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Measuring Ethnodoxy in Egypt and Morocco

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Measuring Ethnodoxy in Egypt and Morocco

Hannah M. Ridge, Ph.D.

Abstract

Ethnodoxy is the conceptual linkage of an ethnic group with a particular religion. It has been previously documented in Slavic Orthodox communities. This study uses Arabic-language surveys in Egypt and Morocco to measure this ethno-religious linkage among Arab Muslims. It develops a parsimonious survey scale for measuring ethnodoxy. It also demonstrates that ethnodox and non-ethnodox Egyptians and Moroccans have different political preferences, both for regime type and for the role of religion in politics.

“Because Pakistanis are not real Muslims. They’re converts. Islam was revealed to the Arabs.”

– Anonymous speaker quoted by Irshad Manji

Islam originated in the Arabian Peninsula and rapidly spread to other regions of the world. Currently, most Muslims live in Asia, outside the Arab heartland. This is consistent with religious tenets that all people could convert to Islam. Nonetheless, some Muslims believe that ethnic connection to the founding community makes Arab Muslims “truer” or “better” Muslims.

Non-Arab Muslims, or those who are coded as such by observers, may feel othered by this assumption. Heterodox Muslim Irshad Manji (a Ugandan-born Canadian Muslim of Egyptian and Indian heritage) describes this as “founder’s privilege” (Manji, 2003, p. 136).¹ Manji recounts being challenged by a Muslim student group during a talk on “God and gays.” She asserted that Islam cannot be a “straight path” because countries vary in how the religion is practiced. A student retorted, “Because Pakistanis are not real Muslims. They’re converts. Islam was revealed to the Arabs” (p. 135). The protesting student group reportedly splintered in argument over his statement.

The linkage between religion and ethnicity is termed *ethnodoxy*. Ethnodoxy has been identified in Slavic orthodox communities (Avetyan, 2017; Karpov et al., 2012). This study builds on those works by examining the prevalence of Arab-Muslim ethnodoxy in North Africa. It utilizes an Arabic-language survey via Qualtrics of 531 Egyptian and 503 Moroccan Muslim respondents. Factor analysis identifies and distinguishes ethno-religious linkage (ethnodoxy) from support for privileging Islam and support for religious diversity in society. These results are slightly different than those found in the Slavic Orthodox studies. However, they do reveal that some Muslims link Arab ethnicity and Islam. The study probes the connection between ethnodoxy and political values. It finds, for instance, that ethnodoxy is linked to openness to non-democratic regimes; however, it is also linked to utility-based reinterpretations of Islamic law. For scholars interested in incorporating ethnodoxy into their analyses of MENA politics and society, the results offer a concise survey scale.

ETHNODOX BELIEFS

Ethnodoxy, at its most simple, is the linkage of an ethnic group with a particular religion, especially the predominant religion in the ethnic group (Avetyan, 2017; Barry, 2019). It does not need to be the founding community for that religion. Rather, group demographics are important. Once ethnodoxic principles are established, the ethnic and religious identities may be mutually reinforcing (Barry, 2019). The religion can maintain social importance even as participation declines if it is embedded in the identity (Avetyan, 2017).

Some scholars have built political policy preferences into a more detailed construction: “Ethnodoxy is a belief system that rigidly links a group’s ethnic identity to its dominant religion and consequently tends to view other religions as potentially or actually harmful to

¹ A Sudanese-American student reported experiencing this othering in the American Muslim community.

the group's unity and well-being and, therefore, seeks protected and privileged status for the group's dominant faith" (Karpov et al., 2012, p. 644). They assume that the linkage naturally leads to a sense of perpetual threat and prioritization.

Ethnodoxo can be considered an objective and subjective phenomenon (Karpov et al., 2012). Objectively, observers can identify "the co-extensiveness of groups' religious and ethnic dimensions" (p. 638). This correlation would be the same across the communities. Individuals can vary, though, in their subjective assessment of identity-group interconnectedness. Citizens have different perceived levels of "social identity complexity" – the "individual's subjective representation of the interrelationships among his or her multiple group identities" (Roccas & Brewer, 2002, p. 88). Social identity is more complex when individuals are part of the ingroup on one identity but part of the outgroup on another dimension. This is based on their subjective assessment, rather than the factual degree of social group convergence or divergence (Brewer & Pierce, 2005).

Ethno-religions would seem ripe for this linkage, which would reduce the social identity complexity. After all, the ethnicity and the religion overlap substantially. Mahmood cites Copts who believe that "the conversion of Copts to Islam [is] more than a religious conversion" but is "the substitution of one ethnic identity (Coptic) with another (Arab)" (Mahmood, 2012, pp. 444-445). For such groups, ethnodoxo would facilitate cognitive identity concordance for compliers; they are highly likely to see themselves and be seen by others as part of their group.

Other religions may not produce as psychologically- or theologically-conducive a linkage. Would-be globalizing religions, like Islam and Christianity, are not supposed to apply only to one ethnic group. As such, they have doctrinal issues with ethnodoxo. Nonetheless, globalizing religions (e.g., Orthodox and Catholic Christianity) have been linked to certain populations (e.g., Russians and Poles) in the popular imaginary: "someone can doctrinally endorse Christianity's 'neither Greek nor Jew' principle and, at the same time, believe that Greeks are innately Christian whereas Jews cannot be even if they try" (Karpov et al., 2012, p. 644). These are contradictory impulses.

The contradiction confronts some members more than others. For instance, this conceptual fusion places converts in a bind. They are supposedly welcomed into the faith, but are still marginalized by some members. They may also face challenges from their own co-ethnics for breaking the norm. Even born members who are not from the founding community may be confronted with these challenges – although not all ethnodoxo is occurring within the founding community. Ethnodoxo thus poses problems at the individual level.

At a societal level, such beliefs could encourage disunity and disorder. These sentiments magnify the boundaries between groups. Furthermore, individuals could perceive a group harm on both ethnic and religious dimensions, magnifying the sense of group threat. Would-be leaders can mobilize individuals through this concordance, and would-be antagonists can specifically inflame tensions on these dimensions. The beliefs could also create feedback loops of in-group preference. For instance, ethnodoxic Russians are more likely to hold xenophobic beliefs (Barry, 2019). This propensity would protect the group and its status but undermine other interests, such as economic development. Ethnodoxo could also make ethnic or religious conflicts more vociferous because of in-group preferences and the magnification of group threat.

Among Muslims, ethnodoxy cuts against doctrinal injunctions. Ethnic privileges subvert the Islamic *umma*, the global Muslim community. An Arab Egyptian man (1990)² invoked this point: “Islam is a moderate religion that does not distinguish between individuals based on color or race. Following other religions under the protection of the Muslims inside their country, they have rights and protections, and they have obligations.”³ The word used here for “under protection,” *dhimma*, recalls the historical status in which non-Muslims paid taxes and obeyed social restrictions in exchange for not being killed. While he supports diversity within Islam, he did not support religious equality. In his survey responses, he opposed religious diversity as a beneficial force (MR1: -0.44, MR2: 0.48).

Under *umma*, ethnodoxy should not pertain. Furthermore, most Muslims now live in Asia, not in the Arab heartlands. Nonetheless, assertions of “founder’s privilege” suggest that ethnic and religious linkages exist for some Muslims. Karpov et al. (2012) postulate such a link. This study tests ethnodoxy measures in the Arab world to produce an ethnodoxy scale and to consider some of the political correlates of ethno-religious linkage by Arab Muslims.

Both ethnic and religious identities have been proposed previously as unifying groupings in the Middle East (e.g., Arab nationalism, Islamic nationalism). While ethnodoxy can be linked to pro-country/pro-national sentiment – Karpov et al. (2012) empirically link one of their components of ethnodoxy to Russian national pride – it is not the same as ethnic or religious nationalism. Nationalism asserts mutual recognition and affiliation by all members (Anderson, 2006). Ethnodoxy is a belief held by some members of a group. Furthermore, ethnodoxic beliefs subvert ethnic or religious nationalism by asserting that some members of these groups do not truly belong as much as others. For instance, it asserts that non-Muslim Arabs are less Arab or non-Arab Muslims are less Muslim. In that sense, ethnodoxy may support pride in a country or in a group, but not be as encompassing as the country or group identity is.

MEASURING ETHNODOXY

In order to assess ethnodoxy, an Arabic-language⁴ survey of 543 Egyptian adults 513 Moroccan adults was conducted February 21-22, 2023 and May 9-19, 2023 and June 17-21, 2023 through Qualtrics’s online survey panel using a survey programmed in Qualtrics.⁵ The survey consent page informed respondents that the survey was anonymous, was written by a researcher at an American university, and would take about six minutes to complete; they were also told they could skip questions or stop at any time. The mean survey time in Egypt was 5.8 minutes (median 5.1 minutes) and 8.25 minutes (median 7.03 minutes) in Morocco.

² For all quoted respondents, the year of birth is marked in parentheses. The MR1 and MR2 are the respondent’s ethno-religious linkage and Islamic privilege scores. More is said below on their calculation.

³ الإسلام بينوس طلي يفرق بين احبفظا للون او عرق .نباع الينيات الخي في ذمقالبول حين دالغ بالذ ممل مكلال خروق ولح حطيه وعلي ممال واجبات .

⁴ Arabic is an official language in both countries and has near total popular penetration. In Morocco, Tamazight replaced French as another official language after the 20 February Movement. Although the surveys were only written in Arabic, a few respondents used French in their open-ended responses.

