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The 'conscience of duty'. The National Broadcasting Service of Portugal and the Spanish Civil War

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1. Introduction

When the Spanish Civil War broke out on 18 July 1936, strained diplomatic relations between Republican Spain and the Portugal of Salazar were passing through a decidedly cooler period, due above all to the lack of ideological affinity and tolerance between both Iberian governments. This mutual mistrust was accentuated by a certain disdain within the Spanish government towards its neighboring country, fueled by the revival of Iberian unity in the discourse of some leftwing parties, which stoked fears on the Portuguese side and strengthened an anti-Spanish line from some quarters of its political power structures (Egido 2017: 74-106). This situation provoked mutual desire for a change in the model of government on the other side of the border, as has been explained in the scientific literature on the history of Iberian relations (Sarias Rodríguez & Jiménez Redondo 2020, Jiménez Redondo, 2019a y 2019b, Vicente 2003, Sánchez Cervelló 2002, Oliveira 1995, De la Torre Gómez 1988, among others).

The Portuguese *Estado Novo* [New State] was a regime founded in 1933 by Coimbra University professor António de Oliveira Salazar, which transformed the military dictatorship initiated with the 1926 coup d'état into an authoritarian model inspired by Italian fascism with the aim of consolidating political structures that would put an end to the convulsive republican period that began in 1910. In his policy of national renewal, Salazar considered it essential to modify the way of thinking and being of Portuguese society by recovering its "true" essence, based on a strong socialization of a traditionalist character (Rosas 2019). This process of national transformation involved the moral renewal of the country through the so-called "policy of the spirit", which ideologically shaped cultural production and subdued the media through strict censorship (Lima 2013). In this dynamic of reciprocal suspicion between Spain and Portugal, the *Estado Novo* ran a propaganda campaign against the Spanish Second Republic, in a particularly hostile manner, following the victory of the Popular Front in the elections of 16 February 1936, which for Salazar represented the interests of the Communist International (Gómez de las Heras 1992, Oliveira 1988, Delgado 1980). In fact, the principal *leitmotiv* of the propaganda against Spain from the Portuguese regime was the fear of a reborn *perigo espanhol* [Spanish danger].¹ An atavic hatred towards Castilian imperialism, this time allegorically identified with the potential threat of an invasion of the so-called *perigo vermelho* [red danger], with which the Spanish republican government was associated. The Portuguese dictatorship used it to exacerbate and to instrumentalize its nationalist discourse (Pais de Sousa 2011, Torgal 2011, Matos 2010, Oliveira 1987) and it was very visible in the newspaper information and editorials of the Portuguese communications media (Sanz-Hernando 2020, Pena-Rodríguez 2021). Thus, Salazar wished to see Spain within the orbit of European countries under authoritarian and nationalist regimes, with corporative power structures and strong leadership, both to guarantee his political survival and for ideological reasons (Rosas 2019, Costa Pinto 2017, Loff 2008 and Adinolfi 2007). As a prelude to the Second World War, the international dimension of the Spanish conflict, both in the military and diplomatic fields, had a great impact on Portugal, whose media apparatus was restructured to respond to the enormous challenge represented by the Spanish war in the Iberian context. The Portuguese media (press, radio and cinema)

quickly became transmission belts for the propaganda messages of the Spanish insurgent side (Sardica 2007, Pena 2007, Ribeiro 2007).

After the start of armed conflict in Spain, the National Propaganda Secretariat (*Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional*) (SPN) deployed frenetic media activity to link the Communist International with the legal Spanish government, which it accused of promoting religious persecution against Catholics and the overthrow of the *Estado Novo* (Pena-Rodríguez, 2019). In coordination with the rebel band, it all fueled an atmosphere of permanent tension through the broadcasting of threatening messages with a three-fold objective: to stimulate popular agitation and social mobilization against an exterior enemy in order to generate consensus over defending the national interest (*i.e.*, Salazarist), consolidate the repressive structures of the regime, and publicly legitimize its support for the rebel band, the political motivation behind which was ennobled through its presentation as a just cause (Pena-Rodríguez 2021).

In the context of the War on Spain (1936-1939), the radio, both an innovative and a disruptive medium, metamorphosed from a simple musical loudspeaker into an armament of war (Sommerville 2012, Garitaonandía 1988), rapidly achieving a more potent capability to convince and to influence than the press (Lazarsfeld 1940), as happened with the Italian fascist movement and then Nazism (Cannistrato 1972, Bergmeier & Lodtz, 1997). Radio propaganda exercised extraordinary protagonism in the Spanish conflict where it was used as a non-conventional instrument of war for the first time, principally in the field of psychological warfare (Arasa 2015, Pizarroso Quintero 2005).

