




*Lars Østby*

## Norway's population groups of developing countries' origin

Change and integration





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*Reports* In this series, analyses and annotated statistical results are published from various surveys. Surveys include sample surveys, censuses and register-based surveys.

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## Preface

This publication is the Norwegian contribution to the project *Scandinavia's population groups of developing countries' origin: Change and integration*. This project has been a cooperation between the Immigration Authorities in Denmark, Statistics Norway and Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM) at Malmö University, Sweden, under coordination of scientific collaborator Miroslav Macura at IDEMO, University of Geneva. The project was funded by a grant from the *Nordic Council of Ministers*. The Norwegian work was sponsored by the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion and Statistics Norway.

The tables on population are produced by Britt Bråten, on education by Geir Nygård, and on employment by Bjørn Olsen. Vebjørn Aalandslid has elaborated the figures on employment. The language editing is done by Silje Vatne Pettersen, and the publication is edited by Marit Berger Gundersen. All assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

The project has collected statistics on key aspects of six groups originating from – Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam – living in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The study examines key aspects of population dynamics and integration into host societies, in a comparative design, and makes use of the rich national register data on population, education and employment during the period 1999 to 2008.

Statistisk sentralbyrå, 10. februar 2013.

Hans Henrik Scheel

## Abstract

The project, *Scandinavia's population groups of developing countries' origin: Change and integration* has collected statistics on key aspects of six groups originating from – Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam – living in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The project is carried out in cooperation between the immigration authorities in Denmark, Statistics Norway and Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM) at Malmö University, and coordinated by Miroslav Macura the University of Geneva. It was financed by a grant from the Nordic Council of Ministers, and the participating organisations.

Key aspects of population dynamics are studied for immigrants as well as for their descendants, along with three facets of integration into the host societies – change in demographic behavior, participation in the education system, and labor market integration during the period 1999 to 2008. The study makes extensive use of national register data, and constitutes one of the first efforts to conduct a comparative, policy relevant analysis for the same population groups across different host societies. Comparative analyses will be published by Malmö University and the University of Geneva later in 2013.

After having presented the national setting, focusing on a broader period, economic situation and the predominant policies in related areas, population dynamics for the six population groups are analysed. The immigrant population and in particular our six groups in focus have been increasing through immigration as well as due to high birth numbers related to high fertility and young age structure. The Pakistani group is the largest, immigrants and descendants taken together, but the immigration from Iraq and Somalia during the decade gave larger numbers of immigrants from these two countries. The growth for these two groups with a short history in Norway is much faster than for the other, more mature groups. Duration of stay is a variable closely related to demographic behavior and integration of immigrant groups. The marital pattern is characterized by a clear tendency, although varying between the nationalities and generations, to marry someone of their own background. The descendants are still too young to make it possible to conclude how their marital pattern will be.

Education is the basis for a successful integration. The level of participation is generally much higher for descendants than for immigrants, and varies less between the population groups for them. Quite naturally, immigrants who have arrived to Norway recently are not as frequently represented in the educational system as those who have stayed longer in the country and acquired linguistic and other skills necessary for successful participation in education. The gender difference in education is mostly in the same direction as among natives, more women than men are participating. Often female descendants are considered to be much more active than men in education, but for many groups the difference in rates between descendant men and natives are larger than the difference between female descendants and their native counterparts. The participation rates for descendants in tertiary education have been strongly increasing during our decade, bringing descendants from Vietnam to far higher participation rates than the natives in Norway.

As full labour market participation is the aim for many integrational efforts, we have studied carefully how immigrants and descendants fare in the labour market. Employment prospects also for immigrants and descendants have been quite positive. Still, the participation rates for immigrants, and in particular immigrant women, are much lower than for the natives. One can hardly expect groups coming from countries with very different labour markets, and different traditions for female labour market participation, to be able to reach rates characteristic for countries with among the highest participation rates in the world. Young immigrants, and descendants, do better than the older immigrants. The gender gap for some countries (like Pakistan) is a sign that efforts to employ immigrant adult women have not been quite successful. The level economic inactivity is very high, especially among immigrants towards the end of their active period in the labour market, and among women. The difference in activity rates for natives shows that there is still a way to go before equal activity pattern is obtained.

## Sammendrag

Prosjektet *Scandinavia's population groups of developing countries' origin: Change and integration* har samlet statistikk om seks grupper med bakgrunn i land i Asia og Afrika – Iran, Irak, Pakistan, Somalia, Tyrkia and Vietnam – bosatt i Danmark, Norge og Sverige. Prosjektet er gjennomført i samarbeid mellom Innvandringsmyndighetene i Danmark, Statistisk sentralbyrå og Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM) ved Malmö Universitet, koordinert av Miroslav Macura ved Universitet i Genève. Det ble finansiert av Nordisk Ministerråd og av de deltakende institusjoner.

Prosjektet studerer de viktigste demografiske endringene som innvandrerne og deres etterkommere gjennomgår, sammen med tre aspekter ved integrering og inkludering – endring i demografisk atferd, deltakelse i utdanningssystemet, og på arbeidsmarkedet, i perioden 1998-2008. Studien bygger på omfattende bruk av data fra befolkningsregistre og andre register, og er ett av de første forsøkene på å gjennomføre komparative analyser av de samme innvandrergruppene i tre ulike innvandringsland. De komparative analysene vil bli publisert av Malmö Universitet og Universitetet i Genève seinere i 2013.

Etter først å ha beskrevet relevante demografiske, økonomiske og politiske forhold i Norge i etterkrigstiden, gis en nærmere analyse av gruppenes demografiske dynamikk. Innvandrerbefolkningen, og særlig de seks gruppene vi ser på har vokst ved stor innvandring, og på grunn av mange fødsler som resultat av høy fruktbarhet og mange i fødedyktig alder. Innvandrere og etterkommere fra Pakistan utgjør den største gruppen i Norge, men det siste ti-året har den store innvandringen fra Somalia og Irak ført til at det nå er flest innvandrere fra disse landene, men antallet norskfødte med foreldre herfra er fortsatt mye mindre enn antallet med foreldre fra Pakistan. Innvandrere fra Somalia og Irak har i gjennomsnitt mye kortere botid enn andre grupper. Det store flertallet av innvandrere og norskfødte med innvandrerforeldre finner en partner med samme landbakgrunn når de gifter seg, selv om det er noen grupper som avviker noe fra dette mønsteret.

Utdanning vil være et viktig grunnlag for en vellykket integrasjon. Deltakelsen i utdanning er vanligvis mye høyere for personer født i Norge med innvandrerforeldre enn den er for innvandrerne selv. Rimeligvis er utdanningsaktiviteten lavere for nyankomne innvandrere enn for dem som har vært i Norge en stund, og derfor behersker norsk og norske forhold bedre. Kjønnsforskjellene i deltakelsen er som blant gjennomsnittet i Norge, gjennomgående er det flere kvinner enn menn under utdanning. Jenter født i Norge med innvandrerforeldre oppfattes ofte som svært mye mer aktive i utdanning enn guttene, men deres forsprang på guttene er mindre enn det forspranget jenter uten innvandrerbakgrunn har på tilsvarende grupper av gutter. Norskfødte med innvandrerforeldre har hatt sterkt økende deltakelse i utdanning på universitets- og høyskolenivå, og de med bakgrunn i Vietnam har klart høyere deltakelse enn gjennomsnittet i Norge.

Mange integreringspolitiske tiltak har som mål å få så nær full sysselsetting som mulig for innvandrere. Mulighetene for å bli sysselsatt har vært ganske positive, men likevel er sysselsettingen blant innvandrere, og særlig innvandrerkvinner, langt lavere enn den er for personer uten innvandrerbakgrunn. Man kan neppe vente at grupper som kommer fra land hvor arbeidsmarkedet og samfunnets struktur ellers er så ulikt Norge som vel mulig, raskt skal nå et sysselsettingsnivå nær toppen i verden. Unge innvandrere, og særlig norskfødte med innvandrerforeldre har mye høyere sysselsetting enn eldre innvandrere. Forskjellen i sysselsetting mellom kjønnene blant innvandrere er til dels svært stor (som blant dem fra Pakistan), og er nok et tegn på at sysselsettingstiltakene ikke helt har nådd de målsettingene som de har. Andelen som ikke er aktive verken i utdanning eller arbeid er svært høy, særlig blant innvandrere mot slutten av den yrkesaktive perioden, og blant kvinner. Disse forskjellene er såpass store at de nok viser at det fortsatt er langt igjen til full likestilling på arbeidsmarkedet.

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## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

During the last four decades, the numbers of immigrants and their descendants in Norway have been growing steadily. Migration flows into the country have been the result of processes internally in Norway and processes abroad, connected to various societal phenomena like labour demand in the growing economy, family reunification and refugee streams due to wars and political conflict. Around 1970, Norway was among the last Western European countries to receive attention as a potential country for labour migrants or refugees. Concern about current migration streams is high on the political agenda and more knowledge about integration patterns in the demographic, educational and labour market arenas will be useful in developing integration policies.

This report on Norway is the outcome of a comparative register-based cross-country study into select key features of population change and integration in the period 1998 to 2008 of Danish, Norwegian and Swedish population groups having roots in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam. With a few exceptions, the six groups are the largest of the many foreign-origin groups of non-European origin that the three Scandinavian countries host today. In line with the way they define their residents of foreign origin, the groups comprise immigrants and their immediate descendants, i.e. children born in the country, to two immigrant parents. This introduction highlights the comparative research in which the present report is embedded and ends with a brief overview of the report. There might be minor differences in the various definitions between the countries, but these have been minimized as far as possible.

The research was motivated by the following two considerations, spelled out in the project proposal for the Nordic Council of Ministers. First, in the Scandinavian countries and much of the rest of Europe, views on and responses to the spread of developing-world-origin population groups and their integration have often been clouded by a lack of information, knowledge and insight into the phenomena. Unless these are rectified, the confusion and mistrust surrounding immigration of peoples of distant ethnic, religious or racial background will persist and possibly deepen. Hence, an empirically grounded understanding of the groups, especially as these settle and gain in relative size, and of their integration is necessary. The progress is essential for an active and sober public discourse on this sensitive topic and for the formulation and implementation of informed policies.

Second, in essence, there are two basic motives for admitting foreigners into a country that does not promote immigration as a means of nation-building. These are economic and humanitarian motives. The former primarily arises from the need to complement domestic labour with foreign workers in times of excess labour demand. The other has to do with the ethical stance that a society, if capable of doing so, has a moral obligation to provide protection to foreigners fleeing war, political persecution and the like. Denmark, Norway and Sweden continue to uphold these motives despite a growing realization that the contribution to the economy of foreign workers from distant countries and refugees, as well as their family members, has been inadequate. The extent of the inadequacy needs to be far better understood than is the case at present.

The research in question has sought to achieve three objectives. The first is to determine the time when the groups in the three countries appeared and the way they developed recently, focusing on key features of population change: overall growth, components of growth and age-sex-structure shifts. The second is to analyse two aspects of recent experience with integration of the groups - participation in the educational system and in the labor market. Due to data

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<sup>1</sup> This introduction is based on a common text for all three participating countries ( Bevelander and Dahlstedt 2012, and Møller Hansen (ed) 2013), drafted by the project coordinator Miroslav Macura.

limitations, the first aspect only concerns school enrolment. The other aspect pertains to employment and unemployment. To provide a bridge between the analyses of population change and integration, compositions of the groups by selected traits, such as immigrant generation and the duration of residence, were examined. As a third objective, where feasible, the impact of selected public policies and practices, in particular those pertaining to immigration and integration, have been studied.

### **1.1. Data, method and limitations**

Research into various aspects of demographic behaviour and the integration of population groups originating in different developing countries, has repeatedly shown cross-group differences. Therefore our research has focused on the largest individual groups rather than composite groups comprising peoples with roots in many different developing countries. This individual group-oriented approach does not only permit interesting differentials to be uncovered, but is also far more useful to policy analysts and policy makers. Policies, particularly those aiming at enhancing integration, cannot be of the type 'one size fits all'. Unless the policies take account of specificities of the various groups, they can not help alleviate problems that may be quite different in different groups. Due to several limitations connected to the data in the three Nordic countries, the research has focused on the ten most recent years at the time of data processing, 1999-2008. All population stock data have 1 January as reference date. Consequently, the stock at the end of the period (end of 2008) is taken by 1 January 2009. All other stock data have a reference date or period in the last quarter of the year.

At the outset, we decided to make ample use of the opportunities that similarities between the three countries provide. Salient among these are the following three. First, the countries have much in common regarding the patterns of immigration from the developing world over the last half a century and the consequent rise of developing-world-origin population groups. Their immigration and integration policies differ, but have basic goals in common. Second, the individual-based registers of the three countries have many similar features. The information on population and integration processes that is based on the linking of these registers, are comparable across national borders and considerably richer than the relevant data that exist elsewhere in Europe and beyond. Third, and related to this, relevant concepts, definitions and classifications used in the three countries are on the whole the same. With these salient shared features, the potential to establish a common empirical and analytical basis for public policy pertaining to immigration, foreign-origin groups and integration is promising. This research is an attempt to take advantage of this potential.

Perfection is a rare commodity, also for registers. Although there are good reasons to believe that the registers in the three Scandinavian countries are a better basis for migration and integration analyses than any other existing sources (Aalandslid and Østby 2009), their coverage is not complete. In all three countries we expect that a number of individuals leave the country each year without notifying the authorities, creating an overcoverage in the registers compared to the real resident population. The magnitude of this is difficult to estimate, but after some years without any traces in the country (no post communication, no income or tax information etc.), the person will be removed from the register as out-migrated, but without any information about country of destination. There are also some who reside in Norway without notifying the authorities. An estimate of non-registered immigrants from non-EU countries of 18 000 was made in 2008 (Zhang 2008). But for long-term residence in the country, it is essential to contact the register in order to receive a personal identification number, needed for work, bank account, education, health, electricity, drivers licence etc. To be included in the register, a person has to have a valid residence permit, and an intention to stay for at least six months.

As part of the research, comparisons were performed across the different countries of origin within each of the three Scandinavian countries. The groups were compared to the native or total population as well. Moreover, generation was a main dimension of this research. As often as deemed desirable (almost everywhere), immigrants and descendants were investigated separately. The immigrants or descendants from any given country were compared to the immigrants or descendants of the other countries as well as to the native or total populations. There are fewer comparisons involving descendants than immigrants. A number of the country groups in the three Scandinavian countries have arrived relatively recently. Consequently, their descendants are relatively young, sometimes in their teens and younger than that. Where this was the case, various indicators, such as fertility, educational enrolment and labour force participation indicators could not be computed or, at best, could be derived and used only in comparisons for comparatively small numbers of the oldest, yet still relatively young 'descendants.

Gender is another principal dimension permeating the research. Whenever meaningful, the indicators have been quantified for females and males separately. Research findings systematically highlight gender differences. The findings point out gender equalities or, for that matter, gender inequalities. In particular, the results contrast gender inequalities in, say, school enrolment and labor force participation across the population groups, as well as between the groups and the native or total populations. They help illustrate the distance that the various groups still have to travel to catch up with the natives regarding gender equality. Gender inequalities between the immigrants and the descendants are investigated as well.

The research is descriptive, not explanatory. The reason is threefold. First, population change and population compositions are typically analysed in a descriptive manner. These topics do not lend themselves to explanatory analyses. Second, although explanatory studies of integration may be preferred to descriptive ones, the explanatory route has not been open to the researchers collaborating on this project. It would have required more time and greater financial resources. Even if the required time and resources had been available, description, which normally precedes explanation, would have been a natural first step. Third, as the research sought to be relevant for policy making, the descriptive analysis was considered preferable, as its results are typically more readily accessible to relatively non-specialized audiences, including policy makers.

The analyses make use of both well established and novel indicators. Some of the indicators pertain to flows and others to stocks. Some capture period effects, others capture cohort effects. The novel indicators were developed for the education system and labour market integration analyses. They were created to help compress large amounts of information into relatively few statistics. Observations for the various indicators were computed from tables prepared by processing individual-level register data in each of the three countries. Due to occasional data limitations, in rare instances, these tables could not fully conform to the standard tables designed early on in the project to ensure high comparability of results. The indicators formed the empirical basis of the research.

Based on these considerations, the Nordic Council of Ministers decided to support this project, and it has been carried out in close cooperation between the Immigration Authorities in Denmark, Statistics Norway and Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM) at Malmö University, Sweden, under coordination of professor Miroslav Macura at the University of Geneva.

### **Outline of the report**

Following this introduction, the report starts with a discussion of the Norwegian national setting, covering the economy, population and the country specific migration and integration issues as well as research on these issues. Specifically,

this second chapter outlines broad features and trends in the economy and the labour market and how population groups originating in the developing world fared in them. It also sketches national population trends, paying special attention to demographic changes at the national level due to the rise of these population groups. Finally, principal objectives of the immigration and integration policies are described, distinguishing those pertaining to humanitarian and economic immigration. Lastly, this chapter addresses briefly post-war immigration and the rise of the foreign-origin group irrespective of country of origin.

In the third chapter, the key aspects of population change within the groups are analysed: marital pattern, fertility, mortality (and natural increase) and in- and outmigration. We make comparisons between the groups and compare them to the native (and the total) population of the country. Note that the comparisons of the groups to the native (total) populations are made in the report whenever appropriate, but that we do not repeatedly emphasize this. The analyses are cognizant of the fact that during the last decade groups originating in the six developing countries have gone through distinctive phases of development and that these may not be readily comparable. This chapter also considers selected features of immigrants, such as duration of residence, and of the entire groups, e.g. composition by generation, typically subdivided into immigrants and descendants.

The fourth chapter is about the integration of the groups in to the educational system. The focus is on the key aspect of integration, i.e. school enrolment. The analysis allows for disaggregation by *level of education*, i.e. *ISCED-1997* levels suitably aggregated for the purposes of this study. Three levels are distinguished: low, intermediate and high (see Glossary of terms at the end of the publication). Comparisons are made across the different population groups. The groups are also compared to the native (total) population. The early design of the research envisaged that another important aspect of educational-system integration would be studies, namely school attainment. However, this proved impossible due to limited data regarding educational attainment among immigrants.

In the fifth chapter, the integration into the labour market is analysed in broader terms than is usually the case. First, the common indicators on employment and unemployment are discussed and analysed. Second, it pays attention to an alternative activity--education--and to the fact that work and education may occur in parallel. Economic inactivity, especially among women of certain groups, has not been of frequent use in comparative integration analyses. Consequently, it also receives considerable attention. As the analysis discriminates between sexes, broad age groups of the working-age span and generations, it sheds light on how men and women of different age groups among immigrants and descendants spend time in the various states. The chapter also focuses on employment rates, in particular on the change in the rates over time among cohorts who are 16-24, 25-39 and 40-54 years old at the beginning of the period of observation.

In chapter six, we summarize the key findings, also including the key features of the six population groups. In an annex, we present a Glossary of terms used in the project.

## 2. National setting

### 2.1. Introduction

Norway has, right or wrong, for a long period considered itself an ethnically very homogeneous country. During the last four decades, however, there has been an increasing immigration from countries in all regions of the world. Immigrants from 219 countries and autonomous regions are at the moment represented in the population. There has also been an increasing awareness that some heterogeneity has always been there, due to the population of Sami and Finnish origin, and also Rom and other travellers and a small Jewish population. We have also “always” had immigrants from mostly neighbouring countries, both as specialists to take a leading role in the Christianisation of Norway and of the modernisation of the country, and more “ordinary” people taking part in Norwegian social and economic life. For a comprehensive presentation of Norwegian immigration history in English, see Brochmann and Kjeldstadli (2008).

Since 1970, Norway has had a net inflow of migrants from all over the world. Some of the consequences of such immigration have right from the beginning been considered to be problematic, and have put immigration questions high on the political agenda. In 1974 Norway introduced an immigration ban with the justification that we had to be able to solve the integration problems for immigrants already present in the country before letting new ones in. The ban was on labour migration, and influenced the composition of the streams more than their size. There are, however, also long term effects of the ban, according to Cappelen et. al (2011). The number of labour migrants from non-European countries at the time when the ban was implemented, was probably around 10 000, less than the yearly inflow from Poland after 2007.

Norwegian population (and migration) statistics are fully based on our population register system. For a comprehensive description of that system for the period this project covers, see Aalandslid and Østby (2009).

**Definitions** of some crucial concepts for this report

**Integration:** In our context, the way immigrants and descendants are included in education and labour market, and how their demographic behaviour change during their stay in the host country.