⁵ The survey was timed not to overlap with a Muslim or Coptic religious holiday and to start on a Monday and Tuesday. However, the Morocco sample includes many respondents who answered on a Friday because of Qualtrics's scheduling; the Moroccan sample was enlarged to balance them with non-Friday responses.

The analysis focuses on the results from the Muslim portion of the sample (N=531 in Egypt, and N=624 in Morocco). However, the results are substantively similar in an analysis of the Arab portion of the sample (N=527 in Egypt, and N=429 in Morocco).⁶

The survey sample is a convenience sample, but quotas were set for age brackets and sex based on the Arab Barometer V reports for age and sex.⁷ The survey sample is more educated and more urban than the general population (Table 1), as identified in the Arab Barometer surveys (Table 2). The religious and ethnic breakdowns are similar. The Arab Barometer used multistage stratified sampling for representativeness at the governorate and national levels based on the 2017 Egyptian Census and the 2014 Moroccan Population and Housing Census, so it is a solid benchmark for population statistics. As the survey used a quota-based convenience sample, this study does not make claims about any particular opinion statistic. Instead, it focuses on the confluence of responses across the several questions.

Both countries are Arab- and Muslim-majority countries in North Africa. Egypt is the largest Arab state. They are differently diverse, though. Morocco has a larger ethnic minority population. Egypt has a high-profile if small religious minority, the Coptic Christian community. Egypt has a recurrently tense relationship with Islamist groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood, and the military plays a high-profile political role. Morocco has a parliamentary monarchy that claims descent from the Prophet Muhammed and recently had an Islamist government. Thus, they represent distinct socio-political environments in which to examine Arab Muslim ethnodoxy.

The survey included several questions drawn from the ethnodoxy literature. The questions target inborn faithfulness by ethnic group members, the sense of religious superiority within the tradition, the exclusion of apostates, the marginalization of converts, the presumption of harm from other religions, and seeking privileges and protection (Karpov et al., 2012). The Russian-Orthodox ethnodoxy survey asked whether foreign churches harmed Russian Orthodoxy in Russia. The questions were rephrased for the Arab survey so that agreement does not always indicate ethnodoxy. Respondents rated how true the statements are from not at all true to definitely true. These questions are used to measure ethnodoxy. The survey also included several political and demographic questions.

⁶ 8 of 10 Christians in the Egypt sample identified as ethnically Coptic, as did 5 Muslims. 3 Muslims identified as Other, and 1 atheist identified as Arab. In Morocco, almost all the Arabs identified as Muslim, and almost all Muslims were Arab or Amazigh. Three Arab Moroccans identified as none and 1 as Other. Two Moroccan Muslims identified as Coptic, 8 as Other, and 3 as Touareg.

⁷ In the 2018 Arab Barometer, among Egyptians, 38.2% were 18-29, 38.7% were 30-29, 20.9% were 50+, and 2.2% skipped that question. 51.6% were male and 48.4% were female. Among Moroccans, 33.5% were 18-29, 37.6% were 30-29, 28% were 50+, and 0.9% skipped that question. 49.8% were male and 50.2% were female. The youth skew in the population is why the median age is younger than the mean age, and the relative proportions are why the Moroccan sample is slightly older than the Egyptian sample.

Table 1: Sample Demographics

	Egypt	Morocco
Percent Muslim	97.8	97.7
Percent Christian	1.8	0.3
Percent None	0.2	1.2
Percent Other		0.6
Percent Arab	97.1	66.8
Percent Amazigh		30.7
Percent Coptic	2.4	0.3
Percent Other	0.6	1.6
Percent Tuareg		0.6
Mean Year of Birth	1986	1984
Median Year of Birth	1990	1988
Percent Male	51.0	51.6
Percent Female	49.0	48.4
Percent with Higher Education	86.0	59.8
Percent Urban Residence	88.6	88.0
Percent Suburban Residence	5.3	9.0
Percent Rural Residence	6.1	2.8
Percent Income Sufficient to Expenses	77.0	66.5

Table 2: Country Demographics (Arab Barometer)

	Egypt	Morocco
Percent Muslim	97.1	99.5
Percent Christian	2.9	0.1
Percent None		0.2
Percent Other		0.2
Percent Arab	100.0	70.8
Percent Amazigh		28.0
Percent Tuareg		0.6
Percent Other		0.6
Percent with Higher Education	16.7	11.4
Percent Urban Residence	44.2	63.3
Percent Rural Residence	55.8	36.7
Percent Income Sufficient to Expenses	20.4	44.1

In the sample, there is a very strong distribution in favor both of viewing religious diversity as good and wanting a special status and protection for Islam. There is also tendency toward believing that Arabs are spiritually rich. There is a tendency against thinking that non-Arabs could never be Muslim or that conversion would make one less Arab. Agreement that Arabs are Muslim at heart and that true Islam is found in Arab countries is more evenly distributed.

Karpov et al. (2012) argue that these items form a syndrome of beliefs. In this case, the Cronbach's Alpha is 0.64 in Egypt and 0.54 in Morocco. This suggests a reasonable amount of interrelatedness in the data. In both country samples, the alpha would be higher if the diversity question were dropped, indicating that it does not scale well with the others. Nonetheless, these questions could be made into a single scale.

Factor analysis with oblimin rotation found two factors with eigenvalues over 1 (Revelle, 2023). Oblimin rotation was preferred over varimax rotation to avoid the assumption that the factors are orthogonal. Based on that result, the dimensionality of these questions can be reduced to two dimensions. The factor loadings for each question are shown in Tables 3-4. Higher scores indicate stronger loadings onto that factor, meaning greater relevance or fit. The proportion variance indicates how much of the variation in the dataset is explained by that component, with higher scores indicating greater explanatory power; it can indicate the relative strength of different components.

The first component is overtly ethnodoxic. It links both "belonging without believing" and religious superiority for Arab Muslims.⁸ It draws on propositions like Arabs being naturally Muslim, even superior Muslims. Founders' privilege is evident. In discussion of the qualitative responses, the ethno-religious linkage score is the MR1 score. Scholars looking to study ethnodoxo should draw on these questions. This component ties directly to the theory of ethnodoxo. For clarity in this discussion, though, the component is referred to as the ethno-religious linkage component.

The second component is more political. It addresses state and social privilege and protection for Islam. Both elements load strongly onto this factor and not the ethno-religious linkage factor. For this discussion, this factor is referred to as the status for Islam component. In discussion of the qualitative responses, the Islamic privilege score is the MR2 score. The explicitly ethnic questions do not load strongly on this component.

Support for religious diversity did not load well on either factor. Some respondents evidently do not see privileging Islam and endorsing or rejecting diversity as related propositions. In the analyses below, the support for diversity variable is included separately. These results are thus slightly different than the three linked dimensions identified in Russia: 1) in-group belonging, 2) exclusion of ethnic or religious others and presumption of harm, and 3) privilege and protection-seeking (Karpov et al., 2012).

⁸ While it would make sense for religious identities to be held only by those who hold the concordant beliefs or engage in the associated rituals, in practice there are individuals who identify themselves with theistic religions (sometimes even engaging in rituals) while reporting not to believe in God, and individuals who identify as believers but do not report belonging to a faith community or participating in the rituals. That may be because they are not presently affiliated with a local religious institution or due to personal slackness.

Table 3: Factor Loadings [Egypt]

	Ethnic Linkage	Status for Islam
An Arab is Muslim in his heart even if he does not go to mosque	0.46	0.00
Arabs are spiritually richer and stronger in their faith than Western peoples	0.44	0.29
Only in Arab countries can one find the true Islam	0.60	0.16
An Arab who converts to another religion (e.g., Christianity) is no longer truly Arab	0.63	-0.07
A non-Arab will never be truly Muslim, even if he goes to mosque	0.73	-0.10
Religious diversity strengthens Arab societies	0.09	0.01
Islam should enjoy a privileged position in society	-0.09	0.69
The state should protect the Muslim faith of the Egyptian/Moroccan people	0.06	0.73
SS Loadings	1.73	1.14
Proportion Variance	0.22	0.14
Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.97		

Table 4: Factor Loadings [Morocco]

	Ethnic Linkage	Status for Islam
An Arab is Muslim in his heart even if he does not go to mosque	0.29	-0.08
Arabs are spiritually richer and stronger in their faith than Western peoples	0.52	0.17
Only in Arab countries can one find the true Islam	0.64	0.02
An Arab who converts to another religion (e.g., Christianity) is no longer truly Arab	0.60	-0.04
A non-Arab will never be truly Muslim, even if he goes to mosque	0.51	-0.13
Religious diversity strengthens Arab societies	0.08	-0.12
Islam should enjoy a privileged position in society	-0.02	0.74
The state should protect the Muslim faith of the Egyptian/Moroccan people	0.02	0.64
SS Loadings	1.39	1.02
Proportion Variance	0.17	0.13
Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.97		

The distribution of the components is shown in Figures 1 and 2. Most respondents scored between -1 and 1 on the component scales. There is great variation on the component most linking Islam and Arab ethnicity in both country samples. While some respondents linked them strongly – consistent with ethnodoxo – not all respondents did. This sentiment was also evident in the open-ended responses. Opinion in the sample leans heavily towards privileging Islam in both countries. The similarities in the results, both the factor loading patterns and these distributions, across the two country samples, are good indicators for generalizability.

