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AUTHORITY AND POLITICS: THE RELATION BETWEEN AUTHORITY  
AND POLITICAL VIEWS WITHIN THE IDENTITY STYLES

By

PATRICK OEFELEIN

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the Honors in the Major Program in Psychology  
in the College of Sciences  
and in The Burnett Honors College  
at the University of Central Florida  
Orlando, Florida

Fall Term, 2023

Thesis Chair: Dr. Steven L. Berman, Ph.D.

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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to determine whether a relationship exists between the theorized identity styles and political positions, views, and opinions. Also investigated were the effects of authority on political views, specifically within the normative identity style. Students at a large southeastern metropolitan university ( $N = 440$ ) took an anonymous online survey in exchange for course credit. Those with a normative identity style, who look to authority figures for answers, were found to have much higher levels of conservatism and held more conservative positions than did those with an informational style, who seek out their own sources for answers. Those with a diffuse-avoidant style, who avoid making identity related decisions, fell between the normative and informational styles on most of these measures. For those with a normative identity style, political views on welfare deservingness were better predicted by news media choice and parental political ideology than by personal political ideology. For those with an informational identity style, most political views were better predicted by personal political ideology than by news media choice, parental political ideology, or parental news media choice. A lack of usage of traditional media in favor of social media may explain some of the results. Further implications are discussed.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

I want to thank Dr. Steven Berman for incredible knowledge and passion for the field of psychology and the study of identity development. He has been an incredible mentor, and this project would not exist without his guidance. I want to thank Julie Hall, who was instrumental in helping me to edit and wordsmith the final versions of this project. I want to thank Ishara Jean-Francois, who helped me to produce and distribute the survey through SONA. Finally, I want to thank Dr. Aslett, who was willing to join the project as a committee member.

## **DEDICATION**

To Hailey Pedreira, who has been an unwavering pillar of support to me and has always had my back for the last 5 years. To my parents, who have supported me in reaching my ambitions throughout my college career. To my siblings, who have shown interest in my research work from the start. To all my close friends who have been with me throughout this process.

Thank you.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .....	1
Identity Development Theories .....	1
Political Ideology .....	4
Media .....	6
Social Welfare .....	8
Rationale .....	9
Hypotheses .....	11
METHODS .....	13
Participants .....	13
Measures .....	13
Procedure .....	17
RESULTS .....	18
Preliminary and Descriptive Analyses .....	18
Main Analyses .....	18
DISCUSSION .....	23
Limitations and Future Research .....	26
APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL LETTER .....	28
APPENDIX B: EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH .....	30
APPENDIX C: TABLES .....	32
APPENDIX D: SURVEY BATTERY .....	37
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE .....	38
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY .....	39
ISI-5 .....	43
MRNI-SF .....	46
LFAIS-SF .....	48
CARIN .....	49
REFERENCES .....	51

## **LIST OF TABLES**

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on All Study Variables.....	33
Table 2: Correlational Analyses for All Study Variables .....	34
Table 3: Regression Analyses Predicting Political Views in the Normative Identity Style .....	35
Table 4: Regression Analyses Predicting Political Views in the Informational Identity Style .....	36



## LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

Adjusted  $R^2$  — coefficient of determination adjusted for number of predictors in the model

ANOVA — Analysis of Variance

$F$  — F-value or F-statistic

$M$  — Mean

$p$  — p-value for Statistical Significance

$r$  — Correlation Coefficient

$SD$  — Standard Deviation

$t$  — t-statistic from t-test

TMI — Traditional Masculine Ideology

## INTRODUCTION

People's political beliefs shape their everyday lives. From what policies and programs people support, what ideologies they believe in, how they perceive and interact with others who have similar and differing opinions, and whether or not they even care to be involved in the first place, people's actions in many scenarios, as well as their psychological and physical well-being, can be traced back to their politics (Ford et al., 2023). These beliefs begin to form when people are still in their youth, before they can even vote, as they begin exploring their identity using various methods of formation, which are discussed below (Berzonsky, 1989; Mah et al., 2020). Researching how identity styles influence the formation of political opinions may provide insight as to what factors may lead people to a specific belief system. This study therefore examines individuals' identity styles and determines firstly whether they can be linked to political beliefs and opinions on relevant topics and secondly how authority, whether it be parental, political, societal, or other, plays into political beliefs.

### Identity Development Theories

Much of the research on identity is based upon Erikson's work in his theory of psychosocial development. Specifically, much of the focus is directed at the identity vs. role confusion stage, which typically occurs during adolescence but often spills over into emerging adulthood (Erikson, 1950/1977). Identity refers to the roles, goals, values, and beliefs about the world that people adopt in order to give their life direction, purpose, and meaning (Berman et al., 2004). Identity is the final product of the integration of childhood experiences, roles, social opportunities, natural abilities, and influences from others (Erikson, 1950/1977). A well-formed identity creates a sense of confidence in a life path, especially in terms of career, as well as

continuity between the inner self and meaning to others. On the other hand, Erikson also stated that doubt of identity, called role confusion, causes people to become distraught and can lead to the loss of identity altogether.

Historically, there have been two common methods of measuring identity formation. The first is James Marcia's Identity Status model. Created in 1966, it uses Erikson's work to define four statuses of identity: achievement, moratorium, foreclosure, and diffusion. These statuses are defined along two continuums: identity exploration and identity commitment (Marcia, 1966). Diffusion is the combination of low identity exploration with low identity commitment and is characterized by a lack of a sense of direction and purpose in life. Foreclosure, the combination of low exploration with high commitment (committing to an identity prematurely without exploring the various available options), is characterized by uncritically accepting an identity that has been prescribed by certain authority figures, most typically the parents. Moratorium is the combination of high exploration but low commitment and is characterized by a period of active searching for possible roles, goals, and values, which might eventually form the basis of a self-chosen identity. Achievement is the combination of high exploration and high commitment and is characterized by attaining a stable sense of identity. It is important to note the use of status rather than stage in this model; individuals can move between statuses, and movement does not necessarily have a linear path (Kroger et al., 2010).

Each status has a different relationship to authority and authority figures. Marcia's (1966) data indicated that those in diffusion did not tend to embrace authoritarian values, but this is more likely a result of a general lack of interest rather than an intentional rejection of such

values. On the other hand, those in foreclosure embraced authoritarian values at greater degrees than any of the other statuses.

The second common method of measuring identity is based on Michael Berzonsky's (1989) Identity Style model. Developed as an extension of Marcia's Identity Status model to better explain the differences in decision-making and problem-solving that underlie the different statuses, it outlines three approaches or styles of dealing with identity questions and issues that may arise during the course of development: diffuse-avoidant, normative, and informational. The diffuse-avoidant style involves procrastination and avoidance of making identity commitments, which tends to lead to stagnation within the diffusion identity status. The normative style involves a tendency to conform to standards held by authority figures, be it a parent or other figure. When confronted with identity issues and questions, people with this style look to others to tell them what to do. This style tends to lead to a foreclosed identity status. Those with an informational style actively seek out new information to help them make decisions about which choices might be best in order to form identity commitments. This style encourages the trajectory through the moratorium identity status and ultimately to the identity achievement status. The informational style is associated with an active formation of self and an internal locus of control, while the normative style is associated with a more passive formation of self and an external locus of control (Schwartz et al., 2013). Essentially, people with the informational style seek to develop themselves, people with the normative style look to others for guidance, and people with the diffuse-avoidant style evade opportunities for personal growth. Important to mention is that the normative style is not necessarily a negative thing, especially in cultures where a collectivist identity is more valued than the individualistic identity that proliferates among majority groups

in the United States and other Western countries (Berman et al., 2011). The key difference between these two identity development theories is that identity status indicates where a person is at a particular moment in time during the process of identity formation, whereas identity style suggests a stable trait-like tendency which can help explain why a person enters or fails to enter a certain status.

