best able to ward off threats, which often include outgroups, to social cohesion (Hetherington & Weiler 2009). Political partisanship has also been shown to influence support for restricting civil liberties for security reasons (Cohrs et al. 2005). In the models described below, individual ideology serves as a control on the effects of partisan alignment.

Polarization

Polarization has gained heightened interest by scholars as it has intensified in the United States over the last half century (Már 2020; Garzia, Ferreira da Silva, and Maye 2023). Research has shown that polarization, by way of social sorting, drives anger and enthusiasm in response to threat (Mason 2016). Political polarization induces alignment along lines of potential conflict and stratifies individuals and groups around exclusive identities (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008). Recent scholarship on polarization have conceptualized multiple different frameworks to understand the phenomenon. Elite polarization, polarization among political elites and parties, and public opinion polarization, alignment of the public along multiple lines of potential disagreement, are related but distinct processes (Hetherington 2001; Baldassarri and Gelman

2008). Conceptualization of public opinion polarization includes at least three frameworks: the "fence" model, the "oil spill" model, and the affective model.

The "fence" model of public opinion polarization describes that people hold increasingly extreme views over time. People may additionally possess inclinations towards an authoritarian or liberal ideology which structures conceptions of how to implement a set of issues, ranging from civil rights to national security (Dunwoody and McFarland 2018). As such, one might expect to observe a close association between attitudes regarding civil liberties and state surveillance. The "oil spill" framework instead describes polarization occurring via belief consolidation such that once cross cutting alignments give way to cohesive packages of beliefs. These broadening alignments spread and encompass a wider range of issues that were previously unpolarized. Polarization in this model flows outward to capture more issues creating correlated stances across once unrelated issues (DellaPosta 2020). Finally, the affective polarization/social identity framework argues against the association between partisanship and ideology as predictive of polarization in favor of emotional loathing of political opponents. For example, Democrats and Republicans have been shown to possess stable enthusiasm ratings of their own party but have grown to increasingly dislike their opponents between 1980 and 2010 (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). Under affectively polarization, individuals may be increasingly willing to adopt, or conform to, their party's policy positions (Iyengar et al. 2019). Within the affective polarization framework, I believe that alignment with the party in charge of government will significantly predict support for state surveillance.

Partisan Alignment

This paper contributes partisan alignment as an additional political factor, though closely related to elite polarization, for which scholars studying public opinion of state surveillance and other state policies of a similar nature should account. Partisan alignment serves as an additional axis of polarization through which individuals may structure their political perceptions and positions. The effect of partisan alignment, as a discrete axis of polarization, on variation in public attitudes is relatively less established. Scholarship on affective polarization suggests that partisan alignment may have a predictive effect on policy attitudes (Iyengar et al. 2019). Research indicates that, within the United States, there is a strong correlation between

presidential approval and support for presidential powers (Reeves and Rogowski 2015). Other research has found an increase in support for democratic norm-eroding policies among Americans when their own party is in power (Simonovits, McCoy, and Littvay 2022). I predict that support for the parties in charge of government, measured through alignment, will be positively associated with acceptance of policies ostensibly meant to guarantee public safety. Partisan alignment and polarization may also interact to create sorting along ideological lines. This paper uses a comparative framework to examine surveillance attitudes, which is ideal for observing the effects of political factors like partisan alignment as it allows the researcher to better account for country-level context. Within this paper, partisan alignment refers to an individual's support of the political party, or coalition, at the head of government expressed through the self-reported party for which one voted.

Hypotheses

As described, there is a strong basis in existing scholarship for the premise that political context and affective polarization effects attitudes towards state surveillance. Authoritarian disposition and polarization are two previously established political factors that shape acceptance of state surveillance. Though partisan alignment is a relatively less explored factor, there is reason to believe that as a locus of polarization it would predict support for certain state powers. Given this basis, I advance three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Partisan alignment predicts the acceptance of state surveillance when controlling for authoritarian disposition and societal polarization.

Hypothesis 2: Partisan alignment predicts the acceptance of counterterrorism policing when controlling for authoritarian disposition and societal polarization.

Hypothesis 3: The effect of partisan alignment on state surveillance attitudes will be amplified when the governing party or coalition possesses a rightwing or center-right ideological tilt.

METHODS

Data

This paper tests these hypotheses using the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2016 module on the role of government, wave V. The most recent wave of the ISSP module on the role of government comprises of 35 nationally representative surveys administered between 2015 and 2018. The 35 surveys represented in the 2016 ISSP module are cross-sectional and nationally representative. Sampling procedures, recruitment strategies, and response rates varied for each country, though each country is represented by a probability sample. Sampling procedures in the survey include simple random sample, systematic random sample, proportional stratified sample, disproportional stratified sample, and multistage sample. ISSP gathered data using procedures that varied by country, including face-to-face interviews, self-administered questionnaires, and telephone interviews and includes weights when applicable (ISSP Research Group 2018). The ISSP proffers two distinct advantages. First, the International Social Survey Programme goes to great lengths to harmonize the data collected from the national surveys (Scholz 2005). Second, the wave V module on the role of government contains seven-items gauging respondents' attitudes regarding state surveillance and counter-terror policing. The seven-items present in the 2016 ISSP allows for a multi-variate analysis of the two constructs.

I removed three national surveys—United Kingdom, Philippines, and Hungary—from the sample. Voting data was not collected in the United Kingdom and Philippines, so I could not measure alignment in the two countries. The Hungary version of two indicators of the state surveillance measure were not harmonizable with the other national surveys, this made it impossible to examine the same dependent variable for that survey. I additionally removed observations from Thailand from the sample because a military coup d'état occurred in between the previous election and data collection. As such, the partisan

alignment measure in Thailand was meaningless. This left me with a starting sample of 43,482 observations across 31 countries.

Measures

State surveillance acceptance. The primary outcome variable of interest, acceptance of state surveillance, is a factor of four four-point scale indicators which gave respondents the range to answer whether they believed the government "definitely should" to "definitely should not" have the right to perform a given act of surveillance. These indicators asked respondents' opinions on the government's right to:

1. conduct video surveillance in public spaces;
2. monitor internet activity;
3. collect information on individuals inside the country;
4. and collect information on individuals abroad.

The Wave V ISSP module on the role of government was the first time the ISSP probed opinions on these facets of government surveillance.

Anti-terror police powers acceptance. A related though distinct construct, acceptance of anti-terrorism policing, is another factor of three four-point scale indicators. The ISSP indicators used to measure this construct asked respondents whether they believed that in the case of a suspected terror attack the government should have the authority to:

1. tap telephone conversations;
2. stop and search people at random;
3. and hold people in pretrial detention.

