How to be critical of security today? Life in motion, untimeliness and the critique of end-thinking.[1]

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Abstract

This article starts from the observation of intense political mobilisations of existential endings. One of the defining challenges for critical engagements with such mobilisations remains how to take war, environmental degradation and pandemics seriously without making existential end-times the conditions that define the present. The article proposes to move beyond critical knowledge that makes security contingent and engage with the conception of life inscribed in the mobilisations of existential endings. It puts forward a concept of life that emphasises continuous movement rather than defining it from the perspective of its inevitable end in death. This point of view challenges traditional existential notions of life and death, highlighting instead the dynamic and transformative nature of life itself.

Introduction

As so many times before, our times are witnessing an intensive mobilisation of existential events and processes threatening the survival of anything, ranging from individual bodies, livelihoods, and nations to species and the planet. Catastrophes, apocalyptic imaginaries, existential threats to states and individuals and other modes of what we could refer to as 'end-thinking' play a significant role in politicising environmental challenges, migration, the nation, and global health, to name a few. The politicisations of these and other issues are not

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reducible or exhausted by the mobilisation of existential endings. Questions of equality, freedom, social mobility, prosperity, and fairness have not taken a back seat. This article, however, seeks to critically engage conceptions of the current conditions that read the present through its existential limits. To that purpose, it explores alternative analytics of life that conceptualise life as always moving. It defines life from the point of view of being in continuous motion and untimely rather than from its finality.

Let's start with three quotes linked to different renditions of insecurity: national defence, planetary threats, and a pandemic.

> The former Prime Minister of Britain, Boris Johnson, wrote in the foreword to 'Global Britain in a competitive age. The integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy (March 2021): "Protecting our people, our homeland and our democracy is the first duty of any government, so I have begun the biggest programme of investment in defence since the end of the Cold War. This will demonstrate to our allies, in Europe and beyond, that they can always count on the UK when it really matters."(UK_Government, 2021, p. 4)

> Dipesh Chakrabarty, in his recent book on climate change and planetary politics 'The Climate of History in a Planetary Age' (2021), writes: "Clearly, however one thinks of human futures, one condition set by European political thinkers of modernity will have to hold in any definition of the political: humans will need protection from predators. Human dwelling has always been about feeling safe." (Chakrabarty, 2021, pp. 194-195)

> The Director-General of the WHO, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, in his opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 on 3 April 2020, said: "More than 1 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 have now been reported to WHO, including more than 50,000 deaths. But we know that this is much more than a health crisis. We are all aware of the profound social and economic consequences of the pandemic. The restrictions many countries have put in place to protect health are taking a heavy toll on the income of individuals and families, and the economies of communities and nations. We are in a shared struggle to protect both lives and livelihoods."(Ghebreyesus, 2020)

As with any text, these quotes can be read in multiple ways. I want to pick up on how, in their respective contexts, they each mobilise conditions in which the existence of composites of life are in danger of metaphorically or physically dying. In that sense, they are securitising statements. The pandemic, global warming, and war in the Ukraine are existential situations of life and death: death of people, death of species, death of a country. That is part of the situation 'when it really matters'. That is implied by 'protecting both lives and livelihoods' in the context of the global pandemic and by making protection from predators a principal condition of the conception and founding of politics in an age of rapid climate change.

Such characterisations of insecurities in the present are not new. In the late 1950s, Brodie introduced the distinct character of his nuclear military present as follows: "Today … with truly cosmic forces harnessed to the machines of war, we have a situation for the first time in history where the opening event by which a great nation enters a war … can decide irretrievably whether or not it will continue to exist."(Brodie, 1965 [1959], p. 7)

Existentialising presents has been a significant instrument to mark the essential importance of an issue and for grounding politics and political prioritisation. Existential securitising is entangled with a conception of life as life-unto-death in which life emerges from the point of view of its ending, from an awareness of and an affectional relation to the end of something. Mobilising security in this existential configuration has naturalising and

trumping effects: 'We can differ on the means to deal with life-threatening dangers, but we cannot differ on whether we prioritise them'. It is a particular form of securitising in which the threat of death is intensely mobilised to hierarchise issues. The inscription of such a conception of life in cultural artefacts, educational practices, political rhetorics, political philosophy, and so on makes security central and, in some cases, foundational to politics and political order.

But what if we consider life from the point of view of its ongoing flows and activities rather than from the point of view of its ending? Would it provide a basis for a critical response to those mobilising existential anxieties and end-times without trivialising the concerns with environmental degradation, life-threatening illnesses, or violence? The proposition here is that it would. Moving from life-unto-death to life-in-motion puts a break on excessive existentialising insecurities. At issue is not the denial of the seriousness of environmental, health, and defence issues but a concern with how existential securitising pushes towards structuring living and politics through anxieties and absolute oppositions with little space for an in-between. If life is movement, the in-between is where life is lived, including political life. Analytically, it endeavours to develop knowledge that fractures horizons of totalisation and modes of absolutism into messy multiplicities connected and negotiated through everyday, minor gestures and processes.

The reason for displacing end-thinking with a conception of life as essentially movement is to offer an alternative to knowledge that prioritises existential finalities as a main instrument for political agenda setting, mobilisation, and affectional bonding. Taking life as movement foregrounds a conception of transformative politics that works with the becoming of insecurities rather than existential limits. It diffuses existential insecurities by submerging them in situations that are always more than existentially insecure and in continuous transmutation. In times of pandemics, climate change, and a resurgence of the possibility of nuclear war, such a conception of insecurities is easily labelled and disciplined as 'denial', 'naivety', and 'depoliticising'. The wager here is that life-in-motion and an untimely understanding of insecurities allow for a politics that transforms conditions of life by intertwining matters of concern and values and that this is a more fruitful and less violent way of engaging with insecurities than a politics that absolutises specific issues of concern by existentialising them and structures hierarchies of values that make survival the essence of life.

Securitisation, contingency and conceptions of life.