### Political Ideology

Research has shown that the period from late adolescence through emerging adulthood is a crucial one for identity development, and this is around the same time individuals begin to develop their political beliefs (Mah et al., 2020). Indeed, political preference, be it for conservatism (which is considered right-leaning and promotes traditional values, resistance to social change, and the support for the status quo) or progressivism (which is considered left-leaning and emphasizes protection from or reduction of harm toward vulnerable individuals and obsession with fairness, reciprocity, and justice) is one of the identity domains that are frequently measured as a part of studying identity development (Graham et al., 2009; Nilsson & Jost, 2020; Schwartz et al., 2013). Conservatism has two domains: social traditionalism, which is associated with the carrying of close-minded beliefs as part of a system protecting against perceived threats, and economic conservatism, which can be linked with comparatively more open-minded views as a function of utilitarianism (Johnson & Tamney, 2001). Conservatism specifically is also context dependent; what “traditional values” are and what the status quo to be maintained is may change from place to place and time to time (Nilsson & Jost, 2020).

Also important to consider is the effect of authority on the development of political beliefs. Authoritarian values place heavy emphasis on obedience, respect for leadership, support

for conventional values, and other values that highlight the role of authority as a guiding force to be followed (Nilsson & Jost, 2020). Understanding the development of political ideology as an aspect of identity development is important because it presents a useful way of understanding the fluctuation of beliefs and allows a potential avenue to explain the influence of authority.

Rekker and colleagues (2015) investigated opinions about economic redistribution (the concerted effort to reduce differences between the rich and poor) and multiculturalism (the support for several cultural groups within a society). Positions on these topics are considered indicative of wider political views, and support for these policies is associated with progressive ideologies (Rekker et al., 2015). The authors found that individuals aged 12-31 in the Netherlands held more negative opinions on economic redistribution during adolescence and more positive ones through emerging adulthood, with opinions eventually becoming stable; the same was true of multiculturalism, where opinions were more negative during adolescence and more positive through emerging adulthood.

Another study by McDermott and colleagues (2022) investigated how identity status affects opinions on traditional masculine ideology (TMI) and feminism. The authors found that individuals in the foreclosed status scored higher on all seven TMI domains (Restrictive Emotionality, Dominance, Toughness, Negativity Toward Sexual Minorities, Importance of Sex, Self-Reliance Through Mechanical Skills, and Avoidance of Femininity) and lower on feminist attitudes than those in the moratorium status. Interestingly though, individuals in the achieved status scored similarly to those in foreclosure on feminist attitudes and three of the seven TMI domains. Overall, they found support for the idea that high commitment to one's identity without serious exploration is associated with greater support toward traditional views on masculinity

and less support for feminist ideals, both of which are typically conservative positions, as well as the idea that those who are actively exploring their identity would have less support for traditional masculinity and more for feminist ideals, which are progressive positions (McDermott et al., 2021; McDermott et al., 2022). In both Rekker et al.'s (2015) and McDermott et al.'s (2022) studies, the beliefs of individuals who had progressed in their lives became less polarized and settled toward the middle.

It has been shown that there is a link between conservatism and authoritarianism, such that conservatives are generally higher on authoritarianism than progressives (Nilsson & Jost, 2020). Nilsson and Jost (2020) further note that people with authoritarian dispositions are drawn at higher rates to conservative ideologies not just in the United States but also in many countries across the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Oceania. They also found that conservatives were more likely to defer to recognized authority, such as the law, and less likely to defer to “activist” authorities, such as environmentalists or civil rights leaders, who challenge the status quo (and, as an extension, the recognized authority). This type of deference to recognized authority, and authoritarian values in general, are not seen at such high rates in progressives.

### *Media*

When discussing political ideology, it is also important to discuss where various political views originate; news media has significant influence over many political attitudes. Earle & Hodson (2022) conducted three studies comparing the effects of right and left-leaning news networks. The authors measured six political views: anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-refugee attitudes, military support, anti-Muslim attitudes, anti-feminist attitudes, and permissive gun attitudes, as well as political affiliation. A greater score on any measure indicated a more

conservative viewpoint. In study three, which used an experimental design (participants were randomly assigned to right or left-leaning coverage of refugees, with sports coverage as a control), Predictably, greater consumption of right-leaning news networks was found to be associated with conservative attitudes, and greater consumption of left-leaning news networks was associated with more progressive attitudes. However, right-leaning news outlets had a stronger association than left-leaning ones, especially in study three, where only the right-leaning news condition differed from the control group (Earle & Hodson, 2022).

Social media is another avenue that has significant influence over political views. It has often been blamed for echo chambers that are attributed to the increasing polarization within the political environment of the United States by preventing people from seeing and engaging with differing viewpoints, and indeed, there is some evidence for this claim (Bail et al., 2018). Within frequent Twitter (now called X) users who are affiliated with either the right-leaning Republican or left-leaning Democratic parties, it was found that those assigned to the experimental condition, who were provided an incentive to follow a Twitter/X bot that would share content opposing the participant's views, ended up adopting more conservative or progressive views, respectively. The difference between the Democrats in the control and experimental groups was not statistically significant; however, the difference between Republicans in the control and experimental groups was substantial. This finding is similar to the results from Earle & Hodson (2022), where right-leaning news was found to have a stronger influence than left-leaning news. Also of note is that when cross-cutting media exposure (exposure to media with views that differ from one's own) was sustained over a longer period of time, this exposure moderated polarized



opinions (Broockman & Kalla, 2022). This phenomenon was found in both CNN viewers who watched Fox News and Fox News viewers who watched CNN.

Another important finding in Earle & Hodson's (2022) article was that the data suggested that news consumption affected political attitudes and ideology, not the other way around. Using a longitudinal approach, the authors determined that, when sociopolitical positions were controlled for, right-leaning news led to more right-leaning political positions and more conservatism months later. Left-leaning news also led to more left-leaning positions and less conservatism upon follow-up. In study three, the authors determined that right-leaning news caused greater conservative attitudes surrounding refugees, terrorism imminence, and the military. This means that rather than choosing news sources that align with their preexisting political views, people's views are shaped by the lean of the news they consume. This finding is consistent with the Broockman and Kalla (2022) study mentioned above.