I use the anti-terror police powers acceptance measure, in the models within which it appears, as a dependent variable covaried with the state surveillance acceptance measure.

Partisan alignment. The binary variable of partisan alignment was measured from respondents' self-reported political party for which they last voted. Respondents who voted for the political party in charge of the

country's executive branch of government, or for a party that is a member of the governing coalition, were coded as aligned with political authority in their country. Respondents who either voted for a party not affiliated with the governing coalition or did not vote, despite being eligible, were coded as not aligned with their country's political authority. Coding was determined using details of relevant election results from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and its archived website (Parline: Inter-Parliamentary Union 2023). Governing parties, along with major parties not in government, and the number of respondents in each group across all countries are listed in Table 7 in the appendix.

Authoritarian disposition. The index variable of liberal-authoritarian ideology is measured from three four-point scale indicators measuring opinions on civil liberties. The items asked respondents whether they believed people should be allowed to:

1. organize public meetings against the government;
2. organize protest marches and demonstrations;
3. and whether people looking to overthrow the government should be allowed to hold public meetings to express their views.

This variable was validated and weighted using confirmatory factor analysis.

Polarization. This ordinal country-level measure, taken from the Varieties of Democracy data set, estimates the level of societal polarization in 2016 on a five-point scale from no polarization to "serious" polarization. Polarization scores, like many other V-Dem measures, was determined by aggregating expert opinions on the level of societal polarization present in a country. The experts were asked "How would you characterize the differences of opinions on major political issues in this society?" Additional clarification that V-Dem was interested in how differences in opinions may result in clashes of views and polarization or, alternatively, whether there is general agreement on key political issues (V-Dem Institute 2023). No countries in the sample achieved "no polarization," so I treat the measure as a four-point scale in which the lowest score is "limited polarization." The societal polarization measure possessed a relatively even distribution across the

sample countries; the "limited," "moderate," and "serious" polarization categories each contained 7 countries and the "medium" polarization category included 10 countries. V-Dem has a separate measure for political polarization which focuses on politically motivated interpersonal hostility, the societal polarization measure was selected due to its focus on attitude polarization. I additionally control for a potential moderating effect of polarization on partisan alignment. Scholars have linked high polarization with autocratization and violence. Additionally, higher perceptions of threat could increase acceptance of policies seen as useful to preserving security among normally authoritarian-adverse individuals (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; McCoy et al. 2022; Papada and Lindberg 2023).

Controls. I include controls for education, wealth, age, and sex (male or female). Scholarship suggests that certain demographics can influence trust in government which may influence the outcome variables (Nakhaie and de Lint 2013; Trüdinger and Steckermeier 2017). Controlling for these demographics helps account for an unobserved mediation pathway to acceptance of state surveillance and counterterrorism policing. To minimize variance across variables and harmonizability of the national surveys, age was sorted into decade long buckets. Education was measured using the 2016 ISSP item on the highest completed degree of education for international comparison. Wealth was measured be grouping individuals into within-country quintiles of wealth based on their household income. Individuals from each national survey were then grouped according to their within-country-quintile of wealth for international comparison.

Analytic strategy

In order to evaluate the hypotheses described above, structural equation modelling (SEM) with latent variables was used. SEM possesses several advantageous qualities that make it well-suited for the analysis. It allows for critical extensions of the quantitative analysis--specifically estimating models with multiple dependent variables and simultaneously estimating latent variables with ordinal indicators. SEM allows researchers to comparatively evaluate the fit of alternative models via nested chi-square tests, likewise it supports the model comparison approach to data analysis (Tomarken and Waller 2005) Additionally, it simultaneously estimates the measurement and structural submodels among multiple variables and it

accommodates measurement error through the estimation of latent variables. It also yields a range of fit measures that enable one to evaluate the degree to which the data confirms the researcher's theorized model.

In the following results section, I estimate a series of models of varying complexity to evaluate the effect of partisan alignment on the outcome variables. The path diagram depicting the measurement model estimated here using confirmatory factor analysis is presented in Figure 1. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is a theoretically informed statistical framework for linking multiple observed variables to latent variables that are not directly observable. The concept underpinning factor analysis is that a small number of latent variables are responsible for variation and covariation in a larger set of observed indicators (Roos and Bauldry 2022). To explain within this paper's context, I am interested in examining the unobservable attitudes towards respondent's possess towards state surveillance. I hypothesize that I can use the four ISSP indicators to measure a latent construct that I believe is representative of people's conceptualization of state surveillance and their attitudes thereof. As shown, the two endogenous variables, acceptance of state surveillance and acceptance of counterterrorism policing, were modeled as latent variables. Confirmatory factor analysis was additionally used to estimate factor loadings with which to weight the authoritarian disposition index measure, which was then treated as an observed variable within the SEM models.

To take full advantage of model comparison approach to data analysis afforded by SEM, I estimated multiple models of varying complexity and compared model fit indices and parameter estimates. I first estimated two discrete single endogenous variable models using acceptance of state surveillance and acceptance of counterterrorism policing as the respective dependent variables. The path diagrams depicting the single endogenous variable SEM models are presented in Figures 3 and 4. Next, I estimated a two endogenous variable model using both acceptance of state surveillance and counterterrorism policing as covarying dependent variables. The path diagram of the model is presented in Figure 5. I then extended my analysis of acceptance of state surveillance by constructing a multilevel model examining the effects of polarization at the country level. I estimated a robustness test of the two univariate models using linear mixed-effects regression. I estimated individual predicted factor scores on the endogenous variables and used them as the dependent variables in the mixed effects models.

Moving beyond global evaluation, I selected four countries of varying levels of polarization for a case comparison analysis. I additionally interrogate the effect of partisan alignment across all sampled countries and divide the countries into groups based on ideological tilt of governing parties to further investigate the potential effects of elite polarization.

All independent variables were allowed to covary to account for possible relationships among them. Descriptive statistics for all observed variables included in the model are shown in Table 1. Analysis was conducted in R using the lavaan package version 0.6-14. To ensure generalizability to the population of each country represented in the sample, analysis was conducted using the weighting factor included in the ISSP dataset. Missing data in the CFA and single endogenous variable models were handled according to full-information maximum likelihood estimation (FIML). FIML allows for partially missing data and non-normal distributions of the data. FIML has additionally been demonstrated to be unbiased and more efficient than other methods for handling missingness (Enders and Bandalos 2001). In the multilevel model, two endogenous variable model, robustness tests, missingness was handled using listwise deletion. I clustered standard errors at the country-level. Cluster robust standard errors are measurements that estimate the standard-error of regression parameters in cases where the observations are subdivided into different groups (Cameron and Miller 2015).

