

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

M. Susan Van Laere for the degree of Master of Arts in Applied Anthropology presented on March 6, 2000. Title: The Grizzly Bear and the Deer: The History of Federal Indian Policy and Its Impact on the Coast Reservation Tribes of Oregon, 1856-1877.

Abstract Approved

**Redacted for privacy**

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David R. Brauner

The Coast Reservation of Oregon was established under Executive Order of President Franklin Pierce in November, 1855, as a homeland for the southern Oregon tribes. It was an immense, isolated wilderness, parts of which had burned earlier in the century. There were some prairies where farming was possible, but because the reservation system itself and farming, particularly along the coast, were unknown entities, life for the Indians was a misery for years.

Those responsible for the establishment of the reservation were subject to the vagaries of the weather, the wilderness, the Congress, and the Office of Indian Affairs. Agents were accountable, not only for the lives of Oregon Indians, but also for all of the minute details involved in answering to a governmental agency. Some of the agents were experienced with the tribes of western Oregon; others were not. All of them believed that the only way to keep the Indians from dying out was to teach them the European American version of agriculturalism. Eventually, if possible, Oregon Indians would be

assimilated into the dominant culture. Most agents held out little hope for the adults of the tribes.

This thesis lays out the background for the development of United States Indian policies. European Americans' ethnocentric ideas about what constituted civilization became inextricably woven into those policies. Those policies were brought in their infant stage to Oregon. Thus, the work on the reservations was experimental, costing lives and destroying community. How those policies were implemented on the Coast Reservation from 1856-1877 concludes this study.

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The Grizzly Bear and the Deer: The History of Federal Indian Policy and Its Impact on the  
Coast Reservation Tribes of Oregon, 1856-1877

by

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Master of Arts thesis of M. Susan Van Laere presented on March 6, 2000

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I understand that my thesis will become part of the permanent collection of Oregon State University libraries. My signature below authorizes release of my thesis to any reader upon request.



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M. Susan Van Laere, Author

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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my parents who encouraged my interest in history and archaeology.

# **THE GRIZZLY BEAR AND THE DEER: THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE COAST RESERVATION TRIBES OF OREGON, 1856-1877**

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Overview**

On November 9, 1855, under President Franklin Pierce's Executive Order, the Coast Reservation was created. By this order, Oregon Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Joel Palmer, succeeded in his goal of acquiring a reservation in western Oregon on which to settle the tribes of southern Oregon and the coastal areas. Known first as the Coast Reservation and later as the Siletz Reservation, the original land area contained 1,100,000 acres (Kentta, 1997), extending from Cape Lookout in the north, between the Siuslaw and Umpqua Rivers in the south, and 20 miles east and west between the summit of the Coast Range and the Pacific Ocean (Ruby and Brown 1992:50). (See Figure 1.1)

The three forts built to guard the borders of the reservation were Fort Umpqua in the south along the coast, Fort Hoskins in the middle of the Coast Range of mountains, and Fort Yamhill on the northeastern edge of the Coast Range. Of these three, Fort Hoskins played the most significant role in maintaining the Coast Reservation. Fort Umpqua was abandoned in 1862, and Yamhill guarded the smaller Grand Ronde Reservation. The Grand Ronde Reservation served both as a temporary living area for those tribes later placed on the Coast Reservation and as a permanent settlement for other tribes, mainly from the Willamette and Umpqua valleys (Ruby and Brown 1992:47). Fort Hoskins supplied men and equipment to a blockhouse on the Siletz. Those soldiers



guarded the area where the Siletz Agency was located, and, in addition, assisted the sub-agent at Alsea when requested. Fort Hoskins' major purpose was to keep the various tribes out of the Willamette Valley and southern Oregon and the non-Indian settlers off the reservation.

The period of 1856-1877 was a transitional period of great significance for the Coast Reservation tribes. During this time, the various tribes' cultures were forcibly changed to meet what the federal government considered as necessary for its "Indian children's" well-being. Progress was not only inevitable but desirable according to the beliefs of the time; if American Indians were to be saved from extinction, they needed to be "civilized" (Trennert 1975:194). If segregation onto reservations away from negative European American influence was the only way to save them, then that was the choice to be made.

The burden of fulfilling governmental policy fell on the shoulders of agents in the field. Under the supervision of a superintendent (who often was changed if the political winds blew from a different direction), agents were charged with helping Oregon Indians make a new life in a different place mostly against their will and with few resources.




Figure 1.1 The Coast Reservation (Barth, 1959)

## 1.2 Research Objectives

In my research I asked two questions. The primary question involved the cultural factors that influenced the development of Indian policy in the United States. The first part of this study focuses on a sociological understanding of the ideas that Europeans brought with them concerning the original peoples of the “New World” and of wilderness as it existed in Europe and on the North American continent. Europeans came, of course, with their own notions of what culture should be, how their new world should look, and how the natives should behave. During the Enlightenment period, philosophical theories had developed about the orderliness of nature and man’s place in it. These theories became the cornerstone of Indian policy.

Philosophers of the period, among whom was Thomas Jefferson, believed that American Indians were simply humans like themselves who, because of the environment in which they lived, were in the pre-civilization stage. They firmly believed that, once shown the way by being taught how to dress properly and become non-nomadic agriculturalists, Indians could be assimilated into the new United States society. When such plans were difficult to achieve and many of the original inhabitants were not receptive to changing their life ways, problems developed.

Because agriculture was the most important component of the immigrants’ world view, the major problems that developed revolved around land use. Immigrants wanted Indian land; American Indians, for the most part, were not amenable to giving it up or did not have the same idea of land use that settlers brought with them.

A policy that the English developed early on (referred to as the “right of preemption”) was used to make the acquisition of American Indian land ethical. This policy stated that the government alone could acquire lands either by purchase, conquest, or appropriation if the original inhabitants left the land. After the American Revolution, the United States continued this policy. However, the policy was extremely difficult to enforce because of the large number of immigrants who continually moved into tribal territories illegally and the lack of military might to enforce the law.

The second part of this thesis is concerned with how federal policy was employed in Oregon. Because agents represented the main contact between the federal government and the Indians, the secondary question I wanted to answer involved the local and national influences that impacted the agents’ ability to do their jobs during the first decades of the Coast Reservation’s existence.

Several years after the federal government instituted reservation policy (in 1851), the Coast Reservation was established. An important part of reservation policy was treaty ratification documenting the exchange of tribal land for annuities. Because the larger number of people who were forced onto the Coast Reservation in 1856 were never party to any ratified treaty, enormous problems were created for western Oregon’s Indian peoples and for those responsible for their well-being on the reservation. The location of the Coast Reservation so far from the seat of official policy-making in Washington, D.C., contributed to innumerable problems, usually revolving around the lack of available funds required to meet the needs of all who were placed there.

Nineteenth-century treaties were designed to make American Indians into non-nomadic farmers and to help them accept the inevitability of their own “civilization.” Because farming was an integral part of reservation policy, there was an emphasis on plowing and planting and getting the people to participate. However, lack of knowledge of the climate on the Coast Reservation for the growth of certain foodstuffs and lack of equipment were serious problems. In addition, after a few years, investors from the Willamette Valley began to see value in the coastal area. This eventually caused the diminution of reservation land. And finally, not all government employees, including soldiers, who worked on the reservation had Indians’ best interests in mind.

All of these problems stemmed from the fact that European Americans believed that land was to be made use of, especially for agriculture, and any other use was not God’s will; therefore, they had a right to the land over Indians. Many settlers believed that American Indians were at the present time inferior but could eventually be shown the way. Others professed that extermination was the only way to solve the “Indian problem.” Still others simply did not care. There were others such as John Beeson in southern Oregon who tried to speak up for Indian rights.

What followed for American Indians after the 1850's in Oregon was built on experimentation and the strategies of the 1846-1851 period:

The concentration of [...] tribes on reservations during the 1850's [...] simply fulfilled by force a relatively passive policy that had been decided upon as a response to the end of the barrier philosophy and the national expansion of the 1840's. The beginnings of the reservation system came in the era of Manifest Destiny, when it was looked upon as an alternative to extinction (Trennert 1975:197).

The Coast Reservation and Fort Hoskins have been written about previously by several authors (Hoop 1929, Onstad 1964, Nelson and Onstad 1965, Harger 1972, Kent 1977, Kasner 1980, Schwartz 1993, 1997, Schablitsky 1996, Trussell 1997). What this study proposes to do is provide an understanding of the cultural forces at work in the nation by which the establishment of the Coast Reservation was a logical result.

Chief Joseph of the eastern Oregon Nez Perce eloquently spoke of the cultural divide that existed between European Americans and American Indians. His words, parts of which I quoted in the title of this thesis, pertain as much to what happened to the Coast Reservation tribes as to the Nez Perce:

I learned [...] that we were but few while the white men were many, and that we could not hold our own with them. We were like deer. They were like grizzly bears. We had a small country. Their country was large. We were contented to let things remain as the Great Spirit Chief made them. They were not; and would change the mountains and the rivers if they did not suit them (quoted in Fee 1936:79).

### **1.3 Methodology**

When I began this project, I knew very little about the tribes of the Oregon coast and the history of the federal government's interaction with them. Therefore, I read as many published sources as I could about Forts Hoskins, Yamhill, and Umpqua and about the Coast Reservation. I also studied the general history of federal Indian policy from a number of published sources. As I reviewed these materials, I often encountered the idea that most agents who worked on reservations were scoundrels and thieves who had little interest in their jobs aside from making money. One agent in particular on Oregon's Coast

Reservation, Robert Metcalfe, was accused of having left the service \$40,000 to \$60,000 richer. I decided to research original sources to better understand the role of agents during this period.

As I read the Office of Indian Affairs microfilmed materials and Indian policy history, I began to see the importance to the federal government of making American Indians into farmers after the pattern of European farming which had been brought to North America. I became curious about the social history of this idea. As a result, the first part of my thesis is concerned with the cultural ideas that Europeans brought with them which, consequently, became the foundation of policy toward American Indians. As I read more of the Office of Indian Affairs material, I became aware of the depth of governmental neglect of western Oregon's Indian population. The second part of my thesis, then, became a demonstration of the failure of Indian policy in Oregon during the period, 1856-1877.

## **2. AMERICAN INDIANS AND EUROPEANS: A CLASH OF CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES**

### **2.1 Europeans and the New World: From Bountiful Paradise to Dangerous Wilderness**

Through their official policies, the people who have had the most lasting political impact on the original inhabitants of the United States came from western Europe—England, Scotland, Ireland, The Netherlands, and Germany. However, colonial laws regarding American Indians evolved from ideas espoused by Spain in their dealings with native peoples. The most important precedent established by Spain was that Indians had to give their consent before Europeans could acquire Indian land or govern them in any way (Cohen 1982:50).

A Spanish intellectual and academic, Francisco de Victoria, in 1532, examined theories of land acquisition such as title by divine right of kings or the Pope. Other theories he examined were those that professed that the natives had no rights to the land because they were unbelievers or were not able to govern by reason. He concluded that American Indians were owners of the land, and Europeans could only claim land by right of discovery if the land was ownerless (Cohen 1982:50-52). The Spanish, however, did not conclude that American Indians owned all of the land, but, rather, that part of the land which they actually occupied or found necessary for their use. By right of discovery, ownership of the land was vested in Spain, rather than the Indians they encountered (Royce 1900:541). This became the foundation of Spanish law in their dealings with the



natives and was accepted by leading writers on international law in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries (Cohen 1982:50-52).

Acquisition of Indian land for agriculture for settlers' use and the "civilization" of American Indians quickly became the driving force behind colonial laws pertaining to the original inhabitants. Eventually, the idea that non-nomadic agriculturalism made one civilized became the guiding principle and goal of United States Indian policy.

The earliest English colonists did not distinguish American Indians as racially different from themselves. Tribal people were divided into several classes according to the wealthy early colonists. Status was everything, and those who appeared to be of the "gentry" class were looked upon as the "better sort" of Indian (Kupperman 1980:3-4).

According to Kupperman, early English writers wrote of the original inhabitants' manner of dress, their clothing, hair style, jewelry, and skin color. English people of the seventeenth century viewed these things as indicative of a person's status, whether of other Englishmen's or Indians' (Kupperman 1980:35). Since one's status in life in Europe was predicated on class and birth, those criteria were used to determine a person's inferiority or superiority (Robertson 1980:75).

At first, Europeans believed that skin color was only an interesting fact about American Indians and not indicative of a concept such as race. Instead, skin color was believed to be a condition of the environment in which the Indians lived. American Indians were described as "tanned" or "tawny" (Robertson 1980:35-36).

Early English settlers came to North America with ideas influenced by writers of the Elizabethan era who believed that Europeans, having lost Paradise through Adam and

Eve, would find it elsewhere on Earth. With these ideas firmly in mind, early visitors saw what they wanted to see of native North American culture and environment. They saw a land so different from what they had left, fruitful and unlimited. To short-term visitors, native people appeared to have everything they needed. The land was a virtual paradise. Native people seemed to need neither laws nor letters as civilized people did (Sheehan 1980:19-28).

The concept of “paradism” idealized the people and resources of the new world. Because life was difficult, the English brought with them the idea that the original people had failed to take advantage of all they had been given of Paradise, a paradise that the English could change to fulfill God’s plan with their own work ethic.

The New World awaited the exploitative touch of English yeomen, miners, and merchants [...] Even allowing for the hyperbole of promotional literature, expectations for America’s future were high. These expectations derived from the perception of the New World as paradise (Sheehan 1980:34-35).

The earliest English settlers, those who came here in the 1500's and 1600's, found themselves having to rely on American Indians for their lives. Having arrived into a strange wilderness, the earliest colonists found themselves unable to exist without Indian help. During the early years the colonists were completely dependent on Indians for food and for cleared fields which the colonists usurped from the inhabitants who had died of diseases brought by previous European visitors (Kupperman 1980:81, 173).

Even though this dependence was a fact of life for the earliest settlers, most of them believed that their own culture was superior to Indians’, and Indians would soon

want to be like them. When this appeared unlikely, many colonists began to look upon American Indians as treacherous (Kupperman 1980:128).

The picture of the tractable Indian underestimated Indian culture, both in its competence and its integrity[...]. The universal expectation of treachery from the Indians, then, proceeded from the colonists' understanding that they [American Indians] would fight for their land as it became clear that nothing but full possession was the intention of the English (Kupperman 1980:128-129).

As Kupperman explains in Settling with the Indians, the idea of treachery had nothing to do with today's concept of American Indians as "savage", even though they were sometimes described using that term. Instead, the English expected treachery everywhere in their daily lives, from their desire to be free of trade with the "perfidious and vile" Roman Catholic countries of Portugal and Spain to suspiciousness of the malcontents of their own country (Kupperman 1980:129-130).

After the English had been in the New World for awhile and had tried to recreate their homeland, their ideas of the native people as "noble" savages changed. Some of the Indians they came up against had chosen to be uninvolved with the English and even hostile toward them. The English began to look upon most native people as "ignoble" savages:

American Indians were expected to be vicious because they represented, in the European imagination, the antiprinciple to humane existence. Europeans believed that life could be properly ordered only if the summation of disorder could be perceived [...] The recognition of civility implied knowledge of incivility [...] It involved a real struggle in the European soul to resist the temptations of incivility, the dangers of violence, brutality, and disorder that men found within themselves (Sheehan 1980:38).

Because taming the New World environment and inhabitants was much more difficult than expected, the earliest colonists came to realize their failures in providing for even their most basic of needs. Experience with the New World changed Europeans' view of it from bountiful paradise to dangerous wilderness.

[...] their lives seemed to be falling apart [...] because this New World was a wilderness, a desert; an empty terrifying place, which, while empty, was at the same time filled with demons and dangers and destruction. Out of their frustrations they created the myth of the New World wilderness, and the necessity of violence against it and all it contained (Robertson 1980:47-48).

Many of the early colonists came to this "New World" because of their religious or political beliefs. Others came seeking new land for agriculture because the "Old World" was increasingly used up; others came to get rich and go home. Still other Europeans, especially lower class Englishmen, came as indentured servants, and still others were "shanghaied" and brought here (Davies 1974:100). In Europe, poverty and unemployment were widespread, and, for many, this new place represented hope for a better life (Robertson 1980:52).

However, this new place came at a price. The harsh and frightening wilderness which was so different from Europe was inhabited by strange creatures who wore unusual clothing, looked different, and were not Christian. "The idea that a social structure might be completely different from the European model was almost as intolerable as the idea that there was a true religion other than Christianity" (Robertson 1980:49). These "wild men" were at the top of the list of what made the wilderness so frightening (Nash 1967:28).

After the American Revolution, a new way to differentiate people arose in which skin color came to be used as the standard to replace class and inheritance. Class and inheritance had become too difficult to sustain in a place where everyone was struggling to survive. In addition to skin color, dress, speech, and behavior were also considered. The two groups which fell into the “different” category, according to European Americans, were slaves and Indians. Most Euro-Americans believed that slaves and Indians could not be in the melting pot because they were too disparate from whites. If they were ever assimilated, it would take a long time to train and educate them; the only way that this would be possible was if they left their own culture behind (Robertson 1980:93).

Christianity was another important element in distinguishing the civilized from the uncivilized. If individuals were civilized, there were certain outward signs such as dressing in proper clothing, living in houses, tilling the soil in a fixed location, bringing children up properly, and doing the proper work as men or women, things “real Christians” did (Robertson 1980:37-38). Most American Indians during the contact period did not fit that category, thus the emphasis later placed on proselytizing along with the use of agriculture and manual labor for the children.

Nearly every European American, except those who advocated extermination or complete segregation, felt the importance of raising Indians to the standards of progress of the dominant culture if it proved possible. “To those white Americans, that goal was so important that force was justified in its achievement, if persuasion and example were insufficient in its accomplishment” (Smith and Kvasnicka 1976:80). These ideas were maintained over the years and found voice in federal reservation policy.

## 2.2 Jeffersonian Era Beliefs

Jeffersonian beliefs about the nature of American Indians were a product of the Enlightenment. During this time, many European people believed that civilization was the end point of a continuum that led from savagism through barbarism to civilization. To Europeans, civilization was defined by urban rather than rural society, advanced techniques in agriculture and industry, and complex cultural organization which included the use of writing (Gove 1961:413).

The first stage of human life was characterized by savagery which was really the antithesis of civilization. It was followed in an orderly manner by barbarism, a step in between savagery and civilization. Barbarism was characterized by a primary agricultural and pastoral economy but without written language (Gove 1961:174).

Jefferson and other Enlightenment philosophers believed in the inherent orderliness of nature. They recognized that American Indians were fully human but had not yet reached the pinnacle of civilization that Europeans had. To Jeffersonians, most American Indians were still in the “savage” stage. The differences between most Europeans and American Indians could be explained by environmentalism (Sheehan 1973:8). Europeans had gone through the same three stages. As their environment changed and became less “wild”, so did Europeans. Consequently, American Indians needed to do so as well. Therefore, to neatly fit into the human category, Indians had to be helped to be more like the “exemplar for humanity-the white man [...]”(Sheehan 1973:19). According to Europeans, there was only one way to be “civilized.”

According to Richard K. Matthews, author of The Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson's philosophy on the nature of man can be summarized in six postulates:

a) man is largely a creature of his environment; b) he has an innate moral sense; c) this moral sense is what makes all men equal; d) man is naturally sociable; e) his nature evolves; f) evolution can lead to human progress and perfectibility ( Matthews 1984:53).

Since people were able to change in response to the environment, the environment also provided the means to change (Sheehan 1973:21). This concept was one of the driving forces behind European Americans' desire to help American Indians become farmers who stayed in a permanent location. According to this theory, if equipment and a place to farm and live were provided, that environment would help Indians to change and reach the same stage of perfection as European Americans.

Many of the prominent men of Jefferson's time believed, as Jefferson did, in the idea of philanthropy toward Indians (Sheehan 1973:6). For philanthropy to work, it was necessary for American Indians to give up their "hunter-warrior culture, the tribal order, and the communal ownership of land." They were to change their manner of dress and take up the attributes of European Americans of the era by living, not communally, but as individualists (Sheehan 1973:10). Agents tried to put this plan into effect on Oregon's Coast Reservation.

Without regard for the length of time American Indians had thrived on this continent, those who subscribed to the philosophy of philanthropy expected that Indians

would soon see that European Americans were showing the way to a better life. People of Jefferson's era were wholly unprepared to understand native peoples' lack of "progress" and lack of desire to live like those people of European descent. Jeffersonian theory "could account for none of the negative consequences of Indian-white relations: the breakdown of tribal society, the failure of the civilizing program to lead to the incorporation of Indians into the white man's world, and the steadfast refusal of many Indians to take the final step into civilization" (Sheehan 1973:11).

As the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries progressed, philanthropists began to realize the relative futility of their ideas for civilizing American Indians. The supposition was that, if Indians would not sense what was necessary for them to change from savagery to civilization, they would have to be forced to comply. "Self-satisfied, righteous, morally aggressive, and paternal, it [philanthropy] tended to infantilize the Indian and to destroy the integrity of his culture" (Sheehan 1973:9-10).

An interesting observation was made by T.W. Davenport, agent at Oregon's Umatilla Reservation in the 1860's, concerning the idea of changing tribal people's world view of work even though, given the possibility, settlers themselves preferred the general Indian way of living:

Likely the true interpretation of the phrase so often repeated, "the Indian is an Indian and you cannot make anything else of him", lies not in his want of ability to become a farmer, but that he prefers hunting and fishing and wandering habits. I rather suspect this to be true of the Indian, for it is true of the white man, who is only civilized by compulsion and relapses to his first estate whenever the pressure is withdrawn. If he could make no easier or better living than by fishing, he would fish; and though plowing is one of the most agreeable of farming operations he prefers the gun to the plow. Running a harvester, mower or



threshing machine; plowing, hoeing, drilling or harrowing is work, and to most people drudgery. Hunting, though accompanied by greater physical exhaustion, is sport, and the Indian is not alone in loving it. The probable truth is, that men of all colors do not love work for work's sake, but for what it will bring to them of the necessities, comforts, conveniences and luxuries of this state of existence (Davenport 1907:17).

### **2.3 American Indian and European American Perspectives on Land Use**

When Europeans first came to this continent, they believed that they were encountering untouched wilderness. Even settlers who came to Oregon in the nineteenth century espoused the same concept. However, American Indians had been exploiting land and water resources for thousands of years. The major difference between the two notions of land and water use was that most Indians believed they did not own them but instead could use the resources that were *on* the land and *in* the rivers and ocean at various times of the year. Europeans believed that, by living on a piece of land and “improving” it, they owned it (Knox et al. 1988:51). “Land was a continual temptation to people who thought of ‘real’ property, ‘real’ security, and ‘real’ status almost solely as ‘real estate’ ”(Robertson 1980:48).

Most tribal societies looked upon nature as united with man; Europeans objectified nature and made it separate from themselves (Knox, et al. 1988:51). According to Europeans, land was a resource to be used and controlled. Because the wilderness was so strange and frightening, settlers looked to control it by making it into a pastoral paradise, reminiscent of what they knew before in Europe. “The pastoral condition seemed closest to paradise and the life of ease and contentment” (Nash 1967:30-31).

Europeans came from a place where wilderness, for the most part, had disappeared long ago. For these people, wilderness in the old country was a “single peak or heath, an island of uninhabited land surrounded by settlement. If men expected to enjoy an idyllic environment in America, they would have to *make* it by conquering wild country” (Nash 1967:27).

Because Europeans had little experience with true wilderness as it existed on the North American continent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they found it necessary to make it look like “home.” The only way to do that was by controlling the environment. Along with the physical landscape, “Indians [...] were often treated (along with mountains, deserts, rivers, and wild beasts) as part of the environment to be overcome” (Smith and Kvasnicka 1976:2).

In the nineteenth century, Luther Standing Bear, an Oglala Sioux, explained the contrasting views of whites and American Indians concerning the wilderness:

Only to the white man was nature a “wilderness” and only to him was the land “infested” with “wild” animals and “savage” people. To us it was tame. Earth was bountiful and we were surrounded with the blessings of the Great Mystery. Not until the hairy man from the east came and with brutal frenzy heaped injustices upon us and the families we loved was it “wild” for us. When the very animals of the forest began fleeing from his approach, then it was for us the “Wild West” began (quoted in Weeks 1990:34).

### **3. FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE 1850'S**

#### **3.1 Treaty Negotiations**

The first treaties of the colonial government were not only for land but also for peace and trade (Prucha 1986:7). In colonial times, the term “treaty” could mean a meeting in which differences were discussed and/or an agreement reached. The treaties had several purposes: a chance to air grievances on both sides; a presentation of gifts, usually from the government to the tribe or tribes; a chance for a show of military strength by the colonial government; and, during the Revolution, an opportunity to keep some Indians on the colonists’ side in the struggle (Prucha 1994:23-26).

The first formal written treaty between the United States and an American Indian tribe, a treaty of alliance, was made at Fort Pitt in 1778 with the Delawares (Prucha 1994:26). In this treaty, the Delawares were guaranteed all of their territorial rights (Schmeckebier 1927:13), a provision that, by 1850, when the Coast tribes were signing treaties, had been discarded.

One of the Delaware signers of the treaty at Fort Pitt, John Killbuck, later said that he had not understood the interpreter and had, therefore, misunderstood the treaty terms. The Congress of the Revolutionary government was supposed to have approved the treaty of Fort Pitt, but there is no indication that any action was ever taken to do so (Prucha 1994:33-34). Misunderstandings because of language and non-ratification of treaties were common occurrences in Oregon as well.

By the 1790's, treaty making had settled into a general pattern. Treaties were written to secure land for settlers (many of whom were already on the land), to provide a program of civilization for the various tribes by giving them implements, animals, and teachers to help them become farmers, and to provide for the other needs of the people who by then had become dependent on traders' goods (Prucha 1994:116-119).

The first instance of appropriations for the Indian Department was in the Act of February 28, 1793, in which \$50,000 was set aside for expenses. In this act, Congress authorized the President to provide agents and goods, money, and animals to various tribes (Schmeckebier 1927:23).

Treaties made by the United States ran the gamut from outright fraudulent (such as the treaty with the Creeks in 1825 in which they were forced out of Georgia) to those made under pressure (such as the treaty with the Osages in 1808 in which the tribes were forced to give up their lands or be considered enemies of the United States) (Cohen 1982: 59; Kinney 1937:44-46). In Oregon, tribes were given the least usable, mountainous land for agriculture--land which was, for awhile, undesired by settlers.

By 1840, most American Indians were behind the "Permanent Indian Frontier" (Prucha 1994:235) through treaties of removal made in the 1830's. During the removals of the 1830's, made legal by the Indian Removal Act of 1830, soldiers were increasingly being used to "voluntarily" move the Indians to their new lands (Cohen 1982:91). This was hauntingly predictive of what was to come for the southern Oregon tribes in the 1850's.

Because new lands were added to the United States in the 1840's (the Mexican Cession, the Louisiana Purchase, and Texas), policy makers began to rely on reservations which were small pieces of various tribes' original lands (Prucha 1994:236). By the time treaties were being made with tribes in Oregon, many of the treaties included cessions of land, temporary removal to a small piece of land in the vicinity of the tribes' original lands with the option of being removed when a "better" place was secured for them, and goods and services rather than money in annuities. The government also reserved the right to survey the reservation, allot lands to individuals, keep portions set aside for roads, and remove parts of the reservation if the reservation appeared to be too large.

All of these policies were disastrous for the Coast Reservation tribes. After a very short period of time living on reservations in their own area, most were removed to a relatively foreign environment to the north. Even this land was not secure because in 1865, 1875, and 1894 large chunks were cut out of the reservation and sold to settlers.

Allotment policy, along with the other policies mentioned above, was disastrous for the Coast Reservation tribes because, by allotting land, the federal government found a way to remove all of the land that was not being "used" by the tribes after the land was divided up into allotments. This allotment policy, for the most part, weakened tribal community ties by forcing American Indians into a pattern of individualization (Cohen 1982:98).

### 3.2 Trade

Trade between Indians and non-Indians presented problems from the outset. Trade had originally been carried on to buy animal pelts, especially beaver, from the Indians in exchange for manufactured goods. However, in the long run, trade had a more sinister outcome. The tribes became more and more dependent on goods that they could buy from traders. In the early years, traders would provide goods on credit in exchange for pelts brought in at the end of the trapping season. In a bad year, Indians finished the season in debt to the trader for the next year. People found themselves hunting, not for food, but for the animal pelts with which they could buy the goods that traders were selling (Dippie 1982:43).

Traders took every opportunity to supply the tribes with all manner of goods, including alcohol (which was one of many factors in tribal disintegration). Philanthropists took the viewpoint that, by being dependent on white men's goods, American Indians would move faster toward civilization. Traders simply looked after themselves.

Just as the trader served his own interests by tying the Indian to a steady supply of civilized goods, thus giving him the weakest position in the trading nexus, the humanitarian found it easier to dispense his cultural wares to natives who had lost the support of an integrated society (Sheehan 1973:220).

With European Americans' guns and traps, Indian people were able to obtain even more of the furs that traders were so anxious to have. As animals disappeared because of over hunting, tribes invaded other hunting areas and fought with the tribes who were there. Guns and traps required upkeep, and Indians found themselves in even more debt

to traders (Sheehan 1973:221). Many manufactured goods became indispensable, and by the mid-seventeenth century, they were an important part of woodland Indian life (Nabokov 1978:39).

Before the War of 1812, the government sought to stop dishonest traders by licensing them. Because licensing did not completely stop unscrupulous traders, the government developed the factory system in 1796. These factories were government-run trading posts whose purpose was to provide goods at fair and just prices. Besides taking care of the tribes, the factories provided the government with several advantages. The government hoped that the factories would lure the various tribes away from dependence on British suppliers and make the Indians become attached to the United States (Horsman 1967:63). Factories were limited in their success and eventually disappeared because private traders looked upon factories as competing with private enterprise (Trennert 1981:3).

### **3.3 Tribes as Sovereign Nations**

After the Revolution, the question of how to negotiate with Indian tribes arose. The major discussion revolved around whether or not tribes should be treated like foreign nations. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, it was determined that the President had the power to negotiate (Prucha 1994:20) and make treaties with two-thirds of the Senate concurring (Prucha 1994:70). The precedent was also established by George Washington that Indian treaties would be formally approved by the Senate before they

took effect (Prucha 1994:73), a decision that would prove disastrous for most of the Coast Reservation tribes in the 1850's.

Even though the intent was that treaties would be made with tribes and foreign nations in similar fashion, in practice, this did not occur. In all treaties, tribes indicated, either because they chose to or were forced to, that they were under the protection of the United States government in all things pertaining to interaction with European Americans, including selling property (Prucha 1986:21).

This scenario was repeated in the 1850's in Oregon when the southern Oregon tribes were displaced from their homeland and forced onto the Coast Reservation. In addition, later in the century, the government took an active role in denying, instead of protecting, Oregon Indians' rights to their reservation lands by taking away the Yaquina strip in 1865, the Alsea Sub-Agency and the coastal area above the Salmon River in 1875, and non-allotted land in 1894. The government's actions were sanctioned because the treaty had never been ratified, and the treaty, in any case, had included a clause whereby the land could be diminished if it was found to be an unnecessarily large area.

The Supreme Court wrote in 1831 that the relationship of American Indians to the federal government was like that of no other people:

Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and heretofore unquestioned, right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it may well be doubted, whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations.[...]their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian (quoted in Schmeckebier 1927:32).



### 3.4 Quieting Tribal Land Title

In the early European charters and grants of land in North America, the fact that the land was occupied was ignored by most of the colonies. The grant of Maryland to Lord Baltimore mentions the natives, but only in reference to savages that might be encountered (Royce 1900:550). There were occasions when the Imperial government had to address difficulties with the Indians. These occasions led to a policy that recognized the Indians' right of occupancy and the necessity to purchase the land or obtain it in some other honorable way (Royce 1900:551). This policy was called the "right of preemption", which effectively stated that the colonists had a right to acquire the land from the local natives either by purchase, conquest, or appropriation of the land if the natives left or became extinct (Prucha 1986:6-7).

Because settlers continued to take Indian land illegally, usually by purchasing land from Indians in territory designated for them alone, colonial governments forbade individuals from buying land privately from American Indians. In addition, the Imperial government declared that the colonies themselves could not purchase land either, and all requests for purchases of land had to go through a Board of Trade. A boundary line for the colonies, the ridge of the Appalachian Mountains, was established in 1763; this was to be the separation line between Indian Territory and the colonies (Prucha 1986:10).

*Thayendanegea*, or Joseph Brant, chief of the Mohawks (Wise and Deloria 1971:123), determined, that, at the end of the Revolutionary War, tribes would lose their lands if they didn't accede to the United States and abandon their allegiance to Britain (Wise and Deloria 1971:137). Therefore, *Thayendanegea* devised a plan whereby tribes

would organize to become the United Indian Nations, a confederacy of tribes from New York to Florida. This confederacy consisted of the Six Nations, Chippewas, Wabash, Miamis, Shawnees, Ottawas, Potawatomis, Hurons, Delawares, Wyandots, and Cherokees. He received help from the British in accomplishing this end (Wise and Deloria 1971:137).

In 1777 the state of New York had written into its constitution that it had jurisdiction over the lands of the Six Nations; however, after the Revolution, the new United States government declared that only the federal government had the right to make decisions concerning Indian lands just as the Imperial government had done. In 1783, New York state appropriated lands that the Iroquois were not using. However, just the year before, in the Treaty of Peace, Britain and the new United States had declared that the Six Nations would not have any lands confiscated because of their association with the British (Wise and Deloria 1971:138-139).

Because this conflict became a major problem between state and federal government, President Washington intervened, urging the immediate recognition of Indian title. Washington's proposal was not well received by some in Congress. Deciding that it would be a mistake to return the land and deal with the United Indian Nations, Congress determined to treat with the tribes separately in order to break up the Confederacy (Wise and Deloria 1971:139).

This was quite different from what occurred in Oregon. When treaties were being written in Oregon for those eventually placed on the Coast Reservation, the government lumped as many tribes together as possible even though they were quite different culturally

from one another. This was possible because the tribes, especially the Coast Reservation tribes, treated from a position of weakness, having been decimated by attacks on their villages and having their food sources and supplies destroyed.

Even though the United States government was adamant about the rights of American Indians to their own land, and a number of laws were passed, there were constant incursions of white settlers onto that land anyway. The government found itself in the position of trying to enforce the laws with few resources to follow through, such as a larger frontier army. Settlers were aware that the government did not have the means to punish violators of these laws (Prucha 1986:47).

As strong as the laws were, they were not meant to be a permanent solution. The inherent assumption in U.S. policy was that settlers would eventually move into Indian Territory, and Indians would retreat westward. Given the assumption that American Indians would eventually be assimilated into the new nation, and because the western territories seemed endless, especially after the acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase, the government's major goal was the orderly and just acquisition of Indian land for white settlement (Prucha 1986:47).