### *Social Welfare*

Opinions on welfare programs are highly politicized, like the topics mentioned above, and similar to economic redistribution and multiculturalism, support for welfare programs is associated with progressive ideologies. Those who support social welfare generally hold the opinion that those receiving welfare need the aid provided and are victims of unjust circumstances, while those who oppose it often hold the opinion that many of these needs are responsibilities that people should provide for on their own and that poverty is often a result of poor moral values, and believe that the welfare system is rife with abuse, inefficiencies, and bureaucracy (Svallfors, 2010; Hansen, 2019). Humanitarianism, the belief that those in need should be helped, is another major factor in people's opinions on welfare and is shaped by daily

interactions with others (Hansen, 2019). Those who are open to or seeking out new information would be more likely to have their views changed by these interactions than those who are not. It has been found that those in the foreclosed status tend to have more authoritarian social views, as do those with a normative identity style (McDermott et al., 2022; Schwartz et al., 2013). It would follow then that those with the normative identity style or in foreclosure may be more likely to have negative opinions on social welfare programs.

### Rationale

Past research has found that identity status is at least somewhat connected to political beliefs (Mah et al., 2020; McDermott et al., 2022). Those in the foreclosed status typically hold the most conservative views, while those in the moratorium status typically hold the most progressive ones (McDermott et al., 2022). The achieved status was found to have beliefs somewhere in the middle. Research on identity and political beliefs has focused on identity status specifically, to the exclusion of identity style. The more stable trait-like tendencies associated with identity style may be a better method for investigating the development of certain attitudes, as opposed to the identity status model, in which a person's status changes throughout their lifetime.

Similarly, finding how closely identity style is related to political ideology could also provide further insight into how and why certain political views are developed by showing how different traits associated with each identity style can be related to different political views. Research on the intersection of identity development and views on traditional masculinity and feminism, while not extensive, has found some associations, particularly between the foreclosed identity status and more conservative views on masculinity and feminism. Investigating opinions

on social welfare programs will serve to extend research on traditional masculinity and feminism by providing another measurable political opinion from which to draw conclusions.

One area that is of particular interest in this study is the relationship between the normative identity style and authority. It is documented that the normative style is characterized by deference to authority figures (Schwartz et al., 2013). Parents are a clear source of authority that would have a heavy influence over those with the normative style, but they are not the only ones. This difference in influence may be partially explained by the normative identity style and how it interacts with authority. It was shown by Nilsson & Jost (2020) that those with authoritarian values have a particular affinity for conservatism. It was also shown by Earle & Hodson (2022) that right-leaning news networks have a stronger pull than left-leaning ones. It stands to reason then that the heightened deference to authority espoused by those with authoritarian traits has some connection to why right-leaning news networks, who often promote the status quo and recognized authority, have a greater pull than left-leaning ones. It would also stand to reason that those with the normative identity style, who look to others for guidance when developing, would be more likely to be conservative as a result of the promotion of authority figures. Also of interest is how those with the diffuse-avoidant style fit into things. There has not been much research on the topic, but it would follow that they should fit somewhere between those with the normative and informational styles as a result of the lack of intentional development, leaving them without strongly held positions.

This research therefore examined the connections between identity style and political identity, views on traditional masculinity and feminism, and views on welfare and the deservingness of those who receive it to determine whether associations existed between the

normative identity style and right-leaning political affiliation and views. It also examined the relationship between the influence of authority, namely parental and media authority, and political views of those with the normative identity style, as well as the possible differences between these associations among those with the normative vs. informational identity styles. The examination of these issues is especially important as political polarization increases. Understanding the differences between how each identity style interacts with authority when developing political views may provide the basis for more nuanced methodologies and approaches to countering polarization going forward.

#### Hypotheses

1. Those with the normative identity style will be more conservative, have more favorable views on traditional masculinity, and less favorable views on feminism and welfare than those with the informational identity style.
2. Those with the normative identity style will frequent right-leaning news sources more than those with the informational style.
3. Those with the diffuse-avoidant identity style will not have strong political leanings or strong views on traditional masculinity, feminism, and welfare, and will fall between those with the normative and informational styles and will not have scores significantly different than scores for those style groups.
4. Political views (views on traditional masculinity, feminism, and welfare) for those with the normative identity style will be better predicted by a combination of news media choice and parental political ideology than by personal political ideology (self-declared progressivism/conservatism) alone.

5. Political views (views on traditional masculinity, feminism, and welfare) for those with the informational identity style will be better predicted by personal political ideology (self-declared progressivism/conservatism) than by news media choice, parental political ideology, and parental news media choice.

## METHODS

### Participants

Participants consisted of college students from a large southeastern University ( $N = 440$ ). Ages ranged from 18 to 52 ( $M = 19.81$ ,  $SD = 4.07$ ). For gender, 56.9% of participants identified as female, 38.3% as male, 4.1% as nonbinary, and .7% as transgender. For ethnicity, 50.5% of participants identified as white, non-Hispanic, 28.9% as Hispanic or Latino/a, 10.4% as Asian or Pacific Islander, 6.1% as Black, non-Hispanic, .7% as Native American or Alaskan Native, and 3.4% as other. Participants were also asked about their political party affiliations; 38.9% identified themselves as Independent/No Party Affiliation, 36.8% as members of the Democratic Party, 21.1% as members of the Republican Party, 1.4% as members of the Libertarian Party, and 1.8% as other.

### Measures

*Demographics:* Participants were asked to report their age, gender, education level, and ethnicity.

*Political Ideology.* To assess political ideology, an original measure was written for this study. Participants were asked to identify on a 7-point Likert scale how progressive or conservative their views are (1 = extremely conservative views, 2 = conservative views, 3 = somewhat conservative views, 4 = neutral or centrist views, 5 = somewhat progressive views, 6 = progressive views, 7 = extremely progressive views). For the purposes of this study, a distinction was not made between liberals and leftists, and this was noted on the survey. They were then provided with a list of several media outlets and asked to rate how often they use those news sources (1 = never, 2 = sparingly, 3 = occasionally, 4 = often, 5 = very often). The lean of

news sources was evaluated using research from the Pew Research Center and Allsides.com. This methodology is similar to that used by Earle & Hodson (2022). The measure was scored so that a lower score meant more consumption of news from conservative sources. These rating scores were averaged to measure news use. Participants will then be prompted to answer both of the above questions for their parents. Cronbach's alphas were calculated at .82 for personal news media use, .85 for mother's media use, and .72 for father's news media use. Participants were asked to indicate how often they look at and post on social media (1 = at least 10 times a day, 2 = Several times a day, 3 = About once a day, 4 = 3 to 6 days a week, 5 = 1 to 2 days a week, 6 = Less than once a week, 7 = Never). A Cronbach's alpha, internal consistency reliability, was calculated to be .82.

*Revised Identity Style Inventory (ISI-5; Berzonsky et al., 2013).* The ISI-5 is a 36-item measure to assess identity styles. Participants rate statements on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all like me, 2 = somewhat unlike me, 3 = neither like nor unlike me, 4 = somewhat like me, 5 = very much like me). The measure is broken into four 9-item subscales, one for each identity style (normative, informational, and diffuse-avoidant) and one for identity commitment. Cronbach's alphas for the subscales were reported to be .79 for normative, .79 for informational, .83 for diffuse-avoidant, and .82 for commitment, respectively (Berzonsky et al., 2013). In this study, Cronbach's alphas for the subscales were calculated to be .72 for normative, .76 for informational, .76 for diffuse-avoidant, and .82 for commitment, respectively. The highest-scoring subscale is used to define an individual's identity style. The commitment scale is used to determine identity status and is particularly important in distinguishing between the moratorium and achieved status, as both tend to have an informational style. An example statement for the

normative scale is “I automatically adopt and follow the values I was brought up with.” An example statement for the informational scale is “When making important decisions, I like to have as much information as possible.” An example statement for the diffuse-avoidant scale is “When I have to make a decision, I try to wait as long as possible in order to see what will happen.” An example statement for the identity commitment scale is “I know what I want to do with my future.”

