

## *Evaluating tradeoffs among ecosystem services to inform marine spatial planning*

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1 **Title:** Evaluating tradeoffs among ecosystem services to inform marine spatial planning

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28 **Running Title:** Ecosystem service tradeoffs

1 **Abstract**

2 A central challenge for natural resource management is developing rigorous yet practical  
3 approaches for balancing the costs and benefits of diverse human uses of ecosystems. Economic  
4 theory has a long history of evaluating tradeoffs in returns from different assets to identify  
5 optimal investment strategies. There has been recent progress applying this framework to the  
6 delivery of ecosystem services in land use planning. However, despite growing national and  
7 international interest in marine spatial planning, we lack parallel frameworks in the marine  
8 realm. This paper reviews an ecosystem service tradeoff analysis framework and provides a more  
9 comprehensive synthesis for how it can be applied to marine spatial planning and marine  
10 ecosystem-based management. A tradeoff analysis approach can reveal inferior management  
11 options, demonstrate the benefits of comprehensive planning for multiple, interacting services  
12 over managing single services, and identify ‘compatible’ services that provide win-win  
13 management options.

14

15 **Keywords:** economics; ecosystem based management; ecosystem services; efficiency frontier;  
16 marine spatial planning; tradeoff analysis.

## 17 **1. Introduction**

18       Given the scope and magnitude of the environmental challenges facing natural resource  
19 management, there is an increasing demand for more holistic, ecosystem-based approaches to  
20 management [1-4]. Ecosystem-based management (EBM) is a place-based approach that aims to  
21 achieve the long-term ecosystem health and functioning that in turn provide the ecosystem  
22 services on which people rely [4-8]. Marine spatial planning (MSP) is one type of planning  
23 process that offers a promising opportunity for more integrated management and has been  
24 gaining political momentum throughout the world [9, 10]. MSP identifies which areas of the  
25 ocean are appropriate for different uses or activities in order to reduce use conflicts and achieve  
26 ecological, economic and social objectives [11]. One central challenge for translating EBM and  
27 MSP tenets from concept to practice is developing rigorous and straightforward approaches for  
28 balancing diverse human uses of ecosystems [12]. This paper highlights tools from economic  
29 theory and multi-objective decision making for evaluating tradeoffs in the delivery of ecosystem  
30 services, with particular emphasis on how such an approach could transform ocean management.

31       Ecosystem services range from tangible to intangible (e.g., food production versus aesthetic  
32 value) and provide natural capital that is essential to human welfare [13]. The Millennium  
33 Ecosystem Assessment [1] brought ecosystem service concepts to the forefront, developing four  
34 widely used service categories: provisioning (e.g., of seafood, timber), regulating (e.g., of  
35 climate, floods, water quality), supporting (of other services, e.g., pollination for food  
36 production, nutrient cycling), and cultural (e.g., recreation, spiritual value). MSP attempts to  
37 allocate space to the full range of services provided by the oceans, presenting a significant  
38 challenge to natural resource managers. Services frequently are not independent of one another,  
39 but instead exhibit complex interactions that generate tradeoffs in the delivery of one service

40 relative to the delivery of others [14-17]. In some cases, two services may be mutually exclusive  
41 in space (e.g., wave energy buoys may preclude commercial fishing and vice versa), while in  
42 other cases the tradeoff is less severe (e.g., fishing and recreational activities can often occur in  
43 the same locations, but fishing impacts might have a negative effect on some types of  
44 recreation). Because not all interacting services can be maximized simultaneously, society must  
45 make decisions about their relative preferences for different services, and, consequently, how  
46 this affects management decisions [15, 18-20]. Managers make these types of decisions on a  
47 regular basis, but often do so without explicit consideration of these tradeoffs [21].

48 Balancing the delivery of a range of services is particularly critical for coastal and ocean  
49 ecosystems, which face growing human populations, increasing associated impacts, and  
50 declining ecosystem services [22-24]. Marine systems offer a challenging and interesting  
51 opportunity for implementing MSP and specifically for examining tradeoffs among services. For  
52 one, service valuation in marine settings is complicated given the general absence of property  
53 rights and the related fact that many key services are not traded in markets (e.g., recreation,  
54 wildlife viewing, protection from shoreline erosion). Furthermore, the primary market service  
55 from the oceans – fisheries – often lacks property rights, has inappropriate incentives and  
56 frequently ineffective governance, and is managed using limited-quality stock assessments,  
57 which together promote unsustainable fishing [25, 26]. Management in the oceans also tends to  
58 be fragmented, with limited governance or institutional frameworks for spatial management and  
59 coordinated management across sectors [27, 28]. Lastly, marine systems host numerous  
60 emerging uses, such as wave energy and offshore aquaculture. These emerging uses will  
61 contribute to crowding among efforts to maximize the delivery of particular services, posing an

62 ideal prospect for more integrated planning prior to their development. Such planning demands  
63 an explicit analysis of tradeoffs among services under different management scenarios.