While the samples are not representative, the demographics are useful for indications of which groups were more inclined to these beliefs (Appendix A). The Amazigh-identifying Muslim respondents evince lower ethno-religious linkage than the Arab Moroccans; Coptic-identifying Muslim respondents expressed less interest in privileging Islam. This makes sense, since they are non-Arab Muslims. In both countries, college-educated respondents also have lower ethno-religious linkage scores, while those with incomes sufficient to cover their expenses have higher scores. More religious respondents – measured by reported frequency of prayer from never (1) to five times a day (6) and by *umma* consciousness – in Morocco reported a greater desire to privilege Islam in society. *Umma* consciousness was measured by response to the statement, “Issues that affect Muslims in other countries are ones that I should care about too,” from not at all true (1) to definitely true (4). Higher scores indicated greater belief in the unified Muslim people, the *umma*.

Prayer frequency was not significantly associated with the ethno-religious linkage factor score. On one hand, more religious individuals may be more likely to hold these views. On the other hand, they also might be more *umma*-aligned, meaning they would be less ethnodoxic. These would be countervailing forces. Furthermore, if the ethnodox subscribe to inborn faithfulness, they may self-construe as devout despite not participating in religious behaviors. For instance, Barry (2019) suggests that religiosity is not a predictor of Russian Orthodox ethnodoxo, and Avetyan (2017, p. 6) notes that Armenian-Americans experience high ethnodoxo “despite low religious practice.” Thus, ethnodoxo appears distinct from religiosity.

Some respondents used a free-response space to disavow ethnodoxo. For instance, a few individuals objected to the privatization of Islam. An Arab Egyptian man (1975) wrote, “From my point of view, Islam is not limited to Arabs only” (MR1: -0.37, MR2: 0.43).⁹ Another Arab Egyptian man (1988) wrote, “Islam does not make distinction among the races, and a Western Muslim in some cases can be better than an Arab Muslim.”¹⁰ He scored low on ethno-religious linkage and expressed pro-immigrant views (MR1: -0.76, MR2: 0.30). An Arab Muslim Moroccan man (1983) appealed to community: “A Muslim is the brother of a Muslim, whatever his race, color, or gender.”¹¹ He did, though, question the utility of religious diversity and endorse ethno-religious linkages, despite his statement (MR1: 1.26, MR2: 0.50); his hypothetical co-religionist may be a brother but not fully equal. These comments are consistent with the principle of *umma*.

⁹ من وجهه نظري أليس الم ليس يتوق فعلى اليع فقط

¹⁰ السالم اليعيزيين ال عراق وللعلم اليعي في ب عرض ال عي انيكورفاضل من العلم العربي

¹¹ الم سلم مع المبرك في فم اكان عرق لولونه او خصه

Figure 1: Component Distribution in Egypt





Figure 2: Component Distribution in Morocco



The Morocco survey included a question about *umma consciousness*, a sense of connection to the global Muslim community (Sediqe, 2019). Muslim respondents were asked how true it was for them that issues that affect Muslims in other countries are ones that they should care about too. Ethno-religious linkage scores did not significantly correlate to *umma consciousness*. Those who would privilege Islam in Morocco were more likely to agree with that sentiment, as were those who pray more often.

One Muslim Amazigh Moroccan (1964) respondent took this a step farther. Not only is Islam for all its adherents, it is for everyone: “All the people in the world are Muslim, only they have, each of them, a [different] degree of faith” (MR1: -1.07, MR2: 0.12).¹² Unsurprisingly, he scored very low in ethno-religious linkages while endorsing religious diversity. An Arab Egyptian man (1962) wrote, “Non-Muslims do not represent any problem,

¹² جميع الناس في العالم مسلمون فقط يوجد عن ذلك واحد درجة من الإيمان

rather the opposite. We have lived as brothers for many years. We do not feel any differences, and any effort at division is a means of sowing sedition [*fitna*] from a group that wants to divide or that understands religion incorrectly.”¹³ His statements contradict some of the exclusionary sentiments avowed by other respondents (see below). While he decoupled Arabness and ethnicity, he scored very low on the principle that religious diversity benefits Arab societies (MR1: -1.11, MR2: 0.27). This suggests tolerance more than endorsement of religious difference. Similarly, an Arab Muslim Moroccan woman (1982) averred, “Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance, and Arabs can live with the other religions easily.” This phrasing tacitly links Islam and Arabness, although her linkage score is lower (MR1: -0.38, MR2: -0.42). She reported confidence in religious diversity for Morocco.

Another Arab Muslim Moroccan man (1995) wrote, “Yes, Islam is a religion, but it must be far from intolerance and racism. Really it must be a religion of tolerance and morals. There is no difference between the Arab and the non-Arab except in piety” (MR1: -0.49, MR2: 0.46).¹⁴ Although not very ethnodox, he certainly asserts spiritual superiority. An Amazigh Muslim woman (1992) used nearly the same phrase: “There is no difference between the Arab and the non-Arab except piety – we made you into peoples and tribes so that you may know each other. Indeed, the most honorable of you with Allah is the most pious of you” (MR1: -1.28, MR2: 0.21).¹⁵ The latter portion is a citation to Qur’an Sura al-Hujarat 13. She still scores very low on ethno-religious linkage. An Arab Muslim Moroccan woman (1967) concluded that in fact “there are no differences between Arabs and non-Arabs.”¹⁶ She scored low on ethno-religious linkage and approved of religious diversity (MR1: -0.77, MR2: -0.40). This demonstrates that overall ethnodox may be low in the face of belief in individual features.

Other respondents objected to ethnodox from a pan-Arabism perspective. An Arab Egyptian woman (1995) wrote, “Truly there is no difference between a Muslim and a Christian, but really we are all siblings who share Arabness.”¹⁷ She also expressed openness to diverse neighbors. Still, she scored high on privileging and protecting Islam in Egypt (MR1: 0.17, MR2: 0.64). An Arab Egyptian woman (1988) stated, “The Arab is Muslim or not Muslim and he lives in Egypt. All the religions are brothers.”¹⁸ She scored very low on ethno-religious linkage and very high on diversity (MR1: -1.11, MR2: 0.27). An Arab Egyptian man (1981) opposed racial distinction while making a religious and nationalist distinction: “As a Muslim, I do not distinguish between any race, whether white or black. Indeed, God’s religion is Islam. We do not love false idols/tyrants like the false idols/tyrants that govern Arabs. We love justice and moral values. We love justice and equality among the individuals in society. We love good things for all people.”¹⁹ He scored low on ethno-religious linkage and high on

¹³ غير العوليين اليتخلون أيهش كل قبل على الخكس ن حنن عيش اخوة من نسنونك ليشروع بأي اصالف وأيم حولة للفسرقة هي في سييل زرع الفتننة نم في فتوي ان يفرق تلفم لليين بصورة خاطئة

¹⁴ ن عمل سالم فيني ولكن هي جب ان يكون بعبدا عن عاصب والخصيرة ثم في جب ان يكون في تنس ام ح واخلق

ال فرقيين ربي و اعجمي الي القوي

¹⁵ ال فرقيين ربي و اعجمي الي القوي - وج عمل نظم شعوب اولي لنحار فوا ان كرمكم عن طل اني لكم

¹⁶ ال فرقيين ربي و اعجمي

¹⁷ ن ال فرقيين سولم ومسيحي وارثين الثنق لتشر الكنا العربية.

¹⁸ العرب مسلم أو غير مسلم وي عيش في مصر جي عال يلات اخوة

¹⁹ Note: In such language, Arabs self-categorize as white, and non-Arab Africans are often coded as black.

كنا مسلم ال اي زيبين اي عرق سوا عيلني ض و اسود

supporting diversity; he also expressed pro-immigrant attitudes (MR1: -0.58, MR2: 0.42).

Another, an Arab Egyptian man (1989), rebutted founders' privilege. He argued, "Islam began in the Arabs, but those who have influenced religious discourse are from all parts of the world. Muslims are attracted generally [by] arranging the study of the religion and going deeper in it. He has the acceptance in joining the true religion. Thanks."²⁰ Fittingly, he scored low on ethno-religious linkage and also accepted religious diversity (MR1: -0.52, MR2: 0.30). These responses demonstrate the variation in public sentiment towards ethnodoxy. Additional comments on the nature of Islam are presented in Appendix B.

Public opinion can also be evaluated empirically by looking at the components' convergence and divergence from other beliefs, such as national pride and interpersonal tolerance (Tables 5 and 6). National pride was assessed based on the World Values Survey question, "The world would be better if more countries were like" Egypt or Morocco respectively. Tolerance is measured using several indicators of seeking social distance; such questions have previously been asked on the Arab Barometer. Respondents could indicate opposition to neighbors who are "immigrants or foreign workers from the Gulf" (co-ethnic foreigners), who are "immigrants or foreign workers from sub-Saharan Africa" (non-co-ethnic foreigners), who are a different race (non-co-ethnics), who are a different religion, or who are from a lower social status. Higher scores mean greater opposition. Notably, only some of those characteristics are overtly ethnic or religious differences. On the whole, in almost all cases, respondents were heavily weighted towards welcoming their neighbors. Religious diversity saw the most opposition. One Amazigh Muslim woman (2000) did not like these questions. She wrote, "I think that the questions who I want to become my neighbor are not important because I am not interested in the race, religion, or social class of my neighbor as much as I care about their respect for us" (MR1: 0.42, MR2: 0.41).²¹ She rated each option the same.