### **3.5 Land Cessions and the Annuity System**

After the War of 1812, the government began to make land cession treaties with tribes in Indiana and Ohio. The annuity system, usually paid in cash, evolved at this time, soon becoming a source of income to ambitious traders who saw a chance to divert cash from the tribes to their own pockets (Trennert 1982:6-7). This problem with cash

annuities eventually led to a different kind of treaty whereby tribes were only offered goods and services supplied by the government rather than cash. This led to even more dependence because purchase choices were taken out of tribal hands; moreover, many of the supplies given to the people were sub-standard.

Along with the notion of civilizing American Indians by converting them to agriculturalists and consumers of manufactured goods, education was a key component as part of annuities. In the 1820's the government worked on providing schools with the help of missionary societies. The goal was to bring the tribes into the mainstream through the children. Education remained a key component of treaty negotiations even though most of the education centered around learning manual labor skills along with reading and writing.

### **3.6 The Push for Removal**

Eventually, because of the increasing demand for land from frontiersmen and the nonconformity of many of the tribes to the philanthropists' viewpoint, the only viable solution was removal of the eastern tribes to the west where they could be separated from settlers. Land, of course, was central to the Jeffersonian ideal. Jeffersonian thinking revolved around the concept of changing wilderness to a civilized garden paradise. By removing tribes from portions of their lands, two goals could be resolved at the same time. Land would be opened up for white use, and Indians would be forced to settle down and stop gathering and hunting, an important component of barbarism, according to Enlightenment philosophers (Sheehan 1973:167).

The first dividing line between American Indians and colonists was along the summit of the Appalachian Mountains. It was not long, however, before settlers had breached that line and had gone as far west as the Mississippi Valley. By 1820, one-fourth of the United States population lived in the trans-Appalachian West (Weeks 1990:16).

Because immigrants continued to advance westward, even those who believed that American Indians should be assimilated into the European American population became uneasy about that likelihood. They began, also, to believe that the only chance Indians had for survival was to move farther west away from the settlements. Between 1829 and 1843, nearly all of the Old Northwest tribes agreed to move to the trans-Mississippi West (Weeks 1990:17-21)

The southern tribes were harder to dislodge. In 1802, the state of Georgia and the United States government made a pact in which land to the west in Georgia was given to the federal government in exchange for extinguishment of Indian title to Georgian land. By the 1820's the government had not followed through on its promise, and settlers demanded the land held by various tribes, especially that of the Cherokees. Cherokees were settled on land they had always held, however, and, in 1827, produced a constitution patterned after that of the United States in which they declared themselves to be a sovereign nation (Prucha 1986:66-67).

The Cherokees had been persuaded by missionaries and other friends to write a constitution that would prove to the government, once and for all, that they were willing to become yeoman farmers and live by a representative government. This plan only infuriated Georgians further because they took the treaty as a sign that the Cherokees

were creating a state within a state. The discovery of gold the next year, 1828, on part of the Cherokee land provided even more reason for Georgians to push the Cherokees off part of their land (Worcester 1975:52).

With the election of Andrew Jackson as President, the clamor for Indian removal became louder. Even though Andrew Jackson was not the first to suggest removal, his beliefs about the rights of Indians brought removal as a real possibility to the forefront. First of all, he believed that Indians did not have a right to all of the land they claimed. He denied that Indians had rights to the land “on which they have neither dwelt nor made improvements, merely because they have seen them from the mountain or passed them in the chase” (quoted in Prucha 1969:532). In addition, Jackson did not believe that Indians could establish an independent government within the territory of another state.

By earlier treaties, some of the Cherokees had ceded parts of their land and had removed to the Arkansas Territory. They were called the Western Cherokees by the government and settlers. Georgians continued to clamor for the removal of the rest of the Cherokees, and, by 1834, the Cherokees had split into two opposing groups. One of the groups was led by John Ridge who had been making a secret treaty with the government. The other was headed by John Ross who adamantly opposed removal. Seeing the inevitability of removal, John Ross proposed selling all of the land for 20 million dollars and removing to Texas where he had plans to purchase a new homeland for his people (Worcester 1975:50-58).

The government, however, wrote a different treaty with the Ridge party for five million dollars. Without Ross' approval, a small group of Ridge supporters met at a

conference at New Echota, Georgia, where they signed the treaty (Worcester 1975:58). In that treaty, the Cherokee Nation ceded all their lands east of the Mississippi to the federal government (Wise and Deloria 1971:230).

Even though there were a number of appeals to the government to declare the New Echota Treaty void, it was to no avail. In the spring of 1838, General Winfield Scott was ordered to round up the Cherokees. Even though Scott had ordered his soldiers to have compassion, they, according to survivor testimony, did not. Ethnologist James Mooney was told that families were rounded up even at dinner time and driven with bayonets and curses to the stockade. They were not allowed to take anything with them, and their homes were burned and looted by those who followed the soldiers (quoted in Weeks 1990:31). After having moved about 300 people, Scott called off the move for the rest of the summer.

John Ross and other leaders made an agreement with Scott that they would see to it that the tribe went peacefully in the fall (Prucha 1986:86-87). Tragically, as the people left in October for Indian Territory, there were few provisions for over 13,000 people. About one-fourth of those who started out never made it. Thomas H. Crawford, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, nonetheless, wrote in his official report that the government "had quietly and gently transported 18,000 friends to the west bank of the Mississippi" (quoted in Weeks 1990:32).

The Southern Oregon Indians had their own "trail of tears" when they were removed to the Coast Reservation. They were forced several hundred miles north in the dead of winter to the Grand Ronde, leaving the Umpqua and Table Rock Reservations.

### 3.7 Squeezing the Tribes-Concentration Policy

The constant push westward by immigrants forced the government to rethink its policy of separation in which the enormous land area of Indian Country had been set aside for Indian use. By 1847 the government began building forts along the trails through the Great Plains and beyond to guard the settlers passing through. These forts and accompanying soldiers, however, failed to achieve their purpose of coercing the tribes to leave the immigrants alone. The tribes were not intimidated and, instead, increased attacks on settlers and soldiers alike.

By the end of the 1840's railroad speculators and others saw the potential of the Plains area as a permanent route to the west. Instead of making treaties with the tribes to give right-of-way along the trails, Secretary of the Interior, Thomas Ewing, proposed treaties which would place the various Plains tribes in well-defined hunting areas of their own (Weeks 1990:59-60).

By 1850 when this question was finally taken up to be resolved, the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Luke Lea, put together a plan to implement this proposal. The new proposal was to be called the policy of Concentration, replacing the Removal policy:

There should be assigned to each tribe, for a permanent home, a country adapted to agriculture, of limited extent and well-defined boundaries; within which all [Indians], with occasional exceptions, should be compelled constantly to remain until such time as their general improvement and good conduct may supersede the necessity of such restriction. In the mean time the government should cause them to be supplied with stock, agricultural implements, and useful material for clothing; encourage and assist them in the erection of comfortable dwellings, and



secure to them the means of facilities of education, intellectual, moral and religious (quoted in Weeks 1990:61).

This new policy was officially approved as the Indian Appropriation Act in 1851 (Weeks 1990:62). In the Treaty of Fort Laramie, September 17, 1851, attended by more than 10,000 American Indians, many of the Plains tribes agreed to a plan whereby each tribe was assigned an area bound by landmarks such as rivers (Kappler 1904:596). The Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapahoe had all claimed and hunted over the same lands, and, during negotiations, the Sioux complained that they were being forced to stay to the north of the Platte River. They were assured that they could still hunt south of the river if they maintained peace. Other tribes were promised in the treaty that, by signing, they did not give up their claims to other lands (Trennert 1975:190-191). With this treaty, the government committed itself to a reservation policy, even though most of the Plains tribes were not forced onto reservations until later in the 1860's (Trennert 1975:191).

For the first time, the government pursued full force the plan of discouraging the roaming habits of different groups and confining them in one place. Because the tribes would soon be unable to pursue their former ways of obtaining subsistence, European-style agricultural training for them became even more of a priority for the federal government (Trennert 1975:60).

## 4. BRINGING GOVERNMENT POLICY TO OREGON

### 4.1 Tribal Rights vs Settlers' Rights

The first visitors to the native people of Oregon were explorers, trappers, and fur traders, beginning in the late 1700's. They were followed in the 1830's by missionaries. One of the earliest writers to extoll the virtues of the Oregon Country, Hall J. Kelley, wrote pamphlets and organized a colonization society (Faulkner 1957:298). Before even visiting Oregon, Kelley sent a memorial to Congress exclaiming that Oregon was the most valuable country on earth. He discerned this from reading Lewis and Clark's journals and talking to others who had been in Oregon. Kelley finally visited in 1832, long after he had written his pamphlets (Schwantes 1989:78-79).

Even though many authors wrote positive comments about Oregon, not everyone was infatuated with the Oregon Country. One such person was P.L. Edwards who, in 1842, wrote Sketch of the Oregon Territory or Emigrants' Guide. It was written first as a letter to a friend in which he pointed out:

I cannot now refrain from observing, that however favorably to the Territory this sketch may be construed, yet I have no doubt that the country is by many greatly overrated. I am sometimes asked if I consider the country better than Missouri? I answer, no! I do not consider any country upon the whole superior to Missouri.

P. L. Edwards to the contrary, the truth is that more people responded positively than negatively. Besides enthusiasm for what they had been reading in publications, settlers had other reasons for seeking out Oregon in the 1840's. Serious floods had

occurred in Iowa, Missouri, and Illinois in 1836, 1844, and 1849 which had destroyed farms and caused illnesses. Many farmers decided to take their chances elsewhere (Schwantes 1989:90-91).

The Panic of 1837 provided another reason for people in the east to sell out. The building of canals and subsequent over speculation in land, along with crop failures in 1835 and 1837, brought about economic collapse and depression (Faulkner 1957:254).

By the 1840's, the flood of immigrants to Oregon and California had begun. (See Figure 4.1) In 1841 there were only about 400 settlers in Oregon (Ekland 1969:111). By 1848 (pre-Gold Rush), more than 11,000 people had come to Oregon (Unruh 1979:119). Even though the 1840s saw a huge influx of people into Oregon, the 1850s, by far, saw the largest increase (Ekland 1969:111). Between 1849 and 1860, over 42,000 people entered the territory (Unruh, 1979:119-120). Because of the discovery of gold in southern Oregon and Northern California in the late 1840's, traffic increased throughout the area, causing more Indian-settler conflicts, especially in Southern Oregon.

The Organic Laws for the Oregon Country were written in 1843 by settlers in the territory. One of these laws allowed a man to take 640 acres for his own use any place in Oregon that he wished, long before any treaties had been written with Oregon Indians (Bancroft 1886, 29:311, 477-78). Congress had actually discussed grants of land to Oregon settlers as early as 1839; however, it was reluctant to do anything to increase problems with Great Britain since Oregon was still disputed territory at that time. The land grant section of the Organic Laws had been written with the hope that Congress would make its own grant laws soon (Bergquist 1957:18).

**Overland Immigration to Oregon and California,  
1840-1860**

	Oregon	California	Total
1840	13	0	13
1841	24	34	58
1842	125	0	125
1843	875	38	913
1844	1,475	53	1,528
1845	2,500	260	2,760
1846	1,200	1,500	2,700
1847	4,000	450	4,450
1848	1,300	400	1,700
<b><u>Total 1840-1848</u></b>	<b><u>11,512</u></b>	<b><u>2,735</u></b>	<b><u>14,247</u></b>
1849	450	25,000	25,450
1850	6,000	44,000	50,000
1851	3,600	1,100	4,700
1852	10,000	50,000	60,000
1853	7,500	20,000	27,500
1854	6,000	12,000	18,000
1855	500	1,500	2,000
1856	1,000	8,000	9,000
1857	1,500	4,000	5,500
1858	1,500	6,000	7,500
1859	2,000	17,000	19,000
1860	1,500	9,000	10,500
<b><u>Total 1849-1860</u></b>	<b><u>41,550</u></b>	<b><u>197,600</u></b>	<b><u>239,150</u></b>
<b><u>Total 1840-1860</u></b>	<b><u>53,062</u></b>	<b><u>200,335</u></b>	<b><u>253,397</u></b>

**Figure 4.1 (Adapted from Unruh, 1979:119-120)**

As Westward Ho to the Oregon Country became an exciting national theme in the 1840's and 1850's, the matter of what to do with the original inhabitants of the area became a pressing problem. After much discussion and with no regard for the Indians' rights to the land, Congress passed the Donation Land Claim Act in 1850 which gave 640 acres to every married couple (320 of the acres were to be in the wife's name) and 320 acres to every single man, including half-breed Indians. ( Stat. 1, 31st Cong., 1st sess., Ch 76, Sec. 4:496, Sept. 27, 1850). Claimants had to have arrived in Oregon before December, 1850. Those who arrived between December, 1850 and December, 1853, could receive 160 acres (320 if married). (Ekland 1969:111) This land act, along with the discovery of gold in California and in southern Oregon, set the stage for one of the major Indian-settler conflicts of the 1850's in Oregon and for the establishment of the Coast Reservation.

The act which established the territorial government of Oregon and the Northwest Ordinance upon which that act was based both promised that native rights would not be abolished. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 swore:

The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent, and in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by the representatives of the people, but, laws founded in justice and humanity, shall, from time to time, be made, for preventing injustice being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them. (Deady 1866:81).

The Territorial Act of 1848 promised that it contained nothing to change the rights of the Indians in the territory as long as those rights were not extinguished by treaty. (Deady 1866:66)

The Donation Land Claim Act was in direct conflict with the Territorial Act and the Northwest Ordinance guidelines. Because the Donation Land Claim Act did not provide for reimbursement to the Indians for their lands, settlers were, in reality, living on stolen land (Zucker, Hummel, and Hogfoss 1983:63).

The policy of the United States government in the past had been to extinguish Indian land titles and bring in soldiers before land was given to settlers (O'Donnell 1991: 126). Even though the government had such a policy, there were still many instances of seizure of Indian lands by unauthorized settlers without extinguishment of title, however. This was the case in Oregon. Even though no treaties were signed with Oregon Indians before 1850, European Americans had been relentlessly moving into Oregon: fur trappers, traders, missionaries, and those who received land through the Organic Laws. Some of these people lived together peacefully with the Indians.

Another group of individuals who claimed rights to land in Oregon were those who were granted bounty lands because they had been involved in fighting Indians or Great Britain. This group was varied. Those who could apply for bounty lands included commissioned and non-commissioned officers, their widows, musicians (those who led soldiers into battle), and privates who had participated in "the service of the United States, in the war with Great Britain, declared by the United States on the eighteenth day of June,

eighteen hundred and twelve, or in any of the Indian wars since seventeen hundred and ninety[...]" (Stat. 1, 31st Cong., 1st sess., Ch. 85, Sec. 1-4:520, September 28, 1850).

With the Donation Land Act, the Bounty Lands Act, and the discovery of gold in southern Oregon, the speed of settlement and conflict increased. This was true especially in southern Oregon which had been sparsely settled by European Americans but contained a good number of native people living on their traditional lands. The peak year for emigration to Oregon was 1852. By fall of that year, 1,079 settlers had claimed 590,720 acres (Bergquist 1957:29) All together 10,000 immigrants arrived that year (Unruh 1979:120).

In a letter to the editor in the Oregon Statesman for December 18, 1852, a person signing himself as "F" wrote that, because all of the available claims in the area (Portland and surrounding area) were taken, people should be encouraged to go to the Rogue valley and along the Elk, Sixes, and Coquille Rivers and settle because there was plenty of good prairie and woodland. "These lands are all rich and well adapted to agricultural purposes, and every way worthy the attention of immigrants who wish to select homes in this Territory" (Oregon Statesman 1852:1).

In 1849, Joseph Lane, as the governor of the new Oregon Territory, involved himself in the discussion of how to provide for settlers' land needs. He, along with Samuel R. Thurston, territorial delegate from Oregon, declared that the Indians should be moved out of the Willamette Valley away from the settlements ( Coan 1922:53; Spaid 1950:69). Both Lane and Thurston believed that the Indians should be moved east of the Cascades because the Willamette Valley was a prime area that should be set aside for

settlers. Upon Lane's recommendation, the legislative assembly sent a memorial to Congress on July 20, 1849, asking that the Willamette Valley Indians be moved to the east (Senate Misc Doc 31 Cong 2 Sess Vol 1 Doc 5:1-6 Serial 592).

#### **4.2 Initial Treaty Making**

Even though the Donation Land Claim Act, the Bounty Lands Act, and the Indian Act authorizing treaty negotiations were passed in the same year, 1850, full-scale negotiations with the tribes didn't begin until 1851 (Stern 1996:231-233). Commissioners were appointed and were given instructions to purchase the lands of the Willamette Valley first and then the rest of western Oregon, to make separate treaties with the tribes and to get them to agree to move to eastern Oregon, and to pay small amounts of annuities in the form of goods and education (House Ex Doc 31 Cong 2 Sess Doc 1:146 Serial 595 Vol 1, October 25, 1850).

In 1851, the Commissioners, George P. Gaines, Alonzo A. Skinner, and Beverly S. Allen, wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Luke Lea, that it would be best for the Indians to remain on small reservations and a portion of their fishing grounds rather than force them to move. The commissioners reported that the Indians did not want to move because they relied almost completely on fishing, which was readily available in the valley, and on wages from working with the farmers of the area. Most of all, they did not want to leave their ancestors' graves or move near the fierce tribes of southeast Oregon (Oregon Superintendency of Indian Affairs [OSIA], Letter Book B, Roll 3:129, February 8, 1851).



None of the six treaties made by these commissioners was ratified by Congress, probably because of pressure from Joseph Lane, who by then had taken Thurston's place as territorial delegate to Washington. Lane and settlers in the area were unhappy that the Indians had refused to move and, instead, had been promised reservation lands on the outskirts of the valley (O'Donnell 1991:138).

By April 12, 1851, these commissioners had been dismissed from their jobs, and the treaties they had entered into declared void. Congress, a little over a month before, on February 27, 1851, had passed an act giving the task of treaty negotiation to any agent the Indian Department designated, and those agents were not to be paid extra for this task. It was to be considered part of their regular duties (OSIA, Letter Book B, Roll 3:129, April 12, 1851). It fell upon Anson Dart's shoulders as Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Oregon to handle the next round of treaties and to find a way to explain to the tribes who had already signed treaties that those treaties were null and void.

Twenty thousand dollars had been appropriated for the Oregon Superintendency during the commissioners' tenure, and, within less than a year, they had used it all up treating with a small number of Willamette Valley Indians (O'Donnell 1991:139). This left no money for the major task ahead of treating with the rest of the Willamette Valley Indians and other tribes.

In October, 1852, the Oregon Statesman complained about the pompous expenditure of money that the commissioners had undertaken. The paper stated that the commissioners had not only spent the entire appropriation, but had actually overrun the

account by \$300.00. "Thus they squandered more than twenty thousand dollars. And this covered simply their personal and incidental expenses" (Oregon Statesman, October 30, 1852:4).

The Oregon Statesman again ranted at length about the reckless disregard of the commissioners for the welfare of the settlers in the Willamette Valley:

They made reservations of large tracts of country in the heart of our valley--in the very neighborhood of white settlements, and sometimes including and surrounding the claims of white settlers [...] those who had settled in the vicinity of the reservations, were compelled either to abandon their property or consent to live upon it with but the filthy Indians for neighbors and companions, and all white persons were forbidden to settle on them (Oregon Statesman, November 16, 1852:4).

After Dart became responsible for treaty making, the Statesman ran another article, this time comparing the amount of money spent by Dart to the amount spent by the commissioners:

They [Dart and several agents] treated at various points, and traveled by sea several hundred miles, (to Port Orford) and they made thirteen treaties in less than two months, and at a cost not exceeding \$3000. Skinner, Gaines and Allen made six treaties, traveled only to Champoeg, a distance of about twenty miles; they were fourteen months, and their salaries and expenses (not including a dollar for lands) amounted to more than twenty thousand dollars (Oregon Statesman, November 20, 1852:4).

In addition to the small amount of money allocated for the Oregon department, Dart received little support from his superior in Washington. Commissioner Lea wrote to Dart in October, 1852, that it would be impossible for the department to provide any relief to the Indians and that "all that can be done, will be for you to use your best efforts to keep the Indians quiet" (OSIA, Letter Book B, Roll 3:257 October 22, 1852).


Several times Dart wrote letters to the Indian Department asking why California Indian agents and the Superintendent received nearly double the salaries that those in Oregon received. Finally, on December 14, 1852, he wrote to Commissioner Lea that he would be resigning from the superintendent's post effective June 30, 1853. He gave as his reason the high cost of living in Oregon and the inadequate salary (Office of Indian Affairs [OIA], M234:608, Frame 13).

As Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Oregon, Anson Dart made 13 treaties with the Indians west of the Cascades. These tribes ceded over six million acres of land at an average of three cents per acre. None of these treaties was ratified by Congress either, again probably because of Lane's influence and because some of the promised reservation land was on acreage already settled by people with donation land claims (O'Donnell 1991: 140).

By 1853, Dart had been replaced by Joel Palmer. (See Figure 4.2) Palmer clearly understood that the native people who remained in the Willamette Valley (because they had been promised part of their traditional lands in the unratified treaties) had to be removed to avoid constant conflict:

[...]a home, remote from the settlements must be selected for them, then they must be guarded from the pestiferous influence of degraded whitemen [...] let comfortable houses be erected for them, seeds and proper implements furnished and instruction and encouragement given them in the cultivation of the soil[...] (quoted in O'Donnell 1991:146).

The native people of the Willamette Valley and the central and northern coastal areas were not the major problem to the newcomers although, for the most part, they were considered an annoyance. However, the settlers in the Willamette Valley definitely did



**Figure 4.2** Joel Palmer, Superintendent of Indian Affairs  
1853-1856  
(Oregon Historical Society, neg. no. Orhi 362)

not want these tribes to remain permanently in their traditional homelands. There were fewer of them, first of all, because more than three-fourths of their numbers had been exterminated by disease brought by outsiders they had encountered in the earlier part of the century (Stern 1996:236) and by the destruction of the habitat for their traditional foods such as camas (Hussey 1967:9-10). They were also less inclined to be confrontational, and some were employed as farm laborers who were badly needed in the valley since a number of settlers had gone to the gold fields in California and southern Oregon.

The peoples of the Rogue River valley and other areas in southern Oregon were a different story, however, to those settlers and miners who wanted to pass through to the gold fields of California and Oregon, settle in southern Oregon to supply the miners, or prospect for gold themselves. E. A. Schwartz in Blood Money states that the Rogue River peoples until about 1850 probably had very little contact with outsiders. He based his conclusion on the fact that they were not very knowledgeable about the language of trade, Chinook (Schwartz 1993:66). In fact, when the Rogue River tribes signed a treaty in the early 1850's, the words had to be translated from their language into Chinook, then to English and back again. James Nesmith, who was Commissioner of Indian Affairs for Oregon in the latter part of the 1850's and who was present at the signing of the treaty with the Rogue River Indians in 1853, wrote about the experience:

Long speeches were made by General Lane and Superintendent Palmer; they had to be translated twice. When an Indian spoke in the Rogue River tongue, it was translated by an Indian interpreter into Chinook or jargon to me, when I translated it into English; when Lane or Palmer spoke, the process was reversed, I giving the speech to the Indian

interpreter in Chinook, and he translating it to the Indians in their own tongue. The double translation of long speeches made the labor tedious, and it was not until late in the afternoon that the treaty was completed and signed (Nesmith and Lane 1907:217-218).

The convergence of Indian people who had remained isolated by distance or by choice, and the type of European Americans who were willing to risk everything for the call of gold was a recipe for trouble. The tribes of southern Oregon, especially those along the Rogue River, intended to fight to retain possession of their traditional homelands.

### **4.3 The Final Solution: The Coast Reservation**

From 1850-1856, there were constant conflicts, mostly in southern Oregon. Many of these conflicts were instigated by some of the miners and other troublemakers. This “makeshift society” (Schwartz 1997:45) living a hard scrabble life, searching for elusive riches, had no intention of letting Indians stop their pursuit of gold. As the troubles intensified, volunteers formed companies and set up small forts, usually at settlers’ homes, to keep the Indians away from the main travel routes.

As soon as Palmer became Superintendent of Indian Affairs, he began to make treaties with the various southern tribes. His purpose was to get them to agree to move to an area that would be set aside for their use. He, as Joseph Lane before him, wanted the tribes to move east of the Cascades to the Klamath area; however, the tribes, both from southern Oregon and the Willamette Valley, refused to go. By 1854, Palmer had settled instead on an area west of the Coast Range (which became known as the Coast Reservation) because it was isolated and was thought undesirable for white settlement.

From 1854 to 1856, Palmer made periodic progress in establishing the reservation. In 1855 President Franklin Pierce declared the area a reservation under Presidential Executive Order. Beyond that, several episodes of fighting in southern Oregon slowed down Palmer's ability to move forward with his plans. In addition, settlers were up in arms about moving Indians through the Willamette Valley to the Coast Reservation and Grand Ronde (which was to be a small reservation for the Willamette Valley tribes and tribes from the Umpqua valley). Settlers continued to be unhappy with the location of the Grand Ronde as well. Because the land had been purchased from some settlers with donation land claims, it was also near others who refused to sell out and did not want a reservation near them.

Because of the fighting in the south, most of the regular army troops were engaged there, and Palmer did not have the funds to hire citizen soldiers to help protect the Indians from attack as they were moved (Harger 1972:38). However, despite this, and, even though the winter of 1855-56 was intensely cold, Palmer pushed ahead to move about 1,500 people to the Grand Ronde (Harger 1972:35). They stayed there until spring.

Throughout the winter, spring, and early summer of 1855-1856, Palmer continued to gather those people who had come to Port Orford. They were moved in June, some by steamship and others on foot across the mountains. George Thompson, descendant of one of the Upper Coquille signers of the Coast Treaty, wrote a manuscript in 1950 telling his relative's story of coming to the reservation:

It was summer time, we were all herded down to the edge of the ocean at Port Orford, Oregon by the soldiers of the Government. Some people were crying, others were just quiet--nobody talked. Each person was


allowed only one package or pack, generally made up of a basket. Naturally, the Indians took mostly something to eat, as they did not know where they were going. [...] We were to camp at Port Orford for one night and during that night many Indians disappeared and were never heard from again. The next day about eleven o'clock we saw a large boat with many sails on it coming straight in from the ocean. [...] After several hours the Captain gave the word that the loading was completed and we were ready to sail. It was our first night at sea; many of the Indians got sea-sick--some tried even to jump overboard and swim back. [...] As day broke we could not see land then all were afraid, we begged the Captain to turn around, and the sea was getting angry also and the boat seemed to almost capsize with each swell. This went on for five days and nights. [...] We sailed up the river to Portland [...] From Dayton we traveled by ox-team to Grande Ronde, Oregon. Some of the people stayed at Grande Ronde and the rest of us went up to Salmon River (Thompson 1950).

In late June, *Te-cum-tum* (Tyee John) and his followers surrendered and were marched to the reservation (Harger 1972:39-40). In November, other people were brought up by the Steamer Columbia to the reservation. (See Figure 4.3 for the Columbia's bill for November 11, 1856.) By fall, the Coast Reservation and the Grand Ronde were "home" to almost 4,000 people who had little shelter, few items of clothing, and inadequate food to survive the winter.



Portland Nov 11<sup>th</sup> 1856

The United States  
Co STEAMSHIP COLUMBIA, Pr.



Esteban Steam Power Press, San Francisco.

MARKS	MEASURE	WEIGHT
<i>Package</i>		
<i>per ton</i>		
<i>5 per cent. per cargo</i>		
For transportation of twenty five from Port of Port (at \$20 ea)		Dollars 1500
Passage of Mr. Lichenor (Spain return up & down 40)		80
Passage of Interpreter		20
		\$1600

*Received Payment.*

Dolphin & Co

**Figure 4.3** Bill for Steamship Columbia  
(OIA, Letters Received, M234:610, Frame 993, November 11, 1856)

## 5. FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY'S IMPACT ON THE COAST RESERVATION TRIBES

### 5.1 Overview

By the time Indian policy was being put in place to any extent in Oregon, the idea that the government would help tribes give up living a nomadic or semi-nomadic life and become agriculturalists was firmly entrenched among policy makers. With well over one hundred years of pushing Indians off their lands as a precedent, many settlers came to believe that continuing to do so was valid. Therefore, creating a reservation for those pushed off their own lands appeared to be the right course to pursue. With the creation of a reservation came all of the problems associated with that, including bringing soldiers to Oregon and dealing with governmental bureaucracy.

Colonel Robert C. Buchanan was designated to decide the placement of the three forts that would be responsible for guarding the Coast Reservation. Evidently, he chose the sites for these forts because they were near the only passes to the Willamette Valley that were known at the time. Fort Yamhill was located on the northeastern edge of the reservation about 25 miles from the town of Dayton which was accessible by steamer from Fort Vancouver. Two companies of soldiers were posted there. They were the 1st Dragoons under Captain A.J. Smith and the 4th Infantry under Captain D. Floyd-Jones (Onstad 1964:173-174). Fort Yamhill became associated, for the most part, with the Grand Ronde Reservation which was officially established in 1857, but which had been in operation since 1856. Fort Yamhill was decommissioned in 1865.

The fort at the southern extreme of the reservation was Fort Umpqua. It was located on a sandspit on the west side of the mouth of the Umpqua River along with Umpqua City. The first soldiers located there were from the 3rd Artillery under Captain and Brevet Major J.F. Reynolds (Onstad 1964:175). Some of the Oregon coast Indians were located near Fort Umpqua until 1860 when they were moved to the southern portion of the Coast Reservation. This area became known as the Alsea Reservation or Alsea Sub-Agency. Fort Umpqua was abandoned in 1862.

Fort Hoskins was the post that was most responsible for the Coast Reservation. The first group of soldiers stationed there was the 4th Infantry under Captain Christopher Colon Augur. The fort was located at a mountain pass near the town of Kings Valley about 25 miles from Corvallis, a port on the Willamette River. Being near Corvallis was a convenience, allowing the fort to be supplied from Fort Vancouver via steamboat (Onstad 1964:175). Fort Hoskins was abandoned in 1865. A blockhouse built near the Indian agency on the Siletz River was abandoned in 1866.

There were many problems in the Oregon Superintendency for Indian Affairs, especially concerning the Coast Reservation. Soldiers from Fort Hoskins had to be used to keep the people on the reservation because they were often destitute and starving. Indian agents and superintendents were, for the most part, appointed on a political basis rather than on ability, knowledge of Indian Affairs bureaucracy, or interest in the Indians' well-being. However, the most glaring, constant problem was money or, rather, the lack of it.

The soldiers at Fort Hoskins and the Siletz Blockhouse contributed to the general misery of western Oregon's native people and were party to the decline of their cultures,

particularly those tribes whose traditional homes were in southern Oregon. The soldiers' task was to give assistance to the Indian Agency by helping to keep the Indians away from their traditional lands and keeping them subjugated on the Coast Reservation and out of the Willamette Valley and southern Oregon.


The Indian agents, the Office of Indian Affairs, and Congress furthered the decline of western Oregon's Indian population. Most of the agents contributed to the Indians' decline directly by mishandling their jobs in a variety of ways (sometimes through little fault of theirs). However, the most important contributors in this decline were the Office of Indian Affairs and Congress. There was a lack of understanding of the problems in the Oregon Territory and a general disbelief in the amount of money truly necessary to fulfill Indian policy so far from the seat of official business in Washington, D.C. In addition, by the early 1860's, the government in Washington was involved in not only fighting the South in the Civil War but also in trying to control the powerful Plains Indians.

Congress spent many months discussing every bit of money that came Oregon's way. When the money finally would be appropriated, the U. S. Treasury took its time taking the money out of the Treasury and sending it to its destination. Those in the Congress had little understanding of the distances involved and the lack of infrastructure in Oregon. Robert Metcalfe, the first agent on the reservation, wrote to Charles Mix, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, about the situation. "We are greatly in the dark in this country and have to rely in a great measure upon our own judgment as to what course to pursue; the printed regulations are not applicable to Ind Affrs in this country" (OIA, Letters Received, M234:611, Frames 207-208, March 17, 1858).

James Nesmith (see Figure 5.1), who was superintendent in Oregon after Absolom Hedges, wrote to the Commissioner that Congress' viewpoint that there was plenty of land in Oregon where the Indians could still live by the chase was wrong (OIA, Letters Received, M234:610, Frame 525, May 5, 1857). This illustrates in a small way Congress' serious lack of understanding of the amount of settlement that had taken place in Oregon in the 1850's and its impact on tribal life. Congress failed to understand just how much the tribes needed to be supported in the first years of the reservation if federal policy was to be implemented.

Aside from the tardiness of appropriated funds, most of the money problems were caused by the government's failure to ratify the treaty that Joel Palmer made with the Coast Tribes in 1855. Decades later, in 1893, during the negotiation and subsequent approval of the sale of non-allotted land on the reservation, a request was made from the president of the Senate to the Department of the Interior for a copy of the treaty of 1855 (Senate Ex Doc 52 Cong 2 Sess Doc 34:1-5 Serial 3056 Vol 2, January 24, 1893). The purpose of the request was to ascertain if the Coast Indians had ever been paid any of the money stipulated in the treaty.

According to this Senate document, the receipt of the treaty had been acknowledged to Joel Palmer in 1855. In the acknowledgment, Palmer was informed that he was to suspend any further action under the treaty until he was notified. In 1857, the treaty was sent to the Department of the Interior and then forwarded to the president of the Senate. In February of 1857, Commissioner George W. Manypenny wrote to the chairman of the committee for Indian Affairs in the House of Representatives that the



**Figure 5.1** James Nesmith, Superintendent of Indian Affairs  
1857-1859  
(Oregon Historical Society, neg. no. 0063034)

treaty had arrived on the 14th of November, 1855. However, because of a recess in Congress, this treaty, along with other treaties, was set aside. When the others were sent to Congress, the Coast Treaty was overlooked (Sen Ex Doc, 53 Cong 1 Sess Doc 25:3 Serial 3144 Vol 1, October 5, 1893).

Thomas J. Morgan, Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1893, wrote, "It does not appear from the records of this office that any further instructions were ever given relative to this treaty" (Senate Ex Doc 52 Cong 2 Sess Doc 34:2, Serial 3056 Vol 2, January 24, 1893). He went on to say "No record of any payments under said unratified treaty is found in this office" (4).

Out of over 2500 Indians on the Coast Reservation in 1857, only about 500 were under any sort of treaty (OSIA, Miscellaneous Loose Papers, Roll 30, September 22, 1857). In 1861, according to the census, there were over 2300 Indians who were not under a treaty (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:360, June 29, 1863).