Critical security studies are a disciplinary area that has spent much effort creating the possibility of thinking differently about pandemics, war, human vulnerability, and planetary conditions by making existential threats contingent rather than essential and necessary. Of particular interest has been turning insecurities from a given into the result of a process of securitisation. Insecurities emerge within social and political processes that re-iterate, mobilise and institutionalise a distinctive problematisation of phenomena like influenza, rising global temperatures, or violence. These processes are historically dependent on discourses, technologies, and standard operating procedures, which are contingent rather than necessary and natural. As such, not only the existentialist problematisation of security is de-naturalised, but also the elements driving the securitisation process are. There are different conceptualisations of these processes. Wæver (Wæver, 1995), who coined the term securitisation, reads the process as one of speech acts of security. Others emphasise discourses and the circulation of particular meanings and statements across time. (Campbell, 1992; Fierke, 1998) Bigo and his collaborators are more sceptical about the power of linguistic acts and statements. They focus on the practices, knowledge, and training of security professionals and the struggles between them. (Bigo, 1996, 2000) Much work has

also gone into how particular technologies enact distinctive security governance modes, from defending against existential threats to managing risks and coping with catastrophes.

In the context of this article, they are interesting because they allow for questioning naturalist enactments of existential dangers and the grounding of their trumping power in an existential pyramid that takes survival as the ultimate value and baseline of what drives life. 'Making security contingent' denaturalises security and the primacy of survival. It does so through a double move: (a) by turning a given into a human-made something — an artifice of culture and professional and technological practices — and (b) by temporalising security, releasing it from necessities of recurrence or progress. (Bartelson, 2001, p. 154)

For example, exceptional border closures and territorial containment strategies to manage COVID-19 seem prima facie justified and natural in light of a pandemic threat. However, a focus on border closure is a standard security practice for professionals of politics who embody and enact a territorialised state. Keeping dangers out by removing them from the territory and closing borders is an institutionalised mode of security governing, which arises from seeing like a state. "Seeing like a state is (…) very often seeing like a defence security manager. It is 'second nature', a collective doxa engrained into the habitus of policymakers. Governments, administrations, and other actors of globalisation routinely and independently of the specificities of any particular catastrophe frame their way of thinking of space and scale through territory and not networked approaches. Therefore, they had great difficulties understanding a networked logic like the spread of COVID-19."(Bigo et al., 2021, p. 5)

Instead of a 'natural reaction,' we have a professional disposition and bias that is socially reproduced by being trained in seeing like a state or by having incorporated seeing like a state as a pre-condition for entering the field of state-level politics. The implication is that the response to COVID-19 can change quite dramatically when trained or pre-disposed, for example, towards a cellular biological logic that folds relations between viruses, including pathogens, cells, and bodies, into composite relations that are the material condition of life. Such a disposition that prioritises the entangled connections between bacterial, cellular, and bodily movements makes it more challenging to reduce engaging with pathogens to the existential question of avoiding death through territorial control.

Such knowledge does not deny the seriousness of a pandemic, war, or environmental degradation. Yet, it resists being drawn into giving priority to the spectre of death and end-times. Making security contingent challenges re-iterations that ground political order in existential insecurities, making security responses the necessary option, and disregarding discrimination and violence because they are a price worth paying when lives and political and social orders face death. However, making 'something' contingent positions knowledge in a paradoxical situation in which it simultaneously criticises and retains the organising grip that this 'something' has on thought. (Bartelson, 2001) Analysing how a catastrophic enactment of the present results from social and political processes rather than being an inevitable given does repeat that the present is indeed catastrophically enacted. Such critical analytics thus does not escape the organising hold on knowledge of what it critiques.

To tackle the grip of existential endings as a defining condition of the present, something else is needed than a constructivist move of making things contingent. It requires diffusing the existential centring of life on death and endings. At issue is a broader question of what conceptions of life are inscribed in security analytics. The question is similar to what Didier Fassin (Fassin, 2018) asks in his book 'La Vie': What do we speak of when we speak of life? He works in detail through the distinction between life in a biological sense and life in a biographical or social sense and what is at stake when the governance, politics, and knowledge of life lean toward privileging the former. I will work with a different distinction between life-unto-death and life-in-motion. I do not consider life-unto-death as a version of life in the biological sense and life-in-motion as life in the biographical sense. The distinction

cuts across Fassin's. Life-in-motion operates a distinctive biological as well as social and biographical meaning of life. So, too, does life-unto-death. I will spend most of my words working up the concept of life-in-motion to develop a challenge to inscriptions of the present through notions of life-unto-death.

Life in motion

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, one of the crucial measures taken to limit the spread of the virus was to minimise people's movements as much as possible. This involved limiting domestic and international travel, confining people to specific areas based on their residential addresses, and even imposing restrictions on leaving one's home. These measures aimed to reduce the number of interactions between people and thus slow the spread of the virus. However, the pandemic also highlighted that life must go on and that movement is essential. People still needed to purchase essential items, harvest crops, and exercise. Imports and exports had to continue for the global economy to function. The lockdowns also hurt people's mental and physical health. As pointed out by Thomas Nail in a brief article about the pandemic, COVID-19 not only highlighted the necessity of movement in modern life but also revealed how entities believed to be static and contained actually exist in motion. Breathing depends on air flows but also makes pathogens flow, showing 'how entangled we are in a sea of turbulent flux'.(Nail, 2020b, p. 892) Critical studies analysing the pandemic have emphasised the impact and implications of confinement and border regulations, COVID-19 has demonstrated that life is constantly in motion.

Observations like these are a hook into exploring a conception of life in which flows of movement are primary. They introduce a simple idea: life is not a state of corporealised entities but motion. If life stands still, it ceases to exist. (Ingold, 2011, p. 4) Yet, it has an important implication. If life is, in essence, motion, then nothing stands still. Movement is not derivative of or opposite to sedentary life; sedentary life is a mode of living in motion. Bodies are confluences of material flows in movement. What appears as corporeal fixed spaces or entities emerges from movements circulating onto themselves. Life (and matter) consists of movements moving with other movements rather than relations between entities. (Nail, 2018a) Giving movement primacy over corporealised entities, thus, does not reverse a hierarchy between two states of being — static and in-motion or sedentary and nomadic — but motions everything, including what appears, is expressed or is thought as non-motion.