64 The economics discipline has developed a rich "production theory" which concerns how  
65 firms optimally trade-off between different inputs to production [29]. This is similar to portfolio  
66 theory, which analyzes the tradeoff between variance (i.e. risk) and return of a collection of  
67 assets, whether financial stocks or fish stocks, so as to maximize return for a given level of risk  
68 [30-32]. In parallel, there is a long history within decision theory, including multi-criteria and  
69 multi-objective analyses, of developing tools for decision-making where there are numerous and  
70 often competing objectives [33]. Multi-criteria analysis has been applied to numerous marine  
71 applications [34-37] and there has been recent progress applying these ideas to managing  
72 ecosystem services [20, 38-41]. However, we lack a synthesis of how tradeoff analysis can be used  
73 in an EBM or MSP approach. This paper: 1) highlights one framework for analyzing tradeoffs,  
74 including reviewing the types of tradeoffs possible in an ecosystem services context and  
75 examining how this framework can guide EBM, and 2) provides demonstrations of how  
76 ecosystem service tradeoff analysis can be applied to MSP using two stylized examples based on  
77 data.

78

## 79 **2. Conceptual framework for ecosystem service tradeoff analysis**

80 Production theory, a branch of microeconomics that deals with the production (as opposed to  
81 the consumption) side of the economy, was developed to examine marketed commodities [42].  
82 While not a perfect parallel, this approach can also be applied to the production of ecosystem  
83 services, marketed or otherwise [43]. The guiding principle when applied to EBM is to ensure  
84 the sustainable and efficient delivery of multiple interacting services. The challenge in meeting

85 this goal is that providing ecosystem services is “costly” in the sense that actions taken to deliver  
86 one service may inhibit or divert scarce resources away from actions that could have been taken  
87 to deliver other services. For example, if one is using marine protected areas to provide the  
88 ecosystem service of biodiversity preservation, the possible provision of fishery yield is reduced  
89 as a second service. The cost of lost provisions from one service due to use of another service  
90 depends on the strength and nature of their interaction. Not all services produce ‘costs’ to other  
91 services and this framework allows one to identify ‘compatible’ services as well. In short, the  
92 following analytical approach supports more informed management decisions about real and  
93 perceived tradeoffs among ecosystem services.

94 Production theory considers how different inputs produce different levels of outputs,  
95 typically expressed as production functions. When applied to ecosystem services, production  
96 functions are models that translate the structure and functioning of ecosystems into the provision  
97 of ecosystem services [40, 44, 45]. A production function approach has been used to value non-  
98 market ecosystem services that can be considered as inputs into the production of goods or  
99 services with market value (e.g., seagrass habitat as nursery grounds is an input into fisheries)  
100 [43, 46], but also applies to ecosystem services that are not readily connected to a marketed  
101 output. Importantly, there may be many potential ecosystem service outcomes that can arise from  
102 a given set of inputs. This provides a basis for examining which outcomes are optimal in terms of  
103 providing the combination of services that are important to society.

104 In cases with a small number of services or objectives, ecosystem service outcomes can be  
105 analyzed graphically to evaluate tradeoffs. In an EBM context, this involves some quantification  
106 of the ecosystem services produced across a broad range of potential management actions or  
107 spatial plans (e.g., all possible MPA siting options, all possible harvest regulations, etc.). This

108 can be conducted using empirical data, quantitative models or conceptual models, depending on  
109 data and model availability, and ideally considers as many sets of management actions as  
110 possible. In such an analysis, the axes of the graph correspond with levels of ecosystem services  
111 and each point corresponds with the outcomes from a given set of management actions that are  
112 known or estimated to produce amounts of each service. After plotting all (or a large subset of)  
113 possible management options, the constraint envelope, or outer bound of all the points, is the  
114 “efficiency frontier” comprised of Pareto-efficient options (Box 1). This “ecosystem services”  
115 frontier depicts management options that provide for the optimal delivery of the two or more  
116 services [37, 47, 48]. Points interior to the frontier are suboptimal – at least one service could be  
117 increased, at no cost to other services.