The radio was, in fact, a sort of “ethereal trench” in which both bands fought to impose their own stories on the course of events, as paradigmatically happened in the battle for Madrid (Cervera Gil 1998). The radio was therefore turned into a key instrument within the strategy of warfare for all-out persuasion to influence both public opinion and the enemy, but also to raise the morale of troops and allies. Radio broadcasts were of crucial influence in the first week of the engagement, when both the military rebels and the Spanish government needed to win over supporters and to consolidate their positions in the military campaign and from the perception of public opinion (Ventín Pereira 1986).

Because of its immediacy and discursive warmth, radio quickly became a mass broadcasting medium, but also a sounding board and a source of information about the war for many print media, which regularly echoed their sensational radio news of the previous day. In the case of Portugal, their radio stations played a particularly relevant role during the fratricidal struggle.

The intervention of the Salazarist government in favor of the military *coup d'état* in Spain converted Portuguese radio into a battle front, raising the morale of the Spanish insurgent troops. It fought against perplexity and demoralization among the rebels and it sowed confusion and discouragement in the Republican columns (Ribeiro 2008 and 2014, Pena-Rodríguez 2015). The Iberian public was subjected to a 'war of the airwaves' between Spanish and Portuguese broadcasters in an attempt to attract followers for one cause or the other. (Arasa 2015, Ventín Pereira 1985).

At the beginning of the war, radio infrastructures in Portugal were in the process of consolidation, with incipient technical development. Only two stations had the capacity to broadcast beyond national borders. One was the *Rádio Club Português* (RCP), a private station founded in 1931 and subsidized by the *Estado Novo* that was promoted by several hundred members headed by Captain Jorge Botelho Moniz, whose objective was to put an end to the “silence of Portugal” on the airwaves (Santos 2003: 52). The other was the official *Emissora Nacional* (EN), founded in October 1934, whose daily broadcasts would begin in 1935 to serve the "national" interests of the regime (Ribeiro, 2005). Both the state EN, directed by Captain Henrique Galvão, and the RCP, founded and also led

by a Captain, Jorge Botelho Moniz, have become powerful loudspeakers in their propaganda battles with the broadcasters loyal to the government of Madrid (Pena-Rodríguez 2015, Ribeiro 2014).

Other stations operated alongside them with less popularity and technological capacity, but always aligned with the official discourse of the Portuguese government, such as *Invicta Radio*, *Ideal Radio*, *Radio Hertz*² or *Radio Renascença*. The last-named radio broadcasting service was the official channel of the Portuguese Catholic Church. Its broadcasting started in January 1937 and its principal objective was to combat the “anti-religious” broadcasts from Russia, in accordance with the plan agreed with the Catholic International Radio Broadcasting Bureau (Anon. 1936g: 16). However, its regular broadcasts began in 1938, and during its first years both its broadcasting hours and technical infrastructure were limited (Miguel 1992). For its part, *Rádio Invicta* was very active in the organization of anti-communist programs, financed by the Porto City Hall, from where it was regularly broadcasting (1936f: 2).

The objective of this investigation, through a method of historical interpretation of a qualitative nature and the use of documental and news archives, is to understand the political, media and propaganda-related roles of what was one of the principle means of communication of the Salazarist authoritarian *Estado Novo* throughout the Spanish civil war: the EN. Although in order to properly contextualize the studied phenomenon, other Portuguese broadcasters are mentioned, as well as previous academic approaches on the Portuguese radio intervention in the conflict, such as the works of Ribeiro (2014, 2008), Pena-Rodríguez (2015) or Abreu (1995, 1996), the object of study focuses on unpublished aspects related to the political-diplomatic strategy of the EN and its European projection, seeking to shed greater light on an event that marked the history of radio in Europe.

2. The RCP and its ‘anti-communist crusade’ alongside the Spanish rebel side

Between the end of July and September 1936, while the Portuguese political police pursued and handed over to Franco's authorities the Republicans who were fleeing to Portugal from the advancing of rebel troops in the border areas during the first months of the Spanish war (Sanz-Hernando 2020), Captain Jorge Botelho Moniz, director of the radio station RCP and at the same time head of the *Secção Militar Portuguesa de Assistência aos Legionários Portugueses em Espanha* [Portuguese Military Section of Assistance to Portuguese Legionnaires in Spain], the so-called 'viriatos', coordinated radio propaganda campaigns with Franco's agents in Lisbon in favor of the rebel army (Pena-Rodríguez 2015, Ribeiro 2014). The exceptional alliance between RCP and the Nationalist Movement led by general Franco was crucial to consolidate an epic narrative of resistance against a supposed communist invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. It aroused feelings of public legitimization for the “anti-communist crusade”, in the same way as the reports of the *coup d'état* against Spanish Republican democracy in the press of the Salazarist regime (Pena-Rodríguez 2015).