**Immigrant:** Persons born abroad to two foreign-born parents, who at some point have immigrated to Norway.

**Descendant:** Persons born in Norway to two parents born abroad; and in addition have four grandparents born abroad. Also referred to as *Norwegian-born to immigrant parents*.

**Refugee:** For the period the data for this project covers, the term “refugee” is used for resettlement refugees and asylum seekers who have been granted asylum or residence on humanitarian grounds.

**Asylum seeker:** A person who on his or her own initiative, and without prior warning, asks the authorities for protection and recognition as a refugee. The person is called “asylum seeker” until a decision has been made on the application, and is not included in the resident population of Norway before receiving a positive decision to stay.

**Population groups:** Immigrants and/or descendants with national background in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey, or Vietnam living in Norway. The groups are often called national groups. Further, we give statistics for

**Natives,** persons living in Norway, with one or two Norwegian-born parents, that is everyone not being an immigrant or descendant. In many tables called *Norwegian origin*.


**Total population** of Norway comprises everyone registered as living in Norway.

Since the immigration ban was introduced, the majority of immigrants from third world countries have been refugees and asylum seekers, in addition to family members being reunited with labour migrants and others already present in the country. We have in periods had a strong inflow also from our Nordic and European neighbours. Nordic citizens have had free right to move to and take work in the other Nordic countries since 1954 (see Fischer and Straubhaar 1996). Under the EEA-agreement, citizens of the European Union enjoy the same rights to move to Norway as to any other EU member state. From 2005, after the expansion of the EU with ten new member states, migrant workers from Europe have more and more dominated the inflow to Norway. Thus, there is a clear difference in recruitment patterns for Nordic and EU citizens on one side, and other citizens on the other, creating social differences along ethnic lines.

Whereas Denmark and Sweden are members of the European Union (from 1973 and 1995, respectively), Norway rejected membership in 1972 and 1994. It is, however, a member of European Economic Area (EEA), and most of EU's rules and regulations for migration come into effect also for Norway. Norway is also included in the Schengen area, and have joined the Dublin Convention. For an overview of the regulations of migration in Norway, see Ministry of Justice (2012) and earlier years. An external assessment of Norwegian migration policy and its consequences, see Cooper (2005).

The broad picture of the migration to and from Norway during the last 50 years is given in figure 2.1. We can see the shifts in the late sixties, the stable increase in migration in the period 1971-1985, the more unstable situation in the period 1985-2000 and the very strong increase in immigration and net migration since 2005. A more detailed description is available in English in Henriksen et. al (eds.) (2011).

**Figure 2.1. In- out- and net migration for Norway. Absolute figures. 1958-2011**



Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

When comparing immigration and integration in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, one should also keep an eye on attitudinal differences, and their causes and consequences. The attitudes among Norwegians towards this new immigration have always been mixed, but probably not more negative than in comparable countries (Blom 2011).

## 2.2. Economy, population and the welfare state

The Norwegian economy has been fairly good, and improving, during the post-World War II era. Norway suffered from German occupation during World War II, but managed to rebuild the infrastructure of the country in a surprisingly short time,

also with help from our allies (Marshall Fund). Norwegian economy had for a long time been based on the export of raw materials from the sea, forests and mountains, and on processing industries that made use of our hydro-electricity. At the very end of the 1960ies the oil resources of the North Sea shelf were discovered, and for the decades to come, this has played a very important, and increasing, role in our economy. As a result of the oil activities and of the way the oil income has been introduced in the national economy, Norway has been influenced less than other Western industrialised countries by the changing global economic cycles during the last four decades. For a recent discussion of the Norwegian economy, see Mjøset and Cappelen (2011). Due to the economic resources created by the oil extraction, Norway has also been less influenced by the recent financial crises in Europe than most other countries, especially as economic growth and unemployment is concerned. At the time the recent Euro-crisis started to torment the EU, one main problem in the Norwegian economy was to attract enough skilled labour.

It has been a main goal in Norwegian policy since before World War II to keep the unemployment on a very low level, and compared to other countries this policy has been quite successful. Although there are differences between the political parties in the way this goal should be reached, this has been a main priority among all governing parties during the last six decades, and not only for the Labour Party who has been in government for large parts of the period since 1945. With such a “full employment policy”, it might be that the country has had less flexibility to cover increases in the demand for manpower. Thus, Norway never had a large stock of potentially available persons not already in employment.

Already in 1954, the Nordic countries introduced a common labour market, meaning that citizens of another Nordic country were free to move in and take work without any kind of restrictions. For an analysis of this agreement, see Fischer and Straubhaar (1996). The number of inter-Nordic migrants was not insignificant in Norway, but were never anywhere near the numbers moving from Finland to Sweden towards the end of the 1960ies. In the border districts, there was a long tradition for close contacts between neighbours. Especially around the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Norway attracted a large number of Swedish workers to build and run infrastructure and factories (for details, see Østby 2005 and Bore 2005).

The economic growth was at the top level in Western Europe for most of the first two decades after the War. From the end of the 1960ies, the need for manpower in some Norwegian industries was met with recruitment of what at the time was considered to be temporary guest workers from Southern Europe and South Asia. This was a period when most of our neighbouring countries started to impose restrictions on immigration, and some of the initial migrant workers came to Norway after having worked in Denmark, Germany or other countries. In chapter 3, we will see that Pakistani immigrants were the first of “our” six groups to arrive around 1970. At the very beginning, there were groups of the same size also from Yugoslavia, Turkey, Morocco and India. Of these groups, the Pakistani remained the largest group of immigrants in Norway for a long time. The immigration history to Norway is thoroughly described by Kjeldstadli (ed.) (2003), and in English by Brochmann and Kjeldstadli (2008).

Even before 1940, Norway attempted to establish an early type of welfare state, more and more based on universal rights for everyone residing in the country (child allowances, old age pensions, sickness and disability pensions, etc.). Some of these welfare benefits, including most pensions, can be exported if the person with the right to receive them moves to another country. Some basic aspects of the Norwegian welfare state is described in NOU 2011:7, and by the National Work and Welfare Authorities (Nav, 2011).

There is a close connection between migration and the sustainability of a modern, universal welfare state, and during the last decade it has been doubted that the welfare state could survive with a heavy immigration from “not like-minded cultures”. The main reasons were two-fold. Many considered that the contract of solidarity that should be the basis for the welfare state would not be accepted by the native population if a large number of immigrants could get rights to welfare contributions without having contributed to the financial basis of the welfare state in the same extent as non-migrants.

The other problem was related to an impression that the net welfare costs resulting from immigration was too high; that immigration would destroy the economic basis for the welfare state. The argument that the costs caused by immigration would be too high was mainly based on costs related to reception and integration of refugees. In addition, the disability rates of permanent labour migrants were considered to be too high to justify large scale labour migration. In this context, the Government established a group chaired by Professor Grete Brochmann to develop a White Paper on Migration and Welfare – The future of the Norwegian model. This group presented its report early 2011 (NOU 2011:7). Their chapter on perspectives and their summary is published also in English.

In short, their conclusion was that if the employment rate for immigrants was on par with the rates of the natives, the immigration would be sustainable. The costs related to labour migrants and to refugees were very different, as is the policy behind their immigration. The basis for their conclusions on the macroeconomic consequences of migration, was a report by Holmøy and Strøm (2012). The report concludes that migrants on average have a negative net contribution to the state economy, more negative the lower their labour market activity are. But, even the average contribution of non-migrants is negative. All groups enjoy the use of oil income for our common purposes.

At the same time, another group, chaired by the former head of the Directorate for Immigration and Inclusion (IMDi), Mr. Osmund Kaldheim, released a White Paper on integration, NOU 2011:14. One main conclusion from their report is that by and large, the integration of immigrants into the Norwegian society is quite good, with some exceptions, often related to lack of participation in the labour market. OECD (2009) is another study of integration of immigrants in Norway. Their conclusions were very much in line with the two White Papers, underlining that integration of children of immigrants in the Norwegian labour market was better than one could find for comparable groups in most other countries.

All three reports have a strong focus on labour market participation, for a number of reasons. In our Nordic comparative project we have for the same reasons much data developed for analyses of how immigrants fair in the labour market, and for understanding the educational activity, which is much of the basis for labour market participation in post-industrial societies.

The welfare state produces demographic consequences not only for migration, but also for the fertility. The fertility level of Norway has been fairly high in a Western European context after World War II. The second demographic transition came later to Norway than to most other European countries. The total fertility rate (TFR) was almost 3 early in the 1960ies, and was above 2 until 1975. The lowest TFR was in 1983 with 1,66, and since then there has been an increase towards almost 2,0 (local maxima of 1,93 in 1990 and 1,98 in 2009). This has been seen as a consequence of a generous family policy. For a thorough description of the Norwegian family policy after 1945, see Voldseth (2011). This comparatively high fertility has been combined with high labour force participation also among women in reproductive ages. The reasons for this development are often seen as related to the family policy of Norway, aiming at making it possible to combine family life with labour market participation.



As a result of high net immigration, relatively high fertility and increasing life expectancy, the population of Norway is expected to increase quite substantially in the foreseeable future. During the last year, the growth was slightly above the global average of 1,1 percent. The growth is expected by Eurostat (2011) in their latest projection to be among the highest in Europe, on level with Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg and Cyprus. After the assumptions for the Eurostat projection were made, the situation in Iceland and Ireland has changed. According the latest projections from Statistics Norway, in the main variant, the population is expected to reach 7 million in 2063 (Statistics Norway 2012 b, [http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/03/folkfram\\_en/](http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/03/folkfram_en/) , Brunborg et. al. 2012 a and b, and Tønnesen et. al. 2012).

### 2.3. Immigration and integration aims and policies

When immigrants from distant countries first reached Norway towards the end of the 1960ies, we had no generally accepted policy to meet them. We had a few thousand war prisoners from World War II of Polish, Russian, Yugoslav and other origins who managed to stay in Norway, and we accepted some refugees from Hungary in 1956, from Czechoslovakia in 1948 and 1968, and from some other countries. The numbers were never high. The need for a policy was felt only when the migrant workers came in visible numbers in the early 1970s. The immigration and integration policies are described in the two Official Norwegian Reports mentioned in the previous chapter (NOU 2011:7 and :11). Kjeldstadli (ed.) (2003) and Brochmann and Kjeldstadli (2008) discuss the development and aims of these policies on a broad basis.

Based on the fact that the newly arrived migrant workers in the early 1970ies had considerably worse working and living conditions than normally accepted in Norway, a temporary Immigration Ban was introduced in 1974, and made permanent in 1975. The argument was that we had to make the conditions acceptable for those already being in the country before allowing more migrants to enter. The ban was only for labour migration. The exemptions from the ban were related to family reunification and formation, also for labour migrants, and to need for protection. The first years after the ban, the main groups of non-European immigrants were family members coming to join their husbands or fathers having arrived as migrant workers. Thus, the stop did not reduce the number of immigrants as much as it changed the composition of the flows. Cooper (2005) puts it like this: “Though it (*Norway*) has not joined the EU and remains outside the reach of most EU policy, many of its independent decisions — particularly regarding its relationship to European borders and migration policy management — have a uniquely European character. The country's carefully regulated effort to allow only selected migrants to be admitted, together with its commitment to ensuring social equality for those who arrive, closely fits the model to which many other European countries (with varying degrees of success) aspire.”

The restrictions (primarily the Immigration Ban) came later than in our neighbouring countries, and partly as a response to their restrictions. In that period, the first oil crisis caused problems in the Norwegian labour market, and the need for foreign labour was not as pronounced as before.

In the 1970ies, new and numerically significant groups of refugees arrived. Most attention was on those from Chile, towards the end of the decade also from Vietnam and some other communist regimes. Small groups of refugees with background from a number of African countries were also registered. These refugees were more like UNHCR-refugees of today than asylum seekers. They were seen more in a context of humanitarian and political responsibilities, than as a group that should be met with an immigration policy. When asylum seekers started to arrive in hundreds in the early 1980ies and in thousands from the mid-80ies, we slowly developed a system for treating their applications, and not to accept a significant number of them. The yearly Norwegian reports to OECD in the

SOPEMI context, give a good overview over recent and previous developments in immigration and integration policies, see Ministry of Justice (2012) and previous issues.

The effects of immigration policies on immigration to Norway 1969-2010 was analysed by Cappelen et. al (2011). They developed a dataset consisting of statistics for migration to Norway from 179 countries from 1969 to 2010. The data includes demographic and economic variables which are standard in the migration literature. They demonstrate that relative income, income distribution and in particular labour market outcomes are important factors in shaping migration flows and that a number of the immigration policy interventions have played an important role in changing the size and geographical composition of migration to Norway. One main conclusion in their paper was that between 1972 and 2010, a range of immigration policy measures were implemented. For the period as a whole, they estimate that immigration to Norway would have been 6.6 per cent higher, i.e. 60 000 more immigrants, if the rules had not been changed. The immigration freeze in 1974 has contributed to the major, long-term reduction in immigration.

The stated aim of the integration policies has always been to give those who were allowed to stay, decent living conditions. Their living conditions were clearly dependant upon their labour market participation, and access to the labour market became an increasingly more important aim. It was quite clear that most refugees did not have the qualifications needed for the Norwegian labour market, neither formal skills nor the language competence. Thus, to find ways to accommodate these missing skills has been the aim of the integration policy. The measures chosen, though, have been changing, according also to changing composition of the group of immigrants and to the changing needs in the Norwegian labour market (see Brochmann and Kjeldstadli 2008). The attitudes towards multiculturalism and in particular to “diversity” have been more favourable on the policy level than in the broader groups of the population. Consequently, there have been discussions for three decades around these concepts. The policy has always been to open for diversity, but with the needs for integration into education and labour market as the first priority. We will later see how integration in these arenas takes place among “our” six major nationalities.

European integration *policy* has three times been evaluated in the MIPEX (The Migrant Integration Policy Index), see British Council et al (2011). The Norwegian integration policy is considered to be among the more favorable for integration, the 2011 edition we ranked as number 7 among 31 European countries, and our policy was characterized as “Slightly favourable” (page 11). Sweden was on the top, the only country with a “Favourable” integration policy. Denmark was with their “Halfway favourable” integration policy close to the European average, ranked as number 14.

The MIPEX consists of 7 policy areas: labour market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination, with a number of items within each, all together 148 detailed policy indicators that are grouped by policy areas, and given a score of 0, 50 or 100. The maximum is awarded when policies meet the highest standards for equal treatment. Norway has the top score for political participation, and is on the average for anti-discrimination, access to nationality and long-term residence. For the rest, we rank between 4 and 8.

The assessment of different policies seems to be partly subjective. For instance, the high naturalisation rates for Norway (Pettersen 2012) speaks against the characterisation of our access to nationality as being at the lower end of “Halfway favourable”. Generally, when it comes to results of the integration policies, the


integration in Norway seems to be pretty well of (OECD 2009). In this project, we will present a solid basis for Nordic comparisons of integration outcomes.

## 2.4. Immigration, the rise of foreign-origin population groups and their integration

As already mentioned in chapter 2.1, migration statistics in Norway is based on our population register, established in 1964. Before that time, however, migration had been of little demographic or statistical importance, with a small yearly net outmigration. Except for our neighbours, Norwegian citizens were the only significant group of migrants before 1970. With the increased demand for unskilled labour towards the end of the 1960ies, this pattern changed. The net out-migration of Norwegians declined, and the immigration of foreign citizens started the increase that still is going on. For a general description of immigration and integration, see Henriksen et. al (eds.) 2011.

In 1970, Norway had 60 000 immigrants and persons born in Norway with two immigrant parents (called descendants in this publication). 25 000 had their background in another Nordic country, 25 000 in the rest of Western Europe and North America, and 10 000 in the rest of the world; 6 500 in Eastern Europe and 3 500 in Africa, Asia and Latin-America.

**Figure 2.2. Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents, by country background. Absolute figures. 1970-2012**



Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

In 1991, the number of immigrants and descendants was 175 000, as compared to 600 000 in 2011. 50 percent had their background from Asia, Africa and Latin America, in 1991 as well as in 2011. In 1991, Vietnam was number two among non-European countries, second only to Pakistan. In spite of an increase from 9 000 to 20 500, Vietnamese-origin immigrants now (2011) ranks behind also Iraq and Somalia.

As we can see from figure 2.1 and 2.2, the numbers and the composition have undergone basic changes. First came the guest workers from the late 1960ies, then their families, and then came refugees in increasing numbers. Table 2.1 gives the number of immigrants from the different continents; table 2.2 has numbers from some interesting countries.

**Table 2.1. Immigrants and descendants, by country background. Absolute figures. 1970-2011**

	1970	1980	1991	2001	2006	2011
Sweden .....	11 198	11 018	12 465	23 010	23 489	34 108
Poland .....	1 198	1 672	4 873	6 432	11 864	60 610
Turkey .....	236	2 384	6 706	10 990	14 084	16 430
Kosovo .....	0	0	0	0	0	13 303
Morocco .....	401	1 286	3 312	5 719	7 031	8 305
Somalia .....	3	31	1 747	10 107	18 015	27 523
Philippines .....	70	789	3 731	5 885	8 561	14 797
Iraq .....	20	38	932	12 357	20 076	27 827
Iran .....	43	135	6 066	11 016	14 362	16 957
Pakistan .....	163	6 828	16 341	23 581	27 675	31 884
Vietnam .....	20	2 072	9 964	15 880	18 333	20 452
Chile .....	85	947	6 028	6 491	7 084	7 708

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway


**Table 2.2. Immigrants and descendants, by regional background. Absolute figures. 1970-2011**

	1970	1980	1991	2001	2006	2011
Nordic countries .....	26 548	31 210	37 285	53 480	53 551	67 201
Western Europe, except Norden .....	15 190	22 686	28 208	33 271	38 635	60 325
Eastern Europe .....	5 806	7 114	14 663	48 257	68 210	159 907
North America, Oceania .....	8 103	11 810	10 558	9 272	9 214	11 349
Asia (incl. Turkey), Africa, and Latin America .....	3 549	22 382	83 954	153 451	217 089	302 140
Total .....	59 196	95 202	174 668	297 731	386 699	600 922

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

More Pakistanis than others used the exemptions from the ban, and continued to arrive. In the period 1988 to 2007 the Pakistanis became the largest non-Nordic immigrant group in Norway. Taking immigrants and descendants together, those coming from Pakistan has been the largest group from Africa, Asia and Latin-America ever since 1972, but will probably be surpassed by those from Somalia and/or Iraq in a few years. Among the Nordic countries, Danes was the largest group up until 1998, then surpassed by Swedes. Those from Poland became the largest group in 2008, and from 2009 on there has been more from Poland than from all ex-Yugoslav states taken together. Those from Poland are in 2011 with their more than 70 000 almost twice as many as the second largest groups (Swedes followed by Pakistani, see figure 2.3). All numbers in this paragraph consist of the sum of immigrants and Norwegian born children of two immigrant parents. Figure 2.3 shows the 15 largest immigration countries to Norway in 2012, showing separately immigrants and descendants.

**Figure 2.3. The 15 largest groups of immigrants and descendants. Absolute figures. Norway 1.1. 2012**



Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

The descendants have also increased considerably in numbers, as members of some immigrant groups have a clear inclination towards partnering a person of the same

group, whereas others tend to have children with a person without immigrant background. Most typically, immigrants from Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Morocco have children with a partner of their own origin, whereas Thai immigrants most frequently have a child with a Norwegian partner.

Table 2.3 shows that the proportion of descendants among those from Pakistan (45 per cent) is at the top among our six countries. Vietnam and Turkey has 36 per cent, and the rest lie around 25 per cent. Iran has the lowest proportion, despite having stayed in Norway for quite a long period. This means that we already here can notice that Iranians have a higher propensity than others to marry (or have children) with someone of a different country background than their own. Due to high fertility and a young age structure, the proportion descendants among those of Iraqi and Somali origin is expected to increase for some time.