*Male Role Norms Inventory–Short Form (MRNI-SF; Levant et al., 2013).* The MRNI-SF is a 21-item measure to assess opinions on traditional masculine ideology. Participants rate statements on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = no opinion, 5 = slightly agree, 6 = agree, 7 = strongly agree). The measure is broken into seven subscales, with three questions each: Restrictive Emotionality, Self-reliance through Mechanical Skills, Negativity toward Sexual Minorities, Avoidance of Femininity, Importance of Sex, Dominance, and Toughness. Cronbach’s alpha for the total measure was .92 in men and .94 in women (Levant et al., 2013). In this study, Cronbach’s alpha for the total measure was calculated to be .94. An example statement is “A man should never admit when others hurt his feelings.”

*Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale–Short Form (LFAIS–SF; Morgan, 1996).* The LFAIS-SF is an 11-item measure to assess feminist attitudes. It contains four reverse-scored items. Participants rate statements on a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = somewhat agree, 5 = agree, 6 = strongly agree) with no neutral option. One item on the measure references a yet-to-be-passed constitutional amendment, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), proposed in 1923; the three-line text of this amendment will be included in the final questionnaire to ensure participants are informed of what they are



answering. Cronbach's alpha for the shortened measure was .81 (Morgan, 1996). In this study, Cronbach's alpha for the measure was calculated to be .88. An example statement is "A woman should have the same job opportunities as a man."

*The Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity, and Need Deservingness Principles Scale (CARIN; Meuleman et al., 2020).* The CARIN scale is a 17-item scale to assess opinions on who should receive welfare benefits and when. The first 13 items are statements regarding welfare deservingness, which participants rate on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). Two of these 13 items measure Control, two measure Attitude, three measure Reciprocity, three measure Identity, and three measure Need. Items 14-17 ask what degree the government should be responsible for ensuring certain social welfare standards and are rated on an 11-point scale, with 0 indicating no governmental responsibility and 10 indicating full governmental responsibility. There are no titles for intermediary answer choices; they are simply numbered 2-9. Some statements in the measure reference Belgium or specific Belgian programs; these references will be replaced with references to the United States or an equivalent program for the purposes of this study. The authors did not calculate a Cronbach's alpha but found good construct validity using Structural Equation Modelling (Meuleman et al., 2020). In this study, Cronbach's alphas for the deservingness and governmental responsibility parts of the measure were calculated to be .86 and .75, respectively. An example statement for the deservingness section is "Social security should be reserved for those who have contributed to collective prosperity." An example statement for the governmental responsibility is "Making sure that the unemployed have a reasonable standard of living."

### Procedure

The proposal was first submitted to the University of Central Florida's Institutional Review Board for approval. Upon approval by the IRB, it was made available for participants on SONA, a participant recruitment system which allows participants to earn course credit for participation in research studies. Any student who chose to participate was first directed to the Explanation of Research, whereupon, if they chose to continue, they were then directed to the survey, which was given anonymously online. Students who did not wish to participate were provided with an alternative assignment requiring similar time and effort for the same course credit opportunity.

## RESULTS

### Preliminary and Descriptive Analyses

The means, standard deviation, possible range, and actual range for each measure are reported in Table 1 (See Table 1 in Appendix C), and a correlation matrix with all study variables is presented in Table 2 (See Table 2 in Appendix C). The mean score on the conservatism-progressivism scale for males ( $M = 4.11, SD = 1.51$ ) was compared to the mean score for females ( $M = 4.79, SD = 1.49$ ), and it was found that the difference in means was statistically significant ( $t_{(394)} = -4.42, p < .001$ ). The mean score on the MRNI-SF for males ( $M = 2.78, SD = 1.05$ ) was compared to the mean score for females ( $M = 2.05, SD = .93$ ) and the difference was found to be statistically significant ( $t_{(416)} = 7.54, p < .001$ ). Mean scores on the LFAIS-SF for males ( $M = 4.57, SD = .82$ ) and females ( $M = 5.23, SD = .67$ ) were compared, with the difference determined to be statistically significant ( $t_{(416)} = -9.01, p < .001$ ). Mean scores on the deservingness portion of CARIN for males ( $M = 3.32, SD = .60$ ) and females ( $M = 3.57, SD = .65$ ) were also compared, with the difference once again being determined to be statistically significant ( $t_{(415)} = -3.98, p < .001$ ). One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests conducted to determine differences by age, ethnicity, and education all showed no significant results.

### Main Analyses

Hypothesis 1 (Those with the normative identity style will be more conservative, have more favorable views on traditional masculinity, and less favorable views on feminism and welfare than those with the informational identity style) was tested via a series of t-tests. The mean score on the conservatism-progressivism scale for those with the normative style ( $M = 3.82, SD = 1.53$ ) was compared to the mean score for those with the informational style ( $M =$

4.94,  $SD = 1.54$ ). The test indicated that the normative style was significantly more conservative than the informational style ( $t_{(294)} = -6.24, p < .001$ ). The mean score on the MRNI-SF for those with the normative style ( $M = 2.76, SD = 1.19$ ) was compared to the mean score for those with the informational style ( $M = 2.10, SD = .88$ ). The test indicated that the normative style held significantly more favorable views on traditional masculinity than the informational style ( $t_{(308)} = 5.60, p < .001$ ). The mean score on the LFAIS-SF for those with the normative style ( $M = 4.66, SD = .87$ ) was compared to the mean score for those with the informational style ( $M = 5.23, SD = .66$ ). The test indicated that the normative style held significantly less favorable views on feminism than the informational style ( $t_{(308)} = -6.53, p < .001$ ). The mean score on the deservingness section of the CARIN for those with the normative style ( $M = 3.25, SD = .57$ ) was compared to the mean score for those with the informational style ( $M = 3.68, SD = .68$ ). The test indicated that the normative style held significantly less favorable views on welfare deservingness than the informational style ( $t_{(307)} = -5.98, p < .001$ ). Therefore, this hypothesis is supported.

Hypothesis 2 (Those with the normative identity style will frequent right-leaning news sources more than those with the informational style) was tested via t-test. The independent variable was the identity style (normative or informational), and the dependent variable was the frequency of use of right-leaning news sources. The mean media consumption score for 161 participants in the informational style who recorded valid scores ( $M = 1.20, SD = .83$ ) was compared to the score for 148 participants in the normative style who recorded valid scores ( $M = 1.19, SD = .93$ ). The difference in mean scores was not statistically significant. Therefore, this hypothesis is not supported.