The RCP was, possibly, the most effective means of propaganda available to the rebels during the first six months of the conflict, when they still lacked relevant means of communication. It was not only a loudspeaker against Madrid, a space of external legitimization for Francoism or a simple instrument to encourage the rebel troops in some particularly symbolic battles, such as the resistance of Colonel Moscardó in the Alcázar of Toledo. The Portuguese station covered the Spanish conflict live and collaborated in the organization of dozens of propaganda events in Portugal, always with the aim of indoctrinating Portuguese society about the dangers of the Spanish Popular Front. In an atmosphere of collective excitement, its director Jorge Botelho Moniz was one of the

greatest propagandists in favor of the militarization of Portuguese society to prevent the “Marxist” advance (Pena-Rodríguez 2015).

After the military insurrection against the government of Madrid, the RCP recruited broadcasters from among the members of the Spanish community in Lisbon, in order to transmit in Castilian Spanish to Spain: Marisabel de la Torre de Colomina (nicknamed by the insurgent propaganda as the ‘Berta’ of Lisbon, in reference to the large German cannon that bombarded London in the First World War), Fernando Gallego de Chaves y Calleja (Marquis of Quintanar), Martínez Romarate, and Santiago Tarodo Fortis, among other collaborators, who converted the headquarters of Portuguese radio into the authentic ‘center of Francoist resistance’ in Portugal (Anon. 1939: 45).

The cooperation between the so-called ‘black embassy’, formed by the diplomats who placed themselves at the service of the rebel army, among whom were members of the Spanish aristocracy exiled in Portugal, such as the Marquis of Miraflores, the Marquis of Vega de Anzo, the Marquis of Contadero, as well as the president of the CEDA (*Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas*) [Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Right-Wing], José María Gil Robles, and the RCP, was close and strategic. In October 1937, a radio broadcasting studio was even planned (although never completed due to lack of funding) in the Spanish embassy in Lisbon (anonymous letter to Arias Paz, C 6631 1937). A plan, like others, devised and approved by Botelho Moniz, Nicolás Franco (the brother of the rebel Spanish General) and the Francoist delegate of Press and Propaganda, Manuel Arias Paz, who considered retransmission from inside the headquarters of the diplomatic mission much more practical and who also managed to plan the construction of a powerful 20 Kw antenna (anonymous letter to Nicolás Franco, C 6631 1937).

The RCP frequently poured scorn on the newscasts transmitted by broadcasters loyal to the legal Spanish government (Botelho Moniz 1936: 5), divulged Second Republic army positions (Anon. 1936a: 5) and, through their radio surveillance service, intercepted encoded telegraphic messages to the Republican zone, which were then relayed to the rebel troops (Anon. 1936b: 2). In addition, the RCP read out editorials on air in favor of the Francoists that were published in the Portuguese and Spanish press, commented on the speeches of the insurgent General Queipo de Llano aired on *Radio Sevilla*, put the rebels on the southern front in contact with those in the north, and was an essential source for the Salazarist press, which reproduced some of their contents word for word (Pena-Rodríguez 2015, Ribeiro 2014).

In addition, the RCP collaborated in the organization of dozens of anti-communist propaganda events in Portugal, in a clear effort to indoctrinate Portuguese society in relation to the dangers that the Spanish ‘communist’ faction represented (Pena-Rodríguez 2015, Ribeiro 2014). Among the most significant events organized by the RCP was the great anti-communist rally held in the Lisbon bullring on August 28, 1936, which prompted the founding of the dictatorship's militia, the *Legião Portuguesa* [Portuguese Legion], presented by the regime as the ‘natural’ popular reaction to the events in Spain (Rodrigues 1996: 39-46). Captain Botelho transformed, *de facto*, the station's headquarters into a center for enlisting Portuguese volunteers to fight ‘Marxism’ alongside General Franco's troops.

(Anon. 1936e: 5). Thanks to his propaganda, which incessantly requested help to fight against the Spanish ‘communists’, hundreds of combatants signed up in the recruiting offices of the rebel army in Portugal (R-1111 1936: 5).

In addition to its recruitment activity and misinformation campaigns (which included the dissemination of false news, hoaxes, caricaturing and mocking the enemy and other rhetorical techniques aimed at delegitimizing and destroying the reputation of the

Republican side), there were specific programs to combat the 'red danger'. Intellectuals and Francoist or Salazarist politicians all participated in attacking the government of Madrid, such as the minister of Culture of the Franco government, José María Pemán (1936: 6) or the new ambassador of the government of Burgos in Lisbon, Nicolás Franco (1939: 1), who would publicly recognize the decisive assistance lent to the rebel army by the RCP in the first months of the war (Franco 1938: 6).

In this context, faced with the reiterated diplomatic protests of the Spanish Republican government, the Portuguese executive cynically retorted that they could do next to nothing to stop their activity, as the RCP was a private broadcaster (Abreu 1996: 37).