ان الذين عن طلال السالم

والنحب لاطوا غيت نثل طوا غيت حكام العرب نخنن حبال العدل والقيم الاخ القوية ونحب العدل ولما سوا اميين الفهر ادا الحبت مع ونحب لخير لكل

"الناس

السالمه افى ال عرب لكن من لم يتشغل على خطاب العيني من كل أنحاء العالم والعمل مؤثرون فيكون عموم لم درس الين وتع مقيمه بده " 20

القبول في تصويري لصحى حالين

وشاركرا

أظن أن لسروال على من رأيد أرى صوا جيرانى، لى كى م هم ألقى ال انقب عرق وال يوقل ال الم ستوى الم ادي لى يوقل ب قدر ما أنقم 21

باحترام لنا

Table 5: Correlations in Egypt

	Ethnic Linkage	Status for Islam
National Pride	0.433**	0.200**
Neighbor: Gulf Workers	-0.241**	-0.066
Neighbor: African Workers	-0.321**	-0.078
Neighbor: Different Religion	-0.032	0.110*
Neighbor: Different Race	-0.223**	-0.084
Neighbor: Different Social Class	-0.255**	-0.018

**p<0.01 *p<0.05

Table 6: Correlations in Morocco

	Ethnic Linkage	Status for Islam
National Pride	0.379**	0.106*
Neighbor: Gulf Workers	-0.137**	0.006
Neighbor: African Workers	-0.180**	0.059
Neighbor: Different Religion	-0.043	0.164**
Neighbor: Different Race	-0.161**	0.028
Neighbor: Different Social Class	-0.199**	-0.027

**p<0.01 *p<0.05

The component that focuses on Arab-Muslim linkage is associated with national pride. It is also associated with greater willingness to have immigrant neighbors and neighbors from a different social class.²² The component that focuses on giving special status to Islam is associated, to a lesser extent, with national pride and with a greater opposition to having non-Muslim neighbors. The relationships are similar but weaker in Morocco than in Egypt, which could reflect the greater ethnic diversity in the Moroccan Muslim community. These findings suggest that, while ethnodoxic respondents may be more nationalistic, they are not transmuting this group-sense into negative outgroup sentiment. That is different from the outgroup bias expressed among ethnodoxic Orthodox Russians (Karpov et al., 2012).

The general tolerance is consistent with comments some respondents made in a free response space. They appealed to the same aphorism. An Arab Egyptian woman (1990) wrote, "Religion is for God and the homeland is for everyone."²³ She scored low on the religion-ethnicity component and saw value for Egypt in religious diversity (MR1: -0.81, MR2: 0.14). The same was said by an Arab Egyptian woman (1969), who was very low in ethno-religious linkage and endorsed diversity and pro-immigrant sentiment (MR1: -1.36, MR2: 0.01).²⁴ A Muslim Arab Egyptian man (1978) said, "There is a saying that religion is for God and the

²² One respondent used the free response space to say he wished the problem of discrimination based on social class would be solved.

²³ ارجو والتريز علي سيد حلهش كل حال يصري مي ن طلبات (MR1: -0.84, MR2: 0.66)

²⁴ الويل والوطن ل جيع

²⁴ الويل والوطن ال جيع

homeland is for everyone. Maybe this saying is, from a particular perspective, largely true. It is inevitable that the spirit of love, tolerance, and belonging will prevail among members of one people, no matter their religion or their [ethnic] affiliation.”²⁵ Notably, he was not excited about the idea of a neighbor of a different class or religion (MR1: -0.45, MR2: -0.45). A Muslim Arab Egyptian woman (1998) invoked the same phrase: “Yes, religion is only for God. Society must stop religious and racial discrimination. There must be equality between all who partake in building societies and the rejection of the existence of vile ideas in society.”²⁶ She saw value in religious diversity in Egypt and decoupled religion and ethnicity (MR1: -0.74, MR2: 0.30). A common phrase gives them simple language to articulate this point; it also suggests a local cultural element that would work against ethnodoxic belief.

This aphorism reflects the principle that religion is both personal and communal.²⁷ An Amazigh Muslim man (1966) put it as follows: “As for religion, it is a personal issue between the person and his Lord, and he shares that with every individual in his community.”²⁸ He was very low in ethno-religious linkage and anti-immigrant sentiment, and he was acceptant toward religious diversity (MR1: -1.37, MR2: 0.23).

Divine forces were invoked in favor of tolerance. An Arab Muslim Moroccan man (1993) stated, “We must deal with any person no matter his color or race and no matter his choice of religion. This is what Islam advises.”²⁹ He still scored high on ethno-religious linkage while approving religious diversity (MR1: 0.79, MR2: 0.32). An Arab Egyptian man (1997) wrote, “God Almighty says in the Holy Qur’an in the Surat al-Kafirun ‘You have your religion, and I have my religion.’ I do not object that there are other religions than Islam, as long as they do not assault us and do not violate our rights :-).”³⁰ While he decoupled ethnicity and religion, he did not view religious diversity as valuable to Arab society (MR1: -0.93, MR2: 0.39). He may feel compelled by religion to accept religious diversity even if he does not enjoy it. Similarly, an Arab Muslim Moroccan man (1995) said, “Islam is a religion of tolerance, respect, and solidarity” (MR1: 0.30, MR2: 0.30).³¹ He himself scored low in support for diversity.

Others presented a need for tolerance in a more general frame. An Arab Muslim Moroccan man (1999) wrote, “The standard by which we must regard our relationships with people of any color, race, language, or creed is respect.”³² Despite saying that, he scored low on ethno-religious linkage and support for diversity but high on protecting Islam (MR1: -0.69, MR2: 0.55). An Amazigh Muslim Moroccan woman (1995) stated in French, “Always, one

25 من اك قول تقول ان لا يميل والوطنى للرحيمى بملتفون هذه لقوله من وجهه معينه على جبل افير من الصرحه. المفسر من ان يكتفون روح
المحبة وبتسامح والتهام والالتقاء لقلبتى وسوي انفرادى عبال واحد مدم الكلت فينتهم او قدامكهم
نعمل اليدين فقط ي جب انتم عمل مضمات الكتيه زيين الليان اوال عرق يجتبح قيق الموس او ميكل المثلث رافيني فيبين اءالم مضمات
ورقض وجولفكار هه في الم مضمع

27 Islamic law places some burdens on the individual, such as his responsibility to pray. Others are fulfilled for everyone such that they have been done by someone in the community but not by each individual, such as taking care of orphans and widows.

28 بالسير لقل في فموس ألة ش تخري قبي الفرد وبمتهيشش ارك مضمع عفي ذلك

29 يجبت عمل م ع ايش خص مدم المثل لون ه او عرقه ومدم المثل ف فينه ددام اوصرن لبس الم

30 يقولوا تعالي في القران الكتيه في سور الكفرون ، لكتيه ينكبولي ين «فال نواع لدي من ان يكتفون من الك غير في نال س الم اءامول م
(- يجتبحوا عطينا ويتكفون وقتنا

31 الال س الم مو في تسمامع و اجتبرام وتضامن

32 الم عي الذي يجبع عطينا البقم به في عمل قتلين للناس أي لقل لون ه او عرق مدم أو لغ مدم أوقتي يت مدم موال اجتبرام

must respect others and others' freedom" (MR1: 0.81, MR2: 0.16).³³ Although high in ethno-religious linkage, she expressed pro-religious diversity views. Another Francophone respondent, an Amazigh Christian Moroccan woman (1990), stated, "I prefer to live in a country where one is free to practice the religion that we want without constraint."³⁴ Many more such statements are included in Appendix B.

Respect was a major theme for these respondents. An Arab Muslim Moroccan woman (1963) stressed it in her response: "Morocco is a country of co-existence between the religions and the types of people. There is no difference among the people. The important thing is sharing in building the country, respecting others, respecting everyone's beliefs, and respecting the law."³⁵ She scored low on ethno-religious linkage and accepted religious diversity (MR1: -0.68, MR2: 0.19). Another Arab Muslim Moroccan woman (1966) phrased the point as, "I respect other religions, and I hope that my religion is respected by others."³⁶ She scored high on ethno-religious linkage, while respecting religious diversity (MR1: 0.97, MR2: 0.36). The nature of respect in these sentiments can be unpacked in future research.

Tolerance, though, does not spring forth fully-formed. It is a value families and societies cultivate. An Arab Egyptian woman (1972) stated, "Muslims must be educated to accept the other."³⁷ She scored low on ethno-religious linkage, and she avowed pro-immigrant sentiments and welcomed diverse neighbors (MR1: -0.51, MR2: 0.30). These values would be consistent with her final statement. Similarly, an Arab Egyptian man (1999) expressed skepticism towards the impact of religion – as opposed to culture and education: "I do not think that religious differences affect our Arab society; rather, education and culture are the important factors that raise an adult aware of rights and obligations" (MR1: -0.44, MR2: 0.48).³⁸ A Muslim Amazigh woman (1981) echoed this appeal to education: "People must live in peace and harmony, whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims. Violence must be renounced and hatred between peoples combatted. This is what was must do in school."³⁹ She was low in ethno-religious linkage and acceptant toward religious diversity (MR1: -0.44, MR2: 0.48). One Arab Muslim Moroccan woman (1979) took it a step further and indicated that once that teaching had happened, the problems would cease: "There will be no problems in co-existence among people, no matter the religion or race, when there is mutual respect and good morals" (MR1: -0.42, MR2: 0.35).⁴⁰ She approved of religious diversity, but not immigrants. Socio-political attitudes, even if they are a result of culture, are inculcated, rather than ordained or inborn.

Some people objected to making religious distinctions. An Arab Egyptian woman (1986) indicated that "Citizens should not be classified according to religion or social level"

³³ Tourjours, il faut respecter les autres et la liberté des autres.