Foregrounding movement as the key to understanding life and matter has long and varied lineages. To mention only two. It connects Greek atomists and the Roman philosopher Lucretius to Marx, Bergson, Deleuze and Serres. (Nail, 2020a, pp. 211-215) It invites a revisiting of Hobbes, for whom motion was a key inroad into understanding life and matter in theories of sovereignty and security. (Slomp, 2010) (Aradau, 2016) Yet, not all approaches take the point of view that the flow of movement is not just primary but that all there is to life and matter is motion. That point of view is mainly associated with a Lucretian lineage and, for Thomas Nail, differentiates it even from the Greek atomists:

> For Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, atoms are always in motion, but the atom itself remains fundamentally unchanged, indivisible, and thus internally *static* — even as it moves. (…) Lucretius *rejected completely* the notion that things emerged from discrete particles. (…) Being is not cut up into discrete particles, but is composed of continuous flows, folds, and weaves. (Nail, 2018a, p. 11)

This lineage of thought resonates with 20th and 21st-century developments in a wide range of knowledge fields, including biology and the life sciences, physics, sociology, and philosophy. The aim here is not to detail or review this lineage but to draw on it to interfere

critically in mobilisations of end-thinking that enact the present from the perspective of its finality — its death. By taking life as essentially motion, insecurities emerge differently from existential enactments of life unto death. In a sense, the argument here is one for moving from contingency analysis, as a form of process analysis or deconstruction, to concept creation in which concepts function as a 'gestural force that opens experience to its potential variation … from within experience itself, activating a shift in tone, a difference in quality.'(Manning, 2016, p. 1) Such concepts aim to create analytical and affectional sensitivities to multiple differences and possibilities that are always already immanent in lived life. In doing so, they experiment with a mode of critical thinking that works by 'multiplying signs of existence' (Foucault, 1994, p. 106) and creating exposure to life as being continually in the making (Austin, 2019; Love, 2017, p. 69).

Folding: movement fracturing 'inside/outside'

Mobilising existential endings tends to foreground bodies or corporealised entities as the referent of life. Bodies, people, and species are alive. They move and are exposed to the movement of other living entities and matter. However, movement itself is not the primary referent of life; life consists in the first instance of corporealised entities co-existing. Existential insecurities arise from the permeation of the body by hostile elements. The horizon of death emerges from malicious external entities permeating the body and internal entities transforming from benign or neutral into life-threatening dangers. Holding off and controlling such permeations and transformations becomes the work of security practices. It is a work of preserving living corpora in a world of movement. The invention of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads raised the threat of a sudden annihilation for states, as Brodie emphasised, not only because of their destructive capacity but also because they reduced the relevance of geographical distance for controlling their movement. By moving triangularly rather than horizontally, these weapons entered territorial space from above, significantly changing the speed of crossing large distances compared to aeroplanes transporting the warheads. The potentially catastrophic nature of the use of nuclear weapons for states and their people, which was extended to the human species when knowledge about the possibility of a nuclear winter became more common, led to intense calls for transforming the international order of states into a universal order of collective security. Such analyses reflected on the state of the then-present and, at the same time, mobilised a catastrophic future in support of quite radical transformations of the international order. In John Herz's words, it made it legitimate for those sceptical about universal orders 'to inquire into the prospects and chances for a "universalist" approach, which, I now believe, offers the only hope for a more permanent solution to world problems, or, to phrase it less grandiloquently perhaps, the only hope for something better than mere day-to-day attempts to avoid the abyss.' (Herz, 1961, p. 230) Herz's security response implies a transformation of the international order to impose adequate controls on nuclear weapons to avoid them being put in motion.

Border controls and governing forced displacement through creating 'safe' spaces close to the home territory, known as refugee camps, enact a similar desire to control movement, in this case, people. The legitimation of such controls includes a wide variety of repertoires. Some of them, at times very intensely, mobilise existential threats that migration poses for bounded entities like states, societies, and cultures. The lockdowns and other attempts to limit viral airflows permeating bodies during the COVID-19 pandemic expressed a similar conception of securing bodies by controlling movement.

I am not suggesting that launching nuclear weapons is similar to the movement of people or the diffusion of a virus; far from it. However, all three include similar inscriptions of movement in which the possibility of an existential ending arises from corporealised entities

— nuclear weapons, a group of people, a different culture, a virus — permeating other entities — a state, a culture, a body. Seeing life as always in motion changes such understanding of insecurities and movement. It transforms the importance of coexistence between relatively fixed, bounded entities that consider movement as an external element that crosses over into the internal into a continuous plane that folds inside and outside. I will start from the securitisation of COVID-19 to develop how life in motion threads and folds rather than permeates and, in so doing, diffuses existential insecurities.

One of the understandings of the COVID-19 experience has been that between February/March 2019 and Spring 2021, many witnessed and lived an intensive securitisation of microbial life in a war on pathogens — a war on the virus and its mutations. (Fishel, 2021) Such an existentialist securitisation significantly reduces the complexity of the relation between human and microbial life by externalising microbes. Some microbes become things that dangerously permeate human bodies and societies from the outside. Similar externalising renditions of pathogenic dangers can be observed in accounts that see the COVID-19 pandemic and infectious diseases more generally resulting from environmental destructions bringing dangerous microbial life in contact with humans because animals carrying pathogens are moving closer to human habitations. (Whitmee et al., 2015, pp. 1991-1993) (Patz et al., 2004, pp. 1092-1093) The relation between microbial, animal and human movements are relations between different bodies that co-exist through interaction. They exist external to one another and then meet. The overall context is partly an existential one in which the risk of death is an essential marker of the problematic nature of the situation.

If we look at these relations from the point of view of life-in-motion, these various bodies fold upon one another. Life exists in the intertwining, meshing, or entangling of multiple flows that make entities emerge as always intertwined with their environment. Some developments in epigenetics work with such a conception of life. They reconfigure the distinction between a body and its outside by foregrounding the importance of biochemical flows and the dynamic ecology they create.