118       Although this approach may seem simplistic, it provides two critical insights that can be  
119 used to guide EBM. First, the position of a point relative to the frontier can suggest  
120 improvements to current management practices. Regardless of the shape of the frontier or social  
121 preferences for specific services, all sets of management actions interior to the frontier represent  
122 suboptimal decisions. These are situations where an EBM approach can lead to societal benefits  
123 at no extra cost, and commonly a gain, for both services. Such knowledge therefore has the  
124 potential to eliminate some conflicts among user groups, as it allows clearly inferior management  
125 decisions to be objectively eliminated. Of particular interest are situations in which management  
126 options that are all interior to the frontier are being debated. In such cases of “false tradeoffs,”  
127 these options may be unnecessarily pitted against each other, and tradeoff analysis could  
128 illustrate that additional management options exist that simultaneously remove the perceived  
129 tradeoff and produce a win-win outcome.



130       Second, the relationship between or among services also indicates whether coordinated  
131 management across services is necessary. In other words, the shape of the frontier can inform  
132 what the optimal management solution(s) is likely to be, narrowing the scope of potential policy  
133 options. Examining pairwise service interactions, important rules of thumb and insights emerge  
134 (Panel 1). There are likely other variants on these curves, but this set captures the most common  
135 (or at least the most expected) types of relationships. Furthermore, the societal preference for one  
136 service compared with another, represented by an indifference curve, will determine which point  
137 along the frontier maximizes social value of ecosystem services [42]. Knowing both the shape of  
138 the frontier and at least some approximation of the indifference curve allows managers to hone in  
139 on a single or small number of optimal management decisions (Fig. 1).

140       There are numerous examples in the terrestrial literature of applying ecosystem service  
141 tradeoff analysis to decision-making. As one example, Nalle et al. [49] examine a three  
142 dimensional tradeoff for timber production and conservation of two wildlife species using a  
143 spatially-explicit, dynamic model. They identify optimal land management decisions, the  
144 shortcomings of current management practices, and the nature of the tradeoff among the three  
145 goals. Polasky et al. [48] examine the tradeoff between biodiversity conservation (number of  
146 species) and economic return from different types of land use. This spatially explicit analysis  
147 demonstrates the potential for large improvements along both axes by altering current spatial  
148 patterns of land use and that optimal land management options fall along a concave frontier. As  
149 another example, Wossink and Swinton [50] examine tradeoffs between agriculture production  
150 and the provision of non-market services such as pollination. They theoretically explore the  
151 potential for non-monotonic concave frontiers, whereby, for example, crop output and

152 pollination service can have a complimentary or competitive relationship over different levels of  
153 pollination output.

154 Production theory can also be used to examine service tradeoffs without employing graphical  
155 analysis. For example, Naidoo and Ricketts [51] conduct a cost-benefit analysis for forest  
156 conservation in Paraguay, examining the benefits in terms of five ecosystem services, relative to  
157 opportunity costs. Their approach compared maps of different spatial planning decisions,  
158 informing what spatial configurations of conservation measures yielded the highest benefits  
159 relative to costs. All of these examples illustrate how tradeoff analysis can be applied to natural  
160 resource management, but these in-depth case studies lack a more general framework. Panel 1 is  
161 intended to provide a synthesis of ecosystem service tradeoff theory that will enable more  
162 widespread adoption of the approach.

163

### 164 **3. Ecosystem service tradeoff analysis for the oceans**

165 As demonstrated thus far, the fundamental economic theory behind tradeoff analysis is well  
166 developed and applicable to any ecosystem type. However, marine systems offer a particularly  
167 challenging opportunity for examining tradeoffs among services. Oceans are facing an ever  
168 increasing number of human uses and threats, while also typically plagued by fragmented  
169 governance. However, MSP offers a promising opportunity for more integrated and ecosystem-  
170 based management of multiple services, provided there are the scientific approaches to support  
171 such integrated decision making. Two hypothetical case studies grounded in data are presented  
172 here, suggesting how tradeoff analysis can advance marine resource management. These  
173 examples are intended to catalyze future applications of tradeoff analysis within MSP processes.

