

simulation. I also submit that the denotative function of the OFC vehicle comprehends three distinct targets, namely seismic faults, Burridge-Knopoff's original spring-block model of earthquakes and nonconservative self-organized critical systems in general. At different passages in their papers, OFC emphasise one or another conceptualization and denotative function in their model, mediated by recognized internal mappings.

My analysis of the OFC case leads to a manifold picture of interpretation, according to which scientific models are construed as networks of interconnected meanings. The pondered integration of these various interpretations, guided by locally attended explanatory commitments, leads to model explanations with layers of content, both in their explanantia and explananda. The various conceptualizations provide content for the explanantia. And the various denotations provide different content for the explananda. At different moments, one or another content can be highlighted, but they are interrelated through internal mappings.

### **Janko Nešić**

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### **Attuning the World: Ambient Smart Environments for Autistic Fields of Affordances**

Autism spectrum disorder is a condition characterised by social and non-social core deficits in social interaction and communication, repetitive patterns of behaviour, and hyper- or hyporeactivity to sensory input. Affordance-based Skilled Intentionality (Rietveld, Denys, & van Westen, 2018) that combines enactive and ecological views of cognition with the Free Energy Principle and Predictive Processing was proposed as the framework from which to view autism (Nešić, 2023) integrally. Skilled Intentionality distinguishes between a landscape of affordances (sociomaterial possibilities for a species) and a field of affordances (inviting possibilities for an individual in a situation). Bodily normativity refers to "the organism's evaluative capacity" (Toro et al., 2020) that guides the organism's behaviour in attuning to the environment. The ecological-enactive approach shows that autistic differences in bodily normativity and their field of affordances stem from aberrant precision estimation (Constant, Bervoets, et al., 2018; Nešić, 2023). Autistics over-rely on the precision afforded by the environment - a stable ecological niche they build. It is argued that autistics have a narrow field, with shallow temporal depth and great intensity and affective salience of the affordances that do come up in the field. In my talk, I will build on the ecological-enactive account of autism to suggest that one therapeutic way to shape the autistic field of affordances and help alleviate ecological problems (environmental volatility with which they cannot cope) is through the use of Ambient Smart Environments (ASEs, interior environments permeated with smart technology). The understanding of ASEs as a meta-affordance that intervenes on the user's field of affordance under the Skilled Intentionality and Active Inference was put forward by White and Miller (2023). Taking the cue from autistic lived experience while supporting the niche construction style autistics resort to themselves, ASEs could help them minimise uncertainty and avoid some suboptimal behavioural patterns.

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White, B., & Miller, M. (2023, January 20). Free-Energy Minimising Agents and Beneficial A.I.: Ambient Smart Environments, Allostasis, and Metacognitive Control. <https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/k34ac>

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### **Complementarity as epistemic infringement**

We argue that Bohr's philosophy of complementarity has historically operated as a vehicle for epistemic infringement. Leydon-Hardy (2021) defines epistemic infringement as the systematic contravention of the interpersonal social and epistemic norms that an agent takes to constrain their relationship to the infringer in a manner that may encroach upon their epistemic agency. The infringer often appeals to the very norm they are violating to justify their actions, steering their victim into radical self-doubt.

Roughly put, complementarity requires rejecting any visualizable description of quantum objects. In a different history, this rejection might have aligned with a norm that Duhem took to govern the practice of physics: the introduction of novel, symbolic meanings for terms like "place" and "speed" with the ultimate aim of increasing the precision of our commonsense descriptions. In our history, however, Bohr's complementarity served as a tool to undermine the commonsense understandings of laypersons and specialists alike. We can never know the full extent to which Bohr intended to use complementarity in this way. We argue, however, that regardless of Bohr's intent, the mechanisms of infringement served to increase his social and political capital while suppressing the uptake of epistemic goods from contributors outside of Copenhagen.

We focus on two historical case studies. First, we offer a reading of Heisenberg's *Physics and Beyond* that suggests Heisenberg took complementarity to function as a tool of infringement in his relationship with Bohr. Second, we examine Wheeler's trip to Copenhagen to advertise Everett's work.

Leydon-Hardy, L. (2021). *Predatory Grooming and Epistemic Infringement*. In J. Lackey (Ed.), *Applied Epistemology* (pp. 119-147). Oxford University Press.

Heisenberg, W. (1971). *Physics and Beyond: Encounters and Conversations* (A. Pomerans, Trans.). Harper & Row.

Everett, H., III. (2012). *The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics: Collected works 1955-1980 with commentary* (J. A. Barrett & P. Byrne, Eds.). Princeton University Press.

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### **Holocultural Moral Psychology Supports the Mind-Dependence of Moral Normativity**

In this talk we will argue that the properties that may ultimately characterize moral