3. The pretense of neutrality of the *Emissora Nacional* (EN) national broadcaster

In contrast to the RCP that had since the outbreak of war immediately sided with the rebels, the state-owned EN showed a calculated political prudence when releasing information on the Spanish tragedy. The status of a 'private' radio station was an effective media-world excuse to justify the negative campaign of the RCP in response to complaints from the Republican government, but this ruse of Salazar's could never serve for the EN.

The official broadcaster of the *Estado Novo* therefore adopted an attitude in accordance with the pretense that the Portuguese government was a neutral party in the conflict, and likewise in accordance with the Non-Intervention Agreement signed by Portugal at the end of September 1936, after repeated resistance to adhere to the international agreement (Soares de Oliveira 2014: 85-97, Rosas 1985). Nevertheless, as the government of Burgos consolidated its positions against those loyal to the Second Spanish Republic, the propaganda of the EN in favor of the rebels was becoming increasingly radical.

Initially, as the contents of its programming could politically compromise the Salazarist government, given the status of the EN as the official broadcaster, an excessively offensive propaganda against the government of Madrid might directly prejudice the barely disguised diplomatic collaboration between Salazar and Franco and weaken the defense of the insurgents own interests in international fora, such as the League of Nations or the so-called 'London Committee', where matters related to the implementation of the Non-Intervention Agreement were discussed. (Pizarroso 2001, Rosas 1985, SPN 1939). It did not seem to suit, therefore, the *Estado Novo*, that a media with as much influence and circulation as the EN should send the message to Europe that Salazar unconditionally supported Franco while demanding an end to aid to Republican Spain from countries such as France (Soares de Oliveira 2008: 167).

Salazar was conscious of the persuasive power of radio (Castelo-Branco, 1987). A little after the start of the onslaught, he therefore decided that the EN should form an administrative section of the Presidency of Government (CO/OP-7 1936), in order to maintain strict supervision over its radio broadcasts. Thus, given the extreme seriousness for Portugal of the 'international' struggle that had been unleashed in Spain, the emissions of the EN were regularly supervised by the Portuguese dictator, as accredited in official sources (SPN 1939: 28).

In line with the government measures, EN propaganda in favor of the rebel troops had necessarily to be compatible with the interests of Portuguese foreign policy, timing its radio campaigns to coincide with the diplomatic efforts of the *Estado Novo* at an international level (Abreu 1996: 39). Its foreign broadcasting on the war therefore sought to transmit the sensation that the Portuguese government was behaving impartially. Although the EN also transmitted proactive propaganda in favor of the insurgents, it tried

to adopt a more moderate and sober language, as its director, Henrique Galvão, explained to Salazar in September 1936:

[...] As the National Broadcaster is an official body, the newscasts on events should be offered in such a way that it serves the political interests of Portugal, closely linked to the fate of the revolutionary movement, but in such a way that it prudently places the Portuguese government at some distance from diplomatic spats. [...] All newscasts that we broadcast and are broadcasting are rigorously reviewed by me and are selected by the political delegate, Sr. Dr. Pestana dos Reis [director of *Diário da Manhã*, official organ of the regime] (CO/NE-9, 1936: 127-128).

Despite the cautious attitude of state Portuguese radio management, the collaboration with the agents of general Franco in Lisbon was intense. In fact, the contacts between the governments of Burgos and Lisbon to set up a united front for radio propaganda in Portugal against the Madrid government began some days after the *coup d'état*. Among other technical support, the telegraphic services of the EN were used to broadcast messages from the Spanish rebels living abroad (R-592 1936). Information from the EGR, the broadcasting service of the rebel government of Burgos, with scant little transmitting power, was also passed to the EN and then broadcast in other European countries (CO/PC-12 1936: 321-322).

The SPN also subsidized the international radio program of the EN that had special reports on the war in various languages as from November 1936 (CO/PC-12 1936). Likewise, the radio surveillance service of the Salazarist broadcasting service picked up an endless number of radio and telegraphic communications from both sides that informed of the real course of events and, by doing so, guided its propaganda strategy (CO/NE-9A 1936: 110).

4. News against ‘democratic temptations’

The information from the EN on the war was generally broadcast by the Spanish broadcaster Tomasa Margarita Cambón, who worked in programs such as *Notícias de Espanha* [News from Spain], *Crónicas dos acontecimentos internacionais* [Reports on international events] and *Crónicas dos acontecimentos nacionais* [Reports on national events], curiously edited by Henrique Galvão and Manuel Pestana dos Reis. These contents were mainly addressed to the Spanish public, although their diffusion covered the entire Iberian spectrum, with a rhetoric that justified a Franco-Salazarist unity of action within the framework of a new Iberian alliance based on a dualism of solidarity against the communist enemy represented by the Madrid government. Unlike the RCP, its programs were never focused on refuting the information from broadcasters loyal to Madrid, attacking the Spanish government or celebrating the rebel victories in heroic language. Instead, they were focused on consolidating ideological indoctrination relating to the causes of the war and the serious threats towards Portugal.