³⁴ Préfère vivre dans un pays où on est libre de pratiquer la religion que nous voulons sans contrainte.

³⁵ "المغرب ببلد بتعطي شوية الحرية والليان والاحترام"

ال فرق بين الناس لا مهم وه المشكفة فسيبين اعطيلد واضرام ال خري واحترام حق دانتال جميع وتلج ام القبولون

اضرام ال بيوات ال خري وتديروا تضررم فيكي من طرف ال خري

³⁶ يجب ان يثق في بلبلش المبرلمون على تقبل ال خري

³⁷ ال اظن ال خت ال فال بيوات تضررم على م يتهم من العرب بلبلش عليهم ولتوقفة هي ال عام ال ال للهت وبتشأ فرديلاغ واعى لل حقوق والواجبات

³⁸ يجب ان يثق في بلبلش المبرلمون على تقبل ال خري

³⁹ ليجه في المدرسه.

⁴⁰ المتكفون من الكم تكليل فسي لتعطي شوية الحرية والعروية عن دم لوكيون ال اضرام ال تبادل وال خال قال طيبة

(MR1: -0.14, MR2: -0.54).⁴¹ Nonetheless, she was not supportive of having neighbors from a different religion or class. An Arab Egyptian woman (1992) stated, “There should not be discrimination against anyone from a different religion or race.”⁴² She was low on ethno-religious linkage or privileging Islam (MR1: -1.05, MR2: -0.71). An Arab Egyptian man (1997) indicated, “There must be no distinction between a Muslim and any other religion.”⁴³ He decoupled Arabness and Islam, and he accepted religious diversity as beneficial in Arab states (MR1: -0.65, MR2: 0.17).

For some, however, religious diversity was a problem. One Arab Egyptian man (1998), when asked if he had anything else to say on these topics, responded “No, but the truth is indisputable, for it is from God. It is the blessed Qur’an. You should read the Qur’an well to know the true Islam.”⁴⁴ He scored low in supporting religious diversity (MR1: -0.02, MR2: 0.45). Unbelievers were singled out by one respondent; an Arab Egyptian man (1977) stated, “Apostasy is the worst of the phases of religious conflict” (MR1: -0.27, MR2: -0.49).⁴⁵ All the same, he scored relatively low on privileging and protecting Islam. Similarly, an Arab Egyptian woman (1987) wrote, “Adherence to religion and its values is one of the most important foundations for building society and reducing crime levels as well.”⁴⁶ She scored very low on believing religious diversity benefits Arab society, while also scoring lower on ethno-religious linkage (MR1: -0.55, MR2: 0.31). A Moroccan Arab Muslim man (2000) also identified apostasy as a threat. He expressed a desire to say more about “the development of the Islamic religion in Arab societies, because the wave of apostasy and licentiousness is having a large effect on the minds of the youth.”⁴⁷ He demonstrated high ethno-religious linkage and anti-immigrant sentiments and little support for religious diversity (MR1: 0.94, MR2: 0.48). In general, the respondents’ ratings on the diversity component are consistent with their expressions of disapproval, suggesting it is accurately tapping into their sentiments.

Intriguingly, a Muslim Tuareg woman (1993) seemed open to apostasy. She wrote, “Whoever does not sanctify his religion, indeed, should reconsider whether the religion is the correct one and appropriate for him.”⁴⁸ She was acceptant towards religious diversity and immigration (MR1: 0.50, MR2: 0.42). Still, another Moroccan, an Arab Muslim man (1998), exhorted the researcher to promote Islam: “You have to spread Islam in the world.”⁴⁹ He was very high in ethno-religious linkage (MR1: 1.69, MR2: 0.15). While he accepted that religious diversity could be good for Morocco, he was opposed to immigration, neighbors of a different religion, or foreign workers.

Notably, the voices expressing inclusivity largely seem to be from the lower end of the ethno-religious linkage spectrum. Those who scored high on ethnodoxy did not come out to volunteer racism. Variation occurs on Islamic primacy and support for diversity. This could reflect a mental separation between *tolerance* and *acceptance* of interpersonal difference and

⁴¹ يجب عند تصريفي فال مواطن هيا ل بين او عرق او بيتوي يتحم اي

⁴² على احد مختل ففى البينة اول عرق الي يجب ان يكون فاك خصية

⁴³ يجب عدم التفرق ق بين سولم و اي فينة اخري

⁴⁴ لاصح راق القاش فيني فو من عن هل ل ووالقران الكي عمل يك بمقراة القران بيحدا لتعرف فال سال الم لص صح

⁴⁵ اللحداد أسواعبم راجل من صراع الاليان

⁴⁶ التمس لبال بين ق يمه من أم لم يسبق اءالم يتحم ع وخصيص تبي اتال جي م وايضا

⁴⁷ تنقي فال في نال س الهي فسي لام يتحم عات ل عريية ألن موح فال لحداد واليهامية لصحت تتكلم شركل م مول على عول للثباب

⁴⁸ ن لهم يق دس ربه فنجيه اعاداة النوظ في ال فيل فالص صح حة والنع اسبته

⁴⁹ على ك في ش ر اللم في عالم

social diversity.⁵⁰ The respondents who volunteered statements in defense of a boundary were doing so largely on the religious front.

EFFECTS OF ETHNODOXY

The survey results also demonstrate political differences associated with these different factors among the Egyptian and Moroccan Muslims. In addition to the ethno-religious linkage component, the status for Islam component, and value for religious diversity, the models include covariates for ethnicity, year of birth, sex, post-secondary education, urban/suburban/rural residence, and income sufficiency. Several questions pertained to political preferences. They were asked how true it is that, “As long as a government can solve a country’s economic problems, it does not matter what kind of government it has”; “Religious leaders should not influence voters’ decisions in elections”; and “Choosing the government by election is compatible with the teachings of Islam.”⁵¹ These questions are regularly asked by the Arab Barometer. The scale ranged from not at all true (1) to definitely true (4). Ordered logistic regression models are utilized.

Respondents were divided in their regime-type preferences. One respondent, a Muslim Arab Egyptian man (1990), expressed democratic sentiments: “I look forward to living a good and democratic life in our Arab countries.”⁵² He believed that democracy was compatible with Islam and that religious leaders should not try to influence vote choice; that is consistent with scoring very low on privileging Islam in society (MR1: -0.88, MR2: -1.76). A Muslim Arab Moroccan man (1968) similarly endorsed democracy and the rule of law: “The law must be applied to everyone, true democracy must spread, and the corrupt must be fought” (MR1: 0.01, MR2: 0.16).⁵³ He still did not believe democracy was acceptable in Islam. Another Muslim Arab Moroccan man (1968) shared a similar sentiment: “The law must be applied to all, and democracy must spread”⁵⁴ (MR1: 0.11, MR2: 0.42). He also did not believe that Islam approved of democracy. These respondents did not interrogate the schism implied between these positions and their Muslim identity. These responses are consistent with other North African surveys showing high support for the rule of law (Ridge, 2022; Ridge, 2023b). As shown in Tables 7-8, higher (lower) scores on the ethno-religious linkage dimension are linked to (not) believing that non-democratic governments are acceptable if useful. Others thought of Islam as the solution. An Arab Muslim Moroccan man (1999) indicated, “I think that the Qur’an must be followed because it is suitable for all times and places” (MR1: -0.15, MR2: 0.35).⁵⁵ He accepted religious diversity and thought Islam approved of democracy.

An Amazigh Muslim woman (1997) felt quite the opposite: “I think Muslim countries should adopt the Caliphate system or the Emirate of Believers to progress or develop, like it

⁵⁰ This is reminiscent of Ivarsflaten and Sniderman’s (2022) discussion of the varieties of inclusivity espoused by non-Muslim Europeans towards Muslims.

⁵¹ The phrase *choosing the government by election* was used instead of the word *democracy* because the Arabic word *dimuqratiyya*, commonly used for democracy, incorporates economic policy as well as political institutions, which artificially elevate the measured popular democratic commitment (Ridge, 2023a).

⁵² نطلع الى الجيش بجاهة ثوريه وديموقراطية في بلدنا العربي

⁵³ يجب تطبيق القانون على الجميع ونشر ديموقراطية قوية ومحاكم لفساديين

⁵⁴ يجب تطبيق القانون على الكل ونشر ديموقراطية

⁵⁵ من افكارنا ان يجب اتباع القرآن الذي يصلح لكل زمن و مكان

was in the era of the Prophet (peace be upon him) and that they should adopt Islam as the country's religion, because we see the humbling of countries that abandon these things. They are destroyed, unlike Islamic countries that adopted the monarchical system."⁵⁶ Recall that the Moroccan monarchy claims religious legitimacy. She scored high in ethno-religious linkage (MR1: 0.65, MR2: 0.49). She was skeptical that Islam approves of democracy, expressed conservative religious interpretations, and favored any government that could solve economic problems. An Arab Egyptian woman (1989) weighed in that, "Indeed, religious people are the best people."⁵⁷ Nonetheless, she indicated that they should not seek to influence vote choices; she held that religious diversity strengthens society (MR1: -0.27, MR2: 0.40). This would be consistent with prior studies that show MENA nationals are not averse to including religious people in government and do not hold it as antithetical to elections-based governance (Brezna et al., 2011; Ridge, 2023a). Similarly, a Muslim Amazigh Moroccan man (1958) wrote, "Religion must be separated from the state and [there must be] freedom of worship, personal freedom, and no connection of it [religion] to the state."⁵⁸ Fittingly, he scored low on privileging Islam, but he also denied a benefit to religious diversity (MR1: -0.05, MR2: -1.63). Thus, this is more a commitment to secularism than religious freedom. A Muslim Amazigh man (1964) stated, "Separating religion from the state might be better for moderation and societies' development" (MR1: -1.14 MR2: -1.61). That is an instrumental rather than philosophical justification for the system. In general, though, these topics received less attention than the overtly religious questions. Still, he endorsed religious diversity and opposed privileging Islam in Morocco.