After having given up their lands, many people on the Coast Reservation starved to death or died of disease and exposure because of the agents' inability to obtain treaty promises of food, clothing, shelter, and the means for the tribes to support themselves. The various tribes were thrown together without regard to their cultural differences. There were at least five different language groups that were forced to live together at this time. Living in relatively close proximity, especially at first, they shared neither language nor culture and were sometimes bitter enemies. They were expected to follow a way of life once they were on the reservation that was foreign and undesirable to most of them.

Had the treaty promises been fulfilled as written, there is little doubt that the tribes would have been successful from the beginning, forced as they were into accepting the Coast Reservation as their new home. All of the tribes had lived for thousands of years utilizing the resources of their particular areas. They were accustomed to using what was available and improving the availability of food with processes such as burning areas of the landscape to provide grass for animals they used as food and taking only certain amounts of roots. Lack of promised resources made life on the reservation a miserable struggle.



## 5.2 The Tribes

A number of language families were represented by the tribes on the reservation. (See Figure 5.2 for original locations of the different tribes.) Even those people who spoke languages in the same general family sometimes had difficulty understanding each other (Kentta, pers. comm. 1997; Berreman 1937:29). This led to a number of difficulties among the tribes as well as with the agents. Chinook jargon was generally used on the reservation among the tribes and with the agents (Dorsey 1889:55).

### 5.2.1 Athapascan speakers

The Athapascan speakers in southern Oregon and northern California were comprised of several tribes. They occupied the upper sections of the Coquille and Umpqua Rivers and the middle Rogue River as well as the coastal area below the Kusans (Berreman 1937:28).

A large group of Athapascan speakers was the *Tututni*. They consisted of a number of bands whose names and spellings change from one source to another. (See Appendix A.) According to Dorsey the *Tututni* name was a collective term meaning “all the people.” They evidently were not united, however, because his informants told him that villages included in this group had fought with other villages within the same group (Dorsey 1890:232). By 1861, the bands of the *Tututni* were known by the following names on the Coast Reservation according to Agent Daniel Newcomb’s annual report: *Tootootna*, Sixes, Joshua, Port Orford, Eucher, and *Macanootna* (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 19, Unregistered Letters, August 15, 1861).




Figure 5.2 Historic Tribal Homelands, Oregon  
(Zucker, et al., 1983:9)

Other groups of Athapascan speakers were the *Dakubetede* (Applegate Creek) and the *Taltushtuntude* (Galice Creek). These two bands were isolated from each other (although their languages were similar) and other Athapascan speakers in a small area within Takelma territory (Berreman 1937:29).

Other Athapascan speakers were the Shasta Costas, Upper Coquilles, the *Naltunnetunne*, and the Chetcos. The Shasta Costas lived near the mouth of the Illinois River and along both sides of the Rogue River. They spoke the same language as the Tututnis. However, the Upper Coquilles (*Mi-shi-khwut-me-tunne*) and *Naltunnetunne* spoke dialects that were different from the Tututnis (Hodge 1910:14; Berreman 1937:30). The Upper Coquilles lived along the upper Coquille River (Berreman 1937:30), and the *Naltunnetunne* lived between the Tututnis and the Chetcos (Hodge, 14). The Chetcos lived near the mouth of the Chetco River and spoke a language which was closely related to the *Tolowas*, an Athapascan tribe in northern California (Hodge 1910:249).

According to most sources, the Chasta-Scotons and Grave Creek band of the Umpquas also were Athapascan speakers whose names can be found on some government reports. However, Dorsey thought that perhaps the Chasta-Scotons were Takilman speakers from a village by the name of *Ses-ti-ku-stun* (Hodge 1910:235). Dorsey does not indicate the location of this village. As can be seen in Appendix A, the names of all of these tribes changed from one source to another, and some names disappeared completely from government reports.

### **5.2.2 *Takilman speakers***

The Takilman speakers were composed of two groups, the Upland Takelmas (Latgawa) and the Lowland Takelmas. The Lowland Takelmas lived along the Rogue River and perhaps along part of the Illinois River and part of Cow Creek (Hodge 1910:673). The Upland Takelmas were considered “mountain people” (Drucker 1940:294) and lived farther east along the upper Rogue River in the Cascade foothills. They were all called “Rogues” by early trappers who considered them hostile toward strangers (Ruby and Brown 1992:235).

### **5.2.3 *Shastan speakers***

Shastan speakers were related to Shastas in northern California. They lived south of Ashland and Jacksonville; they also might have lived along the Rogue River between Ashland and Table Rock (Ruby and Brown 1992:189). In government reports, agent Robert Metcalfe is the only one who links the Shasta with the Upper Rogue River. They were probably considered Rogue Rivers in other government reports. (See Appendix A.) They were allied with the Takelma and often intermarried with them (Hodge 1910:673).

### **5.2.4 *Yakonan speakers***

Both the Yaquina and the Alsea tribes were speakers of a distinct language. There has been some confusion concerning the Alseas and the Yaquinas. Joel Palmer mistakenly referred to both groups as bands of the Tillamooks (Ruby and Brown 1992:40). The Yaquinas lived around the Yaquina River and bay (Hodge 1910:992), and the Alseas lived along the Alsea River and bay and other nearby areas (Ruby and Brown 1992:4). The first

mention of the Yaquina Indians that I found was in a letter from Joseph Lane in which he told of having gone across the Coast Range and met up with the “Yacona” Indians at “Yacona Bay” (OSIA, Letter Book A, Roll 2:61, 1849). At that time, they numbered about two hundred. In the 1855 Coast Treaty, Joel Palmer called them the “*Yah-quo-nah* band of Tillamooks.” There were probably very few Yaquina people left as their numbers had been decimated by the Hudson Bay Company’s massacre of them for interfering with the fur trade (Kentta, 1997). As with most Oregon tribes, many of the Yaquina people probably died from disease, also.

### **5.2.5 *Siuslawan speakers***

Some authors on Oregon tribal languages (such as Dorsey) consider the Siuslaw and the *Kuitsh* (Lower Umpqua) to be Yakonan speakers. However, Frachtenberg considered Siuslawan to be a separate language, and Berreman evidently agreed (Berreman 1937:36). The *Kuitsh* lived along the coast between Five Mile Lake and Ten Mile Lake and up the Umpqua River. The Siuslaw lived along the Siuslaw River and along some of the coastal areas to the Yachats River (Boas in Berreman 1937:36-37). They were associated with the Alsea Sub-Agency although they stayed along the Siuslaw when the Coos and Umpquas were moved to Yachats.

### **5.2.6 *Kusan speakers***

The Kusan speakers were the *Hanis* Coos and *Miluk* Coos who lived along the shores of Coos River and bay (Swanton 1952:62,66). The Coos were placed on the Alsea

Sub-Agency in 1860. A number of authors name the people of the Lower Coquille as Miluk Coos (Berreman 1937; Barry 1927; Hodge 1910).

However, anthropologist Roberta Hall, the only anthropologist to work extensively with Coquille people, (Hall 1991, 1995) calls into question the concept that the Lower Coquille were all *Miluk* speakers. The people who lived in the three small settlements on the Lower Coquille in 1854, according to extensive genealogies going back to 1800, were descendants of *Hanis*, *Miluk*, and Upper Coquille Athapascan people. Hall believes that the idea of a village being all Athapascan or all *Miluk* is inappropriate, an attempt to impose European American constructs on native culture (Hall pers. comm., January 30, 2000).

The Coos language is not Athapascan but, rather, derives from a different family of languages called the Penutian (Zucker, et al., 1983:49-50). This language group is very ancient on Oregon's south coast (Hall pers. comm., January 30, 2000).

I found several reports in the Office of Indian Affairs materials that show that the Coos, Lower Coquille, and Upper Coquille probably associated with each other. In 1855, during the hostilities in southern Oregon, Edwin P. Drew, sub-agent at Umpqua City, reported that the *Kowes* (Coos) Bay people had headed upriver (presumably the Coos River) with their belongings. In the meantime, the Cow Creek band of the Umpquas (Athapascan speakers) were positioned at the north fork of the Coos River about two miles above the mouth of the Isthmus Slough which connects to the Coquille River. Another group of Cow Creek people was at the head of a slough which led to the Umpqua. He said that this resulted in constant communication between the Umpqua,

Coos, and Coquille Rivers. Drew reported that, at the same time, the Upper Coquille people (also Athapascan speakers) had burned one settler's property in the vicinity (Sen Ex Doc 53 Cong 1 Sess Doc 25:43-44 Serial 3144, Vol 1, December 3, 1855). They, too, must have been in communication with the others because the headwaters of the Coos and Coquille Rivers are very near each other. The Coos people must have felt safe and confident enough to move up the river with the Athapascan speakers.

William T. (J.?) Martin, a special agent on the southern Oregon coast, reported in 1853 that the Co-ose people claimed all of the land beginning at Ten Mile Creek ten miles south of the Umpqua down the coast to near the Coquille River. He said that he had had to find an interpreter because the Co-ose could not speak jargon. He found an Umpqua Indian who spoke both Coos and jargon to help him and also had the help of T.R. Magruder, who had a great deal of experience with the tribes there (OIA, Letters Received, M234:608, Frames 271-273, October 14, 1853). It is interesting that Martin said that the Coos claimed the land south to near the Coquille River; he did not say to the mouth of the Coquille. John P. Harrington did extensive interviews with three women whose ancestors included both Upper Coquille and South Slough (near Coos Bay) people. All three said that the boundary between the Coos and Coquilles was Whiskey Run, a small stream several miles north of the Coquille River (Hall, 1995:34). (See Figure 5.3).

The Lower Coquille people must have considered themselves to be a different group from both the Upper Coquilles and the Coos. The three tribes signed the 1855 treaty in separate groups. When the Coquilles first went to the Siletz Reservation, they were still being delineated as Upper and Lower Coquilles (OIA, Letters Received,

M234:609, Frame 271, August 20, 1856). By the next census, they were lumped together under the name “Coquilles” (OSIA, Miscellaneous Loose Papers, Roll 30, September 22, 1857), which could, of course, have been for the government’s convenience. According to the 1858 map of the Siletz Reservation (Figure 5.8), the Coquilles were all living in the same area on the Lower Farm. The chiefs of the tribes were allowed to choose where on the reservation they would live (OSIA, Letters Sent, Roll 6:198-199, July 31, 1856). They must have felt an affiliation with one another to choose to live together.

I found only one reference to the name “Coquille” on the Alsea Sub-Agency which is where the Coos were after 1860 (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 20, Doc 48, March 11, 1862). In that reference, it was unclear if the letter writer was referring to people who actually lived on the Alsea or at Siletz.

Because the Coos, Lower Coquille, and Upper Coquille people lived nearby for a great length of time in an area where the travel is not as difficult as it is in other sections of Oregon, there is little doubt that there would have been sharing and blending of languages or that many people were bi- or multi-lingual. In many instances, people who are truly multilingual use whichever words and phrases fit the subject they are talking about, sometimes using several languages in the same sentence. Marriage outside the village group was a common practice in this area which would have increased the likelihood of language integration (Hall, 1992:182). Because of the small number of Coquille and Coos people left after the decimation of their villages and their experiences on the Coast Reservation, the language affiliation(s) of this particular group of people, unfortunately, may never be known with certainty.






Figure 5.3 Traditional Coquille Territory  
(Hall 1995:26)

### 5.3 The Treaties

A review of the contents of the treaties that were written between the United States government and the Coast Reservation tribes provides an understanding of the reasons why so many Indians suffered on the reservation and often tried to leave. Many of the items and services that were promised never materialized.

#### 5.3.1 *Ratified Treaty with the Rogue River, 1853 -- Table Rock*

(According to Ruby and Brown (1992:49), the following tribes were considered Rogue River Indians: Tututni, Takelma, Shasta, Latgawa, Dakubetede and Taltushtuntude.)

#### Promises

- \*Sixty-thousand dollars, fifteen thousand of which was to be retained to pay for property destroyed in Rogue River war.
- \*A small reserve at Table Rock was to be set aside for their use until another reservation could be found.
- \*Five thousand dollars was to be used to purchase agricultural implements, blankets, clothing, and other goods on or before the first day of September, 1854.
- \*The remaining forty thousand dollars was to be paid in sixteen annual installments in blankets, clothing, farming utensils, stock, and other articles.
- \*One dwelling house for each of the three principal chiefs.
- \*When the tribes were removed to another reservation, the government would make buildings and other improvements equal to those on the Table Rock reservation.
- \*When the tribes were removed to another reservation, they would be given fifteen thousand dollars in five annual installments (evidently cash).
- \*The government reserved the right to change the above annuities into a fund for the establishment of farms.

Cession (See 312 in Figure 5.4) (Royce 1900)

Signed by  
 Joel Palmer, Superintendent of Indian Affairs  
 Samuel H. Culver, Indian Agent  
 Aps-er-ka-har (Jo)  
 To-qua-he-ar (Sam)

Ana-chah-a-rah (Jim)  
 John  
 Lympe (Kappler 1904:603-605)

The following amendment was added to this treaty in 1854 and signed by Aps-sa-ka-hah (Horse-rider or Jo), Ko-ko-ha-wah (Wealthy or Sam), Te-cum-tum (Elk Killer or John), and Chol-cul-tah (Joquah Trader or George).

### **5.3.2 Ratified Treaty with the Rogue River, 1854**

#### Promises

- \*Two thousand, one hundred and fifty dollars in the following articles: twelve horses, one beef, two yokes of oxen, with yokes and chains, one wagon, one hundred men's coats, fifty pairs of pantaloons, and fifty hickory shirts.
- \*In addition, because the Rogue River tribes had agreed to let other tribes move onto the Table Rock reservation, it was agreed that the Rogue River tribes could share in the following which would be in the treaties: erection of two blacksmith shops with tools, iron, and blacksmiths, opening farms and employing farmers, a hospital, medicines, a physician, and one or more schools.

#### Cessions

- \*Other tribes were allowed to move onto the Table Rock Reservation
- \*The Rogue River tribes had to share the fifteen thousand dollars promised in the treaty of 1853 with any other tribe moved onto the reservation.

Signed by  
 Joel Palmer, Superintendent  
 Ap-sa-ka-hah (Joe)  
 Ko-ko-ha-wah (Sam)  
 Sambo  
 Te-cum-tum (John)  
 Te-wah-hait (Elijah)  
 Cho-cul-tah (George)  
 Telum-whah (Bill)  
 Hart-tish (Applegate John)  
 Qua-chis (Jake)  
 Tom  
 Henry  
 Jim (Kappler 1904:654-655)

### 5.3.3 *Unratified Treaty with the Coast Tribes of Oregon, 1855*

#### Promises

- \*Ten thousand dollars per annum for the first three years, starting on or before September, 1857.
- \*Eight thousand dollars per annum for the next three years.
- \*Six thousand dollars per annum for the next three years succeeding the second three years.
- \*Three thousand dollars per annum for six years succeeding the third three year period.
- \*All of the above was to be expended for goods to promote the tribes' well-being and civilization.
- \*An additional thirty thousand dollars to erect buildings, open farms, hire employees on the Reservation and provide for their needs prior to their removal.
- \*An amount not exceeding ten thousand dollars would be expended on wagon roads within the Reservation. In addition, if a suitable landing area for seagoing vessels bringing annuity goods couldn't be secured on the Reservation, an additional ten thousand dollars would be provided to make roads from the Willamette Valley.
- \*The United States agreed to erect two sawmills, two flouring mills, four schoolhouses, two blacksmith shops, houses and outbuildings for two sawyers, two millers, one superintendent of farming operations, three farmers, one physician, four school teachers, and two blacksmiths. The U.S. agreed to hire and subsist the farmers, blacksmiths, sawyers, and millers, for fifteen years. The physician superintendent and school teachers would be hired and subsisted for twenty years.
- \*During the time that employees were contracted, the U.S. agreed to keep in good repair the mills and tools and to provide the medicine, books, stationery, and furniture required.
- \*The U.S. would provide a military post to secure the Indians' peace and safety.

#### Cessions

\*(See 397 in Figure 5.4) (Royce 1900)

\*The land on the Reservation could be divided into tracts for individual families at the discretion of the President according to the following guidelines: a single person over 21 years of age-forty acres; a family of two-sixty acres; a family of three and not exceeding five- eighty acres; a family of six and not exceeding ten-one hundred twenty acres; each family over ten, an extra twenty acres for every three persons. Individuals could not lease or leave their land for more than two

years, nor sell or have it taken away from them. If a person or family refused to live on the land or till it, or chose to roam about indicating a desire to abandon the place, it could be taken away and given to another person or family of Indians on the Reservation. Those who chose to leave the Reservation also forfeited any annuities for which they might be eligible.

Signed between August 11-September 8, 1855 by 228 members of the following tribes and/or bands:

Alcea; Yaquonah; Siletsa; Ne-a-ches-na, Sin-slau (Siuslaw); Kal-a-wot-set (Umpqua); Kowes Bay (Coos); Quans, Sake-nah, Klen-nah-hah, Ke-ah-mas-e-ton bands of the Nas-o-mah or Coquille; Se-quate-sah, Ko-se-a-chah, Euka-che, Yah-shute, Too-too-to-ney, Mack-a-no-tin, Kos-sul-to-ny, Mussle, Cos-sa-to-ny, Klu-it-ta-tel, Te-cha-quot, Chet-less-ing-ton, and Wis-to-na-tin bands of the Too-too-to-ney tribe and Chetco tribe; and the Cah-toch-say, Chin-chen-ten-tah-ta, Whis-ton, and Klen-hos-tun bands of the Coquille

Also signed by Joel Palmer, Cris Taylor, W.W. Raymond, R.W. Dunbar, B.M. Palmer, R.B. Metcalfe, E.P. Drew, Jn. B. Gagnier, John Fleet, J.C. Clark, L.P. Brown, M.H. Hill, John Gale, Jery McGire, Lt. August V. Kautz, Dr. R. Glisan, U.S.A. (Sen. Ex. Doc. 53 Cong 1 Sess Doc 25:8-15, Serial 3144, 1893)

**5.3.4 Ratified Treaty with the Chasta, Scotons, and Grave Creek band of Umpquas, 1854**


Promises

- \*Two thousand dollars annually for fifteen years for provisions, clothing, and merchandise, for building, opening, and fencing farms, breaking land, providing stock, agricultural implements, tools, seeds and other objects.
- \*When the tribes are required to move to Table Rock or elsewhere, six thousand dollars will be spent for provisions for the first year, for erecting necessary building, breaking and planting fifty acres of land, and the seed to plant the same (to be shared with the other Indians).
- \*The following had to be shared with the other tribes on the reservation:
  - \*An experienced farmer for fifteen years.
  - \*two blacksmith shops, tools , stock, and skillful smiths for five years.
  - \*A hospital and medicine for ten years.
  - \*School houses, supplies, and qualified teachers for fifteen years.

Cessions

- \*Removal to the Table Rock reservation or wherever the President of the United States directs.
- \*(See 343 in Figure 5.4) (Royce 1900)

Signed by  
 Joel Palmer, Superintendent  
 Jes-tul-tut (Little Chief)  
 Ko-ne-che-quot (Bill)  
 Se-sel-chetl (Salmon Fisher)  
 Bas-ta-shin (signed for Kul-ke-am-ina [Bushland])  
 Te-po-kon-ta (Sam)  
 Jo (Chief of Grave Creeks)  
 (Kappler, 1904: 655-657)



**Figure 5.4 Tribal Land Cessions\***  
 (Bureau of American Ethnology, 18th Annual Report-in Royce, 1900)  
 \*See key on next page for number identification

## Tribal Land Cessions Key

Number	Cession	Date
312	Rogue River Indians	September 10, 1853
313	Umpqua (Cow Creek Band)	September 19, 1853
343	Chasta, Scoton, and Grave Creek	November 18, 1854
344	Umpqua and Calapooia	November 29, 1854
352	Calapooia and Confederated Bands of Willamette Valley	January 26, 1855
362	Walla Walla, Cayuse, and Umatilla	June 9, 1855
363	Pendleton town site	August 5, 1882
366	Nez Perce	June 11, 1855
369	Confederated Tribes of Middle Oregon	June 25, 1855
370	Reserved tract	June 25, 1855
397	Coast Tribes of Oregon	August 22-September 8, 1855
401	Molalla	December 21, 1855
407	Confederated Bands of Willamette Valley-establishment of Grand Ronde	June 30, 1857
441	Nez Perce	June 9, 1862
444	Shoshoni	October 1, 1863
462	Klamath, Modoc, and Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians	October 14, 1864
463	Reserved Area-temporary lines of Klamath Reservation	October 14, 1864
474	Snake-Woll-pa-pe Tribe	August 12, 1865
479	Part of Coast Reservation removed for road from Willamette Valley to Yaquina Bay	December 21, 1865
578	Portions of Alsea and Siletz Reservations restored to public domain	March 3, 1875
579	Portion of Siletz Reservation retained for tribes	March 3, 1875

(Adapted from Royce, 1900)

**Figure 5.5 Land Cession Key**



## **5.4 Treaty Promises vs. Reality**

By giving up their lands, the Indians of western Oregon thought they were getting something at least partially equivalent to what they had given up. However, that was not to be the case. In 1865, the reduction in acreage on the Reservation began. The first reduction was made by Congress in 1865 for the strip of land leading from the Willamette Valley to Yaquina Bay. In 1875, the entire southern and northern portions were eliminated, and, in 1894, all surplus land not given to the people on the Siletz Reservation as allotments was sold. By 1954, only 2,598 acres of tribal land remained (Zucker, et al 1983:112). Some land was eventually returned after restoration of federal recognition. By 1980, the Reservation had been reduced from well over one million acres to 3,630 acres of scattered portions of land transferred from the Bureau of Land Management (Ruby and Brown 1992:52).

### **5.4.1 Appropriations**

Funds in the Oregon Agency were a constant problem. The tribes had been promised the means to become self-supporting, and that was slow in materializing or non-existent. Because most of the tribes placed on the Coast Reservation were not party to any ratified treaty, agents had to use money that was labeled for subsistence and keeping the peace. This was usually just enough money to keep the Indians from starving. Even in 1865, J.W. Perit Huntington, Superintendent, was reporting to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Dennis N. Cooley, that the amount available for the tribes without a ratified treaty was \$2.50 per person per annum (House Ex Doc 39 Cong. 1 Sess Doc 1:654 Serial 1248

Vol 2, September 17, 1865). This small amount of money was a constant source of conflict because, rightfully, the Indians without a treaty could not understand why they were not getting the same support, small as it was, as those who had treaties.

Aside from the lack of money, another major problem encountered over and over was that the funds that were appropriated to keep the Agency operating were late in arriving, as government agent J. Ross Browne reported in 1858 after a visit to the reservation:

Another difficulty consists in the delays experienced in the receipt of the annuity moneys. The present year's annuities have not yet been received. Winter is approaching, and it is necessary the Indians should be provided with blankets and clothing. The money that should have been paid last year for goods purchased has to be paid this year; from which it will be seen that the ruinous system of credit is kept up even under the treaties, and that the Indians receive but a fraction of what Congress provides for them" (Browne 1858:44).

In 1861, Superintendent Rector complained that appropriations were allowed to remain in the Treasury until almost the end of the year. "[...]by such criminal neglect of the Department, the Superintendent and agents have been forced to make purchases on credit, at prices varying from 20 to 50 percent above what the same purchases could have been made for in cash[...]" (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frame 212, December 13, 1861). By having to pay an exorbitant credit price, agents purchased far less than they would have been able to if they had had the cash on hand with which to work.

The next year, then Superintendent William H. Rector also complained of delays in transferring funds to the Territory. He suggested that he should be furnished with funds in advance instead of six to twelve months in arrears. Because of the late arrival of funds,

the Superintendency was still dependent upon the credit system or, if no credit was given, upon slowing down operations until funds arrived (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:212, September 2, 1862).

A letter from Rector in 1861 demonstrates how the superintendent and agents were at the mercy of Congress or the Office of Indian Affairs in providing necessities to the Indians. Daniel Newcomb, agent at the Siletz, had written to Rector requesting that he be allowed to purchase clothing in Oregon from Oregon manufacturers because the Indians were in need and it would be actually cheaper for the Agency. Rector replied that he agreed with Newcomb's idea but that the government might see fit to purchase goods in the Atlantic States; therefore, he would not be justified in incurring liabilities. Annuities for the current fiscal year had not been received, and Rector had not been informed if they would be forthcoming in the form of cash or goods (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:19, August 13, 1861).

From the first day, life on the reservation was harsh. Robert B. Metcalfe, as the first agent assigned to the Coast Reservation, found that he and the Indians were placed in a nearly impossible situation. J. Ross Browne reported to the Office of Indian Affairs that, when the Indians first arrived at the reservation, there were no accommodations for the large number of people forced to come to the Siletz and Yaquina areas. They were totally destitute during the worst part of the fall, the rainy season. "Dense floods of rain were pouring down day after day without cessation. The whole country was deluged with water" (Browne 1858:40).

The first shipment of flour and supplies did not reach the reservation at Yaquina Bay until October 28 by way of Berryman Jennings's schooner, the Calumet, out of Portland. A.F. Hedges, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Oregon, who had taken over the Superintendency from Joel Palmer after Palmer was fired, went out to the Yaquina to see the state of affairs for himself. Hedges related to his superior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington, D.C., George W. Manypenny, that he found many Indians at the Yaquina "awaiting the arrival of the schooner with much anxiety." Many of them were sick and were being ministered to by Dr. I.S. McIteeny, a physician from Corvallis who had been hired to serve on the reservation (OSIA, Letter Book E, Roll 6:247, November 6, 1856).

Earlier, at the beginning of October, Metcalfe had written to Hedges requesting troops from Grand Ronde be stationed at the Agency because the Indians on the reservation were causing his employees to leave, fearing an outbreak. Metcalfe's rationale for needing more troops was that the Indians were likely to hear of the hostilities by the Nez Perce and of some of the tribes still left in the south and become hostile, too. The more likely reason for their being "already too insolent" (OSIA, Letter Book E, Roll 6:232, October 4, 1856) was that they were starving, barely clothed, and shelterless.

By February 6, 1857, Hedges still had not received any money to be used for the annuities promised the Indians with ratified treaties nor had he heard if the treaty with the Coast Tribes had been ratified:

I confidently hope that a special appropriation of funds has been made by this Congress and also that the treaties with the Coast Tribes[...] have been ratified[...] My funds being exhausted, as anticipated the beef

and flour contractors have refused to furnish on their contracts[...] I have contracted anew, upon the credit of the Government[...] The failure to furnish their [the Indians] Annuity Goods produces, of course, a general feeling of dissatisfaction among them[...] Having left their own lands and placed themselves under the guidance and protection of the Agents of the Government, they rightfully expect that the Government will comply with the agreements made with them[...]almost two years have passed[...]unless this office receives authority to warrant action in compliance with those treaties, in the opening of farms, erection of buildings, and otherwise providing for the comfort of these Indians[...] I fear that an outbreak will occur[...] (OSIA, Letter Book E, Roll 6:306, February 6, 1857).

During the winter of 1856-1857, Henry Fuller, a farmer near Corvallis, provided on credit thirty-six cattle for the Coast Reservation tribes. Because of the lack of food, the people took some of the cattle with Agent Metcalfe's knowledge, killed and ate them and used their hides. Fuller demanded that the Indians pay for the cattle and hides.

In April, 1858, Nesmith sent a note to Metcalfe with a spoliation claim by Henry Fuller asking to be reimbursed for his cattle. Metcalfe was told to make application to the Indians who had committed the offense, evidently to have them pay for the cattle (OSIA, Letter Book F, Roll 7:199, April 16, 1858). The Indians were destitute and had no way of paying.

By November, 1858, Fuller still had not been paid for the cattle. Metcalfe wrote to the Commissioner in Washington, D.C. requesting that Fuller be paid. He said the reasons the Indians were refusing to pay for the cattle were "they have nothing with which to pay, nor do they now remember the exact number of cattle and hides taken and used by them[...]the taking and appropriating of the said cattle and hides was not a theft on the

part of the Indians, as it was done by my knowledge and whilst they were destitute of the necessary food” (OIA, Letters Received, M234:611, Frames 1088-1089, November 15, 1858).

Interestingly, Metcalfe added more detail to the above claim a few days after Daniel Newcomb took over for him as agent in October, 1859. He wrote a letter to Superintendent E.R. Geary telling him that the cattle that Fuller accused the Indians of stealing were actually wild cattle that Fuller had lost in the mountains. The Indians shot them as wild game with Metcalfe’s “full knowledge and consent.” In addition, the hides for which Fuller was requesting payment had been left to rot on the ground and fences so the people took the hides.

Metcalfe believed that Fuller was due some money, but it was difficult to determine how much he was owed because, when the cattle that made it to the reservation were received, they had already been butchered, making it difficult to say how many cattle there had been originally (OIA, Letters Received, M234:611, Frames 1018-1019, October 10, 1859). On October 10, 1859, Fuller was still awaiting payment for his cattle (OSIA, Letter Book G, Roll 8:17). I could not find any proof of payment to Fuller.

#### ***5.4.2 Obtaining Supplies***

Because of the Coast Reservation’s location—a chain of mountains to the east and a fierce ocean to the west—getting supplies to the reservation was a serious problem. Even when ships got into Yaquina Bay, there were only steep trails to use, not roads, necessitating loading everything on mules. If mules were not available, Indian women

were forced to carry the supplies to the agency. Metcalfe decided that, on its second trip, the Calumet should try to off-load the provisions at the mouth of the Siletz River instead of the Yaquina. The Siletz was much closer to where most of the Indians were located along the Salmon River and up the Siletz, and canoes could be used to transport the supplies.

In November, 1856, Metcalfe went to Corvallis to pick up supplies and to transport a number of people to the Siletz. In his letter to Superintendent Hedges, he wrote that he had had to purchase two wagons and teams because of the large number of children and old people to transport. He purchased only a small number of items because he expected the schooner to arrive at the Yaquina soon with his order of goods (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 14: Document 339, November 20, 1856).

However, on December 9, 1856, the Calumet went aground off the mouth of the Siletz. The flour and other supplies were taken ashore from the wreck, but, in the course of the bags being stacked on the shore, a storm came up and washed many of the bags out to sea. Fifty-five thousand pounds of flour, one ton of potatoes, and other supplies were lost (Browne 1858:40). Only one thousand pounds of flour were saved (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 14: Document 375, December 13, 1856).

J. C. Ainsworth, a businessman in Portland, wrote in 1859 about the details of the grounding of the Calumet. He was providing information to Superintendent E. R. Geary because Jennings had never been paid on his contract, and he, Ainsworth, had been one of Jennings' securities. He said that the original captain of the Calumet refused to try to take the schooner into the Siletz, so Jennings contracted with Captain William Tichenor, one of

the most experienced captains on the Pacific Coast, to take her in. When the Calumet tried to enter the mouth of the Siletz, the bar was not deep enough, and the schooner was driven ashore. She lost all of her rigging, leaving only the hull which had been pierced by drift logs. After moving the flour on shore, a high tide came up and washed the schooner across the headland into the river.

Because Metcalfe was unable to get anyone else to send a schooner, he pleaded with Jennings to help him. Jennings had to hire people to pack the rigging for the dismantled vessel across the mountains on snowshoes, costing nearly one dollar per pound (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 17, Document 186, October 3, 1859). The Calumet, after having been repaired, was not seen again until the beginning of April (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 15, Document 95, April 8, 1857). The people, in the meantime, had continued to starve. Metcalfe wrote to Hedges, “[...] in this unheard of delay since she left the Selits [after being repaired]-now let me beg of you as you value the peace and safety of the country to start another Schooner at the earliest moment with the supplies [...] otherwise all is lost (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 15, Document 9, March 30, 1857).

In the meantime, because the people were starving, Metcalfe contracted on credit with a flour supplier in Kings Valley (likely Rowland Chambers who had the only grist mill in Kings Valley). Indians were taken to Kings Valley to transport the flour on their backs, one hundred pounds apiece, over a difficult trail, to the reservation (Browne 1858:41).

In the winter time, it was usually impossible to bring supplies over the Coast Range to the agency because of snow and high water. When the ships did not arrive on time or were lost, as the Calumet was for a time, or if ships’ owners refused to take the



goods to Yaquina Bay because of lack of Indian Department funds, the people on the reservation were in terrible distress.

Metcalfé wrote at the end of December that there was much dissatisfaction among the people because the treaty promises made by Palmer had not come to fruition. "There are many of them in a destitute condition. Their wardrobe consists of nothing more than they brought into the world with them [...]." He went on to say that the government could either fulfill its promises or fight the Indians in the spring. Many of them had guns and pistols and were preparing powder horns and bows and arrows "in preparation for a grand rush in the spring." He wrote that many of them were industrious and wanted to have farms so they could raise their own supplies (OIA, Letters Received M234:610, Frames 243-244, December 29 and 31, 1856).

On March 17, 1857, Hedges wrote to Manypenny that the people wanted to have their land surveyed and plotted so that they could each have their individual farms. He said that this would be a much better arrangement than opening large farms for the benefit of all. Very little had been done before March of that year about opening farmland because "owing to bad weather, the wreck of the schooner Calumet, and the want of funds,[...]we have scarcely been able to keep those Indians from dying from starvation and exposure" (OSIA, Letter Book E, Roll 6:321).

Earlier, in December of 1856, Hedges had sent a letter of resignation to Manypenny citing ill health, (O'Donnell 1991:280) but, no doubt, also due to the frustration he felt at the difficulties in getting his job done because of Congress' reticence in ratifying the Coast Treaty and appropriating the needed funds. In May of 1857, James

Nesmith was appointed Superintendent for Oregon. In addition to the Oregon Territory, his duties were expanded to include Washington Territory (O'Donnell 1991:285).

### **5.4.3 *Financial Complications***

By October, 1857, and probably before that time since Nesmith was highly involved in Oregon politics, Nesmith was aware of the bureaucracy against which he would be spending the next few years. He blasted a letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, James Denver, detailing the problems in the Oregon Superintendency. Nesmith had been instructed by the Treasury Department that the Treasury Warrants recently issued to him were to be used for the third and fourth quarters of that year only. He pointed out that three-fourths of the liabilities incurred during the second quarter were unpaid due to the inadequacy of funds. There was also a discrepancy in the amount of funds that he had estimated was needed and the amount that had been sent. "The department is very largely in debt in this Territory on account of the 2nd and 3rd quarters, and not a dollar of the present remittance will be left from the 3rd quarter applicable to the 4th" (OSIA, Letter Book F, Roll 7:86, October 19, 1857).

According to Nesmith's estimate of available funds, by June, 1858, the Oregon Superintendency would be deficient in the amount of \$362,245.09. Much of this liability was in credit vouchers given to companies and private individuals supplying goods to the reservations in Oregon. Metcalfe alone had contracted \$111,420.35 in liabilities (See Appendix B) for the period of time extending from May to December, 1857 (OSIA, Letter Book F, Roll 7:170, January 19, 1857).