> Environmental epigenetics highlights the activity of natural, material processes through which the supposedly external environment actively enters, shapes, and becomes part of the body. At the same time, epigenetics encourages us to open up the black-box of the body. The body is not a passive recipient of various exposures but is active in its remaking: an exposure to an environmental molecule triggers a molecular hormonal response, which then triggers cellular processes that affect the structure and function of the body, which then responds anew to the environment in an ongoing, iterative relationship. These, then, are dynamic ecological interactions between the body and the environment that suggest a need to attend to biochemical flows rather than spatial containers, bodies as receptors, or bodies as mutable only via intentional human action. (Guthman & Mansfield, 2013, p. 497)

Such a dynamic ecology means that there are no clear insides and outsides. Life envelops corporeal entities and their environment. Looked at from the point of view of an organism moving, its movement bends the environment around itself. In doing so, it also bends the movement of other organisms with whom it co-exists. These latter organisms do not stand still either, however. They are also moving and bending what appears as the environment in which the first organism moves. In other words, they bend what is simultaneously being bent. In the flows of matter and life, movements of organisms thus continuously arrange themselves and their environment while also being continuously arranged by movements of other organisms that exist in the bending of their environment around themselves. (Latour, 2017, pp. 101-104) The individual organisms thus do not exist as self-contained parts but are enveloped into a continuously moving plane — a dynamic ecology —shaped by flows

folding rather than the number of parts and the interaction between them. Using Manning's terminology (2016), the ecology of organisms, plants, and humans is made by movements rather than entities moving with one another. Although organisms as entities move in this understanding, what matters is not their agency of moving but how the threads along which they move fold environments, creating in Latour's terminology interdependencies or Ingold's terminology correspondences (Ingold, 2015b, pp. 154-158). Humans cutting down forests to create arable land and city spaces, the movements of bats intertwining more frequently and intensely with human movement and areas, viruses transmuting so they can mesh with human cells create an ecology of flows in which the organisms — the parts — fold into one another and in doing so simultaneously transform themselves and the ecology. The danger then emerges not from a virus itself but within a transformation of the interdependencies between the multiple movements and how they fold a city space, bat flight paths, and viral change into an ecology. In such an ecology, difference is not a differentiation through identifying parts separated from each other, like the virus as a self-contained entity and the human body as another self-contained entity.

In such a conception of life, the difference between the body and the virus is not a gap creating an outside but a fold in a single plane. Instead of cutting the cloth of life in two, the cloth of life folds. In the latter case, we do not have two parts but two sides of the fold in a single cloth. The differentiation of the sides depends on the continuity of the fabric. If the material is not continuous but cut, we do not have one but two cloths and no longer a fold but a line defining two self-contained parts. In a folding ecology, borders no longer emerge as lines of separation and protective containing forces. The latter figuring of borders rests on the assumption that a state, community, and human being can externalise and control their environment. However, if 'the environment' and 'the corporealised entities' seeking to control it are in continuous movements that fold 'the environments' and themselves, such externalisation is impossible. It is this point of view that helps us understand the significance of du Plessis's observation in her research of bordering done by microbes: "The idea that a superpower can make pathogens "respect" its borders relies on the premise that humans are capable of controlling their environments and that threats can be managed with strategies of elimination. Microbial borders and (…) the natural sciences suggest that these premises are false."(du Plessis, 2018, p. 401) Such a point of view also has implications for how to govern pathogens; it requires controlling relations that exist in correspondence and working with differences that emerge within smooth space rather than a striated space of fixed externalisations and hierarchies.[2] (du Plessis, 2017, p. 53)

Borders are here, neither walls nor sieves. They transmute into membranes. In the debates on migration, the image of a sieve has been used to critique the imagination of borders being a solid line of separation that aims to stop any outside movement from entering. As a sieve, a border has holes differentiating migrant movements that can and cannot cross to the inside. As a membrane, however, the border differentiates between what is left and what is right of it but does so in an ecology of flows through which the left and right of the membrane are already immanently connected. Migrant flows are not coming from the outside but are always already part of the multiple flows that create the dynamic ecology. A membrane matters, but it does so by bending flows, letting them continue but with a difference, just like folding changes the cloth from a plain fabric into a creased cloth but retains it as a cloth.

For example, Rafi Youatt (2020, pp. 27-50) reads the Mexican-US border through how

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[2] Life-in-motion links also to distinctive security techniques (Huysmans, 2023) that incorporate a smoothness of space. I am not expanding on this aspect here because the main focus of this paper is to introduce a mode of critical analysis that works through the untimely concept of life-in-motion. For reference: Tirado and Domenech (2013) also develop a kynetic analysis of security techniques in their exploration of extitutional modes of control.

multiple relations between organisms and things moving transform the border into a multi-species mobility regime. Not the partitioning lines separating territorial sites as such make the area referred to as the Mexico-US border, but the movement of ticks, among others, intertwining with the movements of various other species like white-tailed deer and nilgais, humans protecting their cattle and human land use.

> The movements and mutual invasiveness of nilgais, ticks, babesiasis, and tick riders constitute one multispecies mobility regime along the border. Cattle-dipping vats, practices of quarantine, and game fencing make up part of this regime. So, too, do the ability of ticks to leap onto multiple carriers and their capacity to judge between mammals and nonliving things.{Youatt, 2020 #3735@37}

His chapter is full of organisms and materials threading lines that bend into one another in multiple ways, thus folding the site into numerous differences that exist through the intertwining of moving movements. In doing so, a continuous meshing of threads is substituted for the territorial political border. Umut Ozguc (2021) does something similar in analysing the Separation Wall in the West Bank as a meshwork. Interestingly, she retains a strong focus on the border, but when following through the conceptualisation of movement she uses, the wall dissolves into undivided movements moving with one another. Analytically, the wall transmutes into something else and emerges as a moving meshwork of movements. The wall is still there but is no longer a wall partitioning two enclosures. It is a material presence that gets entangled with multiple movements impacting — or, in other words, moving — the wall itself. The immutable wall submerges into entangling threads and emerges as mutable matter. Along similar lines, William Hasty argued that pirate ships should be treated as mutable rather than immutable mobiles. The vessel moves along, but in doing so, it is shaped by intersecting with the movements of organic life, natural forces, and matter. The ship is, therefore, a folding in movement created by multiple movements moving with one another.