RESULTS

Confirmatory factor analysis

As mentioned above, I first estimate a confirmatory factor analysis of the two endogenous variables using clustered standard errors and FIML. Of the available 43,482 observations, the CFA model used 36,125. As described above, I specified the model such that the items on the government's right to conduct video surveillance of public spaces, monitor internet activity, collect information on individuals inside of the country, and collect information on individuals abroad underlay the latent construct of state surveillance acceptance—whereas, the items on phone tapping, stopping and searching people on the street, and detaining people without trial underlay the construct for counterterrorism policing. I included a covariance between the items on collecting information on individuals within and abroad due to similarities in the wording of the respective survey questions. I specified a covariance linking the two constructs as I believe they are closely related. In spite of good fit, there are some country-level differences which suggest an alternative hypothesized model would better represent the latent construct.

The relevant model fit indices suggest that the specified model structure was consistent with the data. The Yuan-Bentler scaling correction factor yielded a significant chi-square of 187.9, which in usual circumstances would suggest poor fit, however, the chi-square test statistic is highly sensitive to large sample sizes (Bentler and Bonett 1980). As such, I do not consider its estimate when evaluating model fit. Both the robust CFI (.981) and robust TLI (0.967) neared 1.0, the marker which distinguishes ideal fit relative to the baseline model. The RMSEA (0.020) fell under 0.05 and robust RMSEA (0.062) fell under 0.08, the threshold for acceptable fit. SRMR (0.029) passed within the threshold of good fit, 0.08 (Hu and Bentler 1999). Each indicator loaded significantly on the respective constructs; full-results displayed in Figure 1 and goodness-of-fit results are shown in Table 2. The factor loadings of the indicators collect information on individuals abroad and hold individuals in pretrial detention in the case of a suspected terrorist attack were set to 1. As

such the impacts of the indicators and their respective coefficients may be understood in terms relative to the indicators set to 1.

CFA was also used to evaluate a construct on liberal-authoritarian disposition. As the specified model approximated saturation, all fit indices indicated acceptable goodness of fit. Whether people should be allowed to organize public meetings against the government (1.70), organize protest marches and demonstrations (1.784), and whether revolutionaries should be allowed to hold public meetings (1) all loaded on the construct significantly. The factor loadings, presented in the parentheses above, were provided weights for the index of the three indicators used in the following SEM models. The results of the CFA models are presented in Figures 1 & 2 and the goodness-of-fit measures are presented in Table 2.

Single Endogenous Variable Structural Equation Models

I then estimated two discrete models with acceptance of state surveillance and acceptance of counterterrorism policing as the respective dependent variables, the full results of both models are presented in Table 3 and the path diagrams depicting the respective models are presented in Figures 2 and 3.

The surveillance acceptance model goodness-of-fit indices indicated that the model achieved a good representation of the data. The robust CFI (0.977) and robust TLI (0.964) were close to 1, the RMSEA (0.013) and robust RMSEA (0.036) fell under 0.05, and the SRMR (0.020) passed under 0.08. Using FIML to impute missing observations achieved a sample of 26,738. Respondents who were aligned with their country's political authority ($p = 0.005$) on average scored 0.127 units higher on the latent construct of surveillance acceptance than their non-aligned counterparts. Authoritarian disposition ($p = 0.766$), country-level societal polarization ($p = 0.159$), and the interaction of alignment and polarization ($p = 0.386$) did not have a predictive effect on the latent construct of acceptance of state surveillance.

The acceptance of counterterrorism policing goodness-of-fit indices demonstrated adequate model fit. The robust CFI (0.921) passed the 0.9 threshold, though the robust TLI (0.866) neared it, the RMSEA (0.017) fell below 0.05, the robust RMSEA (0.063) was below 0.08, and the SRMR (0.026) passed under 0.08. FIML was used to achieve a sample of 26,738. Respondents aligned with political authorities ($p = 0.021$) scored, on average, 0.131 units higher on the latent construct for counterterrorism policing acceptance than

their non-aligned counterparts. Each increase in the level of polarization (p = 0.027) was associated with a 0.088 unit decrease on the latent construct. Authoritarian disposition (p = 0.526) and the interaction of alignment and polarization (p = 0.836) were not shown to have a predictive effect on the latent construct.

I extend my analysis of the acceptance of the state surveillance latent construct into a Multilevel SEM framework. Owing to the data demands, only the predictor variables—alignment, authoritarian disposition, and the interaction of alignment and polarization—were included in the level 1 equation and polarization was used as the predictor in the level 2 equation. I excluded the demographic controls as none were shown to be a consistently significant predictor of surveillance attitudes. Additionally, inclusion of all independent variables caused the variance-covariance matrix to become not positive definite. The goodness-of-fit measures suggest adequate fit for the multilevel model: the robust CFI (0.986) and robust TLI (0.972) neared 1.0, the RMSEA (0.015) and the robust RMSEA (0.038) fell below 0.05, and the within covariance-matrix SRMR (0.019) fell below 0.08.

Respondents who were aligned with their country's political authority (p = 0.008) on average scored 0.194 units higher on the latent construct of surveillance acceptance than their non-aligned counterparts. Authoritarian disposition (p = 0.351), and the interaction of alignment and polarization (p = 0.632) did not have a predictive effect on the latent construct of acceptance of state surveillance in the level-1 equation. Polarization (p = 0.668) was not shown to influence a latent construct measured using the country-level means of the state surveillance acceptance indicators. The full output results are presented in Table 8 in the appendix.

Two Endogenous Variable Structural Equation Model

Next, I estimated a two dependent variable structural equation model to evaluate the effects of the predictor variables on the dependent variables simultaneously. Due to high data demands stemming from clustering, demographic controls were omitted from the model. These controls were not consistently significant in the single endogenous variable models, nor do they represent a substantive component of the research question. To represent the a priori conceptualization that surveillance and counterterrorism policing are related concepts, I specified a covariance linking the two constructs. The two endogenous variable model

achieved good fit: the robust CFI (0.963) and robust TLI (0.942) neared 1.0, the RMSEA (0.014) fell below 0.05, the robust RMSEA (0.059) fell below 0.08, and the SRMR (0.032) fell below 0.08. The factor loadings of the video surveillance and internet monitoring indicators on the state surveillance construct changed moving from the univariate to multivariate models.