Nesmith wrote to Denver in May that trying to run the Superintendency on credit was detrimental to the good of the service: “[...]this coast is the last place that should be selected to adopt [a credit system], as every article purchased under it costs from twenty-five to fifty per cent higher than the same purchases could be made for cash” (House Ex Doc, 35 Cong 1 Sess Doc 93:9 Serial 957 Vol 11, May 5, 1857).

In December, 1857, Nesmith reported to Commissioner Denver that a flour contractor had defaulted on his contract and not delivered the flour to the Siletz Reservation by October as he was directed. The consequence was that Metcalfe was completely out of flour by that time. The company that provided the security bond for the contractor refused to furnish the flour because of the chance of never being paid by the government. Because it was so late in the season and there was snow in the Coast Range, it was impossible to furnish other flour by that route even if it could be purchased on credit. Flour could not be delivered by sea, either, because no owner of a seagoing vessel was willing, without cash up-front, to take even the supplies that had arrived from New York and were being stored in Portland out to the Yaquina.

In October, Acting Commissioner Mix sent a request to Nesmith asking for a reply as to the necessity of the expenditures in his previous report. Nesmith took this request as accusing him of not using “proper regard [...] for careful economy.” He was asked to find out the circumstances under which the liabilities were contracted and provide evidence of their correctness (House Ex Doc, 35 Cong 1 Sess Doc 93:24-25 Serial 957 Vol 11, October 19, 1857).

Nesmith replied with one of his usual acerbic responses by wondering if the Commissioner was aware that the superintendency extended from the north of California to the British possessions and from the Pacific to the Rocky Mountains. He said that claimants were scattered over the region and that it would take two years and extra money to hire people to authenticate responses. He added, "I would particularly ask if it [the department] desires me to pursue the system of 'economy' to the extent of discharging the employes, stopping the improvements, and to discontinue the feeding of the Indians" (House Ex Doc, 35 Cong 1 Sess Doc 93:25 Serial 957 Vol 11, October 19, 1857). The credit of the Office of Indian Affairs had been destroyed in the territory, and the overdue claims were being offered for sale and "hawked about at enormous discount" (House Ex Doc, 35 Cong 1 Sess Doc 93:9 Serial 957 Vol 11, June 17, 1857).

Nesmith put a letter in the Statesman newspaper asking for individuals to come forward with their claims and provide the necessary information to receive their money. One response to this was given by Dr. Alden H. Steele who had served on the Coast Reservation for two months in July and August, 1856. He sent along to Nesmith certificates of both Palmer and Hedges that the work had been done. He also said, "In regard to the "necessity" for such service I would refer the Department to my reports made at the end of each of the months above named, and already forwarded to Washington by Supdt Palmer." He went on to say that he had already lost one certificate by sending it to Washington and did not want to lose this one (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 15, Doc 275, October 31, 1857).

Nesmith's frustration with the Indian Department's handling of treaties is evident when he wrote:

[...]when the Department knows the number of Indians being subsisted, and the cost of subsistence and only remitted about one seventh part of the funds necessary for the purpose, I could not be presumed to make such a disposition of the funds as would subsist one out of seven and allow the other six to perish from starvation[...] This constant importuning for funds is as disagreeable to me as it possibly can be to yourself, and while I regret its necessity I conceive it to be my duty to state facts as they exist (OSIA, Letter Book F, Roll 7:146, December 24, 1857).

In the fall of 1858, Christopher H. Mott was sent from Washington to audit the Oregon Superintendency's liabilities. As related earlier, in January, 1858, Nesmith had informed the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the Oregon Superintendency would be liable for \$362,245.09 in credit vouchers through June 30, 1858. Mott's investigation found that the amount of liabilities was actually smaller by \$97,143.69 (OSIA, Letter Book F, Roll 7:299, November 20, 1858). Even so, that still left a deficiency of \$265,101.40 owed to various contractors throughout Oregon Territory (  $\$362,245.09 - 97,143.69 = \$265,101.40$ ).

Nesmith was forced to explain that the report he had previously forwarded to the office had been written without all of the information because the previous Superintendent, Hedges, had not given him a list of liabilities (House Ex Doc 35 Cong 1 Sess Doc 93:9 Serial 957 Vol 11, June 17, 1857). His report had been an estimate dependent upon the overestimates of agents in some cases and the failure to report liabilities in other cases. Nesmith had instructed agents to incur no liabilities beyond the funds on hand. Earlier, in January, Nesmith had taken steps to curtail costs by directing all

of the agents to suspend all improvements, discharge all persons not absolutely essential to the reservation and only incur liabilities or dispense funds to preserve the lives of the Indians (author's emphasis) (OSIA, Letter Book F, Roll 7:171, January 19, 1858). (See Figure 5.6, Superintendent of Indian Affairs Circular, for a list of rules agents were to follow.)

In July, Metcalfe wrote to Nesmith stating that he had told the employees that their wages were going to be reduced. He said that they all decided to leave except his brother (James) and another man. The farmers told Metcalfe that it was not worth their while to be paid \$75.00 per month, pay for their board themselves, and then sell their scrip for eighty cents on the dollar (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 16, Doc 176, July 21, 1858).

Even though Mott had found over \$97,000.00 that he did not approve of in the Superintendency's expenditures, very few of those were Metcalfe's. According to Mott's docket of claims for the Siletz Agency, there was only one claim that was disallowed. That claim by a Portland company, Alexander and Dodge, was in the amount of \$18.75 for butter. All the other claims were allowed (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 17, Doc 164, enclosure E, July 27, 1859).

To agree to pay the claims, Mott had to have at least two witnesses for each claim, and each claim had to be paid to the original owner of the certificate. This presented a problem for some because often claims were bought and sold as a kind of barter and constantly changed hands (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 17, Doc 164, enclosure C, July 27, 1859). In some cases, people left the territory before they could be paid and would


## (C I R C U L A R .)

Office Superintendent Indian Affairs,  
SALEM, OREGON, July 4, 1857.

Sir:—In order to correct errors heretofore practiced by some of the Agents in this Superintendency, and to guard against a repetition of the same, your attention is called to the following rules adopted by this Office, and with which all Agents within this Superintendency will be expected to strictly comply:

- RULE 1.** No *due bills* or notes must be given by Agents for services rendered, or supplies furnished.
- RULE 2.** No voucher should be taken unless the money has actually been paid.
- RULE 3.** In cases where Agents incur liabilities for supplies or services in the absence of funds to pay for the same, they are required to make out the account in duplicate, stating it fully, and add their certificate to each account of their correctness, so that the claimant may receive his pay at this Office, by signing and surrendering the vouchers.
- RULE 4.** Payment should never be made on account, but must be for *specific service, or specific purchases.*
- RULE 5.** Agents are strictly prohibited from paying a part of an account, and giving certified vouchers for a balance due on the same account. When they have not sufficient means for the payment of an entire account, if it is of such a nature that it can be divided, it would be proper to do so. For example: An Agent purchases ten thousand pounds of flour, having on hand only sufficient funds to make half the payment; he will pay for five thousand pounds, and take the proper vouchers, and give the claimant certified accounts in duplicate for the other five thousand.
- RULE 6.** All signatures by marks must be witnessed.
- RULE 7.** No lumping bills will be allowed; quantities and prices must be stated.
- RULE 8.** All issues to Indians should be witnessed.
- RULE 9.** No voucher can be signed by an attorney, unless accompanied by powers of attorney in duplicate.
- RULE 10.** The respective Agents will, at the termination of each quarter, furnish this office with a statement of all persons employed by them during the preceding quarter, specifying their names, date of service, employment, and compensation.
- RULE 11.** All Agents will be required to render their accounts promptly at the termination of each quarter, and those now in arrears are expected to render their accounts as soon as practicable.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,



Sup't. Indian Affairs for Oregon and Washington Territories.

Figure 5.6 Superintendent of Indian Affairs Circular  
(OIA, Letters Received, M234:610, Frame 619, July 18, 1857)

sell their claims to someone who was staying. Others bought items such as cattle with the certificates of debt. It is unclear how those who had left the territory received their money.

On August 20, 1858, Nesmith wrote to Commissioner Mix that he had not received any money for the current fiscal year and that creditors were now demanding two to twenty percent above the cash market value for goods needed for the reservation. Suppliers knew that it would be a year or more before they could be assured of receiving their money. He warned that the appropriations for subsistence agreed to by Congress and the crops raised on the Reservation would partially subsist the people on the reservation only until December 1. After that time, he wrote:

I would, therefore, in advance, respectfully suggest the propriety of calling the attention of the War Dept. to the necessities which will exist for a strong reinforcement of troops at Forts Yamhill, Hoskins, and Umpqua for the purpose of holding the four thousand Indians in check, and preventing them from depredating on the settlements (OIA, Letters Received M234:611, Frames 454-457).

On November 29, 1858, Nesmith wrote to Commissioner Charles E. Mix that he only had \$80,250.00 in his account to cover all expenses in Oregon from January to June, 1859. He asked for thirty-five thousand dollars to be expended for subsistence for the winter and to purchase seeds for the spring (OSIA, Letter Book F, Roll 7:311).

When money did arrive for Nesmith, problems continued. Treasury drafts sent from Washington were often written in large amounts. These drafts were impossible to cash in the territories because of the limited amount of hard currency; consequently, either the Superintendent or someone delegated by him had to go to San Francisco to redeem



the drafts. In December, 1858, Nesmith received \$78,000 (evidently for both Washington and Oregon) for the first and second quarters of 1859. Unfortunately, contrary to Nesmith's instructions, the draft was in one large note, necessitating a trip to San Francisco.

The inconvenience was increased by the fact that twenty four hours before receiving the draft I had dispatched an agent to San francisco (sic) Cal for the purpose of obtaining the coin on a draft for \$55,000 received by the previous mail, and I am now reduced to the necessity of going or sending another agent to San Francisco to realise the funds on the draft of \$78,000.00 (OSIA, Letter Book F, Roll 7:320, December 28, 1858).

In 1863, Superintendent J.W. Perit Huntington in his first annual report wrote that paper money issued as legal tender by the government was not accepted at face value as currency on the west coast. Gold was the standard for transactions. Therefore, the legal tender notes constantly fluctuated in value, causing the cost of goods purchased to fluctuate. Huntington reported that this fluctuation sometimes caused the appropriations to be worth thirty or forty percent less.

This problem also continued to cause the salaries of employees to be devalued. When converted to gold, the paper money given to them was worth only sixty to seventy cents to the dollar. "Some of the most experienced and invaluable employees have left the service, and difficulty has been experienced in filling their places" (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:398-399, September 12, 1863).

#### **5.4.4 *Agricultural Plans***

The government's plan was to help the people on the reservation to be self-sufficient through farming. The former life of the tribes placed on the Coast Reservation revolved around gathering and hunting or fishing. Since most of the tribes were from southern Oregon, their new place of residence was virtually a foreign country. The only people on the reservation who had previously lived in the area were the Alseas, Yaquinas and a few remaining Siletz. Metcalfe wrote to Nesmith in 1858 that four-fifths of the people at his agency had never seen agricultural implements before and were unfamiliar with the natural resources in the area (House Ex Doc 35 Cong 2 Sess Doc 2:504, Serial 997 Vol 2 July 27, 1858). The tribes were expected to change their cultural and economic identities that had evolved over thousands of years within a very short time span.

Even though farming was the stated goal, and the tribes had been promised the means to learn farming, Congress did not follow through on its promises. As a result, the Indians were at a distinct disadvantage from the beginning. Because Congress continued to be unresponsive to the complexities of administering Indian Affairs in Oregon, agents found it difficult to do their jobs.


A major handicap facing the agents was the lack of proper equipment to put the reservation in good working order and the lack of good seed for planting. Farmer George Megginson wrote in his annual report for the Siletz Lower Farm in 1862 that he had reserved seventy-five acres to plow for wheat but would not be able to plant it until new plows were furnished or the old ones fixed. "It seems to me that we never can have anything in the right time at this agency. The land for wheat should have been ploughed

during the months of May and June” (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess Doc 1:422-423, Serial 1157 Vol 2 August 13, 1862).

The mills on the Reservation were constant problems. As Metcalfe was finishing up his tenure on the Coast Reservation, he wrote a letter to Superintendent Edward Geary (see Figure 5.7) in which he expressed his disappointment in being forced to stop work on the erection of a flouring mill:

I hardly know how to regard your letter, you do not order me positively to stop operations on the mill, but it amounts almost to an order, [...] you say you are unwilling only on the most extraordinary emergency to incur liabilities beyond the appropriation; [...] I would regard the failure to complete the mill this fall as one of the most serious disasters that could befall [sic] these people, humanity, justice, economy, and everything pertaining to the good of the service demand that we should proceed [...] The Indians say they are willing to do without beef if we will only complete the mill and I do not see the impropriety of using any funds that may be applied to the purchase of provision to the erection of a mill ( OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 17:163, August 27, 1859).

In 1860, Superintendent Rector authorized the millwright work to be done on the partially completed grist mill. Joe E. Davidson was hired to supervise the erection of the mill, and it was completed by November of that year (OSIA, Letter Book G, Roll 8:205, November 27, 1860). However, both the grist mill and the saw mill proved to be unworkable in the locations chosen for them. Benjamin Biddle, agent in 1862, reported that the saw mill was across the Siletz River from the Agency, necessitating crossing the river to get to it. It was also located in a very cramped place without much room to place logs and lumber. In addition, the high water from the Siletz had damaged it the previous winter (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess, Doc 1:420 Serial 1157 Vol 2 August 13, 1862).



**Figure 5.7** Edward R. Geary, Superintendent of Indian Affairs  
1859-1861  
(Oregon Historical Society, neg. no. Orhi 58320)

In 1864 Benjamin Simpson reported that the grist mill was unusable because it had been damaged by high water in the winter. The saw mill was also unusable because the summer was so dry that there wasn't enough water in the mill race to run the mill. It is unclear from the records if Simpson moved the saw mill to a different location. In September, 1865, Huntington wrote to Commissioner Cooley that the saw mill that Simpson had erected was in good working order and producing enough lumber. However, the grist mill had never been of use because it had been erected in the wrong place and needed to be moved (House Ex Doc 39 Cong 1 Sess Doc 1:648-650 Serial 1248 Vol 2, September 17, 1865).


Royal A. Bensell wrote in his journal on April 13, 1864, that, while he was stationed at the Siletz Blockhouse, he had occasion to cross the river to take a look at the grist mill. He reported that, after an hour's walk, he and his companion found the mill down a steep gulch. [...] "I became more than ever impressed [with] the idea that all Agencies and Agents were swindles. Here, in an out-of-way place, stands a Mill costing U.S. over \$100,000 and it never grained 100 bushels of grain. The whole fabric is a ruin" (Barth 1959:138)! In 1877, some twenty years after the promises of mills, the people at Siletz finally had both saw and grist mills that worked (OIA, Letters Received, M234:624, Frames 686-688, October 27, 1877)

### 5.4.5 *Farming*

Problems associated with farming were many and varied. The farmers on both the Siletz Agency and the Alsea Sub-Agency complained of the age of the work cattle, some of which had been on the farms since 1857. Seeds were saved from year to year, resulting in smaller yields. It was often difficult to obtain new seeds; sometimes there were no fresh seeds in the whole territory. Fern and wild sorrel were perennial problems, made even more of a problem by the lack of good implements to plow the soil deeply. George Megginson, farmer at the Lower Farm, wrote in 1862 that the fern grew very thick and was sometimes ten feet high (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess Doc 1:422 Serial 1157 Vol 2, August 1, 1862). One year cutworms were so numerous that most of the potato and turnip crops were wiped out on the Alsea Sub-Agency ( House Ex Doc 39 Cong 1 Sess Doc 1:668 Serial 1248 Vol 2, September 17, 1865).

Figure 5.8 is a map labeled “Siletz Reservation, 1858.” It shows the locations of the different tribes in the separate farming areas. It appears to be accurate in several ways. The mills are shown across the Siletz River from the Agency Farm. Agent Biddle confirmed that as a fact in his 1862 report by saying that it was inconvenient to cross the Siletz to get to the mills (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess Doc 1:420 Serial 1157 Vol 2, August 13, 1862).

In farmer George Megginson’s report in the same document, he names all of the tribes shown on the map to be on the Lower Farm except the Galice Creeks (422). Jacob Allen, farmer at the Agency Farm, recounts that he was farmer to the Shasta-Scotons and superintendent of farming at the Agency Farm. He does not mention the Agency Indians



**Figure 5.8** Siletz Reservation, 1858  
(Oregon Historical Society, G4291, G55S, 1858, AA1)

by tribal names (424). On the map the Shasta-Scotons are shown slightly removed from the rest of the tribes. Robert Hill, farmer at the Upper or Rogue River Farm, mentions that a creek named Mill Creek is directly on the east side of the farm (426). It is shown in that position on the map.

Farming during the early years had to be experimental as the farmers did not know what would grow in that particular climate. Wheat was tried for a number of years with dismal results. The yield was scanty, if the crop produced anything at all. Megginson, however, wrote in his 1862 report that he believed that wheat would grow as well there as any place in Oregon. The problem that he constantly experienced was the lack of seed at the proper time for planting.

The proper time is July or August. This will give the wheat time to get a good start before winter sets in, and the next spring it will be strong and vigorous enough to contend against its great enemy, the fern, and will ripen early. It is my ambition and desire to excel in raising good crops, and I feel very much mortified when I make a failure. If the land is not ploughed and the wheat sown this year in time I wish it distinctly understood that it will not have been my fault. The superintendent of Indian affairs promised, when he was here about two months ago, that, on his return to Portland, he would purchase and forward ploughs and other farming implements, but he has not done so (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess Doc 1:423 Serial 1157 Vol 2, August 1, 1862).

However, Agent Benjamin Simpson wrote in 1864 that the soil and climate were not conducive to wheat growth. He reported an average of eight bushels per acre which was half the average yield in the Willamette Valley. Peas, potatoes, turnips, and garden vegetables grew well (House Ex Doc 38 Cong 2 Sess Doc 1:246 Serial 1220 Vol 5, September 12, 1864). In 1858 Agent Metcalfe reported that corn, beans, or vines would



not grow on the reservation because of the cold nights (House Ex Doc 35 Cong 2 Sess Doc 1:603 Serial 997 Vol 2 July 27, 1858).

The original plan for subsistence was to prepare large farms for the Indians to care for communally. In 1858 Metcalfe wanted to give each tribe its own tract of land to support the tribe and, in addition, to give to each head of household his own small tract for his family's benefit (House Ex Doc 35 Cong 2 Sess Doc 1:604 Serial 997 Vol 2, July 27, 1858).

It appears that this plan wasn't adopted until 1860. Daniel Newcomb, who had replaced Metcalfe, reported that he had given a portion of land to each tribe with a farmer to assist them. His ultimate plan was to divide all this land into individual tracts for each family. However, when Newcomb took over, the planting season was nearly gone, and the Indians objected to being separated; therefore, this plan wasn't carried out that year (Senate Ex Doc 36 Cong 2 Sess Doc 1:435 Serial 1078 Vol 1, August 15, 1860).

Conditions on the farms were in a state of chaos when Benjamin R. Biddle became agent in 1861. He reported that the buildings were old and in desperate need of repair. The fences were broken down, and the cattle were ranging through the fields. The people were destitute and "disposed to be hostile" (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess Doc 1:417 Serial 1157 Vol 2, August 13, 1862).

In 1861, when Biddle took over, the winter came on so early that only a third of the potatoes were dug. Many of those that were dug froze in the potato houses. There were only a few hundred bushels of wheat grown from several hundred acres and that was so smutty and shriveled that Biddle reported that it was not fit for bread or seed (House

Ex Doc 38 Cong 1 Sess Doc 1:179 Serial 1182 Vol 3, June 30, 1862). After the devastating winter, only half of the people were still on the reservation in the summer of 1862. Some of them had left without permission, others had gone into the Willamette Valley to work for settlers, and still others had gone to fish on the coast (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess Doc 1:420 Serial 1157 Vol 2, August 13, 1862).

By 1863, conditions appear to have improved on the farms. George Megginson reported that the crops looked better than any he had raised on the farms. (Megginson had been involved in the farming since the beginning.) He included that most of the people had erected comfortable dwellings and surrounded them for the first time with gardens.

John Willis, farmer on the Agency Farm, reported that most of the people were building good houses and raising gardens. However, Robert Hill, who was farmer on the Rogue River or Upper Farm, wrote that, because the Indians under his charge were not generally of a sedentary nature, preferring to go to the hills when the farming work was finished, they had not built many houses. Those that were built were comfortable. There was also a lack of lumber that year which could have contributed to the lack of housing. (House Ex Doc 38 Cong 1 Sess Doc 1:188-191 Serial 1182 Vol 3, August 8, 1863).

Willis reported that the Mackeenuteenees (Mack-a-notins) and the Shasta Costa had been moved to another area. The Mackeenuteenees evidently moved to the Lower Farm because Megginson reports building a barn for the "Nockeemilteenee" village. The Shasta Costa went to the Rogue River farm. Willis had given them the best oxen and was left with old, worn out ones or those that were too small. He had built, together with the

tribes, four barns-one for the Joshuas, two for the Chet-t-coos, and one for the Too-too-toonees. In addition, they had built two potato houses, one each for the Joshuas and the Too-too-toonees. There was a nursery of 1500 apple trees put in that year.

Part of the Mackeenuteenees (evidently part of this band stayed under Willis' direction) had been moved to a prairie five miles away and had not had time to saw lumber or build houses. He considered the Shasta-Scoton the most "civilized", keeping their tools and stock in good order and putting in their own crops. They did their own hunting and sold the skins to buy "luxuries" (House Ex Doc 38 Cong 1 Sess Doc 1:188-189 Serial 1182 Vol 3, August 1, 1863).

By 1865, the farming situation had changed somewhat. R. A. Bensell was the head farmer on the Siletz with assistant farmers on each farm. On the home (probably the Agency) farm, the assistant was a person whose last name was Copeland. This was possibly Bensell's friend, Josiah Copeland, from Co. D, California Volunteers, which had been stationed at Fort Yamhill and Fort Hoskins. Copeland reported that he and the Indians had built eleven frame and four log houses and a number of barns and fences. He estimated that 100 acres of potatoes would produce 25,000 bushels; the Indian gardens had also done well.

On the Chasta-Scoton farm, which was near the Agency farm, Copeland reported that 20 acres of wheat would produce nothing because of heavy fogs. He had rebuilt six frame houses and repaired garden fences and barns.

William C. Bocke was the farmer on the Upper Farm in 1865. He wrote that the Rogue Rivers, Grease (Galice) Creeks, Coquilles, and Chasta Costas had made great

progress in tilling their fields and everything was doing well. John Willis reported that, on the Lower Farm, the Sixes, Port Orfords, Nult-nort-nas (Nolnatnas), and Uchres were doing well and the barns, fences, etc. were in excellent condition (House Ex Doc 39 Cong 1 Sess Doc 1:678-679 Serial 1248 Vol 2, August 30, 1865).

Megginson, Hill, and Willis, along with Dr. James R. Bayley, were concerned about the heavy work that the women had to do. Hill and Willis both requested one-horse plows so the women could be spared the work of digging the potatoes. Dr. Bayley reported that the hard labor the women had to perform, especially carrying heavy loads, caused sickness among them (House Ex Doc 38 Cong 1 Sess Doc 1: 188-189, 191 Serial 1182 Vol 3, August 1, 8, 1863).

In his 1865 report, Huntington recounted that the Indians had the same discontent as before, complaining of the lack of treaty ratification. They were fearful because whites were coming onto the reservation with regularity. "The Indians are constantly harassed with the apprehension that their last home is to be taken from them" (House Ex Doc 39 Cong. 1 Sess Doc 1:648-650 Serial 1248 Vol 2, September 17, 1865). Their apprehension was not unfounded as, by 1875, their land had been reduced by Congress from over a million acres to fewer than 250,000 acres (Zucker, et al., 1983:112). (See Figure 5.9)




Figure 5.9 Reduced Siletz Reservation and Grand Ronde Reservation, 1877 (OIA, Letters Received, M234:622, Frame 279)

#### **5.4.6 Intrusions onto the Reservation**

Intrusions onto the reservation by non-Indians began early in its history. Probably the first settlers from the Willamette Valley made the trip to Yaquina Bay in 1856. Dr. T. J. Right from Corvallis had been appointed as physician to the Coast Reservation, and E.A. Abbey, E. Hartless, and Mr. Mosee(?) accompanied him. They followed Indian trails to reach the bay about two miles from its mouth (Fagan 1885:478).

Gold miners were sometimes at work on the reservation. In the spring of 1859, Captain Munson and C.B. Hand (These two men were probably L. B. Munson and Charles B. Hand.) of Corvallis returned to town with news of having explored the country around Cape Foulweather, Yaquina Bay, and Alsea valley. They spoke glowingly of the animal resources there and the friendly Indians (The Oregon Weekly Union, Corvallis, May 21, 1859:2). In the same paper for August 6, 1859, there was a report that soldiers were ordered to make them leave the reservation:

Selits Mines--Our townsman, Mr. Roberts, has just returned from these diggings; he was at the camp of Capt. Munson and Hand, saw them take out \$10 retorted gold. Munson & Hand were about to be removed from the reserve by the military (2).

Metcalf wrote to Superintendent Geary that he had tried to get Munson and Hand to leave, but they refused to. "Mssrs Hand and Munson refuse to leave the Reservation on my request, and Capt Augur has sent a detachment of troops to move them" (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 17, Doc 115, August 3, 1859).

J.C. Powell of Corvallis sent a letter to Geary explaining that Munson and Hand had not known that their claim was on the reservation. They requested that they be given

permission to continue working there a while longer to recover their costs (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 17, Doc 100, August 16, 1859). It is unclear if they were given permission to return. By 1860, settlers were beginning to realize the value of the harbor at Yaquina Bay. William Tichenor wrote to the Oregon Weekly Union that Yaquina Bay was perfectly safe to enter as he had gone in three times and never had a problem. Tichenor believed that the bay was commercially important because there was no other bay between Coos Bay and the Columbia River. The only obstacle to making it commercially successful was the reservation. "I protested against forming a reservation on the coast in 1855, and condemned that act of government and have never changed my mind. The present treaty should be revoked and the Indians placed in the interior" (Oregon Weekly Union, August 28, 1860:2).

People from the valley who were going to the coast evidently used the people on the reservation as a source of income by providing them with liquor. On October 10, 1862, Captain F. Seidenstriker at Fort Hoskins issued a notice to the soldiers stationed at the blockhouse that they were to keep their sentinels on alert for those who passed the blockhouse on the way to the coast. If these people were carrying liquor, it was to be taken from them and poured out (Fort Hoskins Post Orders [FHPO] book).

The presence of oysters in the bay proved to be a source of trouble for the reservation. In 1861 a Captain Spencer had taken an Indian guide to the coast. While there, they "discovered" the oyster beds in Yaquina Bay (Fagan 1885:480). Winant and Company under Captain J.J. Winant arrived in 1863 and promptly leased the oyster beds with permission from Agent Ben Simpson for fifteen cents per bushel (Fagan 1885:478).

However, Ludlow & Company, another oystering business under Captain Richard Hillyer, refused to lease any of the beds, citing that all citizens had the right to take fish in American waters (Barth 1959:126). In the Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1864, it was reported that Hillyer had been defying the government for over a year and a half by “engaging in trade, erecting houses, taking oysters, tampering with Indians, &c, &c.” Therefore, Corporal Bensell, along with Lieutenant Herzer from Fort Hoskins, was ordered to visit Hillyer’s ship, and, if it appeared that Hillyer was shipping oysters, Bensell was to arrest him. On February 24, 1864, Captain Hillyer was arrested.

Hillyer telegraphed to General Wright, Commander for the Department of the Pacific, complaining of his arrest and stating that he had a right to take oysters because of his license issued in San Francisco (House Doc 38 Cong 2 Sess Vol 1 Serial 1220, September 12, 1864). Wright issued an order to release Hillyer and let him go about his business. When Wright learned the real facts in the case, he countermanded his order. However, it was too late. Hillyer had already left with a load of oysters (Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs [RCIA] for the Year 1864: 84).

The day that he was released, Hillyer went to Corvallis to sue Simpson. Hillyer procured an injunction against Simpson who was not allowed to interfere with him anymore. When Hillyer returned later in the year, fifteen armed men came with him (RCIA 1864:84). Bensell reported that on September 20, 1864, he saw Hillyer and a “picked crew of roughs at Oysterville. Trouble in perspective. The Winant firm [which had leased the oyster beds] appeal to the Agent for protection. Must have it and by all the justice of contracts should have it” (Barth 1959:176).



Bensell himself was implicated in the suit that Hillyer had brought against Simpson. In his journal, Bensell notes that the sheriff of Benton County served papers on Simpson and him, asking \$12,000 in damages. "My course is clear. Unless ordered by my Superior Officer I shall pay no attention to the writ" (Barth 1959:132).

Because Yaquina Bay was becoming increasingly popular with the settlers in the Willamette Valley, a group of them decided it was time to start preparing for the day when they would have permanent access. The Yaquina Bay Wagon Road had its beginning in 1860 when a group of men from Corvallis made a trip to Yaquina Bay for the express purpose of opening a thoroughfare from the Willamette Valley to the ocean:

A company consisting of Wayman St. Clair, Stephen Robinett, John S. George, Robert T. Baldwin, Benjamin Pilbean, Capt. John Smith, Lucius W. Phelps, Joseph Hamilton, William Hite, J. Friedly, W.H. Johnson, I.N. Smith, James Robinett and B.R. Biddle-started from Corvallis, en-route for the Yaquina Bay[...] It is true that we have an Indian Reservation thrown across our path. What facilities the authorities will afford us for carrying out our plan and opening a thoroughfare to the ocean from the heart of the Willamette Valley, is yet to be seen. The time is at hand for us to act-act wisely and promptly (Oregon Weekly Union, September 11, 1860:1).

In 1864 a company was formed to plan a wagon road from Corvallis to the confluence of the Yaquina and Elk Rivers. It was finally completed in 1866 (Fagan 1885: 479). According to the Coast Treaty of 1855, the government retained permission to construct roads or railroads through the reservation; however, since the treaty was never ratified, the President removed that portion of land from the reservation in 1865, a twenty-five mile wide swath of land extending from the Willamette Valley to the ocean (Ruby and Brown 1992:50).

Jeremiah E. Hinkle, a Benton County pioneer, reported to Mark Phinney, an Historical Records Survey researcher, that he and his father, Ichabod Hinkle, and several other people went to the Yaquina Bay in 1859. They went by way of the Siletz Agency where the agent, Daniel Newcomb, gave them two canoes and Indian guides to take them down to the ocean. In his interview, Mr. Hinkle said that a few days later another party made the trip, and, therefore, interest was aroused in clearing a road from Blodgett Valley to tidewater on the Yaquina (Phinney, 1936). Perhaps Mr. Hinkle was incorrect on the year and meant 1860 if the party he referred to was the group that was reported in the Oregon Weekly Union.

On December 20, 1865, President Andrew Johnson issued an Executive Order to officially reduce the reservation by taking away a portion of the center of the reservation from two miles south of the Siletz Agency to the mouth of the Alsea River. It extended from the ocean to the eastern boundary of the reservation (the summit of the Coast Range of mountains) and was 25 miles wide.

numerous settlers [...] ask for a curtailment of this reservation [...] to secure much-needed access to the coast [...] and propose that a small and rugged portion of the reservation in the vicinity of Aquina Bay, not occupied or desired by the Indians, (author's emphasis) [...] be thrown open to occupation and use by whites (Scholarly Resources 1975:152).

The Alsea Sub-Agency was removed from the Coast Reservation in 1875, and most of the Alsea people had moved to the Siletz by 1877. The portion of the Coast Reservation that remained extended from the Salmon River to just below the Siletz River. Even this was not safe from the desire by settlers to have more access to the area. Senator J.H. Mitchell wanted settlers to be able to fish in the Siletz River, even though it was

completely on reservation land. He believed that there were many more fish in the river than the Indians needed. He wrote a letter to the Commissioner asking that settlers either be allowed to fish for free or be granted a license to take fish (OIA, Letters Received, M234:624, Frames 218-219, October 3, 1877).

Intrusions onto the reservation did not end there. After 1875, more roads were opened from the coast to the Willamette Valley, increasing the ability of settlers to reach the Siletz area. The General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act) virtually forced the people on the Siletz Reservation to accept pieces of land allotted to them, with the rest of the land being sold off. Historian E.A. Schwartz believes that the Siletz people accepted allotment, even though the Dawes Act did not specifically require allotment acceptance, because they had never been paid for any of the other land that had been removed from the reservation in years past. With this act, they would at least be paid a partial value for the land (Schwartz 1997:219-220).

The unallotted land consisted of 175,000 acres for which the Siletz people were paid \$142,600. One hundred thousand dollars was placed in the Treasury to gain interest of five percent per year. The other \$42,600 was paid out to individuals at \$75.00 per person per year until that sum was gone. Individuals were paid interest on the money in the Treasury yearly. The land was sold at \$1.50 per acre, reaping the sum of \$263,500. The government's estimated profit from this transaction was \$120,000 (House Ex Doc 53 Cong 2nd Sess Doc 527:1-2, Serial 3270, March 2, 1894).

### 5.4.7 *Tyee John*

In addition to the major economic and social problems caused by removal to a reservation, the tribes felt that they had been lied to. They had been under the impression when they first moved to the reservation that this was a temporary solution and that they would be going back to their homeland in a few years. John (see Figure 5.10), believed to be Tyee John or Old John, spoke for his people to J. Ross Browne in 1857:


For my own part my heart is sick; many of my people have died since they came here; many are still dying. There will soon be none left of us. Here the mountains are covered with great forests. It is hard to get through them. We have no game; we are sick at heart; many of my people have died since we came here. [...] A long time ago we made a treaty with Palmer. There was a piece of land at Table Rock that was ours. He said it should remain ours, but that for the sake of peace, as the white settlers were bad, we should leave it for a while. When we signed the paper that was our understanding[...] (Browne 1858:45).

Before John surrendered in southern Oregon, he met Lt. Colonel Robert Buchanan at Oak Flat on the Illinois River on May 20-21, 1856, (Applen 1997:43) to talk about coming in to give up. The Oregon Statesman reported his speech on July 15, 1856:

“You are a great chief; so am I a great chief; this is my country; I was in it when those large trees were very little, not higher than my head. My heart is sick fighting the whites, but I want to live in my country--I will, if the whites are willing, go back to the Deer Creek country and live as I used to do amongst the whites; they can visit my camp and I will visit theirs, but I will not lay down my arms and go with you to the reserve. I will fight. Good bye.”

And saying this, he majestically strode out of the camp, and marched off (Oregon Statesman July 15, 1856:2).

There is some confusion in government records as to which tribe John belonged. The first Rogue River treaty was signed by only one “John”. However, the second treaty



CHIEF JOHN.