**Table 2.3. Immigrants and descendants, by country background. Absolute figures. 2001 and 2011**

	2001			2011		
	Immigrants	Descendants	Total	Immigrants	Descendants	Total
Sweden .....	22 100	910	23 010	32 538	1 570	34 108
Poland .....	5 698	734	6 432	56 878	3 732	60 610
Turkey .....	7 507	3 483	10 990	10 583	5 847	16 430
Kosovo .....	0	0	0	9 525	3 778	13 303
Morocco .....	3 870	1 849	5 719	4 987	3 318	8 305
Somalia .....	7 905	2 202	10 107	19 707	7 816	27 523
Philippines .....	5 105	780	5 885	13 372	1 425	14 797
Iraq .....	11 212	1 145	12 357	21 272	6 555	27 827
Iran .....	9 645	1 371	11 016	14 007	2 950	16 957
Pakistan .....	13 554	10 027	23 581	17 454	14 430	31 884
Vietnam .....	11 231	4 649	15 880	13 036	7 416	20 452
Chile .....	5 300	1 191	6 491	6 098	1 610	7 708

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway


The number of descendants have increased from 2 000 in 1970 to more than 100 000 in 2012. The large majority of the descendants (72 per cent) have their background in Africa or Asia, and by far the largest group is of Pakistani origin, with more than 14 000 descendants. Of our six countries, 6-8 000 descendants have a background from Turkey, Iraq, Vietnam or Somalia, and only 3 000 from Iran. Generally, the descendants are still very young, in 2011 17 per cent (17 000) were above the age of 19, in 2001 it was 12 per cent (6 000). There are large differences in the age distribution for the descendants, also between our groups, as their immigration histories are so different. Among Pakistani descendants, 36 per cent were above 19, among Turkish and Vietnamese around 20 per cent, among Iranian 7 per cent and of Iraqi and Somali only one per cent. Norway has more descendants of Pakistani origin above the age of 19 (6 000) than altogether from the other five countries, 3 000. That tells us that integration of descendants in Norway to a large extent still is a question of how Norwegian-born persons of Pakistani origin are doing. But, not further back than in 2001, the percentage above 19 for Pakistani descendants was only 15. The number of descendants of Pakistani origin in 2001 was only slightly above the number of Vietnamese and Turkish descendants in 2011.

In many ways, the integration of the descendants will be the real proof of the failure or the success of the integration of immigrants. This is clearly stated by NOU 2011:14, and texts like Henriksen et. al 2011 and Olsen 2011 show that descendants have as high or even higher participation rates in higher education than natives, and that their participation in the labour market is closer to the natives than to the immigrants. In this country report for Norway, we will have the best opportunity to demonstrate in detail how the integration in education and labour market is, and with the reports from Denmark and Sweden, we are able to compare, based on as comparable data as possible, the situation in these three countries.

Since 2006, Statistics Norway has published information on the number of non-Nordic immigrants by reason for immigration (or more precisely, the legal ground

for issuing their permit to stay). Nordic citizens are allowed to stay in Norway for work or other purposes without needing any kind of permission, but they have to report their migration to the Central Population Register, in the same way as internal migrants have. The data is reconstructed back to 1990 based on the decisions taken by the immigration authorities. The statistics are published in Statistics Norway 2012 c, and found here: [http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/01/10/innvgrunn\\_en/](http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/01/10/innvgrunn_en/). Some main features are summarised below in figure 2.4.

**Figure 2.4. Immigration from non-Nordic countries by reason for immigration. Absolute figures. 1990-2011**



Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

Of more than 500 000 first time immigrants with a Non-Nordic citizenship between 1990 and 2011, 37 per cent came for family reasons, 32 percent came for work and 20 per cent for protection. 125 000 of these have left the country, more work and education migrants than other, so among those still in the country, 40 per cent came for family reasons, 30 per cent for work and 23 per cent for protection (see Andreassen and Dzamarija, 2011).

During the 1990ies, we can in figure 2.4 see two clear peaks for refugees, from Bosnia in 1993 and from Kosovo and Iraq in 1999. For the rest of the period, the yearly number of refugees allowed to settle in Norway was around or below 5000, UNHCR quota refugees included. As the number of migrant workers and their family members, and the refugees, became more numerous, the number of family migrants (family establishment or reunion) increased quite regularly, and was the most common reason for longer parts of the period. With the opening for labour migration from EU, the number of labour migrants became dominant (up to 50 per cent of the total). Many family members are now following, and a further increase can be expected. During the last years, the number of refugees is hardly above the number of persons coming to study. The immigration policy in Norway has for a long period had refugees and family migrants as target group. Today the policy is more and more directed towards the needs of the new types of immigrants, the labour migrants and their families.

## 2.5. Summary

Although immigrants have always been present in Norway, the more recent immigration flow started around 1970, in a modest scale. It became strongly regulated by the immigration ban in 1974. Since the ban was introduced, the majority of immigrants from third world countries have been refugees and asylum

seekers, in addition to family members reuniting with labour migrants and others already present in the country. The ban did not influence the size of the flow as much as it influenced the composition of the immigrant group. In periods, we have also had a strong inflow from our Nordic and European neighbours. After the expansion of the EU in 2004, migrant workers from Europe have increasingly dominated the inflow to Norway. Thus, there is a clear difference in recruitment patterns for Nordic and EU citizens on one side, and other citizens on the other, creating social differences along ethnic lines.

The immigration has been closely related to a fairly good Norwegian economy during the post-World War II era. At the very end of the 1960ies the oil resources of the North Sea shelf were discovered, and for the following decades, this has played a very important, and increasing, role in our economy.

Recently, Norway has had an increasing interest in the connection between migration and the sustainability of a modern, universal welfare state. During the last decade some have doubted whether the welfare state will survive with a heavy immigration from “not like-minded cultures”. Reports to the government have concluded that by and large, if the employment rate for immigrants is on par with the rates of the natives, the immigration will be sustainable.

As a result of high net immigration, relatively high fertility and increasing life expectancy, the population of Norway increased considerably towards the end of our period under investigation, and it is expected to increase substantially in the foreseeable future.

In 1970, Norway had 60 000 immigrants and persons born in Norway with two immigrant parents, 25 000 with a background from another Nordic country, 25 000 from the rest of Western Europe and North America, and 10 000 from the rest of the world. The recent immigration flow started around 1970 with guest workers, then their families, and then refugees in increasing numbers. Pakistanis, more than others, continued to arrive. In the period 1988 to 2007, those from Pakistan became the largest non-Nordic immigrant group in Norway. Poland became the largest group in 2008. Those from Poland, more than 70 000 in 2012, are almost twice as many as the Swedes.

The number of descendants have increased from 2 000 in 1970 to more than 100 000 in 2012. Many of these have a background from our six countries in focus. Generally, the descendants are still very young, 17 percent (17 000) were above the age of 19 in 2011. Norway has more descendants of Pakistani origin above the age of 19 (6 000) than from the other five countries in total (3 000).

During the most recent years, immigration due to labour has dominated, but in a 20-year perspective, family reasons outnumber both labour and protection.

### 3. Population dynamics

In this chapter, we will analyse the change in the population size, and composition along a number of demographic characteristics. First, we will see how these six country groups develop over time, and we will compare their composition to the total population of the country, and to the “natives”; meaning those who are not immigrants themselves or children of an immigrant couple. We will also analyse more closely the composition along traits that are specific for immigrant populations, like duration of residence, composition by generation, and national background of the partner. Some of these aspects are closely related to integration, like fertility and partner choice. Thus, integration will serve as a red thread through the chapter.

#### 3.1. Dynamics proper

The population of Norway, compared to rest of Europe, has had a rather strong growth through the whole post-World War II period, due to consistent high fertility, increasing life expectancy and most important for the later years, heavy net immigration (see Eurostat 2011). The immigrants contribute to this growth directly, and indirectly via their high birth numbers caused by higher fertility and a young age structure. After the data set was established, the growth has been increasing, and in 2011 the growth rate was 1,3 per cent whereas the global rate was estimated at “only” 1,1. Net immigration made up 70 per cent of the growth. Including the birth of immigrants the proportion would be close to 90 per cent. Still, apart from most Western European countries, the native population is growing.

When analysing the demographic behaviour and integration of the immigrant groups, we find it necessary to separate immigrants and descendants. This is due to the very different age structure of the groups, and to the fact that immigrants have experience from a different national setting, whereas the descendants are borne in, and have spent their lives (mostly) in a Scandinavian country. It is also of great integrational relevance to see the convergence, if any, of the descendants to the national averages.

#### Development over time

Before going into detail about the growth of the six different nationalities, we will illustrate a more general aspect of their development. Table 3.1 shows that Pakistan and Turkey were the pioneering nations among the six. The modest start of the non-European immigration in the late 1960ies included these countries, but also Morocco, Yugoslavia and India, and some of less significance. During the seventies, immigration from Pakistan and Turkey continued in higher numbers than from the other countries, highest from Pakistan. Boat refugees from Vietnam came shortly after the war in Vietnam ended, and were the most numerous refugees in Norway since the World War II. The next group to become visible in Norway was the Iranians, with a rather small number of refugees from the Shah regime from 1977. By the mid-eighties they numbered 500 immigrants and 100 descendants. Unlike other groups, going from 50 to 500 Iranians took almost a decade (table 3.1). In the mid 1980s, refugees from Iraq and Somalia also reached a significant level. The immigration from these countries lasted for a long time, and Somalis are still among the more numerous groups, ranking as number 8 in net immigration (1400 persons) in 2011.



**Table 3.1. Significant years in the history of the population groups. Norway. Year for the number of immigrants to surpass 500 (50) and number of descendants to surpass 100 (10)**


	Immigrants > 500 (>50)		Descendants > 100 (>10)	
Iran .....	1 986	1 977	1 987	1 981
Iraq .....	1 988	1 986	1 990	1 986
Pakistan .....	1 971	1 970	1 973	1 971
Somalia .....	1 988	1 987	1 989	1 985
Turkey .....	1 971	1 970	1 975	1 972
Vietnam .....	1 978	1 976	1 978	1 977

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

Figure 3.1 shows the *increase in numbers* in Norway from our six countries, from 1999 to 2009. We give separate diagrams for immigrants and descendants as their dynamics and patters are so different. For some years, immigrants from Pakistan were the largest group, but they were outnumbered by Iraqis in 2004 and Somalis in 2007. We notice that immigration from Iraq, Somalia and to some extent Iran has been strong the last decade, and more modest but consistent net immigration from Pakistan, Turkey and Vietnam (figure 3.1.a). During the last years, Iranians are again arriving in increasing numbers, and more than from Iraq in 2011. Due to the young age structure, the number of deceased is very low among immigrants and descendants, and the number of observations are too few for standard mortality analyses.


As the Pakistanis arrived in largest numbers during the 1970s, their number of descendants are by far the highest throughout the period (figure 3.1.b). Immigrants from Pakistan have had a comparatively high fertility, they do not leave the country, and they have a strong tendency to marry within the group. Somalis and Iraqis show the same development, and different from Iran and Vietnam. Taking the immigrants and the descendants together (figure 3.1.c), Pakistanis still rank on top, with the numbers from Somalia and Iraq increasing faster, and probably surpassing Pakistanis in some years, since Iraqis and Somalis have higher numbers of births, higher net immigration and a younger age structure. Due to the large labour migration to Norway from many EU countries, the number of immigrants from Poland and Sweden are now larger than from Pakistan, even when the descendants and immigrants are counted together. See Statistics Norway (2012 a) [http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/01/10/innvbef\\_en/](http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/01/10/innvbef_en/).

**Figure 3.1a. Immigrants in Norway by country of origin. Absolute figures. 1999-2009**




Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

**Figure 3.1b. Descendants in Norway by country of origin. Absolute figures. 1999-2009**



Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

**Figure 3.1c. Immigrants and descendants in Norway by country of origin. Absolute figures. 1999-2009**



Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

Table 3.2 shows a strong *population growth* 1999-2008 for all groups. The larger and the older groups have the lowest growth. During the first decade after the turn of the millennium, the number of Iraqi and Somali more than doubled, due both to high numbers of immigrations, and high birth rates. At the start of the period, there were not many descendants from Iraq or Somalia, so the growth rate for these groups are extremely high, and cannot continue on that level. The strong increase in numbers of descendants reflects also the young age structure among the immigrants, they are in their reproductive years, and many couples have been separated for a period after they became refugees. The numbers from Pakistan, Vietnam, Turkey, and to some extent Iran illustrates more “mature” populations, with a growth far behind that of the newly arrived, “active” groups from Iraq and Somalia. The total population of Norway increased by 8 per cent, but taking the immigrants and descendants away, the growth would still have been positive, but only 2,5 per cent in ten years. This growth even in the non-migrant population is not common across Europe, and is a result of age distribution, comparatively high fertility and increasing life expectancy. Even the population without any immigrant

background (those with two Norwegian born parents and four Norwegian born grandparents) increased by one per cent in ten years.

The differences in *duration of residence* between the countries explain much of the differences in table 3.2. In table 3.3 we distribute the immigrants by time since first immigration (our definition of duration of stay). Exactly 50 per cent of the Pakistani immigrants have stayed 20 years or longer, and the proportion is above 1/4 also for Vietnamese, Turks and Iranians. Among Iraqis and Somalis, only 2-3 percent came before 1989. Iranians are quite evenly distributed between the five year groups, the others have a more distinct peak period.

**Table 3.2. Per cent growth and number of immigrants and descendants, 1999-2009 by country of origin. Norway**

	Immigrants	Descendants	Immigrants and descendants	Immigrants and descendants	
				1999	2009
Iran .....	52	149	62,4	9 646	15 666
Iraq .....	301	728	351,0	5 433	24 505
Pakistan .....	30	49	37,8	21 889	30 161
Somalia .....	220	304	238,7	6 977	23 633
Turkey .....	46	81	56,6	9 859	15 436
Vietnam .....	17	73	32,1	14 929	19 726
Norwegian origin .....	-	-	2,5	4 184 587	4 291 053
Total population .....	-	-	8,0	4 445 329	4 799 252

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

**Table 3.3. Share of immigrants after duration of stay, by country of birth. Per cent. 2009. Norway**

	0-4 years	5-9 years	10-14 years	15-19 years	20 years and more	Total
Iran .....	14	25	15	20	26	100
Iraq .....	25	52	13	8	2	100
Pakistan .....	14	14	10	11	50	100
Somalia .....	35	38	13	11	3	100
Turkey .....	18	19	13	16	34	100
Vietnam .....	10	8	6	30	45	100

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

In addition to immigration, *fertility* is the main driver behind the growth of the groups. Table 3.4 shows the number of births, the crude birth rate and total fertility rate (TFR) for the six groups of immigrants for 1999-2003 and 2004-2008. We will focus on the numbers and on TFR. During the last period, the number of children born by Somali, and also by Iraqi mothers is higher than the number born by Pakistani mothers. The total fertility rate is declining between the two periods for all immigrant groups, least for Somalis with TFR declining only from 4,45 to 4,4. That might indicate not only persisting high fertility, but also that the proportion of newly arrived immigrants is very high in this group (see table 3.3.). With an increasing duration of stay, the fertility is generally declining. Women with only Norwegian origin has increased their TFR from 1,75 to 1,82 between the periods, but the level peaked (at least temporarily) in 2009. In 2004-2008 the TFR for Iranian women is below the national level in Norway, for those from Somalia, Iraq and Pakistan it is still 1,3 to 2,5 children above the national average. We will not expect these groups to come down to the present Iranian level. The TFR for immigrant women from Turkey and Vietnam is approaching the Norwegian average, but is still 0,6 and 0,2 above it. The immigrant fertility contributes to the high fertility in Norway, but only with around 0,06 children, from a TFR of 1,82 without immigrants to 1,88 including the immigrants in 2004-2008.

**Table 3.4. Number of births, total fertility rate and crude birth rates by five-year periods and country of origin. Norway**

	Births		CBR (I)		TFR(I)	
	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008
Iran .....	931	976	15,0	11,9	1,91	1,51
Iraq .....	1 836	2 999	29,8	28,8	4,29	3,57
Pakistan .....	2 765	2 884	22,7	20,4	3,40	3,18
Somalia .....	2 242	3 717	40,3	38,4	4,45	4,40
Turkey .....	1 417	1 408	24,0	18,3	2,87	2,52
Vietnam .....	1 810	1 794	20,8	16,4	2,31	2,07
Norwegian origin .	250 466	242 594	11,1	10,4	1,75	1,82
Total population .	287 120	291 208	12,7	12,5	1,80	1,88

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

The *mortality*, and the *number of deaths*, is also shaping the demographic structure of a population. However, the number of deaths and the crude death rate are quite low in our groups (see table 3.5). The main reason for this is the age structure; the immigrants are far from the ages where most deaths occur. It would have been much better to present standardised mortality rates or life expectancies, but the number of observations is too low for most groups. One such attempt was made by Østby (2002), showing a lower mortality among non-western immigrants, but higher among descendants. New analyses based on better methods are under way, but they are methodologically very demanding. The difference between the crude death rates for the six groups is closely related to the differences in age structure. A special problem with mortality figures based on register data is related to the fact that some (older) migrants return to their country of origin without notifying the Norwegian authorities, see chapter 1.1. Thus, mortality rates might be distorted by being calculated on the basis of too high numbers of immigrants in Norway.

**Table 3.5. Number of deaths and crude death rates of immigrants by five-year periods and country of origin**

	Deaths		CDR	
	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008
Iran .....	67	92	1,2	1,3
Iraq .....	55	88	0,9	0,8
Pakistan .....	230	282	1,9	2,0
Somalia .....	61	90	1,1	0,9
Turkey .....	78	73	1,4	1,0
Vietnam .....	122	148	1,5	1,6
Norwegian origin .....	214 092	200 473	10,2	9,4
Total population .....	220 096	207 351	9,8	8,9

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

In table 3.6, we show the *natural change* for the immigrant groups and for the population in Norway, with and without immigrants. Based on the results presented earlier in this chapter, this table gives us no surprise. We can observe that even the population of Norwegian origin is increasing, but that most of the natural increase in the population in Norway is attributed to growth in the immigrant population. For all six groups, the crude rate of natural change (CRNC) is more than 10 per 1 000 for both periods. The rate is declining from the first to the second period, due to the fact that the proportion within each group of newly arrivals is declining, and the age structure is slightly maturing. The extremely high growth rate for Somali immigrants is due to high immigration and to high fertility related to family reunification after a period of living apart. For all groups, we expect the crude rate of natural change to continue to decline.

**Table 3.6. Natural change and crude rate of natural change (CRNC) by five-year periods and country of origin. Norway**

	Natural change		CRNC	
	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008
Iran .....	794	770	13,8	10,6
Iraq .....	1 774	2 896	28,9	27,9
Pakistan .....	2 513	2 581	20,8	18,4
Somalia .....	2 146	3 588	39,2	37,4
Turkey .....	1 283	1 236	22,6	17,3
Vietnam .....	1 558	1 376	19,3	14,8
Norwegian origin .....	19 936	20 796	0,9	1
Total population .....	67 024	83 857	3	3,6

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

We will now focus on the contribution of immigration, emigration and net migration to the growth of the six groups. All groups have had a strong and persistent *immigration* to Norway in the period (see table 3.7). The number has declined for all groups from 1999-2003 to 2004-2008, with a small exception for those coming from Vietnam (lowest rates among the six countries both periods), due to the reduced possibility for a person with family members already settled in Norway to be granted permit to join their family in Norway. The general increase in immigration from the first to the second period (shown in the number of immigrants in the total population), is caused by the increasing labour migration, in particular from Poland and the Baltic states. Those arriving from Iraq and Somalia dominate among “our” groups for both periods. In both periods, the rates<sup>2</sup> for these two countries were very high, but strongly declining. Table 3.7 is an interesting confirmation of the fact that high rates of immigration will be followed by significantly lower rates. Doing an age standardisation as in SCIR does not change the picture.

**Table 3.7. Number of Immigrants, crude immigration rate and standardised immigration rate by five year period and country of origin. Norway**

	Immigrants		CIR		SCIR	
	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008
Iran .....	3 959	2 441	68,7	33,6	76,3	37,3
Iraq .....	11 593	6 037	188,7	58,2	162,6	49,4
Pakistan .....	4 142	3 947	34,3	28,1	36,7	27,8
Somalia .....	8 029	7 054	146,7	73,6	135,4	66,5
Turkey .....	2 700	2 341	47,6	32,8	36,6	25,6
Vietnam .....	1 401	1 723	17,3	18,6	13,5	16,2
Norwegian origin .....	43 866	38 901	2,1	1,8	2	1,8
Total population .....	188 726	251 141	8,4	10,8	9,7	10,4

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

The number of *emigrations* (and the emigration rates) are much lower than for the immigrations, but it is still important to notice that the number of emigrations are not insignificant for any of the groups (table 3.8). The numbers are increasing for the six countries from the first to the second period, but as the populations grow, both types of rates decline. The emigration rates and numbers are declining even for the total population and for those of Norwegian origin. Emigration rates of such low levels for the natives, will probably be rather unique in Europe. It should be seen in context with the very positive economic situation and expanding labour market in Norway, even before the Euro crises hit the rest of Europe. By comparing the number of emigrants for the total and the Norwegian origin population, we observe that the number of emigrations of immigrants is twice that of Norwegian origin persons in the last quinquennium.