Hypothesis 3 (Those with the diffuse-avoidant identity style will not have strong political leanings or strong views on traditional masculinity, feminism, and welfare, and will fall between those with the normative and informational styles and will not have scores significantly different than scores for those style groups) will be tested via a one-way ANOVA whereby the three identity style groups will be the independent variable and the scores for the conservatism-progressivism scale, beliefs about masculinity, and beliefs about feminism, and beliefs about welfare deservingness were the dependent variables. There were significant differences between the normative and informational styles for conservatism-progressivism ( $F_{(2,414)} = 28.99, p < .001$ ), views on traditional masculinity ( $F_{(2,436)} = 23.70, p < .001$ ), views on feminism ( $F_{(2,436)} = 23.62, p < .001$ ), and views on welfare deservingness ( $F_{(2,435)} = 18.72, p < .001$ ). The mean score for the diffuse-avoidant style fell between the normative and informational styles for all dependents except for the conservatism-progressivism scale, where it was greater than the score for the informational style, but this difference was not significant. Tukey HSD post hoc tests showed that the diffuse-avoidant style significantly differed from the normative style on all four dependent variables (all  $p < .001$ ) but did not significantly differ from the informational style on any of them. Therefore, this hypothesis is partially supported.

Hypothesis 4 (Political views (views on traditional masculinity, feminism, and welfare) for those with the normative identity style will be better predicted by a combination of news media choice and parental political ideology than by personal political ideology) was tested via a series of stepwise hierarchical linear regressions. In each regression, sex and age were entered on step 1, personal political ideology on step 2, and media choice and parental political ideology on step 3, with one of the three political views measures serving as the dependent variable for each

regression. The traditional masculinity model was significant ( $F_{(6,99)} = 12.04$ , Adjusted  $R^2 = .39$ ,  $p < .001$ ) after step 3, but the media choice and parental political ideology variables added in step 3 were not significant predictors (See Table 3 in Appendix C for  $t$  scores and  $\beta$  weights) and the  $F$  statistic change from step 2 to 3 was insignificant. Similar results were found for the feminism model; the feminism model was significant ( $F_{(6,99)} = 18.70$ , Adjusted  $R^2 = .50$ ,  $p < .001$ ) after step 3, but once again the media choice and parental political ideology variables added in step 3 were not significant predictors (See Table 3) and the  $F$  statistic change from step 2 to 3 was insignificant. The welfare deservingness model was once again significant after step 3 ( $F_{(6,99)} = 5.48$ , Adjusted  $R^2 = .20$ ,  $p < .001$ ). This time, while the parental political ideology variables were once again not significant predictors, the personal news media choice was (see Table 3). However, the  $F$  statistic change from step 2 to step 3 was insignificant yet again. Therefore, this hypothesis is partially supported, but only for welfare deservingness; it is not supported for the other two dependents.

Hypothesis 5 (Political views (views on traditional masculinity, feminism, and welfare) for those with the informational identity style will be better predicted by personal political ideology than by news media choice, parental political ideology, and parental news media choice) will be tested via a series of stepwise hierarchical linear regressions. In each regression, sex and age will be entered on step 1, media choice, parental media choice, and parental political ideology on step 2, and personal political ideology on step 3, with one of the 3 political views measures serving as the dependent variable for each regression. The traditional masculinity model was significant ( $F_{(8,131)} = 14.45$ , Adjusted  $R^2 = .44$ ,  $p < .001$ ) after step 3. Gender and personal political ideology were significant predictors, while age, news media choice, parental

political ideology, and parental news media choice were not (see Table 4 in Appendix C for  $t$  scores and  $\beta$  weights). The feminism model was significant ( $F_{(8,131)} = 19.27$ , Adjusted  $R^2 = .51$ ,  $p < .001$ ) after step 3. Gender, personal political ideology, and news media choice were significant predictors, while age, parental political ideology, and parental news media choice were not (see Table 4). Similar results to traditional masculinity were found for the welfare deservingness model; it was significant ( $F_{(8,130)} = 9.95$ , Adjusted  $R^2 = .34$ ,  $p < .001$ ) after step 3, and once again, gender and personal political ideology were significant predictors, while age, news media choice, parental political ideology, and parental news media choice were not (see Table 4). Therefore, this hypothesis is partially supported for views on feminism, and fully supported for views on traditional masculinity and welfare deservingness.

## DISCUSSION

This study aimed to examine the potential relationships between identity style and political views, opinions, and affiliations, and determine whether a relationship between identity style and authority could be a meaningful way of explaining the differences in political positions between the identity styles. Not much research has been done specifically investigating how identity styles may relate to political positions, although there has been some regarding identity status, namely McDermott and colleagues (2022), which found that identity commitment without serious exploration, in both the achieved and foreclosed statuses, was associated with conservative views, and active exploration was associated with more progressive views. This author believed that approaching political opinions through a lens of identity style rather than identity status may lead to a deeper explanation of the development of political identity.

The only significant difference found in the preliminary analyses was found between males and females, where females were consistently more progressive on average than males. This may be due to a difference in lived experience between men and women, which leads women to place a heavier emphasis on cultural equality, leading to more progressive politics. A similar point was argued by Kaufmann (2002), and this would explain the gender difference that showed across all measured political positions.

The results from the first hypothesis supported the idea that those with the normative style would be more conservative than those with the informational style. Significant differences were found between the normative and informational styles on all measures of political positions, and the normative style was found to hold more conservative views on all positions. The normative identity style is associated with a passive formation of self that looks to others for



guidance in identity decisions, while the holding of conservative or traditional beliefs in general is associated with a tendency to conform to authority figures (Berzonsky, 1989; Schwartz et al., 2013; Nilsson & Jost, 2020). The findings from this hypothesis therefore lend support to the idea that the normative style looks specifically toward authority figures for guidance in the development and formation of political identity.

The second hypothesis speculated that those with the normative identity style would frequent conservative news outlets more frequently than those with the informational style. It followed that if the normative style displayed more conservative political views, it should also show more consumption of conservative media, as that media would be a source of authority which would shape those views. The data did not support this idea; the difference was minuscule and not statistically significant. One potential cause of this might be that the population surveyed, college students with a mean age of 19.78, simply do not use traditional news media at high enough rates to show meaningful differences in a survey like the one conducted for this study. Indeed, while the range for the news media consumption measure was 1 – 5, the mean scores for both the normative and informational styles were below 2. A measure of social media usage with a range of 1 – 7 showed mean scores above 4 for both the normative and informational styles. A lack of usage of traditional media in favor of social media may explain the lack of support for this hypothesis.

The third hypothesis theorized about the diffuse-avoidant style, as the previous two hypotheses had been exclusively investigating the differences between the normative and informational styles. The results only partially supported the hypothesis. The mean scores on the measures of political positions for the diffuse-avoidant style did fall in between the mean scores

for the normative and informational styles for all facets other than the conservatism-progressivism scale, where it was slightly higher than the informational style, but the difference was not significant. It also did not significantly differ from the informational style on any facet but was significantly different from the normative style on all four. This difference between the diffuse-avoidant and normative styles may be explained by the population surveyed. While the diffuse-avoidant style is associated with an absence of the systematic exploration that would be seen from the informational style, it still shows some level of disorganized identity exploration (Schwartz et al., 2013). In an environment like a college campus, this exploration may be fostered, leading to a greater than expected disparity between the diffuse-avoidant and normative styles. There is also a lack of a shift toward the political center or conservative views seen in previous generations (Parker et al., 2019). This may also play a role in the diffuse-avoidant style's significant differences from the normative style, as when mean positions become more progressive, the diffuse-avoidant style may follow this trend as a function of the lack of intentional development. In other words, they may simply be following the trends of the current times.