174

175 *3.1 Case study: fishery yield and biomass preservation*

176 Fisheries over-exploitation is widely regarded as the primary cause of recently publicized  
177 fisheries collapses [23, 52]. One suggested approach for conserving fish stocks and marine  
178 biodiversity is to create no-take marine reserves [53-56]. Indeed, marine protected areas are  
179 typically one of the spatial designations identified in MSP and ocean zoning plans [57, 58].  
180 Although marine reserves eliminate fishing within their boundaries, fisheries management  
181 outside the reserves can have significant effects on the performance of the reserve, and on the  
182 ultimate system-wide biomass. For example, for species with considerable adult movement or  
183 larval dispersal, small (or sparsely located) marine reserves may not protect stocks if fishing  
184 pressure is sufficiently high outside [59, 60]. Furthermore, although it is intuitive that fishery  
185 closures reduce profit from fishing, a less intuitive but powerful recent finding is that fisheries  
186 profits can be maintained or even enhanced, for some species, by the tactical siting of marine  
187 reserve networks that take advantage of adult spillover and larval export [61-65]. Thus, the size,  
188 proximity, and locations of marine reserves will interact in complex ways with fish growth,  
189 production, and dispersal, as well as with spatially-distinct fisheries exploitation, to influence  
190 two common management objectives: fish conservation and profitable fisheries.

191 To evaluate the tradeoff between biomass conservation (fish biomass remaining in the sea)  
192 and sustainable fishery profit, a spatially-heterogeneous model of fish production, dispersal,  
193 harvest, and profits is used, building on Costello and Polasky [62]. This model is illustrative, and  
194 is not intended to replicate any particular geographic region. However, to maintain some level of  
195 realism, it is loosely parameterized based on data from the central coast region of California. The  
196 model contains a set of 48 distinct patches, each with its own adult survival, larval production,  
197 and dispersal to other patches. Spatial heterogeneity enters in two ways. First, larval dispersal

198 depends on ocean currents [66], which are non-uniform in the study system. Second, patch-level  
199 adult survival depends on local habitat. In this case, the model focuses on a species associated  
200 with kelp, e.g. kelp bass. In the model, higher kelp density in a patch leads to higher adult  
201 survival, and density dependence enters through a Beverton-Holt stock recruitment relationship  
202 [67]. The full suite of model parameters for each of the 48 patches is available from the authors  
203 upon request.

204 Spatial harvest interacts with abundance (assuming intracohort density-dependence) to affect  
205 fish production. Thus, any given spatial harvest strategy (e.g., constant patch-level harvest,  
206 heterogeneous harvest across space to maximize steady state profit, set harvest to 0 in some  
207 subset of patches to effectively designate these patches as marine reserves) gives rise to an  
208 equilibrium fish abundance (in each of  $N$  patches), and an equilibrium fishery profit. System-  
209 wide fishery profit is the sum of patch-level profit. Profit in a patch is price (scaled to 1)  
210 multiplied by harvest minus harvest cost, where harvest cost includes a small “stock effect,” as in  
211 White et al. [61]. Data on kelp abundance, bottom type, and dispersal characteristics, obtained  
212 from the Marine Life Protection Act Initiative (<http://marinemap.org/mlpa/>), are overlaid on the  
213 model domain. The larval dispersal matrix is derived from a Regional Ocean Modeling System  
214 [68] oceanographic circulation model [69], assuming a pelagic larval duration of 26-36 days;  
215 larvae that reach patches with suitable habitat at the conclusion of the larval period recruit into  
216 the adult population. Adults are assumed to have a sufficiently small home range to be  
217 considered sessile.

218 The model was run simulating 300 harvest policies. Each simulated policy is generated by  
219 randomly designing a marine reserve network among the 48 patches and optimizing exploitation  
220 of the fishery outside that network. The objective to be maximized (by choosing spatial harvest

221 outside the reserve) is the weighted sum of fishery profit and biomass, in steady state. The  
222 simulated harvest policies randomize the weights within this objective. Equilibrium profit is  
223 plotted against equilibrium fish biomass remaining in the sea, with any given harvest strategy  
224 representing a point on the tradeoff graph. All points are scaled relative to the maximum profit  
225 and maximum biomass, so the theoretical maximum joint production is (1,1). The frontier itself  
226 is calculated by optimizing the weighted objective specified above, but by leaving the marine  
227 reserve network unconstrained. The weights in the objective function are altered to trace out the  
228 frontier.