During the last period, the number of emigrations was higher for Somalis than for any of the other group, and the rates were also quite high, even after age standardisation. Although refugees might not have the possibility to return, or a

<sup>2</sup> The CIR (and the age standardised variant SCIR) is not a rate in the formal sense, as it calculated by dividing the number of immigrants by the number in that group already living in Norway, and not by introducing the population at risk (see Methodological notes).

will to return to Somalia, a significant number is moving on to another country when they have the possibility to do so. The emigration among refugees is at a surprisingly high level, with Vietnamese refugees as an exemption. We are not able to discuss where these emigrants moved, as a large group of them were removed from the register on an administrative decision (see chapter 1.1), and not given any country of destination.

**Table 3.8. Number of emigrants, crude emigration rate and standardised emigration rate by five year period and country of origin. Norway**

	Emigrants		CER		SCER	
	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008
Iran .....	864	1 026	15,0	14,1	23,7	23,7
Iraq .....	1 564	1 677	25,5	16,2	22,4	16,9
Pakistan .....	1 998	2 080	16,6	14,8	22,5	19,4
Somalia .....	1 541	2 430	28,2	25,4	26,0	22,4
Turkey .....	855	984	15,1	13,8	17,7	14,7
Vietnam .....	397	686	4,9	7,4	5,3	8,0
Norwegian origin .....	48 629	38 562	2,3	1,8	2,3	1,8
Total population .	123 625	112 770	5,5	4,8	5,3	4,7

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

The *net migration* for all six groups is positive (table 3.9), and the country has had high and increasing immigration for decades (see figure 2.1). For the last period, it was positive even for the population of Norwegian origin. If data had been available for net migration by country background in the migration statistics in all countries in Europe, this would probably have been quite unique. The net migration for Norway is not for the time being dominated by any of our six countries; the size especially for the last period is quite evenly distributed. New groups (labour migrants from EU countries) are now taking the leading role in our net migration figures, even more so after 2008.

**Table 3.9. Net migration, crude rate of change and standardised crude rate of change due to migration by five-year periods and country of origin. Norway**

	Net migration		CRC		CMR	
	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008
Iran .....	3 095	1 415	67,5	30,0	53,7	19,5
Iraq .....	10 029	4 360	192,1	70,0	163,2	42,1
Pakistan .....	2 144	1 867	38,6	31,7	17,8	13,3
Somalia .....	6 488	4 624	157,7	85,7	118,5	48,2
Turkey .....	1 845	1 357	55,1	36,3	32,5	19,0
Vietnam .....	1 004	1 037	31,7	26,0	12,4	11,2
Norwegian origin ..	-4 763	339	0,7	1,0	-0,2	0,0
Total population ...	65 101	138 371	5,9	9,5	2,9	5,9

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

Natural change is more important than net migration for the well established groups in Norway, and for groups with low fertility. In table 3.10 we can see that natural increase has gained in relative importance from the first to the second period for all origin countries except Vietnam. In the last period, natural change and net migration have more equal contribution to the total growth than in the first period. For the total population of Norway, immigration is more important than natural increase for the total growth in the last period.

**Table 3.10. Natural change as percent of net immigration by five-year periods and country of origin. Norway**

	1999-2003	2004-2008
Iran .....	26	54
Iraq .....	18	66
Pakistan .....	117	138
Somalia .....	33	78
Turkey .....	70	91
Vietnam .....	155	133
Norwegian origin ..	-	2
Total population .....	103	61

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

Table 3.11 shows the *composition of the six groups by age, sex and generation*. This composition is the result of the processes (births, deaths, immigration and emigration) presented earlier in this chapter. The total column shows that the proportion of descendants varies around one third for the groups, from 17 per cent for the Iranians to 45 per cent for those with Pakistani background. This proportion is mainly dependant on the average duration of stay (high among Pakistani and Turkey), on the number of children born (fertility) and on the degree of homogamous marriages (high among Pakistani immigrants, table 3.13). Iranians have stayed in Norway for quite some time, but have a low proportion of descendants due to low fertility (see table 3.4) and more cross-national marriages than other groups (table 3.13). The proportion of descendants is higher for Iraq and Somalia, due to higher fertility and to homogamous marriages (table 3.13).

**Table 3.11. The composition of the group and its age-sex sub groups by generation and year. Per cent. 2009. Norway**

		Total	Age groups		
			0-15 years	16-64 years	65 years and over
<b>Iran</b>					
Female	Immigrants .....	82	27	96	100
	Descendants .....	18	73	4	0
Male	Immigrants .....	84	27	97	100
	Descendants .....	16	73	3	0
Total	Immigrants .....	83	27	97	100
	Descendants .....	17	73	3	0
<b>Iraq</b>					
Female	Immigrants .....	75	37	99	100
	Descendants .....	25	63	1	0
Male	Immigrants .....	81	37	100	100
	Descendants .....	19	63	0	0
Total	Immigrants .....	78	37	100	100
	Descendants .....	22	63	0	0
<b>Pakistan</b>					
Female	Immigrants .....	55	10	71	100
	Descendants .....	45	90	29	0
Male	Immigrants .....	55	10	70	100
	Descendants .....	45	90	30	0
Total	Immigrants .....	55	10	71	100
	Descendants .....	45	90	29	0
<b>Somalia</b>					
Female	Immigrants .....	72	38	98	100
	Descendants .....	28	62	2	0
Male	Immigrants .....	74	37	98	100
	Descendants .....	26	63	2	0
Total	Immigrants .....	73	38	98	100
	Descendants .....	27	62	2	0
<b>Turkey</b>					
Female	Immigrants .....	62	10	83	100
	Descendants .....	38	90	17	0
Male	Immigrants .....	67	10	86	100
	Descendants .....	33	90	14	0
Total	Immigrants .....	65	10	85	100
	Descendants .....	35	90	15	0
<b>Vietnam</b>					
Female	Immigrants .....	67	5	86	100
	Descendants .....	33	95	14	0
Male	Immigrants .....	63	6	84	100
	Descendants .....	37	94	16	0
Total	Immigrants .....	65	5	85	100
	Descendants .....	35	95	15	0

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

The sex distribution among descendants should be a result of sex proportion at birth, as we have seen few signs of sex selective out migration. But the proportion of descendants in table 3.11 might vary between men and women from different countries, as a result of the sex distribution among the *immigrants*. In refugee groups, there will often be more men than women. Consequently, the proportion of descendants will be higher among women than among men, most pronounced for Iraqis.



The distribution among the age groups is quite different from the total. All groups have a clear majority of descendants below the age of 15, from 90-95 per cent among the Vietnamese, Pakistanis and Turkish, to 62-73 per cent among the Somalis, Iraqis and Iranians. In this age, of course, there are no gender differences. In the age above 64, we find virtually no descendants. In the group of adults (16-64) the immigrants dominate among those from Iraq, Iran and Somalia, whereas the picture is more balanced, but still with a distinct majority of immigrants among those from Pakistan, Turkey and Vietnam. This reflects the immigration history and demographic behaviour of these groups.

### 3.2. Composition of immigrant groups by selected traits

In this section, we describe the composition of “our” immigrant groups along a number of demographic variables; average duration of stay, partner background and achieved fertility at different ages. We will start with the average duration of stay, and how this has changed from 1999 to 2009.

Table 3.12 shows *average duration of stay* by sex and country of birth, for 1999, 2004 and 2009. During this ten-year period, the average duration of stay has increased with 7 years for Vietnamese immigrants (as much as 9 years for men), meaning that the population has had rather modest new immigration. For Iranians, Pakistanis and Turks, the duration has increased by 5 years, but for Iraqis and Somalis only with 2-3 years. There are minor gender differences, except for Vietnamese immigrants. Men from Vietnam have on average stayed in Norway four more years than women, whereas they had a difference of only one year in 1999. This is a consequence of women (especially elderly) having joined their family members (often children) in Norway at a later stage. Men from Vietnam have by 1 January 2009 the same duration of stay as Pakistani males, the group with the longest average duration of stay.

**Table 3.12. Average duration of residence in years for immigrants by sex, and country of birth. 1999, 2004 and 2009. Norway**

	1999	2004	2009	Change 1999-2009
<b>Immigrants</b>				
<b>Iran</b>				
Female .....	8	9	13	5
Male .....	9	11	14	5
Total .....	9	10	14	5
<b>Iraq</b>				
Female .....	5	5	8	3
Male .....	5	5	8	3
Total .....	5	5	8	3
<b>Pakistan</b>				
Female .....	13	15	18	5
Male .....	17	19	21	4
Total .....	15	17	19	4
<b>Somalia</b>				
Female .....	5	6	7	2
Male .....	6	6	8	2
Total .....	6	6	8	2
<b>Turkey</b>				
Female .....	11	13	15	5
Male .....	13	14	16	3
Total .....	12	13	16	4
<b>Vietnam</b>				
Female .....	11	14	17	6
Male .....	12	17	21	8
Total .....	12	15	19	7

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

The next table, 3.13, illustrates the marriage pattern, by giving the *proportion among the married who have a partner from the same country, from Norway or from a third country*. The table also gives the proportion married in each group. Numbers are given by sex and generation, but the descendants from Iran, Iraq and



Somalia are too few and too young to allow for analysis. The difference in the proportion married between immigrants and descendants is due to the much lower age of the descendants, but also to a considerably higher age at marriage among the descendants.

**Table 3.13. Marriage rate and proportion among the married who have a partner from the same country, from Norway or from a third country, by country of origin, sex and generation. Per cent. 2009. Norway**

Country	Sex	Generation	Partner background			Marriage rate
			Own	Norwegian	Other	
<b>Iran</b>	Female	Immigrants	85	8	7	51
		Descendants	-	-	-	0
	Male	Immigrants	77	12	12	45
		Descendants	-	-	-	1
	Total	Immigrants	81	10	9	48
		Descendants	-	-	-	1
<b>Iraq</b>	Female	Immigrants	96	1	4	61
		Descendants	-	-	-	0
	Male	Immigrants	87	4	9	52
		Descendants	-	-	-	0
	Total	Immigrants	91	2	6	55
		Descendants	-	-	-	0
<b>Pakistan</b>	Female	Immigrants	96	1	3	77
		Descendants	95	2	3	27
	Male	Immigrants	94	2	3	78
		Descendants	89	3	8	21
	Total	Immigrants	95	2	3	77
		Descendants	92	2	5	24
<b>Somalia</b>	Female	Immigrants	95	1	4	38
		Descendants	-	-	-	0
	Male	Immigrants	95	1	3	44
		Descendants	-	-	-	0
	Total	Immigrants	95	1	4	42
		Descendants	-	-	-	0
<b>Turkey</b>	Female	Immigrants	91	6	3	73
		Descendants	91	3	6	30
	Male	Immigrants	79	18	3	68
		Descendants	92	3	5	16
	Total	Immigrants	84	13	3	70
		Descendants	91	3	6	22
<b>Vietnam</b>	Female	Immigrants	87	11	3	57
		Descendants	66	24	10	3
	Male	Immigrants	95	2	3	57
		Descendants	76	14	10	2
	Total	Immigrants	91	7	3	57
		Descendants	70	20	10	2

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

The marital pattern illustrated by the partner's country background is often considered to be a good indicator of differences in integration, in the sense that the percentage cross-national marriages is taken as an indication of relations between the immigrants and the natives. This pattern should not necessarily be interpreted as a direct indicator of integration, but it carries relevant information about integration. All groups show quite high percentages with a partner from her/his own country of origin among those who are married. For immigrants of Iraqi, Pakistani, Somali and Vietnamese background, the proportion finding a partner with their own country (immigrant in Norway before marriage or not) is more than 90 per cent. For Pakistanis, the proportion among descendants is almost as high as among the immigrants, while it is much lower among descendants of Vietnamese origin. For immigrants from Iran and Turkey, the proportion is around 80 per cent.

There is, however a puzzle in this. Pakistani men might have shorter or more stable relationships with women without immigrant background without marrying, but still having children. The numbers behind the rates in table 3.13 are low, for instance only 200 Pakistani immigrants (75 percent of them males) married to persons with Norwegian background. This is in contrast to counts in the population register, showing that more than 1000 children in 2008 have one Pakistani parent

and one with Norwegian background. Thus, there must be more Norwegian-Pakistani couples having children than the number of Norwegian-Pakistani marriages indicates.

We also notice that the comparatively low proportion among Turks comes from the fact that 18 per cent of Turk males are married to Norwegians. This is partly due to some Turk males in Norway marrying outside their group, and partly due to Norwegian women marrying men living in Turkey before the marriage (clearly illustrated in table 3.13). Thus, the relatively high proportion of male Turks with a Norwegian wife is not an indication of Turkish men in Norway find a spouse among non-migrants, the majority with a Norwegian wife immigrant related to the marriage.

The majority of young persons in Norway starts cohabiting when they form a couple, not many without immigrant background marry without having been cohabiting before marriage. Cohabitation is not well covered by the registers (see Wiik 2012), but the difference between descendants and natives is quite clear, They start their first union at the same age, but the descendants with a marriage.

The gender difference among immigrants is of minor importance, but still interesting. Men marry outside their own group more often than women, among immigrants from Iran, Iraq and Turkey. For Somali and Pakistani immigrants, the proportion marrying within their group is very high for both sexes, whereas Vietnamese women marry outside the group more often than men. If marrying someone not from their own group, this small proportion among immigrants from Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia prefer a partner not with a Norwegian background. This might mean they are marrying someone of their own national background, but not living in Norway before marriage. Among Iranians, Turks and Vietnamese, those finding a partner outside their own group in Norway more often find a partner with Norwegian background.

The descendants from Pakistan and Turkey have more or less the same proportion marrying one of their own background as the immigrants have. Descendants from Vietnam, on the other hand tend to marry someone from Norway or from a third country more than the immigrants do. We are inclined to interpret this as a sign that Vietnamese descendants are orienting themselves outside the group of Vietnamese in Norway. The pattern among Iranians might be seen in the same way. Vietnamese descendants seem to postpone their marriage, and if they marry, they will not follow the same pattern as the immigrants. Their late marriages should be seen in context with their rate of participation in education.

Also among the descendants, a minority who do not marry one of their own country background, marry a Norwegian or one from a third country. Pakistani and Turkish descendants seem to prefer partners from a third country, whereas Vietnamese prefer someone from Norway. The most transnationally oriented are the Vietnamese descendants. More than 9 out of 10 descendants from Pakistan and Turkey marry one from their own group. This seems to be a very high number, but it might be that this is most common among the first born descendants, marrying at rather young ages. Their younger brothers and sisters *might* choose differently. More recent data on marital pattern might indicate such a pattern (Henriksen 2011).

The last “selected trait” illustrates the age specific pattern of fertility, by giving the *achieved fertility at different ages*, for the periods 1999-2003 and 2004-2008 in table 3.13. Due to their young age, no group of descendants can be followed to the end of their reproductive period. We are at best able to give a robust description of the fertility pattern of descendants of Pakistani, Turkish and Vietnamese background, and only for those in their 20ies.

**Table 3.14. Total achieved fertility rate at age 39, 29, 24 for immigrants and descendants by five year intervals. Norway**

	1999-2003				2004-2008			
	TFR	TFR39	TFR29	TFR24	TFR	TFR39	TFR29	TFR24
<b>Iran</b>								
Immigrants .....	1,91	1,83	1,07	0,44	1,51	1,43	0,70	0,26
Descendants .....	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,42	0,12
<b>Iraq</b>								
Immigrants .....	4,29	4,13	2,59	1,31	3,57	3,40	2,01	0,96
Descendants .....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Pakistan</b>								
Immigrants .....	3,40	3,33	2,24	1,15	3,18	3,10	2,05	1,04
Descendants .....	-	-	1,22	0,45	-	2,12	1,08	0,34
<b>Somalia</b>								
Immigrants .....	4,45	4,05	2,18	1,01	4,40	3,95	2,24	1,04
Descendants .....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,03
<b>Turkey</b>								
Immigrants .....	2,87	2,82	2,13	1,33	2,52	2,44	1,72	1,03
Descendants .....	-	-	1,08	0,70	-	-	1,12	0,48
<b>Vietnam</b>								
Immigrants .....	2,31	2,23	1,36	0,63	2,07	2,00	1,17	0,50
Descendants .....	-	-	0,84	0,07	-	-	0,32	0,10
Natives .....	1,75	1,71	0,96	0,34	1,82	1,78	0,93	0,32
Total .....	1,8	1,76	1	0,37	1,88	1,84	0,97	0,34

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

We notice the same differences in fertility and the fertility decline we have observed before. The Iranians are now well below the Norwegian average, Somali and Iraqi women still have high fertility rates, and the rates increase more strongly with increasing age among these than among other nationalities. Groups with high completed fertility, tend also to have the highest rates at all ages. There are still some differences. Immigrant women from Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Turkey all have around 1,0 child at age 24 (TFR24). That number increases by 1,5 child through the rest of the reproductive period for Turks, more the 2,0 for Pakistanis, 2,5 for Iraqi and 3,4 for Somali. Thus, it is towards the end of the reproductive period the great differences between the different nationalities occur. This might be related to the recent arrivals in some of these groups, particularly refugees from Somalia and Iraq. Women who have arrived as refugees or reunified with a refugee (often their husbands) tend to have high fertility the first years after arrival, then declining (Lappegård 2000 and Østby 2002). The figures for immigrant women from Pakistan are also comparatively high. These women came from a country where the fertility decline have started only recently, they married at young ages, and their labour force participation in Norway has always been low.

For the descendants, those of Turkish origin tend to have higher rates in their 20ies than natives, and those from other countries. Pakistani descendants are around the national level until the age of 30, and Vietnamese are on a considerably lower level. The very low TFR24 for Somali descendants should be disregarded, as it only illustrates the weakness of the method. Still, we might conclude that the fertility among descendants tends to come close to the national average, at least for the first part of the reproductive period. If the descendants will copy their mother's high fertility after the age of 30, is too early to say. The oldest group of Pakistani descendants in both periods in table 3.14 have somewhat higher rates than natives at the same age, but those born later tend to come close to the native fertility (TFR24 for descendants 2004-2008).

For those groups that can be compared across the two periods in table 3.14, we see a decline in fertility among almost all groups of immigrants and descendants, and more so for Iraqi immigrants than for others. There is less of a decline for Somali immigrants, associated with the high recent immigration, mentioned above. In parallel with the substantial decline in immigrant fertility, there has been a modest

increase in native total fertility rate, and in the TFR39. There is still a decline in fertility in younger ages, but we expected them to catching up. Consequently, the gap between immigrant and native fertility is still present, but closing. For some groups of descendants, but not for all, there is a small and narrowing gap.

### 3.3. Summary

Unlike most Western European countries, the native population of Norway is growing, albeit at a low rate. The population of immigrants and descendants is growing, mostly due to net immigration and to high number of births in a rather young immigrant population. This causes Norway having one of the fastest growing populations in Europe.

Starting around 1970, the first labour migrants came from Pakistan and Turkey, but also from other countries with not so prominent contributions to the immigrant population today. Then followed refugees, a few from Chile, more from Vietnam and Iran, and most recently from Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan. At the moment (2012) the largest flows of refugees are coming from Somalia and Eritrea. For many years, Pakistani immigrants were the largest group in Norway, Iraqis took over from 2004 and Somalis from 2007. Last year, immigrants from Poland has become by far the largest group.

Descendants are defined as persons born in Norway with two immigrant parents, and their number is closely related to the duration of stay of their national group, and to the fertility (in Norway) of this group. Immigrants from Pakistan have had a comparatively high fertility, they do not leave the country, and they have a strong tendency to marry within the group. Among the descendants, those from Pakistan is twice as many as from Vietnam. Somalis and Iraqis show the same development as Pakistanis, and different from Iran and Vietnam.

In some contexts, immigrants and descendants are analysed as one group. However, when conducting analyses of integration, we do not believe this is correct. Taking the immigrants and the descendants together, Pakistanis still rank on top, but the numbers from Somalia and Iraq are increasing faster.