In a paternalist tone, the broadcasts remarked on the catastrophic consequences for countries that, like Spain, were falling into “democratic temptation” (Abreu 1996: 48). One of the most frequent programs, aimed at the Portuguese audience, was ‘*5 minutos anti-comunistas*’ [5 anti-communist minutes], planned and financed by the SPN to heighten the state of alarm against Republican Spain and the Portuguese opposition, whose contents were regularly published in the official Salazarist newspaper, the *Diário da Manhã* (DM) (see, for example, Anon. 1936d: 3). There were many leaders and

intellectuals on the side of *Estado Novo* who participated in that format, especially in the first months of the war, including such people as Santos Duarte (1936: 3), Humberto Delgado (1936: 2) and Luiz Forjaz Trigueiros (1936: 2), among many others.

To orient the Portuguese public on the progress of the war, there was also a space, directed by Captain Alexandre de Moraes, for specifically military topics, entitled *Crônicas militares* [Military chronicles], which were published in a volume under the publishing label *Livraria Popular Francisco Franco* (1936), in homage to the Spanish leader. And all the contents of the EN were integrally reproduced in the DM and the journal *Rádio Nacional*. In the words of the Salazarist intellectual António da Fonseca, the EN had been turned into the ‘conscience of duty’ (Fonseca 1936: 1).

Among other persuasive techniques of an emotional nature that were employed, the fear of revolutionary infection and its terrible consequences for Portugal were among the most powerful arguments used to manipulate their audience. In this context, their information habitually affirmed that the Francoist cause represented Western civilization against the Asiatic barbarians; or, likewise, that the rebel side in Spain fought to protect traditional values and the Iberian Peninsula against an imaginary genocidal invasion remotely-controlled from Moscow. As the Salazarist broadcaster Neves da Costa stated through its microphones, the communist is ‘[...] a state of the soul in which there is pride, impotence, envy, sloth, desire for animal pleasure, feline tendencies and jungle instincts [...]’ (Costa 1936: 3). According to Henrique Galvão calculated in one of his live speeches on the EN to a horrified audience, ‘communism’ has been the cause of ‘[...] 120,000 deaths, tens of thousands of widows, over one-hundred orphans, thousands of cubic meters of blood, fire, torture – all of that speaks for itself, better and more convincingly than any words’ (Galvão 1936: 3).

The EN also organized special programs to praise the Salazarist authoritarianism among Portuguese listeners. The retransmission of cultural events and national commemorations were a sample of this policy of popular legitimization over the radio with the Spanish war in the background. Wishing to establish a contrast between the Spanish tragedy and Portugal under Salazar, at the inauguration of the Floral Games (*Juegos Florales*) of April 1937, held at the headquarters of the National Society of Fine Arts of Lisbon, the minister of Public Works and Communications, Joaquim Abranches, recalled that while blood was being shed in Spanish territory, imagination was wasted in Portugal on a ‘fight of the spirit against the spirit’. The contents developed in the works that won awards harked back to the imperial glory of Portugal and its past, in line with the ultranationalist discourse of the regime (Abranches 1937: 3).

In the same way, on 14 August 1938, the EN organized, in the iconic square of Lisbon *Praça do Comércio*, a new act of epic inspiration in defense of the independence of the Portuguese nation, dramatically representing the battle of Aljubarrota, one of the foundational myths of the country, in celebration of its 553rd anniversary, excluding the six decades under the reign of Felipe II.

The radio station broadcasted the ‘grandiose’ spectacle of light and color live on air with the presence of various authorities and facing a public in excess of 20,000 people. Furthermore various high-power loudspeakers were set up to amplify the hearing in the center of Lisbon (Anon. 1936c: 1). However, this demonstration of patriotism not only sought to stimulate popular commotion against the ‘red terror’ of Madrid, but it also affirmed Portuguese nationalism against certain Falangist sectors among the Francoist faction who had showed a desire to forge a new Peninsular unity at the end of the war, an idea that Salazarists related to the former Spanish imperialism (De la Torre, 2000).

For this reason, the Portuguese government feared a reaction of its Spanish allies and warned its ambassador in Spain, Pedro Teotónio Pereira, that in case the government of

Burgos were to be bothered by an event that might be perceived as anti-Spanish, he should offer no explanation of any sort (CO/NE-9H 1938: 54). And if Franco were to insist, Salazar suggested to his diplomatic representative that he cynically contextualize the celebration with an event related to the commemoration of the 'happy' anniversary of total control over the Portuguese-Spanish frontier by the rebel troops in mid-August 1936 (CO/NE-9H 1938: 59).

