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Enemy Mine: Negative Partisanship and Satisfaction with Democracy[1]

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Polarization has increased in recent decades, including emotional distance between partisans. While positive partisan identity has been linked to the absorption of democratic norms and democratic satisfaction, this article addresses the impact of negative partisanship on citizens' satisfaction with the functioning of their democracies. Employing two measures of negative partisanship – dislike for a party and unwillingness to ever vote for a party – the article finds that negative partisanship is linked to lower satisfaction with democracy, particularly negative partisanship for major parties. It also finds that respondents' sentiments towards other parties moderate the experience of electoral outcomes; the win/loss satisfaction gap is greater for negative partisans. Defeat is more strongly tied to satisfaction for negative partisans of governing parties. Coalition membership, on the other hand, is more valuable to them. This relationship raises concerns that increasing rates of negative partisan identity reduces democratic commitment, undermining democratic stability.

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[1] Data is available through the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (https://cses.org/data-download/). Replication code is available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/hannahmridge.

For democracies to endure, the general public must maintain a baseline level of satisfaction with the way democracy is practiced in their country. Previous research has demonstrated that individual characteristics, institutional structures, and electoral outcomes substantially influence citizens' level of satisfaction with their democracy. Positive party identity (PPID), feeling close to a political party, significantly improves citizens' evaluation of their democracy's functioning (Aldrich et al. 2020). Partisan identification is part of citizens' "habituation to a competitive party system," and the increase in partisan affiliation in a country, in turn, increases its democratic stability (Converse 1969, 141).

Affiliation, however, only describes part of the relationship individuals can have with the parties in their democracy. This article focuses on what Caruna, McGregor, and Stephenson (2015, 772) call the "dark side" of partisanship: negative partisanship. Negative partisanship is not the party to which a voter is attached; it is the party he hates.

Citizens tend to be fond of their parties. They are also increasingly prone to feeling disaffection towards out-partisans. This growing propensity "to view opposing partisans negatively and copartisans positively" is affective polarization (Iyengar and Westwood 2015, 691). Increasing social distance between members of political parties over decades has been identified in several countries (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018; Garrett et al. 2014; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). This emotional separation from other partisans, expressed both broadly, as disaffection for a party, and interpersonally, such as an unwillingness to have partisans marry into one's family or hire them, has been recognized as a potential threat to democracy. As Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018, 9) write, "The weakening of our democratic norms is rooted in extreme partisan polarization – one that extends beyond policy differences into an existential

conflict over race and culture. […] And if one thing is clear from studying breakdowns throughout history, it's that extreme polarization can kill democracies."

If being close to parties in the system increases satisfaction and, thereby, democratic commitment, does the opposite pertain for hating some parties? Are negative partisans less satisfied with their democracies? This article addresses this question using the third module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Building on previous studies that examine the implications of negative partisanship for voting, protesting, and party loyalty, as well as studies of democratic satisfaction, it finds that negative partisanship is associated with decreased satisfaction with democracy.

Citizens who dislike parties in their system and those who have a party for which they would never vote are less likely to be satisfied with how their democracy is working. Additionally, negative partisanship moderates the experience of electoral victory and defeat. Winners are regularly found to be more satisfied with their democracy; winning has a greater effect on the satisfaction of negative partisans, and losing the election matters significantly more in the satisfaction levels of negative partisans of the president or prime ministers' party. Junior coalition members' satisfaction, on the other hand, benefits more from victory if they are negative partisans of the governing party.

Negative Partisans

Citizens can have both an active affiliation with a party – positive party identity (PPID) – and an aversion to parties in their political system – negative party identity (NPID). A citizen's PPID is the party to which he belongs or feels the closest. NPID is "an affective repulsion from that party, one that is more stable than a current dislike and more strongly held than a passing

opinion, reliant in part because it entails selective information gathering and processing that is capable of overriding rational updating" (Caruna, McGregor, and Stephenson 2015, 772).

NPID is more readily related to ideology than to identity group. Members of social groups may not have a clear other against which to define themselves – a Buddhist may not think of himself as non-Catholic in particular. On the other hand, "ideology is likely to engender not only a party identification but also a negative party identification" of the ideological other (Medeiros and Noël 2014, 1026). The ideology can then become, in part, a social identity (Mason 2016). Positive affect towards a party is more likely for those who psychologically link their personal identity with their party identity, but there is no significant relationship between identity linkage and negative partisanship (Greene 2004). While ethnicity, religion, ideology, and education are strong predictors of PPID in Anglo-American democracies, group identity is a poor predictor of NPID (Medeiros and Noël 2014). Ideology and having a PPID, in that case, are much stronger predictors due to "instrumental reasoning" (1038). Abramowitz and Webster (2018) attribute the rise of negative partisanship in the United States to both ideological and identity factors; Hetherington and Weiler (2009) link it to diverging worldviews. Relative party affect is strongly related to issue polarization, especially social welfare policy position, among Americans (Webster and Abramowitz 2017). Increasingly salient cultural issues and the capacity to select ideologically consistent media support ideological separation (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). The influence of the growing race and racial attitudes divide between the parties, though, is more identarian.