During the period 1999-2008, all six nationality groups in focus grew considerably. The larger and the older groups have the lowest growth. During the first decade after the turn of the millennium, the number of Iraqi and Somali more than doubled, due both to immigration and to high numbers of births. At the start of the period, there were not many descendants from Iraq or Somalia, so the growth rates for these groups are extremely high. During this period, the number of children born by Somali, and also by Iraqi mothers is higher than the number born by Pakistani mothers. The total fertility rate declined for all immigrant groups during this period, least but Somalis. Their TFR declined only from 4,45 to 4,4. The proportion of newly arrived immigrants is very high in this group. In 2004-2008 the TFR for Iranian women is below the national level in Norway, for those from Somalia, Iraq and Pakistan it is still 2,5 to 1,3 children above the national average. It is towards the end of the reproductive period the great differences between the different nationalities occur.

Descendants of Turkish origin tend to have higher rates in their 20ies than natives, and those from other countries. Pakistani descendants are around the national level until the age of 30, and the Vietnamese are at a considerably lower level. They do not follow the pattern of their mothers. For those groups (immigrants and descendants) that can be compared, we see a decline in fertility among almost all of them, but more for Iraqi immigrants and less for Somali than for others. Among most groups of descendants, the fertility tends to come close to the national average, at least for the first part of the reproductive period.

Due to the age structure, the number of deaths and the crude death rate are very low in our groups. The crude rate of natural change is of course high, due to a young age structure and high fertility. All groups have had a strong and persistent *immigration* to Norway. The number declined for all groups from 1999-2003 to 2004-2008. Those arriving from Iraq and Somalia dominate among "our" groups for both periods. In both periods, the rates for these two countries were very high, but strongly declining. The number of *emigrations* are much lower than immigrations, but not insignificant for any of the groups. The numbers increase from the first to the second period, but as the populations grow, the rates decline. During the last period, the number of emigrations was higher for Somalis than for any of the other group.

The proportion of descendants varies around one third for the groups, from 17 per cent for the Iranians to 45 per cent for those with Pakistani background. In refugee groups, there will often be more men than women. Consequently, the *proportion* of descendants will be higher among women than among men, most pronounced for Iraqis. The sex distribution among descendants should be a result of sex proportion at birth, as we have seen few signs of sex selective out migration.

From 1999 to 2009, the average duration of stay has increased by 7 years for Vietnamese immigrants (as much as 9 years for men), meaning that the population has had very modest new immigration. For Iranians, Pakistanis and Turks, the immigration has been more substantial, and their duration has increased by 5 years. The immigration from Iraq and Somalia has been very strong, and their average duration of stay has increased only with 2-3 years.

The difference in the proportion married between immigrants and descendants is due to the much lower age of the descendants, but also to a considerably higher age at marriage among the descendants. For immigrants of Iraqi, Pakistani, Somali and Vietnamese background, the proportion finding a partner with their own country background (immigrant in Norway before marriage or not) is more than 90 per cent. For Pakistanis, the proportion among descendants is almost as high as among the immigrants, while it is much lower among descendants of Vietnamese origin. For immigrants from Iran and Turkey, the proportion is around 80 per cent.

Among immigrants from Iran, Iraq and Turkey, men marry outside their own group more often than women. For Somali and Pakistani immigrants, the proportion marrying within their national group is very high for both sexes, whereas Vietnamese women marry outside the national group more often than men. The small proportion among immigrants from Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia marrying someone not from their own group, prefer a partner who does not have a Norwegian background. This might mean they are marrying someone of their own national background, but who does not live in Norway before marriage. Among Iranians, Turks and Vietnamese, those finding a partner outside their own group in Norway more often find a partner with a Norwegian background.

Descendants from Pakistan and Turkey marry within their own national group to the same extent as immigrants, but their age at marriage is higher. Descendants from Vietnam tend to marry someone from Norway or from a third country more often than do immigrants.

## 4. Enrolment in the educational system

In this project, we consider the educational system to be the gateway to successful integration for immigrants, since education opens for freedom of choice of future work (and income) for most young people in a society like ours. The immigrants themselves have lived parts of their lives in another country than Norway, and the more recent their arrival, the more difficult it will be to follow the normal progress in the educational system of the host country. This might be due to problems with a new language, changing to a completely new and foreign educational system, and to general difficulties with getting into and being accepted in a new society. For their descendants, however, with a full life span in the host country, such problems will not be expected.

In this chapter we will describe the participation in the educational system for immigrant and descendant males and females from “our” six countries, and compare them with the total population in the corresponding age groups. Some reflections will be given on the difference in tendencies to choose between vocational training and academic preparation on the secondary level. We will also describe the participation in tertiary education, and how the participation has changed during the ten years 1998-2008. So far, Norway has not had a system for registering education of immigrants at the time of immigration, and most immigrants arriving after 1999 who have not taken any exams in Norway will have unknown education. Consequently, we include in this chapter only *participation* in education, not *attained* education. A survey to collect information on education taken abroad, was conducted in 2011 and 2012, and a system for registering education for the majority of arriving immigrants will be implemented towards the end of 2012.

### 4.1. Enrolment in the educational system in general

Table 4.1 shows the educational enrolment rates for the age groups 16-19, 20-24 and 25-29. At age 6-15, we expect everyone in Norway to be in the educational system, irrespective of background. The participation in preschool could have been very useful, but we have that information only on the aggregate level. Above the age of 29, most persons have completed their education. All observations are as of 1 October each year. We will first focus on the situation in 2008 (schooling year 2008/2009).

We notice that the *level of participation* varies much more for immigrants than for descendants, partly related to differences in duration of stay. The low level of educational activity among Somali immigrants can partly be seen as a consequence of many recent arrivals (see table 3.3), but immigrants from Turkey are only at a slightly higher level. It might be that more immigrants from Turkey complete their education before migrating, but since we do not have registered education at the time of immigration, that hypothesis cannot be confirmed. Immigrants from Iran have by far the highest level of activity. We can see the same pattern in all three age groups. In the oldest age groups, immigrants from Iran have a clearly higher participation rate than the average in Norway, among women as well as among men. We would expect a slower decline in participation rate among immigrants than among other groups, as many immigrants arrive in ages where others are completing their education. Immigrants will need longer time, as they have to acquire sufficient knowledge in Norwegian before they can be successful participants in the educational system. We can see some signs of such a process in table 4.1, but it is not a major trait in the table.

For *descendants* that can be followed, the level does not differ that much between the nationalities, but the rank order is very much the same as among immigrants. Iraqi, Iranian and Somali descendants are too young to give the number for all ages. Again, rates for Somali and for Turks are on a lower level than the others. The other groups that we can observe all have participation rates around or above

the average in Norway. This is often seen to be a positive sign of integration. There is a rapid change in the participation rates for descendants in Norway, where more and more groups surpass the national participation rates (Nygaard 2011).

In most groups, including the Norwegian totals, the female participation rate is higher than the male. Among immigrants above the age of 20, the pattern is more mixed. For descendants, this pattern is broken only at ages above 25, except the young Somali descendants.

**Table 4.1. Share of 16-19, 20-24 and 25-29 years old immigrants and descendants enrolled in education, by sex and country of origin. Per cent. 1 October 2008. Norway**

	16-19 years			20-24 years			25-29 years		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
<b>Immigrants</b>									
Iran .....	78,7	75	82,7	40,8	38,8	43	27,3	24,6	29,9
Iraq .....	69,5	68,7	70,5	28,8	25,6	32,6	10	7,8	12,7
Pakistan .....	68,7	66,5	70,8	25,4	28,2	23,1	11,7	14,4	9,3
Somalia .....	49,4	47,6	51,4	24,9	26,1	23,6	10,6	12,5	8,7
Turkey .....	53,3	56,4	50	19,6	21,2	18	7,2	5,2	9,5
Vietnam .....	66,8	61	72,4	39,7	37,6	35,6	13,6	15,3	12,5
<b>Descendants</b>									
Iran .....	85,4	86,1	84,6	52,9	41,7	65,6	:	:	:
Iraq .....	84,7	79,3	90	:	:	:	:	:	:
Pakistan .....	80	79,1	80,9	42,7	38,3	47,5	15,9	16,4	15,3
Somalia .....	68,2	71,1	65,3	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey .....	75	74,7	75,3	34,1	33,5	34,7	9,5	7,6	11,5
Vietnam .....	88,9	86,5	91,5	57	55,2	58,8	23,5	24,1	22,8
Norwegian origin ..	84,4	84	84,9	45,9	40,3	51,8	18,4	16,5	20,4
Total population ....	83,2	82,7	83,6	43,9	38,9	49,2	17,3	15,5	19,1

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway

When comparing the six countries, Turks seem to be at the lower end of the educational participation distribution. For Somali, the descendants start at a fairly low level, but the immigrants do relatively better with age. This might be a consequence of they have to take compulsory education even after the age of 20. Pakistanis are also often below the immigrant average, whereas Iranians and Vietnamese tend to have high rates in most groups. Iraqi immigrants have often 10 percentage point lower participation rates than Iranians. That could be related to differences in duration of stay, and the high participation among the Iraqi descendants supports such a hypothesis.

The *development in participation rates since 1998* throws more light on the patterns, see table 4.2. For the average in Norway, there is a rather stable participation rate from 1998 to 2008. During this period the labour market has been quite tight, but considerably tighter in 2008 than in 1998. A labour market characterized by a strong and partly unmet demand for labour will often be related to declining participation rates in education. There was a minor increase for men 16-19, and a decrease for those above the age of 20. For women, we saw a decrease under, and an increase above the age of 20. For immigrants and descendants, the changes were much larger. For all groups of immigrants from Vietnam, we saw quite a large decrease, but from a comparatively high level. For Somalis, the decrease came in all ages for males, whereas females tended to keep or increase their level of participation. Somali male immigrants had a very low level in 2003, then increasing (not shown). This might be due to very high proportions of recently arrived immigrants in 2003, not indicating real behavioural changes. Some changes might also be a result of changing selectivity of outmigration from Somalia. Especially before the breakdown of the regime in 1991, it was the better educated groups in the population who emigrated.

**Table 4.2. Growth in total enrolment rate 1998-2008 by age groups, generation, sex and country of origin. Percentage points. Norway**

	16-19 years			20-24 years			25-29 years		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
<b>Immigrants</b> .....									
Iran .....	7,1	5,9	8,5	3,4	-1,6	8,6	0,9	-3,7	5,4
Iraq .....	18,6	18,1	19,3	6	4,5	8,6	1,1	-1,9	6,3
Pakistan .....	4,7	-0,9	10,2	8,8	9,2	8,4	4,8	6	4
Somalia .....	1,1	-1,5	4,4	0,6	-2,3	3,9	-4,4	-9,7	-0,2
Turkey .....	6,7	9,5	3,7	8,8	11	6,6	2,2	-0,3	5
Vietnam .....	-6,8	-8,1	-6	-7,4	-5,6	-8,9	-5,4	-6,7	-3,7
<b>Descendants</b> .....									
Iran .....	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Iraq .....	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Pakistan .....	6	6,3	5,7	4,9	0,2	10	-3,6	-4,7	-3,1
Somalia .....	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey .....	12,2	9,6	14,7	9,1	12,2	5,6	:	:	:
Vietnam .....	3,7	1,7	5,9	0,7	:	:	:	:	:
Norwegian origin ...	0,3	1,9	-1,3	1,5	-0,2	3,3	0,8	-0,1	1,8
Total population ....	0	1,3	-1,4	0,6	-0,9	2,4	0	-0,9	1

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway

The very high increase in the Iraqi rates, especially for young immigrants, will at least partly be the result of changes in duration of stay. In 2008, the proportion of newly arrived was much lower than before. Still, an increase in participation rate from 50 to 70 is impressive. We can see a declining participation rate among immigrant men, but not among women, with the Vietnamese as an exception. This might be seen as an indication of immigrants coming closer to the Nordic gender pattern as they are staying longer in Norway.

We can observe the change from 1998 only for a few groups among the descendants. Especially the Turkish descendants are approaching the national level quite fast. This is one of the few indications that Turks are improving their education and closing the gap to the national average.

In table 4.3, we focus on *gender differences in educational enrolment*, and how it has changed from 1998. Among young immigrants from Iran, Iraq and Vietnam, almost every ratio is above 1,0, for all three years of observation. This means that more women than men are enrolled at these ages. At the end of the period (2008), women have higher rates than men for all countries of origin, except Turkey. For immigrants older than 19, the female rate of enrolment is consistently lower than the male rate for those from Pakistan and Somalia. The difference is quite substantial, a ratio of 0,67 means that the enrolment rate of men is 50 per cent higher than for women. The Pakistani pattern might be influenced by the fact that immigrants arriving from Pakistan in ages around or above 20, often are coming to marry Pakistanis already living in Norway. For this group, it seems more usual for men than for women to engage in education. For the four remaining countries, there is no clear age or time pattern for the immigrants.

For descendants, we do not have observations for every age in every year, but for most observations there are a small female majority in education (ratios slightly above 1,0). The same situation is found in the Norwegian average. Among those of Norwegian origin, the female dominance increases with age, but the situation is not so clear, and somewhat different among the descendants.



**Table 4.3.. The ratio of the total enrolment rate<sup>3</sup> in education of women to men of age 16-19, 20-24 and 25-29 immigrants and descendants, by country of origin. 1998-2003-2008. Norway**

	16-19 years			20-24 years			25-29 years		
	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008
<b>Immigrants.....</b>									
Iran .....	1,07	1,08	1,1	0,85	0,98	1,11	0,87	1,11	1,22
Iraq .....	1,01	1,19	1,03	1,14	1,09	1,27	0,6	0,87	1,63
Pakistan .....	0,9	0,98	1,06	0,77	0,7	0,82	0,62	0,76	0,64
Somalia .....	0,95	0,96	1,08	0,69	0,61	0,9	0,4	0,55	0,7
Turkey .....	0,98	0,97	0,89	1,12	1	0,85	0,82	1,22	1,83
Vietnam .....	1,13	1,07	1,19	0,98	0,81	0,9	0,74	0,82	0,82
<b>Descendants</b>									
Iran .....	:	1,02	0,98	:	:	1,57	:	:	:
Iraq .....	:	:	1,13	:	:	:	:	:	:
Pakistan .....	1,03	1,07	1,02	0,98	1,14	1,24	0,86	0,96	0,93
Somalia .....	:	:	0,92	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey .....	0,93	1,05	1,01	:	0,96	1,07	:	:	0,95
Vietnam .....	1,01	1,04	1,06	:	0,96	1,07	:	:	0,95
Norwegian origin ..	1,05	1,04	1,01	1,2	1,24	1,29	1,12	1,13	1,24
Total population ...	1,04	1,04	1,01	1,18	1,21	1,26	1,1	1,12	1,23

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway

## 4.2. Enrolment in tertiary education

Table 4.4 focuses on *enrolment in tertiary education for age 20-24 and 25-29*. The majority of those enrolled in education at this age, will be in tertiary education (compare table 4.1 with 4.4). However, there are low rates for Somalis in table 4.4, but not in 4.1. That means that among the Somali immigrants in education at ages 20 and above, a relatively large proportion is still in secondary and not in tertiary education. Also among immigrants from Turkey, the enrolment rates at 20 and above are rather low, but for them, this does not imply the same delay as among Somalis.

The gender gap in table 4.4 is very much the same as in table 4.1. Also in tertiary education, the enrolment rates for immigrants are higher for men than for women from Pakistan and Vietnam, in age 20-24 as well as 25-29. We find the opposite situation for all groups, except Somalis of age 25-29 and Turks 20-24. For the groups of descendants we can observe, descendants of Pakistani and Vietnamese background show a small male majority among students at age 25-29. At age 20-24, the female participation rate is clearly higher than the male rate, for the total population and for most of the descendant groups. Norwegian media are often giving the impression that among descendants, the enrolment rate is much higher for women than for men, but table 4.4 shows that the gender difference is less among most descendant groups than among those of Norwegian origin.

There are large differences in level of enrolment between the countries. Immigrant males from Vietnam and Iran are above the national male average in Norway, all female immigrants except Iranians of age 25-29 are below. Especially two groups, immigrants from Turkey and Somalia, are well below the national average. The low rate for Somalis, with their recent immigration history, is easier to understand than the low rate for the Turks.

For those descendants that we are able to observe, we see that the differences in enrolment rates between the nationalities is less significant than among the immigrants themselves. Most groups, male as well as female, are well above the national average for their age group. Again, Turkey is the only major exception. Their enrolment rate was increasing before 2008, and we have seen in later statistics that their gap to the national average is closing quickly.

<sup>3</sup> Ratio is calculated as the enrolment rate of women divided by the enrolment rate of men. A ratio below 1 means men's enrolment rate is higher than that of women. A ratio above 1 means enrolment rate of women is higher than that of men.

The gender gap is high in the Norwegian national average, for the descendants and immigrants it is in general less pronounced, and it varies between the nationalities.

**Table 4.4. The share of 20-24 and 25-29 years old immigrants and descendants enrolled in tertiary education, by sex and country of origin. Percent. 1. October 2008. Norway**

	20-24 years			25-29 years		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
<b>Immigrants</b>						
Iran .....	29,6	26,6	32,9	27,3	24,6	29,9
Iraq .....	13,8	11	17,2	10	7,8	12,7
Pakistan .....	19,5	21,9	17,6	11,7	14,6	9,3
Somalia .....	9,1	8,3	10,2	3,7	4,9	2,5
Turkey .....	12,8	13,4	12,2	5,2	3,6	7
Vietnam .....	27,4	29	26,2	11,3	13,6	9,8
<b>Descendants</b>						
Iran .....	44,1	33,3	56,3	:	:	:
Iraq .....	:	:	:	:	:	:
Pakistan .....	36	30,8	41,6	14,2	14,8	13,5
Somalia .....	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey .....	23,7	21,4	26	8,1	6,5	9,8
Vietnam .....	49,5	44,5	54,6	20,7	21,8	19,5
Norwegian origin .....	35,5	27,9	43,5	16,2	13,9	18,5
Total population .....	33,7	26,7	40,9	15	13	17

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway

Table 4.5 shows the *growth in the enrolment rate* in tertiary education from 1998 to 2008, for those between 20 and 30 years of age. Most groups of immigrants and descendants have had an increasing rate of participation. The same can be seen on a modest scale for the national average, but due only to an increase in the female participation rates. For immigrants from Vietnam, we register a modest decline in the rates for those at the beginning as well as at the end of their twenties. The level is quite high, but other groups (Iranians for instance) are on a higher level, and still with strongly increasing rates. Thus, it seems difficult to see this as an indication that groups might have reached some kind of “mature” level of participation. For Iranian immigrants, the increase is particularly among women, and they have reached levels above the Norwegian average both for immigrants and descendants. The difference in level and growth between Iranians and Iraqis is strong and seems to be increasing, and not decreasing as we could expect from their immigration history. Even though the increase in participation in tertiary education has been strong among most groups of immigrants, table 4.4 reminds us that there still is a wide gap to the national average, for many groups of immigrants.

**Table 4.5. Growth in the share of 20-24 and 25-29 years-old immigrants and descendants enrolled in tertiary education, by sex and country of origin, from 1998 to 2008. Percentage points. Norway**

	20-24 years			25-29 years		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
<b>Immigrants</b>						
Iran	8,3	-1	17,9	6	1,3	10,6
Iraq	5,9	4,4	8,4	2,5	1,5	3,8
Pakistan	12,8	13,5	12,4	6,3	7,6	5,4
Somalia	4,3	2,7	6,4	-0,4	-3,5	2
Turkey	8	9,1	6,9	2,7	0,5	5,2
Vietnam	-0,7	1,9	-3	-1	-2,3	0,9
<b>Descendants</b>						
Iran	:	:	:	:	:	:
Iraq	:	:	:	:	:	:
Pakistan	14,3	7,7	21,5	2	4,3	-0,1
Somalia	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey	9	13,2	4,2	:	:	:
Vietnam	18,2	:	:	:	:	:
Norwegian origin	1,4	-1,2	4,2	1,9	0,6	3,1
Total population	0,8	-1,6	3,3	1,1	0	2,2

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway

The descendants are so young that we can register changes in their rates from 1998 to 2008 only for those of Pakistani origin, and for the youngest from Turkey and Vietnam. The increase among the 20-24 year olds has been astonishing, and brought those from Pakistan and Vietnam to levels on or above the Norwegian average, whereas descendants with a background from Turkey still have a ways to go, but the gap seems to be closing. Among descendants with Pakistani background, the participation rate has doubled from 1998 to 2008, to a level corresponding with popular statements that the young Pakistani descendant women will be the new leaders of this group. Among descendants aged 25-29, we can calculate changes only for those with Pakistani background. The increase for that age group has been quite modest, but with the strong increase in their early twenties, one could expect the increase to continue as they get older. The growth in table 4.5 is also an illustration that growth in education enrolment rates can also come for rather mature immigrant groups; it will take time before immigrants and descendants reach the same level of education as the natives, but we can see that many (not all) groups are on their way to achieving this goal.