5. The 'perfect' European propaganda of the EN

The EN radio programs were not solely used as mouthpieces to persuade both the Portuguese and the Spanish public. Their powerful radio antennae could broadcast to a large part of Europe, some colonial territories in Africa, Brazil and North-America. The profoundly nationalist and anti-communist messages, accompanied by newscasts with their thinly-veiled false neutrality in the Spanish Civil War, had advantageous results for the Francoist side. The delegate from the International Anticommunist Entente, George Lodygensky, had noticed as much and considered that the Portuguese radio propaganda on the fratricidal conflict broadcast (in English and in French) to Europe was 'perfect' (CO/NE-9A 1936: 132).

Lodygensky recognized in EN's newscasts qualities that Italian and German radios lacked in the external propagandistic broadcasting in favor of the Spanish rebel military. The delegate from the anti-communist body, with its headquarters in Geneva, argued that both the Nazis and the Italian fascists spliced their newscasts with 'violence' and 'factionalism' that lost them all credit, whereas the EN maintained a balanced propagandistic tone that converted it into the most effective in the defense of Spanish 'nationalism' in Europe (CO/NE-9A 1936: 129). Thus, the representatives of the International Anticommunist Entente and the International Committee Pro Deo, a Catholic association, travelled to Lisbon to propose that Henrique Galvão step up his European broadcasts.

The meeting between both parties was fruitful for the development of joint plans for the exchange of propaganda favorable to the insurgents. The EN committed itself to increasing its shortwave continental broadcasts and handed over a selection of the best reports, newscasts and radio conferences to the Genevan propagandists that had ever passed through its microphones. Lodygensky, in turn, handed over all the documentation employed by the Entente to support general Franco in the face of European public opinion (CO/NE-9A 1936: 132). Likewise, the official radio of the *Estado Novo* and the two anti-communist organizations decided to found an Association of Friends of the National Portuguese Broadcaster, with its headquarters in Geneva, to widen the breadth of the EN broadcasts. All of which A. Kourakine, a delegate of the International Committee Pro Deo, noted down in a report sent to Galvão for its foundation a couple of months after the war had started:

[...] We are, with Doctor Lodygensky, tasked with organizing a radio broadcasting surveillance service of which you will take charge. It is our intention to organize an Association of Friends of the National Portuguese Radio-broadcasting service and to broadcast the information that you are communicating to us for the most part through the press. We have sent you this telegram, so that you may specify the hours of the radio broadcasts in French and English. We were unable to listen to them and that is why I have the honor of asking you to let us know the exact time of these broadcasts so that we can tune into them and broadcast them as far as possible (CO/NE-9A 1936: 132).

Among the news items on the conflict that the EN and the anti-communist organizations had a particular interest in broadcasting were the important debates of the League of Nations. The Francoist government had no representatives there, whereas the government of Madrid had diplomats and allies who could persuade the international community to put an end to the intervention of Portugal, Germany and Italy, in support of the rebel army. Even George Lodygensky did not hesitate to give specific instructions to Henrique Galvão to draft the propaganda of the EN, as happened, for example, when the general assembly of the League of Nations was held on 21 September 1936:

[...] According to our information, Litvinoff is preparing to make the most of it, so as to unleash a large-scale offensive of the international 'popular front', looking in first place at the Spanish nationalists and the Germany reply to Nuremberg, as well as Portugal as the 'basecamp' of the insurrection! Spain will be represented at the League of Nations by the delegation of the Government of Madrid. The nationalists, despite the suggestions that have been put to them, have still not sent a protest against such representation from Spain. Now, this is absolutely indispensable. There is room to declare in this protest that a large part of Spain no longer recognizes the Government of Madrid, that this government has placed itself in the group that will soon be swept away and that national Spain in its past attitude with regard to the L.O.N. will take account of the line of action of the present assembly in that regard. A national delegation should be sent to Geneva to act in opposition to the delegation from Madrid, whether in the press or in the *ad hoc* meetings that are organized. It is very important that all the friends of the Spanish national movement of liberation act in way that is indicated above and obtain the decisions and the acts that are laid down within the social milieu of Spanish leaders (CO/NE-9A, 1936).

With the approval of Salazar, as from 1st of December 1936, the European broadcasts of the EN were taken over by the SPN, which took charge of the production of their content, their programming and radio broadcasting, even installing one radio studio in its own headquarters. The SPN put a 15-minute daily news service into operation, between 22:30 and 22:45 hours, which was broadcast twice a week in French, twice in English, twice in German and once in Spanish.

The creation of this propagandistic space required the employment of a copy editor '[...]' with special sensitivity and intelligence not only of our internal and external policy, but also of international policy [...]' and extraordinary annual expenditure of 42,000 Escudos (CO/PC-12 1936: 320). In addition, the propaganda apparatus led by the writer António Ferro³ regularly financed special programs, such as live broadcasts of anti-communist events or patriotic demonstrations to maintain the regime's mobilization capacity (CO/PC-19 1939).