In terms of choosing the party to dislike, multiple factors are in play. In a two-party system, the choice is obvious. A negative party identity is not obligatory, but, if NPID develops, it would only have one potential target. In a multiparty system, several options exist. Ideology

and inter-party competition are both relevant (McGregor, Caruana, and Stephenson 2015). From an ideological perspective, there is less reason to hate ideological siblings, and the most ideologically distant party would be the target for animosity. In terms of ideological opposition, interparty hostility is usually strongest between parties on opposite sides of a political cleavage (Richardson 1991). From a competition perspective, though, the target should be the greatest electoral threat, regardless of relative ideological position (McGregor, Caruana, and Stephenson 2015). This may be an ideologically proximate party. Ideologically similar parties with opposing views on a second-axis issue, such as separatism, could be negative partisans despite the ideological correspondence. As such, both major and minor parties and moderate and extreme parties can foment negative partisanship.

These two forms of partisanship are not necessarily reciprocal and can be held separately. Four types of partisans can be identified based on these two forms of partisanship (Rose and Mishler 1998). Apathetic citizens have neither a positive or negative partisanship. Those who have a party for which they would never vote but do not have a party with which they affirmatively identify are negative partisans. Closed partisans have both a positive and a negative party identity. Open partisans have only a positive party identity. Although Rose and Mishler hold up open partisanship as the ideal, they indicate that *closed* partisanship is superior to negative partisanship in terms of developing stable party identification. To be consistent with other research on partisanship, the term *negative partisanship* here includes both Rose and Mishler's negative and closed partisans.

Negative partisanship has been found to influence many political behaviors.[2] NPID is associated with an increased likelihood of party membership, voting, joining a protest, and

[2] NPID can also influence apolitical behaviors. American partisans who have strong negative affect towards out-partisans were less likely to award scholarships to out-partisans and were less generous with out-partisans in dictator

signing petitions (Caruna, McGregor, and Stephenson 2015; Mayer 2017). NPID also predicts vote choice (Medeiros and Noël 2014; Mayer 2017; Vlachová 2001). Among Americans, negative partisanship is associated with straight-ticket voting (Abramowitz and Webster 2016, 2018). In multi-party contexts, the interaction of positive and negative identity influences the propensity for tactical voting (Vlachová 2001). It appears that "individuals may be motivated to vote to prevent a disliked party from winning, much as PPID inspires individuals to go to the polls to support their preferred party" (Caruna, McGregor, and Stephenson 2015, 781).

There is reason to suspect that negative partisans will be less committed democrats. Converse (1969) proposes that democratic stability requires publics to be socialized into supporting democratic institutions, like competitive party systems. He argues that "aggregate levels of loyalty to existing parties in a democratic system" are "an important ingredient of democratic stability, and perhaps, for the mass level, the most important ingredient" because, as citizens become members of the partisan structure, they will be willing to oppose its destruction and replacement (142). Aldrich et al. (2020) put his theory to the test. They find that individuals who have a positive partisan identity are more likely to be satisfied with the functioning of their democracy. This, in turn, taps into a large literature on citizens' satisfaction with democracy (SWD). The central premise of this literature is that public satisfaction is crucial to democratic stability, because the dissatisfied may seek to replace their regime with a potentially undemocratic system (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2011).[3] As

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and trust games; while in-group favoritism plays a role in this pattern, "Outgroup animosity is more consequential" (Iyengar and Westwood 2015, 703). Strong negative sentiment towards out-partisans is also reflected in unwillingness to accept them as family members (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).

[3] Empirical work does not focus on demonstrating the relationship between satisfaction and commitment. However, it can be shown using the 2nd Module of the CSES that individuals who are more satisfied with the functioning of their democracy are more likely to believe that democracy is the best form of government, making them more committed democrats (Appendix 1).

Anderson (2002, 3) notes, "Lack of specific support can – in the long run – carry over to more general feelings of dissatisfaction with the political system."

This article expands on Aldrich et al.'s (2020) finding. As multiple parties are available, even in systems dominated by two parties, "partisanship is more appropriately considered as a choice of a party within the context of the *alternatives* existing within a particular party system at a particular time" (Richardson 1991, 759). This includes negative partisanship. While positive partisans are identifying an avenue through which they can buy into the democratic system, negative partisanship can create the impression of systemic problems. Just as negative partisans are theorized to turn out in elections due to their fear of the hated party's victory, they may be expressly discomfited at the systemic level by the existence and potential victory of the hated party.

Democracy is a system defined by parties' competition for power. Any party in that arena is a potential victor, who could steer the ship of state. Negative partisans are proactively excluding a portion of the system from their consideration in a structure of interparty competition and choice while being confronted by its participation. This is the functional opposite of Converse's (1969) theory. These voters are not buying into a system via this party; this party alienates them. This disliked party's victory becomes insupportable for the negative partisan: "negative affect toward the opposing party causes partisans to view that party as an unacceptable alternative" (Abramowitz and Webster 2016). Their democracy, as a system, has produced a set of options, some of which are evidently deficient in their estimation. They could imagine that a better functioning system would avert or subvert the formation and persistence of such a party. Instead, their democracy, in form and function, allows it to participate, maybe even win. Furthermore, if other citizens can support this unacceptable party, then the negative partisan

might believe some people are in profound error ideologically or morally. The system based on their participation is thus a system built on incorporating error. The underlying rules could then be called into question. Negative partisans, unlike positive partisans, are expected to be less likely to be satisfied with democracy (Hypothesis 1).