The fourth hypothesis predicted that the political views of those with normative style would be heavily influenced by parental authority. This hypothesis found support in regard to welfare deservingness views, where personal news media choice was a significant predictor alongside gender and personal political ideology, but no support in regard to views on traditional masculinity or feminism. This hypothesis is likely once again affected by the movement away from traditional media sources and towards social media. Personal news media was heavily correlated with parental news media, but because social media was often used instead of

traditional media, it may not have held enough information to be a good predictor. Additionally, there may be other authority figures with higher degrees of influence over the political positions of those with the normative style, be it political leaders or theorists, religious or educational leaders, or social media influencers. This author believes a combination of the two aforementioned possibilities is likely to explain the lack of support for this hypothesis.

The fifth hypothesis predicted that personal political ideology would be the strongest predictor of political views for those in the informational style. This hypothesis was fully supported for views on traditional masculinity and welfare deservingness, where gender and personal political ideology were the only two significant predictors. For views on feminism, personal news media choice was also a significant predictor in addition to gender and personal political ideology. These results are in line with the informational style as an active formation of self, as they indicate that those with the informational style do not rely on parental authority in the development of their political views.

#### Limitations and Future Research

This study has some limitations that must be noted. First, all data was collected via self-report measures, which risk response bias and inattentiveness by participants. The study was also limited by so called “WEIRD” (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) psychology, as the study was conducted at a metropolitan university in the southeastern United States, which does not reflect the diversity in the world and limits the generalizability of any results. The name of the survey within SONA was “Political Identity,” which may have attracted those with greater interest in politics to participate and driven those who are avoidant toward

politics toward other studies. Collecting a more diverse sample may provide more rigorous results.

Political positions measured were by no means comprehensive. Issues such as abortion, private vs. public ownership of industry, housing, or amenities, and positions on climate change, among other issues that are at the nexus of the conservative vs. progressive rift, were not measured in this study. Their inclusion would provide a more in-depth understanding of these differences, and future research should strive to continue expanding on the nature of views that are measured.

By far the most significant limitation in this study was that the measure of social media use was unable to collect data about the ideological lean of the social media consumed. This author believes that having that data would provide much more insight into the influence of non-parental authorities over the political views of those with the normative identity style. Further research should investigate the effects of a broader range of authorities on political positions rather than focusing investigation on the effects of parental authority. In addition to considering the effects of different authorities on political positions in the normative and informational styles, further research should also seek to explore the formation of political views within diffuse-avoidant style more in depth to determine what role disorganized exploration plays.

## **APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL LETTER**



UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

**Institutional Review Board**  
FWA00000351  
IRB00001138, IRB00012110  
Office of Research  
12201 Research Parkway  
Orlando, FL 32826-3246

**EXEMPTION DETERMINATION**

May 31, 2023

Dear Steven Berman:

On 5/31/2023, the IRB determined the following submission to be human subjects research that is exempt from regulation:

Type of Review:	Initial Study
Title:	Political Identity
Investigator:	Steven Berman
IRB ID:	STUDY00005632
Funding:	None
Grant ID:	None
Documents Reviewed:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Explanation of Research _ Form 254 Political Identity 3.pdf, Category: Consent Form;</li> <li>• IRB Berman 5632 HRP-255 - FORM - Request for Exemption.docx, Category: IRB Protocol;</li> <li>• Political Identity Survey Battery Qualtrics 3.docx, Category: Survey / Questionnaire;</li> </ul>

This determination applies only to the activities described in the IRB submission and does not apply should any changes be made. If changes are made, and there are questions about whether these changes affect the exempt status of the human research, please submit a modification request to the IRB. Guidance on submitting Modifications and Administrative Check-in are detailed in the Investigator Manual (HRP-103), which can be found by navigating to the IRB Library within the IRB system. When you have completed your research, please submit a Study Closure request so that IRB records will be accurate.

If you have any questions, please contact the UCF IRB at 407-823-2901 or [irb@ucf.edu](mailto:irb@ucf.edu). Please include your project title and IRB number in all correspondence with this office.

Sincerely,

Kamille Birkbeck  
Designated Reviewer

## **APPENDIX B: EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH**



## **EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH**

**Title of Project:** Political Identity

**Principal Investigator:** Dr. Steven L. Berman

**Co-Investigators:** Patrick Oefelein, Ishara Jean-Francois

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you.

The purpose of this research study is to find out how your political beliefs affect your identity. You will be asked to answer questions regarding your and your parents' political beliefs, your socioeconomic background, and your identity. Please be assured that your responses will be anonymous and no identifiable information will be collected.

The survey should take you around 30 minutes to complete.

You will receive SONA credits for your participation. You may skip any questions that you feel uncomfortable answering and still receive full credit. If you choose not to participate, you can complete an alternate assignment of equal time and effort for equal credit through your psychology course.

Your participation in this research is voluntary. You are free to withdraw your consent and discontinue participation in this study at any time without prejudice or penalty. Your decision to participate or not participate in this study will in no way affect your relationship with UCF, including continued enrollment, grades, employment, or your relationship with the individuals who may have an interest in this study.

**You must be 18 years of age or older and a UCF student who is enrolled through SONA to take part in this research study.**

**Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem:** If you have questions, concerns, or complaints, please contact Dr. Steven Berman, Primary Investigator, Department of Psychology ([steven.Berman@ucf.edu](mailto:steven.Berman@ucf.edu)) or Patrick Oefelein, co-investigator, Department of Psychology ([patrickoefelein@knights.ucf.edu](mailto:patrickoefelein@knights.ucf.edu)).

**IRB contact about your rights in this study or to report a complaint:** If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or have concerns about the conduct of this study, please contact Institutional Review Board (IRB), University of Central Florida, Office of Research, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901, or email [irb@ucf.edu](mailto:irb@ucf.edu).