**Figure 5.10** *Te-cum-tum* or Tyee (Chief) John  
(Oregon Historical Society, neg. no. Orhi 4355)

was signed by two, *Hart-tish* (Applegate John) and *Te-cum-tum* (John). Agent S.H. Culver in 1854 reported that a Tyee John had signed the 1853 treaty and, in addition, included the fact that the Ancient Applegates had not signed the first treaty (OIA, Letters Received, M234:608, Frame 351, July 20, 1854). It can, therefore, be assumed that *Hart-tish*, or Applegate John, was not present at the first treaty, and the John who signed that treaty probably was *Te-cum-tum*.

In the August 20, 1856, census of those who were going to be supplied at the Siletz, Metcalfe refers to a "Rogue River John" (OIA, Letters Received, M234:609, Frame 271). Metcalfe took another census in December, 1856. In this census, he listed "Shasta John" and included a notation that he and his tribe had gone to the Grand Ronde; this list included the same number of men, women, and children as the August census (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 14, Doc 387, December 24, 1856). It is a fact that the Rogue River tribes were left on the Grand Ronde for the winter. Therefore, Shasta John and Rogue River John must have been the same person.

In Metcalfe's census for 1857, he includes "Old John" as a Shasta or Upper Rogue River chief along with George and Joe Lane (OSIA, Miscellaneous Loose Papers, Roll 30, September 22, 1857). J. Ross Browne, the government agent sent to report about the state of Indian affairs in Oregon, also referred to him as "John, the Shasta chief" (Browne 1858:44). H. D. Mount wrote in his *Reminiscences of the Rogue River War* that John had been the "leading spirit" and the one who dictated the treaty with Palmer and Lane (at Table Rock in 1853). He said that John's father was a Rogue River chief, John, and his mother was a Shasta. John became the chief of his people by inheritance:

While John was always reserved in his manner and from general appearance, no man not acquainted or not knowing would ever suspect that this man was a chief, at whose command hundreds of warriors would spring to arms or retire at command. Such was the unassuming appearance that Lane or Palmer never suspected him (Mount:223).

Rodney Glisan, who kept a journal while he was a doctor with the military during the Rogue River wars in southern Oregon refers to Old John as an Applegate (Glisan 1874:316). He described John and his surrender as follows: "He brings with him thirty-five men, capable of bearing arms, ninety women, and ninety children. He is about fifty-five years old--not at all prepossessing in appearance--has a resolute, discontented, and unhappy appearance" (Glisan 1874:348).

The number of men mentioned above closely matches the number on Metcalfe's first census (30) for "Rogue River John", second census (30) for "Shasta John", and third census (36) for "Old John." It appears that Glisan was confused about Chief John's tribal affiliation.

George Ambrose, agent at the Table Rock Reservation where the Rogue River tribes were supposed to be, also might have confused Old John and Applegate John. In a report to Joel Palmer wherein he included a list of tribes who were hostile in 1854, he listed Applegate John. However, the word "Applegate" is crossed out and the word "Old" is written in its place. Applegate John is listed further down on the list (OIA, Letters Received, M234:608, Frame 1263, October 20, 1855). Chief John's tribal affiliation may never be known with certainty, but the records seem to show that he was not Applegate John.

John's last battle as a free man was with Lt. Colonel Robert Buchanan, Captain A.J. Smith, and Captain Christopher Colon Augur. Augur was the same military man who founded Fort Hoskins in 1856 and was responsible, until 1861 when he was called away to the Civil War, for keeping the people on the Reservation. Even though John's band was not defeated at the Battle of Big Bend, it seems that John knew it was futile to resist much longer.

In early June, Brigadier General John K. Lamerick, head of the volunteer forces in Oregon, wrote to Governor George Curry that it was his opinion that all the Indians would be coming in except for John's. "He still refuses to be removed to the reserve, but is anxious to make peace and remain on the river. He has got about 30 warriors, and I think is now trying to make his way to Illinois Valley or that section of country, as all of his old allies have come into camp" (Oregon Statesman, July 1, 1856:3).

The Statesman reported on July 8, 1856, that five of Old John's people had come into Colonel Buchanan's camp at Port Orford with a message from John stating that he wanted to surrender provided he was given the same terms as George and Limpy had been given. He requested that Colonel Buchanan send out 25 pack animals and enough regular troops to protect his band from the "Bostons."

Accordingly on the 24th, Col. Buchanan sent out a command of 110 men, under Maj. Reynolds, to meet him with the required supplies; however, previous to this, he had sent two of the Indians back to John to tell him to come in, and that he would meet him at or near the bark shanty, the other three of which were held in [unreadable], one of John's sons being included in the number. They stated that John was encamped on Illinois river, two or three miles above its mouth, and that he would leave Rogue River on the 23rd, and take up his line of march towards Port Orford (Oregon Statesman, July 8, 1856:2).



On June 29th, 1856, John and his followers agreed to surrender and arrived at Port Orford on July 2nd. The Oregon Statesman reported that Captain Nathan Olney, Indian Agent, had been in Salem the previous week and had given a report about John's band. He stated that the agreement made between Colonel Buchanan and John's band was that they would not be held accountable for any crimes they had committed. In addition, they did not have to return any stolen property (Oregon Statesman July 22, 1856:2).

Robert Metcalfe gave the ultimate praise to Chief John in a letter written to Asahel Bush, editor of the Oregon Statesman. In the letter, Metcalfe was trying to make a point concerning Colonel Buchanan's attitude toward the Oregon Volunteers.

It has been my fortune or misfortune as the case may be, to have met one of these lords of creation (the would-be world-renowned) Col. Buchanan, before whom the fierce savage, king of the forest crouches like the spaniel beneath his master's lash; lays low his arms, and makes an unconditional surrender. Unconditional surrender does he say? Old John was too much of a general for that; he said he would retain the property captured in war, or fight, and only surrendered on those conditions (Oregon Statesman, August 12, 1856:1).

Part of John's tribe, as well as members of the Pistol River and Chetco tribes, was sent by land via the valley of the Coquille and Roseburg (Victor 1894:414-415). The rest of Chief John's people, along with the others who had gathered at Port Orford, were sent up the coast by the steamer Columbia (Glisan 1874:349). Within a month of surrendering, John's tribe and the others were at the Grande Ronde near Fort Yamhill (Bancroft 1886 30:409-410). Part of John's band must have been at Salmon River on the coast because Courtney Meade Walker wrote to Joel Palmer that on August 4 Metcalfe

had arrived with John's people (MSS 249). By May, 1857, the Shastas and most of the Rogue River tribes had been sent from both places to Siletz (Carey 1971: 2:601).

John, still determined to return to his home, constantly urged rebellion among the other tribes on the reservation (Victor 1894:417). During this time of turmoil, John's son, "Cultus" Jim, was killed on October 10, 1857 (Fort Hoskins Letter Book [FHLB] October 17, 1857). Metcalfe reported "Cultus" Jim's death in a lengthy message:

Dear Sir

About ten days since Old John and two of his boys started out with the declaration that their hearts were sick, and that they were not going to stay here and die with sickness, that they had rather die by bullets, and were evidently going down below where I had two or three men sowing wheat; to murder them. When they met two Silits Indians drew their revolvers and fired upon them killing one of them on the ground and when I called upon Old John to know why he did so; he said that it was none of my business that they would kill who they pleased, and when I asked Cultus Jim (Old John's son) for his revolver John sprang to his feet perfectly wild with rage, drew his revolver half out and told Jim to keep his revolver and fight with it, I then saw that he was determined on another outbreak, and that nothing would prevent it, but rigid and prompt measures on my part; I therefore sent an express to Capt Augur for a force sufficient to disarm all the Indians on the Reservation when the troops arrived I called upon John for his arms but he refused to give them up: I then requested Lt Garber to accompany me with his detachment of twenty-five men, with the view of arresting John and Cultus Jim and taking their arms from them, but when we arrived in sight of John's house he and his boys ran to the brush; and we were only able to get two small revolvers, which were given up by those who remained at the house we then returned to our quarters disgusted with our success, the following day Cultus Jim came down to a camp near the agency, when Lt Garber and myself went down to arrest him; he refused to be arrested and after making a desperate resistance drew a concealed revolver ran on the opposite side of his horse from me and fired at me the ball passed near my head; at which moment Sarg Clark arrived and he Lt Garber and myself fired upon him almost at the same instant all three of the balls taking effect killing him on the spot; since that time the excitement has died away and the Indians

have given up nearly all of their arms say twenty guns, eight revolvers, and seven other pistols; the Indians have promised to give up all of their arms which I think will be done in a few days (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 15:261, October 13, 1857).

However, Coquille Thompson (see Figure 5.11), a tribal member on the Siletz Reservation, had always heard another story from his elders. In that version, Garber and the others found Jim in camp and drunk. They ordered him up on a horse and cocked their rifles at him. His attention was diverted to something above him. When Jim looked away, he was shot dead (Thompson, 1937).



**Figure 5.11** Coquille Thompson  
(Oregon Historical Society, neg. no. Orhi 78267)

John surrendered for the moment when his son was killed. However, because John kept threatening Metcalfe's life, he was arrested six months later along with his son Adam. On April 23, 1858, Nesmith wrote to Augur: "I am highly gratified at your success in capturing Old John, and fully concur with you in the opinion that he had better be taken to some Military Post in California, and will so advise Gen'l Clarke by next mail" (OSIA, Letter Book F, Roll 7:261).

The Occidental Messenger newspaper reported the following about John:

The famous Indian, "Old John" who has caused Oregonians so much trouble and his son, were brought into town on Wednesday last, handcuffed, and placed on board the steamer Surprise, to be conveyed to Fort Vancouver, where we believe it is designed to have them imprisoned in the Fort at that place. John is a bad Indian, and all efforts heretofore used to quell his turbulent disposition, or subdue him have proved unavailing. Ever since Mr. Robert Metcalf found it necessary to shoot one of John's tribe, he has been seeking to retaliate on Metcalf in like manner, and to stir up rebellion among the Indians on the Reservation. It is to be hoped that this wily son of the forest, now that he is caught, will be taken care of. The fate of the Indian seems to be a hard one, but the too sympathetic on such subjects should recollect that the earth was designed for the occupancy of those who will make the best use of it. The inexorable law of fate is against them, and it is decreed that they shall disappear before the march of the white man. The feminine portion of John's family accompanied him [to Fort Vancouver] (Occidental Messenger, April 24, 1858:2).

On the way to Alcatraz aboard the ship Columbia, John and his son were involved in a fracas during which Adam was shot in the leg. His leg was eventually amputated. According to Coquille Thompson, both John and Adam were afraid that they were going to be thrown overboard on the way to San Francisco (Thompson, 1937). In his journal, Rodney Glisan reported that John and Adam had been taken below in the steamer on the way to California. They grabbed the Sergeant's pistol and started to fire at him and others

when one of the officers shot John through the nose and Adam in the leg. "It is thought Old John and son supposed they were being taken to the lower deck to be hung-hence their conduct. It is a very unfortunate affair, and will greatly impair the confidence of the Indians in the Whites" (Glisan 1874:405-406).

A woman by the name of Mrs. M. C. Lockwood wrote a remembrance of her passage on the same steamer that John was on. She tells the story somewhat differently but with most of the same basic information. She said that John and his son were brought on board in irons but, after crossing the Columbia River bar, were allowed to go on deck freely. When the steamer arrived at Humboldt Bay, it could not go in to deliver the mail because of rough seas. John and Adam spent some time looking at the land and talking together.

Everyone had gone to bed and was sleeping when, all of a sudden, Mrs. Lockwood felt her skull being smashed, some of her teeth splitting. The watch on deck heard the commotion and yelled "fire", awakening the rest of the passengers. They all tried to rush up the stairs to the deck.

When Mrs. Lockwood saw that John had taken a piece of iron off one of the tables and was swinging at anyone who came near him, she grabbed her baby and tried to get up the stairs. According to her testimony, John swung the iron at her baby, and she put her arm up to protect him. She was hit with such force on the forearm that it broke her arm. Finally she made it to the deck where the other passengers were talking about the woman who had been "murdered" below.

During this time, John's son was trying to kill the sergeant in charge of them. Whenever the officers tried to capture John and Adam, John broke out their lanterns. Finally, the officers divided into two groups. One of the officers shot Adam in his leg, breaking it. John was shot in his right cheek with the ball coming out the other side. The officers then pounded John so hard with the gun that they broke its stock. After John and Adam were overpowered, they were tied up and put below until they reached San Francisco. From there they were sent to Benicia, a government fort (MSS 2217).

As early as 1859, Superintendent Geary was considering Adam's release back to Oregon. Metcalfe had planned to visit John and Adam while in San Francisco, and Geary suggested that Adam could come back if Metcalfe thought it was safe to have him return. However, Geary noted, "I would not at present hazard the return of old John as I fear his indomitable spirit might impel him to some deed of violence or to spread discontent among the Indians on the Siletz" (OSIA, Letter Book G, Roll 8:22, October 24, 1859).

Superintendent W. H. Rector (who had replaced Geary) sent a message to the commander of the Department of the Pacific, Brigadier General Wright about John's arrest:

In April 1858 the Indian Chief John was taken in charge by the Military and conveyed to the Headquarters of the Department of the Pacific then at Benicia I think where he has since remained. Three of his daughters have recently called on me and made appeals for him to be returned in order that he might live with them the few remaining days of his life. His tribe are now nearly all dead. And I am of the opinion that it would not be detrimental to the public good to return him to his family while perhaps the knowledge he has obtained during his exile of the power of the whites he may turn to good account by imparting it to his brethren, who have not had the like opportunity to derive such information. Should you concur in this opinion I will be glad if you will take measures

to have him and his son returned to the Superintendency consigned to me (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:129, May 7, 1862).

On May 22, 1862, Clerk Patton wrote the following to Agent Condon at Grand Ronde:

Office Supt Ind affairs  
Portland Oregon May 22nd

Sir

Gen Wright has complied with the Supt's request and sent "Old John" and his son Adam up. As his children are under your charge at Grand Round Agency, I send them to you for care and protection. I have directed Mr Brown to go up to Dayton with them. I would request and advise that you take some pains to gratify the old Man give him as good quarters as the circumstances will permit if his children have no house for him.

Yours  
T McF. Patton

PS Mr Rector is at Siletz (OSIA, Miscellaneous Loose Papers, Roll 30)

Rector noted the following in his annual report to Commissioner Dole:

I have not seen them but once since their return, but learn from Agent Condon that their conduct is unexceptionable, and that they exert a very salutary [sic] influence over Indians in inducing them to remain at home and live like white men. The old man is now far advanced in years but his Son is in the prime of life, and although he has lost a leg in battling for life and liberty, he is of great service to the Agent (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:199-200, September 2, 1862).

Photographs of both John and Adam were taken at the time of their release. Clerk Patton sent a note to Charles Mix, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, with the message that the pictures were on their way to his office "inasmuch as they are Indians of notoriety in this State, and will occupy a prominent page in its history" (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:245, October 24, 1862).

Tyee John had a number of children besides “Adam” and “Cultus Jim.” He also had several daughters. Harriet Nesmith McArthur, daughter of James Nesmith, wrote in her memoir that she was familiar with a daughter of Chief John, “Princess Mary” (see Figure 5.12), who used to come to the valley to sell baskets (McArthur 1929:378).

In addition, Robert Metcalfe wrote of two women who went with Chief John and Adam to Fort Vancouver when they were arrested: “I have given permission to Kit and her child; Fan and two of Adams wives to accompany John & Adam to Vancouver and earnestly hope you will not allow any more to leave the Reservation;” (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 16, Doc 119, April 19, 1858). As noted previously, in a letter from Rector to Brigadier General Wright, Rector wrote of three of John’s daughters visiting him to request his release from Alcatraz (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:129, May 7, 1862).

Captain C.C. Augur, commander at Fort Hoskins mentioned “Fanny and Kitty” by name and gave a clue to their personalities:

I repeat my conviction that he [John] is a most dangerous indian [sic] not only in reference to the Indians on this reservation, but to all in this county, and that he well merits careful attention.

The same may be said of his daughters Fanny & Kitty, who have inherited in an eminent degree their Fathers peculiarities (FHLB, April 20, 1858).

Tyee John died on June 6, 1864, at Fort Yamhill:

INDIAN NOTABLES DEAD.--John, the War Chief of the Klamath and Rogue river Indians, known and dreaded for several years on account of his desperate hate of the whites, died of old age at Fort Yamhill on the 6th inst., within an hour or two of Stock Whitly, the head chief of the Nez Perces. Thus in one day the two most notable Indian warrior-chiefs of the Northern Pacific Coast, have gone to the great hunting grounds (Oregonian, June 15, 1864:2).





CRONISE



160 STATE ST.  
SALEM, OR.

**Figure 5.12** Princess Mary, daughter of Chief John  
(Oregon Historical Society, neg. no. Orhi 57081)

#### 5.4.8 *The Alsea Sub-Agency*

Not all of the tribes were forced onto the Siletz Reservation immediately. Some were required to live at the Umpqua Sub-Agency until 1859. This sub-agency was at Umpqua City at the mouth of the Umpqua River with Fort Umpqua nearby. The tribes at this agency, under charge of E.P. Drew, were the Scottsburg, Lower Umpqua, and the Coos. Other tribes such as the Siuslaw and Alsea people were left where their homes were for the time being but were associated with the Umpqua Sub-Agency (Sen Ex Doc 35 Cong 1 Sess Doc 11:647, Serial 919 Vol 2, July 1, 1857).

Little money was available for the Umpqua Agency because these tribes had been party to the unratified Coast Treaty. Therefore, at some point in 1858, Drew allowed people from his agency to go to *Kowes* (Coos) River and Ten Mile Creek to catch and dry salmon and to subsist themselves for awhile. When the settlers saw what was happening, they sent a petition to Drew to get him to take the people back to his agency. He was told that “any Indian found off the reserve could at once be shot, and no law or justice reach the offender” (Sen Ex Doc 35 Cong 2 Sess Doc 1:606, Serial 974 Vol 1, June 30, 1858). He was forced to bring the people back to protect them.

E.P. Drew resigned in 1859 and, in November of that year, Joshua B. Sykes took over as agent at the Umpqua Sub-Agency. The Office of Indian Affairs was determined to move the tribes remaining at the Umpqua to the southern portion of the Coast Reservation; therefore, Sykes was ordered to begin looking for an appropriate location. He reported that the most suitable spot was along the coast near the Yachats River. He described it as being “six miles south of the Alsea river, and sixty miles north of Fort

Umpqua” (Sen Ex Doc 36 Cong 2 Sess Doc 1:439, Serial 1978 Vol 1, July 12, 1860).

The tribes that were supposed to move there, however, were reluctant to go, Sykes said, because they “are in the habit of cutting wood for the Steamboats and thereby obtaining considerable money, also by prostituting their women to the whites” (OIA, Letters Received, M234:612, Frame 78, October 4, 1859).

In the same letter, Sykes informed Geary that he had rented an office and storehouse from E.P. Drew for \$60.00 per month. He had no choice because all of the buildings in the vicinity were owned by Drew. He also suggested that, since the new agency at Yachats and the agency at Umpqua City were some 40 miles apart over a difficult and precipitous trail, there be another sub-agent assigned to his agency so that he could spend most of his time at Yachats preparing the new agency (OIA, Letters Received, M234:612, Frames 78-79, October 4, 1859).

In his reply, Geary took Sykes to task for renting buildings for nearly double what Drew had charged. Geary did not seem to make the connection that Drew must have been charging the government to live in his own house. He also took issue with Sykes’ idea of hiring another agent when Drew had gotten by with only himself. Drew had not had to take care of two agencies as Sykes was being temporarily asked to do. Geary noted that the appropriations for the department had been reduced by half for the year; therefore, everyone had to reduce their expenditures by half (OSIA, Letter Book G, Roll 8:43-44, December 13, 1859).

Geary wrote to Commissioner A.B. Greenwood in August, 1860, that Sykes had nearly completed moving the people to the Alsea Sub-Agency. Geary was requesting a

special appropriation from the Office of Indian Affairs partly because of the expenses incurred in the removal:

The reason stated by you for the failure of Congress to make the appropriation is that it was "considered that ample provision had been made under the several treaties for these purposes." It is a serious mistake to suppose that all the Indians of this Superintendency are parties to Treaties and are provided for in the appropriations for fulfilment [sic] of treaty stipulations. [...] there are no less than 16,314 Indians in this Superintendency who are not parties to any Treaty [...] (OIA, Letters Received, M234:612, Frames 294-295, August 26, 1860).

In November of 1860, Sykes reported to Superintendent Geary that he had moved the Coos and Umpqua tribes to the Alsea Sub-Agency under great difficulty. Many of the people, especially women, were hidden by some of the settlers. Others were advised that the President had not ordered their removal and that Sykes was taking their removal upon himself. He was forced to leave some of them in the mountains and go get them later (OIA, Letters Received, M234:612, Frames 817-821, November 16, 1860).

Earlier, in July, Sykes had begun making improvements on the Alsea Sub-Agency in preparation for receiving the Umpqua and Coos Indians. There he built two small agency buildings and planted about twenty-five acres of potatoes and garden vegetables (Sen Ex Doc 36 Cong 2 Sess Doc 1:439, Serial 1078 Vol 1, July 12, 1860). The location of the agency is in the town of Yachats north of the Yachats River. The agency buildings were located just south of the town cemetery which is visible from Highway 101.

The next year, the new agent, Linus Brooks, reported on the farm land. One of the prairies being used was described as extending along the beach for two miles north from the "Laboosh" River (Brooks mistakenly gave this name for the Yachats River). It

averaged one thousand yards in width and contained 724 acres. Many of the people had chosen their garden grounds up the Yachats River where there were other prairies and abundant game.

According to Brooks, the first year's crops under Sykes had not done well for some unknown reason. When Brooks arrived in June, the seed that had been sown on the first of June was not doing well, and he found the people there "disheartened and faithless in regard to the cultivation of their lands." He immediately planted crops "in which the Indians reluctantly participated." According to his August report, the crops were doing well and "the Indians are exultant and happy and manifest a willingness to labor at my bidding" (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 19, Unregistered Letters, August 20, 1861).

In September, 1861, Brooks wrote to Rector asking for shoes for the people. "I do not recollect what the conclusion was in regard to shoes. I cannot see how they can get along without shoes [...]" ( OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 20, Doc 13, November 13, 1861). Unfortunately, the winter of 1861-1862 was one of the worst on record. Brooks sent a special messenger to the Corvallis Post Office to notify Rector of the problems at Yachats. He said that the people there had suffered severely because of the cold and the lack of clothing:

Many are more or less frost bitten yet I have seen none whose lameness will be likely to be permanent. Some have died. Some 19 are absent with or without permits. Universal disappointment and distrust prevails. The arrival of the long looked for Sloop with clothing is believed to be a humbug. [...] The winter on the coast has been severely cold and stormy. The Indian's [sic] horses are mostly dead. My employee (O.W. Weaver) has succeeded by feeding our hay & potatoes in saveing [sic] all of the government Stock excepting two expended mules. [...] P.S. We are entirely out of all necessaries of life

excepting flour and Potatoes (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 20, Doc 52, April 1, 1862).

Rector was unable to ship any goods until the end of April because the sloop had sailed for Tillamook and was delayed in returning. Along with other supplies, he had sent 100 pairs of heavy white English blankets. He noted in his letter to Sykes, "It may not be necessary to issue these at present unless they are destitute." He also sent along middlings in place of flour. "It is utterly useless for this office to purchase flour for Indian Consumption at the present advanced prices and great demand for the article. These middlings are a very good substitute, and are used to a considerable extent among the poorer classes of our own people" (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:124, April 24, 1862).

Yet, in Brooks' report for July, he reported that the year, on the whole, had been prosperous and that the Indians had been well-supplied with subsistence.

No one had suffered with hunger through any lack of wherewith to eat. [...] During the past winter some disaffection was manifest, resulting from an insufficient supply of winter clothing. Their troubles, however, were more imaginary than real. They were not entirely destitute of clothing; their houses were warm; we had ample supplies of provisions for six months in advance, and they had no work to do (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess Doc 1:443, Serial 1157 Vol 2, July 20, 1862).

Brooks' 1862 report gave a good description of the agency and the people there.

He described the government buildings as being four round log buildings:

The agency is 15 by 26 feet, and is divided into three apartments, as follows: a sitting-room twelve by fifteen feet, an office seven by sixteen feet, and a bed-room of the same size, all being eight feet high in the clear, or below the eaves. The sitting room is accommodated with a cobblestone fire-place, and a broad chimney above. The kitchen is a small building six logs high; the commissary is the same. The barn consists of two pole pens twelve by thirteen feet, eight poles high,

with a space of nineteen [sic] feet between them-one is used for a barn, the other for a stable; all of which is roofed over, the roof extending from the ridge far enough one side to form a shed nine feet (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess Doc 1:442, Serial 1157 Vol 2, July 20, 1862).

Most of the Coos and a small part of the Umpqua tribe were on the agency farm with Brooks where they had built small lodges of various construction. “[...]some [are] of logs five or six feet high at the eaves, others of rived [split] boards, and some of grass.” Part of the Coos people were at Coos Bay (Brooks does not say why they were not on the reservation), and part of the Umpquas were with the Siuslaws, their relations.

The Siuslaws were at their traditional home which was at the mouth of the Siuslaw River where they grew their own food and traded furs, fish, and their labor for other supplies. When Sykes was in charge, he had been instructed by Superintendent Geary to leave them where they were and to give them agricultural implements when needed (OIA, Letters Received, M234:612, Frame 76, November 3, 1859). Brooks had not insisted that they come to the agency because they were doing well on their own.

The Alsea tribe was at Alsea Bay. They had never farmed before 1862, instead subsisting on their traditional foods. However, that year, Brooks helped them plant potatoes and turnips on the north end of the Yachats prairie (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess Doc 1:442-443, Serial 1157 Vol 2, July 20, 1862).

By October of that year, Linus Brooks had had enough of the Alsea Sub-Agency and asked to be relieved immediately from his duties at “that isolated place” (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:249, October 27, 1862). He was replaced by Amos Harvey (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:224, September 22, 1862).

The agency at Yachats was never well supplied by the government, and agriculture was not very rewarding, especially on the farm fields near the ocean. Several agents worked at the agency between 1862 and 1870, with the same complaints as always--little money and nonratification of the 1855 treaty. Samuel Case, agent in the early 1870's, felt that the Coos and Umpquas, the people who were at the farm near the ocean, ran away from the agency because of neglect, lack of attention, and lack of necessities (OSIA, Unregistered Letters, Roll 27, Doc 1, December 17, 1870).

The situation was so bad that, when Case left the service and George Litchfield took his place, he urged Litchfield in his report to the Commissioner to tell the true state of affairs. Case said that, in the previous three years, the Alsea Sub-Agency had received only a small number of "presents" to give to the people. If he had not used his own money, he would not have been able to carry on the affairs of the agency at all (OIA, Letters Received, M234:618, Frames 181-182, September 17, 1873).

In 1872, Case had written to Superintendent T.B. Odeneal that the people on the agency were doing better and farming was progressing. He said that the tribes had promised that, if the government would survey their land and give them good title to it, they would abandon their tribal customs and follow "our laws" (OSIA, Unregistered Letters, Roll 27, May 11, 1872).

Only a year later, however, the entire Oregon Superintendency was eliminated, and agents found themselves having to answer directly to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington, D.C. The Oregon Superintendency ceased to exist as of June 30, 1873 (OSIA, Unregistered Letters, Roll 27, June 10, 1873).



In September, Litchfield wrote to the Commissioner to explain the situation at the agency. He had only been appointed a Commissary and not an agent. Therefore, he had been given no money to run the agency (OIA, Letters Received, M234:618, Frames 184-185, September 22, 1873). He received no reply and wrote again in December stating that he had not received a dollar for his salary or for the agency. The crops at the agency had failed, and the people there were going to be destitute. He had no funds with which to pay the Indians who had worked on the farm or the settlers and businesses who had given him credit (OIA, Letters Received, M234:618, Frames 190-191, December 18, 1873).

As early as 1862, the Office of Indian Affairs had considered closing the Alsea Sub-Agency. Superintendent Rector asked for Siletz agent B.R. Biddle's opinion of removing the people from there and placing them with the tribes at Siletz. Biddle thought it was a good idea and wrote Rector with his reasons for thinking so (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 20, Doc 22, January 27, 1862). However, at that time, nothing was done to bring that about.

In 1875, by an act of Congress, the southern part of the Siletz Reservation and the entire Alsea Sub-Agency were thrown open to settlement after years of clamoring by settlers (Kappler, 1904:157). In addition to this section, the entire Tillamook area was taken away as well; the new reservation stopped at the Salmon River.

Therefore, in June, a council was held with the Alsea, Coos, Umpqua, and Siuslaw tribes in which Agents Litchfield and Fairchild explained the government's wishes to have them move and the advantages that would accrue to them if they did so. In his opening remarks, Litchfield (who was against their removal) said pointedly that he had been with

the people there for two years and had never promised anything “[...] unless I was going to be able to fulfill that promise--I will not now talk much but will let Mr. Fairchild talk to you [...].”

Fairchild told them that the Commissioner had directed him to tell them that it would be best for them to move at the present time since President Grant was more favorably disposed toward Indians than a future President might be. The tribes were told that they would have more advantages at Siletz such as a mill that was expected to be built that summer.

Chiefs from each tribe spoke, each saying that they and their people did not want to move:

William, an Alsea chief:

[...] This is our land--We live on our own land--Our children live there--If we die our children will get it--We have houses--There are two mills up the Alsea River--We bought our lumber there--We saw logs and take to the mills and thus get lumber for our houses--All our stock we keep on our own land [...].

Siuslaw John, Chief of the Siuslaws:

I do not know you Mr Fairchild--I know you Mr Litchfield--I will give you my mind--You understand our language--I will not talk much--Ever since you have been here I have talked to you--I have always wanted you to send my words to Washington--I do not want to hear any more about this thing--A long time I have heard it--I thought it was settled long ago--As long as I live on my land I am not sorry if I have nothing--My people have all the same mind as I have on this point--[...] I understand the Washington Chief [sic] wants to send us money--What for?--I know the mind of my people--they do not want money--It is long since we have had money and we no longer care for it--I have only a little place and no money, yet my heart is not sick--[...] At first, the whites promised many things--The people will never do again as they once did sell their land--If I was to talk many days I would say the same thing--Gen Palmer gave us this country and I will never give it up That is all.

Scott, Chief of Umpquas:

[...] I have long had a sick heart on account of Mr Fairchild coming to-day--[...] Today I am in good heart because I see my words written down--I don't want to do as Mr Fairchild advised--Perhaps the Great Chief [sic] will make us poor but we dont [sic] want to do this thing-- We dont [sic] want it even talked about--This was not always my country--I am a driven man--I will not give up my land on that account-- This is my country now and no one has any right here-- [...].

Coos Jeff, head man of the Coos:

[...] I was ashamed when one man said he "did not want to be driven like the Coos"--Yes it is like the whites had made us poor by driving us from our old country--I have a heavy heart on account of the treaty we made with Gen Palmer (unratified)-- We came a long distance from that country--It was not a small country we gave the whites--It was a large country--You see me Mr Fairchild to-day--You do not see me have much property--When we sold our land we never received any pay--You do not see me with team or wagon-- I do not owe anybody anything, but the Great Chief [sic] owes me a great deal for the Country we sold--We have left two Countries now-- I think on that account the Great Chief [sic] will not insist on our leaving this Country--We have not received much help, yet we do very well-- (OIA, Letters Received, M234:621, Frames 291-304, June 17, 1875).

In Fairchild's report of the council to Commissioner E.P. Smith, he wrote that he believed that, if the whole Alsea Reservation were open to settlement, there would be only about five claims taken in ten years by white settlers because of the lack of agricultural land. He gave several suggestions of how the people could be left there, and closed by saying:

I make these suggestions with extreme diffidence, as I do not forget that I once (before I had visited and talked with these Indians) held different opinions--Could their removal now be effected without trouble, it would doubtless be best for them in every point of view, but from their entire unanimity of sentiment, and strong feelings on the subject, I doubt the possibility of their peacable [sic] removal (OIA, Letters Received, M234: 621, Frame 289, June 21, 1875).

Without sending word back to the agents on any decisions made about the reservation, Commissioner Smith sent a letter to Benjamin Simpson (see Figure 5.13) appointing him to help Fairchild and Litchfield remove the tribes from Alsea and Tillamook. Simpson had been agent at the Siletz Reservation for a number of years and was, at that time, the state surveyor. According to the Commissioner, the people were not to be forced to move; nevertheless, they were to be made to understand that the only help they would receive from the government in the future would be in applying to keep their land under the Homestead Act. They, according to the letter, were to be assisted in that purpose (OIA, Letters Received, M234:621, Frames 548-553, July 17, 1875).

Therefore, on August 24th and 25th, Simpson met in council with the people on the reservation, along with Litchfield and M.N. Chapman who had been sent to represent Agent Fairchild. Litchfield was put in an awkward position because he had to try to explain to the people why there was a second council when the first council had been ignored. He told them that Simpson had not received his instructions in time to meet at the first council so had come alone to this one.

Simpson then proceeded to tell the people what the wishes of the government were concerning them:

[...] and urged upon them the necessity of complying, and also explained to them the Act of Congress under which they might take land, if they desired to withdraw from the immediate protection of the Government and endeavored to impress upon their minds the many disadvantages and annoyances that would probably attend them in case they chose to avail themselves of the latter privilege [...] (OIA, Letters Received, M234:621, Frame 672, August 27, 1875) .



**Figure 5.13** Benjamin Simpson, Agent at Coast Reservation  
1863-1871  
(Oregon Historical Society, Neg. no. Orhi 54771)

At this council, as at the previous council, all of the people expressed their desire to stay on their own land. This fact was ignored by Simpson who wrote a lengthy letter to U.S. Senator from Oregon, J.H. Mitchell. Mitchell was highly involved in having the Siletz Reservation, including the Alsea Sub-Agency, diminished in size. Simpson complained that Litchfield never should have been one of the commissioners since he was opposed to removing the tribes from the Alsea. Simpson, therefore, recommended that Agent Fairchild be directed to remove all of the government property from Alsea and Agent Litchfield ordered to the Siletz. In this way, he reasoned, the tribes would see that the government was serious.

Simpson's main concern was that there were poor settlers without land who would be glad to take the land and work it. In his mind, it was unfair that there were only about sixty or seventy Indians who controlled the Alsea River from its mouth to about twenty miles upriver. In all of that expanse, they had only put about five acres in cultivation. However, Simpson wanted it understood that he was not suggesting depriving the tribes of their rights. "They can be well provided for on Siletz Reservation with land and permanent homes, and they should be forced to take it and work it" (OIA, Letters Received, M234:621, frames 746-749, August 26, 1875).