However, if the hated party is a small party or the negative partisan does not anticipate its taking power, the effect of animosity might be masked. While rejecting a party that "appeals to a minority that is effectively an interest group party" may not substantially impair democratic participation, if parties with "a 'majority bent' are rejected, this can cause polarization" and make alternations in government "impossible" (Rose and Mishler 1998, 226). Table 1 (below) shows that in many countries a much larger population hates *a* party than hates one of the two largest parties; maybe they hate the third largest party, but maybe they hate a niche party. In this case, their democratic satisfaction may not be inhibited. If a party representing one of the largest blocs of society is despicable, then the democratic public could be seen as damaged and the democratic structure is a risk because it could empower this group. However, if the hated group is smaller, then a citizen could overlook its participation more readily. The system is working decently so the abhorrent party is marginal. Competitions and transitions in power are still possible. Thus, negative partisanship for one of the largest parties is predicted to negatively impact satisfaction with democracy (Hypothesis 2). Small party NPID need not share this effect.

Rose and Mishler described a quartet pattern of positive and negative partisanship: open, closed, negative, and apathetic partisanship. Given that Aldrich et al. (2020) suggest positive partisanship increases satisfaction and here negative partisanship is anticipated to reduce it, it is predicted that open partisans – those with PPID and without NPID – will be the most satisfied. Negative partisans according to their definition – those with NPID but not PPID – should be the

least satisfied (Hypothesis 3). The relative position of apathetic and closed partisans would depend on whether the effect of NPID or PPID on satisfaction is greater. No *ex ante* prediction is made about the relative influence of those identities.

Winning has long been recognized to play an important role in citizens' democratic satisfaction. Losers are regularly found to be less satisfied with the functioning of the democracy in their country than winners (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Blais and Gélineau 2007; Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2012; Howell and Justwan 2013). In addition to the emotional boost from victory, those who support a governing party are more likely to believe that the government cares about their needs and interests. The stakes for victory are still greater if another party is unacceptable, actively despised. Negative partisans may not support that party's ideology and may be highly suspicious of its intentions to look after their interests should it come to power. It is anticipated that the positive effect of winning on satisfaction – the win/loss satisfaction gap – will be greater for negative partisans than for citizens lacking such strong animus (Hypothesis 4a). Their victory, after all, can keep a hated party away from power. As such, winning would matter more to them than other victors. Negative partisanship adds an additional element to electoral defeat. The particularly painful loss to a negative partisan would be loss to the disliked party. The win/loss satisfaction gap should thus be greater for negative partisans of the governing party (Hypothesis 4b).

Where partisans do not win outright, satisfaction has been found to be higher when their party is included in a coalition because it increases the likelihood that their policy preferences will be realized (Singh, Karoç, and Blais 2012). Additionally, Singh and Thornton (2016) find that voters who are ambivalent – meaning they like their party but dislike other coalition members – are less satisfied with winning than those who supported a winning party in a

coalition for which they felt similarly about all member parties; this effect was smaller for members of the largest coalition party. This suggests that coalition membership and attitudes towards involved parties influence citizens' democratic satisfaction. The influence of coalition involvement on the win/loss satisfaction gap is thus expected to be impacted by negative partisanship. Being in the coalition allows their party to keep a hand on the wheel of the ship of state. This opportunity should matter more when the ship is otherwise being steered by a group one greatly dislikes. Their party's being in the government can then offset the negative effect of the victory of a party they do not like by reducing the government's propensity to enact a policy they fear. Victory should have a greater effect for those who dislike the governing party than for those who do not share this animosity (Hypothesis 5).

Material and Methods

To examine these questions, the third module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) is employed. As the theory relates to electoral participation and democratic commitment, cases were removed for countries whose combined Polity score is less than eight. To exceed this score, countries must have a high democracy rating *and* a low autocracy rating. Some countries also are removed from the sample by default when questions of interest were not asked in those surveys. The final sample includes forty-three elections between 2006 and 2011.[4]

[4] Although the CSES has multiple modules, it is not panel data; the module provides point-in-time respondent information from the post-election surveys. As such, it cannot be used to look for reinforcing relationships for (dis)satisfaction and negative partisanship cross-temporally. For instance, does negative partisanship expand over time to encompass more parties or does it shift over time with other features, like education and electoral victory, that are also related to satisfaction? Such questions must be left to future research. It cannot be conclusively rejected that some previously dissatisfied democrats became subsequently negative partisans. For now, this research relies on associational models, and it considers it more likely that the system is evaluated based on its component parties and their interplay than that a voter's negative evaluation of the political system is being visited on any particular party. Were dissatisfaction to flow into animosity, it seems more likely that it would be generalized; however, the data show that while many citizens would never vote for a particular party, they would not refuse to vote for many of the parties.

For these tests, an operationalization of NPID is necessary. This has been done several ways in previous studies. The first looks at pure affect, such as a feeling thermometer measure. Abramowitz and Webster (2018) identify any American who dislikes the opposing party more than he likes his own as a negative partisan. The second invokes potential behavior related to that party, such as unwillingness to vote for it. Rose and Mishler (1998), Vlachová (2001), and Medeiros and Noël (2014) identify negative partisans as those who say they would never vote for a party.

Both methods can be satisfied using the 3rd module of the CSES. All four modules include a like/dislike scale for political parties, but only the 3rd module includes the question about a party for which the respondent would never vote.[5] A binary variable indicates having a party for which the respondent would never vote. A binary variable is also constructed from the like/dislike scale. It indicates if the respondent has any party he greatly dislikes, rating it four or lower on the zero-to-ten scale. Four is selected to match Mayer's (2017) coding. Negative partisanship for the party of the president or prime minister is indicated with the respondent's like/dislike scale rating for that party and a binary indicator for if the respondent would never vote for the party of the president or prime minister. As the question of never voting for a particular party was only asked for some of the countries, those analyses will only include those surveys.