> Even in the dreaded doldrums, ships and all they contained were subject to the motions of the sea. The ship not only moves between points on a plane, but in other directions and dimensions too, with the swell of the waves. Anchors don't hold ships still, they hold them in place, and only to an extent. These forces are constant, and as they moved the ship they took their toll on its fabric and form. (…) Other organisms, like the Toledo worm, clung, gnawed and burrowed their way through the wood, eating the ship and altering its structural properties as they went. Thundering waves, howling winds, unknown rocks, even the odd piece of flotsam or jetsam could substantially alter the fabric of the ship, or, at least, call on the ship's hands to make alterations. The ship, as absolutely any sailor in the age of sail would have been able to testify, was a living, breathing entity. (Hasty, 2014, p. 355)

In architecture, folds are sometimes expressed as allowing for the smoothness of spaces transitioning into one another. Instead of clear separations between areas connected through lines separating them or sharp corners, areas are connected in continuity, with walls and corners giving way to membranes and bends.

> The fold as a technique in architecture can accomplish opposite qualities: it can represent a sudden change of direction, assumption, or mood [...] Conversely it can resolve differences in a way which is distinct from the other architectural methods of dealing with pluralism, such as collage. This is by enfolding, by connecting that which is different in a smooth transition. Here suppleness and smoothness are important – the way, for instance, that two different liquids are enfolded into each other by stirring. [Jencks, Charles (1995). *The Architecture of*

the Jumping Universe. New York: Academy Editions p. 53f — quoted in (Schramke, 2016, p. 130)

Movement along rather than crossing from one site into another or turning a corner is foregrounded in such architectural design. Differentiation between spaces emerges through a transition in continuity. For example, curves prevail over sharp angles, and colours do not suddenly change from one into another but gradually change through mixing. (Friedman & Krausse, 2016, p. 154)

Smoothness, however, does not imply a harmonious world. Moving along lines leads to bumping into other movements. Movements bend when going through or being deflected by a membrane. The tensions and frictions between the movements bring people, organisms, and matter in relation, or, in Ingold's terminology (Ingold, 2015b, p. 7), what makes them cling to one another without becoming a blob. The tensions and frictions between the movements moving with one another make life a living-in-motion rather than a living-in-being. Without frictions or tensions between the flows, their folding would not be an enveloping into a dynamic ecology but a merging resulting in a single and static whole: Ingold's blob.

Following such a conception of life, insecurities become a modality of threading, bending and folding rather than a solidification of danger into an entity that endangers corporeal entities for whom containing and keeping out is existentially essential. For example, Srishti Malaviya (Malaviya, 2020) reads the insecurity produced by drones as a particular modality of violent bending of and in movements. They force a bending that destroys the continuous everyday threading and folding through which lives are lived:

> …, a group of people consisting of men, women, and children, folded into a 'demography' of bodies and signals are read within a specifically militarised grammar of movement. To speak through Manning, 'the real danger is not that the body will be kept still, but that a politics will be written onto the body that resists engaging with the movement that is intrinsic to the relations between bodies and worlds'. (Malaviya, 2020, p. 102)

The violence of drones is not simply in the ending of human lives — existential death — but in how it seeks to bend other movements into a solidity of corporeal entities and fix them to a grid in which movement is reduced to jumping from one square to the next. In enacting militarised grammar and profiling, drone operations fix the multiple threadings along which people move in their daily lives into prefigured bodies that are set into traceable points or locations. (Malaviya, 2020, p. 92) For Malaviya, it deletes a shared becoming in the threadings of life and the foldings it lets emerge. The violence of drone warfare is then the forced stopping of relational movements of becoming (Malaviya, 2020, p. 91)

Malaviya's work powerfully shows how giving primacy to life-in-motion, to lives lived in continuous movement, leads to a different analysis of insecurities — in this case, the violence of drones. She lets existential issues, the killing of people, emerge within a study that does not centre its attention on them but places them within a conception of life as continuously happening in the everyday flows of life and their continuous foldings. However, her analysis shares with security studies that it tends to centre the analysis on understanding the securitiness of the situation, in this case, identifying the modalities of movement that make drone movement violent. Because movement does not stop and is always seen in relation to other movements, the violent movement of drones needs to be read also in how they move in relation to movements that are qualified differently — in Malaviya's case, in the continuing relationality between daily movements. In other words, life-in-motion invites analytics of multiplying the threadings and foldings — the signs of existence — that emerge from movements moving with one another. Methodologically, it pushes towards a threading that

does not single out existential situations but has to envelop them in multiple foldings. Such diversity is not one of adding other entities besides drones but one of including more foldings that envelop the flow of drones in various everyday flows of life. For Malaviya, drones are violent because they are a threading that does not allow for its threading to mesh with the threading of the population it is targeting (Malaviya, 2020, p. 94) — there is no possibility for correspondence between the threads. She speaks of the impossibility of reciprocity. (Malaviya, 2020) However, the violence of the drones derives from their modality of moving and how their moving works with the daily movements in a site. In doing so, the drones' threading cannot avoid getting entangled with the continuing threadings in everyday life and thus equally undergo the forces that arise between their movements and the "daily" movements. In that sense, the correspondence between the various movements can analytically not be assumed to stop in the face of drones. The daily threadings fold differently when drone movement enters, but the situation cannot be supposed to take the form of the drone's grid and force an end to relational movements of becoming. The foldings will emerge between an assortment of movements and not from the specific operational rationale and modalities of the drone movement.

In this sense, life-in-motion does not only un-contain life but also de-centres existential security threadings. If we motion life in the sense given here, then the existential security issues, rationale and practice always emerge within a broader-than-security domain. They are part of correspondences of a diversity of movements — a multiplicity of threads along which lives are lived. Security is then not known through the securitisation of human life, a site or pathogens but through how insecurities are enacted within an assortment of forces moving with one another. The existential situation is not the centre of attention or the founding set of relations. It fractures into folds of decaying, mutating, and breaking down specific ways in which viral, enzymic, and technological flows envelop one another. 'Dangers' then emerge diffused within a multiplicity of movements-moving (Manning, 2009). It invites working from abundant life (Guillaume & Huysmans, 2019) rather than rarifying life that must be eliminated to protect specific composite forms of life (du Plessis, 2018, p. 401).