In August, Litchfield wrote a private letter to the Commissioner in which he said that Simpson was no friend of the present Peace Policy. Litchfield wanted to take some of the department funds and go to Washington, D.C. to explain his views. He said that he could tell the Commissioner much about the dangerous opponents to the Indians in Oregon. "For an agent to express the situation of affairs adjoining the Reservation, in

relation to the Indians, his life would be almost in jeopardy--They consider that the Indian has no rights that they should respect [...]" (OIA, Letters Received, M234:621, Frames 672-675, August 27, 1875). He was not given permission to go to Washington.

An unsigned letter purported to be from Benjamin Simpson was sent to Litchfield in October in which he was told to turn over all of the government property and funds to the Siletz Agency. Litchfield requested word directly from the Commissioner on the actions he was to take and suggested that, judging from the tone of the letters that Simpson was sending to the newspapers, the Commissioner was misinformed about the willingness of the tribes to move from Alsea (OIA, Letters Received, M234:621, Frames 682-685, October 30, 1875).

Simpson went to Washington, D.C. in April, 1876, and, along with Senator Mitchell, obtained an order to have the people removed from the sub-agency. At that time, Simpson was reporting that the Alsea Indians had given their consent to move the previous summer (The Corvallis Gazette, April 7, 1876:2).

From all of the records that I have examined in the Indian Affairs materials, this was untrue. There was only one leader who was reported to have given his approval to moving and who thought his people might follow suit. In the spring of 1875, a head man of the Alseas, "John", visited Siletz and stated his opinion on the removal. According to Fairchild, when his people heard of what he did, they threatened to drive him away for selling out to "the Bostons." By the time the council was held in June, he had changed his mind (OIA, Letters Received, M234:621, Frame 287, June 21, 1875).

Litchfield was ordered to turn over the government property in September, 1876, to the agent at Siletz, who, by that time, was William Bagley. Fairchild had resigned. In the report of his trip to Alsea, Bagley described several villages that he saw there. He described the houses in the villages as being comfortably built, with those at Alsea built of lumber. All of the people from the villages had disappeared, apparently because they had heard he was coming. Bagley felt that the "intentions of the Government in regard to their removal have been misrepresented to them, and they did not want to se [sic] me (OIA, Letters Received, M234:622, Frames 466-468, September 15, 1876).

Because of a letter written by Bagley to the Commissioner in July stating the futility of moving the Alsea people until the new mills were completed, the order to discontinue the Alsea Agency was rescinded in a letter dated August 1, 1876. Litchfield and his interpreter were ordered to be paid (OIA, Letters Received, M234:622, Frames 833-834). Obviously, Bagley did not receive this letter until after the transfer had taken place. By that time, Litchfield had left the service and did not return.

By February, 1877, Bagley was reporting that credible sources were informing him that many of the Alsea people wanted to move to the mouth of the Siletz and Salmon Rivers (OIA, Letters Received, M234, 623, Frame 614, February 12, 1877). The Alsea people went to the Siletz to celebrate the 4th of July with the other tribes there in 1877. While there, at least according to Bagley, they developed a better impression of the Siletz and met with him on the 24th of July to make plans to move. They agreed to move under the following conditions:



That all property, including the stock, formerly belonging to the Alsea Agency should be given to them in severalty; that the expenses of removal of their goods and effects from Alsea to Yaquina Bay 15 miles, should be paid by me; also the expense of transportation across the portage from Depot Slough to this Agency a distance of six miles; that their ferriage accross [sic] Yaquina Bay also be paid by the Department; and subsistance [sic] furnished them while enroute (OIA, Letters Received, M234:624, Frames 581-583, August 4, 1877).

They were also to be allowed to choose their homesites themselves and the land be given to them in severalty at the pleasure of the government. They were to be on the same footing as the tribes already established on the Siletz with regard to supplies. Bagley moved them without direct authority from the Commissioner because he was afraid that some action on the part of lawless whites against the Indians might stir up a war as an excuse to exterminate all male Indians. There were rumors around the settler communities that all of the tribes of the West were going to rise up against them (OIA, Letters Received, M234:624, Frame 585, August 4, 1877).

Bagley, to his shock and dismay, was sent \$750.00 to remove the people from Alsea and settle them in their new homes:

[...] I respectfully ask if this means that I am expected with Seven Hundred and Fifty Dollars to remove the number of Indians indicated in distances varying from forty to Eighty miles transporting their goods and effects across two Bays and over heavy mountain roads Subsisting them while enroute, and then out of the Same fund pay for food, Clothing, blankets, and provide houses for their Shelter during the coming winter? If So I will Say that it will be impossible to do all this with the amount thus allowed for the purpose, and the only alternative will be to let them return to their former homes to hunt and fish for their subsistence. In many instances These Indians have left comfortable houses constructed by themselves from lumber picked up along the beach and gardens cleared of brush and brought under cultivation by their own labor, and it is but reasonable that they Should expect our Government to make them

at least as comfortable as they have been in their own country. [...] Without these supplies [previously asked for] these Indians must suffer with hunger and cold. In years past they have been promised many things which they have not received and though they are friendly now if not provided for this winter they might commit acts which would lead to hostilities with whites who now occupy their former homes ((OIA, Letters Received, M234:624, Frames 701-704, November 2, 1877)).

Part of the Alsea tribe went to the Siletz according to Bagley's census of 1877.

Some of the Alseas continued to live along the Alsea River for a number of years.

However, by 1879, most, if not all, were being pushed by "aggressive" settlers surrounding the reservation to leave their lands. In 1882, sixty-seven Alsea people were located on the Siletz Reservation (Schwartz, 1997:207-208).

Bagley wrote in his census report that the Siuslaws, Coos, and Umpquas were not at the Siletz and could not have been taken except at great expense to the government (OIA, Letters Received, M234:624, Frame 608, August 20, 1877). According to the 1878 census, no Siuslaw, Coos, or Umpqua people were on the reservation (OIA, Letters Received, M234:625, Frames 184-192, March 13, 1878). In November, Bagley wrote to the commissioner that he had plans to go down to the Siuslaw to help those who had stayed there and who had built houses and planted orchards and gardens. He wanted to make sure that they had taken their land according to the Homestead Law so they would not be cheated out of it. He hoped to persuade those who had not taken any land to come to the reservation (OIA, Letters Received, M234:625, Frames 429-430, November 8, 1878).

Leo J. Frachtenberg, who studied the Coos people, reported that, when the Yachats Agency closed, the Coos refused to go to Siletz. Instead they “emigrated in a body to the mouth of the Siuslaw river, where the majority of them are still living” (Frachtenberg, 1922:305).

The Dawes Act of 1887 (the allotment act which, ultimately, was disastrous for most of western Oregon Indians) provided for those Indians who were not living on a reservation as well as those who were. Those people not living on a reservation could take an allotment on public land not already appropriated, and some of the people who left the Alsea Reservation did so. Allotments were a positive step for some of the non-reservation people because they provided a real place to continue their traditions (Hall pers. comm., March 6, 2000).

## 6. UNSCRUPULOUS AGENTS?

Throughout the history of United States' involvement in Indian affairs, policy revolved around "civilizing" American Indians. In the early part of the 19th century, that policy came to mean that American Indians would be given land west of the Mississippi in which they would establish their own territory where they would be free of European American influence and could be educated to take their place in "mainstream" society. As the century wore on, however, it became clear to the U.S. government that the trans-Mississippi west was also going to be colonized by European Americans determined to have it. William Medill, Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1845 to 1849, expanded on the idea previously espoused by Commissioner Thomas Hartley Crawford seven years earlier. That plan was to divide Indian country into two large reservations or colonies to take the place of the Indian barrier. "This recommendation, first made public in the commissioner's report for 1848, stands out as a significant step in paving the way for a general reservation system" (Kvasnicka and Viola 1979:34).

By the early 1850's Indian departmental policy was firmly entrenched to include education, agricultural training, and religious training with the understood purpose of assimilating American Indians (Kvasnicka and Viola 1979:50). Commissioner George W. Manypenny, commissioner from 1853-1857, devised the policies with which the Coast Reservation tribes had to live. Those policies included annuities to be paid in stock, agricultural implements, and educational and moral training rather than cash. He also formulated the policy of allotment whereby tribal land could be subdivided and allotted to

individual Indians with “excess” land being sold off for the benefit of the tribes. In addition, he opted for larger annuities to be given over a shorter period of time instead of permanent annuities (Kvasnicka and Viola 1979:59-60).

From the 1850's through 1865, mostly through the influence of Charles E. Mix, chief clerk of the Indian Office (and often Acting Commissioner), government policy consisted of providing reservations where tribes would be allotted land for farming and where they could work on what was necessary to be assimilated into the dominant society. William P. Dole, commissioner from 1861-1865, pursued the idea that reservations were too large because they had been established when tribes still lived a seminomadic life. He decided that reservations needed to be reduced in size, and this became permanent policy (Kvasnicka and Viola 1979:90).

These policies that developed between 1848 and 1877 (agricultural training, reservation reduction) were put into practice in Oregon on the Coast Reservation. The Coast Reservation began its existence as a huge area of land but, as it became clear to settlers in the Willamette Valley that the coastal area would be valuable after all, pressure was applied to reduce its size. Because the Coast Reservation land was severely isolated and misunderstood in respect to its ability to produce certain types of food crops, farming was a disaster at first. In addition, Congress' unfamiliarity with Oregon and its view of Indian affairs as a “peripheral” issue (Kvasnicka and Viola 1979:83) caused great problems.

During Commissioner Dennis N. Cooley's term of office, 1865-1866, Congress was again too busy to be highly concerned with Indian affairs. Their work was tied up

with Reconstruction in the South. Shocked at the amount of corruption and waste in the Indian service, Cooley suggested that the reason for the number of people who wanted the job of Indian agent was not because of the pay, which was too low, but rather from the ability to profit from the service (Kvasnicka and Viola 1979:102). Cooley tried to push through badly needed changes (which required congressional action) concerning Indian agents such as increasing pay to get a better class of men to be agents, getting rid of corruption, and making it illegal for a relative of an agent to be in the Indian trade.

Congress ignored most of his reforms. He wrote in his annual report for 1866:

It does not seem a great task to attend to the business of directing the management of about three hundred thousand Indians; but when it is considered that those Indians are scattered over a continent, and divided into more than two hundred tribes, in charge of fourteen superintendents and some seventy agents, whose frequent reports and quarterly accounts are to be examined and adjusted; that no general rules can be adopted for the guidance of those officers, for the reason that the people under their charge are so different in habits, customs, manners, and organization...and that this office is called upon to protect the Indian, whether under treaty stipulations or roaming at will over wild hunting grounds, from abuse by unscrupulous whites, while at the same time it must concede every reasonable privilege to the spirit of enterprise and adventure which is pouring its hardy population into the western country; when these things are considered, the task assigned to this bureau will not seem so light as it is sometimes thought (quoted in Kvasnicka and Viola 1979:105).

Supervision of Indian affairs at both the national and territorial level was extremely politicized and quickly developed into a bureaucratic nightmare of political appointments and paper shuffling. At the local level were the Indian agents who, more likely than not, had been appointed as a favor or as a political appointment. Therefore, few agents had experience with Indian affairs other than, perhaps, having served in the southern or eastern

Oregon wars. Of the four agents who served at the Coast Reservation from 1856-1877, only two, Benjamin Biddle and Benjamin Simpson, had any known business experience. None had any experience dealing with governmental accountability.

T.W. Davenport, agent to the Umatilla Reservation in the 1860's, wrote in his memoir "Recollections of an Indian Agent" that he had been given no direction when he became agent:

Mr. Rector finished as he began, by saying, "I shall give you no written instructions as to the management of the agency and you will consider yourself free to use your own judgment." It may be well to state that I was at that time wholly unacquainted with the art and science of conducting an Indian agency...As to the method of keeping accounts with the Government I knew nothing (Davenport 1907:3).

Agents were required to take bids on goods purchased for the reservation. These, evidently, were not always taken following regulations to the letter. Davenport wrote that he started out his Indian agent career by trying to follow the regulations. They required an agent to advertise in the newspaper for bids or to go out personally to seek bids. He decided to go to Portland to get his bids, but, upon seeking a half dozen bids, he was met always with the same reply.

He was told to quit seeking bids because agents were all alike; he should go and purchase the goods where he wanted to and stop "humbugging." He, therefore, had a contract written up with the supplier of his choosing, enclosed a clipping from the newspaper showing the market costs for Portland, and sent both off to the Indian department. Since there were no objections, "I continued it to the end of the term." When Davenport asked one of the older merchants how he knew agents pilfered from the

government, he replied, "The agent at Warm Springs, at the Grande Ronde, at the Umatilla, at the Siletz does so, and I presume that the rest of them do the same" (Davenport, 1907:18-19).

Providing those goods and services on the Coast Reservation was a daunting task for the agents for several reasons. One major reason was the isolation of the reservation in the early years. Travel across the Coast Range was severely restricted during the difficult winter months, and entering Yaquina Bay was always a tricky proposition for even an experienced mariner. If the goods arrived by way of Yaquina Bay, there was a difficult pack trail that had to be negotiated to get the supplies to the Agency.

The lack of ratification of the Treaty of 1855 for the Coast Indians contributed perhaps the most to the difficult task of trying to provide goods and services. Because the treaty was unratified, appropriations were meant only for the tribes which had ratified treaties, most of whom were the Rogue River and Umpqua Indians. The rest of the tribes, the majority of people on the reservation, had to be provided for through a different fund. J. Ross Browne, a government agent sent to report on the state of Indian affairs in Oregon in the late 1850's, wrote of the injustice of the lack of treaty ratification:

Living on the same reservation, governed by the same agents, knowing no reason why any partiality should be shown to one tribe above another, it is not within the power of the superintendent to preserve order among them, and at the same time carry into effect the provisions of the existing treaties. The delivery of annuity goods to one tribe, and the non-delivery to another, would be a signal for an outbreak which no force at his command could suppress. Nor is this at all unreasonable. The whites are unable to justify any favoritism, and the Indians are fully aware of the fact, for they are sufficiently sagacious to understand the general principles of justice. It has been found necessary, therefore, to make presents to all Indians,



as far as practicable at the same time, under the heads of different funds. This has given rise to the inextricable confusion in the accounts (Browne 1858:37).

Added to this inability to provide fairly for all treaty participants was the delay in actually receiving annuity money. These delays caused agents not only to have to press suppliers continually to believe in the good credit of the United States government but also to be forced to pay higher prices than they would have had to if they had cash in hand.

During this period, legal tender notes were not trusted as much as gold was. Therefore, the notes were not accepted at face value and were subject to devaluation constantly. In spite of this, agents were expected to be frugal in all of their purchases.

In addition, often they were not allowed to buy some goods in Oregon, even though it would have been less expensive. Suppliers from the east coast were contracted to provide some of the goods. These goods were sometimes defective, but the agents were stuck with them. Returning the goods was not an option. The Indians were so destitute that defective supplies were better than no supplies.

Two of the agents during the time with which this study is concerned who were most controversial were Robert B. Metcalfe and Benjamin R. Biddle. They were both accused of having profited from their positions as agents and later spent a good deal of time working on clearing their names.

## **6.1 Robert B. Metcalfe**

### **6.1.1 *In Southern Oregon***

The earliest dated reference I found concerning Robert Metcalfe in regard to Indian Affairs in Oregon is in an 1853 newspaper article. Metcalfe and James Bruce had been sent by Joseph Lane to get Chiefs Sam and Jo to come to Table Rock as they had promised for treaty talks (Oregon Weekly Statesman, September 20, 1853:4). Despite much turmoil in southern Oregon, both came in and signed a treaty with Joseph Lane and others on September 10, 1853, relinquishing their traditional lands for a reservation at Table Rock. Metcalfe was present and signed the treaty. He also signed as interpreter on an amendment to the treaty on April 12, 1854 (Kappler, 1904:605).

The next reference to Metcalfe that I located was an affidavit claiming the value of his and others' property which was on the land appropriated for the Table Rock Reservation (OIA, Letters Received, M234:608, Frame 275, September 13, 1853). On July 30, 1854, and again in August, Metcalfe wrote to Palmer requesting payment for the value of his house in which he said Indians were living (OSIA, Letter Book D, Roll 5:16 and 28). He was also appointed to survey lands on the reservation in 1854 (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 14, Doc 391, April 5, 1855).

On February 10, 1855, Metcalfe wrote to Palmer that he had received an appointment to be sub-agent in place of William J. Martin, agent to the Umpquas. In the communication, Metcalfe was very concerned about the amount of money that he would

have available to him; he was only willing to take the job if he received horses, bed and board, and traveling expenses (OSIA, Letter Book D, Roll 5:141).

Palmer wrote back to Metcalfe, assuring him that his expenses would be taken care of, and Metcalfe accepted the job (OSIA, Letter Book D, Roll 5:168, March 28, 1855). In the same letter, Metcalfe wrote that he had had to leave the reserve to make some money to buy provisions but that he was now back on the reserve making fences and maintaining the wheat and potato crops. It appears that he was on the Table Rock Reserve because he was working with George Ambrose who was agent at Table Rock. He was still working at Table Rock in November, 1855, according to a letter from Ambrose to Palmer (OSIA, Letter Book D, Roll 5:371, November 22, 1855).

During this time many of the bands who were supposed to be at Table Rock had gone off into the mountains. By October, atrocities were being committed by both Indians and non-Indians, especially the volunteers. Ambrose, because of ill health, was asking to be removed from his agent's job (OSIA, Letter Book D, Roll 5:326, October 11, 1855), and William J. Martin, who had been asked by Palmer to again become agent, had refused the job because he had just been elected Major for his battalion of volunteers. He felt that the time had "passed for talking to Indians" (OSIA, Letter Book D, Roll 5:359, October 28, 1855).

Ambrose wrote to Palmer that those who had stayed on the Table Rock Reservation were inclined toward peace and had erected comfortable temporary housing for the winter. He said that they had an aversion to being removed from their native land,

but he was unsure what should be done with them (whether they should be moved). He said of Chief Sam, one of the principal chiefs on the reservation:

Sam [said] if fears were entertained of him to put a guard around him, or put him in the guardhouse; he would submit to any thing for the sake of peace for his people. They had at one time tried war, and were tired of it, had sought for peace, and made a treaty to obtain it, which treaty they ever intended to hold inviolate (OSIA, Letter Book D, Roll 5:382-383, November 30, 1855).

Sam's band, despite their desire to remain in southern Oregon, would soon be moved to the Grand Ronde. In several letters, Palmer expressed the opinion that those residing on Table Rock were not safe from other bands who were determined to live off the reservation and miners or settlers (OSIA, Letter Book D, Roll 5:335, November 12, 1855; December 1, 1855:375). Metcalfe arrived on December 2 with messages to Ambrose to start preparations to move the people at Table Rock (OSIA, Letter Book D, Roll 5:389, December 2, 1855). This move occurred in February, 1856.

### ***6.1.2 Moving the People North***

Metcalfe, along with Courtney Walker, was directed by Joel Palmer to go to the Umpqua Reservation to oversee the removal of the tribes there to the Grand Ronde. Metcalfe was to take the place of Theophilus Magruder who had been filling in for Martin. (OIA, Letters Received, M234:609, Frames 390-392, December 24, 1855). The Umpqua Reservation was in Cole's Valley (Beckham, 1986:97) on the mouth of Calapooya Creek (Bakken, 1969:92) near present-day Roseburg.

Earlier in December Palmer had made a trip to the Umpqua to make sure that his desire to have the tribes removed to the Grand Ronde was fulfilled. In his correspondence to Commissioner Manypenny, he described the condition of the people there:

We reached that point on the evening of the 17th where I found nearly three hundred Umpquas Calapooias Cow Creeks & Molallallas, under the charge of Theophilus Magruder Esq. who had been appointed by Mr Martin (designated by me as Local Agent who declined the appointment) and whose appointment had been approved by Agent Ambrose. The census of this camp gave 89 men, 133 women, 40 boys and 37 girls, many of whom were suffering from sickness, probably induced by a change in diet, being confined to flour and fresh beef, and exposure.

They had been hurried upon the reservation as a means of safety and deprived of their usually comfortable lodges and variety of roots, berries, and fish, and the crop of vegetables prepared by many for winter's use, were dying off rapidly. With a few exceptions, they were destitute of shoes or mockasins [sic], and many nearly in a state of nudity (OIA, Letters Received, M234:609, Frames 382-383, January 2, 1856).

Palmer had purchased several yokes of oxen for removing the tribes and directed Metcalfe to purchase more if necessary (OIA, Letters Received, M234:609, Frame 390, December 24, 1855). Metcalfe started out on January 11, 1856, with the Umpquas and others (Beckham, 1986: 103).

On January 16, Metcalfe sent a message to Palmer from a camp on Elk Creek in northern Douglas County (which Palmer describes as being at the southern base of the Calapooia Mountain) (OIA, Letters Received, M234:609, Frame 479, January 26, 1856). Metcalfe said that while he was stopped at Yoncalla across from Lindsay Applegate's place, the people refused to go on because local settlers, including Applegate, were telling them that they had rights and that the government was cruel to send them away. Metcalfe

requested a military force to make the travelers keep going and to keep anyone from harming them as they passed through the Willamette Valley (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 14, Doc 5, January 16, 1856).

Palmer sent a request to Fort Vancouver for 25 to 30 Dragoons or, if those could not be had, 50 infantry to come to Metcalfe's assistance (OSIA Letter Book E, Roll 6:20-21, January 21, 1856). None was forthcoming, and Metcalfe was left to his own devices to move the people forward to the Grand Ronde and protect them at the same time.

In the January 21 letter to Metcalfe, Palmer told him what he should tell the Indians to give them hope:

Say to those Indians that we are not going to take them into a wild wilderness, but to a country where they can be supplied with all the comforts of life, where there will be houses and fields and they will be protected and supplied with provisions, clothing, and those who wish employment will find plenty to do. Say to them that, if they desire peace and wish to receive my talk, and do what is right and be protected, that I shall expect them to come with you and see me as they have agreed to do.[...]Tell them also, that those persons who represent that our Chief is not pleased with my acts, are lying to them; that he does approve them, [...] (OSIA, Letter Book E, Roll 6:21, January 21, 1856).

Palmer wrote to Commissioner Manypenny that, because of decisions made by the legislative assembly, settlers were up in arms about the Indians moving to the Grand Ronde. The legislature was demanding that they be colonized somewhere other than at the Grand Ronde and threatening force if their wishes weren't carried out. Palmer told Manypenny that there were people "strolling about camp [who told the Indians] that the Supt would be removed and that if they proceeded to the reservation the whites would shoot them &c" (OIA, Letters Received, M234:609, Frames 479-480, January 26, 1856).

Through extremely difficult circumstances, the tribes made their way with Metcalfe up the Willamette Valley. Several people died, and many of the sick and elderly had difficulty walking. Heavy rain caused even more misery, making the roads nearly impassable. At Corvallis, some people gave the Indians liquor, causing more delays, and one man was murdered-by a Klickitat Indian named “Joe”, according to Metcalfe (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 14, Doc. 214, March 31, 1856). Metcalfe arrived with 380 people (OSIA, Letter Book E:33, February 11, 1856) at the Grand Ronde on February 2, 1856, with everyone in a state of terrible ill health (O’Donnell, 1991:251- 252).

Elisha Applegate, son of Lindsay Applegate, wrote years later about this period in southern Oregon Indian history:

Those exiles lined the roads and filled the byways for weeks before the last dispirited dweller of the forest had reached his new home. Day in and day out was heard the sad refrain in wild minor chords: “Ha-la we-yah” in tones of utter desolation. It was pitiful to see the children hanging to the mother’s bedraggled skirts as she labored along, the muddy roads forbidding over-loading the teams. They ought to have been treated better [...] All pity had been lost [...] (Applegate, 1988:282).

### 6.1.3 *On the Grand Ronde*

Joseph Jeffers, who had been hired by Joel Palmer to plant wheat and make other improvements on the Grand Ronde (O’Donnell, 1991:234), wrote to Palmer of the

Indians’ condition when they arrived:

[...]the umqua Indians [...] are suffering with the flux to an extent that it makes humanity shudder[...] those that are sick suffer with the cold at night a nuff [sic] to kill them we have made already three coffins for them and are now at a nother [sic][...] the suffering of this peopill [sic] hants [sic] me day and night (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 14, Doc. 46, February 7, 1856).

Jeffers reported in the same letter that Metcalfe had gone to Portland and he did not know where to write him about the condition of the Indians. When Metcalfe returned from Portland, he evidently stayed on the Grand Ronde until spring. Both Metcalfe and Jeffers resigned in April because of some problems at Grand Ronde and the poor pay.

It is somewhat unclear what the problems were, but they must have revolved around personal problems among the agents and problems that they were experiencing with the Rogue River Indians who refused to give up their weapons (OSIA, Letter Book E:116, April 14, 1856). However, Metcalfe was still on the reservation in May (O'Donnell, 1991:262).

Sometime in June, 1856, Palmer directed Metcalfe to go to the Rogue River valley to consult with Chiefs George and Limpy and to Illinois valley to talk with Chief John about coming to Port Orford in preparation for going to the Grand Ronde. (OIA, Letters Received, M234:609, Frames 783-804, July 3, 1856). Chiefs George and Limpy gave up in early June and Chief John at the end of the month.

In late June, Brigadier General John K. Lamerick of the Volunteers handed over 19 prisoners to Metcalfe at the Big Meadows (Oregon Statesman, July 22, 1856:2). The prisoners were turned over to Colonel Buchanan to be taken to Fort Orford for transport north (OIA, Letters Received, M234:609, Frames 783-804, July 3, 1856).

Metcalfe was still in southern Oregon at Umpqua City (which was on the west side of the Umpqua River in the same location as Fort Umpqua) (Beckham, 1986:108) in July, 1856. He wrote a letter to the Oregon Statesman about the end of the war in southern



Oregon and his opinion of Colonel Buchanan. He felt that the volunteers had acquitted themselves much more nobly than the regulars under Buchanan had (Oregon Statesman, August 12, 1856:1).

#### **6.1.4 *The Coast Reservation***

Metcalfe was on the Coast Reservation at the end of July. He was directed by Palmer to keep the Indians on the south side of the Siletz River's mouth in preparation for receiving supplies. He was to give each man a blanket, pair of pants and a flannel shirt. Each woman was to receive a blanket, linsey or calico dress, and three yards of sheeting. The boys and girls were to get whatever Metcalfe deemed necessary. Beef and flour were to be handed out as it was available.

Joel Palmer was unable to continue pursuing his ideas for the Coast Reservation as he was replaced as Superintendent by A.J. Hedges at the end of July (OSIA, Letter Book E, Roll 6:198-199, July 31, 1856). Palmer did not actually leave office until August 15 because of mail delays in notifying him of his dismissal (O'Donnell, 1991:278). The Willamette Valley settlers wanted him out of his position for several reasons, but mostly because he had continued to follow his policy of bringing the Indians north.

One of the other reasons, or perhaps, excuse, to seek Palmer's dismissal was that he was accused of being a Know-Nothing, a secret organization which sought the elimination of all foreign influence in the government. In addition, he was accused by Robert Metcalfe of having other Know-Nothings in his employ, including Courtney

Walker, a long-time Oregonian, who had been a special agent on the Coast Station when Metcalfe took over (Spaid, 1950: 234).

Walker wrote to Palmer from the Coast Station the following sympathetic letter:

[...] I am pleased, sir, very much pleased you do not come. Go home to your family, Seat yourself comfortably, Cross your legs, and thank Almighty God you are once more out of reach of the foul disgraceful slang of the many lick spittles of this damnable Oregon.

I hope to be at home soon. Believe me to be ever  
 Very truly Yours  
 C, M, Walker (MSS249)

On August 25, 1856, Metcalfe was appointed to be agent in place of R.R. Thompson, resigned. It is unclear why he was appointed to replace Thompson, who was agent in eastern Oregon. However, Superintendent Hedges sent notice to Manypenny of Metcalfe's \$10,000 bond and, in the same letter, said that Metcalfe had been assigned to the Coast Reservation (OIA, Letters Received, M234:609, Frame 193, November 11, 1856).

Hedges wrote to Manypenny in August that he had no funds at all for the Indians placed on the Coast Reservation to feed, clothe, or shelter them (OIA, Letters Received, M234:609, Frame 267, August 22, 1856). He wrote an interestingly understated, and (from descriptions given by Captain Augur as well as others), untrue observation to Manypenny in September, "I found the Indians in charge of Sub-Agent Metcalf to be apparently well satisfied except in being a little anxious to know what provision was being made for their shelter, sustenance, and clothing for the coming winter" (OIA, Letters Received, M234:609, Frame 273, September 6, 1856).

Metcalf's responsibilities for a time included the entire Coast Reservation. Hedges told him that, as soon as possible, he would place a sub-agent at Salmon River and would appoint [E.P.] Drew to be a sub-agent in charge of the tribes south of Yaquina Bay (OSIA, Letter Book E:255, November 10, 1856). Robert Shortess (1850) and W.W. Raymond (1853) were at Astoria District, which included tribes to the Salmon River.

Conditions were evidently grim on the reservation in March of 1857 just six months after Hedges had written that the Indians were satisfied but a "little" anxious. Metcalfe wrote to Hedges that the Indians were planning to leave the reservation within a few days, and no words could persuade them otherwise. About the condition of the Indians, he wrote, "The Schooner has not been seen yet and our condition is truly distressing hunger and starvation is the [unreadable] on every side" (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 15, Doc 78, March 13, 1857).

Metcalf's tenure as agent on the Coast Reservation was fraught with difficulties, some exacerbated by his own actions. One problem that he brought on himself was hiring men to serve on the reservation who had been involved in the recent war in southern Oregon. Some of those men were James Bruce, L.B. Munson, James Cluggage, John K. Lamerick, William H. Packwood, and Relf Bledsoe, well-known figures in the war (House Ex Doc 35 Cong 1 Sess Doc 93:58-64, Serial 957: Vol 11). Lieutenant Philip Sheridan confirmed this in a letter to Augur:

[...]the agent, Mr. Metcalf, has surrounded himself with employees who were engaged in hostilities with them in the lower country and who do not hesitate to express the most improper and hostile language towards them (Record Group 98, A55-Dept. of the Pacific, 1856: April 13, 1857).

### 6.1.5 *Problems With the Military*

Metcalf also had his difficulties with the military. It appears that there were some conflicts between the military and the Indian department concerning control of the reservation (Browne, 1858:47). One of the problems concerned the placement of the military blockhouse in relation to the Indian agency. The military built the blockhouse first, and then Metcalfe located the agency "some twelve miles below the point selected for the military post and where the Blockhouse is erected" (FHLB, February 16, 1857).

In a letter to Major Mackall, Assistant Adjutant General for the Department of the Pacific, Captain Augur complained about Metcalfe's decision to locate the Agency so far from the blockhouse:

Mr. Metcalf's complaints of the apprehension of his employees should attach to himself; and arise from his having located his agency so far away from the military post. When about locating it, I suggested that he should do so in the same prairie with the post, as there would undoubtedly be times when its protection would be required by the Agents and employees. I am informed by a credible person that the reason assigned the Superintendent for locating where he did was to get away from the post, and now he requests a force to be kept there to allay the apprehensions of his employees. There is no reason connected with the good of the Service, in my opinion, why the Agency should be at its present location and certainly no good reason why Government should be put to the trouble and expense of keeping a separate post there to gratify Mr. Metcalf's fancy, for retaining his agency there (FHLB, April 20, 1857).

In a letter to Relf Bledsoe who was acting as agent in Metcalfe's absence, Augur conceded that he would probably have to move the blockhouse because a new superintendent had taken over. He said that the blockhouse location had met with former superintendent Palmer's complete approval (FHLB, April 27, 1857).

According to Augur, the blockhouse had been built for two reasons at the most convenient place that would connect with the trail from Fort Hoskins: because the pass to the settlements in the Willamette Valley needed to be protected and because supplies would most likely be brought from the Willamette Valley to the agency; “the project for supplying them by sea has been disastrous in every way, whatever may have been the motive that led to its adoption” (FHLB, March 10, 1857). Metcalfe felt that the agency was better located closer to the Yaquina to more readily obtain supplies brought by sea because the route from the Willamette Valley was treacherous and often impassable during the winter months. Augur was finally forced to give in and float the blockhouse down the Siletz to the same location as the agency.

Another conflict Metcalfe had with the military was concerned with disarming the Indians. Lieutenant Philip Sheridan, who was stationed briefly at Fort Hoskins, was directed by Captain Augur to go to Yaquina Bay to move a group of 1100 Indians to the Siletz. When Sheridan met with Metcalfe before going to the Yaquina, Metcalfe told him that he could not receive the Indians at the Siletz until the schooner arrived. According to Sheridan, after the schooner arrived with supplies, he had a talk with the chiefs, and the chiefs agreed to go to the Siletz and consider it their home from then on. He promised the chiefs that they could keep the few guns they possessed to use for hunting on the reservation (Record Group 98, A55-Department of the Pacific, April 13, 1857).

When the Indians arrived at the agency, Metcalfe insisted that they give up all of their weapons. He applied to Sheridan to obtain a detachment to help disarm them, but Sheridan refused. Upon this refusal, Sheridan said that Metcalfe “armed four or five of his

employees, called a council of the chiefs, spoke to them in an inflammatory and hostile manner, and finally told them that he would go and bring my command up”[...] (RG98, A55-Department of the Pacific, 1856: April 15, 1857).

The next day, Metcalfe, according to Sheridan, said that it was his intention not to issue any more rations until the Indians did what he said. Hunger would compel them to obey, and then he would “pitch into them and kill as many as he could-that he, at least, had three or four men who would stand by him until they were all killed” (RG98, A55-Department of the Pacific, 1856: April 15, 1857).

J. Ross Browne wrote of the conflict between the military and the Indian Department in his report on Indian Affairs in Oregon and Washington Territories:

The whole quarrel seems to have arisen from a prevailing jealousy between the civil and military authorities as to the control of the reservations. The agents being responsible for the maintenance of peace among the Indians under their charge, and the security of the lives of the employes, I consider that the officers of the army have no right to interfere, unless called upon, and I can see nothing to disapprove in the course pursued (Browne 1858:47).

Metcalfe demanded the guns probably because of some previous incidents concerning his employees and Indians while he and Relf Bledsoe were away at Fort Yamhill in late January or early February, 1857. According to Captain Augur, two Indian Department employees came to him on February 3 to report that some of the employees had been taken hostage by the Indians. They reported that Metcalfe had been gone for a long time, and, during that time, there had been several difficulties between Indians and employees.

An Indian had gone into the kitchen of the employees' house and refused to leave. The cook drew his pistol and tried to shoot the man, but the gun would not work. He then struck him over the head with the gun and killed him. Upon this turn of events, the Indians rushed into the house and took the employees hostage.

After some talk, the Indians told the cook that if he would pay two hundred dollars, they would release him. Because the cook told them that he would have to go get the money from others, the Indians let him go but refused to let the other men go with him. When the cook told the employees outside the house what had happened, they all took refuge in the blockhouse. Augur intended to have the cook arrested until he could get to the bottom of what happened (FHLB, February 3, 1857). A subsequent letter from Augur informed Major Mackall that the affair had been settled "amicably" (FHLB, February 16, 1857).