Caruna, McGregor, and Stephenson (2015) take a more conservative tack in measuring negative partisanship by combining a feeling thermometer with the never voting for a party question. They fear accidentally including people who have strategically defected from a party

[5] As the like/dislike scale was included in multiple waves, those measures were tested as well on the Integrated Module Dataset, which features a subset of questions that have appeared in more than two waves of the CSES. The results are substantively similar to those from the 3rd module (Appendix 2).

for which they would vote if it were viable. Respondents are considered to be negative partisans if they have a party for which they would "absolutely never vote" and for which they had a feeling thermometer rating below fifty. McGregor, Caruna, and Stephenson (2015) add the additional requirement that no party be rated lower on the feeling thermometer. Mayer (2017) follows a similar system, classifying individuals who rate a party between zero and four on an eleven-point scale and who would never vote for that party as negative partisans for that party. The concern that people would say they would *never* vote for a party that they actually like because of its low probability of winning at that time is arguably overblown. After all, they would not *never* vote for that party; they are just currently not doing so. One could also imagine conditions in which one would never vote for a party without animus, like a separatist party; these conditions though seem rare. Only 5.6% of this sample reported the existence of a party for which they would never vote but did not report a great dislike for any party. A few cases happened in each country in the sample. However, to satisfy this concern, a binary variable based on identifying a party for which one would never vote and rating that party four or lower on the like/dislike scale is also tested. Following Mayer (2017), if the never voting for a party question was not available in that country, having only the like/dislike condition satisfied is sufficient.

To test the second hypothesis, two additional negative partisanship variables were constructed. The first identifies whether the party for which the respondent would never vote is a major party, one of the two largest parties in the country, or not. Again, only respondents in election surveys that included the question of never voting for a party are part of the analysis. The second identifies whether the respondent disliked a major party, a minor party, or did not greatly dislike any party. This uses the same sub-four rating to identify dislike as described above. Not so disliking any party is the reference category.

Operationalizing PPID is also necessary. As with NPID, the literature has used a few methods for identifying partisanship. Medeiros and Noël (2014) attribute positive partisanship, depending on the survey instrument, to those who say they think of themselves as part of a party or are (very) strong partisans. McGregor, Caruana, and Stephenson (2015) identify it based on having a very strong or fairly strong connection to a chosen party. Vlachová (2001) treats positive identity as a scale, relying on the strength of the reported attachment. Aldrich et al. (2020) link the strength of party attachment and closeness to a party measures across the ANES and CSES datasets. Mayer (2017) constructs a three-point scale from not very close to very close to a political party. Aldrich et al. (2020) use this three-point scale also in their study of PPID and satisfaction with democracy. Here PPID is measured in a four-point scale for how close the respondent feels to a political party. This is the same as the Aldrich et al. scale, but it adds a lower category for people who do not feel at all close to a party (0). Those who stated that they did feel close to a party received higher scores based on their stated closeness ranging from not very close (1), somewhat close (2), and very close (3). This four-point method retains those who do not have PPID in the sample. This method is consistent with the previous literature while maintaining the range of closeness expressed by the CSES survey options and the variation in partisanship respondents can express.

Positive and negative partisanship are common (Table 1). In each country, large portions of the population have a party to which they are very or somewhat close. Having a party for which one would never vote and that one greatly dislikes are also very widespread. This includes negative partisanship for one of the two largest parties.[6]

[Table 1 about here]

[6] The CSES codebook identifies the largest parties based on the vote share in the lowest level of the recorded election, ideally the first round of the lower house election.

The outcome of interest is citizens' satisfaction with democracy. To measure democratic satisfaction, responses to the question "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [this country]" are used. The question is focused on country-specific democracy, rather than addressing support for democracy as an idea. The question "taps the level of support for how the democratic regime works in practice" (Linde and Ekman 2003, 405). Some scholars have questioned the use of the satisfaction with democracy measure because of its correlation with other indicators, such as partisan preference and support for democracy as a system, in developing democracies (Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001). This, though, need not overpower the indicator. After all, for anything in which satisfaction is estimated, there are expected to be a myriad of considerations influencing satisfaction (Anderson 2002). In fact, that support for democracy correlates with satisfaction with democracy is necessary for the central belief of this literature – satisfied democrats are good democrats. The question is arguably best used for existing democracies rather than proto-democracies (Anderson 2002). This is another reason for limiting the sample to countries with strong democracy ratings. In the words of Wagner, Schneider, and Halla (2009, 32), "Although [SWD] contains some ambiguity, that ambiguity is acceptable."

Electoral victory/defeat is coded based on the party for which the respondent voted (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2011). If that party heads the government, such as holding the presidency, or is in the governing coalition, then the respondent is considered to be on the winning side. Coalition member parties are identified through the election macro-reports from the CSES. Winners, losers, and non-voters are included as a factor variable; defeat is the reference category. Prior studies suggest that non-voters are less satisfied with their democracy than voters (Blais and Gélineau 2007).

Several variables that relate both to partisanship and to satisfaction with democracy are also included as controls. Age is significantly associated with partisan identity and with the type of party for which one would never vote (Rose and Mishler 1998). Older respondents have elsewhere been found to be both more and less satisfied with democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Lühiste 2014). Age here is measured in years.[7] Gender has been significantly linked to levels of satisfaction (Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2011; Lühiste 2014; Dahlberg and Linde 2016) and to partisan identity (Rose and Mishler 1998). Models include an indicator variable for female.