On the other hand, other citizens considered secularism problematic. One Amazigh Muslim man (1987) included it on his list of social ills he would like to discuss: "The dangers of secularism to Muslim society. Corruption and the problem of applying the law. Corruption and the absence of justice and fairness."⁵⁹ He was low in ethno-religious linkage and tolerant towards religious diversity, despite his statement (MR1: -0.56, MR2: 0.45).

Security and economic opportunity were key concerns. An Amazigh Muslim Moroccan man (1961) wrote, "In my opinion, the governments' concern with citizens' peace, stability, security, and standard of living are more important than any religious, ideological, or geopolitical concern."⁶⁰ He scored very low on ethno-religious linkage and endorsed religious diversity (MR1: -1.17, MR2: 0.14). An Arab Muslim Moroccan woman (1999) appealed to economic importance: "Everyone should believe in peace. Despite the differences in religions, races, or social classes, the most important thing is that everyone must know his property and his obligations and respect others without violence, hatred, or ill will" (MR1: -0.42, MR2: 0.35).⁶¹ Both thought Islam would accept democracy, but were willing to permit

⁵⁶ اظن ان على الوبل المسلمة ان تصمد بنظام الاخ الفسة او امارة الامميين لتقدم وتتطور كم القافي ع هوالبول صل لعل اعلي سلم و انتصدم
السال مكفين الدولة البن انرى ان ذلال دلالتي تلجت عن مذل شويها تدمر تعكس الدولال سال في كتي اعتمدتن نظم الملقي

⁵⁷ الالش عبللم تي رافض لشن عب

⁵⁸ ي ج بفضلالين ، بن الدولة ، أن تلخون حرولة عب ادا تجري شة شخرية الصلة للدول ف هـ .

⁵⁹ خوطال عل طولي عل ال تلج ع المسلم _

الفس لإيش ك التي قطني بل قان ون
الفس اد و غي ابال عدل وال بنصر اف

⁶⁰ ف ين ظري نال ش غ الال ك و مفس المة ال مو اطر ليو بتق راره و اجنه و هي عتبه اهم من اين لاش غال بيني او اي هويل و ج و و ميس ياسي

⁶¹ ال جي عي جب بل يؤ من السال "

any government that could get the job done. Thus, their democratic commitments may be weak. These views might also incline them towards revising economic regulation away from Islamic law.

Some patterns are evident in these statements. The respondents writing in to avow their support for Islam often were low on ethno-religious linkage. While they vary in their interest in privileging or protecting Islam, they are less likely to agree that religious diversity is a boon to Arab societies. A latent religious fervor could be motivating these respondents in particular. There is little in these responses from the low-linkage group, though, to indicate anti-minority sentiments.

The relationships for the key independent variables are similar across the two countries (Tables 7-8). The ethno-religious linkage component is positively and significantly associated with openness to non-democratic governance (Model 1). This is not the same as opposing democracy, but it indicates weaker commitment to it. It is also negatively associated with believing religious leaders should not seek to influence their congregants' votes (Model 2). Preferring a protected status in society for Islam is associated with believing that elected government is consistent with the teachings of Islam (Model 3). This is consistent with people who are interested in protecting Islam and also interested in democracy seeing or needing to see these objectives as compatible. Believing that diversity strengthens Arab societies is associated with openness to non-democratic governance (Model 1), believing religious leaders should not influence their congregants' voting choices (Model 2), and believing that elected government is consistent with the teachings of Islam ($p < 0.06$) (Model 3). Valuing diversity links naturally to secularism, and many studies have considered that elected governments in MENA could threaten women's or minorities' rights (Rizzo et al., 2007). That ethnic minorities in Egypt were more likely to endorse non-democratic alternatives and promote secularism is consistent with prior work on Egypt showing that minorities' interest in electoral democracy is contingent on rights protections (Ridge, 2022; Truex & Tavana, 2019).

Table 7: Political Preferences in Egypt

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Ethnic Linkage	0.27** (0.10)	-0.18 (0.11)	0.14 (0.11)
Status for Islam	0.14 (0.09)	0.04 (0.11)	0.28** (0.11)
Diversity	0.31** (0.10)	0.24* (0.10)	0.21 (0.11)
Male	0.25 (0.17)	0.05 (0.18)	0.19 (0.19)
Coptic	0.16*** (0.00)	14.34*** (0.00)	14.21*** (0.00)
Other	1.00*** (0.00)	13.31*** (0.00)	0.43*** (0.00)
Year of Birth	0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Sufficient Income	0.04 (0.20)	0.08 (0.22)	0.49* (0.21)
Higher education	0.40 (0.24)	0.64** (0.25)	0.60* (0.25)
Rural residence	-0.31*** (0.03)	-0.64* (0.32)	-0.01 (0.31)
Suburban resident	0.37*** (0.05)	-0.25 (0.15)	0.13 (0.19)
1 2	7.31*** (0.01)	-6.37*** (0.02)	-13.69*** (0.02)
2 3	8.46*** (0.13)	-5.01*** (0.19)	-12.79*** (0.18)
3 4	10.18*** (0.16)	-3.51*** (0.22)	-10.69*** (0.23)
AIC	1303.78	1068.22	979.82
N	530	530	530

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Table 8: Political Preferences in Morocco

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Ethnic Linkage	0.42 ^{***} (0.10)	-0.22 [*] (0.10)	-0.04 (0.09)
Status for Islam	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.10)	0.26 ^{**} (0.10)
Diversity	0.42 ^{***} (0.08)	0.34 ^{***} (0.08)	0.04 (0.07)
Male	0.26 (0.16)	0.00 (0.16)	0.58 ^{***} (0.15)
Amazigh	-0.16 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.18)	-0.13 (0.16)
Coptic	-0.51 ^{***} (0.00)	-0.28 ^{***} (0.01)	1.19 ^{***} (0.00)
Other	-0.06 ^{***} (0.01)	0.03 [*] (0.01)	-0.13 ^{***} (0.01)
Tuareg	0.56 ^{***} (0.00)	-0.02 ^{***} (0.00)	1.19 ^{***} (0.00)
Year of Birth	-0.01 ^{***} (0.00)	-0.03 ^{***} (0.00)	-0.00 ^{***} (0.00)
Sufficient Income	-0.12 (0.17)	0.22 (0.17)	0.25 (0.16)
Higher Education	-0.11 (0.16)	0.12 (0.17)	0.38 [*] (0.16)
Rural Residence	0.15 ^{***} (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.23 ^{***} (0.03)
Suburban Resident	-0.27 (0.26)	-0.35 (0.28)	0.23 (0.27)
1 2	-17.29 ^{***} (0.01)	-58.50 ^{***} (0.01)	-5.30 ^{***} (0.01)
2 3	-16.29 ^{***} (0.10)	-56.99 ^{***} (0.16)	-4.04 ^{***} (0.11)
3 4	-15.04 ^{***} (0.12)	-55.62 ^{***} (0.18)	-2.77 ^{***} (0.13)
AIC	1575.50	1348.07	1588.26
N	624	624	624

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Other questions focused on policy areas impacted by Islam and traditional values. They were asked how true it is that “University education is more important for men than for women”; “Islam requires that in a Muslim country the political rights of non-Muslims should be inferior to those of Muslims”; “Women’s share of inheritance should be equal to that of men”; and “In order to meet the demands of the modern economy, banks should be allowed to charge interest.” Several of these propositions reflect gender traditionalism. Traditional interpretations of Islamic law award female relatives an inheritance half the size of the male counterpart, and ban lending or borrowing money at (excessive) interest.⁶² The traditional interpretations also afford lower-social status to non-Muslims. These topics have previously been broached by the Arab Barometer.

These multiple components were again related differently to these beliefs, though the results were similar across the two countries (Tables 9-10). The ethnic linkage dimension was significantly related in each case. The more Egyptians and Moroccans link being Arab and being Muslim, the more likely they are to prefer men for higher education (Model 1), and to say Islam restricts minorities’ rights (Model 2). These responses are consistent with the comments rendered above. The individuals espousing religious inclusivity were often at the low-linkage end of the scale. Thus, it seems that ethnodoxic respondents are more socially conservative. Diversity-endorsing Moroccans were less likely to say Muslim-majority countries must restrict minorities’ rights. Individuals who supported a special place for Islam in society were also less likely to say Islam restricts minorities’ rights, so they may believe they can create privilege without disadvantage, or that that disadvantage would only apply to religion but not to other rights.

On the other hand, the more Egyptians and Moroccans link being Arab and being Muslim, the more willing they are to liberalize economic policies related to Islam by equalizing inheritance (Model 3) and permitting lending at interest (Model 4). Those who would assign a special status to Islam were less likely to support these latter statements in either country. Part of that special status may be legalizing traditionalist interpretations. Conversely, those who believe that religious diversity strengthens Arab societies were more likely to endorse the non-traditional economic policies. Islamic finance has been argued to hold back the Middle East economically (Kuran, 2012); one of the benefits respondents may see in diversity is the opportunity to finesse financial regulations or secularize economic policy. These patterns are another indication that religiosity – which could incline respondents towards traditional interpretations of Islamic law – and ethnodoxy are distinct.

