

Janko Nešić

(University of Belgrade)

**“Emergentist“ Russellian monism or that obscure
subject of panpsychist’s desire**

I argue that Sydney Shoemaker’s elusive account of emergent properties can be used to make sense of an emergentist Russellian panpsychism and help us resolve the subject combination problem. Shoemaker’s account, somewhat modified, should be coupled with Russellian monism to yield a more preferable and plausible „*emergentist*“ *Russellian monism*. A different notion of emergence could help us make a case for a more plausible emergentist Russellian monism. Quotation marks show that it isn’t really an emergentism, neither is it reductionism, but something in-between. This way constitution could be avoided, but also radical, brute emergence. But some alterations will have to be made in Shoemaker’s account.

Although panpsychism can be an appealing mind-body theory it suffers from a severe problem of combination. Combination problem arises when we try to understand how o-consciousness comes from fundamental micro-consciousness. This problem is especially hard when it comes to subjects and how macro-subjects arise from micro-subjects.

Chalmers argues against plausible emergentist Russellian monism in which emergence is considered as brute and o-experience is strongly emergent on microexperience. Like in the case of British emergentism macro facts are not predictable from microphenomenal facts. Perhaps a different notion of emergence could solve some of the problems and strengthen the case for emergentist Russellian monism? I think this could be done with Shoemaker’s (2002, 2007) account of emergence, but it has to be altered.

Shoemaker claims that when micro-entities are combined in an emergence engendering way they have two sorts of micro-structural properties. First are specified entirely in terms of the *micro-manifest* powers of the constituent micro-entities together with how these micro-entities are related. These refer to micro-manifest powers only are called by Shoemaker Type-1 properties. The emergent properties are Type-2 micro-structural properties and „are specified in terms of all of the powers, micro-latent and micro-manifest, of the constituent micro-entities“ (2002, 56).

A satisfying reworking of Shoemaker’s emergence has been done by Warren Shrader (2009) and I will outline it in detail. Such „emergence“ can also preserve the causal closure of micro-physical, if one wants to hold to it. Shoemaker’s emergence violates the closure, but Shrader argues that by substituting the nomological dependence of micro-latent powers on micro-manifest powers with causal dependence. O-experiences are thus present (as -latent powers in Shoemaker’s account) at the micro-level and fundamental.

I will show how applying the reworked Shoemakers’s account of emergence to Russellian monism helps us avoid the dreaded subject summing problem. I will also discuss the pros and cons of this „emergentist“, yet reductive, form of Russellian monism.

There is something intuitively true about Shoemaker’s proposition on emergence and this possibility was already present with Broad. Whoever thinks that panpsychism is more plausible than physicalism, applying this account to panpsychism can help her argue for a more coherent and appealing position. Since this is a kind of crossover between reductive and emergent Russellian monism it seems no problem of mental causation should resurface. This kind of panpsychism has an advantage because it does not appeal to any mysterianism about phenomenal bonding or to brute emergence. There is no need for any kind of phenomenal bonding, so it could be a nice way to get round the combination problem. It still seems somewhat obscure, though.