Untimely life & the continuity of movement

Unlike giving meaning and significance to existence from the perspective of its end, life-in-motion understands life in its fluidity. Living emerges in the continuous passing and entangling of flows. The beginning and end of the threadings are of little interest to how lives are being lived. For example, when looking at life in and through a square in a village or town, the square lives through lines of movement of people passing through to buy something, to catch a bus, or to go somewhere else, lines of movement of pigeons, cars and leaves, lines of movement of viruses, and the intertwining, crossing, and indifference between these movements. Somebody can get stabbed and die or be run over by a car, but the possibility of such deaths does not define life in the square. They are merged within the fluidity of the movements that make the square. Being run over by a car is an exceptional entangling of lines of movement, but this exceptionality does not define how the square is lived. Instead, it is part of the intertwining of movements through which life in and of the square emerges and continues. In other words, it becomes 'everyday'. Reading these multiple lines of movement in their continuity thus means that they are not brought into knowledge through their beginning and end but through their continuous threading and folding. (Ingold, 2011) Perec's writings illustrate this well. For example, his lists of observations of a square in Paris create a series of banal happenings. When reading them, there is a sense of emergence, of the square being alive and things taking place: someone enters the square with a briefcase, bus X arrives, a man gets off the bus and gets back on the bus to pick up his umbrella, a cat crosses the street, a woman in a dress with sunflowers enters the cafe on the

corner, bus x leaves, bus y arrives, a child buys an ice cream and so on. It sounds routine and repetitive but also creates an effect of emergence in the sense that life continuously comes into being in the square; the site is full of little possibilities like another bus turning up, the child dropping the ice cream, a man looking around and bumping into the child, and so on. At the same time, life in the square is fleeting. The list takes us through things that appear and then are gone. (Macherey, 2009, pp. 231-260) The appearing and being gone is not a beginning and end but a snapshot of the threadings and their foldings – the child gets on the bus, and they both move on.

If beginning and end are not defining categories, it also means that change is not the relation between a time of ending something that exists and a time of birthing something new. Instead of a difference between moments of death and birth, change becomes continuous motion, or in Bergson's terminology, duration. Such a change is indivisible in that it is not understood as a difference between one fixed moment and another fixed moment but as a continuous transmutation in repetition. (Bergson, 1969) Continuous flows of matter and life and the turbulence they create define movement in temporal terms. Such a conception of life creates an analytical sensitivity towards the immanent presence of new possibilities. In Zourabichvili's words: "We do not abandon what we are to become something else (imitation, identification), but another way of living and sensing haunts or is enveloped within our own and "puts it to flight" [*fait fuir*]." (Zourabichvili, 2012, p. 149) Time does not alternate between moments of sameness — the reproduction of a configuration through self-maintenance — and moments of transcending the limits of a present structure to create a new one. Instead, time becomes untimely. Untimeliness has a double meaning. It un-times time in the sense of breaking with linearity of time, with a temporality juxtaposing moments before and after. But, it also foregrounds a conception of temporality that is untimely in contemporary narratives and repertoires of knowledge and action that intensely mobilise catastrophic and apocalyptic endings as a tool for politicising matters of concern — to save the planet, a nation or a way of life from its destruction. This section will mainly look at the un-timing of time.

The war in Ukraine is sometimes presented as a return to classical geopolitics after 30 years of a different order of things international in Europe. However, we do not need to understand the intense presence of geopolitical forms as an imposition of the past's conditions onto the present. This geopolitical present in Europe co-exists within a composition of forces always in turbulence, making the past present with a difference and thus not like a copy of the past form. The geopolitical past is elusive; it appears and withdraws simultaneously. Geopolitical pasts, particularly 'the Cold War' and '19th century great power politics', are inscribed in the Ukrainian and Russian present. This present, in which the past is interjected, entails a heterogeneity of flows that distribute and transfigure the geopolitical past. The 'return of the past' is an interference rather than a continuation or resurrection. Such an untimely conception of the past makes the past present and non-present simultaneously (Chambers, 2003).

The past is present not as the past as such but as a difference that keeps the present in transmutation. It is a repetition in which the instances of repetition do not create sameness. Each time, they create a singularity that is a repeat in difference rather than an identity or a generality. (Deleuze, 2004 [1968]) When repeating a poem, a song, or a geopolitical analysis, we read, sing and narrate something written in the past, but our reading, singing and narrating is not a copy. This is the case not only because the person repeating gives the narrative a different inflexion but also because the present situation inflects the narration and the work it does. Untimely time is then a time of events, happenings that emerge in the continuous play of difference and their enactment of densities and intensities rather than the juxtaposition of discrete moments. Life becomes a process in the peculiar way of continuous emergence of

events in co-existence. The linearity of time collapses into a repetition of 'making present'; the past is then not before and after but a difference in presence. "What, therefore, is time? Absolute difference, the immediate placing-into-relation of heterogeneities, without a subjacent or subsuming conceptual identity. Time is nothing, properly speaking. It consists only of differences, and in the referral of one difference to another. It has neither center nor pole of identity. (…)" (Zourabichvili, 2012, p. 101) The time of life-in-motion is repetition in difference rather than succession of the same. In that case, the defining force of life is not the 'extraordinary' or 'exceptional' disrupting the boredom of the reproduction of the same. It is the repeating of pasts and futures threading lines along which a poem, song, or geopolitical enactment moves in correspondence with other lines of movement. The renewal of geopolitics across contemporary European security thought and practice inserts various pasts into the present. However, that does not make the present a copy of the past. Instead, the enactment of geopolitics in defence ministries, the military, media reports, and popular culture operates in a distinctive present. The geopolitical imageries, arrangements of military movement, and knowledge are repeated but differ in how they operate and the work they do because they are inflected to speak and work towards the present situations and because the present is folded differently from the past. In that sense, the past is in continuous transmutation through the inflexions given in the present. We get neither the boredom of the reproduction of the same nor the excitement and anxiety of the exceptional moment when the old dies, and the new emerges, but a continuous untimely making present.