6. The terrorist attacks against the EN and the enemy radio broadcasts

The terrorist attacks perpetrated in January 1937 by clandestine opposition cells against the headquarters of the embassy representing Franco in Lisbon and the installations of the Portuguese Ministry of the Interior, the EN and the RCP, coerced the government of Salazar to redouble the anti-communist propaganda even more. In this context of alarm and nationalist agitation, the EN sponsored an orchestrating public fund raising to reward the heroes of a terrorist attack: four policemen with sufficient audacity to transport an

unexploded bomb that was thrown into the waters of the Tagus river. Public contributions to the brave policemen collected 13,039 Escudos, an amount that was delivered by the director of the EN at an official event retransmitted live by the radio station itself.

After the attacks, both the central studios of the EN, in Quelhas, and its network of antennas were placed under permanent police protection (Anon. 1937b: 1). The strategic value of the EN and the communist psychosis stoked by the provocative propaganda of Salazarism pushed the chief technician of the EN radio antennas, Fernando de Cunha Leal, to consider the security force insufficient. He therefore proposed reinforcing the protection of the installations and the antennas of the transmitter with various lines of barbed wire, a ditch with high-tension electric cables, three machine-gun nests, various high-power search lights, and a brigade of police with anti-gas masks to prevent chemical attacks, among other measures (M500-C56 1937). Cunha Leal justified the security force, underlining the fundamental relevance of the EN in the propaganda war unleashed against the enemies of the *Estado Novo*:

[...] More than the value of hundreds of thousands of Escudos, the formidable weapon that the National Broadcaster represents must be taken into account to swiftly and convincingly deny the mistruths that the enemies of the [political] situation wish to spread abroad, always ready to believe rumors, or the highly powerful weapon that could be turned against the Government, if the enemy were to reach it and to make it work, despite the precautions that have been taken [...]. (M500-C56 1937).

The fear of attacks from the enemies of the regime, among whom numerous Portuguese opponents linked to the anarchist movement and to the Communist Party who were living in clandestinity (Farinha, 1998), was to turn into a serious threat when Salazar himself was the target of a terrorist attack with powerful explosives committed on 4 July 1937, as his official vehicle passed by, from which he miraculously emerged unhurt (Madeira, 2013). An event that was very useful to the dictator to justify and to intensify the prosecution of his opponents at a time when freedoms were even more restricted, stimulating censorship activity over the communications media in which the only party of the regime, the *União Nacional* [National Unity], the *Legião Portuguesa*, and the political police, the *Policia de Vigilancia e Defesa do Estado* [Surveillance and State Defense Police] (PVDE) all collaborated (CO/PC-12A, n.d. [1935]).

Salazarism also made the most of the tragic events happening in Spain to highlight the valuable work of the *Estado Novo*, even establishing an association between the presumed military and social victories of Francoism and the Portuguese dictatorship. The EN propaganda spread the idea that both the political and the economic strength of Portugal, as a rearguard of the Spanish insurgents, was their guarantee of success for military triumph over the ‘Communists’ (Anon. 1937c: 2). In echo of these official messages from the EN, attempting to exalt the image of Salazar in an epic tone, the *Diário de Notícias* eloquently expressed the panorama which his country confronted: “The Iberian Peninsula is today a battle-ground and Portugal, whatever the cowards and traitors may wish, stands today as the rearguard of an army on campaign” (Anon. 1937a: ¹).

Through constant unmasking of ‘red terror’ with messages that produced unease, and contrasting the privileged situation of Portugal with the Spanish disaster, the dictatorship disseminated an idyllic image of Salazarist Portugal. To exaggerate the contrast, EN utilized Francoist intellectuals who described the country as a place where people lived reasonably well, an example for the new Spain to follow (Montes 1938: 7). This recurrent comparison with the warlike climate of Spain was a form of emotional pressure implicitly

designed to stimulate a feeling of gratitude towards the regime for safeguarding Portugal and protecting society from war.

The EN used this stark contrast with the drama in Spain to construct a sickly-smooth Salazarist rhetoric of thanks to a leader who had supposedly modernized and ennobled Portugal. In this respect, João Ameal, one of the most influential ideologues of Salazarism, offered a paradigmatic description of the political time through which his country was passing. In one of his radio transmissions, he affirmed that ‘while Spain treads on, with bitter glory the painful way of the Reconquest, Portugal continues its march forwards, happier and safer every day, in the vanguard of European nations’ (Ameal 1936: 1).

Despite the intense official propaganda, since the outbreak of war, the Portuguese government had shown itself worried by the ‘negative’ influence and capability of social destabilization that foreign radio broadcasters could have, above all the Spanish Republican radio stations (MNE 1964: 51). The Portuguese dictator tried by all means to prevent his audition, provoking incredible episodes arising from the repressive action of his political police and the daring imagination of the clandestine propaganda of their opponents. The repressive apparatus of the Portuguese *Estado Novo* established a peculiar radio censorship for the broadcasts of the radios supporting the Republican government in Madrid, placing spies close to both public and private radio receivers. (M482-C35 1936). The PVDE and the *Legião Portuguesa* even arrested owners of transistors who committed the temerity of tuning into ‘Communist’ Spain (Vidarte 1978: 583).