⁶² State laws based on religious proscriptions are forms of religious regulation known as religious legislation (Fox & Flores, 2009; Ridge, 2020). In some Middle East states, religious legislation includes family law and bans interest-carrying loans.

Table 9: Traditional Values in Egypt

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Ethnic Linkage	1.18 ^{***} (0.12)	1.58 ^{***} (0.13)	1.25 ^{***} (0.12)	0.51 ^{***} (0.10)
Status for Islam	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.22 [*] (0.11)	-0.76 ^{***} (0.11)	-0.19 [*] (0.10)
Diversity	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.11)	0.23 [*] (0.11)	0.47 ^{***} (0.10)
Male	0.55 ^{**} (0.19)	0.29 (0.19)	-0.19 (0.20)	0.10 (0.17)
Coptic	-0.23 ^{***} (0.00)	-0.55 ^{***} (0.00)	-0.60 ^{***} (0.00)	0.40 ^{***} (0.00)
Other	-12.32 ^{***} (0.00)	-12.99 ^{***} (0.00)	1.15 ^{***} (0.01)	-0.80 ^{***} (0.00)
Year of Birth	0.00 ^{**} (0.00)	0.01 ^{***} (0.00)	0.01 ^{***} (0.00)	-0.01 ^{***} (0.00)
Sufficient Income	-0.28 (0.23)	-0.08 (0.24)	0.17 (0.24)	0.25 (0.20)
Higher Education	-0.62 ^{**} (0.24)	0.16 (0.26)	-0.16 (0.27)	0.19 (0.24)
Rural Residence	-0.32 (0.29)	-0.36 ^{***} (0.05)	-0.95 ^{***} (0.04)	0.15 (0.25)
Suburban Resident	-0.13 (0.26)	-0.08 [*] (0.03)	-0.19 ^{***} (0.04)	-0.51 [*] (0.24)
1 2	1.43 ^{***} (0.03)	21.57 ^{***} (0.02)	22.25 ^{***} (0.01)	-17.25 ^{***} (0.01)
2 3	2.40 ^{***} (0.10)	23.13 ^{***} (0.13)	23.59 ^{***} (0.12)	-16.18 ^{***} (0.12)
3 4	3.17 ^{***} (0.14)	24.37 ^{***} (0.19)	24.70 ^{***} (0.18)	-14.29 ^{***} (0.16)
AIC	1025.49	1027.11	998.96	1290.94
N	530	530	530	530

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Table 10: Traditional Values in Morocco

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Ethnic Linkage	1.24*** (0.13)	1.31*** (0.12)	0.67*** (0.11)	0.24** (0.09)
Status for Islam	-0.31** (0.11)	-0.35** (0.11)	-0.94*** (0.11)	-0.26** (0.09)
Diversity	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.21* (0.08)	0.45*** (0.09)	0.52*** (0.08)
Male	0.62** (0.20)	-0.25 (0.17)	-0.37* (0.18)	0.21 (0.15)
Amazigh	0.35 (0.22)	0.12 (0.19)	0.59** (0.19)	-0.12 (0.16)
Coptic	0.95*** (0.01)	0.59*** (0.01)	-0.48*** (0.00)	-1.05*** (0.01)
Other	-0.84*** (0.01)	0.80*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	-1.56*** (0.01)
Tuareg	-0.65*** (0.01)	1.58*** (0.01)	-0.41*** (0.00)	0.69*** (0.00)
Year of Birth	0.02*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Sufficient Income	-0.78*** (0.21)	-0.08 (0.18)	-0.12 (0.19)	-0.02 (0.16)
Higher Education	-0.07 (0.21)	0.02 (0.18)	0.08 (0.18)	0.16 (0.16)
Rural Residence	-0.16*** (0.02)	-0.73*** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.21*** (0.02)
Suburban Resident	0.33 (0.30)	0.18 (0.29)	0.42 (0.30)	-0.07 (0.27)
1 2	37.48*** (0.02)	17.09*** (0.01)	22.35*** (0.01)	-16.68*** (0.00)
2 3	38.47*** (0.10)	18.26*** (0.10)	23.18*** (0.08)	-15.68*** (0.09)
3 4	39.82*** (0.19)	19.40*** (0.15)	24.28*** (0.14)	-14.18*** (0.12)
AIC	932.16	1264.12	1183.40	1640.26
N	624	624	624	624

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Islam spread globally from the Arab world through conquest and religious conversion. While Islamic teachings have stressed multi-racial religious unity, in practice, some Muslims assign a “founders’ privilege” to Arab communities, viewing them as more authentic Muslims. Scholars have postulated that being Arab and being Muslim are conceptually linked for some Arab Muslims (Karpov et al., 2012). This linkage is ethnodoxy.

This study has drawn on prior work on ethnodoxy in Slavic Orthodox communities to identify survey questions that tap into Arab-Muslim ethnodoxy among North African Muslims. The Arabic-language survey of 530 Muslim Egyptians and 624 Moroccan Muslims included eight questions about ethnicity, Islam, and socio-political standing. It finds that, for some but not all Egyptian and Moroccan citizens, there is a strong conceptual link between being Muslims and being Arab.

The results differ slightly from the previous Slavic Orthodox surveys. While these several items merged in the ethnic Orthodox surveys, they are separate factors in Egypt and Morocco. The factor patterns are similar, however, in both these Arab- and Muslim-majority countries. The repetition across countries lends credibility to the generalizability of these questions and this scale in the Arab world.

Scholars who wish most directly to tap into ethnodoxy as a concept at its simplest – the definition used, for instance, in Barry (2019) – should focus on the questions that form the first component. These are the items tapping into inborn faithfulness and religious superiority over non-Arabs. This scale focuses most overtly on assuming a connection between Islam and Arabness. The fact that the respondents who scored low on this component were also the ones who took the trouble to write out anti-racist sentiments shows practical consistency. The four questions that load strongly in both countries provide a parsimonious scale that can readily be added to surveys.

Furthermore, the study demonstrates that the level of ethnodoxic belief, among other socio-religious beliefs that citizens hold, is linked to their political attitudes. These citizens have different government-type preferences and different attitudes towards minority rights. These relationships operate distinctly from their opinion on Islam’s place in society and religious diversity.

This study is only a first step. The next phase is to evaluate the survey questions in other Arab countries, like Lebanon and Tunisia. Non-Arab Muslim communities should also be evaluated. Most Muslims are not Arab. Is ethnodoxy prevalent among Persians, Kurds, or Turks? These communities do not have the same “founder’s privilege” that Arabs do. However, they could still link religion and ethnicity; after all, Christianity did not start in Russia or Armenia.

Researchers may further evaluate the connection between religiosity, religious practice, and ethnodoxy. This study touched on this element in Morocco, demonstrating that prayer behavior is associating with supporting privileging Islam in society but with not ethno-religious linkage beliefs. However, future studies could consider other elements of religiosity. There could be division along the elements of religiosity in how it relates to ethnodoxy. Along

this vein, an Egyptian respondent suggested surveys could probe the perceived importance of religion in addressing world problems.⁶³

An ethnodoxy scale could also be used as an independent variable. For instance, scholars might evaluate the impact of this ethno-religious linkage on conflict attitudes. Both forces, ethnicity and religion, are considered to independently enhance conflict propensity (Alexander, 2017). Ethnodoxic individuals could reasonably be the most conflict-prone, especially for ethnic or religious conflicts.

Intriguingly, the respondents – particularly at the lowest levels of ethno-religious fusion – seemed most focused on asserting their opposition to racism and, to a lesser extent, religious discrimination, even though they were slightly more averse to diverse neighbors. Perhaps that is because one relates to interpersonal contact and the other to macro-phenomena. Avetyan (2017) points out that some ethnodoxic Armenian Americans say that they would personally accept Muslims, but believe the community would not, because of the cultural history of antagonism and genocide. Interpersonal relationships may show *less* bias than policy preferences or the potential for social change. Future work could do more to unpack the connection between racialized politics and ethnodoxy.

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APPENDIX A

Predictors of Ethno-Religious Linkage and Privileging Islam

	Ethno- Religious Linkage Morocco	Privileging Islam Morocco	Ethno- Religious Linkage Egypt	Privileging Islam Egypt
(Intercept)	-16.32*** (4.59)	-8.71* (4.32)	2.76 (5.71)	-1.95 (5.62)
Frequency of Prayer	0.00 (0.03)	0.21*** (0.03)		
Umma Consciousness	-0.04 (0.04)	0.12*** (0.03)		
Amazigh	-0.18* (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)		
Coptic	0.40 (0.58)	-2.18*** (0.55)		
Other	-0.48 (0.29)	0.22 (0.27)		
Tuareg	0.19 (0.47)	0.46 (0.44)		
Male	0.09 (0.07)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.21** (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)
Year of Birth	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Sufficient Income	0.16* (0.07)	0.00 (0.07)	0.36*** (0.09)	0.23* (0.09)
Higher Education	-0.28*** (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.26* (0.11)	0.09 (0.11)
Rural Residence	0.09 (0.19)	0.07 (0.18)	-0.35* (0.16)	0.18 (0.16)
Suburban Residence	0.16 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.20 (0.17)	0.08 (0.16)
Coptic			-0.57 (0.38)	-0.88* (0.37)
Other			-0.91 (0.60)	-1.19* (0.59)
R ²	0.07	0.17	0.08	0.04
Adj. R ²	0.05	0.15	0.07	0.03
N	624	624	530	530