Regarding the latent construct for acceptance of state surveillance, respondents aligned with political authority ($p = <0.001$) scored, on average, 0.216 units higher than their counterparts. Polarization ($p = 0.339$) and authoritarian disposition ($p = 0.470$) did not demonstrate a predictive effect on the construct when evaluate simultaneously with the other latent construct. Moving to the latent construct on counterterrorism policing, respondents aligned with political authority ($p = .004$) scored, 0.129 units higher than non-aligned counterparts. Polarization ($p = 0.044$) was weakly significant on the counterterrorism policing construct. On average respondents decreased 0.084 units on the counter terrorism policing construct with each level increase of polarization. Authoritarian disposition was not shown to have a predictive effect on either construct when estimated simultaneously. Full output results are presented in Table 3 and the path diagram is depicted in Figure 5.

Mixed Effects Model

The single endogenous variable models were re-specified within a linear mixed effects model to test the robustness of the results and confirm that the hypotheses would be supported if I made different methodological choices. Acceptance of state surveillance and counterterrorism policing was measured within this framework by calculating individual predicted factor scores from the first CFA model estimated above. The predicted individual factor scores were used as dependent variables.

Regarding the effects of the independent variables on the predicted factor scores of the surveillance attitudes construct, individuals aligned with political authority ($p = <0.001$) scored, on average, 0.0855units higher than their non-aligned counterparts. Additionally, a one unit increase on the authoritarian disposition index ($p = <0.001$) was associated with a 0.0053 unit increase on the predicted latent construct scores. Polarization ($p = 0.274$) and the interaction of alignment and polarization ($p = 0.388$) did not have a predictive effect on the outcome. Moving to the predicted scores on the counterterrorism acceptance

construct, alignment (p = <0.001) was associated with a 0.1449 increase on the average factor scores. A one unit increase on the authoritarian index (p = <0.001) was associated with a 0.0104 unit increase on the construct. Polarization (p = 0.075) did not have a predictive effect on the construct scores however its interaction with alignment (p = 0.013) was associated with a 0.0227 decrease on the construct. Full results are presented in Table 4.

Across all alternative specifications presented above, the conclusions with respect to the hypotheses did not change; partisan alignment consistently demonstrated a predictive effect on acceptance of state surveillance and counterterrorism policing when controlling for authoritarian disposition and societal polarization.

Disentangling Country Effects

As an exploratory set of analyses, I set out to examine more specific country effects. I plotted the confidence intervals of partisan alignment on state surveillance attitudes for each country. The plot shows that partisan alignment is significant with a positive in 15 countries in the sample. It is not significant in 14 countries, and negatively significant in 2. I embarked on this project presuming that notable between-country differences regarding surveillance attitudes, and the constructs underlying them, existed. Alignment may not be universally predictive, but it is instructive in a comparative context. I was left wondering whether alignment may reduce—or be reduced by—the effects of ideology, individual or party, perceptions of insecurity, and context on surveillance acceptance.

Likewise, I next explored the potential effects of elite polarization and governmental ideological tilt on attitudes towards state surveillance. I stratified the sample countries according to the ideological tilt of the parties and coalitions in power and accounted for between-group variation using fixed effects, results presented in Table 5. Country-level measures were excluded from these estimations. Ideological tilt of parties was determined using the innate measure in the ISSP survey supplemented by the *Encyclopedia of World Political Systems* when ISSP coding was missing (Derbyshire 2016). When a coalition included parties on both right and left sides of the political spectrum, I coded the coalition as "centrist." When a coalition included centrists and

parties on one side of the ideological spectrum, I considered the government as tilting towards the respective side of the spectrum. In the stratified models I included a measure for countries as a fixed effects measure.

In the model of countries with left-leaning governments, partisan alignment (0.094) was not found to predict acceptance of state surveillance. A unit increase in authoritarian disposition, however, (<0.001) was associated with a 0.014 increase in support for state surveillance. Neither highest degree earned, nor female had a predictive effect on acceptance of state surveillance Age (0.012) was associated with a 0.018 increase. The model of left-leaning governments demonstrated adequate fit; the CFI (0.989) and TLI (0.983) neared 1.0, the RMSEA (0.026) fell below 0.05, and the SRMR (0.016) fell below 0.08. The achieved sample was 3,717 across 6 countries. Among these six countries, the confidence interval of partisan alignment on the construct did not include zero and values greater than zero only in France and Sweden.

In the model of centrist governments, partisan alignment (<0.001) was associated with a 0.075 increase on acceptance of state surveillance. Age (<0.001) was associated with a 0.018 increase on the latent construct for each decade bucket. Individuals with advanced degrees were less accepting of state surveillance, whereas older and wealthier respondents were more accepting Among the 11 countries with governments categorized as centrist, the confidence intervals of alignment on the state surveillance construct did not include zero, and values below zero, in Czech Republic, Germany, and South Africa. The confidence intervals of the 8 other countries included zero.

In the model of right-leaning governments, partisan alignment (<0.001) had a particularly large effect and was associated with a 0.212 unit increase in acceptance of state surveillance above and beyond the other controls. Authoritarian disposition (<0.001), household income (0.004), and age (<0.001) were positively associated the state surveillance construct with effect sizes of 0.013, 0.011, and 0.034 respectively. Moving up the hierarchy on highest degree earned (<0.001) was associated with a 0.016 decrease in support for state surveillance. The effect of partisan alignment was significant and positive in 11 of the 14 countries categorized as having right-leaning governments. The confidence intervals of partisan alignment on the state surveillance construct for each country arranged by the government's ideological tilt is presented in Figure 6.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has proposed that partisan alignment may predict relatively higher acceptance of state surveillance, a hitherto under-explored explanation of variation in opinions towards security policy. Partisan alignment was consistently found to have a positive predictive effect on the latent constructs of state surveillance and counterterrorism policing attitudes when examined in a comparative framework. The hypothesis was evaluated by analyzing data from 31 nationally representative surveys, that included attitudes on the role of government, self-reported voting records, and demographic information using structural equation modeling and mixed effects models. A confirmatory factor analysis measuring latent constructs on state surveillance and counterterrorism policing attitudes using cluster robust standard errors was found to adequately reproduce the structure underlying the set of the variables.

The effect sizes of partisan alignment on state surveillance acceptance varied across the models, ranging from an associated 0.0855 unit increase on the state surveillance latent construct in the mixed effects model to a 0.216 unit increase in the two dependent variable SEM model. Partisan alignment's effect size on the counterterrorism policing latent construct, on the other hand, were stable across the three models in which it was estimated. These findings suggest that by virtue of being aligned with the parties in government, an individual may be more likely to express greater acceptance of certain measures outwardly designed to maintain public safety. Alternatively, citizens who do not support the current parties in government, may feel greater unease about the state wielding its authority to surveil. Partisan alignment remained highly significant when controlling for age, sex, income, education, authoritarian disposition, and national polarization. Only within the mixed effects models did authoritarianism have an observable and positive effect on the latent constructs. Authoritarian disposition was measured from individual's attitudes towards civil liberties. The operationalization of authoritarian disposition may be a limitation of the present study. Recent literature links

authoritarian disposition, within the context of the United States, closely with attitudes towards civil rights (Hetherington and Weiler 2009).