229 In this example, the frontier is concave (Fig. 2), indicating that it is possible to increase the  
230 delivery of one service substantially without a large cost for the other service, and that corner  
231 solutions would only be chosen if there exists extreme societal preference for one service over  
232 the other. Instead, management is likely to seek a combination of conservation and fishery profit  
233 services. The potential role of marine reserves in obtaining this combination of services can be  
234 explored by examining the percentage of the study area set aside in reserves (if any) for  
235 management actions that lie along the efficiency frontier. In this situation, all harvest policies  
236 along the efficiency frontier include a significant percent of the area set aside in marine reserves,  
237 suggesting that protected areas not only contribute to conservation but are also an important  
238 component of an economically profitable management scenario. Even the policy that maximizes  
239 profit without explicit regard for system biomass (“\*” in Figure 2) contains 34% of the area in  
240 marine reserves. This result, if it holds more generally, has the potential to be quite powerful in  
241 minimizing disputes between conservation and fisheries interests and for implementing marine  
242 reserves as a key component of marine spatial plans.

243

244 *3.2 Case study: wave energy, fishery yield and real estate value*

245 Rising fuel costs and concerns about the negative impacts of climate change have led to an  
246 increased interest in renewable, zero-emissions energy sources [e.g., 70, 71]. As a result, wind,  
247 wave and tidal power harnessed from coastal areas are being widely considered and implemented  
248 around the world. However, in many cases we lack a thorough understanding of the ecological  
249 and environmental consequences of these new technologies, or how they may interact –  
250 positively or negatively – with other services [72-74]. This is true of wave energy, which is being  
251 actively considered for many coastal regions [75], including the Oregon coast in the US and  
252 Spain in Portugal in the EU [76, 77]. As an emerging service, wave energy offers the opportunity  
253 to apply the ecosystem service tradeoff analysis proactively, using it as a tool to inform the  
254 spatial siting of wave energy facilities in a manner that minimizes conflicts among multiple  
255 ocean uses.

256 In this case example, siting of wave energy conversion arrays is examined, considering  
257 tradeoffs between wave energy production and fishery profits and the value of the coastal  
258 viewshed. This analysis approximates wave energy siting for the coast of Oregon, and focuses on  
259 siting in the offshore dimension. While in reality, placement decisions will need to be made in a  
260 two-dimensional context, this cross-shore analysis provides a first approximation of some of the  
261 key service interactions. Specifically, wave energy devices are best anchored over sandy  
262 bottoms, which is also prime habitat and fishing grounds for Dungeness crab. Additionally, real  
263 estate value of coastal properties may be affected by the visual impact of wave energy devices. A  
264 simple model is used to examine the interactions among wave energy production, crab fishery  
265 profit, and impact to coastal real estate value from the altered viewscape, with respect to the  
266 offshore placement of a wave buoy array.

267 Design studies based on a single wave energy conversion (WEC) device generating 190 kW  
268 were used, suggesting that a target commercial wave power farm of 34 MW would require 180  
269 WEC devices arranged in an array extending 2 km cross-shelf and 9 km alongshore [78]. This  
270 amounts to about 4 MW/km of coastline. The 34-MW wave power array generates 300,000 MW-  
271 hours per year. If wave energy can be produced and sold at a profit of \$0.01/kW-hour, this would  
272 amount to  $\$3 \times 10^6$  per year per array. Dividing by the alongshore length of the array yields about  
273  $\$3 \times 10^5$  per year per alongshore km. Wave energy conversion devices are not safe to deploy too  
274 close to shore where large winter waves could damage the devices and potentially uproot the  
275 array. Therefore, the assumption is made that WEC devices would not be placed shallower than  
276 the 30-m isobath (3 km offshore for a 1% bottom slope). The expense of larger mooring  
277 elements and longer electrical transmission lines diminishes the profitability of wave power  
278 generation as water depth increases offshore. Thus, it is assumed the highest profitability occurs  
279 in a water depth of 50 m [79], which for the typical inner-shelf bottom slope off Oregon of 1%,  
280 is found 5 km offshore. Profitability declines shoreward of this location, dropping to zero at 3 km  
281 and also declines toward the deep sea, dropping to zero at 10 km offshore (Fig. 3b; Table 1).