However, the gendarmes of the dictatorship never managed to arrest the promoters of *Rádio Fantasma* [Phantom Radio], a curious radio station sponsored by the Federation of Portuguese Anarchists in Exile (*Federação dos Anarquistas Portugueses Exiliados*) [Federation of Portuguese Anarquist Exiles] (FAPE). It transmitted black propaganda from Madrid, duping the PVDE into thinking that it was broadcasting from Portuguese territory. Functioning alongside it was the radio station of the *Frente Popular Português* [Portuguese Popular Front], whose broadcasts were sporadic. But if the radio propaganda of the Portuguese exiles in Spain, of quite limited effect and scope, was a cause for concern to the Portuguese government, the powerful Spanish radio stations loyal to the 2nd Republic, such as *Unión Radio Madrid*, *Radio España*, *Radio Barcelona* and *Radio Valencia*, with Peninsula coverage and many programs, represented a serious problem for the Salazarist regime, which explains why it sought to jam their transmissions using the technology of the EN and the RCP.

In spite of everything, the voices of almost all the political leaders of Republican Spain could be heard in Portugal, encouraging the resistance of the militias against the rebel’s advance and criticizing the support of the Portuguese dictatorship to the faction that carried out the coup. However, while the tune of the EN represented the “truth” of the facts, the radio propaganda coming from Spain was, according to the gloomy expression of the correspondent of the newspaper *O Século* Leopoldo Nunes (1936: 275), the ‘call of the dead’.

7. Conclusions

With the firm desire that a change should take place in the political direction within Republican Spain towards an authoritarian regime that favored its position in the framework of the complex Iberian relations, the Portuguese National broadcaster was a fundamental instrument used by the Salazarist dictatorship in its political war against the democratic government of Spain, after the military *coup d’état* that sparked the Spanish Civil War.

Its status as the official radio channel, controlled by Salazar himself, who recognized that it could be an excellent and innovative means of communication in order to consolidate his regime with propaganda campaigns, turned the EN into a strategic media channel for broadcasting programs on agitation and social mobilization, such as *5 minutos anticomunistas*. It was also an ideal platform to disseminate messages or proclamations from different leaders of the *Estado Novo* who, depending on the political situation in relation with the Spanish war, sought to guide Portuguese, Spanish and European public opinion (including their listeners in the colonial African empire) on the sequence of war-related events.

With the collaboration of Spanish speakers and the alliances with anti-communist bodies linked to the European Catholic movement such as the Anti-Communist International Entente and the Pro Deo Committee, the EN planned its propaganda in view of political convenience and diplomatic contingencies that the regime was confronting, very especially during the defense of the Spanish Francoist and its interests at the meetings of the Committee of London and the General Assembly of the League of Nations.

Among its actions of counter-propaganda and psychological warfare across de sound waves, it also sought a response to the needs of the Francoist troops on the battle field, with whom it maintained close contact. In that way, it could profile and better adapt the most adequate slogans for its different audiences, so as to appear more persuasive when broadcasting information, denials and the demoralization of the Republican army. Likewise, faced with the threat of internal revolt due to the influence of enemy propaganda, the EN was a kind of defensive bastion against the programs from radio stations loyal to the government of Madrid. It used its powerful antenna to interfere with those programs, retransmitting on the same wavelength and thereby preventing many Portuguese from listening to critical voices that encouraged resistance against Salazarist authoritarianism.

In short, the EN played a relevant role during the Spanish Civil War for the political ends of the Portuguese government and the Spanish insurgent army, both in a national and in an international context. Its calculated rhetoric contributed to legitimize the diplomatic strategy of Portugal in defense of Francoist interests, seeking to show that the *Estado Novo* was a political model that pursued peace while recognizing the right of the Spanish 'nationalist' faction to defend itself from an imaginary 'Communist' invasion that also threatened Portugal's independence.

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¹ Authors’ translations of the Portuguese texts.

² Rádio Hertz was the pioneer of Portuguese radio broadcasting that began its programs on 24 April 1914. It was founded by Fernando Cardelho de Medeiros. See: ‘Rádio Hertz’, *Rádio Nacional*, 28 May 1939, p. 19.

³ António Ferro (1895-1957), a modernist Portuguese writer, editor of the journal *Orpheu* and a contributor to various Portuguese communication media, was appointed director of the SPN after its foundation in September 1933, with the objective of carrying out its interventionist project to influence the arts and culture. He was director of the SPN between 1933 and 1945 and then of the National Secretariat of Information, *Secretariado Nacional de Informação* (the SPN under a new name), from the end of the war until 1950. Also, he was the Chairman of the Board of EN in 1941. See: Raimundo (2015), Acciaiuoli (2013) and Ramos de Ó (1999).