The lack of association between support for civil liberties and support/opposition to state surveillance may suggest that, within this paper's context, opinions between the two issues are not polarized together as one would expect under the fence or oil spill models. Acceptance of state surveillance may still be ideologically motivated, but it does appear to be partially determined by partisan alignment which fits well within an affective polarization framework. These findings have implications for further study of public opinion and how polarization my influence support for the use of certain state powers.

Elite polarization does seem to influence state surveillance attitudes. When I stratified the sample countries by governing party/coalition ideology, alignment in countries with left-leaning governments was negatively associated with support for state surveillance. On the other hand, the effect of alignment was particularly pronounced in countries with right-leaning governments, as shown in Table 5 and Figure 6. As explored in Tables 9, 10, & 11 in the appendix, center and left leaning governments may reduce differences in opinion regarding surveillance between those aligned and not aligned with the parties in government, whereas a right-leaning government amplifies differences between the two groups. The effect of government ideological tilt should be further explored in future study. The V-dem societal polarization, on the other hand, was inconsistently significant on the two latent constructs. Additionally, there was little evidence to suggest that polarization moderated the effect of partisan alignment on the two latent constructs. Another limitation of the present study, and indeed comparative studies broadly, is the fact that the surveyed countries represent a non-probability sample and the sample skew towards Europe, and countries with ideologically right-leaning governments, shaped the observed outcomes. (Dedrick et al. 2009).

The effects of alignment are likely best appreciated within a multilevel or longitudinal framework. Partisan alignment did not have a significant effect in all evaluated countries, as shown in Figure 6. This does not contradict my hypothesis as countries represent different political and historical contexts that influence attitudes of the measured constructs. Indeed, a multilevel or comparative framework is ideal to observe the effects of partisan alignment on public opinion. Within a cross-section of a single country, alignment is

difficult to disentangle from other contextual political factors, such as elite polarization and ideology. In cases where there is not an observed effect of partisan alignment, it may still be amplifying or attenuating the effects of other variables, as appears to be the case in Tables 9 and 10. But it would be exceedingly difficult to disentangle these effects without the ability to draw comparisons. To use the United States as an example, there was not an appreciable difference in opinions on state surveillance between people who previously voted Democrat and those who previously voted Republican/non-voters when Barack Obama was president. One could imagine data collected ten years prior during the Bush presidency yielding different results.

This study advances a number of contributions to the ongoing academic discourse about variations in public opinion regarding state surveillance and counterterrorism policing. First, it joins a growing literature looking at political orientation of individuals situated within their respective political contexts. To this end, it contributes partisan alignment as a predictor of security policy support within a multilevel and affective polarization framework. Second, researchers should not take effects observed within a single country for granted. The estimates of the latent construct and model fits varied widely across the sample countries. This suggests that the construct of state surveillance, in essence people's conception of the construct, may differs across contexts as well (Ruelens, Meuleman, and Nicaise 2018). Lastly, though societal polarization and authoritarianism remain important factors to consider regarding public opinion formation for the topics examined in the study, their roles and the models used to understand their impact should be interrogated further. Future studies should continue to explore affective polarization's and partisan alignment's impacts on shaping public opinion.

TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables, Unweighted

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Count
State Surveillance*					
Video Surveillance	2.85	1.043	1	4	41494
Internet Surveillance	2.123	1.032	1	4	40443
Collect Info. Within Country	2.313	1.051	1	4	40783
Collect Info. Outside Country	2.224	1.028	1	4	40072
Counter Terrorism Policing*					
Terror Suspect: Phone tapping	2.695	1.066	1	4	41105
Terror Suspect: Detain People	2.315	1.075	1	4	40615
Terror Suspect: Stop and Search	2.493	1.07	1	4	40830
Authoritarian Disposition*	5.131	3.484	1	14.452	38402
Public Protest Meetings	1.743	0.875	1	4	40643
Protest Demonstrations	1.884	0.939	1	4	40363
Revolutionaries: Public Meetings	2.31	1.073	1	4	40255
Partisan Alignment	0.402	0.490	0	1	37278
Polarization	1.452	1.091	0	3	31
Female	1.535	0.499	1	2	43369
Quintile of Household Income	2.998	1.414	1	5	33365
Age by Decade	3.699	1.653	1	6	43185
	18-25		11.57%		
	26-35		16.72%		
	36-45		17.46%		

	46-55			17.74%			
	56-65			17.45%			
	greater than 66			19.05%			
Highest Degree Earned		3.318	1.643349	0	6	42816	
	No formal education			5.12%			
	Primary school			8.00%			
	Lower secondary			18.93%			
	Upper secondary			25.47%			
	Post-secondary, non-tertiary			13.80%			
	Lower-level tertiary, first stage			17.77%			
	Upper-level tertiary			10.93%			

*****Higher values indicate greater support for state surveillance, counterterrorism policing and curbing civil liberties respectively.

Table 2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Goodness-of-Fit Indices

Scaled $\chi 2$	df	$\chi 2$ P-value	Robust CFI	Robust TLI	RMSEA	Robust RMSEA	SRMR	Number of Clusters
187.889	12	0.000	0.981	0.967	0.020	0.062	0.029	31

Figure 1. Confirmatory factor analysis model of the two endogenous latent constructs.

This figure depicts CFA model of the two endogenous variables. The researcher specified covariances between the two constructs and between the indicators for collecting information on individuals within a country and abroad. The goodness-of-fit measures, shown in Table 2, excluding chi-square, indicate that the model depicted in the figure is a good representation of the data. The factor loadings, listed above the lines connecting the indicators to the constructs show the relative magnitude each item has on the respective construct.



Figure 2. Confirmatory factor analysis model of authoritarian disposition measure.

This figure depicts the CFA model used on the three indicators for the authoritarian disposition measure. The factor loading scores obtained from the CFA estimation were used as weights for the respective index variable.