Education influences partisanship (Medeiros and Noël 2014). This could reflect a direct education effect. Education could also indicate political sophistication or socioeconomic status, for which Medeiros and Noël (2014) take it as a proxy. Economic condition relates to the choice of party for which one would never vote (Rose and Mishler 1998). These features, which have been linked also to democratic satisfaction, are included (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Dahlberg and Linde 2016; Lühiste 2014; Aldrich et al. 2020). Education is an eight-point scale with higher levels indicating more education. Income is a five-point scale for income quintile in the country with higher scores indicating a higher income. General economic condition is included as GDP per capita in the year prior to the election. Sophisticates are also more likely to be aware of and influenced by the ideological elements of partisanship (Mayne and Hakhverdian 2017). Political interest is measured by how closely the respondent followed the election campaign. It is a four-point scale from not closely at all to very closely. Interest in politics has been positively connected to satisfaction (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Aldrich et al. 2020). The age, education, and GDP per capita variables are scaled to facilitate convergence in the multilevel models.

[7] The 3rd module data for the US assigns a value of 001 for respondents over 90; this is adjusted to 90.

The ideological difference between the respondents' ideological position and the position of the party he most dislikes is also included. Conservative individuals have been found more likely to be satisfied with a democracy (Lühiste 2014). As discussed already, individuals' ideology relative to the ideological position of the parties in their system influences their partisan identity (Medeiros and Noël 2014). The most disliked party could be an ideological neighbor hated for another reason, such as electoral competition or opposing views on an orthogonal issue, or it could be a party that is ideologically separate from the respondent, which is disliked because of the distance and the difference in views it represents. This variable controls for the possibility that the negative partisan satisfaction effects or the connection between partisanship and victory and satisfaction stem from this ideological separation. Voters are "sensitive to the realities of the ideological menu before them" (Mayne and Hakhverdian 2017, 842) and that menu is most palatable to citizens when it is populated by their ideological proximates (Mayne and Hakhverdian 2017; Kim 2009). They are less satisfied when the menu features more extreme parties (Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011). A great distance between the respondent and a party he does not like means it represents both an ideological threat and that the system features more extreme parties and partisans. To account for distance effects, the absolute distance of the respondent's self-identified left/right placement on the zero-to-ten scale from the expert-identified placement of the disliked party is included.

Because the dependent variable is a four-point scale, ordered logistic regression models are appropriate. Some research collapses the scale into a binary, but this sacrifices potentially useful information. As the surveys and elections occur within countries, hierarchical models are appropriate, grouping responses by election with random effects by election. Wells and Krieckhaus (2006) recommend using multi-level models in studies of citizens' satisfaction that

incorporate national-level information; they find that failure to do so can artificially inflate apparent significance of those variables. The sample also includes a sufficient number of countries to use multilevel models (Bryan and Jenkins 2015). The primary variables of interest, here, though, are individual-level variables. The use of multilevel ordered logistic regression models follows Curini, Jou, and Memoli (2011) and is akin to Blais and Gélineau's (2007) use of ordered probit models.

Results and Discussion

[Table 2 approximately here]

Negative partisans are less likely to be satisfied with their democracy. This shows both in the behavioral measure, having a party one would never vote for (Model 1 in Table 2), and in the affective measure, having a party one greatly dislikes (Model 2 in Table 2). The effect size is larger for reporting dislike than reporting unwillingness to vote for a party. This could reflect that some people who will never vote for a party do not have a strong animus towards that party. The negative effect of negative partisanship also shows in the joint measure, which includes only the never voters with such a strong dislike (Appendix 3). Holding such strong negative feelings towards a party predicts dissatisfaction with the country's democracy. This supports the first hypothesis.

Citizens with a positive partisan identity, on the other hand, are more likely to be satisfied with the democracy. This is consistent with Aldrich et al.'s (2020) findings. The win/loss satisfaction gap is also evident here. This result is consistent with the other literature on winning and satisfaction (Campbell 2015; Blais and Gélineau 2007; Anderson and Guillory 1997). Older respondents and women are less likely to be satisfied with the democracy. Individuals who paid

greater attention to the campaign, and higher income individuals report greater satisfaction. Citizens in countries with higher GDP per capita are more likely to be satisfied.

To test the second hypothesis, the negative partisanship towards one of the two largest parties variables are used. Compared to citizens without NPID, citizens who dislike one of the major parties are significantly less satisfied with their democracy (Model 4 in Table 2). The same is true for those who would never vote for one of the major parties (Model 3 in Table 2). In neither metric are citizens with negative partisanship for a minor party significantly different from citizens without NPID. This result is consistent with the second hypothesis. The effect of negative partisanship towards a major party on satisfaction with democracy is markedly greater for major party negative partisans than negative partisans as a group. This could reflect their larger role in the country's politics generally and their relatively greater likelihood of winning.

[Table 3 approximately here]

In addition to PPID and NPID, the four-part system of classification proposed by Rose and Mishler (1998) is also considered. Partisans are classified by being very close to a party and having a party for which one would never vote (Models 3 and 4 of Table 3) or having a party one greatly dislikes (Models 1 and 2 of Table 3). Open partisans – those with PPID but not NPID – were more likely to be satisfied with their democracy than other partisan groups. Not only are they Rose and Mishler's theoretical ideal democrats, they are the most system supportive. Negative partisans, those possessing a negative identity but no positive partisanship, are the group least satisfied with their democracy. This is consistent with the third hypothesis. Apathetic and closed partisans are not significantly different from each other in terms of satisfaction with democracy in the never vote for a party measure of negative partisanship. When using the like/dislike a party standard, apathetic citizens are significantly more likely to be satisfied with

their democracy than closed partisans (Appendix 4). This is consistent with negative partisanship having a larger effect on satisfaction than PPID (Table 2).