## **APPENDIX C: TABLES**

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on All Study Variables

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Possible Range	Actual Range
Personal Political Ideology	4.59	1.55	1 – 7	1 – 7
Mother’s Political Ideology	3.75	1.58	1 – 7	1 – 7
Father’s Political Ideology	3.28	1.62	1 – 7	1 – 7
Personal News Media Choice	1.17	.87	0 – 5	0 – 3.75
Mother’s News Media Choice	1.01	.92	0 – 5	0 – 3.69
Father’s News Media Choice	2.03	.83	0 – 5	.45 – 4.08
Traditional Masculinity Views	2.31	1.03	1 – 7	1 – 5.43
Feminism Views	5.00	.80	1 – 6	2.64 – 6
Welfare Deservingness Views	3.51	.66	1 – 5	1.77 – 5
Informational Style Traits	3.95	.53	1 – 5	2.22 – 5
Normative Style Traits	2.44	.62	1 – 5	1 – 4.33
Diffuse-Avoidant Style Traits	2.48	.69	1 – 5	1 – 4.56
Identity Commitment	3.82	.69	1 – 5	1.56 – 5

Table 2: Correlational Analyses for All Study Variables

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.
1. Age	--															
2. Gender	.08	--														
3. Education	.52***	.09	--													
4. Ethnicity	-.43	-.05	.04	--												
5. Personal Political Ideology	.04	.30***	.08	.11*	--											
6. Mother's Political Ideology	.03	.02	.03	.04	.45***	--										
7. Father's Political Ideology	.04	.06	.06	.14**	.40***	.61***	--									
8. Personal News Media Choice	.10	.02	.04	.06	.04	.03	-.01	--								
9. Mother's News Media Choice	.00	.04	-.02	.04	.07	.10*	.07	.60***	--							
10. Father's News Media Choice	.01	.07	-.05	.12	.16	.21**	.33***	.39***	.57***	--						
11. Traditional Masculinity Views	-.10*	-.33***	-.08	.06	-.58***	-.20***	-.19***	.11*	.06	-.04	--					
12. Feminism Views	.03	.41***	.07	-.01	.66***	.24***	.20***	-.06	-.04	.04	-.69***	--				
13. Welfare Deservingness Views	.06	.28***	.07	.01	.55***	.18***	.18***	.04	-.02	-.08	-.50***	.53***	--			
14. Informational Style Traits	.14**	.02	.08	.01	.19***	.12**	.09	-.01	-.04	.02	-.14**	.19***	.23***	--		
15. Normative Style Traits	-.11*	-.11*	-.06	.10*	-.38***	-.04	.00	.06	.14**	.11	.37***	-.31***	-.36***	-.24***	--	
16. Diffuse-Avoidant Style Traits	-.12*	-.01	-.05	.11*	.14**	.03	.11*	.00	.05	.05	.03	-.04	-.07	-.13**	.15**	--
17. Identity Commitment	.08	.06	.05	-.04	-.11*	.02	-.01	-.03	-.07	-.06	.05	.07	.04	.23***	.13**	-.61***

\*p < .05, \*\*p < .01, \*\*\*p < .001

Table 3: Regression Analyses Predicting Political Views in the Normative Identity Style

	Traditional Masculinity			Feminism			Welfare Deservingness		
	$\beta$	$t$	$p$	$\beta$	$t$	$p$	$\beta$	$t$	$p$
Gender	-.23	-2.79	<b>.006</b>	.37	5.01	<b>&lt; .001</b>	.215	2.32	<b>.022</b>
Age	-.18	-2.39	<b>.019</b>	-.13	-1.95	.054	.07	.76	.453
Personal Political Ideology	-.52	-4.19	<b>&lt; .001</b>	.47	4.21	<b>&lt; .001</b>	.344	2.44	<b>.016</b>
Personal News Media Choice	-.05	.60	.552	-.01	-.07	.945	.18	2.01	<b>.047</b>
Mother's Political Ideology	-.01	-.11	.913	.21	1.8	.075	.09	.59	.555
Father's Political Ideology	-.01	-.11	.917	-.16	-1.52	.132	-.07	-.54	.592

Significant predictors in **bold**.

Table 4: Regression Analyses Predicting Political Views in the Informational Identity Style

	Traditional Masculinity			Feminism			Welfare Deservingness		
	$\beta$	$t$	$p$	$\beta$	$t$	$p$	$\beta$	$t$	$p$
Gender	-.17	-2.45	<b>.015</b>	.29	4.53	<b>&lt; .001</b>	.16	2.09	<b>.038</b>
Age	-.08	-1.29	.199	.03	.42	.674	-.11	-1.58	.117
Personal News Media Choice	.14	1.62	.108	-.16	-2.09	<b>.038</b>	.13	1.48	.142
Mother's News Media Choice	-.01	-.12	.904	.08	.86	.389	-.09	-.86	.391
Father's News Media Choice	-.05	-.60	.548	.05	.64	.521	-.12	-1.20	.232
Mother's Political Ideology	.00	.00	1.000	-.05	-.56	.574	-.18	-1.90	.060
Father's Political Ideology	.10	1.12	.265	-.01	-.14	.888	.02	.24	.811
Personal Political Ideology	-.63	-8.82	<b>&lt; .001</b>	.605	9.12	<b>&lt; .001</b>	.59	7.57	<b>&lt; .001</b>

Significant predictors in **bold**.

## **APPENDIX D: SURVEY BATTERY**

DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE

AGE: \_\_\_\_\_

GENDER: Indicate your gender

- Male
- Female
- Transgender
- Non-binary
- Other (explain): \_\_\_\_\_

EDUCATION: Indicate year in school

- Freshman
- Sophomore
- Junior
- Senior
- Non-degree Seeking
- Graduate Student
- Other (explain): \_\_\_\_\_

ETHNICITY: Select the ethnic/racial identifier that best describes you:

- White, non-Hispanic
- Black, non-Hispanic
- Hispanic or Latino/a
- Asian or Pacific Islander
- Native American or Alaskan Native
- Other (Specify): \_\_\_\_\_

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

**POLITICAL STANDING:** Select where on the scale you would place your political beliefs.  
(Please note that for the purposes of this study, a distinction is not being made between liberal and leftist. Instead, the terminology “progressive” is used)

Extremely conservative	Conservative	Slightly conservative	Neutral or Centrist	Somewhat progressive	Progressive	Extremely progressive
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

**PARTY AFFILIATION:** Please select your party affiliation

- Democratic Party
- Republican Party
- Libertarian Party
- Green Party
- Independent/No Party Affiliation
- Other (Specify): \_\_\_\_\_

**NEWS SOURCES:** Rate the frequency at which you use the following news sources

Never	Sparingly	Occasionally	Often	Very often
1	2	3	4	5

- Fox News
- CNN
- MSNBC
- HuffPost
- The Wall Street Journal
- The New York Times
- Reuters
- POLITICO
- The Associated Press
- USA Today
- The Daily Wire
- Democracy Now!
- Newsmax
- Other (Specify): \_\_\_\_\_



Indicate how often you do the following:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
At least 10 times a day	Several times a day	About once a day	3 – 6 times a week	1 – 2 times a week	Less than once a week	Never

- Look at social media
- Post on social media

Please answer to the best of your knowledge for your mother/primary parent:

**POLITICAL STANDING:** Select where on the scale you would place your mother/primary parent’s political beliefs.

Extremely conservative	Conservative	Slightly conservative	Neutral or Centrist	Somewhat progressive	Progressive	Extremely progressive
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

**PARTY AFFILIATION:** Please select your mother/primary parent’s party affiliation

- Democratic Party
- Republican Party
- Libertarian Party
- Green Party
- Independent/No Party Affiliation
- Other (Specify):\_\_\_\_\_

**NEWS SOURCES:** To the best of your knowledge, rate the frequency at which your mother/primary caregiver uses the following news sources