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

APPENDIX B

ADDITIONAL RESPONDENT COMMENTS

Some respondents spoke generally about positive aspects of Islam. An Amazigh Muslim woman (1977) stated that “Islam is a religion of tolerance in which race, color, or social class do not matter. All that matters is good deeds.”⁶⁴ Consistent with her statements, she rejected ethno-religious linkage and supported religious diversity (MR1: -1.36, MR2: 0.20). In turn, another Amazigh woman (1996) said, “Honestly I would like to say that Islam is innocent of all the evils of people. In truth, each person leads himself to bad deeds” (MR1: 0.13, MR2: 0.44).⁶⁵ She thought though that religious diversity would be detrimental to society. An Arab Moroccan Muslim man (1984) said, “Islam is a religion of co-existence” (MR1: 0.60, MR2: 0.40).⁶⁶ Another Arab Muslim Moroccan woman (1992) used a very similar expression: “Islam is a religion of tolerance and coexistence” (MR1: 0.15, MR2: 0.26).⁶⁷ Another Arab Muslim Moroccan man (2001) wrote, “The most beautiful religion is Islam” (MR1: -0.69, MR2: 0.55).⁶⁸ He scored low on ethno-religious linkage and high on privileging that beautiful religion in Morocco, while opposing religious diversity. One Arab Egyptian woman (1995), who greatly opposed having neighbors of a different religion, replied, “Islam is a social religion, and it is the most complete religion, encompassing all facets of life.”⁶⁹ She scored low both on ethnic-religious linkage and interest in diversity (MR1: -0.81, MR2: 0.30). A Muslim Arab Egyptian man (2000) stated that “Islam is the religion of truth and whoever follows it and submits, the people are delivered from evil; he has been saved” (MR1: -1.38, MR2: 0.01).⁷⁰ One Muslim Arab Egyptian man (1985) put a spin on a traditionally-Muslim phrase: “God is one, and Jesus is the prophet of God.”⁷¹ This would imply great inclusivity towards Christians as “people of the book”; he also expressed openness to diverse neighbors. Nonetheless, while he scored low on ethno-religious linkage, he also scored low on valuing diversity (MR1: -1.43, MR2: 0.01). An Arab Muslim Moroccan woman (1992) made a similar appeal to tolerance: “Islam does not mean animosity toward non-Muslim people of every religion and every civilization, so let’s everyone take care of his own affairs without harming others.”⁷² She scored low on ethno-religious linkage and on privileging Islam in Morocco, while approving of religious diversity for Morocco (MR1: -1.28, MR2: -1.62).

A Muslim Arab Egyptian man (1976), who expressed openness to diverse neighbors and religious diversity, said, “I like to say that Islam, like Christianity, is a religion of love, and we are all in Egypt a family and brothers. Praise be to God.” Still, he scored high on

⁶⁴ الإسلام بين الناس أحسن فيهم في عرق أولاد أو المسميتوى اللى يضم اعني لكل ماني هم هي اللى عم الال محيدة

للاصراحة اود ان اقول ان الاسلام بمرئ من كل شروا لولنا اس فلحق حقيقة ان لكل شخص صيرته بنفسه لافتح اللى سويته

⁶⁶ الإسلام بين الناس أحسن

⁶⁷ الإسلام بين الناس أحسن والتعويض

⁶⁸ أحسن من بين هؤلاء المسلمين

⁶⁹ الإسلام بين معاليه وهو كمال الدين وشامل جميع نواحي الالهيه

⁷⁰ الإسلام بيننا حق ومن يتبعه وول لموسر لهم الناس شويته فقود نجا

⁷¹ لى واحده عيسى رس ولفلدا

⁷² الإسلام اللهم ينعني معادات الشخاص غير المهول بين لكل بينه فكل حضراته بيقدم كل شويته دون ليداء آلخر

privileging Islam (MR1: -0.42, MR2: 0.55).⁷³ The language of brotherhood was also used by a Muslim Arab Moroccan man (1963). He wrote, “We honestly want peace and security in our country and all Muslim countries. We are brothers in the world” (MR1: 1.02, MR2: 0.22).⁷⁴ Although he was high on ethno-religious linkage, he endorsed religious diversity in Morocco. Another Arab Muslim Moroccan woman (1997) echoed these sentiments: “Despite differences in belief and religious teachings, there are numerous shared values among the religions. These include basic moral values like justice, mercy, love, and tolerance.”⁷⁵ She was very low in ethno-religious linkage, but high in anti-immigrant sentiment (MR1: -0.92, MR2: 0.26). Maybe surprisingly, she saw little value in religious diversity. Similarly, an Arab Muslim Moroccan woman (1989) indicated, “We are people who are measured on the basis of piety, not on race, gender, or money.”⁷⁶ She scored very low on ethno-religious linkage and on anti-immigrant beliefs, and she was accepting towards religious diversity (MR1: -1.37, MR2: 0.23).

An Arab Muslim Moroccan man (1994) who endorsed religious diversity stated, “I, as a Muslim, respect all divine messages, and I respect Christians and Jews and coexist with them” (MR1: -0.32, MR2: 0.28).⁷⁷ Another, a Muslim Arab Egyptian woman (1990), stated “Islam is the religion of truth, justice, and equality.”⁷⁸ She decoupled Arabness and Islam, but she did not endorse religious diversity in Arab societies (MR1: -1.43, MR2: 0.01). This is consistent with welcoming immigration and accepting neighbors of a different race or class, but not of a different religion. These sentiments were echoed by another Arab Egyptian woman (2000): “Islam is a religion of kindness and forgiveness, not violence.”⁷⁹ She, though, was not averse to religious diversity (MR1: -0.54, MR2: 0.37). The low ethno-religious linkage scores among these respondents are consistent with the principle of *umma*, even if they do not use that word.

Moroccan Islam was considered special by several Moroccans. One Muslim Arab man (1963) wrote, “Moroccan Islam is distinct, moderate, realistic, peaceful, because it is the result of Sunni Sufism” (MR1: -1.17, MR2: -1.48).⁸⁰ He still endorsed religious diversity and immigration, and scored low on ethno-religious linkage and privileging Islam. Another echoed this sentiment. The Muslim Arab Moroccan man (1963) wrote, “Moroccan Islam [is a] mild, moderate, rational Islam” (MR1: -1.17, MR2: -0.14).⁸¹ He endorsed religious diversity, while scoring low on ethno-religious linkage and anti-immigrant sentiments.

Generalized tolerance was widely invoked. An Arab Muslim Egyptian man (1990) said, “All religions, regardless of the type of religion, must be respected, and all people and all cultures respected.”⁸² While he was open to neighbors of a different social class or race, he

⁷³ احب اقول ان الاسلام يمثل العمى حيه في م حططن اننا في مصر اول واخوات ولا ح حططن

⁷⁴ نحن صرنا اخوان في الدنيا لم والنا في الدنيا في بلاد المغرب الذين جيعاً نحن اخوة في عالم

⁷⁵ على الرغم من اختلاف العقائد والتعاليم الدينية فإن من التي يديد لمن يقبلهم بتركهم الذين الذين انتم لم تذلوا قيم الأخ التي هي السيرة النبوية تجعلنا عدلة ولرحمة وللمحبة وليس اح

⁷⁶ زمان قبل نقاتس على أساس التقوى وليس العرق والجنس والمال

⁷⁷ اللهم سلمنا من جميع اللوس والتكاسم مويّة و اضرم بطيخ ان يم يهيحي وي هودي وبتعليس معهم

⁷⁸ الاسلام هو فينا لحيق ولا عدل والمساواة

⁷⁹ الاسلام بين لطف ومسامحة وليس عرق

⁸⁰ الاسلام مرغبي.. بتييزم عدل وقعي سبالم.. الن هتي حة للتصوف والسني

⁸¹ الاسلام مرغبي.. اسالم عدل وسطي وقعي ..

⁸² يجب ان يتم احترام جميع الاديان بصرف النظر عن عقولها و احترام جميع الشعوب وبلدان وثقافات

opposed neighbors of a different religion (MR1: -0.42, MR2: 0.43). Similarly, a Muslim Arab Egyptian man (1979) wrote, “Freedom of religion is a right of all members of society. Color and race make up all the children of Egypt without a difference.”⁸³ He expressed openness to diverse neighbors, and scored low on privileging Islam (MR1: -0.20, MR2: -1.56). Tolerance, then, is just a thing that should happen, without requiring a religious obligation. It may depend, though, on not undermining Islam. An Arab Muslim Moroccan man (1964) stated, “I hope that every Muslim is open to other cultures and accepting of other opinions, as long as it does not impinge on his traditions and religious beliefs. We are all equal. Thank you.”⁸⁴ He expressed openness to religious diversity and immigration, while linking Islam and Arabness (MR1: 0.94, MR2: 0.30). Similarly, another Arab Muslim Moroccan man (1965) said, “Every Muslim should respect other religions. Similarly, people from other religions must respect Muslims” (MR1: -0.72 MR2: -2.23).⁸⁵ He scored very low on privileging Islam in Morocco, and on ethno-religious linkage.

⁸³ حرية الاعتقيدة حق لجميع أفراد المجتمع
اللون والعرق شركاء لبناء مصر جميعاً دولتنا

⁸⁴ أرجو أن يكون لكل مسلم منفتح على ثقافة المصطفى بالهدى الآخر ظلم الذي يدينه منعتك هالوي في قلنا سولوية شركرا

⁸⁵ يجب على كل مسلم أن يضرم اليقظة الأخري. كما يجب على أهل اليقظة الأخري أن يتقوا المسلمين