#### ***6.1.6 Severity of Problems on the Coast Reservation***

Metcalf's problems were not all of his making. First of all, the Coast Reservation was a new reservation in an isolated location. In addition, the 1855 Coast Treaty, which was intended to supply the needs of the people on the reservation, was never ratified, and there was never enough money to fulfill even basic necessities, much less all of the treaty promises. Most of the people on the reservation were those who had signed the Coast Treaty. Finally, many of the Indians on the Coast Reservation were those who had fought against the advance of settlers in southern Oregon and who had fought to the end to avoid going to a reservation.

Because the reservation was so isolated, supplying it was a never-ending problem. The road from Kings Valley to the agency was impassable most of the winter. This road had been hacked out of the forest by Philip Sheridan and other soldiers from Fort Hoskins. They had to cut and burn huge logs that had fallen one on top of the other over the years; the soldiers, then, had to try to move them out of the way. Sheridan took an ox team and wagon across the road once and left it permanently at the blockhouse because traveling with it had been nearly impossible (Sheridan 1888:95-97). Captain C.C. Augur, commander at Fort Hoskins, reported that rain had caused the streams to rise and wash away portions of the road (Fort Hoskins Letter Book, October 21, 1856). In addition to the poor road condition, the Coast Range was usually inundated with rain, and snowstorms were common at higher elevations. Travelers who made it across the mountains often had to ford high, fast-moving streams.

Frequent storms on the Pacific and distrust of the government kept schooners from reaching Yaquina Bay. If schooners made it to Yaquina Bay, they often could not go in. At other times, owners refused to take their ships out of the Columbia River because it has a difficult and dangerous bar to cross. Some suppliers refused to bring goods to the Yaquina for fear of never being paid by the government or having to wait for years.

Shelter, which should have been prepared before the tribes were brought to the reservation, was completely inadequate the first winter. The records are confusing on this matter. Dr. Rodney Glisan, an army physician, wrote in his memoir that those people who were encamped on the coast at the mouth of the Salmon River and others who were near Grand Ronde were supplied with tents for the winter (Glisan, 1874:372). However, J.



Ross Browne wrote in his report that, when Metcalfe reached the reservation, neither tents nor buildings were available (Browne, 1858:40). Superintendent Absolom Hedges wrote to Commissioner Manypenny that workers were busy preparing houses for the Indians when he visited in late August and early September, 1856 (OIA, Letters Received, M234:609, Frame 273, September 6, 1856).

A memo in the Fort Yamhill Letter Book mentions that 20 men from Fort Yamhill were stationed at the coast to keep peace and construct houses for the people (FYLB, October 20, 1856). Metcalfe wrote in his first report (a year after the first arrivals on the reservation) that he would have log cabins erected for the Indians because the winters were too severe for them to live in tents (House Ex Doc 35 Cong 1 Sess Doc 2:646, Serial 942 Vol 2, July 15, 1857). It can be seen from the records of the time that it is unclear what kinds of accommodations were available for the people that first winter.

When J. Ross Browne visited the Siletz in 1857, he saw about 27 houses for Indians and timber and boards for thirty more (Browne 1858:43). Historian E. A. Schwartz estimates that, if there were 27 houses, there were approximately 36 people per house, using the figure of 2,049 people reported by Metcalfe to be on the reservation in July, 1857 (Schwartz 1997:167).

Conditions on the Coast Reservation were much more extreme than on the Grand Ronde. The Grand Ronde location had been purchased from settlers who had already cleared fields and built houses and outbuildings. The Coast Reservation was a true wilderness, not in any way an area easily farmed or supplied, and game and salmon were not always readily available. Metcalfe described it in his first annual report:

[...]eight hundred [square miles] are so mountainous and destitute of vegetation that animals cannot subsist thereon, and even mountain goats would perish with hunger. The remaining two hundred square miles embrace much valuable land and timber. In the northern portion of the district the mountains are covered with green fir timber, and abound with elk and deer, whilst the middle and southern portions present a most gloomy prospect. It is the most rugged country I have ever seen, presenting one continued range of high sharp mountains and deep canons, covered with immense forests of dead timber, a portion of which has fallen in all directions, and grown over with vines and underbrush, so that it is impossible for either man or beast to travel them (House Ex Doc 35 Cong 1 Sess Doc 2:644 Serial 942 Vol 2, July 15, 1857).

In his second annual report, Metcalfe reported that the wild game which had been “tolerably abundant” last year had all been driven back to the high mountains, and the salmon did not run up the streams in the district. The people had little food except that supplied by the government (House Ex Doc 35 Cong 2 Sess Doc 2:503 Serial 997 Vol 2, July 27, 1858).

In addition to the isolation of the reservation, Metcalfe’s hands were tied because the Coast Treaty was not ratified. This meant that he had to use whichever funds were available under different headings, usually under “removal and subsistence of Indians.” These funds fell far short of the amounts actually needed to keep the people in good health. As an illustration of the lack of funds caused not only by nonratification of the Coast Treaty but also by Congress’ inattention to sending on the appropriations already specified, Superintendent J.W. Nesmith wrote a lengthy letter to Commissioner Denver in December, 1857.

In his letter he told of the cost of rations supplied to 3939 Indians west of the Cascades and compared that amount to the deficiencies in the funds for the Indian

Department in Oregon. Bulk beef could be had for nine cents per pound and bulk flour for eight cents per pound. Thus the cost of daily rations per person was 17 cents, which added up to \$669.63 per day. Nesmith said that for the last three quarters of 1857, this added up to \$183,478.62. The cost of employees alone for those quarters was \$29,166.67, leaving a deficiency in the subsistence account of \$154,311.95, which was the approximate actual deficiency.

By reference to my annual report, and the various contracts which I have forwarded to you, you will perceive that you have had all the data from which the above computations are made, in your office, without taking steps to meet the deficiency which has destroyed the credit and paralysed the efficiency of the Department here. [...] (OSIA, Letter Book F, Roll 7:146, December 24, 1857).

In the same letter, Nesmith warned of the probable outbreak of the Indians from the Coast Reservation because of their present destitute condition and enclosed a letter from Metcalfe to that effect. He said of Metcalfe that he is “a man not likely to be daunted by impending danger, and the fact of his mentioning it is certain evidence of its reality.”

Because the Coast Reservation was so isolated, most of the bands who had fought during the Rogue River Wars were placed there. This added to Metcalfe’s problems because groups constantly left the reservation to go home and had to be rounded up and brought back. While they were on the reservation, they often were hostile and did whatever they could to let Metcalfe know they were not going to be passive while restrained there.

On December 10, 1857, Metcalfe wrote to Nesmith that there was much excitement on the reservation; “for the last six or eight days the war dance and war hoop [sic] can be heard at all times-day or night, shooting arrows into our houses, and burning our fences.” He indicated that the Indians did not hesitate to tell him that they planned to kill him the first chance they got so they could go back to Rogue River (OIA, Letters Received, M234:611, Frame 254). These incidents occurred after Tyee John’s son, “Cultus” Jim, was killed but before John was arrested and sent to Alcatraz.

After Christmas that same year, Metcalfe wrote to Nesmith of other trials he was experiencing:

Christmas has come and gone without finding its way to our forsaken portion of the world, but I console myself with the idea that there are better times coming; everything is [unreadable] quiet here except the the [sic] occasional fights amongst the Indians in which they kill about one every week, and now and then amuse themselves shooting arrows into our stock this morning one of my cows had two arrows sticking in her side. (About three in [inches] deep.) Burning my garden fences about twice a week is a favourite amusement with them, but these are small annoyances which I have learned to look over, not being able to help myself [...] (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 15, Doc 325, December 26, 1857).

In Metcalfe’s final annual report before he left the agency, he enumerated his ideas for the improvement of the reservation. One of his observations, which was a common theory of the time, concerned the method that should be used to insure the civilization of the Indians. He suggested that all children over the age of three and under ten should be placed on a separate reservation; the other Indians would never be allowed to see them again. Without doing this, he said, “failing to make some such disposition of the children, their ultimate civilization, in my opinion, is hopeless. Their parents will never fail to make

more heathen impressions upon their youthful minds in one day than can be erased in a month” (Senate Ex Doc, 36 Cong 1 Sess Doc 2:794 Serial 1023 Vol 2, July 8, 1859).

Metcalfé’s attitude toward the Indians was a mixture of admiration for their abilities to learn “white ways” and disdain for their beliefs. In his first report, he said that they were generally industrious and learned very quickly. He had them working to make all of the items needed for life on the reservation “in which many of them are doing better service than one-half of the white men I have had employed” (House Ex Doc 35 Cong 1 Sess Doc 2:645 Serial 942 Vol 2, July 15, 1857).

He recognized their humanness but, at the same time, felt that what the government was doing was the right thing:

They all express a strong desire to return to their native country, and appear to have a superstitious awe of having their bodies buried in a foreign land. Many of the more sensitive have died from a depression of spirits, having failed in the last desperate struggle to regain their country, where they once roamed free as air, unmolested by the white man, and knew no bounds to their liberties and savage ambition. [...] The zeal which their [the children’s] parents manifest in their education, and the aptness of the children to learn, induces me to believe something can be done with these people if properly managed (645-646).

### **6.1.7 *Accusations***

Metcalfé is probably best remembered for others’ accusations that he absconded with \$40,000 of Indian appropriation money when he left the service in 1859 (Victor, 1894:416). T.B. Odeneal, who was superintendent for Oregon in 1873, accused him of taking even more than \$40,000:

During the first four or five years [of the reservation's existence], the appropriations were much more liberal, but the Agent, Robert Metcalf, received about all the benefits that could be derived from them, and took away with him some sixty thousand dollars of the amount, in 1861, when he went to join the rebel army in Texas (OIA, Letters Received, M234: 618, Frame 461, January 27, 1873).

Metcalf went to Washington, D.C. to settle his accounts in 1860 after he left the service. He wrote letters to E.R. Geary, Superintendent for Oregon, to get copies of vouchers that the Treasury Department did not have in Washington and discovered in his own papers receipts and vouchers that were missing at the Treasury. Having seen a report in several papers that he had defaulted for a large amount of money while acting as Indian agent and wanting to set the record straight, he wrote to the editor of the Oregon Weekly Union in Corvallis. He enclosed a letter from the second auditor of the Treasury:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,  
SECOND AUDITOR'S OFFICE  
15th December, 1860

Sir.--Your account as late Indian Agent, has this day been settled and the sum of \$122368. passed to your credit,--it being the amount suspended for want of appropriation--leaving a balance due you of \$534.07.

Very respectfully your obt. Servant  
T.J.D. Fuller  
Second Auditor

R.B. Metcalf  
Late Indian Agent (March 30, 1861:3)

### **6.1.8 *Delegate to the Democratic Convention***

When Metcalfe left the service, he was ill and went to Portland to recuperate. While there, someone wrote to the Oregon Weekly Union that Metcalfe would be a good delegate to the Charleston Democratic convention for President (Oregon Weekly Union, August 20, 1859:2). He was a delegate from Oregon at the convention even though he

had moved to Texas by then. When the Douglas platform was adopted by the convention, the pro-slavery wing of the party left and initiated their own convention at Baltimore. The Oregon delegation joined the secessionists, but, by that time, Metcalfe had evidently left the convention because a man named H.R. Crosbie had taken his place. Metcalfe went on to become a lieutenant in the Confederate Army (Woodward, 1911:175-177).

### **6.1.9 Conclusion**

I believe that Frances Fuller Victor was incorrect in writing that Metcalfe left the service \$40,000 richer. She probably got this idea from Superintendent Rector's letter of 1863 to Commissioner Dole in which he said that Metcalfe had left the service \$41,000.00 richer on a salary of \$1500.00 per year (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:298, January 23, 1863). He gave no hint of his reason for saying this.

It was a common assumption among many at the time that agents stole from the Indians and, thus, from the government. I have found little evidence of Metcalfe's participation in this in my research. There are several methods Metcalfe could have used to pilfer from government funds. I will discuss these individually.

The first plan he could have used would have been to charge more than he should have by having the vouchers signed before he filled in the amount of purchase. This is highly unlikely because settlers were very interested in getting the proper amount of money for their goods. Suppliers were given copies of the vouchers, and they would have had to match. He could have cheated, perhaps, with those Indians who were paid for

services if they did not understand what they were signing. Since most Indians did not write English at the time, they usually made an X mark which could have been easily forged as well. However, the amount paid to Indian laborers was relatively small.

Secondly, Metcalfe could have conspired with others to charge more than the going rate for goods and services and then divide the profits. I doubt if this occurred to any extent because of the length of time required for anyone to be paid. People often bought and sold these vouchers so that the vouchers ended up in different hands. Metcalfe would not have received his part of the profit without creating a scandal. There is no evidence that I have found in the Office of Indian Affairs records to support this view.

Metcalfe could have falsified names by writing out vouchers for materials not received. However, if he had done that, he surely would have been found out in C.H. Mott's audit because the money from each voucher had to be paid to the original holder and attested to by two witnesses.

Finally, a common assumption is that agents sold government goods to Indians rather than giving the goods to them. Several lists of goods purchased for the sutler's store on the reservation which was owned by Relf Bledsoe have survived in the records. One of the lists notes that these supplies had been purchased from a local citizen, albeit from one of Bledsoe's bondsmen, Nat H. Lane, son of Joseph Lane. Bondsmen were required to swear that they had enough money, less all of their debts, to cover the bond of the person in question. In this case, the bond was \$5,000.00. The bondsmen were Nat H. Lane and George E. Cole, a respected Corvallis merchant. Bledsoe and the others had to



swear that they would uphold all of the rules and regulations “of trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and in no respect violate the same” (OSIA, Miscellaneous Loose Papers, Roll 30, March 13, 1858). The amount of money required to be sworn to was a large amount for the time and would not have been pledged without thought.

In Metcalfe’s correspondence to his superiors, there are frequent reminders to pay his bills or to have his accounts reviewed for correctness. I did not find that to be the case with the other agents from this period, 1856-1877. Metcalfe was rarely reprimanded for having turned in his accounts late or having made mistakes whereas some of the other agents were reprimanded.

One disadvantage I found in my research is the apparent lack of records documenting the amount of money given to Metcalfe (and other agents) and disbursed by him. I could not locate any records for the period of January, 1857 to May, 1858, and other records were not consistently kept.

I believe that Metcalfe probably did the best he could under extremely trying circumstances. He was, unfortunately, influenced, along with most non-Indians of that time, by the ethnocentric idea that Indian peoples needed to be “civilized” for their own good, and the use of force was permissible to accomplish that goal. There were few people who thought otherwise, if they thought about American Indians at all. Metcalfe was a product of that era in which European Americans believed that it was their manifest duty and destiny to spread their ideas to every corner.


## 6.2 Benjamin R. Biddle

Benjamin Robert Biddle (see Figure 6.1) came to Oregon with his family in 1852 from Springfield, Illinois, where he worked as a tailor and was a friend of Abraham Lincoln. Earlier, in 1849, he had left his family in Illinois and had gone to the gold fields in northern California. While in California he made a trip to Oregon where his sister, Harriet Campbell, lived and decided to bring his family there. He and his family packed up and came to Oregon in 1852 in time to get a free homestead of 320 acres northwest of Corvallis. The site is now part of Oregon State University's Oak Creek Laboratory of Biology in McDonald Forest (Munford and Moore, 1982: 12-13).

In addition to claiming a homesite, B.R. Biddle, known to his family as Robert, purchased a number of lots in Corvallis for speculation and built a home which still stands on the corner of 6th and Harrison in Corvallis. Biddle and his wife, Maria, had the distinction of having the first deed recorded in Benton County in 1854 (Bancroft, 1886: 387).

As soon as he arrived in Benton County, Biddle began a real estate and insurance business while still living on his claim northwest of town (Leithold, 1944:137). He was also clerk in Benton County from 1853-1855 and auditor for the county in 1855 (Fagan, 1885:392).

According to his great-granddaughter, Esther Moreland Leithold, after the death of his son Henry in 1858, Biddle took his family for a camping trip over to Yaquina Bay. While there, he became determined to have some of the property along the bay (even though this was still part of the Coast Reservation) (Leithold, 1944:145-146).



**Figure 6.1** Benjamin Robert Biddle, Siletz Reservation Agent  
1861-1862  
(Leithold, 1994:33)

In 1860, William H. Barnhart, who was the husband of Biddle's niece, Mary Campbell, was appointed Indian Agent at the Umatilla Reservation. He told Biddle about the bad conditions on the Coast Reservation. According to Leithold, Biddle was sure that he could do better than the others had done and applied for the position of agent (Leithold, 1944:154). However there might have been other motivations as well. Because two of Biddle's much-loved sons had recently died (Robert died in 1859), it is possible that he chose to do something different to get his mind off their deaths. It also might have been the opportunity to become more familiar with the area in order to further his chances of acquiring some of the land around Yaquina Bay.

#### **6.2.1 *Agent at the Coast Reservation***

Biddle was notified by mail from Superintendent William H. Rector on September 24, 1861, that he would be the next Indian agent at the Siletz Reservation, replacing Daniel Newcomb. At that time Biddle was told that appropriations were very limited for the year, and he needed to exercise thrift in requesting supplies for the Indians in his charge (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:36-37).

When Biddle took over the agency in October, conditions were very poor. Captain Frederick T. Dent, commander at Fort Hoskins, wrote to Rector on September 30, 1861, soon after Biddle was appointed, that he had sent troops after some Indians who had gone back to the Rogue River country. The Indians remaining on the reservation had told him that the reason people were leaving was because they did not have food or clothing, and they would not get any if they stayed on the reservation. Dent said that

farming was an “utter failure” on the reserve, and the “grain produced is of such inferior quality as to be almost useless” (OIA, Letters Received, M234:612, Frames 1122-1123, September 30, 1861).

Biddle reported in his first annual report that when he took over in October, 1861, “everything was in the utmost confusion”, fences were broken down, buildings were badly in need of repair, and the Indians were “generally destitute of clothing, dissatisfied, and disposed to be hostile.” He said that food was in short supply because Daniel Newcomb had misrepresented the amount of potatoes and grain available when Newcomb handed over the books to him (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess Doc 1:419 Serial 1157 Vol 2 August 13, 1862).

Thus began B.R. Biddle’s tenure as agent at the Siletz. Biddle took over on October 1, and Superintendent Rector wrote to him on October 9 that Biddle should send him a list of absolute necessities for the destitute Indians on the Siletz and “we will try to procure them on the credit of the Government” [sic] (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:44, October 9, 1861). According to Rector, no funds had been received yet for the Indian Service in Oregon for that period. Biddle received thirty-five tons of supplies via the sloop Fanny on November 19th, 1861, according to a letter from Rector to Commissioner Dole (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frame 377, June 7, 1862). Indian women reportedly packed much of it on their backs six miles mostly uphill from the Depot on Yaquina Bay to the agency. They received a pint of flour for the effort.

The winter of 1861-62 was a harsh one throughout Oregon but especially for those on the Coast Reservation. According to reports, Rector’s included, the rains began in

October or November and continued throughout the winter, causing widespread flooding. In addition to the rain, the weather on the coast was extremely cold with the result that a large portion of the potato crop, which was supposed to be the mainstay of the diet on the reservation, remained in the fields. According to the Oregon Statesman, from October, 1861 through March, 1862, there were upwards of 70 inches of rain in the valley. In December, the rains turned to snow (Oregon Statesman, January 19, 1969:30).

Superintendent Rector wrote to James Nesmith in January, 1862, that the rain and snow that winter were unbelievable:

The entire Pacifick coast [sic] has underwent [sic] a deluge such as has never occurred [sic] since the days of Noah [...] And now there is snow on the ground and has been for the last twenty days [...] The Columbia is frozen and likely to remain so for some time [...] (MSS 577 Box 2 File 2/23 Oregon Historical Society, January 26, 1862).

Two men who worked upon the reservation also reported the state of the weather that winter. One of the men, James Miller, swore in an affidavit in support of Biddle's ability as agent, that he had been a farmer in Oregon since 1851 and had never had trouble drying and storing potatoes until the winter of 1861-62. He said that the rains started early in October and continued until the 20th of December when it snowed and everything froze. The weather continued to be very cold until the first part of March, 1862 (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 81-82, October 25, 1862).

The other man, George W. Bethers, Superintendent of Farming on the reservation, swore in an affidavit that the rains commenced about the 28th of October and continued until the 25th of December when it started to snow and freeze. He reiterated what Miller

had said, that the weather continued to be very cold until the first part of March, 1862 (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 85-86, November 4, 1862). Because of a charge of malfeasance in office which was pressed against Biddle early in 1862, these weather reports became important in explaining the fallacious character of several of the accusations.

Besides problems with food and clothing supplies, Biddle had difficulties with some of the employees. In his first report he said that, because he had had to turn away a number of prospective job seekers, he had been subject to false accusations by those who did not receive jobs. In addition, according to Biddle, some of those that he did hire were more interested in furthering their own financial interests than in doing the agency work. Three of those who caused problems on the reservation, according to Biddle, were the blacksmith, the packer (Frank Cooper), and the physician (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess Doc 1:417-418 Serial 1157 Vol 2, August 13, 1862). The blacksmith's shop was burned in December, causing loss of all the carpenter's tools and farming equipment that were in there at the time. Biddle suspected Frank Cooper and the blacksmith of having a hand in the fire (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess Doc 1:419 Serial 1157 Vol 2, August 13, 1862). No one was ever charged in the matter, however (Leithold, 1944:156).

### **6.2.2 *Accusations of Fraud***

By March, Biddle's troubles began in earnest with an affidavit sworn to by the packer, Frank Cooper, that Biddle had cheated him and had defrauded the government in several ways. When Biddle reported the blacksmith shop fire to Rector, he enclosed with

his official letter a private letter addressed to "Friend Rector." Written in a conversational tone, Biddle asked for chairs, mattress, bedstead, and other items "which will add very much to my comfort. My friend Thomas [probably clerk Patton] will feel for me, I know" (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 20, Doc 8, November 20, 1861).

It appears that, until March, there had been no bad feelings between Rector and Biddle. Rector had written a letter to Biddle in February asking for his opinion on making a better road between Yaquina Bay and the Agency (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 268-271, February 18, 1862). He had also written several letters to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs previous to March about various ideas he had for the reservation with no mention of a problem with Biddle.

Rector, in addition, wrote a letter to Commissioner Dole about problems Biddle was having on the reservation with Indians who were determined to leave. He wrote, "This [outbreak] has been anticipated by this office for some time past, and the attention of the Department has been repeatedly called to it, both by my predecessor and myself" (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613 Frame 99, February 10, 1862). There was no mention of blaming the problem on Biddle.

In April, Biddle was charged with malfeasance in office by Superintendent Rector (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 69-70, April 19, 1862). One of the things Rector accused Biddle of was contracting with Frank Cooper to pack articles to the Siletz from Corvallis and Yaquina Bay, charging the government certain prices and then promising to give half of the money received to Cooper. Cooper, in addition, said in his affidavit that Biddle had required him to sign blank vouchers, saying that he needed to do



so to receive his pay. He also accused the agent of using mules from the agency and Fort Hoskins and then charging the government for their use (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 390-393, March 26, 1862).

According to Biddle's statement in reply to these charges, all of these accusations were false (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 71-80, November 14, 1862) . Biddle had purchased a pack train with his own money because the Indian department had no pack animals at the time, and it had been impossible to contract for a pack train except at exorbitant prices. All of the trains were at the northern mines. He hired Frank Cooper on a separate private contract to pack Biddle's personal items as well as items for the reservation and for the employees. Because it was "irregular" for an agent to hire himself to work for the service, Biddle had Cooper sign the vouchers, according to Biddle's testimony, so that Biddle's own name did not appear. Biddle swore that the vouchers had been completely filled in before he asked Cooper to sign them and that Cooper had agreed completely to the arrangements.

By Biddle's testimony, there were precedents, not only for owning an interest in a pack train but also for the amount charged for packing. He said that Robert Metcalfe and Daniel Newcomb had interests in pack trains which had supplied the reservation previously; Biddle had only charged what Newcomb had for similar services. In addition, he wrote that Rector himself had had an interest in a pack train run by Martin Newcomb which had brought supplies to the Siletz. "It is also a well-known fact that the original contract with Martin Newcomb was at the rate of \$1.00 per day for each mule, and how

the sum happened to grow to \$2.00 per day for each mule is a question that Supt. Rector can best answer himself.”

Other charges as well were brought against Biddle by Superintendent Rector. One of the charges was that he had sold government stores to employees. Biddle countered that this was true. Because of severe weather conditions which eliminated the passage between the valley and the reservation, Biddle sold small quantities of provisions and supplies out of government stores but told the employees that as soon as the weather cleared, he would replace what had been sold. His clerk, W.H. Spencer, (who was married to Biddle’s daughter, Emma) swore in an affidavit that this was true and that everything had been replaced (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frame 90, November 14, 1862).

Alfred Flickinger, who worked on the reservation from October 1 to February 24, stated that he, as well as others, had purchased supplies at the regular price plus five cents per pound for packing from Agent Biddle (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 385-386, April 7, 1862). However, because Flickinger left the service before Biddle was able to get off the reservation in March to replace the items, Flickinger does not say whether he knew if Biddle replaced the supplies.

A questionable sale of flour was to Linnton Starr, who, at least according to Flickinger, was a miner on the beach, not an employee. Biddle said that he had sold flour to Starr from his own supply which had come on the sloop and that the bags were clearly marked “B R B.” Flickinger said that all of the bags of flour had the same markings (evidently not “B R B”) (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 385-386, April 7,

1862). According to a document in the Office of Indian Affairs' files, L. Starr was providing services at the Alsea Sub-Agency during at least the fourth quarter of 1860 for Agent Joshua Sykes (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 464-468, August 5, 1862). It is unclear if he was Biddle's employee at the time in question (November, 1861).

In a private letter to Rector in November, Biddle wrote that he had ordered some items on private account and wanted them shipped with the other things to the reservation (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 20, Doc 8, November 20, 1861). This could have included flour which would have been his to sell to Starr. However, if Starr was a miner on the reservation, Biddle should have had him removed. A letter from Sub-Agent Sykes to Superintendent Geary mentioned that two miners were on the beach near the Alsea Sub-Agency, but he had done nothing to remove them. "[...] on the contrary, a benefit has resulted to the Government, as well as to the Indians, several of them being employed get not only their board, but one dollar a day for wages, in clothing such as they need" (OSIA, Letters Received, Roll 19, Doc 131, July 23, 1861). This would have been within the same approximate time frame.

One of the major charges brought against Biddle was that of leaving the potatoes in the ground to rot instead of having them dug and stored. However, Biddle had the weather reports given by a number of people to help him refute these charges. George Bethers gave the most detailed account of how Biddle, the employees, and Indians tried to save the crop. When he became Superintendent of Farming on October 1, 1861, he wrote:

[...] nearly everything about the agency was in confusion-and it required some days to straiten [sic] things up preparatory to commencing the work of securing the potatoe [sic] crop. The potatoe [sic] houses were cleaned out-and "aired" before any of the new crop was put in-that on or about the 12th of October he ordered out all the ablebodied Indians of both sexes-both old and young at the Agency to "dig" and carry the Potatoes to the Potatoe [sic] houses -that the Indians turned out accordingly and did "dig" and carry and store the Potatoes in the several Potatoe [sic] houses-And continued to do so from day to day as the state of the weather permitted-until about the 28th day of October, at which time the heavy rains commenced to fall and continued almost without any intermission until about the 20th of December-during which time it was impossible to work with the potatoes. [...]it commenced to snow and freeze about the 25th Dec. and continued very cold until about the 1st of March 1862-The Affiant further says that it was the most sever (sic) and cold winter that he ever experienced on the Pacific Coast (And he has resided here since 1848) [...] The Affiant says that up to the 28th Oct. by great exertion, he with the aid of the Indians succeeded in housing about one half of the entire crop-And that neither Agent Biddle nor any other man could have done any more than was done to secure said Potatoe [sic] crop-that there was no "carelessness" whatever on the part of Agent Biddle or any other person in reference to same-that the work was only suspended from causes beyond the control of man.

[...]He further states that he worked "harder" and used more exertion to secure the potatoe [sic] crop refered [sic] to for the Indians, than he ever worked for himself or ever would again for any body under any circumstances whatever. (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 85-86, November 4, 1862).

Biddle was also accused of other misdeeds, such as leaving thousands of small fruit trees shipped to Yaquina Bay to freeze and go to waste and of filling out his abstracts with misinformation. Rector finally determined that, if he could not relieve Biddle of his position until Commissioner Dole decided what to do, he would at least take away Biddle's access to money. Rector decided to do the purchasing for the reservation himself (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frame 379, June 7, 1862).

To help Biddle in his quest to be exonerated from the charges against him, several citizens of the area wrote letters and affidavits of support for Biddle, at the same time denigrating Frank Cooper. About Cooper, they all reported that he was a “common liar” (S.N. Lilly, OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frame 88, November 6, 1862) and could not be believed in anything where Cooper was an “interested party” (J.L. Lilly: OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frame 87, November 3, 1862). C.P. Blair swore that he had had a conversation with Frank Cooper on December 25, 1861, wherein Cooper had said that he had been paid in full and was well satisfied with his treatment by Biddle (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frame 84, November 6, 1862).

A.J. Thayer, who was U.S. District Attorney (Bancroft, Volume 30: 443, 1888), wrote a letter to President Abraham Lincoln, reminding Lincoln of his friendship with Biddle and requesting that Biddle not be removed from the position. Thayer told Lincoln that Biddle had done a great deal to keep things calm in Benton County, “the worst county in the state” for secessionist activities, during the war. Thayer said that he was familiar with all the facts in the matter (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 679-680, June 12, 1862).

Rector felt it his duty as superintendent to investigate Biddle fully. In May and June, he went to the Siletz to observe the state of affairs there. He wrote an official condemnatory letter to Dole detailing most of the items that were on the charge of malfeasance against Biddle (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 376-383, June 7, 1862).

Interestingly, he followed that up with a private letter to Dole on the same subject to “avoid placeing [sic] his [Biddle’s] shortcomings on the prominent records of the gov.”

In the letter he stated that soon after Biddle took over the Agency, he saw that most of Biddle’s plans and recommendations had a “tendency towards his pocket.” He described the condition of the Indians in more detail:

Immadgine [sic] my feelings when the half naked and emmaciated [sic] wretches were gathered arround [sic] me, confidently believeing [sic] that I had come to give them some relief. They pressed me to go in to their cabbins [sic] to see the sick ones and then would show me their food. This they done by takeing [sic] up frozen potatoes that were partly rotten and squeezing the watter [sic] out of them and show how they baked them on the coals. Some had oats that they managed to eat by parching them in order to crisp [?] the hull and then boil or bake with the rotten potatoes. They complained of the Agent and and [sic] wanted me to send them one that had a good heart. They sayed [sic] that they knew that I had sent the little ship there with flour and other articles for them but that they had got but little of it (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 406-410, June 9, 1862).

Rector also sent along copies of speeches given by some of the tribal chiefs on the Siletz testifying to their treatment. Most of the chiefs said that they wanted what they had been promised and wanted to work for themselves. They wanted the Coast Treaty ratified. Some of the complaints were about Biddle. For example, “William”, chief of the Chetcoes, said, “The goods you [sent] us in the little ship was not given to us. I don’t know what became of them. We get one cup full of flour for one days work. We are slaves. Nine of my people have died last winter from hunger and cold. I do not like the Agent to abuse my people.” Er-ches-sa, chief of the Sixes, was quoted as saying, “I have no confidence in Mr. Biddle. I want another agent that will give us what you send here for us and not sell it, and abuse us.”

Others did not mention Biddle by name or did not appear to blame only Biddle for their problems. "Sixes George" said that if the treaty had not been ratified, his tribe did not really sell their country and wanted to go back to it. "I have never [told] this to the Agent, because I know he had nothing to do with the treaty."

"Old Bill" of the Rogue River Indians declared:

I will say that the Indians here are used like slaves and have been ever since Metcalf left. We have but little to eat and sometimes nothing at all. [...] Metcalf gave us Beef and flour when we first came here, and we want it now, or if you cannot give give [sic] it to us let us go home and provide for ourselves. We were promised by Major Buchanan that we should return after four years and we want to go now or have better treatment" (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 397-404, June 10, 1862).

Rector's clerk, Thomas McF. Patton, sent a copy of his examination of Biddle's accounts to Commissioner Dole in August. There were a number of objections as to how Biddle had kept accounts, but one, especially, concerned the infamous potato crop. In Biddle's subsistence return, he had reported that the tribes that had lost so many potatoes to freezing were on the Lower Farm and not on the Agency Farm which was under Biddle's direct supervision. Patton wrote, "Charging that loss to the Indians on the lower farm is a wilful [sic] perversion of facts, and [illegible] intentionally to shield himself from censure" (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 473-479, August 9, 1862).

However, in his annual report, George Megginson, who was superintendent of farming on the Lower Farm, wrote, "Last winter was unusually severe, and many of the potatoes, both in the field and in the potato houses, were frozen" (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess Doc 1:422, Serial 1157 Vol 2, August 1, 1862). It is unclear from the annual

report who was in charge of farming at the Agency farm at the time in question as the information from the Agency farmer is from Jacob Allen who did not begin his duties until April, 1862.

All through the spring and summer, Biddle's problems increased. He wrote to Dole in June that the reservation had not had a blacksmith since autumn because any that he could get would have to be paid \$1200 per annum, and Rector had rejected that. Biddle said that there were many complaints from the Indians because of lack of treaty ratification. "Many of the bolder ones have made threats, during the summer and autumn, they would revolt from the authority of the agent, kill the employes, burn the agency buildings, and then leave for their old hunting grounds" (House Ex Doc 38 Cong 1 Sess Doc 1:180, Serial 1182 Vol 3, June 30, 1862). He said that he had difficulty controlling them, that Southern sympathizers were tampering with the Indians, telling them to fight and giving them guns.

In August his report was no better. Biddle was unable to give a report on the census because so many people were off the reservation. Some had gone back home, others were off to the coastal fisheries, and others had left with or without passes to work in the Willamette Valley to assist farmers with the harvests (House Ex Doc 37 Cong 3 Sess Doc 1:420, Serial 1157 Vol 3, August 13, 1862).

In October, Rector decided that he would let Biddle resign rather than suspend him and give the job to James B. Condon, the agent at the Grand Ronde. Condon was told that he could divide his time between the Grand Ronde and Siletz. Evidently Biddle had been to see Rector on October 10, the same day that the letter was written to Condon



informing him of the agent's job at Siletz. In closing, Rector said, "Biddle and myself parted this morning apparantly [sic] friendly. Spencer had much to do with him in bringing about the arrangement to turn over without a suspencion [sic] (OSIA, Miscellaneous Loose Papers, Roll 30, October 10, 1862).