In table 4.6 we have calculated the *ratios of enrolment rates for women to men in tertiary education*, for the years 1998, 2003 and 2008. Based the total population and the natives, we can see that there is a strong gender imbalance in enrolment rates, women are more often enrolled than men and the difference increases with time and diminish by age.

**Table 4.6. The ratio of the enrolment rate of women to men in tertiary education of 20-24 and 25-29 year old immigrants and descendants, by country of origin.1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway**

	20-24 years			25-29 years		
	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008
<b>Immigrants</b>						
Iran .....	0,54	1,02	1,24	0,67	0,71	1,18
Iraq .....	1,33	1,76	1,56	0,58	1,63	1,22
Pakistan .....	0,62	0,68	0,8	0,39	0,59	0,58
Somalia .....	0,68	0,67	1,23	0,06	0,39	0,51
Turkey .....	1,23	1,43	0,91	0,58	1,28	1,94
Vietnam .....	1,07	0,85	0,9	0,56	0,76	0,72
<b>Descendants</b>						
Iran .....	:	:	1,69	:	:	:
Iraq .....	:	:	:	:	:	:
Pakistan .....	0,91	1,18	1,35	1,3	0,91	0,91
Somalia .....	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey .....	2,65	2,08	1,21	:	0,5	1,51
Vietnam .....	:	1,16	1,23	:	:	0,89
Norwegian origin .....	1,35	1,43	1,56	1,16	1,16	1,33
Total population .....	1,33	1,4	1,53	1,13	1,15	1,31

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway

The main aspects of the pattern described for the majority, can be observed among immigrants and descendants as well, but some differences are apparent. For the latest year, among immigrants only three of the countries have female majority at the universities, those from Iran and Iraq for both age groups, Somalis for the youngest one and Turks for the older. The difference is fluctuating between the observation years, probably due to small groups under observation. In 1998, there was a clear male majority among immigrant students of age 25-29 in all national groups, but declining as the groups had been in Norway for a longer period. It is quite surprising to notice that the highest female majority at the universities among students of age 25-29, we find among immigrants from Turkey.

Descendants do not show a very regular pattern, due also to stochastic variation in small groups. For the younger, and more numerous, groups, there is a female majority for all groups after 1998. The difference varies from country to country and from year to year, but the average resembles the national average for Norway. For the older group, four of six observations show a male majority. This can be related to later re-entry into education for some male descendants.

### 4.3. Enrolment in academically oriented courses

In table 4.7, we focus on the *proportion enrolled in academically oriented courses* at secondary level. There is always a possibility to change direction, but this proportion is a fairly good indicator of the share preparing themselves for academic studies after completed secondary education. For most immigrants and descendants, and for the national total, it is more common for girls than for boys to prepare for academic studies. Generally, girls do much better in school than boys, and at the same time their choice of vocational courses might be considered to be more limited. For immigrants and descendants from Iran and Vietnam, the share in academically oriented courses is well above the national average. The same goes for descendants from Iraq, and from Pakistan and Somalia. This is another indication of Pakistanis changing their preferences towards a more academic orientation than before. The number of Somali descendants is quite low, and they are children of the first Somali immigrants to Norway. Still, this is a sign that those born in Norway with Somali parents do not follow the pattern of the immigrants, as showed in this table. The share of Somali boys enrolled in academically oriented programs is more than 50 percent above the national average for boys. We notice that the shares for the total population and those of Norwegian origin is the same, meaning that those with and without immigrant background have the same share enrolled in academic programs.

**Table 4.7. Share of 16-19 year old immigrants and descendants enrolled in academically oriented programs, by sex and country of origin 1. October 2008, and enrolment growth rate 1998-2008. Per cent. Norway**

	Share 2008			Growth 1998-2008		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
<b>Immigrants</b>						
Iran .....	45,7	39	53	-3,7	-8,2	-1,4
Iraq .....	29,2	26,4	53,7	-0,8	-0,9	-0,6
Pakistan .....	37,9	36	39,8	4	-3,2	11,2
Somalia .....	24,4	22,3	26,6	0,2	-1,9	2,4
Turkey .....	21,8	23,9	19,6	2,6	8,9	-3,5
Vietnam .....	42	37,4	46,5	3,9	0,5	7,2
<b>Descendants</b>						
Iran .....	59,1	60,1	58	:	:	:
Iraq .....	47,5	41,4	53,3	:	:	:
Pakistan .....	48,5	45,9	51,2	5,1	3,4	7
Somalia .....	51,3	55,7	46,9	:	:	:
Turkey .....	35,5	30,6	40,6	14,4	14,3	14,8
Vietnam .....	52,7	49,4	56,5	-2,9	-4,2	1,1
Norwegian origin .....	40	34,2	46,2	0,4	-0,3	1,3
Total population .....	39,9	34,3	45,8	0,4	-0,3	1,3

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway

The growth in these shares from 1998 to 2008 can be estimated only for three groups of descendants, and the growth differs between the countries. There is an increasing proportion enrolled in academically oriented programs for immigrants from Pakistan (girls) and Vietnam, and for descendants from Pakistan, and in particular from Turkey. Turks, both immigrants and descendants have for a long time not been very active in academic educations, but this might be a sign of a new situation. The national total has almost the same share in 1998 and 2008.

In table 4.8 we are studying the *share enrolled in vocational training*. Normally, we will find students in vocational training in their late teens, and we will put most emphasis on this group. Differences in shares for the total population between the Scandinavian countries might be a result of differences in the school systems, although the ISCED codes are supposed to take care of these. The differences between the countries of origin are much less than for academic orientations (table 4.7), but the share in vocational training among Vietnamese immigrants is clearly lower than the others. Contrary to the previous table, there is a male dominance in almost every group, stronger among those of Norwegian origin than among any other group. The share for both sexes taken together, shows a dominance of

academic orientation among all descendant groups, except Turkey. For the immigrants, vocational courses are more frequent than academic ones among immigrants from Iraq and Turkey.

**Table 4.8. Share of 16-19 and 20-24 year old male and female immigrants and descendants enrolled in vocational education (ISCED 3C and 4C), by country of origin. Per cent. 1. October 2008. Norway**

	16-19 years			20-24 years		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
<b>Immigrants</b>						
Iran .....	28,6	33,4	23,3	6,3	8,2	4,1
Iraq .....	38,7	40,9	35,9	11,2	10,9	11,5
Pakistan .....	27,4	29,1	25,9	3,8	4,4	3,4
Somalia .....	23,8	24,6	22,9	10,9	12,9	8,4
Turkey .....	28,4	28,2	28,6	4,9	6	3,8
Vietnam .....	19,6	21,1	18,1	7,6	8,2	7,2
<b>Descendants</b>						
Iran .....	21,8	22,5	21,0	5,9	5,6	6,3
Iraq .....	32,2	34,5	30	:	:	:
Pakistan .....	24,6	27,9	21,3	4,1	4,6	3,5
Somalia .....	13,8	14,4	13,3	:	:	:
Turkey .....	35,8	41,9	29,4	8,8	10,9	6,6
Vietnam .....	28,6	31,1	25,7	5,9	8,4	3,3
Norwegian origin .....	40,2	47,3	32,7	8,6	10,7	6,5
Total population .....	39,1	45,8	32	8,3	10,3	6,3

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway

For the age 20-24, the rates are much lower, and closer to the Norwegian average. For some newly arrived groups, the share in age 20-24 is quite high (from Iraq and Somalia). Newly arrived immigrants will often have a delayed educational carrier, as we can trace here. There is a gender difference for all groups, more boys than girls, of immigrant origin or not, in vocational training. The differences, however, are quite small for the descendants.

**Table 4.9. Growth 1998-2008 in the share of 16-19 and 20-24 year old male and female immigrants and descendants enrolled in vocational education, by country of origin. Percentage points. Norway**

	16-19 years			20-24 years		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
<b>Immigrants</b>						
Iran .....	8,8	12,1	5	-0,9	1,4	-3,4
Iraq .....	18,9	18,2	19,6	4,2	2,3	6,6
Pakistan .....	-0,6	1,4	-3,4	-1,5	-0,8	-2
Somalia .....	0	0,1	0,2	-1,6	-1,6	-1,8
Turkey .....	2,5	-1,9	6,7	0,7	1	0,4
Vietnam .....	-12,5	-8,6	-16,1	-3,7	-9,8	-2,4
<b>Descendants</b>						
Iran .....	:	:	:	:	:	:
Iraq .....	:	:	:	:	:	:
Pakistan .....	-2,1	0,4	-4,6	-5	-5,1	-5
Somalia .....	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey .....	-4,4	-6,2	-3,2	1,9	4,3	-0,7
Vietnam .....	1,9	2,3	1,1	-6,6	-4,1	-9,2
Norwegian origin .....	-0,5	2	-3,1	0,6	1,2	0,1
Total population .....	-0,8	1,4	-3,2	0,4	0,9	0

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway

The growth from 1998 to 2008 in share enrolled in vocational training differs quite a bit for the groups in table 4.9. The total population shows very stable shares, and with an increase in enrolment rates for men but not for women. Immigrants from Iraq have had a strong increase in particular among 16-19 year olds, related to increase in their average duration of stay. Even Iranian immigrants have had a clear increase among the younger immigrants. Young immigrants from Vietnam have had a strong decline in share participating in vocational training, in both age groups. Other immigrants had small changes. The changes in enrolment rates in vocational training in table 4.9 are for many groups larger than the changes in

academically oriented programs in table 4.7. For descendants, we can observe a decline in vocational training for the younger age groups from Turkey. This has to be seen in relation to the strong increase for Turkish descendants in academically oriented programs in table 4.7. Pakistani and Vietnamese descendants at age 20-24 have declining rates in vocational training, but as we remember from table 4.8, the level is quite low at this age.

#### 4.4. Summary

The educational system is a gateway to successful integration for immigrants, since education opens for freedom of choice of future work (and income) for most young people in a society like the Scandinavian. In this chapter we have described the participation in the educational system for immigrants and descendants from six countries.

*The level of participation varies much more for immigrants than for descendants, partly related to differences in duration of stay. The low level of educational activity among Somali immigrants can partly be seen as a consequence of many recent arrivals. Immigrants from Iran have by far the highest level of activity. In the oldest age groups, they have a higher participation rate than the Norwegian average, for both sexes. For descendants numerous enough to be included in the analysis, the level differs less between the nationalities. Again, rates for Turks are lower than the others. The other groups all have participation rates around or above the Norwegian average. In most groups, including the Norwegian totals, the female participation rate is higher than the male. Among immigrants above the age of 20, the pattern is more mixed. For descendants, this pattern is broken only at ages above 25.*

The gender differences in educational enrolment is interesting, and we have also illustrated how it changed between 1998 and 2008. Among immigrants aged 16-19 from Iran, Iraq and Vietnam, almost every female/male ratio is above 1,0. That means that more women than men are enrolled. At the end of the period (2008), women have higher rates than men for all countries of origin, except Turkey. For immigrants older than 19, the female rate of enrolment is consistently lower than the male rate for those from Pakistan and Somalia. The Pakistani pattern might be connected with the fact that immigrants arriving from Pakistan in ages around or above 20, often come to marry Pakistanis already living in Norway. For most groups of descendants there is a small female majority in education, as for the Norwegian average.

The majority of those enrolled at age 20-24 and 25-29, are in tertiary education. However, among the Somali immigrants in education at ages 20 and above, a relatively large proportion is still in secondary and not in tertiary education. Also among immigrants from Turkey, the enrolment rates at 20 and above are rather low, but for them, this does not imply the same delay as among Somalis.

The gender gap in tertiary education is very much the same as in secondary education. Also in tertiary education, the enrolment rates for immigrants are higher for men than for women from Pakistan and Vietnam. We find the opposite situation for most other groups. For the groups of descendants we can observe, descendants of Pakistani and Vietnamese background show a small male majority among students at age 25-29. At age 20-24, the female participation rate is clearly higher than the male rate. The gender difference is smaller among most descendant groups than among those of Norwegian origin.

Immigrant males from Iran, Pakistan and Vietnam have higher participation rates in age 25-29 than the national male average in Norway, while all female immigrants except Iranians in aged 25-29 have a lower rate than the national female average. Especially two groups, immigrants from Turkey and Somalia, are well below the national average.

Again, for descendants that we are able to observe, we see that the differences in enrolment rates between the nationalities is less significant than among the immigrants themselves. Most groups, male as well as female, are well above the national average for their age group, with Turkey as the only major exception. The gender gap is high in the Norwegian national average, for the descendants and immigrants it is in general less pronounced, and it varies between the nationalities.

Most immigrant groups and descendants have experienced an increased rate of participation in education in the decade 1998 to 2008. For the descendants we can follow changes in the rates from 1998 to 2008 only for some groups. The increase among the 20-24 year olds has been astonishing, and brought those from Pakistan and Vietnam to levels on or above the Norwegian average, whereas descendants with a background from Turkey still have a way to go.

For the total population and the natives, we can observe a strong gender imbalance in enrolment rates for tertiary education, throughout the decade. Women are more often enrolled than men and the difference increases with time and decrease with age. The pattern of the majority can be observed among immigrants and descendants as well, but some differences are apparent. It is quite surprising to notice that the highest female majority at the universities among students of age 25-29, we find among immigrants from Turkey.

Those with and without immigrant background have the same proportion enrolled in academic programs at secondary level. For most immigrant and descendant groups, and for the national total, it is more common for girls than for boys to prepare for academic studies. For immigrants and descendants from Iran and Vietnam, the share in academically oriented courses is well above the national average. The same goes for descendants from Iraq, and from Pakistan and Somalia. This is another indication of Pakistanis changing their preferences towards a more academic orientation than before. The number of Somali descendants is quite low. Still, this is a sign that those born in Norway with Somali parents do not follow the pattern of the immigrants in their preference for academic training. The share of Somali boys enrolled in academically oriented programs is more than 50 percent above the national average for boys. The differences between the countries of origin in share enrolled in vocational training are much less than for academic orientations, but the share in vocational training among Vietnamese immigrants is clearly lower than the others. There is a male dominance in almost every group, stronger among those of Norwegian origin than among any other group.

## 5. Labour market integration

### 5.1. Introduction.

The goal for the integration policies for immigrants is to see immigrants well included in the labour market (NOU 2011:7 and 14). And the labour market situation of descendants is seen as the litmus test of these policies. Good performance in the educational system is a prerequisite for a successful integration in the labour market, success in education alone will probably not be seen as enough for successful integration. Thus, we will in this chapter study the employment for the different groups of immigrants and descendants and compare with the national employment. Unemployment is also described. To be unemployed means that there is an interest to be employed, and attempts to enter the labour market will be done. Worse off are those who are not active in any economic meaning of the word, not in education, not in work and not unemployed. In our presentation, we will also give this group a certain attention. This group is often not identified in labour market analyses, but the register statistical system in the Scandinavian countries gives us a basis for such analyses. When we compare results based on register data and on survey data (LFS), the latter will be richer in variables but the high and selective non-response in sample surveys will limit the usefulness of LFS-data for labour market analyses and comparisons for migrant workers.

The labour market situation for immigrants has been included in the register-based labour market statistics since the “new” immigration started in the early 1970s. The labour migrants arriving for work had high employment rates the first years in the country, in jobs that had low or no requirements for formal education or qualifications. These were often physically quite demanding jobs, and they were quite marginal in the Norwegian labour market. As the number of such jobs were declining, not everyone who was made redundant had easy access to jobs in the expanding (more modern and qualification-oriented) segments of the labour market. Consequently, the employment rates declined in many groups. After the immigration ban of 1975, the inflow of new labour migrants was halted, but family members (most often wives and minor children) were allowed to enter. Understandably, the labour force participation rate for these women was quite low. They came from countries with no tradition for female work in the modern labour market, to Nordic countries with among the highest female labour force participation in the World.

A further contribution to declining immigrant employment rate was the situation for the refugees, who had an increasing significance in Norway from the late 1970s. Refugees from Asia and Africa often had a traumatic background, and their qualifications were not well fit for our labour market, often not recognised at all. It took time to acquire working level knowledge of the Norwegian language, and these groups of refugees had low employment rates. It was probably not fully understood that these low rates partly were related to duration of stay. In 1990, the employment rates for Vietnamese immigrants were even lower than the Somali rate for 2011, but they are now well above the average for Asian immigrants.


### 5.2. Employment rates 1998-2008

In all figures, we give employment rates for men and women separately. The gender differences are basic, and should be possible to study everywhere. Figure 5.1 presents the employment rate for female immigrants, and for the total population. The age group is 25-54, the core age for labour force participation. The level of participation is very high in the Scandinavian countries, compared to the rest of Europe. It is in all European countries difficult for groups immigrating for other purposes than work, to reach that level (OECD 2012). More than 80 per cent of women aged 25-54 in the population of Norway is employed, 15-20 per cent above the level of Vietnamese and Iranian women. Both groups consist mainly of



refugees and their family members, and they have stayed in Norway for quite some time. The educational background from home differs; very low for Vietnamese and comparatively high for Iranians (Blom and Henriksen 2009). Immigrants from Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan are 40-50 percentage points below the Norwegian female average in employment rates. Pakistani immigrants are the oldest immigrant group in Norway, but the employment rate among women from Pakistan is still very low. Immigrant women from Somalia have an employment rate almost 60 percentage points below the average in Norway. This can partly be attributed to their recent arrival, but it will need strong efforts to bring them to the level of the Vietnamese women.

**Figure 5.1. Employment rate for female immigrants aged 25-54, by country of birth, and total population. Per cent. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway**




Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway

We can see a systematic increase for all groups from 1998 to 2008, of between 10 and 20 percentage points. The increase among Pakistani women is on par with the Norwegian average of 10 percentage points, the other groups lie between 10 and 20. As the proportion of newly arrived declines, Iraqi women show a very positive development. The strong increase in employment for all groups is closely related to the increasing demand for labour in the Norwegian labour market.

In Figure 5.2, we have the corresponding rates for men. For the total population, male rates are slightly higher than female rates. The differences between activity rates for male immigrants and the male total are lower than between female immigrants and the female total. Again, Somali immigrants are in the lower end, for males 40 percentage points below the average. The rest are between 15 and 30 percentage points below. An employment level around 60 per cent is not too bad in a comparative perspective, we can find countries in Europe with a national average on that level (Eurostat 2012).

There are substantially higher employment rates for men than for women, in all immigrant groups. In the national average, the difference is only 5 percent. As for many other social indicators, the gender difference is pretty small among Iranians (Blom and Henriksen 2009), less than 10 percentage points. The difference between male and female employment rates is at maximum almost 40 percentage points, for Pakistanis. For men as well as for women the rates are lower for Somali than for any other group. The rates indicate that large numbers of Somali families are without any income earned from employed persons, with the consequences that will have for the level of poverty (Henriksen et al. 2011).

**Figure 5.2. Employment rate for male immigrants aged 25-54 by country of birth, and total population. Per cent. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway**




Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway

For the total population, the growth in male employment from 1998 is not as strong as for females. Still, there is a consistent increase in all groups, in particular among Iraqi immigrants, with their increasing duration of stay. Also for the well established groups of Pakistani men, the increase has been substantial. Their level is close to the level of Vietnamese men, but Pakistani female immigrants have only half the employment rate of Vietnamese-origin women.

The *gender employment gap* (figure 5.3) is only 5 per cent for the total population, much lower than for most of the immigrant groups. Immigrants from Iran and Vietnam have for 2008 a gap not very much wider (8 per cent). Iraq, Somalia and Turkey have a gap of 20 per cent, and the Pakistani gap is still twice that level. The gender gap was rather stable for the period, all countries taken together, closing for Vietnamese and widening for Iraqis.

**Figure 5.3. Gender gap in employment rate for male immigrants by country of birth, and total population, ages 25-54. Percentage points. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway**




Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway

### 5.3. Employment for young people 1998-2008

For young people, we also have the possibility to compare immigrants with descendants, at least for some groups, and more groups in 2008 than in the two


preceding years. Comparing figure 5.1 with figure 5.4, we can observe that the differences between the countries of origin are smaller for those 16-24 years old than for adults. Immigrant females of age 16-24 from Somalia had an employment rate 35 percentage points below the national level, whereas the difference was almost 60 for adults (figure 5.1). The other groups lie between 20 percentage points below and the national average. Young Vietnamese immigrant women are on the same level as the national average. In spite of their successful participation in education, Pakistani women are still well below the average. All groups and the total have a strong increase in the employment rate from 1998 to 2008, Iraqi female immigrants from 10 to 40 percent.