Table 3. Output of Structural Equation Modeling Regressions on the State Surveillance, Counterterrorism Policing, and Multivariate Models

	State Surveillance Acceptance			Counterterrorism Policing Acceptance			Multivariate Model		
	Estimate	Std. Err.	p	Estimate	Std. Err.	p	Estimate	Std. Err.	p
Factor Loadings									
State Surveillance									
Video Surveillance	1.108	0.072	<0.001				0.925	0.069	<0.001
Internet Surveillance	1.399	0.093	<0.001				1.073	0.053	<0.001
Collect Info. Within Country	1.089	0.026	<0.001				1.082	0.020	<0.001
Collect Info. Outside Country	1.00+						1.00+		
Counterterrorism Policing									
Terror Suspect: Phone tapping				1.234	0.097	<0.001	1.281	0.062	<0.001
Terror Suspect: Stop and Search				1.091	0.057	<0.001	1.082	0.054	<0.001
Terror Suspect: Detain People				1.00+			1.00+		
Regression Slopes									
State Surveillance									
Authoritarian Disposition	0.002	0.006	0.766				0.005	0.007	0.470
Partisan Alignment	0.127	0.043	0.003				0.216	0.041	≤0.000
Polarization	-0.048	0.034	0.159				-0.039	0.041	0.339
Female	-0.008	0.009	0.354						
Quintile of Household Income	0.008	0.005	0.117						
Age by Decade	0.022	0.011	0.051						
Highest Degree Earned	-0.031	0.026	0.231						
Interaction of Alignment & Polarization	0.023	0.026	0.386						
Counterterrorism Policing									
Authoritarian Disposition				-0.005	0.008	0.526	-0.003	0.007	0.705
Partisan Alignment				0.131	0.057	0.021	0.129	0.045	0.004
Polarization				-0.088	0.04	0.027	-0.084	0.042	0.044
Female				-0.031	0.011	0.005			
Quintile of Household Income				0.020	0.006	0.002			
Age by Decade				0.016	0.010	0.122			
Highest Degree Earned				-0.012	0.024	0.613			
Interaction of Alignment & Polarization				-0.008	0.039	0.836			
Fit Indices									
Scaled $\chi 2$	137.886			144.856			180.992		
df	25			16			27		
Robust CFI	0.977			0.921			0.963		
Robust TLI	0.964			0.866			0.942		
RMSEA	0.013			0.017			0.014		
Robust RMSEA	0.036			0.063			0.059		
SRMR	0.02			0.026			0.032		
Count	26738			26738			29368		

Figure 3. Path diagram of the univariate SEM model of the state surveillance acceptance latent construct. This is a visual representation of the first model expressed in Table 3. The relevant fit indices suggested this model is an adequate representation of the data. As denoted by the solid lines, only the measure for partisan alignment had a significant predictive effect on the latent construct.



Figure 4. Path diagram of the univariate model of the counterterrorism policing acceptance latent construct. This is a visual representation of the second model expressed in Table 3. The relevant goodness-of-fit measures suggest adequate representation of the data. As denoted by the solid lines, partisan alignment, polarization, female, and household income all had significant predictive effects on the latent construct. The effects of partisan alignment (0.131) and household income (0.020) were both positive, whereas the effect estimates for polarization (-0.088) and female (-0.031) were negative on the latent construct.



Figure 5. Path diagram of the multivariate model of the state surveillance and counterterrorism policing acceptance latent constructs. This is a visual representation of the third model expressed in Table 3. The relevant fit indices suggested this model is an adequate representation of the data. Partisan alignment had a positive and significant on both constructs. Polarization had a negative significant effect on the counterterrorism policing acceptance construct. Authoritarian disposition measure was insignificant across the two constructs. Effect estimates are written above the respective line in the path diagram.



Table 4. Mixed Effects Model Regressions of State Surveillance and Counterterrorism Policing Constructs

	State Surveillance Acceptance		Counterterrorism Policing Acceptance	
Predictors	*Estimates*	*p*	*Estimates*	*p*
(Intercept)	-0.0229	0.682	0.0865	0.350
Alignment	0.0855	**<0.001**	0.1449	**<0.001**

Authoritarian Disposition	0.0053	**<0.001**	0.0104	**<0.001**
Alignment by Polarization	-0.0044	0.388	-0.0227	**0.013**
Polarization	0.0287	0.274	-0.084	0.075
Age by Decade	0.0091	**<0.001**	0.0025	0.412
Female	-0.0187	**<0.001**	-0.0205	**0.028**
Highest Degree Earned	-0.0112	**<0.001**	-0.0297	**<0.001**
Household Income	0.0149	**<0.001**	0.0315	**<0.001**

Random Effects

σ^2	0.156131	0.501131
τ_{00}	0.024103 $_{country}$	0.078049 $_{country}$
ICC	0.133731	0.134758
N	31 $_{country}$	31 $_{country}$
Observations	23516	23516
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.021 / 0.152	0.026 / 0.157
log-Likelihood	-11641.737	-25348.426

Figure 6. Confidence interval of alignment on the state surveillance construct estimated for each country and organized by ideology of the governing party or coalition.



Table 5. State Surveillance Attitudes Stratified by Governing Coalition's Ideological Tilt Using Fixed Effects

	Mod Left Tilt			Mod Centrist			Mod Right Tilt		
	Estimate	Std. Err.	p	Estimate	Std. Err.	p	Estimate	Std. Err.	p
Factor Loadings									
State Surveillance									
Video Surveillance	1.124	0.059	<0.001	1.136	0.043	<0.001	1.157	0.033	<0.001
Internet Surveillance	1.444	0.086	<0.001	1.487	0.064	<0.001	1.434	0.040	<0.001
Collect Info. Within Country	1.103	0.028	<0.001	1.146	0.027	<0.001	1.093	0.019	<0.001
Collect Info. Outside Country	1.00+			1.00+			1.00+		
Regression Slopes									
State Surveillance									
Authoritarian Disposition	0.014	0.003	<0.001	<0.001	0.002	0.965	0.013	0.002	<0.001
Partisan Alignment	-0.041	0.025	0.094	0.075	0.014	<0.001	0.212	0.013	<0.001
Female	-0.023	0.024	0.325	0.018	0.014	0.196	0.007	0.011	0.513
Quintile of Household Income	0.004	0.009	0.625	0.011	0.005	0.037	0.011	0.004	0.012
Age by Decade	0.018	0.007	0.012	0.018	0.005	<0.001	0.034	0.004	<0.001
Highest Degree Earned	-0.011	0.007	0.126	-0.020	0.005	<0.001	-0.016	0.004	<0.001
Fit Indices									
Scaled $\chi 2$	66.15			93.292			181.102		
df	19			19			19		
CFI	0.989			0.989			0.988		
TLI	0.983			0.983			0.98		
RMSEA	0.026			0.019			0.026		
SRMR	0.016			0.014			0.015		
Count	3713			10324			12701		

APPENDIX

Table 6. Mean scores on each indicator used in the two endogenous latent variables