282 The annual revenue from the Oregon Dungeness crab fishery is \$5-44 million per year  
283 (<http://www.oregondungeness.org/fishery.shtml>). Using the high value and dividing by the  
284 length of the Oregon coastline, about 440 km (admittedly an overestimate since about 10% of the  
285 Oregon shelf is rocky bottom, which is not exploited by the crab fishery), this is  $\$1 \times 10^5$  per  
286 alongshore kilometer of coastline per year. The high value of the crab fishery was used to  
287 represent potential value of the fishery. While not needed for the tradeoff analysis, one can  
288 estimate the number of crab pots needed to realize this catch value. Using an estimate of \$1.43  
289 per crab, this amounts to  $7.0 \times 10^4$  crabs per km per year. If it is assumed that during the four-

290 month intensive crab fishing season, pots are turned around every 6 days and about 10 crabs are  
291 caught in each pot per soak, then the total crab catch would require about 350 pots per kilometer  
292 (i.e., 154,000 pots fished in Oregon waters), which is not an unrealistic number  
293 (<http://www.oregondungeness.org/fishery.shtml>). In order to estimate the impact of displacing  
294 the crab fishery for a WEC array, it is necessary to know the cross-shelf distribution of pots. It is  
295 assumed that pots are placed no closer than the 30-m isobath (3 km offshore) (an underestimate  
296 of how close to shore crabs are fished) and no deeper than the 90-m isobath (9 km offshore) and  
297 that the optimum crab fishing depth is at the 60-m isobath (6 km offshore) (Table 1)  
298 (<http://www.oregondungeness.org/fishery.shtml>). To estimate the impact on the crab fishery due  
299 to the presence of a wave energy installation, the loss of a 2-km cross-shelf swath – the width of  
300 the WEC array – is moved across the crab fishery profit curve from zero to 15 km offshore,  
301 resulting in the curve in Figure 3a.

302 To model the effect of a wave farm on coastal real estate values via its alteration of the  
303 viewscape, it is assumed that a wave buoy is approximately 6 meters in height and 4.5 meters in  
304 width (e.g., Finavera Renewables, AquaBuOY) and the height of an observer is 5 meters (height  
305 from a typical bluff). The wave buoy array is modeled as 9 km long perpendicular to the coast,  
306 with wave buoys evenly distributed across the 9 x 2 km array. In Oregon, the median value of a  
307 1-acre cross-shore, 1-km along-shore parcel of coastal property (c. 15 acres along the coast),  
308 with a median distribution of one residence structure per acre, is \$21,000,000 (using  
309 [www.rwre.com](http://www.rwre.com), the median was calculated based on 33 coastal properties with ocean views that  
310 listed the asking price and acreage, November 2008). To make this property value comparable to  
311 the fishery and energy annualized values, the property value (with an intact view) was multiplied  
312 by a discount rate of 5% to get the future value of the view in \$/km through infinite time (Table



313 1). Finally, given that there is somewhat equivocal evidence regarding the effect of offshore  
314 wind or wave farms on aesthetics and property values [80-82], it was assumed that annualized  
315 property values were decreased by the proportion of the horizon view that is impacted. This  
316 proportion is calculated using simple geometry, based on the height of the observer, the height  
317 and width of the energy facility, and the distance of the facility offshore (from zero to 15km  
318 offshore), taking into account the curvature of the earth and assuming that coastal properties  
319 have a 90 degree angle view of the ocean. Property values are reduced by 2% or less (Fig. 3c).

320 The analysis reduces to a cost-benefit analysis because all three services are modeled in the  
321 same units (\$/km/year); the values of the three services are summed to determine the optimal  
322 offshore placement for a WEC array, where total value is maximized (Fig. 4a). In cases where  
323 services are not valued in common units, the frontier can be determined from multi-dimensional  
324 tradeoff analysis. In this example, the frontier is complex with multiple inflection points (Fig.  
325 4b). Considering all three services, the optimal placement of a wave energy facility is at 4.95 km  
326 offshore. This is only slightly inshore from where it would be sited without considering the other  
327 services (5km). This can also be compared with the optimal siting considering wave energy and  
328 the crab fishery only (4.93 km) or wave energy and property value only (5.12 km). The value  
329 distribution of the crab fishery pushes the optimal placement of a wave facility closer to shore,  
330 while property value has the opposite effect.

331 Considering all three services, wave facility placement is minimally affected by the two  
332 other services because of the large dollar value of energy production relative to the other services  
333 and because of the opposing spatial effects of interactions with the other services. In some cases,  
334 as is shown here, tradeoff analysis may indicate that interactions that were presumed to be  
335 important are relatively insignificant, potentially ameliorating stakeholder conflicts. On the other

336 hand, if other services had been examined or if these services had been valued in terms other  
337 than dollars, a different answer may have emerged.