[Table 4 approximately here]

To identify an increased win/loss satisfaction gap for negative partisans, models featuring an interaction term between voting for a winning party and negative partisanship are used. NPID significantly changes the magnitude of effect for winning in the never vote for a party specification (Model 2 in Table 4). This suggests that the increased satisfaction from winning, as opposed to losing, is greater among negative partisans than those without negative partisanship. A visualization of the interactive effect can be seen in Figure 1. Those without negative partisanship are more likely to be in the higher satisfaction groups than those with negative partisanship; within these groups, the difference in probabilities between winners and losers is greater among negative partisans than non-partisans. The relationship is also significant in the joint measure of negative partisanship (Appendix 3). The effect does not reach significance when NPID is assessed based on disliking a party ($p=0.064$) (Model 1 in Table 4). This is consistent with Hypothesis 4a.

[Figure 1 approximately here]

To consider whether losing to the party for which one is a negative partisan is particularly salient, the interaction is tested using indicators for negative partisanship for the party of the president or prime minister. For ease of interpretation, in these models winning is the reference category, rather than losing. As much as the literature has shown that losing depresses satisfaction with democracy, it can be seen here that losing in extrema, losing the top job to a party one would never support, has a substantially negative effect on citizens' satisfaction with the functioning of their democracy. There is a significant interaction for the like/dislike scale for

the governing party (Model 4 in Table 4). A visualization of the interactive effect can be seen in Figure 2. Those who like the governing party are more likely to be in a higher satisfaction group generally, as are winners. The negative relationship between losing the election and satisfaction with democracy is ameliorated when one is less negative about the winning party. Indicating that one would never vote for the winning party does not interact significantly with loss (Model 6 in Table 4). This provides support for Hypothesis 4b.

[Figure 2 approximately here]

Negative partisanship for the governing party is also relevant for some winners – the other members of a coalition. Citizens can have strong negative sentiment toward the party heading their government while their party is in coalition with that party. It is uncommon though for coalition partisans to hate the head of government. In countries with a coalition government, only 9.9% of the sample hates the party of the president or prime minister *and* voted for a party in the winning coalition; only 5.6% supported a coalition member party while saying they would never vote for the party of the president or prime minister. Most winners at least tolerate the president or prime minister's party. These tensions could reflect citizens' negative partisanship responding to both ideological difference and interparty competition, as discussed above (Richardson 1991; McGregor, Caruana, and Stephenson 2015). The sentiments would also depend on the nature of the coalition that formed. So that the analyses only consider junior coalition partners compared against outright losers, respondents who supported the party of the president or prime minister are excluded, as were elections in which no coalitions were formed.

[Table 5 approximately here]

A significant negative interaction is identified between liking the governing party and being in the winning coalition. The negative interaction indicates a reduction in the effect size of

being a member of a winning coalition party – electoral victory – on satisfaction as the (dis)like measure increases (Model 2 in Table 5). The more the minority coalition party member likes the governing party – the weaker his negative partisanship – the less influence winning – having his party in the winning coalition – has on his satisfaction with democracy. If the head of government's party is despised, though, having one's party in the winning coalition is more predictive of the individual's satisfaction with his democracy. Being a member of a winning coalition is an opportunity to influence policy outcomes. For the negative partisans having that potential influence is important for the anticipated outcomes, which in turn shapes satisfaction. A visualization of the interactive effect can be seen in Figure 3. Those who are more positively disposed to the governing party are more likely to be in a high satisfaction group, as are those who are in the winning coalition. The difference in probabilities between those who are in the coalition and those who are not, which is to say winners and losers, is greater among those who dislike the party heading the government. The interaction is not significant with respect to never voting for the party of the president or prime minister (Model 4 in Table 5). The hypothesis is thus supported.

[Figure 3 approximately here]

Conclusion

Building on Converse (1969) and Aldrich et al.'s (2020) work on positive partisan identity and democratic satisfaction and commitment, this article has considered the effect of negative partisanship on satisfaction with democracy. To test this, two measures of NPID were identified using the 3rd module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. First, whether an individual has a party he greatly dislikes, and, second, whether he has a party for which he would never vote. Negative partisanship by both standards is negatively related to citizens' satisfaction

with the functioning of their democracy, the system that features the participation of and threatens the empowerment of these disliked groups.

Negative partisanship is also found to moderate the impact of electoral outcomes on satisfaction with democracy. As with previous studies, winning is shown to increase satisfaction with democracy. Strong opposition to other parties in the system adds an additional layer to that relationship. Electoral victory has a stronger effect on the democratic satisfaction of negative partisans. Electoral defeat has a greater influence on satisfaction among negative partisans of the governing party. The outcome also matters to negative partisans in the governing coalition. Being part of that coalition, having a role in government and a chance to influence policy, matters more to satisfaction for negative partisans of the governing party. Winning is always influential, but winning when it can limit the capacity of a disliked out-group to govern without one's own party's influence is even better.