**Figure 5.4. Employment rate for female immigrants by country of birth, and total population, ages 16-24. Per cent. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway**



Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway

**Figure 5.5. Employment rate for male immigrants by country of birth, and total population, ages 16-24. Per cent. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway**



Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway

For young *male immigrants* (figure 5.5), the employment rate is 50-60 per cent for all groups in 2008, except, again, the Somali. They have only half of that level. For some groups, those from Iran, Iraq and Vietnam in particular, there has been a strong increase of around 20 percentage points in employment rates for the age group 16-24 in the period 1998-2008. Even for the total population, the increase has been around 15 percentage points, related to the strong and increasing demand for labour in the Norwegian labour market.


The *gender gap* (not shown) is much smaller than in the prime working age, and it is close to zero for the total population of age 16-24, and for immigrants from Vietnam and Iran. If the difference between the younger immigrants and those of the prime working age can be interpreted as a sign of the behaviour of the young as they grow older, this difference can be seen as an indication that the immigrants are coming closer to the Norwegian average with time.

We will look for the same indications when we now focus on the descendants. For descendants we have enough observations to give rates for all three years only for those with Pakistani, Turkish and Vietnamese background. For Iranian and Somali descendants, we can observe only 2008, and we do not have enough descendants from Iraq to give any rates. The level for the total population of women 16-24 years of age was around 65, slightly below (!) the rate for descendants from Vietnam (figure 5.6). All groups of female descendants lie above or well above the level of the immigrants of the same age (compare figure 5.6 to 5.4). Those with high rates for immigrants show a slightly higher level for descendants, while those with a low level among immigrants have a considerably higher level for the descendants. Somali female descendants had the lowest level, but with an employment rate of 50 per cent they do almost as well as other descendants in the labour market. The increase from 1998 to 2008 is not as pronounced as among immigrants of the same age (16-24), but the increase for descendants from Vietnam and Pakistan is significant, Turk descendants are on a stable, but high level.

Figure 5.7 gives the *employment rates for male descendants* aged 16-24. None of the nationalities reach the same level as the national average for men 16-24 (65 per cent); in 2008 all five nationalities have employment rates around 55 - 60 per cent. Remarkably, there is virtually no difference between male descendants of age 16-24 from these five countries. The rates for 2008 are higher than for the previous years, with strongest increase for Vietnamese descendants, who had very low employment in 1998.


The very positive development in the Norwegian labour market could be the reason both for the increase in almost all rates in the preceding paragraphs, and also important for the evening out of the differences between the different countries of origin.

**Figure 5.6. Employment rate for female descendants of immigrants by parents' country background, ages 16-24. Per cent. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway**



Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway

**Figure 5.7. Employment rate for male descendants of immigrants parents' country background, ages 16-24. Per cent. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway**




Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway

### 5.4. Employment by cohort 1998-2008

Some of the differences from 1998 to 2008 can be the result of a change in the composition of the country groups, for instance that young adult immigrants from Somalia in 1998 came from other situations in their home country than those arriving in 2008. That is, the selection processes might have changed. To reduce that problem, we will in figure 5.8 and 5.9 show employment rates on a cohort basis. We start with immigrants of age 25-39 in 1998, and follow them trough age 30-44 in 2003 to the age 35-49 in 2008. There has of course been a certain immigration in all groups, and also outmigration, but this is a rather simple way to give an alternative description of the development over time.

**Figure 5.8. Employment rate among female immigrants by country of origin, and total population, age 25-39 in 1998 and measured in 2003 and 2008. Per cent. Norway**



Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway


The employment rate for women in Norway aged 25-39 in 1998 has increased by 14 percentage points to 2008, where they were 35-49 years of age (figure 5.8). This increase is partly related to improvements in the Norwegian labour market, but the changes in age of youngest child and in family care responsibilities from 25-39 to 35-49 are probably more important. Norwegian family policy has as a goal to make

it possible to combine work and family (Lappegård, 2010). Any effects of such a policy should be easiest to spot for the age group under consideration.

Many women have left their child-bearing period and returned to (or entered) the labour market. The same process is of course taking place among immigrants. As we could expect by now, the increase in employment rate is strong and the gap to the national average is closing for immigrant women from Vietnam and Iran. Iraqi women have also had an increase larger than the national, but from a very low level. For immigrant women from Pakistan, Turkey and Somalia, the gap is widening, even though we can observe an increase in level of around 10 per cent. That might be a result of immigrant women from these countries having larger families, and that their fertility towards the end of their reproductive period is relatively high (see comments to table 3.13). For Somali, the immigration in this age group has been high, making increasing labour participation more difficult.

For men (figure 5.9) we can also see an increase in employment from year to year, but not on the level of the women. Men in the total population had an increase of around 10 per cent, from below 80 to close to 90 per cent. The gap was narrowed for men from Iraq and Iran, but not for the rest. For most groups, we can see an increase in employment rate from 1998 to 2003 and further to 2008, with an exception for Somali men. High immigration from Somalia throughout the period might be related to that decline. The difference between employment rates for men for the seven groups is clearly less than the difference for women.

**Figure 5.9.** Employment rate among male immigrants by country of origin, and total population, age 25-39 in 1998 and measured in 2003 and 2008. Per cent. Norway




Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway

The gender gap is, as we have noticed already, high for some countries, but not for all. When comparing figure 5.8 and 5.9, we can supplement the comments given to figure 5.3. Even when we follow the same cohort from 1998 to 2008, the Pakistani gender gap is still 40 percentage points, and stable. Iraq, Somalia and Turkey have half that level, and with minor changes in the period. For Vietnamese, the gap has been reduced to 10 percentage points. For the total population, the gap is reduced from 8 to 4 percentage points, and for Iranians almost the same, from 11 to 6. This means that the picture given by comparing cross-sectional data for 25-54 year olds is the same as the one given by the cohort approach for 25-39 olds in 1998, for all groups with a high gender gap in 1998. For all groups with broad gender gap in 1998, it seems that the gap is quite robust. It has been reduced significantly only for the Vietnamese. Those with the narrowest gender gap, the total population and the Iranians, show closing gender gaps for the 25-39 cohort, but not in comparisons of cross-sectional data for persons aged 25-54.

For descendants, we can produce such numbers only for those of Pakistani origin. The gender gap for Pakistani immigrants was 40 per cent throughout the period. For the descendants 25-39 years of age in 1998, it went down from 20 percentage points in 1998 to “only” 7 percentage points in 2008. Thus, the Pakistani descendants do not seem to copy the employment gender pattern of their parental generation. For both men and women the employment rates (unemployed as per cent of the total population, not of the labour force) for this cohort were only a 2-4 percentage points below the national average.

In a situation with almost full employment, like in Norway, the unemployment figures do not have the same meaning as in other contexts. There are, however, some aspects of the unemployment pattern that are worth noticing. The unemployment in Norway is traditionally among the lowest in Europe, and the *unemployment rate for women* is down under 2 per cent in 2008 (figure 5.10). In 2003 it was 2,5 percent. In 1998, the unemployment was not included in the register, and we are not able to include that year in these kinds of tables. For immigrant women, the unemployment is several times higher, but still not higher than between 5 and 10 per cent. The level is in most groups lower in 2008 than in 2003.

**Figure 5.10. Unemployment rate for female immigrants by country of birth, and total**



Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway

**Figure 5.11. Unemployment rate for male immigrants by country of birth, and total population, ages 25-54. Per cent. 2003 and 2008. Norway**




Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway

The *male unemployment rate* (figure 5.11) is close to the female one for the total, but for immigrant men from Somalia, the rates are higher than for their female counterparts. I take this as a sign that they are trying to enter the labour market after finalising their Introduction Programme (see Enes and Henriksen 2012). Somali men have lower employment rate than most other group after having finalised that programme, and as we can notice, higher unemployment. For the other nationalities, the gender difference is minor, and Pakistani men are below the level of Pakistani women. From 2003 to 2008, the unemployment rate has been reduced for all groups, notably for Iraqis and Vietnamese.


In a country like Norway with high rates of participation in education for teenagers and persons in their early twenties, the *youth unemployment rates* will be low. For women of age 16-24, the unemployment rate (see figure 5.12) is only 1,5 per cent for the total population in 2008. It is several times higher for immigrants, but still the level is only between 3 and 5 per cent. The differences between the countries of origin are minor, and all rates are lower in 2008 than in 2003.

**Figure 5.12. Unemployment rate for female immigrants by country of birth and total population, ages 16-24. Per cent. 2003 and 2008. Norway**



Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway

**Figure 5.13. Unemployment rate for male immigrants and total population, by country of birth, ages 16-24. Per cent. 2003 and 2008. Norway**




Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway




The *unemployment rate for young men* (see figure 5.13) is for the total slightly higher (2 per cent) than for women (1,5 per cent). The situation is the same for the young immigrant males and females. Basically, the levels are low. Still, unemployment is higher among the newly arrived than for others. The rates have declined from 2003 to 2008 for all groups, but again Somali immigrants are worse of than the other groups, and the difference can not be explained by the proportion newly arrived alone. Young male immigrants from Pakistan, Iran and Vietnam have unemployment rates around or below 3 per cent, not much more than the national average.

**Figure 5.14. Unemployment rate for female descendants, by country background, age 16-24. Per cent. 2003 and 2008. Norway**



Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway

**Figure 5.15. Unemployment rate for male descendants, by country background, ages 16-24. Per cent. 2003 and 2008. Norway**



Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway

For the descendants, we have enough observations only for those with a background from Pakistan, Turkey and Vietnam. For the totals, unemployment for females aged 16-24 was down from 2 per cent in 2003 to 1,5 in 2008. Turkish *female descendants* were above that level, Pakistani came down to that level in 2008, and for Iranian and Vietnamese female descendant, no unemployment was registered in 2008. These groups are not that large, but still there were 400 female descendants in this age in 2003, and more than 800 in 2008 from Vietnam. Iranians can be observed only for 2008, and they were 400 female descendants at that time, but 85 per cent of them were below the age of 20. None were registered as unemployed.

## 5.5. Economically inactive

In this section, those *not economically active* are in focus. In the terminology used here, this group includes persons who are not registered as employed, are not seeking work (not registered as unemployed), and not attending education. They are typically working in their own homes or in the shadow labour market, they are disabled or have other forms for pensions, or they might be “discouraged workers”. They might have given up the hope of finding a job, or they simply do not want to work in the ordinary labour market. The economically inactive are much more numerous than the unemployed, and consist of many different groups not having found or not being interested in finding a role as economically active in the formal labour market.

Information on the proportion economically inactive in our standard country groups is found in table 5.1. For the total population, the proportion inactive is low in the prime working age, 25-54 years of age. 11 per cent of the men and 15 per cent women were inactive in 2008.

**Table 5.1. Share of 16-24, 25-54 and 55-64-year-old immigrants and total population who were inactive in 2008, by sex and country of origin. Per cent. Norway**

	16-24		16-24		25-54		55-64	
	Immigrants		Descendants		Immigrants		Immigrants	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Iran .....	13	14	0	4	31	25	66	55
Iraq .....	26	18	:	:	51	33	85	69
Pakistan .....	31	22	12	13	57	21	86	61
Somalia .....	44	33	20	20	63	36	92	70
Turkey .....	30	15	16	12	51	28	90	75
Vietnam .....	19	14	5	8	29	21	63	49
<b>Total population ...</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>			<b>15</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>24</b>

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway

For the immigrants, the proportion inactive varies quite a bit. For almost all groups, Somali immigrants have the highest rates. These high levels are partly to be explained by many recent arrivals, and for women also high number of children in the household and many single mothers. Recent arrivals might explain high rates also for Iraqi immigrants. Women have higher non-activity rates than men in almost every group of immigrants, but once again, Iranian immigrants have an insignificant gender gap. The gender gap for Vietnamese is narrower than for most other groups of immigrants.

The non-activity rate in age 55-64 is very high, between 50 and 90 per cent in all immigrant groups, as much as between two and three times the national level for every group. There might be many explanations to this; one is that older immigrants have spent a considerable share of their adult life elsewhere, before starting their way into the Norwegian society. Whatever explanations that are relevant, the proportion not active among immigrant aged 55-64 is a real problem, for the immigrants themselves and for the Norwegian society. The number of immigrants in this age group is not (yet) very high, but it is increasing.

In the prime working age, the inactivity rate is particularly high among women, due to a prolonged period with minor children in the household, and to gender roles quite different from the Norwegian average. Again, the rate is two to four times higher for immigrants than for the national average. The same holds for the younger ones, but for men aged 16-24, the difference is smaller than for women. Family patterns and duration of stay are related to this.

For descendants, however, the picture is much closer to the national average. Descendants with their background from Iran and Vietnam have lower non-activity rates than the average of age 16-24 in Norway, and all descendants have lower rates than the immigrants of the same age and country background. Somali descendants have a level of non-activity far below immigrants of the same age, but

still well above other descendant groups. Gender differences are minor and non-systematic for descendants.

## 5.6. Summary

Integration policy for immigrants is aimed at including immigrants in the labour market. We have looked at three dimensions of inclusion; the employed, the unemployed and those not active either in the labour market or in education.

Compared to the rest of Europe, the level of participation in the labour market is very high in the Scandinavian countries. One can hardly expect that groups immigrating for other purposes than work can reach that level. Women aged 25-54 in the population of Norway have an employment rate 15-20 percentage points higher than that of Vietnamese and Iranian women. Both these groups consist mainly of refugees and their family members, and they have lived in Norway for quite some time, but their educational background from home differs. Immigrants from Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan are 40-50 percentage points below the Norwegian female average in employment rates. Immigrant women from Somalia have an employment rate almost 60 percentage points below the average in Norway. This can partly be attributed to their recent arrival.

For the total population, male employment rates are slightly higher than female rates. The differences between activity rates for male immigrants and the male total are much lower than between female immigrants and the female total. Again, Somali immigrants are in the lower end, for males 40 percentage points below the average. The rest are between 15 and 30 percentage points below.

We can see a systematic increase for all groups from 1998 to 2008, of between 10 and 20 percentage points. The strong increase in employment for all groups is closely related to the increasing demand for labour in the Norwegian labour market. For the total population, the growth in male employment from 1998 is not as strong as for females. Still, there is a consistent increase in all groups, in particular among Iraqi immigrants. Also for the well established groups of Pakistani men, the increase has been substantial. Their level is close to the level of Vietnamese men, but Pakistani female immigrants have only half the employment rate of Vietnamese-origin women, and the growth in their rate has been slower than among other female immigrants.

The gender employment gap is only 5 percentage points for the total population, much lower than for most of the immigrant groups. In 2008, the gap for immigrants from Iran and Vietnam was not much wider (8 percentage points). The gap for Iraq, Somalia and Turkey is 20 percentage points, and the Pakistani gap is still twice that level.

For immigrants aged 16-24, we can observe that the differences between the countries of origin are smaller than for those older than 24. Immigrant females of age 16-24 from Somalia had an employment rate 35 percentage points below the national level, whereas the difference was almost 60 for the older women. The other groups lie between 20 percentage points below the national average. For young male immigrants, the employment rate is 50-60 per cent (compared to national average of 65 per cent) for all groups in 2008, except, again, the Somali. For men from Iran, Iraq and Vietnam, there has been a strong increase of around 20 percentage points in employment rates for the age group 16-24 in the period 1998-2008.

All groups of female descendants lie above the immigrant level at the same age. The level for the total population of women aged 16-24 was around 65 per cent, slightly below the rate for descendants from Vietnam. Those with high rates for immigrants show a slightly higher level for descendants, while those with a low level among immigrants have a considerably higher level for the descendants.

Somali female descendants had the lowest level, but with an employment rate of 50 per cent they do almost as well as other descendants in the labour market.

Among male descendants aged 16-24, none of the descendants reach the national average for men 16-24 (65 per cent); in 2008 all five nationalities have employment rates around 55 - 60 per cent. Remarkably, there is virtually no country difference for male descendants. The rates for 2008 are higher than for the previous years, with strongest increase for Vietnamese descendants, who had very low employment in 1998.

We have compared those aged 25-39 in 1998 with those aged 30-44 in 2003 and 35-49 in 2008. The gap to the national average is closing for immigrant women from Vietnam and Iran. Iraqi women have also experienced an increase larger than the national, but from a very low level. For immigrant women from Pakistan, Turkey and Somalia, the gap is widening, even though we can observe an increase in the level of around 10 per cent. For men we also observe an increase in employment, but not as fast as among women. Men in the total population had an increase of around 10 per cent, from below 80 to close to 90 per cent. The gap was narrowed for men from Iraq and Iran.

The gender gap is high for some countries, but not for all. Even when we follow the same cohort from 1998 to 2008, the Pakistani gender gap is still 40 percentage points, and stable. Iraq, Somalia and Turkey have half that level. For the Vietnamese, the gap has been reduced to 10 percentage points. For the total population, the gap is reduced from 8 to 4 percentage points, and for Iranians almost the same, from 11 to 6.

For descendants, we can produce such numbers only for those of Pakistani origin. For descendants 25-39 years of age in 1998, the gender gap decreased from 20 percentage points in 1998 to "only" 7 percentage points in 2008. Thus, the Pakistani descendants do not seem to copy the employment gender pattern of their parental generation. For both men and women the employment rates for this cohort were only 2-4 percentage points below the national average.

The unemployment rate for young men is for the total population slightly higher than for women. The situation is the same for the young immigrant males and females. Basically, the levels are low. Still, unemployment is higher among the newly arrived than for others. Young male immigrants from Pakistan, Iran and Vietnam have unemployment rates around or below 3 per cent, not much more than the national average. Descendants have low unemployment rates (less than 5 per cent), still above the average of their age group.

For the total population, the proportion economically inactive is low in the prime working age, 11 per cent among men and 15 per cent among women were inactive in 2008. For immigrants, the proportion inactive is generally much higher, and varies quite a bit. For almost all groups, Somali immigrants have the highest rates. Women have higher non-activity rates than men in almost every group. But, Iranian and to a lesser extent, Vietnamese immigrants, have an insignificant gender gap.

The non-activity rate in age 55-64 is very high for all immigrant groups. In the prime working age, the inactivity rate is particularly high among women, due to a prolonged period with minor children in the household, and to gender roles quite different from the Norwegian average. The rate is two to four times higher for immigrants than for the national average.

For descendants, the pattern is much closer to the national average. Descendants with a background from Iran and Vietnam have lower non-activity rates than the average of age 16-24 in Norway. All descendants have lower rates than the immigrants of the same age and country background.

## 6. Summary and conclusions

### 6.1. National context for the analyses

Norway has for a long period considered itself an ethnically homogeneous country. That might not always have been true. During the last four decades, however, there has been an increase in immigration from all regions of the world. Immigrants from 219 countries are represented in Norway at the beginning of 2012. In 1954, the Nordic countries introduced a common labour market where citizens of Nordic country were free to move and take work without any restrictions. Since 1970, Norway has had a net inflow of migrants from all over the world. In 1974 Norway introduced a ban on labour migration to be able to solve the integration problems for immigrants already present in the country, before letting new ones in. The ban was on labour migration, and influenced the composition of the streams more than their size.

Since the immigration ban was introduced, the majority of immigrants from countries outside the EU and North America, have been refugees and asylum seekers, and family members reuniting with or joining (mostly for marriage) persons already present in the country. After the expansion of the EU with ten new member states in 2004 (and 2007), migrant workers from Europe have increasingly dominated the inflow to Norway.

During the post-World War II era, the Norwegian economy has for the most part been very good. At the end of the 1960ies the oil resources of the North Sea shelf were discovered, and for the decades to come, the oil has played a very important, and increasing, role in our economy. Due to the economic resources created by the oil revenues, Norway has been less influenced by the recent financial crises in Europe, especially as economic growth and unemployment is concerned.

The policy regarding the integration of immigrants has for a long time focused on immigrant labour market participation, for a number of good reasons. Based on the fact that the newly arrived migrant workers in the early 1970ies had considerably worse working and living conditions than normally accepted in Norway, a temporary Immigration Ban was introduced in 1974, and made permanent in 1975.