The officers in charge of Fort Hoskins, Captain F. Seidenstriker, 1st Lt. H.E. Funk, and 2nd Lt. Louis Heyzer, as well as the doctor there, Horace Carpenter, also requested that Biddle be removed. Carpenter wrote, "The farmers having resided on this Agency, Since it has been established, and having immediate control over the Indians, positively refuse to remain if Mr. Biddle is retained as Agent (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 538-539, October 13, 1862).

### ***6.2.3 Suspension From the Service***

On October 16, 1862, Biddle was suspended. Rector continued to write letters to Commissioner Dole and to Senator Nesmith but to no avail. No one would reply to him about Biddle's suspension. On December 24, 1862, Nesmith and B.F. Harding, another senator from Oregon, wrote to Dole that, even though the Indian Service was suffering from Rector's and Biddle's actions, they felt that they could not properly investigate the matter. Instead, they recommended that Biddle and Rector be dismissed from the service rather than have the Indian Department engage in a lengthy and costly investigation (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 135-136).

In early January, 1863, Rector himself came under suspicion for having the banking house of Ladd and Tilton cash in a Treasury note for gold coin in San Francisco

and bring back to Oregon the value in legal tender notes, or greenbacks. Rector was accused of having pocketed the difference (Daily Oregonian, January 7, 1863:2; January 14, 1863:2; January 29, 1863:2, February 4, 1863:2; Oregon Statesman, January 26, 1863). He was also accused of “forcing” Agent William H. Barnhart to hire Rector’s son to complete the Umatilla and Grand Ronde emigrant road in eastern Oregon. A number of newspapers printed articles about Rector’s guilt, and Rector wrote letters to the editor claiming his innocence on both issues. My search of Indian Department records was inconclusive as to the veracity of these complaints.

#### **6.2.4 Conclusion**

Even though Biddle’s tenure as agent was only for a year, his is one of the more interesting and complicated agent stories. He had been agent for only a short time when he was accused of wrongdoing.

The year 1861 was probably the wrong time for Biddle to try his hand as agent. He had recently lost two beloved sons within a year of each other which devastated him. Family was very important to him, and, when he took the agent’s job, he thought his wife, Maria, would be able to join him. However, before she had a chance to go to the Siletz, the weather turned bad, making the mountains impassable, and Biddle was left there without his family until spring (Leithold, 1944:156).

In addition to the psychological difficulties associated with his family, Biddle was given an agency that was in wretched condition and received little money to improve it.

He had the misfortune of taking over an agency that was far from the minds of the politicians in Washington, even more so than usual because of the Civil War.

His conduct as agent concerning his fiscal responsibilities certainly had the appearance of fraud. He did not help his position by circumventing department regulations in hiring his own teams to carry supplies but having another person sign the vouchers as if they were his. If he had been honest with the department, he would have been told directly that he could not hire himself. Superintendents and agents were constantly having to use their own money or good name to purchase supplies for the department. Perhaps he tried to purchase on the credit of the government, was unable to, and, therefore, decided to go ahead and buy the teams himself as a way to move forward faster. His mistake would have been in buying them for himself rather than for the department.

J.B. Congle of Benton County was asked to confirm the correctness of one of Biddle's vouchers. Congle said that there was an error on the voucher. Biddle had reported that he purchased two saddles at \$15.00 apiece when, in reality, he had purchased a side saddle for \$30.00 (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frame 395, June 10, 1862). Since side saddles were used by many women, it might have been purchased for the school teacher, but, again, this was another suspicious-looking incident that had the appearance of carelessness in reporting expenses.

Congle was also asked about bacon being issued to the tribes on the reservation. He swore that, during the time he was at the agency, which was from October, 1861 until the end of February, 1862, he never saw bacon being issued to Indians. He and other

employees on the reservation had, however, purchased bacon from Biddle out of government supplies (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 395, June 10, 1862). On one of Biddle's abstracts sent to the superintendent's office, he had reported issuing bacon to Indians (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:94, February 3, 1862). Again, this was questionable behavior to Rector although other agents had issued bacon to the people on the reservation.

It is difficult to know whether Biddle's motives were honorable or not. I tend to believe that his motivation was toward getting the job done, even if it meant not exactly following government regulations. Mistakes were made on all agents' accounts and were called into question. It seems that there was some sort of personal issue between Biddle and Rector that turned questionable errors into a full-fledged war of words. That particular point was mentioned several times in the records (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frame 65, October 23, 1862; OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 620-621, November 11, 1862). I was not able to find a specific reference as to the nature of any conflict, however.

There are several letters that mention that Biddle was not liked by the Indians or the employees on the reservation (OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 538-539, October 13, 1862; OIA, Letters Received, M234:613, Frames 397-404, June 10, 1862). Dealing with the constant vagaries of the position of agent must have been extremely frustrating to someone like Biddle who was used to being in charge of his own businesses. Agents had to have a huge amount of patience for a number of reasons: correspondence often took weeks to months to get a reply; there was never enough money, food, or

clothing to properly care for the people on the reservation; agents, Biddle included, must have felt that their hard work was unappreciated by the people they were supposed to be helping. On the Coast Reservation, the isolation must have been unbearable for someone like Biddle who had spent nearly all of his life living in town and being with family. In addition, Biddle was not used to failure, especially for reasons that he could not control.

I believe that Biddle followed precedent in some of his questionable practices. Rector himself wrote to Biddle that he was to use his own judgment in the management of affairs at the reservation (OSIA, Letter Book H, roll 9:37, September 24, 1861). Rector also wrote to Agent Newcomb that he was to hand over all of the records and papers in his office. In addition, he was to pass on “valuable information which will enable him [Biddle] to carry out the benevolent designs of Government already inaugurated.” The only instructions that Biddle would have had for awhile would have been Newcomb’s advice and any of the instructions that had been sent from the superintendent’s office from time to time (OSIA, Letter Book H, Roll 9:38, September 24, 1861).

The correspondence in the Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Received, shows that most of Biddle’s vouchers had been settled by 1865 with the exception of \$266.44 (M234:614, Frames 635-636, June 8, 1865). His difficulties with the Indian Department seem not to have hurt his reputation to any degree. In 1863, he, along with Dr. J.R. Bayley and T.B. Odeneal, incorporated the Toll Road Company with the idea of building a wagon road from Corvallis to the coast. Biddle was elected mayor of Corvallis in the 1860's and owned a drug store there as well as rental property with his wife. In 1875, he and his wife left Corvallis for Healdsburg, California, where some of their children were

and lived out their lives there. Benjamin Robert Biddle died on September 18, 1882, in Healdsburg (Leithold, 1944:178). Leithold wrote of her grandfather's time in the Indian

Service:

The trouble was that Robert was a born aristocrat and individualist-a man of imagination and ability; who could not work successfully with politicians. He wanted to get results; and if the Rules and Regulations of the Indian Department retarded his work;-he simply disregarded the Rules and Regulations. He was sure that he was doing right; and, no doubt, he was if the welfare of the Indians was the important issue:-but that was not the way to hold a political office in 1862 (Leithold, 1944:158).

## 7. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I wanted to demonstrate that European perception of how the world worked came to be expressed in the policies of the Office of Indian Affairs. All of the policies and practices had as their base the idea that subsistence living was uncivilized, and the use of European-style agriculture, along with the ownership of property, was the proof of being civilized.

At first, policies just involved getting American Indians to move off their land so that it could be used “properly.” Land would sometimes be purchased, not always from persons with the authority to sell and not always at the price the land was worth. At other times, settlers simply arrived and started clearing trees and building homes for their families. Extermination was the policy of some immigrants. Many American Indians, at first, generously welcomed the new people, not having the same idea of land use as Europeans.

However, as the newcomers came to know American Indians and to observe that much of the land was not being “used” for anything, it became clear that it would be necessary to curtail the land area to which the tribes thought they had a right. This was especially so as the eastern seaboard filled up and western expansion rapidly followed.

Tribes had been pushed so far to the west by European American immigrants that the federal government finally concluded that pulling the tribes together on lands with government, not tribal, determined boundaries was the only way to keep American Indians

and the new immigrants separate. At this juncture, removal to a reservation became a reality for thousands of American Indians.

The reservation system was only meant to be a temporary solution, however. The eventual plan was to assimilate American Indians into mainstream “white” society, thus eliminating the need for reservations. When this plan was difficult to achieve, reservation policy became more entrenched, and many Indian tribes became virtual wards of the government through the treaty system. At this point, the Coast Reservation came into existence in Oregon.

By the time the Coast Reservation was established in 1856, few European Americans questioned the policy of offering a certain amount of money in the form of goods and services to tribes for their land. Tribes would then be moved or agree to stay in a much smaller area.

The federal government had developed a set pattern to the way treaties were written, with certain obligations on the part of the government toward American Indians. These obligations usually involved granting appropriations for a certain number of years. Appropriation grants followed the plan for “civilizing” American Indians by promising the necessary agricultural implements, teachers, and supplies in exchange for the Indians’ moving off their land.

Oregon Indians had no alternatives to the plans presented in the treaties. For awhile, a number of the southern Oregon tribes resisted, but the truth was that European Americans had more firepower, and it was used. Robert Metcalfe confirmed this when he wrote in July, 1857, to Superintendent J.W. Nesmith:



At present they regard the white man as their natural enemy, and recognize no other principle of government than that of force, the weaker yielding to the stronger in all instances; and as they regard the whites as superior in number and in the use of fire-arms, they have determined to submit to such regulations as we may think best for their future government and advancement in civilization (House Ex. Doc. 35 Cong 1 Sess Doc 2:645, Serial 942 Vol 2, July 15, 1857).

In Oregon, promises were made and broken with regularity. Those who made the treaties, such as Anson Dart and Joel Palmer, made the promises with sincerity. Congress and the Office of Indian Affairs gave Dart and Palmer general guidelines on what the contents of the treaties should be. However, when it came time to pay in an honest way for those promises, Congress and the Office of Indian Affairs did not always do the honorable thing. Appropriations (for those with treaties) were not paid on time or were less than specified. On the Coast Reservation, the vast majority of people had no ratified treaty and, therefore, were not eligible for appropriations, having to rely instead on a pitiful amount of money sent to Oregon under the heading of "removal and subsistence."

This put agents in an awkward position. I believe that most agents that I researched tried to do the right thing in trying to do their jobs properly. They were hampered, however, by lack of money and distance from where the real decisions were being made, which was Washington, D.C. The amount of bureaucratic paper shuffling was always a shock and usually a losing battle for most of the agents. Many had some compassion for the people they were responsible for although nearly all agents subscribed to the popular belief that Indians needed "civilizing" for their own good and for the good of the dominant culture.

Superintendents had little power. They had to ask permission for nearly everything they did; therefore, they were of little real help to agents. They often did not have the ability to purchase items when they were needed because, sometimes, items were purchased on the east coast and shipped at high cost to Oregon. In 1874, George Lichfield wrote to Acting Commissioner Plum that the Indians at Siletz had protested in Council that they did not want any more blankets or cloth sent to them. They wanted agricultural implements or food (OIA, Letters Received, M234:619, Frames 588-589, September 2, 1874). In addition to purchases, mail was slow and often lost for months at a time, or permanently if, as happened quite frequently, a ship went down.

Because of the inability to get appropriations on time or in the amount needed, the department in Oregon had a bad reputation for not paying bills, sometimes for years. In addition, bills often were paid in Treasury notes rather than gold coin. These notes fluctuated in value and were always lower than the value of gold. Superintendents and agents alike often had to resort to using their own money for supplies or their own good name to get credit.

During the years with which this paper is concerned, Congress and the Office of Indian Affairs turned blind eyes to the needs of the Coast Reservation tribes, even to the point of the original Coast Treaty having been "lost" until 1893. Even though there were constant reminders in agent and superintendent reports inquiring about the state of the treaty, Congress, it appears, never took up the issue. According to a memorandum in the files of the Office of Indian Affairs, the treaty was received on November 14, 1855. It was

not sent to the Department of the Interior until February 5 or 6, 1857. It finally reached the President on February 11, 1857. From there, it “disappeared” until 1893.

There is little doubt that there were probably deals done to purchase goods for the reservation. They were probably more in the range of giving friends first choice for contracts by not always seeking out the lowest bid or by hiring friends as employees rather than agents hugely profiting from Indian department funds. I could not find much support in the documents for the popular notion that agents profited from their jobs to the degree reported. Agents and superintendents had to submit too much paperwork that was scrutinized, not only at the superintendent’s office, but at the Treasury as well. They were called upon to explain differences in their accounts, often soon after the quarterly accounts had been received by the Treasury. However, it was not unusual that, years later, agents had to straighten up their accounts and find missing vouchers or clear up inadequately prepared reports before their names were vindicated. If there was even a hint of wrongdoing by an agent or superintendent, those who had given their bond in the promise of a substantial amount of money would ask to have themselves removed from their bond.

The first years of trying to make the Coast Reservation agriculturally sound were a travesty. Crop growing was experimental; the devastating part of this experimentation was that these crops were being relied upon for subsistence. Indian lives could not depend on experiments, but they had to anyway. There was frequently a serious lack of agricultural implements and animals with which to do the farm work. The people often

were destitute for clothing and shelter as well as food, causing illness and, no doubt, depression and despair.

The reservation was a large area “given” to the tribes for a new homeland with the idea (on the government’s part) that it would eventually be reduced in size should the entire land area not be needed. Within ten years, when settlers and others realized the value of Yaquina Bay, steps were taken to reduce the reservation’s size by cutting out a wide swath for a road from the valley to Yaquina Bay. Over the years and into the twentieth century, the reservation was eventually reduced to a few thousand acres.

When the Alsea Reservation was closed in 1875, many of the Coos and Kuitshes (Lower Umpqua) moved back to the Coos Bay area. In the early twentieth century, they purchased a 6.1 acre reservation on Coos Bay. In 1916-17, they met, along with the Siuslaws, to plan a suit against the government for lost lands. Their suit was dismissed in 1938 because of “inadequate” documentation. Even though the group provided more documentation, the Supreme Court refused to hear it, claiming that they had already had their day in court.

In 1975, a bill was presented to reopen the case of the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaws, but it was again rejected. Determined to succeed, the tribes had already incorporated in 1972 under State of Oregon laws and began operating as a business. They opened a tribal trading post to provide groceries to low-income families and established job-placement and alcohol and drug abuse prevention programs. In 1975, the tribes began programs to preserve Coos culture (Ruby and Brown, 1992:80)

In 1984, the Confederated Tribes of Coos, Lower Umpqua, and Siuslaw Indians were restored as a federally recognized tribe (United States Code, 1994 edition, Title 25:534). Presently, they are working on securing published and manuscript sources as well as microfilm, recordings, and material culture so that younger members can research their past (Buan and Lewis, 1991:82).

Several of the Siletz tribes-the Upper Coquilles, Tututnis, Chetcos, Siletzes, Neachesnas (Salmon Rivers and Nestuccas), and Alseas-were in the first group of non-treaty Indians to be awarded claims by the government. Taking lessons they had learned from the Coos, Lower Umpqua, and Siuslaw case, the tribes from Siletz were successful in obtaining an award claim in 1950, which, at the time, included interest ( Number 45230, 115 Ct. Cl. 463, 87 Federal Supplement 938). However, in 1951, they were disallowed interest money on their claim by the Supreme Court (Number 281, Supreme Court, 95 Lawyer's Edition 738).

Finally, in 1954, all Siletz Reservation tribes were terminated from the federal government's responsibility, and all remaining tribal land was sold (Zucker, et.al., 1983:77). Many lost their allotments at this time because of inability to pay taxes on property that had previously been untaxed (Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians, 1999).

However, in 1977, after much work and lobbying by the people of the terminated Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians, they became the second tribe to regain their federally recognized status. In 1980, Congress returned 3,660 acres of tribal land to the Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians. The land consists of scattered parcels of former BLM land and Government Hill in the town of Siletz (which was the site of the old

Agency and one of the tribal cemeteries). The Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians has successfully managed their own affairs under a program called "Self-Governance" in which they compact with the government to provide services for their own people. They have also succeeded in developing the Chinook Winds Casino and Convention Center in Lincoln City, a project to make themselves economically self-sufficient, as well as the Siletz Indian Smokehouse in Depoe Bay and a hardwood lumber mill (Kentta, 1997).

The Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians has built housing for its members through HUD funding. In addition, they operate a health clinic which is open to Indian and non-Indian alike. In August of each year, they hold one of the largest pow wows in the Pacific Northwest (Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians, 1999).

The Coquille Indian Tribe achieved restored status as a federally recognized tribe in 1989 after many years of lobbying. The tribe purchased an abandoned sawmill in 1995 and built it into a successful casino called The Mill Casino. They have used the profits from the casino to start other businesses in the area and are now the second largest employer in Coos County.

Along with the casino, the tribe has a successful organic cranberry business and an assisted living facility with Alzheimer's unit. In 1996, Senator Mark Hatfield sponsored legislation which restored 5,410 acres of ancestral forest land to the tribe which will be used to preserve habitat and endangered species and also give the public recreational access. Through revenue from the casino, they have also been able to contribute hundreds of thousands of dollars to local non-profit organizations (Coquille Economic Development Corporation, 1998).

As I did my research, I encountered several unexpected elements. I fully expected to find that agents cheated and embezzled. I believe that was not the case to the extent that others have suggested. Moreover, reading the Office of Indian Affairs records gave me a deeper understanding of how much the federal government failed to meet its promises to Oregon tribes, and, crucially, the reasons for this failure.

There are several areas in which more research could be conducted. Some of the records in the Office of Indian Affairs materials concerning the Astoria Sub-Agency, which included the Tillamook area Indians, have not been fully explored. Because that area was taken from the Tillamooks, Clatsops, and others without a ratified treaty, that research should be done. In addition, more research could be directed toward researching the amount of money given to the Oregon Superintendency during this period. Even though the records in the Office of Indian Affairs were not substantial, information might be found in other branches of the government. Research in this area could substantiate or refute my contention that agents did not embezzle Indian affairs funds.

Oregon Indians survived the ordeals of the last one hundred and fifty years through sheer force of will. Many were able to hang on to what they could of their culture during those years and, today, are working on a renewal of spirit by learning and passing on to the children what remains of their languages and oral histories.

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_____	Roll 17	Letters Received:January 3-December 30, 1859
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**APPENDICES**

## Appendix A Tribal Names

### Athapascan Tribes on the Coast Reservation

F.W. Hodge 1910	J. L. Parrish 1854	Coast Treaty 1855	R.B. Metcalfe 1856	R.B. Metcalfe 1857	Reservation Map 1858	Daniel Newcomb 1861	Benjamin Simpson 1863	Benjamin Simpson 1865
Tututni	Bands of the To-to-tin:	Bands of the Too-to-neys: Ko-se-e-ehah						
	A band of the Quah-to-mah	Se-quah-chiee	Sixes	Sixes	Sixes	Sixes	Sixes	Sixes
	To-to-tin	Too-too-to-ny	Too-too-ta-na	Too-too-ta-ny	Tootootna	Tootootna	Toot-toot-en-nays	Too-too-e-ways
	Yah-shute	Yah-shute	Joshutes	Ioshuts	Joshua	Joshua	Joshua	Joshuas
	Wish-te-na-tin	Whis-to-natin						
	Co-sutt-hen-tun	Co-sa-to-ny	Co-sate-he-ne					
	Chet-less-en-tun (Pistol River)	Chet-less-ing-ton	Chetlessing-ton					
	A band of the Quah-to-mah	Port Orford		Port Orford	Port Orford	Port Orford	Port Orford	Port Orfords
	Eu-qua-chiee	Eukie-chiee	Eu-que-chiee	Yukers	Youca	Euchee	Eucher	Euches
		Kus-so-to-ny						
		Kler-it-la-tel	Cha-it-tel-la-tel					
		Te-cha-quot	Te-cha-quit					
	Mack-a-no-tin	Mack-a-no-tin	Mac-a-no-tin	Mac-a-no-te-ny	Mul-noot-na (?)	Macanootna	Maca Nootna	Mac-en-noot-e-ways
Quah-to-mah (Flores Creek)		Flora's Creek		Flores Creek			Flores Creek	
Choc-re-le-a-tan (Upper Coquille ?)								
Dakubetede (Applegate Creek)					Rogue River (?)			
Taltsh-tuntude (Galice Creek)					Galice Creek			
Chasta Costa (Shista Kwusta)	Shis-ta-koos-tee			Shasta Coasta	Shasta Costa	Chasta Costa	Shasta Costa	Chasta-Costas
Chetco (Cheti)	Che-at-tee	Chet-co	Chetco	Chec-coo	Chetco	Chetcoe	Chetcoe	Chetcoes
Mishi-kwutme-tunne		Coquille	Upper Coquille	Coquille	Coquille		Coquille	Coquills
Nal-tunne-tunne					Nolt-nat-na	Noltanana	Noltana	Nolt-nat-nahs
					Shasta Scoton	Chasta Scoton	Shasta Scoton	Chasta-Scotons and Umpquas

### Appendix A (Continued)

#### Shastan Tribes on the Coast Reservation

Treaty with the Rogue River	R.B. Metcalfe 1856	R.B. Metcalfe 1857	Reservation Map 1858	Daniel Newcomb 1861	Benjamin Simpson 1863	Benjamin Simpson 1865
Rogue River	Rogue River John's	Shasta, or Upper Rogue River: Old John's, Goerge's, Joe Lane's	Rogue River	Rogue River	Rogue Rivers	Rogue Rivers

#### Takilman Tribes on the Coast Reservation

Treaty with the Rogue River	R.B. Metcalfe 1856	R.B. Metcalfe 1857	Reservation Map 1858	Daniel Newcomb 1861	Benjamin Simpson 1863	Benjamin Simpson 1865
Takelma (?) Latgawa (Upper Takelmas) (?)			Rogue River (?) Rogue River (?)	Rogue River (?) Rogue River (?)	Rogue Rivers Rogue River (?)	

#### Yakonan Tribes on the Alsea Reservation

F.W. Hodge 1910	Coast Treaty 1855	Sub-agent Linus Brooks (Alsea Reservation) 1861	Sub-agent Amos Harvey (Alsea Reservation) 1863	Sub-agent George Collins (Alsea Reservation) 1865
Yaquina	Yah-quo-nah band of Tilamooks Alcea band of Tilamooks	Alcea	Alsea	Alseas

#### Siuslawan Tribes on the Alsea Reservation

F.W. Hodge 1910	Coast Treaty 1855	Sub-agent Linus Brooks (Alsea Reservation) 1861	Sub-agent Amos Harvey (Alsea Reservation) 1863	Sub-agent George Collins (Alsea Reservation) 1865
Siuslaw	Sin-slau band of the Tilamooks	Sayousla	Siuselaw	Siuselaws
Kuitsh	Kal-a-wot-set or Umpqua	Umpqua	Umpqua	Umpqua

## Appendix A (Continued)

### Kusan Tribes on the Alsea Reservation

Sub-agent S.H. Culver 1853 (Port Orford Sub-agency)	Coast Treaty 1855	Sub-agent Linus Brooks (Alsea Reservation) 1861	Sub-agent Amos Harvey (Alsea Reservation) 1863	Sub-agent George Collins (Alsea Reservation) 1865
Nasoes (bordering on the Coquille River)* (*Disagreed upon among scholars as to language)	Kowes Bay Bands of the Nasomah: Quans- sake-nah, Klen-nah- hah, Ke-ah-mas-e- ton*	Coose	Coose	Coose

### Coast Salish Tribes on Coast Reservation

Coast Treaty 1855	William Bagley 1878
Ne-a-ches-na band of Tilamooks  Siletsa band of Tilamooks	Salmon Rivers  Nestuccas

### Sahaptin Tribes on the Coast Reservation

Coast Treaty 1855	William Bagley 1878
	Klamath



**APPENDIX B**  
**R. B. Metcalfe's Debts**

*Statement showing the debts contracted by R.B. Metcalfe, Indian agent at Selet's agency district, Coast Indian reservation, Oregon Territory, from the 1st day of May to the 31st day of December, 1857, the same being now outstanding unpaid and due from the United States.*

Date 1857	To whom due	For what due	Amount	Remarks
May 1 to May 10	F. Henry	Local Indian agent	\$33.33	In charge of a party of Indians at King's Valley, Oregon Ter.
May 1 to June 27	S.K. Remick	Services as carpenter	235.75	
May 1 to July 15	L.B. Munson	.....do.....	133.00	
May 1 to May 27	Alexander Furguson	Services as cook for employes	87.09	
May 1 to October 17	G.C. Hubbard	Services hewing timber and lumber for buildings	385.25	
May 1 to July 29	B.A. Steward	Services making shingles, boards, &c.	110.50	
May 1 to May 30	S.B. Flowers	Services, hewing timber for buildings	60.00	
May 1 to May 15	William J. Coleman	Services, whip sawing for buildings	55.00	
May 1 to May 15	James Trimbell	.....do.....do.....	54.00	See abstract of purchases of subsistence, 2nd and 3d quarters 1857.
May 1 to August 31	Rowland Chambers	Flour, for subsistence of Indians	1,799.87	
May 1 to Sept. 30	Thomas Cain	Services, building Indian houses, making boards, &c	403.75	
May 1 to June 2	George Bevins	Services, herding cattle, carrying express, &c	53.16	
May 1 to October 15	James Bruce	Breaking and seeding ground, building Indian houses, &c., and 28 oxen.	6,292.00	
May 1 to Dec. 31	John S. Chamberlin	Services as clerk	800.00	
May 1 to May 5	Perry Wilson	Scoring timber, and putting up fence	10.00	
May 1 to May 5	James Heays	.....do.....do.....	10.00	
May 1 to May 5	Jasper Jones	.....do.....do.....	10.00	
May 1 to May 5	Francis Mansfield	.....do.....do.....	10.00	
May 1 to May 5	John Wilson	.....do.....do.....	11.25	
May 1 to Oct. 15	James Clugage	Services in charge of a party of Indians, \$80; packing, whilst removing Indians from Grand Ronde agency, and also Willamette Valley, Selet's landing, &c.	6015.72	See abstract of purchases of subsistence and property, 3d quarter, 1857.

Appendix B (Continued)

Date	To whom due	For what due	Amount	Remarks
May 1 to Dec. 31	Henry Fuller	Beef and flour for subsistence of Indians, and 1 horse, \$55	39,119.80	See abstract of purchases of subsistence and property, 2d, 3d, and 4th quarters 1857.
May 1 to May 26	W.W. Dow	Scoring timber for buildings	56.25	
May 1 to May 3	George McBee	Making ox bows	7.00	
May 1 to Aug 29	Edward Moran	Services as laborer	236.25	
May 1 to Oct. 10	Jonathan Scott	Services, making rails, boards, laying up fence, &c	633.00	
May 3 to May 9	James Strang	Hire of 3 teams, &c, whilst removing Indians	179.50	
May 3 to May 9	.....do.....	Beef and flour for subsistence for Indians	185.50	See abstract of purchases of subsistence, 2d quarter, 1857.
May 9 to Oct. 10	William Halbert	Services, making boards, shingles, &c	305.64	
May 21 to June 27	Dudley Dorr	Services as carpenter	132.00	
May 26	J.C. Ainsworth & Co.	Subsistence for Indians, seeds and other supplies	2,673.66	See abstract of purchases of subsistence and property, 2d quarter, 1857.
May 26	.....do.....	Transportation on seeds and other supplies	180.00	
May 26 to August 22	Samuel Mansfield	Services, working on roads, harvesting, &c	248.00	
May 13 to Dec. 31	Luke Gray	Services as laborer, teamster, &c	567.00	
May 27 to June 19	Thomas Bouker	Services, boating supplies from Yaquama bay to Selet's landing	52.50	
May 27 to June 30	Nat. H. Lane	Supplies	339.05	See abstract of purchases of subsistence, 2d quarter 1857.
May 17 to July 31	Thomas H. Powers	Services as teamster	166.25	
June 8 to Dec. 31	Stephen Z. Pierce	Services as carpenter	785.00	
June 10 to Aug. 5	John K. Lamerick	.....do.....	283.50	
June 13 to Dec. 31	James Leslie	.....do.....	865.00	
June 16 to July 2	J.T. Leonard	Services, making roads	40.50	
June 16 to June 30	Lane & Bledsoe	Supplies	386.34	See abstract of purchases of subsistence and property, 2d quarter 1857.
June 20 to Oct. 13	Stuart, O'Neill & Dodge	Transportation on annuity goods and supplies	1,090.63	

Appendix B (Continued)

Date 1857	To whom due	For what due	Amount	Remarks
September 10	.....do.....do.....	Supplies, seeds, &c.	2,914.46	See abstract of purchases of property and subsistence, 3d quarter 1857.
July 1 to Sept. 30	Lewis & Mulkey	Beef for subsistence for Indians	11,155.34	Do. Do.
July 3 to Oct. 10	Smith & Davis	Medicines	747.19	See abstract of purchases of property, 3d and 4th quarters 1857.
July 5 to Dec. 31	S.B. Shaffer	Services, working on roads, &c, and farmer	549.00	Commenced as farmer October 19, 1857, at \$1,200 per annum.
July 5 to Dec. 31	A.H. Matthews	Services, working on roads, making shingles, farming, &c.	369.73	
July 15 to Aug. 22	L.R. Whitlock	Services, working on roads	78.25	
July 15	J.S. McIteeny	Books, medicines, &c	74.50	See abstract of purchases of property, 3d quarter 1857.
July 17 to Aug. 8	William Shires	Services as carpenter	80.00	
July 27 to Oct. 15	Frank Kramer	...do.....	272.00	
Aug. 3 to Oct. 29	Nathan N. Cox	...do.....	263.25	
Aug. 3	O.P. Curlett	6 Indian horses	228.00	Do. do.
Aug. 5 to Sept. 8	Patrick Daly	Services in getting out timber for Indian houses	85.50	
Aug. 8 to Dec. 31	Joseph B. Gray	Services as carpenter	620.50	
Aug. 8 to Sept. 15	John Brennan	.....do.....	165.00	
Aug. 10 to Dec. 18	John Murray	Services as stone mason, hewing timber &c	485.00	
Aug. 10 to Dec. 31	John L. Bills	Services as carpenter to September 18, and farmer to December 31, 1857.	589.44	

Appendix B (Continued)

Date	To whom due	For what due	Amount	Remarks
1857				
August 13	J.B. Congle	Saddles and bridles	36.00	Do. do.
August 16	A.J. Long	1 horse	75.00	Do. do.
Oct. 25 to Dec. 31	.....do.....	Services as farmer	206.11	
Aug 21 to Sept. 10	Albert Horner	Services building Indian houses	49.50	
Aug. 22 to Oct. 9	Ann Murray	Services as cook for employes	136.00	
Aug. 24 to Sept. 15	A. Nicholson	Services as carpenter	95.00	
Aug. 25 to Oct. 3	Jackson Moody	Services as teamster	111.00	
Aug. 25 to Oct. 28	Allen & Lewis	Supplies	1,251.95	See abstract of purchases of subsistence and property, 3d and 4th quarters 1857.
August 25	J. Kohn & Co	.....do.....	512.65	See abstract of purchases of property, 3d quarter 1857
August 27	E.E. Taylor	6 oxen	360.00	Do. do.
Sept. 16 to Oct. 7	George L. Hays	Services as carpenter and forwarding supplies at Yaquama bay.	36.66	
Sept. 21 to Oct. 10	Alphonso Ware	Services as teamster	25.50	
Sept. 30 to Dec. 31	Relfe Bledsoe	Supplies	237.48	See abstracts of purchases and subsistence, 3d and 4th quarters 1857
	.....Do.....	Services as commissary from May 1 to June 30, 1857	150.00	
	.....Do.....	Transportation on medicines and supplies from Portland to King's valley.	89.02	
	.....Do.....	Orders paid in favor of Indians for labor	9,128.86	
Oct. 1 to Dec. 31	George H. Abbott	Services as local Indian agent and commissary	300.00	In charge of Indians at Yaquama bay station.
Oct. 1 to Dec. 31	James K. Metcalfe	Services as commissary	300.00	
Oct. 1 to Dec. 31	Peter McGuire	Services as interpreter and farmer	300.00	
Oct. 1 to Dec. 31	George Leasure	Services as blacksmith	300.00	
Oct. 5 to Dec. 31	William H. Packwood	Services in charge of depot at Selet's landing	217.50	
October 8	John Smith	Services, carrying express to King's valley	12.00	
Oct. 5 to Dec. 31	Alfred Wood	Services as carpenter	380.00	

Appendix B (Continued)

Date	To whom due	For what due	Amount	Remarks
October 27	A.D. Shelby	Clothing, &c., for presents to Indians	\$1,337. 50	See abstract of purchases of property, 4th quarter 1857.
October 27 November 30	Sellers Friendly Stock & Kaufman	.....do.....do..... Supplies	9,369.74 25.00	
Sept. 23 to Dec. 31	David Wall	Services as hospital steward to November 4, and acting physician from November 5 to December 31, 1857.	294.17	See abstract of purchases of subsistence, 4th quarter 1857.
May 1 to Dec. 31	Indians	Services of labor at Selet's agency, Oregon Ter. &c.	<u>1200.00</u> 111,420.35	

I certify, on honor, that the above statement is correct and true, and embraces all the accounts made by me and now outstanding and due from the United States on account of the Indian service in Oregon Territory from the 1st day of May to the 31st day of December, 1857, inclusive.

R.B. Metcalfe, *Indian Agent*

<b>WESTERN OREGON AGENTS:1850-1877</b>			
<b><u>Rogue River Sub-Agency</u></b>	<b><u>Port Orford Sub-Agency</u></b>	<b><u>Siletz Agency</u></b>	<b><u>Alsea Sub-Agency</u></b>
Henry H. Spaulding 1850	Samuel H. Culver 1852	Robert B. Metcalfe 1856	Joshua B. Sykes 1859
Alonzo A. Skinner 1851	Josiah M. Parrish 1854	Daniel Newcomb 1859	Linus Brooks 1861
Samuel H. Culver 1853	Benjamin Wright 1854	Benjamin R. Biddle 1861	Amos Harvey 1862
George H. Ambrose 1854	Nathan Olney 1856	Benjamin Simpson 1863	George W. Collins 1864
John F. Miller 1856		Joel Palmer 1871	Lieut. F.A. Batty 1869
		John Fairchild 1873	Samuel Case 1870
		William Bagley 1877	George Litchfield 1873
<b><u>Grand Ronde Agency</u></b>	<b><u>Astoria District</u></b>	<b><u>Yaquina Bay Station</u></b>	<b><u>Fort Umpqua Sub-Agency</u></b>
John F. Miller 1856	Robert Shortess 1850	George H. Abbott 1856	Edward P. Drew 1854
James B. Condon 1861	W.W. Raymond 1853-1857		Joshua B. Sykes 1859
Amos Harvey 1864			
Charles Lafollette 1869			
Patrick B. Sinnott 1872			