Studies have identified affective polarization, both in the United States and around the world, meaning more and more citizens are holding these strong negative perceptions towards the other parties and partisans in their democracies (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Garrett et al. 2014). What does this rise in NPID mean for democracy? Following Aldrich et al. (2020, 257), it is recognized that understanding citizen's satisfaction with democracy is "a critical step toward assessing whether the public has a role in enhancing democratic stability." The internalization of democratic norms and support for the system of government are important for democracy's perpetuation. To the extent that negative partisanship drives down satisfaction, NPID undermines democracy as a system of government. The threat that democracy will create and empower a disliked party reduces its perceived value to its participants. Continual experience of such animosity and that threat, especially if it is realized in

the election of the disliked group, could wear away at the store of democratic goodwill that sustains democratic commitment.

Table 1

Country (Election)	Positive Party ID (Very/Somewhat Close to a Party)	Negative Party ID (Never Vote for a Party)	Negative Party ID (Dislike a Party)	Negative Party ID (Dislike a Major Party)
Australia	64.5	75.7	78.7	62.6
Austria	49.6	85.1	97.5	65.1
Brazil (2006)	36.6	46.8	79.4	64.7
Brazil (2010)	41.1	76.3	84.2	51.4
Canada	61.2	84.7	94.6	67.1
Croatia	59.7	82.4	95.0	77.7
Czech Republic (2006)	52.1	94.5	96.9	83.0
Czech Republic (2010)	46.2	94.9	98.3	92.1
Denmark	26.4	98.5	98.6	59.8
Estonia	58.8	87.2	94.6	88.2
Finland (2007)	64.2	86.2	88.1	43.5
Finland (2011)	65.2	90.4	94.5	54.3
France	75.7	--	99.3	65.7
Germany (2005)	62.8	97.8	99.8	76.3
Germany (2009)	51.1	90.7	91.3	62.0
Greece	62.8	88.3	95.0	60.2
Iceland (2007)	69.9	82.6	95.5	42.9
Iceland (2009)	65.4	85.1	96.1	75.8
Ireland	45.7	71.3	88.2	45.2
Israel	52.6	78.5	89.9	51.3
Japan	60.4	61.5	93.0	60.3
Latvia	56.8	91.1	96.8	76.3
Mexico (2006)	52.8	65.8	76.1	53.7
Mexico (2009)	49.6	85.7	70.8	32.6
Netherlands (2006)	24.9	96.2	88.9	34.8
Netherlands (2010)	23.3	94.8	93.4	38.7
New Zealand	60.1	84.0	92.8	59.5
Norway (2005)	26.9	--	98.6	61.6
Norway (2009)	32.6	94.3	98.2	69.0
Peru	61.3	79.0	95.4	80.1
Philippines	21.2	39.8	72.8	43.1
Poland (2005)	26.3	88.2	97.4	51.0
Poland (2007)	25.4	87.5	94.1	79.5
Portugal	20.3	60.4	87.3	63.3
Romania	64.3	74.2	87.7	65.2
Slovakia	78.0	91.1	98.9	73.3
Slovenia	26.0	76.3	95.3	76.5
South Africa	65.5	79.6	92.7	65.2
South Korea	53.3	--	83.7	64.6
Spain	74.4	71.1	95.0	82.6
Sweden	67.5	95.4	98.7	65.1
Switzerland	39.3	88.4	92.0	83.0
Turkey	77.7	76.3	97.5	91.4
Uruguay	76.2	--	94.1	80.1
United States	62.1	57.2	62.4	62.4

Table 2

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Never Vote for a Party	-0.19***			
	(0.03)			
Dislike a Party		-0.37***		
		(0.04)		
Never Vote for Major Party			-0.42***	
			(0.03)	
Never Vote for a Minor Party			-0.01	
			(0.03)	
Dislike a Major Party				-0.53***
				(0.04)
Dislike a Minor Party				-0.03
				(0.04)
Positive Party ID	0.12***	0.12***	0.13***	0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Vote for a Winning Party	0.66***	0.66***	0.64***	0.65***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Non-Voter	-0.04	0.03	-0.06	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Age	-0.06***	-0.04***	-0.07***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.06**	-0.07***	-0.05*	-0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita	0.54***	0.52***	0.54***	0.50***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Political Interest	0.18***	0.20***	0.18***	0.21***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.02	0.03*	0.02	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Quintile	0.08***	0.08***	0.07***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideological Distance	0.01	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
1|2	-1.60***	-1.73***	-1.58***	-1.75***
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
2|3	0.42***	0.29*	0.45***	0.30*
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
3|4	3.63***	3.51***	3.68***	3.53***
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Log Likelihood	-35210.65	-43492.46	-35077.10	-43254.79
AIC	70451.31	87014.93	70186.20	86541.57

Num. obs.	34276	42435	34276	42435
Groups (Election)	39	43	39	43
Variance: Election: (Intercept)	0.49	0.50	0.51	0.51

$^{***}p<0.001$, $^{**}p<0.01$, $^{*}p<0.05$

Table 3

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Open Partisan	0.70***		0.48***	
	(0.10)		(0.08)	
Closed Partisan	0.23***	-0.47***	0.22***	-0.25**
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.09)
Apathetic Partisan	0.34***	-0.36***	0.16***	-0.32***
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.09)
Negative Partisan		-0.70***		-0.48***
		(0.10)		(0.08)
Vote for a Winning Party	0.68***	0.68***	0.67***	0.67***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Non-Voter	0.01	0.01	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.06**	-0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita	0.51***	0.51***	0.54***	0.54***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Political Interest	0.22***	0.22***	0.19***	0.19***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.03**	0.03**	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Quintile	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideological Distance	0.01**	0.01**	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
1|2	-1.43***	-2.13***	-1.48***	-1.95***
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.15)
2|3	0.59***	-0.11	0.53***	0.06
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.15)
3|4	3.80***	3.10***	3.74***	3.27***
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Log Likelihood	-43533.31	-43533.31	-35239.45	-35239.45
AIC	87098.62	87098.62	70510.90	70510.90
Num. obs.	42435	42435	34276	34276
Groups (Election)	43	43	39	39
Variance: Election: (Intercept)	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.47