338

#### 339 **4. Conclusions**

340 This paper presents a straightforward, scientifically-based approach for quantitatively  
341 evaluating tradeoffs among multiple ecosystem services. Acknowledgement of such tradeoffs is  
342 not new – managers and ecologists have long recognized the complex interactions between  
343 different human uses of ecosystems. However, there is a tendency for decisions about tradeoffs  
344 to be made implicitly, which is often exacerbated by fragmented or single-sector management,  
345 whereby each service is managed independently. An ecosystem service tradeoff approach reveals  
346 when the single-sector approach is appropriate and when there is a need for a more integrated,  
347 ecosystem-based approach. It also reveals suboptimal management decisions, with the potential  
348 for eliminating conflicts among user groups when a service or multiple services could be  
349 maintained or even increased without a cost to other services. Finally, this framework can also be  
350 used to evaluate when the frontier is unobtainable due to regulatory or legal constraints and  
351 could even be used to guide institutional changes to ensure more equitable service delivery.

352 While the simplicity of the approach as presented here makes it an ideal starting point for  
353 evaluating tradeoffs among ecosystem services, implementing the approach in practice is not  
354 without challenges. It is difficult to accurately estimate indifference curves (and in particular,  
355 define what is meant by “societal preference”), develop production functions, and use  
356 appropriate ecosystem service metrics [83] given the diversity of human values, perceptions and  
357 preferences related to ocean uses. These challenges are not insurmountable, and added  
358 complexity will certainly be required to improve the applicability of this tool to real world

359 management. For example, production functions and service interactions are not static over time.  
360 To consider temporal variability, efficiency frontiers can be assumed to have a dynamic path,  
361 rather than operating in steady state [e.g., 49], with management decisions taking frontier  
362 trajectories into account. Additionally, our ability to distinguish among different types of service  
363 interactions depends on our level of certainty regarding how much of the services will be  
364 realized under different management policies. If uncertainty is high and the error bars around  
365 each point are large, it may be difficult to distinguish among frontier shapes. However,  
366 alternative frontiers can be analyzed in order to consider uncertainty from inputs, from external  
367 drivers, and for the effect of management actions. Historical data and past management  
368 “experiments” and associated outcomes can be used to learn more about the system. Ironically,  
369 management failures of the past may even prove beneficial in the long-term because of their  
370 contribution to reducing uncertainty.

371 The framework presented here has the potential to advance how marine spatial planning is  
372 conducted. Managers and scientists need simple and transparent means for determining the  
373 tradeoffs, or lack thereof, among key services and communicating these interactions to policy  
374 makers and stakeholders. This approach can be readily communicated, developed using complex  
375 simulation models, empirical data, or a conceptual understanding of the system, applied in a  
376 range of systems and to a variety of services and service metrics, and can be nested within other  
377 marine management approaches [e.g., Integrated Ecosystem Assessments, 84]. Tradeoff analysis  
378 can also evaluate services that are not readily valued in monetary units, and can consider services  
379 measured in different units, allowing managers a quantitative approach for balancing services  
380 that otherwise would seem like apples and oranges. These attributes suggest that ecosystem  
381 service tradeoff analysis is likely to be a key ingredient in efforts to realize effective marine

382 spatial planning in which we explicitly plan for existing and emerging ocean uses in a spatial  
383 context.

384

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397

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





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**Box 1. Common types of ecosystem service interactions: insights gained from frontier shapes.** Although the focus here is on pairs of services, management decisions will undoubtedly influence multiple services simultaneously. The logic for thinking about the frontier with multiple services, however, is the same, although it is difficult to visualize more dimensions.