Never	Sparingly	Occasionally	Often	Very often
1	2	3	4	5

- Fox News
- CNN
- MSNBC
- HuffPost

- The Wall Street Journal
- The New York Times
- Reuters
- POLITICO
- The Associated Press
- USA Today
- The Daily Wire
- Daily Beast
- Democracy Now!
- Newsmax
- Other (Specify): \_\_\_\_\_

Please indicate whether you have a second parent

- I have 2 parents
- I only have one parent

Please answer to the best of your knowledge for your father/second parent

**POLITICAL STANDING:** Select where on the scale you would place your father/second parent’s political beliefs.

Extremely conservative	Conservative	Slightly conservative	Neutral or Centrist	Somewhat progressive	Progressive	Extremely progressive
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

**PARTY AFFILIATION:** Please select your father/secondary parent’s party affiliation

- Democratic Party
- Republican Party
- Libertarian Party
- Green Party
- Independent/No Party Affiliation
- Other (Specify): \_\_\_\_\_

**NEWS SOURCES:** To the best of your knowledge, rate the frequency at which your father/second caregiver uses the following news sources

Never	Sparingly	Occasionally	Often	Very often
-------	-----------	--------------	-------	------------

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

- Fox News
- CNN
- MSNBC
- HuffPost
- The Wall Street Journal
- The New York Times
- Reuters
- POLITICO
- The Associated Press
- USA Today
- The Daily Wire
- Democracy Now!
- Newsmax

Other (Specify): \_\_\_\_\_

ISI-5

You will find a number of statements about beliefs, attitudes, and/or ways of dealing with issues. Read each carefully and use it to describe yourself. On the answer sheet, bubble in the number which indicates the extent to which you think the statement represents you. There are no right or wrong answers. For instance, if the statement is very much like you, mark a 5, if it is not like you at all, mark a 1. Use the 1 to 5 point scale to indicate the degree to which you think each statement is uncharacteristic (1) or characteristic (5) of yourself.

Not at all like me	Somewhat unlike me	Neither like nor unlike me	Somewhat like me	Very much like me
1	2	3	4	5

1. I know basically what I believe and don't believe.
2. I automatically adopt and follow the values I was brought up with.
3. I'm not sure where I'm heading with my life; I guess things will work themselves out.
4. Talking to others helps me explore my personal beliefs.
5. I know what I want to do with my future.
6. I strive to achieve the goals that my family and friends hold for me.
7. It doesn't pay to worry about values in advance; I decide things as they happen.
8. When facing a life decision, I take into account different points of view before making a choice.
9. I am not really sure what I believe.
10. I have always known what I believe and don't believe; I never really have doubts about my beliefs.
11. I am not really thinking about my future now, it is still a long way off.
12. I spend a lot of time reading or talking to others trying to develop a set of values that makes sense to me.
13. I am not sure which values I really hold.

14. I never question what I want to do with my life because I tend to follow what important people expect me to do.
15. When I have to make an important life decision, I try to wait as long as possible in order to see what will happen.
16. When facing a life decision, I try to analyze the situation in order to understand it.
17. I am not sure what I want to do in the future.
18. I think it is better to adopt a firm set of beliefs than to be open-minded.
19. I try not to think about or deal with personal problems as long as I can.
20. When making important life decisions, I like to spend time thinking about my options.
21. I have clear and definite life goals.
22. I think it's better to hold on to fixed values rather than to consider alternative value systems.
23. I try to avoid personal situations that require me to think a lot and deal with them on my own.
24. When making important life decisions, I like to have as much information as possible.
25. I am not sure what I want out of life.
26. When I make a decision about my future, I automatically follow what close friends or relatives think about me.
27. My life plans tend to change whenever I talk to different people.
28. I handle problems in my life by actively reflecting on them.
29. I have a definite set of values that I use to make personal decisions.
30. When others say something that challenges my personal values or beliefs, I automatically disregard what they have to say.
31. Who I am changes from situation to situation.

32. I periodically think about and examine the logical consistency between my life goals.
33. I am emotionally involved and committed to specific values and ideals.
34. I prefer to deal with situations in which I can rely on social norms and standards.
35. When personal problems arise, I try to delay acting as long as possible.
36. It is important for me to obtain and evaluate information from a variety of sources before I make important life decisions.

MRNI-SF

Please complete the questionnaire by choosing the number which indicates your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement. Give only one answer for each statement.

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

1. Homosexuals should never marry.
2. The President of the US should always be a man.
3. Men should be the leader in any group.
4. Men should watch football games instead of soap operas.
5. All homosexual bars should be closed down.
6. Men should have home improvement skills.
7. Men should be able to fix most things around the house.
8. A man should prefer watching action movies to reading romantic novels.
9. Men should always like to have sex.
10. Boys should prefer to play with trucks rather than dolls.
11. A man should not turn down sex.
12. A man should always be the boss.
13. Homosexuals should never kiss in public.
14. A man should know how to repair his car if it should break down.
15. A man should never admit when others hurt his feelings.
16. Men should be detached in emotionally charged situations.
17. It is important for a man to take risks, even if he might get hurt.

18. A man should always be ready for sex.

19. When the going gets tough, men should get tough.

20. I think a young man should try to be physically tough, even if he's not big.

21. Men should not be too quick to tell others that they care about them.



LFAIS-SF

Using the scale below choose the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6

1. Women should be considered as seriously as men as candidates for the Presidency of the United States.
2. Although women can be good leaders, men make better leaders.
3. A woman should have the same job opportunities as a man.
4. Men should respect women more than they currently do.
5. Many women in the work force are taking jobs away from men who need the jobs more.
6. Doctors need to take women's health concerns more seriously.
7. America should pass the Equal Rights Amendment.

The Equal Rights Amendment reads as follows:

Equality of Rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of sex. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.

8. Women have been treated unfairly on the basis of their gender throughout most of human history.
9. Women are already given equal opportunities with men in all important sectors of their lives.
10. Women in the U.S. are treated as second-class citizens.
11. Women can best overcome discrimination by doing the best that they can at their jobs, not by wasting time with political activity.

CARIN

Use the scale to indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

Completely disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree
1	2	3	4	5

1. People who fall into poverty because of their own mistakes should be entitled to a living wage from TANF, commonly known as welfare.
2. People who are themselves to blame for their problems do not deserve any social security.
3. People on benefits should show more gratitude.
4. People who receive a living wage should be pleased about this and do not have any right to complain.
5. Social security should be reserved for those who have contributed to collective prosperity.
6. It is not fair that people receive social benefits to which they have not contributed.
7. People who have worked and contributed in the past deserve better social services than people who have contributed little or nothing.
8. Only people whose parents are American are entitled to social services and benefits.
9. When granting social benefits, people who have been born here should get priority over people who have not been born here.
10. Migrants should be allowed to enjoy the same social services as Americans.
11. Social security should only be available to those who truly live in poverty.
12. People with sufficient financial reserves should not receive social benefits.
13. Only people in dire need may receive social benefits.

Use the scale to indicate to what extent you think the government should be responsible for the following tasks.

No responsibility											Full responsibility
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0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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1. Making sure the elderly have a reasonable pension.
2. Making sure there is affordable healthcare for all.
3. Making sure that the unemployed have a reasonable standard of living.
4. Making sure that ethnic minorities are not discriminated against.

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