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
Dislike a Party	-0.39***					
	(0.05)					
Never Vote for a Party		-0.25***				
		(0.04)				
Like the Governing Party			0.14***	0.12***		
			(0.00)	(0.01)		
Never Vote for the Governing Party					-0.58***	-0.52***
					(0.03)	(0.06)
Vote for a Winning Party	0.54***	0.55***				
	(0.07)	(0.06)				
Vote for a Losing Party			-0.29***	-0.51***	-0.53***	-0.53***
			(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Non-Voter	0.16	-0.09	-0.39***	-0.69***	-0.63***	-0.60***
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Dislike a Party:Vote for a Winning Party	0.14					
	(0.07)					
Dislike a Party:Non-Voter	-0.15					
	(0.09)					
Never Vote for a Party: Vote for a Winning Party		0.13*				
		(0.06)				
Never Vote for a Party: Non-Voter		0.05				
		(0.09)				
Like the Governing Party: Vote for a Losing Party				0.04***		
				(0.01)		
Like the Governing Party: Non-Voter				0.05***		
				(0.01)		
Never Vote for the Governing Party:Vote for a Losing Party						-0.05
						(0.07)
Never Vote for the Governing Party:Non-Voter						-0.26*
						(0.12)
Positive Party ID	0.12***	0.12***	0.10***	0.11***	0.13***	0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	-0.04***	-0.06***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.06***	-0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.07***	-0.06**	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.05*	-0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita	0.51***	0.54***	0.51***	0.50***	0.53***	0.53***

	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Political Interest	0.20***	0.18***	0.19***	0.19***	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.03*	0.02	0.04**	0.03**	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Quintile	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideological Distance	0.01*	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
1|2	-1.76***	-1.65***	-1.24***	-1.41***	-2.13***	-2.13***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
2|3	0.27*	0.37**	0.84***	0.68***	-0.10	-0.09
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
3|4	3.48***	3.58***	4.12***	3.95***	3.13***	3.14***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Log Likelihood	-43487.61	-35208.36	-42788.54	-42773.17	-35036.29	-35033.67
AIC	87009.22	70450.72	85607.07	85580.33	70102.58	70101.34
Num. obs.	42435	34276	42435	42435	34276	34276
Groups (Election)	43	39	43	43	39	39
Variance: Election: (Intercept)	0.51	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 5

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Like the Governing Party	0.18***	0.19***		
	(0.01)	(0.01)		
Never Vote for the Governing Party			-0.65***	-0.67***
			(0.04)	(0.04)
Vote for a Winning Party	0.27***	0.50***	0.40***	0.37***
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Non-Voter	-0.19***	-0.18*	-0.20***	-0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Like the Governing Party:		-0.05***		
Vote for a Winning Party		(0.01)		
Like the Governing Party:		-0.00		
Non-Voter		(0.01)		
Never Vote for the Governing Party:				0.09
Vote for a Winning Party				(0.08)
Never Vote for the Governing Party:				0.00
Non-Voter				(0.12)
Positive Party ID	0.09***	0.09***	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.10***	-0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
GDP per Capita	0.54***	0.54***	0.51***	0.51***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Political Interest	0.14***	0.14***	0.13***	0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income Quintile	0.08***	0.08***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideological Distance	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
1|2	-1.11***	-1.06***	-1.93***	-1.94***
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)
2|3	1.04***	1.09***	0.17	0.17
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)
3|4	4.50***	4.55***	3.58***	3.58***
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Log Likelihood	-22051.46	-22044.17	-17861.78	-17861.20

AIC	44132.93	44122.35	35753.57	35756.40
Num. obs.	22292	22292	17728	17728
Groups (Election)	29	29	27	27
Variance: Election: (Intercept)	0.57	0.57	0.64	0.64

$^{***}p<0.001$, $^{**}p<0.01$, $^{*}p<0.05$

Figure 1: Effect of Victory for Negative Partisans



Hypothetical respondent is of average age and education. He has no positive party ID. He is not at all interested in politics. He is in the bottom income quintile in a country of average GDP per capita, and there is no ideological distance from between his position and that of his least liked party. The estimation is based on Table 4 Model 2. Note: For this estimation, the random effects are held to zero.

Figure 2: Effect of Victory for Negative Partisans of a Governing Party



Hypothetical respondent is of average age and education. He has no positive party ID. He is not at all interested in politics. He is in the bottom income quintile in a country of average GDP per capita, and there is no ideological distance from between his position and that of his least liked party. The estimation is based on Table 4 Model 4. Note: For this estimation, the random effects are held to zero.

Figure 3: Effect of Coalition Membership for Negative Partisans of the Leading Party



Hypothetical respondent is of average age and education. He has no positive party ID. He is not at all interested in politics. He is in the bottom income quintile in a country of average GDP per capita, and there is no ideological distance from between his position and that of his least liked party. The estimation is based on Table 5 Model 2. Note: For this estimation, the random effects are held to zero.

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