In the untimeliness of life-in-motion, futures are similarly evasive, present and non-present. They are possibilities, and not potentialities, in the present. Possibility refers to undefined and unending time to come. It differs from 'potentiality', which refers to a future that is already present but needs activating (for example, a geopolitical potentiality now becoming reality, shaping the future as a revival of a familiar geopolitical order.) Potentiality is a future-present, a defined form brought into the present as a future outcome of dialectic, causal or probabilistic processes. Untimely futures, on the other hand, are futures-to-come, undirected futures.[13] (Chambers, 2003) Such a conception of possibility invites analytics of compositions of flows that are immanently in the making. As a concept, 'life-in-motion' is an analytical gesture creating sensitivities for the possibilities to live differently inherent to the lives being lived but without defining where they lead. Borrowing from Ingold, we can speak of an analytics of exposure that delays end-directed activity. (Ingold, 2015b, p. 146) Exposure differs from inculcation. In inculcation, the 'recipient' of information is told how things are, have been or will be to instil a form of approved knowledge. Exposure, however, invites them to be as attentive to the present as possible and actively roam without a defined destination. Untimely presents are no longer caught between already formed pasts and aimed-for future forms but are restored as the times one can live *with* (Ingold, 2015b, pp. 134, 146). That is quite different from catastrophic knowledge that posits a future one *cannot* live *with* as the condition of the present.

Such untimeliness gestures towards analytics that work with the becoming of life in which 'all of chance' is restored each time: it thus excludes finality, but also causality and probability, to the benefit of a non-causal correspondence between events (EPS 326; LS 170).'[4] (Zourabichvili, 2012, p. 98) That 'all of chance is restored each time' expresses a

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[3] The future is undefined, not because differences are infinite in the present. Multiplications of signs of existence arise from undefined, rather than unlimited, possibilities of differences emerging from within compositions of forces.

[4] Untimeliness differs from accounting for a state of affairs as a product of history, tracing causal and probabilistic lines of connections while assuming the way things panned out was not necessary but contingent. Making presents contingent does not multiply differences in the contemporary but reads the present as a state of affairs historically structured into its current form. (Bartelson, 2001).

conception of life that gives priority to freedom over inevitability and probability. Freedom is not a 'choice between alternatives' here, but the creativity that emerges between the flows and takes the form of continuing transmutations. (Bergson, 1969, p. 11) The relations between the flows are neither causally determined nor probabilistically open; they are possibilistic. The untimeliness of life-in-motion thus does not just raise questions for the analysis and mobilisation of exceptional responses in light of an existential ending that will necessarily happen but also for the study and mobilisation of the governance of risk through probabilistic management of futures in the present. The idea is not just that the future only exists in the present but that it does this as lines of flight enacted between the movements entangling.

Regarding COVID-19, the vaccine or the closing or opening of borders create 'ripples' that bend the viral environment, and in doing so, also bend the human environment and the trade environment, among others. We have a situation where the movements work upon one another, creating mutations and re-arranging viral, trade and human flows. They are in turbulence. This has implications for how we understand the co-existence of movements. Their folding is a threading in a patterned way that is also inherently possibilistic. The relations between movements are one of temporal modulation rather than fixing them in a grid or through coding. Or, to be more precise, they are enacted codes and grids but always in continuing modulation and never in stasis. (Schramke, 2016, p. 132) The patterning is in motion in an unpredictable but not random way.[35] Change is the intrinsic possibility of difference within this repetition. The question is then not whether the virus is under control but what transmutations are taking place in the relations between movements of viruses and their mutations, movements of trade and movements of human beings. It invites an analysis of time that works with happenings rather than beings or things. (Rovelli, 2018)

This possibilistic nature of untimeliness needs more explanation to avoid that it leads to analytics that detach life from structural patterns. It is not simply an assertion that anything always goes or an assertion of individual freedom. Ingold's concept of doing as undergoing helps explain how becoming of living differs from 'anything goes' and the freedom to do whatever one wants. He distinguishes between approaches that prioritise either doing over undergoing or undergoing over doing. In the former approach, the doing by some creates an undergoing for others. It is a ruler and ruled distinction in which the ruler holds the active component — they are free — and the led are on the receiving and undergoing end of things — they are unfree. The undergoing comes from the doing. When translating this in structural configurations, the life of most people and other organisms then emerges as simply undergoing. Drawing on Wieman's insight that life is never merely undergoing, something being done to us, or movement shaped in light of pre-given forms, he conceptualises undergoing as always overflowing into doing, or more accurately, that any undergoing is a doing. The doing is in the undergoing.

Life consists of undergoing, but undergoing is always a doing too. Rather than separating doing and undergoing, it makes doing immanent to undergoing. That means 'freedom' is not an outside or oppositional force that seeks to change a given configuration we are undergoing but is a defining quality of movements composing in their movement with other movements. The configuration is a confluence of flows that keep their composition in motion and not a bounded order that imposes itself. Hence, the notion of 'doing-in-undergoing' and not 'doing as that what escapes or resists the undergoing'. (Ingold, 2015a, p. 127) For example, it relates to understanding walking as roaming, not simply shaped by the built pathways and the direction towards an endpoint. Instead, walking does something by undergoing the built

[5] One speaks of pedesis or stochastic conceptions of change, change that is unpredictable but not random. (Nail, 2018b).

environment, encounters, and visual impulses; in short, by the exposure to the site. It is a mode of walking that is not commanded by what is given but on the way to being given; it is attentive — 'opened up in readiness for the 'not yet' of what is to come''.(Ingold, 2015a, p. 136)

Such a conception of temporality seriously questions both those seeking a transhumanist elimination of death and their existentialist critics for whom the human awareness of death is a defining condition of human practice. For example, in her reflections on philosophy during a pandemic and how it challenged transhumanism ideology, Françoise Dastur offers an existentialist view. For her, the pandemic brought home that death is the foundation of human beings and reminded us about the dangers of transhumanism, which seeks a permanent improvement of physical and mental faculties promising 'the death of death'.