	<p><b>Non-interacting services:</b> These services can be managed independently (e.g., two non-interacting fisheries species with non overlapping habitat requirements). The optimal management solution is at the vertex of the two lines. This type of relationship does not typically arise from traditional economic theory.</p>
	<p><b>Direct tradeoff:</b> A management decision that increases the provisioning of one service results in a proportional decrease of the other service, with no diminishing returns, and vice versa (e.g., zoning mutually exclusive uses of areas of the ocean). This is a common expectation of how services trade off with each other, although it is likely uncommon for most ecosystem services.</p>
	<p><b>Convex tradeoff:</b> Obtaining even a small increase in the provisioning of one service comes at a large cost for the other service. Scenarios near the middle of the frontier are optimal only when societal preferences for the two services are equal or nearly so. Asymmetrical preferences force management decisions toward “corner solutions” where the frontier asymptotes at one of the axes (Fig. 1). As a result, stakeholder conflicts are more likely because there is little middle ground for compromise.</p>
	<p><b>Concave tradeoff:</b> Although there is a tradeoff, there are scenarios that increase the delivery of one service substantially without a large cost to the other service (e.g., if MPAs produce significant spillover of targeted fish, they may provide conservation benefits with minimal cost to the fishery). Optimal management solutions for all types of concave curves occur between the horizontal and vertical tangents to the curve and corner solutions are unlikely because they would reflect an extreme societal preference for one service over the other. Management is likely to seek a combination of the two services (Fig. 1).</p>
	<p><b>Non-monotonic concave tradeoff:</b> There are some levels of one service for which there are two potential outcomes for the other service. There may be a synergism in the system (e.g., as the yield of a predator species increases, the yield of its prey can also increase because it is released from natural predation). It is sub-optimal to make a decision to the left of the peak of the curve, even in cases where the service on the y axis is valued infinitely more than the service on the x axis.</p>
	<p><b>Backwards S tradeoff:</b> Over some range of one service, it can be increased at no cost to the other service. However, after a threshold it becomes very costly to increase that service in terms of the other. This could result from the placement of ocean wind farms and a fishery. If the wind turbines exclude fishing or alter habitat, they could impose costs on the fishery. The costs could initially be small if they are placed in locations with strong winds and poor fishing grounds. Once these “low cost” sites are filled, however, obtaining more wind energy will come at great expense to the fishery.</p>

**Table 1:** Functions used to model the three services in the wave energy case study.

Service	Functions
Wave energy profit (WE)	<p>WE = 0 for <math>x &lt; 3</math> km,</p> <p>WE = <math>\\$3 \times 10^5 \sin[\pi(x-3\text{km})/4\text{km}]</math> for <math>x \geq 3</math> km and <math>x &lt; 5</math> km,</p> <p>WE = <math>\\$3 \times 10^5 \cos[\pi(x-5\text{km})/10\text{km}]</math> for <math>x \geq 3</math> km and <math>x &lt; 5</math> km,</p> <p>WE = 0 for <math>x \geq 10</math> km.</p>
Crab fishery profit (CF)	<p>CF = 0 for <math>x &lt; 3</math> km,</p> <p>CF = <math>\\$ \sin[\pi(x-3\text{km})/6\text{km}]</math> for <math>x \geq 3</math> and <math>x &lt; 9</math>,</p> <p>CF = 0 for <math>x \geq 9</math> km.</p>
Viewscape value (VS)	<p>VS = <math>\\$ 2.1 \times 10^7 * \delta</math>; <math>\delta</math> = discount rate = 0.05</p>

## **Figure Legends**

### **Figure 1**

Two hypothetical ecosystem service frontier shapes (blue), shown with different possible indifference curves (red). An indifference curve is a representation of bundles of services for which one has equal preference. Higher indifference curves represent higher levels of total value or utility, but all points on a single curve are equally preferred. Indifference curves are down-sloping and typically convex, because the per-unit value of goods or services generally increases as that good or service becomes scarcer. The highest indifference curve that touches the frontier (yellow star) represents the optimal delivery given the preferences captured by the indifference curves. In the case of a concave frontier, knowing the indifference curve has relatively little impact on the optimal management solution; both panels A and B result in a combination of both services. In contrast, for the case of a convex frontier, most indifference curves result in one service being maximized at the extreme expense of the other service (panels C, D), and therefore it is more informative in this case to have a good estimate of the indifference curve.

### **Figure 2**

Tradeoffs between system-wide biomass (horizontal axis) and system-wide profit (vertical axis) for a harvested, spatially-explicit meta-population. Fishery management is composed of patch-specific harvest levels, including the possibility of marine reserves in some patches. The solid line indicates the ecosystem service frontier and points represent (biomass, profit) combinations from 300 randomly designed marine reserve networks, with the percent of the area set aside in marine reserves indicated by the color and size of the point. The pure profit maximizing solution involves 34% closure and is shown by the asterisk (\*).

**Figure 3**

The value of wave energy (B), the values of the crab fishery (A) and coastal property (C) as modified by the placement of a wave energy facility, with respect to the offshore placement of a wave energy facility.

**Figure 4**

The combined value of wave energy, crab fishery profit, and coastal property with respect to the offshore placement of a wave energy facility (A) and the tradeoff curve for this three service interaction (B). Each point on the graph refers to an offshore placement distance(s) of the wave energy facility and the star represents the optimal solution, where the tradeoff curve has a slope of -1 (all services tradeoff equally in marginal value) and the maximum total value is achieved when the wave farm is sited 4.95km from shore.

Figure 1




Figure 2






Figure 3




Figure 4