The attitudes towards multiculturalism, and in particular to “diversity”, have been more favourable at a policy level than in the general population. Consequently, there have been discussions for three decades around these concepts. The policy has always been to open up for diversity, with priority given to educational and labour market integration.

In 1970, Norway had 60 000 immigrants and persons born in Norway with two immigrant parents, less than one tenth of the number in 2012. Initially, guest workers arrived in the late 1960ies, then their families, and then came refugees in increasing numbers. The number of descendants have increased from 2 000 in 1970 to more than 100 000 in 2012. The large majority of the descendants (72 per cent) have their background from Africa or Asia, and by far the largest and oldest group is of Pakistani origin.

Among more than 500 000 first time immigrants with a Non-Nordic citizenship who arrived between 1990 and 2011, 37 per cent came for family reasons, 32 per cent came for work and 20 per cent for protection. 125 000 of these have left the country, more work and education migrants than other. Since 2007, labour has been the major reason for immigration comprising slightly less than 50 percent of the immigration permits.

## 6.2. Population dynamics

The immigration history of the six groups - immigrants and descendants with a background from Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam – is essential when studying the demographic development. The immigration of workers from Pakistan and Turkey started around 1970. Turkey is geographically much closer to Norway than is Pakistan, and consequently it has been easier for Turks to remain in contact with their country of origin. Both groups have had rather high, but declining fertility. As they show a strong tendency to marry within their own national background, the number of descendants has been growing steadily since the late 1970ies.

Boat refugees from Vietnam started to arrive towards the end of the 1970ies, and they continued to arrive for more than a decade. Because their fertility is lower than the previous groups, and because fewer among them marry a person of their own background, the number of descendants increases at a lower rate than for Pakistanis and Turks.

Immigrants from Iran are primarily refugees, arriving in modest numbers already in the 1970ies. They have low fertility and are less inclined to marry someone of their own background, so the group has been growing at a rather low rate for a period. If we are to receive an increasing number of refugees from Iran, the growth might be larger in the future.

Immigration from Iraq and Somalia has much in common. For both countries, immigration started in the late 1980ies, and for a while, these countries were major sources of immigration to Norway. Due to continued immigration (more from Somalia than from Iraq), demographic structure and high fertility rates (more so among Somali than Iraqi women), these two groups are fast growing. The large majority marries someone with the same background, and the number of descendants is growing faster than any other group of descendants. Still, immigrants and descendants taken together there are more from Pakistan than from these two countries.

For the groups that can be compared for the first and second five years period, we see a decline in fertility among almost all groups of immigrants and descendants, and more so for Iraqi immigrants than for others. The decline is at all stages in the reproductive period.

Descendants are still young, and those who have married, did so at rather young ages. Those marrying at later ages might follow a different pattern. Descendants from Pakistan and Turkey marry within their own background to the same degree as the immigrants.

Those not marrying a partner with their own background do not adhere to the mainstream behaviour of their group, and are more prone to follow the mainstream pattern in Norway, for instance cohabiting rather than marrying.

The migration pattern of these groups is clearly mirrored in their duration of stay. Integration in the Norwegian society normally improves with duration of stay. The Pakistani and Vietnamese have the longest average duration of stay, men from both countries had on average stayed in Norway for 21 years in 2009. From 2004 to 2009, the average increased with two to four years for all country groups.

Compared to the natives, the population growth of all six national groups is very strong, largely due to their young age structure (many birth, few deaths), marital pattern, high fertility and modest outmigration.

### 6.3. Education

As a basic prerequisite for integration, we have described the participation in the educational system for immigrant and descendant males and females from six countries, and compared them with the total population in the corresponding age groups. Education opens a wide range of choices regarding future work for most young people in a society like the Scandinavian.

When it comes to education, descendants fare much better than immigrants, and the level of participation varies much more for immigrants than for descendants, partly related to differences in duration of stay. The low level of educational activity among Somali immigrants is partly a consequence of many recent arrivals, and partly related to the rudimentary schooling system in Somalia the last decades. Iranians do better in the educational system than most other immigrant groups, and better even than natives in some contexts. For descendants, the level differs less between the nationalities than it does among the immigrants. Again, rates for Turks are often at a lower level than the others. The other groups all have participation rates around or above the average in Norway. In most groups, including the Norwegian totals, the female participation rate is higher than the male. Recently, however, the gap for the Turks seems to be closing.

Contrary to common beliefs, the gender difference is smaller among most descendant groups than among those of Norwegian origin. The increasing rates of participation in education for most groups from 1998 to 2008 has been remarkable, and it depicts a process where immigrants and descendants are approaching, and for some groups and measures, surpasses the native population.

For most immigrant and descendant groups, and for the national total, more girls than boys prepare for academic studies. For immigrants and descendants from Iran and Vietnam, the share in academically oriented courses is well above the national average, as it is also for descendants from Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia. The number of Somali descendants is quite low, but in their preference for academic studies they do not follow the pattern of the immigrant generation.

### 6.4. Labour market

The aim of the integration policies is to see immigrants well included in the labour market, as the labour market often is considered to be the basis for income and recognition, and an important element of one's social life. The labour market situation of descendants is seen as the litmus test of these policies. We have studied the employment of different groups of immigrants and descendants and compared them to the national average. Unemployment is also described. Worse off than the unemployed are those who are not active in any economic meaning of the word, not in education, not in work and not unemployed. This group is also studied.

The immigrants have in almost every group lower employment and higher unemployment and non-activity rates than the total population. The picture is less consistent for immigrants than for descendants. The first labour migrants in the early 1970ies might be an exception. In parallel with increasing numbers of refugees, employment for immigrants declined, and the unemployment increased. High rates of unemployment might be a result of many seeking access to the labour market. But it takes time to find a job, especially if the formal qualifications are foreign to the Norwegian employers. Discrimination may also be a force at work (Midtbøen and Rogstad, 2012).

Gender differences in employment are significant and have consequences for living conditions, and are a sign of lack of equal opportunities. From 1998 to 2008, there has been a strong and consistent increase in employment for both sexes and all countries. However, very few groups reach the Norwegian average, which is among the very highest in Europe. The differences between activity rates for male

immigrants and the male total are lower than between female immigrants and the female total. Somali immigrants are in the lower end, for males 40 percentage points below the average. The other nationalities are between 15 and 30 percentage points below. The employment rates offers challenges for the integration policies, in particular the rates among Somali immigrants and female Pakistani immigrants. Although both groups have a high proportion of newly arrived, Iraqi immigrants are better included in the labour market than the Somalis.

In Norway, the gender employment gap is only 5 per cent, much lower than for most of the immigrant groups in 2008. Immigrants from Iran and Vietnam have a similar gap (8 per cent). Those coming from Iraq, Somalia and Turkey have a gap of 20 per cent, and the Pakistani gap is twice that level. The gender gap was rather stable 1998-2008, in spite of a strong increase in employment.

For those aged 16-24 the differences between the countries of origin are smaller than for those in their prime working age (25-54). Immigrant females aged 16-24 from Somalia had an employment rate 35 percentage points below the national level, whereas the difference was almost 60 for adults. The other groups lie between 20 percentage points below the national average. For young male immigrants, the employment rate is 50-60 per cent for all groups in 2008, except, again, the Somali with only half of that level. The gender gap is much smaller than in the prime working age. Employment rates for descendants come close to the national averages, and the five countries we are able to observe (not Iraq) have almost identical employment rates.

The proportion inactive in some groups is very high, in spite of a series of action plans aimed at finding employment for as many immigrants as possible. More women than men are inactive, and inactivity increases much with age. In 2008, the inactivity rates for immigrants from Somalia were higher than for all other groups. The gender pattern was strong. Descendants, however, come closer to the national average, and some groups are at an even lower level. Gender differences among descendants are minor.

## 6.5. Summary of the development of each of the six national groups

The first immigrants from *Iran* arrived before the fall of the Shah, and they became a sizeable group after the mid 1980ies. The immigration was higher in the first half of the period 1999 – 2008 than in the second. Due to very low fertility and more heterogeneous marriages (few marrying within their group), the number of descendants is clearly lower than any other group. Both immigrants and descendants originating from Iran have very high enrolment rates in education, often higher than natives. At secondary level, they prefer academic oriented programs more than any other group. The gender differences are modest. Immigrants and descendants from Iran have employment rates on par with the highest rates for immigrant groups, still lagging some percentage points behind the natives. The gender balance is better than any other immigrant group, only slightly worse than for the natives. Although high, the proportion inactive is by and large lower among Iranians in all age groups than among other immigrants. Among the descendants with a background in Iran, there are very few who do not work or study.

Immigrants from *Iraq* began arriving after 1985. They are mostly refugees with families, having fled the wars. The inflow has varied much from year to year, but the numbers have been high throughout our period of investigation. In 1999 they were the smallest among the six groups studied here, since 2005 they have been the largest. If including descendants they still rank behind Pakistanis. Their age structure, short duration of stay in Norway, their fertility and strong tendency for homogeneity, all contribute to the increasing numbers of descendants. The school



enrolment rates of Iraqis have increased throughout the period, but still not reached the level of the natives. Both immigrants and descendants have larger shares than others in vocational training. As can be expected for groups with a short duration of stay, the employment rates are low, but increasing. The gender gap is large, but not at all as large as among Pakistani immigrants. Young immigrants seem to do better in the labour market than older immigrants. Descendants are still too young to be present in the labour market. With the exception of the youngest, inactivity rates are very high among Iraqi immigrants.

Immigrants from *Pakistan* were the first to arrive in Norway in large numbers (around 1970), but in spite of their long history in Norway, their integration is not as good as other groups. There are far more descendants of Pakistani origin than from any other country, and their educational activity and labour market participation lags only slightly behind the Norwegian average. The descendants still marry other Pakistanis, but with a higher age at marriage than their parents. Their fertility is close to the national average. For immigrants, the enrolment rate in education has increased significantly in the period 1998-2008, but it is still on a modest level. In tertiary education, Pakistani immigrants have lower enrolment rates than the national level, but among our six groups, they rank behind only Iran, and Vietnam at age 20-24. The employment rates for prime working age men and women from Pakistan have increased in the period 1998-2008, but the gender gap is still around 40 per cent. This has severe consequences for the poverty rate of this group. Duration of stay is no explanation for the low rates. For young immigrants the situation is better, and for descendants the employment rate is close to the national level and the other country groups. Linked to the low employment, the non-activity rate for women is extremely high.

*Somalis* are very new in Norway, and their rates and indicators are strongly influenced by their recent arrival. The situation seems to improve with time, but not as fast and consistent as among the Iraqis. For descendants and younger immigrants, the situation is better than among the older immigrants. Coming from a country without properly functioning governmental institutions, the integration process will have to take time. The inflow has been considerable for many years, and outmigration only occasionally of any importance. Their fertility has been higher than any other group in the period, and the decline is very modest. Partners are almost never of Norwegian background and the descendants are too young to marry. The school enrolment rate for immigrants is very low compared to all other groups. For the small group of pupils aged 16-19, the share seeking academic programmes is surprisingly high, and might indicate that those in their 20ies might attend the universities.

Immigrants from *Turkey* have many characteristics in common with those from Pakistan. They arrived as labour migrants around 1970, joined by family after 1975. Immigrants and descendants from Turkey lag behind Pakistanis in educational enrolment, in spite of their strong increase in participation the last decade. Their participation in the labour market is higher than the Pakistani, due to a higher participation rate among women, and a much smaller gender gap. Young immigrants do better, and the descendants are even closer to the national average. There are, for both countries, gender gaps at all ages, and although smaller, for descendants as well. Except for prime working age women, the non-activity rates are higher among Turks than among Pakistanis. For descendants, the rates are also clearly higher than the national averages.

Immigrants (and descendants) from *Vietnam* have made great strides in their integrational careers, more so than any other group in this study. The large majority arrived as boat refugees after the end of the war in 1975. Their educational background was rather modest, and their background was further removed from the Norwegian average than any other immigrant group at that time. In 1990, socioeconomic indicators such as educational participation and labour market

participation were at the levels of Somali immigrants 20 years later. Like the Somali, the Vietnamese were considered by many observers to be unemployable, and without willingness or ability to acquire a working level knowledge of the Norwegian language. In our study, Vietnamese immigrants are in many ways the most successful of our groups. Their demographic behaviour is approaching the Norwegian average, and their participation in education, especially among descendants is at a very high level. Employment rates are above the other nations', and females are particularly active in the labour market, resulting in a gender gap only slightly above the national average. The level of inactivity is mostly lower than any other country's, but still twice the level of the national average.

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## Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

This glossary provides definitions of the terms used in this study. In many cases the definitions pertain to indicators. In order to keep the glossary relatively simple, the definitions do not deal with issues relating to the estimation of indicators when these cannot be computed directly, but have to be estimated from relevant data. The estimation issues are considered in the Methodological note.

The glossary consists of three sections, each of which deals with terms pertaining to population dynamics, integration in the education sector and labour market integration. In each section the items are in alphabetical order. Whenever a particular item is mentioned in a definition of another item, it is italicised. If it is mentioned more than once in a given definition, it is only italicised when it appears for the first time.

In part, the glossary draws on the glossaries of relevant international organisations, in particular the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.

### Population Dynamics

*Average duration of residence of immigrants:* The average number of years that immigrants of a population group have lived in the country of residence.

*Birth:* In the case of a population group, any of the births to immigrants of the population group. In the case of a native population, any of the births to natives.

*Crude birth rate:* The number of births in a population during a specified period divided by the number of person-years lived by the population during the same period. It is expressed as the number of births per 1,000 inhabitants.

*Crude death rate:* The number of deaths in a population during a specified period divided by the number of person-years lived by the population during the same period. It is expressed as the number of deaths per 1,000 inhabitants.

*Crude emigration rate:* The number of emigrants, i.e. persons leaving a population due to *international migration* during a given period, divided by the number of person-years lived by the population during the same period. It is expressed as the number of emigrants per 1,000 inhabitants.

*Crude immigration rate:* The number of immigrants, i.e. persons joining a population due to international migration during a given period, divided by the number of person-years lived by the population during the same period. It is expressed as the number of immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants.

*Death:* A death taking place in a population.

*Descendant of a population group:* A person born to two immigrants, both of whom are members of a same population group, provided that his or her birth occurred in the country of parents' residence and that the person resides in it. Also, a person born to a women immigrant, who is a member of the population group and to a non-native man who is not a member of the group, provided the birth occurred in the country of the mother's residence and that the person resides in it.

*Emigrant:* A person who leaves his or her country of residence with the intention of taking residence elsewhere and who, in the process, leaves a population of which he or she is a member.

*Immigrant:* A person who arrives in a country with a view to taking up residency there and who, in the process, joins a population as its new member.

*International migration:* Movements of individuals between different countries. From the perspective of a population of a given country, this includes the arrival of people coming to take up residency in the country and joins the population and the departure of residents leaving with the intention of taking up residency elsewhere, thus leaving the population.

*Native:* A person born to a native mother and/or to a native father. Also, a person born to a woman who, at the time of birth, is a descendant of a population group. In other words, any person who is not an immigrant or a descendant.

*Native population:* All the resident natives of a country.

*Natural change:* The difference between births and deaths in a population.

*Net migration:* The difference between immigrants and emigrants in a population.

*Partner:* A person who is currently married to another person or who lives in a registered consensual union with another person.

*Population:* A group of people residing in a given country and sharing a certain characteristic, such as a country of birth. Two types of groups are distinguished: resident persons originating from another country (referred to as a foreign-origin population group or a population group for short) and resident natives of a given country who collectively make up the native population of the country. A total population of a country comprises the native population and all the existing population groups in the country.

*Population group:* A group comprising immigrants residing in a given country who were born in the country in which the group has its origins, along with their immediate descendants born in the country of the immigrants' residence. For the sake of convenience, the population groups bear the names of the nationals of the countries in which they have their roots, such as Iranians or Turks.

*Proportion of descendants:* A proportion that descendants of a population group represent with respect to the total size of the population group. The proportion is expressed in per cent.

*Proportion of immigrants:* A proportion that immigrants of a population group represent with respect to the total size of the population group. The proportion is expressed in per cent.

*Proportion of people with a partner of a given background:* A proportion that people with a partner of a given background represent with respect to all people with partners. The types of background distinguished are: member of the same population group, native, other. The proportion is expressed in per cent.

*Standard age-sex distribution of a population:* A distribution of a population by age and sex, the proportions of which add up to one. It is used to compute *standardised crude rates* of change. The distribution used in this study is an unweighted average of the proportionate age-sex distributions of the total populations of Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 2008.

*Standardised crude rate:* A crude rate of change that is observed in a population during a specified period if its age-sex distribution is equal to a *standard age-sex distribution of a population* rather than its actual one. The following standardised crude rates are distinguished: standardised crude birth rate, standardised crude



death rate, standardised crude immigration rate and standardised crude emigration rate. In addition, two other standardised rates are distinguished: standardised crude emigration rate among immigrants of a population group and standardised crude birth rate of among descendants of a population group.

*Total fertility rate:* The average number of children that a hypothetical cohort of women would have at the end of their reproductive period if the women were subject to the *age-specific fertility rates* of a given period throughout their lives and were not subject to mortality. It is expressed as children per woman.

*Total fertility by age x:* The average number of children that a hypothetical cohort of women would have by age x inclusive if the women were subject to the age-specific fertility rates of a given period and were not subject to mortality. It is expressed as children per woman. The values used for x are 24, 29 and 39.

### **Integration in the Education Sector**

*Enrolment rate:* The number of students in a particular age group that is enrolled in educational institutions of a given level of education and/or *sub-level of education* at a given date, divided by the total number of people in that age group on that date. The age groups used are: 16-19, 20-24, 25-29 and 30-34.

*ISCED:* The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997) is the revised version of the International Standard Classification of Education, which was adopted in 1997 by UNESCO's General Conference as a replacement of the former version.

*ISCED 1 - Primary education:* Education that usually begins at the age of five, six or seven and lasts for four to six years. Programmes at the primary level generally require no previous formal education, although it is becoming increasingly common for children to have attended a pre-primary programme before entering primary education.

*ISCED 2 - Lower secondary education:* Education that generally continues the basic programmes of the primary level, although here the teaching is typically more subject-focused. This type of education may either be “terminal” (i.e. prepare students for working life) and/or “preparatory” (i.e. prepare students for upper secondary education).

*ISCED 3 - Upper secondary education:* Education that corresponds to the final stage of secondary education. Instruction is often more organised along subject matter lines than ISCED 2. The entrance age for this level is typically 15 or 16 years. There are substantial differences in the usual duration of ISCED 3 programmes both across and between countries, typically ranging from two to five years of schooling. ISCED 3 may either be “terminal” (i.e. prepare students for working life) and/or “preparatory” (i.e. prepare students for tertiary education).

*ISCED 4 - Post-secondary non-tertiary education:* Education that straddles the boundary between upper secondary education and post-secondary education from an international point of view, even though this might clearly be considered as upper secondary or postsecondary programmes in a national context. Although the content of this type of education may not be significantly more advanced than upper secondary programmes, it serves to broaden the knowledge of participants who have already gained an upper secondary qualification. The students tend to be older than those enrolled at the upper secondary level.

*ISCED 5A - Tertiary-type A education:* Education comprising programmes that are largely theory-based and designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry into advanced research programmes and professions with high skills requirements, such as medicine, dentistry or architecture. The full-time programmes have a minimum,

cumulative, theoretical duration of three years, although they typically last four or more years.

*ISCED 5B - Tertiary-type B education:* Education comprising programmes that are typically shorter than those of tertiary-type A and that focus on practical, technical or occupational skills for direct entry into the labour market, although some theoretical foundations may be covered in the respective programmes. These full-time programmes have a minimum duration of two years.

*Level of education:* A broad section of the education “ladder”, i.e. the progression from very elementary to more complicated learning experience, embracing all fields and programme groups that may occur at that particular stage of the progression.

*Student:* A person who attends any regular educational institution, public or private, for systematic instruction at any level of education.

### **Labour Market Integration**

*Inactive:* A person who at any given time is not employed, unemployed or enrolled in education.

*Employed:* A person over a specified age who is either in paid employment or self-employed.

*Unemployed:* A person who, at any given time, has no employment but is available to start work within the next two weeks and has actively sought employment at some time during the previous four weeks. Also, a person who, during the reference week, has no employment but has been offered a job that is due to start later.

*Employment rate:* The number of *employed* persons of a particular age at any given time divided by the total number of people employed of that age at that particular time.

*Unemployment rate:* The number of *unemployed* persons of a particular age at any given time divided by the total number of people of that age at that particular time.

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