> But today the specter of death resurfaces with force. Everyone is afraid of contamination, so that in a society where everything is done not to think about death, it is now coming back to consciousness. (…) That would mean not only to face death in thought and to look it in the face, but to see in it not an imperfection, but on the contrary the very foundation of human existence. It is from there that it could then be revealed to us that the anguish of death is in no way incompatible with the joy of existing. (Dastur, 2020, p. 842)

The 'death of death' is for her also the death of being human. Similar to existentialist works, like de Beauvoir's novel 'All Men Are Mortal', which explore the 'emptiness' of eternal life, the awareness of life's finality gives life meaning. Dastur's argument for the anguish of death being compatible with the joy of existence comes partly from an understanding that humans are creative in a unique way when they face death. In this point of view, the mobilisation of existential endings is not necessarily favouring self-preservation, stability and reproduction of what is. The awareness of finality becomes the condition for living in change, a life of creating new possibilities.

'Creativity' and 'possibility', however, are in this existentialist conception, very different from how possibilities emerge in life in motion and its untimeliness. The possibilities and creativity of life emerge within the fluidity of continuous entanglings of movement in life in motion. In a life lived in the face of existential threats, creativity unfolds within a discontinuous temporality marked by an existential limit. Such necro-cultural creativity defines significant developments, moments, and situations in which possibilities emerge from crises, risking the ending of something. The question of change arises from the enactment of tipping points, catastrophes, exceptionalist moments redefining a historical era, and so on. Such a conception of change can indeed be seen at work at moments of existential securitisation: nothing will be the same after the pandemic; war in Ukraine is creating a new European security order; to deal with global warming, we will need to change the economic model and our habits fundamentally.

Necro-cultural creativity also connects to a desire for authenticity: facing death brings a more authentic view of life and oneself. The superficial layers fade, and genuine humanness emerges. To continue illustrating with Dastur's piece, she states that in reducing freedom of movement out of fear of death during the COVID-19 pandemic, people found something else, 'another form of freedom, that of establishing a more authentic relationship to oneself and the world'.(Dastur, 2020, p. 840)] There are other expressions of such a conception of authenticity. For example, it also drove notions like Ernst Jünger's militarism, in which experiencing death and the brutality of war was a condition for discovering one's authentic, real self. Authenticity implies that the real self or situation is obscured, hidden or inaccessible. Mobilising or facing an existential end becomes the condition or tool for breaking out of the inauthentic shell and transforming relations towards a more authentic co-existence.

The possiblistic nature of life-in-motion is not existential in the sense explained here. It is not about creating more authentic living. Instead, it takes life in its banal, continuous unfolding and entangling. Changes in values, inequalities, discriminations, or other relations occur within this continuity. The driver of these changes is not a horizon of death, of existential finality, but the ordinary threading of practice and matter creating interdependencies. Such an understanding of life acknowledges that climate change, for example, can have deadly consequences for people, species, or the planet. Yet, it avoids using them as a basis for catastrophic or apocalyptic imaginations or claims of an absolute need for dramatic interventions in human lifestyles. Instead, climate change consists of meshing a heterogeneity of flows that continue to transform. It does not exist as a single existential moment or configuration. It enables working within the complex entanglements of climate change and its diverse possibilities, which we cannot fully control but can interfere with to create various ripple effects. Existential claims and representations of crises are blended into the fluidity of everyday life. When incorporating these existential happenings into the ongoing motion of life, they lose their unique status as defining moments in life and time. Existential events such as death and endings are thus not absent, but they are manifested differently in the turbulent and repetitive time of an analysis of life-in-motion. Death becomes a normal part of life, a flow of life. Existential events lose their ability to break time, and their trumping power fractures.

The basic idea is to redefine death through life instead of defining life through death. Does this imply that a life in motion is lived with hope rather than despair? In a way, yes, but the word 'hope' does not quite fit. The line of flight is not a line of hope but of possibilities. Living in motion is about taking life as it (un)folds — a life-in-the-making (Love, 2017) — including despair, violence and discrimination. It is, thus, not an expression of the beautiful soul that opposes an ugly world. It is, however, a life lived with and through its continuous fluidity and possibilities rather than through a fear or embracing of endings.

Conclusion

This article started from observing intense political mobilisations of existential endings today. It aimed to analytically fracture such mobilisations in ways that allow for taking existential insecurities seriously without making them organise devices of life or giving them the trumping power they invite. To achieve this, I have proposed moving beyond a critique that makes security contingent by engaging the conception of life inscribed in the mobilisations of existential endings. To critically engage with end-thinking, I put forward a concept of biological and social life that emphasises continuous movement rather than defining it from the perspective of its inevitable end. This point of view highlights the dynamic and transformative nature of life itself.[6]

Taking life as essentially moving makes life a continuing threading of movements with one another and the forces that exist in between. Corporeal entities and the problem of their ending or death give way to correspondences between lines of movement; existential limits and transcendence give way to turbulence and continuous transmutations. The temporality of life is one of becoming, which is an untimely time with immanent possibilities that are not defined but present. Death, or, in security speak, existential dangers, remain matters of concern in life-in-motion — life-in-motion is not the transhumanist notion of a life without death — but they are folded into an abundance of life in permanent becoming. An ecological catastrophe, a war, or a global pandemic is no longer conceptualised as a unified whole that

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[6] There are other ways of doing this than I have proposed here. For example, some have argued for subsuming security within a different problem that is given analytical priority, such as freedom and equality (Aradau, 2008), citizenship (Guillaume & Huysmans, 2013), or capitalism (Neocleous, 2008).

organises the present through fear and mobilisation of the imminence of death but exists through assortments of threadings and foldings that create co-existences in interdependencies. In doing so, the concept of life-in-motion introduces an analytics of the becoming of insecurities that explicitly comes to existential insecurities from the outside, from a situation that is always rendered as more than security without being just many. Methodologically, life-in-motion composes relations that are mobile and, in some sense, non-localisable because it is the movement between them that matters rather than their solidification in or around a centre, composition or point (Deleuze, 1986, p. 81). In that sense, one can say that from the point of view that centres life on existential insecurities, life-in-motion implies an analytics that always prioritises the outside, not in the sense of exteriority but of making that which looks like a centre (e.g. a catastrophe, death, end of an era) into a non-centre.

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