Country	State Surveillance Construct				Counterterrorism Policing Construct		
	Video Surveillance	Internet Surveillance	Collect Info. Within Country	Collect Info. Outside Country	Terror Suspect: Phone tapping	Terror Suspect: Stop and Search	Terror Suspect: Detain People
Australia	3.306	2.484	2.830	2.582	3.333	2.881	2.729
Belgium	3.037	2.412	2.879	2.828	3.372	2.941	2.639
Chile	3.127	1.989	2.197	2.053	2.436	2.525	2.104
Croatia	2.187	1.762	2.359	1.931	2.829	2.463	2.804
Czech Republic	2.556	1.817	2.215	2.124	2.740	2.619	2.781
Denmark	3.296	2.140	2.375	2.257	3.254	2.974	2.294
Finland	3.510	2.163	2.591	2.623	3.133	2.651	2.394
France	3.101	2.441	2.696	2.478	3.437	1.862	2.564
Georgia	2.397	1.813	2.139	2.109	2.272	2.364	1.866
Germany	2.699	2.142	1.993	2.002	2.969	2.650	2.251
Iceland	3.410	1.639	1.943	1.727	2.864	2.401	2.092
India	3.315	3.201	2.882	2.795	3.018	2.887	2.838
Israel	2.696	2.324	2.538	2.446	2.785	2.400	2.528
Japan	2.828	2.062	1.966	1.963	2.592	2.564	2.399
Korea	2.448	1.869	1.785	1.858	1.985	2.563	2.170
Latvia	2.961	2.029	2.012	1.883	2.413	2.089	2.201
Lithuania	2.877	1.754	2.085	1.953	2.557	2.550	2.354

New Zealand	3.080	2.250	2.593	2.317	3.042	2.609	2.410
Norway	2.796	2.151	2.919	2.786	3.214	2.663	2.450
Russia	2.751	2.147	2.288	2.314	2.311	2.174	2.058
Slovakia	2.507	1.719	1.862	1.813	2.159	2.151	2.204
Slovenia	2.161	1.636	2.061	1.840	2.437	2.567	2.693
South Africa	2.658	2.070	2.247	2.177	2.147	2.450	2.185
Spain	2.505	2.107	2.344	2.205	2.637	2.126	2.432
Suriname	2.616	2.229	2.213	2.133	2.648	2.219	2.081
Sweden	3.317	2.284	2.789	2.665	3.309	2.819	2.252
Switzerland	2.554	2.225	2.167	2.061	3.033	2.958	2.441
Taiwan	3.515	2.352	2.110	2.235	2.462	2.587	1.824
Turkey	2.559	2.232	2.148	2.163	2.349	2.442	2.033
United States	2.743	2.040	2.427	2.383	2.463	2.082	2.171
Venezuela	2.483	1.642	1.686	1.636	1.686	2.046	1.804

Table 7. Political Party Alignment Codings

Country	Start and end of data collection	Parties not in Government	Sample non-aligned (Includes eligible nonvoters and individuals who reported that they refused to vote)	Parties in Government	Sample aligned	Total Sample

Australia	31.05.2016 - 18.05.2017	Labor Party Greens All Other Parties	595	Liberal Party National Party	518	1,113
Belgium	28.11.2017 - 28.03.2018	Green Party Flemish Flemish Interest Green Party (Francophone) Socialist Party (Francophone) Christian Democrats All Other Parties	777	Reformist Movement (Francophone) Flemish Liberals and Democrats National Flemish Alliance Christian Democrats Flemish	663	1,440
Switzerland	15.02.2017 07.08.2017	Social Democratic Party - SP/ PS Green Party - GPS/ PES/ I Verdi Liberal Green Party (GLP/PVL) All Other Parties	383	The Liberals - FDP/ PLR Christian-Democratic Party - CVP/ PDC/ PPD Swiss People's Party - SVP/ UDC Mixed vote[1]	353	736
Chile	09.07.2016 - 07.08.2016	National Renewal Party – RN All Other Parties	742	Socialist Party Christian Democratic Party Radical Social Democratic Party Communist Party of Chile	150	892
Czech Republic	24.05.2016 - 18.07.2016	Civic Democratic Party – ODS Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia – KSCM TOP 09 All Other Parties	757	Czech Social Democratic Party – CSSD Christian Democratic Party-Czech Peoples Party - KDU-CSL ANO 2011 - ANO	434	1,191
Germany	05.04.2016 - 18.09.2016	The Left - Die Linke Alliance 90/ The Greens - Buendnis 90/ Die Gruenen All Other Parties	822	Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union - CDU/ CSU Social Democratic Party of Germany - SPD	669	1,491
Denmark	15.05.2016 - 19.07.2016	Social Democratic Party Radical Liberal Party	504	Danish People's Party Liberal Party Liberal Alliance	427	931

		All Other Parties		Conservative People's Party		
Spain	11.04.2016 - 29.06.2016	Spanish Socialist Workers Party Podemos Ciudadanos All Other Parties	1147	Popular Party[2]	311	1,458
Finland	16.09.2016 - 20.12.2016	Social Democratic Party Green League All Other Parties	648	National Coalition Party True Finns Centre Party of Finland	427	1,075
France	09.02.2016 - 30.09.2016	Union for a Popular Movement National Front All Other Parties	796	Socialist Party Green Party	429	1,225
Georgia	05.06.2016 - 23.07.2016	Election Bloc "United National Movement" ("United National Movement", Christian-Conservative Party of Georgia) All Other Parties	865	Election Bloc "Georgian Dream" (Georgian Dream, Conservative Party, Industry Will Save Georgia, Republican Party of Georgia, National Forum)	584	1,449
Croatia	20.07.2017 - 25.08.2017	Social Democratic Party (Social-Democrat) Croatian Democratic Union of Slavonija and Baranja - HDSSB	723	Croatian Democratic Union (Conservative) Bridge of Independent Lists - MOST	263	986
Israel	24.12.2015 - 05.04.2016	HaMahane HaTzioni The Joint List All Other Parties	607	Likud Kulanu The Jewish Home United Torah Judaism Shas	443	1,050
India	11.02.2018 - 25.03.2018	Congress + Allied Parties Left Front/ Communist Party All Other Parties	806	Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) + Allied Parties	630	1,436
Iceland	01.02.2017 - 10.05.2017	Left-Green Movement Progressive Party	473	Bright Future Independence Party The Reform Party	470	943

Japan	29.10.2016 - 06.11.2016	The Democratic Party of Japan All Other Parties	942	Liberal Democratic Party of Japan	509	1,451
South Korea	27.06.2016 - 07.10.2016	The Minjoo Party The People's Party	706	Saenuri Party	328	1,034
Lithuania	27.06.2016 - 02.08.2016	Liberal and Centre Union Christian Party	503	Labour Party Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles Lithuanian Social Democratic Party Order and Justice	267	770
Latvia	27.08.2016 - 25.09.2016	Social-democratic party All Other Parties	397	Unity Union of Greens and Farmers National Alliance of "All for Latvia!" - "For Fatherland and Freedom	330	727
Norway	26.10.2016 - 13.02.2017	Labour Party The Green Party	586	Progress Party Conservative Party Christian Democratic Party Liberal Party	466	1,052
New Zealand	11.07.2016 - 19.12.2016	Labour Green All Other Parties	672	National	590	1,262
Russian Federation	16.02.2016 - 23.02.2016	Russian Communist Party Just Russia	802	United Russia	636	1,438
Sweden	10.10.2016 - 12.12.2016	Conservative Party Sweden Democrats All Other Parties	686	Social Democratic Party Green Party	386	1,072
Slovenia	14.11.2015 - 23.02.2016	United Left Liberal Democrats	526	Democratic Party of Slovenian Pensioners New Slovenia Social Democrats Party of Miro Cerar/ Party of Modern Center Alenka Bratusek Alliance	322	848

Slovakia	13.10.2016 - 28.11.2016	Freedom and Solidarity All Other Parties	676	Bridge - MOST-HÍD Slovak National Party – SNS Social Democracy - SMER-SD #SEIT'	421	1,097
Suriname	11.01.2018 - 21.06.2018	V7 (Political Alliance) All Other Parties	587	National Democratic Party	287	874
Turkey	26.08.2017 - 15.11.2017	Republican Peoples Party Nationalist Action Party	628	Justice and development Party	654	1,282
Taiwan[3]	07.08.2016 - 27.11.2016	Kuo Min Tang People First Party	952	Democratic Progressive Party	844	1,796
United States	05.04.2016 - 19.11.2016	Republican (Romney) Other Candidates	713	Democrat (Obama)	506	1,219
Venezuela	02.09.2016 - 04.10.2016	MUD (opposition) All Other Parties	683	PSUV (government)	254	937
South Africa	25.01.2017 - 30.04.2017	Democratic Party/ Alliance All Other Parties	1,493	African National Congress	1,294	2,787

Table 8. Multilevel Model of State Surveillance Acceptance

	Estimate	Std. Err.	p
Factor Loadings			
Individual-level State Surveillance			
Video Surveillance	1.098	0.074	<0.001
Internet Surveillance	1.383	0.065	<0.001
Collect Info. Within Country	1.077	0.024	<0.001
Collect Info. Outside Country	1.00+		
Country-level State Surveillance			

Video Surveillance	0.771	0.223	0.001
Internet Surveillance	0.992	0.254	<0.001
Collect Info. Within Country	0.958	0.071	<0.001
Collect Info. Outside Country	1.00+		
	Regression Slopes		
Individual-level State Surveillance			
Authoritarian Disposition	0.005	0.006	0.351
Partisan Alignment	0.194	0.073	0.008
Interaction of Alignment & Polarization	-0.019	0.039	0.632
Country-level State Surveillance			
Polarization	-0.027	0.063	0.668
	Fit Indices		
Scaled $\chi 2$	105.732		
df	14		
Robust CFI	0.986		
Robust TLI	0.972		
RMSEA	0.015		
Robust RMSEA	0.038		
SRMR	0.019		
Count	30482		

Table 9. Percent of Respondents who answered that the government probably or definitely should have the right to conduct a given form of surveillance organized by ideological tilt of their respective government and individual partisan alignment

	Center & Left Leaning Government		**Right Leaning Government**	
	Not aligned	Aligned	Not aligned	Aligned
State Surveillance				
Video Surveillance	66.7%	68.4%	64.7%	78.1%
Internet Surveillance	30.5%	33.8%	35.8%	51.0%
Collect information on individuals within the country	38.6%	40.7%	44.7%	62.8%
Collect information on individuals abroad out country	34.4%	36.6%	38.9%	56.0%
Counterterrorism Police Powers				
Phone tapping	56.0%	55.3%	65.9%	78.8%
Stop and searching	48.7%	48.8%	54.1%	68.0%
Preventative detentions	38.9%	38.0%	44.1%	58.1%

Table 10. Percent of Respondents who answered that the government probably or definitely should have the right to conduct a given form of surveillance organized by ideological tilt of government and ideology of parties for which respondents voted

	Centrist & Left Leaning Governments			Right Leaning Governments		
	Left Leaning Parties	Centrist Parties	Right Leaning Parties	Left Leaning Parties	Centrist Parties	Right Leaning Parties
State Surveillance						
Video Surveillance	68.1%	66.4%	75.1%	63.2%	75.6%	77.1%
Internet Surveillance	30.3%	32.8%	38.1%	36.0%	39.6%	51.0%

Collect information on individuals within the country	38.9%	44.1%	49.8%	45.8%	54.5%	61.4%
Collect information on individuals abroad out country	33.2%	38.8%	43.0%	39.7%	49.0%	54.7%
Counterterrorism Police Powers						
Phone tapping	68.1%	50.4%	75.0%	66.7%	74.4%	76.7%
Stop and searching	45.4%	47.3%	59.9%	50.5%	61.8%	66.9%
Preventative detentions	39.0%	39.3%	51.0%	39.8%	49.9%	58.3%

Table 11. Percent of Respondents who answered that the government probably or definitely should have the right to conduct a given form of surveillance organized by ideological tilt of government and support for civil liberties based on the authoritarian disposition index

	More supportive of civil liberties		Less supportive of civil liberties	
	Centrist/Left Leaning Government	Right Leaning Government	Centrist/Left Leaning Government	Right Leaning Government
State Surveillance				
Video surveillance	68.0%	69.4%	66.3%	70.3%
Internet surveillance	30.4%	39.3%	33.6%	47.6%
Collect information on individuals within the country	40.0%	51.9%	39.1%	52.8%

Collect information on individuals abroad out country	35.6%	45.1%	34.2%	47.5%
Counterterrorism				
Police Powers				
Phone tapping	58.3%	72.2%	49.1%	68.6%
Stop and searching	49.4%	59.1%	47.6%	62.2%
Preventative detentions	37.2%	46.5%	40.9%	56.8%

Figure 7. Confidence interval of alignment on the state surveillance latent construct for all countries measured separately.



Figure 8. The confidence interval of alignment on the state surveillance construct (in blue) and on the counterterrorism policing construct (in green) for all countries measured separately.



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